Reinforcing Finland's Attachment to the West

British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944-1962

Marek Fields

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki, in auditorium XII (Main building), on the 13th of May, 2015, at 12 o'clock.
Preface

This study is a result of a process that could be described with such adjectives as 'long', 'bumpy', 'challenging' and, finally, 'rewarding'. I first came up with the idea of investigating British propaganda in Finland in 2000 when studying for an MA in International Communications at the University of Leeds. The course included modules on propaganda and public diplomacy, which stirred a great deal of interest among fellow students as well as members of staff. After that, however, work outside academia pushed any ambition I had on undertaking further research on the subject to the background for several years. Even when working full-time, I did, however, start to gradually collect material for a study on first British and then American propaganda activities in Finland during the early Cold War. In 2011, I finally managed to win my first scholarship for conducting full-time doctoral research, which enabled me to take study leave and start a more thorough project on the subject.

Even though doing research is often lonely and frustrating, there are many people and organisations whose help and support have made a great difference to my project, and all of whom deserve to be mentioned. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Emeritus Hannes Saarinen and Professor Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, for supporting me through the writing process and giving me feedback of the highest standard. I would also like to thank Professor Emeritus Erkki Kouri, who acted as my first supervisor and backed my initial interest in dwelling into my selected research topic. The external examiners, Professor Timo Soikkanen from the University of Turku and Docent Mikko Majander from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, provided many critical and useful comments, which helped me in the final part of this project. My sincere thanks go out to them, as well.

I would also like to thank the examiners of my Licentiate Thesis, which I wrote on the same subject, Docents Juhana Aunesluoma and Vesa Vares, whose comments on my work provided me with plenty of useful ideas on how to expand my study. Furthermore, the late Philip Taylor, who worked as Professor at the University of Leeds, deserves a mention for inspiring me to take a closer look at the field of propaganda in the first place. As for staff and students at the University of Helsinki, I found the numerous seminars I attended under the wings of Professors Erkki Kouri, Markku Peltonen, Hannes Saarinen and Laura Kolbe all highly useful for learning more about how to conduct historical research and, above all, for sharing ideas.

The many fellow post-graduate students I had the pleasure of acquainting during my research process, most of them by now doctors, also played a great role in my project both by making study-related observations and by offering moral support. I would like to specifically thank Juho Kotakallio, Elina Melgin, Samu Nyström, Henrik Tala and Seppo Vepsäläinen for their fruitful comments as well as excellent company.

I am also deeply grateful to the numerous other people who helped me with several research-related and technical matters. Above all, I would like to thank my sister, Marion Fields, for proofreading my thesis and engaging in, at times heated, debate with me over questions related to the English language and linguistics. Jukka Rislakki played an important part in my project by providing me with copies of documents he had studied in the US for a book of his, for which I am grateful. Furthermore, I would like to specifically thank the following persons
for their help and guidance during my long process: Joonas Ahola, Nicholas Cull, Jussi-Pekka Hakkarainen, Antti Hattula, Riku Mäki, Mikael Nilsson, Erkki Teräväinen and Antti Veijola.

As this study has required an enormous amount of research in archives and libraries in Britain, the US, Finland and Sweden, the help I received from the staff in all these institutions proved vital for making a thorough study on my topic possible. I am particularly grateful for all the help and information provided to me by the three most essential archives for my study: the National Archives, Kew, the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, and the Finnish National Archives, Helsinki. Of all the institutions I have visited over the years, I would like to give special credit to two Finnish archives, the Päivälehti Archives and the Archives of President Urho Kekkonen, whose directors Pekka Anttonen and Pekka Lähteenkorva not only provide visitors with professional assistance, but also make sure that working in their archives is a pleasant experience.

When conducting archive research in Finland, it was also highly important for my project to receive separate research permissions for the archived material of a number of organisations. I would like to thank the Finnish-British Society, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the Fulbright Center Finland, the IofC Finland Foundation, the League of Finnish American Societies and Juha Vuorinen, who all kindly granted me the permission to study documents that proved greatly valuable for my thesis.

As the extent of research conducted for this study indicates, this project simply would not have been possible without the financial support offered to me by the Eino Jutikkala Fund, the Emil Aaltonen Fund and the Kaarlo Koskimies and Irma Koskimies Scholarship Fund. The latter, together with the Finnish Doctoral Programme of History and the former Department of History, University of Helsinki, also awarded me with travel grants that enabled me to fund at least a part of my trips to England and the US. I would like to express my gratitude to all of the aforementioned organisations.

On a more personal note, I would like to thank all of my friends for sharing also the difficult moments during the process of this study. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family: my mother, Leena, and my sister, Marion, who have always supported and encouraged me even during times of uncertainty. I would like to dedicate this study to them, and to my late father, Donald.

Helsinki, February 28, 2015

Marek Fields
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# List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>America Calling Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labour</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASLA</td>
<td>Amerikan Suomen Lainan Apurahat (Grants from the American Loan to Finland Program)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Congress for Cultural Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Congress of Industrialized Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Central Office of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Cultural Relations Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREST</td>
<td>CIA Research Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBU</td>
<td>European Broadcasting Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Payments Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCMA</td>
<td>Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (YYA)</td>
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<td>FCSTUS</td>
<td>Finnish Committee on Studying and Training in the USA</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTUC</td>
<td>Free Trade Union Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUSEEC</td>
<td>Finnish-US Educational Exchange Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FWF</td>
<td>Forum World Features</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Greenwich Mean Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty's Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUAC</td>
<td>House Committee on Un-American Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBS</td>
<td>Intercollegiate Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTFU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA</td>
<td>US International Information Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIE</td>
<td>Institute of International Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIS</td>
<td>Interim International Information Service</td>
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<td>IMP</td>
<td>International Motion Picture Division</td>
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<td>IPD</td>
<td>Information Policy Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Press Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Independent Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC-COSEC</td>
<td>International Student Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAVI</td>
<td>Kansallinen audiovisuaalinen instituutti</td>
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In this study I have opted to use the definite article in connection with the abbreviations of the names of certain institutions according to their conventional use in historical literature.
1. INTRODUCTION

Research Topic

This thesis deals with British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during the first decades of the Cold War, more precisely between the years 1944 and 1962. The study explores the nature and scope of Britain's \(^1\) and the United States' (US) propaganda and cultural operations in the challenging Finnish Cold War environment. Moreover, it discusses how the prevalent characteristics of Finnish society in this era, such as the widely accepted practice of self-censorship, affected the Western powers’ operational methods in their quests for winning the Finnish people’s support for their Cold War cause and providing the country with encouragement in its struggle with the Soviet Union. The thesis also aims to investigate the extent to which British and American cultural and information activities in Finland followed the more general operational policies in these fields and explains how the chosen methods reflected their broader Cold War strategies as well as general international developments.

Available archived documents related to the subject reveal that the two Western powers were more interested in expressing their support for the northern country in the early Cold War decades through various informational and cultural channels than it has previously been conceived. The study argues that both the British and US governments were relatively successful in achieving this general objective largely because of their ability to launch a great variety of related activities, many of which were exclusively adjusted to the demands of the Finnish environment. As a consequence, the thesis also suggests that when executing their informational and cultural campaign in a country such as Finland, officially neutral and located between East and West, both the British and Americans were willing to follow more flexible policies than in many other parts of the world in which the activities often followed a more predetermined pattern. In addition to providing a new angle to Finnish history, a parallel examination of the two Western powers’ operations in Finland also offers an interesting dimension for extending our understanding of their roles and objectives during the Cold War. In spite of being close allies, the British and the Americans often had their own distinctive goals and methods for their achievement also in informational and cultural activities.

In recent decades, there has been a growing tendency to examine the Cold War as an ideological and cultural contest as well as a political and economic one. Indeed, far greater emphasis is now laid on the psychological dimension of the conflict, and international relations in general\(^2\), which means that not even the most traditional of diplomatic historians can leave

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\(^1\) In this study, 'Britain' rather than the 'United Kingdom' has been used when referring to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, mostly because the full official name was not very commonly used during the study period, as official documents used for this thesis confirm.

\(^2\) Recent studies emphasising the significance of psychology, ideology and propaganda in the Cold War battle include, for instance: Berghahn, Volker R., America and the Intellectual Cold War in Europe (Princeton, NJ 2001); Caute, David, The Dancer Defects. The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford 2003); Falk, Andrew J., Upstaging the Cold War. American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960 (Amherst, MA 2010); Hixson, Walter L., Parting the Curtain – Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York 1997); Lucas, Scott, Freedom's War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union (New York 1999); Osgood, Kenneth,
such topics as international cultural exchange or communication policy entirely unnoticed. This leads us all to a situation in which our understanding of the scope and scale of the Cold War grows at a relatively rapid pace. In this development cultural historians and communications scholars have played a major role by conceptualising the struggle as an essentially rhetorical one based on the war of words, images, perceptions, motives and expectations. As a consequence, the conventional examination of the ‘high politics’ of the Cold War now overlaps with areas previously known as ‘low politics’ and it is, therefore, harder to distinguish between the two.

This rather recent development has to a great extent resulted from the declassification of formerly classified official records around the world. Even though some of the key documents even from the early Cold War period are still categorised as secret, and the recently declassified files are highly scattered and inadequately organised, the evidence shows us that the struggle between the East and the West was very much so a ‘war of the mind’ or a ‘contest for the hearts and minds’, as the most popular interpretations of the conflict are known. Indeed, the sheer volume of resources and effort channelled into the presentation of words and images with the goal of changing people’s perceptions and attitudes is quite staggering to today’s observer, even though barely twenty years has passed since the conflict ended. New possibilities in mass communication played a key part in ensuring that almost every aspect of political and cultural life in most parts of the world was somehow affected by the bi-polar framework of international relations. This framework was built on the fear of war of an apocalyptic scale, a situation that has widely been referred to as ‘the balance of terror’. Thankfully, both superpowers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, became to realise, especially after the expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals in the 1950s, that direct military conflict between them would be devastating. The resulting psychological and cultural conflict, an alternative to ‘real war’, was unparalleled in scale, ingenuity and power.

It did not take long after the situation between the two blocs had intensified for both sides to realise that the total nature of the Cold War would considerably increase the importance of public opinion home and abroad. Both the East and the West perceived that various communication techniques, such as propaganda and public relations, would serve their foreign policy interests. As influencing international public opinion evolved into a major objective of international relations, propaganda became such a significant element of foreign relations that

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4 The terms ‘high politics’, including strategy and conflict, and ‘low politics’, consisting of, for instance, social, cultural and economic matters, became commonly used during the Cold War.
5 See, for example, Osgood 2006, pp. 7-9; Taylor, Philip M., British Propaganda in the 20th Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh 1999) (Taylor 1999a), p. 228.
6 Taylor 1997, p. 28.
many started referring to it and any other action taken to affect public opinion as the ‘fourth weapon’ or the ‘fourth dimension’ of foreign politics, which complemented the political, economic and military components of policy. As words and images were seen as the principal weapons in the struggle, both sides invested in developing effective channels of communication for the distribution, control and manipulation of information about themselves as well as the other side to such an extent that the Cold War publicity battle affected almost every field of human activity for over forty years. As historian Tony Shaw puts it: “Virtually everything, from sport to ballet to comic books and space travel, assumed political significance and hence potentially could be deployed as a weapon both to shape opinion at home and to subvert societies abroad”. In addition to bringing propaganda closer to the core of Cold War studies, this way of examining the conflict has increased scholars' interest in more popular forms of culture and people's everyday lives, partly at the expense of more traditional 'high culture'.

The accelerating pace at which new studies on Cold War culture and the East-West propaganda battle are published has also led to a somewhat universal acceptance over the decisive role the ideological and cultural dimension played in influencing the conflict's outcome. Although the failure of the economy has frequently been accepted as the main reason for the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, several authoritative commentators have also stressed the significance of, for example, Western radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union and its satellites. According to their viewpoint, Eastern Europeans' knowledge of freedom and the perceived contrast in living standards between East and West, shaped by for instance Western broadcasts, eventually destroyed their support to communism. In this way, of course, economic and informational factors were closely entwined.

While it is hard to argue with the view that overseas informational activities had an eroding effect on the communist regimes' control of people and their perceptions, one must be careful not to overemphasise the part the ideological and cultural dimension played in Cold War developments in relation to political and economic factors. The viewpoint of the realist school of Cold War interpretation, that the conflict was a continuation of Great Power politics with certain additions, such as nuclear weapons, arms racing and capitalist-communist ideological rivalry, is in many respects valid particularly when examining the outcome of the Cold War through factors that are at least to a certain degree quantifiable such as the impact of the arms race on the failure of the Soviet Union's economy. The growing evidence of the sheer scale of propaganda and cultural operations used in the Cold War battle has, however, given more ground for subjectivist theories examining the conflict, and foreign policy in general, through individual and collective perceptions and misperceptions.

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8 Osgood 2006, p. 4; Taylor 1997, p. 28.
9 Shaw 2001, p. 59
11 For example, Nelson, Michael: War of the Black Heavens. The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse, NJ 1997), pp. xi – xv.
13 Ibid., p. 172.
14 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
As numerous previous studies have indicated, both the British and US governments sharpened their machineries for propaganda and cultural activities soon after the Second World War. They acknowledged that both overt and covert measures had to be taken to confront the threat of communism and growing Soviet propaganda against the West. With this objective in mind, a secret anti-communist propaganda unit known as the Information Research Department (IRD) was established at the British Foreign Office (FO) in January 1948. In the US, the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which defined the terms on which the US Government could engage foreign audiences, and in particular the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) written in 1950, the document giving high priority to containment of the expansion of communism, guaranteed that a growing share of American resources would be invested in informational and cultural operations carried out on a global scale. These developments led the two Western powers to invest an immense amount of money, and perhaps an even more staggering number of working hours, to ensure that their message would come across more convincingly than that of their Eastern rivals in every corner of the world, including highly exceptional environments such as Finland.

Although often rather suspicious of the true nature of Finland’s political position during the Cold War, both the British and US governments felt that the country’s independence should be supported and that “everything possible should be done to reinforce the Finns’ attachment to the West”.15 As political and military measures to display this support were largely limited due to the Soviet Union’s strong influence in the country, the importance of cultural and informational operations in Finland was far greater than in most other non-communist European countries. Even though Finland’s unique political position placed a number of obstacles for the practice of Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy, British and US officials aimed to use relatively similar methods and distribution channels for their activities as in any other country.

In the case of Britain, this meant the circulation of political IRD-produced content both directly to influential Finns and indirectly through Finnish newspapers. This activity was carried out alongside the distribution of more ‘neutral’ print material which had the objective of promoting Britain and aspects of the British society to the Finns. These print operations were complemented above all by the transmission of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Finnish Service programmes and the use of the British Council (BC) for cultural activities such as educational exchanges and language teaching.

As for the United States’ activities in Finland, including press, film and library operations as well as educational exchange, they were to a great extent carried out by the United States Information Service (USIS) office in Helsinki. Nonetheless, not all operations were solely in the hands of officials working at the USIS/Helsinki. The Americans also used various other channels of distribution, such as the Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts and a field magazine specifically produced for the Finnish market in close cooperation with Finnish contributors. Furthermore, the CIA was likely to have been involved in all American activities in one way or another.

15 ‘Memorandum of Discussion of British and American Information Policy in Finland’, October 16, 1952, FO 1110/481, National Archives (Hereafter NA), Kew, Surrey, UK.
In spite of making informational and cultural operations a high priority, both US and British officials saw Finland as an extremely difficult environment, especially in terms of propaganda. They continuously questioned the freedom of the Finnish press and felt that the newspapers’ cautious publishing policy seriously restricted their opportunities to give, in particular, people living in the provinces a less distorted picture of the world. On the other hand, the British and the Americans were well aware that they had to avoid doing anything in Finland that would endanger the country’s sensitive relationship with its giant neighbour. Both Western powers respected this situation and tried to refrain from spreading too provocative a message. This did not, however, prevent the extent of self-censorship\(^\text{16}\) exercised by the Finnish press and the anti-Western material published in the local communist papers from constantly puzzling and frustrating them. The understanding of local circumstances in Finland, in particular the nature of self-censorship, was the very key for successful informational and cultural activities in Finland.

**Research Objectives and Methods**

An examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during the first Cold War decades is particularly interesting due to Finland’s unique position between East and West. Although Finland’s inclination to the West was strong, a large variety of official cultural events and ceremonies, together with the overall official policy, were more or less geared to praising the warm friendship the country had with the Soviet Union, making the situation somewhat confusing to both the Finns and Western observers. Even though the Western powers were always happy to recognise that a deep mistrust of Russia dominated public opinion in Finland, both the Americans and the British constantly feared that Finland would slip closer into Soviet control. As the Western powers’ use of political or military methods was largely limited, the examination of economic and cultural action as part of the governments’ foreign policy gains an increasingly important role when forming an overall picture of Finland’s position in the Cold War.\(^\text{17}\)

The primary objective of this study is to discover what propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations Britain and the United States used in Finland: how broad were they, what was their nature, and which channels were used for their execution? The thesis also discusses the reasons behind the Western powers’ decision to engage in this kind of activity in Finland, explains why certain operational methods were preferred in this neutral Nordic country instead of others, and explores the effects Finland’s domestic politics and the development of the country’s international position had on British and American informational and cultural policies and the execution of related operations.

Some emphasis has also been laid on the estimation of the operations’ overall influence, even if analysing the results of informational and cultural activities is almost always a highly

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\(^{16}\) The concept ‘self-censorship’ has been used widely to describe the line of action adopted by the Finnish press during the Cold War, in particular with regard to its dealings with events in the Soviet Union. The concept is discussed more closely later in this chapter.

speculative affair. A broader examination of the effects would require an altogether different kind of approach to the research topic and is, therefore, left for future studies. In the context of this particular study, however, it is possible to evaluate the operations’ efficiency through British and American documents discussing the number and nature of Finnish press articles that were based on their distributed material. The regular BBC and VOA research reports, which include information about listener numbers and feedback, make the estimation of the broadcasting companies’ impact in Finland slightly easier.

It is also important to note that this study focuses almost exclusively on the propaganda and cultural activities managed by the two Western governments, not by other organisations or groups such as private corporations or non-governmental organisations. Therefore, the goal is to uncover what measures the two Western powers introduced in their attempt to create a fruitful soil for their policy in Finland, not to present broader theories about the triumph of Western culture or its impact on the broader masses. As a consequence, when referring to British and American operations or using 'Britain' and the 'US' to refer to actors behind, for instance, a policy or an activity, I mean the two countries' governments or government-related units, unless otherwise stated.

When studying the used methods, it must be stressed that even though the informational and cultural operations are at times examined separately in this thesis, the two activities were so closely linked to each other that an exclusion of either of them would be, if not impossible, highly ill-advised. In other words, a separate examination of, for instance, British and American informational activities in Finland would be insufficient for understanding the full nature of Western operations in the country as it would neglect the closely-related and highly important cultural dimension. The fact is that both propaganda and cultural diplomacy were closely run by state actors, often even administrated by the same government department. All of the related operations were planned to complement each other for meeting the broader objective: to have a desired effect on the Finnish nation and Finnish policies mostly on a long-term basis.

As for why this thesis examines both American and British propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland, the most obvious reason is that both of the two leading Western countries held an increasingly influential position among Finns in the first post-war decades. As we will see, during this time period the activities of both powers made a decisive contribution to the Finns' psychological struggle against the Soviet Union and formed a natural counterbalance to the growing impact of Moscow on Finnish affairs. While the role of the US in Cold War propaganda has in general, largely due to its superior resources, been considered as more decisive to the Western cause than the operations planned in London, it is worth noting that at least in Finland the British campaign was also highly important, and during the very first post-war years even more extensive and effective than that of its American counterpart. As the two governments'
objectives as well as the execution of their operations often overlapped, examining both Western powers’ doings in the northern country is a rather natural approach for this study.

The decision to focus almost exclusively on government-led operations has been made for several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, an overall examination of British and American official propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland has so far been neglected and deserves a study of its own. In this respect, this thesis hopefully works as a catalyst for future and more detailed studies on, for instance, Western press, radio and television operations in the country as well as examinations on the impact the exchange of persons, language teaching and cultural exhibitions had on the country. By covering the most important aspects of all of the aforementioned topics, this study also wishes to emphasise that the leading Western governments’ propaganda and cultural diplomacy activities in Finland included a great variety of fields beyond the promotion of commercial films, which often seems to come to people’s minds when particularly American propaganda is mentioned. The fact that during the time period of this study, 1944-1962, a lion’s share of British and American informational and cultural activities around the world, both official and unofficial, were still at least partly administered and executed by their respective embassies also explains the concentration on state-led operations, as does the availability of research material, which is much greater as concerns state organisations than private actors.

That this study examines government-managed activities does not mean that the focus is strictly on state-related actors. As one key aspect of the Cold War activities of the West, in particular the US, was the complex partnership built between state and private actors, the role of the latter is also examined when it closely supported the greater goals defined in Washington and London. Moreover, the cooperation between state organisations and the trade union movement was particularly distinctive in the Western Cold War effort and played a significant part in the campaigns directed at countries such as Finland. As a result, the activities of trade unions are also closely followed in this study. All this does not, however, imply that the study aims to provide a thorough analysis of the effects these activities and the Cold War in general had on Western arts such as film, theatre or literature.\(^20\) As the primary focus is on state activities implemented mainly on the grassroots level, the main actors in this study are usually civil servants such as information officers and public affairs officers as well as British and American ministers and ambassadors to Finland.

By addressing the primary research questions and by using case-specific examples it is also possible to discuss how British and the American foreign policy, main international developments and broader Cold War culture were reflected in the two governments’ informational and cultural strategy in Finland. In order to analyse this, it is essential to first clarify the general goals of British and American informational and cultural policies and examine the ways in which the operations were coordinated and distributed between various actors. After this, it is possible to compare the administrations’ objectives and methods of operation.

\(^{20}\) A great share of Cold War studies has given extensive attention to the impact the bi-polar conflict had on Western cultural content and its presentation to domestic audiences in the US and Britain in particular. For example, Rose, Lisle A., The Cold War Comes to the Street (Lawrence, KS 1999); Whitfield, Stephen J., The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, MD and London 1991).
On a more theoretical level, the content of Western propaganda is also briefly analysed and reflected against the most commonly used propaganda-related concepts. This can be done by examining articles published in Finnish newspapers that were based on materials of British or American origin and by examining the contents of the USIS field magazine, titled *Aikamme* ("Our Time"). As the line between propaganda and more neutral information activity is extremely thin, the aim has been to define which kind of action or material can be regarded as propaganda or as simply a part of general information activities as clearly as possible. Even though such a definition can be given, the reality is that in many cases a distinction between the two is all but impossible to make.

Another problem for making a thorough analysis on the content of the propaganda material distributed by Britain and the US in Finland is that neither administration kept a systematic record of the material or the articles that were published based on their content. Both British and American archives offer a relatively large number of documents on distributed and published material but their content and order is highly inconsistent. Defining American state-related propaganda is made even more difficult by the extensive links the US Government built with the domestic private media sector when producing content for its Cold War cause. As a number of leading American newspapers, magazines, news agencies, radio and television stations as well as various non-governmental organisations had close, and often complex, relations with officials in Washington and were deeply involved in the Government’s propaganda efforts both home and abroad, it is more or less impossible to distinguish between the content that was actually produced with the task of directly supporting the Government’s informational objectives and the material that was written more independently and that was less overtly biased. For these reasons a comprehensive analysis of British and American propaganda content in Finland is more or less impossible. In this study, the objective has been to trace the propaganda material that was certainly or highly likely produced with the governments’ broader ambitions in mind and then evaluate its contents and actual purposes. After this, these findings are placed into the larger context. As it has turned out, there is enough documented evidence available to credibly deal with all of these issues. The most detailed information about material distributed and published in Finland offered by the British and American archives originate from the 1950s; hence the content produced during this time period is examined more closely than the material written before or after.

While the main objective of this study is to examine the policies Britain and the United States adopted for their propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland and to explore how these policies were put into practice, this cannot be adequately done without explaining the main developments in Finnish politics, society and in particular the media environment. Indeed, for understanding British and American propaganda in Finland, an examination of the nature and magnitude of the Western powers’ cooperation with various

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Finnish actors in promoting their message is absolutely necessary. As a result, this thesis also explores the ways in which the Finnish Government, state departments, political parties and the mass media, all hugely influential in information distribution and shaping people’s opinions, reacted to British and American activities and to what extent they actually found the material provided useful. For explaining the positions various Finnish actors took in relation to the operations, it is also necessary to explain the broader reasons behind such decisions: these include developments in Finland’s domestic or foreign policies, changes in the nature and extent of the self-censorship followed by the Finnish media or even more abstract factors such as the rise of anti-communist sentiment in Finnish society.

While factors related to Finnish society are significant in discussing British and American activities in Finland, it is important to note that in this study they are only examined in a context relevant for the actual goal, the examination of the two Western powers’ operations. For example, this study does explore the main changes in Finnish newspapers’ published content during the study period, but only by evaluating how they affected British and American operations. While this thesis recognises that the domestic political propaganda battle in Finland, mainly between the communists and non-communists, is a relevant aspect when discussing British and American activities in the country, there is no need for a closer analysis of this topic. The same principle applies to Finnish politics. Political developments and the actions and opinions of Finnish politicians are more closely examined only when they are relevant to the most important research objectives. It is true that the Finnish political environment often determined the nature and volume of British and American operations in the country, but as they were directed by London and Washington, reflecting the two governments’ broader policies, this study examines the developments predominantly from a British and American perspective.

It is also important to note that the purpose of this study is to give a close examination of the operations of Britain and the United States, not the activities of, for example, the Soviet Union, the main opponent of the two not only politically, but also in the fields of informational and cultural operations. This does not mean that Soviet activities have been neglected altogether. Indeed, this would be almost impossible given the vast impact the country had on Finnish politics and the society, including the battlefield for propaganda. As the Soviet Union’s policies towards Finland, including its propaganda and cultural activities, often determined the way the British and Americans carried out their equivalent actions, a general examination of Soviet propaganda operations is also included in this study.

In order to examine the Western powers’ informational and cultural operations as part of their foreign policy, this study also discusses Britain's and the United States’ general relations with Finland during the determined time period and identifies the most important developments. Since political, economic and social relations between the countries all had a profound impact on British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy, they also are briefly explained in this study.

As already mentioned, the key to an examination of information activity in Finland is to understand what the Finnish environment was like for such activities. For example, in the field of the printed word, the way Finnish newspapers determined which articles were to be
published and which were not was an essential restricting factor for the operations’ success. While this study is neither as such an analysis of Finnish newspapers nor an examination of the degree of self-censorship they adopted, the significance of the Finnish media practices for British and American informational operations during the study period was so decisive that these matters are closely explored. This also enables a brief analysis on what all this says in a broader sense about Finland during the study period.

The general assumption has been that self-censorship in the Finnish press was not as dominant in the 1950s as it was in the 1960s, not to mention the following decade.\(^{22}\) A study on British and American propaganda activities and their success tests this claim, opening up a new dimension. In my licentiate thesis\(^{23}\) I came to the conclusion that both Britain and the US practised broad-scale propaganda in Finland through a number of channels, but the degree of self-censorship practised by the Finnish press already in the early and mid-1950s made this effort substantially more difficult. For this study I set off, with a greater variety of source material in use, from the hypothesis that cooperation between British, American and Finnish actors on informational activities was actually much closer than it has previously been realised, and that for this reason self-censorship among Finnish newspapers was perhaps not as dominating a practice as I had earlier thought.

The time period covered in this study, 1944 to 1962, has been chosen mainly due to the fact that the period in question can be regarded as especially important, eventful and sensitive not only in Finnish politics, but also in a global context. The ending of the Continuation War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1944 gives a natural starting point for the study as this event marked the ending of one era and the beginning of another. Moreover, in that year the British and the Americans started gradually resuming their informational and cultural activities in Finland. The year 1962 was also something of a watershed in Finnish politics: the aftermath of the Note Crisis\(^{24}\) and Urho Kekkonen’s re-election as President saw the emergence of a new period in the country’s history. While this shift was taking place in Finland, considerable changes had started to gain momentum in international relations as well. The world not only sighed of relief after the serious crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis in autumn 1962, came to a close, but it also started taking new steps towards a more stable and peaceful era. The foreign policies of the US and Britain also reflected this development. The two powers’ aggressive approach to the struggle between East and West started to give way to a strategy that was based more on, albeit limited, cooperation with the rivalling side. The fact that the decline of Britain’s position in world politics, and consequently its influence in the fields of information and culture, had become increasingly obvious by the early 1960s provides another reason why the time period covered in this study ends in the year 1962.


\(^{24}\) For details of this development in Finnish history, see p. 313.
As for the research methods used for this study, the approach follows the traditions typical not only in the discipline of history, but also, for instance, communication studies. The dominating research method is qualitative and the study's structure follows a predominantly narrative style and chronological order. Closer evaluations of, for example, relevant political developments are given in this broader context. As the research topic concerns closely propaganda and informational activities mostly exploiting the mass media, certain analyses of media content are made based on theories mainly used in communications studies. When saying this, it is important to note that this study does not follow one pre-defined broader theory in the presentation of research results. As the main ambition is to present an account on the various informational and cultural operations both Britain and the US carried out in Finland, a topic that as such has not been studied before, it is my belief that adapting a single theory for explaining this activity would be rather artificial and could actually undermine the actual research goals. Since my task is to explore the nature, reasons and effects of the British and American campaigns in Finland, this study follows an approach familiar in classic historical research: it simply aims to answer how and why something has happened and to what effect.

In this study, the examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland has been divided into six time frames in order to emphasise the different nature they had during these periods; their selection is even more greatly determined by various political developments in Finland and, above all, the country's relationship with the Soviet Union. Together with general Cold War developments and the way they shaped the content of British and American informational and cultural operations, the changing degree of political pressure the Finns were placed under through demands made by the Kremlin gave all these time periods highly distinctive characteristics. As a consequence, it has been logical to construct the first time period (1944-1947) around the first post-war years, when Soviet presence in Finland was highly evident and the degree of Western activity somewhat limited. The second time period (1948-1949) focuses on an era when the Cold War gradually landed on Finnish shores. The examination of the third time period (1950-1953) makes up the longest part of this thesis, mostly because during this period Western propaganda in Finland was at its most aggressive and a great number of new operational methods were introduced, also in the field of cultural diplomacy. The period of 1954-1957 reflects a time when Moscow eased its pressure on Finland, and the British and American operations enjoyed unprecedented success. The final two time periods, 1958-1960 and 1961-1962, are above all determined by changes in the Finnish political landscape and the country's relationship with the Soviet Union, which had a direct, mostly restrictive impact on the way the two Western governments were able to execute their operations in Helsinki.

Previous Research, Source Material and Structure of Study

As already mentioned, British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland has thus far not been as such the topic of closer examination. Until rather recently, research on the relations between Finland and the two leading Western powers focused almost inclusively on
the action and opinions of leading political actors. For long, such themes as Urho Kekkonen’s role in Finnish history and Finlandisation dominated both Finnish Cold War studies and the general public discussion at the expense of economic and cultural matters. Indeed, one could come to the conclusion that for decades Finnish Cold War history was, perhaps, too obsessed with examining Finnish-Soviet relations and diplomatic history with the question of Finlandisation lurking in the background. Accounts on any British or American cultural or informational activity in Finland were almost non-existent. The cultural impact foreign countries had on Finland during the Cold War has, on the other hand, been studied from at least two angles, albeit somewhat narrowly. These examinations have included accounts of the Soviet Union’s influence on Finnish cultural policies, for example concerning its role in political film censorship, and statistical analyses on the hegemony of American and Western cultural products imported to Finland. To the latter group one can also include studies on the volume of media coverage given to foreign news material by country.

The last fifteen years or so have comprehensively reshaped the field of Finnish Cold War history, as a number of scholars have written several ground-breaking studies on Finland’s relations with Britain and the United States. Economic relations between Finland and the West have, in particular, been commendably explored in recent years. As economic, as well as cultural, methods usually held centre stage in the execution of British and American overall policies towards Finland, this development is particularly fruitful for forming a wider understanding of Finland’s relationship with the Western powers as well as Finnish Cold War history in general. In particular, Niklas Jensen-Eriksen’s work has shed new light onto the development of British and American economic policies on Finland during the early Cold War period by providing a number of thorough accounts on previously unexamined topics. As for

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27 For example, Jalonen, Olli, Kansa kulttuurien virroissa (Helsinki 1985).
political developments between Finland and the Western powers, interesting studies have been published by, for instance, Vesa Vares and Markku Ruotsila as well as Juhana Aunesluoma, who has also edited a book on Anglo-Finnish relations in the twentieth century, which has been of great use for this study.31

What is common for some of the more recent studies is that they have presented new evidence about how cooperation between Finland and the Western powers was actually much closer in the early Cold War decades than it had previously been realised. Kimmo Rentola’s study on the history of the Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi, Supo)32 belongs to this category. In his work, Rentola has proved that within the field of national security and espionage Finland started to collaborate with Britain and the US already in the 1950s. The recent book by Jukka Rislakki33 has, to some extent, done the same as far as military relations between Finland and the US go by pointing out how closely Finland actually cooperated with the US on military assistance as well as the exchange of military information and even personnel not many years after the Second World War. Although focusing mostly on military issues, Rislakki’s book also includes new information about Finnish and American Cold War relations in general, including cultural relations, and has therefore been of particular value for this study.

The clear shortage of studies focusing on Finland’s cultural relations with foreign countries does not mean that no general research on Finland’s relations with the West has been conducted until of late. The problem is that the majority of the older studies have almost conclusively been written from the Finnish perspective. For example Hannu Rautkallio and Jukka Nevakivi have given rather thorough accounts of the activities of American and British diplomats in Finland particularly in the late 1940s and 1950s and the two governments’ policies on Finland, but they mention informational or cultural activities only in passing.34 Rautkallio in particular mostly uses Western actors’ policies and opinions regarding Finland for examining the northern country’s domestic politics rather than for analysing the larger policy developments determined in Washington and London. As background reading, the books of both scholars are among the most relevant ones for this thesis.

33 Rislakki, Jukka, Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi (Helsinki 2010).
Scholars like Jussi Hanhimäki, Helena P. Evans and Tuomo Polvinen have been more successful in drawing a picture of Finland’s relationship with the West. Hanhimäki and Evans, together with Jensen-Eriksen, are among the few scholars to write about Finland from the American or British perspective. While Hanhimäki has thoroughly explained the way in which the United States’ understanding of Finland’s neutrality developed during the first two Cold War decades, Evans has published a detailed study on Britain’s policy towards Finland during the first crucial years after the Second World War. Although important for providing a new perspective to Finland’s post-war position, many of the topics discussed in Evans’s book have previously been covered in Polvinen’s work on Finland’s international relations in 1944-1947, which to a certain degree summarises his famous series of books on Finland’s external relations during and after the war. Neither Hanhimäki, Evans nor Polvinen has given much attention to cultural matters in their studies.

As for more recent works not mentioned above, articles and books written by Mikko Majander and Jarkko Vesikansa have also provided highly valuable background information for this thesis. Majander has successfully studied, for instance, the international connections of the Finnish Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP) and the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto, SAK). In his most recent works, he gives detailed accounts of the considerable funds these two organisations received from a number of American actors, some of which were backed by the CIA. Majander’s findings on the SDP’s and the SAK’s contacts with American and British political parties and trade unions have been of great use for understanding the Western powers’ desire to influence the two organisations that were both regarded as absolutely critical for the containment of communism in Finland. What is even more interesting for this study than the mere examination of the sums particularly American trade unions invested in Finland is that Majander has published details about how Finnish social democrats, associated either with the party or the trade union movement or both, were often encouraged and assisted by both the British and the Americans in their propaganda war with Finnish communists. As Majander’s main interests have laid on other issues and his accounts on this particular subject therefore remain somewhat limited, this study complements his findings by presenting information about

35 Evans, Helena P., Diplomatic Deceptions. Anglo-Soviet Relations and the Fate of Finland (Helsinki 2011); Hanhimäki, Jussi M., Containing Coexistence. America, Russia and the "Finnish Solution” (Kent, OH 1997); Hanhimäki, Jussi M., Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa – Yhdysvallat ja Paasikiven linja 1948–1956 (Helsinki 1996); Polvinen, Tuomo, Between East and West – Finland in International Politics 1944–1947 (Helsinki 1986).
the propaganda material American and British trade unions, as well as the State Department and the Foreign Office, delivered to Finnish social democrats not only explicitly for their battle against their communist rivals, but also for more general informational activities.

In his study on anti-communism in Finland, Jarkko Vesikansa has presented new details about Finnish organisations established for anti-communist purposes during the Cold War years. For this thesis Vesikansa’s work is important for two reasons. Firstly, his study provides an excellent summary on the rise of anti-communist sentiment in Finland from the 1950s on. This development obviously had a profound impact on British and American informational activities in the country, particularly in the field of anti-communist propaganda. Secondly, and even more importantly, Vesikansa has presented detailed information about the propaganda activities of Finnish anti-communist organisations, in particular those of Suomalaisen Yhteiskunnan Tuki –säätiö (SYT). With the help of this information, and the documents available at the SYT collection, one is able to give at least an estimation of the extent of material the Finnish organisation used in its propaganda campaigns that had British or American origins.

For some years Vesikansa and Majander, together with Riskakki, were more or less the only Finnish scholars to mention, albeit mainly in passing, British and American covert propaganda activities in Finland. In 2008, this changed when a master’s thesis written by Olli-Matti Nykänen was approved at the University of Helsinki. In his study, Nykänen examines British informational and cultural activities in Finland in the 1960s. Although Nykänen’s study is fairly successful, its significance for this particular thesis is somewhat limited most of all because it focuses in a different period.

As for studies on Finnish media during the early Cold War decades, an important aspect for this study, Esko Salminen has published a number of books and articles on the history of the Finnish press. His works on Finnish newspapers’ publishing policies and Finnish self-censorship in particular offer essential information for the evaluation of Finland as an environment for information activities during the Cold War. Indeed, this study partly uses Salminen’s analyses on the content published in Finnish newspapers for its assessment of the efficiency of British and American press activities. Otherwise, the history of the Finnish media, both in terms of general studies and more specific works on, for instance, newspapers and the radio, is a surprisingly neglected field. Comprehensive studies on the history and publishing policy of leading Finnish newspapers are rare. For studying the developments of Helsingin Sanomat, traditionally Finland’s largest and most influential publication, the recent biography on Eljas Erkko, the owner and editor of the paper during the study period, has shed new light not only onto journalistic issues inside Helsingin Sanomat, but also its international business.

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arrangements. As goes for studies on other newspapers as well, the biography gives little attention to the publication of British and American official propaganda material. 41

The history of the Finnish Broadcasting Company, Yleisradio (YLE) 42 , provides some details about how Finland’s delicate political position affected the corporation’s both domestic and foreign broadcast content. While making important observations about YLE’s cautious policy regarding broadcasts or arrangements that could have aroused political tension, the book lacks a systematic examination of, for example, the relationship between YLE and the BBC or the various ways with which the British and Americans wished to cooperate with the broadcaster for their informational purposes.

The international relations of leading Finnish parties and the trade union movement have also been rather narrowly examined. Official party histories do give accounts of relations between Finnish party officials and their foreign counterparts, but only on a general level. 43 An exploration of several archives in Finland, Britain and the US reveals one simple reason for this: material regarding the topic is somewhat scarce. As contacts between Finnish parties and trade unions and the British and the Americans were particularly important during the early Cold War decades, also in terms of propaganda activities, this study aims to provide new details also about this issue.

As for the growing number of studies emphasising the psychological and cultural dimension of the Cold War, their large share focuses on anti-communist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, most typically radio broadcasts. 44 In recent years, however, several scholars have included the operations executed in Western European countries in their area of research. Some of them have also mentioned Finland in their studies, but their general focus has been on operations executed in larger European countries. 45

In Britain, the covert propaganda operations coordinated by the IRD were first revealed to the public in the late 1970s. However, a large share of the most essential documents was kept secret until the mid-1990s. When the first bulk of IRD-related documents was released, a couple of studies, focusing more on sensation rather than academic analysis, soon followed. 46 The story of a covert propaganda unit was also widely covered by the British press, which

41 This is likely to change in the upcoming years thanks to a broad research project on the history of Helsingin Sanomat currently being carried out at the University of Helsinki.
46 For example, Lashmar, Paul & Oliver, James, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 1948-1977 (Stroud 1998).
rather emphasised the involvement of certain famous names, in particular George Orwell, in the department’s activities than gave broader accounts on the actual operations. After even more documents were filtered out to the open, a number of scholars have given detailed accounts of the IRD’s activities in specific regions, like Tony Shaw has done with regard to the Korean War and James Vaughan concerning the Middle East. Lyn Smith was the first to publish an extensive article on the IRD and its activities in the Journal of International Studies in 1980. She has since been followed by scholars such as Wesley Wark and Hugh Wilford, who have both written encompassing articles on covert propaganda. Researchers like Richard Aldrich have later given more extensive accounts on, for example, youth and student organisations’ role in British anti-communist propaganda operations as well as Cold War intelligence cooperation between Britain and the US.

Perhaps the most extensive work on the development of British anti-communist propaganda, including the operations of the IRD, in the early Cold War era, has been written by Andrew Defty. His studies give a highly detailed account on the wider policies determining British propaganda, the main principles and organisational development of the IRD’s work as well as British and American cooperation in anti-communist activities. Although Defty gives examples of the actual propaganda material distributed both home and abroad, his work does not offer much for forming an analysis of the operations or the actual content distributed in a specific country, such as Finland. The same applies to Philip M. Taylor’s various books and articles concerning British propaganda and cultural diplomacy, which either deal with the operations on a rather broader sense or give more emphasis to domestic propaganda. The official histories of the BBC and the British Council also naturally provide an insight into the two organisation's work, but ignore operations relevant to Finland or even Scandinavia almost completely.

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47 For example, The Guardian, July 11, 1996.
Since a considerable body of material concerning American overseas anti-communist operations was declassified in the mid-1990s, several scholars have published comprehensive studies on the subject. Kenneth A. Osgood's studies regarding US propaganda activity during the Eisenhower Administration and Walter Hixson's work on the propaganda and cultural battle between the East and West are particularly relevant for this study. The two scholars' works are above all useful for examining the USIA's larger worldwide propaganda themes and their relevance to broader US foreign policy. Laura Belmonte's book on US propaganda during the Cold War follows the same path, but is more focused on the actual content of, above all, USIA pamphlets, and therefore gives a more detailed account on how this material was used for selling such ideas as American freedom, capitalism and harmonious race relations to the world.

For understanding the broader background of the various operations, Richard Arndt's studies on American cultural diplomacy have also been of great help. Arndt gives a summary of the role the numerous propaganda and cultural diplomacy-related state organisations and departments played before and after the creation of the USIA and explains their internal structural changes. As especially the State Department's organisational bureaucracy underwent almost constant changes during the first post-war years, Arndt's work has brought some order out of chaos for those wanting to understand how tasks related to cultural diplomacy were actually divided between different actors. The same can be said about Nicholas J. Cull's extensive history of the USIA. Cull not only explains the organisational structures of US propaganda activities, but also provides information about, for instance, how various actors worked together and, more importantly, how closely the American organisations followed broader developments in world politics and how quickly their operations reacted to them.

Among the studies related to US propaganda that have caught the greatest attention in recent years is Frances Stonor Saunders's book *Who Paid the Piper?*, which deals with the CIA’s extensive role in the cultural Cold War. The study gives a thorough account of the sheer magnitude of the CIA’s involvement in various cultural organisations and operations. Stonor Saunders’s main claim, belonging to a post-revisionist interpretation of the Cold War, is that the CIA’s covert funding of numerous trade unions, cultural organisations and student movements was a well calculated move through which it was possible for the agency to greatly manipulate numerous organisations' activities so that they would meet the ends of US Cold War

58 Cull 2008.
60 While the revisionist theory of the Cold War stresses that the origins of the conflict was above all a result of the United States' aggressive policy of economic imperialism, so-called post-revisionist interpretations acknowledge that the threat, and scale of propaganda, of the Soviet Union may even have been underestimated in the West. At the same time, historians belonging to this school of thought have also pointed out that the covert attempts Western governments, particularly that of the US, introduced to influence public opinion reached a scale that has previously gone unnoticed. For example, Gaddis, John Lewis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, No. 7 (Summer 1983), pp. 171-190; Defy 2004, pp. 4-5.
strategy. For instance, Hugh Wilford has later pointed out that the picture was not as simple as this. According to him, organisations secretly funded by the CIA often actually resisted Washington's view on how American values should be presented and what measures should be taken in this direction. Wilford, therefore, gives much more room for the cultural movements' independence than Stonor Saunders, who sees that CIA to a very large extent called the tune.

One of the very few studies to actually focus directly on American propaganda operations regarding Finland is John I. Kolehmainen's work on VOA's Finnish Section. Kolehmainen, a US-based history professor of Finnish descent, worked as head of the section for a short period in the early 1950s. His book gives intriguing details about both broader policies behind the VOA broadcasts and the way work at the Finnish section was organised. The publication, however, is not a comprehensive account on the matter, and needs further studies to complete the history of VOA Finland.

As with the British case, country-specific studies on American propaganda and cultural diplomacy are relatively rare. Reinhold Wagnleitner's extensive book on US cultural activities in Austria is an important exception. In addition to providing plenty of information about US activities in Austria, the study gives a broader analysis on the growing American influence in post-war Europe, and is therefore highly helpful. This also applies to Mikael Nilsson's recent research on mainly USIA operations in Sweden, which offer a useful perspective for understanding American activities in Finland through examining the operations in its Western neighbour.

Since prior research on British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland is more or less non-existent, this thesis is predominantly based on primary sources. For the examination of Britain's policies and activities, the most important official documents are found in the National Archives in Kew. Foreign Office files on the IRD (above all record group FO 1110) form the most important data for this study: they include, for instance, documents concerning the unit's operations and relationship with other actors such as the BBC. The files also comprise information on the unit's propaganda activity in Finland along with more general files on Britain's overall policy towards Finland (FO 371). For a closer examination of IRD-produced content, record groups FO 975 and FO 1059 include a large number of publications and articles produced by the department particularly in the 1950s. As informational and cultural operations were also coordinated by other Foreign Office units, documents on the policies of the Information Policy Department (IPD) (FO 953) and the Cultural Relations Department (CRD) (FO 924) have also been of great value. Documents concerning the British Council can also be found at the National Archives (mostly in BW 30). These files consist of general correspondence and annual reports, which provide detailed information about the various cultural activities carried

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61 Wilford 2008.
63 Wagnleitner, Reinhold (translated by Diana M. Wolf), Coca-Colonization and the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, NC and London 1994).
out during the study period. In general, the available Foreign Office and British Council files are not very organised or regular in terms of the covered time period, but they do provide enough information for a comprehensive investigation. A great share of the available documents on British propaganda operations is from the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the amount of files regarding cultural activities is at its largest for the late 1950s and early 1960s.

As already mentioned, studying the United States’ propaganda is a much more complicated affair. Even though a considerable number of documents have been opened to the public in recent years, the fact remains that especially CIA-related material is hard to come by. Moreover, State Department records at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland, are poorly organised and woefully incomplete. For the purposes of this study, my main focus has been on examining NARA documents on the operations of the USIS/Helsinki. Documents concerning these activities are scattered around numerous record groups, most importantly in Record Group (RG) 306. As in the British case, the availability of documents in this record group varies greatly by year. The largest amount of material, which consists of, for instance, correspondence, country reports, evaluation reports, background studies, printed propaganda pamphlets as well as comments on VOA broadcasts, is either from the early 1950s or the following decade. This is rather understandable as the availability of material seems to be closely related to the operations’ actual size. In fact, one has to give the Americans some credit for this, as their reporting of activities has clearly been more systematic and extensive than that of their British counterparts.

Apart from offering indispensable evidence on the US general policy towards Finland, State Department files at RG 59, both decimal files and central records of the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs (CU) in particular, also include a great deal of information regarding USIA operations in the country, including country proposals and reports on activities taken up due to some specific developments or events, such as the 1952 Helsinki Olympics and the Helsinki Youth Festival held in 1962. Similar content can also be found at RG 84 and the CU collection held at the University of Arkansas Library, the organisation of which is much more systematic than of the material stored at NARA. Other valuable research material for this thesis available at NARA includes, for instance, documents that can be found through the relatively new CIA Research Tool (CREST) and the USIA-produced films that have been donated to the archives.

The vast number of organisations taking part in the US propaganda machinery, and the American style of holding various state-related organisations’ collections at number of libraries and archives around the country make conducting research in the US more laborious than in Britain. For this study, documents held at the Eisenhower Presidential Library and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library have been particularly valuable for providing more details about the US policies towards Finland. Other important American archives include the George Meany Memorial Archives and the University of Chicago Library’ Special Collections Research Center. While the former holds documents related to the two largest American federations of trade unions, the latter is significant for its collection on the activities of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).

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65 Osgood 2002, p. 87.
A great number of Finnish archives also provide some information about the reception of Western propaganda. As the operations have been regarded as a somewhat delicate affair in Finland, the material available at the archives is also highly fragmented. By going through archive collections of several Finnish politicians, the leading political parties, the largest newspapers, state departments, in particular the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and some non-governmental organisations, I have managed to come up with a consistent picture of how the Finns reacted to Western propaganda work and what measures were possibly taken as a result.

For this task, the collections held at the Finnish National Archives have proved most invaluable. In addition to the private collections of Finnish politicians and journalists, the documents available, for instance, at the anti-communist organisation SYT’s collection, have been important for understanding the use of British and American printed content in Finnish political propaganda. The collections of the Finland-Soviet Union Society (Suomi-Neuvostoliitto-Seura, SNS) also turned out to be useful. By examining the society’s documents, as well as the material of the Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue, SKP), helmed at Kansan Arkisto, one can not only become familiar with the communist reaction to British and American informational and cultural activities, but also find out more about the Western operations such as, as the opposite players often kept a close record of them. Among the most important collections for this study held at the Finnish National Archives also are the archives of the Finnish Committee on Studying and Training in the USA (FCSTUS) and the Finnish-US Educational Exchange Commission (FUSEEC).

For examining the distribution of British and American material, printed, audio as well as visual, in the Finnish media, the archives of three leading Finnish newspapers (Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti) have been of use, as have the YLE archives held at Suomen Elinkeinoelämän Keskusarkisto in Mikkeli. Documents related to Helsingin Sanomat, Ilta-Sanomat and their publisher Sanoma Oy, held at Päivälehden arkisto, proved particularly important for this thesis. Both the newspapers’ external correspondence and the records regarding the commissions paid for published articles turned out to be especially useful for tracking down the stories that had been distributed through official British and American channels. These documents do not provide a complete figure for the extent of published Western articles in the two papers, but they are extremely helpful in forming an understanding about, for instance, at which time periods this material was particularly in favour.

As understanding Finnish newspapers’ publishing trends is vitally important for an analysis of the British and American operations’ efficiency, I have also examined the content of a number of important papers during the study period. These publications include, in addition to the ones already mentioned above, a number of newspapers known for using a particularly large volume of Western content, such as Hafrudstadsbladet, Aamulehti and Kaleva. The leading communist publications, Vapaa Sana, Työkansan Sanomat and Kansan Uutiset, founded after a merger between the first two, have also been included in the analysis mainly to learn about their reactions to the policies of the West, and more specifically to British and American propaganda. While this thesis is not as such a study about the content of Finnish newspapers, their examination is also important for determining how the Western powers’ propaganda material
compared with the publications’ general content and met their publication policies. With this in mind, I have decided to examine the content of a number of leading Finnish newspapers more closely in three different time periods: in the summer of 1950, the summer of 1955 and autumn 1962. As the publishing policies of the Finnish printed media, together with Finland’s political position, were distinctively different during these three points in time, a closer examination of the newspapers both gives an idea how the coverage of particularly foreign news topics altered through the years and reveals how the publication of British and American propaganda material fitted in this broader trend.

Apart from newspapers, several magazines published in Finland have been explored for this thesis. The most important task was to study the entire content of *Aikamme*, the USIS-produced local publication for Finland. Its articles reveal almost directly the subjects the Americans wished to emphasise in their print media campaign in Finland. Among the other magazines studied for this thesis are the influential *Suomen Kuvalehti* and *Viikkosanomat*, as well as *Valitut Palat* (the Finnish edition of *Reader’s Digest*), which played an integral part in spreading US propaganda themes throughout the country.

As for visual content, documents held at the YLE archives provide a useful insight into the introduction of television in Finland and its effects for foreign powers’ propaganda activities. For studying film propaganda, the USIS-affiliated short movies available at Kansallinen audiovisuaalinen instituutti (KAVI) give a valuable addition to the films that can be watched at NARA. Although the number of available USIS-produced films in Finland is small, an examination of them does give significant information about what broader propaganda themes the American wished their targeted audiences to pick up.

As already mentioned, the examination of British and American activities in Finland has been divided into six time periods in this study. Although Britain’s and the United States’ operations are dealt with in parallel with each other in most chapters, I have decided to mainly discuss their activities separately. The main reason for making such a general division is the way the British and the Americans implemented their campaigns. Although the two Western powers were close allies and, for instance, exchanged vast amounts of information, in the execution of informational and cultural operations they acted very much on their own. This was also the case for activities in Finland, where their governments carried out almost entirely independent campaigns particularly during the first ten post-war years. The practice of slightly closer Anglo-American cooperation in the late 1950s and early 1960s has, however, been taken into account in the way the text is structured. As a result, the chapters dealing with the time periods in question (chapters 8–9) examine the Western powers’ activities from a more convergent perspective.

This study has been divided into ten chapters. After the introduction, the aim is to provide the wider themes within a theoretical framework by defining terms such as propaganda and cultural diplomacy (chapter 1). After this, it is necessary to present the main developments in both British and American policy on informational and cultural operations as well as to introduce the main actors in the field (chapter 2). Chapters 3–9, the core of this study, focus on British and American field operations in Finland and assess the various channels’ roles in these activities. Although the main goal of the thesis is to examine the actual activities the two Western powers put into practice
in Finland and to explain the policies behind them, in order to understand the true nature of the operations it has also been necessary to briefly analyse the content of British and American propaganda material published in Finland. As documents from the mid-1950s offer by far the largest amount of information about this matter, the greatest part of this analysis appears in the chapter covering this particular period (chapter 7). The final chapter concentrates on making final conclusions and placing the research results into a wider context.

**Definition of Key Terms**

In order to understand the main questions addressed by this study and to avoid ambiguity, it is necessary to define some key concepts. The terms are all very closely connected to each other and not always that simple.

There are a number of short descriptions for the concept of propaganda. With the term we usually understand the construction and dissemination of certain words and images in order to shape the attitudes and behaviour of populations66, or in other words, the communication of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a designed way. It differs from education since as a concept ‘education’ allows for the recipient to make up his mind on a given issue. In propaganda, however, people are persuaded to do things which benefit those applying the persuasion.67 It is also distinct from information, which seeks to transmit facts objectively. Although using techniques familiar in advertising or public relations, propaganda is often strictly seen as a tool for promoting political causes or ideas, or indeed undermining them. This, and more particularly the large-scale propaganda operations executed by Nazi Germany under Joseph Goebbels’ leadership, has given the term a negative connotation as a treacherous and deceitful practice.68

This negative label has led to numerous misconceptions about the nature of propaganda. For example, although manipulative, propaganda is not necessarily untruthful as is commonly believed.69 In fact, it is often pointed out that the most effective propaganda is completely truthful as propaganda based on fact is more likely to be persuasive than bald-faced lies.70 Among the scholars emphasising the use of truth is Jacques Ellul who in his extensive work on propaganda noted that propagandists have for a long time recognised that lying must be avoided.71 Although this is an important point, one has to remember that the truth in propaganda is, of course, a highly relative concept since facts are often presented selectively or are actually half-truths or truth out of context.

People who view propaganda entirely in a negative light also often ignore the points that communications theorist Harold Lasswell already made in 1927 in his classic study *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. According to Lasswell, democracies needed propaganda as it was the

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68 See, for example, Hixson 1997, p. 2.
70 Ibid., p. 7.
only way to keep the masses informed about matters determined to be in their interest and to ensure their support for the greater cause. As propaganda was a mere instrument, it had no moral and could be used for good or for ill.72 In Lasswell’s view war-time propaganda had four objectives: “to mobilise hatred against the enemy, to preserve the friendship of allies, to preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals and to demoralise the enemy”.73 Although Lasswell saw that psychological warfare against the enemy was important, maintaining the morale of one’s own soldiers, citizens and allies and keeping the neutrals from sliding with the enemy was indispensable.74

Even though there are various acute definitions of propaganda, as already mentioned, for this study Jacques Ellul’s explanation is perhaps the most suitable. According to him, “propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organised group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organisation”.75 Ellul’s point that the desired activity of propaganda can be either active or passive is important for the examination of British and American Cold War propaganda in Finland in particular. Obviously neither of the countries wished to encourage the Finns to take direct action against the Soviet Union in particular, but rather wished their target groups to adopt a certain kind of a worldview and to make sure this view was supported on a long term basis. According to Ellul, this kind of propaganda is often not based on expressed intentions but on creating a general climate "that influences people imperceptibly without having the appearance of propaganda".76 A large share of the operations examined in this study fits into this categorisation. Therefore, what is above all meant as propaganda in this thesis is the activity that saw both the British and the Americans to try and influence the Finnish opinion leaders' and the broader public's views on topical events in particular by supplying them with selected news themes and opinions through a great number of different channels. As the Finns were already familiar with most of the topics the Western actors fed them with, the studied operations had more to do with redirecting the audience's attention to more detailed and analytical accounts on these issues rather than distributing direct attacks or blatant lies about the Soviet Union.

Ellul’s work is valuable for studying Cold War propaganda also because he stresses the scientific nature of propaganda, a characteristic typical especially for US overseas operations.77 While Ellul agrees that a definition on the effects of propaganda is very difficult to make, he sees that the increasing analysis of propaganda activity and its results at least gives us a better chance of understanding propaganda operations through rivalling psychological and social theories and systematically collected data. This is of course an important point for this study as well. As drawing definite conclusions on the effects of British and American operations in

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73 Ibid., p. 195
74 Ibid., pp. 47, 102, 105.
75 Ellul 1969, p. 61.
76 Ibid., pp. 63-64
77 Ibid., pp. 3-6.
Finland is more or less impossible, the collected data, although at times highly imperfect, enables us to estimate the pervasiveness and general content of the propaganda efforts.

Many scholars have also often classified propaganda according to the source and nature of the message. With ‘white’ propaganda we usually mean objective truth-telling coming from an open source. ‘Black’ operations, on the other hand, involve planting misleading stories or disguising their true source. ‘Grey’ propaganda, as its title suggests, lies somewhere in between white and black. It usually means the dissemination of biased information from an indeterminate source. Naturally, the lines between the three categories are often blurred.

In classifying propaganda by source, scholars like Ellul have stressed that while each usable medium has its own particular way of penetration, the way the media's effective use is mostly limited to their respective fields only shows the necessity of complementing with other media. In other words, the modern propagandist must utilise all technical means at his disposal, such as the press, radio, TV and films. While Ellul points out that each medium is particularly suited to a certain type of propaganda, he recognises that the nature of propaganda is total. This study also follows this viewpoint in the way British and American propaganda in Finland is examined. While the media used for Western operations are often examined separately in this thesis, their pre-defined roles played for the broader propaganda purpose. Hence, in this study the focus is always on the larger context as well, i.e. on examining what the broader propaganda policies were and how various media were designed to complement each other in their execution.

Determining which material is propaganda and which merely ‘information’ is often an all but impossible task. In the evaluation process, the source and its motives have a vital role. As one of the characteristics of propaganda is that it aspires to modify or control people’s opinions and actions to benefit the sponsor rather than the recipient, it can be said that a large share of the activities examined in this study can be categorised as propaganda. The informational activities of both Britain and the US in Finland during the first decades of the Cold War usually had the objective of influencing people’s opinions over some particular topic or their perceptions of the source itself in order to gain either some short-term advantage or benefit in the longer run. In this study, the term ‘informational activities’ is often used to cover both the circulation of material that could be labelled as political propaganda and the distribution of content that could be called more ‘neutral’. When talking about ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ content distributed in Finland, it is important to note that a great majority of this material can also be categorised as being white propaganda, as the distinction between white propaganda and informative communication is that white propaganda informs solely to promote a specific ideology.

To make things even more complicated, the Americans in particular often use euphemisms for propaganda due to its predominantly negative connotations. ‘Public diplomacy’ has perhaps been the most widely used one. According to one of its first definitions devised in the US, the term describes efforts on behalf of a government to reach foreign audiences without going through the government of the foreign countries. Such concepts as ‘overseas information

78 Ellul 1969, pp. 9-11.
policy’ or ‘national self-advertisement’ have also been used to describe activities to promote a country’s image, for instance, through national radio or television services. Although public diplomacy is often defined to include cultural matters, such as the administration of student exchange programmes or overseas exhibitions, I believe that ‘cultural diplomacy’ is the more appropriate term to describe such activities. The concept refers to governmental activity that attempts to by-pass commercial media images by appealing directly to the people in foreign societies on an ostensibly non-political level. Its principal instruments include language teaching, educational exchanges and other forms of cultural contact. Even the promotion of national architecture, used as a tool of diplomacy and political power even before the ancient Greeks, can be regarded as a classic product of cultural diplomacy.

The objective behind cultural and educational exchange, the establishment of libraries in overseas countries, or the sponsorship of, for instance, drama or music tours is to complement the foreign policy of the government in question, in addition to the goal of increasing international understanding. Indeed, one could say that the key assumption behind, for instance, student and expert exchange programmes is that after spending time in the country of destination and witnessing the advantages of the society and the nation’s way of life, the visitor will speak highly of his or her experiences when returning and possibly even make major decisions in favour of that particular country. Therefore, the work of such government-sponsored or supported organisations as the British Council or the Alliance Française supports foreign policy especially on a long-term basis.

What is important to recognise also for this study is that cultural diplomacy is always managed or funded by state-related actors. This is the most profound difference between cultural diplomacy and such terms as ‘cultural relations’ or ‘cultural affairs’, which refer more closely to cross-border activities that grow without government intervention, such as the transaction of trade and tourism or intermarriage. As a term, therefore, ‘cultural relations’ refers to more neutral activity that has no purpose of seeking one-sided advantage whereas cultural diplomacy usually seeks to present a favourable image. When defining these activities, it is also valuable to place them in their historical context. Indeed, operations that could be defined under cultural diplomacy in the 1950s, dictated by government actors, were much larger in number than they are in the 21st century. In other words, the role of diplomats in the management of cross-border activities, such as the exchange of students or communications, has diminished in recent decades to such an extent that their great significance during the Cold War decades could even come as a surprise to today’s reader.

As a term, cultural diplomacy is obviously closely linked to propaganda and it is not that simple to draw a line between the two. All overseas informational and cultural activities are often referred to as simply propaganda, regardless of them being undertaken through the exploitation of various media channels or through a cultural institution. It can, however, be argued that using the term propaganda for, for instance, culture or its promotion would be

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81 Taylor 1997, pp. 77–79.
82 Arndt 2005, p. 142.
83 Ibid., p. xiii.
somewhat deficient. With this and the goal of avoiding ambiguity in mind, in this study I have decided to use two terms to describe the Western powers’ overseas informational and cultural activities: ‘propaganda’ for activities principally aiming at influencing opinion through official media channels and ‘cultural diplomacy’ for the operations of, for example, the British Council, which include educational exchanges, language training and the projection of British culture. The use of the phrases ‘cultural activities’ or ‘cultural operations’ refers to cultural diplomacy.

The two main terms, ‘propaganda’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’, are predominantly used throughout the study, although at times it has simply been wiser to use one of the number of euphemisms given for propaganda during the Cold War, as well as today. The fact that US government officials in particular used the terms ‘psychological warfare’, ‘political warfare’, ‘propaganda’ and ‘psychological strategy’ more or less interchangeably in their classified communications85 means that these concepts are also used in this study in part because their inclusion reflects common usage during the first Cold War decades.

As self-censorship is a core, albeit to some extent contested, concept in understanding the Finnish environment vis-à-vis propaganda and cultural activities, it is essential to define the term as well as the broader concept of censorship. The two notions are also closely linked to propaganda and also for this reason important for this study.

Censorship has existed in various forms for thousands of years. Usually, we understand the term as a process where a certain authority, usually the state, prevents the transmission of messages and thus controls or manipulates, for example, newspaper writings. The extent of censorship can vary significantly, for instance in wartime states have practised tight control over information. Censorship is often understood as the opposite to the principle of freedom of speech, which is based on the public opportunity and right to criticise those who are in power. For this reason it is no wonder that many people (often Marxists) have argued that the elite uses censorship as a tool to maintain or strengthen their position, acknowledging language as the ultimate force of power.86

Pierre Bourdieu has successfully recognised that there exist two kinds of censorship in the fields of arts and politics. First, there is the manifest, traditional one based on rules, restriction of access and other such factors. This is the way people usually understand the word censorship. Secondly, there is what Bourdieu calls ‘structural censorship’, which is a much more complicated concept. By this term he refers to the certain linguistic codes and unwritten rules that determine what can be stated or expressed in each society and what not.87 Thus, censorship does not always mean preventing or denying the facts that are to be published, but can also refer to a certain code under which things are done. This code reflects any society and its


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values, for instance in news broadcasts, since news is not, semantically speaking, solely a value-free reflections of facts, but is also based on social and economic values.88

One could say that the concept of self-censorship is close to Bourdieu’s structural censorship. Usually self-censorship is understood as unwillingness to handle certain facts or topics in fear of the consequences, which can be political or personal. Self-censorship can also be seen as a broader process in which people remain silent about certain topics or handle them in an uncritical way, even when a more open discussion could be possible. The way this process works is usually controlled by unspoken rules and norms rather than direct laws, although political authorities may be rather directly behind it.89

According to Lilius, self-censorship is a concept that can never be fully defined, as it is mostly an ethical problem concerning sincerity and trust. In his view, self-censorship means that certain controversial subjects are rarely discussed and very often ignored completely.90 When this takes place in journalism, it is often extremely difficult to distinguish self-censorship from ‘normal’ journalism due to the perfectly normal procedure of self-control that every respected reporter practices according to the ethics of journalism. As problematic as this distinction is, one can agree with the view that when state authorities pick up the ethics of journalism and begin commenting on them officially, we are moving into the area of self-censorship.91

The terms ‘censorship’ and ‘self-censorship’ are often closely connected with the concept of ‘propaganda’. Indeed, one can say that censorship is the essential counterpart to propaganda and the manipulation of opinion. As Taylor has put it, when censorship (institutional or self) occurs, one needs to recognise how close one is sailing to the winds of propaganda.92 Both propaganda and censorship include the idea of communicating (or preventing actors from communicating) ideas to persuade people and are, therefore, seen as useful instruments for those owning the media in particular. Even if the media might not always be able to persuade the public directly, their impact on what people know and consider important is strong. It is no wonder that also the media have been seen as a powerful agency of social control with the function of maintaining social order and the confirmed status quo.93 Although the role of the media can also be seen in an entirely different light, for those examining propaganda this is a rather common one.

According to a commonly shared view, the neighbouring presence of the Soviet Union had such an influence in Finnish society that self-censorship was broadly practiced in the country throughout the Cold War. While this undoubtedly was the case, it is also necessary to point out that there was no direct censorship of media content during most of that time. Furthermore, the publishing policies adopted in the country were by no means systematic and varied greatly according to both the nature of each medium and the broader political climate. In the Finnish

case, self-censorship can above all be defined as the extent to which the Finnish media left out information or views about the Soviet Union in their news or published views that were limited or 'soft' towards the country in the fear that some information might not have been welcome in Moscow, or might have stood in contradiction with the official foreign policy of the Finnish Government.94 It has also generally been recognised that the political leadership, Presidents Juho Kusti Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen in particular, played a significant role in the self-censoring process.

Although the term self-censorship has often been used to explain the Finnish media's performance during the Cold War decades, the difficulty to precisely identify its practice leaves some room for contemplating whether simply the word 'caution' would be more accurate for describing the procedure of leaving news reports that might have irritated the eastern neighbour unpublished. While it is true that in regard to the Soviet Union Finnish reporters mostly followed common sense rather than some detailed line of policy dictated from above, the practice of leaving certain sensitive topics aside was so common and so profoundly linked to the Finnish society and its history that in this study the term self-censorship can be used to describe this activity without much hesitation. As both American and British officials often chose the very same term to define the Finnish media's reluctance to cover a number of issues regarded as potentially delicate throughout the study period, its use is not anachronistic, either.

As for the Finnish case and propaganda, one could call the way the media usually handled things as being educational rather than direct propaganda, as difficult as distinguishing between the two might be. Even during times when self-censorship was highly evident, people were usually given the facts and let to make up their own minds over any given issue. The relationship with the Soviet Union was also much more closely characterised by the concept of self-censorship rather than propaganda, even though Salminen points out that at one stage there was a tendency of publishing propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union and against the US.95 This was done not least because of fear, which in some cases can also be directly responsible for propaganda.96

Since the terms censorship, self-censorship and propaganda can be perceived as close to each other, at times it is extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other. They all are connected to one wide concept characteristic of Finland, namely Finlandisation. This concept will be discussed in closer detail later in this study when evaluating what the Finnish environment was like for British and American informational and cultural operations in the early Cold War decades and what the Finnish reactions to these activities say about the country during this particular era. Only by understanding the rather complex concept of Finlandisation and the special characteristics of Finnish politics is one able to present a broader analysis of the operations aimed at influencing Finnish opinions through various media channels.

95 Ibid., p. 21.
2. BRITISH AND AMERICAN PROPAGANDA AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EARLY COLD WAR DECADES

Need to Take Initiative

Before we can examine British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland after the Second World War, it is essential to briefly present the main organisations behind such actions and discuss their role. The most important changes in British and American policies on propaganda and cultural diplomacy during the early Cold War era are also presented in this chapter.

During the Second World War, both the British and the American governments introduced a great number of new and extensive propaganda operations to influence audiences both home and abroad. Since these activities were in general regarded as a successful and efficient way to spread government-dictated information through the increasingly important mass media, both administrations emerged from the war convinced of the value of permanent peacetime propaganda machinery. The leaders of neither country, however, actually perceived peacetime propaganda as a defence against hostile powers, and in the first post-war years both Prime Minister Clement Attlee and President Harry S. Truman reverted to concepts of government propaganda which owed more to ideas of national projection and advertising developed in the inter-war years than the lessons of the Second World War. 97 Only the reassessment of the Soviet Union’s intentions triggered the establishment of a more aggressive propaganda machinery that would reach an unprecedented size.

In Britain, post-war activities in the fields of propaganda and cultural diplomacy were obviously to be determined by the country’s future position in world politics. In 1945 it was difficult for many at the Foreign Office to see how Britain could maintain its position as one of the ‘big three’ in international politics. The country was close to bankruptcy and without the financial help of the US the possibility for the British to play an active and influential role in the future of Europe, let alone the world, would have been much more limited than before. At least the very first post-war years suggested that this role was to some extent lost. During this time, the British Government adopted a somewhat passive line in foreign policy that was characterised by greater dependency on the United States and growing fears about the true intentions of the Soviet Union. 98

Even if Britain’s true global relevance may have declined from what it was before the war, the British Government was by no means willing to surrender its influence on international developments without a fight. Many British politicians and officials still wished to hold on to their country’s position as a world power and tried to find new working methods to do so. With all this in mind, it is perhaps not so surprising that Britain, not the US, was actually the first Western power to sharpen its machinery for propaganda and cultural activities to meet the new

97 Defy 2004, p. 27.
requirements of a changing world. Britain’s declining economy and position as a world power actually meant that the new Labour Government would place considerable faith in the projection of British power through propaganda. For this objective, the Government received strong support from FO officials, although only after a period of hesitation.

