Policy Framework for Sustainable Peacebuilding in South Sudan

A Critical Discourse Analysis of South Sudanese Peace Policy Documents

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The aim of this study was to critically analyse the South Sudanese peace policy framework which has been expressed in its post-independence peace and development policies. The study also aimed at analyzing the nexus between peacebuilding and broader development agenda and at identifying types of discourses, beliefs and ideologies that have been adopted or relinquished in the South Sudanese peacebuilding framework. Any ideological impact of external factors in influencing peace policies was also critically analyzed.

Four policy documents namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013-2015 and the Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013 were selected and critically analysed using Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for Critical Discourse Analysis: (1) linguistic features and texts, (2) interdiscursivity, and (3) explanation of wider social, political, historical and cultural contexts.

Key theoretical concepts surrounding peacebuilding have been discussed starting from the Kantian notion of perpetual peace and continuing to modern ideas of democratic peace theory, negative-positive peace, international engagement and liberal peacebuilding. More recent concepts of new wars and transitional justice systems have been discussed as well.

The study identifies altogether six discourses that are maintained through the policy documents. The identified discourses are the capitalist corporate discourse, the curative peace discourse, the development aid/dependency discourse, the good-governance discourse, the religious discourse and the reconciliation discourse.

The findings of this study suggest that the South Sudanese peacebuilding framework is based on building peace primarily through security measures and institutional strengthening while paying less attention to bottom-up approaches and people’s subjective wellbeing. In addition, the policy documents studied do not envision any form of transitional justice mechanism and lack a comprehensive national reconciliation program. This is likely to deepen pervasive impunity and result in further divisions, more belligerencies and bloodshed in the country.

The study also finds that the South Sudanese peace policy framework is heavily influenced by the so called Western idea of liberal peacebuilding that aim to promote liberal economy, Western-style democracy, marketization and globalization. Though the policy documents emphasize on democracy, good governance and human rights, their implementation modality is not clear. In addition, the policy documents lack coherency, one document prioritising one theme while another adopting a completely different approach, and the nexus between peacebuilding and broader development is poorly established.

**Keywords**: South Sudan, Peacebuilding, Transitional Justice, Peace Policy, Peace Theories, Critical Discourse Analysis
Preface

When protracted conflicts and decades long suffering come to a formal conclusion, political emphasis and popular enthusiasm for ‘development’ and ‘progress’ are not uncommon. Countries in post-conflict scenario are often keen in introducing series of state-building measures and development initiatives that are aimed at peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The idea of building sustainable peace merely through institutional reforms and development initiatives is contestable.

As a student of Development Studies, I have had keen interest in peacebuilding and post-conflict issues, primary focus being as to why certain political and ideological choices are adopted in post-conflict situations: how do certain internal and external factors influence such choices and what are the consequences of making certain choices or adapting to or perpetuating certain ideologies, beliefs or set of discourses. On the other hand, having lived through Nepal’s ten year long bloody civil war and having witnessed civilians suffer horrendously, I am equally interested in transitional justice mechanisms and issues of healing, truth, reparation and national reconciliation in post-conflict scenarios like Nepal or South Sudan.

Apart from the intention to look at peacebuilding issues outside my native land, my attachment to South Sudan has a personal reason too: the memory of a deceased friend, a former South Sudanese rebel, who spent four years with me in college as a close friend, lived with the only dream to see a free Southern Sudan, but passed away untimely before that dream became a reality just a few months later.

Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to all those who supported me throughout this rather long and tedious process of thesis writing. First and foremost, special thanks to my supervisors Marjaana Jauhola, Susanne Dahlgren and Lauri Siitonen for their kind and consistent supervision. Many thanks to Professors Teivo Teivainen and Barry Gills for their tips and comments during thesis seminars and special thanks to Professor Jukka Törnönen for his insightful advice on using CDA and other tools of textual analysis.

Thank you, dear family and friends, for encouraging me in my every step and for understanding my long silences and usual disappearances.

Helsinki, Finland
August 2014
Abbreviations

CPA    The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GOS and SPLM/A 2005
CDA    Critical Discourse Analysis
CSDHPR  Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013
DPT    Democratic Peace Theory
DDR    Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
GoSS   Government of South Sudan
GoS    Government of Sudan
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF    International Monetary Fund
NCP    National Congress Party
PRS    South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013–2015
SPLA   Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM   Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSDP   South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013
SSPC   Southern Sudan Peace Commission
SSPRC  South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WB     World Bank
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Chapter I

Introduction

“Let justice be done though the heavens fall.”
- William Prynne, 1646

“We have ended one struggle and now we must start a new one, that of nation building...Our purpose is to give to our children what the war took away from us: peace, rule of law, food security, health care, good education, running water, clean water, electric power, and opportunity for the pursuit of happiness and prosperity.”
- Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, 2011

After nearly five decades of bloodshed, in 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the separatist SPLM/A (Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army) rebels and the Sudanese government officially ended one of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars, which claimed more than two million lives. The CPA divided the country into two different authorities, creating a federal governmental setup in the Sudan. Ultimately, in July 2011, as stipulated by the CPA, a referendum took place and a huge majority (98%) of Southern Sudanese opted for secession from the North. Thus, on 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was born as the youngest nation on the planet.

Post-independence journey hasn’t been very smooth for South Sudan. As a newly formed nation, the country struggles to build its base almost from scratch and grapples with post-war nuisances, dilapidated socio-political structures and institutions ravaged by war. The country faces huge external and internal challenges, and alternative is a failed state (Shinn 2011, p. 2). Thousands of people have died in conflicts that have erupted since independence. An internal dispute in the ruling party and a coup attempt claimed more than a thousand lives in early 2014 alone (UNMISS 2014).

In a war-shattered scenario like South Sudan, aspirations for peace,
however, are certainly high, at least amongst the common people. The country has introduced a number of policies that allegedly aim to build sustainable peace and integrate peacebuilding to broader development agendas. Having carried out Critical Discourse Analysis of selected four South Sudanese peace policy documents, this Master’s thesis seeks to critically analyze the peace policy framework of South Sudan. The primary aim is to look at different discourses, ideologies and beliefs that are sustained through or relinquished from policy documents especially at a time when the country is taking a transitional leap.

After a peace deal has been reached, the tendency to focus on state building measures, election processes and constitution making seems to be common. Policies for peacebuilding are likely to be introduced, but it is certainly useful to look at exactly where do such policies emanate from, from which ideological standpoint, what types of discourses they carry through and what do they seek to achieve.

1.1 Research Question, Aim and Objectives

The overall question this study tries to address is what type of peace policy framework South Sudan has adopted and what types of discourses, beliefs and ideologies have been adopted or relinquished in its post-independence peace and development policies.

While addressing the main research question, the study also looks at other issues such as whether peacebuilding has been linked to broader development agenda and, if so, how has that been manifested in the policy documents. The emphasis is also on whether particular notions, concepts, beliefs and discourses are adopted or rejected in the peace and development policy documents and weather such choices are affected by any internal or external ideological factors.

Sustainable peacebuilding, obviously, is a long-term process and requires ‘a triumvirate of transformation: Transformation of the society from one that resorts to violence to one that resorts to political means to resolve conflict’ (Samuels 2005, p. 1). South Sudan’s post-independence journey towards sustainable peacebuilding hasn’t been too long, at least not long enough to
make conclusive remarks on its approach and achievements. However, given that the CPA was signed in 2005, which formally ended the ongoing war and envisioned sustainable peace in Southern Sudan \(^1\), and the country has introduced major peace and development policies and institutions such as National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, it is certainly not too early for preliminary remarks and reflections.

By addressing the issues mentioned above, the main objectives of the study are:

- To illustrate how peace and development policies are influenced by certain ideas, discourses and set of beliefs.

- To demonstrate how, if any, peace policies are integrated into greater development agenda/plans and manifested in policy documents.

- To provide general understanding of South Sudanese peace process, its dynamics, key players and challenges that lie ahead.

**Thesis structure:**

This thesis is divided altogether into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the research question, aims and objectives; outlines research method and design; discusses sets of data and sampling method used and gives an overview of the significance and limitations of the study.

Chapter II presents a detailed overview of the research context, i.e. South Sudan, its decades long struggle for independence, the 2005 peace agreement and the momentous 2011 referendum. Chapter II discusses also the main causes and consequences of the North–South conflict, factors that led to peace agreement, post-secession tensions in South Sudan and an overview of development indicators and dire humanitarian needs. The chapter is closed by

\(^1\) Southern Sudan refers to pre-independence territory, belonging to Sudan. After independence, it became the Republic of South Sudan.
reviewing a number of recent studies that focus on different aspects of peacebuilding in South Sudan.

Chapter III, on the other hand, discusses theories of peace and peacebuilding starting from the Kantian notion of perpetual peace and continuing to modern concepts of democratic peace theory; discussing in detail the idea and criticisms associated with liberal peacebuilding and international engagement. In addition, Galtung’s ideas of negative-positive peace and issues of transitional justice and new forms of warfare will be discussed as well.

Chapter IV outlines the methodological standpoints adopted in this research, discussing different ways of carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis and understanding discourse in socio-political domain. The chapter elaborates also the concepts of genre and intertextuality and discusses Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model of CDA in detail.

Chapter V carries out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the selected four Policy documents by using Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional approach to CDA and discusses the major findings. The chapter begins with a textual analysis of the text and moves onward to explore the ‘interdiscursivity’, i.e. treating text as discursive practice, in the case of Policy documents. Altogether six discourses have been identified and thoroughly discussed before presenting a contextual positioning of the discourses identified.

Chapter VI presents major findings of the study with some conclusive remarks. A second section of the chapter offers a few recommendations for future research.

1.2 Research Method and Design

Policies for peacebuilding are fairly common in post-conflict situations. The question, however, is how holistic, integrated and comprehensive such policies tend to be. On the other hand, equally important question is of discourses. Why some notions, beliefs, and discourses are included, adopted and consolidated, while some are abandoned and rejected? How do new ideas get introduced through policy documents in the aftermath of a violent conflict or a peace deal? In line with these questions, a second question would be of
priority setting too. Why some activities are prioritized, for instance disarmament and institutional reforms, or state-building in general, and other activities, such as transitional justice or reconciliation processes, get insufficient attention and lack a national priority? If so, why is it so? In a nutshell, this thesis aims to address these issues in the South Sudanese post-conflict context, and that is done by using a constructivist epistemological approach.

Selection of the right and relevant research method is important for any research, but more specifically for the study of this type. As there seems to be no comprehensive studies done previously particularly on this subject, a thorough and vigorous explanation is needed to come to a better understanding. Methodologically this study employs qualitative sets of tools and is a qualitative study in nature.

Denzin & Lincoln argue that qualitative research 'involves an interpretive, specific naturalistic approach to the world,' meaning that qualitative researchers 'study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them' (2000, p.3). Snape & Spencer define qualitative research as a 'blend of empirical investigation and creative discovery' and argue that 'qualitative methods are used to address research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their contexts. They are particularly well suited to exploring issues that hold some complexity and to studying processes that occur over time' (2003, p.5).

Adopting a constructivist epistemological approach means seeking subjective explanations of phenomena to study or accepting that 'knowledge and reality do not have an objective or absolute value or, at the least, that we have no way of knowing this reality' (Murphy 1997, p.5).

Descriptive studies, though can be qualitative as well as quantitative, seek to find out 'what is' and 'can yield rich data that lead to important recommendations' (Knupfer & McLellan 2001). The focus, therefore, is not excessively on the methods to be employed, but on finding answers to the research question. Hereby, the aim of this study is to find out what type of policy framework is in place for sustainable peacebuilding in post-independent South Sudan, and also to analyze what type of discourses are
sustained, strengthened and validated in policy documents formulated for peacebuilding. The focus is not only on what is included, but also on what is excluded.

A separate chapter elaborates on the specific methodological tools used in this study, whereas, the intention in this section is to provide an overall methodological standpoint and specific research design that has been used to tackle the research topic.

As presented in the chart above, the study makes use of a data set of four policy documents to tackle the research question. In order to analyze what one might call here the South Sudanese peace discourse: certain beliefs, notions, and ideas included and not included in peace policy documents, the study carries out a Critical Discourse Analysis of four significant peace policy documents.

1.3 Research Data and Sampling
Altogether, four policy documents were selected as data for the study. The following chart and subsequent description details how data was selected and explains the rationale behind their selection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Research Data</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Reason for Selection</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overall peacebuilding framework/Discourses, beliefs and notions in peace policies</td>
<td>Policy documents:</td>
<td>− UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>− Provides road-map for peace before and after referendum</td>
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<td></td>
<td>− The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005</td>
<td>− Government of South Sudan (GoSS)</td>
<td>− A politically binding document signed between GoS and SPLM</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>− South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013</td>
<td>− Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Finland</td>
<td>− Most comprehensive development plan so far with a separate section for peacebuilding issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>− South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy (2013–2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td>− Includes strategic measures for peacebuilding</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>− Sets out priority areas for peace</td>
</tr>
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</table>
As presented above, the following four policy documents was selected for the study:

1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005
2. South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013
4. Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013

### The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005

Signed in January 2005 in Kenya between the Sudan’s Peaople’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan (GoS), The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was in fact a culmination of previous agreements signed during the peace process. A series of agreements were signed between the warring parties starting with The Machakos Protocol signed on 20 July 2002 in Machakos, Kenya where the parties agreed on broad principles of

<table>
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<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Signatures</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Protocol of Machakos:</td>
<td>Signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002</td>
<td>in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Protocol on wealth-sharing:</td>
<td>Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Protocol on Power-sharing:</td>
<td>Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States:</td>
<td>Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei:</td>
<td>Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004</td>
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Source: UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2013
governance, government and management of the transitional process. Though the CPA has often been criticized for not being really comprehensive (see for instance, Ylönen 2012, p. 28–40) or for being exclusive club of the NPC and SPLM and not addressing many outstanding issues between the parties (Abdin 2012, p. 5), the Agreement, however, ended Africa’s longest civil war and paved the way to a successful referendum that led to the birth of South Sudan. The Agreement also addressed issues of power sharing, wealth sharing and envisioned ‘self-determination to the people of South Sudan through a referendum and right of legislations based on Sharia for the North’ (Abdin 2012, p. 1). The CPA was an outcome of prolonged negotiations facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a consortium of donor countries, lead by the USA, UK and Norway, but also African leaders such as the Presidents of Kenya and Uganda. The international community praised the agreement and the CPA signing ceremony on 12 July 2005 was witnessed by the presidents of Uganda, Kenya, representatives from the United States of America, African Union, Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, European Union, IGAD, Arab League and the United Nations (Abdin 2012, p. 2).

Despite its limitations and criticisms surrounding, the CPA is undoubtedly the most comprehensive document to begin with when it comes to analyzing the peacebuilding framework of South Sudan. The Agreement, on the other hand, is a political promise done by the warring parties to a broader international community.

For the purpose of this study, an electronically archived scanned version of the original CPA was downloaded in December 2013 from the UN Mission’s South Sudan website. The entire document is 260 pages in length and includes 6 chapters and 2 annexes. The document has been signed by representatives of both parties and a number of foreign delegates, including the presidents of Kenya and Uganda as well as the US Secretary of State.

2. The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013: The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013, hereafter referred simply as the Plan or the SSDP, was introduced by the Government of South Sudan in August 2011. The Plan, which is available online on the official website of the Government
of South Sudan (www.goss-online.org), is 437 pages in length and on the cover, under the main title, reads: “realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all.”

Introducing the Plan, the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning, David Deng Athorbei, states, “The South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) represents our aspirations as a new nation, following a long struggle for the freedom of the people of South Sudan. It provides a road-map for our future, setting out our priorities and the actions necessary to achieve rapid, inclusive and sustainable development’ (SSDP 2011, p. xi).

The Plan is very comprehensive in the sense that it touches many aspects of South Sudan that range from projection of oil revenues to indicators of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, governance, economic development, social and human development, conflict prevention and security have been prioritized as main pillars or topmost themes of the plan. Peacebuilding issues have been largely included under the conflict prevention and security theme, but can be found scattered elsewhere as well. For the purpose of this study, peacebuilding policy issues were collected not only from the Conflict Prevention and Security section, but throughout the Plan.

It would be important to note that the Plan, like the CPA, was drafted and promulgated under the auspices of international donor community. The Plan mentions that the donor community provided financial as well logistical support including working as co-chairs in working groups (SSDP 2011, p. Xii).

Inclusion of the Plan as research data of this study was deemed useful for the fact that the Plan was introduced as one of the major policy responses from the Government of South Sudan in the aftermath of independence. On the other hand, the Plan’s comprehensive nature and its attempt to establish a link between peacebuilding with other areas of development also makes it an ideal choice for this study.

3. The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategic Plan 2013–2015: In the aftermath of independence, when Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) was disbanded, as its task of promoting peace during the transitional period was completed, a new presidential degree (62/2011) gave birth to a new
commission that was named The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC). According to the SSPRC, its duty is to ‘promote peaceful co-existence amongst the people of South Sudan and to advise the government on matters related to peace’ (SSPRC 2013). The commission’s mandate also include promoting ‘peace and reconciliation between conflicting communities, development of early warning system, campaigning for peaceful elections’ and establishment of a Peace Resource Centre in South Sudan’ (ibid). As of Jan 2014, the commission was chaired by Mr. Chuol Rambang Luoth and consisted of 8 administrative units (SSPRC 2013).

