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PART I

Financing the Wars

CHAPTER 2

Officers as Creditors during the Ingrian War (1609–1617)

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Endless money forms the sinews of war.
— Marcus Tullius Cicero

From 1554 to 1660, the Swedish Realm was in a more or less permanent state of war against one or more of its neighbours. During this tumultuous period, organising, extracting and husbanding ‘national’ resources for warfare was the primary occupation and *raison d'être* of the developing fiscal-military state. Despite its minuscule population of only some 1.2 million and a small, underdeveloped economy, the Swedish Realm nonetheless managed to defeat its rivals and transform into a heavily militarised Baltic empire.¹

¹ Lindegren 2000, p. 133.

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This remarkable success, the heavy burden of war and their implications for the society have naturally attracted the attention of historians of diverse fields. However, from the point of view of military finances, the focus has mainly been on resource extraction by the central state: taxation, conscription, and state-run enterprises at home, as well as contributions and foreign subsidies abroad.² Much less attention has been paid to the role of personal agency and private enterprise in Swedish military finances.³ Although the extensive use of mercenaries and military enterprisers willing to provide men, money and materials for war is a well-known fact, no deeper study of this business of war has been made. Furthermore, these entrepreneurs are still viewed as foreigners and other outsiders detached from the state, while in reality many were or became members of the Swedish elite and closely integrated with high administration and the royal court.⁴

In this chapter, I investigate the lending practices and credit networks of the officers, both domestic and foreign, of the Swedish army during the Ingrian War (1609–1617); a Russian civil war that the Swedes entered as ally to Czar Vasily IV, which soon turned into a war of conquest of the eastern Baltic sea region (see Figure 2.1). This was a war the Swedish Realm could not afford, and, as the army got little or no help from the central administration, it was left to fend for itself. It was largely thanks to the personal resources of private enterprisers and the army's

² See for example Lundkvist 1966, Lindegren 2000, Glete 2002, Hallenberg 2009 and Glete 2010. The most thorough study on 17th-century Swedish war finances is *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid* by Hans Landberg, Lars Ekholm, Roland Nordlund and Sven A. Nilsson (1971). However, even the case studies of this collection assume a very macro-economic view of military finances.

³ For an overview of the status of the debate regarding the role of personal agency, see Karonen & Hakanen 2017 and Fynn-Paul, 't Hart, & Vermeesch 2014.

⁴ For example in Linnarsson 2014.

Figure 2.1: The eastern Baltic sea region at the turn of the 17th century. Source: Map drawn by Kasper Kepsu and Petri Talvitie.

officers that Sweden managed to limp its way to victory eight years later.

I argue that, in the context of this particular war, the state use of credit advanced by its officers was a mutually beneficial solution. Officers were important intermediaries in a chain of borrowing, which tied social and mercantile groups behind the crown's war effort. Thanks to the good credit and broad connections of the

officers, the state gained access to otherwise inaccessible resources at better terms than it could otherwise manage. Officers' credit was also crucial to overcoming the recurring failures of the state's supply apparatus and preventing military collapse. In turn, many officers were greatly enriched or otherwise benefited from lending to the crown.

The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin with a presentation of the various means and mechanisms through which officers advanced credit to the crown during recruitment and, subsequently, during the war. In the second part, I outline the sources of the funds advanced by officers, and their links to a broader credit network. Finally, in the third section I look at how officers were repaid for their services, and the kind of rewards they could hope to receive.

Credit and Military Supply

Officers played an important role in supplying the Swedish military effort. Besides shouldering a large burden of the recruitment of troops and mobilising resources at the start of the war, officers continued to provide funds and credit throughout the war to make up for the inadequacy of state-organised military supply. These loans helped the army tide over the worst disasters and increased the duration that the army could be kept in the field.

Recruitment

Foreign troops formed the backbone of the Swedish army in the Ingrian War. A few years prior to the outbreak of the war, the Swedish conscript army had been virtually annihilated by a smaller Polish force at the battle of Kirkholm. Estimates for Swedish losses at Kirkholm range from 6,000 to 8,000 men, over 1% of the total male population, and a much higher percentage of those of fighting age. As a result, the Swedish army became increasingly dependent on foreigners to make up the numbers and improve

the quality of the army. German, British, French and Dutch soldiers, among others, answered the call. Although domestic troops still constituted half the numbers, the foreigners bore the brunt of the fighting.⁵

Recruitment of these foreign troops depended heavily on credit advanced by recruiting officers. Acting as military enterprisers, foreign officers would contract to recruit a unit of a specified composition and equipment, by a certain time, for a fixed fee. The crown would defray some of the costs, most notably by sometimes providing infantry with arms and armour and cavalry with mounts, as well as a small advance payment of *laufgeld* or *anritt*, but the bulk of costs were to be borne by the officers.⁶ These costs included recruitment money, equipment, and upkeep for the men between recruitment and the first muster.

Muster was to be held at an agreed port and in the presence of Swedish commissaries, who would inspect the troops. After making deductions based on shortcomings and advance payments, the commissary would then pay the officer his commission, before boarding the men onto ships and sending them to Sweden. If an officer managed to schedule the various tasks properly and get

⁵ Domestic infantry was mostly used as garrison troops and as local militia near the border. Most were reluctant to serve abroad, and the Swedish king had a particularly difficult time forcing troops from mainland Sweden to serve in Finland, let alone in Russia. The total population of the Swedish Realm at the time of the battle of Kirkholm was in the region of 1.2 million. Mankell 1865, pp. 11, 20–21 and Appendix 8; Lindgren 2000, p. 133.

⁶ *Laufgeld* (for infantry) and *anritt* (for cavalry) were standardized payments in the international mercenary market, originally intended to cover living expenses for recruits traveling between the recruiting place and muster place and issued to recruits when they first signed up. However, the way the Swedes used these terms in documents and correspondence seem to refer to all funds advanced to assist recruiting officers prior to the first muster. See Redlich 1964, pp. 41–42.

men and equipment at advantageous rates, then he could expect to recover the advanced sums, and perhaps even make a profit.⁷

Companies, headed by captains, formed the basic building blocks for recruitment.⁸ In the period 1606–1616, infantry was typically recruited in companies of 200 men at a commission of 1,600 Swedish dalers⁹ per full company, excluding arms and armour, which the Swedes would provide and deduct from pay. Cavalry was far more expensive and, to make it manageable for enterprisers, was recruited in companies of 100–150 troopers, with more allowance for deviating from the contracted number of troopers. More lightly armoured cavalry was to be supplied with an arquebus, pistol, sword and helmet, for which the recruiter would receive 26 dalers per trooper. Most expensive were the plate-armoured cuirassiers, armed with a sword and pair of pistols or lance, which were commissioned at a rate of 35 dalers per man.¹⁰

During the Ingrian War, the Swedes continued to follow the earlier practice of contracting individual captains to recruit their own companies, which would then be loosely combined into regiments

⁷ RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Philip Scheduling and Hans Nilsson 26.4.1606; Charles IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldsson and Henrik Eriksson 5.9.1607.

⁸ Cavalry companies were called cornets or *fana*, while infantry were either *fänika* or companies. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to all these company-level units, both infantry and cavalry, as companies and their leaders as captains.

⁹ The Swedish daler (henceforth simply daler) was a unit of account, equal to 4 marks or 32 öre. As most accounts are conducted in dalers, I have used this throughout this chapter. Actual payments were made in a variety of Swedish, Russian and foreign coinage, as well as luxury furs and other materials. Inflation was considerable and exchange rates fluctuated. Unless an exchange rate has been specifically provided, I have calculated the riksdaler at 6 marks and 1 daler equal to 28 denga (0.28 rubles), which were the norm in military accounts. Edvinsson (2010).

¹⁰ RA, Diplomata Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Charles IX 28.7.1607.

or larger detachments. However, there was an increasing trend towards organising recruitment through higher-level enterprisers, capable of recruiting multiple companies or entire regiments of some five to six companies (1,000–1,200 infantry or 500–600 cavalry), which they would then command with the rank of colonel or higher. Besides reducing the administrative burden of contracting multiple enterprisers, this development was encouraged by the Swedish crown's keenness to secure the services of foreign aristocrats with both fiscal and social capital.¹¹

Officers were very dependent on their social standing and networks for recruitment. It was common for men to be recruited from among the enterprisers' personal affinity, from his tenants and clients or, more broadly, from the populace of his area of origin or the area where he held government office.¹² Successful recruiters were also able to subcontract and delegate part of their task to subordinates, family and other contacts. These agents would each be allocated a certain region or place in which to recruit and would undertake part of the responsibility for managing and financing the process. Thus, although a colonel held overall responsibility for recruiting a regiment and served as the frontman towards the Swedish crown, funding was actually shared by a larger group. This was beneficial both to the crown, which gained access to a broader credit network, and to the enterprisers, who could share the burden and risks.

Though information on how much funds various officers actually advanced remains sparse, the sums appear to have been considerable. Colonel Jacob Spens provided at least 9,214 dalers and 8 öre for the recruitment of a regiment of Scottish infantry, for which he was repaid in 1610. Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie, commander of the Swedish army, used 4,000 riksdalers (6,000

¹¹ RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Philip Scheduling 25.3.1606, and Charles IX to Evert Horn and Hans Nilsson 12.7.1607.

¹² Trim 2011, pp. 158, 185–186; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Casteguisson to Charles IX 3.5.1608, De Corbeille to Charles IX 23.5.1608, Francois des Essars to Charles IX 17.9.1608.

dalers) of his own funds to recruit some 650 infantry, plus further funds to reform existing companies into his own lifeguard regiment at a time when reinforcements from Sweden were not forthcoming.¹³ Smaller sums were provided by captains, such as Daniel Hepburn, who brought 479.75 riksdalers (720 dalers) worth of clothes and cash for the troops recruited by De la Gardie.¹⁴

Particularly difficult and expensive was the recruitment of cavalry, which required the purchase of expensive equipment and specialised troopers. In 1607 and 1608, when Swedish recruitment was at its peak, competition on the recruiting market was severe, and it was difficult to obtain arms and armour quickly or inexpensively. Manufacturers also required half of the pay up front and in cash. As enterprisers operated largely on credit, obtaining cash posed its own difficulties, particularly since lending from professional moneylenders could be expensive. Furthermore, enterprisers were reluctant to provide funds early on, preferring to minimise risks and costs by deferring payments as late as possible.¹⁵

¹³ RA, Kommissariats m.fl räkenskaper och handlingar, Account of Swedish crown's debts to Colonel Jacob Spens in 1610. It is possible that Spens had lent even more, for which he had already been repaid. Spens had been contacted as early as 1605 to recruit 1,600 infantry and 600 cavalrymen. In 1608 these numbers were amended to 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalrymen, though it would seem that eventually only 1,200 infantrymen recruited by Spens arrived. However, Spens was also directly and indirectly involved with the recruitment of other Scottish forces, so it remains unclear what these costs actually entailed. See Fischer 1907, pp. 71–73; Grosjean 2003, pp. 26–30; Murdoch and Grosjean 'James Spens' (SSNE); AOSB I:2 pp. 150–153, Axel Oxenstierna to Jacob De la Gardie 16.10.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 836–839, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14, 1615/12; Generalstaben 1936, pp. 433–434.

¹⁴ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol, 6:1, Jacob De la Gardie's promissory note for Daniel Hepburn 25.11.1613.

¹⁵ At this time, pistols and holsters cost 8.5 riksdaler (12.75 dalers) and cavalry armour 16 riksdaler (24 dalers) per set. RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Wilhelm von Danzig to Charles IX February

Swedish mismanagement of the process incurred additional difficulties and costs. Recruitment was primarily financed with the crown's sale of copper, iron and other mining products to international merchants, who would provide bills of exchange to pay recruiters abroad. However, the Swedes tried to recruit too many troops at once, and had difficulties providing the resources on time. The crown's lack of credit and complications caused by overseas travel and communications meant that payments were delayed, and ships and money arrived in the wrong places at the wrong time.