Even before the end of the war was nowhere near the horizon, a number of military leaders in particular had realised that the next conflict would eventually be fought against communism. During the first post-war years, certain military circles’ insistence for action against the Soviet Union was an issue constantly discussed at the FO, which in general wished to introduce a more cautious approach to relations with the Russians. The FO’s position was well reflected in its very first post-war policies on British propaganda and cultural diplomacy abroad, which followed the concept of positive national projection. According to this view, British propaganda was to focus on explaining British policies and ideas rather than attack any possible enemies such as the Soviet Union. This objective was explained in one of the first directives sent to British overseas information officers by the FO’s new Information Policy Department, which was established to give more general guidance distinct from the regional information departments. The paper emphasised the value of projecting such British, or more precisely Labour Government, values as social democracy and the new welfare state along with the more traditional promotion of Britain’s role as a world power and leading player in international trade. The projection of British achievements in, for instance, the sciences, art and music was not neglected either. A list of common themes for overseas publicity prepared at the FO in January 1946 stressed the importance of "spotlighting all those things which show Britain as a strong and vital factor in the world and illustrating by practical examples the distinctive contribution which she can make".

During this time, the whole of Whitehall was in the middle of readjusting its information machinery into a new organisational structure, which it most definitely required. The most important decision was to abolish the Ministry of Information (MOI) and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), both central bodies for war-time information and propaganda operations. The new Central Office of Information (COI) inherited from the MOI the responsibility for the production of finished publicity materials and the preparation and issue of the official London Press Service. The integration of overseas information operations under only a couple of Foreign Office departments was a particularly complicated task. In June 1946, after some considerable readjustment, the FO information machinery still included five regional branches in addition to the IPD and the Cultural Relations Department, which was planned to be axed in due course.

99 Several military leaders went even further in their assessment and proposed that action against the Soviet Union should be taken straight after the rearmament of Germany had been achieved. Aldrich 2002, pp. 53—58.
100 Office Circular No. 68. ‘Information Policy Department’, by D.J. Scott, June 17, 1946, FO 953/131, NA.
101 FO memorandum: ‘The Projection of Britain’, September 12, 1946; Information Newsletter No. 4, October 17, 1946, both FO 930/496, NA.
103 Office Circular No. 53. The Information Work of the Foreign Office, May 1946, FO 953/131, NA.
104 ‘Information Newsletter No. 1’, June 28, 1946, FO 930/498, NA.
While FO officials were busy reorganising the British informational machinery, Whitehall’s general approach to the nature of overseas propaganda operations started to change. Even though the FO still objected to any military measures taken against the Soviet Union, even diplomats and politicians who had earlier called for a more constructive approach towards the communist power began gradually to admit the growing tension in Anglo-Soviet relations and that a new line of policy should be introduced. Particularly, the developments taking place in 1945—1947 in the Middle East, Greece and, above all, Germany confirmed the increasingly anti-Russian mood.105 Often seen as the onset of the Cold War, Winston Churchill’s famous ‘Iron Curtain Speech’ given at Fulton in March 1946 summarised the sentiment emerging among leading politicians and civil servants: Europe had been divided into two blocs, the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to Western democracies, and this threat had to be confronted in every possible way.

Frank Roberts, the Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, was one of the first at the FO to suggest that Anglo-Soviet relations should be treated in the same way as major military problems during the war, through the closest coordination of political strategy.106 This view led to the establishment of the Foreign Office Russia Committee in April 1946, which then oversaw the gradual revival of a department for British covert political warfare.107 In the same month, Christopher Warner, Head of the FO’s Northern Department, proposed the more aggressive use of propaganda in confronting the Soviets.108 The paper drawn up by Mr Warner, which outlined ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country’, easily won most FO officials’ support. As a consequence, new instructions about the more efficient use of material on Britain were quickly sent to missions abroad. These instructions gave a rather detailed account on the distribution of the London Press Service news bulletins and feature articles as well as newsreels and documentaries, all produced by the COI. They also emphasised the importance of personal contacts with foreign political and trade union leaders, lecturers and journalists and advised on the arrangement of visits to Britain for the members from these groups “who can be relied on to take the opportunity of doing us on their return”.109

The opposition to Soviet imperialism emerged relatively quickly also on the agenda of Clement Attlee’s Labour Government, in spite of a considerable number of left-wing MPs known as the ‘Keep Left’ group still showing some sympathy to the Soviet Union. In fact, during the Labour Party’s first couple of years in power, it was seriously divided over foreign policy matters between the idealists calling for the introduction of ‘socialist foreign policy’, which would be committed to worldwide reconciliation, disarmament and a new international order, and the more pragmatic wing supporting the sentiment evolving in the US particularly after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine that communism must be fought all over the

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108 Warner’s view was that the global nature of Soviet policy required an equally coordinated response and that Britain’s propaganda “should be developed to attack and expose international communism as totalitarianism wherever it shows itself”. ‘Memorandum by Mr Warner’, April 2, 1946 DBPO (London 1991), p. 349.
109 ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country’, Memorandum by I. Kirkpatrick, May 22, 1946, FO 930/488, NA.
world under the leadership of an Anglo-American alliance. A constant dilemma for Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was how to support the American anti-Sovietism he himself had encouraged since autumn 1946 without outraging his own backbenchers and British public opinion, which in the first post-war years had reflected a deep antagonism to American-style capitalism. As time passed, Bevin, a key figure in the creation of Marshall Aid and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), started to more openly acknowledge that both overt and covert measures had to be taken to confront the Soviet Union and its ferocious propaganda against the West.

A secret anti-communist propaganda unit, known as the Information Research Department, was finally established at the Foreign Office in January 1948. At the time, there was a growing realisation among FO officials that Britain's post-war economic and military weakness required a greater dependence on propaganda as a means of defending the country's interests than before. The idea of establishing the department was sold to the left-wing members of the Labour party by linking it with the 'Third Force' concept, by which the idea of 'socialist foreign policy' had become known. Indeed, the IRD was initially given the role of supporting this policy by advertising social democracy and the British way of life in a positive light against communism, rather than attacking the Soviet Union as such. The 'Third Force' idea remained, however, more or less mere rhetoric, and the Labour Government's support for it soon faded. As a result, the 'positive' approach was soon rejected and the IRD's work focused increasingly on revealing the weaknesses and injustices of the communist system in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The IRD and its Primary Objectives

As the establishment of the IRD has been covered in some detail in previous studies, it is not the point of this thesis to describe the process. What can be said, though, is that the department's first year of operation reflected closely the change taking place in the British way of thinking in a more general sense. At first, for instance Bevin gave declamatory statements about how it was for the British Government, not the US, to give a spiritual, political and moral lead to all Western European anti-communist elements through overtly positive measures. As Soviet propaganda against Britain grew all over the world, such declarations gave way to the use of propaganda to expose the weaknesses and injustices of the communist system.
of more aggressive informational strategies\textsuperscript{116} that were to be implemented in cooperation with other Western countries when possible.

The IRD's main mission was to collect information about communist policies and propaganda as well as co-ordinate the discreet production and dissemination of fact-based anti-communist material to opinion formers both home and abroad. After the rejection of the Third Force idea, the department's general objective was defined as follows: "to pass over to the offensive and not to leave the initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves".\textsuperscript{117}

The IRD particularly focused on areas outside the Eastern Bloc that were estimated to be under communist threat. Ernest Bevin mostly ruled out the use of anti-communist operations in the Soviet satellites by taking the view that the British Government should not incite people to subversive activities if they were not in a position to lend active assistance in overthrowing their regimes.\textsuperscript{118} The Soviet campaign was combated by selecting and slanting carefully produced information, such as studies on Soviet policies, without revealing the original source. This chosen work method, based on the tactics of ‘grey’ propaganda, could be described as distributing truth with a certain ‘spin’.\textsuperscript{119}

For the distribution of IRD propaganda material through British missions overseas, a special network of ‘influential people’ was built in each country. This arrangement offered a valuable addition to the more usual channels made available to the IRD, namely the British Overseas Information Service, the press and the radio. Distribution of IRD content was very much the responsibility of the information officers of each mission, who for the most part were former officers of the war-time MOI.\textsuperscript{120} The material fell into two categories: one consisted of secret and confidential studies on Soviet policies that were distributed to high-level politicians and the other of more general and less classified material sent to journalists, academics and labour leaders for background use.\textsuperscript{121} Missions worldwide played an active part in the production of this content by responding to London's requests for information about communist activities in their parts of the world. The bulk of the produced material was sent to highly influential figures, but at first the IRD defined the broader masses as an equally important target group. Even though the activity of reaching working class audiences through foreign social democratic parties and trade unions turned out to be successful in many Western European countries, in the 1950s the IRD often stressed that its basic method was to influence opinion leaders rather than to make a mass appeal.\textsuperscript{122}

Close contacts with the new COI were also important for the coordination and distribution of IRD material, while liaison with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more commonly known as MI6, and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) was regarded as essential for the collection and use of

\textsuperscript{117} Taylor 1999a, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{118} For example, ‘Memorandum of anti-Communist Propaganda Operations’, July 24, 1951, FO 1110/460, NA; Parliamentary Historians 1993, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{119} Wark 1987, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{120} Mr Moorehead to Mr McNeil, ‘British propaganda in Europe’, May 13, 1947, FO 953/4H, NA.
\textsuperscript{121} For example, Wilford 1998, p. 358; Smith 1980, p. 73
\textsuperscript{122} For example, ‘IRD’s circular letter to Posts’, June 6, 1955, FO 1110/716, NA.
intelligence information. The IRD’s relationship with MI6 was not always frictionless, as many intelligence officers believed that the department was too low-key and defensive for producing effective results. On the other hand, the IRD’s involvement in the dissemination of ‘black’ material, such as forgeries, lies and fabrications for use by its own outlets as well as MI6-funded radio stations and news agencies also raised some doubts about the department's credibility and merits, especially in Foreign Office circles.  

Although the intention was to keep the IRD small, it soon became clear that greater resources would be required to perform tasks of collecting information about communist policy and providing material for anti-communist publicity through missions and information services abroad. The rapidly growing number of prominent writers recruited to the cause, including George Orwell and Malcolm Muggeridge, also required more funds. In late 1948, the department’s funding was transferred to the so-called Secret Vote, the Parliamentary allocation of money for the intelligence services, which made it possible to receive adequate funds for the sharply increasing operational costs more flexibly. In the 1950s, the number of staff had already grown to over three hundred.

The IRD was also successful in establishing contacts with non-governmental organisations and private businesses, especially leading newspapers both home and abroad. Due to the IRD’s secret nature, all journalists were told as little as possible about the department, and material was sent to their homes under a plain cover. It was stressed that the documents should not be attributed to HM Government as they were not official policy. Arrangements were also made with several British newspapers on payment of a fee to allow them to select, reprint and distribute suitable articles for republication abroad. The Observer, The Times and The Sunday Times were all involved in this way.

The IRD’s influence in the printed word was far greater than it would have been by merely supplying overseas missions with background papers or journalists with news material. The department for instance secretly sponsored anti-communist books by supposedly reputable publishers. In the early 1950s, over a dozen of anti-communist handbooks were published through a small firm, Ampersand Ltd. Although these books did not sell very well, some of them, for instance R.N. Carew-Hunt’s Theory and Practice of Communism, were used as a standard text in schools and colleges for many years. This evidence, together with the IRD’s secret funding of such institutions as Reuters, could even be seen as a serious subversion of the democratic process, because such arrangements prevented public opinion from forming a balanced view on certain issues.

123 Dorril, Stephen, MI6 – Fifty Years of Special Operations (London 2000), p. 79. The FO had originally wished to avoid receiving such a reputation by keeping some distance from MI6 and COS as far as the ‘black operations’ taking place in the communist countries as well as in Germany and Austria were concerned, but as time passed the IRD’s involvement in them became more commonplace. For example; ‘Anti-Communist Propaganda – Memorandum of the Secretary of Cabinet’, April 1948; W.O. Hayter to FO, June 2, 1948, both FO 1093/375, NA.
125 Wilford 1998, p. 353
126 Smith 1980, p. 72.
In its first years, the IRD’s focus was very much on Europe. France and Italy were identified as top priority targets due to the possibility of communist success in their parliamentary elections. In February 1948, the FO informed its Embassy in Rome that material on the realities of life under communist regimes would soon be available for handing over to influential figures.\(^{129}\) At the end of the same year, after the IRD had stepped up its production, the dissemination of propaganda within French-based media outlets became an intrinsic part of work for all British Missions in France.\(^{130}\) From the early 1950s on, the IRD’s role in Third World countries became more important.\(^{131}\) Since around the same time IRD propaganda was also introduced in other British dominions, both with and without collaboration with the respective Commonwealth Governments\(^{132}\), the department’s global significance grew quickly. The Korean War turned out to be the first major test for the IRD, as it revealed that a new kind of psychological dimension was becoming increasingly important when dealing with such conflicts both home and overseas.\(^{133}\)

As for the content produced by the IRD, great importance was given to finding the right topics and the correct political language. After the initial goal of mainly distributing material emphasising the superiority of the British way of life against conditions in the communist countries was rejected, the content turned more aggressive and dealt with such issues as Soviet labour camps, human rights and the treatment of national minorities. An examination of some of the first circulated *The Interpreters*, the IRD publication specialising in extensive studies of communism that was sent to missions abroad for distribution as background material, and *Digests*, collections of shorter news items on developments behind the Iron Curtain, reveals clearly the department’s key focus areas. Particularly the first *Digest* reports show that in addition to the exposure of forced labour camps throughout the Soviet Union, the IRD wished to deal with a great variety of matters in the Soviet Union and its satellites, ranging from the inadequate freedom of the press, the facade of elections, the position of religion and working conditions to the education system.\(^{134}\) *The Interpreter* often focused on similar matters and also provided in-depth analyses on the way Soviet propaganda against the Free World was organised.\(^{135}\) As the Cold War progressed, the publication also started to keep a close watch on other broader developments within the Soviet orbit, such as Sino-Soviet relations and church-state relations in Poland.\(^{136}\)

In the early 1950s, the IRD gave special attention to undermining the Soviet ‘Peace Campaign’ by labelling it as mere Soviet propaganda\(^{137}\). The department also reported about the various crises taking place in communist countries, such as the food shortage in East

\(^{129}\) Parliamentary Historians 1993, p. 8  
\(^{130}\) Footit 2013, p. 69.  
\(^{131}\) Urgent attention was given to the Middle East, India, Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina. Smith 1980, p. 73.  
\(^{133}\) Shaw 1999 p. 267.  
\(^{135}\) The Interpreter, No. 1, 1952, FO 1059/1, NA.  
\(^{136}\) For example, The Interpreter, December, 1958, FO 1059/51, NA.  
\(^{137}\) ‘Peace and Soviet Policy’, April 1951, FO 975/50, NA.
Germany.\textsuperscript{138} All matters of importance for human activity were covered, even the Soviet Union’s entry to the field of international sport and the "state-led and propaganda-seeking nature" of the Soviet sports machinery were given extensive attention.\textsuperscript{139} The titles of the shorter news published in the \textit{Digests}, such as ‘Estonian Farmers Jailed’, ‘Soviet Campaign Against Moslem Faith in Central Asia’ and ‘Anti-Communist Peasants Forced to Pay Higher Prices for Bread’\textsuperscript{140} give us some indication of what the IRD-produced material was usually like.

Due to the developments taking place in the Soviet Union after Josif Stalin’s death and Britain's slightly closer relations with the Russians in the latter part of the 1950s, IRD material began to give increasing priority to the economic race between the East and the West\textsuperscript{141} as well as the question regarding atomic energy.\textsuperscript{142} This did not mean that injustices within the Soviet bloc were forgotten. Major incidents behind the Iron Curtain, such as protests and international communist meetings, were conscientiously reported by the department with the growing flow of refugees from Eastern Europe to the West becoming an area of special focus.\textsuperscript{143} The use of language in these writings gives us interesting evidence on how profoundly the IRD planned its output. Many of the selected words and phrases quickly entered the vocabulary of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{144} One of these terms was 'Kremlin', which was regarded as “the most useful single word for general audiences in order to fix in people’s minds the character of Russian communism".\textsuperscript{145}

The IRD’s role in covert anti-communist work became particularly strong after its remit had been expanded in the early 1950s. At the same time, the nature of British propaganda also changed as Winston Churchill’s Government embraced a more offensive policy of intensified psychological operations against the communist bloc.\textsuperscript{146} For some years, the idea of using propaganda to make direct appeals to the people behind the Iron Curtain was supported not only by leading Conservatives, but also by senior officials in the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{147} By the end of the 1950s, after considerable expansion, the IRD had evolved into much more than an anti-communist department; it was essentially a peacetime psychological warfare organisation of almost unlimited scope.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{138} 'Food Crisis in Eastern Germany', 1952, FO 975/67, NA.
\textsuperscript{139} 'Sport Behind the Iron Curtain', September 1955, FO 975/82, NA.
\textsuperscript{140} FO Memorandum: ‘IRD’s Digest of Information on Current Relations with Soviet Russia and the Satellites’, October 1948, FO 371/71715, NA.
\textsuperscript{141} Several IRD writings started to give detailed accounts about the actual figures of, for example, the Soviet Union’s industrial output, compared to the ones the Kremlin announced. For example, The Interpreter, November 1961, FO 1059/86, NA.
\textsuperscript{142} FO Minutes: ‘Changes in IRD’s outlook due to HM Government’s amended policy towards the Soviet Government in light of recent events’, June 27, 1956, FO 1110/872, NA.
\textsuperscript{143} For example, ‘The Refugee Flow Westwards’, May 1960, FO 975/137, NA.
\textsuperscript{144} Deery 2004, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{145} Other suggested terms to describe Soviet internal practices included ‘Stalinist’ and ‘totalitarian’, while for instance the words ‘communist’ and ‘red’ were to be avoided “because of their vague attraction for many wavers”. FO Minute to Mr Mayhew, ‘Draft of first edition of Speaker’s Notes for circulation to ministers’, January 14, 1949; FO Memorandum: ‘Use of words in publicity about communism’, March 1949, both FO 1110/191, NA.
\textsuperscript{146} Deery 2004, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 94.
\textsuperscript{148} Shaw 1999, p. 264.
In the 1960s and in the 1970s the IRD’s impact started to fall gradually under the political climate of détente. Partly due to this reason its operations were finally put to a halt in 1977. The IRD’s effect on public opinion in Britain, let alone abroad, is obviously hard to assess. According to Hugh Wilford, it is clear that the anti-communist Cold War consensus that prevailed in Britain after the 1950s did not simply form in response to international events, but was in part deliberately constructed by the British Government.149 Christopher Mayhew, Labour politician and one of the key figures behind the IRD, has also claimed that the operations were a huge success; they destroyed Stalinist illusions, gave encouragement to people who wished to tell the truth about the Soviet Union, and helped to blunt the impact of Stalinist political warfare.150

In addition to the IRD, the Foreign Office coordinated its information activities through its overt Whitehall branches, mainly the FO News Department and the IPD, as well as the COI. The Overseas Information Service distributed more ‘normal’ or ‘objective’ material, as determined by the IPD, on British policy and other aspects of British life to the outside world. All in all, it is evident that a network of linkages between the FO, the official information agencies and the media gave, and still continues to give, the FO considerable control of the process of building up Britain’s image abroad.151

It should also be noted that the IRD was by no means the only FO unit dealing with anti-communist activities. If the Russia Committee was responsible for the overall coordination of anti-communist operations, the Cultural Relations Department focused on preventing Soviet domination in the fields of international movements, federations and festivals. It soon became evident for the unit that its principal battleground was to be the struggle over the minds of European youth.152 In order to respond to the communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) the CRD first teamed up with members of non-communist British youth groups.153 In August 1948, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), Britain’s first covertly orchestrated international organisation, was founded with the goal of objecting the spread of communism in Western European youth movements by furthering the exchange of ideas, information and visits between young people from different countries.154 British influence on the student front was, however, soon drastically reduced as financial problems began to make their mark also in this area of activity.155 By 1955, the International Secretariat of WAY had become a largely American-funded body, receiving subsidies from a range of US-based groups.156

Another FO scheme was the Wilton Park forum, which was initially meant to re-educate German prisoners of war into democratic values. In 1947, Wilton Park's functions were expanded to hold courses on British institutions to other non-communist foreigners also.157

149 Wilford 1998, p. 369
150 Smith 1980, p. 81.
153 For example, Britain's National Union of Students (NUS) played into the hands of the CRD because of their lack of money. Aldrich 2002, p. 116.
154 C.F.A. Warner to G.G. Williams, July 8, 1948, ED 124/137, NA.
155 Already in 1948 the FO faced problems in winning the required grants from the Treasury for the organising of an international youth conference. G.G. Williams to I. Kirkpatrick, February 6, 1948, ED 124/137, NA.
156 Aldrich 2003, p. 127.
157 'Future Foreign Policy', Memorandum by Ernest Bevin, January 4, 1948, CAB 129/23, NA.
After this was done, organisers of the forum stressed that rather than lecturing to the participants, Wilton Park should encourage them to discussion through the introductions given often by prominent political and academic figures.  

A typical Wilton Park course lasted for around four weeks, and in addition to discussing the structure of British society and the concept of European democracy, students were taken on several visits to, for example, government and party offices, industrial institutions, the BBC and the leading daily newspapers. The participants for these courses were carefully selected according to their position in their respective societies with younger rising professionals in politics, the trade union movement or the media given the strongest nod.

As dominating as the Foreign Office’s role in the coordination of British Cold War overseas propaganda may have been, the operations naturally required the activities of other agencies besides the FO missions abroad. Attlee’s Labour Government stressed the importance of expanding the party’s international section and finding ways to cooperate with the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in their dissemination of anti-communist propaganda both home and abroad. Among the contributors to the activities seen as particularly valuable also were the Christian churches, which, according to the Government, "had a stimulating effect in Western Europe". Although in the 1940s several key values of the Labour Government were visibly present in British propaganda content, the Conservative Party was also kept informed about the new policies, and even before the Churchill Government took office in 1951, the party worked in close contact with Labour and the IRD in matters related to anti-communist propaganda.

The BBC: Struggle between Independence and Government Pressure

The significance of the BBC’s global role in the Cold War years, as well as during the Second World War, cannot be exaggerated. Since it was listened to by people throughout the world, including those living behind the Iron Curtain, the BBC Overseas Service became a vital channel for the British Government to push its viewpoint through. During the war, the broadcasting corporation had been successful in building a reputation for providing the most objective and balanced news service both home and abroad. Although the BBC, a publicly owned and state-financed corporation, has until this day emphasised its journalistic independence and the objectivity of its news, it is evident that running Britain's interests as well as promoting its policies and culture have always been one of its main tasks.

The rather vague definition of the broadcasting corporation’s role, especially when it comes to its Overseas Service, as given in the BBC's charter in 1946, left the British Government, and the FO in particular, with plenty of loopholes should they have wished to have direct impact on

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158 'Notes on Wilton Park', February 19, 1949, FO 1049/1917, NA.
159 For example, 'Wilton Park – Timetable for Session XXV, January 5 – February 3, 1950', FO 371/85372, NA.
160 'Guidance in Selection of German Personalities to Participate in Wilton Park Courses', 1949, FO 371/85372, NA.
161 'Anti-Communist Propaganda. Minutes of a Meeting of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street', May 11, 1948, CAB 130/37, NA.
162 'Anti-Communist Propaganda Operations', July 27, 1951, CAB 127/296, NA.
163 According to, for example, Briggs, the reputation of the BBC both home and abroad was at its highest during the Second World War. Briggs 1985, p. V.
broadcasting material. The charter acknowledged the corporation's independence in the preparation of programmes for overseas audiences, but noted that it should take into consideration the Government's policies towards foreign countries and plan its broadcasts according to the "national interest". In hindsight, it can be said that what constituted the national interest varied according to the situation in question and was inevitably shaped by an acceptance of the prevailing Cold War culture. This was reflected in the propaganda strategy adopted by the British Government and articulated in BBC broadcasts.

The significance of the BBC Overseas Services' role in British Cold War propaganda was strongly emphasised by the Labour Government when the new policy was announced in 1948. The corporation was ranked as the most important British propaganda weapon in Eastern Europe, mainly because listeners there were under the impression that it acted independently of the Government. While it can be noted that the new propaganda policy constituted a turning point for BBC's participation in the broader propaganda war, Alban Webb has pointed out that there actually was no single switch from peacetime broadcasting to the requirements of broadcasting in the early Cold War. The corporation was quite willing to integrate new foreign policy objectives into the direction and output of the Overseas Services in alignment with hardening Cold War attitudes. At least Sir Ian Jacob, Director of the BBC's Overseas Services, and later Director-General, had no doubt that he was engaged in propaganda and already in 1946 noted that “any country deciding to embark on a service of broadcasts to foreign audiences does so because it wants to influence those audiences in favour. All such broadcasting is therefore propaganda”.

In spite of the support the BBC was ready to give to the Government’s objectives, the corporation was by no means willing to give up its journalistic independence. The BBC, as well as leading British politicians in general, understood that a commitment to presenting facts and broadcasting the truth was a national asset and the most effective form of propaganda. Indeed, the BBC rarely even admitted to be in the business of propaganda. After the Second World War was over, its main job was the projection of Britain and the presentation of the British viewpoint, as it often declared. Even when the Cold War reached its peak in around 1949, the BBC, while recognising the need to “keep the Russians and the people living in satellite countries in touch with the West and combat defeatism in Western Europe”, had less enthusiasm for the new ‘war of words’ than its American counterparts.

164 'Broadcasting Policy', Presented by the Lord President of the Council and the Postmaster General to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1946, FO 553/1487, NA.
166 'Anti-Communist Propaganda. Minutes of a Meeting of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street', May 11, 1948, CAB 130/37, NA.
170 Ibid., pp. 219—222.
The BBC's close ties with the IRD not only challenged its independence, but meant that maintaining a credible balance between being an objective news service and a spokesperson for the British Government became an almost daily challenge. The IRD saw international broadcasting as a propaganda tool of paramount importance in reaching the broader masses throughout the world. Soon after the creation of the IRD, Ralph Murray, the first head of the new department, noted that the BBC should be persuaded to help the unit "in the task imposed by the new policy". Although Foreign Secretary Bevin rejected calls for the Government to force the corporation “to accept definite official direction” in its foreign programming as potentially damaging to the reputations of both actors, he did arrange for the day-to-day monitoring of the Overseas Service broadcasts to be stepped up in order to find out whether or not the corporation was following the new policy. Sir Ian Jacob, who had direct contacts to the Foreign Office, agreed with the view that the BBC could broadcast IRD material, but was always willing to stress the absolute accuracy of broadcast facts. Jacob's approval soon led to regular discussions between the BBC and the FO over programme content and eventually the increasing use of IRD material in external broadcasts. As time passed, BBC reporters started to give great value to the IRD’s factual content and most typically used it as background information for their commentaries.

The BBC's insistence on having complete editorial authority even after the new policy was implemented became less and less convincing as the Cold War intensified and the FO's interference with its broadcasts became more the norm rather than the exception. Documents reveal that in 1950 the BBC was very much taking part in the Cold War mind battle. This was the year when the corporation decided to transmit anti-communist propaganda on all overseas services rather than just the Eastern European Service. The BBC output dealing with the Cold War was by now divided into long-term political series and short-term ad hoc talks. While the former were mostly occupied with the positive aspects of the British way of life, the day-to-day talks commenting on the news as they developed started to display a more critical edge.

The BBC's concession to use IRD output at least as background material did not prevent the relationship between Whitehall and Bush House from becoming rather tense in the 1950s. While the corporation continued to underline its editorial independence, the FO criticised its programming constantly. In 1953, for instance, it claimed that the BBC Russian Service was too critical of the US Government and not sufficiently critical of the Soviet Government. The corporation’s output during the Hungarian Uprising and the Suez Crisis also raised many eyebrows in Whitehall. The cautious approach adopted in broadcasts not only to Hungary but the whole of Europe during the uprising was to some extent accepted by the FO, but the

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171 'Minutes by Ralph Murray', February 17, 1948, FO 1110/16, NA.
173 For example, I. Jacob to C. Warner, April 26, 1948, FO 1110/16, NA.
174 For example, 'Minutes by Ralph Murray', February 17, 1948, FO 1110/16, NA.
175 Smith 1980, p. 73.
176 'Extension of the BBC's anti-communist propaganda campaign', Minutes by C.F. MacLaren, August 18, 1950, FO 1110/296, NA.
177 T. Lean to R. Murray, 2 October, 1950, FO 1110/296, NA.
178 'The BBC Russian Service', Minutes by R.H. Mason, December 16, 1953, FO 1110/625, NA.
179 Rawnsley 1999a, p. 169.
Suez Crisis was far more serious an affair. The BBC saw that its duty was to report about the strong opposition developing against the British and French policy to take military action against Egypt. The resulting fallout between the corporation and the Government was so considerable that at one stage Prime Minister Anthony Eden even wanted the Government to take over the BBC.¹⁸⁰

Particularly the latter incident shows that the BBC’s goal of finding a balance between objective reporting and the presentation of broader British objectives was under Whitehall’s constant scrutiny. The broadcasting content was not only monitored by officials in London; several surveys concerning BBC’s external broadcasts were also sent to British ambassadors in Eastern European satellite countries in particular. The results of these enquiries tell about general dissatisfaction with the output. In 1948, a survey showed that the BBC was not anti-communist enough, while in 1961 the embassies felt that the corporation was too anti-communist and outdated and because of this made the making of friends and contacts behind the Iron Curtain more difficult.¹⁸¹

The BBC’s task of providing reliable world-wide services was made even harder by the constant threats made over expense cuts. In the late 1940s, both the BBC and the FO were still able to reject the numerous calls for the reduction of foreign language broadcasts by arguing that such moves would compromise Britain’s standing in the world.¹⁸² This did not quite convince the Treasury, which regarded the amount of money spent on overseas broadcasting as too excessive for post-war conditions. As the pressure grew in the early 1950s, the BBC was forced to make its first concessions by eliminating the majority of breakfast and lunchtime broadcasts to Western Europe and discontinuing its services to Belgium and Luxemburg.

The final report of a small expert advisory body known as the Drogheda Committee published in 1953 acted as a catalyst for further changes. The report understood the popularity of the BBC’s External Services, but doubted the post-war value of several European services. The BBC and the FO’s strong opposition to this view¹⁸³ was not enough to prevent the Treasury from making further reductions to the BBC budget which would lead to the termination of more services. As broadcasts to Russia and its satellites, the Middle East, the Far East and South East Asia, as well as the General Overseas Service, were regarded as absolutely vital, more European services, such as the Dutch, Danish and Swedish services, were eventually closed down. In this way, the BBC followed the Drogheda Report’s argument that there were ‘special reasons’ why some other language services, such as services to Germany, Yugoslavia and Finland should be retained. The reductions had such an effect to the BBC’s authority that by 1955 the Soviet Union had wiped out its position as the world’s leading international broadcaster in terms of broadcasting hours.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ For example, ‘Brief for conversation with Sir Ian Jacob’, March 28, 1955, FO 953/1561, NA.
¹⁸⁴ Nelson 1997, p. 86.
Role of the British Council

During the Cold War years, as well as today, a positive image of Britain was also promulgated through the British Council, which had the general task of “promoting abroad a wider appreciation of British culture and civilisation, by encouraging the study of the English language and the British contribution to music and the fine arts, literature and music”.

Furthermore, the Council aimed at encouraging both cultural and political interchanges between Britain and other countries and assisting the free flow of students from overseas. Supporting British institutes and societies in overseas countries, recruiting university lecturers, providing support to students and English teachers, distributing books and periodicals for libraries, as well as organising lecture tours, music performances and art exhibitions were among its core tasks.

Established in 1934, the British Council, first known as the British Committee for Relations with Other Countries, had a semi-autonomous position, since even though it was partly funded by the Foreign Office, it had its own committee and was responsible for its own policies. Before the first overseas representative was sent to Egypt in 1938, the Council worked through British embassies and high commissions. Although the BC did manage to expand its network of representatives around the world to a reasonable degree, Britain was slow to enter the field of cultural diplomacy in comparison to countries such as Italy and, in particular, France, which had already in the 19th century established a clear lead in related activities. This was perhaps due to a lack of imagination. A reluctance to embrace the concept of cultural diplomacy would be characteristic for the British also in years to come.

As the Second World War progressed, British Council activity had to be withdrawn from most European countries. In 1945, the work was restarted and expanded throughout Europe and other parts of the world. Back then, the FO recognised that the general aim of Britain’s information policy was to ensure the overseas presentation of a true and adequate picture of British policy, British institutions and the British way of life. This was, of course, very much the area of the BC, and its grant was restored to the wartime level. At the same time, however, the Council’s operations were more closely monitored. The relationship between the FO and the BC was seen as ill-defined and unsatisfactory, and the latter was to a growing extent criticised for inefficiency.

The British Council’s image of being inefficient and elitist was one reason why the British Government’s investment in cultural diplomacy in the first post-war years left room for improvement. Although the FO was happy to declare that the projection of the British way of life was important, it wished to invest more in psychological and political warfare through the IRD in particular. According to J.M. Lee, the system of government and the people who ran it produced few incentives to embrace the concept of cultural diplomacy simply because the

185 Donaldson 1984, pp. 1–2.
186 Mitchell pp. 23-24, 35, 43.
propaganda management experience of the Second World War influenced ministers and officials well into the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{189}

The FO's Cultural Relations Department was particularly critical of Britain's efforts in cultural diplomacy. The CRD condemned the Council's overt information services, or its 'white' propaganda, for promoting British culture in a superficial way without proclaiming core British political and social values.\textsuperscript{190} In the early post-war years, a major part of CRD work was, in fact, associated with giving 'political guidance' to the BC in a number of areas ranging from UNESCO to overseas links with British learned societies.\textsuperscript{191} Only after the CRD's main focus shifted towards the area of international organisations, the Council was given some more freedom to focus on what it was developed for — overt peacetime cultural propaganda.

The British Government's unwillingness to invest more heavily in cultural diplomacy, together with the taxpayers' reluctance to pay growing sums for campaigns abroad, led to the first considerable cuts in the British Council's operations in the late 1940s. Activities in countries like Iceland and Switzerland were put to a halt altogether, while individual institutes were closed for instance in Belgium. The Council also had to leave Eastern European countries due to political reasons.\textsuperscript{192} Work in British colonies and dominions was, however, kicked off as it was estimated that “the British Council can do valuable positive work in countering communist propaganda by showing that Britain and the Western tradition for which Britain stands has something better to offer than the communist way of life”.\textsuperscript{193}

The Drogheda Report turned out to be even more of a watershed in the British Council's history than it was for the BBC Overseas Services. The report hit the Council's activities in Europe particularly hard by noting that “we do not believe that a knowledge of the English language, a taste of British books, admiration for British medical science or modern sculpture are likely to make the slightest difference to the outlook of the average educated European on the subject of communism”.\textsuperscript{194} Although the most drastic proposals calling for the closure of all European offices never materialised, the FO grant to the BC's foreign posts was reduced considerably in the 1950s. Europeans were quite stunned by all this as they had difficulties understanding the British public's negative attitude to the projection of their own natural culture. The extent of the commercial loss Britain suffered from its own cuts is impossible to estimate.\textsuperscript{195}

Although often criticised by taxpayers and even by leading politicians, the BC's importance in the projection of British values and the implementation of long-term cultural cooperation especially during the first Cold War decades is indisputable. An undervaluation of the Council's true value and the often tight financial constraints continued, however, to be reflected in the way Britain laid greater emphasis on the short-term, immediate propagandistic role of the

\textsuperscript{190} Aldrich 2003, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p. 118.
\textsuperscript{192} The BC's post-war presence in Eastern Europe was not totally pointless, as it managed to introduce a considerable book promotion scheme in the region before its withdrawal. MOI to Miss Aitken, January 25, 1946, FO 924/431, NA.
\textsuperscript{193} Donaldson 1984, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p. 185.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p. 175.
information services at the expense of the long-term cultural activity. The BC’s role as a propaganda tool is underestimated or unrecognised even today. As Philip Taylor has put it: “Anyone who pretends that the British Council is anything other than a different facet of the struggle for hearts and minds fails to recognise the significance of operating at different psychological levels within the fourth dimension of international affairs”.

The British Council’s history to some extent reflects Britain’s performance in propaganda and cultural diplomacy in a broader sense. As during the very first post-war years British leaders became to understand the essential role propaganda would play in the quest of maintaining London’s world status, from the 1950s onwards the lack of finances hampered continuity. While funding for the overt information services responsible for the ‘positive’ projection of Britain was cut as a result of, for example, the Drogheda Report, the covert operations of the IRD expanded still in the early 1960s. During that decade information work underwent some further changes as a growing body of overseas information operations started focusing more on advocating British commerce rather than the British way of life. An even more important development was the gradual decline of Britain’s global influence, which, particularly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, meant that in relation to anti-communist operations, including information activity, the British Government started to look for more assistance from the United States, its closest ally.

The US: Containment and the Offensive against Communism

Even if it took some while for the US Government to come up with coordinated anti-communist propaganda machinery of its own, the impressively rapid growth of both overt and covert propaganda operations around the world made the British efforts eventually pale into insignificance. In the first year or so after the end of the Second World War, the administration was, however, left without a clear direction in its general overseas policy; this included informational activity. Cultural matters were not all popular in a country suffering from war fatigue and moving towards nationalism in its electoral politics. What is more, people like Dean Acheson, in 1945 Undersecretary at the State Department, had always been sceptical about the importance of cultural relations. All this meant that while the US was debating whether to continue its investment in cultural affairs, European countries, in which culture maintained its traditional value after the war and the role of cultural diplomacy was unquestioned, were already getting back into business.

There was, of course, nothing new about this. For decades there had been deep mistrust in the governmental promotion of American culture both among key decision-makers and the broader public. In fact, the Government in Washington had no control over any US cultural exports until 1938, when the first decision to deal with cultural and educational matters was

196 Taylor 1999a, p. 235.
197 Taylor 1997, p. 80.
198 According to Cohen, while only 30 per cent of publicity material prepared by the COI in the mid-1950s comprised commercial publicity, by the 1970s this figure had risen to 70 per cent. Cohen 1986, p. 86.
made. Even after this, bureaucratically directed cultural diplomacy was strongly rejected by US public opinion, in particular by representatives of universal internationalism. According to Wagnleitner, state interventionism in cultural matters strongly contradicted liberal theories of modernising and thereby saving the world through private initiative.200

President Harry S. Truman, nowhere near as strong a supporter of cultural and informational activities as his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt, believed that Washington still needed an overseas information programme after the war, but that the wartime agencies would have to be replaced with new services.201 In August 1945, he abolished the Office of War Information (OWI), with the intention of creating a peacetime overseas programme that would “present a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government”.202 After the general overseas policy was redefined through George Kennan’s Long Telegram, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, it gradually became clear that a post-war propaganda effort was needed to confront communism around the world, starting from such West European countries as Italy and France that were seen to be under serious communist threat.

In particular, Kennan’s observations on the Soviet Union’s hostile strategy, and how it should be addressed through long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies203, became the basis for the American strategy towards the Soviet Union throughout the rest of the Cold War.204 The declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the announcement made later in the same year by George Marshall over the European Recovery Programme supported this view and made it more concrete. Marshall Aid in itself not only provided Western European countries with vital economic and cultural support, but at the same time bolstered the anti-communist containment policy in the whole region. The Americans understood that the greatest threat to Western interests in Europe was not the prospect of Soviet military invention, but rather the risk that hunger, poverty and despair might cause Europeans to vote their own communists into office.205 The selling of American goods and ideas in post-war Europe now started to proceed very much hand in hand.206

Naturally, the growing overseas cultural and propaganda activities of the Soviet Union did not go unnoticed in Washington. The passage of the Fulbright Act in 1946 recorded the United States’ first effort to take the offensive in cultural matters. Although the exchange of students, academics and experts had a relatively modest start, the activity quickly grew into a significant tool in spreading US influence to foreign countries and supporting the revival of the European intellectual community. By 1947, more robust governmental involvement in propaganda and cultural diplomacy started to win the backing of leaders in Washington. The dominating reason

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200 Wagnleitner 1994, p. 47.
202 Ibid., p. 5.
205 See, for example, Gaddis 2005, p. 32.
for this was the creation of Cominform (the Information Bureau of Communist Parties), whose totalitarian propaganda, according to Walter Bedell-Smith, US Ambassador to Moscow, could destroy plans for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. In response to the growing communist campaign, he recommended that the US Government should start to stress the inconsistencies between Soviet words and deeds. His suggestion, not unlike the propaganda policies discussed in Britain, was that US propaganda strategists should expose the real conditions of life in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while demonstrating the advantages American capitalism accorded the average worker.207

The Smith-Mundt Act, passed by Congress in January 1948, finally established a foundation for efforts to promote propaganda and culture on a global scale. The legislation had the objective of ensuring the dissemination of information about the United States with the help of modern communication tools, including print, radio, film, exchange programmes and exhibitions. The Smith-Mundt Act guaranteed a solid framework for more aggressive US propaganda activities both in the ‘Free World’ and behind the Iron Curtain. The legislation reflected the new direction in foreign policy: one could argue that from 1948 onwards, Washington’s goal was for some years not just mere containment, but also the promotion of freedom, which required an effort to roll back communism and eventually break up the Soviet bloc.208

One of the most decisive events for US propaganda policies, and for the onset of the Cold War, was the Soviet Union’s first atomic test conducted in August 1949. The loss of the atomic bomb monopoly not only led to an even tenser world situation by triggering a massive rearmament race between the two superpowers, but it also brought the Cold War into the homes of every American. By 1950, the US had already become an altogether different kind of a country, with the fear of communism dominating the national agenda. Communism was no longer seen as a vicious plot hatched by a few men in the cellar, but a conspiracy of and for change, based on powerful visions and convictions and the willingness to educate men and women to act on those views and convictions.209

The US Government now started hammering home the message about the evils of communism, while at the same time giving advice about how to act during a nuclear attack, by using literature, music, art and the media, in particular television. Now every American was expected to enlist in the Cold War, and neutrality was seen as suspect.210 Following this conviction, several famous artists working for the Hollywood film industry, including John Wayne, James Stewart, John Ford and Walt Disney, set an example of Cold War participation to all Americans by contributing to the anti-communist onslaught on screen.211 They were not exactly alone; all larger film companies started to launch propaganda movies, which bound the entire industry to the state and thus to the Cold War.212

209 Rose 1999, p. 320.
211 Shaw, Tony & Youngblood, Denise, Cinematic Cold War. The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds (Lawrence, KS 2010), p. 21.
212 The way the conflict was explained to the audience through various themes and stories resulted in the creation of entirely new movie genres, such as the nuclear catastrophe films, espionage stories and Cold War-inspired epics.
Hollywood’s declaration of full-scale war against international communism was not entirely a spontaneous act, but a result of the tremendous pressure film producers came under in the late 1940s by organisations like the House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By excluding all elements that might be regarded as suspiciously leftist, the two organisations, together with the CIA, successfully drafted the film industry to the Cold War cause. Hollywood’s output of explicitly anti-communist productions was at its highest before and after the Korean War when dozens of films were launched not only about the war itself but about the fear of the spreading of the evils of communism in a more global context. 213 While the hard-hitting propaganda films played their part in combating communism, the inspiration the blockbuster films selling the American dream gave people around the world was decisive in the Cold War cause. These films, produced by the hundreds in the 1950s, did not screen the country as a new, exiting, classless consumer society by coincidence, but because their producers wanted to present the broader 'soft power' themes accepted by the State Department and the CIA.214

In addition to the conscription of numerous Hollywood actors and directors to the Cold War cause, and the exposure of the suspicious ones, the growing hysteria around communism led to the large-scale McCarthyist witch hunts also in Washington, which seem rather bizarre to today’s reader. A more important development was that apocalyptic anti-communism, popular in a country built on individualism and private enterprise, made it easier for American presidents to raise the vast sums required for US policy “from a citizenry notorious for its disinclination of to pay taxes”, as Eric Hobsbawm has noted.215 Naturally, all this gave extra momentum to the government machinery for propaganda and cultural activities both home and abroad. Amidst all of its military rhetoric, the National Security Council Report 68, the global blueprint for US strategy, also concluded in April 1950 that “we have no choice but to demonstrate our freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.”216 The rejection of the renewal of American isolationism not only led to a massive build-up of the US military and its weaponry, but also meant that the psychological offensive would receive more emphasis in government policy. As a result, the Truman Administration was granted with extra funds totalling nearly $80 million for an expanded propaganda effort by Congress approval.

214 According to, for example, Shaw, in order to appreciate Cold War cinema fully, one must look beyond fear and hatred and instead examine films that accentuated the positive over the negative and that indirectly celebrated their side’s way of life. Shaw & Youngblood 2010, p. 124.
Truman’s propaganda offensive ‘The Campaign of Truth’, also launched in April 1950, signalled a renewed determination to undermine communism across the globe. As a consequence, propaganda finally became a more acceptable activity among State Department officials who had still been suspicious of its potential intrusion upon the sensitive worlds of foreign policy and diplomacy which they inhabited. In order to secure additional funding for this global propaganda campaign, the State Department deliberately emphasised its offensive nature. Now officials in Washington stopped referring to US overseas propaganda as ‘information activities’ and instead began to use the term ‘psychological warfare’. With the help of this new strategy, the Campaign of Truth managed to capture public attention, and, most importantly, expanded the cooperation between the architects of US propaganda and private industry even further. In the following decades, this collaboration, the so-called private-public network, held a key position in the actual execution of American propaganda activities both home and abroad.

In 1951, information, propaganda and political warfare operations were at last brought under a single government umbrella after the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was created. It was the first government agency with the task of coordinating the policies of the State Department, the CIA, the military service and other government agencies in a grand effort to vanquish the Soviet Union. The Cold War had turned into a total struggle demanding contributions from all Americans, a tendency that was only enhanced by the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), PSB’s successor, in September 1953. The Eisenhower Administration’s appreciation of the importance of propaganda was noticeable in the new organisation’s goals and activities. The OCB, like its name suggests, had the objective of bringing greater coordination to the numerous psychological operations taking place around the world and of drafting detailed plans of action to implement the grand strategy formulated by the NSC. The propaganda effort was now taken into account in all political, military and economic developments as well as private activities. By the mid-1950s, the governmental psychological warfare machinery had developed into an enormous and complicated apparatus that had a profound impact on, for instance, academic research.

USIE/USIA/USIS activities

If the launch of government-led propaganda and cultural diplomacy had been somewhat slow in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the structure of the State Department’s information units

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219 Defy 2004, p. 140.
220 For example, Gull 2008, p. 56.
222 In academic research, studies on techniques of persuasion, opinion measurement and related issues became heavily funded by the likes of the CIA. At least six of the most important US centres of post-war communication studies in fact grew up as de facto adjuncts of governmental psychological warfare programmes. Simpson, Christopher, Science of Coercion – Communication Research & Political Warfare 1945–1960 (Oxford & New York 1999), p. 4.
during these years was confusing to say the least. Overseas activities were at first managed by the Interim International Information Service (IIS) and then the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). Between 1947 and 1949, when the administration applied itself to rapid preparation for the Cold War, the work was coordinated by the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange (OIE). After the Campaign of Truth, the unit had evolved into the United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE). The final year of the Truman Administration saw an effort to remove US information operations from the Department of State into its own agency, the semi-autonomous US International Information Administration (IIA or USIIA).223

In June 1953, the expanded resources invested in overseas information and cultural activities finally guaranteed the creation of an independent public diplomacy agency, the United States Information Agency (USIA), which quickly grew into a powerful worldwide information machine. The agency, and its overseas offices known as the United States Information Service (USIS), produced overt press, radio, film and television materials around global themes defined to defend the American cause. In President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s statement, the USIA, responsible under the National Security Council to the President, was given the general purpose “to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace”. This task was meant to be carried out by explaining the policies of the US Government and the aspects of the life and culture of the American people that influenced these policies, as well as by unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort US objectives.224 These principles, followed closely in decades to come, determined the USIA’s role as one of the key players in the formation and execution of US foreign policy.

As the Americans did not have an equivalent to the British Council, the agency’s responsibilities covered both informational and cultural activities, such as the organisation of exhibitions and the administration of certain exchange programmes. In the area of education-related exchange, however, the main responsibility lay still in the hands of the State Department due to Senator J. William Fulbright’s insistence that the same people who orchestrated propaganda operations should not be involved in education. This rather confusing compromise was made even more complicated by the overseas field officers’ habit of reporting about their activities to both the USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.225 Even though in theory the responsibilities between the USIA and the State Department were divided in such a way, in real terms the two coordinated all related operations together. In embassies around the world, the boundaries between agency and State Department responsibilities became more or less distinct, and the informational and cultural operations were

223 The, often confusing, development of US information units in the late 1940s and early 1950s is well summarised, for instance by Nicholas Cull. Cull 2008, pp. 22-23. See also, for example, Arndt, p. 256.


mainly run by USIA officials. In the 1950s, as many as 208 US Information Service posts in 91 countries, none of them behind the Iron Curtain, sought to fulfil both the USIA tasks and the State Department’s broader objective of increasing mutual understanding between the Americans and the people of other countries.226

Reading rooms and libraries were the most obvious signs of the USIA’s presence, but the unit also operated in a discreet manner, quietly manipulating local circumstances to serve American purposes. Among the more boisterous channels used by the State Department and the USIA for pushing the message of democracy through to audiences behind the Iron Curtain in particular was the radio station Voice of America. Founded in 1942, the service fought for its very existence after the war, but the beginning of the Cold War saw it grow into one of the United States’ most significant peacetime overseas programmes. The station did not, however, enjoy much popularity in the US, mostly due to the nation’s old suspicion of anything related to government-led information operations.227 VOA's most severe crisis took place in the early 1953 when Senator Joseph McCarthy launched a fierce attack on the station, claiming that it was partly run by a communist conspiracy. This accusation led to an official investigation and a series of open hearings over the radio station’s activities. Although VOA once again managed to avoid total abolition, these hearings did not do any good to its reputation, which had already collapsed into an all time low.228 This, in part, led to major reforms within the VOA that culminated in the abolishment of many overseas operations.

McCarthy’s attacks against VOA seem even more curious than most of his other crusades, considering that VOA was generally regarded, both home and abroad, as an advocate of hard-hitting anti-communist propaganda throughout the world that only gradually evolved into a more objective information agency.229 Although making a special effort for becoming as reliable and authoritative a source as the BBC, the service never quite reached similar universal acclaim for objectivity as the world-famous British service. The reason for this, in addition to its rather hard-hitting anti-communist programme content, was that compared to the BBC, VOA was more directly the official voice of government: it was a state-funded service and ultimately, as the entire USIE/USIA, directly accountable to the President and the State Department.230

In the early 1950s, the propaganda techniques used by the USIA in VOA broadcasts and the printed material sent to overseas posts, i.e. its two main channels of communication, were still somewhat unsophisticated. The idea that propaganda could be adopted to 'sell' America with the same effectiveness as the advertising of retail goods was reflected in the rather crude form of output, which included the continuous gloating over US workers’ higher standards of living

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227 A good example of the general mood was the news agencies AP and UP's threat to stop supplying their services to VOA, because they felt that by selling their services to the US Government overseas information service they ran the risk of accusations that they were controlled by the Government, which might have damaged overseas sales. Nelson 1997, pp. 17-18.
228 The McCarthy hearings on VOA have been covered with detail by a number of scholars. See, for example, Cull 2008, pp. 82-94; Belmonte 2008, pp. 51-55.
229 VOA's adaptation of more objective broadcasting took mostly place in the late 1950s when its programming became clearly less strident. See, for example, Fitzgerald, Merni Ingrassia, Voice of America (New York 1987), p. 8; Heil, Alan & Schiele, Barbara, 'The Voice Past: VOA, the USSR and Communist Europe' in Short 1986, p.101.
230 See, for example, Taylor 1997, p. 34.
as compared to those of Soviet workers. Soon it became evident that audiences were unimpressed and even offended by such techniques, and as a consequence operational methods gradually adopted a more sophisticated form. In Europe in particular, the USIA also emphasised covert means of influencing the region’s media. Cross-reporting, i.e. taking a news item from one country and publishing it in another, became a normal tactic in the region. Most typically, information officers would ‘inspire’ or plant a news story in the country’s media and then widely distribute the publication in question in neighbouring countries in order to suggest that the ideas originated from European rather than American sources.

To help their officials in both overt and covert means, the USIA’s International Press Service (IPS) produced news and background material up to 7,000 words a day and forwarded it in the wireless file to sixty-six countries. Although the majority of the material consisted of news events in the US, IPS, just like the IRD in Britain, also aimed to expose the flaws of communism in its books, news reports and cartoon strips. IPS’s journal *Problems of Communism* was entirely devoted to this cause and included articles on, for example, Soviet propaganda techniques. The difference to IRD’s *The Interpreter* was that the journal was openly credited to the IIA, and later the USIA, and freely available at American diplomatic posts. If possible, the publication was an even heavier read than the IRD journal. Using the writings of distinguished academics and journalists, it was not uncommon for *Problems of Communism* to include in-depth analyses of such topics as ‘Dialectical Materialism vs. Stalin’ or ‘China and the Soviet Theory of People’s Democracy’. Some of the distributed IPS-produced pamphlets and books, such as *Forced Labour in the Soviet Union* even exceeded these articles in detail by exposing the repressive nature of the Soviet system through presenting a group of historic secret documents.

IPS collaborated also with the International Motion Picture Division (IMP), which selected, acquired, produced and distributed films shown in 85 nations already under the USIE. In order to reach as large an audience as possible, the division tailored films for specific countries and translated them into local languages. As with the printed word, the largest share of these films presented day-to-day life in the US, often by demonstrating American achievements in science, technology and industry. Another common theme for USIE/USIA -associated films shown abroad was the demonstration of the economic advantages of US involvement abroad, through for example the Marshall Plan. A typical example of this was the short film *Me and Mr Marshall*, which explains the favourable effects the Marshall Plan had on the European economy not only on the macro level but also from the perspective of the individual, in this case an industrial worker Hans Fischer from the Ruhr area. The movie represents IMP propaganda well also because it warns audiences about what would happen without American aid (the new rise of fascism and communism in Europe). Although attaining considerable audiences around the

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231 Critchlow 2004, p. 75.
233 Call 2008, p. 112.
236 Belmonte 2008, p. 44.
237 The short film *Me and Mr Marshall* was produced and distributed in cooperation with the US Military Government in Germany. *Me and Mr Marshall* (1948), RG 306, Movie Division, NARA.
world already in the late 1940s, the potential of films portraying US achievements reached an
altogether new level around ten years later when the television had become increasingly
common throughout the world.

A considerable share of the material produced both by IPS and IMP was based on global
propaganda themes that were developed by the USIA, the State Department, the OCB and the
NSC. These themes were to a great extent promoted uniformly around the world.238 Although
local circumstances were taken into account in the so-called country plans prepared by overseas
information officers, US propaganda policy was more or less the same around the world.
Practically all of the global themes were based on the three main propaganda objectives: to
denounce communism, to exalt the capitalist system and to promote democracy.239 The
distributed USIA material, focusing on topics such as standards of living, scientific
accomplishments, cultural products, educational systems and economic benefits, was usually
based on the truth, but often given a certain ‘spin’.

This approach was formulated with the aid of the USIA’s massive research and analysis unit,
which collected information from around the globe and evaluated the results of certain publicity
campaigns or public opinion in general. Public opinion polls and surveys were seen as an
essential part of the US Government’s intelligence-gathering mechanism as they provided a
more accurate measure of people's opinions than for instance diplomatic reporting.240 The
diverse data collected from the targeted countries made the Americans gradually understand
that local factors did hold a considerable influence on the propaganda programme executed in
each country after all and that a more balanced presentation of their country was in many cases
more fruitful than simple nationalistic flag-waving. The way foreign audiences helped to define
the character and intensity of the Cold War also reminds us that the struggle was by no means a
strictly bipolar one.241 In 1961, the use of worldwide foreign public opinion polls was
 discontinued by Edward R. Murrow, new head of the USIA, but already in 1963 the agency
introduced a new world opinion survey, which was eagerly read by President John F. Kennedy
himself each day.242 The creation of the concept of ‘free world opinion’ was of course very
much in the USIA’s interest, as it could be used as a psychological tool to deepen the
assumption of common cause in the free world.243

In addition to words and images, many American propaganda experts acknowledged that
exchange programmes were most effective instruments for extending American influence
abroad. They were seen as especially vital in winning over Third World elites, as they provided

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238 See, for example, Osgood 2006, p. 105.
226–229.
242 Memorandum From the Director-Designate to President Kennedy, February 7, 1961, FRUS (Washington
2001), p. 230; Office of Public Information to USIA Employees,' Some Changes in USIA since March, 1961',
Call 2008, p. 190.
243 Annex to 'Introduction to the United States Information Service', October 12, 1953, RG 306, Agency History
Program Subject Files, Mission Statements, 1945-1967, box 5, NARA,
mechanisms for direct contact with the individuals who would determine the social and political fate of these newly independent countries. Most of the funds of, for example, the Fulbright Programme were spent on academic exchanges, but a considerable share of the expenditure was used for what were known as leader grants to bring influential foreigners to the US for training, education or travel. Certain ideological content was usually added to these exchanges, as Foreign Service and USIA officers gave foreigners travelling under State Department grants "training, briefing and an introduction" to American society. Teachers in particular were targeted for this kind of indoctrination.

The CIA and the Cultural Cold War

When discussing US anti-communist activity, it is impossible to leave the role of the CIA unexamined. It is also impossible, and not the point of this study, to investigate all the massive CIA operations executed during the Cold War years. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the agency's main covert activities in the European field of propaganda and culture.

Soon after the CIA was established in 1947, its role was expanded from mere information collection and analysis to the conduction of numerous covert activities related to, for instance, propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and assistance to indigenous anti-communist elements in the free world. When one takes a look at its long task list, it comes as no surprise that officials at the Pentagon and the State Department were not at first exactly thrilled with the new agency; they felt it lacked a clear definition of its authorisation and had too much expectations in relation to its resources.

In spite of this, it did not take long for the CIA to introduce its first measures in the fight against communism in Europe, first in Italy and France. The agency was fully aware of the power the political left had on the old continent and viewed left-wing intellectuals as important opinion-formers that were particularly vulnerable to Soviet propaganda. In order to win their backing to the US cause, the Americans founded the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which was secretly funded by the CIA. The CCF, seen as one the most important American weapons in the cultural Cold War, arranged a whole variety of activities, including festivals, seminars and concerts, to demonstrate the cultural advantages of political freedom. Challenging the intellectual basis for neutralism was one of the principal objectives of US policy, and it was also the official line of the CCF. The organisation, led by prominent figures like Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., focused on the value of culture in Western Europe rather than political activity. Its most visible contributions to the Cold War cause was the publication of such highly-valued journals as the English-language *Encounter*, the German *Der Monat* and the French *Preuves*.

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247 Stonor Saunders 1999, p. 89.
The fact that most people taking part in CCF events were journalists, authors, academics and politicians from the non-communist left, many of them former Marxists, suited the CIA’s needs perfectly.248 Largely due to its associates' determination to create a credible offensive against Soviet totalitarianism, the CCF, which at its height had offices in around 33 countries, has afterwards been regarded as a success. The exposure of the CIA’s secret role in funding of anti-communist cultural organisations such as the CCF made in 1967 by the magazine *Ramparts* has, however, given the operations a somewhat suspicious image.

In addition to European cultural organisations, the CIA provided massive support to a wide range of other organisations from youth movements and trade unions to political parties, universities and publishing houses. The use of philanthropic foundations such as the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations was considered the most convenient way to pass large sums of money to agency operations without alerting the recipients of their source.249 CIA money was infiltrated to a number of overseas political parties and trade union movements also through organisations like the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), an agency of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) dedicated to fighting communism within the international labour movement around the world, and in particular in such European countries as France, Italy and Finland, where domestic communism was strong and dependency for undercover finance high.250

When the close links between youth movements, such as the US National Student Association (NSA) and the International Student Conference (ISC-COSEC), were exposed in the 1960s, it turned out that in some cases CIA funds had amounted to even three quarters of their entire budget.251 The active role the CIA played in, for instance, the youth movements' recruitment processes indicates that these organisations were very much in the agency's pocket252 and suggests that Stonor Saunders's claim that the CIA greatly determined the use of the funds it channelled is valid.253 While saying this, one must stress that the relationship between the agency and the movements it backed varied markedly according to the organisation in question. Therefore, Wilford's discovery that for instance the FTUC often opposed the CIA's wishes and planned most of its activities independently is also plausible.254 It is also important not to overemphasise the CIA's role, for instance, in American art exhibitions abroad.

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248 According to Coleman, “the basic hallmark of the CCF's anti-communism was that it felt itself to be of the Left and on the Left.” The list of participants at the first large CCF conference held in Berlin in 1950 reveals that almost all of them were liberals or social democrats, critical of capitalism and opposed to colonialism, imperialism, racism and dictatorship. Coleman, Peter, The Liberal Conspiracy, The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York & London 1989), pp. 11-12, 21.


253 Stonor Saunders does not claim that the CIA as such interfered with the day-to-day management of the NGOs it funded, but stresses that the agency’s role as a supporter and adviser was generally accepted by them. Stonor Saunders 1999, pp. 414-416.

254 Wilford calls the CIA-FTUC relationship “a marriage of convenience, beset by mutual suspicion and resentment”. According to him, representatives of the American labour movement were entirely confident of their own ability to carry our covert operations without agency involvement. Wilford 2008, pp. 64-65.
as they were predominantly financed directly by a number of private foundations rather than the agency itself.255 This does not change the fact that a considerable number of leading actors inside the backed NGOs knew exactly the origins of the funds and the objectives of their use.256

This was not an issue in the field of direct propaganda, in which the CIA’s most important activity in Europe was the support given to Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), the stations that broadcast their message to Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union respectively.257 As the USIA and VOA broadcasts represented the official voice of the US Government and hence needed to be mostly reliable, the creation of the two stations enabled a more direct conduct of anti-communist warfare. RFE and RL were the first broadcast services whose purpose was to change the form of government in a foreign nation by airing news not about the country from which the broadcast originated but about the target countries.258 Their primary target group, the popular audience rather than the elites, was attracted through both broadcasts aimed at a specific audience and programmes with centralised anti-communist themes. In the late 1950s, when the importance of American youth culture became increasingly evident even to the most conservative American officials, much of the focus was turned to the hugely popular RFE pop and rock broadcasts for which the station is probably the most famous.

The CIA’s association with the media went much further than the two radio stations. After initially shying away from press contacts, under the directorship of Allen Dulles the agency started to positively cultivate the news media. Journalists from many of the best-known American newspapers and magazines, such as The New York Times, Time, Life, Look, Fortune and, perhaps most importantly, Reader’s Digest, were often tasked both for the collection of intelligence and for propaganda purposes, reporting stories that showed the US in a flattering light.259 One of the papers enjoying covert subsidies from the CIA was The New Leader, which, albeit having a rather small total circulation, was widely read by labour movement circles both in New York and Western Europe, not least because it enjoyed a reputation as a centre of anti-Soviet expertise and activism.260 For reaching the broader masses, the agency's close relationship with, above all, the news agencies the Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI), national radio and television channels the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National Broadcasting Company (NBC) became increasingly important as the Cold War progressed. In recruiting the media to the Cold War cause, the CIA was given plenty of help by the State Department and its Office of Private

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255 Caute 2003, pp. 540-541.
256 According to Coleman, many more people knew precisely what was going on for instance at the CCF than were later willing to admit. Coleman 1989 pp. 48-49, 228-231.
257 For more about the CIA’s secret backing of RFE and RL, see, for example, Mitrovich, Gregory, Undermining the Kremlin – America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947—1956 (Ithaca, NY & London 2000), p. 22.
258 Puddington 2000, p. 6.
259 According to Weiner, feeding newspapers and radio channels with news stories was easy and natural for Dulles, as American news departments were dominated by OWI propaganda veterans. Dulles was able to build a PR and propaganda machinery with approximately 50 news departments and 10 publishers in addition to numerous personal contacts with other media actors. Weiner 2008, p. 102; Wilford 2008, pp. 226-228.
Enterprise and Cooperation, whose media connections included the likes of *Time*, *Life* and King Features Syndicate, which inserted anti-communist messages into its comic strips for export.\(^{261}\)

The CIA’s role as a collector of intelligence through the global media expanded as the Cold War heated up. The agency followed Soviet propaganda techniques with great detail and provided Washington with regular analyses on the used methods, objectives and content. This work grew in size during the Korean War when the Americans had become particularly concerned that the Soviet use of Western rearmament as evidence of aggressive intentions could win some sympathy among the uncommitted, sceptical audience.\(^{262}\)

As indicated above, the CIA’s role in Western propaganda during the first Cold War decades, and especially its commitment to cultural matters, was so immense that Stonor Saunders’s claim that the agency was in effect acting as America’s Ministry of Culture\(^ {263}\) is largely valid. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that despite their immense size, the agency’s operations have often been assessed as to have brought more harm than good to the United States’ image abroad especially after the revelations about the CIA’s direct and somewhat blind funding of non-governmental organisations.\(^ {264}\)

**From Roll-back to an Evolutionary Strategy**

US anti-communist operations were at first heavily weighted towards Europe and the Soviet Union as these were seen as the high priority areas. Through propaganda, covert operations, economic aid and cultural diplomacy, the Truman Administration initiated a massive intervention in European affairs in order to prevent communist domination on the continent. The Atlantic Alliance and European integration were particularly strongly promoted, while the formation of neutralist attitudes towards the Cold War was to be prevented. The Eisenhower Administration only expanded the ‘psychological dimension’ of the Cold War by making US operations more effective with a growing emphasis on Third World countries.

During the 1950s, the overall strategy for propaganda and cultural activities underwent some major changes due to various international developments, such as Stalin’s death, the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and the Geneva Summits. The steps taken by the two superpowers towards a détente clearly undermined the aggressive approach adopted towards propaganda. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s realisation of the potential propaganda value of breaking the Soviet Union from international isolation also contributed to turning the contest between the superpowers into a more cultural one. While the initial aggressive propaganda activities directed against Eastern European communist regimes had encouraged people to stand up against their oppressors and seek for ‘roll-back’ or ‘liberation’ and a new form of government, developments in the mid-1950s led to the introduction of a less direct approach that could be labelled as an ‘evolutionary’ strategy, or more generally as ‘mutual coexistence’. This was a term

\(^{261}\) Cull 2008, pp. 56-57.


\(^{263}\) Stonor Saunders 1999, p. 129.

\(^{264}\) See, for example, Arndt 2005, pp. 224–225.
first strongly promoted by the Soviets, yet later also used by Westerners to describe the peaceful but limited relations between the superpowers in a broader context.

The events that took place during and after the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 symbolised a turning point in American propaganda. During the time of crisis, the hard-hitting and liberating message sent out in RFE broadcasts made listening Hungarians to believe that they were being promised US military assistance if they fought against the Soviet troops. The number of deaths and the international scandal that followed had a profound impact on American thinking: a more long-term strategy was introduced, aiming at encouraging satellite states to believe that their situation could be improved by working within the system rather than trying to destroy it. This approach was reflected in the general US foreign policy as it now focused on building economic order around the Soviet bloc and at the same time acknowledged that limited agreements on specific issues could be made with the Soviet Union. This development can be seen as the birth of the modern Cold War era.

The shift to a less offensive propaganda strategy could already be noted in the Eisenhower Administration’s large-scale propaganda campaigns ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Skies’, which the USIA tirelessly advertised throughout the world. These American initiatives promoting the peaceful use of atomic power and the mutual aerial inspection of military facilities had the objective of countering the Soviet peace campaign and showing the world the peaceful intentions of the US, while undermining those of its rival. The focus was now rather on promoting the positive than merely hammering the enemy and its actions. This also applied to the issue of racism in the US, the country’s biggest propaganda problem. Throughout the 1950s, despite the damaging scenes emerging in, for instance, Little Rock in 1957, American propagandists wished to emphasise that slow and steady progress was being made on the race issue. Information packets sent to the world included feature articles and photographs of well dressed, smiling ‘negroes’ engaging in activities with the whites. A similar policy was also adopted in the field of film, as the propagandists’ wished to plant an increasing number of well-off African-Americans as a part of the American scene in the promoted films whenever the background of the production permitted.

Above all, the new dimension in the Cold War pushed cultural factors to the front stage in the superpower race. The Americans wished to ‘humanize’ the image of their country through cultural exchanges and the presentation of everyday life. The US was now projected as a

265 The often stated view that Western broadcasting encouraged the people of Hungary to rebellion has later been to some extent re-modified. According to, for instance, Alban Webb, evidence suggests that Western broadcasters were merely responding to developments in Hungary, not leading them. As for the charge of promising Western intervention, it would seem that a large share of Hungarians had the impression that the West would provide them with aid specifically through RFE. The BBC and VOA both adopted a clearly reserved approach on the matter.


266 Mitrovich 2000, p. 186.


268 For example, C.D. Jackson to Mr. Owen, January 24, 1953, C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54, box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Hereafter DDEL), Abiline, Kansas, US.
classless society characterised by spiritual vitality as well as prosperity. In order to successfully promote the country through its culture, the Americans not only produced films and TV programmes featuring their leading cultural celebrities, but also sent symphonies, plays, musicians and athletes abroad. This activity was mainly conducted under the Cultural Presentations Program, which during the first eight years after its establishment in 1954 exported more than two hundred American performers to almost every country in the world. Particularly in Europe, the programme mainly targeted an elite audience of opinion makers by giving special emphasis on the exportation of artists in the fields of classical music, modern dance and classical ballet. As time passed, however, the importance of popular culture even in the old continent became more evident to the Americans. Whereas rock ‘n’ roll music was only gradually featured by the USIA, as it was not seen as sophisticated enough an art form, jazz was used as a truly American product and a propaganda tool already in the early 1950s. Both music styles turned out to have immeasurable importance in the psychological struggle and were to a growing extent played by the likes of VOA and RFE/RL to an audience whose enthusiasm created a slowly expanding sub-culture of its own in, for instance, Moscow.

Although the promotion of American culture attracted more attention in US propaganda in the late 1950s, the use of economic issues and technological achievements were not neglected, either. In fact, as Andrew Yarrow has proved by studying a number of USIA publications distributed in the Soviet Union and Asia, during this period especially American print propagandists came to believe that the country’s chief selling point was its economic prowess and prosperity rather than the old messages about democracy and civil liberties. The same tendency can be recognised when reading USIA pamphlets distributed around the world. In the late 1950s, these publications often stressed the great possibilities the American consumer had thanks to their high earnings, affordable housing and the capitalist system in general. Another main theme in these writings was the American trade unions’ role in securing growing living standards, usually through collective bargaining and arbitration rather than labour disputes.

The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 was generally regarded as a huge propaganda victory for the Russians, which caused some panic among American officials. Although the launch diverted greater shares of available US resources to science, technology and space exploration, it did not prevent the progress made towards an East-West cultural exchange.

