Foucault’s Affirmative Biopolitics: Cynic Parrhesia and the Biopower of the Powerless

Introduction

In *History of Sexuality I* and Foucault’s other works of the period, the theme of affirmative biopolitics was never addressed in an explicit manner, aside from a brief and still somewhat enigmatic reference to ‘bodies and pleasures’ that presumably pose an alternative to the biopolitics defined in terms of desire and sexuality. Of course, Foucault was notoriously evasive when it came to elucidating alternatives to the apparatuses of power and knowledge that he reconstituted, unwilling to subject them to a normative critique but content with showing how they historically emerged and how they can always be undone, if one so prefers. We should also recall that the theme of biopolitics was only Foucault’s explicit concern during a relatively brief period of 1975-1977, after which his research shifted to the problematics of, respectively, governmentality, liberalism, confession and the techniques of the self. Yet, despite the brevity of Foucault’s explicit concern with biopolitics, rethinking biopower in the affirmative key remained an important concern of his final work.

In this article we shall argue that Foucault’s work on *parrhesia*, particularly the lectures on Cynicism in his final course at the Collège de France, elucidates a version of biopolitics that does not negate ‘mere life’ in the name of a privileged form of ‘true life’ but rather relocates truth to the domain of life itself. Moreover, for Foucault Cynic practices of truth-telling were not an antiquated curiosity of
little relevance to our contemporary experience. As we shall demonstrate, Foucault’s turn to Cynic parrhesia took place at the time of his active engagement on behalf of East European dissident movements, whose ethos and practices similarly problematized the relation of truth and life in the formation of the political subject. Through a study of the resonances between Cynic parrhesia and the dissident ethics of ‘living within the truth’ developed in the work of Václav Havel we shall demonstrate the centrality of Foucault’s late thought to the problematic of biopolitics and the advantages of his version of affirmative biopolitics over the competing accounts in the current debate. The constellation of these two discourses, almost twenty five centuries apart, forms what Walter Benjamin termed a ‘dialectical image’ that enhances the intelligibility of both of them as strategies of reclaiming both life and truth from governmental rationalities that negate the former in the name of the latter. In the conclusion we address the implications of this reinterpretation of Foucault’s final work both for Foucault scholarship and the studies of biopolitics.

**Thinking Biopolitics Affirmatively**

Since Foucault never address the affirmative dimension of biopolitics explicitly, this theme has been primarily addressed in post-Foucauldian writings, of which Agamben’s and Esposito’s works are the most widely-discussed. The key term of Agamben’s affirmative biopolitics is *form-of-life*, hyphenated in order to stress the inseparability of life and its form: ‘[This] biopolitical body that is bare life must itself be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a *bios* that is only its own *zoe*.’

Since, as Agamben argues in *Homo Sacer*, biopolitics includes the unqualified life of *zoe* into the positive form of *bios* in the destitute mode of bare life, then the only possibility for biopolitics to refrain from this negation and begin to affirm life requires that *bios* and *zoe* become entirely indistinct. What is affirmed in
Agamben’s affirmative biopolitics is therefore not any particular form of bios, but a bios of zoe itself, unqualified life that enjoys its absence of qualifications as its proper form.

Roberto Esposito’s version of affirmative biopolitics similarly proceeds through a radical reversal of the conventional biopolitical logic. In Esposito’s argument, in both liberal and Nazi biopolitics the recourse to violence enters governmental rationality through the logic of immunity, whereby government takes it upon itself to protect life against its own constituent negativity that places it in danger. It is the excessive force of this immunitary violence that transforms biopolitics into thanatopolitics either partially or completely. Accordingly, Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics ventures to temper this immunitary drive by restoring its relation to the communitarian principle of exposure to the other from which it arises and seeks to efface.\textsuperscript{5} While the immunitary logic is plagued by the paradox of negating the immanent negativity of life that only plunges it further into the negative, Esposito seeks to attain the ‘self-suppression of the negation itself’,\textsuperscript{6} whereby this immanent negativity is rethought as an essential part of life, without which it would lose its self-generating potential.

This brief summary of the two key accounts of affirmative biopolitics suffices to demonstrate that they continue to focus on biopower as a rationality of government. What they affirm is therefore either the suspension of the governmental apparatus as such (Agamben) or the inversion of its immunizing powers (Esposito). As a result of these operations biopower is to be weakened and extinguished and life is governed less or is let be entirely. In a strict sense, we are dealing not with the affirmation of biopolitics than with its critique that seeks to undermine biopolitical rationalities and liberate life from its capture in them. In this critique life primarily figures as an object, if not an outright victim of biopower, always already negated by the very power that claims to work for its
preservation or augmentation. While both Agamben and Esposito repeatedly emphasize the power or potentiality proper to life itself, this potentiality is invoked only as the ground for another, ‘coming’ politics that remains entirely in the future. What is lacking in this discourse is less a theory of affirmative biopolitics than its paradigm in the sense developed by Agamben, a concrete example that would demonstrate the political use of the power of life that does not relapse into its thanatopolitical destruction.⁷

In this article we shall argue that such a paradigm may be found in Foucault’s reading of Cynic parrhesia in his final course ‘The Courage of Truth’. In his 2010 review of Foucault’s two final lecture courses Michael Hardt briefly addressed the biopolitical significance of the Cynics. Making a distinction between (governmental) biopower and (emancipatory) biopolitics, Hardt argued that while ‘[biopower] is a form of power, in which the life of populations becomes the central object of rule, the militancy of the ancient Cynics is clearly an entirely different politics of life. Biopolitics is the realm, in which we have the freedom to make another life for ourselves, and through that life transform the world. Biopolitics is thus not only distinct from biopower but also may be the most effective weapon to combat it.’⁸