In January 2013, the SSPRC introduced its new three year strategic plan for the years 2013–2015. The Plan states that the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and its donor (i.e. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) provided funds and facilitated the development process of the plan (SSPRC 2013, p.5). In May 2013, this researcher obtained the 24 paged report from the CMI, as the SSPRC official website seems to be dysfunctional lately.

Selection of this plan for this study is important primarily for three reasons. First, the SSPRC has the official mandate of peacebuilding as stipulated by the government decree 62/2011. Second, the plan is relatively new, published in 2013, and provides an updated information on recent developments in the country, and, third, the plan provides some sort of ‘official stance’ on internal as well as external challenges to peacebuilding in South Sudan.

4. Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013: In August 2011, only one month after independence, South Sudan’s first vice-president Dr. Riek Machar Teny visited the Dinka Bor community and publicly apologized for his activities in 1991, after his split with SPLM, which resulted in violent killings of the Bor-Dinka and Lou-Nuer communities. By apologizing publicly, he became, reportedly, the first senior politician to start peace and national reconciliation in South Sudan (Dak 2012). He thus led a national reconciliation process, garnered significant media attention and planned a national reconciliation conference for April 2013 (Deng 2013). Allegedly, afraid of Vice-President’s popularity as a peace-builder and his plans to run for SPLM leadership in the future, President Salva Kiir suspended the national reconciliation process with a presidential order. The process was
revived on 23 April 2013 and the Archbishop of Episcopal Church, Daniel Deng Bul was appointed as its president (Sudan Tribune 2013). Officially named as the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for South Sudan and authorized to work ‘independently’, the committee team includes three bishops, one representative from Muslim community and other representatives from South Sudanese civil society and federal states (AFJN, 2013).

In July 2013, the Committee came up with a 20 paged document titled The Way Forward: Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for all South Sudanese. The document starts and ends with verses from the Bible and emphasizes on faith based healing and reconciliation. The document was obtained from the Comboni Missionaries contact point in Juba, South Sudan.

As the report is the Committee’s official stance on healing, peace and reconciliation, it’s a very useful read to understand what type of peace South Sudan is trying to achieve and what type of reconciliation measures the country is initiating. On the other hand, it’s the latest publication from the Committee and very useful document for the scope of this research.

1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Study

As a qualitative study and as a study carried out without physically visiting the country of research context, this study has a number of biases and limitations. Rajendran (2001) argues that qualitative researchers should ‘acknowledge and take into account their own biases as a method of dealing with them’ (p.1).

First, when it came to selecting policy documents, only four documents, deemed most relevant, were selected, but a number of other policy documents, for instance the Act on DDR, that directly or indirectly deal with peacebuilding in South Sudan remained un–entertained. Selection was based on the central focus of the policies, their coverage, national policies instead of regional policies, their binding nature as well as likelihood of their immediate impact. Despite being comprehensive in nature, documents like South Sudan Vision 2040, were not selected for their overly idealistic nature, lack of clarity
about implementation and so forth.

Second, as South Sudan is in a fast moving transitional phase, different events and responses to them are rapidly changing. Discussions and conclusions presented in this thesis are based on past events and policy responses, and the study does not rely on or take into account of any possible future events or policy responses that might dramatically change the current scenario.

Third, this study has been affected by a sort of a empirical bias as well. The study relies on the selected policy documents and their qualitative contents, analysing them mainly from a theoretical and discursive perspective. The study does not focus on the pragmatic aspect of the policy documents; it does not try to link or explain how the selected policies were implemented and what sort of impact they have had on the ground.

Fourth, the study is primarily based on four important pieces of policy documents that were introduced between the years 2005 and 2013. Though informed of the past peace negotiations and policy initiatives, the study did not attempt to analyse them all. Instead it has remained focused on a limited period of time.

Finally, as the researcher was unable to travel to the country and gain a firsthand experience of the culture, everyday life and the ongoing peace process, all the information, assumptions, and tacit generalizations which are likely to be found in this thesis were based on secondary information and knowledge that the researcher grasped from different sources, mainly from the books and academic journals dealing with South Sudan, but also from the Internet, newspapers and by talking to a few South Sudanese acquaintances.

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2 Though the CPA process already started in forms of different agreements in 2002, it culminated and was signed only in 2005.
Chapter I

Background

Chapter I provided a short introduction of the study, presented main research questions, objectives and offered an explanation for research method, design and research data. This chapter focuses on a historical overview of the conflict that led to Southern Sudan’s independence. Causes and consequences of both first and second Sudanese wars have been briefly discussed. Issues surrounding the CPA, the 2011 referendum and outstanding issues in the wake of independence have also been discussed. In addition, with the help of key development indicators and an analysis of humanitarian needs, South Sudan’s current socio-economic scenario is discussed.

2.1 First Civil War (1955–1972)

Colonialism and choices made by the colonialists have been attributed as one of the root causes of devastating civil wars in Sudan. From 1899 to 1955, southern Sudan was part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, jointly governed by the British-Egyptian rule. However, until 1946, northern Sudan and southern Sudan were treated and governed as separate regions. Many new development initiatives, such as extensive railway networks and a trained civil service, were introduced in the north, but the south remained virtually isolated. In 1922, the ‘Passport and Permits Ordinance’ issued by the British, further isolated the south making it difficult for southerners to move. (Hoile 2002, p.27.)

The ‘Southern Policy’, introduced in 1930, further deepened the divisions, but the policy was ultimately reversed in 1946, and the colonialists urged that ‘southern Sudan was inextricably bound to the Arabicized northern Sudan’ and the goal of the new policy was merely to ‘ensure that the southern Sudanese were equipped to stand up for themselves as social and economic equals of the northerners’ (Hoile 2002, p.27).
The 1947 Juba Conference, organized by the British colonial administration and attended by representatives both from the South and North, envisioned a more developed southern Sudan ‘in the framework of a united Sudan’ (Hoile 2002, p.27).

This shift in British colonial strategy resulted in the merger of the two regions, but with devastating results. In 1953, Britain and Egypt agreed to grant independence to Sudan, but did not make any new arrangements for the future of southern Sudan. That meant when the British colonialists would leave, they would hand over the helms of administration to Arab Muslim elites, their close affinities, of the North. (Deng 1995, Jok 2007.) The British policy affected both sides, but differently. The southerners felt rejected as they were not consulted in the process, specially prior to the 1947 Juba conference, and feared subjugation from the North, whereas, the Northern elites saw this as an opportunity to impose their Arab values and traditions to non-Arab and non-Muslim Africans (Machar 2012, p.12).

Prior to independence of Sudan in 1956, The Liberal Party, a southern Sudanese political party formerly known as the Southern Party, passed a resolution, in October 1954, calling for a federal status with northern Sudan. The calls were not responded positively, and in the wake, an unrest was seen in the Nzara and Juba regions. In August 1955, southern Sudanese soldiers belonging to the Sudan Defence Force Equatorial corps mutinied in Torit, Juba, Yei and Maridi. (O’balance 1977, p.41.) The mutiny resulted in 261 deaths of the northerners and the beginning of the Sudanese civil war (Hoile 2002, p. 28).

The mutinies, however, were easily quashed and the subsequent eight years were just a matter of guerrilla survival. The insurgents organized themselves more effectively and, in 1993, southern students and the 1955 mutineers joined hands and formed the secessionist Anya-Nya movement (O’balance 1977, p.57). In literal terms, Anya-Nya means snake venom in the south Sudanese Madi language (Wells & Samuel 1993).

The Anya-Nya rebel military movement founded in September 1963 and led by Emilio Tafeng as the commander-in-chief launched its first major military attack in barracks in Wau on 11 January 1964 (Hoile 2002, p. 29).

Amidst subsequent coup d’états and regime change in the North and rifts
among tribal lines of the Anya–Nya movement in the South, the prospect for peaceful solution was nowhere to be seen. However, things started changing when, in May 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry overthrew the government of Mohammed Mahgoub in a bloodless coup. Nimeiry abolished all political parties and institutions, introduced socialist policies and, through a policy statement, recognized the ‘historical and cultural differences between the North and the South’outlining that the ‘Southern people have a right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan’ (Hoile 2002, p.30). Shinn (2004) has argued that as Nimeiry had a weak power base in the North, he wanted to end the civil war and consolidate his political support in the South (p. 240).

On the other hand, having realized the drawbacks of the splits within the tribal lines of the Anya–Nya movement, Colonel Joseph Lagu, an Anya–Nya commander from Eastern Equatoria, brought together the dividing factions and founded a united force, which began to known as the SSLM or the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (Yoh 2001, p. 29). Nimeiry’s vested political interest in the South and the unification within the Anya–Nya movement subsequently led to the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement.

Signed in 1972 in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, the Addis Ababa peace agreement ended the SSLM armed struggle and ensured a single southern administrative region, i.e. a regional autonomy, for the southerners (Yoh 2001, p. 29). Thereby, the agreement assured southern Sudan’s own legislative and executive organs, freedom of religious opinion, extensive grants for development, English as the ‘principal’ language for ‘Southern Region,’ and a new army command in the South that would consist 6000 ex Anya–Nya soldiers and 6000 soldiers from the North (Shinn 2004, p. 242–243).

The Addis Ababa peace agreement offered a decade long relative peace, but ultimately it proved to be just a hiatus or merely a decade long ceasefire. Many factors have been proposed (see for instance Wakoson 1993, Malwal 1981, Shinn 2004, Yoh 2001) as to why the Agreement couldn’t bring lasting peace in Sudan.

David H. Shinn, writing in 2004, notes that some of the most important provisions of the Agreement were never properly implemented. The Nimeiry administration did not show genuine interest in meaningfully integrating the
ex–Anya Nya soldiers into the Sudanese armed force, and the ones who were integrated were gradually retired, without replacing a substitute from the South (Shinn 2004, p.245). Second, the North wasn’t interested in providing enough funds to the South, as stipulated by the agreement. The small amount of funds that was received had to be spent on salaries of ex–Anya–Nya soldiers and the economic development of the South continued to be a distant dream for the southerners (Sylvester 1976, p. 183).

Situation worsened after the discovery of oil in 1978 by Chevron in different parts of the South (Alier 1992, p.244). After the discovery, the Northern government even put forward a proposal to redraw the boundary between the North and the South, with the aim of annexing oil reach areas to the North (Yoh 2001, p. 32). The Southerners were already frustrated by the continuous provocation, neglect and marginalization from the North, and the discovery of oil and virtual negation of the South only aggravated the already tensed situation (Alier 1992, Shinn 2004).

The government in the North didn’t consult the southerners on issues related to natural resources and their management, revenue distribution and other benefits. All the oil revenue generated from the oil fields in Southern Sudan went exclusively to the North and ‘Nimeiry could not accept the idea that revenue from natural resources come under the control of Southerners’ (Shinn 2004, p.249). In this way, as Wakoson argues, ‘the discovery of oil in the Southern Sudan created a political time−bomb’ (Wakoson 1993, p. 45).

Other factors, such as an increasing voice in the South for total independence, construction of the Jonglie canal in the South that provided irrigation to the North and water to Egypt, but practically nothing to the Southerners, consistent efforts to redraw the North–South boundary, and continuous interference in Southern politics from the North, worsened the situation so much that the relevance of the Addis Ababa agreement remained only on paper (Shinn 2004, Yoh & Maloka 2005).

In addition, on 5 June 1983, President Nimeiry issued a presidential decree and divided the South into three small and separate regions, with capitals in Juba, Malakal and Wau (Yoh & Maloka 2005, p.32). The move was against the constitution and the Addis Ababa peace agreement, and a maneuver of the North to ‘divide the South along ethnic lines’ (Malwal 1981, p. 244) and to
‘undermine the political strength of a unified South’ (Shinn 2004, p. 253).

Finally, on 8 September 1983, Nimeiry declared the application of Islamic Sharia law throughout the country, including the Christian South (Wakoson 1993, p. 37). The announcement practically left no option for the Southerners than to take up arms against the North. In the wake, another bloody war engulfed the region. The following section elaborates upon the second Sudanese civil war that lasted for 22 years until the signing of another peace agreement in 2005.

2.2 Second Civil War (1983–2005)
Though it’s been generally mentioned that Sudan’s second civil war started in 1983, after the revocation of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, Kim Deng, a South Sudanese military historian, has contested the notion. He has argued that there was a pocket of Anya–Nya I movement that doubted the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement and decided to remain in the ‘bush’ and reorganize themselves. They wanted a total separation from the North, not just an illusive self-determination. (Deng 2012.)

The seed to Second Civil War was sown already in 1975 when President Nimeiry tried to neutralize the power of Southern soldiers by transferring them to the North and sending Northern soldiers to the South. This caused sheer tension in the South and a significant number of soldiers mutinied in Akobo and, with their arms, fled to Ethiopia. This was the start of what later came to be known as Anya–Nya II movement. (Shinn 2004, p. 245.)

In 1983, similar tensions occurred in units of Southern battalion in Pibor, Bor and Pochalla. John Garang, a Southerner but a Lieutenant Colonel in the national army who later became the icon of the struggle and led the SPLM/A movement until his death in 2005, was sent to mediate the dispute. Garang himself sided with the mutineers, encountered the Northern army, and fled to Ethiopia with Southern troops. (Johnson 2003, p. 61–62.)

Some of the mutineers joined the fledgling Anya–Nya II movement, led by Lt. Col. Sammuel Gai Tut Yang, while the others joined the newly established Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Established in May 1983, with around 2500 soldiers in Ethiopia and 500 soldiers in Bahr el–
Ghazal region of Southern Sudan, the SPLM/A movement was initially led by Joseph Oduho and John Garang. However, when Joseph Oduho was deposed after a few months, Garang came to be SPLM/A’s only supreme leader. (Hoile 2002 p.33–34, Johnson 2003, p.61–62.)

It is worth mentioning that the SPLM/A and the Anya–Nya II had a few fundamental differences. Anya–Nya II, dominated by the southern Sudanese Nuer tribe, wanted a total separation from the North, whereas, the SPLM/A, dominated by southern Sudanese Dinka tribe, envisaged a united, but socialist and secular Sudan, which was often referred as a New Sudan (Deng 2012). The SPLM/A maintained its desire for a united Sudan for a long time. In 1986, addressing his meeting with the National Alliance, John Garang declared:

Brothers, as we have said many times before, we are not secessionists. And if anybody wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. We will maintain this opinion. (Garang 1986, cited in Khalid 1992, p.137).

Garang made similar remarks in October 1987 and emphasized that SPLM/A was fighting ‘a cultural, political and economic war’ that would lead to an annulment of national Islamic laws and pave the way for greater autonomy for all regions of Sudan (Garang 1987, cited in Hoile 2002, p. 40).

Since Anya–Nya II and the SPLM/A had major ideological and objective differences (i.e. separation vs. dignified unity), tensions started to arise. Battles erupted between the two factions and a few influential leaders of Anya–Nya II, such as William Abdullah Choul and Samuel Gai Tut, were killed by the SPLA soldiers (Deng 2012, Hoile 2002, p. 37).

Anya–Nya II could not compete with the SPLM/A and suffered a gradual disintegration. Some of its members joined the SPLM/A, whereas some chose to join government-supported militia groups (Wells & Samuel 1993). The remaining few formed a separate militia group known as the South Sudan Defense Forces, which somehow became an umbrella of anti–SPLM/A forces in the South (Young 2006, p.3).

Already in 1984, the Nimeiry government declared a state of emergency in Southern Sudan and tried to quash the rebellion by force. However, the
SPLM/A kept on launching major attacks. Between 1984 and 1986, the SPLA soldiers halted the construction of the Jonglei canal, chased Chevron away from the South, started killing Baggara tribesmen, i.e. Arab nomads close to the north–south boundary, and went on to shoot down a civilian Sudan Airways aircraft killing sixty passengers and crew on board. (Hoile 2002, 34–39.)

While the South was being ravaged by war, hunger and disease, the political melodrama continued in the North. In 1985, in another episode of coup d’État, in the wake of popular protests, President Nimeiry was deposed by General Abdel-Rahman Swar al-Dahab. As promised by the military ruler, elections were held within a year, and the Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi became Sudan’s new Prime Minister. (Fearon & Laitin 2006, p. 19.)

Unlike Nimeiry, elected leader al-Mahdi showed some interest in peace talks with the SPLM/A. The rebels had been rejecting any prospect of dialogue with Nimeiry’s government, but agreed to engage in talks with the al-Mahdi administration. In January 1987, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A rebels met for talks in London. However, the talks failed as the government took the rebels merely as secessionists: thereby willing to grant certain autonomy to the South, but the rebels were firm to their demand of a New Sudan. For the government, SPLM/A was a Southern problem, whereas, the rebels defined their struggle as a national issue that affected the entire Sudan. (Hoile 2002, p.40–43.) Islamic Sharia law was another major issue. While senior army officers and a faction of the ruling coalition were ready to give up Sharia for peace, the National Islamic Front (NIF) rejected the idea (Metz 1991, p.59–60).

While efforts for further talks were underway, Sudan went through another political change in 1989. On 30 June that year, there was another military coup d’État, supported by Muslim Brotherhood, that overthrew elected Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, abolished the post of Prime Minister altogether and a new military Colonel, Omer al-Bashir took the helms of the country (Fearon & Laitin 2006, p. 19).