270 L.D. Battle to M. Bundy, 'Report to the President on International Cultural Presentations Program', November 30, 1961, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (Hereafter CU), Cultural Presentations Program (Hereafter CPP), box 47, University of Arkansas Libraries (Hereafter UAL), Fayetteville, Arkansas, US.
272 For example, Caute 2003, pp. 452-460.
275 For example, the USIA pamphlets: ‘Americans at Work’, August 1959; ‘American Labor Unions…their role in the free world’, 1951, RG 306, MFCPL, boxes 1 and 2, NARA.
276 Hixson 1997, p. 142.
agreement, which was eventually signed between the US and the Soviet Union in January 1958. This agreement epitomised the shift in US policy from aggressive psychological warfare to the use of a more evolutionary strategy in undermining the Soviet empire. People behind the Iron Curtain were now increasingly being attracted with Western ideas and symbols, particularly consumer culture. The cultural agreement, allowing increased person-to-person contacts, travel and trade between the two countries, indicated that the Cold War struggle was entering a phase in which psychological competition would play an even greater part. This rivalry led to scenes that today might seem somewhat hilarious, such as the famous ‘kitchen debate’ between Khrushchev and Vice President Richard Nixon during the American National Exhibition in Moscow in July 1959. In the following year, the prospects for an East-West détente were ended after the American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Soviet airspace and the superpowers opted for a harder line in their propaganda activities.

Unlike in the British case, the biggest problem for US overseas activities was never funding, but the lack of a strong coordinating authority. This often led to a lack of vision along with bureaucratic struggles. The number of organisations involved in the anti-communist crusade was simply so vast that the coordination of the often overlapping activities proved troublesome. It has also been argued that US propagandists were especially in the 1950s too unspecific in their definition of American culture. These views belong to a group of scholars who recognise the Eisenhower Administration’s greater emphasis on the importance of psychological warfare, but question the operations’ actual efficiency. According to, for instance, James Marchio, Eisenhower’s support of psychological warfare measures was merely rhetorical and faded after the US ran out of options for aggressive Cold War policies.

One could also argue, as for instance Chris Tudda has done, that while the Eisenhower Administration was keen to use a greater number of propaganda channels for the promotion of a dynamic foreign policy designed to confront the Soviet Union, the US Government in reality continued to practice a foreign policy that was both diplomatic and pragmatic. In this respect, the Kennedy Administration did not really rock the boat. Kennedy’s tone of foreign policy at first sounded fresh and strikingly different from that of Eisenhower. Yet, the administration was rather quickly dubbed as ‘the third Eisenhower Administration’ as it did far less to challenge conventional truths of foreign policy than its rhetoric initially implied.
Anglo-American Cooperation

It took a year or so after the Second World War ended for a common Anglo-American response to communism to evolve. The ‘special relationship’ between the two countries was going through a phase of re-examination as both powers wished to redefine their role in the future world. The appointment of Attlee’s Labour Government did not exactly enhance the ties between the two Western powers. US officials were suspicious of the socialist Government and the trade union movement in Britain to such an extent that for quite some years it put considerable effort to encourage British labour and trade union circles to launch both internal and external anti-communist campaigns of their own.284 At the same time, however, the Americans recognised Britain as their staunchest and most powerful ally.285

The introduction of Marshall Aid, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, a precursor of NATO, finally signalled that the US was committed to a new global role and prepared to contain communism in all parts of the world. President Truman’s presentation of containment as a crusade to save Western civilisation and Christianity from an atheistic Soviet Union offered a platform on which a common anti-communist response could be developed.286 The closer economic, military and political cooperation between the US and Britain in the late 1940s was not, however, reflected in propaganda and cultural diplomacy partly because of the British insistence to stress the values of social democracy in the promotion of its national interests.

After the IRD was established in 1948, it was decided that the signatories of the Brussels Treaty should co-ordinate their anti-communist propaganda more closely. The British Government was particularly keen to take leadership in defining the ‘spiritual aspects of the Western Union’ and proposing measures that would make use of the countries’ common factors.287 In October 1948, the Western Union Consultative Council agreed that each country would carry out its own plans according to national needs, but an exchange of information useful in dealing with the ideological aspects would be instituted.288

The exchange of information and propaganda material was later also applied to the Americans, who were kept fully informed of the new policy. A plan to expand Anglo-American cooperation on the actual field level was, however, rejected mostly by British officials due to a number of reasons. Firstly, it would appear that the British held a very low opinion of US

286 Ibid., p. 308.
287 In early 1948, the FO set up a working party on the ‘spiritual aspects of Western Union’. It defined a list of common factors that united the countries belonging to this union, such as the freedom of choice and the support of arts and sciences. This union was planned to consist of the following countries: United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Iceland. For example, C.F.A. Warner to O. Sargeant, February 13, 1948; ‘Notes on the first meeting of the Working Party on “spiritual” aspects of Western Union’, February 27, 1948; J.O. Rennie to C.A.F. Warner, March 3, 1948, all FO 953/144, NA.
publicity output, doubting its reliability and subtleness. Secondly, the FO saw that positive advantage could be gained from both sides “shooting the target from different angles”.

Perhaps the most important reason for the initial rejection of common operations was that the strategies for countering communism differed markedly. Whereas the Americans saw the Soviet Bloc as the most important region for psychological action, the primary focus of British propaganda lay in Western Europe, South-East Asia and India. The FO’s decision not to incite subversion in Eastern European countries only emphasised Britain’s goal in this area, which was to ensure that British propaganda and the American variety would not be identified in the minds of the local inhabitants.

The two Western governments’ significantly different propaganda methods also restricted cooperation at first. While the Americans’ two main channels were VOA and the bulletins sent out to US posts abroad, the British based their operations on the ‘grey’ propaganda material produced by the IRD and the ‘objective’ information provided by the BBC and the British Council. Cooperation between, for example, the BBC and VOA was not considered recommendable from the British viewpoint. VOA was seen as an open propaganda organisation, while the BBC took the greatest of pains to ensure that it was not regarded as one itself. Moreover, the FO felt that VOA was not only often inaccurate in substance but also “tactless and hectoring in tone, losing the confidence of that large body of persons who are neither on the extreme right nor on the extreme left but who like to listen to reason.” The British also stressed the importance of material prepared for the local market by local people if possible, while the Americans produced the majority of their output in Washington as bulk material for distribution throughout the world.

Apart from strategy and methods, the FO learnt that a big problem in attempts to cooperate with American agencies was their multiplicity and mutual jealousies. The fact that the CIA, the State Department and the military all had pretensions in this area did not help to make the situation any simpler. In the first Cold War years, cooperation on propaganda and intelligence operations was mainly based on the distribution of material and intelligence collection. Possible cooperation in the actual field activities was to be worked out at each overseas mission on its merits on a rather ad hoc basis.

Anglo-American cooperation on anti-communist propaganda started to finally show steady growth in the early 1950s. The British began to acknowledge their increasingly subordinate position in the special relationship and understood that they could not run their anti-communists operations without American support. Furthermore, the final abandonment of the Third Force foreign policy, along with international events such as the Berlin Crisis, was propelling Britain towards an Anglo-American partnership based on a common strategy and

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290 Ibid., p. 367.
294 D. Allen to J.H. Watson, Washington, November 17, 1948, FO 1110/128, NA.
common ideology. In terms of propaganda strategies, the launch of the American Campaign of Truth reinforced the FO’s confidence in the US operations, as it now felt that the two governments’ ideas regarding the general need for publicity, both overt and covert, for counteracting the spread of communism were much the same. The appointment of information liaison officers to the British Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in London in August 1950 was an important step towards closer consultation in this particular field. This development led to the radical expansion of information exchange and the more thorough examination of cooperation between the IRD and local USIS offices. Although still feeling superior about their methods, the British were at last ready to give some credit to the American campaign. The FO was particularly impressed with the use of effective ministerial speeches, an area which the British felt they had to some extent neglected.

The Korean War accelerated the process towards closer cooperation in the field of propaganda. Although few joint operations were carried out, the regular exchange of information between the two Western powers ensured that the Asians were more or less fed with the same line of propaganda. According to Shaw, the State Department actually followed the FO’s propaganda lead in many areas, pooling the latter’s more discreet and personal approach with the greater resources of the USIS. This was rather characteristic for Western propaganda activities in the early 1950s. The Americans understood that they were behind the British particularly in the area of ‘grey’ propaganda, and knew that they still had plenty to learn from their FO colleagues. Partly because of this, as Defty argues in his article, the British position in joint anti-communist operations was not as subordinate in the 1950s as many other scholars have claimed.

Even though the two powers still conducted their operations independently using the different methods they had adopted, it was evident from the very start that the British and the American programmes would complement each other. Britain’s more subtle approach was more appropriate for countering communism in the ‘Free World’, while the bold propaganda adopted by the Americans was more suited to bolstering resistance behind the Iron Curtain. There were no precise instructions for cooperation in each country, but the exchange of information and the need for common coordination in the fields of propaganda and cultural diplomacy became increasingly important as the Cold War continued.

297 The first official consultative meeting concerning information cooperation was held in London in May 1950. During the meeting, it was agreed that similar cooperation in this field with the other partners in NATO would be unrealistic. ‘Anglo-American Cooperation in Information Work’, May 20, 1950, FO 953/629, NARA.
298 ‘Priorities in Publicity and Similar Activities Designed to Counter Communism’, May 16, 1950, FO 953/629, NA.
301 Ibid., p. 125.
3. RESUMPTION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN FINLAND, 1944-1947

Second World War Propaganda

After the war between Finland and the Soviet Union ended in September 1944, the quick resumption of more normal informational and cultural operations in Finland was more important for Britain than the United States. The country had officially declared war against Finland in December 1941 and run a rather consistent propaganda campaign to undermine the Finnish Government’s war-time policies. The main channel for this campaign was the BBC Finnish Service, which had originally been established on March 15, 1940 when Finland’s goodwill in Britain was, according to the service’s reporter Hillar Kallas, still tremendous.302 After the final number of *The Review*, a small publication circulated by the British with the aim of keeping the Finns informed about the British point of view as it had been expressed in the editorial columns of British newspapers, was published in August 1941303, the British viewpoint was expressed to the Finns solely through the BBC.

The Finnish Service’s war-time broadcasts reflect how quickly the understanding of Finland’s position suffered in London after the country had started fighting against the Soviet Union again in June 1941. On the day Finland declared war, the Finnish Service commentator ‘Sanansaattaja’ noted: “The lights have gone out again in Finland for the third time in twenty-four years. However unwillingly, you are joining hands with evil forces, who will one day exact their due”.304 Although this view was repeated in the daily broadcasts from London, the Finnish Service’s war-time programmes were initially rather neutral in tone, following the BBC’s broader policies according to which news reporting was to be based on objectivity and the, albeit selected, use of truth rather than lies.305 The BBC and PWE, which coordinated the aired content, regarded the broadcasts as a great opportunity to enlighten the Finns about war events not only from the Finnish Russian front but also around the world. As the war progressed, and Anglo-Finnish relations deteriorated, the Finnish Service also picked up a more aggressive tone. In late 1941 the broadcasts were already filled with warnings about what prolonging the war would lead to.306 In February 1942, Rex Bosley, who was in charge of the Finnish Section of the Press Reading Bureau at the British Legation in Stockholm307, determined the aims of BBC’s propaganda to Finland as follows: To bring about a separate Finnish-Russian peace, to cause

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302 'BBC Broadcasts to Finland – The War Years’ by Hillar Kallas, Hillar Kallas’ collection (HK), box 1 Kansallisarkisto (Hereafter KA). Helsinki, Finland.
303 ‘Final Number of “Review of the British Press”’, August 2, 1941, FO 930/243, NA.
304 ‘BBC Broadcasts to Finland – The War Years’ by Hillar Kallas, HK, box 1, KA.
305 Vihavainen 1996, p. 213.
307 As in many other cases, Bosley’s informational activities were carried out on a part-time basis. His real area of expertise was espionage, which he had conducted in Finland for several years already. After the British Legation’s staff moved to Sweden in September 1941, Stockholm became a centre for British intelligence in North Europe. See, Kotala, Juha ”Kaikkialla läsnä oleva Lontoon Secret Service”. Secret Intelligence Service ja Suomi 1918-1941 (PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki 2014), pp. 215-220.
trouble between Finns and Germans, to get the German troops out of Finland and to convince the Finns of a German defeat.  

As compared to the British, the United States' decision not to declare war against Finland left the Americans in a much better position to influence the Finns through various channels. Mainly because it wished to counteract German pressure on Finland, the US decided to maintain diplomatic relations until the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement was signed in June 1944. The US Mission formed a useful centre for the State Department's propaganda and intelligence operations. After Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Finland in August 1941, the US also became a provider of much-needed intelligence for its closest ally. The Mission's role as a collector of intelligence rather than a source of propaganda only became more apparent in December 1942 when the State Department informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry that it was to end its informational activities in Helsinki and that the Finns should do the same in New York. After this, the US continued to distribute material about Finland and American viewpoints in general through English and Swedish news bulletins published by the American Legation in Stockholm.

Although the US presence in Finland weakened towards the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, the Americans were able to defend the use of their cultural products amazingly well. This was most evident in the screening of American films in Finland: the US Mission fought a fierce battle over this issue with Germany, which wished to pressurise Finnish officials to ban them. This 'film war', which lasted from the summer of 1942 to the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, divided Finnish cinemas into two camps: to those willing to follow the German instructions and to those opposing them. The Americans took this issue very seriously, and in order to secure the screening of their films, made sure that more copies were made of them on the raw film shipped from Stockholm in October 1943. Although a number of American films had been censored by Finnish authorities during the war, US officials could only be satisfied with
the outcome of their efforts: Finland was the only country fighting with the Germans in which American films had been shown throughout the war despite German pressure.  

During the first years of the war, Britain's influence in Finland was much more limited than that of the US. British films were mostly censored and the BBC Finnish Service did not enjoy that much credibility among the Finns, either. The frequency was clearly tuned into, but both Finnish newspaper commentators and the general public claimed that the news reports included too many errors about the situation in the Russian front in particular. As the war progressed, the reliability of the news started to gradually command greater respect among the Finnish audience, especially when related to anything else than their own country. In early 1944, after it had become increasingly evident that Finland’s war fortunes were fading, the BBC’s popularity grew at accelerating pace despite the increasingly aggressive line it adopted towards the Finnish Government. The broadcasts were particularly direct in their approach in spring 1944 after Finland had rejected Russian peace terms, which, according to the BBC, had been fair and justified.

Towards the end of the Finnish-Soviet War, the BBC had already reached a popularity which, according to the Finnish authorities, was impossible to exceed. Apart from the favourable war developments and its policy not to lie even about own casualties, the BBC had partly the Finns to thank for this as they did not start a coordinated campaign of their own against British propaganda until the summer of 1944. This was clearly too late for undermining the BBC’s position as the most trustworthy source of world news among the public. The popularity of the Finnish Service had turned many of its reporters, in particular ‘London Jenny’, the pseudonym of Greta Kivinen-Armstrong, ‘Abacus', in real life D.R. Roper, and military commentator 'British Major', in reality J.H. Magill, future British Military Attaché to Finland and member of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, into household names who were listened to with great attention.

The British were by no means the only ones verbally hammering the Finnish Government. In April 1942, the Americans had also started to send regular broadcasts to Finland, using the BBC’s relays. The broadcasts, although not as popular as the BBC Finnish Service, managed to attract a reasonable following, as even back then a great number of Finns felt that the maintenance of good relations with the US was of primary importance. Although the main

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316 Not surprisingly, British films were heavily censored during the war. Already in February 1941 a film about the London Blitz was partly banned due to the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s wishes. Sedergren 1999, pp. 215-216.
317 In spring 1942, the FO was particularly worried about the effectiveness of the BBC Finnish Service. On the other hand, it acknowledged that increasing attacks made in Finnish newspapers against BBC broadcasts indicated that the service was after all hitting its target. V.A. Mallet to A.Eden, 'Criticism of British Broadcasts to Finland and Sweden', April 17, 1942; B. Thomas to C.A.F. Warner, 'Broadcasts to Finland', May 26, 1942, both FO 371/32781, NA.
318 J.G. Winant to A.E. Eden, February 14, 1942, E1/680, BBC Written Archives Centre (Hereafter WAC), Reading, UK.
321 Ibid., pp. 280, 311.
objective of the broadcasts, known as America Calling Finland (ACF) (also identified as the Finnish Voice of America), was to present US policies and the country's position in regard to Finland, they also offered the British propaganda campaign valuable support as their content followed closely the instructions sent from London by PWE to the OWI. These directives determined that the ACF broadcasts followed two general principles: the admiration of Finnish democratic traditions and the avoidance of giving Finns direct instructions, at least on behalf of the US Government.

When hopes for an armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union ran high in March-April 1944, the US role became more active also on the broadcasting front. The Americans, who had already in the autumn of 1943 interpreted that Finnish peace sentiments had been on the rise, continuously pointed out that the more Finland delayed its acceptance to an armistice, the more difficult it would to get out of the war with reasonable terms. After ACF started to adopt a more propagandistic approach in its output, following the new OWI policy of scaring the Finns more directly about the consequences of their actions, the broadcasts started to receive plenty of criticism in Finland for being amateurish, ill-advised and naïve. ACF's rather dubious reputation would at least to some extent dampen the United States' credibility in the field of radio propaganda for some years to come.

Even though the BBC Finnish Service had also changed into even higher gear between the signing of the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement and the Finnish-Soviet Armistice, Britain would not suffer from a similar problem in post-war Finland. The high degree of credibility the BBC continued to enjoy in Finland made it possible for the broadcaster to more directly encourage the Finnish people to overthrow their Government without any serious consequences to its position. When the Finnish Parliament eventually voted on breaking relations with Germany and truce was agreed on with the Soviet Union in early September, the BBC naturally welcomed the development, but warned that Finland should now build a peaceful relationship with its eastern neighbour if it wished to be welcomed to the group of free and democratic countries.

323 Even if the overall content of the American broadcasts to Finland was at least until 1943 more diplomatic than that of the BBC, these directives gave detailed advice on how to, for example, increase anxiety over the advancement of the Russian army or expose the activities of the fascists groups in Finland. For example, FO to Washington, 'Finnish Directive', March 20, 1943; FO to Washington, 'Finnish Directive', July 24, 1943, both FO 317/32781, NA.
325 The OWI followed developments in Finland closely and made regular assessments on the nation's psychological landscape. 'Peace sentiment in Finland - an OWI summary', September 8, 1943, RG 208, Overseas Branch, Bureau of Overseas Intelligence Central Files 1941-1945, box 281, NARA.
326 Although OWI directives became more direct, they also cautioned broadcasters against attacks on President Ryti, Prime Minister Linkomies and Marshall Mannerheim, all of whom OWI believed would be instrumental in leading Finland to a peace settlement at a later date. OWI dispatch, 'The Finnish Directive', June 9, 1944, RG 208, Overseas Operations Branch, OWI Monthly Progress Report (May 15 – June 15, 1943), box 1, NARA; Berry 1987, p. 417.
327 The growing Finnish distrust of American radio propaganda is well reflected for instance by a comment J.K. Paasikivi, future Prime Minister and President, made in his diary. Paasikivi was dissatisfied with the way ACF urged the Finns to accept Russian peace terms and regarded American propaganda as filled with lies. During an interview with an American correspondent in Finland, he lectured to his guest that the Americans should stop interfering with Finland's policy. Kolehmainen 1986, pp. 43, 53-57; Paasikivi, Juho K., Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944-1956, Ensimmäinen osa 1944-1949 (eds. Blomstedt, Yrjö & Klinge, Matti) (Porvoo 1985), 30.6.1944, p. 13.
once more.\textsuperscript{328} The emphasis of the broadcaster's main message was, however, soon re-examined, and already in early September 1944, PWE directives to the Finnish Service gave greater priority to underlining that Germany had already lost the war than criticising the Finns' involvement in it.\textsuperscript{329} The same very much applied to the ACF broadcasts. The American interpretation of events in Finland continued to dominate the broadcasts for quite some time, but gradually the commentators started to focus more on world events and domestic issues than merely on the Finnish question.\textsuperscript{330} By June 1945, a couple of months before the termination of the service, the broadcasts rarely even mentioned Finland.\textsuperscript{331}

Relaunching British Propaganda

In the very first post-war years, Finland's future was something of an enigma to the United States and Britain both in terms of overall policy and informational operations. The British Government, in particular, recognised that the country lay mainly in the Soviet sphere of influence and let the Russians play first fiddle in the Allied Control Commission. More than that, as promoting close Anglo-Soviet ties remained as a top priority on the FO's agenda, the British were even willing to make several additional concessions to the Russians on, for instance, their territorial rights in Eastern Finland and the degree of reparations they were to receive from Finland. The British Government's desire to actively use Finland as a vehicle to foster its relationship with the Soviet Union illustrates that to describe the country's position towards Finland in the first post-war years as 'a policy of non-interference', as has often been done\textsuperscript{332}, is in fact partly incorrect.\textsuperscript{333}

Britain's lenient policy as comes to Finland would not, however, last for very long. Already after the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed, it became increasingly clear that the British wished to secure their commercial interests in the country from which it imported, in particular, pulp and timber.\textsuperscript{334} As the Anglo-Soviet relationship started to deteriorate in 1946, Britain's policy of containing the Soviet Union also reached Finnish shores. Mainly because the British Government wished to secure strategic stability in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden, a policy according to which Soviet dominance in Finland should be resisted in all respects other than the military plane was gradually adopted.\textsuperscript{335}

After an initial period of hesitation, the US chose a much more positive policy towards Finland and started channelling humanitarian aid into the country and providing it with much-

\textsuperscript{328} Radiokatsaus nro 205, Englannin radio 5.9.1944, VTL KURL, Dk 39, VNTE, KA.
\textsuperscript{329} PWE Weekly Directive for BBC Finnish Services, September 9 – September 15, 1944, FO 371/43171, NA.
\textsuperscript{330} For example, Radiokatsaus Nro 228, America Calling Finland, 3.10.1944, VTL KURL, Dk 40, VNTE, KA.
\textsuperscript{331} For example, Radiokatsaus Nro 124, America Calling Finland, 4.6.1945, VTL KURL, Dk 40, VNTE, KA.
\textsuperscript{332} See, for example, Aunesluoma, Juhana, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War (Basingstoke 2003), p. 6.
\textsuperscript{333} This is the main thesis of Evans's book, and it is hard to argue against it, such was Britain's desire to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union in the first post-war years. Evans 2011, pp. 12-14, 273-290.
needed credit.336 As American foreign policy evolved into the containment of communism around the world, including Scandinavia, Finland's geographical position increased Washington's interest in the country. As a result, the Soviet Union's constant interference with Finnish domestic politics and the growing popularity of communism in Finland were observed with growing concern among American officials. It was not desirable to see Finland slip into communist hands and become subjected to even stronger Soviet influence in the same way as had happened to several Eastern European countries. At the same time, the Americans recognised that preventing such an outcome would never be easy, particularly as according to their estimations given between 1944 and 1947 the Soviet Union’s pressure on Finland would only grow in the future.337

An examination of British and American informational and cultural activities in Finland in the first post-war years reveals that the pessimistic evaluations over Finland's independence at the FO do not tell the whole story of the two Western powers' position in regard to the country's future. The eagerness with which both the British and US governments wished to see the resumption of their operations as soon as hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union had been concluded indicates that neither country had entirely lost hope over Finland's independent future. Both the British and the Americans were more than willing to have a strong cultural and informational presence in the country, a position they had already held before the Winter War and during the time of truce in 1940-1941.

The British began to discuss the eventual resumption of MOI activities as early as in March 1944. Back then, the task was still regarded as tough due to the apparent ‘bitter disillusionment’ among the Finnish public opinion towards Britain. As a direct political approach towards the Finns immediately after the country’s withdrawal from the war was seen as doomed to failure, the FO started to emphasise the future importance of indirect cultural propaganda through the British Council in particular.338 The British Government was clearly in a hurry to resume its activities in the country before the Russians and Americans would be operating there at full speed. To make sure everything would be ready when the time arises, British officials made arrangements for the production of both a Finnish edition of Nyheter från Storbritannien, a weekly newspaper mainly for the Stockholm press339, and a Finnish version of the daily press bulletin circulated in Sweden. The supply of books, seen as one of the most effective forms of propaganda during the time, and the conversion of the BBC Finnish Service into ‘white’ propaganda were also among Britain’s main priorities340, as was the presentation of British

338 Mr Scott to Mr Purves, ‘Eventual Resumption of MOI Activities in Finland’, March 9, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
339 The paper, notionally a MOI publication, was mainly produced in Stockholm and after D Day had a circulation as large as 250,000. Its publication was terminated in 1946. Corse, Edward, A Battle for Neutral Europe. British Cultural Propaganda during the Second World War (London & New York 2013), p. 81.
340 The British regarded the provision of books, both scientific and literary, as one of the surest and safest ways of resuming work in Finland. C. Purves to P. Tennant, ‘Resumption of MOI in Finland’, August 16, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA; Mr Scott to Mr Purves, ‘Eventual Resumption of MOI Activities in Finland’, March 9, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
commercial films in Finland with the help of Paramount Sweden.\(^\text{341}\) The MOI also stressed the importance of launching a window display in Helsinki as quickly as possible as well as the resumption of personal relations between Finns and British ‘in all walks of life’. The distribution of MOI pamphlets and publications was not, however, recommended, as “they are not likely to be very welcome to the Finns in their present mood.”\(^\text{342}\) Although willing to launch their propaganda campaign as rapidly as possible, the British recognised the necessity of extreme caution in Finland, a country engaged in a bitter war and feeling somewhat alienated by the Western powers after their behaviour during the Winter War and the support they had later given to the Soviet Union.

The listed activities were not launched as smoothly as the British had planned even after the armistice was signed. First of all, as Finland belonged to the Soviet Union’s military sphere of influence, it was necessary to hear the view of the Russians authorities over any operations conducted before the resumption of ordinary diplomatic relations with Finland. Since the Soviet officials had few problems with British activities in Finland, such as the screening of British films\(^\text{343}\), the bureaucracy between British government agencies proved to be a more severe hindrance to an efficient relaunch of operations. For several months in autumn 1944, British officials did not seem to know whether operations in Finland had been passed from PWE to the MOI.\(^\text{344}\) Due to political reasons, nothing could be done, either, before Francis Shepherd, who was appointed as Political Representative in Finland, had reviewed the situation.

For estimating propaganda opportunities in Finland, Mr Shepherd was supported by Peter Tennant, Press Attaché at the British Legation in Stockholm, who visited the country in November 1944.\(^\text{345}\) In his long report about his findings, Mr Tennant noted that the British would face quite a challenge in Finland, as the country had been isolated for a long time and the public was extremely ill-informed and ignorant about world affairs. He saw that the first short-term objective of propaganda activities would be to counter “the fantastic underground whispering campaigns put around by the Germans” with something more positive and optimistic. Being loyal to the FO's broader policy, Mr Tennant also underlined the importance of giving the Finns all possible information and evidence of Britain’s cooperation with the Soviet Union also in the future.\(^\text{346}\) Although rather positive about British opportunities in the field of informational activities, mainly due to the huge demand for English books and newspapers, he, together with Mr Shepherd, stressed that the undetermined exchange rate for

\(^{341}\) Extract from Stockholm despatch No. 108, 2 March, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.

\(^{342}\) C. Purves to P. Tennant, ‘Resumption of MOI Activities in Finland’, August 16, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA.

\(^{343}\) In October 1944, M. Orlov from the Soviet Embassy assured Mr Shepherd that the Control Commission would have no objection to the screening of British films. During the conversation, M. Orlov also suggested closer cooperation in the Allied propaganda to counteract Axis propaganda in Finland. After the matter was discussed at the FO, the British came to the conclusion that they would rather conduct their own propaganda in their own way. F.M. Shepherd to FO, October 28, 1944; A. Haigh to F.M. Shepherd, January 27, 1945, both FO 371/32781, NA.

\(^{344}\) V. Mallet to C.F.A. Warner, September 26, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.

\(^{345}\) As in Bosley’s case, Tennant’s position as press attaché was partly a cover. His other role was to manage Special Operations Executive (SOE) activities in Stockholm. Tennant, Peter, Touchlines of War (Hull 1992), pp. 133-152.

\(^{346}\) ‘Observations on my visit to Finland, November 7 – November 14, 1944, by P. Tennant’, November 17, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA.
the Finnish mark made purchasing books, newspapers and films for the Finnish market very complicated. 347

The time wasted on organisational bureaucracy and the various technical difficulties faced in the production of material for Finland 348 made British officials in Stockholm increasingly nervous that valuable propaganda opportunities would be lost. 349 If Britain in general was swift to introduce post-war propaganda measures, in Finland’s case it lagged behind both the Soviet Union and the US, which had started to send newspapers and films to the country at much faster pace. 350 The MOI finally took over the Finnish operations in December 1944. As soon as informational activities were resumed, the FO took care of sending all important newspapers and periodicals for commercial use in Finland 351 as well as the usual MOI supplies of books, pamphlets and photographs. The Press Department in Stockholm was responsible for providing Helsinki with 2,000 copies of the daily review of the British press and a limited number of copies of Nyheter från Storbritannien for distribution among Swedish-speaking Finns. 352

The actual local publicity campaign was not introduced until late January 1945, when a temporary information officer was sent to Helsinki from Stockholm. Again, the procedure was anything but simple considering that the British suffered from serious shortages in currency and the delivery of books, in addition to the difficulties they encountered with facilities and staff. 353 The technical difficulties regarding film titles were solved by hiring a Helsinki-based translator, after which the MOI staff in Helsinki was finally able to present its short films entitled as 'Britain Today' at two Helsinki cinemas. The very first print material the British were able to distribute, mainly booklets for sale at booksellers and articles distributed to the editors of Helsinki-based newspapers, focused mostly on promoting the war effort. The first British window display in Helsinki, entitled 'Britain and her Allies' also concentrated on the same theme. 354 In spite of these first achievements, the British regarded their propaganda effort as unsatisfactory compared to the American activities. The opening of a British Council office was constantly urged, as were larger investments in the BBC Finnish Service, still seen as the main source of information about Britain in Finland. These views reflected a more general realisation evolving among British officials according to which possibilities for spreading propaganda in Finland were improving by the day, not least because a number of Finnish state officials and journalists had expressed their support for the launch of broader British activities. 355 The Finns’

347 Annex to ‘Observations on my visit to Finland, November 7 – November 14, 1944 by P. Tennant’, November 17, 1944; F. Shepherd to A. Eden, November 13, 1944, both FO 371/32781, NA.
348 The British, for instance, learnt that it was against Finnish law to text a film in any foreign country for use in Finland. Extract from Stockholm despatch No. 108, March 2, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
349 V. Mallet to C.F.A. Warner, Stockholm, September 26, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
350 For example, Mr Tennant reported in November 1944 with some anxiety that the Russians were already selling Pravda and Izvestia daily in the streets of Helsinki and other Finnish towns. Annex to ‘Observations on my visit to Finland’, November 7 – November 14 1944 by P. Tennant’, November 17, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA.
351 Northern Section, European Division to F.M. Shepherd, December 7, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
352 MOI to Stockholm, ‘Propaganda to Finland’, January 7, 1945, FO/371/47374, NA.
354 Helsinki to MOI, February 28, 1945, FO 371/47374, NA.
355 ‘Propaganda to Finland’, Extract from a report on conditions in Finland by Mr Alexander, BBC Broadcasting Officer in Stockholm, January 19, 1945, FO 371/47374, NA.
wish that British activities would prove a counter to Soviet propaganda was becoming increasingly obvious.

The British effort took another step forward in May 1945 when Mr D.R. Roper, who had for the past four years worked for the BBC Finnish Service, was appointed as the first permanent Press Attaché to Finland. In August, it was reported that the MOI staff in Finland, which was housed in a flat in Mikonkatu, Helsinki, consisted of seven persons. Even if expanding, the new department continued to face the same difficulties in the delivery of British books. Finnish publishers' reluctance to undertake the publication of MOI material generated yet another problem that forced the Ministry to perform the task at its own cost. Considerable progress was, however, made particularly as concerns films after Britain received a license for importing commercial feature films to Finland. Several British films were now rented out for showing around Finland, and MOI short films as well as the weekly newsreel *The Free World* were also widely screened.356

By autumn 1945 the British had become even more positive about their future operations in Finland. Diplomatic relations were soon restored, and the general attitude of Finns towards Britain was already estimated as friendly. Furthermore, the Finnish Government's decision to raise the status of English as the first foreign language taught in schools alongside German was seen a particularly pleasing. These developments made British officials even more confident about their opportunities to influence the Finns and rectify "the effects of their isolation from the free world during the war".357 The report Francis Shepherd sent to Ernest Bevin in November 1945 not only expressed the increasingly optimistic mood the British had started to adopt in Finland, but already reflected a broader change taking place in their position. According to the Political Representative, Finland would always be a doubtful ally of the Soviet Union and belt a resistance against Russian penetration of other Scandinavian countries. It would, therefore, be to Britain's advantage from a strategic point of view to encourage the Western form of democracy in Finland as well as Finnish cultural relations with Scandinavia and Western Europe, he concluded.358

This declaration did not change the general need of caution the British felt they should follow when presenting their own case to the Finnish people. Since Finns were perceived as "sick of propaganda of the Nazi type" and the war in general, the FO saw that the publicity should be based more on genuine information about subjects relating to the future, such as British democracy, social institutions, labour management and scientific progress.359 As Anglo-Soviet cooperation was far from over, the task of making elements of the Finnish right to give up their hopes of using Britain and the US against the Soviet Union also continued to be on the British informational agenda.

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356 'Overseas Planning Committee. Plan for Propaganda for Finland. Channels', August 27, 1945, FO 371/4734, NA.
357 'Overseas Planning Committee. Plan of propaganda for Finland. Appreciation. Aims and Objectives', August 29, 1945, FO 371/47374, NA.
359 'Overseas Planning Committee. Plan of Propaganda for Finland', August 29, 1945, FO 371/47374, NA.
In determining the general policy for peacetime informational and cultural operations, the British Government did not have to start from scratch. It had managed an expanding informational and cultural programme in Finland through the British Legation, the British Council and the Finnish-British Society already before the war. In the 1920s and 1930s, Britain had paid particular attention to increasing its commercial relations with Finland. For the objective of promoting British products, as well as culture, the country's representatives had organised a special British Week in September 1933. The event, arranged in all leading Finnish cities, had undoubtedly increased the Finnish people’s knowledge of Britain, not least because Finnish newspapers took active part in its organisation.360

By July 1939, the FO's confidence about its presence in Finland had grown to such an extent that its officials claimed that the Finns had clearly started to show greater interest in English ideas and a declining interest in German culture, which before the advent of national socialism had been a dominant influence in the country. The British even planned to establish a ‘British House’ in Helsinki for both the long-term promotion of British culture and the management of propaganda operations in time of war. Although this scheme never materialised, a number of the principles determined for British informational activities back then turned out to be valid even in the Cold War era. Trying to cope with the Finnish Government's power to prevent the local press from publishing anything likely to endanger the policy of neutrality was a theme that dominated the planning of overt propaganda even back then361, which meant that the British had gained plenty of prior experience of dealing with this national characteristic even before its relevance became much larger in post-war Finland.

The British Council and the BBC: Restoration to Peace Time Conditions

The FO's desire to launch British Council activities in Finland as soon as the Fenno-Soviet Armistice had been signed was above all generated by the massive demand the Finns expressed for almost anything coming from the West. The rapid decay of German influence in Finland provided a great opportunity for the British to promote their culture, and most of all, language, in the country.

Competing with elements in Finland that were favourable to Germany was not an entirely new thing. In the mid-1930s, the British had already paid attention to influencing the opinion of authoritative Finns, including the Finnish Government, in a direction favourable to Britain and to undermining Germany’s dominant cultural position. What had made the task difficult was that, according to the British estimation, Finnish academic, tourist, sport, scientific, musical, art and press circles knew hardly anything of Britain. Furthermore, the British Council did not have an office of its own in Finland before the Second World War. It had made its presence felt

360 Helsingin Sanomat in particular cooperated with British newspapers and other enterprises in, for example, exchanging articles about the British Week and Britain in general and in assisting The Times' photographic exhibition in Helsinki. Ransomes & Rapited Limited to E. Erkko, August 10, 1933; Manchester Guardian to E. Erkko, August 17, 1933; The Times to E. Erkko, August 18, 1933, all Sanoma Osakeyhtiön liittryön arkiston kirjeenvaihtoa (Hereafter SOLAK), Aa 11, EEA, PLA.
361 C. O’Neill to I.S. Macadam, ‘MOI Publicity Division, Report on Finland’, July 26, 1939, INF 1/742, NA.
mainly by funding the activities of the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki, and such wide-scale projects as the British reading room and library, which was built next to the Legation’s premises and opened in August 1935.\(^{362}\) Cultural diplomacy was also enhanced by encouraging the exchange of students. Finland and the Scandinavian countries had been involved in one of the very first British Council operations when technical students from these countries were funded to visit Britain.\(^{363}\) As for the promotion of language, Britain’s main goal in Finland in the late 1930s had been to elevate the study of English to an equal position with German in the school curriculum by establishing agencies in all large towns under the leadership of a separate British institute.\(^{364}\) This task had been regarded as entirely realistic since, according to the British, interest in their country was growing steadily at the expense of not only Germany, but also Sweden and Russia.\(^{365}\)

The Second World War interrupted Britain’s expanding cultural activities in Finland as well as the growth of anglophile societies around the country. Founded in 1926, with the objective of “working for a more intimate intercourse between the Finnish and English people and getting Finnish people of different circles acquainted with the English spirit and the English way of thinking”\(^{366}\), the central organisation for these societies, the Finnish-British Society, had been responsible for a number of activities in Finland from importing and screening British films and supporting language education to promoting British artists visiting Finland.\(^{367}\) In all these activities the society had cooperated closely with the British Council in London, which provided its library with growing supplies of the most important British newspapers and periodicals as well as gramophone records of British music.\(^{368}\) Even after diplomatic relations between Britain and Finland had been broken off due to the war, the Finnish-British Society’s library in Helsinki was kept open, albeit in a low-key manner, in the premises of the English Church.\(^{369}\)

After the war between Finland and the Soviet Union had ended, the British wished to return the society's library services to normal as soon as possible. Among other activities, the British Council started sending the library, as well as the University of Helsinki, the University of Turku and Åbo Akademi, sets of periodicals and newspapers in the same way it had done before the war. The re-establishment of the smaller anglophile societies around the country was another task that became increasingly important to the British, particularly after the Americans had founded a new Finnish-American society in Turku. As with all post-war activities in Finland, British officials wished to proceed carefully when doing this. On several occasions the FO stressed that all membership lists of Finnish-British societies should be closely scrutinised in case they included Nazi sympathisers. The last thing the British wished to see was that anglophile societies were exploited as centres of attack and propaganda against the Soviet

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\(^{362}\) G. Watson to S. Hoare, July 1935, BW 30/1, NA.

\(^{363}\) Donaldson 1984, p. 30.

\(^{364}\) ‘Memorandum respecting Cultural Propaganda in Finland’, July 1935, BW 30/1, NA.

\(^{365}\) ‘Memorandum by HM Legation, Helsinki, on Cultural Propaganda in Finland’, December 1934, BW 30/1, NA.


\(^{367}\) For example, in February 1938 the Finnish-British Society agreed to carry out the promotion of British musicians giving concerts in Finland. A. Tillet to Finnish-British Society, February 1, 1938, FBS.

\(^{368}\) For example, British Council to R.M Alleyne, July 26, 1938, FBS.

\(^{369}\) ‘Summary of the Council’s Activity in Finland from 1935 to date’, December 1944, BW 30/1, NA.
Union. In November 1944, the FO and Francis Shepherd felt that the time was finally right to revive anglophile society activities around the country, not least because they offered an excellent vehicle for non-political propaganda.

The objective of opening a British Council office in Finland began to carry heavier weight in Whitehall after Finland was classified as one of the Council's 'priority one countries' in spring 1945. Before this, the launch of cultural operations in Helsinki had suffered from many of the same obstacles that had hampered the resumption of MOI activities: funding problems and organisational misunderstanding. To observers at the FO, confusion over such issues as whether the British Legation should at first be responsible for the distribution of British Council print material was highly frustrating at a time when British culture and language should have been promoted as efficiently as possible.

Some clarity was finally achieved in the summer of 1945, when Denis Frean, a young man appointed as English Lecturer at the University of Helsinki, took over the task of unofficial Council representative and saw to the initial distribution of British Council books and films. Mr Frean's report from August 1945 shows that this appointment was a shrewd move from the Council. In a matter of only a couple of months, Frean had, among other things, established an office organisation, sorted out the financial arrangements, contacted a large number of members of the Finnish academic and professional classes, arranged the distribution of periodicals and books to Finnish institutions, approached bookshops with the view to selling a number of Council booklets in the 'Britain Advances', 'British Life and Thought' and 'Science in Britain' series, helped the English School in Helsinki by providing it with books and administrated the application process for the first British Council scholarships. Denis Frean clearly managed to bring order out of chaos in terms of BC activities in Finland and gave the first official representative, J.B.C. Grundy, a much more solid platform to work on.

The Graphic Art Exhibition, which opened in October 1945 at the Art Hall (Taidehalli) in Helsinki, also came as something of a godsend to the British Council. The exhibition had been on show in Stockholm in 1941, after which it had been shipped to Helsinki. After the outbreak of war, the pictures had been all but forgotten until late 1944 when Professor Bertel Hintze, Head of the Academy of Fine Arts in Helsinki, reminded of their existence and expressed his interest in putting them on show as early as in 1945. Francis Shepherd and the FO accepted the idea, especially as the Finnish-American Society had already held a popular exhibition of American photographs. After the official approval, the British spent no time in putting the wheels in motion. Major Alfred Longden, Director of Fine Arts at the British Council, contacted Mr Hintze and made sure that the exhibition would be held as soon as possible and

370 Mr Bottral to Mr Wickham, November 30, 1944, BW 30/1, NA.
371 F.M. Shepherd to FO, November 22, 1944, FO 924/86, NA.
372 J.B.C. Grundy to K.R. Johnstone, Helsinki, July 19, 1945, BW 30/1, NA.
373 Mr Blake to Deputy Secretary General, March 6, 1945, BW 30/1, NA.
374 'Report on the activities of the British Council's acting representative in Finland from July 28 to August 27, 1945', BW 30/1, NA.
375 M. Roberts to A.A. Longden, December 21, 1944, BW 30/4, NA.
376 F.M. Shepherd to FO, January 1945, BW 30/4, NA.
coordinated together with the BC in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{377} The exhibition turned out to be a great success: it attracted a total of over 10,000 visitors in Helsinki and Turku where it was also put on show. Furthermore, more presented prints were sold than in all the other Nordic countries together, and the catalogue was sold out in two weeks.\textsuperscript{378} As a result of the exhibition, and a number of newspaper articles covering it\textsuperscript{379}, the Finnish people became for the first time properly acquainted with the British Council and its activities. After it became obvious that the Finns had a great interest in any art coming from the West, the BC started to plan new exhibitions. “The art iron is now hot here”, Mr Grundy enthusiastically concluded in his report on art exhibitions in November 1945.\textsuperscript{380} In order to make sure that cooperation with the Helsinki Art Hall would continue to work smoothly, the BC even invited Mr Hintze to London for a ten-day visit.\textsuperscript{381}

Although the British Council office in Helsinki had an encouraging start, and Finland was ranked as a priority one country, its core activities were constantly aggravated by the lack of appropriate funds and skilful staff.\textsuperscript{382} The growing pressure on Whitehall to make cuts in overseas information operations restricted the material investments in the BC’s activities in Europe even before they had been properly launched. An example of how Britain’s difficult economic position affected activities in Finland was the closure of the small British Council branch in Turku in 1948 after only a few months of operation. The decision to close down the office was made after a simple realisation: most of the promised displays, assistants and scheduled lecturers never actually arrived to the old capital city.\textsuperscript{383}

The BBC Finnish Service suffered from no such problems. As its broadcasts were in the first post-war years ranked as the main source of information about Britain especially for the broader masses, the conversion of the programme content to peacetime form was started as quickly as possible. In fact, the first plans concerning the service’s broadcasting policies in post-war conditions were laid out already in August 1943 when Hillar Kallas wrote a report stressing the BBC’s task to guide the Finns through the intricacies of post-war rehabilitation, to encourage British trade and to promote British culture. According to Kallas, broadcasting should focus more on lighter issues such as theatre and cinema reviews, music and sports rather than political news reports.\textsuperscript{384} These observations were put into practice soon after the Finnish-Soviet War ended. After PWE decided to discontinue sending regional directives to Finland in late September 1944\textsuperscript{385}, the news content became rapidly more neutral and focused on

\textsuperscript{377} A.A. Longden to B. Hintze, January 9, 1945, Bertel Hintze's collection (BH), box 12, Kuvataiteen Keskusarkisto (Herafter KKA).
\textsuperscript{378} B. Hintze to J.B.C. Grundy, November 29, 1945, BW 30/4, NA; B. Hintze to A.A. Longden, December 27, 1945, BH, box 12, KKA.
\textsuperscript{379} For example, Helsingin Sanomat, September 28, 1945.
\textsuperscript{380} J.B.C. Grundy to A.A. Longden, November 9, 1945, BW 30/4, NA.
\textsuperscript{381} J.B.C. Grundy to B. Hintze, June 5, 1946; D. Frean to B. Hintze, July 8, 1946, both BH, box 12, KKA.
\textsuperscript{382} Especially Mr Grundy constantly complained about the short resources provided by London. Undoubtedly, he had a point, as in July 1946 the Helsinki office was still lacking basic supplies and apparatus, such as a cinematograph or a gramophone. J.B.C. Grundy to K.R. Johnstone, July 19, 1946, BW 30/1, NA.
\textsuperscript{383} Grundy, J.B.C., Life’s Five Windows (London 1968), p. 167
\textsuperscript{384} ‘Post-War Finnish Broadcasts’, H. Kallas to D.E. Ritchie, August 11, 1943, HK, box 2, KA.
\textsuperscript{385} B. Thomas to A. Nutting, September 28, 1944, FO 371/43171, NA.
international news reports rather than the political situation in Finland. The expansion of broadcasts presenting everyday life in Britain and British culture, most notably music, was almost as important.

Despite these changes, or perhaps because of them, the station’s audience declined sharply after the war. Assurances given by public figures like MP Yrjö Kallinen over the broadcasts’ widespread popularity among the working class and the 'enlightened bourgeoisie' were not enough to prevent British diplomats in Helsinki from making the conclusion that many Finns seemed unaware of their continuation. In order to re-attract its audience, the BBC sought to win publicity for its service in Finnish newspapers, which turned out to be a rather difficult task. What started winning the broadcaster more listeners was, above all, the introduction of the English teaching programme, 'English by Radio' and the Saturday night dance music special. The reason for this was that the Finnish home radio had nothing similar to offer.

In terms of political broadcasts to post-war Finland, the BBC staff made the same observations as Mr Kallas and the British Legation: the Finns were sick of the war and certainly in no mood for serious propaganda. In a report written after her visit to Finland in early 1947, Liisa Morell, Programme Organiser at the Finnish section, reconfirmed this view and suggested that the service should include even more light entertainment and keep political discussions as simple as possible. While saying this, she also stressed that there still was a clear demand for a service such as the BBC to give vigorous and intelligent political commentaries that would “put world events in right perspective”, particularly after a large number of Finns had developed a somewhat antagonistic approach to YLE, which they saw serving the interests of the far left. The Finns’ growing interest in all things related to Britain also helped the BBC to increase its profile among the public, as did the Finnish Service’s strategy to interview practically all prominent Finns visiting Britain.

**American Presence: Quick but Reserved Start**

If Britain was relatively slow to launch its informational and cultural activities in post-war Finland, the United States was able to keep its presence felt in the country through the US Legation in Stockholm even before hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union had ended. As the US had never been at war with Finland, the expansion of American informational operations did not suffer from similar bureaucratic constraints that held the British campaign back, either. According to British reports, the Americans started to import and distribute newspapers in Finland already in the early months of 1944. In September 1944, the US Legation in Helsinki obtained permission for the export of commercial films to Finland from the Trading with the Enemy Department.

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386 In 1945, typical BBC Finnish Service news reports included mainly parliamentary reviews, reports on the progress of war and summaries about topical issues discussed in Britain. Comments made on Finnish political developments were already rare. For example, Radiokatsaus nro 124, Englannin radio 4.6.1945, VTL KURL, Dk 40, VNTE, KA.

387 'Finnish Intelligence Report', September 4, 1945, E3/42/1, WAC.

388 'Finnish Intelligence Report', December 7, 1946, E3/118/1, WAC.

389 'Report of visit to Finland, February 20 to March 24, 1947', by Liisa Morell, E1/688, WAC.

with the support of the State Department. This led to the rapid launch of, particularly war-related American films to the Finnish market, which was something that the audiences, wishing to see more 'normal films', were not entirely happy with.

By early 1945, US propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland had become increasingly evident, for example, through the sale of English and Swedish versions of *Time* magazine in leading bookshops and the opening of the American Architectural Exhibition, which was attracting large crowds. The Americans also made a specific effort to provide Finnish newspapers with a daily news bulletin both in English and Finnish as soon as possible. The rapidly growing number of Finnish-American societies also proved that the Americans had got off to an almost flying start in post-war Finland as far as informational and cultural operations went.

As the Americans were in the first post-war years reluctant, to say the least, to engage in full-scale government-led propaganda, it did not take long for the US to lose its lead in informational activities also in Finland. Even if the Americans had managed to precede the British in the country, the scale of their informational activities remained modest for quite some time. State Department reports from early 1945 reveal that this was a perfectly conscious decision. In a summary of future OWI operations in Finland, written in March 1945, US officials noted that it was neither desirable nor possible to introduce proper peacetime operations in the country. For the time being, American informational activities were restricted to the distribution of the press bulletin, feature articles and picture material to Finnish newspapers via Stockholm and the placement of commercial books and films to the Finnish market.

Maxwell Hamilton, the appointed US Minister to Finland, summarised the US Government's position towards informational activities well in one of his first reports from Finland. In the report, Hamilton, not unlike the British, stressed the importance of Finland developing friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In Hamilton’s view, massive distribution of American informational material would only make it more difficult for the Finns to adjust themselves to informational and cultural contact with the Soviet Union and, more seriously, develop a hope that the US was sufficiently interested in Finland to save the country from the Soviets if the need should arise. Even though Hamilton listed a number of proposals about how American presence in Finland could be strengthened, for example through establishing an OWI reference library and distributing non-political material to Finnish individuals, he did emphasise that the US informational programme should be “affirmative and positive in character but at the outset proceed slowly and quietly”.

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391 Mr Purves to Dr. Thornton & Mr Scott, September 29, 1944, FO 930/243, NA.
393 ‘Propaganda to Finland’, Extract from a report on conditions in Finland by Mr Alexander, BBC Broadcasting Officer in Stockholm, January 19, 1945, FO 371/47374, NA.
395 M. Hamilton to Secretary of State, ‘Informational Activities in Finland’, April 12, 1945, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
and confirmed that the Finns would for some time still be predominantly reached through the US Legation in Stockholm.396

Of course there was nothing new about the Americans making only a limited effort in the field of information and culture. Although US officials in Helsinki acknowledged that before the outbreak of war Finnish people had been particularly keen on anything American, their predecessors had little to do with it. The State Department had not run a highly planned informational and cultural campaign in the small northern country either, and the pre-war work of the US Legation focused on protecting American political and economic interests predominantly through more traditional methods, namely by creating close contacts with political leaders and business groups.397 American culture was naturally promoted, but usually only by supporting commercial activities in the country, most importantly those of the US film industry. Even in this field, the US Legation’s role had remained rather limited due to the simple fact that the popularity of Hollywood-produced movies had already grown at a staggering pace in the early 1920s after American film studios had reduced their sale prices and as a consequence become more competitive in comparison to Germany, which until then had been the largest exporter of films in many European countries, including Finland.398 The expanding funds invested in the production and marketing of Hollywood films, the large popularity of blockbusters like Dr. Jekyll & Mr Hyde and the new and successful way of promoting films through world-famous film stars, such as Charles Chaplin and Mary Pickford399, had all played their part in turning Finland into such a fertile country for the American film industry that it had hardly required much help from US officials posted in Helsinki. In the 1930s, American dominance in the Finnish film scene had already been such that as much as 70 per cent of screened films had been imported from the US and distributed by as many as four American businesses in the country.400 Another form of American culture becoming increasingly popular among younger Finns during that time was jazz music.401

The promotion of films was an obvious focus area for the Americans after the Finnish-Soviet War ended, not least because of the war-weary Finnish public’s huge demand for both domestic and foreign movies. Although the country suffered from a chronic shortage of raw film after the war, the number of Finnish cinema audiences reached an all-time high in 1945 when each Finn saw ten films on average.402 The American quest of pushing new films into the market as quickly as possible was to some extent decelerated by the control practices introduced at the State Department. In early 1945, the export of American film prints to Finland was

396 W. Carroll to E. Bellquist, ‘Informational Activities in Finland’, May 12, 1945, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
397 US Legation to Secretary of State, ‘Budget Estimate for 1949 Fiscal Year for American Legation, Helsinki’, April 29, 1947, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
399 Ibid., pp. 48-49, 120-121, 369.
managed by the US Legation in Stockholm, which assessed which films might be harmful to US interests in Finland. For instance, such films as Paramount’s *Standing Room Only* and Fox’s *The Gang’s All Here* were not recommended to the Finnish market by Stockholm. This arrangement was not to last very long, as already in June 1945 the Legation in Stockholm suggested that American film distributors in Helsinki should submit information about the films proposed for distribution directly to the Mission in Helsinki and follow its instructions.

As the US Legation remained reluctant to expand its activities in the very first post-war years in Finland, the Finnish-American Society’s role in promoting American culture grew in importance. The society, founded in July 1943 mainly for political reasons, had already played its part in American war-time cultural propaganda by screening a number of films mainly in Helsinki. It had also managed to quickly increase its membership and establish a first local chapter in Turku at the end of 1944. During the following year, the number of local chapters rose to thirteen, while the overall membership figure exceeded 7,000. Although the US Legation in Helsinki was naturally pleased with the growing activities of The Finnish-American Society, which in 1945 included the screening of films and organising the America Builds Exhibition in Helsinki, the Americans were not at first unreservedly enthusiastic about the organisation and, in particular, some of its members. Several reports from 1945 reveal that the Americans were initially highly suspicious about supporting the society, as it discovered that a considerable number of its new members had leftist sympathies. In May 1945, the US Legation was convinced that an intentional communist party infiltration was taking place and contemplated the possibility of founding another friendship society that would be dominated by members of conservative business circles. Towards the late 1940s, however, the Finnish-American Society was able to win the trust of the Americans, and gradually became one of the most influential channels for promoting American culture in Finland.

403 US Legation, Stockholm to SD, January 15, 1945, RG 59, 860D.4061 M.P./1-1545, mf USA 12, KA.
404 The decision to not to export these particular films shows the degree of sensitivity US officials had adopted with regard to Finland. Neither of the films include political references that could be interpreted as damaging to the American image abroad. The first is a comedy with somewhat harmless references to the effects of the war. The decision to ban the latter from Finland was likely to have resulted from the musical's sexual innuendo rather than any political content. State Department (Hereafter SD) to US Legation, Stockholm, January 29, 1945, RG 59, 860D.4061 Motion Pictures/1-1545, mf USA 12, KA; ‘Standing Room Only’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WoO_qhiM4iQ); Parts of ‘The Gang’s All Here’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pPgLWoqR44Y) (both March 5, 2014).
405 US Legation, Stockholm to SD, June 22, 1945, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
408 For example, ‘Memorandum of conversation between B. Hulley and H. Rämö’, May 23, 1945; F.A. Klaveness to SD, May 15, 1946, both RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA. US officials reservation about being officially associated with the society continued for some years and was well reflected by the White House’s denial of the society publication Suomi-Finland USA’s request to receive a greeting from the President. Although the explanation given to the Finns, i.e. that the President presents views outside the US only through diplomatic channels, was common policy, the decision not to send even a photograph of Truman to the paper seems rather curious. E. Miettinen to H.S. Truman, July 25, 1949; C.G. Ross to E. Miettinen, July 28, 1949, both Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, box 1434, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, USA.
Removal of ‘Nazi Elements’ in Finnish Media

As much as the US Legation was concerned about communist infiltration in the Finnish-American Society, the initial objective for the leading Western powers after the Finnish-Soviet War was to remove Finnish people with Nazi sympathies from public posts, including the media. For US officials, the most important task was to get rid of the people whose firms had boycotted the screening of American movies during the war. As a result, they, together with the British, blacklisted a number of prominent players in the Finnish film industry for engaging in Nazi propaganda during the war. At the top of the American list were Adams Filmi and Suomi-Filmi, which according to the Americans had taken strong stands against the exhibition of American films.409 US mistrust of the future of Suomi-Filmi was so deep that according to diplomatic correspondence Paramount even considered the possibility of buying out the company.410 British officials' attitude to blacklisting Finnish film companies was somewhat more flexible, perhaps due to the arguments made by Suomi-Filmi representative Risto Orko, according to which the Germans had forced the company to boycott Western films. The British realised that if they wished to screen their films at the premier theatres with good distribution, it might be better to reconsider some companies' position on the list.411

In April 1945, the Americans started plans to remove Adams-Filmi from the list. Soon after, Suomi-Finland's position was also normalised, not least because of the large number of theatres it owned throughout the country.412 Similar arrangements were also made in other fields of media. In the publishing sector, the British in particular were at first highly suspicious of the companies Otava and Werner Söderström Oy, which had “indulged in pro-Nazi, pro-Japanese and anti-allied literature”. For this reason, in the first post-war months the British Legation recommended that such rising publishers as Tammi should also be considered when selling translation rights for British books.413 Tammi took full advantage of this and quickly turned into an important partner in the promotion of Anglo-American books. Already in 1948 over 40 per cent of the titles it published were translations, an exceptional figure for a Finnish publisher.414

As Britain had been at war with Finland, it was natural that the country was more active than the US in pressuring the Finns to oust people who had been in close contact with the Germans. One of the most prominent Finns the British piled pressure on was Eero A. Berg, Editor of the

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409 Besides Adams-Filmi and Suomi-Filmi, the blacklist included theatres of Arkadia Filmi. In spite of the American boycott of such important players in the Finnish movie scene, the blacklist actually affected only 25 movie theatres around the country. Arkadia Filmi suffered from the absence of new American films the most as the lack of revenue forced it to stop operating altogether. Elokuvateatteri 7-8/1944 & 10/1944; Uusitalo, Kari, Suomen Biografiliitosta Suomen Filmikamariin: Viisi vuosikymmenä elokuva-alan järjestötoimintaa Suomessa (Helsinki 1974), p. 59.
410 US Legation, Helsinki to US Legation, Stockholm, April 18, 1945, RG 84, Helsinki Legation and Embassy, Classified General Records (Secret File) 1944-46, Entry UD 2442 (Hereafter HLE CGR SF), box 1, NARA.
411 Annex to ‘Observations on my visit to Finland, November 7 – November 14, 1944 by P. Tennant’, November 17, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA.
412 The blacklist of Finnish film companies was finally abolished in November 1945. Uusitalo 1974, p. 61.
413 Annex to Observations on my visit to Finland, November 7 – November 14, 1944 by P. Tennant’, November 17, 1944, FO 371/32781, NA.
news agency Suomen Tietotoimisto (STT). Francis Shepherd was particularly active in demanding the removal of Berg due to his general sympathies towards Germany and his wartime association with Hans Metzger, who had been Germany’s Press Attaché in Finland, and presumably a SD (Sicherheitsdienst) agent. In April 1945, Eero Berg categorically denied that he had promoted Nazi propaganda in Finland by claiming that despite his close ties with Mr Metzger he and STT had acted perfectly impartially in regard to Germany and that he personally had demanded the right for the distribution of Allied war reports. Apparently, Mr Berg managed to convince his impartiality, as he kept his position as main editor for another fourteen years. Although this outcome can be regarded as somewhat surprising, considering both the Allied Countries’ and Finnish communists’ desire to oust people with any wartime association with the Germans from public positions, it also indicates that, in particular, Anglo-American enthusiasm for such action waned rather quickly.

When the removal of Finns with suspicious sentiment was still very much on the agenda, it was not restricted to the management level, either. When recruiting a new announcer for the BBC Finnish Service, the FO had to advice the broadcasting company to postpone the appointment of a journalist with the name of Mr Hiisivaara (most likely Tapio Hiisivaara, journalist, wartime correspondent and author) after the British Legation in Helsinki had received information about his wartime reporting tendencies. According to the Finnish sources, "two prominent ladies from the left circles", Mr Hiisivaara “was very fascist". After a thorough inquiry, Francis Shepherd saw it inadvisable to employ Mr Hiisivaara as announcer at the Finnish Service because his writings suggested a definite sympathy for Germany. As the BBC was highly anxious about hiring anyone who was politically active, the broadcasting company followed the advice and arranged a new recruitment process through the British Legation in Helsinki. This turn of events illustrates how sensitive the British were at time about having to deal with anyone with a suspiciously pro-German background. The initial candidate had received several favourable references from both Finnish and British circles, but in the end a local complaint led to the termination of his employment and the recruitment of a new candidate, the young and able Max Jakobson, who after the war had been working for STT and UP.

**Steady Growth of British Impact**

As mentioned, the desire among the Americans and British to punish Finns with supposedly pro-German attitudes did not last very long. This not only suggested of a gradual turn in the

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415 For more about Hans Metzger and Eero A. Berg’s association with him, see for example, Nevalkivi 1983, pp. 21-47.
417 In addition to YLE, Finnish communists were directly after the war eager to see major changes in STT’s employment policies. Uola, Mikko, Unelma kommunistisesta Suomesta 1944-1953 (Helsinki 2013), pp. 124-128.
418 British Legation to FO, March 16, 1945, FO 371/47420, NA.
419 British Legation to FO, March 29, 1945, FO 371/47420, NA.
420 Hiisivaara’s appointment was initially recommended by J. Magill. YLE also backed him for the job. F.N. Shepherd to FO March 29, 1945; ‘Telegram concerning Mr Hiisivaara and the BBC, April 17, 1945, both FO 371/47420, NA.
general policy towards Finland, but also reflected the two governments’ increasing desire to establish more positive relationships with prominent Finns, including those working in the media. For achieving this goal, informational and cultural activities held a key position. Particularly the British information service began to perform more smoothly in 1946-1947. First of all, the funding arrangements that in 1945 had held its activities back were considerably improved after the Bank of Finland became better supplied with sterling. This helped the purchase of British books and films in particular. The issue of the daily Press Bulletin, which was published in Finnish since late 1946, also absorbed a growing proportion of the Information Office’s, as the information department was now known, total man-hours.422 The importance of the bulletin as a channel for the British point of view was often stressed, as was the liaison with the new British Council office, which took over, for example, film and music record distribution activities and the conduction of regular broadcasts with the Finnish YLE.423

As for the general political objectives in 1946-1947, the British regarded the reassurance of their goodwill towards Finland as especially important before the discussions leading into the Paris Peace Treaty. British officials recognised that widespread pessimism among the Finns had only grown after the war partly because they were, rather understandably it has to be said, afraid that Britain had no interest in their country and that they would be left to face the Russians on their own. The FO noted that a public statement of British concern for Finland’s sovereignty and independence would only arouse Soviet suspicions and “cause a stiffening of their attitude”. The British Legation in Helsinki was, however, encouraged to bring this message up in private conversations. It was again viewed that the best way to help Finland was to promote trade between Finland and the West and, thus, reduce Finland’s dependency on any market or source of materials without saying too much about the intentions in public.424

The concessions Britain had given to the Soviet Union with regard to Finland did not mean that the Soviets were left to increase their political and cultural dominance in Finland entirely as they pleased. The FO kept a close eye on Soviet activities in Finland, reporting in detail about such major events as the Red Army Choir’s concerts in February 1945, and analysing how Britain’s presence in the country could be increased. Although the British wished to avoid doing anything that would upset the Russians too much, they also started to take some first, albeit cautious, steps to oppose the Soviet campaign already during the first post-war year mainly by countering some myths of Soviet propaganda in verbal form.

When the British Government’s attitude towards the Soviet Union hardened in early 1946 and British diplomats were encouraged to counter Russian propaganda, following the principles determined by the FO’s Russia Committee and the IPD, the British Legation in Helsinki faced the same dilemma as it would do for many years to come: to what degree it would be wise to counter Soviet propaganda in the country? In July 1946, Mr Shepherd gave his view on what would be sensible. According to him, it would be unwise to try and get anti-communist articles

published in Finnish newspapers even if the Finns had the courage to include them. In Shepherd’s view the Soviets could still be best countered by “encouraging the Finns to proceed with the development of their own sturdy democracy and to avoid becoming tainted with the totalitarian methods which the Communists would like to introduce.” He did, however, suggest that the Legation staff should devise a more systematic programme to orally expose the lies the Russian were distributing for justifying their policies. This programme was also to include positive propaganda about the true situation in the British Empire, which, according to Mr Shepherd, the Russians persistently misrepresented. 425 The Russia Committee approved this proposal and agreed to furnish the Legation with all possible support, providing that extreme discretion was followed in all forms of action. 426

As the British Legation’s measures for countering the growing Soviet propaganda campaign in Finland remained limited even after this slight change of policy, the British Council and the BBC played significant roles in presenting the British case in the first post-war years. Expanding the BBC Finnish Service’s audience base remained particularly high on the British agenda. For learning more about its listeners and getting feedback for its programmes, the broadcaster set up a listener panel, arranged competitions and closely examined the correspondence with its followers. It also ordered audience analyses from the privately-owned research companies Suomen Gallup and Markkinatutkimus. In 1947, Suomen Gallup estimated that the number of occasional listeners to the BBC Finnish Service, which at this stage only included a 30-minute broadcast at 1600 GMT, was between 200,000 and 250,000. 427

The first listener competition was organised in March 1948, and the feedback given by the participants to the Finnish Service was almost entirely complimentary. The BBC’s impartiality and reliability in its news bulletins won particular praise. Indeed, it turned out that the news was the main reason for listening to the station, which reflected a growing feeling among Finns that the YLE news could not be relied to give them the truth or even being up to date. More than anything, what was expected from the BBC broadcasts were objective news, the British viewpoint to world affairs and talks on Russia and its Eastern European satellites, the Baltic States in particular. 428 In political reporting, the Finnish audience ranked the commentaries given by Max Jakobson particularly highly due to their accuracy and point of interest. Jakobson was undoubtedly influenced by the staff working for the BBC’s international section, many of whom had taken part in the propaganda battle during the war and were now about to start their attack on communism. According to him, the BBC’s post-war engagement in the distribution of propaganda was a reality that the broadcaster’s selective use of facts rather than blatant lies made less obvious. 429

Although the Finns’ demand for wider news reports and political talk programmes increased steadily, the largest number of requests made by the Finnish audience to the BBC called for

426 ‘Russia Committee meeting’, November 1946, FO 371/56887, NA.
427 ‘Report of Gallup survey in Finland, September – December, 1947’, F3/43/1, WAC.
428 For example, ‘Report on Finnish Listener Research Week, March 7 – March 13, 1948’, F3/118/2, WAC.
429 Tarkka 2010, p. 77.
programmes on everyday life in Britain.\textsuperscript{430} Programmes for special audiences, such as workers, farmers and young people, were also in demand as were comments on Finnish affairs from a British viewpoint. Due to its wide variety of programmes ranging from developments taking place in the British Commonwealth to reports on British culture including music, literature, theatre and sports, the Finns started to gradually regard the BBC not only as a provider of trustworthy news, but also as a ‘window to the world’.

In making the Finns more acquainted with Britain, the work done through the British Council was, even if not always as appreciated, as important as the BBC broadcasts. Observations made both by the British Legation and Finnish contacts supported the Helsinki office’s view that it had managed to gain considerable success even with limited resources.\textsuperscript{431} In addition to the usual BC objectives, i.e. the promotion of a better knowledge of British scientific and cultural achievements and the encouragement of exchange in these fields, in Finland specific attention was given to extending the knowledge of the English language and to support and expand the network of anglophile societies. The decision made shortly after the war by a large number of Finnish schools to replace German with English as the first taught foreign language gave an enormous boost to the promotion of the language, as well as British culture in general. The rapidly growing numbers of students of English at the University of Helsinki only enhanced this trend.\textsuperscript{432}

The partial replacement of German language by English in the Finnish educational sphere was, unsurprisingly, not a completely straightforward matter. The shortage of qualified teachers and the lack of textbooks were the two most crucial obstacles preventing an even faster embrace of the language in the country. According to the BC Helsinki office, the lack of teachers was an issue that would take several years to rectify. To do at least something about this, from 1946 onwards the Council started to hold special summer schools for Finnish teachers.\textsuperscript{433} As for language publications, the plan was to distribute a sufficient number of books and periodicals to schoolteachers, universities and anglophile societies with even more immediate effect. In this task, however, British officials were at first left bitterly disappointed with the Bank of Finland’s sterling allocations for the two leading Finnish bookshops, Akateeminen Kirjakauppa and Suomalainen Kirjakauppa, which permitted very little increase in the volume of book imports.\textsuperscript{434} As the demand for books in English was so great in post-war Finland that virtually all titles were sold at once, the situation greatly frustrated the British Legation, also closely involved in this particular field.

Towards the late 1940s, the situation in academic publications gradually improved and the British managed to send a more reasonable amount of required teaching material and

\textsuperscript{430} For example, ‘Report on Finnish Listener Research Week, March 7 – March 13, 1948’, E3/118/2, WAC.

\textsuperscript{431} For example Yrjö Kallinen, Minister of Defence in 1946 – 1948, praised the work of the British Council to F.M. Shepherd and stressed the importance of training more English teachers. He himself had not heard of any criticism of the Council’s work. F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, October 22, 1946, BW 30/1, NA.

\textsuperscript{432} In 1939, the number of English students at the university had been under 250. In 1946, the figure had risen to over 600. ‘Memorandum of British Books and Periodicals in Finland by J.B.C. Grundy’, January 28, 1947, BW 30/2, NA.

\textsuperscript{433} British Legation to FO, ‘Brief on Anglo-Finnish Relations’, January 13, 1948, FO 371/71421A, NA.

\textsuperscript{434} ‘Memorandum of British Books and Periodicals in Finland by J.B.C. Grundy’, January 28, 1947, BW 30/2, NA.
periodicals to Finland. Textbooks and handbooks on the English language were sent to schools and universities. The numbers of English books, both scientific and fictional, sent to the University of Helsinki Library also grew considerably before the end of the decade. In order to accelerate the general shift towards the English language in the world of academia, the BC began to offer Finnish universities a list of alternatives for prevailing German textbooks used in all subjects. The British also started sponsoring the use of lecturers at the University of Helsinki and Åbo Akademi, which both held a chair in English philology. A readership in the subject of British Institutes at the former was also funded in order to shift the emphasis away from the purely philological study of English.  

The recruitment of more British-born teacher-secretaries to provincial anglophile societies enhanced the supply of teaching to working and middle class Finns. Since a large share of their members had joined in order to learn the language, English courses were the societies’ main area of activity. In this respect they differed from the Finnish-American societies, which initially had a more social than educational approach. The popularity of the anglophile societies continuously surprised the British. In 1945, the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki already had 1,300 members, and the number of societies around the country had passed the thirty mark. What turned out to be even more surprising was the provincial societies' persistence. The British Council had expected that many of them would lose members especially after the 1952 Helsinki Olympics when the greatest desire to learn at least some English was over. This proved not to be the case, as the number of language groups run by the societies only grew in the early 1950s. 