Enterprisers recruiting troops were confused by the uncertainty and, for fear of personal losses, held back on drawing up their troops until payment was certain. A lack of trust combined with the difficulty of travel to the Swedish Realm also caused problems, as officers refused to sail before receiving their pay in full, whereas the Swedish crown was reluctant to advance funds prior to the first muster, and wished to control shipping so that the recruits would not desert. Finally, diplomatic incidents with the United Provinces and the Stuart monarchy, as well as a war with Denmark in 1611–1613, made the import of already recruited troops from Western Europe difficult at times.

The net effect of these shortcomings was that during the most intense period of recruitment, from 1606 to 1610, the process was drawn-out and expensive. Many units had to wait more than a year abroad before finally arriving in the Swedish Realm. During this entire time, officers were forced to arrange additional funds to maintain their men, or risk dissolution and loss of all their assets. To the detriment of recruiters, what should have been short-term loans of a few months became costly medium-term loans of over a year.

What followed was a great deal of incrimination and haggling between the Swedish crown and the enterprisers over who was to blame and who should pay the extra cost. The crown agreed to

1608, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 28.11.1607, La Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608; Terjanian 2005.

pay for some of the upkeep and help with procuring equipment, yet the officers' debts kept accumulating. For example, a year after his commission to recruit 500 French cuirassiers for a contract sum of 17,500 dalers, Henri de la Borde de Luxe complained that he had only received 2,500 florins (1,250 dalers), despite having spent more than 7,500 dalers of his own money.¹⁶ In another letter, La Borde was growing concerned that his advances might soon exceed 10,000 dalers, and demanded additional security for repayment.¹⁷

Regis de Vernet, another colonel recruiting 580 arquebusiers for 15,080 dalers, complained in June 1607 that he had already advanced 6,103 livres (2,560 dalers) for the upkeep of 60 men and the purchase of 150 suits of armour. On top of this, Vernet had provided 2,500 livres (1,050 dalers) to his subordinate captains for their recruitment. Six months later, the advanced sum had risen to 4,928.5 dalers, while at least one of the four subordinate captains had spent 500 crowns (625 dalers) to recruit 'good men' from Languedoc.¹⁸

Eventually, settlements were reached with many of the recruiters. The Swedes feared that failure to meet some of the enterprisers' demands would cause them to lose the recruits they desperately needed, as well as cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the Swedish crown on the international mercenary market.¹⁹

¹⁶ RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, De la Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608.

¹⁷ RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Sieur de la Borde's request to Charles IX 1608; RA, Diplomata Hollandica vol 1, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson 28.7.1607; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 13.8.1607.

¹⁸ RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28.2.1608; RA, Latinska riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Regis de Vernet 28.2.1608; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Costeguisson to Charles IX 1.12.1607 and 3.5.1608, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 4.6.1607.

¹⁹ RA, Diplomata Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Söftring Jönsson 27.7.1607.

Enterprisers were allowed to bring fewer men than agreed and with incomplete equipment. The crown squeezed additional funds through mercantile credit, and the recruiters agreed to send over part of their units, while making new contracts for the recruitment of the remainder and additional troops.

Despite these difficulties, the Swedish crown eventually managed to recruit tens of thousands of foreign troops, of whom perhaps 16,000–20,000 took part in the Ingrian War at one point or another.²⁰ The expense was enormous. In 1609, La Borde claimed that French enterprisers alone had provided 500,000 dalers for the recruitment and salaries of their men, which remained unpaid.²¹ Though this sum was certainly exaggerated, it is clear that this army could not have been mobilised without significant credit from enterprising officers.

Problems of military supply

Whereas recruitment relied on the private credit of contractors, the subsequent pay, upkeep and resupply of the recruited forces was the responsibility of the crown. Officers and soldiers were supposed to receive their pay on a monthly basis in cash (*sold*) or, more commonly, with a roughly 50–50 mixture of cash and kind (*commis*). As was typical for early modern warfare, the crown's

²⁰ This is a rough estimate based on calculations from figures in Generalstab (1936), muster rolls (KrA, Militieräkningar) and various commissary accounts (RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar), as well as pay and supply accounts (RA, Proviant-räkenskaper 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12 and 13). This figure includes only troops who ended up serving in the Ingrian War. As the Swedish Realm was also fighting other wars at the time, the total number of recruited troops in this period is higher. I have also excluded thousands of Polish and Russian troops who fought for pay in the Swedish army but were not recruited by the Swedes.

²¹ RA, Diplomata Gallica vol. 548, Larmen Borgereich to Erik Jörenssohn 3.8.1609.

policy was that national resources would pay for recruitment and mobilisation, but that otherwise the war should pay for itself.²²

For the first 15 months of the war, this worked well. The compact, 5,000-man army that crossed the border in February 1609 started the war as an allied detachment of Czar Vasily IV's army. As agreed with the czar's representatives, the army would be paid in full by the Russians. Though there were some tensions with regard to the payment of wages and military policy, the main army received most of what was agreed and fought a successful campaign to drive back Vasily IV's rebellious rivals and liberate Moscow.²³

However, the military situation changed drastically in July 1610, as the combined Russo-Swedish army suffered ignominious defeat against a far smaller Polish-Lithuanian host at the battle of Klushino. The czar's position collapsed, and the much-reduced Swedish army transformed from Russian ally to an occupier. In the future, the war would have to be financed with resources from Sweden and of those Russian territories which the Swedes managed to occupy.

Unfortunately, the Swedish crown was ill-equipped to pay for the war. Besides the difficulty and cost of transporting supplies to Russia, the crown lacked the resources. As Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna put it, the country was in a deplorable state after 52 years of almost constant warfare. The best of the men had already been killed and those who remained could not be paid or fed and were close to mutiny. The crown was out of money, all its credit was used up, and future revenues for many years had already been allocated to service mounting debts.²⁴ Moreover, in

²² Ekholm 1971, p. 145.

²³ According to surviving accounts, the Russians paid 498,167 dalers in cash, clothes, and precious furs. This was sufficient to pay full wages for at least 10 months out of 14, besides which the army received provisions and quarters at various times. See KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21; RA Provianträkenskapar 11.3.

²⁴ AOSB I:2 pp. 42–47, Axel Oxenstierna (on behalf of the Privy Council) to Queen Dowager Christina 25.3.1612.

April 1611, long-simmering tensions with Denmark escalated into the Kalmar War (1611–1613). The war with the Danes threatened the heartlands of the Swedish Realm and was therefore of higher priority to the central administration than the offensives in Russia. The exorbitant indemnities of the Kalmar War, a million riksdalers, consumed virtually all of the crown's resources, which left the army in Russia to fight the remainder of the war on a shoestring budget.

Starting from the rebuilding of the army in Russia in 1610 and 1611, it began to rely increasingly on private capital advanced by both officers and civilian merchants. The capture of the important trading city of Novgorod with its surrounding territories in 1611 alleviated the supply situation somewhat. However, by the end of the year the army was still in a deplorable state. A large portion of the troops were again unarmed and without mounts, which was due to ordinary wastage, but also because soldiers were forced to sell or pawn their equipment in order to get food.²⁵ The army was close to mutiny and, in April 1612, the commander complained that no more than two and a half months' wages had been received since the battle of Klushino 21 months earlier!²⁶

By the start of 1613, commerce in Novgorod and other Russian cities under Swedish occupation had all but ground to a halt, and there were no more funds.²⁷ In order to make ends meet, the commissariat and high command increasingly resorted to dubious means to stretch the limited resources. Methods included debasing the coinage, selectively using more favourable exchange

²⁵ TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 147–163, 173–181, Jacob De la Gardie to Charles IX 14.2.1611, 12.3.1611, 1.4.1611, 23.4.1611, 26.8.1611, 3.10.1611, and pp. 188–193, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 30.12.1611.

²⁶ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 859–866b, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 22.4.1612; AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.4.1612.

²⁷ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 767b–771a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 24.1.1613; AOSB II:5 pp. 44–47, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 1.8.1613.

rates, attempting to re-calculate a month as 40 days (with limited success), skimping on payments to the sick and wounded, and alternating between paying wages in cash or kind depending on which was cheaper.²⁸ Contrary to his orders, Jacob De la Gardie was forced to send units to Finland, where their supply would be somebody else's problem, while officers who had advanced large sums were sent to demand pay from the king himself.²⁹

In the spring and summer of 1614, a much larger crisis developed rapidly and threatened to overwhelm the entire army. A failed harvest in 1613 combined with longstanding over-taxation meant that the grain production of the Novgorod region plummeted, and the army and civilian population faced starvation. Rye, which had previously cost 1 daler per barrel, had by 1613 gone up to over 3 dalers, reached 5 dalers around New Year 1614, and skyrocketed to 15 dalers by the summer of 1614.³⁰ By this point, many of the soldiers were eating horse meat and dying of malnutrition.³¹

Plague struck in the spring. It killed at least 7,652 burghers in Novgorod alone and also laid low a large part of the army.³² The remaining Russian peasants and burghers mostly fled across the border, and even the meagre harvest could not be collected

²⁸ RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Order of länung for Nils Assersson's cavalry 1615; Berglund & Zakharov 1983; KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Proviantränskaper 11.3.; TUL F6 Cordt 4 pp. 602–603b, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 27.7.1612.

²⁹ AOSB II:5 pp. 39–42, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 6.7.1613.

³⁰ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614.

³¹ AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614.

³² AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614; RA, Handlingar rörander proviantering o.d. (M 1287) Fol 19, List of deceased in Novgorod 1614.

without Finnish conscripts sent to help.³³ To make matters worse, a resurgent Muscovy united under the recently elected Czar Michael Romanov started to press the Swedes hard, and threatened to overwhelm Swedish positions with a major offensive launched in the summer.

Although the attack was repulsed, Jacob De la Gardie had no illusions that the Swedes could still profit from the war, and – having himself advanced vast sums to the army – urged the king to negotiate for peace.³⁴ It took the king slightly longer to come to the same conclusion, and one last big offensive aimed at capturing Pskov was planned for 1615. The king led the operation personally but, despite meticulous planning and all available crown resources being diverted to the task, the operation failed due to lack of cash and supplies.³⁵

The last year and a half of the war was mostly a matter of ‘hanging through’, while the exhausted belligerents negotiated a settlement. The supply base of the army remained as deplorable as ever, and officers continued to advance funds not only for the benefit of the army but also to maintain stately appearances during diplomatic negotiations and provide for the English and Dutch delegations mediating the peace talks. However, the situation was helped by the discharge of parts of the army, and the knowledge that the war would soon come to a conclusion meant that the last resources of Novgorod, which had been spared for the rainy day, could be exploited. Peace was finally resolved on 27 February 1617, with the last troops vacating Novgorod a few months later.

The resources used to supply the army were more or less insufficient throughout the course of the war. The army, which ranged

³³ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 566–570, 577b 581, 587, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614, 8.7.1614, 4.8.1614.

³⁴ AOSB II:5 pp. 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 13.3.1614.

³⁵ AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 26.8.1615.

in size from under 5,000 to little over 10,000 men, required on average around 50,000–60,000 dalers per month.³⁶ In all calculations and reports, the amount actually provided came to little more than half of this. For example, during the eight months from 8 July 1613 to 8 February 1614, the entire army of just under 9,766 men received only 251,078 dalers' worth of pay and provisions of the 455,386 dalers owed, or 55%.³⁷ In total, 1,443,458 dalers' worth of cash and wares, plus an undetermined amount of provisions, passed through the army's treasury or were brought from Sweden by special commissaries.³⁸ This sum was comparable to the contemporary 'Älvsborg Ransom', the 1,000,000 riksdalers the Swedish crown had to pay to the Danes after losing the Kalmar War, and which almost bankrupted the realm. Though enormous, this fortune still only sufficed to pay for half or less of the cost of the war.

³⁶ For most of the war the army was 7,000–8,000 men strong. In October 1613 the army of 7,947 was owed 58,345 dalers per month. In February 1614, 9,766 men required 64,726 dalers per month and a projection for 1615 estimated that 7,978 men would require 39,320 dalers per month plus victuals. See KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/4; Generalstaben 1936, Appendix 12; RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Projection for 1615.

³⁷ KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/4.