In our analysis we will proceed from Hardt’s intuition without employing his distinction between biopower and biopolitics, which pits politics against power in the manner that is entirely at odds with Foucault’s approach. Instead, we shall address Foucault’s final lectures in terms of the shift from the understanding of biopolitics as the rationality of the government of populations towards approaching it as a mode of subjectivation. In both cases life is the object of transformation in accordance with a certain idea or ‘truth’, but in the latter case the object of transformation fully coincides with its subject, as the Cynic parrhesiast makes its entire existence the site of the
formation of a different, ‘true life’ that is also capable of transforming the world as a whole. Besides its evident and much discussed ethical significance, in the final lectures parrhesia emerges as the means of political change that, moreover, takes place precisely in the domain of life whose subjection to power Foucault previouslycharted.

While the final lectures have not yet been analysed from the biopolitical perspective at length, their political significance has been recognized in a number of recent interpretations. Marcelo Hoffman has argued that contrary to the readings that approach the ‘turn to the Greeks’ as an instance of depoliticization in Foucault’s thought, the final lectures were rather inspired by Foucault’s intense political engagement on behalf of the Solidarity movement in Poland and actually mark the culmination of his political thought. He nonetheless argues that Hardt’s reading of Cynic parrhesia as an example of biopolitical resistance to biopower only ‘ends up depleting the concept of biopolitics of its historical specificity’. Similarly, while Arpad Szakolczai argues that it was Foucault’s engagement in the Polish events that permitted him to formulate his genealogy of parrhesia that he considers his public testament, he views the turn to parrhesia as Foucault’s way out of the apparent dead-end that he reached with his work on biopolitics. Simona Forti has argued for the strong correspondence between Foucault’s thought on parrhesia and the East European dissident authors, most notably Patočka and Havel, who developed the ethos of living in truth against the Soviet-style ‘real socialist’ regimes, yet the biopolitical perspective remains largely implicit in her reading. It has been addressed more explicitly by Vanessa Lemm, who elucidates the resonances between the Cynics and Nietzsche and interprets Foucault’s account of the Cynics’ ‘true life’ in Esposito’s terms as the inversion of the immunitary logic of the constitution of forms of life. In this article we rely on these readings to develop an interpretation of Foucault’s account of Cynicism in the context of his engagement with East European dissident movements that establishes
a constellation between these two ethics and practices that enhances their intelligibility as concrete paradigms of an affirmative politics of life.

Before delving into this analysis two methodological caveats are in order. Firstly, we do not seek to interpret Foucault against himself, attributing to him a concealed persistence with the problematic of biopolitics despite its explicit abandonment. It is well-known that by 1979 Foucault abandoned not merely the explicit theorization of biopolitics begun in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ and History of Sexuality I, but also the wider inquiry into modern European governmentality, in which biopolitics was recontextualized in the 1977-1978 lectures. On a strictly exoteric level, Foucault’s discourse on biopolitics expired at the latest with the 1978-1979 Birth of Biopolitics lectures that, as some commentators have noted, were not really about biopolitics either. Yet, given the abundance of both theoretical and empirical research on biopolitics in the last two decades, in which the concept was expanded and transformed far beyond Foucault’s original articulation, sticking to the exoteric level appears to us an unwarranted restriction in Foucault scholarship that is, moreover, entirely contrary to Foucault’s well-known vision of his work as a toolkit available for experimental use. Instead, it would be more fruitful to consider how the problematics we today associate with biopolitics were in fact anticipated in Foucault’s final work, whose relation to his more explicitly political writings remains contested. Secondly, as was the case with all of Foucault’s historical investigations, it is evidently not a matter of proposing Cynicism as a model for contemporary political practice. The reading of bios kynikos as a paradigm of affirmative biopolitics does not deprive the concept of biopolitics of any historical specificity because it is not offered as an example for emulation but as a paradigm that makes contemporary political practices more intelligible and more effective. While the specific problems that Cynicism addressed are clearly different from the concerns of our time, the mode of problematization they espoused remains timely for our attempts
to rethink politics affirmatively on the very terrain that governmental rationalities of biopolitics have dominated.

From Biopolitics to Parrhesia

Foucault began his studies of truth-telling or ‘veridiction’ in his 1980 course On the Government of the Living. Similarly to the lectures of the previous year, The Birth of Biopolitics, the course title is deceptive: just as there was nothing about the birth of biopolitics in the 1979 course, the 1980 lectures did not deal with the government of the living in any meaningful way, but from the outset adopted a new focus on what Foucault called ‘alethurgy’, the processes of the manifestation of truth. While both problematics clearly date back to the same source in History of Sexuality I, the difference between them is quite evident: the focus on the government of populations in the European modernity is replaced by the concern with the individual subject governed through injunction to truth-telling in the early Christianity. The move away from biopolitics appears even more definitive with the turn to the Antiquity in the subsequent courses and volumes two and three of History of Sexuality. Even when the techniques of the self that Foucault analysed involved a variety of physical regimen (abstinence, diet, endurance), the recourse to these was guided by certain ethical ideals of the subject that give one’s life a positive form, to which one’s ‘natural’ life was subjected in the name of the attainment of self-mastery or even renounced through purification and penance in the name of salvation. While all Foucault’s courses from 1980 to 1984 deal with forms of life in some sense, the first three courses clearly prioritize forms over life.