The Bashir government, which was called the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), suspended the 1986 transitional constitution and introduced harsh rules and regulations to impose the Sharia
law, but also to strengthen its grip on power. The RCC banned all political parties, trade unions, human rights organizations and any other institutions that were ‘non-Islamic’ in nature. More than 3000 army officers were sacked from their job for not cooperating well during the imposition of Sharia (Kebbede 1997, p.30). Bashir’s insistence to seek a military solution to the conflict and his decision to impose Sharia even to the non-Muslim South escalated the conflict (Metz 1991, p. 60).

A new penal code, The Criminal Act of 1991, was introduced to Islamize the legal system. The Act allowed inhumane punishments like stoning and amputations. Two years later, non-Muslim judges from the South were replaced with Muslim judges from the North. Teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals not paying heed to the regime were sacked and replaced with NIF staunches. (Kebbede 1997.)

In her 1997 portrayal of the initial offences of the Bashir regime, Girma Kebbede writes:

[The regime] obtained new weapons from Iran and Libya (both supplied jet fighters used to bomb civilians in the South). Iran also paid for Chinese light weapons, ammunitions, tanks and artillery shells. With fresh supplies of sophisticated military weapons and using local Arab militias as a proxy army, its armed forces achieved major victories during 1992, and regained nearly all the garrison towns they had lost in previous encounters. (Kebbede 1997, p.30.)

In mid 1991, while the Bashir administration was devising new offensives against the SPLM/A, the movement suffered another blow due to Mengistu regime’s collapse in Ethiopia. Since the 1980s, the communist regime of Colonel Mengistu had been providing direct military aid to SPLM/A (Kebedde 1997, p. 38), and for a short period of time SPLA soldiers even fought to defend the Mengistu government (Hoile 2002, p. 44).

Collapse of the Mengistu regime and extreme aggression from the North created tensions within the SPLM/A movement. Once again the movement got divided into the lines of unionists and secessionists. Overt secessionist SPLM/A field commanders; like Dr Riek Machar, Dr Lam Akol and Gordon Kong, based in the Nasir region, issued a statement demanding the removal of
John Garang as SPLM commander. They called Garang a ‘dictator’ and slammed SPLM/A’s support to Mengistu: its Dinka domination and poor human rights records. In August 1991, the dissidents separated from the mainstream SPLM/A and formed SPLA-Nasir. Though it wasn’t officially renamed, after the split, the SPLM/A led by Garang came to be known as SPLM/A-Torit or SPLM/A-Mainstream. (Deng 1995, Hoile 2002.)

The mainstream SPLM/A suffered another fragmentation when Garang’s deputy William Nyoun defected and formed SPLA-Unity, later joining with SPLA-Nasir and forming SPLA-United in March 1993. The SPLA-United went through another division when Dr Machar formed the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and Dr Akol became the commander of SPLA-United. (Johnson 2003, p.90-97.)

The severe split within the SPLM/A resulted in fierce fighting between the different factions of the movement. For instance, in 1992, only in the Kongor and Waat areas, the fighting between SPLA-Mainstream and SPLA-Unity left more than 2,000 people dead (Hoile 2002, p. 45).

However, when it started becoming clear that the defected factions had been receiving military support from the government in Khartoum (Rone 2003, p.14–15) their popularity in the South plummeted. Eventually, the Nasir faction signed the 1997 Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government and Riek Machar became an assistant to Omar el Bashir and was appointed as president of the Southern States Coordination Council (SSCC). He went on to form another political party, United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and became commander-in-chief of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), which was mainly fighting against the SPLM/A. (Jonhson 2003, p. 95–99, Rone 2003 p. 14–16.)

Amidst SPLM/A’s internal rifts and Khartoum government’s determination to quash the movement with force, initial peace talks carried out with the mainstream SPLM/A, such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa (1989) and Abuja talks (1992–1993), miserably failed.

Writing in 1997, Girma Kабede argues that though SPLM/A’s own internal problems and weakening strength contributed to the negative outcome of peace talks, the major factor, however, was the Northern government’s strategy to Islamize the South by any means (p.42). They even
believed that ‘the North had a moral responsibility to Islamize the South and reverse the colonial legacy of Christian influence in the region’ (Kebedde 1997, p.42).

2.3 The 2005 Peace Agreement

Earlier attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict went in vain mainly because the warring parties were not ready to retreat from their positions. On the other hand, the interests of the mediators also affected the peace talks. For instance, the 1992–1993 Abuja talks failed also because Nigeria itself wouldn’t be willing to engage in the issue of secession and self-determination as it would leave a precedent and that wouldn’t be very favorable for Nigeria’s own interest. The 1999–2001 Egypt–Libya initiatives, allegedly, were inspired because Africans dominated the ongoing peace process and an Arab perspective was deemed to be missing. Egypt was particularly concerned because of its enormous interest in Sudan, mainly for the Nile water, but also the burgeoning political Islam was a matter of concern for both countries. (Rogier 2005, p. 6.)

After the 1992–93 Abuja talks failed, John Garang announced that, in cooperation with northern opposition parties, he would take the war to North by forming a new force, the New Sudan Brigade (Hoile 2002, p. 51).

Under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), which includes the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan: peace negotiations were once again initiated by late 1993 and intensified by early 1994. IGAD achieved its first breakthrough by introducing Declaration of Principles that incorporated self-determination and secularism for Sudan as core principles for peace talks: something the SPLM/A had been advocating for. Though the SPLM/A immediately accepted the Principles, GoS rejected them outright and left the negotiating table for three years. (Rogier 2005, p.40.) After the peace talks failed, both parties sought to win over militarily.

After widespread regional and international pressure, in 1997, the Sudanese government, however, accepted with reservation, the IGAD Declaration of Principles as the basis for dialogue. Rounds of discussions were
held in Nairobi and Addis Ababa for almost two years. The talks often faltered on the issue of secularism, but also due to disagreement over what is constituted as southern Sudan. The talks in August 1998 couldn’t progress because SPLM/A’s bottom line was a confederal system, whereas GoS wouldn’t go for more than a federal set up. (Hoile 2002 p. 78.)

In April 1999, the Sudanese government suspended all peace talks and retreated from the peace process. This has been attributed to the fact that since Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged in their own border war and Uganda’s attention was shifted towards the new conflicts emerging in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sudanese peace process received very little attention from IGAD members. At least till mid 2001, the prospect for peace in Sudan was minimal. (Rogier 2005 p.45.)

The situation improved dramatically over the next few months and in July 2002; the warring parties signed the Machakos Protocol. Negotiations, however, were extremely difficult and the chief negotiator even ‘locked two members of each delegation in a room and told them this was their last chance’ (Rolandsen 2011, p.556).

The Machakos Protocol ensured Sharia law in the North and self-determination for the South. It also guaranteed referendum for the future of Southern Sudan and envisioned a united, better Sudan. However, as the protocol only called for a negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive cease-fire (p.3), it didn’t immediately stop belligerencies.

The Machakos Protocol suffered a blow when the SPLA attacked on the Southern town of Torit. The GoS left the peace talks and demanded an immediate ceasefire. By the beginning of 2003, however, the derailed peace process came back to track and despite occasional skirmishes, by and large, the process succeeded and concluded with the groundbreaking CPA in January 2005. (Rolandsen 2011, p.556.)

In a nutshell, the peace process that reached a landmark in the form of the CPA in 2005 had the following arrangements:

- Self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan through a referendum
- Right to formulate legislations based on Sharia for the North
- The North-South border is that of January 1956 as incorporated in the
Declaration of Principles adopted by IGAD
- An interim period of six years before the referendum
- During the interim period, a semi–independent rule in the South: in the legislature of the South with 70% SPLM, 15% NCP, and 15% other political forces in the South
- In the national assembly 52% of the seats to NCP, 28% to SPLM, 14% to other northern parties, 6% to other southern parties
- Special arrangements in some form of self–autonomy to disputed regions of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Special commissions to define boundaries of disputed areas and conduct referendum in Abyei
- Wealth sharing: oil revenues obtained from oil fields in the South to be divided 50% each, after giving 2% to the producing areas
- The national government, the government in the South and state governments entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes
- The security arrangements: two armies, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA, to continue as separate forces, however, Joint Integrated Units (39000 soldiers) to be formed from SAF and SPLA and be stationed in the South, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum (Abdin 2012, Rolandsen 2011, the CPA 2005)

2.4 Factors that Led to Peace Agreement
Many factors have been attributed as possible reasons that compelled the warring parties to be serious about the peace talks and find a peaceful solution.

Hilde Johnson, then Norway’s Minister for International Development and a peace talk facilitator, recalls in her 2011 memoir that the peace talks were possible because both the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government came to realize that a military victory was not a viable option (p.3). She also sees the role of the international community, specially the Troika consisting the US, UK and Norway, to be crucial and commends profound negotiating skills of the Kenyan negotiators (ibid).
In a more comprehensive analysis, Rogier (2005) argues that, more than just mere war fatigue; there were at least four other factors that exerted pressure on both SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan and ultimately led to successful peace talks.

First, the US involvement in Sudan in the post 9/11 scenario was significantly different. The US wasn’t concerned that much when democratically elected government of Sadiq-al-Mahdi was overthrown in a military coup, but when the new regime was inclined towards Iraq in the Gulf war, formed strong ties with Iran, allegedly hosted terrorist groups and was committing war crimes in the South; the US wanted to overthrow or weaken the Islamist regime in Sudan.

Second, especially when the hardline ideological leader Hassan al-Turabi lost his grip on power and Sudan was virtually isolated by the international community; the Sudanese government itself was interested in improving its relationship with the United States and wanted to join the fight against international terrorism in the wake of ‘9/11’ attacks.

Third, the SPLM/A garnered more political and military strength when it reconciled with the Sudan People’s Defense Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF), led by Riek Machar. SPDF was a faction separated from the SPLM/A–Mainstream in 1991. However, even after (re)unification, they realized that, military victory was not at sight, the government still had access to oil revenues and could keep on purchasing weapons, the regional support was fading and the demand for peace was widespread. These factors convinced the SPLM/A to join the peace talks and take them seriously.

In addition, when the US appointed Senator Danforth as a Special Envoy for Peace in the Sudan and adopted The Sudan Peace Act, allowing further sanctions and even indicating possible use of military force against Khartoum, that apparently exerted pressure on Bashir’s administration in Khartoum (Cockett 2010, p. 162–164). Finally, it has been also acknowledged that Kenyan President Daniel Moi’s determination to revive the IGAD process and the exceptional negotiation skills of the negotiating team led by the Kenyan General Lazarus Sumbeiywo were also found to be instrumental in finding a peaceful end to the conflict (Rogier 2005, p.45).
2.5 Main Causes of North–South Conflict

As explained in the examples and arguments presented above, the dynamics of conflict in South Sudan clearly seem to be of two dimensional. First, there was and still is, though not always overt and belligerent, conflict with the North; and second, there was and is conflict between southern factions and ethnic groups within South Sudan. Different scholars propose different reasons for such conflicts, and many of them can be divided into two main categories.

First proposition is that of ethno–sectarian grievances, i.e. the conflict with the North, or within the South, is caused by historically unaddressed grievances of the marginalized, exploited and disempowered minorities, whereas, the second proposition is that of greed, i.e. conflicts between or in Sudan/South Sudan are driven by the greed of natural resources, primarily the oil, in the South.

Until South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Sudan was a country with two identities: African and Arab. Some scholars (such as Deng 1995, Jok 2007, Wai 1981) argue that ethno–sectarian differences between African Christians/Animists and Muslim Arabs is the root cause of the North–South conflict that manifested during First and Second Sudanese civil wars. Proponents of this notion see the conflict as a resistance movement against an authoritative Muslim government that sought to impose Sharia laws and aimed at Islamilizing its population by any means (Tibi 2008, p. 33). Salman M.A. Salman (2013) observes that ‘the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural differences and diversity that are usually a source of strength for nations were Sudan’s weakness’ (p. 410). He further argues that ‘the sense of the superiority of the Arab–Islamic culture dominated the thinking and actions of all the Northern political leaders, and Southern Sudan was simply a cultural vacuum to be filled by Northern Sudan’s values and norms’ (ibid).

In his 2012 study, Perceptions and Voices of South Sudanese About the North–South Sudan Conflict, Machar Wek Aleu–Baak, a South Sudanese, argues that many South Sudanese perceive the conflict as a clash between Muslim North versus Christian South: a fight between two cultural and religious identities where national identity was of second priority. Reflecting upon his own experiences, he states:
When I was a little boy growing up in Southern Sudan, my parents taught me to identify myself as an African Christian and Animist. In early childhood, I began to understand that Sudan was home for two different peoples: African Christians and Animists and Arab Muslims. I was told that Africans live in Southern Sudan and Arabs live in Northern Sudan. I learned about various historical conflicts between my ancestors and those of Arabs. This fighting took place in cattle camps, at schools, in the markets, on buses, at work, and over political issues...These memories are heartbreaking: millions of deaths, cultures and properties lost, and thousands displaced into foreign lands. (Machar 2012, p.4-5.)

Another school of thought has been that of greed: natural resources, primarily oil, but also water, fertile land, cattle and other natural resources in the South. The issue of human resources, human trafficking and slavery, doesn’t seem to be usually linked to the idea of ‘resources’, but often as a byproduct of war. However, human trafficking and slave trade can sufficiently be linked to the resource issue as well. South Sudanese war literature is full of slave stories that were exploited, exported and tortured in the North.

It is estimated that as many as 200,000 Southern Sudanese and Nuba children and women have been taken into slavery from Southern Sudanese towns and villages during the war. Both the government regular armed forces and notorious militia (known as the People’s Defense Forces, PDF) were used to attack and raid villages in the South and the Nuba Mountains for slaves and cattle. (Alley, 2001.)

The greed discourse has been attributed to both warring parties: the rebels and the Sudanese government. First, the greedy North that eyes the resources in the South, but also the southern elites who seek to benefit from the resources and use war as a means of fulfilling their vested interests. Also the idea that groups rebel when rebellion is financially viable (See Collier & Hoeffler 2002) has often been presented to link the conflict with resources and economic opportunities.

As stated above, oil discovery in 1978 in the Unity State and subsequent discoveries in different parts of southern Sudan has been linked to origination and exacerbation of the conflict. Jemera Rone, in a 2003 study commissioned by the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch, argues
that oil was ‘the main objective and principal cause’ of the conflict in Sudan. She claims that oil was not only the principal cause, but also became an ‘important obstacle to a lasting peace’ as oil revenues were ‘used by the government to obtain weapons and ammunition that intensified the war’. (Rone 2003, p. 36.) She further argues that ‘expansion of oil development has continued to be accompanied by the violent displacement of the agro–pastoral southern Nuer and Dinka people from their traditional lands atop the oilfields’ (ibid). Similarly, Haile (2012) argues that the greed versus grievances discourse can be understood in relation to post-independence conflict within South Sudan as well. She observes that a majority of rebel group which have mushroomed in the wake of independence are mostly active in oil rich states; and they use ‘various grievances, such as rising inflation, corruption, nepotism, tribalism, inequality, and high unemployment’ just to garner public support and justify violence (Haile 2012, p.2).

Some scholars, however, refrain from splitting the conflict into two distinct poles and rather choose to offer alternative explanations, demonstrating a more complex picture of the conflict. A widely cited author and an expert in Sudan–South Sudan issues, Douglas Johnson, argues that the causes of the North–South conflict in Sudan are both multiple and deep. Moving beyond the religion–resources or greed–grievances factors, though not rejecting them altogether, he sees the conflict as a tussle between an exploitative center and a neglected periphery. He also outlines international politics, Cold war, post 9/11 global terrorism debate constantly affecting the dynamics of the conflict (Johnson 2003). In a similar observation, Aleksi Ylönen argues that the rebellion is not guided by the economic opportunity, but rather by ‘socio-economic grievances derived from culturally and regionally imposed political marginalisation, which require broader analysis’ (Ylönen 2005, p.100).

Obviously, though some factors seem to have contributed more, there is no single explanation for the four decades of conflict in Sudan. Though the main and manifested factors seem to be that of cultural clashes, tumultuous center–periphery relations and the greed for natural resources, other narratives, often subtle and shaped by people’s own experiences during the conflict have emerged and they certainly deserve a thorough attention and
2.6 Consequences of the Conflict

The protracted conflict that started in 1955: though with a brief hiatus in between 1972–82, was one of Africa’s bloodiest and longest civil wars. More than half a million people lost their lives during the first civil war that lasted for over 17 years.

The Second Sudanese civil war that started in 1983 was worse than the first one in terms of death toll, displacement, and human suffering. During 22 years of violent conflict, more than 2 million people died, mostly in southern Sudan. The figure is contested; some propose that the actual death toll could have exceeded three million. In addition, more than 4.8 million people were internally displaced. As the war destroyed livelihood opportunities and safety mechanisms, more than 0.8 million people went into exile. (Ahmed 2008, Sharkey 2004, SSPRC 2013, p. 9.)

The Sudanese economy was severely affected as the cost of operating war went up to $2 million a day (Kebedde 1997, p.42). A Human Rights Watch report in 2003 found that many deaths in Sudan’s conflict occurred not merely due to war bullets and overt belligerency, but also because of pervasive hunger, rampant diseases, widespread rape, torture and slavery (p. 39–42).

While excessive force used by the government in the North was one reason for acute suffering; many factors within the South also contributed to it. Many deaths occurred during inter-tribal fighting, cattle raids, revenge and forced conscription. Both SPLA and SSIM had poor human rights records and forced conscription of child soldiers was a common practice (Hoile 2002, p. 52).