³⁸ This figure has been compiled from the surviving military accounts: KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21, 1613/4, 1614/7; RA, Provi-anträkenskaper 11.3, Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613, RA, Provianträkenskaper 12, Isack Månssons account for provisions in Novgorod 1613–1614 and Commissary Falentin Jöransson Frost's account for Novgorod 1613; RA, Provianträkenskaper 13, Proviantmästare Erik Andersson's account 1610, Anders Munck's account for provisions in Novgorod 1611–1617, Account for the war treasury and provisions in Livonia 1616–1617; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Account of supply to Evert Horn's forces at Koporie 2.5.1613, Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for matters of war 1614.

Arrears

The main long-term supply problem was the accumulation of unpaid wages, called *arrears*. Because of the irregular and insufficient availability of resources, military units could seldom be paid more than the bare minimum needed for sustenance. This basic pay, called *länning*, was issued every 10 days with a mix of cash and provisions.³⁹ In theory, *länning* was meant to be complemented with full wages (*sold*) paid on a regular basis.⁴⁰ However, more often than not, these payments were neglected, which resulted in the continuous and untenable accumulation of arrears. This accumulation is illustrated by pay received in both cash and kind by Jacob De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment of foot (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Pay to De la Gardie's regiment 1.1.1615–4.3.1616 (in Swedish dalers).⁴¹

Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25. Figure by the author.

³⁹ The value of *länning* was approximately half the nominal wage of common soldiers, and a fraction of the normal salary of NCOs and officers.

⁴⁰ Later this was established as every four months, which was possibly also the goal during the Ingrian War. Roberts 1958, pp. 217–218.

⁴¹ The unit was meant to receive pay every 10 days. What it was owed was calculated by company clerks based on personnel per company between musters. I have used the medium of what was owed per company per 10-day period. What the regiment actually received is calculated as a combination of payments with known dates and the mean of payments, per 10-day period, of payments with known timeframes.

The regiment, which numbered 13 companies and 2,087 men in January 1615, received a minimum level of upkeep from the crown on a regular basis, supplemented by infrequent peaks when larger quantities of cash or clothes suddenly became available. The timing of these peaks was not haphazard but governed by how funds became available and how pressing the situation was. In particular, commanders sought to ensure that the men received proper equipment and pay prior to dangerous undertakings, such as sieges or battles. Looking at Figure 2.2, the first peak resulted from the payment of a half-month's *sold* to the entire regiment on 25 February 1615, just six days after 33,392 dalers arrived from Stockholm. The troops received another month's *sold* in July as a perquisite for them to be willing to serve at the siege of Pskov, and again more substantial wages while the siege was underway.⁴²

Only towards the end of 1615 did the amount of pay issued start to approach the required level, which was thanks to an improvement of the supply situation combined with a decrease in the number of men serving in the regiment.⁴³ In total, the pay received by De la Gardie's regiment during 1615 and early 1616 was less than half of that owed. With some elements of the regiment having been in service since at least 1610, the regiment was already owed 75,165 dalers by the start of 1615. By March 1616, the cumulative debt to both officers and men was already up to 189,411 dalers, as shown in Figure 2.3.

In the short term, as long as the soldiers received the minimum level of indispensable necessities, arrears were not a problem. Scarcity of resources, irregularity of supply, and delays in payment were common features of economic life and the norm for early modern soldiers, who could borrow or make do without

⁴² KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25.

⁴³ In March 1616, the regiment only numbered 1,355 men in eight companies. This decrease was due to attrition caused by disease, desertion and combat, as well as Jost Clodt's company of around 200 men being requisitioned by the king into his new lifeguard regiment. See Barkman 1963, p. 234.

Figure 2.3: Accumulation of arrears to De la Gardie's regiment 1.1.1615–4.3.1616 (Swedish dalers).

Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12. Figure by the author.

their full salary. However, in the long run, insufficient resources would begin to cause problems: lack of proper equipment, disease, indiscipline, disorders, desertions and eventually rampant loss of life or mutiny among the troops. Moreover, constantly operating on the margin of subsistence made the army brittle, which meant that any unexpected adversity could have potentially catastrophic consequences and lead to collapse.

To make up for this deficiency, the army had two options. It could resort to licentiousness and the forced requisitioning of what was needed from the local population, or it could rely on private credit. As the countless complaints of Russian peasants testify, the former option was frequently used. The resources of occupied Russian territories were exploited with co-ordinated collection of contributions, as well as unlicensed individual and collective looting.⁴⁴ However, marauding alone was not sufficient to maintain the army, and it was detrimental to military supply in the long run, since it would erode the supply base and drive away merchants.

⁴⁴ See the numerous petitions and complaints regarding the licentiousness of Swedish troops in Löfstrand & Nordquist 2005.

Increasingly, officers were required to advance their own funds to supply the army. They had a contractual and moral obligation to provide for the men under their command, and part of the rationale for their high wages was to recognise this responsibility and to provide the means to support their units.⁴⁵ Furthermore, officers had a vested interest to lend money. Lending to the crown could be a profitable and socially beneficial activity in its own right, besides which officers could hope to make a profit with the management of a company or regiment. Officers could also enrich themselves with assorted side ventures of both legal and illegal variety, which entailed being in command of a unit. On the other hand, officers who allowed their units to collapse or disintegrate would lose these revenues and the social prestige of commanding a company or regiment, standing little chance of recovering the funds they had advanced.⁴⁶

Crisis credit

Credit advanced by officers was particularly important during moments of acute crisis. These were unfortunately common occurrences, which could arise from the failure of regular supply, military defeat, unexpected collapse of morale, or some other unforeseen event. Owing to the slow speed of travel, uncertainty of information, and lack of stores, the personal wealth and credit of officers were frequently the only resources available on short notice. This 'crisis credit' formed an important buffer to cushion the army from the worst effects of these failures and saved parts of the army from collapse on multiple occasions.

Isolated detachments, operating away from the main army and the principal supply bases, were particularly susceptible to supply crises. Not only were such troops more difficult to maintain but the requirements for pay, provisions, clothes and armaments were

⁴⁵ See for example the recruiting patent for Bertrand du Carrane of 26.9.1606. RA, Riksregistraturet, Latinskt registratur 1606–1610.

⁴⁶ Parrott 2012, pp. 90–95, 208–209.

also more stringent due to the rigours of campaigning and the presence of the enemy.

Field Marshal Evert Horn was repeatedly in command of such detachments, and his personal funds and credit helped stave off a number of disasters. The first instance was in early 1610, when Horn led a force of several thousand foreign troops from Finland to reinforce the main army. After crossing the frozen Gulf of Finland, the detachment ran into unexpected difficulties when supposedly friendly Russian magistrates refused to provide provisions and encouraged peasants to flee into the forests with their foodstuffs.⁴⁷

As the soldiers were dying in the snow, Evert Horn had little choice but to provide the men with 8,399 dalers' worth of cash, food and clothes obtained from merchants.⁴⁸ Other officers also pitched in, such as captain Pierre De la Ville, who provided an additional 1,200 dalers for upkeep.⁴⁹ Although the force suffered severely from the 900-kilometre winter march through hostile territory, Horn nonetheless managed to complete his mission and link up with the main army on the eve of the battle of Klushino.

A slightly different form of crisis arose late in 1612, when Horn led a detachment to capture Ivangorod. Earlier attempts to besiege the fortress had failed, and the passage of troops and incessant raiding had picked the surrounding countryside bare and burned down much of the adjoining Swedish supply base of Narva. With the onset of winter and heavily engaged, the force was fully exposed to the elements and close to starvation. Disaster was once again staved off by the field marshal's personal procurements, which included at least 1,100 barrels of grain (enough to feed 1,500 men

⁴⁷ RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 12.2.1610.

⁴⁸ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–859, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 10.4.1612; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Jacob De la Gardie's patent of what owed to Evert Horn 25.7.1610.

⁴⁹ RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 10.6.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

for a month),⁵⁰ as well as large quantities of clothes, cash, and other supplies from Livonian and Finnish merchants. Later, while petitioning the crown to repay his subordinate, Jacob De la Gardie estimated that Horn had spent over 18,000 dalers for this operation.⁵¹

Commanders of garrisons were frequently left to their own devices as well. In Porchov, a remote castle near the front line, Stadtholder Hemming Grass had to provide 486 dalers in cash and 538 barrels of grain worth 1,806 dalers to a company of Scottish soldiers quartered there.⁵² Similarly, Understadtholder Claus Schlang was forced to pawn his silverware and jewellery in order to provide cash, clothes, food and supplies worth 1,336 dalers and 29 öre for the garrison at Narva at a time when it was close to starvation.⁵³

Besides these local emergencies, there were two periods of general crisis, which affected the entire army and forced many officers to dig deep into their pockets. The first was the defeat at the battle of Klushino in 1610, which caused the collapse of both the army and the Russo-Swedish alliance that had supplied it. As the army treasury was lost during the battle, paying and supplying the remaining loyal troops who limped their way back to the border fell on the shoulders of the officers. As commander of the army, Jacob De la Gardie showed the way, providing 5,474 dalers and 8 öre to supply and refit the men. More or less willingly, Colonel Reinhold Taube provided 2,600 dalers, Field Marshal Evert Horn 2,500 dalers, Colonel Samuel Cockburn an unknown figure, and captains smaller amounts. These funds were indispensable for purchasing weapons, ammunition, horses, clothes and

⁵⁰ RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Ordinance for provisions to Nils Assersson's cavalry 18.1.1615; Korhonen 1939, p. 75.

⁵¹ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 618–619, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 7.10.1612; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 891b–896, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 17.1.1613.

⁵² KrA, Militieräkningar 1617/3.

⁵³ RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.

provisions, but also to pay the troops, who refused to recross the border until they had received money.⁵⁴

An even greater ordeal was the supply crisis of 1613–1614, which arose from a combination of years of deficient supply combined with the economic collapse of Novgorod. As the failure of the 1613 harvest became clear, requests for assistance sent to Sweden became increasingly urgent. These requests had been largely ignored in the previous years and, yet again, most of Jacob De la Gardie's letters to Stockholm went unanswered. Even if the crown had been ready to step in, little help could be expected before the summer, when waterways and roads would be clear of ice and mud, and foreign supplies could again be imported.

To stave off disaster, the senior commanders took the initiative to arrange the necessary supply using their own resources. For starters, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie provided 700 barrels of grain from his estates and ordered another 1,000 barrels on his own credit from merchants in Tallinn and Narva, worth 5,100 dalers in total.⁵⁵ Later, the commander ordered his estate manager to send as much additional grain as could be got during the following harvest.⁵⁶ Other officers were also asked to advance funds to pay their men and purchase supplies. Although the sums advanced remain

⁵⁴ RA, Proviantränskaper 11.1 pp. 246–247, Evert Horn's and Samuel Cockburn's receipts 6.7.1610; RA, Proviantränskaper 11.3, Summary of upkeep for the army under the siege of Kexholm, in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613; TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 145–147, Jacob De la Gardie to Charles IX 25.1.1611; LUL, De la Gardieska släktarkivet vol 5-1, Jacob De la Gardie to Lasse Abrahamsson 8.10.1610 and Reinhold Taube's reversal to Jacob De la Gardie 5.12.1610; Brännman 1950 p. 45.

⁵⁵ De la Gardie asked to receive 3 dalers per barrel, though he claimed that the actual price in Russia was 5 dalers per barrel. See AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

⁵⁶ TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614.

obscure, we know that Colonel Cockburn provided at least 3,429 dalers for the purchase of clothes and weapons.⁵⁷

Besides grain, the army was in serious need of clothing, which was a recurring problem each autumn and winter. By the end of 1613, this need had become dire, since years of neglect and heightening enemy activity meant that ill-equipped troops were increasingly exposed to the elements. With the resources of Novgorod tied to staving off the anticipated famine, the burden of clothing the troops in 1613 and 1614 was left to the officers.

Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn had already previously furnished the soldiers with 12,000 dalers' worth of clothes, and now ordered cloth and clothes to the value of 30,000 dalers from merchants in Tallinn and Narva on their own credit. An additional 6,000 dalers' worth of clothes were purchased from a Dutch merchant, who had conveniently learned of the opportunity and arrived to offer his services to the generals.⁵⁸

These collective efforts helped the army tide over the worst of the 1613–1614 crisis. By mid-July, the military situation had stabilised, and at least 40,000 dalers in cash and several thousand barrels of grain had reached Narva.⁵⁹ The defeat of a major offensive from Muscovy gave the army some respite, and the victorious troops could be spread out into small garrisons, where they could be more easily supplied.

