This study derives its motive from the recent proposals to transform the European Commission into the formal government of the European Union. It assumes political accountability to the parliament the executive to be a central element of any government, and therefore goes on to assess the degree to which the Commission is currently politically accountable to the European Parliament. Political accountability is regarded as susceptibility to parliamentary control mechanisms on the basis of political, rather than legal or financial matters.

The study follows the atomistic approach to the institutionalist logic and a comparative method of political science, as it relates the Commission situation to that of the federal government of Canada. Comparativeness necessitates certain presumptions, which will be built on the nature of federalism in the EU, and consequently to the notion, that the European Commission can be regarded as a majority government.

The central findings, on the one hand confirm previous arguments about the difficulty to fully realize parliamentary accountability in a federal setting. On the other hand, they add to the discussion an argument, by which certain parliamentarian principles also hinder the functioning of political accountability as they appear to outweight one another. Overall, however, albeit some outlying questions, this study finds that political accountability in Canada, a full parliamentary democracy, and the political accountability of the European Commission share certain common deficiencies.