Harrowing accounts of human suffering have been widely recorded in different reports and literature that emerged during and after the conflict. The following excerpt from a 1996 report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Gaspar Biro, describes a violent attack carried out by the SPLA soldiers in July 1995:

Eyewitnesses reported that some of the victims, mostly women, children and the elderly, were caught while trying to escape and killed with spears and pangas. M.N., a member of the World Food
Programme relief committee at Panyajor, lost four of her five children (aged 8–15 years). The youngest child was thrown into the fire after being shot. D.K. witnessed three women with their babies being caught. Two of the women were shot and one was killed with a panga. Their babies were all killed with pangas. A total of 1,987 households were reported destroyed and looted and 3,500 cattle were taken.


In a 1996 article published in the New York Times Magazine, reporter Bill Berkerly made similar remarks:

In far-flung scorched-earth sweeps, minimally trained, totally illiterate, heavily armed fighters torch villages, steal the livestock and food, plant land mines, conscript the young men and boys and rape the women and girls. Garang’s explicit strategy was to render south Sudan ungovernable, and in that he succeeded. The south today is not only ungovernable but virtually uninhabitable. (Berkeley 1996.)

The extent of human suffering has somehow decreased in the post-independence scenario; but South Sudan still grapples with a number of challenges that involve violent incidences, numerous deaths and mass displacements.

2.7 The CPA Implementation and 2011 Referendum

The CPA implementation proved to be a sheer challenge when the SPLM/A supreme leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash only after 6 months of signing the agreement. Hilde Johnson, in her memoir, mentions that when the IGAD supported talks were in the verge of collapse in 2004, John Garang and Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha took the helm of the process and many compromises were possible due to close negotiations between the two (Johnson 2011).

Though the crash was reportedly caused by bad weather conditions, Garang’s sudden death caused sheer suspicion and mistrust between the two sides. Clashes erupted in different parts of Sudan; and Khartoum was under curfew for many days. In addition to Garang’s void, there were other issues that made the CPA implementation a daunting challenge. Sharing and
management of oil revenues, unfulfilled (aid) promises of the international community, US sanctions against the North, border issues, the referendum laws for the South and Abyei all caused tensions to the point that at one point SPLM/A even left the Government of National Unity and parliament. (Abdin 2012.) Young (2007) argues that government-supported militias in the South also affected smooth implementation of the CPA.

Despite these hurdles and despite the fact that some issues of disputes were postponed for discussion in post-referendum period, a referendum took place in Southern Sudan from 9–15 January 2011. Southern Sudanese living in the North and in diaspora also voted. On 7 February 2011 it was announced that 98.83% of Southern Sudanese voted in favor of secession. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan was declared independent in a spectacular ceremony attained by many world leaders (Sudan Tribune 2011).

2.8 Post–Secession Tension and Outstanding Issues

Even after secession, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan have been filled with tensions and mutual mistrust. The Heglig border conflict that erupted in March 2012 claimed hundreds of lives from both sides. In another move, South Sudan decided to shut down oil production altogether after a row over transport fees. Despite vast reserves of oil, South Sudan doesn’t have its own refinery and transport mechanism and is dependent on the North. As the stoppage badly hit both economies, the dispute was settled after 16 months, through a series of negotiations. Khartoum and Juba still accuse each other of supporting insurgent militias in their territories. (Ndukong 2013.)

As of June 2014, some issues, such as that of oil, have been settled, but there are other partially settled or unsettled issues. Up to 70% of border demarcation has been agreed, but tensions remain in some areas. According to the CPA, a popular consultation should have taken place already in 2011 to determine the future of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, but they have been indefinitely postponed. These disputed regions are in the Sudanese map, but due to their cultural intimacy to the South and also the fact that the residents of these states supported the independence movement and fought along with the SPLM/A, the desire to remain with the South is immense. (Ndukong
The situation in another disputed oil rich region of Abyei has been even more serious. The CPA stipulated that a simultaneous referendum with the 2011 Southern Sudan referendum would finalize the future of Abyei, but due to mounting tensions and sheer disagreement: no referendum has been organized yet. Violent clashes have been frequently reported in the disputed regions and an African Union High Level committee has been negotiating to end the impasse. The main disagreement has been over the issue of who is entitled to vote in a possible referendum. South Sudan wants that the voting rights should only be given to permanently residing Dinka Ngok tribes, however, Sudan also insists on including Arab Misseriya nomads who spend 6–9 months a year in the territory (Abdin 2012).

As close interdependent neighbors with a mutually shared bitter past, the way forward is not easy for both countries. Nevertheless, amidst widespread suspicion, mistrust and paranoia, the door to dialogue has remained open and many issues have been, in fact, solved. However, Sudan–South Sudan relations still remain fragile and volatile and seem to pose threat to sustainable peace in the region.

2.9 Fragile Peace and Internal Tensions within South Sudan

South Sudan still maintains hostilities with its neighbor in the North on several issues, but tensions within South Sudan have become even more challenging in recent months.

A series of armed rebellions, such as the National United Front and the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) led by former SPLA General George Athor, emerged shortly after the independence. Though incapable of toppling the ruling regime, these rebellions destabilized regional security and caused continuous civilian suffering. Majority of such groups are led by former SPLA commanders and basically aim at fulfilling their vested interests. (Haile 2012).

A more serious conflict has erupted since December 2013 after the ruling party tussle turned violent on the evening of 15 December in a party meeting.
Fighting started initially among members of the Presidential Guard and the SPLA split between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and former Vice-President Riek Machar, a Nuer. Fighting rapidly spread to various military joints and within less than 24 hours civilian lives were caught in the violence. (UNMISS 2014.)

The SPLA suffered disintegration in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States and the capitals of these states were under control of the opposition forces.

In Jonglei State, when opposition forces initially took Bor town, civilians fled and, according to local authorities, more than 300 civilians, mainly women and children, died while trying to cross the river into Lakes State (UNMISS 2014, p.3).

The 12 days of intense fighting claimed numerous lives and according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the conflict has displaced ‘estimated 743,400 people inside South Sudan and another 130,400 people have fled to neighboring countries’ (UNOCHA 2014). A 2014 report released by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan accused both warring parties of extrajudicial killing and war crime.

Reports of widespread killing of hundreds of civilians, destruction of entire villages, and looting of livestock, food items, and other personal possessions were received...The consequences for the civilian population have been devastating. There have been attacks on hospitals, churches, mosques, and United Nations bases. All parties to the conflict have committed acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women of different ethnic groups...Despite the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement on 23 January, fighting continues with little hope that civilians will see any respite from the relentless violence...there are also reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other acts of sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment have occurred. (UNMISS 2014, p. 2–3).

In May 2014, President Kiir and the defected leader Machar signed another ceasefire in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, but the agreement was violated.

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3 The actual death toll is unclear as no confirmed official number has been provided so far. On 26 December, Hilde Johnson, head of the U.N. mission in South Sudan, estimated that well over 1,000 people had died, whereas, the International Crisis Group in January 2014 estimated that up to 10,000 people might have died as a result of the conflict.
within hours of promulgation. In June 2014, talks on the formation of a transitional government have started and as agreed, the parties should have refrained from hostilities during the talks, but the talks have been often boycotted by both sides and the ceasefire has reported to be violated (Sudan tribune 2014).

According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2014, put together by the Institute for Economics and Peace, South Sudan experienced the largest drop (of 17 spots as compared to 2013) and now ranks as the third least peaceful country in the world after Syria and Afghanistan (IEP 2014).

2.10 Key Development Indicators and Humanitarian Catastrophe

Ravaged by decades of war, oppression and marginalization, South Sudan has some of the worst social and human development indicators in the world. In a 2012 interview, Lise Grande, the UNDP Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan elucidates the gravity of the situation:

[In South Sudan] More than 90 per cent of women can’t read or write. A 15-year-old girl has a higher chance of dying from pregnancy-related causes than finishing school. Out of the world’s 13 deadly diseases, 12 of them are in South Sudan. In fact, the highest maternal mortality rate anywhere in the world is in South Sudan. (Grande, 2012.)

Previously estimated to be 8.26 million, South Sudan’s population now is estimated to be 8.26 million due to influx of South Sudanese returnees and refugees escaping the conflict in neighboring Sudan (OCHA, 2014).

In 2013, Fund for Peace, a US based think-tank, placed South Sudan on number 4 of its Failed States Index and the country remains one of the least developed countries in the world: more than half the country’s population living below the poverty line (Oxfam et al. 2011, p.3).

According to a 2012 report published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the official statistics agency of the Government of South Sudan, the
country’s area is 644,329 sq. km, roughly the size of France, and more than half of the population is below the age of eighteen. The report further highlights that 72% of the population is below the age of thirty and merely 27% of the adult population is literate. Largely an agrarian society, more than 83% of the population lives in villages practicing subsistence agriculture.

As a legacy of decades of violence and instability, South Sudan grapples with dilapidated infrastructures and a devastated public health system. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, as of 2012, barely 7.4% of the population has access to improved sanitation (NBS 2012, p.1–3, SHHS 2010). More strikingly, ICRC in July 2012 reported that South Sudan has about 120 medical doctors and just over 100 nurses for an estimated population of nearly nine million people (ICRC 2012). According to the 2010 South Sudan Household Health Survey, life expectancy of South Sudanese people stood at mere 42 years and only 6% of children aged 12–23 months received proper immunization (SHHS 2010, NBS 2012, p.7).

South Sudan is a landlocked country sharing borders with Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. More than 60 ethnic indigenous groups, major ethnicities being the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Murle and Bari, inhabit the country (NBS 2012).

Religious composition of the country has often been contested. Recent statistical reports published by the South Sudanese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) do not provide any data on religion. Some scholarly works argue that a majority of southern Sudanese follow indigenous, often referred to as Animist, beliefs (Kaufmann 2004, p. 45, Minahan 2002), however, the most recent report published by Pew Research Centre on Religion and Public Life estimates that, as of 2010, more than 60% of South Sudanese are Christians, whereas, about 33% follow African indigenous faiths and about 6.2% practice Islam (PewResearch, 2012).

South Sudan’s economy is primarily based on oil exports and subsistence agriculture. Nearly 98% of South Sudan’s budget revenues come from oil (NBS 2012, p.5). As of 2012, the country had just 80 km of paved roads, and when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) helped construct a 192 km long Juba-Nimule Road, that was hailed as the largest infrastructure project ever built in South Sudan (USAID 2012).
South Sudan annually receives a substantial amount of international aid. For instance, the country’s 2012–2013 budget of US$3bn was supplemented by US$ 1 billion of development assistance, and additional US$ 300 million of international humanitarian assistance (World Bank 2013).

2.11 Recent Studies on Peacebuilding in South Sudan

The North–South conflict in Sudan has grabbed significant academic attention over the years, partly because the conflict lasted for decades and caused devastating consequences. However, despite the fact that there is ample academic literature available on causes, consequences and different dynamics of the conflict, the volume of literature dealing with post-secession/post-conflict peacebuilding policy issues and transitional justice mechanisms is rather thin. Nonetheless, a few studies that have emerged in the wake of independence have been briefly and critically discussed below.

One of the policy documents that have received significant academic attention is the CPA. The peace process itself and the CPA both have been defended and criticized by researchers. The ones defending the 2005 peace deal (for instance Rolandsen 2011) argue that since there was no better alternative to coming to the negotiating table and end the war, despite its limitations, the peace process envisioned by the CPA and the 2011 referendum, was a prudent move. On the other hand, the ones criticizing the process (such as Ylönen 2012, Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) emphasize that the peace negotiation and subsequent arrangements couldn’t really be comprehensive in nature and the threat of future belligerencies and rebound to conflict cannot be ruled out.

Writing in 2011, the Norwegian peace researcher Øystein H. Rolandsen argues that though ‘the CPA did not include other political parties, solve conflicts elsewhere in Sudan, or provide a blueprint for democratisation and economic development,’ it did, however, ‘brought a halt to the conflict between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A’ (Rolandsen 2011, p.561–562). In addition, he stresses that the CPA process ‘laid the foundation for
change and development, but other processes are needed to realise these aspirations’ (ibid).

Many researchers, however, have criticized this type of utilitarian way of looking at the peace process. For instance, writing in late 2012, Aleksi Ylönen argues that the CPA was indeed an exclusive deal between the SPLM/A and GoS and there are other strong factions who oppose it (p.29). In addition, he argues that the South Sudanese approach to peacebuilding has been riddled with the ‘Western-led liberal discourse’ that seeks to achieve ‘peace through state-building’, but not necessarily through development and good governance. Ylönen asserts that ‘reorientation of the approach to peace, governance and development in South Sudan is necessary if the Africa’s newest state is to become viable and stable political entity in the long term’ (p.29).

In his 2012 study Negotiating Statehood in the Republic of South Sudan, Agnes Koppelman makes similar remarks regarding the exclusivity of the SPLM/A as the most powerful force that is hardly distinguishable from GoSS (p.43). He observes that with its legacy of leading the independence movement, SPLM/A is the biggest and strongest political force in the country and that has narrowed down the growth space for other political forces, heavily compromising the idea of democratic competition and participation (ibid).

In another 2013 study Post–Independence Peacebuilding in South Sudan: Looking Beyond Ephemeral Peace, Nwanegbo & Odigbo argue that South Sudan, in the wake of independence, has multiple challenges to peacebuilding that range from peaceful border demarcation between Sudan and South Sudan to rehabilitation of ex–combatants (p.9). They also raise the issue of transitional justice and argue that mere independence does not lead to peace per se; and ‘failing to deal adequately with transitional justice issues will be very costly over the long term’ (p.3).

There are a few other recent studies that rather focus on how different approaches to peacebuilding could be useful in the South Sudanese context and, at the same time, try to map out different, often neglected, stakeholders that are important for sustainable peacebuilding in the country.

One such study conducted by Da Costa & Karlsrud (2012) emphasizes that getting engaged with local customary authorities is vital in peacebuilding
as government authorities may not necessarily represent the communities of their official jurisdiction (p.51). Brown (2008) observes that as the role of the South Sudanese churches have been instrumental in facilitating grassroots peace dialogues and encouraging inter-ethnic reconciliation in the past, their role in peacebuilding in the aftermath of independence could be equally crucial (p. 253).

Haneef (2013) sees South Sudan in a quasi-emergency situation, with ongoing conflict in different regions, and raises the issue of South Sudanese repatriates whose inability to find livelihood opportunities in the country is likely to create considerable tensions. Though, she argues, many South Sudanese strongly associate with their identity and want to go back to their country, the situation in the ground is not conducive; neither for development nor for safe repatriation of refugees (p. 66–67).

A 2012 study Conflict Transformation in the Republic of South Sudan emphasizes on the need to see peace as a process, specially while a society has to retreat from a deep embedded culture of violence (Alex 2012, p.3). The author advocates for an adoption of ‘new peace-oriented beliefs, behaviors and attitudes’ and recommends reconciliation measures as well as special peace education for violent prone youths (ibid).

The studies briefly discussed above do offer some significant insights into the South Sudanese peace process. They focus and elaborate on different factors that are important for peacebuilding; they also identify and discuss the role of different stakeholders and make different recommendations for peacebuilding mainly on the basis of their empirical findings. However, these studies do not provide sufficient insights into policies and discourses they carry and perpetuate. They do not touch upon issues such as why certain ideas and concepts; for instance state-building, market economy; are promoted while other concepts; such as peace by development and welfare, are less prioritized. On the other hand, these studies fail to draw sufficient examples from historical experiences of foreign involvement and contextualize that with the current affairs in South Sudan. As none of the studies reviewed above focused on post-secession peace policies, they are not able to provide an outlook into the peace policy atmosphere of South Sudan. Likewise, these studies position their work on isolated issues; such as the CPA, or refugees,
reconciliation or different individual stakeholders; and fail to provide a holistic and coherent understanding of peacebuilding in South Sudan.

Though without being overtly ambitious, this thesis looks into policy issues in a wider perspective, tries to identify discursive practices; i.e. why some concepts are adopted and prioritized while others are not. It also contextualizes historical links of foreign involvement and tries to incorporate both micro and macro issues in an attempt to construct a holistic understanding of peacebuilding.
Chapter III

Theoretical Framework: 
*Theories Of Peace And Peacebuilding*

The aim of this chapter is to critically discuss a few relevant and major theoretical paradigms surrounding peacebuilding. First, the Kantian notion of perpetual peace is briefly discussed primarily because of its alleged influence on the contemporary liberal thought in peacebuilding (Doyle 1983, p. 205–235). Then the subsequent sections introduce the ideas of democratic peace theory, liberal peacebuilding and international engagement and discuss their wider implications. A separate section elaborates on Johan Galtung’s notions of positive peace and negative peace and gives an insight into structural violence, new forms of warfare and intrastate aggression that are apparently different from traditional forms of interstate warfare, but cause equally, if not more, devastating results. Finally, the last section critically discusses issues of transitional justice and national reconciliation in a post-conflict situation.

**Peace Research in practice**

Ekkehart Krippendorff argues that due to the emergence of International Relations as an academic discipline in the wake of World War I and also because of the widely felt need and demand to have 'a new policy of peace among nations', Peace Research emerged as an 'effort to understand the origins of war and to discover means for preventing the future outbreak of another war' (Krippendorff 1970, p.1).