However, with the turn to the Cynics in the 1983-1984 course The Courage of Truth the order of priority is clearly reversed, life assuming a certain primacy in relation to any of its positive forms.
Firstly, in these lectures the theme of life reappears with full force as the very mode of the manifestation of truth, which in turn is no longer contrasted with natural behaviours and desires but is expressed solely and immediately through them. Secondly, whereas On the Government of the Living concluded by demonstrating how the obligation to tell the truth in Christianity was inextricably tied to one’s complete and permanent obedience to the other, Cynic parrhesia explicitly inverted this relationship: truth-telling is only possible as an act of disobedience in the face of all social norms and conventions. Finally, in contrast to prior forms of parrhesia, the veridiction of the Cynics was no longer a condition for practicing politics or even an instrument for the attainment of political ends, but rather became itself immediately political in effecting the transformation of the world through practicing another life in accordance with truth. In this manner, Foucault moved from the study of the governmental subjection of life to truth towards the analysis of the political subjectivation that overcomes this subjection by fully translating the truth into life itself.

Anticipating Agamben’s later inquiries into the form-of-life, in which bios and zoe become indistinct, Foucault traced the way the Cynics’ true life was constituted through an intricate operation that made life and truth reciprocally conditional. ‘The Cynics turn life into a vehicle of truth and truth into a vehicle of life, bringing forth a perfect communion between life and truth, such that the body gives form to truth and truth gives form to body.’ Whereas many of the Greek techniques of the self, including even the philosophical parrhesia of Socrates, proceeded by strictly distinguishing life and truth, whereby the latter would dominate the former, no such distinction was articulated in Cynicism, for which the condition of truth is rather its complete embodiment in life and any separation between them indicates its distortion.
Of course, Greek parrhesia was constitutively linked with life in all its forms, since it was distinguished from other modes of free speech (e.g. *isegoria*, a statutory right to speak) precisely by the risk to the speaker’s very existence that it involved.²¹ In different ways, Pericles’ ‘democratic parrhesia’ in the *agora*, Plato’s parrhesiastic advice to Dionysius of Syracuse and the philosophical parrhesia of Socrates’s injunction to care for oneself were all acts of speaking in the face of adversity and even putting one’s very life at stake in the utterance of truth. Yet, with the Cynics, this necessary risk of veridiction is extended from the danger involved in one’s words to one’s way of life itself: ‘[one] risks one’s life, not just by telling the truth, and in order to tell it, but by the very way one lives. One risks it by displaying it and it is because of displaying it that one risks it. One exposes one’s life not through one’s discourses but through one’s life itself.’²² In this manner, life becomes more than the price one might have to pay for speaking the truth but is itself the site in which the truth is manifested. This formulation evidently resonates with the biopolitical problematic, albeit with an important twist: Cynic parrhesia no longer involves governmental power over the lives of its subjects but rather the power of one’s own life that the subject mobilizes and puts at stake in its truth-telling. Life is not merely the object but also the subject of biopower. Yet, what does it mean for life itself (in the unqualified and universal sense of *zoe*) to be the subject of power?

The name ‘Cynic’ is translated from Ancient Greek as ‘dog-like’. While there are various explanations of this comparison, Foucault finds its basis in the bare life of the Cynics: Cynic parrhesia was wholly contained in ‘the manifestation, in complete nakedness, of the truth of the world and of life’.²³ While in Agamben’s famous argument the Greeks constituted their positive form of *bios* by the *exclusion* of bare life, the Cynics made of this bare life itself the very *mode* of the manifestation of truth. Their destitute, brute and stripped mode of existence that was explicitly posited as ‘animal’ was intended not merely as an extreme form of self-assertion or self-fashioning but also as the manifestation, the
bearing witness to the truth, whereby the body itself became ‘the visible theatre of the truth’.²⁴ It became such by redeploying in its very existence the familiar characteristics of truth in Ancient Greek philosophy. Foucault emphasizes repeatedly that the Cynics did not introduce almost any innovation on the level of philosophical doctrine but rather borrowed the most conventional and widespread ideas, which they nonetheless subjected to a radical reinterpretation by relocating them to the level of life itself. The fundamental principle of the Cynics that Foucault derives from the retelling of the life of Diogenes by Diogenes Laertius, proclaims: ‘Change the value of the currency!’ (parakharattein to nomisma)²⁵ In Foucault’s reading, this principle refers to the thoroughgoing re- or trans-valuation of the existing norms and laws that restores to them their original meaning or value by taking their prescriptions to the extreme, even at the cost of overturning their established meanings.²⁶ In the following section we shall consider four such transvaluations undertaken in relation to the concept of truth.

The True Life of a Dog

In Foucault’s reading, the truth in classical Greek philosophy was defined by its unconcealed, undistorted, straight and sovereign character. Rather than contest these four principles of truth, the Cynics appropriated them as inherent in life itself, which evidently altered their conventional meanings. Firstly, the Cynic’s life ‘is without modesty, shame, and human respect. It is a life which does in public, in front of everyone, what only dogs and animals dare to do, and which mean usually hide.’²⁷ This scandalous display of ‘animal’ behaviour that does not recognize social conventions and insists on the complete publicity of all its actions is perhaps the most famous aspect of Cynicism. Yet, this shameless or brazen life is only the literal and consistent application of the principle of unconcealment that defines the Platonic true logos. ‘Applying the principle of non-concealment
literally, Cynicism explodes the code of propriety with which this principle remained associated. As a result, the philosophical life appears as radically other than all other forms of life. While the Platonic principle of unconcealment sought to secure the conventional and proper forms of life that had nothing to hide precisely because they were fully in accordance with the prevailing codes, the Cynics took this principle to the extreme, arguing that there could be nothing bad in whatever nature had endowed us with. For this reason, concealing any aspect of one's natural life, however 'doglike' it might appear from the perspective of those codes, merely brings in untruth into one's life.