The final year of the war was also marked by crises, albeit on a smaller scale than the situation in 1613–1614. With the war winding down, collapse was averted by discharging a large part of the

⁵⁷ TUL, Lossius A1 p. 213, Jacob De la Gardie to Johan De la Gardie 3.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614; RA, Provianträkenskaper 12, Isack Månssons account for provisions in Novgorod 4.12.1613–30.9.1614.

⁵⁸ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, 572, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614 and 8.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, 5.5.1614 Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna.

⁵⁹ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 585–586, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 23.7.1614; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for matters of war 1614.

army, squeezing the occupied territory of every last resource, and with the officers providing vast sums of money and provisions. De la Gardie himself provided at least 10,000 dalers more, and, together with Field Secretary Måns Mårtensson, the pair imported 730 barrels of grains to Novgorod during the final year of the war.⁶⁰

Sustenance credit

Resources lent in moments of crisis, though crucial, were only a fraction of the total debt owed to the soldiers and officers of the army. The bulk of the crown's debt accumulated over time. Soldiers and officers were constantly underpaid, which put pressure on the officers to lend more of their own resources to cover the shortfall and prevent this attrition from reaching catastrophic proportions. These regular loans significantly increased the resources at the crown's disposal, helped maintain operational effectiveness, and kept the army going longer than would have been possible otherwise.

One common method for officers to maintain their men was by providing them with replacement weapons, armour, clothing, equipment and, most expensive of all, remounts.⁶¹ These would be purchased by captains and colonels from the merchants of Novgorod, Narva, Viipuri or further abroad and distributed to the men, becoming their property. Eventually, when the unit would receive pay, the officer would recover his loan by deducting the value of the items (including a mark-up price) from the individual

⁶⁰ AOSB II:5 pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 281–282, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616; RA, Provianträkenskaper 13, Anders Muncks account for provisions in Novgorod 1611–1617.

⁶¹ Commanders of domestic troops apparently had less of an obligation to equip their men, and we certainly find examples of small bands or entire units of troops, particularly Finnish cavalry, sent back to Finland to be re-equipped. Though we lack evidence, it seems likely that in the interim officers of domestic units provided replacements for their men in the same way as in mercenary units, but in a smaller scale.

troopers' wages. Horses killed in combat – rather than through disease or 'ill keep' – ammunition expended and ransoms would not be deducted from pay, but would rather be reimbursed to the officer by the crown.⁶²

These purchases meant that officers could have significant amounts of their own capital invested in equipping their men, particularly since the crown failed to pay *sold* regularly and thus repayment for these purchases would be delayed at the same time as the purchases continued to accumulate. In 1613, Evert Horn claimed that he had already provided some 20,000 dalers for the army, which included substantial sums of cash, clothes and horses for his own men. Some of the personal accounts of Jacob De la Gardie have also survived, and they list large quantities of clothes, armaments and other equipment imported to the warzone on a regular basis.⁶³

Besides providing equipment for their men, officers administered the payment of wages, and could use this to manage the crown's debt within their own units and to lend money. The arrears of each individual officer, NCO and soldier were carefully recorded in company accounts and, in theory, this was a personal debt between each man and the crown. However, the crown did not have the resources or interest to monitor this debt so closely, instead delegating the responsibility to colonels and captains. When units received pay, a commissary would muster the troops, count them and then pay their wages in a lump sum to the commanding officer, who could distribute the pay as he saw fit.⁶⁴

Control of the distribution of wages of course provided great opportunity for corruption.⁶⁵ Indeed, during the Ingrian War we

⁶² RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 1608; Parrott 2012, pp. 208–209.

⁶³ See LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie's personal accounts for Nov 1610–25.2.1611, 8.5.1611–16.9.1611, 3.1.1613–5.6.1613 and 12.2.1614–30.4.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 53–55, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 17.9.1613; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Löfstrand & Nordquist 2009, vol. II:169 p. 224, Petition concerning payment.

⁶⁴ Redlich 1964, pp. 320–321, 503–514.

⁶⁵ Redlich 1964 pp. 320–321.

find accusations of officers pocketing the pay of their men. For example, English soldier Nixon describes that, when his regiment mustered for the first time, they received clothes, but all the money was kept by captains and sent back to their wives in England.⁶⁶ Later in the war, it apparently became common practice for heavily indebted officers to sell some of the companies' grain rations to pay off their debts.⁶⁷

Table 2.1: Accounts of De la Gardie's lifeguard cornet for the period 2.8.1610–22.5.1617 arranged by rank and months of service.

Rank and numbers	Months in service	Horses at start	Horses at end	Earned (dalers)	Still outstanding (dalers)	Arrears
<i>Ryttmästare</i> (captain)	80	7	7	14,250	9,230	65%
Lieutenant	20	6	6	2,400	882	37%
<i>Fendrik</i> (ensign)	80	4	6	5,220	1,260	24%
2 NCOs	80	4	7	4,910	2,150	44%
2 NCOs	51–62	3	5	2,532	1,093	43%
4 NCOs	30	9	9	3,780	1,215	32%
2 NCOs	20–27	8	7	2,550	694	27%
16 Troopers	80	22	26	18,970	9,827	52%
17 Troopers	61–62	31	36	17,850	7,176	40%
7 Troopers	51–54	10	13	6,270	2,574	41%
17 Troopers	37–44	32	28	11,370	3,602	32%
9 Troopers	30–35	25	23	6,510	1,818	28%
10 Troopers	14–20	22	22	4,450	1,115	25%
89 Men		183	195	101,062	42,636	42%

Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1. Table by the author.

⁶⁶ Nixon 1610.

⁶⁷ AOSB II:1 pp. 74–75, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 2.8.1614.

However, it can be argued that both cases are examples of officers recovering what was owed to them and using this to manage the personal debt they had accrued on behalf of the company during recruitment and afterward. In contrast, we find numerous cases of officers actively using their own funds, or even borrowing money from third parties, to pay many months' wages for their men, besides which they would pay special rewards and compensations to individual out of their own pocket.⁶⁸ Officers could also forfeit their own, substantial wages in favour of repaying the arrears of their men.⁶⁹ This practice can be seen from De la Gardie's lifeguard cornet of cavalry, whose accounts were drawn up on 22 May 1617, shortly before discharge (Table 2.1).

As this account demonstrates, the wage arrears of men of every rank could be quite considerable. Indeed, for captains and officers of lower rank, arrears represented the largest single source of money owed by the crown. Unsurprisingly, the men who had served the longest had received the most money, but also had the greatest arrears. These men had also increased their stakeholding in the company by accumulating more horses than they had

⁶⁸ Compensations and rewards included bonus for capturing prisoners, pensions for wounded and widows, ransoms and even funeral expenses. For examples of officers providing salary for their men: TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610 and 16.6.1612, pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson Palm 16.9.1613; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob De la Gardie to Evert Horn 10.6.1614, p. 728, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 6.2.1616; AOSB II:5 pp. 460–476, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.

⁶⁹ Officers' wages were set high to compensate for and recognise their personal and financial risk, the responsibility of command, and the personal funds that they were expected to advance. Typical wage rates were: 500 dalers/month for colonels; 100 dalers/month for *överste wachtmestare*; 100 dalers/month for foreign captains or *ryttmästare* + 10–12 dalers/month for his 6–10 horses; and 40 dalers/month for domestic captains or *ryttmästare* + 10 dalers/month for his horses.

started out with, also receiving pay for these extra mounts. Officers consistently had the maximum number of horses allowed in their contract. Others arranged horses from Finland or Novgorod, and then sold these to their captain or to the unit (the crown).⁷⁰

Regarding how large a portion of their wages the men had in arrears, there is no real difference between NCOs and common troopers. However, the two senior officers, *Ryttmästare* Lorenz Wagner and Lieutenant Oluf Bengtsson, had higher arrears than common troopers who had served the same length of time: 65% for the *ryttmästare* compared to 52% for troopers, and 37% for the lieutenant compared to 25% for troopers who had served for 20 months. Another way to look at this is that 27% of the arrears owed to the unit were owed to the three officers alone. The situation was similar in Colonel Patrick Rutherford's personal company of 103 men, mustered in February 1611, where the foremost three officers were owed 31% or 5,083 dalers of the total arrears of 16,643 dalers, on top of which the colonel had separately advanced 1,500 dalers for some of the men.⁷¹

Besides these arrears, the crown was indebted for the pay of men lost along the way due to death or desertion. The number of men actually serving in the unit could only be calculated when a muster was held, which the men refused to do unless they received pay.⁷² Because this was such a rare occurrence, the discrepancy

⁷⁰ For example, Fendrik Johan Jacobsson delivered three horses to the unit from Finland for 78 dalers, while interpreter Erik Andersson and commissary Jören Thomasson provided four horses to replace losses in May 1609. See RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 6.12.1609 and 10.5.1610 entries in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

⁷¹ RA, Rullor vol. B7 (1611–1625), Account of what is owed to Colonel Rutherford and his men 1611.

⁷² Foreign troops' service contracts expressly guaranteed that they would not be mustered unless they received pay, which was also customary. See RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 1608; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 56–570, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614.

between how many men the unit had previously mustered and how many still remained could become quite large.

In central Europe, it was accepted practice that officers were allowed to collect pay based on the starting strength of the unit for the period of service, rather than the men remaining at muster. This extra pay was intended to provide compensation for the widows of dead soldiers and the enterpriser who had provided supplies to the men during the period, as well as informal interest for the delayed payment of wages.⁷³

In the Swedish army of the Ingrian War, this practice seems to have been partly followed. Units continued to receive *länning* (upkeep) regularly based on the last known muster strength. Outstanding *sold*, on the other hand, was paid based on the number of men actually present at the muster at the end of a period.⁷⁴ Indeed, the crown seems to have counted on the loss of some of the men to reduce the amount of arrears it would have to pay.⁷⁵ This meant that officers who provided pay, equipment and supplies for their men ran the risk of losing their investment if the man was killed.

However, officers had several means of offsetting this problem. Issues of pay and acknowledgement of debt left significant room for negotiation and interpretation. At times, when the crown could not provide full payment to the unit or they could not be properly mustered due to the enemy, a partial muster was held instead,

⁷³ Parrott 2012, p. 206.

⁷⁴ This led to at least one major argument between a German colonel, Linck, and Jacob De la Gardie, after the former lost 500 out of 1,000 men on the march into Russia. Linck demanded pay for the original 1,000 men, while De la Gardie wanted to pay only for the remaining strength. Eventually, a compromise was settled. See RA, Proviant-räkenskaper 11.3, 25.1.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

⁷⁵ Gustavus Adolphus assumed that 1,500 men would be lost over the winter of 1614–1615 to desertion and death. Although the king needed men for the coming siege of Pskov, he chose to prioritize the recruitment of new troops rather than maintaining the existing ones. Generalstab 1936, p. 500.

whereby the exact composition of the unit was not so rigorously examined and pay was issued based on paper strength instead. Officers of course made use of such situations to receive pay for non-existent *passvolants*, which the crown grudgingly accepted as ‘customary’ compensation for its inability to provide pay in a timely or regular fashion.⁷⁶

Captains and colonels would also hold regular musters on their own initiative and, presumably, in part at their own expense.⁷⁷ These musters helped fix the amounts owed for specific periods of time, even if the men were subsequently lost. For example, De la Gardie’s personal company in his infantry regiment reported having served with 237 men from 10 February to 15 September 1611 to the value of 13,916 dalers, with 234 men for the next 5.5 months (10,802 dalers), 230 men for the five months after (9,660 dalers) and so on.⁷⁸ Then, when it came time settle debts, the regiment clerk would compare the sum of what was owed for all these periods to how much each company had actually received from the crown, which would form the basis for the commanding officer’s debt claim.

Officers did not automatically receive the full sum owed to the unit. When units were discharged or depleted units that owed different amounts were merged together (*reformed*), arrears were paid for surviving individuals. However, officers could make a claim that they should receive some or all of what was owed to the dead men, and would support their claim with receipts, accounts, and muster rolls. Settlement of debts was a process of negotiation

⁷⁶ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 16.2.1610.