Given that the world is grappling with a number of wars and conflicts, tragedies, suffering and displacements; the scope of peace as an area of academic inquisition is unprecedented, and today, the field of peace research or peace studies holds a number of ‘peace theories’ that aim for, among others, a meaningful conflict transformation, cessation of violence, and embodiment of peace notions as a cultural practice.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go through and analyze each peace theory in existence, but the effort here is to give a general overview of a few influential peace theories and concepts that are theoretically relevant to the focus of this study, i.e. sustainable peacebuilding in a post–conflict scenario.

3.1 The Kantian notion of perpetual peace

In his 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* the German philosopher Immanuel Kant proposes his ideas for perpetual peace. His recommendations basically constitute steps to be taken by states for a peaceful coexistence. Structured in two parts, the essay first presents a set of preliminary measures to be immediately adopted and then supplements a few more definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.

In his *Preliminary Articles*, Kant presents the following six points:

1. 'No peace treaty is valid if it was made with mental reservations that could lead to a future war.'
2. 'No independent states, large or small, are to come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.'
3. 'Standing armies are eventually to be abolished.'
4. 'National debts are not to be incurred as an aid to the conduct of foreign policy.'
5. 'No state is to interfere by force with the constitution or government of another state.'
6. 'No state during a war is to permit acts of hostility that would make mutual confidence impossible after the war is over—e.g. the use of assassins and poisoners, breach of capitulation, incitement to treason in the opposing state.' (Kant 1795, p.1–3.)

In addition, Kant’s three *Definitive Articles* provide a broader perspective on peacebuilding and cessation of hostilities.

'The civil constitution of every state is to be republican.'

'The law of nations is to be founded on a federation of free states.'
‘The law of world citizenship is to be united to conditions of universal hospitality.’ (Kant 1795, p. 3–6.)

Obviously, the philosophical debate concerning peace and justice in the international system started long ago before Kant and the quest still continues, but still the Kantian perspective is notable for a number of reasons. First and foremost, his ideas have significantly influenced modern theories of peace and international relations (See for instance, Doyle 1983, Solomon 2003, Rauber 2009) and despite their own shortcomings his ideas have, arguably, 'created a self-contained, comprehensive system of philosophy which in terms of thematic versatility and theoretical foundation has only seldom been truly challenged' (Rauber 2009, p. 51). Though Kant was not fond of democracy (Ray 1998, p.28), his idea of perpetual peace 'as the ultimate virtue and the main purpose of practical philosophy matches the most prominent concern of international law’ (Rauber 2009, p. 51).

3.2 The Kantian Legacy and the Democratic Peace Theory

Even though Immanuel Kant offers a comprehensive set of thoughts on peace, the need to move beyond the Kantian philosophy is obvious as the global socio-political realities are significantly different to that of 1795 and with the evolutionary development of the Social Sciences, a new set of theories have emerged.

Let’s look at one of the contemporary peace theories which, arguably, has its roots in the Kantian philosophy and is often regarded as highly influential in the present day global peace discourse: the democratic peace theory. The main assumption of the democratic peace theory is that democracies do not fight against each other and are more peaceful compared to other political systems, for instance, an autocracy (Maoz & Abdolali 1989, Small & Singer 1976, Oneal & Russett 2001, Tocqueville 1988, Ray 1998, Framceschet 2000, p. 279, Gat 2006 p. 597–609). Though less likely to fight against each other, there is no evidence that democracies are less likely to fight wars in general (Lake 1992, p.24).
Azar Gat, in his 2006 book War in Human Civilization, argues that democratic societies seem to be more peaceful than other forms of governance primarily because of several related as well as independent factors such as wealth and comfort; metropolitan service society, sexual revolution, fewer number of males, fewer children per family, women's franchise and the dread of nuclear weapons. He believes that wealth and comfort make people willing to engage in luxury than opting for war. Similarly, he argues that the decrease in military conscription from countryside and availability of sex due to the pill and women's increased participation in the labor market also decreases the likelihood of war. In addition, Gat implies that factors such as fewer number of younger males in population distribution, due to elevated life expectancy of course, fewer children in families, women's franchise and their less belligerent nature, and the dread of nuclear weapons also help reduce the risk of war. (Gat 2006 p. 597–609). However, Gat’s analysis doesn't seem to be focusing on the fact that non-democracies, too, are equip with a number of elements that he mentions in his list.

Presenting his ideas on the basis of the microeconomic theory of the state, Lake (1992) argues that democracies are less belligerent because the cost of running the state is low in democracies as compared to autocracies, and the fact ultimately makes the latter expansionist and war prone, while the former tend to ‘devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies’ (p. 24). Similarly, Ray (1998) argues that there are some factors that compel democracies to refrain from serious, militarized hostilities, while some other factors enable them to solve disputes peacefully even when they do occur (p. 43).

While looking for empirical evidence to support the notion that democracies are less belligerent, Maoz & Abdolahi (1989) analyze almost every state in the world in the years from 1816 to 1976, totaling 271,904 observations, and conclude that even during the lengthy period of 160 years, not even a single war was fought between two democratic states. They also argue that democracies are less likely to engage in 'lower-level' conflict with each other. (Maoz & Abdolahi 1989, p. 21.) Similarly, Melvin Small & J. David Singer find similar results with mere two statistically insignificant
exceptions (Small & Singer 1976, p. 56–69). Bremer (1992, p. 309) also confirms that a lack of 'democratic polity' makes states vulnerable to wars.

Though supported by robust arguments and a number of empirical evidences, the democratic peace theory equally suffers from harsh criticisms. The theory has been criticized mainly on three grounds: the lack of sufficient empirical data due to newness of democracy (Wayman 2002, Gowa 1999), complications associated with the definition of democracy and war (Spiro 1994, Ray 1995, p.103) and the difficulty to vividly establish causal relationships (Henderson 2002).

Some critics of the democratic peace theory argue that since there have been few democracies and few inter-state wars, the lack of war between democracies can't be very surprising (See for instance Wayman 2002, Gowa 1999, Small & Singer 1976). In addition, Wayman (2002) argues that the phenomenon is not that surprising 'given that many of the democracies that have existed have been allies in NATO, driven into each other’s arms by their sense of threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War era' and other aspects such as 'shared trade and prosperity, membership in common in international organizations, and the global drift toward less inter-state war nowadays' might have played significant role for an alleged peaceful existence of democracies (p.1).

The proponents of the democratic peace theory have been accused of manipulating the definitions of democracy and war to support their empirical data and ultimately the inductive outcome. David Spiro argues that they do so by quickly dismissing the anomalous evidence stating that the states in question are either not democracies, or not independent, or by discarding the conflict in question as war (Spiro 1994, p. 50–86).

Though acknowledging that democracies have waged few wars against each other, Mansfield and Snyder, however, argue that states in the process of 'democratization' are more war prone than mature democracies or stable autocracies or even countries moving toward autocracy. They claim that 'transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely to generate hostilities than transitions toward autocracy' (Mansfield & Snyder 2002, p. 298). This happens so because 'elites in newly democratizing states often use nationalist appeals to attract mass support without submitting to full
democratic accountability and that the institutional weakness of transitional states creates the opportunity for such war-causing strategies to succeed' (ibid).

Definition of interstate war per se and inclusion and exclusion of certain type of conflict has been problematic as well. While many researches have chosen to use 1000 battle deaths, as indicated by the Correlates of War project, as a standard for defining an interstate war, others see it inadequate as it doesn't include civil wars and other various wars that occur for different reasons (Ray 1998, p. 31). Some researchers, however, seem to choose their own standards for labelling whether conflict in question is a war. For instance, Weart (1998) limits his choice to 200 battle deaths, while Russett (1993) takes any battle engagement into consideration (p. 50).

Though problematic and not enough to make confidant and universal generalizations, the democratic peace theory does have significant empirical and theoretical backing, and as Solomon (2003) argues, the DPT doctrine 'has in recent years provided cause for optimism', despite, 'large measures of uncertainty still remain and its significance for the question of competitive war preparations is far from clear' (p. 122).

The motive here, however, is not to argue for or against the DPT, but to discuss the far-reaching implications of it when it is integrated and advocated as a standard instrument of foreign policy and a mandatory prerequisite for international development cooperation.

Though amidst controversies, relative credibility and validity of the DPT has certainly strengthened the Western confidence in its political system and has encouraged Western governments to include democracy as a topmost priority in their explicit foreign policy regimen. For instance, Mansfield & Snyder (2002) argue that the policy implication of the DPT in the US foreign policy sphere has had been significant.

The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s was the claim that promoting democracy would foster peace. Noting that no two democracies have ever fought a war against each other, President Bill Clinton argued that support for democratization would be an antidote to international war and civil strife. Yet the 1990s turned out to be a decade of both democratization and chronic nationalist conflict, both
within and between some transitional states. (Mansfield & Snyder 2002, p. 297.)

This way, it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to argue that the confidence in democracy as the most peaceful polity and a similar fondness for other liberal notions prompted the West to export the mantras of democracy and economic liberalism as means of building peace in troubled states and that ultimately gave rise to a whole new idea in the field of international peacebuilding: the liberal peacebuilding, and the following section discusses that very issue.

3.3 Liberal Peacebuilding and International Engagement

Commonly known as the international version of the democratic peace theory, the notion of liberal peace is based on the idea that peace can be developed and consolidated in a country by the promotion of ‘liberal democracy, liberal human rights, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized secular state’ (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p.4). Chandler (2010) argues that, in essence, the ‘liberal peace’ is held to go beyond traditional approaches of conflict prevention, or ‘negative peace’; towards the external engineering of post-conflict societies through the export of liberal frameworks of ‘good governance’, democratic elections, human rights, the rule of law and market relations’ (p. 1–2).

In their 2009 work New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding Newman, Paris & Richmond observe that international peacebuilding in recent years comprise of ‘security, development, humanitarian assistance, governance and the rule of law’ (p.5). They argue, in addition, that a majority of peacebuilding operations have involved ‘elections or broader democracy—assistance activities, market economics...and a broader range of practices and values, including secular authority, capacity—building, centralized governance and institutions of justice’ (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 10–12). Sabaratnam (2011) argues that particularly since the terrorist attacks in 2001, focus of international conflict management has been systematically and
substantially on ‘governance and statebuilding’ rather than on ‘peace and reconciliation’ (p.18).

Newman, Paris & Richmond (2009) equate contemporary peacebuilding to liberal peacebuilding and argue that the concept is based on the notion that liberally constituted societies ‘tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are’ (p.10).

In essence, the idea of liberal peace, thus, is based on the premises that liberal societies tend to be peaceful and prosperous, at least akin to Western states, and their replication in conflict-prone or post-conflict countries is likely to bring similar results.

The liberal peace approach has been criticized on different grounds. Chandler (2010) argues that the main cause behind the criticism of the liberal peace approach is based on the assumption that the focus of the liberal peace approach is to ‘reproduce and impose Western models’ along with ‘winner-takes-all elections; and neo-liberal free market economic programmes’ (p.1). He, however, broadly categorizes such critics into two lines as power-based and idea based critiques. The power-based critiques question the authenticity of Western rhetoric of freedom and democracy and see liberal peace policies as power-based and political, thereby, merely representing Western self-interest. Whereas, the idea-based critics, while supporting the values of democracy and the free market, argue ‘against the liberal peace approach on the basis that it is unsuitable in the context of post-conflict states and situations of state failure’ (Chandler 2010, p.5–6). According to them, ‘attempts to universalise Western models in non-liberal contexts, will merely reproduce, and maybe even exacerbate, the problems of conflict and instability’ (ibid p.8).

Similarly, the liberal peace approach has been criticized for its inability to accommodate and ensure local people’s participation in peacebuilding. For instance, Roberts (2012) argues that the liberal peace approach suffers elite hijacking and is affected by its own illiberal character and indifference to local people in determining their own fate (p. 366–368). He further elaborates:

The problem lies here: Local people do not direct the nature of the peace built in peacebuilding; they are excluded from its design, a
process commandeered instead by national elites and international policy makers (Roberts 2012, p. 368).

Oliver Richmond, another fervent critic of the liberal peace approach, accuses liberal peacebuilding of focusing too much on international or regional peace instead of an everyday form of peace. He further criticizes the approach for its ‘lack of social welfare frameworks’, ‘failure to mediate cultural differences’ and the ‘tendency towards assimilation rather than local cultural engagement’ (Richmond 2009, p. 566). Newman, Paris & Richmond in their 2009 work outline that liberal peacebuilding and some ‘international interventions are counterproductive because they in effect “freeze” conflicts in place rather than allowing these conflicts to burn themselves out’ (p.16).

Some theoretical arguments have certainly emerged in defense of liberal peace, with the core argument being that there are no viable, better alternatives to liberal peace: and conflict-prone and post-conflict countries would be worse off in absence of liberal peace approach (see for instance Paris 2010). Some have argued for a reformed and rectified form of liberal peace that would accommodate local participation and welfare activities.

Paris (2010) argues that the liberal peace approach has been ‘more difficult and unpredictable than initially expected’ but, for him, critiques that label liberal peacebuilding as ‘fundamentally destructive and illegitimate’ are either ‘exaggerated or misdirected’ (p.337). Paris calls for a reform to existing approaches within what he calls a ‘broadly liberal framework’ and defends international peacebuilding operations:

In spite of their many flaws, they have done more good than harm...and the failure of the existing peacebuilding project would be tantamount to abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease and fear (Paris 2010, p. 338).

Roberts (2012), on the other hand, criticizes liberal peacebuilding for its underestimation of local capacity and argues for a new form of ‘popular peace’, which, in essence, is ‘designed by local societies and furnished externally by international society,’ (p. 368). He sees this type of popular peace to be more emancipatory and more likely to be accepted and cherished
Richmond (2009), however, emphasizes on detailed ontological understanding of local cultural traditions and links poverty and deprivation with violence and aggression. He stresses on creating social welfare oriented peacebuilding institutions and offers a more comprehensive set of recommendations putting welfare initiatives in center. His ‘post liberal peace’ also encompasses a sheer focus on everyday care, empathy, human security and other measures that lead to emancipation of ordinary people (P. 578–580).

It is obvious that ideas and discourses of international peacebuilding have been gradually changing over the years, but rather dismally the center of discussion still revolves around the idea that ‘ideally peaceful’ global North is an agent of bringing peace to rather tumultuous global South. However, as Sabaratnam (2011), envisages, ‘the next iteration of the important debate will also have to speak to an increasingly confident global South, which shows scepticism towards traditional forms of assistance and the presumed better capabilities of the North’ (p.21).

3.4 Negative Peace, Positive Peace & New Wars

Norwegian peace scholar Johan Galtung offers a wide range of ideas on peace, conflict, structural violence and reconciliation. Galtung divides peace into either as negative or positive and discuss different factors that contribute to sustainable/positive peacebuilding. Galtung’s ideas on peace remain amongst most cited and discussed ones in the contemporary peacebuilding discourses.

In his 1996 book Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, Johan Galtung offers a holistic approach to the overall idea of peace and peacebuilding. He argues that peace can be both positive and negative and the cure could be both preventive and curative. For him, negative peace 'is the absence of violence, absence of war' or processes of violence reduction, whereas, positive peace 'is the integration of human society' or 'processes of life enhancement (Galtung 1964 p. 2, Galtung 1996, p. 30). Thus, positive peace is emancipatory in nature (Grewal 2003, p. 6).

Galtung defines peace as the 'absence/reduction of violence of all kinds',
but also as ‘nonviolent and creative conflict transformation’ (Galtung 1996, p. 9). For him, peace work is ‘work to reduce violence by peaceful means’ (ibid).

Galtung equates indirect violence with structural violence and believes that ‘indirect violence comes from the social structure itself’ (Galtung 1996, p. 2). That notion is particularly important at a time when forms and targets of violence seem to have changed significantly. In line with that, Simon Cottle argues that despite ‘major intensive wars fought for territorial conquest and control have declined in the world, civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflicts often involving extreme violence, including genocide and the deliberate targeting of civilian population continue’ (Cottle 2008, p. 114–115). He adds that such conflicts often cause ‘large number of internally displaced people and an exodus of refugees to neighboring territories’ (ibid).

Wars and conflicts end most often with political negotiations, but ending a conflict doesn’t mean that wounds caused by war heal automatically. As Galtung elaborates, ‘the most naïve view one can possibly have of a conflict is to believe that a conflict is solved once the elites from the parties of the conflict formation have accepted the solution, as indicated by their signature on some document outlining the new formation’ (Galtung 1996, p. 89). He broadens the scope of peacebuilding and argues that peacebuilding is about overcoming ‘the contradiction at the root of the conflict formation...the goal is an acceptable formula, defining a new formation: new structures, new institutions’ (Galtung 1996, p. 112).

In addition, Galtung presents three factors that uphold war or violent conflicts: patriarchy, i.e. rule by the male gender; the state system, with its monopoly on violence and the super-state; and superpower system, with the ultimate monopoly of the hegemons, are responsible for upholding war (Galtung 1996, p. 5). His focus is on structures: gender and hegemonic issues, but there might be other issues such as identity and natural resources that perpetuate a violent conflict. Galtung advocates for a South–South cooperation for peacebuilding and development in the South, which could, in fact, be useful in South Sudan’s case as the country can significantly benefit from other countries’ experiences with conflict transformation and peacebuilding.
A few scholars have come up with explanations for new types of war that are being seen especially after the Cold War. Mary Kaldor, a key thinker of New Wars theory, argues that whereas old war could be understood as a ‘war between states fought by armed forces in uniform’, there is another type of warfare which has little to do with the use of new technology, but with the social relations of warfare (Kaldor 2005). She talks about a new type of warfare that is fought for claiming identity instead of territory, often with ruthless guerrilla and terror tactics, causing enormous civilian suffering. She argues that New War is associated with ‘globalization and the disintegration of states’ (Kaldor 2005, p. 2).