The relationship between the BC and the anglophile societies was particularly close in the first post-war years when the British wished to kick off their activities by providing study grants and distributing printed material, short films, photographs and other such products. One important activity in which the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki was of particular value was the promotion of prominent British individuals visiting Finland. Both the BC and the British Legation were more than keen to arrange British visitors, among them the novelist and playwright J.B. Priestley, to give lectures for anglophile societies whenever possible. British officials in Finland also gave their personal contribution to the cause by occasionally giving their own lectures to society members. In 1946, the British were also able to find a much broader listener audience for such commentaries when YLE agreed to air a series of talks given by the

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435 F.M. Shepherd to W.A. Montagu-Pollock, October 1, 1946, BW 30/2, NA.
436 The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1951—1952, BW 30/6, NA.
438 R. Washbourn to Director of North and Eastern Europe Department, 'Periodical Confidential Report', December 31, 1952, BW 30/5, NA.
439 British people visiting the Finnish-British Society after the war included artists, authors, journalists and economists. In addition to Priestley, who visited Finland in October 1945, one of the most notable visits was made by Sir William Beveridge, MP. ‘Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Finnish-British Society’, October 19, 1945; ‘The Activities of the Finnish-British Society in May 1946’, both FBS; Grundy 1968, p. 160.
440 J.B.C. Grundy was particularly active in giving lecture tours. For example in October, 1948 he lectured in a number of Finnish towns. In the early 1950s, Hamish McGhie, Press Attaché at the British Legation, also gave several lectures to the societies on issues like British journalism. The British Council Bulletin to Anglophile Societies, No. 11, December 1948; ‘Notice on J. McGhie’s lecture given on February 23, 1950’, both FBS; Grundy 1968, p. 150.
likes of J.B.C. Grundy and Denis Frean. These broadcasts, given fortnightly with the title ‘Britain Today’, dealt with topics like the British educational system, the London scene and life in the English countryside. D.R. Roper from the British Legation complemented the broadcasts by presenting similar issues in Finnish in his ‘From the British Point of View’ series.

The British Council’s most visible activity took shape in the various exhibitions it organised in Finland. As in the post-war years every event with any connection to the West generated considerable interest among the Finns, the BC’s exhibitions and theme weeks, which for instance in 1946 included a book exhibition, an exhibition for children’s art and a British music week, were well attended and produced plenty of visible and favourable publicity in Finnish newspapers. The regular visits many Finnish political leaders paid to these exhibitions reflected how interesting and highly valued foreign, especially Western, cultures were regarded in Finland at that time. The success of these exhibitions, together with the spread of the English language and the expansion of the anglophile societies, impressed Oswald Scott, British Minister to Finland, to such an extent that in January 1948 he declared that “of all foreign cultural activities in Finland the British remained by far the most extensively and effectively conducted”. Although this praise was followed by a FO observation emphasising the importance of cultural diplomacy in Finland, one is left with the feeling that even more could have been done in the country. The decision to spend less on activities aiming to have a longer term effect on its target groups meant that the British Council was not able to execute even its most central tasks as efficiently as it would have wished.

First Signs of USIS Expansion

As concerned as British actors in Helsinki remained of the resources at their disposal, the scale of their operations were at least growing impressively. The same cannot be said about the US campaign, which remained fairly modest for quite some time. The British Legation felt in late 1946 that the Americans, although slowly extending their activities, were above all constrained by their inability to call on “the highly organised home producer services as we and the British Council”. This and the fact that even the BC’s resources at first clearly outweighed those of

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441 J. Koskiluoma to J.B.C. Grundy, October 13, 1946, Kansainvälinen kirjeenvaihto (Hereafter KK), box 4; Programme Dep. to J.B.C. Grundy, January 5, 1946; J.B.C Grundy to Miss Nordström, January 18, 1946; Miss Nordström to British Council, February 25, 1946 all Pääjohtajien kirjeenvaihtoa (Hereafter PK), Hella Wuolijoki (HW), box 4, all Yleisradion arkisto (Hereafter YLE), Suomen Elinkeinoelämän Keskusarkisto, (Hereafter ELKA) Mikkeli, Finland.

442 For books, see Helsingin Sanomat, September 17, 1946; for children’s art, see Helsingin Sanomat, November 30, 1946; for the British music week, see Helsingin Sanomat, September 3, 1946.

443 In the 1940s and 1950s it was more than common for leading Finnish politicians to visit British Council exhibitions or other foreign events. For example in April 1949, President J.K. Paasikivi paid a visit to the British Council book exhibition. J.B.C. Grundy to J.K. Paasikivi, April 23, 1949, J.K. Paasikivi’s collection (JKP), VAY 4393, KA.


445 B.C. MacDermot to O.A. Scott, May 26, 1948, FO 924/705, NA.

446 ‘Progress report for the quarter October, November, December, 1946’, January 1947, FO 953/25, NA.
the American cultural attaché\textsuperscript{447} meant that the scope of the American operations would be a good deal smaller, the British concluded.

It is true that in the first years after the war, US policy towards Finland predominantly focused on providing financial assistance, which was, of course, as such considered the best kind of propaganda. Although a USIS country programme for Finland was launched in 1946, soon after the arrival of the first post-war public affairs officer, American information activities did not really pick up speed until the passing of the Smith-Mundt Act in January 1948, which guaranteed proper funds for propaganda operations also in Finland. This did not mean that the Americans were indifferent of informational and cultural affairs in Finland. On the contrary: as early as in 1945 the US Legation started to follow closely, and with some concern, the expanding Soviet propaganda activities in the country. The Legation wrote several reports on the issue and after the visit of the Red Army Choir seemed particularly impressed with the use of military music in propaganda, which according to the Americans was highly efficient since it appealed equally to the broad public and the cultural circles.\textsuperscript{448} The increasingly visible presence of Soviet newspapers and publications in the streets of Helsinki was another worry for US officials. The suspicion that American cultural products could be overshadowed by Soviet ones is well reflected in a report by Mr Hamilton claiming that Soviet books, mainly on communism, available at Akateeminen Kirjakauppa were more prominently placed than books in English after a Russian officer had visited the store.\textsuperscript{449}

The Americans felt more confused than alarmed of these kinds of developments, as they knew perfectly well that the sentiment in Finland was in general pro-Western and anti-Russian. As Soviet propaganda in Finland grew, and the policy of containing communism started to gain ground in Washington, the US Legation in Helsinki was, however, more than willing to introduce a reasonable expansion to informational and cultural operations in 1947. The activities were now clearly divided into the printed word, films and the radio, exhibitions and the exchange of people. This division would be characteristic for the USIS programme in Finland for years to come.

Not surprisingly, the expanded programme gave closest attention to film. In 1947, the USIS/Helsinki already held almost 700 screenings to a total audience of over 93,000. For screening purposes, the Americans quickly found efficient partners from a number of Finnish organisations such as elementary and secondary schools, the Finnish trade union movement and various cultural organisations. As a result, the seven film projectors the USIS owned were in constant use throughout the country.\textsuperscript{450} At this point, the content provided by the US Motion Picture Department focused more on presenting American history, particularly the country’s role in the Second World War, and US achievements in the fields of health and technology rather than

\textsuperscript{447} J.B.C. Grundy to K.R. Johnstone, January 14, 1946, BW 30/1, NA.
\textsuperscript{448} US Legation to SD, Memorandum to Despatch No 1, 'The Power of Military Music as Propaganda', February 5, 1945, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
\textsuperscript{449} M. Hamilton to Secretary of State, 'Some Soviet and Extreme Leftist Tactics', June 21, 1946, RG 59, 860D00/6-2146, mf USA 9, KA.
\textsuperscript{450} US Legation to Secretary of State, 'Budget Estimate for 1949 Fiscal Year for American Legation, Helsinki', April 29, 1947, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
contemporary political events. Because of this, the Americans faced few problems in the films' importation and distribution. For example in 1947, the Finnish Censorship Board approved all of the 153 educational films the Americans imported to the country. This was in stark contrast with the commercial American films shipped to Finland during the same year of which as many as 7.7 per cent were banned by the Finnish authorities.

The distribution of American-produced news and articles was also finally growing in 1947. The State Department Wireless Bulletin was now delivered on a daily basis to over a hundred 'clients', including Finnish Government officials, newspaper editors and leaders in Finnish industrial and cultural life. A fifteen-page Finnish-language bulletin was produced twice a week and circulated to over fifty Finnish daily newspapers. In addition to the two bulletins, selected Finnish newspapers and magazines were served on request with special stories and photographs from the leading American publications. While the expansion of distributed material led to the growing use of American content in Finnish newspapers, evidence also suggests that the reports included in the Wireless Bulletin, which had the general objective of keeping leading Finnish politicians informed about international developments from the US perspective, were closely read and used by Finnish leaders. This was evident, for example in January 1947 when President Paasikivi prepared a separate memorandum based on bulletin content on the way Soviet Union had increased its control of the economies of, for instance, Hungary and Romania by taking over companies that used to be in German ownership and founding new ones with mixed ownership. As one of Paasikivi’s top priorities was to prevent the Soviets from increasing their presence in the economic life of Finland, feeding him with news articles over similar developments in other countries was undoubtedly a smart move from the US Legation. This incident also shows that behind the scenes the Americans, despite often pessimistic about Finland’s future, wished to make sure that the country’s fate would not be determined by its leaders' lack of topical information.

The opening of the USIS library in Kalevankatu, Helsinki, in May 1946 was something that made US officials particularly proud. During its first year of operation, over 38,000 Finns visited the library and the number of borrowed books, periodicals and recordings reached a new level. Among its other activities, the library took an active part in organising American exhibits in Finland, now prepared on average twice a month, both for use as window-displays and as travelling shows. The library and the exhibits on show around Finland, together with the larger exhibitions imported from the US, gave the Americans such an influential presence in Helsinki in particular that even the British, convinced of the supremacy of their own

452 Memorandum: 'Finland: Custom Duties and Other Restrictions on Films and Filmstrips', February 27, 1950, RG 306, Legal Subject File, 1950-54, Entry 11, box 16, NARA.
453 Välimäki 1992, p. 87.
455 Helsingin Sanomat, May 29, 1946.
456 US Legation to Secretary of State, ‘Budget Estimate for 1949 Fiscal Year for American Legation, Helsinki, April 29, 1947, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
programme, were impressed with them. The gradually growing activities gave a reason also for the US Legation to be reasonably happy with the USIS/Helsinki’s overall performance. At the same time, however, the Americans felt that any further expansion of the informational and cultural programme would not be possible due their lack of staff. As the main objective of the US activities remained the same as in earlier years, i.e. to encourage Finns to understand American ideas and polices rather than questioning communism, the State Department was still not convinced that larger resources were needed in Helsinki.

If it took some while for the US Government to have its worldwide propaganda machinery running after the Second World War, the growing focus on cultural and educational diplomacy was turned into practice at a faster pace. Investment in various exchange programmes grew rapidly after American leaders began to recognise their importance as a part of the country’s foreign policy and an important weapon in the Cold War. The 1950s were a particular golden age for the Fulbright Programme, as back then the US Government saw no contradiction in making sizeable investments in overseas education for the young, while refraining from interfering with them too much. The exchange of persons was a field in which the Americans were willing to invest early on also in Finland. Indeed, in the very first post-war years, the US gave specific emphasis on the establishment of cultural contacts and the promotion of educational exchange through privately-sponsored programmes. All these efforts were, naturally, made in order to make Finland more integrated to the West.

Already before the war, private foundations had sponsored the education of a number of promising Finnish students in the US. When the conflict came to an end, it did not take long for, for example, representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation to visit Finland and make agreements concerning future exchange schemes and projects in which the foundation was willing to invest. The Finns themselves were obviously eager to establish new contacts with American universities and other educational institutions. From 1945 to 1947, three rivalling organisations were involved in offering a still modest number of scholarships available for Finnish students willing to study in the US. The Finnish-American Society was the first actor to enter the field in December 1945 when it offered its first four scholarships. In spring 1947, the specially established Finnish-American Cultural Commission was also able to offer four grants that were provided by private American foundations and institutions. The National Union of University Students in Finland (Suomen Ylioppilaskuntien Liitto, SYL) joined the market during the same year after establishing contacts with such organisations as the Institute of International Education and the American Scandinavian Foundation.

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458 Arndt & Rubin 1993, p. 54.
459 For example, Dr. Charles Nelson Leach, Director of the European Office of the Rockefeller Foundation, visited Helsinki in April 1946 to be acquainted with the Finnish medical and public health sector, which the foundation later began to fund. M. Hamilton to SD, April 24, 1946, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
461 Annual Report of the Finnish Committee on Study and Training in the USA, October 1947 – October 1948, Finnish Committee on Study and Training in the USA (Herafter FCSTUS), box 1, KA.
In order to make the offering of scholarships more efficient and end the rivalry between
the three organisations, representatives of American universities and foundations, together with
the US Legation in Helsinki, suggested that a single organ should be established for the promotion of
scholarly exchange. In October 1947, the proposal materialised when the Finnish-American
Committee on Study and Training in the United States (FCSTUS) was established by the Finnish-
American Society, the Finnish Cultural Fund and several Finnish academies.\footnote{Copeland, William, 'Forty Years of Academic and Professional Exchange between Finland and the United
States' in Rinehart, Robert (ed.), Finland and the United States – Diplomatic Relations Through Seventy Years (Washington
D.C. 1993), p. 80.} The committee
dedicated its first years of operation mainly to the establishment of new contacts. Representatives
of a number of American foundations visited Finland in 1947-1948, while Eino Saari and Bengt
Broms, Chairman and General Secretary of the new committee, toured the US with the quest of
becoming acquainted with the various American organisations offering scholarships.\footnote{Annual Report of the Finnish Committee on Study and Training in the USA, October 1947 – October 1948,
FCSTUS, box 1, KA.} As new
contacts were made and new foundations were willing to offer scholarships to Finland, the
number of Finns making the trip across the Atlantic for study purposes started to grow
formidably. The introduction of the Fulbright Programme in Finland, and subsequently more
comprehensible academic exchange, was, however, still some years away.

The US Government’s growing, albeit rather slow-paced, investment in cultural diplomacy
and informational activities in Finland in the first post-war years shows that the Americans did
show some interest in the northern country after all. As political, not to mention military,
support to the Finns remained unwise, US officials, like the British, realised that it could
influence Finland’s development only through cultural and economic methods, which often
complemented each other. Helping the Finns to modernise their industrial sector and making
the country’s economy more dependent on Western trade\footnote{For more about the post-war aim to tie Finland closer to the West through economic methods, see, for example,
Kuisma 1997, pp. 27-29.} was an objective for which the activity involving the exchange of persons, most importantly businessmen and academics,
would play a particularly integral part. The general American sentiment regarding Finland’s
future was well epitomised in one of the CIA’s early situation reports from June 1947. Although
the report categorised Finland as "a model Stalin protectorate", it noted that the country was
still free and its exports to the West were growing.\footnote{‘Intelligence Report: Current situation in Finland’, June 1947, CREST.} The US started to become at least slightly
more confident that Finland could maintain its position as an independent country after all.

\textbf{Finland and Propaganda: Tight Control and Intensifying Political Agitation}

As already suggested, it did not take long for the Western powers to discover that post-war
Finland would be a tough environment for informational and cultural activities. Soviet
propaganda in Finland was strong and the country had a substantial influence on Finnish media
content. The situation was particularly difficult in 1944-1947 when official censorship prevailed
and the Finnish Government instituted a consistent control of the press to protect the nation’s
new course in foreign policy. Soviet sensitivity over anything that could be regarded as unfavourable was well reflected in the Control Commission’s order to Finnish libraries and bookshops to dispose of books that did not meet its approval. As a result, over 1,700 titles were removed, including books that criticised the Soviet system or handled the Fenno-Ugric nations sharing ties of kinship with the Finnish people. Several school text books on history, geography and the Finnish and German languages were also rejected and their content was altered in order to prevent the teaching of fascist or anti-communist elements to pupils.\textsuperscript{466}

The Finnish state censorship machinery that continued to carry out its war-time duties was at its most active in 1945 when it gave as many as 130 instructions to Finnish newspapers and magazines regarding topical issues and requested the removal of 153 articles in total.\textsuperscript{467} The most typical requests concerned reports on developments in the Soviet Union or Finnish-Soviet affairs.\textsuperscript{468} In addition to articles written by Finns, the censorship organ monitored outgoing and incoming foreign news reports, telegrams and telephone messages, occasionally making requests to remove whole articles meant to be published by Finnish newspapers, mostly the larger ones based in Helsinki, or STT.\textsuperscript{469} This obviously made the promotion of British and American policies in post-war Finland an even harder task. The strictest censorship period did not, however, last for very long, and already in 1946 after the War-Responsibility Trial, during which the Finnish press was particularly closely monitored, newspaper editors found a somewhat sharper tone and became increasingly reluctant to let their papers’ text in the hands of censors.\textsuperscript{470}

Even though formal censorship was finally lifted in 1947, the position of the Finnish press changed only to a certain extent. J.K. Paasikivi had already as Prime Minister in 1946 famously warned editors about the possible consequences of their writings and urged them to “help to shape the way towards a new kind of relationship with the eastern neighbour by writing about it correctly and in a better and more versatile way”.\textsuperscript{471} As President, he continued for some while to influence the press through telephone calls, letters and personal meetings as well as speeches on the newspapers and their contents.\textsuperscript{472} The regular comments and personal instructions Paasikivi and his Prime Ministers Mauno Pekkala and Urho Kekkonen gave newspaper editors

\textsuperscript{466} For a more detailed account on the removed books, see Ekholm, Kai, Kielletty kirjat 1944—1946 – Yleisten kirjastojen kirjoistot 1944—1946 (Jyväskylä 2000). On the demands presented by Finnish communists to the Finnish Board of Education, see Uola 2013, pp. 115-116.

\textsuperscript{467} On Finnish press and publishing censorship in 1944-1947, see, for example, Salminen 1979, pp. 58-64.

\textsuperscript{468} In autumn 1945, for example several reports on Stalin’s illness were removed. ‘Tarkastustoimiston ohjeita’, October 1945, Tarkastustoimistojen kuukausiraportit 1945-1946. Valtioneuvoston tarkastuselimet 1940-1947, Ea, KA.

\textsuperscript{469} In early 1945, when censorship was at its tightest, in a fortnight’s period as many as thirty telegrams, six telephone messages and two letters were censored. Helsingin Lennätintarkastus- ja ulkomaantoomiston päiväkirja ajalle 1.1.1945-15.1.1945, Tarkastustoimistojen kuukausiraportit 1945-1946, Valtioneuvoston tarkastuselimet 1940-1947, Ea, KA.

\textsuperscript{470} Salminen 1979, p. 199.


\textsuperscript{472} J.K. Paasikivi’s comments on Finnish newspapers’ content has since reached a somewhat legendary status. His instructions given by telephone to the editors of Sanoma Oy’s publications, Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat, were often so loud that the whole editing staff was able to hear the president’s views on published content. For example, Kilpi, Timo, Uutisia, historiaa ja puheenaiheita. Ilta-Sanomat 75 v. (Helsinki 2007), p. 107.
over the writings of the press played an important part in persuading the Helsinki papers to adopt an extremely sensitive course in their writings about the Soviet Union.

The special amendment made to Finnish law in 1948 only increased this caution as it made it possible to give a prison sentence to a journalist for articles slandering foreign nations. Although the law was never applied, together with the leading politicians’ efforts to guide the press it laid the foundation for Finnish newspapers’ dealings with Soviet matters during the Cold War. The Finnish press, even the more outspoken right-wing and social democratic papers, remained in general reluctant to write about the eastern neighbour. Sensitive matters, such as conflicts or various disasters, as well as developments in international politics involving the Soviet Union, were often only reported about through quoting international news agencies. According to Salminen, the exaggerated caution with which the Soviets were treated resulted in a whole practice of silence, indirect expressions and readings between the lines. The rules and measures of Finnish self-censorship were already being defined in the first post-war years and closely guarded by the state censorship organs' and the Finnish Foreign Ministry' continuous monitoring of the media.

All this did not mean that Finnish newspapers did not practise any criticism towards events involving the Soviet Union. As the final boundaries for the Cold War were drawn in the late 1940s, the Finnish press was also divided into two camps that would relentlessly criticise each other. By attacking domestic communists, right-wing, liberal and social democratic publications were able to indirectly undermine Soviet actions as well. Although the country’s leading newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*, officially independent but with well-known liberal and social democratic sympathies, the conservative *Uusi Suomi*, and particularly the social democratic *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, did start to provide stronger comments about international developments, such as the communist takeover in Hungary in 1948 or Marshall Aid, when it came to examining superpower relations, they continued to follow a predominantly cautious policy for some time.

The battle of words between the non-communist papers and publications from the far left, mainly *Vapaa Sana* and *Työkansan Sanomat*, quickly turned fierce. Although focusing mostly on domestic issues, the leading communist papers formed a significant part of the Soviet Union’s propaganda machinery in Finland by regularly quoting Soviet newspapers on topical issues. In this task, they were supported by Moscow’s Finnish language radio broadcasts, by far the most hard-hitting organ of Soviet propaganda. The broadcasts, listened to only by the most loyal communists, picked up where they had left off after the war by providing daily comments on developments in Finland and criticising the Finnish Government and its policies, the Finns’ or

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473 See, for example, Vihavainen 1991, p. 39.
474 Salminen 1999, p. 17.
475 Suistola, Jouni, Kylmä sota paleltaa – Kylmän sota Suomen johtavassa sanomalehdistössä (Rovaniemi 1994), pp. 93, 149.
476 Moscow’s broadcasts to Finland never gained much popularity. According to an American poll carried out in 1948, only some 4 per cent regarded the service as reliable. ‘American Poll in Finland November 1948 – December 1948’, John I. Kolehmainen's collection (JK), box 4, KA.
more precisely ‘the reactionary forces’, ties with ‘Western capitalists’ and, above all, the social democrats and their leading newspapers.477

Even though the Soviet Legation conducted a propaganda programme of its own in Helsinki, and its officials, together with the Russian members of the Control Commission, relentlessly complained to Finnish politicians about anything that might be interpreted as negative towards the Soviet Union or the country’s poor visibility in the media, a lion’s share of Soviet propaganda in Finland was executed through the leading communist party, the Finnish People’s Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto, SKDL), the SKP and, above all, SNS. The society, which was joined by a number of leading Finnish politicians against their real political convictions as a gesture of friendship towards the vast eastern neighbour, provided an important organ for the implementation of closer cultural ties between the two countries. In close cooperation with the Soviet VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, SNS managed to import an impressive number of Soviet artists to Finland after the war as well as promote Russian films, exhibitions, plays and literature. After the rush of activity in 1945, when the number of members was as large as 170,000, the visits and exhibitions became more scarce and the society’s popularity started to decline slowly.478 In spite of this, SNS remained an influential actor in Finnish society during the early Cold War. It continued to implement broad-scale propaganda activities and acted as something of a watchdog of Western activities in Finland, reporting actively about ‘anti-communist’ propaganda practised in the country.

In following anti-communist propaganda the Finnish communists received plenty of assistance from the services of the communist-dominated Finnish Security Police (Valtiollinen poliisi, Valpo). Apart from keeping an eye on foreign activity in the country, the police shaped the information and cultural battleground in Finland by monitoring both domestic and foreign cultural products, such as films, books and pamphlets, which were distributed throughout the country. Valpo agents, often complete amateurs in their conduct, reported actively about anything that might be interpreted as anti-communist or anti-Soviet and urged the Finnish police to penalise for such activities. While carrying out this close follow-up, Valpo also started to make somewhat exaggerated interpretations about developments in Finnish society. By 1947 Valpo officials had reached the conclusion that anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland had adopted a particularly arrogant tone and that the encouragement of a hostile sentiment against the communist neighbour had become common throughout the country.479 This sentiment, according to Valpo reports, was evident in newspaper articles, politicians’ comments, the distribution of anti-communist propaganda leaflets and the activities of some suspicious

477 The rise of ‘reactionary forces’ or ‘fascist groupings’ was a regular feature in Moscow’s Finnish broadcasts. British and American ‘fascists’ and their policies were also openly attacked from 1947 onwards. For example, Radiokatsaus nro 172, NL:n radio 1.8.1947; Radiokatsaus nro 173, NL:n radio 2.8.1947; Radiokatsaus nro 196, NL:n radio 29.8.1947, all VTL KURL, Dk 50, VNTE, KA.
479 For example, ‘Vaasan osaston tilannekatsaus 1.6.1947 – 30.6.1947’; ‘Muisito Neuvostoliittovastaisen mielilaita levineysyydestä’, both Asiamapisto (Amp), box 79, Valtiollinen poliisin arkisto II (Hereafter Valpo II), KA.
organisations, such as various youth clubs.\textsuperscript{480} In order to prevent the anti-Soviet feeling from becoming even stronger, the security police kept a close watch on all British and American activities in the country. Valpo's agents reported regularly about, for instance, the Finnish-British Society and the Finnish-American Society\textsuperscript{481} and collected samples of British and American news bulletins\textsuperscript{482} distributed in Finland so that the suitability of their content could be estimated. The secret police also gathered information about the daily movements of British and American information officers in Finland, often following their travels even outside the capital area.\textsuperscript{483}

When monitoring the distribution of films and books in Finland, at times Valpo officials even provided an analysis of their own over the product's suitability for the local environment. One such comment concerned George Orwell's novel \textit{Animal Farm}, one of the IRD's and the USIA's most used Cold War propaganda products throughout the world, both in print and as an animated film.\textsuperscript{484} According to the Valpo agent reviewing the book in 1947, the work was "undoubtedly propaganda directed against the Soviet Union in which the tendency's obviousness has been skilfully hidden by the use of satire".\textsuperscript{485} The fact that the book was sent to the Ministry of Justice for further review and not published in Finnish until 1969 tells a lot about the degree of caution that prevailed in Cold War Finland. Orwell's other famous work, \textit{Nineteen Eighty-Four}, also promoted eagerly by the IRD, fared somewhat better as it was published in Finnish by WSOY in 1950, but only after the publisher excluded a part from it judging the Soviet Union's systematic persecution of all dissidents.\textsuperscript{486} An uncensored translation of the book was not published until 1999, fifty years after it was first put on sale in London.

Although both the British and the Americans in general regarded the increasing propaganda battle in the Finnish press mainly as a domestic issue, the slandering tone the leading communist papers often adopted against their respective countries and governments was something both of them were ready to counter. The British Legation proved more active also in this respect. Already in June 1945 the Legation made its first complaint to the Finnish Foreign Ministry about articles appearing in the press that it found objectionable. According to Francis

\textsuperscript{480} The distribution of anti-communist propaganda leaflets was something that Valpo agents reported regularly about, as this kind of activity was regarded as unacceptable and, if interpreted strictly, illegal. For example, 'Ilmoitus kosken Kotkassa tavaratuja kommunismin ja Neuvostoliiton vastaisia lappusia, 4.10.1948', Amp, box 78, Valpo II, KA.

\textsuperscript{481} For example, 'Ilmoitus koski Kotkan Suomalais-Englantilaisen Seuran tilaisuutta, 4.10.1948', 'Ilmoitus koski Kotkan Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen Yhdistyksen esitelmätilaisuutta, 20.11.1947', both Amp, box 15, Valpo II, KA.

\textsuperscript{482} The collected bulletins included a British bulletin that dealt with protests in Hungary and an American bulletin, which covered Truman's statements on foreign policy. Englannin lähetystö, Sanomalehtikatsaus, July 19,1946; Department of State Wireless Bulletin No. 221, September 14, 1946, Amp, boxes 95 - 96, Valpo II, KA.

\textsuperscript{483} One of these travels was made by D.R. Roper, who in November 1947 visited several Finnish newspapers in Central Finland. As Mr Roper had made similar trips before, he had become a recognisable character in the provinces and therefore easy to track down, as happened for example when he visited in Jyväskylä. After an earlier visit he made to leading provincial newspapers, Roper had requested for details about the articles covering his visit from the Finnish State Information Centre. D.R. Roper to V. Meltti, March 2, 1946, Ulkomaiden viranomaisilta saapuneet kirjeasiakirjat, Ea 1, VNTE; 'Ilmoitus koskin Englannin sanomalehtitassbea Mr. Roperin käyntia Jyväskylässä virkakokeiluun aikana, 4.12.1947', Amp, box 95, Valpo II, both KA.

\textsuperscript{484} For example, Cull 2008, pp. 73; Defy 2004, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{485} 'Muistit: George Orwell: Animal Farm', April 11, 1947, Amp, box 33, Valpo II, KA.

Shepherd, a press campaign against Britain in particular was taking place in a number of papers from the extreme left, including the SNS journal *SNS Lehti*, which for example criticised Britain’s attitude with regard to Yugoslavia, Poland and Greece, and *Vapaa Sana*, which claimed that Western Powers were protecting fascists and repressing democratic risings by force. Shepherd, well aware that the attacks found their inspiration in Moscow, asked instructions from London whether an official complaint should be made and whether it would be wise to respond to these attacks by inspiring an article in an English newspaper, such as *The Times*. The FO felt that neither of these measures was necessary since they would only give too much importance to the attacks and start a controversy. At the end, Mr Shepherd discussed the matter with Reinhold Svento, Second Minister for Foreign Affairs and a new member of the SKDL, who promised to take action against a repetition of similar articles through the Ministry of Education.

In early 1946, the tension between British officials and Finnish communists only grew after *Vapaa Sana* and *Työkansan Sanomat* published more violently anti-British articles. The papers, for instance, labelled Britain’s occupation of Indonesia as "British imperialism" and criticised the dealings of the Anglo-American alliance concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Persia. Acting in accordance with FO orders, Mr Shepherd again discussed the subject with Mr Svento and in particular complained about the claims appearing in the article on Indonesia that Britain subdued by force of arms liberty movements wherever she encountered them. As Article 21 of the Armistice Agreement obliged the Finnish Government to prevent propaganda against the UN, also criticised in the story, the issue was brought to the Allied Control Commission’s notice with the consequence of General Grigor Savonenkov promising to take action. The British felt that a firm response would be desirable and that the Finns needed to be recalled about Britain’s position as the other Power Signatory to the Armistice.

When more anti-British articles, culled from the Moscow press, kept appearing in spring 1946, Britain decided to send an official note regarding the affair. In the note, Francis Shepherd brought to Carl Enckell’s, Minister for Foreign Affairs, attention a report on the Persian question that was published by both *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Vapaa Sana*, and an article, which labelled the Second World War as having been an imperialistic conflict until the Soviet Union had entered the struggle. According to Mr Shepherd, the articles not only displayed a hostile feeling towards Western democracies including Britain, but also appeared to be designed to direct attention to and encourage differences between the Soviet Union and the British Empire. Mr Enckell, regretting the ignorance of the newspapers, brought the note to the attention of the papers’ chief editors and suggested to them to avoid publishing articles with

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487 F.M. Shepherd to A. Eden, June 12, 1945, FO 371/47399, NA.
488 C.F.A. Warner to F.M. Shepherd, July 5, 1945, FO 371/47399, NA.
489 F.M. Shepherd to A. Eden, July 16, 1945, FO 371/47399, NA.
490 F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, January 25, 1946, FO 371/56197, NA.
491 F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, May 21, 1946, FO 371/56197, NA.
492 Työkansan Sanomat, March 30, 1946; Vapaa Sana, March 31, 1946.
493 Vapaa Sana, May 8, 1946.
494 Note by British Legation, Helsinki to Finnish Foreign Minister C. Enckell, May 13, 1946, 12 L. Englanti, UMA.
“tendentious and inaccurate statements”.495 The British were pleased with this response and generally happy to see that the protest made against anti-British articles was given considerable publicity by the Finnish press.496

The note did not stop the communist papers from publishing further provocative material. By autumn 1946, however, the domestic situation in Finland had developed to such degree that the social democratic newspapers, following a party directive, started to campaign for tactfulness towards Britain and the US. After this, the British felt that the Finnish press was becoming strong enough to react against the propaganda from the extreme left and that a further protest over anti-British articles would no longer be necessary.497 Although reducing the number of official complaints, this position did not stop the British Legation from making the occasional unofficial inquiry over certain articles published in the Finnish press. For instance in November 1946, Ray Muston, Third Secretary at the British Legation, brought to the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s attention an article published in the small communist paper Kansan Ääni, which suggested that "British reactionary forces" were involved in the so-called Weapons Cache Case.498

The US Legation also kept a close eye on articles appearing in the Finnish press and the development of the country’s propaganda environment. As early as in 1945, the Americans made a direct complaint about a report they felt was insulting towards President Truman. As a result of this complaint, the Finnish Censorship Board notified Työkansan Sanomat about its publishing policy.499 In February 1947, the Legation reported about a series of anti-American editorials appearing in Työkansan Sanomat500, the publication of which followed a conscious decision made by the Finnish communists to strengthen their rhetoric attack against "the world's leading reactionary power the US".501 In general, however, American officials did not seem quite as concerned as their British counterparts about growing communist propaganda. For instance in April 1947 Maxwell Hamilton reported that SNS was having great difficulty in adjusting propaganda received from the Soviet Union for use in Finland.502 Although strongly anti-Western editorials and reports appearing in the communist press would become more the norm rather than the exception in the upcoming years, over time the British also relaxed their attitude towards them, mainly because the total circulation of the corresponding publications remained rather small.

495 C. Enckell to F.M. Shepherd, May 15, 1946, FO 371/56197, NA.
496 F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, May 26, 1946, FO 371/56197, NA.
497 F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, September 25, 1946, FO 371/56198, NA.
498 Memorandum of Conversation between R.F. Muston and R. Seppälä, November 23, 1946, 12 L Englanti, UMA.
499 Salminen 1979, p. 53.
500 The first of these editorials attacked against an UP article published in Helsingin Sanomat, which reported about Americans pleading for leaner peace terms for Finland. The war reparations were dealt with also in an editorial suggesting that the US could actually pay Finland’s debts, as the country’s net profit was mostly gained from the labour of American workers and the reduction of their real wages. The communist paper also published an article claiming that a law directed against workers’ rights was being proposed in Washington. Työkansan Sanomat, February 13, 1947, February 18, 1947 & February 21, 1947.
501 Uola 2013, pp. 384-387.
502 M. Hamilton to SD, April 23, 1947, RG 59, 860D.00B/4-2247, Tk 15, Printed copies of records from NARA, KA.
Contacting Key Media Outlets

In the first post-war years, both British and American officials more than anything stressed the importance of creating close personal ties with influential Finns, such as politicians, civil servants, academics and journalists. The British Legation was highly active also in this field, particularly after its campaign to verbally undermine Russian fabrications had been introduced. After the Control Commission finished its work in Finland and interaction with Finns became more relaxed, the Legation started to invite even more prominent Finns from various walks of life to weekly social gatherings at its premises. The objective of these meetings was not only to collect information about Finland, but also to reassure Finns that the Western powers knew about the latest developments in their country. There was nothing strange about this, as the link between gathering intelligence and distributing information was very close in post-war Finland. The appointment of Rex Bosley, whose main task in Finland was to reopen and take full charge of the MI6 station in Helsinki, as Assistant Information Officer in 1947 only emphasised this connection. Mr Bosley was to cultivate hundreds of contacts in Finland, both for intelligence and propaganda purposes.

Although both the British and the Americans wished to make close contacts with all leading political parties in Finland, considerable effort was made to building a warm relationship with the SDP, as it was seen to hold the very key position in countering communism in Finland. Finnish social democrats, together with the conservatives, were also regarded as useful providers of intelligence regarding political development in Finland and the undertakings of the Soviets. The fact that Britain was governed by a Labour Government naturally made cooperation with the SPD significantly easier.

The Finnish social democrats, especially staunch anti-communists such as Väinö Leskinen and Unto Varjonen, certainly did not object to having closer ties with their ideological allies all over Western Europe. In addition to being in close contact with the British and American legations in Helsinki from 1945 onwards, both men made numerous trips to Sweden and Britain in order to win support and receive advice for their struggle against communism from their Western comrades. Varjonen was particularly active in pleading authoritative members of the Labour Party to show some solidarity for Finland during the most uncertain post-war times. He, for example, requested Morgan Phillips, General Secretary of the Labour Party, to contact the Labour press and arrange that British journalists would be present at the War-Responsibility Trial. Varjonen was also successful in inviting Western social democrats, including Labour MP John Freeman, to the SDP’s Party Congress in 1946. The closer ties with other European socialists also increased the exchange of information on international affairs and labour matters

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506 U. Varjonen to M. Phillips, October 9, 1945, SDP:n kansainvälisen kirjeenvaihto (Hereafter SDP KV), box F229, Työväen arkisto (Hereafter TA), Helsinki, Finland.
507 J. Freeman to U. Varjonen, June 25, 1946, Unto Varjonen's collection (UV), box F2, TA.
through such channels as the 'SILO Bulletin', circulated by the Labour Party’s Socialist Information and Liaison Office.508

Both British and American officials were impressed by the way the SDP was able to build a highly effective propaganda and intelligence collection organisation so quickly after the war. Because the communists had the edge in most Finnish labour organisations in the very first post-war years, the SDP made some significant reorganising to its party machinery by establishing a new party propaganda department and a trade union section.509 Both of these new divisions were to play a significant role in combating communism within the labour movement; in political parties, the trade unions and in workplaces.510 The SDP’s trade union section, in particular, held a key position in implementing the tougher propaganda line adopted against the communists after the Party Congress in 1946.511 Having a highly modern organisation that, according to Seppo Hentilä, resembled the structure of military intelligence work512, the section listed a great number of detailed propaganda activities513 for opposing the communists and stressed the importance of using opinion polls for political purposes.514 For the latter objective, the SDP even founded a company of its own, Psyko-Työ, which would conduct a large number of surveys on such issues as the general attitudes of factory workers and the performance of political parties.515 The effectiveness of the SDP’s new propaganda activities, based on the new concept of ‘fighting social democracy’ was eventually measured, above all, in the SAK elections of spring 1947 in which the social democrats managed to win a clear majority of representatives thanks to a campaign of unprecedented scale that saw leading SDP propagandists like Unto Varjonen, Väinö Leskinen and Yrjö “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen use all their creativity to undermine

508 The bulletin was distributed to a number of European social democratic parties and included news about political developments around the continent. For example, SILO Bulletin from 1946, UV, box H5, TA. In late 1947, the Labour Party started also to collect information for a new international socialist magazine, ‘Socialist World’, which was to provide information about, for example, communist policies and activities in Europe. E. Loeb to V. Leskinen, March 19, 1947, SDP KV, box F229; E. Thompson to V. Leskinen, August 27, 1948; SDP KV, box F267, both TA.

509 For example, Soikkanen, H. 1991, p. 140.

510 According to Hannu Soikkanen, a typical characteristic of the battle between Finnish social democrats and communists after the Second World War was that it was increasingly directed at influencing people at the workplace rather than being based on an open ideological and political confrontation. Soikkanen, H. 1991, p. 142.


512 According to Hentilä, the fact that several actors taking part in the actual SDP field work had experience of similar operations during the war was clearly reflected by the way the section’s propaganda work was implemented and how the activities were organised. Hentilä 1986, pp. 124-126.

513 The section listed detailed plans about how the social democrats should make their propaganda activities in trade union organisations more effective by using all media, including the printed word, films and the radio. A-jaoston tiedotus nro 65, ‘Sos.dem. Ammattiyhdistysjaoston valistustyön järjestäminen’ by Janne Hakulinen, August 30, 1946, SDP:n A-jaoston tiedotusia, box HAA5, TA.

514 According to a document of the trade union section, the use of opinion surveys clearly increased the amount of reliable information that could be used for determining both propaganda and political tasks. A-jaaston tiedotus nro 65, ‘Mielipidetutkimusten käytöstä sos. dem. puheen tarkoituksin’, June 20, 1947. SDP:n A-jaoston tiedotusia, box HAA5, TA.

515 Janne Hakulinen, the founder of Psyko-Työ and an influential figure in the SDP, was well acquainted with American opinion research and, above all, emphasised the avoidance of incorrect information in propaganda. For example, Asennemittaus X-tehtaana työntekijöiden keskuudessa; Mielipidetutkimus suhtautumisesta yleisiin epäkohdoin, tri Kekkosen hallitukseen, sekä taloudelliseen vakaannuttamiseen, July 28, 1950, both Psyko-Työ, box 1, TA; Hakulinen, Janne, Propagandan käsikirja (Helsinki 1951), pp. 16, 44, 103.
the communists under the 'Enough is Enough' (Jo riittää) slogan. A similar campaign was also successfully carried out for the parliamentary elections of July 1948 when the SDP managed to gain more seats mainly at the expense of the SKDL.

Although pleased with the modern propaganda organisation the SDP had created to contain communism in political parties, the British and Americans remained worried that the social democrats, and Finns in general, might be getting too enthusiastic and open in this activity. As a result, for example Denis Healey, Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party, on several occasions reminded them against becoming overexcited and too provocative, as the number one priority for the SDP should, after all, be the preservation of Finland’s independence and democracy, which could be guaranteed only with the goodwill of the Soviet Union. Healey feared that if the Finns could not resist themselves, there was the possibility that the Soviet Union would not ratify the Peace Treaty with Finland. Väinö Leskinen did not agree with Mr Healey’s rather pessimistic view of Finland’s future and tried to convince him that Finns in general did not feel that the country was going to follow Hungary’s recent fate.

The strong anti-Soviet sentiment developing among certain social democrats also worried John Freeman, who after his visit to Helsinki noted to Unto Varjonen that at times the general discussion in Finland was irresponsible considering the circumstances. Francis Shepherd partly agreed with this view in a report to Minister Bevin in which he stressed that particularly Mr Varjonen’s criticism of the Soviet Union could turn out to be dangerous for the whole country. The US State Department adopted a similar position in regard to anti-communist activities in post-war Finland; in general the containment of communism was to be supported, but at the same time caution was to be emphasised. This policy was well evident for example in December 1947 when the US Legation decided not to lend another film projector to a member of the Finnish-American Society of Hämeenlinna, who planned to travel around the countryside showing USIS filmstrips in an effort to arouse anti-communist activity.

Due to their close contacts with the SDP, the British and US Legations were able to distribute plenty of propaganda of their own through the party network and the social democrat newspapers. The fact that perhaps the largest amount of official British and American propaganda content distributed in Finland, both anti-communist and neutral, can be found at the party’s archives illustrates this well. The material from the first post-war years, consisting of British and American news bulletins, supports the view that the two Western powers adopted a

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517 The struggle between Finnish social democrats and communists was closely followed, for example, by the CIA, which estimated the SDP organisation as effective for combating communist influence in the trade unions. The agency was particularly impressed with the large network of social democrat trade unions throughout the country and the rapid pace with which instructions from party headquarters were given and propaganda material was distributed to them. Status of the Conflict between Finland's Social Democratic and Communist Parties, November 4, 1947, CREST.
518 For example, D. Healey to V. Leskinen, August 29, 1947, SDP KV, box F229, TA; Majander 2005, pp. 119–127.
519 V. Leskinen to D. Healey, September 12, 1947, FO 371/65919, NA.
521 F.M. Shepherd to E. Bevin, October 22, 1946, FO 371/56198, NA.
522 J.M. Pitkänen to A.R. Randolph, December 17, 1947, RG 84, USEH, CGR, box 7, NARA.
somewhat neutral policy in regard to their informational content after the war. The bulletins issued by both countries consisted mostly of reports on topical international issues without making any criticism of the Soviet Union or communism. During the first post-war years, the American bulletin, at times even thirteen pages long and published in English, gave a highly detailed account of US foreign policy\textsuperscript{523}, while the Finnish-language British bulletin, much shorter in length, focused more on presenting the economic and social achievements of the Labour Government.\textsuperscript{524}

As important as the close relationship with the social democrats and their newspapers, most crucially \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti}, was to the British and Americans, the most significant contact in the Finnish media for both Western legations was Eljas Erkko, owner and editor of the country’s leading newspaper \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} and the leading tabloid \textit{Ilta-Sanomat}. Closely connected to both countries, Erkko often acted as something of an intermediary between the Finnish political leadership and the Western powers.\textsuperscript{525} In his publishing policies, Mr Erkko pretty much kept his own head during the post-war years and refused to introduce too strict censorship measures in his newspapers, despite being regularly pressurised by J.K. Paasikivi and later Urho Kekkonen. This did not mean that his papers were openly critical of, for example the Soviet Union; they merely published much more material on British and American issues than articles concerning Finland’s mighty neighbour.\textsuperscript{526} If conditions in the Soviet Union were criticised in \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}, it was mainly done through articles written by foreign writers.

For keeping Finns on track with international news topics, the agreements with UP and \textit{The Times} were of particular importance for \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}. The deal with \textit{The Times} gave Erkko’s publication the exclusive right in Finland to include any material from the famous British paper. This agreement was so binding that even COI had to pay compensation through the British Legation to \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} when picking articles from \textit{The Times} for the Finnish editions of various periodicals it spread for propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{527} Erkko also built close contacts with, for example, the editors of \textit{Time} and \textit{Life}, which provided the Sanoma papers with plenty of content for years to come. \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}'s position as the leading newspaper in Finland also meant that both the British and US legations aimed to provide the paper with as much material as they could. The USIS, for example, started to offer various photographs from the US for the publication's use, free of charge.\textsuperscript{528} \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}'s employment of correspondents abroad, a very rare treat for a Finnish newspaper in the 1940s, also contributed to giving the readers a more profound picture of international issues. For their

\textsuperscript{523} For example, Department of State Wireless Bulletin No. 126, May 28, 1947; Department of State Wireless Bulletin No. 159, June 18, 1947, SDP KV, box F266, TA.
\textsuperscript{524} Englannin lähetystö, Sanomalehtikatsaus, September 4, 1947, SDP KV, box F266, TA.
\textsuperscript{525} For example, in May 1948 President Paasikivi discussed "matters that were good to let the Americans know" with Erkko before the latter took off to the US. The President clearly wished to assure the Americans after the Mutual Assistance Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union had been signed that there was no reason for panic in regard to Finland’s future as an independent country. 'Muistio keskustelusta Paasikiven kanssa 12.5.1948', Julkisten tehtävien hoitoon ja seurantaan liittyvä arkisto, Hb1, EEA, PLA.
\textsuperscript{526} Salminen 1979, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{527} G. Dilnot to E. Erkko, October 17, 1946; C.V. Smith to E, Erkko, June 2, 1947, both Ulkomaiset kirjoituspalkkiot, Dd, box 5, Sanoma Oy:n arkisto; I. Hinton to E. Erkko, August 7, 1956, SOLAK, Aa 41, EEA, all PLA.
\textsuperscript{528} H. Arnold to Y. Niiniluoto, July 24, 1946, SOLAK, Aa 41, EEA, PLA.
reports from London, for example, the correspondents naturally used a wide range of British newspapers as sources. This was not always that simple, as the Finns always had to contemplate whether their content was suitable for readers back home. For example, Eero Petäjäniemi, *Helsingin Sanomat*’s London correspondent, regretted in 1947 that the broad articles *The Times* published on Eastern European countries could perhaps not be used in Finland, even if the British newspaper’s publishing policy was, in general, neutral.529 In addition to its own correspondents, the use of a number of prominent foreign commentators, such as Walter Lippman, gave *Helsingin Sanomat* more international flair.530

Eljas Erkko’s desire to include mainly American cartoons in his newspapers also brought the Western way of life closer to the Finnish public. Already before the war, Helsingin Sanomat had published a great variety of famous comics from the 'Lone Ranger' to 'Mickey Mouse'. In 1947, Sanoma Oy extended the agreement with Bull’s Pressstjänst, the Scandinavian representative of the cartoon sales organisation Kings Features Syndicate531, whose inclusion of Cold War messages to its comics began at full force in the 1950s. Erkko’s enthusiasm with the possibilities cartoons offered culminated in the decision to start publishing the 'Donald Duck' comic book under Sanoma Oy in 1951. The huge popularity the comic reached quickly after its launch gives another indication of the Finnish people's great interest in US-related publications and American culture in general. Mr Erkko realised fully well the wider importance of cartoons. In a later letter to Walt Disney he praised Disney comics for "drawing the young generation’s attention to normal and peaceful things and helping them to avoid the cruel day happenings in the rest of the world". 532

One of Erkko’s many achievements that pleased the Americans was the launch of *Valitut Palat*, the Finnish edition of *Reader’s Digest*, which was during the Cold War generally regarded as Finland’s ‘window to the West’. The publication of a Finnish version of the world-famous magazine was not, mainly due to Finland’s position, a straightforward affair. When *Valitut Palat* was finally founded in April 1945, the agreement made between *Reader’s Digest* and Eljas Erkko was in many ways exceptional. Whereas in other countries editions of *Reader’s Digest* were published by its affiliated companies, the deal gave Mr Erkko the right to act as the temporary publisher of the *Reader’s Digest*’s Finnish version, being responsible for the translating, publishing, promoting, distributing and selling of the magazine. Mr Erkko was also given the full right to choose the articles published in the Finnish edition and edit them whenever he felt

529 E. Petäjäniemi to E. Erkko, October 11, 1946, Sanoma Oy:n toimintaan liittyvät asiakirjat, Sanoma Osakeyhtiöön liittyvät asiakirjat, Bh3, EEA, PLA.
530 Helsingin Sanomat started to publish Walter Lippman’s comments on international affairs as early as 1943, a move that was so exceptional at the time that it led to Wipert von Blücher, the German Ambassador in Finland, making a protest over the matter to the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Klemola, Perri, *Helsingin Sanomat - sananvapauden monopoli* (Helsinki 1981), p. 35. Soon after the war, several of Lippman’s articles included in-depth analyses on the increasingly tense relationship between the Soviet Union and Britain and the US. For example, Helsingin Sanomat May 31, 1945.
531 Manninen & Salokangas 2009 pp. 150-157, 552-553.
532 E. Erkko to W. Disney, November 7, 1956, SOLAK, Aa 1, EEA, PLA.
necessary. The exceptional arrangement was justified by “the urgent desire of the Finnish public to have good reading matter from abroad now”.533

Eljas Erkko and Reader’s Digest’s management in the US soon found out that this was exactly the case. The first two editions of Valitut Palat, with total circulations of 50,000 and 75,000, were sold out in a matter of couple of days.534 By 1947, the circulation had already easily surpassed the 100,000 mark, inspiring Barcley Acheson, Head of Reader’s Digest, to claim that Finland was the magazine’s brightest spot, particularly considering its political position.535 Mr Erkko was also more than happy with the new magazine, later describing that the launch of Valitut Palat in 1945 was exactly what the country had needed in that moment “when we had just escaped a war, which had taken us to the wrong side, perhaps”.536

As Valitut Palat soon gained a reputation of being a mouthpiece for American culture, it is no surprise that Finnish authorities kept a close watch on its content. For making the magazine more suitable for the Finnish market, Eljas Erkko and his assistants, mainly Sirkka Ruotsalainen, the first actual editor of Valitut Palat, gave great consideration when picking and editing the articles originally published in magazines like Time and Life. This work bore fruit, and the magazine actually turned out be more acceptable to the censorship authorities than the other versions of Reader’s Digest on sale in Finland, mainly the Swedish Det Bästa, the selling of which was at times banned in Finland.537 When reading the first editions of Valitut Palat, one instantly realises why this was the case: their focus was very much on presenting American scientific inventions and various wonders of the world. The magazine also gave notable attention to the promotion of such traditional, and rather puritan, American values as modesty, courage, religion, democracy and, above all, the possibility of making a fortune out of nothing through hard work.538 The few articles that can be regarded as political mainly dealt with either the war or topical issues in the US domestic politics.539

As for other contacts with Finnish newspapers, the likes of Uusi Suomi and Hufvudstadsbladet were the obvious targets for the British and Americans. Both papers were regarded as Western-orientated and willing to publish material explaining Britain or the United States’ point of view. The fact that Uusi Suomi, together with Helsingin Sanomat, was the only publication to employ a correspondent in London obviously made the relationship easier to build on. The paper’s agreements over the use of material with, for example, AP540 and the Daily Mail541 also

533 Agreement between Reader’s Digest Ab and Mr Eljas Erkko, April 9, 1945, SOLAK, Aa 32, EEA, PLA. For more about the founding of Valitut Palat, see, for example, Manninen & Salokangas 2009, pp. 499-504.
534 Manninen & Salokangas 2009, p. 504.
535 B. Acheson to E. Erkko, December 23, 1947, SOLAK, Aa 32, EEA, PLA.
536 E. Erkko to B. Acheson, June 18, 1955, SOLAK, Aa 32, EEA, PLA.
537 By 1947 the censorship authorities had already banned the selling of two editions of Det Bästa. In January 1947 this was done due to its inclusion of an article on Yugoslavia, which the Soviet element in the Allied Control Commission for Finland had found objectionable. H. F. Arnold to SD, January 20, 1947, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA.
539 On war, for example, the article about the Allied bombing of Germany, Valitut Palat, October 1945. On domestic politics, for example, the article about President Truman’s future challenges, Valitut Palat, May 1946.
540 The first annual contract between Uusi Suomi and AP was signed in December 1945. L. Aho to F. Palm, December 21, 1945, Uuden Suomen arkisto (Hereafter US), box 41, KA.
contributed to this. In terms of publishing more foreign content, however, Uusi Suomi faced similar problems as other Finnish newspapers in the post-war years. The lack of paper often prevented the inclusion of articles offered by foreign newspapers, such as The Evening Standard and The New York Herald Tribune.\footnote{Uusi Suomi first planned to sign an agreement with the Daily Express. This deal quickly collapsed due to difficulties with the Bank of Finland over the granting of sterling. An agreement with the Daily Mail was eventually made in August 1949. This cooperation did not, however, turn out as fruitful as Uusi Suomi would have wished, as already in December 1949 Max Jakobson, now the paper’s London correspondent, reported about his disappointment with the Mail’s foreign news service. The cooperation between the two papers was finally terminated in December 1954 when Uusi Suomi signed an agreement with the Daily Telegraph. L. Aho to G. Young, August 5, 1946; M. Jakobson to L. Aho, December 29, 1949, US, box 43; L. Aho to C. Sutton, December 5, 1954, US, box 45, all KA.} Moreover, President J.K. Paasikivi’s close relationship with Lauri Aho, Editor of Uusi Suomi, made it awkward for the newspaper to publish any material that could be interpreted as critical of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the President clearly wished to use the publication for persuading the supporters of the Coalition Party to adopt the principles of his new foreign policy.\footnote{Salminen 1979, pp. 30-31.} The lectures Paasikivi gave to Mr Aho not only on material he regarded unsuitable for Finland’s foreign policy, but also on his newspapers’ coverage of certain domestic political issues\footnote{For example, in October 1947 Paasikivi criticised Uusi Suomi’s position on the question of making reforms to Finland’s provincial structure. L. Aho to J.K. Paasiviki, October 18, 1947, Lauri Aho’s collection, box 3, KA.}, reflect the newspaper’s difficult position in the late 1940s; it was simply too close to the President to adopt anything else but a cautious publishing policy.

In this respect life was easier for newspapers published outside the capital region. Since their content was not as closely followed by the political leadership or the censorship authorities, papers like Ilkka were able to publish slightly sharper content.\footnote{Salminen 1979, p. 35.} On the other hand, the share of international news in these papers was small and dependent on STT’s articles. This gave the British and the Americans an excellent opportunity to push more of their material through in provincial papers, as they were quick to discover.

If contacts with influential members of the press were easy to make, the relationship with YLE proved a somewhat more difficult affair. Both the FO and the State Department first suspected that the appointment of Hella Wuolijoki, the left-wing politician and playwright, as Chairman of YLE’s Governing Board could lead to the domination of communist content on the Finnish radio\footnote{For example, F.M. Shepherd to A. Eden, May 22, 1945, FO 371/47420, NA.}, but soon learnt otherwise. Although YLE, under regular monitoring by Finnish communists\footnote{Mrs Wuolijoki received numerous letters from provincial communist organisations which demanded the increase of programmes directed to the working class and broadcasts regarding the Soviet Union. For example, SKP:n Rovaniemien osasto to H. Wuolijoki, February 3, 1948, Hella Wuolijoki’s collection (HW), box 35, KA.}, did increase the use of broadcasts about the Soviet Union\footnote{Kinnunen 1998, p. 295.} and introduced new programmes it found more appealing to the working classes, such as the famous ‘Työmiehen perhe’, Mrs Wuolijoki never launched a large scale communist propaganda
campaign on the airwaves.\textsuperscript{549} This conclusion can be made, for example, by examining the statistics on the newspapers quoted in YLE broadcasts. For instance, in autumn 1948, the principle according to which the use of newspapers in YLE broadcasts was defined according to the number of seats each party held in the parliament was closely followed.\textsuperscript{550}

Hella Wuolijoki’s keenness to introduce a great number of British and American plays to the Finnish public also proves that she did not base her broadcasting policies strictly on increasing content regarding the Soviet Union. As a playwright, Mrs Wuolijoki wanted to decide herself whether various British or American scripts were suitable for the Finnish radio. Her interest in this content was so large that, for example, when visiting London in April 1946, she left with her bags full of drama scripts she planned to review.\textsuperscript{551} Although she rejected a great number of offered scripts, Finnish adaptations of plays such as William Shakespeare’s \textit{Henry IV} \textsuperscript{552} were produced and aired to a large audience. In the first post-war years, the use of British plays, short dramas and talks was, in fact, seconded only by broadcasts of Swedish origin.\textsuperscript{553} Due to the music exchange scheme, British concerts were particularly often aired.\textsuperscript{554} Educational broadcasts for, for example, upper secondary school students was another growing programme group, with the ‘English by radio’ series becoming especially popular also among YLE listeners.\textsuperscript{555} Although cooperation between American radio networks and YLE was more limited than the one with the BBC, the US Legation reported in 1947 that 21 programmes of American origin were aired by YLE that year.\textsuperscript{556}

In addition to Mrs Wuolijoki’s visit to London, and Programme Director Jussi Koskiluoma’s one-month trip to the same city\textsuperscript{557}, the relationship between YLE and the BBC was further enhanced through the visits of Sir Ian Jacob, Liisa Pesonen from the BBC’s Finnish Section and Denis Winther, Head of the Scandinavian Section.\textsuperscript{558} Hillar Kallas also visited Finland more than once, for example in July 1947 when he assisted the British Council’s summer school in Aulanko and in June 1948 when he gave daily reports on the Finnish general elections from one of YLE’s studios to all BBC services.\textsuperscript{559} The assistance YLE provided to the BBC in recruiting

\textsuperscript{549} For example Erkki Tuomioja, grandson and biographer of Hella Wuolijoki, insists that Mrs Wuolijoki had no intentions of making Yleisradio a propaganda organ for the communists. According to him, on the contrary, Wuolijoki made the radio more open by broadcasting the views of many political groups that had been ignored before. Tuomioja, Erkki, Häivähdys punaista. Hella Wuolijoki ja hänen sisarensa Salme Pekkala vallankumouksen palveluksessa (Helsinki 2006), pp. 323, 326.

\textsuperscript{550} Yleisradio sanomalehtikatsaukset ajalla 16.9. – 6.11.1948, HW, box 35, KA.

\textsuperscript{551} C. Pughe to H. Wuolijoki, April 30, 1946, PK, HW, box 5, YLE, ELKA.

\textsuperscript{552} Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Abn toiminnasta vuonna 1946 (Helsinki 1947), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{553} Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Abn toiminnasta vuonna 1947 (Helsinki 1948), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{554} For example in June 1946 YLE typically aired one to two British programmes per week. For example, Yleisradio’s Programme Department to British Council Helsinki, May 4, 1946, PK, HW, box 5, YLE, ELKA.

\textsuperscript{555} For example, J. Koskiluoma to E. Coffery, February 3, 1948, KK, box 4, YLE, ELKA.

\textsuperscript{556} US Legation to Secretary of State, ‘Budget Estimate for 1949 Fiscal Year for American Legation, Helsinki, April 29, 1947, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 7, NARA

\textsuperscript{557} Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Abn toiminnasta vuonna 1947 (Helsinki 1948), p. 9.

\textsuperscript{558} Ian Jacob, Denis Winther and Liisa Pesonen all visited Finland in July 1947. L. Pesonen to J. Koskiluoma, July 3, 1947, KK, box 4, YLE, ELKA.

\textsuperscript{559} H. Kallas to H. Wuolijoki, May 14, 1947, H. Kallas to H. Wuolijoki, June 11, 1948, both HW, KAY 221, KA.
staff to its Finnish Section also increased the cooperation between the two broadcasting companies.  

Even if the British and the Americans felt that they were more successful in getting broadcasts through on YLE’s frequency than they had initially expected, doing business with the corporation was always a delicate affair. This became evident already when the British Council lecture programmes were launched. Although pleased with the broadcasts, Hella Wuolijoki was not at all happy with their introduction part, which informed the audience that the programmes belonged to the British Council talk series. An YLE employee informed the British Council representative J.B.C. Grundy that the reason for this was that mentioning that the broadcasts were exclusively produced by the British Council could be associated with propaganda.  

Despite Mr Grundy’s protest, the British Council had to accept that the programmes it offered were to be given the introduction "arranged in cooperation with the British Council."  

The agreement between the BBC and YLE, according to which the latter would receive and broadcast every fortnight the news summary ‘London Calling’ prepared by the BBC Finnish Section’s commentator in London, would also turn out to be a highly sensitive affair. When Mrs Wuolijoki learnt about the arrangement, she was particularly horrified when finding out that the BBC’s Max Jakobson, also an assistant of YLE, was getting paid only by the British company. Jakobson’s relationship with a foreign broadcaster was obviously a touchy subject to her. Since YLE received similar summaries by a reporter of the Moscow Radio in the late 1940s, even Wuolijoki, however, had to admit that the airing of BBC material was acceptable also from a foreign policy perspective. Although the two broadcasters reached an agreement concerning the use of Mr Jakobson’s services, YLE’s airing of the BBC Finnish Service’s summaries, together with the commentator’s terms of employment, was a topic that would be discussed several times in the upcoming years. Any activity that could even remotely be associated with the transmission of the views of another government was always going to be sensitive.

A Restricted yet Far-Reaching Beginning

The incident discussed above is a good example of the situations Britain and the US faced when relaunching their operations in the very first post-war years. The two governments were able to implement reasonably active campaigns and form close contacts with a number of influential Finns, but at the same time the Finnish environment placed various restrictions to the activities and often made them a delicate balancing act. This kind of a position did not seem to trouble Western officials too much, as they wished to follow a cautious policy towards the country in

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560 YLE and the BBC were in contact already in 1945, when both corporations were recruiting a commentator in London. Later in the 1950s, YLE assisted the BBC actively in its recruiting process by, for example, offering its facilities for voice tests. For example, D. Winther to J. Koskiluoma, January 22, 1954, KK, box 7, YLE, ELKA.

561 Miss Nordström to J.B.C. Grundy, March 16, 1946, PK, HW, box 4, YLE, ELKA.

562 J.B.C. Grundy to H. Wuolijoki, March 18, 1946; H. Wuolijoki to J.B.C. Grundy, March 23, 1946, both PK, HW, box 4, YLE, ELKA.

563 H. Wuolijoki to D. Winther, October 14, 1947, PK, HW, box 6, YLE, ELKA.

564 Salokangas 1996, pp. 52-53.
any case and to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the Soviets. As a consequence, the FO's first post-war instructions for overseas propaganda, which stressed the promotion of British institutions and the new welfare state, fitted in with the Finnish environment well. Even though the Americans were willing to show some support to the Finns, their somewhat rapidly launched activities remained fairly modest for quite some time since the US Government also believed that it was both in its and Finland's interest not to risk the country's friendly relations with Moscow. This position also reflected Washington's attitude to post-war informational operations in a broader sense.

In the middle of all the caution, Western officials were quick to learn that Finland offered fruitful soil for their cultural programmes in particular. The Finns' great demand for all forms of Western culture in particular bolstered the British Council's position in the country and made its work easier even with limited resources. When the relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union started to deteriorate, both British and American officials began to pay more attention also to their informational operations in Helsinki and to defending their respective countries against the increasing verbal attacks published in communist newspapers. Although political propaganda remained limited and the northern country's independence seemed uncertain, the two Western governments' officials gradually became to realise that informational and cultural operations were likely to hold an exceptional position when attempting to influence Finland's future. In this respect, British and American activities in Finland in the first post-war years were important as they, despite their restricted nature, successfully laid down the foundation for broader and more direct operations launched in upcoming years.
4. COLD WAR BATTLE IN FINLAND BEGINS, 1948-1949

Introduction of IRD Print Material and Anti-Communist Radio Propaganda

The year 1948 can be seen as something of a watershed not only in Finnish history, but also in the Western powers’ policy towards the country. The exclusion of the communists from the Finnish Government, the abolishment of the police organisation Valpo and the realisation that the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), signed between Finland and the Soviet Union, was a less threatening pact than the West originally had feared strengthened the US and British governments’ belief in Finland’s survival as an independent country.565

In early 1948 this belief had been especially thin after Josif Stalin’s request for military consultation was received by the Finnish Government. Finland was now widely expected to ‘follow Czechoslovakia’s path’. The assurances given by the US Government that it would back Finland in anything short of war were the country to turn down Stalin’s request was small consolation to the Finns and left them to face the Soviets virtually on their own. The British Chiefs of Staff was, once again, particularly negative about the situation, stating that Finland was sooner or later doomed to be dominated by the Soviet Union.566 CIA reports from March 1948 were slightly more confident about the Finnish situation, noting that due to intense nationalism in Finland and the communists’ limited influence in the Government, Moscow would probably seek to avoid a major Finnish crisis and settle for terms which would “prepare the way for ultimate and complete domination at some future date”.567 As spring went on, the Americans became even more optimistic about the developments and saw that Finland would not be easily willing to give way to all Soviet propositions and that the communists would perhaps not have enough support to gain political power after all.568

The FCMA Treaty’s final form, although initially treated with suspicion, came as something of a relief to the West as it gave Finland some space to move on.569 The treaty, and the fact that the numerous rumours of a communist coup in Finland were quashed after the incidents of spring 1948570, gave new hope that Finland would not necessarily follow the same pattern as

565 Majander 1993, pp. 112–114.
567 Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States, CIA 3-48, March 10, 1948, CREST.
569 For example, the FO’s first reaction to the FCMA Treaty was that the Finns had obtained the best terms that they could hope for. FO to Lord Invarchapel, April 16, 1948, CAB 122/912, NA.
570 Americans in particular had for some time been concerned about rumours over a possible communist coup in Finland. At the end of April, these rumours seemed justified as prior to the ratification of the FCMA Treaty in the Finnish Parliament, a general alarm was given in Helsinki over a possible coup attempt. Already before this, arms and ammunition of the police force had been removed to the air shelter under Helsinki Cathedral. After some confusion, the situation calmed down and coup rumours waned off. There has later been endless debate over whether the threat of a coup was real. The prevailing view is that the communists did not have Moscow’s backing for such a move and that the whole situation was staged by the social democrats and/or President Paasikivi to show both foreign and domestic observers that the threat was seen as real and that the political leadership was ready to take necessary action in case such a situation occurred. See for example Rentola, Kimmo, Niin kylmää että polttaa: kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947–1958 (Helsinki 1997), pp. 53–54; Rautkallio 1979, pp. 240–251; Uola 2013, pp. 323-326; Visuri, Pekka, Suomi kylmässä sodassa (Helsinki 2006), pp. 95–96.

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other Eastern European countries had done after the war. Instead of discussing what kind of action should be chosen in the situation of complete Soviet domination, the Western powers started to prepare themselves for a more long-term strategy. Essential to this strategy was the belief that a free-market economy would be the strongest obstacle to the spread of communism.\footnote{Hanhimäki 1996, p. 55.} Therefore, the West should, with caution, strengthen its economic ties with Finland and support its reconstruction process. For fulfilling these objectives, the Finnish forest industry offered to be the perfect sector for investment, forming the strongest and most permanent link between Finland and the West.\footnote{Kuisma 1997, pp. 27-31.}

Naturally, the Western governments’ more optimistic interpretation of Finland's future did not mean that the country’s position would not continue to be under constant re-examination. In particular, Finland's closer trade relationship with its giant neighbour and Urho Kekkonen’s warm relationship with Moscow were followed with some alarm. The five-year trade agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1950 was seen as an attempt to influence Finland’s domestic politics and tie, the then Prime Minister, Kekkonen to closer dependency on Finnish communists.\footnote{Hanhimäki 1996, p. 86.} This view became more of a norm than the exception in the 1950s.

As the founding of the IRD coincided with a particularly sensitive period in Finnish history, the launch of the department’s material in the country was always going to have a slow start. The FCMA Treaty negotiations and its eventual ratification made the British realise that the moment was not quite right for a firmer line against Soviet propaganda in Finland. The FO’s first instructions concerning Britain’s more active anti-communist propaganda campaign from January 1948 had already confirmed that Whitehall’s estimation of Finland’s position remained unchanged also in terms of informational activities. With the actual telegram, a secret message was sent to British legations regarded as unable to carry out active anti-communist propaganda locally.\footnote{Secret Telegram No. 11 from Foreign Office to Helsinki, January 23, 1948, FO 1110/1, NA.} The Helsinki Legation’s inclusion in this group, in addition to the ones in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Belgrade, illustrates that Finland was firmly regarded as having more in common with Eastern European countries than those belonging to the West. According to the FO, legations such as Helsinki should concentrate on implementing the positive side of the news policy, i.e. to publicise the virtues of Western civilisation and let the BBC, if possible, to carry out the anti-communist campaign.

In his reply to these instructions, Oswald Scott, the new Minister to Finland, agreed that it would be unwise to “press Finland to throw in her lot with the Western Democracies”.\footnote{O. Scott to E. Bevin, February 9, 1948, FO 1110/1, NA.} According to him, the British campaign in Finland would focus on presenting the virtues and material advantages of the British approach to democracy by disseminating information through personal contacts with Finns in influential positions in politics, the trade unions, industry and journalism. As for written anti-communist propaganda, Scott was more positive than his colleagues at the FO, estimating that the Legation’s output would achieve at least some publicity. In general, however, Scott labelled Britain’s policy in Finland as one of “maximum
influence and minimum display”, a definition that illustrated the nature of the British campaign well in the late 1940s.

Subsequent correspondence on IRD work in Finland kept emphasising the country’s special position both geographically and politically and stressed that embarrassing the Finnish Government was not in line with British policy. This was also taken into account in day-to-day informational activities. The British Legation remained virtually silent during the events of spring 1948, while the BBC Finnish Service, following the FO’s instructions, focused on reporting about the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland in a neutral manner, merely speculating about the motives behind the Soviets’ action rather than encouraging the Finns to resist their neighbour’s demands. The adopted policy came as a disappointment to several prominent Finns, for example to Hjalmar Procopé, former Minister to the US and active, albeit entirely unofficial, spokesman concerning Finland’s position after the war, who had suggested that the British radio and press should encourage the Finns to reject the Soviet Union’s demands for a defensive pact.576

Saying that Britain practised a policy of minimum display in Finland in spring 1948 does not mean that the FO did not show any support to the Finns during one of the most crucial periods in their history. In early April, the FO’s Northern Department decided to provide appropriate Finnish politicians and officials with a memorandum that set out in detail the procedure followed by the communists when they seized power in Czechoslovakia.577 The FO felt that the memorandum, originally prepared by Pierson Dixon, Britain’s Minister to Prague, and requested for translation into Finnish by Oswald Scott, could be of use for Finnish anti-communists in preventing a similar coup d’état in their country. The writing, for example, stressed the importance of using the forces of order at the first sign of danger.578 As President Paasikivi, who also received the text from the British Legation579, quashed all coup d’état rumours in Helsinki in late April 1948 by taking rapid and decisive action, for example by approving the movement of police arms, scholars like Hannu Soikkanen and Jukka Nevakivi have interpreted that he, and in Soikkanen’s view some leading social democrats as well, actually followed the memorandum’s propositions.580 Although this might be too direct a conclusion, for instance because the points brought up in the memorandum were not exactly novel, it is obvious that a public demonstration of force helped the Finnish political leadership to reach its objective of showing that what happened in Czechoslovakia would not be possible in Finland.