⁷⁷ It is hard to substantiate whether these were at the officers’ expense. However, units were mustered more frequently than ‘official’ *sold* was issued and, due to the unwillingness of soldiers to be mustered without pay, it makes sense to assume that the officers provided some form of compensation. At least this is what the officers claimed later, when demanding repayment for debts.

⁷⁸ KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12.

between the crown and the officers. How much each enterpriser received depended not only on the strength of their claim but many tertiary factors, which shall be discussed later.

By the end of the war, many officers had lent considerable sums to the crown to finance the war. The biggest creditor was the commander of the army, Jacob De la Gardie, who had lent 45,736 dalers to pay his own regiment, as well as 58,568 dalers to the army more generally.⁷⁹ Other officers followed suit in proportion to their rank and involvement. Field Marshal Evert Horn had at least 36,000 dalers' worth of receivables from the crown by the start of 1614, and continued to lend money until his untimely death the following year.⁸⁰ Duke Julius Heinrich of Saxony had been with the army for only a year by the time he was discharged in 1614, but even in this short period he had accumulated receivables from the crown to the sum of 22,122 dalers.⁸¹

Colonels also advanced significant sums to their regiments. Dutch Colonel Johan van Mönnichhofen served as the head of his regiment for three years, before being killed leading an assault in 1614. After his death, the crown recognised a debt of 6,093 dalers and 8 öre owed to his estate.⁸² Scottish Colonel Samuel Cockburn was lucky enough to survive and served for the duration of the war (1609–1617). By the end of 1612, Cockburn had already loaned at least 8,000 dalers, and by the summer of 1614 had lent an additional 10,000 dalers for the upkeep of his regiment, plus 6,241 to the rest of the army.⁸³

⁷⁹ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 11-1 fol. 47, His Majesty's account with count Jacob De la Gardie for his loans and what he has given to matters of war.

⁸⁰ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 21.5.1614; Gillingstam 'Evert Horn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

⁸¹ TUL, Lossius C p. 145, Gustavus Adolphus to Duke Julius Heinrich of Saxony 24.5.1614.

⁸² RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker vol. 1, Account with Colonel Mönnichhofen's estate 1615–1623; Generalstab 1936, p. 478.

⁸³ Brännman 1950, p. 45.

Regarding the total volume of lending, these examples are only the tip of the iceberg. Many loans were repaid during the course of the war, besides which these sums only represent the debts that the crown accepted. For example, the crown repaid Colonel Pierre De la Ville 23,955 dalers and 21.5 öre for credit advanced 1611–1613, yet refused to recognise an additional debt of tens of thousands from 1613–1614.⁸⁴ The bulk of debts to captains and lower-ranking officers remain vague as well, although the 9,230 dalers *Ryttmästare* Lorentz Wagner had in arrears (Table 2.1) is perhaps indicative of the amount owed to cavalry captains.

Finances

Having established the scale of funds advanced by the army's officers, let us now turn to look at how these loans were financed, and the credit networks that were involved. There were three sources for these funds: officers might advance their own capital, they could borrow funds, or they could use their personal credit to guarantee loans taken by the crown from third parties.⁸⁵

Advancing capital

The simplest means for officers to lend money to the crown's war effort was to advance their own capital. This capital could come in various forms, including buying provisions and paying salaries

⁸⁴ La Ville recruited a regiment 740 men in 1613 at the bequest of Jacob De la Gardie, the senior commander. However, the king had come to mistrust La Ville in the interim and wished to reduce costs, thereby refusing to accept the troops and acknowledge the debt. See RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, 19.4.1614 Account with Monsieur La Ville including attached letter from Jacob De la Gardie dated 18.5.1614; TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613.

⁸⁵ Redlich 1964, pp. 245–255.

with cash, importing and distributing grain from the officers' estates, redistributing equipment such as arms, armour and horses that had come into the officers' possession, and so forth.

The source of this capital was either inherited or accumulated. Inheritance was often important in establishing officers in their command, particularly for those domestic and foreign officers who undertook to recruit soldiers on behalf of the crown. Inherited estates were also important for providing a steady, reliable income to supplement officers' regular wages during the course of the war. However, inheritances did not go far in financing investment in the war, let alone suffice for large-scale loans. The bulk of inheritances were tied in estates, with only a small amount of liquid capital available for loan. Domestic captains and junior officers were mostly small provincial nobles or commoners with meagre estates. Aristocratic senior officers were not much better off. Jacob De la Gardie's inherited estates produced only 1,500 dalers annually, and the commander in fact commenced the war heavily in debt.⁸⁶

Foreign enterprisers necessarily needed to have the available funds to recruit their units. However, their initial capital does not seem to have sufficed for much more than this endeavour. As Henri de la Borde de Luxe, senior commander of the French in Swedish service, complained, he had inherited little else besides his prestigious name and prowess at arms.⁸⁷ In any case, foreign officers serving far from home did not have access to their estates, and were dependent on payment from the Swedes and the profits of war.⁸⁸

As the war progressed, officers started to accumulate capital in the form of salaries received, enfeoffments from the crown granted as either rewards or as recompense in lieu of salary, loot, profits

⁸⁶ Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.

⁸⁷ RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608.

⁸⁸ RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, French captains to Charles IX 25.10.1608.

from buying and selling equipment, and other sources. These profits could be substantial, and, unless some calamity struck, could surpass the officers' inherited wealth in only a few years.⁸⁹

Only a small portion of this accumulated capital was retained as cash and movables – mainly silverware and clothing – to cover running expenses and provide liquidity in case of emergency. The bulk was invested in land and realty such as town houses or mansions back home, or reinvested in the military enterprise.⁹⁰ How much officers chose to send back home and how much to reinvest in the army depended on their level of commitment to the Swedish crown and this particular war, expected risk and reward in financing the war, as well as the availability of other sources of investment.⁹¹

Some foreign officers served only to gain an apprenticeship in command or were otherwise merely 'passing through'. These officers would send virtually everything back home and were reluctant to invest anything but the bare minimum in the war. Other foreigners, the Scots in particular, were looking to enter Swedish service more permanently and eventually settle in the Swedish Realm. These foreigners, as well as those professional military migrants who had no desire to return home – if such a place even existed – were more committed and also more ready to reinvest their

⁸⁹ Of course, we must remember that the war was much more profitable in the early years than towards the end, when the crown was running out of funds and most of the warzone had already been picked bare. See AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

⁹⁰ It was common for officers to seek to purchase ownership of those farms whose taxation the crown had already enfeoffed to the officer as payment of salaries or debts. Also existing estates were enlarged and new estates purchased from other nobles. Nilsson 1990, pp. 290–291.

⁹¹ For many, reinvestment in the army might be the only or most secure place to invest profits, which also saved the trouble and risk of sending profits back home. See TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Nilsson 1989, pp. 162–167; Nixon 1610; Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.

earnings. The same was also true of ambitious domestic officers, who stood to gain from the war not only economically, but also through career advancement and advancement in royal favour.

There were two methods by which officers might reinvest in the war: providing wages and provisions for existing troops, or by recruiting additional forces. Owing to the mounting arrears detailed previously, officers were often called upon to use their own wages and other means to provide for the troops under their command. These additional investments in the officer's own unit in effect increased the crown's debt towards the officer, as well as the officer's vested interest in seeing the war through to a victorious conclusion. Owing to the desperation of the situation, such loans were not always voluntary, since, without added investment, the unit might collapse and the officer might lose his best chance at reclaiming the debt, as well as his command. As such, the choice was more about how much to reinvest and how much he could afford to send to safety. Another option was to pull out completely, although this was not always feasible without incurring the wrath of the Swedish king or without losing everything invested.⁹²

However, during the Ingrian War we also find ample evidence of officers of all ranks, as well as NCOs and common soldiers, actively seeking to increase their investment in the army by recruiting more soldiers and providing mounts. Captains such as Pierre De la Ville, who had recruited and commanded a company since 1607, arranged the recruitment of an entire regiment from France in 1612. Lieutenant Edmund Kolb managed to 'buy' the captaincy of his company after the former captain had died by recruiting an additional 20 men and settling the debts of the former

⁹² Some foreign officers managed to withdraw from the war while still recovering their funds by finding buyers for their units, as did domestic officers who were excused by the king due to wounds or old age. The two most senior Swedish commanders, Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn, each petitioned the king to discharge them at least temporarily so that they could get their finances in order, but were repeatedly denied.

captain's widow at better terms than his competitors were offering.⁹³ Another lieutenant, Daniel Hepburne, went on to recruit his own company and ended up lieutenant colonel in Count Jacob De la Gardie's regiment, which De la Gardie and the other officers recruited largely with their own funds in 1613.⁹⁴

Far more numerous were the captains who undertook to recruit new troops for their devastated companies or, in several cases, recruit completely new ones after the former had been destroyed or had deserted *en masse*. Furthermore, as the accounts for De la Gardie's lifeguard cornets (Table 2.1) show, officers, NCOs, and common troopers alike would also reinvest their earnings to furnish additional mounts for their company.⁹⁵

Borrowed funds

What the officer corps lacked in inherited wealth, they made up with social capital. Positions of command went hand in hand with social hierarchy and, although the officers were in many ways the runt of the litter in their own class, they were nonetheless members of the elite. Through their familial, clientage, and social networks, officers had access to significant wealth. Moreover, thanks to their connections and status, officers had credit and networking value, which they could use to gain access to mercantile credit.

Using these connections, officers would frequently borrow what was needed and advance these funds to finance the war on the crown's behalf. This followed the common early modern pattern identified by Laurence Fontaine: the officer borrowed money primarily from his family, close friends and acquaintances, and secondly from the outer circle of his social network. Only after

⁹³ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 631–632, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 13.12.1612.

⁹⁴ RA, Västergötlands handlingar 1607:1, Älvsborg och Gullberg, Receipt for Lieutenant Daniel Hepburn 4.3.1608; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14; Generalstab 1936, pp. 433–434.

⁹⁵ KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1.

that did he resort to 'outsiders', such as professional moneylenders and merchants.⁹⁶

Family and friends were an important source of funds, particularly at the start of an officer's career. Foreign enterprisers relied heavily on their innermost network to find and equip the men they were to lead. Military enterprise was often a family affair, with most captains or colonels having one or more brother, cousin or other close relative serving as their second, not to mention more removed kith and kin as NCOs or in the ranks. On top of these serving relatives, foreign officers would receive financial support from relatives staying afield to provide starting capital, and in some cases further loans while abroad.

Domestic officers would also borrow extensively from family and friends. At the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie was very dependent on some 4,500–5,000 dalers' worth of funds and resources provided by his siblings, as well as their aristocratic contacts, Councillor Axel Oxenstierna and Admiral Henrik Tönnesson.⁹⁷ Evert Horn also borrowed at least 1,000 dalers from his mother and several thousand from his brother Henrik Horn, and seems to have enjoyed further support from his family through the transfer of estates to finance loans, although the exact nature of these dealings remains vague.⁹⁸

Family and friends were more or less socially obliged to lend funds, particularly when the need was dire.⁹⁹ Even when they did not actually lend money, the existence of a wealthy inner network

⁹⁶ Fontaine 2014, p. 26.

⁹⁷ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6-1, Receipt to Henrik Tönnesson 18.1.1609, vol. 4, Order to Mats Olsson 12.2.1609, vol. 12:1, Account of items purchased from Johan Grönwald 1608, vol. 6-1, Copy of receipt for Johan Grönwald January 1609, vol. 11.2, Lasse Abrahamsson's account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and taken to Runsa 1611.

⁹⁸ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 561–564, 658–659, 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 13.11.1610, 21.5.1614 and 30.10.1614.

⁹⁹ Fontaine 2014, p. 44.

provided important security in case the officer hit a rough patch or if he needed additional guarantors for loans he wished to obtain. Moreover, through a network of family and friends an officer could call upon an even broader social network of potential creditors. To continue the example of Evert Horn: after his family could not (or would not) lend any more, the field marshal still managed to borrow 700 dalers from Brita De la Gardie, the sister of his friend and superior Jacob De la Gardie, who had asked his sister to advance these funds.