Second, the idea of true life as unalloyed or undistorted is converted by the Cynics into the principle of a life that is utterly indifferent to its own needs. The Platonic idea of a life purified from all disorder and discord, from all things material and physical, is 'revaluated' by the Cynics through the relocation of the ideal of purity towards the very domain of the physical and the bodily that it was supposed to be purified from. In this domain pure life is a life of poverty, stripped of everything superficial and inessential. For the Cynics poverty is an active principle going beyond mere indifference to wealth and contentment with one's own station. It is 'a real conduct of poverty' that is in principle unlimited, going further and further into dispossession in a quest for the absolutely indispensable.

Third, the Platonic principle of a straight life in accordance with the logos is converted into a life that accepts no law other than that of nature. Only what is natural is truly in accordance with the logos, hence all social conventions and codes must be abandoned, be it marriage, family, or even the prohibition of incest. Nature or animality forms the new model that the human being must emulate to arrive at the true life. In Foucault’s argument, animality becomes a '[material] model in
accordance with the idea that the human being must not have as a need what the animal can do without. In order not to be inferior to the animal, one must be capable of taking on that animality as a reduced, but prescriptive form of life. Animality is not a given; it is a duty. Animality is an exercise. It is a task for oneself and at the same time a scandal for others. Similarly to poverty, animalization is not a matter of a one-off act of renouncing one’s humanity but of the perpetual exercise that is to be pursued in an aggressive or ‘bestial’ confrontation with the untrue lives of others.

Finally, the Cynics simultaneously apply and reverse the Platonic principle of the immutable and self-contained sovereignty of the true life. The Cynic infamously proclaims himself the true ‘king’, precisely by virtue of his scandalous, dirty and beastly life. While in Platonism and Stoicism the philosopher was often compared to a king because he was capable of governing both his own soul and the souls of others in accordance with the truth, the Cynic asserts that he is the king, not metaphorically or ideally in a perfect world, but in the here and now. ‘[Crowned] sovereigns, visible sovereigns, as it were, are only shadows of a true monarchy. The Cynic is the only true king. And vis-à-vis the kings of the world, crowned kings sitting on their thrones, he is the anti-king who shows how hollow, illusory and precarious the monarchy of kings is.’ And yet, rather than live a life of contentment and enjoyment, the Cynic king submits his life to tireless tests in order to be able to take care of others, lead them out of their untruth by his own manifestation of the true life. This care is undertaken in a characteristically animalistic, violent manner, ‘with a bark’: ‘[the] Cynic is of service in a very different way than through leading an exemplary life or giving advice. He is useful because he battles, because he bites, because he attacks.’ For this reason the Cynic is compared to a ‘guard dog’, dedicated to service and saving others.
In all these four reversals the principle of animality remains crucial as a paradoxical criterion of truth. Foucault argues that ancient thought generally approached animality as a ‘point of repulsion’ for the constitution of the human being, an ‘absolute point of differentiation’ that, in Agamben’s later terminology, was ‘inclusively excluded’ from the human as its negative foundation.²⁵ A true life was then the life that successfully excluded, subjected or dominated one’s animal nature. In contrast, the Cynics transform this negative foundation into a positive telos of human existence, whereby animality is not a given to be mastered or conquered within oneself but a model to be attained in one’s existence through courageous practices of truth-telling that break with established ways of living. And yet, there is nothing in this model that is not already given by nature, which therefore need not be subjected or dominated for this model to be implemented. On the contrary, the constitution of a true bios is conditioned by the prior grafting of its precepts onto zoe itself. Animality is not the other that must be subjected and mastered for a life of truth to be possible but rather the manner, in which this life unfolds in the self. It is this use of animality that constitutes the true scandal of Cynicism: while there is nothing offensive in animal behaviour itself, which may, depending on the context, also be viewed as charming, innocent or stupid, the fact that the same old familiar truths that have hitherto prescribed a life of obedience could give rise to such a violent irruption in the order of things is a genuine affront to the existing order.

The deployment of truth in this animalized mode is what makes the procedure of the Cynics radically affirmative. In Vanessa Lemm’s formulation, ‘the life of zoe, that is, the bios of zoe, is a life where bios is not imposed on animal life (zoe) like a second nature but where zoe brings forth out of its own resources a bios.’³⁶ This formulation clearly echoes Agamben’s notion of form-of-life, in which the bios is only its own zoe. Yet, to what extent may the true life of Cynicism be said to be constituted out of zoe’s ‘own resources’? After all, it remains a philosophical life to be lived in accordance with
the truth. Nature itself was never a concern of the Cynics, but was only the site, into which truth must be relocated to redeem itself as truth. Moreover, as we have shown, the truth at stake in the Cynic revaluation of the currency was not some idiosyncratic ‘naturalist’ alternative to the general principles and conventions of the time. What was different was the Cynics' move of the identification of these principles with the attributes of life as such and the consequent grafting of these principles onto life as the sole consistent manner of their application. The destitution, nakedness and poverty of the Cynic's life thus became at the same time the conditions of the truth of his life and its entire content. Ideas or principles become true only by virtue of being lived, but life only attains a truly philosophical status when it is in accordance with these truths. Life and truth therefore become all but indistinct: by becoming as unconcealed, unalloyed, straight and sovereign as zoe itself, the praxis of the Cynics attains the status of a true bios. Nonetheless, this indistinction remains a philosophical decision that cannot be reduced to zoe itself. The true bios can only be 'brought forth out of zoe’s own resources' because these resources were themselves first derived from the philosophical concept of truth and then transferred to the domain of zoe.