British officials in Helsinki certainly felt that the memorandum had landed in fruitful ground, and with the FO’s permission continued to distribute another version of it to several Finnish MPs before the parliamentary elections of July 1948. Mr Scott wished that this version would be used by the politicians to bring home to the electorate the essentials and functions of

577 O. Scott to FO, April 2, 1948; FO to O. Scott, April 3, 1948, both FO 371/71409; O. Scott to E. Bevin, ’Anti-Communist Publicity’, April 27, 1948, FO 1110/8, all NA.
578 P.J. Dixon to FO, April 16, 1948, FO 371/71410, NA. The Finnish version of the memorandum, ‘Tšekkoslovakian kommunistien vallankaappausstrategia”, can be found at least at Päivälehden arkisto and Työväen arkisto. SOLAK, Aa 48, EEA, PLA; SDP:n tiedotusosaston tiedotuksia (Hereafter SDP TT) 1948, HAB1, TA.
communism and what a communist government would mean in terms of loss of personal liberties. In his view, the issue between communism and social democracy in Finland could no longer be regarded as a matter of purely internal politics. This position can be regarded as somewhat controversial considering that only in late April the FO had, once again, stressed to the Minister to Finland that Britain should not leave the Finns under any illusion that they could hope for more than moral and political support from the country. Mr Scott’s statement suggested that some British officials were ready to introduce at least slightly stronger measures for supporting anti-communist Finns in their activities against the communists.

British propaganda activity in Finland was finally expanded in 1949. Although the majority of the Information Office’s work still concerned overt activities, such as the distribution of ‘normal’ printed content, the introduction of IRD material increased the attention given to more covert means. Also with this in mind, the British Legation made the distribution of its printed material to Finnish newspapers and political parties considerably more efficient. The network of ‘influential contacts’, which included politicians, newspaper editors, academics and teachers, played a large part in this. The publication of newspaper reports, in particular feature articles, was constantly discussed with various Finnish editors and journalists. At first, the ‘straight’ material provided by the COI totally dominated the material sent to the Finnish press through the daily press bulletin, but as time passed and Finland’s independence grew more robust, the more aggressive IRD-produced anti-communist articles were included in the bulletin to a growing extent. Already in April 1948, Oswald Scott noted that such papers as Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi and Hufvudstadsbladet would hold a key position in advocating the anti-communist message under the special circumstances prevailing in Finland, as they had been “consistently resourceful and courageous in their anti-communist line”. In order to present the British viewpoint to Finnish as effectively as possible, the FO started to arrange several visits of top-flight Finnish editors to Britain. The first of these trips took place in spring 1950, and included well-known names like Yrjö Niiniluoto of Helsingin Sanomat and Lauri Aho of Uusi Suomi.

Despite the gradual increase in distributed anti-communist material, it would be an exaggeration to say that Britain practiced broad scale anti-communist propaganda in Finland in the late 1940s. Indeed, in many respects the content of British printed propaganda in Finland during this particular period remained similar to that distributed in Eastern satellites countries. Publicity was confined to the virtues of the Western way of life. The Finns’ objection to propaganda, as well as the fact that they needed no reminding of the Soviet Union being an imperialist power, was generally recognised in London, and it was assessed that blatant anti-Russian propaganda might have an opposite effect to that intended.

This view was not always applied to the BBC Finnish Service broadcasts, which the British Legation in Helsinki regarded as the main channel for anti-communist commentary in the late 1940s. As the FO wished to 'brighten up' the Finnish transmissions after the new propaganda

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581 O. Scott to P.J. Dixon, May 18, 1948, FO 371/71410, NA.
582 R.M.A. Hankey to O. Scott, April 20, 1948, FO 371/71407, mf Englanti 88, KA.
583 O. Scott to E. Bevin, 'Anti-Communist publicity', April 27, 1948, FO 1110/8, NA.
584 J.I. McGhie to IPD, February 1, 1950, FO 953/857; O. Scott to C.F.A. Warner, July 4, 1950, FO 953/876, both NA.
policy was introduced at Whitehall, the Finnish audience would soon have more of what it wanted in terms of political content. The closer cooperation between the FO and the BBC also concerned Finnish broadcasts, which meant that the British Legation started to follow the service more closely and to provide comments and suggestions on how the programmes should be developed. The introduction of two-way correspondence between the Legation and Denis Winther, Head of Scandinavian and Finnish Sections at the BBC, soon turned into a regular feature for broadcast planning. In particular, the criticism on individual scripts by Hamish McGhie, the Information Officer posted in Helsinki in the late 1940s and early 1950s, were highly detailed and included a great number of improvement proposals. The FO also requested that the Legation start sending what were known as Aside telegrams to London in order to provide the BBC with ammunition of a more political nature. The Aside telegrams, usually transmitted only from Soviet satellite countries, included information on the propaganda line adopted by the communist press and they were sent from Helsinki in particular when any attack was made on Britain or any misrepresentation of British policy appeared so that the FO could suggest the BBC on how to address them.585

In Finnish working class areas that were strongly affected by communist agitation and propaganda in the late 1940s and 1950s, the British Legation regarded the BBC as virtually the only channel that could make an effective contribution to the counter-attack.586 While the inclusion of more political and, in particular, anti-communist content was urged by the FO, it was also acknowledged that material on the misdeeds of communism deemed as too heavy “might overexcite the Finns, most of whom are anyhow as hostile to the Russians and the communists as they could possibly be, with unwelcome results”. At least in early 1948 there was no fear of this as the broadcasts mainly included news, music and discussion programmes with titles like ‘An interview with an Anglo-Finnish Family’.587

The British Legation certainly provided plenty of comments on the BBC to both the FO and the broadcaster itself from 1948 onwards. In February 1948, Minister Scott gave a highly detailed account on how the output of the Finnish Service should be allotted in terms of programme content. Not surprisingly, the Legation called for more political commentaries that “should be presented in a confident, almost aggressive tone, calculated to stimulate the listener’s confidence in what he is hearing”. The British officials in Helsinki also recommended the inclusion of favourable comments on Finnish events. This proposal was justified by noting that Finns continued to feel both geographically and culturally isolated from the West and that “anything that the British can say to create a feeling that they are nevertheless in some respect marching along a road approved by us would have value”. Despite this local angle, the Legation agreed that the bulk of material should concern Britain and that, for instance, the music played on air should be British.588 FO officials agreed with these views and suggested that a greater number of the Finnish Section's political broadcasts should focus on enlightening the Finns.

585 For example, C.F.A. Warner to O.A. Scott, February 3, 1950, FO 953/871, NA.
586 A.R.H. Kellas to C.F.A. Warner, April 15, 1951, FO 953/1119, NA.
588 O.A. Scott to E. Bevin, February 10, 1948, FO 953/233, NA.
about such heavier issues as economic and political difficulties inside the Soviet sphere of interest while at the same time stressing the economic and military power of the West.  

Although the BBC insisted that it would remain cautious in its broadcasts to Finland, the greater amount of news material the Finnish Service started to share with other regional services made its content more in line with the hardening anti-communist policy emerging in Britain. This tendency was also noted by Eero A. Wuori, Finland’s Minister to Britain, who in September 1948 asked the FO whether the sharper tone adopted by the BBC would mean a change in British policy towards Finland. Mr Wuori felt that “the Finnish opinion should not be too actively stirred up.” Although the FO gave Mr Wuori the diplomatic answer that the British Government’s policy had not changed and that it was not part of their policy to carry the Cold War to Finland, the British felt that it would be a mistake to refrain from stating their case merely because it involved reporting facts that were unpleasant to the Soviets. The reply seemed to convince Mr Wuori, who while understanding that Britain’s more direct policy for countering Soviet propaganda would only increase tension in Europe, estimated that it was not in its interest to cause a conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union, simply because it would have no effective methods to intervene in such a dispute.

This was not the first time when a Finnish official such as Minister Wuori expressed his concerns over the consequences of a stronger anti-communist, not to mention anti-Soviet, campaign that the British or the Americans might introduce in Finland. As Wuori felt that his primary task in London was to maintain confidence among British circles about Finland’s prospects and assure the FO that there was no need to bring the Cold War to the country, his activity in this matter was hardly surprising. The claim according to which irritating the Soviets was in no way in the Finnish Government’s interest was often shared with Western officials in Finland who in general respected this view. The line between being too aggressive and too defeatist was, however, never easy to draw, even by the Finns themselves. During the delicate situation Finland faced in spring 1948, Mr Wuori expressed his concerns to the FO over the tone of British and American newspapers comments, which he found too negative in terms of Finland’s future. Oswald Scott felt that Wuori’s allegation had some justification and saw to it that the few British correspondents in Finland were reminded about the desirability of objective reporting. Although the British Legation felt that the Finnish Government’s actions in matters related to informational activities were often exaggerated, the British did realise that

589 H.A.P. Hohler to R.M.A. Hankey, November 3, 1948, FO 953/233, NA.
592 Wuori summarised this to be his main goal in London already when arriving in the city in late 1945. For example, Pekkarinen, Jussi, Maailmanluokan tarkkailupäällä: Suomen Lontoon suurlähetystön historia (Porvoo 2012), p. 138.
593 In Wuori’s view, newspaper articles claiming that Finland could be more or less written off would only depress non-communist Finns, because they suggested that the West was losing interest in their fate, and encourage the Russians to increase their pressure during the upcoming treaty negotiations. FO minute by Mr Bateman, ‘Tone of the British and US Press in Regard to Events in Finland’, March 15, 1948, FO 371/71421A, NA.
594 O. Scott to FO, March 23, 1948, FO 371/71421A, NA.
finding something of a middle ground in both newspaper reports and radio commentary was important for Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union.

**Promoting the Positive of America**

In the late 1940s the US Government adopted an informational policy in Finland in many respects similar to the British one. American officials continued to expand their contacts with Finnish politicians and members of the media, but refrained from introducing the same kind of a broad-scale anti-communist propaganda campaign they had started to implement both home and abroad. There is no evidence of the US Legation distributing similar material to the FO memorandum during spring 1948, but it is evident that officials both in Helsinki and Washington followed the developments closely and backed any action taken to defeat possible coups in the country. The Americans’ close contacts with leading Finnish politicians, in particular with the social democrats, kept them well informed about the general developments in the country, including the activities of the communists, and helped them to form a suitable policy for informational and cultural operations. As the outcome of the FCMA Treaty negotiations turned out to be more lenient than the State Department had initially feared, the US Legation in Helsinki started to feel more confident about planning its activities further to the future.

Although the Smith-Mundt Act guaranteed greater funds for informational and cultural operations also in Helsinki, the shift to large-scale American activities did not take place at once. In 1948, the fact that the personnel of the US Legation’s information and cultural section included only two Americans and five local employees\(^595\) limited the execution of press, film and library services in particular. Some improvement was achieved in the summer of 1948 when the USIS restarted issuing its daily Finnish-language Wireless Bulletin, which had been axed as a result of budget cuts in the previous year.\(^596\) Improving the distribution of American news reports through the USIS bulletins and American newspapers was something the US Legation put particular effort to in the late 1940s. In addition to the relaunch of the Finnish-language bulletin, the distribution of the original English Wireless Bulletin was, with the help of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, increased to a greater number of leading politicians.\(^597\) By early 1948 the English bulletin was, in addition to the President and leading ministers, sent to, for example, members of the Finnish Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. Henry F. Arnold, the first American Cultural and Press Attaché in Finland, also made sure that leading Finnish decision-makers, including President Paasikivi, received American publications such as *The New York Times*, *Newsweek* and *Life Magazine* on a regular basis.\(^598\)

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595 US Legation to SD, 'Report on Information and Cultural Activities for May, 1948', July 12, 1948, RG 59, SD Decimal Files on Finland (Hereafter SDDFF) 1945—1949, box 4808, 811.42760D SE/5—1248, NARA.


597 H.F. Arnold to L. Hjelt, September 22, 1947; L. Hjelt to H.F. Arnold, September 30, 1947, both 115,UMA.

598 H.F. Arnold to J.K. Paasikivi, September 15, 1949; J.K. Paasikivi to H.F. Arnold, September 21, 1949, both JKP, VAY 4079, KA.
A close relationship with the Finnish press was of great importance for the US Legation and its quest of increasing coverage of American news in the local newspapers. After the official inception of the USIS programme in Finland, the Americans were quick to realise that Finnish newspapers were more than willing to publish their material. In September 1948, the press service had already expanded to the point at which the USIS distributed both its English and Finnish news bulletin to over 200 recipients, 112 of which were Finnish newspapers. At this stage, the largest Finnish papers, using mostly commercial news services and their own correspondents, published only one or more items every month. These two publications, together with some provincial newspapers, particularly the Tampere-based Aamulehti and social democratic party affiliations were to become the best outlets for USIE and later USIA material in Finland. In order to create closer relationships with Finnish journalists and increase their use of USIS content even further, the Americans, not unlike the British, also invited them to their country. One of the first organised visits of leading Finnish reporters to the American continent took place in September 1949, when Helsingin Sanomat, Uusi Suomi, Hufvudstadsbladet and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti sent one senior journalist each on the two-week ‘air discovery tour’ of the US organised by the State Department for editors from fourteen European countries.

As it became increasingly evident that Finnish editors were not ready to publish material that could be interpreted as anti-Soviet, the Americans focused on supplying them with more positive items about their country. There was no problem in having this kind of material published, and the Americans learnt that news on new inventions and medical discoveries were especially easy to place, as were stories on economic developments in the US. USIS officials were aware that their news service could not match the commercial news agencies in terms of reporting speed. Mainly for this reason, the bulletins’ primary objective was to provide material that would supplement the already reported news and give editors some valuable background material for further articles. In addition to news articles, for example translations of the most important speeches of leading American politicians were constantly sent to editors. In order to push their message through as efficiently as possible, the Americans gradually developed a practice that saw them closely monitoring the leading Finnish newspapers and then providing them with material on news that had been insufficiently covered or left out altogether. For this reason, and because anti-communist material was rarely used by the press, the Finnish news bulletin became highly tailored for local needs. The items were selected for “their importance as timely statements in American foreign policy, as picturing events, conditions, or life in the United States, or because of their direct or indirect interest to Finns”.


600 The four leading Finnish journalists taking part in the tour were Arvo Ääri of Helsingin Sanomat, Kaj Brunila of Hufvudstadsbladet, Kurt Linderborg of Uusi Suomi and Lauri Sihvo of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti. F.L. Brunton to M.J. Connelly, September 1, 1949, Tk 1, Printed copies of records from Harry S. Truman Library, K.A.

In November 1949, the USIS reported that the Finnish-language bulletin sent to
newspapers, known as ‘Uutisia Usasta’, consisted of material of which 60 per cent was
translated from the daily Wireless Bulletin and 40 per cent from the USIE’s Air Bulletins, Press
Features and Magazine Reprints. USIE’s ‘Negro Notes’, which had the objective of presenting
the increasing opportunities black people had in the US, were also widely included in the
bulletin. Finnish newspapers were also willing to publish “the positive negro news”; in fact,
other news material concerning Afro-American people in the US was rare in Finnish

In addition to improving the execution of informational operations in Helsinki, the
Americans gradually started to pay attention to making contacts throughout the country. One
example of this kind of activity was the public affairs officer’s field trip in May 1948 to
provincial Finnish towns with the goal of acquainting civic leaders and newspaper editors with
the facilities available through the USIS for acquiring information about the US, showing USIS
films to Finnish-American societies and creating “a general awareness in the visiting

In terms of publicity, these activities certainly paid off. Provincial newspapers were more than happy to
report about such visits as well as about American culture in general. By covering American
activities in their region, the publications were, of course, no different from the newspapers
published in Helsinki. The volume of foreign activity in Finland in the late 1940s was still so
small, as was the number of foreigners, that the Finnish press followed them with great interest.

Both American and British informational and cultural operations were at the time broadly
covered in Finnish newspapers with officers such as Henry Arnold and Hamish McGhie
becoming relatively well-known figures among the Finnish public.\footnote{In the late 1940s, leading Finnish ne wspapers usually gave gr eat attention to all major American and British exhibitions and covered comments by cultural and informational officers such as Mr Arnold and Mr McGhie. For Arnold’s comments on American culture given to Finnish journalists, see Helsingin Sanomat, September 21, 1946. For Arnold’s speech at the Finnish-American Society, see Helsingin Sanomat, January 10, 1946. For McGhie’s interview on his arrival to Helsinki, see Helsingin Sanomat, July 17, 1949. For McGhie’s views on the British Documentary Films Week, see Ita-Sanomat, January 21, 1950. For McGhie departing, see Helsingin Sanomat, November 18, 1952.}

As the available resources increased, the USIS office in Finland continued its steady
expansion in the late 1940s. Finnish people’s eagerness to watch and read almost anything
coming from the US was well reflected by the impressive pace at which the audience size for
USIE films grew. In October 1949, a total of 45,837 persons viewed the films at 384 non-
commercial performances. A year later, as many as 148,000 persons, 117,975 of whom at non-

A growth rate of this magnitude meant that the four people looking after the USIS Motion Picture Section had their hands full
in running its everyday business. As one of the main objectives of the USIE film programme
was to give people living in sparsely-settled rural areas the possibility to see the productions, the

office staff was as overwhelmed with loaning out films and projectors to organisations and individuals throughout the country and arranging Finnish and Swedish translations for the films as they were with presentations in the Helsinki area, mostly in schools and other educational institutes. The Finnish State's decision to place a lower tax rate for short films of educational nature meant that USIE films, together with American newsreels provided by private companies, were also to a growing extent shown in commercial movie theatres before the main film. By 1950, the Americans were able to note that the USIS/Helsinki had become by far the chief supplier of educational films in Finland. This was, of course, hardly surprising considering that the total number of American films, both commercial and non-commercial, made up for an incredible 69 per cent of all film premieres given to the Finnish audience during that year.

Despite the early success of USIS operations in Finland, the US Legation was always aware of the limitations imposed by the local circumstances. In November 1949, the Americans summarised the main challenge for USIS activities by reporting that foreign government propaganda, particularly American, required almost the same level of caution with which Finland handled its relationship with its powerful neighbour “for the delicacy of the Finnish position rules out any flamboyant approach such as might be possible in other countries”. For this reason, USIS activity in post-war Finland continued to proceed relatively quietly, stressing positive, factual information about the US. The USIS/Helsinki realised that its operations must be so correct that they precluded any Soviet reaction against the Finns for allowing such activities.

The objective of not endangering Finland’s position also involved calming the Finns by avoiding to give them any assurances about assistance. According to J. Raymond Ylitalo, a CIA official working at the US Legation in Helsinki in the 1940s and 1950s, American officials were in the first post-war years constantly contacted by even fanatical underground leaders seeking promises of support in their future conflict with the Russians. Although the most direct expressions of resentment to the Soviet Union cooled down by the 1950s, or were more likely swept under the carpet, the Americans were fully aware about the anti-Soviet sentiment among the majority of Finns, which was to prevail for decades to come.

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607 For example, Ristimäki 1996, p. 264

608 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘USIE Country Paper for Finland’, April 28, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60/4-2850, NARA.

609 The share of American commercial films shown in Finland grew quickly after the war, reaching the 50-per cent mark out of all movie premieres as early as 1945. In comparison, British movies made up an 8.2 per cent share of all premieres between 1944 and 1950; the similar figure for Soviet films was 7.3 per cent. Välimäki 1992, pp. 57-59.


The sense of caution reflected a broader concern regarding Finland’s position. Both CIA and State Department reports from 1949 reveal that although somewhat more confident about the future of Finland, the Americans could not entirely write off either Soviet military aggression in Finland or the erection of a communist state in Finland by other means. The CIA interpreted the rumours about the increase of Soviet troops along the Finnish border in spring 1949 as being mere ‘war of nerves’ to prevent Scandinavian participation in the Atlantic Pact, and believed that the Kremlin would avoid a military occupation of Finland because that might only frighten Sweden into the arms of the West.613 Nevertheless, it also pointed out that Finland was among the few remaining regions in Europe where a Soviet military operation could be carried out without inevitably precipitating a war with the West.614 The US Legation in Helsinki, while agreeing that a military move from the Kremlin seemed unlikely, concluded that the Russians were willing to invest more in propaganda in Finland in the belief that its activities, together with an often predicted economic depression in the capitalist world, would weaken the anti-communist forces in Finland and pave way for a legitimately appointed communist-influenced government.615 This concern would sharpen the American activities in Finland considerably in the early 1950s.

**Spreading the Word to Social Democrats**

Even though both the US and British administrations continuously stressed that they should operate discreetly in Finland, the Western powers were unwilling to watch the growing tension between Finnish communists and non-communists entirely from the sidelines. The ever-heating battle between the two in both party politics and within the trade union movement made the British and Americans expand their connections and support for SDP officials, increasingly regarded as key players for Finland’s future development. Political propaganda offered the most natural platform for the cooperation between the SDP and the two Western countries. The British in particular understood that the social democratic propaganda machinery, which increasingly stressed the importance of countering communism in the field by exposing the true nature of its ideology616, would offer an important channel for the further distribution of their informational material. The fact that party memoranda urged social democratic publications to acquire a greater number of international news reports and expressed the importance of countering communist propaganda by spreading reliable information about the situation in Eastern Europe617, which was hard to come by in Finland, also suited the British objectives perfectly. As a result, the British Legation started to feed the SDP Information Department

613 'Intelligence Memorandum No. 149: Soviet Reactions to Scandinavian Adherence to the Atlantic Pact', March 29, 1949, CREST.
614 'Review of the World Situation', CIA 3-49, March 16, 1949, CREST.
615 Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 49 dated March 10, 1949, from US Legation, Helsinki, entitled: “Finnish-Soviet Relations”, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 14, NARA.
616 For example, Memorandum: 'Suomen työväenliikkeen ja erityisesti Suomen ammattiyhdistysliikkeen sisäisestä tilanteesta syksylä 1949', Väinö Leskinen’s collection (VL), box Hb1, TA.
617 For example, 'Muistio Puoluetomistolle SA:n toimittamista koskevista asiaista’, by Y. Kaarne, February 23, 1950, VL, box Hb2, TA.
with more anti-communist content, put together both in London and in Helsinki, in addition to the more ‘neutral’ news included in their bulletin.  

The first examples of material of this nature sent to the party in the late 1940s included a summary of a lecture Denis Healey gave on the BBC concerning communist tactics during the Czechoslovakian coup, his written comment on the tight control the Soviet Union practised over its Eastern European satellites and an extract of Christopher Mayhew’s speech dealing with forced labour in the Soviet Union he gave as Britain’s delegate at the UN’s Economic and Social Council. As both Healey and Mayhew were closely associated with the IRD, the distribution of this content to foreign shores was obviously planned by the department itself. Since these comments countered the Soviet Union and communist practices in a direct manner, they clearly offered another perspective to world developments than the British bulletin. The same can be said about the summaries of the foreign press and the reviews of events behind the Iron Curtain, which, judging by their content, style of writing and quality of paper, the British Legation also delivered to the SDP. The social democrats certainly made full use of all of the content mentioned above by producing and spreading copies of them to different parts of the country through the party’s information department.

British influence on the SDP’s informational operations was not restricted to the distribution of propaganda material. Finnish social democrats also received plenty of useful advice on field-level propaganda strategies from the Labour Party in London, in addition to the FO officials in Helsinki. In 1950, Armas D. Siimes, with the title ‘SDP’s propaganda secretary’, and Aito Anto, one of Väinö Leskinen’s closest collaborators, visited Britain in order to learn about Labour’s propaganda activities. Although it is not possible to estimate the actual outcome of these visits, one can assume that the superior resources invested in political propaganda in Britain impressed the visitors and gave them new ideas for making their own propaganda machinery even more efficient. Even if this was true, the collaboration between the Labour Party and the SDP remained at the ‘foot soldier’ level, as Mikko Majander has noted. This of course suited

618 In the late 1940s, the British Legation’s news bulletins continued to exclude material that would counter communism or the Soviet Union. The reports dealt with issues like the founding of the European Council or the introduction of new television technology in Britain. For example, Englannin lähetystö, Sanomalehtikatsaus, September 18, 1949; Englannin lähetystö, Sanomalehtikatsaus, November 22, 1949, both SDP KV, box F281, TA.

619 ‘Kommunistien vallanastustekniikka’, SDP TT, 1948, HAB1, TA.

620 ‘Itä-Euroopan talouselämä Neuvostoliiton valvonnassa’, August 10, 1949, SDP TT, 1949, HAB2, TA.


622 Denis Healey of the Labour Party was also closely connected to the IRD. The two acted as channels between the FO and the Labour Party distributing IRD material and also contributing to it. Defty 2004, pp. 50, 196.

623 For example, ‘Katsaus ulkomaiseen lehdistöön 25.2.1949’, SDP TT, 1949, HAB2, TA.

624 For example, ‘Tietoja rautaesiripun takaa’, June 29, 1949, SDP TT, 1949, HAB2, TA.

625 Although a large share of the international content delivered to and used by the SDP does not include details about the source, the prints that do indicate that they are of British origin have so much in common in terms of style and the themes they handle with the content not revealing the source, it is safe to assume that most have the same origin.

626 V. Leskinen to D. Healey, December 30, 1949, SDP KV, box F281; V. Leskinen to D. Healey, October 27, 1950, SDP KV, box F289, both TA; Majander 2005, p. 133.

627 Majander 2005, p. 133.
Britain’s general policy towards Finland, which accepted gestures of moral support, but stressed the need of caution when it came to broader cooperation.

Although the cautious approach also applied to Britain’s relations with Finnish trade unions, it did not prevent the FO from wanting to increase its influence in Finnish labour circles. For this purpose, the FO appointed a labour attaché to the British Legation in Helsinki. From 1946 to 1950 this post was held by Charles L. Thomas, who can be considered as to have been Britain’s most important link to Finnish labour market circles during that time. Thomas’ regular reports from Helsinki give the reader a good impression of the scale of his activities in Finland. He not only monitored the battle taking place within the Finnish trade union movement, but also undertook several travels throughout the country, for both presentation and information collection purposes, and managed to establish a vast number of contacts with ministers, civil servants, the press and the University of Helsinki at which he also gave some lectures. In addition to his own presentation tours, which focused on giving talks on topics like socialised industry in Britain and the British National Health Service, Mr Thomas also collaborated closely with both the British Council and the Finnish-British Society in addressing aspects of life in Britain to various groups of Finns.

As for printed propaganda, from August 1947 onwards Mr Thomas started distributing a special labour bulletin, ‘Työalan uutisia Britanniaasta’ (Labour News from Britain), to a selected group of Finns, mainly social democratic trade unions. There was clearly some demand for information related to labour matters among Finns since the circulation of the monthly bulletin grew rapidly from 70 to 150. Several of its articles were also included as such in Finnish newspapers or used indirectly for other published reports. The British Legation soon understood the significance of distributing such content, ranking the labour bulletin among the most important tools of propaganda in Finland together with its other bulletins and the BBC Finnish Service. Although the articles included in the first bulletins, as well as other reports sent by Mr Thomas, largely followed the same guidelines as the other British material spread to the Finns, emphasising such positive labour-related developments in Britain as the creation of the welfare state, the share of anti-communist material in the publication was soon increased. In the last years of the 1940s, the bulletin started to include more articles dealing with the TUC’s position on the dispute taking place at the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and on communism in a more general sense. The Finnish trade unionists made the most of

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629 Report by Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas, January 26, 1948, FO 371/71414, NA.
630 British Legation to SAK, ‘A timetable for Mr. Thomas’ presentation tour around Finland in June 1949’, April 28, 1949, SAK:n kansainvälinen kirjeenvaihto (Herafter SAK KV) 1949 (Englanti), TA.
631 Report by Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas, January 26, 1948, FO 371/71414, NA.
632 Ibid.
633 'Review of 1948' by C.L. Thomas, January 12, 1949, LAB 13/486, NA.
634 For example, ‘Sosiaalinen turvallisuus Britanniaassa’, Office of Labour Attaché, Helsinki, March 1948, SAK KV 1948 (Englanti), TA.
635 'Review of 1948' by C.L. Thomas, January 12, 1949, LAB 13/486, NA; For example, 'Työalan uutisia Britanniaasta, No. 16', December 1948; V. Tewson to E. Huunonen, 'Ammattiyhdistysliike ja kommunismi', October 27, 1948; 'Työalan uutisia Britanniaasta, No. 18', February 1949, all SAK KV 1948 & 1949 (Englanti), TA.
this material, as for instance a special Finnish version of the TUC pamphlet regarding its relationship with the WFTU was circulated to all members of the SAK.636

In addition to the labour attaché’s activities, the FO and the TUC also expressed their solidarity to Finnish social democratic trade unions by sending prominent visitors to Finland and jointly organising visits of several Finnish trade unionists to Britain. The first important figure to take part in this scheme was long-time trade unionist Sir George Chester, who visited the SAK Congress in June 1947. Although Chester’s stay was regarded as a success by both sides, the visit that really caught attention was made by Victor Feather, Assistant Secretary of the TUC, who in autumn 1949 addressed large audiences in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku. The impact of Feather’s small tour, which was well covered by the Finnish press637, was such that the organisation of similar events by the FO and the TUC became even increasingly important in British eyes.638 From the propaganda operation perspective, the significance of Feather’s visit to Finland was that he was the TUC’s main connection to the IRD, who not only coordinated the distribution of propaganda material within the trade unions, but also contributed to the anti-communist cause by writing several articles and pamphlets that were spread around the world and by giving lectures both home and abroad.639

The British trade union leaders’ visits to Finland had a great propagandistic value for the hosts, as they symbolised Western support for social democratic trade unionists during difficult times. The visits made by leading Finnish trade union officials to Britain, part of the FO’s larger anti-communist scheme to invite foreign labour leaders, or future leaders, to the country640, were also warmly welcomed by the Finns. Although some Finnish trade union officials had visited Britain already in February 1945641, the tour given to eight labour leaders, including Aku Sumu, General Secretary of the SAK, in summer 1949 marked the first effort to influence Finnish visitors in an organised way. According to C.L. Thomas, the tour, which took the participating Finns all over the country from London to Leeds and from the Ministry of Labour to football matches, was undoubtcdly of great value. “The Social Democrats, already good friends of ours, have had their faith stabilised and have returned with plenty of material ready to hand with which to promote the cause of Western Democracy and Britain in general”, he concluded.642

Even though the US Legation had formed a close relationship with Finnish social democrats already in the first post-war years, for quite some time the Americans remained cautious about promising anything but verbal support. When the State Department became more convinced of Finland’s future and the SDP’s and the SAK’s key positions in containing communism in the

636 Report by Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas, April 5, 1949, LAB 13/487, NA.
637 See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, October 11, 1949.
638 Both Minister Scott and C.L. Thomas praised the importance of Feather’s visit and encouraged the FO and TUC to send similar lecturers to Finland. O. Scott to C.E.A. Warner. ‘Report on Information work during the last quarter of 1949’. February 5, 1950, FO 953/876; ‘Visit to Finland of Mr Victor Feather’ by C.L. Thomas, October 19, 1949, LAB 13/487, both NA.
640 ‘Visits to the United Kingdom by groups of Foreign Trade Unionists as the guests of HM Government’, Confidential memo, April 1949, FO 371/77359, NA.
641 FO minute: ‘Broadcast by Finnish Trade Unionist visiting this country’, February 19, 1945, FO 371/47420, NA.
country, US officials both in Helsinki and Washington gradually started to find more concrete ways to back the social democrats. It soon became evident that the main channel for this would be the CIA-backed AFL-organ the FTUC. The organisation’s two leading Cold War warriors, Jay Lovestone, a former communist who was the de facto head of FTUC operations, and Irving Brown, the AFL representative in Europe also working directly for the CIA, both felt that the Finns should be provided with more than just verbal encouragement and quickly formed contacts with several prominent members of both the SDP and the SAK. Of course, this task was not that difficult as prominent figures like Väinö Leskinen and Olavi Lindblom, General Secretary at the SAK, were in regular contact with both men, trying to convince them of how crucial any financial support to the social democrats would be in the battle against communism. Soon after Brown’s first visit to Helsinki in October 1949, during which he met a number of leading Finnish politicians and trade unionists, the FTUC decided that the SAK was definitely worth supporting financially. Lovestone now had two objectives in Finland; to get enough CIA funding to support the field-level fight against the communists and to wean the SAK away from the WFTU.

The actual money started to flow to the SAK the following year after the CIA finally opened its cash pipeline. When the first sums arrived to the "Finnish lumber merchants", as Lovestone labelled the receiving group, they helped the social democrats to outnumber the communists in the SAK Congress and gave the Finnish trade union movement confidence to seed from the WFTU. In his biography of Lovestone, Ted Morgan has claimed that from 1951 on, the CIA continued to fund the SAK by approximately $160,000 per year. Although Mikko Majander has later dismissed this figure as too large, he has recognised that the exact sum is more or less impossible to estimate due to the great number of sources pumping money to the Finnish social democrats. Whatever the precise sum was, Finland’s share of FTUC support was, undoubtedly, among the most considerable during the early Cold War. This did not prevent the Finns from actively asking for more funds to cover additional expenses throughout the 1950s.

In his quest to contain communism in Europe, Jay Lovestone understood the value of personal contacts in addition to mere financial support. For the Finnish case, he managed to form a relationship with such prominent Finns as Arvo “Poika” Tuominen. In the late 1940s, Tuominen, a former member of the Comintern Executive Committee, worked as a correspondent for the Finnish social democratic press in Stockholm and acted as something of a middleman for the SDP, channelling material support to the party from mostly Finns living in the

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643 For example, Majander 2001, p. 231
644 Brown’s visit to Finland in October 1949 was widely covered by the Finnish press. When, for example, Helsingin Sanomat wrote that the purpose of Mr Brown’s visit was to become acquainted with the Finnish trade union movement, the communist press connected Brown’s arrival with the West’s intentions to lure the SAK to leave the WFTU and with the ‘imperialists’ plans to stage a new war’. For example, Helsingin Sanomat, October 22, 1949; Majander 2007, p. 104.
646 For example, Wilford 2008, p. 55.
649 For example, Majander 2001, p. 250.
Lovestone realised fully well the propaganda value such individuals as Tuominen had to offer to the Cold War battle and started to exchange articles with him that were mostly of an anti-communist nature. Tuominen was pleased with this correspondence and, for example, contributed an article about the ideological battle taking place in the Finnish trade unions to the FTUC publication *International Free Trade Union News.* For translating the article, Tuominen received help from Hjalmar Procopé, who also was in correspondence with Lovestone and even met him in Washington. Procopé acted as something of a promoter of closer ties between Finland and the US, cooperating also with social democrats such as Tuominen and Oskari Tokoi, former head of the SDP living in exile in Massachusetts. All three men, as different as their backgrounds were, shared the same goal of countering communism in Finland. Tokoi, in addition to raising funds to help the Finns in their post-war struggle, wrote regular articles about the Finnish situation and developments in the US not only for *Raivaaja*, the leading publication for Finnish-Americans, but also for *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti.*

While providing the social democrats with financial support, the Americans also made sure that they would receive plenty of propaganda material about labour issues both at home and abroad. The most important channel for labour-related news was the special labour bulletin, first named as ‘Työuutisia Yhdysvalloista’, which the USIS/Helsinki started to deliver bi-weekly in 1951. The bulletin was edited by the labour reporting officer of the Legation primarily on the material published by the Department of Labour, and distributed to leaders of labour organisations and the SDP. Early issues suggest that its articles emphasised the high standard of labour conditions in the US and promoted such broader American propaganda themes as the improvement of race equality in the workplace without paying that much attention to attacking the communist system. The tendency remained more or less the same even when

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650 Tuominen's latter role was particularly important for the SDP, which in the first post-war years received significant amount of funds by organising the export of certain American products, such as fruit, coffee and cigarettes, to Finland where they were sold at much higher price, as post-war rationing served to inflate prices. Majander 2007, p. 295.
651 In addition to articles on the trade union movement, the material Lovestone sent to Tuominen included such publications as 'Slave Labor in Russia', which Tuominen found highly useful for his work. The correspondence between the two is held both at the George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, MD, US (Hereafter GMMA), and the Finnish National Archives. For example, J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, March 20, 1950; A. Tuominen to J. Lovestone, May 30, 1950, both RG 18, Jay Lovestone Files (JL), box 34, GMMA, Arvo Tuominen's collection (AT), box 9, KA.
652 J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, August 9, 1950, RG 18, JL, box 34, GMMA, AT, box 9, KA; Majander 2007, p. 163.
653 J. Lovestone to A. Tuominen, June 22, 1950; H. Procopé to J. Lovestone, August 3, 1950, both RG 18, JL, box 34, GMMA; J. Lovestone to H. Procopé, August 5, 1950, Hjalmar Procopé's collection (HP), KAY 6593, KA.
654 The long-lasting correspondence between Messrs Procopé, Tuominen and Tokoi can be found in Arvo Tuominen's collection, boxes 10 and 13, and Hjalmar Procopé's collection, both KA.
655 Tokoi's numerous articles about American society, in particular labour issues, gave the US plenty of 'free' propaganda in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti. In particular, the series 'Kirjeitä rapakon takaa' gave the Finns highly detailed, mostly positive information about developments in the US. For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, October 5, 1952. A number of Tokoi's published articles can be found as clippings in Oskari Tokoi's collection, box HB 1, TA.
657 For example, 'Työuutisia Yhdysvalloista', January 2, 1951, SDP KV, box F295, TA.
the Cold War started to heat up also in Finland.\textsuperscript{658} When this happened, Finnish social democrats were also able to use more hard-hitting material from, for instance, the CIA-backed \textit{The New Leader}, whose content was widely published in Finland. When receiving the first copies of the magazine in 1950, Väinö Leskinen informed \textit{The New Leader’s} Editor Sol Levitas, also a founding member and activist of the CCF\textsuperscript{659}, that articles from his publication would be used throughout the social democratic press, from \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti} to small provincial papers and the periodical \textit{Sosialistinen Aikakausilehti}.\textsuperscript{660}

In addition to the labour-related news delivered by the USIS and US-based newspapers, the SAK received much-needed propaganda content also directly from the American trade unions AFL and the Congress of Industrialized Organisations (CIO). For this they mostly had Olavi Lindblom to thank, who during his travels to the US collected as much interesting "educational and topical propaganda material" as he could and ordered for some more when returning home.\textsuperscript{661} Although the social democrats in Finland were pleased to receive any material that they could use in their battle against the communists, even they soon discovered that not all American labour movement material was suitable for the Finnish environment. When evaluating, for example, the possibility of receiving a special Finnish version of AFL’s Soviet ‘slave labour camp map’, Lindblom informed Jay Lovestone that it would not be wise to produce or use such content.\textsuperscript{662} The US Legation in Helsinki understood this position better than the trade unionists back home, since they agreed with the view that the distribution of such a map might do more harm than good.\textsuperscript{663}

**Soviet and Communist Countermeasures Reach Burning Point**

The timing for providing Finnish social democrats with more moral and material support was, of course, no coincidence. The last years of the 1940s was not only a period when the Cold War quickly intensified throughout the world, but also a time when the Finnish propaganda environment heated up into a more open conflict. Although the main political battle was fought between Finnish social democrats and communists, both Britain and the US were to a growing extent dragged into the conflict, particularly after the communists started to use the two countries and their activities in Finland as a propaganda tool.

It did not take long for Finnish communists to react to the gradually growing Western propaganda and cultural operations in Finland. Already in January 1948 a Valpo official wrote about growing British propaganda operations, which, according to the report, were led by Rex Bosley and had the objective to “win as much Finnish friends in the event of a conflict between

\textsuperscript{658} For example, in September 1952, the bulletin reported about such issues as AFL’s and CIO’s political activities, the steelworkers’ strike and the rise of consumer prices in the US. ‘Työuutisia Amerikasta’, No. 11, September 9, 1952.

\textsuperscript{659} Berghahn 2001, pp. 115, 134.

\textsuperscript{660} V. Leskinen to S.M. Levitas, May 9, 1950, SDP KV, box F289, TA.

\textsuperscript{661} O. Lindblom to J.P. Delaney, November 30, 1951, RG 18, International Affairs Department Country Files, Finland 1949-1970 (Hereafter IADCF, F), Series 1, box 1, GMMA; O. Lindblom to Educational Department, CIO, November 30, 1951, SAK KV 1951 (Yhdysvallat), TA.

\textsuperscript{662} O. Lindblom to J. Lovestone, November 30, 1951, SAK KV 1951 (Yhdysvallat), TA.

\textsuperscript{663} US Legation to SD, ‘Soviet Slave Labor Camp Map’, February 20, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
the Soviet Union and the US. A Valpo report warning about the United States' more hostile policy towards the Soviet Union also backed the communists' view that the Finns were under "growing American agitation". After Valpo was replaced by the non-communist Suojelupoliisi, and the security police gradually shifted its attention to the activities of Finnish communists, these kinds of reports became a rarity. This does not mean that Supo did not monitor British and American informational and cultural operations and treat them with some suspicion. The new organisation continued to keep an eye on foreign activities in case they adopted too provocative an approach or posed some kind of a security risk.

Officials of the SKP and SNS also followed foreign activities in Finland and regularly reported about the "strong, foreign-led anti-Soviet propaganda" taking place throughout the country. According to SNS, Valitut Palat, and in particular Det Bästa, represented the most outrageous anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland as it not only published lies about Soviet society but also had only positive things to say about everything American. Since SNS feared that this publication, "scientifically developed to please the masses with its layout, choice of topic and low price", together with other means of promoting Anglo-American culture, would increase anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland, it urged its members to take every possible measure to counter the growing Western propaganda, which, according to communist papers, at times dealt with affairs of the Soviet Union with a technique similar to Nazi propaganda. The greater focus SNS gave on its film operations in Lapland, a region to which the Americans had also paid increasing attention, is a good example of how the Finnish communists wished to produce a direct response to Western activity in the country.

Rather than an impulsive reaction to the growing propaganda operations of both Finnish non-communists and the two Western powers, the Finnish communists' activities were a part of a larger Soviet propaganda offensive in Finland, which started in 1948 and reached its strongest form in spring 1949 and again in the autumn of the same year. The offensive saw the Soviets increase their presence in Finland by expanding their radio, print and film propaganda, the promotion of Soviet artists and athletes and the import of industrial and architectural exhibitions. Although the broad reports written by the US Legation about growing Soviet propaganda, part of the State Department's scheme to collect information about the activity in certain European countries, indicate that the Americans were at least slightly concerned about the situation, figures like Henry F. Arnold did not give much hope for the Soviet programme in terms of

664 'Ilmoitus koskien ulkomaiden propagandaa Suomessa, 23.1.1948', Amp, box 147, Valpo II, KA.
665 'Ilmoitus koskien amerikkalaista agitaatiotoimintaa Suomessa, 19.1.1948, Amp, box 96, Valpo II, KA.
666 For example, 'Ilmoitus N7 31, 14.3.1949'; 'Liite ilmoitukseen N7 31, 22.3.1949', both Amp, XXIII, F1 1949, Suojelupoliisin arkisto (Hereafter SUPO), KA.
667 For example, 'SNS:n vuosikertomus 1948', Suomi-Neuvostolitto-seuran arkisto (Hereafter SNS), box 50, KA.
668 'Report on Valitut Palat', 1949, SNS, box 419, KA.
669 For example, 'Pöytäkirja SN-Seuran puhemiesistön kokouksesta 21.1.1949', SNS, box 39, KA.
670 A. Evans to Secretary of State, 'Report on Soviet Propaganda', July 28, 1949, RG 84, HLE CGR SF, box 3, NARA.
effectiveness due to the simple fact that the vast majority of Finnish people were anti-Russian and
discounted foreign propaganda.\footnote{672}

A greater concern to both the Americans and the British was the way with
which the Soviets, aided by the Finnish communist press, constantly attacked against the social
democrat Prime Minister K.A. Fagerholm and his minority government and tried to find a
connection between their policies and the two Western governments. According to Soviet
propaganda, the Finnish Government had the objective of binding Finland into the Western
camp and therefore served the interests of the imperialist powers.\footnote{673} While criticising the
government and its policies, the Soviets also made heavy attacks against the content published
in non-communist Finnish newspapers, which it regarded as excessively based on Western
news. In the late 1940s, Soviet officials and correspondents in Finland, including representatives
of the news agencies TASS and Sovietform, made a number of complaints to the Finnish
Foreign Ministry about ‘unfriendly’ articles published in Finnish newspapers and claimed that
not enough Soviet content was included.\footnote{674} The article series written by Walter Bedell-Smith,
former US Ambassador to Moscow and future head of the CIA, which were published in
\textit{Helsingin Sanomat}, caused the biggest uproar. In Soviet eyes, Bedell-Smith was “the Soviet
Union’s greatest enemy and a professional liar” and, therefore, the worst possible person to
have his opinions published in Finland.\footnote{675} According to the interpretation by the Soviet Union’s
Foreign Ministry, the FCMA Treaty actually prohibited the publication of memoirs of this
nature.\footnote{676} Since Bedell-Smith’s articles can be regarded as rather neutral accounts on
developments in the Soviet Union\footnote{677}, mainly because \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} had excluded long parts
of them\footnote{678}, the scale of the Soviet protest just shows the extent of their mistrust towards both
the Finnish Government and of the non-communist press.

The increasingly atrocious claims made by communist newspapers about Britain and the US
and their relationship with the Finnish Government left the Western powers with no other
option than to protest about their publication again. This time it was the Americans who
reacted more strongly to the matter. During a meeting between John M. Cabot, Minister to
Finland, and Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen held in March 1950, Cabot, while emphasising

\footnote{672} US Legation to Secretary of State, ‘Report on Soviet Propaganda by H.F. Arnold’, September 29, 1949, RG 84,
HLE CGR SF, box 3; H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Soviet Propaganda Campaign in Finland During November, 1949’, RG
84, USEH CGR, box 15, both NARA.

\footnote{673} The Finnish communist press and the Moscow radio, for example, framed a story claiming that Mr Fagerholm
had held secret talks with Avra M. Warren, the US Minister to Finland, over Finland joining the Marshall Plan
46-49.

\footnote{674} ‘Muistio keskustelusta Neuvostoliiton Suomessa olevien kirjeenvaihtajien kanssa’ by H. Brotherus, March 31,
1949, 12 L Venäjä, UMA; ‘Muistio keskustelusta Sovinformin edustajien kanssa’ by H. Brotherus, July 29, 1949,
K.A. Fagerholm's collection, box HD 18, TA.

\footnote{675} This statement was given by Professor Zaslavski, who was a member of the Soviet cultural delegation visiting
Finland in November 1949. O. Scott to FO, ‘Visit of a Soviet cultural delegation to Finland for the third annual
congress of the Finland-Soviet Union Society’, November 1949, FO 371/77363, NA.

\footnote{676} KP:n muisto N:o 25, ‘Keskustelu Neuvostoliiton lähetystöneuvoksen kanssa’ by E.A. Wuori, November 9,
1949, 12 L Venäjä, UMA.

\footnote{677} The article series focused mostly on Bedell-Smith’s experiences working in Moscow and speculation over the
Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy. See, for example, \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} November 12, 1949.

\footnote{678} ‘Muistio keskustelusta professori Zaslavskin kanssa’, by H. Brotherus, December 3, 1949, 12 L Venäjä, UMA.
that the US did not request the Finnish Government to take any direct action over anti-American newspaper articles, expressed his wish that the Finnish authorities would not create an environment where only one side of the story could be told to the Finnish public. Mr Kekkonen’s answer, i.e. that Finland had a free press that could only be given moral guidance, was precisely the kind of reaction the US Minister had, undoubtedly, expected. Even if the US Minister from time to time wished to remind Finnish leaders about anti-American propaganda taking place in their country, American reactions to the Soviet pressure in Finland remained somewhat moderate in the late 1940s. US Legation officials had no desire to launch such broad and open anti-communist cultural offensives as were suggested to them for instance by Jaakko Kahma, Director of the Finnish Trade Association.

The continuous official protests made by representatives from both sides of the Iron Curtain over press articles obviously placed the Finnish politicians and Finnish Foreign Ministry officials in an awkward position. As their main priority was to keep the Cold War out of Finland, they wished that all actors, both domestic and foreign, would follow caution in their informational activities. However, despite their extremely careful approach towards propaganda activities, the Finns gradually started to realise the importance of cooperating more closely with foreign countries in informational and cultural operations. The country’s slightly more stable position also gave the political leadership the confidence to expand the promotion of Finnish policies and culture abroad.

In order to launch broader cultural and informational activities of their own and increase cooperation in this area, the Finnish Parliament set up a committee to analyse Finland’s cultural ties with foreign nations and explore possibilities to enhance them. According to the committee’s final report, presented in May 1949, Finland’s international exchange in the fields of art and science did not meet the required standards and should therefore be expanded as quickly as possible. With this objective in mind, the committee proposed greater funds for, for example, scientific exchange, the organisation of cultural exhibitions and, perhaps most significantly, the introduction of the Foreign Ministry’s cultural attachés.

The desire to introduce broader cultural and informational activities in Western Europe and the US was also evident in the way leading Finnish politicians and officials directly asked for Western advice for their actual implementation. For example, during an interview in 1949 Prime Minister Fagerholm asked for Information Officer Hamish McGhie’s opinion on the possible introduction of a Finnish press attaché in London. The timing of Fagerholm’s enquiry was no coincidence since the Finnish Foreign Ministry had become increasingly annoyed with how little the British public actually knew about Finland. When learning about Finland’s plans, the FO felt that it was sensible to assure the Finns that, in particular, their quest to explain the Western public that Finland did not belong to the other side of the Iron Curtain was a

682 ‘Memorandum of conversation between Mr McGhie and Mr Fagerholm’, May 3, 1949, FO 371/77357, NA.
welcomed move. In Whitehall’s eyes, a successful publicity campaign would not only improve Finland’s chances to make its political position properly understood around the world, but also help the country increase its commercial ties with the West.

As much as this, undoubtedly, encouraged the Finns, the promotion of Finnish culture and policies abroad remained a somewhat limited activity for years to come. Although the first press attachés were appointed to the Finnish legations in London, Washington and Paris in 1950, the meagre available funds together with the lack of a centralised coordination body prevented the launch of broader and more consistent international publicity campaigns. The professional field for public relations in Finland was still young and remained rather unappreciated despite the foundation of the Finnish Association of Public Relations and its active position in convincing Finnish leaders of the sensibility of establishing a separate Finnish institute that would see to the promotion of the country to foreigners. Another factor restricting Finnish informational activities was the number of complaints the Russians made over the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s country promotion campaigns, which focused mostly on the ways Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union was presented. In the international presentation of arts and crafts as well as visual arts, the Finns’ performance was more efficient than in informational country promotion, mainly thanks to the work of several independent actors rather than operations run by a single central organisation.

Balancing between Political Propaganda and Misleading Promises

In conclusion, the late 1940s was a time when the Cold War propaganda war started to reach Finnish shores. Both Western powers, above all Britain, implemented anti-communist propaganda operations in the country, but local circumstances continued to place restrictions on both propaganda activities and content. As a consequence, the increasingly aggressive East-West battle for people’s hearts and minds entered Finland at a slower pace and appeared in somewhat weaker form. The accelerating domestic confrontation between the communists and non-communists did, however, result in the Western countries increasing their cooperation with

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684 British Legation to FO, May 10, 1949; Minutes by B. Ruthven-Murray, June 3, 1949, both FO 371/77358, NA.
686 Although Finland expanded its informational activities in the early 1950s, the slim resources held back the opening of, for example, the Finland House in London until December 1958. For example, Pekkarinen 2012, pp. 193-194.
688 An example of Moscow’s sensibility to Finland’s publicity campaigns was the way the Soviet press reacted when it discovered that the English version of the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s advertising booklet ‘Finland’, distributed to foreigners during industrial exhibitions abroad, did not include the same phrases about Finland aiming to “promote mutual friendship with all peace-loving nations” as the Russian version. Similar complaints were made over Finnish activities throughout the 1950s. Finnish Embassy, Moscow to Finnish Foreign Ministry, January 8, 1949; Translation of the article published in Literaturnaja Gazeta, January 8, 1949, supplement to telegram from L.Hjelt to Finnish Foreign Ministry, January 10, 1949, both 12 L Venäjä, UMA; Lähteenkorva & Pekkarinen 2008, pp. 56-57, 65-67.
social democratic labour circles in addition to the positive promotion of their countries, which continued to make up the largest share of their informational and cultural operations.

Evidence suggests that the British and US governments were to a large degree successful in expressing moral support to the Finns through informational and cultural channels, and in the American case through funding, while abstaining from giving direct promises for other kind of assistance. Even though the FCMA Treaty's final form gave Western officials in Helsinki greater confidence to plan their operations on a more long-term basis, the majority of their activities remained covert. The Finnish communists' 'revelations' and Soviet officials complaints' about Western propaganda in the country did indicate of expanding British and American informational programmes, but at the same time reflected more the tightening world situation than an actual broad-scale Western anti-communist propaganda offensive. While the Western position in several political matters was to a growing extent reaching through to the Finnish audience, the overtly distributed message remained largely unaggressive. In the very end of the 1940s, the intensifying Cold War became, however, increasingly apparent also in Finland and led to an altogether new era as far as more direct political propaganda in the country was concerned.
5. WESTERN PROPAGANDA REACHES FULL GEAR, 1950-1953

Expansion of US Activities

If the British and American governments had at the end of the 1940s felt at least slightly more confident about Finland’s chances of surviving as an independent country, the early 1950s saw the two Western powers again adopt a more pessimistic approach in regard to the country’s future. As the Cold War was reaching burning point mainly because of the Korean War, fears over a communist offensive in Europe grew both on London and Washington. A number of State Department, NSC and CIA reports from this period reveal that US officials regarded the war spreading to Finland if not likely, but a fairly realistic possibility, nonetheless. The British Chiefs of Staff shared this view with their American colleagues and noted that the Soviets were more than capable of advancing rapidly to the West in the following few years due to, for example, their air force superiority. Although both London and Washington estimated that the Finns would oppose any military attack made against their country, the West regarded the Finnish Army as not only too small, but also ill-equipped to pose any credible threat to its gigantic eastern rival. Partly because of this, but more importantly because of Finland’s unchanged relationship with the Soviet Union, the Americans and the British were left with no other realistic option but to follow the same general policy as in the late 1940s: Finnish independence was to be supported mainly by moral and economic backing, but no military assistance could be provided to the country even in the case of war.

The Western powers were already in the early 1950s more concerned about developments that could lead to a gradual satellisation of Finland than they were of a possible military invention. The country’s expanding trade arrangements with the Soviet Union, particularly after the final reparation payments in 1952, increased fears that Finland was becoming too closely tied to the East. The growing acceptance of ‘neutrality’ and what became known as the Paasikivi Line as Finland’s adopted foreign policy raised even more eyebrows, particularly in Washington. The Americans regarded neutrality as more or less the goal of Soviet policy, or at least as a weakness to resist communism, and the Finns’ ability to oppose Soviet pressure was at times, especially during international crises, seriously undermined. This concern was also...
shared by the British, who, like the Americans, saw it important that communists were excluded from the Finnish government also in the future.\textsuperscript{696}

Although both American and British officials kept following the same general principle in their propaganda and cultural operations in Finland as before, which meant avoiding anything that would embarrass the Finnish Government, increasing suspicions over the Finns’ ability to stay firm in containing communism, together with growing international tension, led to the two expand their activities also in the northern country. The Western governments came to realise that they had a role to play in the intensifying propaganda battle between Finnish communists and non-communists after all, if not directly but at least by providing support from the sidelines. Although the Finnish Government officially opposed ‘bringing the Cold War to the country’, the Finns’ desire to invest more in informational and cultural cooperation made the Finnish environment more fertile for Western activities as did the gradually increasing collaboration on, for example, intelligence and military issues between certain Finnish and US officials. The more robust approach many Finns adopted against the spread of communism, for example by founding new anti-communist organisations, offered both Britain and the US new possibilities for the distribution of their anti-communist propaganda in particular.

As Western informational and cultural operations expanded in Finland in the 1950s, it soon became clear that the US campaign would overtake the British one thanks to the rapidly growing resources granted by Washington. The Campaign of Truth and the State Department’s new determination to launch a ‘psychological offensive’ to counter Soviet propaganda against the ‘Free World’ gave American activities a completely different magnitude also in Finland, which was ranked among the 21 countries that could either become the next targets of communist aggression or be in a position “where the danger of the disaffection of large groups is present or most probable”.\textsuperscript{697} As the State Department regarded a psychological offensive as necessary in each of these countries, the size of the information and cultural section was quickly expanded also at the US Legation in Helsinki. By autumn 1951, the department employed eight American officials and well over a dozen local employees.\textsuperscript{698} New premises in central Helsinki also enabled the USIS to make its Information Centre more appealing to the general public.

Even if available resources for USIS operations in Finland started to grow steadily, new American recruits in Helsinki quickly noted that their activities would have a different character from what they were like in many other countries. In addition to the obvious reason, i.e. Finland’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the self-censorship practiced by the media, which according to USIS officials was continuously reflected in the Finns’ unequal treatment of anti-communist propaganda and anti-American messages\textsuperscript{699}, the country’s vast physical size and sparsely-settled population made the Americans realise that approaching the broad masses

\textsuperscript{696} For example, Vares 2002, pp. 143–165.

\textsuperscript{697} In addition to Finland, the 21 countries that were given particular focus included, for example, Austria, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Turkey and Yugoslavia. SD to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, ‘Psychological Offensive’, September 13, 1950, CREST.


\textsuperscript{699} For example, ‘USIS Country Plan for Finland’, July 22, 1953, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948-81, OCB Central File Series, box 29, DDEL.
would be more difficult than in most parts of the world. At the same time, they concluded that an aggressive anti-communist propaganda offensive in the country was not entirely necessary given the Finnish nation’s antipathy of the Soviet Union. In April 1950, the USIS estimated that its objective of “encouraging the Finnish people to maintain their political, economic and cultural independence and presenting the foreign and domestic policies of the United States as persuasively as possible from day to day” could be achieved by creating a receptive climate of opinion primarily through the presentation of a “dignified, full, factual picture of the US”. Harder-hitting propaganda was to be practised almost entirely through indirect channels.

The increasing criticism Finnish newspapers on the extreme left directed against the US made American officials in Helsinki soon revise this strategy. Although they still recognised that a direct anti-Soviet crusade could damage their own image and cause trouble to the Finns, the stronger presentation of the anti-communist message won growing support. As early as May 1950, Minister John Cabot noted that the US must in particular “seek to reach those who are sympathetic to communism but not wholly impervious to reason, and those who consciously reject communist propaganda yet innocently accept authentic some of its falsehoods regarding the United States”. One of the main objectives was to convince the Finns that communist attacks on the US were damaging to Finland and that it was in their own interests to actively combat them.

In the early 1950s, the staff, finances and facilities of the USIS in Finland were finally regarded as adequate enough to make the task of encouraging Finns to resist communist pressures and strengthening Finland’s traditional attachment to the West more realistic. The objective was made even more plausible by the attitude of the Finnish people, which American officials more than once described as predominantly open to American and Western influence, and the highly organised structure of Finnish social, economic and cultural life, which provided various channels for reaching almost any conceivable audience.

In order to ‘provide psychological encouragement to the Finns’, the USIS staff in Helsinki defined labour groups and organisations, teachers and intellectuals and the broad masses as their primary target groups, in this order. Young university students along with professional and technical groups were defined as secondary target groups. The American view that reaching anti-communist labour leaders would be absolutely vital as blue-collar workers constituted a critically significant segment of the population would be characteristic for their campaign for years to come. This strategy was by no means unusual since the same approach was closely followed in many other European countries, including neighbouring Sweden. At the same time one must note that the chosen approach was not automatic either, but based on a thorough analysis of local conditions. The example of Austria, another neutral country where

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701 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘Propaganda War in Finland’, May 11, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 5.11.60E/5-1150, NARA.
702 For example, ’USIS Country Plan for Finland’, July 22, 1953, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-81, OCB Central File Series, box 29, DDEL.
the educated middle class was the USIS's number one target instead of labour leaders, indicates that in different circumstances the American campaign in Finland could have also followed another kind of path.

Placing teachers and intellectuals high on the list of importance was justified by a view held by the Americans that education in Finland followed a stereotyped pattern that generally excluded American history, culture and policies. US officials felt that the broad masses had a friendly attitude to their country, but they also saw that the picture of America was somewhat distorted. Because of this, the general public should also be given a deeper understanding of the US and its way of life, they concluded. As for the secondary target groups, the USIS felt that students, in particular, needed to be shown that quiet cooperation with the West would not mean surrendering their country's independence.

The USIS/Helsinki constantly sought for new and more developed channels of communication to reach its target groups. As the need to counter communism grew also in Finland, the officials wished to introduce channels that would give them greater freedom in responding to Russian allegations in a more direct manner than it would ever be possible with the Legation’s standard methods. The Americans’ ability to make several breakthroughs in the fields of propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland in the early 1950s leaves, for example, Jussi Hanhimäki’s claim that the State Department refused to establish new cultural programmes in Finland during that period due to the precarious Finnish-Soviet relationship rather inaccurate. Indeed, available source material reveals that Washington had no intention of leaving the Finns alone in resenting Soviet pressure when it came to informational and cultural methods.

US Press Operations – From the Projection of America to Counterattacking Communist Propaganda

Presenting a positive picture of the United States to the Finns and using ‘subtle’ propaganda through mainly factual material turned out to be one of the most successful American operations in Finland. By 1950, all major non-communist newspapers published large numbers of USIS-based articles and photographs. According to USIS officials, the use of their material in Finnish papers was even close to reaching saturation point. The Americans were particularly pleased to report that Helsingin Sanomat started publishing the monthly series ‘Letter from America’. Ilta-Sanomat also kept increasing its coverage of USIS material and now included regularly the complete ‘Week in the United States’, while Suomen Sosialidemokraatti published several excerpts of President Truman’s most important speeches. The series ‘What Americans

705 Wagnleitner 1999, p. 73.
707 Hanhimäki 1997, p. 106.
Are Really Thinking’ also turned out to be hugely popular both in the Helsinki region publications and provincial newspapers. The US Legation was also satisfied with the way in which the Finnish press reported about major world events, such as the progress of the Marshall Plan.710 The Korean War was also, according to the Legation, covered in a very pro-Western manner by leading Finnish papers, even if a couple of published articles questioning “the American tendency to oversimplify not only things in the Far East but also on a universal scale” did raise some concern of the Finns’ general attitude towards US foreign policy.711

Among the main themes on which the USIS focused and which were widely covered was the positive economic development taking place in the US. Speeches and official figures from the employment and business world were used to show the truth about the ‘depression’ in which the communist press had claimed the country to be. Like in many other countries, US officials gave special emphasis on explaining American capitalism in order to overcome European misconceptions.712 In this campaign also, the USIS wished to focus on the positives of the American system by, for instance, presenting how the average American benefitted from it rather than by directly attacking socialism or the Soviet Union.713 Items with a factual basis focusing on, for example, the comparative prices of food in Washington and Moscow were more than once successfully placed in Finland, especially in social democratic papers.

The importance of projecting American culture and way of life was not neglected, either. Although jazz music was not yet part of the official cultural programme, the USIS/Helsinki, like many other USIE posts, also showed some interest in promoting jazz music as it felt that “we must not let the Finns continue to think that we are only a nation of gadgets”.714 For this purpose Louis Armstrong’s visit to Helsinki in October 1949 gave a natural boost, as did the concert given by Benny Goodman a couple of years later.715 The significance of sports as a propaganda tool was also gradually recognised in Washington, and as a consequence, Finnish papers were fed with news of American sporting heroes. The visit of an American athletic team to Finland in June 1950 was regarded as a particular publicity success.716

The projection of America through positive news articles and photographs was not regarded as a success only by USIS staff. Several high-ranking Finns expressed their appreciation of the news service, while a number of newspapers claimed that they would not get hold of similar kind of material any other way. According to the Americans, the USIS service was used more often than any non-commercial service in Finland. USIS officials did appreciate the content of

711 US Legation to SD, December 5, 1950, RG 59, 760E.00/12-550, mf USA 13, KA.
712 In the 1950s, US propagandists placed considerable effort into differentiating American capitalism from its European “cartel-like or feudalistic” variations, stressing individual freedom and economic competition. Belmonte 2008, p. 121.
713 J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Suggestions on Explaining US Capitalism Abroad’, October 24, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF, box 2426, 511.60E21/10-2451, NARA.
the British Information Service, but noted that the British campaign focused more on influencing certain individuals than expanding the use of their material.\(^{717}\)

In spite of factual news stories finding their way to the pages of Finnish publications, in the early 1950s the Americans started to become increasingly frustrated with the policies of the Finnish press. It was not only self-censorship and the legislation forbidding the slandering of a foreign nation that set limitations for making the American message properly heard: indeed, the Finnish newspapers habit of often excluding international topics, especially if they did not pertain directly to Finland, made things even more difficult. The way the press almost totally ignored, for example, Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson’s renowned California speeches, in which he called the West to practice ‘total diplomacy’ for countering hostile propaganda and defined terms for settlement should talks with the Soviet Union ever become possible\(^ {718}\), disappointed the US Legation a great deal, especially when much effort had been put into translating the speeches and distributing them in advance.

According to the USIS, the limited and delayed editorial comment given to the speeches was typical of the Finnish press. Furthermore, the newspapers’ general attitude to international events, seen as "realistic and seasoned with scepticism", made the Americans doubt whether the USIS could produce any spectacular results in such an environment, after all.\(^ {719}\) The reserved treatment given by Finnish papers to the Baltic plane incident in 1950 only increased these suspicions as, according to the Americans, most papers avoided commenting on the matter and the few that did seemed to favour the Russian version of the affair.\(^ {720}\)

At the same time, the Americans recognised that Finnish newspapers did not usually resist publishing quotes from speeches and quoting foreign newspapers even if they included anti-communist statements. Larger resources enabled the USIS/Helsinki to translate a greater number of speeches and produce such special papers as 'The UN and the Korean Crisis', which was distributed to a total of 6,243 recipients.\(^ {721}\) Newspaper editors were also supplied with State Department pamphlets, such as 'Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations' and 'Our Foreign Policy', which for instance Helsingin Sanomat used as background material in an editorial.\(^ {722}\) The Americans also learnt that although direct criticism of the Soviet Union was restricted in Finland, anti-communist propaganda could be distributed by delivering material exposing the flaws of communism in satellite countries. As a result, the USIS bulletin 'Uutisia Usasta' also started to include more direct quotations from American newspapers over

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\(^{717}\) J.M. Cabot to SD, 'The USIS Program in Finland', August 23, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2426, 511.60E/9-1152, NARA.

\(^{718}\) For more about the California speeches, see Beisner, Robert L., Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford & New York 2006), pp. 248-250.


\(^{720}\) On April 8, 1950, a United States Navy Privateer aeroplane was apparently shot down over the Baltic Sea by Soviet aircraft. According to the Soviets, the plane had violated Soviet airspace over Latvia and had exchanged fire with Soviet fighters. US Legation to SD, 'Report on Information and Cultural Activities for June 1950', September 18, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950─1954, box 2425, 511.60E/9-1850, NARA.


such news issues as riots in East Berlin. The fact that the news agency STT forwarded USIS articles like ‘Hungarian Army Russianized’ and ‘30,000 Political Prisoners in Czech Concentration Camp’, which were then published by leading papers such as Aamulehti and Uusi Suomi, not only encouraged the Americans in their anti-communist efforts, but also led to ever-hardening attacks against non-communist newspapers by the far left.

The need to distribute such material started to become more evident in the first years of the 1950s, as Soviet-based material was increasingly being published by the Finnish press, partly due to the direct pressure on newspaper editors and partly because Soviet propaganda was turning less crude and obvious than it had been in the late 1940s. Furthermore, the far-left repeatedly accused leading Finnish newspapers and the SDP in particular of being mere tools of the USIS’s “warmonger propaganda” who “obeyed the orders of Wall Street”. A major problem for meeting Minister Cabot’s quest of responding to communist propaganda in a more offensive manner was that a large share of material supplied to the USIS as part of the ‘psychological offensive’ could not be used in Finland. The USIS noted that copies of such items as the Herblock cartoon book, which included a communist character with a handlebar moustache, should be sent to them only by request as they would have no chance of being published by Finnish newspapers. Indeed, a constant challenge for the press section was to come as close as possible to the line that seemed acceptable and judicious without going too far and, thereby, endangering major American objectives in Finland. The delicacy of this task was emphasised in a number of messages sent from Helsinki to Washington, for instance in the US Legation’s reply to an inquiry over the use of the USIE’s new ‘Background and Actions Kits’, which contained of propaganda material dealing with topical issues such as the Soviet peace offensive. Although officials in Helsinki reported that the kits were of high value in Finland, particularly for the factual background material certain articles and pamphlets provided, they stressed that very little of the outspokenly anti-Soviet material could be put into effective use.

The limited possibility of distributing anti-communist material made the Americans constantly contemplate the use of other channels and ways of communication. In 1951, the USIS/Helsinki sharpened its output by launching its own pamphlets for distribution to newspapers and individuals mainly through the labour organisations and the SDP. For example, the edited translation of Erwin D. Canham’s, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, pamphlet The Authentic Revolution, ‘Todellinen Vallankumous’ in Finnish, which discussed the basic conflicts between the

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723 For example, ‘Uutisia Usasta’, No. 114, June 19, 1953, Amp, XIV Y, 1953, SUPO, KA.
724 D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Communist Newspaper’s Attack on VOA’, July 20, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2429, 511.60E/4-7-2051, NARA.
726 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘Propaganda War in Finland’, May 11, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2425, 511.60E/5-1150, NARA.
728 SD Circular Airgram to Certain American and Diplomatic Consular Officers, ‘Background and Action Kits’, September 8, 1951, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
729 D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Background and Action Kits’, October 9, 1951, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
Other pamphlets and leaflets distributed included the ‘Americana Free World Pamphlets’ and adaptation of texts on more precise topics such as ‘Rauhanehdotus’ (Proposal for Peace) and ‘Kaksi aseistariisumissuunnitelmaa’ (Two Plans for Disarmament).

In 1953, US propaganda became even more extensive, as a special pamphlet series was launched under the general title of ‘Ajattelemissen Aihetta’ (Something to Think About) for distribution to the main USIS target groups. The more aggressive approach was also reflected in separate smaller leaflets spread around Finland, which for example in Eisenhower’s and Acheson’s name attacked directly the Soviet Union’s intentions over world peace. In 1953 the USIS also delivered the first edition of the History of the American Labor Movement to Finnish labour circles and members of the media. This booklet, originally edited by the US Ministry of Labor, gave the Finns a detailed account of the American trade union movement’s development from its humble origins in the late 18th century to its post-war position as a powerful and fully accepted force in American society, emphasising the trade unions’ long tradition of proceeding with their objectives gradually rather than engaging in a direct class struggle.

In light of a more direct American propaganda policy in Finland, the introduction of the journal Problems of Communism took place at a good moment. The journal, first published in early 1952, was distributed to Finnish journalists, academics, civil servants and politicians. As Problems of Communism was, due to its highly academic approach, meant mainly as background material, it is doubtful that much of its content was such used by the Finnish press or politicians. The publication’s value as a documentation of the flaws of the communist system should not, however, be dismissed. Particularly in its first couple of years the journal offered strong articles on, for example, the peasant’s everyday life under Marxism, Eastern European trials and the true performance of the Soviet economy, which undoubtedly complemented the Finnish readers’ knowledge of international communism.

In addition to increasing the number of pamphlets, leaflets and other publications distributed to the Finnish press, placing articles in newspapers was also made more effective with the help of a special Finnish-language background service and through growing cooperation with Finnish editors. For instance, a writer of a Finnish magazine assisted the USIS by writing ‘a factual explanation’ of the so-called Rosenberg Case, after which the article was distributed by the National Coalition Party press organisation. As the overseas presentation of
the case was among the topics on which the State Department had given highly detailed instructions to American missions around the world. The USIS/Helsinki staff was undoubtedly pleased with this arrangement.