They are wars where taxation is falling and war finance consists of loot and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue. They are wars where the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, legitimate violence and criminality are all breaking down. These are wars which exacerbate the disintegration of the state – declines in GDP, loss of tax revenue, loss of legitimacy. Above all, they construct new sectarian identities (religious, ethnic or tribal) that undermine the sense of a shared political community. (Kaldor 2005, p.3.)

Another proponent of New Wars theory Mark Duffield argues that new wars can be fought in territorial network through and around states and instead of traditional armies such wars are mostly fought by ‘trans-border resource networks of state incumbents, social groups, diasporas, strongmen, and so on’ (Duffield 2001, p.14).

On the basis of above mentioned arguments it can be said that New Wars are the wars fought by a network of state or non-state actors, mostly using guerrilla techniques to cause more damage, targeting mainly civilians and violating conventions of wars and international human rights legislation; based on identity, hate, separation and so forth.

3.5 Transitional Justice & Reconciliation for Peacebuilding
First coined in 1995, the term transitional justice seems to be sort of a
buzzword in many post conflict scenarios. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a New York based organization monitoring transitional justice issues globally; transitional justice refers to the ‘set of judicial and non–judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses’ (ICTJ 2014). These measures include ‘criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms’ (ibid).

Anderlini, Conway & Kays (2007) argue that ‘in the aftermath of conflict or authoritarian rule, people who have been victimised often demand justice and the notion that there cannot be peace without justice emerges forcefully in many communities’ (p.1). Transitional justice mechanisms seem to be justified on the grounds that ‘in the aftermath of massive human rights abuses, victims have well established rights to see the perpetrators punished, to know the truth, and to receive reparations’ (ICTJ 2014). And such mechanisms are important because ‘systemic human rights violations affect not just the direct victims, but society as a whole...and states have duties to guarantee that the violations will not recur, and therefore, a special duty to reform institutions that were either involved in or incapable of preventing the abuses’ (ibid).

Reconciliation, one of the components of transitional justice, varies in meaning. According to Anderlini, Conway & Kays (2007), reconciliation can simply mean ‘coexistence, dialogue, forgiveness and healing’ and is not an ‘attempt to restore things to how they were before the conflict, but rather about constructing relationships in a way that allows everyone to move forward together’ (p.2). They further argue that ‘reconciliation is often seen to be crucial if peace processes are to succeed, as it establishes relations among parties after a conflict and decreases the risk of further violence’ (p. 3).

On reconciliation and transitional justice, Johan Galtung emphasizes on the roles of the actors.

The move from past to future: This move is indispensable, since the past evokes all the memories of what went wrong, of direct and structural violence of all types. The actors are likely to be experts here, The past offers an empirical basis for guilt–distribution, mutually among the actors and from above. (Galtung 1996, p. 109.)
There have been a few critics of the transitional justice approach as well. Chandra Lekha Sriram, for instance, argues that ‘transitional justice processes and mechanisms may, like liberal peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict and post-atrocity countries, and may also be externally imposed and inappropriate for the political and legal cultures in which they are set up’ (2007, p. 579). Vieille (2012) sees the transitional justice approach defined by a ‘Western, legalistic approach to justice’ and questions the motive behind scholars’ predilection for certain types of institutions that are based on neoliberal democratic framework (p.58).

Criticisms towards transitional justice processes, however, do not seem to be targeted at the concept of transitional justice per se, but seem to aim at reforming its inadequacies and saving it from possible risks.

Based on the theoretical standpoints discussed above, it can be argued that the field of peacebuilding has experienced a paradigm shift in the course of time and practice. Theories that focus on interstate warfare seem to be rapidly eclipsed by new theories that focus on intra-state warfare, civil wars, international engagement, peacekeeping and the so-called war on terrorism. On the other hand, more often than before, issues of human rights violations, war crimes, transitional justice and reparations seem to be emphasized both in peacebuilding literature and practice.

Rather skeptical to the ideas of liberal peacebuilding and international engagement due to their overtly invasive nature, this study borrows from and uses ideas expressed in theories that focus on qualitative and grassroots aspects of peacebuilding, such as Galtung’s negative and positive peace, and more recent ideas expressed on transitional justice and popular peace.
Chapter IV

Research Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodological tools adopted in the study and outlines the rationale behind their choice. The chapter starts with a section on policy documents analysis and continues to the concept of discourse in socio-political domain. Different ways of carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis and the concepts of genre and intertextuality are discussed before unfolding Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model of CDA in detail. Criticisms surrounding Critical Discourse Analysis and its relevance for analysing policy documents have been discussed in the final two sections of this chapter.

4.1 Analysis of Policy Documents

There are many methodological tools and approaches for the study and analysis of policy documents and political texts, but not all of them go beyond analyzing literal manifestations produced in texts. The aim of this study, however, is to go beyond literal textual explanations and to see the implicit meanings and subtle messages hidden underneath the words and statements, to identify discourses and ideologies sustained and consolidated through policy texts. The need to do so obviously demands a method that can sufficiently address these issues.

When it comes to analyzing policy documents, policy analysis as an analytical tool seems to be many researchers’ choice. In general, policy analysis seeks to explain political decisions and their consequences and it can be regarded as one of the ‘means to the end of improving the bases on which policies are made at all levels of government’ (Lynn 1998, p.417). Similarly, Yanow (2000) argues that policy analysis basically intends to ‘inform some audience—traditionally, the policymaker—about an anticipated policy: what its impact will be on a targeted population, whether it is likely to achieve the
desired outcome, whether it is the right policy to address a specific problem (p.8). However, as the traditional approach to policy analysis focuses more on 'costs, benefits, and choice points', a more humane approach with focus on 'values, beliefs, and feelings as a set of meanings' has been advocated (ibid p.9) as interpretative policy analysis, with apparent emphasis on qualitative outcomes. With its emphasis on qualitative outcomes, interpretative policy analysis does seem to have different focus than that of ordinary policy analysis, but identifying and analyzing discourses in policy documents is not its primary focus.

Policy analysis has been criticized for its overemphasis on 'economic assumptions and instrumental rationality' and for neglecting 'distributive ends, procedural and historical principles, and the values' (Tribe 1972, p.105). More recent criticisms (see for instance Lindblom 1990, Schön & Rein 1994) have recommended for a drastic revamp of the practice, and have called for a cooperative inquiry or 'probing' by scholars and policymakers, but not just 'solving the decision maker's problem for him' (Lindblom 1990, p.271).

Policy analysis or even interpretative policy analysis thus, do not offer sufficient methodological instruments to accomplish the mission of this study, as they seem more useful on policy-study-recommendation areas and do not necessarily tackle the beliefs, convictions, ideologies and discourses that are perpetuated or consolidated through texts, often in indirect, implicit and ambiguous ways. This necessitates the search and adoption of another methodological tool that can sufficiently relate to and address the research question.

4.2 Understanding Discourse in Socio-Political Domain

Discourse, in literal sense, can be understood as a written or spoken communication, text, or debate, but its use in the socio-political domain is significantly broader; and can be seen as a system of power and knowledge. The word discourse emanates from the Latin word discurrere which means 'to run apart' and thus Diskursus meaning 'to run to and fro' (Encarta 1999, p.538).
Michel Foucault, in his popular book *Archeology of Knowledge: Discourse on Language*, extensively discusses the nature of discourse, knowledge and how they relate to power relations (Foucault 1972). Foucault contents that “whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say...that we are dealing with a discursive formation’ (Foucault 1972, p.38). Foucault’s focus has been also on inclusion and exclusion in discourse practices, i.e. who gets to participate and who is excluded. Foucault tries to demonstrate the irrationality of discourses, calling them 'risky, discontinuous and overlapping’ and labeling discourses as a form of violence (Foucault 1971, 55 cited in Stahl 2004).

Power relations as well as discipline and rationality seem to be central interests of Foucauldian notion of discourse. Instead of literal meanings and interpretations, factors that shape communication, such as social interaction and processes, are crucial (Foucault 1972). Providing examples of changes in medical and legal discourses, Foucault shows how transformation in discourses produce real life reverberations, such as on medical institutions and court system and criminal punishment methods (Whisnant 2012, p.5).

Having borrowed from Foucauldian approach to discourse, Whisnant (2012) elaborates on four ways of discourse operation. First, by shaping people’s perception of the world, discourse creates a world in itself, which is largely a social construction that emanates from a ‘complex interaction between experience, upbringing and education’ (p. 5). Second, discourse also operates by generating certain type of knowledge and 'truth', ultimately, in some contexts, exhibiting the power to convince people to accept certain statements as truth. Third, discourse not only imparts the 'intended meaning of the language’, but also ‘says something about the people who speak it.’ For instance, Whisnant offers an example of doctor–patient relationship where the medical discourse give the doctor an authority to speak and places on higher position of authority. Fourth, discourses have intimate links with 'socially embedded networks of power’. (Whisnant 2012, p. 5–7.)

Though a robust and revolutionary approach to look at power relations, Foucault’s approach to discourse has been criticized mainly on two grounds. First, the notion of power he uses is extensively wide (see Habermas 1994a),
and, second, his blatant criticism and rejection of all discourses, without offering a possibility of distinguishing between less desirable and more desirable discourses has suffered harsh criticism as well (Habermas 1994b, p. 88).

The following section deals with a few more concepts of discourse that are, theoretically or methodologically, relevant to this study. While doing so, the attempt is to move from mere 'discourse' to discourse analysis, and ultimately to critical discourse analysis (CDA), the methodological tool adopted for this study.

4.3 Different Approaches to Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis can be understood as a way of identifying and interpreting discourses. In that sense, discourse analysis moves beyond the literal meaning and what’s explicitly expressed in the text. Fairclough argues that discourse is 'use of language seen as a form of social practice', whereas, discourse analysis is 'analysis of how texts work within sociocultural practice' (Fairclough 1995, p. 17). However, he further suggests that a text is not necessarily written or linguistic, but could be spoken or even any cultural artefact — a picture, a building, a piece of music' (ibid p.14).

Emphasizing the need for a distinction between explicit and implicit features in a text, Fairclough argues for a multifunctional view of text which is relevant to carry out 'sociocultural analysis' and also 'ideological analysis' of text. For Fairclough, 'texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction' and their analysis requires a multifunctional analytical approach (Fairclough1995, p. 15-16).

Similarly, Blommaert (2005) argues that the focus of discourse analysis is on 'how language is an ingredient of power processes resulting in, and sustained by, forms of inequality, and how discourse can be or become a justifiable object of analysis, crucial to an understanding of wider aspects of power relations' (p.2). He treats discourse as a 'general mode of semiosis', calling it 'meaningful symbolic behavior' and defining discourse as 'language—in—action' (ibid). Aligning himself to the Foucauldian understanding of power,
Blommaert argues that discourse 'comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developments of use...What is traditionally understood by language is but one manifestation of it' (Blommaert 2005, p.3). Stressing on the importance of the relationship between text and context and the social nature of discourse, he contends that discourses do matter to people as they are used in everyday life, in different forms and, can be associated with social differences, conflict and struggle and different types of social–structural effects (ibid p.4).

There are different approaches to discourse analysis. For instance, Eggins & Slade (1997) try to locate different approaches to discourse analysis and categorize them in relation to respective epistemological approaches that range from ethnomethodological conversation analysis to social–semiotic critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics (p.24).

Pennycook (1994), on the other hand, argues that discourse analysis could be either descriptive or critical in nature. While descriptive discourse analysis emphasizes language as a system and focuses on contextual factors that influence language in use; critical discourse analysis looks at social and cultural relationships as the origin of meanings which can be realized in language use (Pennycook 1994). While descriptive discourse analysis is positivist/modernist, critical discourse analysis is constructionist/poststructuralist (MacDonald 2013, p.7).

4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has its roots in Hallidayan linguistics, a theory which examines language in relation to social interactions, and is heavily influenced by European scholarship tradition. CDA was founded on the idea that approaches to social critique could significantly benefit from linguistic analysis. (Blommaert 2005, p. 22.) British Cultural Studies had another significant influence on CDA. For instance, The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies tried to 'systematically address social, cultural, and political problems related to transformations in late capitalist society in Britain' (Blommaert 2005, p. 23) and that had a major influence on the development of CDA (Slembrouck, 2001). However, the publication of
Language and Power by Norman Fairclough in 1989 brought about a new era of CDA. In the book, Fairclough presented 'an explicitly politicised analysis of 'powerful’discourses in Britain and offered the synthesis of linguistic method, objects of analysis, and political commitment’ which have now become the trademark of CDA (Blommaert 2005, p.23).

There are many methods for carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis (see for instance Wodak & Meyer 2009, Lillis & McKinney 2003). This study, however, follows Norman Fairclough's framework (1992; 1995; Chouliarak & Fairclough, 1999) for Critical Discourse Analysis which is based on the idea that texts cannot be detached and analyzed in isolation from the wider social context. Fairclough offers a three-layer analytical framework that encompasses textual, intertextual and contextual paradigms. Before moving on to Fairclough’s specific model, let’s examine some basic notions of Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodological/analytical tool.

According to Van Dijk 'Critical Discourse Analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately to resist social inequality.' (Dijk 1998, p.1.) So the primary focus of CDA is to look at both overt and covert discourses underlying in text. 'To put it simply, CDA aims at making transparent the connections between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures, connections that might be opaque to the layperson'(Sheyholislami 2013).

Many theorists in CDA have come up with their own version of principles, but the most cited work has been that of Fairclough & Wodak (1997: 271–280) who summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Though early studies in CDA primarily used 'language' as the 'basis for studies of power,' that nowadays has often been 'replaced by discourse as the unit of actual language use in which power is enacted' (Dijk. 1998, p.9). Dijk further argues, 'if dominant groups, and especially their elites largely control public discourse and its structures, they thus also have more control over the minds of the public at large', though, 'such control has its limits' and 'the complexity of comprehension and the formation and change of beliefs, are such that one cannot always predict which features of a specific text or talk will have which effects on the minds of specific recipients' (Dijk, 1998, p. 9).

Power and its institutional reproduction remain central to CDA. Thus its aim is to analyze ‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ (Wodak 1995 p.204). In addition:

[CDA] studies real, and often extended, instances of social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed. (Wodak 1997, p.173.)

It has been argued that CDA sees discourse as 'socially constitutive' and 'socially conditioned' and 'advocates (active) intervention in the social practices it critically investigates' (Blommaert 2005, p. 25). Some scholars like M. Toolan (1997) even prescribe CDA to explicitly advocate for change, empowerment and practice orientedness. Some scholars argue that CDA acknowledges the dialectical relationship between language and society, i.e. Language is influenced by society and society is influenced by language (Wang 2006). CDA 'conceives discourse as a social phenomenon and seeks, consequently, to improve the social-theoretical foundations for practising discourse analysis as well as for situating discourse in society' (Blommaert 2005, p. 27).
There are two major streams of critical discourse analysis: the detailed textual analysis approach to CDA based on Norman Fairclough's work and the study of social variables as represented by van Dijk and Gee.

4.5 Norman Fairclough's CDA

Norman Fairclough, one of the prominent scholars of CDA, especially within the British context, has contributed enormously by linking different dimensions of power and social context to CDA, and thereby developing it as a method of analysis. His focus has been on social construction and social formation of language which constitutes 'social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief'. (Dijk, 1998, p. 18.)

Fairclough's three-dimensional model for CDA (Fairclough 1995), which this study uses as a tool for analysis, constitutes:

1. The examination of the linguistic features of texts (the level of the text)
2. The exploration of processes related to the production and consumption of texts (the discursive practice); and
3. The consideration of the wider social and cultural context to which the text as a "communicative event" belongs (the sociocultural practices).

Fairclough uses three components—description, interpretation and explanation—for his analysis. Textual analysis, primarily, is carried out by description of linguistic characteristics, the link between the productive and interpretative procedures of discursive practice and the text is interpreted, finally explaining the nexus between social practice and discursive practice (Fairclough 1995). Discursive practice can be understood as discourse which is 'produced, circulated, distributed, and consumed in society' (Blommaert 2005, p. 29). Thus Fairclough's attempt is towards establishing a systematic method for studying the nexus between text and its social context, the dimensions on which the method relies on are shown in the figure below.
This framework based on Fairclough’s 1992 work includes multi-layered analysis that includes text, process of interpretation and discourse practice, but also sociocultural practice. Interestingly, text is at the core of the analysis, which figuratively means that linguistic features offer the bases or evidence for claims in discourse analytical work.

### 4.6 Genre and Intertextuality

In Critical Discourse Analysis the 'type of language used in the performance of a particular social practice' has been defined as genre (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 57). Such genres could be, for instance, the legal genre, the journalism genre, the fictional genre and so on. However, when it comes to an order of discourse, it has been defined as 'a socially structured articulation of discursive practices (including both genres and discourses)' (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 114). According to Hyland:

Genres are abstract, socially recognized ways of using language. Genre analysis is based on two central assumptions: that the features of a similar group of texts depend on the social context of their creation and use, and that those features can be described in a way that relates a text to others like it.
and to the choices and constraints acting on text producers. (Hyland, 2002, p. 114.)