Yet, this transfer makes all the difference. Despite the fundamental identity between the ideational contents of the truths of the Cynics and their adversaries, the former's true life remains radically other than the life lived by the ostensible proponents of truth:

The Cynic changes the values of the currency and reveals that the true life can only be an other life, in relation to the traditional life of men, including philosophers. It is from the point of view of this other life that the usual life of ordinary people will be revealed as precisely other than the true. I live in an other way, and by the very otherness of my life, I show you that what you are looking for is somewhere other than where you
are looking for it, that the path you are taking is other than the one you should be taking.\textsuperscript{37}

We may now understand the final words of Foucault’s final lecture course: ‘there is no establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness: the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life.’\textsuperscript{38} However familiar it is in its nominal content, the truth is \textit{made other} by its relocation from the domain of discourse towards the realm of life. In the very same movement life is also made \textit{other} by the truth, attaining the status of a philosophical life without transcending or negating any of its natural dispositions. Thirdly, by disseminating the truth in its own transformed existence this life can eventually change the world at large. While both Platonism and Christianity posited, in their own different ways, the existence of the \textit{other world} beyond this one, the Cynics sought to attain another life right here in \textit{this} world and thereby make it \textit{otherwise} that it was. By virtue of their disobedience of all conventional moral codes, the Cynics made every act of veridictive subjectivation a part of the transformation of the wider world: ‘Through this dissonant irruption of the ‘true life’ in the midst of the chorus of lies and pretences, of accepted injustice and concealed iniquities, the Cynic makes ‘an other world’ loom up on the horizon, the advent of which would presuppose the transformation of the present world.’\textsuperscript{39}

While their orientation towards the transformation of the world renders Cynic parrhesia irreducibly political, their embodiment of the principles governing this transformation in life itself makes it unmistakably \textit{bio-political}. Yet, contrary to Hardt, there is no need to separate biopower and biopolitics, as if politics were devoid of power or power was not political. Cynic parrhesia is biopolitical precisely and solely to the extent that it brings the power of one’s life into play in one’s affirmation of truth – it is an \textit{exercise of biopower whose object fully coincides with its subject}. In the following section we shall elaborate this model of affirmative biopolitics by tracing its reactivation
in the practices of East European dissident movements that Foucault was actively supporting at the
time of his work on parrhesia.

Living within the Truth

While the term ‘biopolitics’ is not found in the 1983-1984 lectures, Foucault addresses the political
significance of the Cynics at length and always does so with reference to their singular articulation
of life and truth. He discusses Cynicism as the genealogical point of descent of the idea of a militant
or revolutionary life that would have enormous influence in the Western tradition, where militancy
was at least originally not merely a matter of ideological commitments but also a form of life, which
had to ‘manifest directly, by its visible form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the
concrete possibility and the evident value of an other life, which is the true life’.\(^{40}\) Besides such
familiar forms as the secret society, the union or the party, revolutionary militancy also took the
form of a style of existence, ranging from revolutionary nihilism and terrorism in late 19\(^{th}\) century
Russia to the European leftism of Foucault’s time. The radical break with the existing norms,
conventions and habits that the militant ideology promised on the level of the overall social order
was in such styles immediately embodied in the life of the militant. Foucault then proceeded to
ridicule the French Left of his time for abandoning this constitutive theme of the manifestation of
the truth in life or, worse, practicing it in the inverted form of utter conventionalism and
conservatism, adopting ‘all the accepted values, all the most customary forms of behaviour, and all
the most traditional schemas of conduct’.\(^{41}\) Foucault’s earlier criticism of socialism in the Birth of
Biopolitics as lacking its own governmentality is thus fortified by the even more damaging accusation
of the lack of a style of existence corresponding to revolutionary ideas, which renders socialism
strictly lifeless.\(^{42}\)
It is therefore hardly coincidental that Foucault develops his account of Cynic parrhesia at the time of his engagement with the struggle of the civil society in Poland against the regime that was allegedly the descendant of revolutionary politics but had long abandoned or betrayed the revolutionary truths it still vainly propagated in its discourse. The resonance between Cynic parrhesia and the East European dissident practices of living within the truth forms what Walter Benjamin termed a ‘dialectical image’, a constellation of past and present events, in which the past event acquires full intelligibility and thereby finds its fulfilment. ‘The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again. For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.’ For Benjamin past texts or practices are not immediately available for interpretation at any given moment, but acquire their full legibility or ‘knowability’ only in specific historical contexts that thereby themselves attain historical significance. While it is impossible to say whether it was the interest in the Cynics that led Foucault to actively support the Polish dissidents or it was this support that interested him in Cynicism, the powerful resonance between discourses and practices that are two and a half millennia apart evidently endowed Foucault’s final lectures with an ethico-political exigency that the immediately preceding courses arguably lacked.