Moving outward from an inner ring of family and friends, the next source of lenders were colleagues and associates. On the front, fellow officers and civil-military administrators were often the readiest source of funds for an officer strapped of cash. As members of a military collective and in close proximity for protracted periods, officers got to know each other and form a rapport. Though officers did not always see eye-to-eye, members of the community – one could even call them a guild – were expected to trust and look after each other, while the shared military structure provided multiple mechanisms for arranging repayment.¹⁰⁰

Most numerous were the multitude of small short-term loans officers would give and receive from each other to alleviate the chronic shortage of coinage or to help each other through fluctuating fortunes. Many of these loans were meant to cover mundane personal expenses, such as gambling debts, wages to servants and cash needed to purchase supplies for their households. Others were given for the maintenance of a fellow officer's soldiers by providing a few horses or some cash to pay wages and purchase provisions.¹⁰¹

At times, officers would also lend more sizeable sums to one another. This often occurred during moments of crisis, such as when supply failed or a particular unit met with some disaster. If a commander was unable to meet the unexpected shortfall,

¹⁰⁰ Fontaine 2014, p. 32.

¹⁰¹ See for example the multitude of personal accounts in the De la Gardie family archives: LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1.

then fellow officers with deeper pockets might lend a hand. This was the situation during the crisis of 1610, where Field Marshal Evert Horn had to borrow 1,000 dalers from Colonel Mönnichhofen and 500 dalers from Captain La Ville to purchase clothes for his men, besides which he took out loans on behalf of the crown and asked his subordinates to provide additional funds.¹⁰² Similar round sums were advanced by other officers such as the Duke of Saxony, who borrowed 1,000 dalers in 1614, and Jacob De la Gardie, who in turn borrowed 1,000 riksdalers from Count Mansfeld in 1608 and another 1,000 dalers from Colonel Mönnichhofen in 1613.¹⁰³

The multitude of overlapping loans issued by officers to one another meant that many, if not most, officers were connected through a web of debts. This interconnectivity is visible in Count Jacob De la Gardie's personal accounts. Between 12 February and 30 April 1614, the Feldherre received 1,350 rubles (4,820 dalers), of which at least 506.92, possibly up to 1,070 rubles, were loans from nine officers and civil administrators working in his chancellery. The accounts indicate that the officers had in turn taken many of these loans from other officers or from merchant bankers. This money was used to pay all sorts of personal and military expenses and repay debts, including some of those received during this same period, but also to issue a loan of 280 rubles (1,000 dalers) to Duke Julius Henrik of Saxony, and a similar sized loan to Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm.¹⁰⁴

By lending to each other, officers could manage their personal debts and their level of commitment to the war. Loans were not

¹⁰² TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 26.4.1611.

¹⁰³ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 3:3 fol. 288, Jacob and Johan De la Gardie's obligation to count Mansfeld; AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

¹⁰⁴ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie's accounts for 8.5.–16.9.1611, 13.1.–5.6.1613 and 12.2.–30.4.1614, Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm to Jacob De la Gardie 24.2.1614.

only financial transactions but also formed social ties and marked out hierarchies. In the military context, traditional notions of credit and patronage – of patrons lending to their clients, who in return owed loyalty and friendship – did not apply in exactly the same way as in the civilian world. Rather, military subordinates would advance funds to their superiors, who would guarantee repayment, but also advance their own funds to those above them. The amounts advanced and who owed who were expected to follow military hierarchy, which meant that superiors were expected to ‘bail out’ their subordinates, and the total sums advanced were expected to increase with military rank.

Credit advanced between officers added few new resources to the sustenance of the war. However, these loans were important in a number of ways. First, they enhanced the fiscal resilience of the officers and, by extension, the army. Second, by lending to each other, officers could manage and share the burden of financing the crown’s shortcomings and weather the worst of fluctuating fortunes. Furthermore, these loans also alleviated problems caused by a shortage of coinage and helped keep the existing money in circulation, thereby stimulating the market sustaining the army. Finally, the interlinked web of debts created bonds between officers. Although it is hard to prove, this bond probably strengthened social and military hierarchies, and helped tie the officers into one cohesive force.

Finally, let us turn to look at officers’ connections with the civilian market, and their effect on financing and supplying the war. Sutlers, peddlers and tavern keepers, as well as local and international merchants, were a vital group in supplying the army on both private and public levels. A large and active market developed around the army, which officers and common soldiers would turn to sell loot and to purchase provisions and equipment, ranging from beer and garments to armour and horses. This market was vital in shoring up the shortcomings of military supply, which was not only slow and unreliable but also unable to deliver many of the individual items required by the troops.

Owing to the lack of coinage, much of this commerce took place with credit. Sales credit was a common feature in purchases made

by all ranks. Common soldiers would often buy food and drink based on a running tab, with a promise to settle their debts when their pay came in.¹⁰⁵ Officers would purchase equipment and provisions for themselves and their men with short-term sales credit of a few months or even a year. International merchants were often willing to accept payment in agricultural produce from the officer's estates or with a bill of exchange abroad, which facilitated commerce, as the officers did not have to transport or sell the agrarian products themselves.¹⁰⁶

Some officers also conducted personal businesses with merchants, increasing the interconnectivity of military and mercantile groups. For example, in 1614 or 1615, Evert Horn was selling 60 lasts of tar worth 1,500 dalers as well as some hemp obtained from the conquered territories to Dutch merchant Gert van der Heyden, which he intended to use to repay some other loans. Heyden was also a major provider of clothes to the army, to whom Evert Horn and Jacob De la Gardie were indebted at various times.¹⁰⁷ Claes Grambou, who had provided cash, clothes and provisions for Evert Horn's ill-fated detachment in 1610, continued to offer wares for many years. Grambou became a trusted supplier to Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn, and the commanders went out of their way to ensure that the merchant's business would prosper, including arranging reparations for Grambou's wares that were destroyed in a fire.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ When the army left Moscow in June 1610, many units had to be issued advance payment of their wages to settle debts accrued over the previous three months. See RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.1 pp. 239–240, 12.6.1610 receipt.

¹⁰⁶ LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Accounts with Johan Grönewaldt for January 1609 and 6.12.1611.

¹⁰⁷ TUL, Lossius B1 p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie.

¹⁰⁸ Arguably, the commanders were also motivated by their own debt to Grambou and it was mutinying French soldiers in Swedish service who caused the fire that destroyed his warehouse. TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 559–560, 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 6.10.1610

However, despite these connections, relations with merchants remained far more detached, formal and professional than with fellow officers, friends and family. Although officers frequently made use of merchants' services to obtain supplies, in terms of borrowing they were the last, outermost circle to which officers would turn to. This more stringent relationship is evident in the contractual nature with which officers received credit from merchants. Whereas loans from their inner circle were very open-ended verbal agreements or simple IOUs, the terms of mercantile credit, such as repayment schedules and interest, were formally drafted with promissory notes and contracts. Quite often, these contracts would also stipulate some form of security for the loan.

All the purchase and cash loans that I have found were made for the short term. Repayment was tied to established market days, such as Pentecost or Michaelmas, and were usually due within six months or a year. Most had an annual interest rate of 6%, which was perhaps a norm for short-term loans with good securities. Less secure loans were at 8% annual interest, which seems to be in line with rates charged by merchants from one another in risky overseas transactions.¹⁰⁹ We also find a case of Evert Horn paying interest on a monthly basis at a high but unspecified rate for a loan of 1,000 dalers taken in Tallinn, which suggests that short-term credit might be lent at even more exorbitant rates.¹¹⁰

Most loans required some form of security. For small loans, officers might pawn silverware or jewellery, which the creditor could sell if the loan were not repaid within a certain period after it was due. For example, at the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie had to pawn a gold chain worth 532 dalers in order to obtain a loan

and 21.5.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob De la Gardie to Evert Horn 10.6.1614.

¹⁰⁹ Möller 1954, pp. 261–262.

¹¹⁰ AOSB II:1 pp. 68–69, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 25.7.1614; LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1 p. 10, Jacob De la Gardie's receipt to Axel Oxenstierna 4.1.1609; TUL Lossius B1 p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie; Möller 1954, pp. 261–263; Heckscher 1936, pp. 577–578.

of 400 dalers needed to outfit himself for the coming campaign.¹¹¹ Similarly, in 1614, Understadtholder Claus Schlang pawned a silver pitcher and quart for a loan of 176 dalers, as well as a golden chain for a loan of 286 dalers, to obtain pay for the soldiers of his garrison.¹¹²

For larger loans, officer's estates or their revenues often acted as security. Such loans were arranged so that, after they became due, repayment of interest was tied to the produce of the mortgaged estate. If the debt remained unpaid for some time, the creditors would gain control of the estate and, depending on the contract, retain it either in perpetuity or until the yield of the estate had cleared the debt. I have been unable to find out how well defined or long this period of grace was before the estate would be handed over. However, some indication is provided by a loan of 5,000 dalers taken by Jacob De la Gardie in 1613, with the Feldherr's Livonian estates mortgaged as security. The debt remained unpaid three years later, and although the creditor, a merchant from Tallinn, had received interest this whole time, he was now becoming impatient and demanding the transfer of the estates.¹¹³

The most extreme example of mercantile borrowing during the war is provided by Evert Horn. By the end of 1614, the field marshal was heavily indebted to various merchants for purchases of military supplies. Having expended other sources of credit, Horn decided to turn to the open market to obtain new loans to pay off

¹¹¹ Remarkably, the jewellery was borrowed first from Henrik Tönnesson, so that De la Gardie could pawn it to merchant Henrich Schmidt. De la Gardie promised to repay the loan to Tönnesson within three months, with 50 dalers (9%) interest and revenue from his estates as security. LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1, Contract between Jacob De la Gardie and Henrik Tönnesson 18.1.1609.

¹¹² RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.

¹¹³ AOSB II:5 pp. 118–121, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 9.9.1616.

his previous debts, as well as advance a further 20,000 dalers ‘to keep the army willing to serve’.¹¹⁴

To obtain the loans, Horn provided his representative Philip Scheduling with the deeds of Saris, Mallahof, Parikkala and Kankainen manors with their underlying farms, three smaller estates, a number of farmsteads, and a royal patent he had received to collect an annual rent of 2,000 dalers from four Finnish parishes.¹¹⁵ Scheduling was to take these documents to Tallinn and find willing merchants to accept the documents as security for an unspecified sum of money. Should the debt be repaid within a year, Horn asked that he should repay only the principal. Otherwise, the estates would pass to Horn’s creditors, who would use the revenues to amortise the debt with an annual interest of 8% collected from the cash revenue portion of the estates’ rent.¹¹⁶

Guarantors of loans

The third and final way in which officers financed the Swedish war effort was by acting as guarantors for loans taken by the crown when procuring supplies from merchants. This is similar to the personal loans taken by officers from the merchants outlined above, yet distinct in that the state was the debtor, with the officers simply acting as guarantors.

During the course of the war, the crown depended heavily on merchants to supply the army with wares that could not be obtained through taxation. Clothes and armaments were particularly

¹¹⁴ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 30.10.1614; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 441–443, Gustavus Adolphus to Evert Horn 22.1.1615.

¹¹⁵ Kankainen and Mallahof had recently been transferred to Evert Horn from his brothers Henrik and Gustaf (Mallahof temporarily for five years) and, in all likelihood, constituted loans or some other form of support for their indebted brother.

¹¹⁶ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 30.10.1614.

necessary and were imported in large quantities from abroad. Eventually, as the economic basis of Novgorod deteriorated, the army also became dependent on horses, grain and provisions purchased from foreign merchants.

Procurement of these supplies was a shared responsibility between agents of the central administration operating from Stockholm, and the senior commanders and civil administrators responsible for supplying the army in Russia. Initially the army's supply officers were able to procure most of what was needed on their own, using local tax revenues to repay merchants. However, as the cost of purchases increased and they had to be procured from further afield, supply officers increasingly requested the central administration to pitch in and arrange payment from Sweden. Unfortunately, the central administration was slow to act and usually possessed only a superficial and out-of-date understanding of the situation. Owing to the urgency of the moment, senior officers thus assumed an increasingly active role in contracting merchants on behalf of the crown.

As was customary for most commercial transactions of this magnitude, these purchases took place with short-term, interest-free credit. In this case, senior officers acting in their role of state agents would promise repayment by the crown from copper mined in Sweden, butter taxed in Finland, or other sources of revenue, as the crown would see fit. The broad and ambiguous range of goods for repayment does not seem to have been a problem for merchants, who traded in a variety of goods on the international market.