Kress (1989) argues that analysing genre is a way of understating the link between text and social context as genre analysis 'based on the idea of the communicative purpose of social context determines the source of the text' and an insight into genres also means an insight into the culture (p.17).

The concept of intertextuality is derived from the Bakhtinian notion that texts have histories and they are an echo of past texts (Bakhtin 1986, Kristeva 1986). Adoption of intertextual view thereby enables one to go beyond purely linguistic analysis.

While the linguistic analysis of texts shows how (texts) are positioned in the language or languages they draw upon, the intertextual analysis of texts shows how they are positioned in relation to what I shall call 'orders of discourse' (Chouliaraki 1998, p.10).

According to Fairclough's notion of intertextuality and intertextual analysis, while there is linguistic analysis of text, the same can be done with discourse practice as well, and that is what he has termed as intertextuality. Fairclough argues that 'intertextual analysis focuses on the borderline between text and discourse practice in the analytical framework. Intertextual analysis is looking at text from the perspective of discourse practice, looking at the traces of the discourse practice in the text'. (Fairclough 1995, p.16.) In addition, Fairclough contends that while linguistic analysis is descriptive in nature, intertextual analysis tends to be more interpretative (Fairclough 1995, p.16).

4.7 Criticisms of Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis has been critized on many grounds. Such criticisms come from scholars that advocate for other forms of textual analysis (Wang 2006). Criticisms to CDA are mainly focused on theoretical and methodological defects, but it has received some general critics too. Widdowson (1995), for instance, claims that CDA fails to make a clear distinction between text and discourse and is more of ideological
interpretation of text rather than an analysis. He further argues that CDA compels the reader to see an ideology in text, even if there is no ideology at all (p.158). Similarly, Schegloff (1997) claims that, in the name of analysis, CDA analysts are in fact projecting their own 'political biases and prejudices onto their data and analyse them accordingly' (cited in Blommaert 2005, p. 32). Slembrouck (2001) pose a serious criticism questioning the 'explanatory' level in CDA, which he believes, excludes the participant out of the analysis and, thereby, impose a view from above, instead of giving voice to the below.

Blommaert (2005), while commending CDA as a method that offers considerable potential, discusses a few shortcomings of CDA as its limitations. In his opinion, the linguistic bias i.e. Putting very high price on linguistic–textual analysis is one of the problems that CDA severely suffers from. He also argues that CDA is silent on as to how linguistically investigate discourses that are absent and expresses his concern for the fact that CDA stops the process of analysis as soon as the discourse has been found. He also calls the practice First World focused and closure to particular time–frame only. (p.33–36.)

Despite these criticisms, many academic practitioners adopt and vigorously support CDA as it has the ability to revealing implicit values, beliefs, extricate power relations, injustices that are perpetuate through text, but not necessarily explicit in nature.

4.8 Critical Discourse Analysis and Policy Documents

Discourse analysis or critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodological and analytical tool has been used by many researchers to identify different discourses in policy documents. A few examples of such studies have been provided herein.

Pinto (2011) applies Fairclough’s three–layered approach of CDA to study, what she mentions, the single most important policy instrument in the disability arena in Portugal: the First National Action Plan for the Integration of People with Disabilities and Impairment (PAIPDI), and, among others, finds the adoption of the rights discourse in disability as a new phenomenon.
and highlights the perpetuation of other discourses, such as medical discourse, that keep power relations sustained and consolidated.

Isola (2012) carries out a critical discourse analysis of the US foreign policy during two presidential terms, that of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, by analyzing state-of-the-union speeches by the two presidents and finds that GW Bush’s policy dominated by the danger and unilateral discourses, whereas, that of Obama by responsible leadership and multilateralism. However, she finds, both presidents used American exceptionalism as a common discourse to frame their foreign policy.

Repo (2006) applies discourse analysis and Foucauldian approach to discourse as her methodological orientation to study gendering and militarization of war on terrorism. With a special emphasis on representation of masculinities and femininities, she points out to discourses, such as demonizing discourse and women’s rights discourse, that shape gendering and militarization of war on terror.

Having used the CDA for educational policy research, Dunn (2006) argues that neoliberal discourses in educational policy necessitate new tools for an effective critique and, in his opinion, CDA has just done that. Similarly, Hewitt (2009) praises discourse analysis for public policy research or study of policy documents as the method helps understand complex policy activity which are not always based on rational or political framework.

To conclude, as presented in the different sections of this chapter, different methods and tools can be used to analyse policy documents. While some methods of policy analysis focus on textual and interpretative analysis, discourse analysis looks for discourses that are overtly or covertly embedded in policy texts. This is obviously helpful when one intends to understand different discourses hidden in socio-political domains. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) takes the practice of discourse analysis to a new level as it offers a holistice framework for analysing discourses through textual, intertextual and contextual analyses. This way certain domains of discourses can be linked to other domains, power relations can be better understood and the utility of discourses can be analysed in terms of contexts they are introduced.
Chapter V

Critical Discourse Analysis of the Policy Documents

The aim of this chapter is to carry out a Critical Discourse Analysis of the selected four Policy documents by using Norman Fairclouh’s three dimensional approach to CDA. First, the chapter begins with a textual analysis of the policy texts with the aim of exploring the 'texture' of the policy documents. In the second section, the idea of text as discursive pratice is further explored and different discourses are identified and discussed. Finally, the third section presents a historical and contextual positioning of the discourses and proposes factors that possibly caused their emergence.

The selected policy documents namely are:

1- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A 2005 (the CPA)
2- South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 (the SSDP)
3- South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013–2015 (the PRS)
4- Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013 (the CSDHPR)

Hereafter, the documents are either referred jointly as the Policy documents/papers or separately as the CPA, the SSDP, the PRS and the CSDHPR. The chapter is divided into three sub-chapters for the purpose of three different analyses of the CDA: Textual analysis, Intertextual analysis and Contextual analysis.
5.1 Textual Analysis— Exploring the 'Texture' of the Policy Documents

As Fairclough’s framework entails the analysis of the 'texture of the text' as its first dimension, it is certainly prudent to start from the lexical as well as the structural analysis of the text used in the policy documents. These documents apparently were created and promulgated at a historical juncture when a decades long, protracted, tedious and bloody war had just come to an end. These documents appeared at a time when a new country and a new identity was being born and was being internationally recognized and a promising future seemed to be at sight for the people of South Sudan. These factors certainly have influenced the language used in the policy documents. Starting from the CPA up to the CSDHPR, the longing for peace, prosperity and development is profound, often in the form of different metaphors. Therefore, obviously these policy documents were created to serve their specific, rather utilitarian purposes, but they serve also as metaphors of hope, peace and better future for South Sudan.

Let’s talk about use of metaphors in the documents. Text as a metaphorical element is of particular interest while carrying out a CDA. From the CDA perspective, metaphors do give significant insights into particular aspects of reality. As Fairclough (1992) argues: ‘When we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another. Metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way’ (p. 195).

Relatively, the CPA is written in a technical language, with a lot of jargons and sophisticated terminologies, and is not very elaborate on various occasions. However, it does not refrain from imparting hope for peace deprived people of the Sudan and Southern Sudan.

Mindful of the urgent need to bring peace and security to the people of the Sudan who have endured this conflict for far too long… Now herein the parties jointly acknowledge that the CPA offers not only hope but also a concrete model for solving problems and other conflicts in the country (the CPA 2005, p. xi–xii).
Though the CPA was signed between only two warring parties, the GoS and SPLM/A, and thereby its scope was very narrow and limited, but still its aims are ambitious. It didn’t end other conflicts in Sudan, such as one in Darfur or conflicts within Southern Sudan, but the document goes on claiming that it has ‘concrete model’ for solving conflicts in Sudan. This is apparently an outcome of the excitement of ending a four decade long conflict that caused tremendous suffering and bloodshed.

The SSDP, on the other hand, was created in the wake of independence and the document is constructed as a metaphor of a 'new beginning' for South Sudan. When going through the text, that sense of determination, at least in the language, is identifiable everywhere. So, the SSDP was crafted as a metaphor of 'hope' for South Sudanese; rather a symbol of 'progress' or an emblem of 'enthusiasm', a sign of breaking away from the past and moving forward to a new, better future.

Hopes for a better and stable future are abundant in the text. The SSDP also presents a retrospective analysis and memories of the past; having frequently referred to the long and tedious process of liberation, the decades long conflict, rampant poverty and suffering of the South Sudanese. As stated, the overall objective of the SSDP is:

To ensure that by 2014 South Sudan is a united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all (the SSDP 2011, p. xiv).

The language used in the above paragraph and also in the entire text of the SSDP is intened to deliver a message of political commitment to a peaceful and prosperous South Sudan, though, given the challenges the country faced, it was quite unrealistic to have such high expectations.

Still the use of politically affirmative language in the development plan can be explained in terms of historical needs of the country. That type of language certainly emanates from the understanding that, in the wake of independence, the people of South Sudan needed a political affirmation that their newly born
independent nation is going to be peaceful and developed and their age-old grievances are going to be heard and addressed.

When comes to peacebuilding, the SSDP’s chapter on *Conflict Prevention & Security– Deepening Peace and Improving Security* states the objective of peace building is to:

> defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Sudan, prevent the resurgence of conflict and uphold the constitution by providing equitable access to justice and maintaining law and order through institutions which are transparent, accountable and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms (SSDP 2011, p. xix).

The topmost emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity can be attributed to the newly independent state of the country, the bloodshed and the wounds of the war, but also the historically violent and even in post-independent scenario apparently turbulent relations with the Sudan.

Though words such as *respect for human rights* and *fundamental freedoms* haven’t been left apart, a highly prioritized mentions of words such as *defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, maintenance of law and order* gives an instant impression that South Sudan’s focus seems to be on promoting what Johan Galtung calls negative peace— an absence of overt violence and war or processes of violence reduction, but without due recourse to integration of human society or life enhancement mechanisms (Galtung 1964 p. 2, Galtung 1996, p. 30).

The language used in the PRS and the CSDHPR differs to certain extent from the one used in the CPA and the SSDP. While the CPA and the SSDP try to be very promising and appear tremendously optimistic about the future, the PRS and the CSDHPR are rather cautious. Obviously, the timing of their appearance has something to do with these remarkable discrepancies in the tone of the language. The CPA and the SSDP appeared before and just after independence when the zeal and confidence and optimism was certainly high, whereas, the PRS and the CSDHPR were promulgated after two years of independence, with rather a bitter experience of fragile peace, growing internal conflicts, displacements and widespread corruption among ruling
elites. The adjacent figures presents a timeline view of the four policy documents and their timing of appearance.

**Figure 5.1: Timeline of South Sudanese peace policy documents**

![Timeline of South Sudanese peace policy documents](image)

The PRS, for instance, is articulate about the limitations of the CPA and overtly expresses how it failed to end all practices of violence in South Sudan.

The CPA brought peace and opportunities for human security and social development that Southern Sudan had not seen for decades. It did not put an end to historically entrenched practices such as cattle raiding which generate violence and insecurity, nor did it do away with the perception that corruption, nepotism and political privilege frustrate legitimate ambitions to participate more fully in the defining of a common future. (the PRS 2013, p. 10.)

The CSDHPR, on the other hand, takes a different approach to produce an affirmative language. While people’s faith in political leadership was gradually waning, the document brings in God as an authority to have faith in.

You know very well that had it not been for our consistent trust in God, we could have given up in the face of so many difficulties. But God helped us to the end...you remember that it is God who has helped this country to gain its freedom...it is distressing to see the very people who struggled shoulder to shoulder are now butchering each other as though they have so easily forgotten where God has taken us through. (The
This utmost emphasis on God is obviously an attempt to find an alternative faith figure for people but also influenced by the way the Healing Peace and Reconciliation Commission is constituted, which is explained later in the second section.

5.2 Text as 'Discursive Practice': Exploring the Interdiscursivity in the Policy Documents

Interdiscursivity is an analytical concept that links a discourse to other discourses. The term relates to the idea that discursive elements are imported to a discourse from other discourses. Interdiscursivity is closely linked to the idea of intertextuality which means the framing of a text’s meaning by another text, by using intertextual figures such as, allusion, translation, quotation, plagiarism, parody, pastiche and calque. (Gerard 1997, p.18; Hallo 2010, p.608; Cancogni 1985 p.203–213.) Fairclough argues that intertextual analysis looks at text from the angle of discourse practice, that is basically looking at discourse practices reflected in the text. Unlike linguistic analysis, which is descriptive in nature, intertextual analysis tends to be interpretative. (Fairclough 1995, p. 16.)

On the basis of the methodological framework of the CDA, the attempt here is to undertake an interdiscursive analysis of the policy documents so that one can go beyond the literal understanding of the text and be able to fathom the overtly unexpressed, but underlying discourses latent in the texts.

The selected policy papers contain a collection of massive text involving a number of issues dealing with South Sudan, and obviously various discourses can be identified throughout the texts. However, as the focus of this study, primarily, is on policy frameworks for sustainable peacebuilding, only the discourses that are deemed relevant to peacebuilding issues have been identified and discussed.
5.2.1 The Capitalist–Corporate Discourse:

One of the discourses that is visible in the policy texts is what one can call a capitalist-corporate discourse. The policy texts articulate and uphold the capitalist-corporate discourse by giving an emphasis on private led growth, privatization, foreign investment and assistance.

The SSDP, for instance, highlights 'the importance of promoting private sector-led economic growth and the delivery of basic services in reducing the incidence of poverty among the population' (page xi).

The CPA talks about supporting a just world economic order (p.27), but doesn’t elaborate on that. As a development plan document, the SSDP is more articulate about the issue.

Emphasis on privatization and private-led growth signals that the country adopts, supports and promote a capitalist-corporate culture that, among others, allows people to amass private property, be part of a free and deregulated market economy, but also allows privatization of production means including delivery of basic services, health as well as education.

The capital-corporate discourse or South Sudan’s preference for market economy could be understood as a component of liberal peace agenda promoted in South Sudan. Market liberalization in war-torn post conflict scenarios has faced criticisms as it tends to increase the vulnerability of populations to poverty and shadow economic activity (Pugh 2005).

5.2.2 The Curative Peace Discourse:

The second discourse that is visible in the policy documents can be named the curative peace discourse. The policy documents prioritize peace and security as top priorities and repeatedly mention measures to be adopted to ensure peace and security in the country. Such measures, however, are primarily curative ones, and not so much of preventive and holistic. For instance, the SSDP explains:

Peace—building involves a range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of relapse into conflict, by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management and laying the foundation for sustainable peace and development...
Peacebuilding as a process is the responsibility of South Sudan but external involvement can be critical and very supportive (The SSDP, p. 9).

The CPA, on the other hand, talks of the need to reach a ‘just and sustainable peace’, but doesn’t provide concrete measures as such. Instead, the document concentrates on strengthening peace by administrative and security measures. The CPA disqualifies all other armed groups in Sudan and requires them to side either the SPLA or the SAF.

No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces... The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transitional process. (The CPA, p 89–90.)

When events unfolded, this provision proved to be potentially dangerous, as only a few rebel groups decided to join the ‘mainstream’ and a number of them didn’t recognize the peace process at all. Historical grievances of many groups seem to have remained unaddressed and a number of new rebel groups sprang throughout South Sudan in the wake of independence.

The CPA’s chapter on the DDRR (Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation) recognizes the DDRR process mostly as a civilian affair with a vital military input (p. 118) but doesn’t offer a framework that would engage civilian prowess either in DDRR or in peacebuilding in general. In fact, the CPA doesn’t offer any framework of sustainable peace, though it repeatedly makes statements about quick, just and sustainable peace.

The peacebuilding measures envisioned in the policy documents are mainly curative ones, emphasizing the idea that peace can be achieved by curative measures such as post-conflict management or tight security measures with heavy investments in national defense mechanisms. For instance, the SSDP emphasizes on strengthening of national capacities at all levels of conflict management, which basically means improving capacity of agencies that maintain law and order, which is not necessarily undesirable, but this
prioritization neglects another part of conflict transformation which Johan Galtung calls the preventive measures, by which peace is an 'absence/reduction of violence of all kinds', but also as 'nonviolent and creative conflict transformation' and, thereby, peace work is 'work to reduce violence by peaceful means' (Galtung 1996, p. 9).

5.2.3 The Good Governance Discourse

Another discourse that has been articulated through the policy documents is that of good governance. Repeated mentions of terms such as good governance, human rights, rule of law, democracy and transparency are pretty common throughout the policy documents.

Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law at all levels of government to achieve lasting peace (The CPA, p. 12).

[The parties are] convinced that decentralization and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country. (The CPA, p.11)

The SSDP contains dozens of mentions of good governance and links good governance with an effective service delivery, consolidation of peace and democracy and rule of law. The PRS paper, similarly, includes the good-governance rhetoric in its core mission statement as follows:

The South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission will work to promote and maintain a sustainable peace in South Sudan. It will work against all forms of violence through building unity, pursuing reconciliation and transforming conflict through dialogue, policy-making, advocacy, networking, and the promotion of good governance, participatory democracy and human development. (The PRS, p. 15.)
This good-governance discourse can be linked again to the liberal peace discourse, i.e. the idea that democracies are more peaceful and rule of law is desirable for maintaining sustainable peacebuilding. The inclusion of good governance discourse in the South Sudanese peace policy documents can also be linked to substantial Western influence during the peace negotiations, but also after the independence of South Sudan. For instance, various, particularly Western, donor agencies supported the formulation of all the policy documents, but more vigorously of the SSDP and the PRS.