It is important to emphasize that the dialectical image that we seek to reconstruct arises from the constellation of Cynic parrhesia as described by Foucault and East European dissident discourse, not between Foucault’s philosophy and the thought of any of the dissident thinkers of Eastern Europe. Thus, when we reconstitute the key aspects of Cynic parrhesia in Vaclav Havel’s famous essay ‘Power of the Powerless’ in this section, we do not intend to occlude the numerous differences between Foucault’s and Havel’s philosophical or political standpoints, regarding e.g. their relations
to humanism, existentialism and phenomenology. Yet, just as Foucault need not have followed every injunction of Diogenes of Sinope to affirm the Cynic version of parrhesia, he need not have subscribed to Havel’s entire philosophy to affirm the struggles of Charter 77 and other dissident movements against ‘real socialist’ regimes for a life within the truth. Moreover, while the differences between the two authors are certainly substantial, they need not be exaggerated. In fact, the resonance between the true life of the Cynics and Havel’s ‘living within the truth’ suggests at least one area of convergence between Havel and Foucault, which arises out of the shared influence of Jan Patočka and the interest in philosophy as a spiritual exercise constitutive of a specific way of life. For all their philosophical differences, Havel and Foucault certainly agreed on what philosophy was to be – an experience of subjectivation rather than a set of doctrines or a disciplinary structure. Similarly, while political differences between Foucault and Havel are considerable, they need not be overstated, as the current debate about Foucault’s relation to neoliberal governmentality testifies. While it would certainly be far-fetched to cast Foucault as a champion of liberal government, his political standpoint in the early 1980s clearly shifted towards an enthusiastic affirmation of a different kind of liberalism, the dissident liberalism of Charter 77 and other movements, which was furthest away from a governmental rationality but rather embodied an ethos of resistance to it.

In order to understand this ethos, let us first revisit ‘real socialism’ from the biopolitical perspective. As we have argued elsewhere, the biopolitical orientation of Soviet-style socialism was marked by the primacy of the transformative logic over the securitarian one that was at work in different ways in Western biopolitics, both liberal and fascist. Contrary to the quasi-naturalist approach of Western biopolitics that sought to secure the life of the population and thereby exposed some of its members to death, socialist biopolitics sought to produce a new socialist form of life to replace the allegedly
obsolete and dying capitalist forms. Yet, particularly during the Stalinist period, its efforts at the forcing of socialism into life ended up exposing to death the forms of life that conflicted with its ideology, be it through the violence of collectivization, the iconoclasm of the Cultural Revolution or the ‘mass operations’ of the Great Terror. After the cessation of the terror in the post-Stalin period, the forcing of the idea into life was primarily accomplished through the proliferation of ideological simulacra in e.g. socialist-realist art that coexisted with the unofficial retreat of the regime from its own ideological maxims, reflected in the growth of shadow economies, the spread of governmental corruption, the moral degradation of the elites, etc. It is precisely this ‘post-totalitarian’ period that witnessed the rise of dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Charter 77, Solidarity, the Moscow Helsinki Group).47

Post-totalitarian regimes no longer demanded passionate belief in the official ideology, in which they themselves only pretended to believe, but continued to demand obedient participation in the sedimented rituals of its reproduction. It is this situation that the dissident movements problematized as resigning Soviet and East European societies to a life within a lie. The attempt to produce a socialist form of life ended up in the real suppression and negation of all conflicting forms of life, whereas socialism itself remained ‘a world of appearances, a mere ritual, a formalized language deprived of semantic contact with reality’.48 Real socialism was thus problematized as a paradigmatic site of untruth, of living a lie in the guise of transforming truth into life. Dissident thought begins with posing the question of true life anew: is living in truth possible otherwise than by forcing truth into life? Can the subject relate itself to truth other than by being a passive object of external indoctrination or even the victim of the violent imposition of the truth?
A powerful response in the affirmative was offered in the seminal 1978 essay ‘The Power of the Powerless’, written by one of the leaders of Charter 77 Václav Havel who would eventually serve as President of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic during 1989-2003. The essay takes up and elaborates the theme of living within the truth, first articulated in the context of dissident movements in the 1974 article by Alexander Solzhenitsyn entitled ‘Live Not by Lies!’ Havel begins with a famous example of a greengrocer who displays the official slogan ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ in his shop window, even though he certainly does not care much about the workers of the world and whether they choose to unite or not. He does so because he knows he is expected to do so and by doing so expects to be left in peace by the authorities, permitted to go about his daily business and enjoy whatever humble privileges his status confers. ‘[Individuals] need not believe all these mystifications, but they must behave as though they did, or they must at least tolerate them in silence. For this reason, however, they must live within a lie. They need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have accepted their life with it and in it. For by this very fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the system.’

To refuse to live a lie is then to suspend one’s participation in this system. As Slavoj Zizek has argued, Havel’s concept of truth is not at all metaphysical, its entire content exhausted in one’s disengagement from the reproduction of the official simulacrum. The proverbial greengrocer stops displaying the slogan, begins to distribute banned literature, speaks out at political meetings and joins the communities of others who refuse to live the lie. In this manner, the lie is revealed as a lie and truth is affirmed not as a hypothetical possibility of life in a brighter future but as a real form of life in the here and now. Similarly to the Cynics, Havel does not equate living within the truth with the embrace of some alternative ideology, programme or moral code but rather defines it as following the ‘real aims’ of life itself.
[Between] the aims of the post-totalitarian system and the aims of life there is a yawning abyss: while life, in its essence, moves toward plurality, diversity, independent self-constitution and self-organization, in short, toward the fulfillment of its own freedom, the post-totalitarian system demands conformity, uniformity, and discipline. While life ever strives to create new and improbable structures, the post-totalitarian system contrives to force life into its most probable states.\textsuperscript{52}