However, many merchants had reservations with lending directly to the crown, which was notoriously bad at repaying debts and difficult to hold accountable if it failed to pay. In 1612, the crown was already having trouble paying all of its debts in the allotted time and found it impossible to purchase wares on credit except at exorbitant rates and with heavy securities. The state was repeatedly embarrassed to find out that, due to lack of co-ordination, the same sources of revenues had been allocated to the repayment of multiple debts. In 1613, the crown's credit sunk further, as the new king, Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf), cancelled

all previous assignments of state revenues to service debts (*invisningar*). The following year, a strict regime of prioritisation was undertaken to decide which debts would be serviced and which neglected, further increasing the reluctance of merchants to provide credit.¹¹⁷

As the crown's credit standing sunk, senior commanders and administrators procuring supplies on behalf of the crown were increasingly forced to guarantee repayment with their own credit. Merchants were far more willing to sell to noblemen, who were easier to hold accountable, and who possessed sizeable estates, which could be used as securities. Furthermore, merchants perceived credit as a means of building bonds with powerful aristocrats, who might in return petition the crown on their behalf or enable them to do commerce in other areas.¹¹⁸

The primary commodity purchased with the credit of senior commanders was clothes. In the early years of the war, these purchases could be repaid with property confiscated from Russian 'traitors' or the tax revenues of conquered Novgorod, which the commanders administered. In this situation, acting as guarantor for the crown's purchases was hardly a risk or a burden worth mentioning. However, by the end of 1611, the army had grown in size and the resources of Novgorod were becoming thin. With winter approaching, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and Field Marshal Evert Horn contracted the Tallinn-based merchant Claes Grambou to provide the army with 7,200 dalers' worth of clothes repayable by the crown but guaranteed by the officers. Because of the lack

¹¹⁷ AOSB I:2 pp. 42–48, Privy Council to Queen Christina 25.3.1612, pp. 873–884, Privy Council to Karl Bonde 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 pp. 43–47, 53–55, 68–69, 89–90, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxensiterna 17.5.1614, 31.5.1614, 25.7.1614 and April 1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 199–202, 264–266, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 4.8.1614, 13.8.1614 and 26.4.1616, pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyk 26.8.1615, p. 218, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 3.11.1614.

¹¹⁸ Möller 1954, pp. 220–227; Fontaine 2014, p. 87.

of resources, De la Gardie sent a letter to Stockholm, requesting the crown to arrange payment by the following Pentecost, or Midsummer at the latest.¹¹⁹

De la Gardie received no reply. Together with Evert Horn he started to arrange repayment on their own from Finnish and Russian revenues, with meagre results. Taxes and confiscated property from the Novgorod region proved insufficient, and local administrators in Finland refused to provide payment without express orders from Stockholm. The debt went unpaid, yet Grambou continued to advance funds, providing at least another 7,985 dalers of supplies in 1612 and 1613, before his premature death.

The clothes purchased during the crisis of 1613–1614 followed the same pattern as with Grambou, but on a larger scale. 40,000 dalers' worth of clothes were purchased at the end of 1613 by De la Gardie and Horn on behalf of the crown, of which De la Gardie guaranteed 30,000 dalers and Horn secured repayment for the remaining 10,000.¹²⁰ The pair made additional purchases in 1614 and 1615, and by 1616, De la Gardie had personally guaranteed crown loans of some 38,000 dalers to Dutch merchant Gert van der Heyden and 41,729 dalers to a Tallinn merchant Bogislaus von Rosen, as well as others for which we have no records.¹²¹

The crown recognised these debts and promised payment. However, because of the lack of revenues, this became a long-drawn-out process. Only 77% of the debt to Bogislaus von Rosen had

¹¹⁹ TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–849, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 10.4.1612.

¹²⁰ AOSB II:5 pp. 58–69, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna October 1613, 18.12.1613 and 13.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 16.12.1613.

¹²¹ Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, 118–121, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616 and 9.9.1616. A large amount of clothes was apparently also purchased from a merchant named Herman Timbermann on behalf of the crown, though the value of these purchases and how they were repaid remain obscure. For Timbermann see AOSB II:5 pp. 79–80, 107–110, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 23.5.1615 and 6.4.1616.

been paid by 1617, while De la Gardie's commitment to van der Heyden continued until at least the end of 1623.¹²² All the while, De la Gardie's and Horn's credit was tied up with guaranteeing the debt, and the commanders continued to actively remind the crown of its obligation and to ensure that the funds were actually transferred. It does not seem as though De la Gardie or Horn handed over any of their estates, but they were forced to pay interest on behalf of the crown.¹²³

For the most part, merchants appear to have been willing to settle for longer repayment periods, with steady interest. However, there were instances where repayment was hurried. Merchants who lost confidence in the Swedish crown's or its aristocratic intermediaries' ability to repay – which was closely connected to how well the war was perceived as going – were less willing to wait. A merchant's financial overcommitment or the demands of his own creditors could also add pressure for speedy repayment. Moreover, because lending remained a very social, inter-personal practice, the death or withdrawal of a debtor would push creditors to demand swift repayment.¹²⁴

The death of Claes Grambou in 1613 caused a small crisis, since this incited his creditors to demand what the merchant owed them. In March 1614, De la Gardie warned that, unless Grambou's widow could be repaid by the following Bartholomew's Day (24 August), De la Gardie would be forced to repay everything, at the cost of ruining his own finances. The king heeded the plea, and on 19 July 1614 Grambou's widow received estates in Estonia as security of the still-outstanding debt of 12,000 dalers, which she could retain and use to recover the funds advanced by her husband.¹²⁵

¹²² Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 241–244, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 27.10.1623.

¹²³ TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 83–85, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.

¹²⁴ Fontaine 2014, p. 50.

¹²⁵ AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, 32–35, 58–60, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.4.1612, 21.3.1613, October 1613 and 13.3.1614;

Besides financial self-interest, De la Gardie and Horn had a national interest in safeguarding the repayment of merchant creditors, which the king and the Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) also recognised. The default, or even rumoured lack of liquidity of one of these merchant bankers could lead to their financial collapse. Besides losing a good supplier, this would close access to an important source of mercantile credit and hurt the crown's reputation. Because of the interconnectivity of debts, the default of a single creditor could also reverberate through the rest of the network and threaten to topple the entire system of mercantile borrowing on which military supply depended.¹²⁶

Repayment

As the previous sections demonstrated, officers served as important intermediaries in the mobilisation of resources for war: both lending funds by various means, as well as borrowing from the civilian market on behalf of the crown. It now remains to look at how these debts were repaid, and what sorts of reward the officers could hope to reap.

Settling debts

The bulk of the debts by the crown to officers and by officers to others started out very informally. Except for some of the commercial loans taken from merchants, debts were ill-defined in

RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Summary of debts to Claes Grambou; RA, Riksregistraturet, Mortgage letter for Grambou's widow 19.7.1614.

¹²⁶ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 559–560, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 6.10.1610; TUL F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 26.8.1615.

terms of means and time of repayment, securities and interest (if any). Credit advanced on behalf of the crown was seldom agreed beforehand with the central administration, owing to the urgency of the situation and the difficult communications to Stockholm. On the other hand, arrears and purchases made on behalf of an officer's company or regiment were constant, ongoing affairs, which were expected to be settled at some indeterminate point in the future.

As debts went unpaid and started to accumulate, pressure to find a solution guaranteeing their repayment increased. At this point, the original debt was usually renegotiated, and formally confirmed in official contracts. There was usually significant room to renegotiate debts in order to find a secure solution for repayment, and debtors could usually postpone repayment for some time, especially if they were high up in the military or social hierarchy.

As far as possible, debts were managed and repaid within the military organisation. The commissariat and senior commanders controlled the military treasury, the taxation of occupied Russian territories and, to a degree, revenues from Finland and Estonia allocated to supply the forces. Merchants and officers who had provided cash and supplies for the army might be repaid by the commissariat from the revenues of the occupied territory and from the property of Russian merchants and boyars labelled as 'traitors'. In some cases, the debts between officers could even be repaid through the army treasury by transferring part of the wages of one officer to another.¹²⁷

Debts were also redistributed within the military. Senior officers were personally responsible for the pay and supply of their juniors and the men under their command. As arrears began to mount and officers were forced to advance funds, restitution was always sought from the next rung of military hierarchy: soldiers and

¹²⁷ Regarding repayment of merchants from Russian resources, see for example TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, 602–603b, 614–617, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610, 27.2.1612, 16.9.1612 and 27.9.1612.

junior officers from captains, captains from colonels, and colonels from the commissariat and senior commanders. Superior officers, under increasing pressure from below, would frequently appropriate part of their subordinates' debts by repaying them or their creditors, or by leaving the debts unpaid but assuming responsibility for them.

For example, Evert Horn was eventually forced to repay Captain Pierre De la Ville for some of the funds which the latter had been forced to advance while under Horn's command.¹²⁸ Horn, in turn, complained of his mounting debt to Commander Jacob De la Gardie, who assumed part of this debt.¹²⁹ In the end, credit advanced by officers followed military and social hierarchies, and the transfer of debts from subordinates to seniors served to rectify any irregularities in this hierarchy.

The rearrangement of debts within the army helped waylay the problem but could not overcome the insufficient means at the army's disposal. Soldiers became unwilling to serve or outright mutinous and would require payment or additional rewards before they could be expected to undertake difficult or dangerous tasks. By 1614, the situation had become so bad that De la Gardie, the senior commander responsible for all wages, could not appear in front of his troops for fear that this would spark a mutiny.¹³⁰

To ease these mounting debts, commanders sought to shift responsibility for repayment directly to the king. Already in 1612, De la Gardie was forced to send Colonel Samuel Cockburn's regiment to Finland to receive pay and provisions either from local administrators or by force from Finnish peasants. The colonel was given leave to travel to Stockholm to demand repayment directly from the king. To aid his cause, De la Gardie wrote strong letters

¹²⁸ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 26.4.1611.

¹²⁹ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–558, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610 and 28.9.1610.

¹³⁰ AOSB II:5 pp. 74–75, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 29.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 577b–581, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 8.7.1614.

praising Cockburn's services and the necessity of repaying him and gave them to the colonel to deliver to the king and Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna.

Colonel Cockburn was successful in petitioning his case. His long and loyal service, De la Gardie's strong support, and the fact that the colonel still commanded a sizeable regiment of veterans, which could continue to offer good service if paid, probably aided his cause. In December 1612, Cockburn was enfeoffed with several estates in the Finnish parishes of Pernaja and Porvoo, which he could hold for life, as well as 465 royal homesteads in the Finnish provinces of Ostrobothnia and Satakunta, which were mortgaged against a loan of 8,000 dalers recognised by the royal accounting chamber (*räknekammaren*). The annual rent of the homesteads would be used to repay the debt over a number of years, and the rights of the peasants were secured so that they could not be evicted or forced to pay more than the customary annual rent.¹³¹

Over the following years, Cockburn successfully negotiated the repayment of additional loans. By summer or autumn of 1614, the crown accepted a further debt of 16,241 dalers, which Cockburn had used to pay his own regiment and for the upkeep of the rest of the army. Cockburn requested that this sum should be paid in cash, probably so that he could repay his creditors, to which Gustavus Adolphus concurred. However, repayment was drawn-out, and in 1615 new settlements were made. In June, Cockburn was enfeoffed with the parishes of Kroneby and Karleby in Ostrobothnia and was promised cash payment when the king arrived in Narva.¹³²

However, the cash which the king brought from Sweden was insufficient to repay all the creditors waiting in Narva, especially since a major siege against nearby Pskov was in the works.¹³³

¹³¹ Brännman 1950, p. 45; Boëthius 'Cockburn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

¹³² Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49.