In its quest of ‘giving the Finns a less distorted picture of America’, the US Legation also started giving growing emphasis on the Finnish-American Society’s publication *Suomi-Finland USA*, which regularly included USIS pamphlets in its editions. Moreover, three leading American-Finnish newspapers, *Raivaaja*, *New Yorkin Uutiset* and *Minnesotan Uutiset*, were also made available in Finland through libraries and the Finnish-American societies. According to John Cabot, the distribution of these publications was important since by reading about Finns in the US, the readers “can scarcely fail to absorb facts and impressions which will nail commie lies”. This estimation can be regarded as highly accurate as the Finnish-American papers published at the time, the labour-orientated *Raivaaja* in particular, regularly included political articles revealing, for instance, the true nature of the Eastern European communist countries’ juridical system and the actual scale of the population transfers taking place in the Baltic States as well as editorials condemning Soviet peace propaganda and defending US foreign, defence and economic policies. The fact that the papers’ material had not been written with propaganda intentions only enhanced their position as the most effective sort of propaganda, Cabot praised.

This assessment was certainly taken seriously within the State Department, and in particular the IIA’s Private Enterprise Cooperation Department, which launched a special project to encourage Finnish-Americans to send newspapers and magazines both in Finnish and English to friends in Finland in order to meet the lack of American publications in the country. For this goal, State Department officials were in close contact with Finnish newspapers, radio stations and nationality organisations based in the US. After early difficulties concerning the shipment process, the American officials were pleased with the ‘Magazines for Finland Drive’ project, a part of the State Department’s larger ‘Magazines for Friendship’ campaign, noting that the increase of American printed material was met with some enthusiasm. For this they had partly the Finnish-American Society to thank, as the association gave valuable assistance to...

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738 J.A. Hamilton to American posts, December 11, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 15, NARA.
739 J.M. Cabot to E.W. Barrett, October 19, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2426, 511.60E21/10-1951, NARA.
740 Of these three newspapers, *Raivaaja* published by far the most politically charged material on the Soviet Union and communism in general. The paper not only included anti-communist articles on almost a daily basis, but also made constant praise of the American economy and the local trade union movement. *New Yorkin Uutiset*, the most widely read American-Finnish newspaper in the US, did not publish as long and direct anti-communist editorials as *Raivaaja*, but at times included detailed news reports about the injustices taking place in Eastern Europe. *Minnesotan Uutiset* mainly published brief reports on world events, but often strongly backed the US international position and the country’s armament process. For example, *Raivaaja* July 17, 1951, October 3, 1951, October 27, 1951; *New Yorkin Uutiset*, April 20, 1951, October 2, 1951, November 6, 1951; *Minnesotan Uutiset*, July 31, 1951, September 29, 1951.
742 J.M. Begg to B.H. Undehill, January 14, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 24, NARA.
743 H. Hynde to M. Gletzer, September 17, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 24, NARA.
the USIS/Helsinki in distributing the publications throughout the country. A greater number of more professional industrial and technological periodicals also became available at Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, even if at first at least the American publisher Cleworth Publishing refused to send their products to Finland due to their understanding that the country was in communist hands.

Aikamme Catches Workers’ Attention

Despite the introduction of new media, the Americans were not convinced that the working class, the number one target group, was efficiently reached in Finland. The Legation came up with a number of novel methods to remedy this problem. In addition to the distribution of the Labor Bulletin and other USIS-produced pamphlets, the Americans started to put more effort into creating new personal contacts with labour leaders around the country. For example, the US Legation started to organise so-called labour information trips to various parts of the country during which members of the Legation met local trade unionists and discussed both Finnish and American labour and social issues with them. According to Mr Cabot, who himself visited the Ostrobothnia region in June 1952, these trips were warmly welcomed by the attending Finns, as they appreciated the down-to-earth nature of the discussions, which they said were in stark contrast with the Soviet delegations’ strongly propagandistic behaviour during their corresponding events. As successful as these activities were, the most important reform, however, was the launch of a local magazine that was mainly meant for working class readers.

The US Legation came up with the idea of printing a field magazine of its own in 1951. The objective was to supplement the other USIS media by devoting each issue of the magazine to one or two related subjects that would be based on IPS pamphlets and feature stories sent to Helsinki. By this stage, the Legation was particularly concerned that growing communist propaganda had led into a situation in which there was a serious lack of information about the US and its aims in Finland, especially among the working class population. It was felt that the introduction of a regular publication in magazine format would enable a more complete treatment of certain subjects and make such information more readily available and more acceptable than mere pamphlets.

It took quite some time before the first issue of the field magazine was published, as the Legation ran into several legal and technical problems. The main obstacle was that Finnish law prohibited an entirely foreign publisher from printing and distributing its material in Finland. As

744 In 1952, the Finnish-American Society and USIS distributed around 12,000 American magazines across Finland. Kertomus suomalais-amerikkalaisen yhdistyksen toiminnasta 1952, Vuosikokousten pöytäkirjat, Suomi-Amerikka Yhdisysten Liiton arkisto (Hereafter SAYL), box 2, KA.

745 Only after the State Department explained Finland’s position and its relations with the US to the publisher did it start to accept subscriptions from the country again. M. Darnbacher to Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, February 12, 1951; J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘The Refusal of an American Publishing Firm to Send its Technical Magazines to Finland’, February 26, 1951, both RG 59, both SDDFF 1950-1954, box 2120, 460E.1116/2-2651, NARA.


the Americans wished to proceed openly in the magazine’s production, John Lund, Second
Press Attaché at the US Legation, approached the Finnish Foreign Ministry to receive advice on
the matter, stressing that the publication would be based on purely informative content and
would avoid making any political comments or provocations against the Soviet Union.748 A
solution for this problem was found in spring 1952 when a dummy corporation known as the
Publishing Company Katsaus was founded. Each of the company’s three directors was a
Finnish citizen and owned one share of its stock.

The managing director of the company, Mr Pentti Lehti, was to become the editor of the
magazine.749 Lehti had studied at Stanford University and was familiar with American society
and US objectives in Finland.750 For the field magazine, he prepared an extensive guide for
editorial content and distribution details. According to him, the most important group of
citizens to reach through the publication would be the labour force organised under the SAK,
followed by educators who conveyed ideas to young people at upper secondary schools and
universities. The editor stressed that the magazine should have a down-to-earth approach
stressing US economic welfare and purchasing power. As American culture and education were
generally considered weak as compared to Europe, special emphasis should also be placed on
these areas. In general, according to Lehti, the magazine should avoid the use of oversimplified
propaganda as it could only offer suitable ground for further anti-American information.751
These were, undoubtedly, sensible remarks made during a time when anti-American feeling was
actually on the rise among Europeans, mainly due to their reactions towards racism and
McCarthyism, but also because the American campaign was at times regarded as patronising.752

The first issue of the magazine *Aikamme* (‘Our Time’), originally published bi-monthly but
from 1954 onwards every month, was at last published in May 1952 and sold approximately
7,500 copies at newsstands. The sales figures for the following issues exceeded this level, which
according to the Americans indicated that the Finns were ready to pay for a propaganda
publication if it was intelligently edited and attractively presented.753 In July 1953, the US
Legation reported that *Aikamme* had around 3,000 subscribers with a heavy concentration
among labour groups and that newsstand sales were still growing. The magazine had, according
to Public Affairs Officer David Wilson, evolved an editorial formula that had developed high
reader interest while successfully pushing its propaganda message through.754

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748 ‘Memorandum of a visit made by John Lund, written by H. Leppo’, January 25, 1952, 115 Yhdysvallat, UMA.
2426, 511.60E/4-852, NARA.
750 During his stay in Stanford, Lehti had already expressed great interest in the use of official overseas propaganda
material by enquiring the Finnish Legation in Washington over any such content. ‘Undated note informing about
Pentti Lehti from Stanford wanting to order propaganda material from Finnish Legation’. K.T. Jutila’s collection,
box 13, KA.
751 J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Plans for Finnish Field Magazine’ with attachment ‘Policies for the Finnish Field Magazine’ by
P. Lehti, January 3, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E21/1-352, NARA.
752 For example, Bergbahn 2001, p. 136.
753 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘The USIS Program in Finland’, August 23, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426,
511.60E/9-1152, NARA.
SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/7-1553, NARA.
Other evidence of Aikamme’s successful start included Mr Lehti’s report about an incident at a Finnish plant located in Tikkakoski, which was owned by the Soviet Union. After discovering that Aikamme was sold in the company-owned kiosk, the Soviet management immediately banned the magazine. This only increased the number of Aikamme subscribers in the region. Lehti also started receiving several positive reports about the magazine being a big hit among non-communist workers whose information sources were relatively limited as compared with the well-briefed communist section.755

Although the Americans were satisfied with the field magazine’s early success, the publication did not turn out to be as triumphant a medium as was intended. The State Department was not entirely happy with Aikamme’s content, calling it somewhat ‘fluffy’. Officials in Washington did acknowledge that the magazine should be light enough for broad appeal and that overt propaganda was undesirable in Finland, but reminded the USIS/Helsinki that the purpose of Aikamme was to further the aims of US foreign policy. Therefore, it was urged that each issue of the magazine should include at least two “thought-provoking articles which are expressive of the American view and will tend to influence Finnish thought toward that end”.756

The more severe problem had to do with finance. The growing expenses for the publishing of Aikamme, together with the increasingly successful USIS article placements in Finnish magazines, finally led to the abolishment of the publication in 1957. Even the publication’s ability to increase its total circulation to approximately 30,000 was not enough to prevent this.757 American officials in Helsinki expressed no regret about the decision, as by the time it was made they were already using new methods to reach the much desired labour groups.

Adjusting British Propaganda to Local Practices

As the US Government expanded its propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland in the early 1950s, the British felt that they must also come up with new ideas in order to increase their presence in the country. Although London and Washington had by now taken their first steps towards cooperation in propaganda operations, the FO had no intention to let the Americans entirely steal the show on the psychological anti-communist front in Finland. While the British Government’s general approach towards Finland in the early 1950s remained cautious, the now commonly accepted notion that Finland had a future as an independent country after all, together with Whitehall’s more robust policy on anti-communist propaganda, gave an altogether new impetus for the activities in the country.

A broader British propaganda campaign was also justified by Whitehall’s increasing worry that the so-called Soviet Peace Campaign might in the long run end up in some weaker countries falling into neutrality and eventually joining the communist bandwagon; according to

756 SD to US Legation, June 12, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E21/6-1252, NARA.
757 Ilmoitus koskien Yhdysvaltain tiedoitustoimiston määrärahoja ja Aikamme-lehteäi, September 17, 1957. Amp XV, SUPO, KA.
some FO officials, these countries included Finland. In this instance it is important to note that the British did express some understanding of what was meant by Finnish neutrality, acknowledging that the country's political behaviour largely resulted from its geographical position. When British and US officials saw it fitting to criticise Finland's policies, it was because they suspected Finnish neutrality being too much inclined towards the Soviet Union, not because they wanted to condemn the country's neutral position as such.

As for information activity, the belief that Finland would remain outside the communist bloc was reflected well by a request made by the British Legation in Helsinki in April 1950 that it no longer wished to receive reports, telegrams, political papers and so-called 'E despatches' that were distributed to British posts in communist countries. The Legation justified this by pointing out that Finland was by no means a Soviet satellite and that its problems were consequently quite unlike those in the orbit states. The FO's Northern Department agreed with this view, especially as it was in line with the economy drive taking place in Whitehall. From then on, only reports from satellite countries that were of relevance to Finland were sent to Helsinki.

Being finally categorised as a non-communist country did not mean that Finland was treated as an outright Western European country in information operations. A report from the Cabinet Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Services from May 1952 placed the country in the group of Western European 'frontier countries' together with Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia and Greece. This categorisation did not mean that conditions for information work in these countries were poor. On the contrary, the committee reported that in the frontier countries circumstances had created an exceptional interest in all things British or had placed Britain in a particularly favourable position to put across its point of view. Although the largest sums were still invested in operations taking place in Italy, an expenditure estimation for overseas information services in 1952 and 1953 confirms that informational activity in these countries was regarded more important than in the rest of Europe. The money allocated for operations taking place in Finland, which included both the Legation's Information Service and the British Council, was in the early 1950s almost two times larger than the budget for activities implemented in neighbouring Sweden and Norway. This made the regular complaints of British officials in Helsinki over the slim resources available for informational and cultural activities not always entirely justified.

Even if the British Legation and the British Council in Helsinki did have some money to work on, by the early 1950s it had become increasingly obvious that their resources paled in comparison to those of the US. Determined not be discouraged by this, the British constantly

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758 'Anti-Communist Propaganda Operations', July 27, 1951, CAB 127/296, NA.
759 British Legation, Helsinki to British Legation, Bucharest, April 3, 1950, FO 371/86492, NA.
760 Northern Department to British Legation, June 20, 1950, FO 371/86492, NA.
761 Cabinet Committee of Enquiry into Overseas Information Services. Memorandum by the Foreign Office, July 30, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA.
762 The total expenditure for Finland in 1952-1953 was assessed to be £38,510. The figure for operations in Sweden and Norway were £21,700 and £22,000 respectively. All in all, the sums invested in operations taking place in Western Europe followed closely the categorisation of countries into 'frontier countries' and others. In relation to size of population, Finland's share of money was among the largest, only behind those of Austria and Greece. 'Table I, Overseas Information 1952-1953, Expenditure per annum by areas in sterling', Committee of Enquiry into Overseas Information Services, May 16, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA.
tried to come up with operational methods that would not require that much money. Building a network of contacts with influential Finns was an area into which British officials in Helsinki put more care than their American counterparts. The fact that the British Legation had come to regard the position of the Finnish press considerably stronger than in the first post-war years increased the efforts to form close ties with Finnish journalists in particular. Indeed, the British seemed even more confident than the Americans that the newspapers had adopted a stiffening attitude towards communism, predominantly as a result of the Korean War. In August 1950, Oswald Scott was pleased to report to Foreign Secretary Bevin that in addition to the social democratic press, the right-wing papers had also begun to give supporting fire. According to Scott's interpretation, the discussion on communism had now been raised onto an ideological plane, “and the danger of communism as a world-wide evil, as opposed to communism in Finland as a purely local evil”. The Minister to Finland justified his view by listing a number of comments made on communism in conservative and liberal papers. Of these, Scott was particularly impressed by Aamulehti, which in its editorial reminded its readers about how dangerous it was to tolerate such an absolute conception of life as communism. Ilta-Sanomat and Helsinki Sanomat also received the Minister's approval for the way they commented on the Cominform meeting taking place in Berlin and the United States' role in safeguarding peace. Although the more robust policy adopted by Finnish newspapers gave the British encouragement about the potentially broader possibilities for printed propaganda, Finland’s delicate position was taken into account in the distributed content as it had been done in the late 1940s. The British knew that the Finns would not, despite the recent encouraging trend, publish excessively aggressive anti-communist articles, not to mention anti-Soviet comments, and sought to supply them with more positive material. The FO continued to stress that the Cold War should not be brought closer to Finland than it already was. In April 1951, the British Information Service’s efforts were reported to be “directed against undue pessimism, pointing to the growing strength of the West, and the solid basis of the Anglo-American alliance, and trying to explain, by reference to the threat to peace represented by the preponderance of the Soviet and satellite armies, the case for the enlistment of Germany’s potential strength.”

The adopted strategy also meant that the British did not wish to pressure Finnish editors to publish anything that would be against Finnish law or that would place them in a difficult position. One example of this policy was Oswald Scott's decision not to make special arrangements for the exposure of Russian forced labour, a successful IRD theme in several other countries, in view of local conditions. The cautious approach was also reflected in a

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763 O. Scott to E. Bevin, 'Anti-Communist articles which are appearing in the Finnish press' August 2, 1950, FO 371/86432, NA.

764 Aamulehti, July 15, 1950.


766 For example, O. Scott to C.F.A Warner, August 9, 1950, FO 953/876, NA.


768 Telegram No. 296 from O. Scott, Helsinki, to London, ‘Publicity given to the Russian Forced Labour Codex in Finland’, August 4, 1950, FO 1110/174, NA.
remark made by Scott in July 1950 on the inadvisability of opening new Information Department premises in Helsinki: “While we have ample evidence that the quiet expansion of ‘non-public’ information work which has been going on is widely appreciated, I feel that to open public premises would be a gesture of a kind which would be more likely to embarrass than to gratify the Finns”.

In spite of continuing to implement a non-aggressive informational strategy in Finland in the early 1950s, the British Government was by no means willing to end its support for the SDP, which was left with the tricky position of fighting against the communists without provoking the Soviets. Indeed, the British Legation was now in even closer contact with the Finnish social democrats and more than once expressed its desire to assist them in their struggle, as long as their measures would not take an excessively aggressive form. If in the late 1940s Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas had been the central figure in providing Finnish social democrats with suitable anti-communist propaganda material, it was now left for Hamish McGhie, the highly active British Information Officer, to carry the main responsibility in this field. In McGhie’s view, it was in British interests to back such SDP field activities as the education of party officials of the real meaning of Stalinism and the circulation of anti-communist propaganda throughout the party. For this purpose, he managed to convince the IRD to supply the SDP central library with background papers and books that were not obtainable in Finland. The first book list from August 1950 included publications like *A Communist Party in Action* by Angelo Rossi, *Tito’s Plot against Europe* by Derek Kartun and *The Police State* by Craig Thompson.

Only a few months later, the British Legation started to send such titles, as well as a growing flouiry of IRD background papers, also to social democratic trade unions, which the British continued to regard as almost as important in confronting communism in Finland as political parties or the public press. In early 1951, the British Legation once again expressed its concern over increasingly strong communist agitation in working class areas, factories and forests and added, alarmed, that the social democratic workers' inability to make any counter-effort made the situation even worse. The objective of influencing the wavering Finnish voter that could be in danger of slipping towards communism was now very much regarded as one of the main British informational tasks in Finland. In July 1952, the FO estimated that it had managed to achieve this goal by securing a considerable audience among the Finnish trade unions in addition to the various political parties.

A number of practical reasons prevented the collaboration between the British Legation and the Finnish social democrats from expanding even more. The most important reason obviously had to with the nature of available propaganda material. As the social democrats, as well as other Finnish anti-communists, wished to avoid explicitly abusing the Soviet Union or its leaders in their propaganda, the broader use of many of the titles produced by the British

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769 O. Scott to C.F.A. Warner, July 4, 1950, FO 953/876, NA.
770 J.I. McGhie to R. Murray, August 24, 1950, FO 1110/333, NA.
772 Cabinet Committee of Enquiry into Overseas Information Services. Memorandum by the Foreign Office, July 30, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA.
propaganda machinery was still simply out of the question. Completely aware of this, British officials in Helsinki tried to adapt to local conditions as well as they could by providing their Finnish contacts with more positive material from the IRD publication *Digest*, or material concerning, for instance, only Eastern European matters. Items showing how the worker fared economically under a communist regime continued to be of particular interest to the Finns and were, therefore, almost regularly included in the material distributed to them.

Even though in general the British propaganda machinery was more flexible than its American counterpart, the IRD was not always able to meet demands for the production of material more suitable for the local circumstances in question due to the extra work required.773 In the case of Finnish social democrats, this problem was partly solved by keeping them informed about the latest IRD publications and supplying them with material whenever it was seen as appropriate to local needs. Providing details about communist strategies and tactics in France and Israel was one example of suitable propaganda material for Finnish social democrats.774 Officials at the FO regarded this kind of information as useful for the SDP, as in their view the Finns’ knowledge of communist activity abroad continued to be limited.

The close cooperation between the British Legation and the SDP was in the early 1950s above all reflected by the eagerness of the social democratic newspapers to publish British news reports and feature articles. Indeed, the social democratic press, in particular the leading party paper *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, was the most active instrument for promoting the Western message in printed form. In 1952, the British Legation, for instance, reported that the political commentator of *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, Yrjö “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen, a well-known propagandist and a close associate of Leskinen and Varjonen, based around 25 per cent of his articles on the IRD material sent to him by the British.775

Mr Kilpeläinen’s use of Western anti-communist material hardly comes as surprise considering his background. Nicknamed “Jahvetti” after the war-time radio programme he hosted as part of the Finnish propaganda effort, he quickly became one of the Finnish communists’ pet hates in the first post-war years. The devilish style with which Kilpeläinen criticised Finnish communists in his numerous columns and political speeches not only made him a constant target for Valpo surveillance776, but also inspired his adversaries to give him another, more dubious nickname: “Little Goebbels”.777 Both a politician and a journalist, Kilpeläinen developed an expertise in anti-communist rhetoric that was sharp and witty, while being understandable to the common man. Although usually adopting a humorous style in his columns, he did not make his comments regarding communism off the top of his head. On the

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773 For example, R. Murray to J.I. McGhie, November 3, 1950, FO 1110/333, NA.
774 British Legation to Northern Department, Foreign Office, April 3, 1950, FO 371/86491, NA.
776 Kilpeläinen’s activities were constantly followed by both Valpo and Supo. Valpo also interrogated him on several occasions. For example, ‘Valpon pääosaston kuulustelu Nro 103’, June 18, 1948, Kilpeläinen, Yrjö, Hmp, Valpo II, KA.
777 The Finnish communists first gave Mr Kilpeläinen this nickname in April 1947. See Juntunen, Simo (Simppa), Jahvetti – Legenda jo eläessään (Porvoo 1976), pp. 100-101; Vapaa Sana, April 1, 1947.
contrary, Kilpeläinen continuously expanded his knowledge of his number one topic by collecting a wide range of relevant newspaper articles from both home and abroad.778

Going through Kilpeläinen’s political comments published in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti reveals that the claim of him using IRD material in 25 per cent of his columns was something of an exaggeration. Although occasionally commenting explicitly on the true nature of, for example, ‘people’s democracy in Czechoslovakia’,779 Kilpeläinen’s columns, in the early 1950s published almost daily, predominantly took a stab at Finnish communists and their publications rather than provided information about developments abroad. At times, however, Jahvetti made direct references to comments published in The Daily Herald, some of which might well have been based on IRD material, and discussed topical world events through them.780 What makes an estimation of the true impact British propaganda had on Mr Kilpeläinen’s comments almost impossible is that in many of his columns he combined domestic and international topics while making ambiguous references to developments in countries like Yugoslavia and Hungary.781 When Kilpeläinen did choose to make use of IRD-based material in his columns, British propaganda themes were guaranteed to receive plenty of attention, such was the popularity of his witty comments.782

In addition to the social democrats, the British Legation wished to increase its cooperation with parties on the political right and centre. Although the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) had been in political wilderness after the war ended, its sharpened propaganda policy against domestic communists that was already evident in the parliamentary elections of 1948783 made the British more curious about using the party as another channel for its informational objectives. This did not, however, change the way London and Washington perceived Kokoomus and its position in Finnish politics. Indeed, when discussing the cooperation between the two leading Western powers and Kokoomus in the early 1950s, one has to keep in mind that the party was not in general of particular interest to either the British or the Americans, since it was expected to be predominantly sympathetic to the West in any case. The party was simply not considered as the main organ in containing communism in Finland, and therefore not a likely target of financial investment either, as Vesa Vares has noted.784

British officials’ intention to collaborate with the Coalition Party on informational activities progressed decisively in early 1951 when Mr McGhie managed to establish good relations with the Kokoomus press syndicate and started consulting party officials about articles and features

778 Yrjö Kilpeläinen’s collection at Työväen Arkisto gives an indication of the way the propagandist systematically collected material related to communism to his use. The collection also reveals his particular interest in communism in France on which he became a particular expert. See, Yrjö Kilpeläinen’s collection, box 3, TA. See also, for example, Yrjö Kilpeläinen’s article on the background for French communism; Sosialistinen Aikakausilehti, Nro 9, 1953.
779 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, June 28, 1950.
780 An example of this was Kilpeläinen’s column in which he labeled the Archbishop of Canterbury as “A Christian decoy for communism” because of his comments in which he accused UN troops of using bacteriological warfare in Korea. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, July 20, 1952.
781 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, May 25, 1952.
782 According to Juntunen, in the early 1950s Kilpeläinen was almost indispensable to Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, as many of its readers bought the paper only to read his column. Juntunen 1976, p. 177.
783 Vares 2008, pp. 103-106.
784 Ibid., p. 287.
that could be placed in their service.785 In addition to press articles, the British Legation also
started providing the party library with pamphlets and books on communism. For example, in
August 1952 Mr McGhie sent Niilo Honkala, Party Secretary of Kokoomus, a long list of
British publications from which to choose.786 The fact that at least on this occasion almost all of
the publications Honkala picked were written by authors associated with the IRD, such as
George Orwell, Dennis Healy and R.N. Carew-Hunt, as well as Bertrand Russell, Leonard
Schapiro, C.D. Darlington, Francis Watson, W.N. Ewer and Victor Feather, who all
contributed to the essay collection *Why Communism Must Fail*787, shows that the British had now
found a new, even if indirect, channel for their anti-communist propaganda campaign. Up until
this development, Kokoomus’ collection of printed Western political material had been modest
and mostly included publications sent to them by the British Conservative Party. The exchange
of political pamphlets between the two parties had not begun until the summer of 1950 when
the Tories had requested for Kokoomus’ recent campaign literature.788

The relatively modest extent of international cooperation applied even more to the Agrarian
Party (Maalaisliitto), which the British also wished to use as a distributor of their printed
content. As the party’s international contacts mainly consisted of politicians from similar parties
in Scandinavia and West Germany789, this would always be a difficult proposition. The fact that
leading party figures such as Urho Kekkonen in the early 1950s considered cooperation with
the West secondary to building a working relationship with the Soviet Union790 made the
challenge even bigger. All this did not, however, stop Hamish McGhie from offering British
articles to the Agrarian Party press syndicate. In order to create closer ties with party officials,
McGhie also requested them to send him examples of the kind of propaganda the party had
implemented in the parliamentary elections of 1951 that would be useful for a “London-based
association conducting research in political propaganda”791, undoubtedly the IRD. Although
Maalaisliitto agreed to this wish, and party officials continued to remain on McGhie’s contact
list, cooperation between British Legation and the party remained slim. The British were not
particularly surprised by all of this since they were fully aware that the Agrarian Party’s
reluctance to adopt a closer relationship with Western countries, especially if they were

953/1119, NA.
786 J.I. McGhie to N. Honkala, August 9, 1952, Ulkomainen kirjeenvaihto 1948-1953, Fb1, Kansallisen
Kokoamaksen arkisto (Hereafter KK), Porvarillisen Työn Arkisto (Hereafter PTA), Helsinki.
787 N. Honkala to J.I. McGhie, September 20, 1952, Ulkomainen kirjeenvaihto 1948-1953, Fb1, KK, PTA; For
more about the publication *Why Communism Must Fail* and its authors’ connection with the IRD, see Defty
2004, p 166.
788 Soon after the Finnish conservatives fulfilled this wish, the party started to receive Tory literature from London.
A.N. Odling to Kokoomus, May 19, 1950; N. Honkala to Conservative and Unionist Central Office, June 29, 1950;
R.D. Milne to N. Honkala, August 3, 1951, all Ulkomainen kirjeenvaihto 1948-1953, Fb1, KK, PTA.
789 Going though Maalaisliitto’s international correspondence reveals how few and far between the party’s contacts
to the outside world really were in the 1940s and 1950s. Kansainvälistet asiat ja kirjeenvaihto, boxes 1-4, Keskustan
ja Maaseudun arkisto (Hereafter KMA), Helsinki. See also, Hokkanen 1996, pp. 16, 372.
791 Maalaisliitto was by no means the only party to receive a letter from McGhie requesting political material for a
"London-based organisation". A similar request was also sent to at least the SDP. J.I. McGhie to M. Miettunen,
September 11, 1951, Kansainvälistet asiat ja kirjeenvaihto, box 2, KMA; J.I. McGhie to V. Leskinen, September 11,
1951, SDP KV, box F295, TA.
members of NATO\textsuperscript{792}, was largely down to its position as one of the leading governmental parties, often the case in the 1950s.

In spite of the local conditions, the harder-hitting IRD material, which was both sent as background papers to, for instance, political and newspaper contacts and included in the press bulletin, in general had a satisfactory landing in Finland. For the distribution of the material, the Legation developed a routine under which a great deal of the received content was translated and then duplicated to the contacts made mostly by Mr McGhie. The number of Digest items included in the press bulletin that were printed by the Finnish press even surprised the British at first. They also soon recognised that provincial papers in particular could be more easily encouraged to publish anti-communist material as their resources for own production were so limited. In October 1950, such anti-communist items as ‘Forced Labour in Czech Uranium Mines’ and ‘The Communists and the Attack on the Churches’ were published by Finnish newspapers, which were now considered even more willing to publish more controversial material, naturally providing it did not infringe the FCMA Treaty.\textsuperscript{793} Especially semi-humorous content and items on Eastern European countries were actively picked up from the Legation press bulletin, published on a weekly basis from 1950 onwards.

Naturally, the anti-communist propaganda distributed in Finland made up only a certain share of the printed material delivered by the British Information Service. Although no official figures exist, it is not difficult to conclude that in a country like Finland the more neutral material produced by the COI, which above all focused on British matters, made up the majority of the publicity. Particularly short items compiled together in the press bulletin and translated into Finnish were actively published by newspapers throughout the country. The main themes distributed to the Finnish press in the early 1950s dealt with such major international issues as Britain’s position to the Korean War and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Conflict. The welfare state and other social, industrial, economic and scientific developments also remained among the larger topics most typically included in both the press and labour bulletins.\textsuperscript{794}

**Britain Enters Harder Propaganda War**

The fairly successful start in the placement of IRD material did not stop British officials from noting that a number of reasons kept holding back its use. For instance, in addition to making observations about the practice of self-censorship in Finland, they recognised that Finnish newspapers were restricted in size, there was a complete absence of periodicals of The Economist or New Statesman class and that important international news without direct repercussions on

\textsuperscript{792} According to Hokkanen, in the 1950s members of Maalaisliitto, loyal to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, were extremely cautious regarding the introduction of any kind of official relationship with parties from the NATO countries. Hokkanen 2002, pp. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{793} A.R.H. Kellas to C.F.A. Warner, October 9, 1950, FO 953/876, NA.

\textsuperscript{794} Although both the British Press Bulletin and the Labour Bulletin included a fair share of ‘softer topics’, such as sports and entertainment news, the content of both news summaries continued to predominantly focus on political and economic issues in the early 1950s. The more human interest-typed articles were delivered to Finnish newspapers through the Feature Article Service, which served 85 newspapers around the country. See, for example, ‘Työalan uutisia Britanniaasta’, No. 16, December 1948; No. 55, May 1952 & No. 56, June 1952, SDP TT 1952, HAB8, TA; A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.
Finland, if even published, had strikingly little impact on the newspaper reading public. Indeed, British officials often regarded the average Finn living outside Helsinki as insulated from any real sense of world affairs.

The question on the attribution of the material was also seen as tricky in Finland. As IRD content was always circulated confidentially and recipients were asked not to reveal the articles’ source, journalists in some Western European countries used the material as if they had thought of it themselves. In Finland, however, this was possible only in exceptional cases as the newspapers saw that they should reveal the story’s source. For this reason, Oswald Scott requested that on some occasions, in order to secure publicity, it would be useful to be able to attribute the material to, for example, ‘a Foreign Office spokesman’. According to his estimation, many Finnish papers would print more of IRD material if they were able to publish it as an official view of the British Government. This was not to happen as John Peck, who was to become Head of the IRD, replied to Scott that no permission to attribute the material to an official source of any kind could be given.

Such a denial did not prevent the circulation of the IRD’s semi-secret background material to ‘trustworthy recipients’ from becoming general knowledge in Finnish press and political circles. In 1951, both Vapaa Sana and Työkansan Sanomat saw as their duty to ‘expose’ the activity on two occasions after they had got their hands on confidentially circulated material to chief newspaper editors and Mr McGhie’s accompanying letter. On the first occasion, which took place in January 1951, the document in question was the IRD’s long background paper on the Soviet Peace Campaign, which analysed with great detail the Soviet Government’s policy and tactics regarding the campaign and discussed the role of the communist-controlled international organisations. The two Finnish papers published parts of the document and the entire covering letter with the title ‘The anti-Soviet propaganda of the social democratic press is directed from a legation of a foreign power’. The papers did not, however, attack the British for their activities as much as they did Yrjö Kilpeläinen, who was shown to have used a quotation from the document. All this fitted in well with one of the main communist propaganda themes, that the SDP received its orders and directives from the Western powers. The FO did not see this ‘exposure’ as particularly serious, but decided to duplicate 175 more copies of the document in question “to give it much wider circulation that it received before pointing out that the document in question is in no way secret, and that it was intended for the background guidance of publicists and others free to form an unbiased opinion of world events”.

The second incident, taking place in April 1951, was taken more seriously. This time, the communist papers published a letter addressed to Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen by Toivo Karvonen, Secretary General of SNS. In his letter, Karvonen announced that a circular letter issued by the SDP to its information officials in the field had come into his hands. The circular,
according to Mr Karvonen, was based on a pamphlet issued by the British Information Office in Helsinki. The 'exposed' document was the same background paper on the Soviet Peace Campaign that had already been revealed in January. According to Väinö Leskinen, now Secretary General of the SDP, the intention of these communist 'revelations' was once again to discredit the party in connection with the trade union elections and to assemble a volume of 'proof' of foreign support of the Finnish social democrats as a foundation for eventual Russian pressure.802

Arthur Kellas, First Secretary at the British Legation, saw that it was unwise of the SDP to circulate a document that had already been shown to have originated in the British Legation and another for which the British origin had not been concealed and felt that it could not do the Finns any good to be accused of spreading British propaganda.803 The IRD’s Mr Peck felt that the Legation in Helsinki had been stretching things somewhat in passing this kind of material to social democratic organisations and agreed with Kellas that such activity should be suspended for the time being.804 IRD officials did, however, understand that it was impossible in the long run to entirely conceal the origin of its material. In Finland’s case the question merely was more delicate than in most other countries where this did not matter so much.

What is ironic about these ‘revelations’ is that while the Finnish communists reported about their discoveries, the Finnish Foreign Ministry already owned two versions of the paper, one in Finnish sent by Hamish McGhie as another example of British background material,805 and one shipped from London by Eero A. Wuori, who “had got his hands on this kind of a memorandum”.806 It is likely that the IRD paper was also circulated to some foreign ministry officials. This conclusion can be drawn from a memorandum prepared for Urho Kekkonen in which the various versions of the document, including the one used by the SDP’s Editorial Department, were compared to each other.807 The memo also tells something about the methods the social democrats used for tailoring the British documents into a form that would be more suitable for the Finnish environment. In addition to making the papers shorter, SDP officials also, for example, replaced the word ‘Soviet’ with the word ‘communist’. This procedure was very typical of the Finns, who always tried to avoid directly offending their giant neighbour, whatever the topic in question was.

These incidents did not come out of nowhere. The propaganda battle in Finland, both domestic and international, was becoming fiercer and, according to the British, the Soviets had for a couple of years increased their direct pressure on Finnish newspapers to publish more of their material and give more space to Russian topics in general. In the early 1950s, the British Legation in Helsinki reported about several new incidents in which editors of leading newspapers, for instance Helsingin Sanomat, were ruthlessly directed to print more Soviet-based material or leave certain contents unpublished. The Soviets particularly focused on the cooperative press as they regarded it as the ‘workers’ press’. For instance Martti Larni, editor of

802 A.R.H. Kellas to H. Morrison, ‘Accusation against H.M. Legation of direct participation in the Cold War in Finland’, April 18, 1951, FO 371/94605, NA.
803 Ibid.
804 Minutes by A.N. Noble to IRD & IPD, April 26, 1951, FO 371/94605, NA.
805 J.I. McGhie to undefined recipient, December 9, 1950, 115, UMA.
806 E.A. Wuori to Å. Gartz, November 13, 1950, 5B Lontoo, UMA.
807 ‘Ulkoasianministeriön muistio: Neuvostoliiton rauhankampanjaa koskevien muistioiden vertailu’, 5B Lontoo, UMA.
the weekly magazine *Elanto*, was under scrutiny as the Soviet Legation felt that he had not used enough Soviet content and gave too much space to articles and picture materials originating from the West. After paying a visit to the Soviet Legation, together with Väinö Tanner, once again an authoritative SDP parliamentarian, he agreed to use Soviet material if it was objective when “dealing with culture, scenery and other non-controversial subjects”.

The intensifying activity of the Soviets and the Finnish communists, together with international developments and the more aggressive material produced by the IRD, led to the British adopting a somewhat harder line in their propaganda activities in Finland in 1951 and 1952 in particular. According to the British Legation, the establishment of NATO and the disappearance of fears related to the Korean War made Finnish newspapers more prepared to publish controversial material. The British noticed that the Finns continued to have a lively distrust of and healthy resistance to communist propaganda, but also reminded that there were no grounds for complacency as “in the absence of encouragement from the West the Finns might conceivably succumb to despair”.

It was now that the tendency of President Paasikivi’s neutralism to harden from an expedient policy into a national doctrine really started to worry the British Legation. The FO instructed British officials in Helsinki to gain more influence in the opinion of Finnish politicians as well as the general public on such world affairs that might have an actual effect on Finland rather than merely projecting Britain for its own sake. This change of heart had also to do with the increasing threat of expense cuts to which the FO information services around the world were subject. More results of British political influence on world public opinion were now called for by Whitehall. As a consequence, the British Legation in Helsinki made its propaganda machinery more effective to face the communist propaganda offensive.

In this new situation, the British Legation particularly focused on strengthening its work through local channels and finding even more contacts. Cooperation with parties fighting against communism was again expanded and material sent by the British was, according to a report by Andrew Noble, Minister to Finland, increasingly used in spring 1952 for articles, speeches, lectures, talking points and information bulletins that different parties circulated privatively. The British, still rather cautious, felt that they would rather work like this than attempt to enter a more open war with a local political party. This was also a question of expenditure, as the wider distribution of books and pamphlets would require sums out of the British Legation’s reach. Moreover, the British were still willing to avoid an excessively aggressive anti-communist propaganda campaign, as it might have encouraged adventurous elements in Finland to expect more help from the West than could have been given. As the circulation of anti-Soviet material violated Finnish law and therefore involved a great risk of embarrassing exposure, the British, and the Americans, decided that any content circulated on the larger scale should notify the publication’s originator.

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808 J.I. McGhie to IPD, ‘Soviet Pressure on Finnish press’, February 1, 1951, FO 953/1184, NA.
809 A.R.H. Kellas to H. Morrison, ‘Accusation against H.M. Legation of direct participation in the Cold War in Finland’, April 18, 1951, FO 371/94605, NA.
810 C.F.A. Warner to O.A. Scott, July 26, 1950, FO 953/876, NA.

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Regardless of the risk of exposure, the use of indigenous organisations as channels for the distribution of anti-communist material was seen as the only way to reach Finns who were personally anti-communist but still exposed to the SKDL at every election. Both the British and the Americans realised that the degree to which the distribution of material through local organisations was effective depended almost entirely on how ‘Finnish’ they could make their adaptation of the original publication.812

Despite all the obvious limits and risks, British officials in Helsinki were in 1952 able to note with some satisfaction that they had become rather successful in promoting their harder-hitting propaganda. A greater number of articles on serious economic and political subjects now found their way into newspapers, and the resistance certain editors had previously shown against this type of material was beginning to weaken. The British Legation felt that it had been particularly successful in placing articles on the country's economic position, the Egyptian question, Britain's relations with the US and the Commonwealth countries and on NATO.813

Among the more specific British propaganda themes that were advocated in Finland to some success was the objective of discrediting charges made by Soviet and Finnish communists according to which the Americans had undertaken bacteriological warfare in North Korea.814 After feeding the Finnish press with IRD background material on the issue815, the Legation was pleased to report that a number of Finnish newspapers had published articles condemning the communists’ claims. Not surprisingly, the germ warfare campaign was conspicuously tackled by Yrjö Kilpeläinen, who on several occasions used the theme as a propaganda tool in his satirical comments on both Finnish and international communism.816 Although Finnish commentators must have been fully aware of this dimension of Soviet propaganda for quite some time, they undoubtedly found great use of the IRD report published in June 1952, which examined the germ warfare from a strategic perspective and labeled the affair as the climax of the broader Soviet Peace Campaign.817 W.N. Ewer, correspondent of The Daily Herald and the IRD's most dependable contributor818, also increased the Finns’ awareness of the topic through an article, published at least in Ilta-Sanomat, in which he suspected that the whole myth was created due to the outbreak of either malaria or bubonic plague in Manchuria and North Korea.819

In June 1952 things were running so smoothly for the British activities in Finland that Mr Noble saw it fitting to claim that British material was receiving more publicity in the country

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812 'Memorandum of Discussion of British and American Information Policy in Finland', October 16, 1952, FO 1110/481, NA.
814 Ibid.
815 The IRD took great care over tackling the bacteriological warfare campaign around the free world. It made sure that the FO’s condemnation of the allegations was spread efficiently through the BBC, Reuters and British newspapers. The background material on the issue sent abroad included two ‘basic papers’ and as many as seven articles from the IRD’s regular writers. For example, ‘Bacteriological warfare, a memorandum by T.O. Tull’, March 25, 1952, Appendix to ‘US Reply to the Germ Warfare Campaign’, a memorandum by J. H. Peck, September 24, 1952, both FO 1110/494, NA.
816 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, February 23, 1954.
818 Jenks, John, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War (Edinburgh 2006), p. 82.
819 Ilta-Sanomat, May 2, 1952.
than the material supplied by any other foreign mission. At the same time, however, he
reminded how difficult it was to assess the Information Service’s value to Britain “because of
the restraint with which international affairs are necessarily handled in Finland”. According to
Noble, the Finnish press remained very responsive to guidance on its desirable line in
commenting on foreign affairs and, therefore, the extent of the impact of anti-communist
propaganda could not be adequately measured by the number of printed columns in the
newspapers or the tone of leading articles.820 This remark was made all the more understandable
by the British Legation's growing launch of more overt IRD-produced background material,
consisting of, for example, quotations of editorial opinion on communist and Soviet topics, that
was promoted as topics of ‘idea debates’ for the Finnish press as well as opinion-makers and
intellectuals. This material also included translated summaries of articles that had appeared in
the British press and pamphlets such as *What is Communism?* and *Titoism*. The content with
which the Finns were being fed was becoming so much more complex that it made assessing
the actual source behind newspaper reports even more troublesome.

**More Open Pro-Western and Anti-Communist Sentiment Arises**

In order to understand the factors behind the boost in British and American activities in
Finland in the early 1950s, one must study the broader developments taking place in the
Finnish political and journalistic fields during that time. Even though the tightening
international situation largely explained the Western governments' more resolute conduct also
in Finland, the domestic scene played a much greater role than in many other countries in
determining their operations' scope and degree of success. An examination of the local political
parties' and newspapers' main policies also makes it possible to comprehend how the two
campaigns and the printed content distributed under them suited their purposes.

As suggested, the early 1950s was a period when the domestic political propaganda battle in
the northern country was particularly aggressive. The attacks made by communists newspapers
against the US and Britain was part of a larger offensive that saw the communists, backed by
Moscow, taking every possible measure to undermine both their Finnish rivals and the
representatives of the Western world. For this purpose, particularly officials of the SKP
developed the communists’ propaganda strategy into a more systematic one by examining
especially American activities closely and defining specific ‘battles’ and ‘workplace agitations’ in
which Finnish communists should take part. In 1953, the SKP’s ‘agitation department’s’ general
objective of “promoting peaceful co-existence and fighting against chauvinistic and right-wing
social democratic influence” was met by arranging closely determined 'battles' for example in
the areas of 'peace defending' and the promotion of friendly ties between Finland and the
Soviet Union.821 The fight against American influence in the Finnish media was also a common
target for the communists, with the “war propaganda and American agitation” of STT and
Yleisradio becoming specific targets. For instance, for opposing ‘war propaganda’ on YLE

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820 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.
821 Undated memorandum: 'Muistilista piirien agit.- ja propagandajaostojen vuosineljännessuunnitelma varten', SKP, Tiedotusjaosto, Da 2, Kansan arkisto, Helsinki, Finland.

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broadcasts, the SKP instructed its members to write letters and make phone calls to the company protesting over its content.\textsuperscript{822}

The activities of SNS reached their peak in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{823} The growth of the society’s film operations was particularly impressive largely due to the cars and film projectors donated to the society by the Russian film distributor Sovexportfilm.\textsuperscript{824} For example, in 1953 SNS gave a total of 5,221 film presentations reaching almost 400,000 spectators.\textsuperscript{825} The society also introduced a broad ‘lie-blocking campaign’ that aimed to expose anti-Soviet propaganda, which, according to SNS, was evident throughout Finnish society: in the media, in theatres, in schools, the army and in the rumours deliberately spread to ordinary Finns.\textsuperscript{826} SNS activists were fully aware of the activities of the British and American legations, including the content of their bulletins, and named the distribution of publications like \textit{Valitut Palat}, \textit{Aikamme}, \textit{Time} and \textit{Life} as the most outrageous anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland.\textsuperscript{827} In order to give its claims more credibility SNS started the systematic collection of anti-Soviet articles published by Finnish newspapers\textsuperscript{828} with special emphasis on news printed in \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}, \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} and \textit{Aamulehti}.\textsuperscript{829}

The society also made sure that the Finnish public and leading politicians were informed about its findings. In a letter presented to President Paasikivi in February 1951, SNS wished that the President would do something about the hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union that, according to Chairman Sylvi-Kyllikki Kilpi and Secretary General Toivo Karvonen, was particularly evident in a number of Finnish newspapers and several American films presented in Finland.\textsuperscript{830} Paasikivi was apparently not that impressed with this presentation, writing down in his diary that the criticism directed towards the Soviet Union was not worrying, keeping in mind the tone with which Russian newspapers dealt with Finland.\textsuperscript{831}

Soviet officials posted in Helsinki kept backing the propaganda campaigns conducted by the SKP, the SKDL and SNS, and contributed to the exposure of rivalling activities. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union delivered two notable démarches to the Finnish Foreign Ministry concerning matters related to culture and the media. The first had to do with the censorship of the Russian film ‘Peace Wins War’ and the poor audibility of Russian radio broadcasts\textsuperscript{832}, and the second complained about the hostile attitude adopted by Finnish newspapers and YLE towards the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{833} The constant unofficial remarks the Soviets made about the Finnish press, the screening of American films and the publishing of controversial books, in

\textsuperscript{822} Undated memorandum: ‘Agitaatio-osaston työstä alkuvuonna 1952’; Undated memorandum: ‘Eriiiti agitaatiotyön kysymyksiä, both SKP, Tiedotusjoasto, Da 1, Kansan arkisto.
\textsuperscript{823} Kinnunen 1998, pp. 112-117.
\textsuperscript{824} Pöytäkirja SN-Seuran puhemiehistön kokouksesta 25.2.1952, SNS, box 40, KA.
\textsuperscript{825} Suomi-Neuvostoliitton-Seura, Toimintakertomus vuodelta 1953, SNS, box 50, KA.
\textsuperscript{826} Pöytäkirja SN-Seuran puhemiehistön kokouksesta 15.2.1951, SNS, box 39, KA.
\textsuperscript{827} Undated memorandum: ‘Neuvostoliittovastaisen propaganda muodoista Suomessa’, SNS, box 419, KA.
\textsuperscript{828} Undated circular: ‘Neuvostoliittoa vastaan kohdistettujen valheiden kokoaminen ja torjuminen’, SNS, box 50, KA.
\textsuperscript{829} ‘Undated list of anti-Soviet articles published by the Finnish press’, SNS, box 419, KA.
\textsuperscript{830} SNS to J.K. Paasikivi, February 22, 1951, SNS, box 68, KA.
\textsuperscript{832} KP:n muisto 4/50, ‘Neuvostoliiton lähetystön demarcheja’, by T. Voionmaa, February 7, 1950, 12 L Venäjä, UMA.
\textsuperscript{833} Memorandum: ‘Pushkinin démarche’, June 19, 1954, 12 L Venäjä, UMA.

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particular Väinö Tanner’s memoirs of his time as Foreign Ministry during the Winter War, again shows how closely the cultural and informational fields in Finland were monitored.

As the communists enhanced their activities, non-communist Finns also began to behave with more intent. The growing faith over Finland’s independent future gave a number of prominent Finns the confidence to expand the cooperation between Finnish and Western organisations, often behind the scenes. In recent years, studies have, for example, revealed that cooperation between Finland and the US on military affairs was closer in the Cold War period than it had previously been realised. This collaboration began already in the early 1950s when members of the Finnish Armed Forces started visiting the US more frequently, some of them in training purposes. Since the US Army saw that the value of the information received from Finland, due to its close proximity to the periphery of the Soviet Bloc, would outweigh any security risk that might have been involved, the exchange of intelligence information was also launched in 1952. The Americans were particularly interested in receiving information about, for example, Soviet-produced engineering equipment, Soviet cold-weather construction equipment and the port of Petsamo. For learning more about winter warfare, the US Army specifically enlisted fifteen ex-Finnish officers famously led by Colonel Alpo Marttinen as instructors in this field.

According to the US Army Attaché in Helsinki, a great deal of valuable military intelligence was, indeed, received from the Finns. In turn, the Finnish General Staff was provided with publications describing, for example, North Korean methods on mines, field fortifications and bridging, while Finns visiting US military instalments were informed about guns, tanks, physical training and military psychology. The supply of appropriate military background material to the Finns was another way for the US to show support to the Finns. The cooperation would only expand in the upcoming decades, reaching its height in the 1960s and 1970s, when a large number of influential Finnish military leaders collaborated with their American counterparts partly behind the political leadership’s backs.

The exchange of security intelligence largely followed the pattern. For instance in the early 1950s, apart from providing the British with details about defectors from the Soviet Union, some of whom turned out to be commissioned agents, the Finnish Suojelupoliisi remained

834 Väinö Tanner remained as one of Moscow’s pet hates in Finland. His memoir ‘Olin ulkoministerinä talvisodan aikana’, published in 1950, was a regular target of Soviet criticism, for instance, in Russian newspapers. For example, ‘Suomalaisen sotarikollisen muistelmat’ by V. Bereskov. Translation of a book review published in Novoje Vremja, no 46/November 15, 1950’, 12 L Venäjä, UMA.
835 See, for example, Riskakki 2010; Tarkka, Jukka, Karhun kainalossa (Helsinki 2012).
836 ‘Memorandum for Chairman, State Defense-Military Information Control Committee: Exchange of Intelligence with Finland’, June 25, 1952, RG 319, Army-Intelligence Project Decimal File 1951–1952 (Hereafter AIF), box 4, NARA.
838 B.B. McMahon to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, May 29, 1952, RG 319, AIF, box 4, NARA.
841 Rentola 2009, pp. 21-22.
somewhat cautious in terms of collaborating with the CIA and MI6. This policy changed in the mid-1950s when cooperation between the intelligence agencies became closer.842

The more open pro-Western and, in particular, anti-communist position adopted by a number of Finns can also be recognised in the behaviour of the leading political parties. Among the most notable developments was the more robust stance implemented by Finnish parties from the political right. Such party officials inside Kokoomus as Niilo Honkala concluded that the SDP's position in the fight against communism should be challenged.843 The vitality of expanding anti-communist propaganda was strongly emphasised in several party memoranda before and after the parliamentary elections of 1951.844 Reports on the situation in Eastern Europe and the flaws of Marxism845, together with various broad analyses of the Finnish communists' strategies846, were increasingly distributed inside circles representing the political right. The conservatives' more systematic use of political propaganda was also becoming more evident in the activities of the Confederation of Finnish Employers (Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto, STK). In order to strengthen its position in Finnish society, and undermine above all the idea of socialisation, the confederation founded a news agency of its own, first known as Taloustieto and from 1949 onwards as Taloudellinen Tiedotustoimisto.847 This development was closely related to the larger financial support various Finnish industries started to provide to non-communist parties.848 Although fairly successful in their informational operations in the early 1950s, the employers did not pay too much attention to influencing public opinion until the general strike of 1956, when they introduced more extensive and efficient propaganda methods.849

Compared to the Coalition Party, the Agrarian Party and the Swedish People's Party of Finland (RKP) were not closely connected to the Western campaigns for two very different reasons. The Agrarian Party had no intention of becoming involved in the broader Cold War propaganda battle and although approached by the Western powers, party members were, according to the British view, “not easily accessible for linguistic, social and cultural reasons”.850 Although this was to a large extent the case, one has to remember that Maalaisliitto played an important part in the ideological battle against communism in rural areas and therefore indirectly helped the Western cause. Towards the mid-1950s, the party gradually extended its

842 Rentola 2009, pp. 24-25.
843 Party circular: 'Taustattetoja päivänpolitiikkaan', May 6, 1953, Niilo Honkala’s collection (NH), box 8, KA.
844 Party memoranda: 'Propagandakysymykset', January 15, 1951 and 'Kv. taistelu, 1952', both Db6, KK, PTA.
845 The development in Eastern Europe was particularly closely covered by the news summary circular ‘Rautaesiripun takaa’ (From Behind the Iron Curtain). As the circulars do not reveal the source of the news reports, their origin remains uncertain. The covered topics and the style of writing do, however, refer to the IRD. For example, ‘Rautaesiripun takaa’, March 21, 1953, Db6; ‘Rautaesiripun takaa’, 1952, Hga 1, both KK, PTA.
846 For example, ‘Varottaja. SKP nykytilanteessa’, 1953, Db6, KK, PTA.
848 For instance, the forest industry started to finance the election funds of even the SDP and the Agrarian Party in the 1950s since they were regarded to hold an influential position in the containment of communism, which it regarded as absolutely vital. For example, Jensen-Erikse, Niklas, Metsäteollisuuden maa 4. Läpimurto: Metsäteollisuus kasvun, integraation ja kylmiän sodan Euroopassa 1950-1973 (Helsinki 2007), pp. 87-89.
850 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.
attack against the SKDL in particular\textsuperscript{851} and adopted a more systematic approach to its informational activities by expanding the use of printed word, establishing its own survey company Maaeudun Gallup\textsuperscript{852} and introducing the use of films.\textsuperscript{853} As for the RKP, the Swedish-speaking minority was, according to Andrew Noble, simply unnecessary to approach as their leaders were able to read English newspapers and frequently visited Britain.\textsuperscript{854} The party’s orientation to the West was well reflected in the content published by the RKP’s leading paper, \textit{Hufvudstadsbladet}. Compared to the leading Finnish language newspapers, the publication gave considerably more space to articles with an Anglo-American origin while ignoring Soviet-related topics almost entirely.\textsuperscript{855}

The more active position adopted by the conservatives did not challenge the social democrats’ leading position in anti-communist activities or Western cooperation. Visits by SDP and SAK delegations to both the US and Britain had by now become somewhat regular. Olavi Lindblom remained particularly active in arranging meetings with not only Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown, but also CIO’s European Representative Victor Reuther\textsuperscript{856}, who had visited Finland, for example, in autumn 1949 and again in September 1951 for the America Days held in Lahti\textsuperscript{857}, with the purpose of requesting a larger slice from the FTUC funds. Even though not all requests were automatically funded by the FTUC, the early 1950s was a period when the most important foreign funding for the social democrats’ struggle against communism took place.\textsuperscript{858} The crucial ideological battle within the Finnish trade union movement also turned the SAK’s international department into something of an information distribution centre with propaganda content, including leaflets, pamphlets and books, being flown in not only from Britain and the US, but also from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) headquarters. In turn, SAK officials collected different language versions of the material it received from the WTO and Soviet trade unions and forwarded them to their brothers in Brussels.\textsuperscript{859} After the SAK finally applied for official ICTFU membership in 1957, this activity naturally became more limited.

The Finns’ more determined approach can also be sensed by reading party-associated newspapers. Newspaper editors had, to some extent paradoxically considering the general Soviet pressure, more confidence to publish more openly political and critical content than they

\textsuperscript{851} For example, Party circular, February 1, 1954, Puolueistoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1953-1955, KMA

\textsuperscript{852} 'Maalaisliiton tiedotustoiminnan tehostaminen ja uudelleenorganisoiminen', Annex to 'Maalaisliiton keskushallituksen kokous', October 9, 1951; Circular: 'Gallup-asiamiesten toimintaohjeet', October 24, 1952, both Puoluetoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1950-1952, KMA.

\textsuperscript{853} 'Elokuvatoimilautakunnan mietintö', March 29, 1951, Puoluetoimisto, Da Lähetettyjä kirjeitä 1950-1952, KMA.

\textsuperscript{854} A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.

\textsuperscript{855} For example on July 19, 1950, Hufvudstadsbladet's international section included eleven news reports credited to Reuters (and STT) and two to AP. None of them were related to the Soviet Union. Hufvudstadsbladet, July 19, 1950.

\textsuperscript{856} O. Lindblom to V. Reuther, January 10, 1952, RG 18, Irving Brown Files 1943-1989 (IB), box 15, GMMA

\textsuperscript{857} Bergholm 2005, pp. 252-253; V. Reuther to A. Sumu, September 28, 1951, SAK KV 1951 (Yhdysvallat), TA.

\textsuperscript{858} One of the most significant projects for which the Finnish trade unions needed funding was a new printing machine for their newspaper Palkkatyöläinen. V. Puskala and O. Wikström to J. Lovestone, November 22, 1953, RG 18, JL, Series 1, box 34, GMMA. See, also, Majander 2007, pp. 172-173, 181, 192, 210.

\textsuperscript{859} A. Adamczyk to O. Lindblom, July 15, 1953; O. Lindblom to A. Adamczyk, September 11, 1953, both SAK KV 1953 (VAKL), TA.
had had in the late 1940s. This also made the content offered to them by the British and Americans more publishable.

Since SDP-affiliated newspapers only expanded their relentless crusade against Finnish communists, they continued to offer the best outlets for Western anti-communist propaganda. The content published by Suomen Sosialidemokraatti in the early 1950s shows that the social democrats were indirectly willing to undermine the Soviet Union by giving increasing attention to developments in Eastern Europe. The coverage included both broad article series, such as ‘What Life Is Like in a People’s Republic’, which labelled communist republics as systems based on dictatorship and forced labour, and regular less extensive reports about, for instance, the agricultural crisis and political purges taking place in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. For covering these issues, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, as other Finnish papers, used a wide number of predominantly foreign sources. In addition to publishing news about the harsh realities of life behind the Iron Curtain, the paper supported the Anglo-American cause by frequently including articles written by prominent Western trade unionists, such as Morgan Phillips, and reports presenting the US as the leader of popular innovations and consumer products such as Coca-Cola.

Although rather cautious in its publishing practices, and rarely if never openly critical of the Soviet Union, the leading Coalition Party paper Uusi Suomi also started to offer greater possibilities for the Western actors to get their message through. The publication contributed to the party’s new policy by including reports on international developments, such as the Korean War and Eastern European issues, that it received through the Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph. Due to the lack of foreign correspondents of their own, the other major conservative dailies, Aamulehti and Kaleva, also covered these topics almost exclusively through, often very short, reports provided by Reuters or UP. Smaller Finnish papers’ similar practices continued to see their international sections dominated by Western content. These papers included Karjala, which published a great number of, often anti-communist, articles provided by Reuters through STT. The Agrarian Party-affiliated publications made up a notable exception in the Finnish

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861 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti July 11, 1951, July 31, 1951, September 18, 1951, October 25, 1951, July 5, 1953 & July 6, 1953.
862 In his articles Phillips explained the trade union movement’s objection of Marxism in every form. For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, July 7, 1950. Phillips’s contribution was highly topical, since he, as General Secretary of the Labour Party, visited Helsinki only a couple of months later as a guest of the SDP. Majander 2004a, pp. 356-357.
863 For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, September 23, 1951. A list of American and British subjects published by the paper can be found by browsing its card index filed in boxes B1-B5, Suomen Sosialidemokraatin arkisto, TA.
864 Uusi Suomi was especially willing to use Daily Mail-produced news on the Korean War. In subjects related to Eastern Europe it resorted more to Reuters. For example, Uusi Suomi, September 8, 1950 & October 29, 1950.
865 For example, Aamulehti, July 31, 1950: Kaleva, July 2, 1950.
866 It was not uncommon for middle-sized Finnish newspapers, such as Karjala, to credit all of their international news to ‘STT-Reuters’ or ‘STT-AP’. As the published news often included content originating from the British and American propaganda machinery, these papers offered a highly valuable channel for both Britain and the US. For example in 1950, Karjala included such topics covered by Reuters as Dean Acheson’s comments on countering the Soviet Union’s expansionist objectives and the rise of anti-communist movements in Asia. As no written records exist on the degree with which these stories were influenced by either the IRD or the USIA, an exact estimation of the amount of British and American official propaganda content published in these papers is impossible to give. We can, however, assume that a fair share of the news content was influenced by them. For example, Karjala, March 17, 1950 & May 16, 1950.
press. Since leading papers such as *Maakansa* mostly consisted of local issues and challenged their opponents usually through very practical, often agrarian topics,867 their use of international content stayed small. *Maakansa* also published Soviet-related articles as well as news material provided by the Soviet Information Bureau (SIB) more frequently than its social democratic or conservative rivals.868

Even if many newspapers associated with the non-communist Finnish political parties started to feel more confident about publishing news articles criticising developments in Eastern Europe, the independent *Helsingin Sanomat* and the Sanoma-owned tabloid *Ilta-Sanomat* continued to dominate the field of international news coverage. The growing gap between Sanoma’s resources and those available for other Finnish newspapers became more evident as the decade went on,869 and gave the publishing company the ability to invest more in international coverage by employing more foreign correspondents and maintaining a variety of extensive partnerships with foreign publishers and news agencies. Partly because of this, the content of both *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat* gradually became even more orientated to the West and, at times, even openly anti-communist. The latter tendency was greatly enhanced by the policy of giving more coverage to political comments written by foreign politicians and journalists.

In covering Eastern European matters, Sanoma benefitted particularly from the output of Immanuel Birnbaum, a Polish-German political reporter specialising in both the Soviet Union and the Nordic Countries, who first offered his services to Eljas Erkko in May 1946 when still living in Warsaw.870 Birnbaum’s long articles on various political, economic and cultural developments became almost a regular feature both in *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat*, and not even his forced leave from Poland871 changed this. Birnbaum’s reports dealing with Eastern European issues soon became a permanent feature in the paper and ensured that Finnish readers were not kept in the dark when it came to such matters as the inability of socialism to produce actual growth in Polish living standards or the Jewish question in Eastern Europe.872

Readers of Sanoma-owned newspapers also learnt about international developments through reports distributed by international news agencies. As this output included material from such contributors as Walter Kolarz, an IRD-associated writer whose UP-distributed reports dealt with as diverse topics as the tactics of the Cominform and religion in the Soviet

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867 For example, ‘Pienviljelijät ja vasemmisto’, September 25, 1951, Maalaisliiton sanomakeskus 1951, KMA.
868 For example, during spring 1950 the paper published several articles, some of which were produced by SIB, on such topics as teachers’ position in the Soviet Union, the mechanisation of Russian agriculture and the growing industrial production in the world’s leading communist country. Maakansa, May 23, 1950, May 27, 1950 & June 9, 1950.
869 Not surprisingly, Helsingin Sanomat’s superior resources increased the newspaper’s share of the total circulation of Finnish newspapers. When in 1946 Helsingin Sanomat’s circulation made up 10.6 per cent of the total circulation, in 1965 the figure already reached 13.1 per cent. For example, Löyttyniemi, Veikko, Sanomalehdistö 1940-luvulta 1980-luvulle in Salminen, Esko (ed.), Sanomalehdistö Suomessa (Helsinki 1981), p. 22.
870 I. Birnbaum to E. Erkko, May 5, 1946, SOLAK, Aa 4, EEA, PLA.
871 Birnbaum was deported from Warsaw without any official reason in November 1949. For more about Birnbaum’s career and his connection to Finland, see Teräväinen, Erkki, ‘Immanuel Birnbaum ja Urho Kekkonen - Kun kuva Kekkosen ulkopolitiikasta saksalaisille komistui’ in Multamäki, Kustaa, Peltonen Markku & Saarinen, Hannes (eds.), ”Se rakkain kotipolku”: Erkki Kouri ja Yleinen historia (Helsinki 2000), pp. 437-453.
872 Ilta-Sanomat, July 31, 1952; Helsingin Sanomat, March 18, 1950. A detailed list of the topics Birnbaum covered for Helsingin Sanomat can be found at Ulkomaiset kirjoituspalkkiot, Dd, for example, box 38, Sanoma Oy:n arkisto, PLA.
Union\textsuperscript{873}, they obviously offered both the British and the Americans a valuable channel for their propaganda. Although a large amount of propaganda articles were published simply under the name of the news agency, in the mid-1950s it became increasingly common for \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} and \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} to both publish independent articles from political commentators and give the name of the story’s actual writer. As a consequence, it is possible to track down some of the reports published during that particular period from writers associated with the IRD. However, when reading newspaper content from the first years of the 1950s, one can only speculate with the connection between the writer and the state-run propaganda organisation.

In the American case this is not as problematic, since the propaganda agency operated mostly in overt fashion and only rarely credited articles to a specific individual. Indeed, when reading Sanoma-owned newspapers from the early 1950s, it is relatively easy to identify some of the main themes the USIS-produced reports wished to promote during the period. In addition to distributing news about political developments in the US, the USIS articles focused on such broad issues like the expanding political rights of African-Americans\textsuperscript{874} and freedom of speech in the American media\textsuperscript{875}. The USIS’s desire to assure the reader about the US being a country where traditional art forms were appreciated as much as popular culture\textsuperscript{876} shows that at least the promotional material distributed to Finnish newspapers followed to a great extent the broader themes mapped out in Washington.

When discussing Sanoma Oy’s role in providing Finns with reliable international news, Eljas Erkko’s personal contribution to the cause cannot be overestimated. His insistence of publishing material from well-known Western political writers, who were at times directly critical of the Soviet Union, was somewhat courageous considering the constant pressure he was subjected to by the political leadership. Erkko’s ability to include even strongly anti-communist content, for instance, in the pages of \textit{Valitut Palat}\textsuperscript{877} continuously amazed his American colleagues. When asked about how he was able to publish such material, Erkko noted that when the material touched propaganda he wished only to touch the danger line, not go over it, and that in many cases his publishing practice was “a matter of instinct more than of brains”.\textsuperscript{878} This policy did not stop Erkko from often crossing the danger line, at least in the eyes of the political leadership. In particular, President Paasikivi made sure that the newspaper tycoon received his share of verbal feedback and guidance to Finland’s political position.\textsuperscript{879} The relationship Eljas Erkko developed with Urho Kekkonen, Paasikivi’s successor, was more complex, based on suspicion and respect at the same time.\textsuperscript{880}

\textsuperscript{873} For example, Ilta-Sanomat, May 31, 1949 & July 9, 1949.
\textsuperscript{874} Ilta-Sanomat, December 1, 1950.
\textsuperscript{875} Ilta-Sanomat, December 28, 1950.
\textsuperscript{876} For example, Ilta-Sanomat, December 3, 1951.
\textsuperscript{877} By the early 1950s, Valitut Palat had clearly adopted a harder-hitting approach by covering such topics as RFE’s battle against communism and defectors’ accounts on life behind the Iron Curtain. For example, Valitut Palat, April 1954; Valitut Palat, August 1954; Valitut Palat, September 1954.
\textsuperscript{878} A. Berwick to E. Erkko, February 28, 1952; E. Erkko to A. Berwick, March 10, 1952, both SOLAK, Aa 32, EEA, PLA.
\textsuperscript{879} Manninen & Salokangas 2009, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{880} Ibid., pp. 490-494.
Although the more active approach to combating communism adopted by Finnish political parties and the leading newspapers pleased the Americans and the British, even more important for their work in the northern country was the general sentiment among Finnish people, which had gradually become more open and active, at least if compared to the relative apathy that dominated Finnish society in the first post-war years. In the world of academia, the more confident mood adopted particularly by those on the political right was reflected as a stronger stance against communism and a growing emphasis on patriotism, Western democracy and individual freedom. \(^{881}\) The new mood was well materialised in the activities of Vapauden Akateeminen Liitto (VAL), a semi-covert academic association founded in November 1950. The organisation, which declared to “promote a Finnish way of thought, a higher sense of morality and the spirit of social justice among its members” \(^{882}\), played a significant role in promoting anti-communist sentiment not only among students but also in marginal areas where it, for instance, organised discussion events and distributed printed propaganda. \(^{883}\)

Among the most important organisations for the distribution of Western propaganda was SYT, which was founded in spring 1952. The organisation, financially backed by large employers and supported by several influential Finnish politicians, academics and journalists, focused on collecting information about communism and Finnish communists and producing objective research material out of it, offering support for non-communist parties, among other things, in their election strategies, as well as for producing anti-communist propaganda and organising lectures and related events throughout the country. However, SYT did not wish to interfere too closely with daily political issues \(^{884}\), presumably in order to avoid provoking the Soviet Union.

Although SYT would remain a rather vague foundation, mainly due to the obvious circumstantial limitations on its activities, both the British and Americans welcomed the establishment of a local anti-communist actor with some pleasure. The legations of both countries followed the developments that led to the organisation’s founding closely \(^{885}\) and stayed in contact with a number of its members for years to come. Even the SDP’s decision to remain out of SYT, due to its members’ misgivings about being openly associated with the political right and employer representatives \(^{886}\), did not stop particularly the British feeling that something significant had been achieved on the anti-communist front. \(^{887}\) As SYT was founded during a time when the FO seemed highly worried about the strong support of communism particularly in Northern Finland, and somewhat envious of the progress the Americans had


\(^{882}\) ‘Vapauden Akateemisen Liiton toimintakertomus vuonna 1950’, Vapauden Akateemisen Liiton arkisto (Hereafter VAL), box 1, KA.

\(^{883}\) VAL leaflet ‘Mitä nuoriso tänään, sitä kansa huomenna’, Undated, VAL, box 1, KA; Vesikansa 2004a, pp. 56-58

\(^{884}\) ‘SYT:n hallituksen 10.2.1953 pitämän kokouksen pöytäkirja’, Suomen Yhteiskunnan Tuki –säätiön arkisto (Hereafter SYT), box 2, KA.

\(^{885}\) The British Legation was kept well posted about the founding of SYT and its main lines of development mainly by Finnish social democrats such as Väinö Leskinen and Aito Anto. For example, I. Scott to A. Eden, ‘Report on progress made by the Committee recently set up to combat Communism in Finland’, October 21, 1952, FO 1110/481, NA.

\(^{886}\) See for example, Vesikansa 2004a, p. 93.

\(^{887}\) For example, IRD to British Legation, April 26, 1952, FO 511/26, NA.
achieved in the country, for example, through the publishing of Aikamme, the IRD’s John Peck even considered the possibility of offering some financial support if not to the foundation itself, then “any other useful local channel for the transmission of anti-communist material”. Since the idea was against the broader British policy of not supplying direct financial support to an individual group or organisation, and because there is no evidence to prove otherwise, it is highly unlikely that SYT received money from London. The suggestion that the CIA funded the anti-communist organisation, a claim that has been expressed more than once, is also unlikely to be accurate mainly because there is no trace of such activity, as Vesikansa has pointed out.

What available evidence strongly suggests, nonetheless, is that the relationship between SYT and the two Western powers was far from being just a passive one. Both American and British officials were particularly interested in SYT’s research activities concerning the reasons for the popularity of communism in Finland. According to Vesikansa, at least the US Legation got its hands on SYT’s first main research report, which examined the people's various reasons to vote for the SKDL. It is very hard to imagine that the British would not have received SYT’s research material; after all, from its offset the foundation’s propaganda section was under the leadership of Aito Anto, the former SDP official who had received propaganda training in England and remained in close contact with British diplomats in Finland.