5.2.4 The Development Aid-Dependency Discourse:

All four policy documents studied emphatically call for foreign assistance in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction of South Sudan. One of few commonalities of the four policy documents is that they are very welcoming of international assistance and have shown substantial faith in international donor agencies.

Peacebuilding as a process is the responsibility of South Sudan but external involvement can be critical and very supportive (The SSDP, p. 9).

The CPA, too, calls for international assistance at different stages and the requested assistance is not only monetary, but also military: such as calling for a UN Peacekeeping Mission; technical, such as ceasefire and election observation and so forth.

In agreeing to these wealth sharing agreements the Parties signal to the international community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict construction/reconstruction assistance to Sudan, especially to Southern Sudan and other war affected and least developed areas (The CPA, p. 48).

The CPA gives an unrestricted access to international observers to monitor ceasefire related activities (p. 106) and anticipates foreign assistance for post-conflict reconstruction, however, it also expects foreign assistance to complete
basic operations of the peace agreement such as formation of Joint Military Teams (JMTs) and for funding of the armed forces.

[Funding of the Armed Forces]...the Government of Southern Sudan shall raise financial resources from both local and foreign sources and seek international assistance (the CPA, p. 116).

Similarly, the PRS and the CSDHPR too equally look for foreign assistance and cooperation in peacebuilding in South Sudan. The PRS, for instance, states that 'the enhancement and prospects for peace is a common task of the national and international communities' (p.17) and argues that the Peace Commission seeks to promote and conduct peace activities 'with the support of multilateral and bilateral public partners and international and national NGOs’ (p.12). The CSDHPR sees growing public demand and continued international support as important factors that make consolidation of peace and reconciliation plausible in South Sudan (p.10).

This desire for external support or call for an international involvement can be seen in terms of the development aid/dependency discourse, the stereotyped idea that development aid or international engagement is benevolent and helps promote development and peace. The call for international support in the policy documents is basically a call for increased foreign aid and external assistance for advancement of the ongoing peace process and post-conflict reconstruction. Given that the country is very rich in natural resources and hasn’t been able to build efficient and robust institutions to sufficiently protect its self-interests, any form of foreign involvement, whether in form of development aid, conflict mediation, consultation or military assistance, must be perceived cautiously. On the other hand, seeking international support for a myriad of issues appears to lessen South Sudan’s confidence to stand and perform as an independent nation.

5.2.5 The Religious Discourse:
While the other three documents remain more or less indifferent towards religious affairs, though the CPA argues that ‘religious, customs and beliefs are
a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people’ (p.5), one of the policy documents, the CSDHPR, promulgated by the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, heavily relies on a religious rhetoric. The document claims that the people of South Sudan are deeply religious and reconciliation equates ultimately to finding peace with God (p.9).

The people of South Sudan are deeply religious, whether followers of Christianity, Islam or traditional religions...it is our faith in God, which brings us together and gives us the strength and courage to heal ourselves...if there is no spiritual foundation, our attempts at reconciliation will be flawed and it will not succeed. (The CSDHPR p. 4)

The document also calls for a faith based social justice (p.8) and makes a very shallow statement about socio-political conflicts claiming that ‘communities and nations are made-up of weak, fallible, broken human beings, who have an inherent tendency towards conflict’ (p.7).

The God rhetoric and an incessant focus on divine guidance and faith can be explained in terms of four different aspects here. First, the chairman of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation is the South Sudanese Archbishop and probably it’s his religious affinity that influenced the text of the document. Second, since the faith in political leadership was decreasing for different reasons, the attempt to fill that faith vacuum with God seemed to have been a secure alternative. Third, the desire to come up with a divine substitute or an all inclusive faith figure might have been triggered by the fact that the Sudan in the North practised Sharia as its principal document for governance and regarded Allah as its primary guider. Fourth, the God rhetoric comes handy when one has to advocate issues of forgiveness, reconciliation, pardon, generosity and repentance and deliberately avoid issues of justice, reparation, compensation and judicial investigations of crimes committed during the war. This emphasis on God clearly seems to be influenced by South Sudan’s intention to forget the atrocities, get along with impunity and move forward.
5.2.6 The Reconciliation Discourse:

The policy documents repeatedly stress on reconciliation and assert on the need to forget the past and move forward. The reconciliation discourse starts right from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The CPA underlines ‘tolerance’ as the basis of coexistence (p.23) and calls for the promotion of ‘peace culture and confidence building measures’ without specifying how (p.95). The CPA avoids the issue of transitional justice by mentioning that ‘national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed on and dealt with within the discussion on the implementation modalities’ (p. 121).

The CSDHPR urges South Sudanese to accept faith based reconciliation (p.12) and argues that ‘reconciliation can better thrive in such a context, where there is the eagerness to put the past to rest and embrace the future’ (p.10).

Forgiveness is painful but it is the bitter pill we need. We have to swallow our pride for the sake of the survival of our young nation (The CSDHPR, p.5).

Without reconciliation, there will be no South Sudan, or at least, it will degenerate into a failed state, with decades of conflict and misery ahead of us (The CSDHPR, p.4).

These statements of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation as pronounced in the CSDHPR clearly try to impart first a sense of persuasion and then fear. The first statement tries to persuade South Sudanese to forgive and forget the bitter past for the sake of the nation, while the second one, more emphatically, asserts that failing to reconcile means once again decades of conflict and misery ahead. This is a clear indication of cashing in on people’s aspirations to progress forward and an attempt to impose a forced reconciliation.

The CSDHPR does talk about a few measures of transitional justice, such as possibilities of providing reparation, acknowledgment of responsibilities and public apology, but doesn’t offer any definite framework for that. The document heavily focuses on forgiveness and doesn’t show any interest in investigations of serious war crimes committed during the independence
movement, but also during conflicts that erupted after independence.

Interestingly, it was discovered during this research that the CSDHPR thoroughly copies a substantial portion of text from a similar document (Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation) that was introduced a year earlier in Liberia. The massive plagiarism does give significant space to question the intention behind South Sudan’s national healing and reconciliation program and one can argue that the program seems to be aimed at ‘showing’ rather than ‘doing’.

The PRS document, on the other hand, states that its aim is to promoting ‘an inclusive national reconciliation process’ (p.4) and enlists the following components as guiding principles for peace and national reconciliation.

- Respect for all persons
- Unity of South Sudan and a common identity
- Peaceful coexistence
- Reconciliation, forgiveness and opposition to hate speech
- Tolerance (The PRS, p.6–7)

Thus, the PRS too emphasizes on concepts of tolerance, reconciliation, respect, forgiveness, coexistence and refrains from raising broader issues of social justice, sustainable peacebuilding and formulation of transitional justice mechanisms.

In a very similar fashion, the SSDP links peacebuilding with security issues and its chapter on Conflict Prevention and Security – Deepening Peace and Improving Security states:

Efforts to increase security and deepen peace-building will focus on solidifying a lasting peace with neighbours and overcoming persistent and deep-rooted internal sources of conflict through comprehensive national and local peace dialogue and reconciliation programmes. Specifically, there will be a comprehensive national programme to transform the uniformed security services; one which addresses demobilisation needs holistically, including Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and provides security and dignity to all ex-combatants. The target is to have completed DDR for almost 78,000 ex-combatants by the end
of this plan period. A new civilian-led National Security Architecture (NSA) will (a) transfer local security from military to a civilian police force, and (b) transform SPLA into a smaller, modern and more efficient force. (The SSDP, p. xix)

The statements in the given paragraph reinforce the reconciliation as well as negative/curative peace discourses. Calling for provisions of sheer bureaucratic and political nature such as a comprehensive national program to transfer the uniformed services, and the DDR process and the construction of a new National Security Architecture and so forth, the SSDP prioritizes the importance of security measures, bureaucratic institutions, and some sort of central planning and technical/bureaucratic solutions to solve the country’s some of the codifficult problems.

5.3 Discourse in Context: Historical Demand, Post–independent Zeal and Continuation of Impunity

In order to fully grasp the aims, intention, the language used, the priorities set-up and the overall rationale of the policy documents, one needs to sketch out broader social, political, historical relations and structures from which these documents emerged and got promulgated.

First, the emphasis on change, progress, prosperity and development obviously emanates from the commitment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that started in the early 1980s with the aim of liberating Southern Sudan from the oppressive regime in Sudan. As a SPLM political document puts it, the armed conflict was a 'natural reaction of the oppressed and marginalized peoples of the Sudan against the various Khartoum–based governments' (SPLM 2012, p.1). And obviously secession and liberation weren’t the only goals, with them were the promises for better future for Southern Sudanese people, the right to self determination, poverty eradication and so on and so forth. And these policy documents had to reflect and dwell upon those promises.
The discourses identified in the policy documents seem to have contextual links to the ground realities in South Sudan. For instance, the capitalist-corporate discourse and the development aid/dependency discourses pronounced in the documents could be identified in terms of the involvement of foreign powers that are said to be assisting the country in many ways. For instance, as of March 2012, the World Bank led Multi-donor Trust Fund for South Sudan has disbursed more than $505 million in aid (The World Bank, 2013). And it is well known that The World Bank, historically, has been the darling of corporate capitalism, privatization, the notorious structural adjustment programs and so forth. South Sudan is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) too, and according to an IMF brief, it intends to provide South Sudan US$10.3 million during 2013–2015 (IMF, 2012), obviously with a number of conditions and strings attached to it.

In addition, there seems to be a clear nexus between the curative peace and the reconciliation discourses sustained in the policy documents. While the curative peace discourse emphasises on peace by order and security instead of welfare and peaceful means, the reconciliation discourse adds on to that by advocating for almost an unconditional reconciliation call.

Since its birth as a nation, South Sudan has been exclusively governed by the SPLM/A and since their leadership was responsible for many of the war crimes committed during the war years, their desire to investigate severe war crimes and human rights violations is minimal. This lack of political will in addressing severe war crimes is certainly going to be a huge sustenance for impunity and is likely to create a fertile ground for other bloody conflicts in the country. Lack of transitional justice mechanisms has been often found to be discussed in South Sudanese media. For instance, the following excerpt from an oped column published in a South Sudanese online news portal emphatically raises that issue:

The most tragic about the two civil wars we had undergone is the loss felt by the people: hundreds of thousands of us today suffer from various levels of trauma as a result of either having being born and brought up during war times whilst others fought at any given time during any of the two wars. We carry deep scars of bullets either physically on our bodies or
mentally by having witnessed the innocent deaths of millions over the years. The trauma is surmountable and heavy... the mental impact is leading many to suffer from mental ailments and sicknesses including madness, chronic depression in different forms and high temperaments to mention a few... The aggrieved People must feel protected, listened to and justice done to them. The aggressors and perpetrators must be investigated through public hearings and justice must take its course accordingly. (Jambo 2011.)

While the religious discourse or the God rhetoric seems to have emanated from the desire to have a different religious identity than that of the North, persuade people to forget the past, have faith in God, forgive and move forward; the good governance discourse, on the other hand, tries to assure South Sudanese that the existing political–bureaucratic set-up in South Sudan is committed and good enough to deliver the promises made during the decades-long independence movement. This is obviously South–Sudanese ruling class’s predilection to, by and large, retain the old political and bureaucratic system inherited from the Sudan and be indifferent and reluctant to implement drastic changes as per ordinary people’s aspirations.

In addition, one important observation one can make from the policy documents is that they do not talk much about participation of grassroots populations in priority setting, decision–making, peacebuilding initiatives and so forth. While reading, the documents give an overall impression that the texts basically intend to promote top–to–bottom approach to development and peacebuilding in general. People’s direct participation, not only of local officials and bureaucrats, should have been ensured to make peacebuilding and development initiatives more holistic, participative and widely implementable.
Chapter VI

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter is to reflect upon the major findings of this study and offer some conclusive remarks. The second section of this chapter makes a few recommendations for future research.

The main aim of this study was to understand the peace policy framework of South Sudan that the country has adopted in its post–independence peace and development policies. A special emphasis was put on identifying types of discourses, beliefs and ideologies that were adopted, maintained or rejected in the policy documents.

Having been based on Fairclough’s three–dimensional model for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): (1) linguistic features and texts, (2) interdiscursivity, and (3) explanation of wider social, political, historical and cultural context; the study carries out a critical discourse analysis of four South Sudanese peace policy documents. The selected Policy documents namely were The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A 2005 (the CPA), South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 (the SSDP), South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Strategy 2013–2015 (the PRS), Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation 2013 (the CSDHPR).

The analysis discusses that the Policy documents were in fact introduced as a metaphor of ‘hope’, ‘progress’ and ‘enthusiasm’ keeping in mind the post–independence scenario of South Sudan. The policy documents that were introduced right after independence are more hopeful to the future than the ones that were introduced after 2 years.

In the interdiscursivity analysis, a number of discourses have been identified and discussed. First, the policy documents maintain a capitalist–corporate discourse that welcomes and favor a capitalist–corporate culture in everyday affairs and promotes neoliberal concepts of privatization, foreign
investment and establishment of a market economy. Identifying capitalist–corporate discourse is important for peacebuilding too because the economic set-up and market relations play a major role in determining quality of life and people’s access to welfare, which ultimately have an impact on sustainable peacebuilding.

The second discourse identified was that of curative–peace which prioritizes on security measures and institutional strengthening instead of welfare and quality of life when it comes to the question of peacebuilding. So the policy measures constituted in the policy documents seem to be crafted to promote, what Johan Galtung calls, negative peace rather than positive peace (Galtung 1964). Preferring a negative peace would mean trying to achieve mere absence of violence and war, but with no guarantees of life enhancement mechanisms for ordinary citizens.

The third and fourth discourse were the good governance discourse and the development aid/dependency discourse. As their names characterize, the good–governance discourse tries to maintain the old political–bureaucratic model inherited from the North (Sudan) by trying to persuade people that it is capable of and committed to promote good governance, human rights and rule of law. Whereas, the policy documents maintain the development aid/dependency discourse by looking for foreign financial aid/loan and technical/moral support for a number of issues. Foreign assistance, without an word of caution, has been prioritized and taken as a key element in all four policy documents.

The fifth and the sixth discourses pronounced in the policy documents, the religious and the reconciliation discourses, try to convince South Sudanese to forget and forgive the past atrocities and move forward. The religious discourse as pronounced primarily in the Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (the CSDHPR) calls for people to have faith in God and forget everything about the past for the sake of the newly born nation. The reconciliation discourse, similarly, advocates for an unconditional reconciliation, tolerance, forgiveness and points out to the danger of another civil war in case of failing to do so.

The Policy documents are silent about transitional justice mechanism and apart from the DDR, do not talk anything about investigation of serious war
crimes committed during the decades long war but also during conflicts that spread after independence. A transitional justice mechanism would have provided justice to the victims of nearly a half-century long civil war and would have fastened the healing process of war-generated sufferings. On the other hand, it would have worked as a deterrent to impunity and recurrence of violent insurgencies in and around the region. Previous research warns that South Sudan’s reluctance to deal with transitional justice issues is likely to prove costly over the long run (see for instance Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) and this research reiterates the likelihood and the danger of further violence.

Based on the measures constituted in the policy papers, it is argued here that the crux of the South Sudanese peace policy framework is promotion of negative peace; mainly through security measures and top-down approaches, with minimal attention to national reconciliation and an abandoned appetite for transitional justice processes.

The study also finds that South Sudanese peace and development policies seem to be greatly influenced by so called Western ideas of liberal peace that aim to promote liberal economy, democracy, marketization and espouse the tenets of globalization. Emphasis on good governance, rule of law, human rights promotion is widespread in the texts, however, since there was no clear roadmap for implementation, they can not be regarded more than a political rhetoric.

The policy documents exhibit also a lack of coherence. While one document, for instance, focuses on security measures, another calls for having faith in God and a sense of forgiveness for peacebuilding. The linkage between broader development agendas and peace policies is poorly established and weakly manifested in the policy documents. One example is that the policy documents prioritize peace by security over peace by welfare, development or other peaceful means.

The topmost optimism expressed in the policy documents do not seem to represent the ground realities in South Sudan, given that while formulating these documents, South Sudan had a very fragile and tensed relations with the Sudan and a number of arms insurgencies were active or sprouting within the newly independent country. These peace policy documents fail to anticipate the likelihood of tussle with the Sudan, and also fail to take into account any
possible unrest and ethnic violence within South Sudan. These findings strengthen the critical remarks made by previous researchers (such as Ylönén 2012, Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013) that the peace negotiation and subsequent arrangements couldn’t be really comprehensive and coherent in nature, thereby posing a threat of future belligerencies and bloodshed.

6.1 Recommendation for future research:
During the course of this research, the researcher encountered a few interesting issues that could be considered by future researchers for further study. First, since IGAD’s involvement in Sudan–Southern Sudan peace talks was extremely important one and since IGAD constitutes a group of 8 developing countries in Eastern Africa, south–south cooperation in peace negotiations and peacebuilding is certainly an interesting and important topic to study. Second, since this study limited itself only to a narrow selection of 4 policy documents, future researchers can focus on a comprehensive set of policy documents and pay attention to their implementation practices and outcome modalities. Third, since independence, the lines of ethnic division have widened and the internal conflict has escalated in South Sudan. Future researchers could focus their work on similar issues such as, greed–grivances and identity politics, escalation of the internal conflict, divisions along the ethnic lines, state sponsored violence, and the impact of external agents, such as the UNMISS, in peacebuilding.
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