¹³³ Some of the funds brought with the king were used to repay Cockburn, besides which the king asked Jacob De la Gardie to advance

Instead, a new agreement was ironed out in September 1615, whereby Cockburn received a multitude of additional estates across southern Finland against a shortening of the debt by 6,000 dalers. These new estates, as well as those enfeoffed for life in 1612, were now endowed as inheritable property (*donations*), with all the freedoms and privileges that nobles enjoyed for their inherited estates. There were also stringent requirements: the estates could not be sold or mortgaged without first offering them to the crown; only male heirs¹³⁴ could inherit the estates; and these rights would have to be confirmed with every future king. Finally, Cockburn received a promotion to the rank of *generalfältvaktmästare*, and started to receive higher wages.¹³⁵

These settlements with Samuel Cockburn were typical of how the crown managed its overgrown debts to the army's officers. Repayment was a long-drawn-out process, requiring active petitioning by the creditor and multiple rounds of negotiation. Amount of debt and terms of repayment were negotiable, and the crown repeatedly reneged on its promises. Every time the debt was renegotiated, even those settlements that had already been agreed upon were reconfirmed, suggesting that they were not so secure after all. After a settlement was reached, it could take some time and much work before the funds were actually arranged. It was quite common to find the revenues assigned to service the debt already directed elsewhere, or to prove to be far less than the optimistic administration had calculated. Furthermore, bailiffs, toll masters, and other civil servants could prove quite intransigent in handing over the promised estates or sources of revenue, even after receiving direct orders from the king.

5,000 dalers, of which some or even all were used to repay Cockburn. However, the total sum repaid in cash remains obscure. AOSB II:5 pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxensiterna 22.3.1616.

¹³⁴ If no male heirs were present, the estates would return to the crown and female inheritors would be repaid with the original 6,000 dalers against which the estates had been donated.

¹³⁵ Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49; Boëthius 'Cockburn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

As in Cockburn's case, many debts were serviced by enfeoffing or donating land, or by farming out the collection of taxes from parishes, tolls, and other sources. The heavy cost of the Ingrian War and the crown's other military ventures led to a massive increase in the alienation of crown revenues during Gustavus Adolphus's reign (1611–1632). Enfeoffments and donations often took place within the newly conquered territory. In the case of the Ingrian War, virtually all of the annexed territory consisting of the provinces of Kexholm and Ingria was enfeoffed to the largest creditors, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and merchant Bogislaus von Rosen. Besides gaining the title of count and a number of estates in Finland, Sweden and Estonia, De la Gardie was repaid for his services and the credit he had advanced with 4,500 rubles (15,000 dalers) from Russian war indemnities and the enforcement of Kexholm province and Nöteborg for six years, which was later extended to 12 years.¹³⁶

In general, officers appear to have been content to receive land in lieu of payments in cash. As Evert Horn put it, allocations of land were much better than promises of repayment in cash, since the Treasury (Sw. Räkningekammaren) was so flooded with demands that repayment would take years or be neglected altogether.¹³⁷ Though repayment from enfeoffed land was slower, it provided security and a steady and predictable stream of revenue, and, if the terms of enfeoffment allowed, the land could be mortgaged or sold to settle an officer's debts with his own creditors.

Enfeoffments and donations also served to tie officers to the service of the state. As long as the debt continued to be serviced, officers and the crown remained connected by the personal bond of credit. For officers, control of land and debts from the crown

¹³⁶ Besides repaying the 104,304 dalers' worth of credit he had advanced to the crown, Grill calculates that Jacob De la Gardie made a profit of 170,218 dalers from the enfeoffment over the 12-year period. Hallenberg 2009; Grill 1949, pp. 26–44.

¹³⁷ TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 21.5.1614.

provided influence, prestige and the promise of future employment and advancement. From the crown's perspective, land grants were part repayment, part reward, which increased an officer's stakeholding and enticed him to continue in the crown's service. Donations and their promise were an important component in enticing Swedish elites to serve, but also a tool for retaining the services of good foreign officers.¹³⁸

Prioritisation of payments

Not everyone was as lucky as Colonel Cockburn or Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie. The massive cost of the war meant that, even with the alienation of crown revenues, the means to repay everything owed to the army simply did not exist. In 1613 and 1614, an increasing number of disgruntled officers received a leave to travel to Stockholm, overwhelming the central administration with their petitions. In April 1614, the Privy Council wrote to the king asking for prompt instructions what to do with the 'multitude of soldiers' who arrived daily from Russia and Finland to demand payment. The councillors also reminded the king that the country was overcommitted, and asked the king to outline which debts they were to pay, and what would have to be left unpaid, even with some peril.¹³⁹

The king and Privy Council settled on a form of triage. Priority was given to the repayment of those senior officers deemed absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war: Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie, Field Marshal Evert Horn, and Colonels Mönnichhofen and Cockburn. These men were to receive some payment immediately, with which they could repay their creditors and their subordinates. More permanent, long-term settlements were to be arranged to cover the rest of the debt. Bogislaus von Rosen, the principal contractor supplying the army at the time, was also

¹³⁸ Fontaine 2012, pp. 129, 249; Nilsson 1990, pp. 117–146.

¹³⁹ AOSB II:5 pp. 17–26, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 17.1.1613; AOSB II:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614.

included on the priority list, but other merchants who had lent money in the past would either be made to wait or promised repayment in the distant future, if the situation and their merits allowed. Individual creditors owed very little could be repaid more freely, since this would not jeopardise the royal finances.¹⁴⁰

Some officers such as Colonel Pierre De la Ville, who had served since 1607 and lent significant sums of money, were neglected. Despite being close to Jacob De la Gardie and receiving strong endorsement from the feldherr, La Ville had fallen out of favour with the king, who did not trust him. Gustavus Adolphus was also furious that La Ville had recruited more troops at De la Gardie's bequest without consulting Stockholm. De la Gardie, on the other hand, was not reproached for allowing this, nor for conducting an identical recruitment of his own. The feldherr was 'part of the system', favoured and indispensable, and thereby received repayment, whereas La Ville was not.¹⁴¹

Unlike other senior officers who received land, La Ville received pay merely in cash, mostly in the form of bills of exchange redeemable in Lübeck and Hamburg. Moreover, the crown refused to acknowledge a substantial part of La Ville's claim. The royal accounting chamber calculated that the colonel had received 955 dalers and 21.5 öre in excess of the acknowledged debt of 23,000 dalers, and that the Frenchman in fact owed the crown. The colonel's outstanding claim went unpaid, and a petition was made as late as 1781 – 170 years later – asking for recompense to his descendants!¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ AOSB I:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 pp. 44–45, 68–69, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna, Johan Skytte and Broder Andersson 17.5.1614, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 25.7.1614.

¹⁴¹ TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613; TUL, Lossius A1 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614.

¹⁴² RA, Hären löneavkräkningar 1620–1680 series 4, Memorial for the outstanding debt to Pierre De la Ville's descendants 5.3.1781; RA,

The choice of who would receive repayment was in part a matter of utility: could the crown expect to have future use for this individual, and what would be the cost if it refused to pay? Creditors knew this, and most petitions for repayment of officers and merchants alike promised to serve faithfully and to advance further sums, but only if the previous debts were first repaid. Officers who still commanded sizeable units might also use the threat of mutiny or licentiousness to pressure the crown, although this required subtleness and a balance of threat combined with justified grievance and ability to negotiate in order to succeed.

For example, in 1616, when the situation in Russia was untenable, a number of units that had fought well were sent to Finland with promises that the crown would repay all its debts from the treasury of Turku Castle. Unsurprisingly, the money was not available, but the threat that the soldiers would forcibly exact repayment from the peasantry prompted the crown to divert funds from other ventures. It still could not afford to pay the officers and men in full but managed to negotiate settlements with the officers. Some of the troops were retained in service, which enabled the crown to postpone repayment still further. In the case of others, the crown offered to pay part of its debts and give the officers good commendations, and then sought to find a foreign sovereign who would accept them into his service and assume responsibility for the remainder of the debt.¹⁴³

Besides utility, patronage was important for securing repayment. Evert Horn and Samuel Cockburn could rely on Jacob De la Gardie's support, who in turn relied on Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's patronage. Even the Duke of Saxony, who failed as a military commander, received repayment through the patronage of Queen Dowager Christina, who pressured her son to repay the duke. Truly 'mercenary' officers who remained detached from the

Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Peder Olofsson's account for Pierre de la Ville's company 18.3.1614.

¹⁴³ TUL, Lossius A2 p. 439, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 29.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 271–273, 281–828, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 22.5.1616 and 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616.

Swedish crown and aristocratic elite stood little chance of receiving pay over those creditors more closely integrated to the state.¹⁴⁴

Finally, repayment was very much a question of moral obligation and reciprocity. Those officers who had served well and, above all, loyally, could expect to receive both repayment and reward. In their petitions, officers emphasised the sacrifices they had made both to their health and to their inherited wealth on behalf of the crown. In particular, the widows of officers killed in combat could expect recompense. The most prominent examples were Colonel Mönnichhofen, killed leading an assault on Gdov, and Field Marshal Evert Horn, who died repelling an attack at the siege of Pskov. The king was present to witness both these deaths and did not fail to repay the estates of his brave subordinates.¹⁴⁵

Conversely, officers who failed in their duties or proved disloyal stood little chance of recovering their investment, even if warranted. Charles IX refused to repay his debt to many of the French officers who recruited troops between 1606 and 1610, because he considered that they had not earned it. Henri de la Borde de Luxe planned to complain to the King of France Henry IV and make this a diplomatic matter, but the assassination of the French monarch prevented this. Naturally, those French troops who defected to the enemy in 1610 – arguably with little choice – forfeited all chance of repayment. Despite their latter successes, Charles IX held Evert Horn and Jacob De la Gardie partly responsible for the defeat at Klushino in 1610 and refused to repay the funds they had advanced to maintain the army before this defeat.¹⁴⁶

Most successful were those officers who proved their commitment to the war effort, often with great financial and personal risk, and managed to integrate themselves in Swedish social networks. These officers were favoured with not only repayment of their outstanding debts but also additional gifts of land and wealth,

¹⁴⁴ AOSB I:2 p. 211, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Skytte 2.10.1614.

¹⁴⁵ Generalstaben 1936, pp. 478, 522; RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker vol. 1, Account with Colonel Mönnichhofen's estate 1615–1623.

¹⁴⁶ Le Mercure Francois 1615, pp. 49 – 56; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 561–564, 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 13.11.1610 and 26.4.1611.

money and jewellery, social advancement and offices in the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy.

Conclusion

Victory often goes to the army that makes the least mistakes, not the most brilliant plans.

— Charles de Gaulle

The history of the Ingrian War can be presented as a series of failures in military supply. Despite best efforts, state-run military finances and supply proved utterly inadequate to pay, feed or clothe the Swedish army in Russia. However, in spite of recurring crises and steady deterioration, the army managed to outlast the enemy and limp its way to victory. The ensuing Treaty of Stolbova gave the Swedish Realm control over the entire Gulf of Finland, tighter control of Baltic trade revenues, the new provinces of Ingria and Kexholm, and a more secure eastern border.

This victory was largely the result of the commitment and credit advanced by the entrepreneurial officers of the Swedish army. The men, money and materials provided by both native Swedish and foreign officers alike greatly expanded the resources at the state's disposal at the point where they mattered the most, increasing the longevity that the army could be kept in the field. Moreover, the personal resources of officers helped the army tide over the worst supply crises, thereby making the army more robust and preventing its collapse on multiple occasions.

As well-connected members of the elite, officers also functioned as crucial intermediaries at the nexus between the civilian and military economies, obtaining resources from the civilian market and putting these to use for the benefit of the war effort. This helped tie disparate economic agents within the realm and beyond its borders behind the crown's interests in support of a common war effort. Moreover, tapping into the credit network of the army's officers gave the crown access to a larger resource base, and otherwise inaccessible resources at potentially lower transaction costs, than if the entire affair had been state-run.

An important yet often overlooked component of military entrepreneurship was the devolution of risk from the crown. Officers were not merely subordinates but investors and stakeholders in the ‘military enterprise’. So long as the war went well, officers could expect to make a profit and enjoy a prestigious position in the king’s service. However, if they failed in their duties or the war was lost, officers stood to lose their investment and reputation.

Morals and social ties governed reward and repayment, which encouraged officers to serve faithfully and integrate with Swedish networks, rather than remain detached mercenaries. Many officers accepted a vested interest in the outcome of the war and were prepared to commit both their person and their wealth. Through military entrepreneurship, members of the elite were enticed to participate in the crown’s military venture and integrated more closely with the interests of the nascent Swedish empire.

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