SYT’s collaboration with British and US officials in the production of propaganda material also indicates that the foundation’s relationship with them was a two-way street. More or less immediately after SYT's founding, both Helsinki-based legations started supplying the organisation with their propaganda material. Whereas in the British case this meant the delivery of copies of The Interpreter and other IRD material, the Americans focused on distributing USIS-produced pamphlets on typical propaganda themes, such as the reasons behind the Korean War and the history of the American labour movement. Since SYT used a wide range of both domestic and international sources for its printed propaganda, the Anglo-American content came to good use. The foundation's decision to hire two editor-translators to produce material suggests that Western content was widely reproduced and distributed to politicians and journalists around the country.

As SYT’s policy for producing printed content was based on the idea of avoiding too aggressive forms of propaganda, particularly the IRD’s more sophisticated analyses of political, economic and cultural developments in Eastern Europe proved valuable for anti-communist Finns. For example, when examining the propaganda leaflets distributed for the non-

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888 A.N. Noble to J. Peck, May 15, 1952; J. Peck to A.N. Noble, both FO 511/126, NA.
889 Vesikansa 2004a, p. 139.
890 Ibid., p. 116.
891 Over the years, SYT produced numerous reports on the reasons for the SKDL's popularity and the communists' influence on people. The reports also included several suggestions on how to confront communism as efficiently as possible. A report for 1953-1954 pointed out that anti-communist propaganda should focus more on individual psychology rather than treating people as mere involuntary members of a group. SKDL:n kannatus 1953-1954 suorittujen tutkimusten valossa, 10.1.1955, 34, box 2, UMA.
892 Copies of British and American propaganda material, such as The Interpreter, December 1952-1953, ‘VK ja Korean Kriisi’ (USIS/Helsinki, undated) and ‘Amerikan työväenliikkeen historiaa’ (USIS/Helsinki 1953), can be found at SYT, boxes 154 and 332, KA.
893 SYT memorandum, April 24, 1953, SYT, box 103, KA.
communist parties’ 1954 parliamentary election campaign, it is relatively easy to notice a close connection between IRD and SYT propaganda. All the leaflets in question followed the very same themes that were tackled by a number of IRD publications, namely working conditions, living standards and the position of the church in communist countries. A closer analysis of SYT leaflets shows that while they were not direct copies of the IRD texts, a considerable share of the content has been used particularly when dealing with agriculture and workers’ rights. As these were topics that were covered also in various USIA pamphlets, SYT by no means fell short of Western material it could adjust to local circumstances.

Since members of SYT, like most other Finns, did not wish to attack their giant neighbour directly, the use of IRD texts required a fair amount of editing and rewriting. However, as the SYT propaganda material was distributed to a wide range of actors throughout the political spectrum, including the influential social democrats, the foundation offered the British yet another channel for at least indirectly reaching an even greater number of Finns who could help their cause of undermining communism. Both British and American officials had emphasised the importance of working through indigenous organisations and now a growing number of them were willing to expand their collaboration.

**USIS Finds New Film Audiences**

As mentioned above, a characteristic of, in particular, the US campaign in Finland in the early 1950s was the constant search for new methods and channels of communications through which a more direct anti-communist message could be presented. Screening films fitted into this quest perfectly and quickly became one of the key methods for the Americans to reach the Finns throughout the country. Although the majority of USIE films was at first shown at short subject-newsreel cinemas and at the USIS Audience Room in Helsinki, which gave almost daily presentations to a variety of groups ranging from business organisations to sports clubs and youth organisations, the proportional share of films loaned out to numerous organisations operating also in provincial areas kept growing at rapid pace. Among organisations regularly using the films for their touring lectures and local events were the two large cooperative societies Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta (SOK) and Kulutusosuuskuntien Keskusliitto.

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894 For the elections, SYT supplied several political parties, organisations and newspapers with printed material “to support their battle against communism”. The content consisted of special material, including research reports on SDKL supporters and leaflets on life behind the Iron Curtain, and press articles. ‘Kommunisminvastainen tiedotustoiminta ennen eduskuntavaaleja 7.-8.3. 1954’, Annex to ‘SYT:n hallituksen kokous, 29.5.1954’, SYT, box 2, KA.

895 The leaflets ‘Työolot kansandemokratioissa’, Elintaso kansandemokratioissa’, ‘Maatalouden kollektivisointi kansandemokratioissa’ and ‘Kirkon asema kansandemokratioissa’ can be found in a number of political archives, including those of the SDP, Kokoomus and Maalaisliitto. The ‘original’ leaflets can be found at, SYT, box 87, KA.

896 For example, ‘The Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union’, April 1949, FO 975/24; ‘Land Reform and Collectivisation in Eastern and south-Eastern Europe, 1952, FO 975/59; ‘Control of Workers in Countries under Communist Domination’, 1948, FO 975/16, all NA.

897 For example, The USIA pamphlet: ‘Collectivization in Europe and the Far East’, Undated , RG 306, MFCPL, box 4, NARA.

898 In addition to the party headquarters, SYT material, including the 1954 leaflets, was distributed to influential SDP politicians engaged in the struggle against communism. One of them was Penna Tervo, Minister for Trade and Industry in 1951-1953 and former editor of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti. See Penna Tervo’s collection, box 3, KA.
(KK), the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Employment Safety Association, adult education centres in Helsinki, numerous workers’ institutes, women’s clubs, teacher training institutes and religious groups.\(^\text{899}\) As a large share of the movies, which in 1953 reached the total figure of 351\(^\text{900}\), dealt with scientific and agricultural developments, there was also great demand for them from professional and technical groups as well as agricultural organisations. One example of the latter was the 4H Club in Finland, which in February 1950 had two lecturers on tour showing USIE films exclusively.\(^\text{901}\)

In order to reach audiences in the most sparsely-settled areas in Finland, the USIS introduced a special mobile unit, a jeep equipped with facilities enabling screenings even in places without electricity, in October 1949. The first film tour with the mobile unit was made to Eastern Finland the following month. During the course of two weeks, film operator Väinö Lindman gave 57 different performances, mainly in schools, Finnish-American societies and reserve officers’ clubs.\(^\text{902}\) As the tour proved to be a success, similar operations were conducted in the following couple of months to the south-west of Finland and the small towns and villages in the Ostrobothnia region. The most ambitious mobile unit trip was made by Mr Lindman to Lapland in March 1950. During the one-month tour, 45 shows were presented to almost 4,000 local residents in the most sparsely inhabited areas of the country. Lumber camps and schools in remote regions, where the USIS mobile generator was the only available power supply, constituted the chief audience. According to the US Legation’s report, the screenings were sympathetically received and fully appreciated in localities where film shows had been virtually non-existent. Mr Lindman himself did, however, face a degree of unfriendliness at a few of his lumber camp visits, mainly due to the relatively large number of communists employed as lumbermen in Lapland.\(^\text{903}\)

The USIS/Helsinki was definitely satisfied with the way its film operations were developing in the early 1950s. The programme reached people of all ages in every corner of the country and its popularity only kept growing. As a result, the US Legation felt it was necessary to hire a full-time film officer as well as another mobile film operator who could focus on presenting the movies in the capital region.\(^\text{904}\) The number of complementing letters and newspaper articles regarding the USIS film presentations indicated that the audience was also satisfied.

The USIS regarded the content of the movies as suitable for the Finnish environment, although it did demand for more productions for more specifically defined groups such as labourers and young people. At this stage, the great majority of USIE films either dealt with


\(^{900}\) Elämää Amerikassa – Valistuselokuvaluettelo (USIS/Helsinki 1953).


\(^{903}\) H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Report on Information and Cultural Activities for March 1950’, April 20, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/4-2050, NARA. Apparently Lindman was not too upset about these encounters since he remained loyal to his job and continued to give extensive tours of Finland for years to come.

news events or a specific scientific or technical subject or projected American culture in a more
general sense. Among the most popular productions in 1950 were such films as High Over the
Border and A Step Saving Kitchen. The overall efficiency of presenting these films was seen as so high that according to an US Legation report from November 1950, no other mass medium was as successful in reaching certain USIS targets.

Although the bulk of USIE films were non-political productions focusing on the projection of America, the USIS/Helsinki had to remain careful in terms of what kind of material it could present to the Finnish audience. Finnish film distributors were on many occasions wary of handling certain films for the fear of communist reactions. For instance, in December 1950, the US Legation reported that Finnish commercial film distributors had refused to run the USIE picture on President Truman’s ‘San Francisco Speech’ in spite of it having been passed by the Finnish Film Censorship Board. The representative of Columbia Pictures, with which the USIS cooperated closely on film distribution, decided to show the film in his own theatre for one week, but withdrew the movie after the film critic of the newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet labelled it as propaganda and stated that propaganda was unwelcome in Finland, regardless of its source.

In September 1950, the US Legation had reported about another incident concerning Finland’s overcautious policy to anything resembling propaganda. In this case, the Finnish Censorship Board had informed the local USIS clerk responsible for motion pictures that a section of the film President Truman Reports on Korea had to be cut before prints could be exhibited. The censored version of the film, which was sent to USIS officials did not include the phrase: “We are united in detesting communist slavery”. After making inquiries, the USIS information officer found out that someone in the Censorship Board’s office “had interpreted regulations too strictly and industriously”. Although the cut sections of the film were eventually returned to the USIS/Helsinki for reinsertion, this incident could be added to the growing list of peculiarities effecting American informational activities in Finland.

In the field of film, these peculiarities were rather common, particularly in the years before Stalin’s death. Although relatively few Western films, among them such obvious propaganda productions as MGM’s The Red Danube, were completely banned by the Finnish Censorship Board, a considerable number of American documentaries and newsreels or certain parts of them were censored either by the board or already during the preventive censorship procedure conducted by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, as Jari Sedergren has explained in his

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905 The USIS/Helsinki catalogue from 1953 shows that typical subjects for the projection of America included the presentation of US cities, the educational system, healthcare as well as introductions to typical modern American professions. Elämää Amerikassa – Valistuselokuvaluettelo (USIS/Helsinki 1953).
909 Valtion elokuvatarkastamon päätös, Nro 32290, August 24, 1950, Fbb37, VETA, KA.
910 H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Attempt to Censor the USIE Motion Picture Film: “President Truman Reports on Korea”’, September 12, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2429, 511.60E/9-1250, NARA.
911 ’Ote Valtion elokuvatarkastamon pöytäkirjasta’, March 21, 1950, Da1, VETA, KA; Sedergren 2006, p. 95.
comprehensive study. A glance at the Censorship Board’s documents gives a good indication on just how conscientiously newsreels were studied during the Korean War in particular. The board made sure that not only controversial comments given by Harry S. Truman or Dean Acheson on the dictatorial nature of communism were cut out from the newsreels, but also insisted that pictures of Stalin should be censored from several of them.

The Americans understood that in certain cases they too needed to take preventive action regarding their films. For instance in May 1950, the Legation’s senior officers agreed that the film *The Story of Two Cities* was unsuitable for showing in Finland because its direct attacks on Soviet policy would only cause embarrassment to Finnish authorities. Finland’s political situation required that the material sent from Washington always had to be checked and its suitability evaluated. In addition to the verdict of its own staff, the USIS/Helsinki explored the opinion of some prominent Finns over the film’s feasibility for the country’s political climate by carrying out extensive field testing for almost all titles before Finnish language versions were ordered. The Finns did not, however, have the last say about the suitability of the films. For example, the screening of *A Watch for Joe*, an AFL film on retail clerks, was found unjustified by the USIS due to its "completely unrealistic approach to actual living conditions of workers in the US", even though Olavi Lindblom, active also on this front, had expressed keen interest in the production.

Caution in the promotion of films in Finland did not prevent the US Government from supporting the screening of American films and the Finnish motion picture industry in a more general sense. The administration in Washington kept providing important backing for film companies such as Suomi-Filmi, which continued to suffer from the lack of unexposed motion picture film in the early 1950s. This support was by no means automatic, but after the State Department acknowledged in spring 1951 that there was a real possibility that Suomi-Filmi would have to resort to supplies from the Soviet-controlled import and export firm Seximo Oy, and in return be forced to show Soviet propaganda films in its studios, Washington made fast arrangements over raw stock film supplies worth $40,000 to Finland.

The USIS's general satisfaction with their extensive motion picture activities did not stop its staff from worrying that their number one target group in Finland, labour groups and organisations, was not being reached. The same more or less applied to young university students. Furthermore, the Legation felt that the commercial movies provided by private

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913 For example, Valtion elokuvatarkastamon päätökset: Nro 32698, November 7, 1950, Nro 33063, January 11, 1951, Nro 33088, January 16, 1951, Fbb39, VETA, KA.
914 For example, Valtion elokuvatarkastamon päätökset: Nro 33085, January 1, 1951, Nro 33257, February 2, 1951, Nro 34590, September 24, 1951, Fbb39, VETA, KA.
915 H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Motion Picture Film; The Story of Two Cities’, January 18, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2429, 511.60E/5-1250, NARA.
916 US Legation to SD, ‘Motion Pictures – Labor Films’, March 12, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
917 W. Barnes to SD, ‘Finland’s Requirements for Unexposed 35-mm Motion Picture Film’, April 6, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2120, 460E.119/4-651, NARA.
918 W. Barnes to SD, ‘Finland’s Requirements for Unexposed 35-mm Motion Picture Film’, May 24, 1951; D. Acheson to US Legation, June 26, 1951, both RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2120, 460E.119/5-2451, NARA.
corporations such as Columbia were, despite their popularity, not of the highest quality and, in fact, one key reason for the “extremely diverse impressions various Finns seem to have of the US – a paradise on the one hand, a crime-ridden, unstable, uncultured and superficial existence on the other”.920

In order to give people a more realistic picture of America, the USIS gave great care to becoming something else than a mere source of free entertainment. The staff saw that their film operations could be made even more effective by moving away from the general audience to a more specifically targeted group consisting mainly of members of labour organisations. According to the Legation’s view, the hiring of an American official to monitor the films and present them on certain occasions was of upmost importance as the official would be more conscious than a Finn in hitting the targets and give a certain objectivity to the programme.921 With the help of greater resources, which included the appointment of an American film officer, the very first years of the 1950s saw the USIS staff constantly planning special campaigns and eagerly requesting Washington to send them films like The Mechanic and Johnny Jones which could be more of interest to labour groups. Even though these films presented the lives of typical American working families, the latter from the perspective of a young boy922, they were still rather neutral in tone, focusing on the individual rather than a larger group of workers.

The USIS/Helsinki started receiving more of the films it craved for in late 1951 directly from Washington or by borrowing them from other posts. Features explaining the nature and functions of American labour unions such as Union Local, which told the story of workers’ struggles from their own viewpoint, and, according to Washington, should help to discredit the communist theory of class conflict923, were warmly welcomed by USIS officials. The film that they ranked particularly highly was The Carpenter, which depicted American technical and industrial advances from a labour viewpoint. Enthusiasm for this particular film was so great that the Legation believed that it had found a new angle for approaching the primary target audience more effectively. In order to convince themselves of the accuracy of this evaluation, the Americans first screened the film to a group of top labour leaders. Their reactions were, if possible, even more excited as, according to their view, the film addressed effectively the communist propaganda line that only in the Soviet Union had great strides been made in industrial development.924

After receiving a greater number of labour-related films, the USIS started strongly pressing for their presentation throughout the labour field. Some, like The Carpenter, were distributed to local organisations without attribution to the USIS. In April 1950, the Americans still reported that workers’ organisations were not using the films to the degree that was believed potentially

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921 Ibid.
922 Elämää Amerikassa – Valistuselokuvaluettelo (USIS/Helsinki 1953), pp. 41, 44.
923 SD circular, ‘USIE Film Policy Guide – Union Local’, June 1950, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
possible.\textsuperscript{925} In the following couple of years, the situation showed some considerable improvement after the USIS made special efforts to make nationwide organisations show their films. The Americans sought to accomplish this goal by special mobile unit tours, cooperative campaigns in conjunction with organisation-sponsored lecture tours and through selective bookings utilising ‘packaged’ programmes more efficiently.\textsuperscript{926}

The first significant step in nationwide mobile film tours organised in cooperation with a large Finnish organisation was taken in the summer of 1951 when the USIS/Helsinki and the Finnish Sports Federation (Suomen Valtakunnan Urheiluliitto, SVUL) carried out a seven-week campaign during which films were presented at many of the organisation’s key locations. The US Legation reported that this project was probably the first extended tour to reach more adults than school children and that it included more of the primary target group than any other campaign, as many audiences were composed entirely of workers. All in all, the Americans saw that “since the interest in sports was high in Finland, the subject of this tour was a valuable device for creating interest and establishing desirable attitudes”.\textsuperscript{927}

An even more extensive sports-related campaign took place in the same autumn, when a ten-week film campaign was organised in cooperation with both leading national sports federations, the more right wing SVUL and the Finnish Workers’ Sports Federation (Suomen Työväen Urheiluliitto, TUL). Having the two highly competitive organisations to sponsor the same project was almost unheard of. Although the campaign was planned in cooperation with the national headquarters of both organisations, only one of the sports federations carried the responsibility for the project in each community. According to American reports, interest in the project was so wide that several members of the federations attended screenings arranged by the rival organisation. The comprehensive and spontaneous press coverage of the campaign also suggested that the tour had been a great success.\textsuperscript{928}

The most strategic and direct campaign of the entire USIS film programme implemented in cooperation with several leaders of the primary target group, the blue-collar workforce, was planned for quite some time. After the worker-related films finally started flowing in, especially after the introduction of the so-called ‘Phase Two’ in the distribution of USIE movies,\textsuperscript{929} the possibility to increase labour organisations’ use of USIE material improved to a considerable extent. The quest of convincing all social democrat leaders inside the SAK about the importance of propaganda collaboration was not, however, that simple as many of them still feared that such an activity would be more damaging than helpful. After some persuasion, a gradual breakthrough was made during 1951 and 1952 when the SAK started presenting labour meetings all over the country with films about American labour and American industry, which

\textsuperscript{925} H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Motion Pictures for Workers’ Groups’, April 5, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2429, 511.60E5/4-550, NARA.
\textsuperscript{929} SD circular ‘Use of Films with Quarterly Propaganda Emphases: Phase Two’, May 21, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
“give the lie to communist propaganda about ‘Wall Street control’ and ‘enslavement of the workers’”, as Ambassador Cabot put it.930 The operations were organised in such a way that the SAK presented the films during its promotional tours, while the role of the USIS in providing and adapting them into the Finnish environment was kept as invisible as possible. Although the SDP had some film production of its own, in the shape of Kansan Filmi, which had collaborated with both the Americans and the British on, among other matters, the import of film projectors931, the fact that SAK officials felt that there was a huge shortage of both domestic and foreign productions, especially at an affordable price, undoubtedly helped the Americans in having their input screened.932

The key that unlocked the final door for USIS cooperation with the SAK was the International Ladies Garments Union film With These Hands of which a Finnish-language adaptation was made in Finland rather than New York. Both the USIS and the SAK invested heavily in the local version of the film by giving it a rewritten Finnish script and soundtrack. By September 1952, ten 16 mm prints of the film were ready for the SAK’s ‘Trade Union Week’ during which the movie was shown to union members in more than 150 cities, towns and villages throughout Finland.933 The film tour, widely advertised in the trade union publication Palkkatyöläinen934, was regarded as a huge success by USIS officials, leading to regular use of their films on the SAK’s own circuits and, in more general, to “cracking the labour-target problem in Finland” as now “the social democrats have learnt that they can trust the USIS and that the USIS can help them in their struggle to keep control of Finnish labour in non-communist hands”.935

What both the USIS staff and the Finns appreciated most about With These Hands was that it made a point that the SAK’s social democrats wished to stress in their war against the communists – that the right road to the improvement of workers’ wellbeing was to act through union organisation under a democratic government, not political strikes or a communist regime. The film, directed by Jack Arnold and produced by Radio Corporation of America (RCA), presents a dramatic story of the history of the union from the perspective of a retiring

930 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘The USIS Program in Finland’, August 23, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2426, 511.60E/9-1152, NARA. Mr Cabot’s objective of discrediting the communist view that the US was run by Wall Street became something of an obsession to him. Not only did he emphasise this goal in his reports to Washington, but he also wished to use visiting Americans to support the cause. This was particularly evident during Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt’s four-day visit to Finland in June 1950. Well before her trip, Mr Cabot sent a detailed list to the former president’s widow in which he listed issues that were either advisable or inadvisable to say to the local press. According to Cabot, while it was not recommendable to make direct attacks against the Soviet Union, a passing comment made by Mrs Roosevelt dismissing the most common views presented about America by the communists, including Wall Street control, would be highly appreciated. J.M. Cabot to E. Roosevelt, April 20, 1950 & May 11, 1950; E. Roosevelt to J.M. Cabot, June 16, 1950, all The Diplomatic Papers of John Moors Cabot, reel 6, DDEL.


933 D. Wilson to SD, ‘Request for raw stock for priority USIS film project’, September 17, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.

934 The paper published detailed information about the ‘film presentation evenings’. The tour started from Eastern Finland and ended in Helsinki in early October. Palkkatyöläinen, September 19, 1952 & September 26, 1952.

935 Presentation at PAO’s Conference, Brussels, ‘A Motion Picture Cracks the Labor-Target Problem in Finland’, December 8 – December 12, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
member. Although it starts off by showing the poor working conditions in the early 20th century and the bitter strikes that followed, the real emphasis is on proving that the model of collective bargaining and the new union laws introduced by F.D. Roosevelt in the late 1930s had been the main reasons for workers’ improved healthcare standards and pensions. The split of the union in the 1920s is, on the other hand, explained by the "unrealistic demands made by workers illusioned by Lenin". Although the main message is by today’s standards presented in too obvious a fashion, one can understand why the film was regarded as so powerful in the 1950s; the quality of production is high and the storyline with its rather stereotypic characters is made understandable to audiences across the world.

The growing success of the USIS/Helsinki's film operations did not stop the Americans from continuously developing new techniques for reaching labour groups. For example, workplace screenings of USIS films in a group of factories were planned in great detail. Factory safety was a topic of particular focus. According to the USIS, films presenting American factories and working conditions in the context of safety education would reach the primary target audience in a highly efficient manner by not only showing that the US was extremely interested in the safety and well-being of workers, but also demonstrating the technical advances of American industry. In this particular project, the Americans cooperated with the Finnish insurance companies Teollisuus Tapaturma and Vakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola, which conducted extensive safety insurance programmes promoted by travelling lecturers who also used USIS films to illustrate their point.

As for other US activities using visual material to affect people’s perceptions, the photo exhibits in the display window rented by the USIS in the Lasipalatsi building in central Helsinki were the most visible. In addition to more general displays projecting America, the exhibited photographs illustrated the American living standard graphically, especially the purchasing power of the American worker. In this area, mainly due to financial matters, the USIS worked closely with the British Information Service. In 1953, the Americans rented one window in Turku and the British one in Lahti after which the American and British displays were shown alternately. In the same year, Public Affairs Officer David Wilson reported that in order to produce a stronger propaganda impact and reduce expenses, elaborate displays in the Lasipalatsi window had been replaced by four panels of news and feature photos one of which was changed each week. In addition to exhibits in rented windows, American photographs were regularly sent to various newspaper offices in Finland for their show windows, and other

936 The film ‘With These Hands’, 1950, RG 306, USIA Movie Division, NARA; Dialogue sheets of With These Hands by Morton Wishengrad, RG 306, Movie Scripts 1942-1965, Entry 1098, box 49, NARA.
938 D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Motion Pictures for Factory Safety Companies’, May 21, 1952; D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Motion Picture Program for F.Y. 1953’, October 26, 1952, both RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
collections were provided to associations and businesses in various fields. As for picture posters, the USIS faced difficulties in their successful placement as the most obvious outlet, schools, showed hardly any interest in them at all due to their propagandistic nature, as the Americans estimated. Film strips were used slightly more efficiently by teachers who realised the value of them as a teaching aid.

**VOA Finland – Propaganda Effort Falling Short**

The way the Americans, like the British, saw that radio would be an essential medium for a successful propaganda campaign in Finland gives even more proof that the US Government was willing to adopt a much more active role in this exceptional environment. If the distribution of *Aikamme* and other locally-printed US-based material, together with the screening of USIE films, had the intention of addressing communist propaganda in Finland within a highly specified target group, the Voice of America broadcasts in Finnish focused on providing a more direct response to even broader masses. The fact that the radio channel’s story turned out to be a rather short one not only reflected the broader policy changes taking place in Washington, but also indicates that the use of this particular medium did not quite meet this expectation.

The slow pace at which VOA broadcasts to Finland were reintroduced gives a good example of the general post-war American sentiment to the use of public funds for media operations abroad. International shortwave broadcasting was regarded more of a war-time activity than a useful tool for longer-term public diplomacy. As a consequence, VOA’s global output suffered some drastic cuts in the first post-war years. As the tide turned in the late 1940s, the idea of resuming broadcasts to Finland gradually started to win more support in State Department circles. As Soviet pressure in Finland grew, also through Moscow’s daily broadcasts in Finnish, this idea materialised into a formal recommendation made by the department in January 1949. As this did not lead to the inauguration of broadcasts to Finland, the US Legation in Helsinki decided to start its own campaign to promote its importance. In his strong letter sent to Washington in May 1950, Minister Cabot expressed his fear that remaining silent about communist propaganda claiming the US to be a "money-mad nation of imperialists and warmongers" would make some Finns believe that there was some truth in these charges. According to him, VOA offered the best possibilities for an immediate reply to attacks made on behalf of the far-left press. Radio broadcasts would have greater freedom of action as they could “show up the falsity of the Russian allegations without mincing words and maintain a direct, positive counteract in a manner the Legation could never do”, Cabot added. He saw that

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the establishment of a Finnish service, should events ever come to a point where the Russians dominated Finland, would be wise from a psychological as well as a practical point of view.944

A Finnish VOA service could also be justified by the Americans’ inability to secure USIE recordings air time through YLE. Only a couple of educational programmes and music transcriptions prepared by the USIE were broadcast per month.945 The great caution given by YLE to foreign programmes was evident, for instance, in its decision to refuse the Finnish-American Society from presenting an American Independence Day programme in 1950. YLE explained this decision by noting that a general ban had been placed on commemorative programmes for foreign national days.946 Although the USIS/Helsinki came up with some ideas for stepping up the use of their broadcast material through the Finnish national radio, for instance by arranging special interviews with Finns visiting the US that might interest YLE947, the limited possibilities for the use of radio in Finland meant that the need for VOA broadcasts became increasingly obvious.

Before the eventual inauguration of Finnish VOA broadcasts, the programme content was discussed in great detail. The Americans were well aware of the popularity of the BBC Finnish Service and the Finns’ appreciation of the objectivity of its news. Partly for this reason, VOA’s goal should not be to compete in this area but to focus more closely on topics in which the Finns had particular interest, the Legation pointed out. The leading assumption was that a large number of Finns living in the US would give a firm basis to build on as there would surely be strong interest in the everyday life of American Finns.948 In general, the US Legation saw that the programmes should not go too far in their propaganda as Finns would resent any attacks on domestic party activity from the outside – even if directed against the communists. In addition to using Finnish-Americans in interviews and factually portraying America, the programmes should focus on well-presented dramatisations of actual Soviet and satellite tactics and explanations on current events, it was recommended.949

These views were all taken into account in the actual build-up of the VOA Finnish Service. In December 1950, Henry F. Arnold was specifically sent on a temporary basis from Helsinki to New York to launch the Finnish operation and to ensure that the programme policy was actually understood and followed.950 In recruiting staff, he was helped, among others, by Raymond Ylitalo, who was still stationed in Helsinki. After a rather testing recruitment period,
the regular staff of VOA Finland made up of eight employees, five of whom were born in Finland. Undoubtedly, the Finnish Desk’s most pre-eminent writer was Esa Arra, an experienced journalist who joined the radio station from the editorship of the Brooklyn-based *New Yorkin Uutiset*. At first VOA Finland operated without an officially appointed senior official. In August 1952 the man who finally took charge of the operations was John I. Kolehmainen, a professor well-known for his studies on immigrant life in the US. After Kolehmainen decided to return to the world of academia after only ten months with the radio station, senior reporters Alan Nelson, former Press Officer at the USIS/Helsinki, and Piltti Heiskanen served as acting chiefs.951

VOA’s first Finnish broadcast was finally heard on January 1st, 1951. The 15-minute daily programme was increased to two 15-minute programmes by the same autumn. The service did not enjoy the most perfect of starts as its broadcasting reception was at first poor. Despite a fair amount of publicity given to the broadcasts, the audience size remained far below its potential for quite some time, and the early listener reaction was for the most part apathetic. In order to make the Finnish Service more attractive, Minister Cabot felt that the broadcasts should have a lighter touch and include more topics that would bring them closer to Finnish listeners’ immediate interest. To give a more local flair to the service, the Americans started seeking Finnish journalists who would be able to deal with communist propaganda humorously and provide more topical material.952 Mr Cabot’s views on the content of the early programmes was shared by a Finnish listener panel, which recommended a more down-to-earth approach to some news broadcasts as it felt that the over-excited use of the Finnish language by certain VOA presenters made American politicians’ remarks sound boastful and threatening and as a whole too much of ‘propaganda’.953

One of VOA Finland’s first special tasks was to support non-communists in the SAK’s elections in spring 1951. The service transmitted a regular labour programme consisting of features and commentaries on American labour unions and such subjects as slave labour and workers’ lowering living standards in communist countries.954 To make sure the approach would be appropriate to Finnish trade unions, Minister Cabot discussed the programme content with Olavi Lindblom, who gave his approval while stressing the importance on building talks around known facts, keeping polemics and ‘propaganda’ to a minimum.955

This kind of an approach would become characteristic of Finnish VOA broadcasts. Although radio broadcasts enabled the Americans to address Soviet propaganda more directly than the case had been with the printed word, Finland’s position did place restrictions on the use of this medium as well. Indeed, by far the greatest majority of VOA Finland’s programmes

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952 J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘VOA Broadcasts in Finland’, March 9, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2429, 511.60E4/3-951, NARA.
954 SD to Us Legation, February 21, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2429, 511.60E4/2-2751, NARA.
955 J.M. Cabot to SD, March 2, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2429, 511.60E4/2-2751, NARA.
dealt with American and Finnish-American culture, history and religion. In addition to American history, John I. Kolehmainen was particularly active in promoting wide themes like the history of Finnish-American immigrants and Finnish and Nordic mythology. The adopted policy also meant that in some respects the Americans, particularly during the station’s early months, refrained from using broadcasting methods that were seen appropriate in many other parts of the world. One example of this was that Finland was left out of an extensive VOA programme comparing living standards between East and West. According to the US Legation, including Finland in the Western category would only have given extra ammunition to the communist propaganda campaign claiming that the country was dominated by the West.

Although the projection of America and American culture was VOA’s main objective in Finland, and the Finnish situation restricted the use of hard-hitting propaganda, political content was certainly not neglected. Indeed, the US Legation’s humble estimation was that the programme content was usually ‘sharper’ than that of the BBC Finnish Service. The talks given by Oskari Tokoi, aired on Sunday nights, aroused particular interest in Finland and became the station’s most popular programme. Besides covering the everyday lives of Finnish-Americans, Tokoi gave a number of political talks on labour issues and the standard of living in the US. The popularity of the talks was strongly boosted by the US Legation in Helsinki, which offered Tokoi’s comments in written form to those who were interested. Scripts of the talks, together with other suitable VOA material, were also incorporated into the USIS/Helsinki’s information releases, most notably its bulletins, and picked up extensively by Finnish newspapers. All this obviously pleased USIS officials as they were now offered a whole new dimension to their work in printed propaganda.

The success of Oskari Tokoi’s broadcasts gave the Americans the confidence to expand VOA Finland’s political output. The service started to give more air time to interviews with substantial anti-communist figures, such as Irving Brown, who commented on international

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956 A typical week of VOA broadcasts consisted mainly of coverage of events concerning Finnish-Americans, Alan Nelson’s sports commentaries, summaries of the Finnish-American press content, presentations of different states of the US through such programmes as 'Across the USA' and contemporary music. Interviews with distinguished Americans, such as ex-president Herbert Hoover, were also frequently aired together with interviews with visiting Finnish students, professors, labour leaders and journalists. For example, J.I. Kolehmainen to A. Puhan, 'Special Features on the Finnish Language Broadcasts', May 16, 1953, JK, box 3, KA; Radiokuuntelija 7/1951.

957 Nordic mythology was extensively covered during the special Kalevala Day broadcasts in February 1953. A. Gustafson to J.I. Kolehmainen, March 2, 1953, JK, box 1, KA. A number of Kolehmainen’s radio scripts on Finnish-American history can be found at the Department of General History, University of Turku (Hereafter UTU). For example, ‘Finnish-American history by John I. Kolehmainen’, John I. Kolehmainen’s collection (JK), TYYH/S/a/198/1, UTU. For examples of Mr Kolehmainen’s radio talks on Finnish immigrants in the US, see also Kolehmainen, John I., Tämä on Amerikan Ääni. Kuvaelmia Amerikan suomalaisten siirtolaisten elämän eri vaiheista (Tiffin, OH 1983).


961 Engelberg to J.I. Kolehmainen, September 26, 1952, JK, box 8, KA.
labour issues on the channel in March 1953. By far the most controversial and hard-hitting anti-communist propaganda series transmitted through VOA Finland, however, had started already when the Americans finally found a Finn who would give anti-communist broadcasts under a pseudonym. For this role Arvo “Poika” Tuominen fitted perfectly, as he was able to give first-hand insights on events taking place in the Soviet Union. When trying to persuade Tuominen to the job, Esa Arra determined Tuominen’s task as to write 6-minute long scripts that would “put the doings of the Soviet Union and the communists in its service into the right perspective and in particular pluck the feathers off the Finnish communists’ tails”. After Tuominen, still living in Stockholm, accepted the job offer, it was agreed that the talks would be presented under the pseudonym ‘Niilo Virta’, a man who had, before escaping back to Finland, held responsible posts in the Comintern and knew the Soviet system inside out.

When Tuominen got started, he certainly fulfilled VOA Finland’s wishes. The Niilo Virta broadcasts, aired on Friday nights from May 1952, gave a thorough account on the way the Soviet system worked and the political leadership, in particular Stalin behaved. After Stalin’s death, the broadcasts gave broad accounts on the power struggles in the Kremlin and speculated over their outcome. From the very first talk on, Virta also dealt with the concentration camps in the Soviet Union, claiming that the number of people living in them had reached 20 million. Details about the state terror practiced by Stalin were also brought into the public attention more than once.

As one would imagine, the Niilo Virta talks quickly stirred interest among the Finnish public. Although not unaware of the injustices taking place in their neighbouring country, the Finns had before this hardly received as uncensored, detailed and hard-hitting information about Soviet controversies as this. This was also reflected in listener feedback, which predominately thanked the broadcasts, in addition to “providing moral support during dark times”, for revealing the enslaving nature of communism. The use of Tuominen’s printed scripts for unofficial political campaigning also shows how effective the Virta broadcasts were considered in Finland. If the number of subscribers for scripts of Tokoi’s broadcasts could be counted in their hundreds, Veikko Puskala, a leading SDP strategist, made sure that as many as 20,000 copies of Virta’s second series were distributed throughout the country in printed form.

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962 VOA News: ‘Irving Brown, American labor leader, to be heard on Voice of America broadcast on April 17’, March 31, 1953, RG 59, VOA Issues of ”VOA Radio News” and Related Materials, 1951-1953, Entry P 229, box 1, NARA.
963 The idea of including Tuominen in the VOA service was actively promoted by Esa Arra, who had got to know the former communist when working as a correspondent for Uusi Suomi in Stockholm in the late 1940s. Seppälä, Raimo, “Poika”. Mies ja myytti (Helsinki 1979), p. 188.
964 E. Arra to A. Tuominen, November 7, 1951, AT, box 6, KA.
965 A. Tuominen to E. Arra, May 7, 1952, AT, box 6, KA.
966 Scripts of all five series of the talks aired in 1952 and 1953 can be found at Arvo Tuominen's collection, box 29, KA.
968 For example, ‘Niilo Virta III Sarja II Esitys’, ‘Niilo Virta III Sarja II Esitys’, both AT, box 29, KA.
970 V. Puskala to A. Tuominen, November 10, 1952, AT, box 11, KA.
kind of popularity ensured that Niilo Virta kept analysing the Soviet Union and its flaws until the eventual termination of the VOA Finnish Service.

Besides the revelations given by Niilo Virta, the Finnish political and media circles speculated furiously over the actual identity of the former communist on air. VOA gave great care that Tuominen’s role would not be revealed and was rather successful in doing so. The communist newspaper *Työkansan Sanomat* did eventually try to prove that Tuominen was actually the real Virta, by comparing the content of the broadcasts and Tuominen’s writings published in *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* and the Tampere-based *Kansan Lehti*.

Tuominen himself replied to these allegations by noting that “this kind of a claim was extremely stupid even by communist standards”. Niilo Virta’s real identity was kept secret until the early 1980s when Raimo Seppälä finally confirmed it in his biography of Tuominen.

Not surprisingly, the Niilo Virta talks also played their part in the quest of winning more listeners to VOA Finland’s broadcasts. Nonetheless, the growing number of articles published in the far-left press claiming the station to be “an indication of the crisis prevailing in US propaganda” indicates that the service’s popularity had, actually, risen even before the introduction of Virta. According to the 1952 VOA/BBC Poll, the American station had in a single year managed to increase the size of its audience by as much as 40 points to approximately 212,000 weekly listeners. The service was now particularly popular in rural areas thanks to the considerable volume of special broadcasts directed to certain communities from which large numbers of Finns had emigrated to the US. Finns living in the countryside were not, however, that eager to listen to news and politics from an American perspective. The appreciation of VOA’s political dimension, including the Niilo Virta talks, was therefore a more urban phenomenon.

Despite the growing number of listeners, it was always evident that VOA would never be able to replace the BBC’s position as the most popular and trusted foreign radio service in Finland. This and the continuous Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts were among the main reasons behind the decision to discontinue the service to Finland. Officially the resolution was justified by the grant reductions influenced by the McCarthy hearings, which forced the broadcaster to abolish six other foreign services. The termination of broadcasts was hard to understand not only for the VOA Finland staff but also the USIA, whose director defended the service in a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee meeting in spring 1953 by noting that it played a vital role in “counterattacking Russian influence in Finland and keeping the Finnish...
people constantly alert and informed about the threat of Russian communism. This appeal did not manage to prevent the discontinuation VOA Finland, which gave its final broadcast on September 12, 1953.

Although the discontinuation of VOA's Finnish desk came as a disappointment to a great number of Finns, comments undermining the service's importance hint that in the early 1950s the Finnish environment was not that fertile for more hard-hitting political comment after all. For example, the tabloid Ilta-Sanomat noted that the service's termination indicated an American realisation that the broadcasts had managed to do nothing essential to the picture of the US in “a country where there prevails freedom to publish all manner of news, news stories and other information materials of American origin, too.” This explanation was not very accurate, as the Americans, together with representatives of a number of nationalities, remained far from convinced about the freedom of the Finnish press.

Officials at the US Legation certainly did not regard the VOA Finnish broadcasts as a failure. After the last broadcast, the idea of resuming the service came up occasionally in their reports. The concern expressed by a number of Finns over the outcome of the ongoing propaganda war between the social democrats and the communists led to a number of campaigns backing the relaunch of American broadcasts. The most potential of these was led by Reijo Korhonen, former employee of VOA Finland, who claimed to have ready facilities for new broadcasts from the US to Finland that would be conducted on a privately-sponsored basis. Despite winning support for his project from the USIA and gaining valuable moral backing from people like Oskari Tokoi and Hjalmar Procopé, Korhonen's plans never saw daylight due to a lack of adequate funds. Any hopes for the quick reintroduction of broadcasts to Finland started to fade in 1954. Even though Jack McFall, Minister to Finland, noted that the rather limited possibilities to reach the VOA audience by other media had to some extent thwarted the US information programme in Finland, the Legation was no longer willing to support an early resumption of VOA broadcasts as it felt that available funds could be much more effectively used for other kinds of projects.

**BBC Joins Arms**

The performance of the BBC Finnish Service in the early 1950s gives another indication that also the British saw it necessary to address the Finns more directly. The service's position as the most popular Anglo-American broadcaster in Finland even during VOA's most successful days, together with its traditional image of being a more objective news producer offered the channel

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979 'Voice of America, Finland. Testimony given at the meeting of the Subcommittee of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March-April-May 1953', JT, box 1, KA. See also, Kolehmainen 1986, p. 95.
980 Ilta-Sanomat, September 10, 1953.
981 R. Korhonen to M. Ross, September 10, 1953, RG 18, IADCF, F, Series 1, box 1, GMMA; E. Arra to H. H. Procopé, September 16, 1953, HP, KAY 6592, KA.
982 J.K. McFall to SD, 'Evaluation of the Program Effectiveness of United States International Broadcasting', June 10, 1954, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2429, 511.60E4/6-1054, NARA.
the opportunity to attack Britain's enemies in a way that would reach a wide audience and be generally perceived as credible at the same time.

The pressure the Finnish Service was under by the FO to reform its broadcasting content grew quickly in 1950. According to the British Legation in Helsinki, the tense world situation would attract a growing number of listeners who expected to hear the British opinion about the turn of international events and especially about the British attitude towards communism. Therefore, talks like ‘Nature Talk’ and the ‘Porcelain Industry in Britain’, were seen as not producing the intended listener reaction. FO officials both in Helsinki and London also felt that Finnish communists should now be countered more urgently. Since one of the most important purposes of British informational activity in Finland was to stress the strength and solidarity of Anglo-American cooperation, particularly accusations appearing in the far-left press over the discord between the British and Americans were regarded as necessary to be shot down as effectively as possible. Both Minister Scott and the FO also recognised that the more open anti-communist sentiment developing in Finland would justify some modifications to the Finnish Service's output and the broader interpretation of the 'not bring the Cold War into Finland' policy in the BBC's case.

The FO’s wish to give more political punch to the Finnish broadcasts was enthusiastically backed by the Finns to whom the matter was mentioned. The social democrats felt that the BBC’s output had been far too modest, objective and colourless and that workers listening to the Tallinn, Leningrad and Moscow broadcasts were not impressed by the “self-criticism which the BBC indulges on behalf of Britain”. Antero Vartia, Finland’s Press Attaché in London, noted that if the BBC Finnish Service were to enter the political field by answering communist lies directly, it would soon have a million listeners.

The attempt to ‘hot-up’ the BBC Finnish Service can be seen as a rather typical arm wrestling contest between Whitehall officials and the broadcasting corporation. In this case, it was the job of Sir Christopher Warner to try and convince Sir Ian Jacob that political commentaries should contain some anti-communist material, while bearing in mind Finland’s delicate position. As at so many instances when the FO aimed to influence the BBC’s broadcasts, Warner’s attempts did not lead to any immediate changes. An IRD official’s comment noting that Denis Winther was never particularly responsive to the attempts to strengthen the Finnish programmes illustrates the same stance. The BBC was clearly no more ready to change its cautious approach to a sensitive country like Finland than it was to alter the objectivity of its news service.

After growing pressure the corporation did, however, give some concessions also to the Finnish broadcasts. The share of centrally-produced political programmes, originally broadcast in English, started to grow in Finnish transmissions at the expense of cultural content in the early 1950s. The decision to broadcast anti-communist propaganda on all overseas services of

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984 J.I. McGhie to D. Winther, August 11, 1950, FO 953/873, NA.
985 Minutes by I. Grey, January 14, 1950, FO 953/871, NA.
986 J.I. McGhie to R. Murray, August 24, 1950, FO 1110/333, NA.
987 A.R.H. Kellas to C.F.A. Warner, April 15, 1951, FO 953/1119, NA.
988 Minutes by P.C. Storey, January 20, 1953, FO 1110/481, NA.
the BBC from October 1950 onwards, therefore, concerned Finland as well. Broadcasts entitled ‘Estonian Workers under Soviet Rule’ and talks on Russian concentration camps quickly became more frequent also in the Finnish language. The British Legation in Helsinki welcomed this development warmly. According to Mr McGhie, the Finns were familiar to these kinds of topics, but seemed to like confirmation from time to time.989

The number of political talks increased decisively when series such as ‘In Eastern Europe’, ‘International Communism’ and ‘The Land of Detained Counter-revolutionaries’ were included in the Finnish Service. The first two were written by Walter Kolarz, a Czech refugee, who in addition to radio programmes based on material provided by the IRD, wrote at least six books on communism and the Soviet Union and lent his name to several anti-communist books, pamphlets and news-feature articles that the IRD was able to place widely.990 The available scripts of Kolarz’s radio talks reveal the extensive nature of his expertise in both the theoretical and practical side of communism. Apart from discussing the true nature of, for example, the Soviet Union’s leadership structure and public expenditure991, he gave a number of in-depth insights into race relations in both the US and the Soviet sphere, arguing that African-Americans had no need to resort to a communist party in their fight against discrimination.992

Walter Kolarz’s political analyses seemed to hit the target in Finland. In particular ‘In Eastern Europe’, first launched in January 1950993, received almost entirely positive feedback from the audience and became one of the service’s most popular programmes. Again, the sentiment among the Finnish audience was that the BBC provided the only way for a Finn to properly follow the discussed issues.994 The series was regarded as particularly useful in counteracting Moscow Radio’s misrepresentations and elucidating the predominantly one-sided impressions gained during Finnish workers’ tours to the Soviet Union.995

While Kolarz’s output exposed communist tactics in a number of countries, ‘The Land of Detained Counter-revolutionaries’ was strictly based on Dr. Julius Margolin’s 5-year experience in Soviet forced labour camps. Both this series and the programme ‘East-West Settlement’, which exposed the oppressive nature of the Moscow dictatorship, were also popular among Finnish listeners as “these matters never fail to interest people living in the East-West borderline”, as one listener noted.996 The reception of these broadcasts was, however, more controversial since some listeners saw their content as overly propagandistic, reminding them too much of the Soviet technique.997 The number of comments requesting the service to concentrate on promoting the Western way of life in a positive way suggests that the BBC might have crossed the line for the 'propaganda-sensitive Finns'.

989 J.I. McGhie to D. Winther, March 3, 1950, FO 953/853, NA.
990 Jenks 2006, p. 86.
992 ‘Race Relations – Series of eight talks by Walter Kolarz’, August 16, 1954, FO 1110/627, NA.
993 Radiokuuntelija 4/1950.
995 ‘Overseas Listener Research Report for 1951’, E3/42/2, File2, WAC.
Other political talks broadcast in 1951, including ‘Lenin and Stalin Versus the Peasantry’ and ‘Labour Camps in Satellite Countries’ and a serialised reading of Orwell’s *Animal Farm* managed to win a better rating from the Finnish listener panel. The titles of these broadcasts indicate that the more hard-hitting material had been reasonably widely included in the Finnish Service in a matter of only twelve months. When saying this, it has to be remembered that the more neutral programmes projecting Britain that were prepared by the Finnish staff continued to dominate the service’s total output.

The popularity of political series and such commentary programmes as Max Jakobson’s ‘The English Scene’, together with the much-praised new Sunday jazz broadcast, won the station new listeners. According to a BBC/VOA poll conducted in 1952, the Finnish Service had approximately 38,000 listeners every day, and 325,000 at least once a week. The number of the occasional audience was estimated to be as high as 750,000. An independent Finnish poll confirmed the BBC’s popularity by claiming that the channel was the second most favoured foreign broadcast with an audience more or less the same size as the Soviet radio had (minimum 14 per cent of the adult population). The most popular foreign station was the Swedish Radio, mainly due to its music broadcasts.

As for the audience, what distinguished the BBC Finnish Service, which in the early 1950s had three transmission times for its 15-minute and half-hour broadcasts, from other stations was that the majority of its listeners were young men from Southern Finland. Moreover, the audience was more urban and educated than that of, for example, VOA or YLE. After VOA ended its Finnish Service, the importance of the BBC grew also in rural areas. The discontinuation of French broadcasts in the Finnish language did not, however, have much effect as the size of its audience had been modest. The same applied to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) broadcasts to Finland, which started off as a once-a-week service in both Finnish and Swedish in December 1950. The service only managed to attract approximately 25,000 listeners, but continued to run persistently until April 1955 when it was axed due to the reductions made to Canadian foreign broadcasts to Western Europe. As for the BBC General Overseas Service, it never matched the Finnish Service’s popularity, either, as only an estimated 4 per cent of the adult population listened to radio broadcasts in English.

Even though the FO was pleased to see the inclusion of centrally-produced anti-communist programmes in the Finnish Service, it continued to give detailed criticism on the broadcasts and felt that more could be done. The British Legation kept stressing that the Finnish communists and their misrepresentations about the Anglo-American distortion or British colonial policy should be answered directly through the radio. With this purpose in mind, and because the staff

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998 *Overseas Listener Report, Finnish Service, July, August, September, 1951*, E3/42/2, File2, WAC.
999 *The Listeners of VOA, BBC and Other Foreign Broadcasts in Finnish – A listening survey conducted in November/December 1952 by Suomen Gallup Oy*, E3/42/2, File2, WAC.
1000 For example, *Overseas Listener Report, Finnish Service, July – September 1953*, E3/42/2, File2, WAC.
1002 G. Rugheimer to E. Sundström, October 27, 1950, KK, box 6, YLE, ELKA.
of the Finnish Service apparently did not include anyone of "the sufficient political or journalistic calibre", the Legation planned to hire a prominent Finnish politician or journalist who could write a more direct and personal counterblast to communist propaganda.\footnote{J.I. McGhie to B. Ruthven-Murray, August 14, 1950, FO 953/873, NA.}

Finding the right commentator was left to Hamish McGhie, who started an active search for suitable candidates and sending trial scripts to London.\footnote{J.I. McGhie to B. Ruthven-Murray, October 11, 1950, FO 953/873, NA.} The social democrats assured the British that they would find someone appropriate for the job in question, but McGhie rejected this suggestion by stressing that the BBC could never become the vehicle of the propaganda of one internal party in Finland.\footnote{J.I. McGhie to R. Murray, August 24, 1950, FO 1110/333, NA.} It is highly unlikely that someone was ever hired for the task. Neither FO nor BBC correspondence give any indication of such a recruitment, and going through the Finnish Service's broadcasting content does not give any reason to believe otherwise.\footnote{The programmes can be examined either by going through the P as B files at WAC or by reading the lists published by Radiokuuntelija, the YLE-produced magazine for radio listeners. For example, Radiokuuntelija 8/1950, Radiokuuntelija 19/1951 & Radiokuuntelija 21/1952.}

The fact that the recruitment process seemed to take months or even years also suggests that the BBC decided against appointing a local commentator at least on a permanent basis and relied on interviewing various Finnish anti-communist politicians, such as the rising Coalition Party MPs Tuure Junnila and Päiviö Hetemäki, who, as former Minister of Defence, gave comments on both defence issues and Finnish domestic politics on the BBC Home Service programme ‘At Home and Abroad’ in July 1955.\footnote{BBC to T. Junnila, ‘Invitation to deliver a talk’, May 18, 1955, Tuure Junnila’s collection (TJ), box 69, KA; S.W. Bonarjee to E. Sundström, July 5, 1955; ‘Extract from At Home and Abroad. P. Hetemäki interviewed by W. Pickles’, July 1, 1955, both PK, Einar Sundström (ES), box 1711, YLE, ELKA; S.W. Bonarjee to A. Vartia, June 30, 1955, Päiviö Hetemäki’s collection (PH), box 6, KA.} Interviewing figures like Junnila and Hetemäki suited the broader British objectives well as although neither of them criticised the general Finnish foreign policy as such, they did, particularly later on, question the true nature of Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union.\footnote{Nummivuori, Petri, Oikeistolainen – Tuure Junnilan elämäkerta (Helsinki 2009), pp. 142-143, 156-157, 198-202.}

In spite of not materialising, the desire to hire a political commentator reveals that the Niilo Virta talks launched by VOA Finland were something over which the British, usually stressing the BBC’s superiority over VOA, were actually envious. The way the FO was willing to dictate the Finnish Service's recruitment policy also reveals that Finland made no exception when it came to the relationship between Whitehall and the broadcasting corporation. Indeed, the Finnish case enhances the view according to which in the late 1940s and early 1950s the BBC was to a growing extent harnessed to support Britain’s broader Cold War objectives. It also shows that the Finnish Service did not determine its broadcasting content independently but was subject to the broader policy of the BBC’s External Services. This conclusion is in some contrast to a later interview given by Essi Kiviranta, who joined the service as a reporter in the early 1950s, in which she assured that apart from the news bulletins, which were written at the BBC News Department and directly translated to numerous languages, the service’s content
was rarely interfered with by the External Services, let alone the FO.\textsuperscript{1010} The truth, undoubtedly, lies somewhere in the middle. While it is true that the Finnish Service was usually able to determine its broadcasts on its own, the rapid inclusion of anti-communist propaganda, something the Finns themselves were not particularly willing to do, suggests that at least in political output the broadcasting content was, at least to some extent, dictated by the BBC and ultimately the FO.

It is no surprise that the inclusion of political talks analysing the internal affairs of Eastern European countries and even the Soviet Union stirred some reactions from Finnish communists. As they realised that their opportunities to prevent the activities of a foreign broadcaster were limited to say the least, the communists did find a way to protest over the new broadcasting content by, for example, filing a strong complaint against STT after the news agency had distributed a story advertising Walter Kolarz’s talk on Otto-Wille Kuusinen, the Finnish-born Soviet politician and former leader of Finnish communists.\textsuperscript{1011} As the communists felt that the broadcast included an outrageous attack against not only Mr Kuusinen but Stalin as well, they demanded an explanation from the Finnish Government. The Finnish Foreign Office did look into the matter by requesting a comment by Eero A. Berg, still Editor in Chief at STT. In his reply, Berg noted that STT had no way of knowing the content of Kolarz’s broadcast and stressed that the news agency followed a cautious and sophisticated policy when it came to matters related to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1012}

The Soviets also seemed to have had enough of Western broadcasts to Finland and began to jam them. The first deliberate interference of the BBC’s broadcasts to Finland took place on January 8, 1952. This was something quite new in international radio communication as it was the first time in peacetime when anyone had jammed radio transmissions between two other free and independent states. The Finnish Service was soon followed by broadcasts to some other non-communist countries sharing a border with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1013} The jamming of the Finnish Service broadcasts came as a surprise to the British, as they thought that Finland as a country with free press and access to international news would be spared from such actions. The BBC’s popularity was regarded as one possible reason why the Russians started jamming the service before any other foreign broadcasts in Finnish.\textsuperscript{1014} The most acceptable theory, however, was that the intention of the jamming was to protect radio listeners in Eastern Karelia and Estonia against the influence of the BBC. This view was backed by observations noting that jamming seemed more severe in South East Finland, the area closest to the Soviet frontier.

\textsuperscript{1010} ‘Broadcasting to Finland. A conversation with Essi Kiviranta, Program Organiser, Finnish Section, BBC. Taped by John I. Kolehmainen in Tiffin, Ohio’, May 20, 1986, JK, TYYH/S/a/213, UTU.

\textsuperscript{1011} The talk on Kuusinen was broadcast on October 4, 1951, the Finnish communist’s 70th birthday. The presentation was advertised, for example, in Helsingin Sanomat. Helsingin Sanomat, October 4, 1951. Kolarz was not the only one to provide comments about Kuusinen to the BBC. Arvo Tuominen’s script ‘Seventieth Birthday of O. Kuusinen’ was accepted for broadcast by the European Service. J. Cuthbertson to A. Tuominen, October 24, 1951, AT, box 6, KA.

\textsuperscript{1012} Jussila 2007, pp. 197-198.

\textsuperscript{1013} These services included the ones to Turkey, Iran and the Western Zones of Germany. Nelson 1997, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{1014} ‘European Service – General News Talk, Jamming of Finnish Broadcasts by Maurice Latey’, January 11, 1952, E1/681, WAC.

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The jamming of the Finnish Service was big news in Britain also because this was the first time BBC broadcasts had been jammed from a source outside the country. For instance, The Times reported about the matter and the upcoming countermeasures that the BBC was quick to introduce. These measures, first used as early as January 14, 1952, were based on the idea of forming a ‘barrage’ by broadcasting on as many frequencies with a larger number of transmitters. Similar operations had already been used to overcome the jamming of the BBC’s Russian and Polish programmes. The only problem with the activities was that they required more money in a time when the first major expense cuts were already taking hold of the BBC’s overseas services. The matter of funding the jamming countermeasures was raised in Parliament. A special grant for the operations was rejected by the Chancellor, which meant that the BBC had to make further cuts if it wished to combat jamming effectively.

The BBC succeeded relatively well at least in countering the jamming of Finnish Services. According to the numerous questionnaires sent to the BBC audience, 60 per cent of listeners in spring 1952 had difficulties, but more with fading than jamming. The British also learnt, thanks to their regular monitoring arrangements, that the effect of Soviet interference varied greatly by area and time. The jamming was also highly selective, as for instance the Sunday dance music programmes were hardly ever disturbed. These observations were shared by listeners of VOA, which also suffered from even heavy interference. The fact that the jamming of the American broadcasts were at their heaviest during the Niilo Virta talks also shows that Soviet jamming followed a pattern, which was predefined by the programmes’ nature and content.

All in all, the effect of Soviet jamming was limited. The audience for Finnish Service remained more or less the same size in the 1950s, although it would appear that some people stopped listening to the broadcasts after the interference had started while others, on the other hand, started to follow them as a result. Finnish listeners did not seem too disturbed by the Soviet operations, although some comments, mainly from Lapland, where the reception was also at times particularly bad, claimed that “now that only Moscow, Warsaw and Hungary can be heard free from interference, it seems as if the West is defeated in the Cold War”. After the early surprise, the BBC was not too alarmed about the situation, either. After all, in one way the jamming of foreign broadcasts could be interpreted as a sign of success, as the British often acknowledged. In June 1952, the Legation again confirmed that the BBC Finnish Service held a leading position among foreign broadcasts to Finland. According to Minister Noble, the audience would grow even more sharply at a time of international crisis.

The Finnish audience certainly supported the British impression of a successful operation as it remained highly complementary to the broadcast content. As time passed, however, some change in the listeners’ priorities did occur. Even though the BBC was still followed by and

1016 Minutes by R.S. Scrivener, February 29, 1952, FO 953/1264, NA.
1017 ‘Report on Finnish jamming during the month of May 1952’, E1/681, WAC.
1018 A. Nelson to J. Kolehmainen, October 31, 1980, JK, box 1, KA.
1021 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.
large because of its news broadcasts, the audience’s interest in the news and political broadcasts declined to some extent towards the mid-1950s. The political programmes were more often criticised for being too heavy and dry, and several listeners reminded the BBC not to neglect humour in its political broadcasts as it “was one of the best weapons on the political front too”.1022 This change in listener attitude was already at the time explained by being a result of an easier political situation and by the assumption that the audience was now taking the news service for granted.

The numerous surveys also suggested that the projection of Britain, the BBC’s most important objective, had been a success in post-war Finland. Finns had learnt a great deal more about British culture and the way of life, as well as about specially promoted topics such as workers’ social conditions in Britain.1023 Without doubt, the service offered Finns an opportunity to hear about international topics or follow modern culture more closely than they ever could by listening to their domestic channels. In addition to culture and the news, science turned into a popular programme theme, with the Finnish adaptation of the astronomer Fred Hoyle’s BBC Home Service production ‘The Nature of the Universe’ winning particular praise from the audience.1024 The opportunity to listen to a large variety of different programs would not, however, last forever. Even though the cuts made to the BBC Overseas Services did not directly concern Finland, as it belonged to the countries where services should be continued for ‘special reasons’, the reduction and reorganisation of European Services meant that the Finnish Service was forced to abolish, for instance, its weekly half-hour jazz programme.

As for the BBC’s other activities regarding Finland, the corporation managed to build an increasingly warm relationship with YLE, whose new Director Einar Sundström was almost a regular visitor in England. The two companies cooperated, for instance, on broadcasting the Olympics held both in London 1948 and Helsinki 1952. The BBC also gave valuable broadcasting training for Finns representing a large variety of organisations. Although pleased with the expanding cooperation between the two broadcasters, the British were not entirely happy with YLE’s policy of using foreign broadcasts. While the number of programmes of British origin aired by YLE remained among the largest for a foreign country1025, and cooperation in music programme exchange and language training in particular flourished1026, the Finnish broadcaster’s caution in transmitting any political content that could be associated with the West was treated with continuous frustration in British circles.

As with many newspapers, the national radio was under persistence scrutiny from Finnish communists, who relentlessly filed complaints over the broadcaster’s coverage of, for example, the Korean War, which, according to the critics, followed a bias to the US and glorified warfare in general.1027 YLE had undoubtedly anticipated that the outbreak of war in East Asia would

1023 ‘Analysis of end-of-year questionnaires’, 1951, E3/42/2, File 2, WAC.
1024 Helsingin Sanomat, July 23, 1952.
1025 For example in 1951 the number of British-related broadcasts made by YLE was 34, the third largest behind Sweden and Norway. Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Aho toiminnasta vuonna 1951 (Helsinki 1952), p. 12.
1026 The cooperation in music included, for example, exchange programmes in choral and folk music. J.W.T. Eyton to J. Koskioma, May 8, 1951; J.W.T. Eyton to J. Koskioma, April 1, 1952, both KK, box 6, YLE, ELKA.
lead to an even closer examination of its broadcasts. This can be concluded, for instance, from a letter sent by Programme Director Jussi Koskiluoma to Max Jakobson, who continued to produce news summaries for both YLE and the BBC Finnish Service, in which the London-based reporter was told to avoid handling foreign policy altogether due to the delicate political climate.\textsuperscript{1028} YLE's position regarding its association with foreign broadcasters was well epitomised by its decision not to rebroadcast CBC's opening transmission in Finland.\textsuperscript{1029}

The examples mentioned above only illustrate a point that became apparent also through BBC's listener feedback: in the early 1950s there was still a clear demand among radio-listening Finns for a service that provided international news reports from an angle that was at times even highly different from the national broadcaster's coverage. The BBC Finnish Service, undoubtedly, fulfilled this need perfectly. The channel offered its listeners a Western perspective to a large variety of international events, and by doing so also provided Finland with some much needed moral support in its edgy relationship with its Eastern neighbour. At the same time, many Finns remained cautious about being associated with the service for years to come. A good example of this kind of stance was Uusi Suomi's decision to prevent Max Jakobson from continuing to work for the BBC after he had joined the newspaper in January 1952. Editor Lauri Aho explained the situation by revealing that according to a number of Finns, Mr Jakobson could not act as an independent journalist while being an important voice of the BBC Finnish Service, which they saw as a semi-official propaganda organ of the British Government.\textsuperscript{1030}

### An Increasingly Direct but Slightly Predictable Approach

The matters discussed above indicate that the early 1950s was a time when Cold War propaganda in Finland took its most direct form, mostly as a consequence of the Korean War. Growing American and British investment in informing the Finnish audience about communist injustices shows that the two Western governments were more willing to shape public opinion also in the northern country, and in this way support its independence to a greater extent than has been earlier recognised. In particular, the US Government made considerable expansions to its anti-communist activities and introduced several new methods of influence. Due to Soviet pressure in Finland, the most direct Western political propaganda was channelled to closely specified audiences through new forms of print content, short films and, above all, the radio. That a growing number of British and American anti-communist comments were also finding their way through to Finnish newspapers shows that self-censoring practices did not entirely dominate the Finnish press's behaviour even when the Cold War was at its hottest. Indeed, the Western governments were surprisingly efficient in reaching their target audiences, considering the circumstances. For this they largely had various Finnish actors' stronger involvement in the

\textsuperscript{1028} J. Koskiluoma to M. Jakobson, September 8, 1950, KK, box 6, YLE, ELKA.
\textsuperscript{1029} In autumn 1950, CBC required YLE whether it would be willing to mark the opening of its broadcasts by rebroadcasting the opening transmission. According to Koskiluoma, this kind of an arrangement was impossible as YLE's approach "must, due to the force of circumstances, remain in some respects passive". G. Rugheimer to E. Sundström, October 27, 1950; J. Koskiluoma to G. Rugheimer, November 4, 1950, both KK, box 6, YLE, ELKA.
\textsuperscript{1030} J.I. McGhie to IRD, January 23, 1952, FO 953/1214, NA.
anti-communist campaign to thank for. In addition to offering British and American officials with new possibilities for spreading their message, the expanding anti-communist operations of, above all, SYT and non-communist political parties dragged them closer to the fierce domestic propaganda war taking place in Finland, which was not always compatible with their general policy of not becoming openly involved in local struggles. Offering their support to the Finns covertly was much more to the Western governments' liking, and this remained the usual form of cooperation.

Even if the Americans and British were somewhat innovative in finding new ways to influence the Finnish public opinion, the content of distributed propaganda suggests that in the 1950s they did not entirely realise what kind of a message would be the most effective in the country. The way Western propaganda spread and published in Finland constantly sought to directly criticise the communist system was rather unsophisticated and lacked the lighter touch that would have possibly appealed to the Finns even more. Indeed, one could say that in the early 1950s the East-West propaganda war in Finland took a rather predictable form: the Finnish communists, backed by the Soviets, attacked the West on imperialism and the true nature of capitalism, while the content of Western origin focused on criticising the backwardness of the communist system by, above all, comparing living standards between capitalist and communist countries. As these messages were repeated on a near regular basis, one is left with a somewhat unimaginative impression of both camps' propaganda techniques. When saying this, one must point out that at least the Western content distributed in Finland followed closely the propaganda policies determined in London and Washington, which at the time focused on hitting the enemy in an overwhelmingly direct manner.
6. THE MANY FORMS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, 1950-1953

Anglo-American Cooperation in Finland Begins

The expansion of political propaganda in Finland also had an effect on Anglo-American collaboration in the country. As the methods for direct influence in Finland were far and few between, representatives of the two Western powers gradually began to explore opportunities to work together in the informational and cultural sectors. The way in which US and British officials cooperated in Finland in these fields followed to a great extent the general pattern discussed in chapter two. At first, both administrations were highly suspicious of closer cooperation. However, from the early 1950s onwards, the other party was at least kept informed about day-to-day activities and major developments. As with Anglo-American cooperation in general, both British and American propaganda and cultural operations in Finland were almost without exception independently executed.

British and American documents related to propaganda activities in Finland in the first post-war years draw a picture of two competing powers rather than cooperating allies. Officials from both countries closely monitored the propaganda and cultural operations of the other. As already mentioned, particularly the British followed the launch of American activities with some concern, but were at the same time confident that the scope of USIS operations in the country would remain a good deal less than theirs, largely because they did not have a similar organisation to the British Council on which to rely.

The first big question concerning cooperation in Finland closely concerned British Council activities. The desire of some Finnish anglophile societies to actually become Anglo-American societies, and to be titled in that way as well, might today seem as a perfectly innocent idea, but back in 1946 it almost caused uproar among the British. At the time, the British Council’s general policy was to discourage Anglo-American ventures where this could be done without offending the Americans. According to the Council, an Anglo-American institution was likely to be an awkward and doubtful vehicle for forwarding its purposes. In countries like Finland, the British were particularly apprehensive of the double title being deliberately used by the local nationals to imply a Western bloc against the Soviet Union. British opposition to the scheme confirms that in the late 1940s the BC was not very

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1031 M. Grant to J.B.C. Grundy, March 28, 1946, FO 924/461, NA.
1032 Dr. Jackson to M. Grant, February 28, 1946, BW 30/1, NA.
enthusiastic about expanding its cooperation with the Americans any further than to the organisation of common lecturers, especially in provincial societies.\textsuperscript{1033}

The situation concerning propaganda activities in Finland was rather similar to that in the cultural field. Both parties were happy to share information with the other, but there was hardly any shared coordination of activities, not to mention common operations in the field. The British objective was not dissimilar to that in Italy, where the posted officials had no intention to undertake joint activities, but wished to let the Americans know what they were up to in order to avoid the two governments' efforts from overlapping with each other.\textsuperscript{1034}

Anglo-American cooperation became significantly closer in the early 1950s after both Washington and London gave all posts instructions concerning liaison on informational activities. In Finland, the timing of the new policy could not have been better as both the British and Americans had been observing the expanding Soviet propaganda activities with growing concern. Officials of both countries felt that closer liaison could help them to match the Russians and, in particular, enable the more sensible use of resources, which in the British case were now starting to lag behind those of its larger ally.

The possibility of British-American cooperation in Finland in the informational field was first discussed in a joint meeting held at the British Legation in August 1950. During the meeting, the major policy objective of both governments was defined as “to assist the Finns to maintain and strengthen their independence, to encourage them in their beliefs in the democratic way of life and to do everything possible to reinforce their attachment to the Western world”.\textsuperscript{1035} Although hampering the influence of communists in Finland was seen as a definite objective, officials from both countries stressed the importance of sustaining from doing anything likely to endanger Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union. The best way of directly addressing communist propaganda, especially as for the workers' groups, was through BBC and VOA broadcasts, both parties noted. As various operational fields were explored during the meeting, the parties also decided to a certain degree to embark on mutual cooperation in film distribution, the coordination of visits to Finnish-American and Finnish-British societies, and arranging alternating displays of American and British window exhibitions in provincial towns. The Americans and the British also agreed to increase joint consultations between the information officers of both legations in order to exchange information about newspapers, their editors and their reactions to the various materials they received, and to discuss day-to-day editing and distribution techniques. These kinds of discussions were eventually held on a monthly basis, while broader consultative meetings took place every four months.\textsuperscript{1036}

Even after the positive steps taken towards more extensive liaison, both the US and British legations were more than often willing to emphasise that they must carry out the majority of their activities independently. Indeed, the cooperation between officials was rather based on

\textsuperscript{1033} J.B.C. Grundy to K.R. Johnstone, January 14, 1946, BW 30/1, NA.

\textsuperscript{1034} British Embassy, Rome, to C.F.A. Warner, April 30, 1948, FO 1110/8, NA.

\textsuperscript{1035} H.F. Arnold to SD, 'Cooperation Between American and British Information Services', August 17, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/8-1750, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1036} Ibid.
discussing broader issues and strategies than practical action. The Finnish press’s practice of self-censorship and the need to stimulate Finnish editorial columns with topics that were of essential concern to Finland and its future were among the topics most typically discussed between American and British officials. On these kinds of issues, as with regard to informational policy in general, they were usually of the same mind. For instance, in October 1952, the Americans and the British unanimously decided that the bulk of the output provided by both administrations should continue to “accentuate the positive”. Nevertheless, the circulation of overt ‘idea debate’ material and the distribution of overt but private and more complex material, as well as covert and indirect distribution of hard-hitting anti-communist materials through reliable indigenous agencies, should be increased simultaneously by both parties.1037 These operations were to a great extent put into practise independently, but the use of new materials or new distribution channels, which involved joint interests, always required inter-legation consultation.

Anglo-American collaboration in the actual field continued to grow, albeit gradually, in the early 1950s. Propaganda operations executed through the Finnish press, perhaps the most independent of the Western powers’ activities, usually included strategic cooperation only in exceptional cases, such as in spring 1952 when the British found evidence of the wide propaganda net the communists were spreading about the bacteriological warfare myth.1038 Otherwise, liaison in press operations included the several joint visits made by the British information officer and the American press attaché to provincial newspapers and the discussions held with their editors.1039

Radio transmissions were another area in which cooperation was fairly rare in Finland largely due British officials’ low regard of VOA’s output. Anglo-American collaboration was largely restricted to exchanging information about anti-jamming techniques. The Americans sought to increase the liaison by suggesting greater cooperation in the way ‘Learn English’ broadcasts were presented and promoted.1040 The British, quite typically, remained somewhat passive also on this front as they clearly wished to maintain their superiority in the field of language education. As time went by, English teaching would become the field in which Britain and the US would cooperate the most. The two governments gradually came to realise that they could achieve considerable advantage by increasing the joint coordination of their broader cultural schemes as well.