Living in truth must ‘above all be an expression of life in the process of transforming itself’, which calls for its withdrawal from the system, whose project of constructing a ‘new life’ ended up conflicting with the aims of life itself.\textsuperscript{53} Yet, it is important to note that just as the Cynics’ idea of a true life could not possibly be derived from \textit{zoe} itself but was rather transferred there by philosophical decision, Havel’s ‘aims of life’ must first be posited as truths before they could be identified with life. Moreover, these truths were not necessarily opposed to the official discourse of the system, which complacently presented itself as full of vitality and dynamism, fostering independence and innovation and otherwise concurring with the ‘aims of life’. Just as the Cynics creatively reoriented the accepted truths of their time against the sterile and sedimented conventions and rules justified by them, making them the source of a radically other life, Havel and other dissident authors sought to reclaim the possibility of a different life by recasting freedom, pluralism, diversity and other values as inherent in life itself.

What was important for both the Cynics and the dissidents was not proving the natural character of their truths, i.e. their hypothetical origin in \textit{zoe}, but rather giving the truths precisely this character, demonstrating their viability against the sterility of official simulacra, forming a \textit{bios} of truth within
the domain of zoe. This is why Havel repeatedly speaks of living within the truth as a ‘natural’, ‘existential’ and ‘pre-political’ mode of existence: ‘For some time now, the problem has no longer resided in a political line or programme: it is a problem of life itself.’ Yet, the true form of life is never simply given but must be cultivated, not through oppositional political action in the narrow sense, but rather through what Havel calls ‘independent spiritual, social and political life of society’, concretely manifested in the parallel structures in various social spheres: independent trade unions, theatres, universities, bookshops, rock clubs, etc.: ‘What else are parallel structures than an area where a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony with its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with those aims?’

Despite lacking any explicit oppositional orientation, these ‘pre-political’ practices, unfolding in the ‘obscure arena of being itself’, were perceived as extremely dangerous by Soviet and East European regimes. Insofar as they expressed the desire for the truth in the very lives of their participants, things as innocuous as rock concerts, independent theatre performances, or public poetry readings, could produce explosive political effects, undermining the carefully constructed simulacrum of the socialist form of life. ‘Every free expression of life indirectly threatens the post-totalitarian system politically, including forms of expression to which, in other social systems, no one would attribute any potential political significance, not to mention explosive power.’ Similarly to the Cynics, the transformation of the truth by its relocation to life produces both the reality of a different life and the possibility of a different world. It is easy to see that the dissident life within the truth manifests exactly the same features of truth as Cynicism did: it is unconcealed by virtue of refusing to live the lie, unalloyed by ceasing one’s participation in the system, straight by virtue of being in accordance with the ‘real aims of life’ and, finally, sovereign, reclaiming its power from the system in ostensibly pre-political practices that nonetheless have potentially explosive political effects. The power of the
powerless that Havel speaks of can only be bio-power, the power of and over one’s life, which becomes the site of the confrontation between governmental rationalities and the subject’s acts of veridiction.

Besides their ‘critical’ effect of demonstrating the failure of governmental biopower to fully translate its rationalities into life, which made the officially proclaimed ‘new life’ patently untrue, the practices of Charter 77 and other East European dissident movements also produced the ‘affirmative’ effect of demonstrating the capacity of the subjects of emergent civil societies to fashioning their lives in truth at a distance from the regime. As Foucault noted in his article on the Polish resistance, ‘people have not only struggled for freedom, democracy and the exercise of basic rights but they have done so by exercising rights, freedom and democracy.’\(^5\) What was a perpetual illusion of governmental biopolitics, i.e. the successful translation of the idea into life, became a reality in the veridictive practices of the dissidents, precisely because in the latter case biopolitics was no longer a matter of forcing the idea into life by overcoming resistance to it, which necessarily entails the resort of power to negativity that contradicts its very intention. Living within the truth exemplifies nothing less than a complete reversal of the biopolitical logic of real socialism, whereby the governmental forcing of truth into life gives way to the fashioning of a life of truth through active disobedience to governmental rationalities.

From this perspective, ‘living within the truth’ is not merely a form of biopolitics among others but indeed its paradigmatic form, because it is able to avoid being contaminated with the negativity of sovereign power as a result of having to force its rationality within the life that resists it. In the parrhesiastic subject, be it the Cynic or the dissident, life and truth do not face each other as antagonists but rather become indistinct in their perpetual passage into one another. The
parrhesiastic subject is therefore able to go one crucial step further than any governmentality that seeks to take hold of life and transform it in line with its own truths. It is not merely that resistance acquires a certain primacy in relation to power,\(^{59}\) but that the political subject acquires an autonomous consistency that goes beyond any notion of resistance. Strictly speaking, the parrhesiast does not resist governmental biopower but demonstrates in its very practice of the true life how it has always already failed to transform and govern one's life, while s/he has on the contrary succeeded in doing so by reclaiming its own biopower and applying it to oneself. There is a fundamental asymmetry between biopolitical governmentality and the affirmative biopolitics of the parrhesiast, since even in the worst circumstances the latter is capable of that very productivity or creativity that the former tirelessly asserts but invariably lacks. ‘Cynicism constantly reminds us that very little truth is indispensable for whoever wishes to live truly and that very little life is needed when one truly holds to the truth.’\(^{60}\) Against the power that captures and governs life to adapt it to its rationalities it is always possible to live differently, even if from the perspective of these established forms this ‘other life’ appears shameful, violent or dirty. It is always possible to make one’s life the manifestation of the ‘ungovernable’.\(^{61}\)

**Conclusion**

Our reading of Foucault's account of Cynical parrhesia as a paradigm of affirmative biopolitics has two key implications pertaining respectively to Foucault scholarship and the wider debates on biopolitics in contemporary political theory. Firstly, our interpretation suggests that rather than abandon the problematic of biopolitics in 1976 (after *History of Sexuality I*) or 1979 (after *Birth of Biopolitics*) Foucault shifted his perspective on it, moving from the consideration of governmental power over life towards the focus on the power that the subject may exercise by enacting certain
ideas or truths in its own life. The constellation of Cynicism and East European dissidence presented Foucault with a powerful image of the affirmative relation between life and truth, whereby truth-telling no longer functions as an obligation imposed to ensure obedience but rather as a condition for the reciprocal transformation of life and truth that opens the possibility of a different world. One reason why the biopolitical significance of parrhesia has remained obscured in Foucault scholarship and more generally in the studies of biopolitics is arguably the specificity of the reception of East European dissident thought in Western Europe and North America. During the Cold War it was all too quickly subsumed under the liberal anticommunist discourse and, in its aftermath, was filed away as ‘overly tied to particular historical circumstances’ and not deserving of serious theoretical consideration. In this manner, Foucault commentary often lost sight of the events that led Foucault to approach politics of life otherwise than in terms of the governmental regulation of vital processes that subjects life to politics, focusing instead on the subject’s exercise of biopower to transform their life and the world at large.

In History of Sexuality I and ‘Society Must Be Defended’ Foucault addressed biopolitics in its most negative, thanatopolitical mode of racism, accentuating its lethal power over its productive capacity. In the final course, he presented an alternative to this harrowing power of negative protection of life against all otherness in the form of parrhesiastic practices of disobedience, in which both truth and life are made other. In On the Government of the Living Foucault half-jokingly called himself a ‘negative theorist’, whose contribution consisted not in the articulation of determinate theoretical theses but rather in ‘[leaving] a trace, in the most intelligible outline possible, of the movements by which I am no longer at the place I where was earlier, the displacement by which my theoretical positions continually change’. We may now suggest that this apparently negative mode of theorizing actually produces positive effects. Foucault’s key
theoretical contribution does not consist in either the study of the biopolitics of the population or of Greek aesthetics of existence but precisely in the move from one to the other that subjects biopolitics itself to a microphysical analysis, which relocates bio-power within the subject in order both to dismantle the effects of domination identified in the studies of governmental biopolitics and to affirm the transformative power of the truth in one's life.

Secondly, our interpretation also has important implications for contemporary debates on affirmative biopolitics. As we have seen, such leading authors as Agamben and Esposito tend to interpret it as a politics, whose form (bios) is derived from zoe itself, which leads to a fascinating if also somewhat paradoxical quest for a form that would consist in formlessness alone. In order not to negate bare life in the name of its privileged form the only legitimate form must be somehow based on bare life itself, yet its very bareness obviously makes for a poor basis for the constitution of any form. There is an evident temptation to resolve this problem by identifying zoe with ‘natural’, ‘animal’ or even ‘biological’ life, which would then lead to the constitution of bios on naturalist or vitalist grounds. Yet, both vitalism and naturalism are philosophical concepts and not attributes of zoe, which indeed is usually defined by the subtraction from any such attributes. Such accounts of affirmative biopolitics therefore remain perilously close to familiar biopolitical governmentalities, which after all also operated with the categories of liberty or race that they claimed to derive from life itself. In contrast, Foucault’s reading of the Cynics suggests that a more fruitful alternative to the derivation of bios from zoe may be the reverse move of bringing the bios down to the level of zoe, whereby the truths of bios would be verified as viable in bare life that would thereby acquire a form that is nonetheless indistinct from it. What matters is less the content of the truth in question, which in the case of both the Cynics and the East European dissidents was familiar if not outright banal, but its deployment for attaining a different life against the prevailing order of things. While today’s
discussion of affirmative biopolitics tends to address it in terms of a radical rupture that remains entirely in the future. Foucault’s account of Cynic parrhesia finds it in the practices of disobedient truth-telling that are almost as old as life itself. In this manner, he once again ‘show[s] people that they are much freer than they feel’,\(^6\) that a different life and a different world have a real existence in the parrhesiastic practices that reclaim the power of our lives and apply it to ourselves.


\(^4\) Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 188.


\(^6\) Ibid., 102.


\(^10\) Hoffman, *Foucault and Power*, 125.


23 Ibid., 183. See more generally ibid., 242-244.

24 Ibid., 179-180.
Ibid., 226.

Ibid., 241-243. The Nietzschean overtones of this principle are addressed in detail in Lemm 2014.

Ibid., 243, 252-255.

Ibid., 255.

Ibid., 258.

Ibid., 262-264.

Ibid., 265.

Ibid., 275.

Ibid., 279.

Ibid., 243.


Lemm, 'The Embodiment of Truth', 221.

Ibid., 314.


Ibid., 186.

Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 93.


See Forti, *New Demons*, 267-305 for a more detailed exploration of the philosophical and political affinities of Foucault and East European philosophers, including Havel. See also Szakolczai, ‘Thinking beyond the East-West Divide: Foucault, Patočka and the Care of the Self’, *Social Research* 61: 297-
324 for the study of affinities between Foucault’s and Patočka’s interpretations of the Antiquity.


48 Ibid., 16.


53 Ibid., 30.

54 Ibid., 40.

55 Ibid., 48.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 23.


63 Foucault, *On the Government of the Living*, 76.