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1037 ‘Memorandum of Discussion of British and American Information Policy in Finland’, October 16, 1952, FO 1110/481, NA.
1038 A.N. Noble to A.C.E. Malcolm, April 8, 1952, FO 953/1325, NA. That the countries collaborated in the germ warfare issue in Finland was nothing exceptional as the global response to the allegations was coordinated in cooperation by officials in London and Washington. For example, T.S Tull to B.A.B. Burrows, July 8, 1952, FO 1110/494, NA.
1039 For example, A.N. Noble to A.C.E. Malcolm, October 6, 1951, FO 953/1119, NA.
Breakthrough in Exchange of People – ASLA and Fulbright

Educational diplomacy was an area in which the two Western governments operated almost exclusively alone in the early 1950s. The Americans' breakthrough in this field was the most important development during the period, leaving every USIS/Helsinki propaganda effort clearly behind. The progress made in the exchange of persons programme brought a considerable expansion to the US Legation's activities in Finland and decisively increased American influence throughout Finnish society.

Even though American officials in Helsinki had been pleased with the progress in extending the number of Finns studying in the US through privately-sponsored programmes in the late 1940s, the introduction of a much broader exchange programme between the two countries had for some years been one of their main objectives. This task, like so many in post-war Finland, turned out to be anything but simple. After the Finnish Government, following its cautious foreign policy, rejected the first unofficial invitation to join the Fulbright Programme in December 1947, the Americans started to plan the structure and funding of an educational programme that would be suitable for the Finns. The idea of using a portion of the funds made available by the settlement of credits extended to Finland by the US for the purchase of surplus war material for educational exchange had been presented already in June 1947, but the matter was not introduced to Finnish officials for some time due to the State Department's view that an agreement of this nature could have an adverse effect on Soviet-Finnish relations and produce a strong reaction from the communist press.\(^\text{1041}\) In the following year, linking Finland's payment of its First World War debt\(^\text{1042}\) to the US with educational exchange was discussed in Washington with even greater detail. The handling of a new programme proposal based on this funding structure was, however, also delayed as the State Department decided to wait for the outcome of the Finnish election in July 1948 and for the “clarification of the situation in the country”.\(^\text{1043}\)

An educational programme for Finland was finally determined by Public Law 265, endorsed by Senator Howard Alexander Smith, which was passed in August 1949. The Grants from the American Loan to Finland Program – Amerikan Suomen Lainan Apurahat (ASLA) – was established by a joint resolution of the two houses of the US Congress in recognition of Finland's impeccable record of honouring its international credit commitments.\(^\text{1044}\) According to the resolution, all subsequent repayments of Finland's loan from the US should be used to support academic and professional exchanges between the two countries. A share of the funds was to be used for providing Finns with appropriate scientific books and laboratory equipment.

\(^{1041}\) State Department officials also decided to wait for the Soviet ratification of the Finnish Peace Treaty before broaching the matter with Finnish officials. M. Hamilton to Secretary of State, June 16, 1947, RG 59, SD Decimal Files on Finland 1945–1949, box 4807, 811.42760D/6-1647, NARA.

\(^{1042}\) Finland was one of the countries to receive short-term loans from the US to purchase grain in the aftermath of the First World War. Finland's determination in repaying its loan exactly on schedule even during the Great Depression earned the country immense goodwill among the American people. For example, Copeland 1993, pp. 79–81.

\(^{1043}\) Mr Rice to Mrs. Williams, 'Finnish Scholarship Aid Resolution', June 8, 1948, RG 59, SDDFF 1945–1949, box 4807, 811.42760D/5-1848, NARA.

\(^{1044}\) Copeland 1993, p. 79.
The US Legation in Helsinki was well aware of the necessity for discretion in presenting P.L. 265 to the Finns. The first concrete measures to implement the Finnish-American educational programme were taken in January 1950, when a temporary committee of seven prominent Finns, chaired by Eljas Erkko, was appointed by Minister Avra Warren. The committee completed its job at the end of January and its report on the nomination of specialist candidates and the classification of graduate student groups was submitted to the Legation. The Americans felt that the policy of appointing a committee to offer guidance in these matters would convince the Finns that this exchange programme was not to be one-sidedly administered, but was one in which the Finns themselves were to be granted a substantial voice.\textsuperscript{1045}

American officials in Helsinki also stressed that the administration of P.L. 265 should as far as possible be divorced from the general aspects of the Legation’s information and cultural programme, "which foreigners identify as propaganda".\textsuperscript{1046} In order to avoid the harshest communist criticism over the programme being merely American cultural imperialism, the State Department decided that the use of P.L. 265 funds as an expansion of general USIS activities in Finland, such as translations, exhibits and subsidies to the Finnish-American Society, should be avoided. Finland’s political situation was taken into account also in the way the Legation wished to avoid the public use of the word 'leader' for describing the status of other than academic professionals taking part in the exchange programme and use 'specialist' instead, since the former could have produced some adverse propaganda.\textsuperscript{1047}

A press statement concerning the exchange programme was finally issued with the approval of the Finnish Government in February 1950. The timing was decided also with Finnish politics in mind, as both the Finnish Foreign Office and Prime Minister K.A. Fagerholm now held the opinion that the release could no longer encumber the re-election of President Paasikivi, should it evoke a reaction from Moscow.\textsuperscript{1048} The press statement confirmed that the Finnish Committee on Study and Training in the United States, headed by Professor Eino Saari, was given the responsibility of the preliminary screening of Finnish applicants for student grants, while various professional Finnish organisations would be requested to assist in the nomination of specialist candidates. The USIS/Helsinki would, however, take care of the majority of the administration and the final nominations. In the US, the Institute of International Education (IIE) started to administrate the Finnish programme for the State Department. The ASLA Programme got onto a swift start as the first 35 Finnish graduate students and 10 specialists were awarded their stipends, and the first allocation of scientific books and equipment was made in spring 1950.

The figure of Finns travelling to the US under the ASLA Programme grew steadily in the upcoming years. In 1953, the number of ASLA graduates and teachers studying in the US

\textsuperscript{1047} US Legation to Secretary of State, January 23, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950-1954, box 2426, 511.60E3/1-2350, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1048} US Legation to Secretary of State, January 31, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2426, 511.60E/2-1750, NARA.
already reached 49. In addition to ASLA, the duties of the FCSTUS were also expanded by the growing number of the other student exchange schemes it administrated. These included, for instance, the American Field Service’s high school student grants, which were introduced in 1948, and the Jonas Foundation’s Camp Rising Sun summer camp grants, the first of which had been awarded to a Finnish schoolboy back in 1946. In 1953, the foundation also started to manage the grants awarded to four to five young Finns taking part in the ‘Salzburg Seminar’, which for example in 1954 held sessions focusing on American society and legal thought through a great variety of lectures given by such famous names as Professor Hans J. Morgenthau. The later revelation that the seminar enjoyed funding from the CIA only shows how important any activity influencing young foreigners was considered in Washington.

Despite the progress made through P.L. 265 and other exchange schemes, the US kept persistently encouraging Finland to join the Fulbright Programme. The Americans clearly felt that the introduction of the programme in a country like Finland was such a vital task that they were even ready to make special amendments to their agreement proposals if necessary. Although anticipating that it could take some time before the country would join the scheme, US officials were caught with some surprise about how many efforts it took to persuade the Finns to give the final go-ahead. The Finnish Fulbright agreement had been discussed particularly thoroughly at the Finnish Foreign Ministry during 1948, only to be rejected due to the officials' concerns over how the Soviets would react on such a move and their dissatisfaction over how according to the US proposal the Americans should have a majority in the programme's administrative foundation. Even after a new proposal presented to the Finns by Mrs Margaret Williams, Acting Chief of the Northern European Branch of USIE, during her visit in Helsinki in spring 1949 had included the idea of an equal number of Finnish and American foundation members, Finnish Foreign Minister Carl Enckell and his successor Åke Gartz both kept blocking Finland from entering such an agreement in fear of Moscow's response. The Americans' patience was finally rewarded in July 1952, when Finland signed the Fulbright Agreement, which complemented the ASLA programme. The agreement recognised Finland's role in the administration of the programme by defining the number of board directors at the new United States Educational Foundation in Finland (USEF) to four American citizens and four Finnish citizens. Finland now had two parallel exchange

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1049 ‘Suomalais-amerikkalaisen stipenditoimikunnan toimintakertomus ajalta 1.1. – 31.12.1953’, FCSTUS, box 1, KA.
1051 'Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, XXXIII Session, July 18 to August 14, 1954', Finnish-US Educational Exchange Commission (Hereafter FUSEEC), box 36, KA.
1052 For example, Wilford 2008, p. 126.
1053 The ministry opposed Finland from joining the programme even if the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for Education and the Bank of Finland all recommended the Government to accept the invitation. Foreign Ministry Memorandum on the Proposed Fulbright Agreement, May 24, 1948, 46 N Yhdysvallat, UMA.
1054 'Memorandum Regarding Recent Visit of M. Williams to Helsinki', June 10, 1949, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 14, NARA.
1055 In particular, Gartz openly informed Minister Cabot that the Soviet Union was the actual reason why Finland was having doubts about accepting the agreement. J.M. Cabot to SD, 'Discussion on Proposed Fulbright Agreement', April 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2426, 511.60E3/4-2150, NARA.
1056 J.M. Cabot to Secretary of State, June 30, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950–1954, box 2428, 511.60E3/6-3052, NARA.
1057 Agreement between the USA and Finland, signed at Helsinki July 2, 1952, FUSEEC, box 9, KA.
programmes with the US, which would later simply become known as the ASLA-Fulbright programme. In addition to extending the number of Finns visiting the US, the new agreement enabled American students to win a scholarship for studying in Finland.

Quite soon after the implementation of the ASLA Programme, the US Legation realised that the educational exchange programme would occupy a special position in Finland. The USIS office now handled an even larger number of visitors requiring information about the programme. The allotment of books to thirteen Finnish libraries associated with higher educational institutions also kept the personnel busy. As the scientific books sent to Finland were mostly brand new and the quantitative significance of them for Finnish academic libraries was vast, this activity played a part in improving the standards of Finnish universities and enhancing their library network.\textsuperscript{1058} Indeed, when discussing the ASLA-Fulbright programme one should keep in mind that in its first couple of years approximately one-third of the funds programmed each year were spent in books and equipment.\textsuperscript{1059}

Great care was also given to the way P.L. 265 was presented to the Finns, as the Americans expected the far-left press to take every opportunity to attack the bill and label it as mere propaganda. Indeed, the USIS consciously attempted to counteract any communist criticism, which turned out to be surprisingly rare, in conversations about the programme, pointing out that the American taxpayer was, in reality, paying the bill.\textsuperscript{1060}

\textbf{Printed Praise, Leader Visits and Academic Reform}

It did not take long for the Americans to acknowledge the impact of the exchange of people programme, either. As early as in November 1950, the Legation pointed out that no other medium could offer such fruitful knowledge of the US as a personal visit. The enthusiasm shown by returning Finns for the American people and American institutions, as well as the knowledge they had gained in their specific fields, were regarded as a vital means for achieving long-term friendship and understanding between the US and Finland.\textsuperscript{1061} The more concrete evidence of the programme’s effectiveness were the returning grantees’ positive comments about the US made public in newspaper articles, books and lectures. The USIS gave special attention to assisting the returnees in their literal delivery and even sent the most prominent of them on lecture tours throughout Finland for which they were later equipped with publications and films.\textsuperscript{1062} The Americans felt that the propaganda value of returning grantees and their newspaper articles was highly significant and that the publication of positive experiences was, in

\textsuperscript{1059} Department of State report: "An Investment in Understanding", Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Finland, 1950-1954, June 1956, CU, FP, box 106, UAL.
\textsuperscript{1060} US Legation to SD, 'Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for February, 1950', March 14, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/5-1450, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1061} US Legation to SD, 'Semi-Annual Evaluation Report', November 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/11-2150, NARA.

Articles from returning politicians visiting the US with specialist and leader grants were regarded as particularly influential. The Americans were pleased to see that articles from leading figures like Yrjö Kallinen, former Minister of Defence, Tyyne Leivo-Larsson, former Minister of Social Affairs, and Eila Jokela, journalist of leading magazine Suomen Kuvalehti, were based on a combination of praise and criticism that carried conviction. According to the American view, the mass circulation magazines publishing this material would never think of accepting State Department articles of the same tenor.\footnote{Suomen Kuvalehti, 1/1952, 2/1952, 3/1952 & 4/1952.} This claim is credible particularly for Eila Jokela’s lengthy reports in which she praised the US for its forward-looking and liberal spirit and gave positive estimations of both the Native Americans’ and African Americans’ future prospects in the country.\footnote{Kallinen, one-time minister and well-known pacifist and theosophist, was in regular contact with several Western officials in Finland in the 1940s and 1950s. A good example of Kallinen’s social character was that after his visit to the US in 1951 he held a social gathering for members of the US Legation in Finland. See, Nieminen, Saul, Yrjö Kallinen – Mies äänen takana (Helsinki 1978), pp. 106-109.} The by and large twenty lectures given by pacifist politician Mr Kallinen, a board member of the Finnish-American Society with close personal contacts to both American and British officials in Finland,\footnote{J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Speakers’ Bureau for Grantees’, December 8, 1952, RG 84, USEH, box 29, NARA.} in a dozen Finnish towns on his visit to the US were also highly appreciated by the Americans and made the USIS even to explore the possibility of organising a special speakers’ bureau for returning specialist grantees.\footnote{'Finnish ASLA-Fulbright Grantees’, FUSEEC, box 168, KA.} Even though a more organised lecture campaign such as this was not materialised, the significance of specialist and leader grants for visits lasting between two or three weeks and a couple of months was constantly emphasised by American officials in Helsinki, and their proportional share of the exchange programme remained considerable throughout the 1950s.

Indeed, when discussing both the ASLA and Fulbright programmes, it is important to note that the exchange of persons by no means concerned only students, teachers and academics. The number of Finns who studied in the US between 1950 and 1962, mostly subjects related to technology and the natural or social sciences, was 665 (806 if lecturers and researchers are included). Leaders and specialists did not come that far behind as its total number for the similar period reached 430.\footnote{J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November, 1951’, December 19, 1951, SDDFF 1950−1954, box 2426, 511.60E/12-1951, NARA; Annual Report of USEF for Program Year 1955 Covering Exchanges for the Academic Year July 1, 1955 − June 30, 1957, FUSEEEC, box 17, KA.} The category not only included politicians and other highly-
ranking officials, but also technological experts who were invited to the US to learn more about the rationalisation of industrial and agricultural processes.\textsuperscript{1070}

As with its other operations in Finland, the USIS was constantly concerned about making the exchange of persons programme more influential in labour circles. The visits made by almost every top labour leader who knew some English to the US on governmental and non-governmental grants were not enough for the Americans, as they wished to make the trips more available to such labour leaders who were likely to assume top leadership in the future.\textsuperscript{1071} American officials realised that using more P.L. 265 funds for this purpose would be out of line and that the only way to expand labour grants was through P.L. 402 funds, commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, and private financing through such institutions as CIO, AFL and the Ford Foundation.

Visiting Finnish trade unionists and social democrats were not only given a view of American political, economic and cultural life, but were also acquainted with the principal labour union central organisations.\textsuperscript{1072} Special group trips for labour leaders were organised from autumn 1952 onwards with the idea that “the reports they bring back from the US will help undermine communist tactics by promoting between labour and management a greater sense of mutual interest”.\textsuperscript{1073} Quite often the most important purpose for these trips was, however, the collection of funding for the SDP and the SAK. During their visits, like the one made with an ASLA grant in autumn 1951 by Olavi Lindblom, both party and trade union officials received large sums of money through, for instance, FTUC contacts.\textsuperscript{1074} Indeed, according to Lindblom, his three-month exploration of the US was more or less a “begging mission” during which he gave several speeches to American trade unionists emphasising Finland’s difficult economic position and the constant political struggle against the communists.\textsuperscript{1075}

The propaganda value of returning labour leaders was also highly ranked by the USIS/Helsinki. Mr Lindblom’s series of articles on labour and social conditions in the US, published by \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti} and the SAK publication \textit{Palkkatyöläinen}, was precisely the kind of positive propaganda the Americans were after, particularly as he stressed the country’s superior living standards and the high quality of its healthcare system.\textsuperscript{1076} The USIS staff was also pleased to read about the vast coverage the latter publication gave to the Finnish trade union delegation touring the US in late 1950. What makes this piece of publicity interesting is that, partly

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\textsuperscript{1071} D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending October 31’, November 8, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/11-2061, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1073} J.M. Cabot to SD, ‘The USIS Program in Finland’, August 23, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/9-1152, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1074} Majander 2007, pp. 172, 222.
\textsuperscript{1075} Lindblom, Olavi, Pirkällä palkilla (Helsinki 1981), pp. 166—183.
at the same time, Palkkatyöläinen also published articles covering another delegation’s visit to the Soviet Union. A browse through the articles reveals that the American visit won more and highly visible coverage than the tour of Russia, consisting of a number of favourable reports on the trade unions' influential role in US society.  

The Americans, naturally, had nothing against this kind of a battle taking place in Finnish labour publications and started to provide visiting leaders and specialists with comprehensive ideological orientation to their country.

This was rather small-scale activity as compared to the orientation programmes Finnish students and particularly teachers were made to attend so that they would "broaden their acquaintance with American society and civilisation", as one of the exchange programme’s official goals stated. Even though exchange students from all over the world were strongly exposed to American culture through Hollywood movies and popular music, US officials saw it fitting to organise various orientation programmes for the visitors to ensure that they would receive a ‘proper’ picture of the society they were visiting. During the orientation period, the Americans gave visiting students, who were often living with a number of American families, various lectures on American politics and culture as well as English classes and organised field trips to special places of interest, such as industrial plants.

Although the larger orientation programmes, often taking place in Washington, were voluntary, the inclusion of special introductions into life in the US by most universities meant that the majority of Finnish students were presented with a thoroughly planned image of their host country and its general ideology. The USIS office in Helsinki also played a part in this by organising one to two meetings to leaving Finnish grantees during which they were lectured, shown films and provided with material on, for instance, American democracy. Although Finns in general had nothing against these kinds of activities, especially the orientation programme for teachers, which was compulsory and took up to three weeks, was more than once criticised for not giving the participants the freedom to make their own decisions while focusing on mere trivialities. By the late 1950s, the orientation for teachers also started to include political lecturers on, for example, the flaws of communist ideology. This kind of guidance only shows that although American officials more than once noted that Finnish teachers taking part in the Fulbright Programme were usually of such high calibre that they should actually be placed under the lecturer category, they were still treated as a group that could be influenced with traditional, often highly obvious and predictable methods.
As for American educational activities in Finland, the promotion of American Studies especially at the University of Helsinki was a primary task. At first, the Americans had some difficulties in bringing many professors or competent lecturers to the country, but their number and quality increased in the 1950s. When this happened, visiting Fulbright grantees were also able to give highly popular courses on American History as well as American Civilisation and Literature also at the University of Turku and Åbo Akademi. The first American students arriving in Finland through the exchange programme also offered a new and effective channel for the general projection of the US. American scholarship students became in some cases recognisable figures in Finland as newspapers, the radio and even television showed an interest in them. The USIS was not slow to realise the potential these ‘unofficial ambassadors’ offered and provided them with American newspapers and books as well as USIE films and film projectors. The exhibitions and concerts given by American artist grantees, often held at USIS premises, also contributed in a tangible way to building an understanding between Finns and Americans, as an USEF annual report concluded.

When evaluating the significance of the exchange of persons between Finland and the US, one has to take its remarkable size into account. According to Copeland, only five bi-national commissions recorded a larger exchange programme during the 1952 - 1989 period when taking into consideration the grantee-population ratio. In addition to the vastness, the Americans' willingness to meet Finland’s specific needs in the creation of the ASLA-Fulbright Programme shows that the US Government realised the importance the exchange of persons had for Finnish-American relations in a broader sense. The high number of politicians and labour leaders invited to the US reflected the Americans’ desire to influence Finnish society as a whole also through this channel.

This objective gave the exchange of persons programme a highly flexible nature. When seen necessary, the Americans were willing to assign certain individuals grants even on short notice as so-called bona fide study grants. One example of such an arrangement was the State Department's decision to provide financial help to assure Finland’s representation at the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference held in Washington in 1953. In this case, leaders of the five Finnish non-communist parties were informally invited to suggest members who would meet the exchange programme criteria and at the same time be suitable for representation at the conference.

It is all but impossible to estimate the full impact the exchange of persons had for the future of Finland. The US Legation certainly had no doubts over the activities’ success. Already in 1951, it noted that the exchange of persons programme was by far the most effective USIS

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1083 Board of Foreign Scholarships Analysis, Finland. Academic Year 1954-1955, FUSEEC, box 15, KA.
1084 USEF Annual Program Proposal, Program Year 1955, Covering exchanges for the local academic year, September 1, 1955 – May 31, 1956, FUSEEC, box 15, KA.
1086 Annual Report of the USEF, Program Year 1955, Covering exchanges for the academic year July 1, 1955 – June 30, 1956, FUSEEC, box 17, KA.
1087 Copeland 1993, p. 81.
operation in Finland. Although the Americans acknowledged that the results of educational and professional exchange could be measured only after the passage of some years, and even then imperfectly, the operations’ immediate impact was rather soon regarded as plain and far-reaching. According to Minister Cabot, the testimony of Finns about what they had seen and learnt in the US would always make a deeper impression on their fellow Finns than anything the Americans might say about themselves.

As for the long-term impact, it is evident that the exchange programmes enhanced Finland’s closer association with the West and Western culture. The ASLA-Fulbright programme provided the US with a concrete tool for supporting Finland’s independence during the Cold War years. The symbolic value of offering Finnish students and various kinds of professionals the opportunity to cross the Atlantic was, naturally, immense. In the world of academia, the ASLA-Fulbright Programme served as an important catalyst for most other kinds of educational and professional exchanges. Furthermore, the growing number of Finnish scholars, researchers and graduate students working and studying in American universities and research institutes inevitably redirected the focus of Finnish academic tradition from a Europe-orientated one towards the US. This not only led to changes in academic structures in Finland, mainly to the erosion of old hierarchical constructions, but also increased American influence in Finnish research activity. This was particularly strong in the social sciences: for instance, every single researcher or lecturer from the University of Helsinki's Department of Sociology had by the mid-1950s spent at least some time in the US. The greater role the Americans began to play in the world of science also became evident by the superior amount of citations made of American sources in Finnish doctoral dissertations and other academic publications in the upcoming decades.

The psychological impact of the experience of living in the US on young Finns was examined with perhaps even greater interest and satisfaction by the Americans than the developments on the macro level of Finnish society. The evaluation reports written by Finnish students taking part in the ASLA programme in the early 1950s certainly give an overall indication of young people who had changed their way of thinking about the US as a result of their stay. Many of the reporting Finnish students give close details about how their attitude towards American society had changed for the better from the perception they had held of the country prior to their arrival. One typical report described how false an image Hollywood films gave of Americans, who, according to the writer, had a much higher moral standing than

1091 Copeland 1993, p. 84.
1094 For example, ‘Second report written by a Finnish student studying at the California Institute of Technology for the academic year 1950-1951’, June 30, 1951; ‘Second report written by a Finnish student studying at the New York State College of Forestry for the academic year 1949-1950’, undated, both FCSTUS, box 16, KA.
was universally realised.\textsuperscript{1095} Not all reports by Finnish students were, however, full of praise of their hosts. The differences between the two countries’ educational systems were criticised by several Finns, some of which felt that they had had difficulties in adjusting to the more school-like American way of studying.\textsuperscript{1096}

The Americans valued these reports, which had to be written twice a year to the IIE, highly as, according to them, they provided as exact evidence of the programme’s success as it would be possible to get. Both the accounts given by Finnish students and the reports written about Finns visiting with the leader grant were also studied by the CIA, which indicates the great interest the US placed on the psychological effects the experience of spending time abroad had on the individual level.\textsuperscript{1097} Although it is impossible to give an exact analysis on the influence of the continuously growing number of personal exchange with the US had on the Finnish psyche, the various reports concerning Finnish people’s stay in the country support the generally recognised claim that the ASLA and Fulbright programmes played a significant role in shaping also the Finnish mental environment in the early Cold War.\textsuperscript{1098}

**Popularity of American Culture Dwarfs Soviet Efforts**

Amidst the decisive expansion accomplished through the exchange programmes, the USIS/Helsinki continued the management of its wide range of other culture-relates tasks. With its large collections, the USIS library in central Helsinki, from the early 1950s onwards known also as the Information Centre, formed the very basis for these activities. The quickly-growing popularity of the library services enabled the Americans to reach all segments of the Finnish population. Already in October 1949, the library was reported to have over 3,000 monthly visitors, who had borrowed almost 1,000 books and over 2,000 periodicals. All of these figures would more or less double only in a matter of a couple of years.\textsuperscript{1099} The demand for American publications was so great that the library soon started loaning out its material to Finnish provincial libraries.\textsuperscript{1100}

All this was made possible by the rapid growth of the library’s collection. In addition to having the largest collection of American books in Finland, the USIS library offered material that was otherwise very hard to come by in the country, such as children’s books. Even though the library reading and music rooms became highly popular, the Americans regarded it equally

\textsuperscript{1095} ‘Second report written by a Finnish student studying at the Southern Methodist University, Dallas, for the academic year 1949-1950’, undated, FCSTUS, box 16, KA.

\textsuperscript{1096} For example, ‘First Report written by a Finnish student studying at the University of California for the academic year 1951-1952’, March 23, 1952; ‘First report written by a Finnish student studying at the University of California for the academic year 1952-1953’, March 14, 1953, both FCSTUS, box 16, KA.

\textsuperscript{1097} Rislakki 2010, p. 179; Lindfors & Rislakki 1978, pp. 391-396.

\textsuperscript{1098} For example, Tarkka 2012, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{1099} H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Report on Information and Cultural Activities for October, 1949’, December 2, 1949, RG 59, SDDFF 1945—1949, box 4807, 811.42760D/12-249, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1100} The popularity of American books proved especially great in Tampere, which made the Legation to suggest the opening of another branch in the city. Although this never happened, American publications were made well available in a growing number of Finnish libraries. J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending November 30, 1951’, December 19, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/12-1951, NARA.
as important to reach the general public outside the capital region. For this purpose, the USIS also organised regular book exhibitions in leading cities such as Turku and Tampere, which gave the visitors an opportunity to become acquainted with the American publishers' latest output in the field of non-fiction.1101

The Finnish public's growing demand for the American novel was taken into account both in the library collection and the commercial promotion of American books, which the USIS also assisted. American officials noted, with some disappointment, that the more scholarly type of American book was hardly ever translated into Finnish1102, while “the sensational interest-catching novel, frequently of low order is most likely to find itself in print in the Finnish language”.1103 On the other hand, the frequent translations and great popularity of works by Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck gave the Americans plenty to cheer about.

Growing visitor and out-loaning numbers were not the only proof of the Information Centre's popularity. The library's information services were highly sought after by a number of public organisations, such as Finnish ministries, English teachers and Finnish authors who often called on the centre to check on the reliability of selected American materials.1104 The USIS's goal of promoting American culture to the larger population was also met to a great extent. The staff, for example, distributed free copies of such fact-based publications as An Outline of American History and An Outline of American Education through bookshops and schools.1105 As it supported the greater quest of placing education at the very core of the US campaign in Finland, particular care was given to the production of the latter pamphlet. What was common for the various Finnish language editions of the booklet produced in later years, particularly after the launch of Sputnik, was that they all defended the American schooling system by underlining not only the quality of educational methods but also the benefits of providing a higher education to a considerably larger share of younger people than was the case in Europe.1106

The Americans' almost obsessive goal of reaching labour groups more effectively also concerned library services. The USIS felt that it was successful in catching the services' chief targets: teachers, intellectuals, students, school pupils, professionals and technical groups, but reported about its problems in introducing the information service to rural areas. The importance of making more personal visits to towns and villages was stressed already in


1102 This observation was correct since translations of for example works in the social sciences were rare in the first ten post-war years. Aho, Tuomas, 'Yhteiskunnallinen kirjallisuus' in Paloposki, Outi & Riikonen, H.K. (eds.) Suomenennetun tietokirjallisuuden historia (Helsinki 2013), p. 310. Finnish publishers' unwillingness to publish translated non-fiction is well evident when studying their contract details. For example in 1951, WSOY focused on publishing translations of, for example, Jane Austen's novels. The list of translated non-fiction works was limited to Peter Howard's 'The World Rebuilt'. WSOY:n hallituksen pöytäkirja, August 31, 1951, WSOY:n arkisto, PLA.


1106 For example, Yhdysvaltain koululaitos (USIS/Helsinki 1953), pp. 57-63; Yhdysvaltain opetuslaitos (USIS/Helsinki 1959), pp. 5-16.
December 1950, but due to limited resources this kind of activity remained rare. More effort was made in contacting organised labour and factory workers in the city through personal contacts, and by placing small loan collections in factories as well as workers’ colleges and clubs. Furthermore, from 1951 the USIS provided five leading labour group libraries in various parts of the country with magazines especially ordered for distribution purposes. Newspapers published in the Finnish language in the US and the Finnish translation of Facts About the United States, the USIA’s hundred-page reference booklet containing basic information about life in America, were also sent to groups that could not be reached through English-language material. 

The Finnish-American Society provided important support in the promotion of American culture to the average Finn. The society, which in January 1950 was reported to have 21 chapters throughout Finland, turned out to be an effective distributor of periodicals, magazines, books and pamphlets, a valuable organiser of exhibitions and lecture programmes as well as a presenter of motion pictures. The Americans saw that using the Finnish-American Society and other organisations as sponsors of, for example, USIE art exhibitions or musical events had the effect of making the local societies more active than usual and attracting non-members who might not ordinarily attend functions sponsored by a foreign agency.

They were certainly correct in this assessment as far as the popularity of the ‘American Home 1953’ exhibition went. The exhibition held at Taidehalli, Helsinki, attracted over 20,000 visitors, by far the largest figure for any exhibition that year, and won several praises in the Finnish press over the presentation of kitchen equipment, such as the fully automated oven, in particular. The Americans had the Finnish-American Society to thank for about the original idea of organising an exhibition that would celebrate the society’s tenth anniversary by combining two different displays into one exhibition: the society’s own ‘Home Economics Display’ and the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) ‘American Design for Home and Decorative Use’. The way the society comprised two independently organised sub-sections to the exhibition was an entirely new one since the usual practice for the exhibitions of mainly USIA-sponsored organisations, most notably MoMA, was that they were initiated and planned in the US. The advantage of the Finnish-American Society’s involvement in staging the

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1111 ‘American Home 1953’ exhibition held at the Arks Hall in 1953. As the number of total visitors was around 95,000, the exhibition accounted for almost a quarter of the year’s total figure. ‘Helsingin Taidehallin säätiön hallituksen toimintakertomus vuodelta 1953’, March 7, 1954, Vuosikertomukset 1929–1979, Helsingin Taidehallin Arkisto (Hereafter HTA), KK.
combined exhibition, as well as sharing its expenses with the USIS\textsuperscript{1114}, was that it was more aware of how to present aspects of the American domestic model to the local audience. The ‘Home Economics Display,’ therefore, offered a less style conscious and a more practical image of contemporary American domestic life than that promoted by the equipment supplier Westinghouse.\textsuperscript{1115} The society’s general intention was not only to promote the very latest American household appliances to the public and local industries, but also to make sure that the displayed equipment would be used for teaching home economics in Finnish institutions.\textsuperscript{1116} This was not an impossible task to accomplish, given the Finnish people's huge desire to compensate the consumption opportunities they had lost in the previous decade with the very latest household appliances.\textsuperscript{1117}

The promotion of American visitors to Finland was another area in which the Finnish-American Society proved to be a particularly valuable partner for US officials. Partly thanks to the society’s contacts around the country, high profile American visitors, often invited to Finland in cooperation with the USIS/Helsinki, and in some cases the Finnish Foreign Ministry,\textsuperscript{1118} both met distinguished Finns during their stay and won a great deal of publicity for their country. As bringing various visitors to Finland often served the purpose of promoting broader American propaganda objectives, US officials felt that naming the Finnish-American Society as their official host, rather than the USIS, would dampen the most violent protests on behalf of local communists. A good example of using visitors for propaganda purposes was the way a number of distinguished African-Americans were invited to Finland under the society’s auspices partly with the objective of proving that it was possible also for members of this minority to gain a good education and have an internationally recognised career. As racial discrimination was one of the most effective weapons for anti-American propaganda also in Finland, the USIS valued the visits of Ralph Bunche, the first black winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Dean Dixon, world-famous orchestra leader, and Edit S. Sampson, the first black member of the US UN Council, exceptionally highly. Particularly the importance of Miss Sampson’s visit to Finland in January 1952 was praised by the USIS/Helsinki staff.\textsuperscript{1119} During her stay, Miss Sampson, who had already become something of a specialist in answering to the Soviet Union’s criticism over racial segregation in the US, gave lectures on the topic ‘Negro in America’ to large audiences in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku.\textsuperscript{1120} The fact that Miss Sampson’s

\textsuperscript{1114} The society actually took care of a lion’s share of the expenses by paying for the rental of Taidehalli and advertising costs, while USIS/Helsinki was responsible for all handling charges. Memorandum: ‘Arrangements for the American Home Exhibits at Taidehalli’ by D.G. Wilson, August 28, 1953, Toiminta ja tapahtumat, box 1, SAYL, KA.

\textsuperscript{1115} McDonald 2010, pp. 391-392.

\textsuperscript{1116} Ibid., p. 390.

\textsuperscript{1117} Pantzar 2000, pp. 36, 66.

\textsuperscript{1118} Because the Finnish Foreign Ministry, in order to avoid Soviet suspicions, wished to keep its role behind the invitation of certain American individuals to Finland out from publicity, the Finnish-American Society acted as their official host. A good example of this kind of an arrangement took place in October 1950 when Walter Lippman was invited to Finland by the Ministry, but officially by the Finnish-American Society, in order to show the famous journalist that Finland still remained a Western democracy. Broms 1986, pp. 180-181.

\textsuperscript{1119} Aalto 2012, pp. 47-51.

\textsuperscript{1120} ‘Pöytäkirja Suomalais-Amerikkalaisen Yhdistyksen keskushallituksen kokouksesta’, January 11, 1952, Keskushallituksen pöytäkirjat, SAYL, KA.
comments were covered with great detail in the Finnish press, and on YLE radio, only confirmed USIS officials’ earlier view that visits of similar kind were more useful than a thousand press releases.  

The popularity of the various events made US officials in Finland acknowledge that giving a more active role to the Finnish-American Society and increasing the use of its facilities for locally-sponsored projects would play an important part in reaching people in all parts of Finland. The Americans clearly felt that in this way the propaganda stigma of foreign-government sponsorship could be avoided. On the other hand, the US Legation stressed that it would be unwise to create an impression that the society was another arm of the USIS. Even though the Finnish organisation proved to be an effective outlet for the US campaign, mainly its budget limitations restricted the use of high-calibre lecturers in the country as well as prevented organising as many exhibitions on, for instance, American paintings and sculpture as would have been desirable. The society members' occasional dissatisfaction with the more simple photographic exhibits they were asked to display, that they felt were planned for Third World audiences rather than people living in countries like Finland, also shows that USIS officials were not always sure of what would be the most effective way to take advantage of the society and its resources.

The Finnish-American Society’s desire to bring famous artists to Finland was at times also restricted by some US officials’ mistrust of American citizens with suspected leftist worldviews. This kind of suspicion was evident, for example, in early 1953 after the society had invited the playwright Tennessee Williams to be a quest of honour at its tenth anniversary celebrations and the University of Helsinki had requested Mr Williams to deliver lectures on modern drama during his visit. For this intention, the university even applied for a Fulbright grant. This funding was never granted to Mr Williams as the Dramatic Workshop and Technical Institute, at which he was a member of the Board of Trustees, was cited as a communist-front organisation by the California Committee of Un-American Activities. As Mr Williams was also otherwise cited by the HUAC, the State Department recommended the possible visit to be kept on a private basis.  

In the field of promoting the English language, the USIS continued to admit that it lagged far behind the British Council, which had been much more determined in implementing its activities. In particular, the way in which the BC had organised the educational operations of the Finnish-British societies clearly impressed the Americans. Some progress in the American teaching of English was achieved in the early 1950s as well, mainly through the supply of teaching material to schools, the organisation of occasional lectures to Finnish-American

1121 Aalto 2012, p. 50.
1125 SD to US Legation, February 19, 1953, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E3/2-253, NARA.
societies and the arrangement of small conversation groups for Helsinki-based students and businessmen. The USIS also managed to establish close contacts with Finnish institutes of higher learning and increase the teaching of American culture as well as the use of American material in their preferred English-language textbooks.\textsuperscript{1127} American influence on Finnish educational institutes was also enhanced through private foundations’ financial gifts. For example, in 1953 the Rockefeller Foundation made two considerable donations to the University of Helsinki for scientific and medical research.\textsuperscript{1128}

The promotion of American theatre and music was also an integral part of the US cultural programme abroad. In Finland, the production of American plays was for a long time modest, mainly due to their highly-priced production rights. In 1952, the Finnish Theatre Association pointed out that although American plays and musicals were included in the Finnish theatre repertory, the US ranked only fourth in the number of performances by country of origin.\textsuperscript{1129} In the field of music, on the other hand, the situation was better. Visits of American artists were frequent and received large attention when of high merit.\textsuperscript{1130} The popularity of American music was further boosted by making American records available at the USIS library and its music room for the use of professional musicians, music students and persons preparing special radio programmes.\textsuperscript{1131}

When discussing the promotion of American culture in Finland, one cannot ignore the so-called American Days, sponsored by the Finnish-American Society and held annually in one of Finland’s major cities. The celebration helped the Americans to emphasise their literature, music, films, living standards and social-economic progress through special performances and exhibitions. The festival was not strictly an affair of high culture since the organisers wished to include events attracting a wider audience as well, such as the first game of American-style baseball ever played in Finland, which took place during the celebration held at Lahti in August 1951.\textsuperscript{1132} The opportunity to do this was one of the reasons why the US Legation considered the American Days as a valuable addition to its cultural programme.

Despite the problems related to the nearby presence of the Soviet Union or, indeed, because of it, the environment for the promotion of American culture was generally speaking fertile. After the overcautious first post-war years, the Finns started to show an interest in all things American more openly. The popularity of American culture, especially films, literature and music, grew at a staggering pace in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1953, over 60 per cent of films imported to Finland were produced in the US, while the share of ‘movie days’ of all running films in the

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{1127} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{1129} J.V. Lund to SD, ‘Request for assistance in increasing number of American plays produced in Finland’, February 1, 1952, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/2-152, NARA.
\item\textsuperscript{1130} H.F. Arnold to SD, ‘Semi-Annual Evaluation Report’, November 21, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/11-2150, NARA.
\item\textsuperscript{1131} US Legation to SD, ‘Report on Informational and Cultural Activities for February, 1950’, March 14, 1950, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2425, 511.60E/10-351, NARA.
\item\textsuperscript{1132} D.G. Wilson to SD, ‘American Days Celebration at Lahti’, October 3, 1951, RG 59, SDDFF 1950—1954, box 2426, 511.60E/10-351, NARA.
\end{footnotes}
country was as large as 70 per cent, among the highest in Western Europe. In this kind of a situation, the US Legation was not too concerned about the cultural activities of the Soviet Union, which they nonetheless followed closely. Even though the Americans recognised that they could never match the sheer size of Moscow's campaign in Finland, especially in terms of bringing artists, lecturers or athletes to the country, they felt that the Russians were failing to win the Finnish people onto their side. Not even the cultural offensive launched by the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, during which Soviet propaganda and the terms the Russians used to present a polarised image of world politics were perhaps at their most aggressive, seemed to create panic among the American ranks. According to the Legation, SNS, the most active of Finnish pro-Soviet agencies, engaged in types of activities hardly palatable to most Finns and could not be considered effective. As with all USIS activities, the main concern was not that the broader public would suddenly turn pro-Soviet in their cultural preferences, but that certain labour groups could be overly exposed to Soviet influence.

Making British Ends Meet

Although the early 1950s was a period when, due to the fever point reached in East-West relations, the British Government placed growing focus on political propaganda in areas such as Finland, the more subtle projection of the country through cultural diplomacy was not forgotten, either. The expenditure estimation for the British overseas information services for 1952-1953 shows that also British Council operations in Finland received more financial backing than the ones in, for example, Sweden and Norway. This did not, however, prevent officials from both the British Council and the British Legation in Helsinki from constantly pointing out that their resources were inadequate for promoting any significant new initiatives. Although it is not entirely unheard of that a representative of a public organisation groans about the lack of resources, available documents show that these complaints were not entirely ungrounded. In spite of playing a vital part in the promotion of Britain, and English language in particular, the financial restrictions, together with Finland’s political position, meant that the BC’s main policy in Finland was determined as “to help the Finns to help themselves”. Of course, the shortage of money was not an entirely bad thing as it made sure that the BC operations were more or less forced to follow the broader objective of avoiding any kind of ‘cultural aggression’ in Finland.

Supporting the activities of native Finns was mostly channeled through the anglophile societies, which kept growing rapidly both in size and number. By 1953, the number of societies had already passed the sixty mark, and as many as 28 teacher-secretaries had been hired to teach

1134 For example, Barghoorn, Frederick C., Soviet Foreign Propaganda (Princeton, NJ 1964), pp. 49-56.
1136 The total expenditure for the British Council in Finland in 1952-1953 was estimated to be £24,100. The same figure for operations in Sweden and Norway were £19,200 and £19,800 respectively. ‘Table I, Overseas Information 1952-1953’, Committee of Enquiry into Overseas Information Services, May 16, 1952, CAB 130/75, NA.
their members English. As a result, knowledge of the English language, considered as the number priority for both the British Council in Finland and the anglophile societies, kept spreading. The way the number of Finns taking part in the Cambridge Examinations in English almost quadrupled in only a one-year period from 56 candidates in 1952 to 215 in 1953 illustrates the pace of development perfectly. Another area closely involving the Finns themselves was the promotion of English language through drama. For instance, in March 1954, the Finnish-British Society in Helsinki gave three successful performances of George Bernard Shaw’s *Pygmalion* at the Swedish Theatre in Helsinki under the guidance of Kingsley Hart, the British Council-subsidised lecturer at the University of Helsinki. Drama fared well also as comes to visits from Britain. From the early 1950s onwards British theatre groups became regular visitors in Finland and especially the performances of the Old Vic Company, the first one held in February 1952, were rated as memorable both by British and Finnish observers.

The strong focus given by the BC on theatre in Finland throughout the 1950s indicates how much the British relied on their traditionally recognised art forms in their cultural projection rather than presenting a more modern image of their country that would appeal more to younger people and the public in a more general sense. The rather safe operational formula adopted by the Council in Helsinki was also evident in the annual lecture tours it organised to anglophile societies. The lectures, sometimes given by the BC representative himself, focused usually on the traditional virtues of British culture, namely drama, literature, films, science, the humanities and journalism. Although perhaps not that appealing to the broader masses, some of the presentations given by prominent Brits turned into major events. An excellent example of this were the two lectures that the historian Arnold J. Toynbee gave in Helsinki on ‘The Creative Minority’ and ‘Christianity and Western Civilisations’, which attracted over a thousand listeners. These kinds of visits were, however, rare exceptions. Towards the mid-1950s also the less spectacular lecture tours and artistic performances diminished in number due to the lack of adequate funding. This led to constant worries that the most remote societies would lose contact and strength as a result.

In other British Council activities in Finland the office also largely followed a pre-determined operational model designed for all parts of the world. In the early 1950s, its tasks included delivering BC publications such as *Britain Today*, *English Language Teaching* and *British Agricultural Bulletin* to subscribers and bookstores and organising various British exhibitions both in Helsinki and the provincial towns. As a result of the popularity of English language and culture, particularly the British Council Library in Helsinki grew rapidly. If in 1947, the library had contained around 2,500 books, the figure had almost tripled by the early 1950s.
The one area in which the British Council can be regarded to have failed in Finland was the exchange of persons, one of the most essential tasks also for British cultural diplomacy. In the very first post-war years things had still looked promising as BC scholarships and bursaries for studying in Britain were introduced as soon as the Council operations got under way. The first scholarships were awarded to Finnish students after T.H. Searls, the BC’s Deputy Controller of Education, had visited Finland in 1946. In the following year, for example Oxford University entered the student exchange market independently by introducing a cooperative programme with the University of Helsinki. These developments were, naturally, greeted warmly in the Finnish student circles, which by the late 1940s had developed a growing interest in international cooperation and the, often purely theoretical, opportunity to study or travel abroad. In spite of these first encouraging steps, however, the exchange of students between Britain and Finland remained modest in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. The number of annual British Council scholarships varied between four and eight, a level that was explained by both financial reasons and the impossibility of placing larger numbers of overseas students in British universities in post-war conditions. Teachers, scientists and other professionals were more successful in this respect, as their visits to Britain grew steadily in the 1950s. The exchange of university lecturers expanded substantially in 1952 after Finland was included in the British University Interchange Scheme.

British Council officials regarded Helsinki as a demanding yet interesting environment, not least because by the early 1950s other governments had also increased their cultural work in Finland. The country’s location between East and West made it a particularly appealing area for cultural activities, even though at the same time this meant that cultural competition was taken more seriously also by the locals than in many other countries. Although the British Legation had immediately after the war feared that the popularity of SNS would grow at an alarming pace, already in 1947 it had observed that the Russophile endeavours were in decline at the same time as the Finnish-British societies were experiencing a strong revival. In June 1952, Andrew Noble confirmed this trend by noting the following: “Our resources are too small to enable us to match the Russians pound for pound (in winning over the Finns), but we do not need to, because we have the goodwill of the Finns on our side.”

The question of insignificant resources is also a central issue when comparing the British cultural activities to those of the US. According to the BC, the resources the USIS deployed in Finland in the 1950s were on a scale comparable with the Soviet activities. In particular, the size of the Fulbright Programme impressed the British, who knew that they could never provide

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1143 Kolbe 1993, pp. 151-156.
1144 Between 1948 and 1953, only 18 Finnish students were awarded with a Council scholarship. This was not an exceptionally low figure since the number of scholarships granted to the Swedes during the period was 19.
1145 University Interchange between the U.K. and Other European Countries, Issued by the British Council, 46Z Englanti, UMA.
1146 A.C. Hayter to J.B.C. Grundy, October 21, 1947, BW 30/1, NA.
1148 F.M. Shepherd to W.A. Montagu-Pollack, March 11, 1947, BW 30/3, NA.
1149 A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 5, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA.
anything of the same scale.\textsuperscript{1149} The same did not apply to the efforts of other countries in Finland, although in the early 1950s the British were somewhat concerned about the re-emergence of Germany as a factor in cultural relations.\textsuperscript{1150} Even though, for instance, France, Switzerland, Italy, Canada and India, as well as most East European countries, most notably Poland and Hungary, all expanded their cultural activity in Finland in the 1950s, mainly by arranging exhibitions and establishing friendship societies, their influence in Finland remained much smaller than that of Britain. The one campaign the British were willing to give some credit for was that of the French, who in their view were "not afraid of being high-brow". The numerous French exhibitions and drama performances in Finland were highly regarded by the BC as were the social and cultural activities of the two small Finnish-French Societies.\textsuperscript{1151}

In spite of the growing competition in the cultural field, British Council officers in Helsinki felt that they were successful in their adopted role, which was based on offering liaison rather than direct instructions to the Finns. On the other hand, they also recognised that it was not always simple to assess the effect of their activities especially because of the cautious attitude many Finns had developed towards being openly associated with foreign activities.\textsuperscript{1152} Even though this was true, it is afterwards easy to conclude that the Council played an essential role in complementing the more direct propaganda activities of the British Legation and the BBC. As the cultural activities’ focus was on influencing people and their way of thinking in the longer-term, their importance was particularly high in a country like Finland.

When examining the British cultural campaign, it is also necessary to note that a growing number of operations were placed under the responsibility of the British Legation, another indication that the British Council’s potential was not fully appreciated. The most important development was moving most film activities from the BC to the Legation's care in 1950, undoubtedly in order to boost the promotion and lending of British films. This move proved to be effective, as for instance in 1952 the Legation reported that around 700 short films were distributed to schools, clubs, institutes and societies. The most active user of these productions was the Finnish-British Society, which usually screened one to two British films to its members every week.\textsuperscript{1153}

In the field of commercial films, the annual British Film Festivals were regarded as particular successes as they attracted large audiences and produced good publicity. The festivals were high-profile events as, for example, the opening ceremony of the 1950 festival was attended by President Paasikivi and several members of the Finnish Government.\textsuperscript{1154} In the daily movie screenings around the country, British films were actively distributed by Suomi-Filmi, which often screened the weekly British-sponsored newsreel Pathé Gazette News. Various newsreels continued to be an efficient media to promote the British message even in the 1950s, and the

\textsuperscript{1149} 'The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951—1952’, BW 30/6, NA.
\textsuperscript{1150} R. Washbourn to Director of North and Eastern Europe Department, 'Periodical Confidential Report', December 31, 1952, BW 30/5, NA.
\textsuperscript{1151} 'The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1951—1952’, BW 30/6, NA.
\textsuperscript{1152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1153} A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952, FO 953/1324, NA; Finnish-British Society circular No. 4/1950/51, FBS.
\textsuperscript{1154} O.A. Scott to C.F.A. Warner, 'Report on Information work during the first quarter of 1950', March 23, 1950, FO 953/876, NA.
FO on more than one occasion tried to increase their anti-communist bias without too much success.\footnote{At least in the late 1940s, of the companies producing British newsreels only Paramount accepted some political guidance from the FO, while the likes of Pathé remained hesitant. Britain's desire to sponsor the screening of the Pathé newsreel in Finland suggests that their content was, however, in line with the official policy. P.F. Tennant to R. Murray, 'Newsreels and Anti-Communism', April 16, 1948; C.F. MacLaren to IRD, October 2, 1948, both FO 1110/50, NA.}

As successful as the British Legation regarded its film activities, the vast expansion of the American motion picture programme in the early 1950s left the British in a secondary position in the distribution of short films, not to mention the commercial blockbusters. By December 1951 the USIS/Helsinki already had 750 films to offer, half of which were subtitled into Finnish, while the British Legation had to settle for 260 prints.\footnote{A.N. Noble to FO, January 8, 1952. FO 953/1325, NA.} This did not mean that the Information Department's role in promoting the British way of life was insignificant. On the contrary, the COI-produced films distributed in Finland covered a wide range of important topics ranging from technological innovations in the aviation industry to the British schooling system.\footnote{An incomplete list of COI films screened in Finland can be found at KAVI's Elonet service, www.elonet.fi.} The British monarchy was also an obvious film topic with the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II becoming the most-borrowed short film in Finland. Although the majority of the films shared information about a certain aspect of British society, some of them promoted the same Western propaganda themes as the American ones. One good example of this was a film titled \textit{Factory Inspector}, which in a humorous way informed the audience about the various ways in which employees’ working conditions were monitored in Britain.\footnote{The film 'Factory Inspector', 1955, Kansallinen audiovisualinen instituutti (Hereafter KAVI), Helsinki, Finland.} The main intention of the film was to convince the audience that employers worked hard to improve work safety in Britain (and the Western world). As this movie had a proper script and included professional actors, it was in many ways a more credible way to promote the ideas than often was the case with American short films, which usually merely lectured about a certain positive aspect of American society through facts and documentary picture.

At times, British Council and British Legation lecture activities also overlapped. British information officers arranged promotional tours of their own during which they promoted British culture besides discussing the supply of information with newspaper editors. The administration of Finnish journalists' visits to Britain and British journalists' trips to Finland, the number of which kept growing, was also in the Information Department’s range of duty. Even if at times confusing, making the British presence felt by two operators was in general considered as a functional arrangement. The cooperation between the two was enhanced by the growing attention both actors started to pay to the promotion of Britain's commercial interests. In the 1950s, a larger share of, in particular, COI material comprised news about British products, including consumer goods that were of interest to the Finns. Apart from ensuring publicity for such events as the British Industries Fair, British information officers made sure that economic bulletins and background material were sent to public opinion leaders, economists and trade unionists.\footnote{A.N. Noble to A. Eden, June 13, 1952. FO 953/1324, NA.}
Helsinki Olympics: Using a Sporting Event as a Tool for Propaganda

The one event giving a decisive boost for Western informational and cultural efforts in Finland was, naturally, the Olympic Games held in Helsinki in 1952. In particular, US officials started to invest rather heavily in increasing the American presence during the games after realising the opportunities the world of sports had to offer for the Cold War mind battle. If the Summer Olympics held in London in 1948 had still been contested relatively free of political propaganda, the Soviet Union’s decision to join the Olympic movement and for the first time send athletes to the 1952 Summer Olympics forced officials in Washington to start viewing international sports events from a different angle. The increasing number of reports and analyses of the importance of sports to the Soviet Union and its communist propaganda campaign, as prepared by the State Department in the early 1950s, shows how seriously this question was all of sudden taken in Washington. In order to beat the Soviets also on the sporting front, American officials started to make systematic plans for how to make use of sporting events as much as possible.

The US Government began planning its propaganda operations for the Helsinki Olympics well in advance. In addition to studying different sports-related propaganda techniques, including the famous ones used by the Nazis during the Berlin Games in 1936, State Department officials gathered information about the reactions American teams performing abroad generated in different parts of the world. Although the presentation of American and athletes and American culture in general were regarded as the most important task during the games, the way athletes from behind the Iron Curtain were to be approached was also thoroughly planned in State Department circles. This not only concerned the way the media should cover the performance and behaviour of communist athletes; American athletes were also given detailed instructions about how to behave in case they were to be in contact with their communist competitors and how to present the US message of friendship and international goodwill. In order to make sure that the Americans knew as much as possible about their rivals, the CIA was asked to collect as much information about the most outstanding Soviet athletes, their records and training programmes and even about possible defectors among them.

As the State Department expected, in hindsight rather falsely, that the number of spectators from satellite countries to Helsinki would be significant and that the games would offer an excellent opportunity for communist propaganda, the Americans wanted to make sure that information about the US would be easily available during the games for both local and visiting spectators as well as the athletes. For this purpose a special information office was opened at the USIS premises in downtown Helsinki a few days before the opening ceremony. This

1161 The State Department followed in great detail what kind of a reaction, for example, the visit of an American ice-hockey team to Sweden in March 1952 generated. W.W. Butterworth to SD, ‘Public Reaction to American Olympic Hockey Team in Sweden’, March 12, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.
1162 Undated memorandum: ‘ 1952 Olympic Games’, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.
1163 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, July 17, 1952.
office not only helped American visitors and their quests for information about Finland, but also provided other nationalities with leaflets and pamphlets, both with or without attribution, about life in the US. J. Raymond Ylitalo, back in Finland, was given the special task to head this operation with the title ‘Olympic Attaché’.

Even if the opening of a special information office was a shrewd move from the US Legation, the Americans were able to gain the most visible coverage for their political opinions during the games through *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat*, which both agreed to publish a special two-page English language news summary to serve visitors from foreign shores. The English news review, based mainly on UP reports dealing mostly with international issues, avoided publishing any critical comments on, for example, life in Eastern Europe, but did include several news articles about developments of the Korean War that clearly exaggerated American progress in the conflict.\(^\text{1164}\) Even if the service was mainly meant for American visitors, the agreement made with Sanoma gave a great opportunity for the US Government to promote its viewpoint to the Finnish public as well. In addition to reports on international news, this was done, for example, through an article written by John Cabot in which he praised Finland’s post-war efforts and corrected some mistaken ideas circulated in the US concerning Finland’s political status.\(^\text{1165}\) By this, Mr Cabot referred to a map published by *Life Magazine* showing Finland as a communist satellite. As at least Eljas Erkko had previously felt that it was his duty to remind the magazine about this mistake\(^\text{1166}\), the Minister to Finland was not the only one who wanted to correct this particular blunder. News telegrams were published in English and French also in other Finnish newspapers, most notably in *Uusi Suomi*, but the size of column inches they provided for reporting in foreign languages paled in comparison to the two Sanoma-owned papers.\(^\text{1167}\)

The USIS office also screened a number of USIE short films to Olympic visitors as a nonstop service on a daily basis.\(^\text{1168}\) In order to operate this task, the State Department had requested a number of American posts around the world to send suitable films in several languages to Helsinki that would help in offering an image of America and its way of life to as many athletes from behind the Iron Curtain as possible. The selection and presentation of these films were in line with the broader American policy, as the State Department officials stressed that the screened films should be strictly "non-political, non-war and non-controversial" in order to avoid causing any embarrassment to the organisers.\(^\text{1169}\) A list of films sent from Paris to Helsinki indicates that this request was conscientiously followed. Such films as *Hudson Valley* and *Nevada and its Resources* were hardly political in nature and, therefore, suitable for both

\(^{1164}\) For example, *Helsingin Sanomat* July 17, 1952; *Ilta-Sanomat*, July 29, 1952.

\(^{1165}\) *Helsingin Sanomat*, July 26, 1952.

\(^{1166}\) E. Erkko to J.A. Linen, January 5, 1950, SOLAK, Aa 41, EEA, PLA.

\(^{1167}\) *Uusi Suomi* published news telegrams in both English and French. Both sections were, however, small, and the news content predominately concerned American or French domestic news or Olympic performances. For example, *Uusi Suomi*, July 23, 1952.

\(^{1168}\) *Ilta-Sanomat*, July 23, 1952.

\(^{1169}\) D. Acheson to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, ‘Motion Pictures: Films for the Olympics’, June 20, 1952 RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
Finnish and foreign audiences in Helsinki. One typical feature that was screened was a short film titled *Appalachian Trail*, which presents the joy with which the Americans enjoy their natural wonders. Although the way in which the sense of community spirit among all hikers, also including African-Americans, is emphasised in the film was a rather typical American propaganda theme in the early 1950s, the production lacks any direct political content and was, therefore, appropriate for even such exceptional circumstances as the Helsinki Olympic Games.

American officials in Helsinki had even higher hopes for the utilisation of Hollywood’s popularity during the games. As one of the State Department’s tasks was to encourage American companies, in particular airlines, to attract as many American Olympic visitors to Finland as possible, the obvious ambition was also to bring some recognisable faces to Helsinki. The film industry, and its world-famous representatives, was seen as perfect for this activity. The fact that many of the most famous stars were members of the Screen Actors’ Guild gave them even more propaganda value as they could be presented as perfect examples of the way free trade unions took care of people’s rights and encouraged personal success at the same time. This angle was first discussed in AFL and State Department circles in January 1952, after the SAK’s Olavi Lindblom had visited Hollywood and talked about the possibility to use film actors for the campaign against communism in Finland with Jay Lovestone. Both the State Department and AFL supported this idea warmly. Encouraged by this, Lindblom wrote a letter to William Holden asking him if it would be possible for two guild members to visit Finland on SAK’s invitation. As nothing came out of this invitation, the matter was put aside for a while.

In May 1952, press reports noted that some American actors were planning to attend the Helsinki Games. Once again, the SAK got excited by this and hoped that at least one of them, preferably Gregory Peck, would make a few appearances in trade union meetings. After State Department officials realised that Mr Peck had recently been affiliated with active communist front groups, Washington could not support his visit. In the end, only the actor’s Finnish-born wife flew to Helsinki, while the absence of her husband was explained to the Finnish press by “film shootings in Rome and his three attention-seeking small sons”.

This turn of events accelerated the State Department, the Department of Labor and AFL’s hunt for other famous candidates. The international representative of the actors’ union did provide them with a list of American films stars, including Danny Kaye, Clark Cable, Errol Flynn and Katherine Hepburn, who could be invited to Helsinki, but as this information arrived after the Olympics had already kicked off, in the end none of the biggest Hollywood stars graced Finland with their presence. The idea of inviting American film stars was not,

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1171 The film ‘Appalachian Trail’, 1951, KAVI.
1172 O. Lindblom to W. Pidgeon, January 11, 1952, SAK KV 1952 (Yhdysvallat), TA.
1173 O. Lindblom to W. Holden, January 11, 1952, SAK KV 1949 (Yhdysvallat), TA.
1174 W.H. Witt to A. Zempel, May 2, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
1175 W.H. Witt to A. Zempel, May 6, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
1176 Uusi Suomi, July 21, 1952.
1177 R. Brewer to A. Steinbach, July 22, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA.
however, a complete failure, as in the next couple of years actors like Gregory Peck and William Holden actually visited the country, partly thanks to the Finnish-American Society’s activity.\footnote{Peck paid a visit to Helsinki in January 1953 and was warmly greeted both by Minister McFall and David Wilson, now Head of USIS/Helsinki. Somewhat bizarrely, his alleged affiliation with communist groups had been put aside. For Mr Peck’s visit, see Ilta-Sanomat, January 19, 1953; For Mr Holden, see Viikkosanomat, 31/1954.}

The opportunity the Olympics offered for American private companies to expand their businesses was too attractive for the State Department to ignore. Some months before the event, the department’s Private Enterprise Cooperation Staff started collaborating with American advertising companies in an attempt to encourage American businesses to increase their advertising in Finland during the games. All interested firms were offered highly visible advertising space in the biggest newspapers \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} and \textit{Uusi Suomi} for a reasonable price. Since the Finnish market was small in size, the ideological dimension of an advertising campaign “on an extremely sensitive Cold War front” was emphasised.\footnote{J.M. Begg to B.H. Underhill, ‘Newspaper Advertising by American Firms in Helsinki Newspapers During Olympic Games’, June 30, 1952; C.P. Jensen to undefined recipients, June 1952, both RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.} Apparently, US-based companies did not grab this opportunity as enthusiastically as was expected. Although giant car manufacturers Ford and General Motors placed highly visible advertisements in both papers\footnote{For example, Helsingin Sanomat, July 19, 1952, July 23, 1952 & July 25, 1952; Uusi Suomi, July 19, 1952, July 23, 1952 & July 25, 1952.}, smaller American players remained conspicuously absent. The project, even if perhaps not as successful as American advertising companies would have hoped for, offers a good example of how private companies were to a growing extent included into the Cold War mind game and how the economic dimension of the struggle was gaining importance in the US propaganda machinery.

The setback felt in the advertising project, if there was any, did not change the general sentiment in Washington according to which particularly print and film operations during the games had been a success. As the State Department was also pleased with the number of newsreels and photographs of American athletes distributed around the world, even if somewhat disappointed with the lack of opportunities offered by the hosts for non-governmental broadcasters to televise the games for the first time\footnote{The Americans negotiated with the Finnish organisers for quite some time with the hope of winning television rights of the Helsinki Olympics for RCA with the possible support of NBC. In the end, no television coverage of the games was broadcast. VOA and RFE also wished to cover the games, but were denied of an official broadcaster status by the Finns, who felt that according to the ‘Olympic spirit’, only one radio organisation from each participating country should be ranked as an ‘official broadcaster’ and guaranteed with broadcasting facilities. Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 774 from Helsinki to SD, ‘General Organization of Broadcasting of the Helsinki Olympic Games’, March 1, 1952; R.B. Walsh to D.G. Wilson, May 19, 1952, both RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.}, it is no surprise that the Americans’ versatile activities during the Helsinki Games caused some uproar among Finnish communists. Despite reporting about the “hugely successful” Soviet activities during the games, including Russian dance performances to a crowd of 40,000\footnote{‘Pöytäkirja SN-seuran puhemiehistön kokouksesta 19.8.1952’, SNS, box 40, KA.}, the overall reaction inside SNS was that the games were filled with Anglo-American propaganda that was evident in Finnish newspapers, films and commercial products, such as Coca-Cola, which was famously introduced to the Finnish masses for the first time.\footnote{For example, ‘Neuvostovastaisen propagandan muodoista Suomessa’, 1952, SNS, box 419, KA.} The organisation of an ICTFU summer
school during the games at the SAK’s Trade Union Institute in Kiljava only offered more fuel for communist protests.\footnote{Several newspaper articles and letters to the editor published not only in the far left press but also in more moderate trade union publications labelled the ICTFU as an “organisation which has adopted in its programme espionage and destructive activity” and described the school in general as “a centre for American anti-Soviet propaganda”. W.H. Witt to SD, ‘International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ Summer School at Kiljava, July 21 – August 3’, August 15, 1952, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 29, NARA; Työkansan Sanomat, July 4, 1952; Palkkatyöläinen, September 26, 1952.} As for the Soviets, one of their main complaints concerning the Olympics was that the newsreel and photographic coverage and the subsequent Finnish film based on that material did not include enough Soviet athletes.\footnote{Apart from SNS, Soviet officials voiced this claim through the Russian radio broadcasts to Finland. For example, ‘UMn sanomalehtasiainhoitoisto, Radiokatsaus No: 84, Neuvostoliiton radio 14.4.1953, Amp, VI F, SUPO, KA.} This reaction, together with the communist claims mentioned above, enables one to make a simple conclusion of the superpowers’ battle during the Helsinki Olympics: the American not only outplayed their Soviet counterparts on the track but also on the propaganda front.

The propaganda activities in Helsinki were followed with great interest in Washington. Particularly the opportunity to have direct influence on athletes from behind the Iron Curtain gave the State Department the idea to invite Soviet athletes, for instance the country’s basketball team, to tour the US. According to the Americans, they had only to win from this kind of an event as it could support their propaganda line saying that the Americans liked the Russian people but despised their tyrannical masters in the Kremlin.\footnote{J. Hummel to B. Underhill, August 12, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.} In the end the basketball tour never took place, nor did the visit of the triple-gold-winning Czech runner Emil Zatopek, which was backed warmly by President Truman. This project was made impossible by the McArran Act, which for instance prevented suspected communists from leaving or entering the country, and the apparent difficulty of getting Mr Zatopek out of Czechoslovakia.\footnote{M. Glatzer to J. Hummel, ‘Admiral Radio’s Proposal on Olympic Star Emil Zatopek’, August 18, 1952, RG 59, GRDS IIA PECS, box 23, NARA.} The incident gives another good example of the nature of many American propaganda operations in the early 1950s, also in Finland. The organisations running the vast propaganda machinery were not short of ideas or commitment. The only problem was that many of the operations were not very well planned and because of this often short-lived.

Britain’s campaign during the Olympics was much more modest than that of the US. This did not prevent the British Legation from declaring that the games had turned out to be a huge propaganda victory for them. The achievements of British athletes were widely appreciated by the Finnish public and the country won a considerable amount of favourable publicity in the Finnish press.\footnote{Besides including news reports from Reuters in its English pages, Helsingin Sanomat published two articles promoting British culture and the Finnish-British relationship. The first was written by Andrew Noble and the second by Margaret Sampson, Head of BBC’s Fenno-Scandinavian Section, who stressed the great role the Finnish Service had played in developing the understanding between the two nations. Helsingin Sanomat, July 20, 1952 & July 23, 1952.} Otherwise, the British presence was very much centred in the arrival of the Duke of Edinburgh to Helsinki by yacht, escorted by the cruiser H.M.S. Swiftsure. During his nine-day stay the Duke visited famous sights, met a number of prominent Finns and gave
encouragement to British athletes.\textsuperscript{1189} This olympic visit was regarded as a great success, as both the Duke and the ship attracted huge crowds and the visit “served to remind the people that Great Britain is still a large and important country whose friendship may mean a great deal to Finland”, as Minister Noble reported.\textsuperscript{1190}

The Finnish newspapers’ coverage of the Duke’s activities in Helsinki was particularly lavish. For instance, \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} published daily articles about Philip’s movements in the Finnish capital with such big headlines as ‘Philip Conquers Helsinki’ and wondered “if even the greatest Hollywood stars would have generated such a spontaneous and warm welcome from the people of Helsinki”.\textsuperscript{1191} Andrew Noble was so thrilled by all of the positive publicity generated by both a sporting event and a royal visit that he suggested an athletics meeting between Britain and Finland and another similar naval visit by the Duke of Edinburgh for the following year.\textsuperscript{1192}

In terms of sports, Mr Noble was apparently blissfully unaware that a British athletics and football team had already visited the country twice before.\textsuperscript{1193} While cooperation in athletics meetings was expanded even further, another royal visit did not materialise for quite some time for various practical reasons and for the FO’s view that a visit to Helsinki two years running might appear to be too demonstrative.\textsuperscript{1194}

\textbf{Responding to Growing Cultural Demand}

An examination of Western cultural diplomacy in early 1950s reveals that this was the time period when investment in Finland’s attachment to the West through more long-term operational methods began in earnest. The most overwhelming breakthrough was made by the Americans in the field of educational exchange in which the ASLA-Fulbright programme would have a profound impact on various segments of Finnish society for decades to come. The growing number of Finns crossing the Atlantic also provided more ammunition for the more short-term propaganda battle in the shape of numerous visitors’ written praises of the US. The cultural activities launched in Helsinki also increased Western presence in the country impressively. The Finns’ abiding interest in almost anything coming from the West, most importantly the English language, was decisive in this process and materialised, in particular, in the expansion of activities launched through friendship societies. Although the American cultural campaign was growing at faster pace, the British still managed to lead the way in this area of activity at least partly due to the high regard the Finns gave to traditional British virtues in literature, theatre and the humanities. The Americans wished to offer similar features through their operations, for example by promoting their country through educational achievements and the import of high-profile

\textsuperscript{1189} For a detailed account of the activities of the Duke and those taking place on the H.M.S. Swiftsure, see ‘Visit to Helsinki by the Duke of Edinburgh and the Duke of Kent’, August 14, 1952, ADM 1/23953, NA.
\textsuperscript{1190} A.N. Noble to A. Eden, ‘XV Olympic Games. General report on the success of the games and the international relationships involved’, August 7, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA.
\textsuperscript{1192} A.N. Noble to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Browning, August 14, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA.
\textsuperscript{1193} A British team consisting of footballers and athletes toured Finland both in 1948 and 1950 on the invitation of the United Paper Mills. Report by Labour Attaché C.L. Thomas, July 5, 1950, LAB 13/487, NA.
\textsuperscript{1194} For example, P. Mason to A.N. Noble, October 23, 1952, FO 371/100495, NA.
visitors, but their campaign did not quite enjoy similar esteem as that of the British Council. On the other hand, the success of the American Home 1953 exhibition indicated to officials in Helsinki that focusing on the advertisement of the practical side of US prosperity might generate even greater interest in their country rather than the promotion of traditional forms of culture. For presenting the US through consumer products, the Americans also received valuable experience from the publicity campaign launched during the Olympic Games in Helsinki. In general, the games offered an exceptional opportunity for the promotion of the two Western countries and accelerated the Finns' enthusiasm for their cultures even further.
7. BRITISH AND AMERICAN MESSAGE FINDS ITS AUDIENCE, 1954-1957

‘A Western Breeze’

The mid-1950s was a period when Western propaganda in Finland expanded at its fastest pace. A greater amount of controversial political content found its way to Finnish newspapers and rising forms of Western culture offered the operations an altogether new dimension. The first development was mostly a result of the country's changed relationship with the Soviet Union, which reflected the broader political reformatons introduced in Moscow. Although Stalin’s death did not bring immediate change to Soviet foreign policy, in 1954 it was already evident that the Russians wished to follow a strategy that would endorse more relaxed East-West relations. The denunciation of Stalin's purges and the introduction of less repressive policies, famously confirmed by new leader Nikita Khrushchev during the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, had a direct impact also on the international presentation of the Soviet Union, moving some focus from aggressive political propaganda to the promotion of culture both home and abroad. The so-called Soviet cultural offensive created an impression that the Soviet Union had abandoned isolationism and chauvinism in favour of East-West contacts as a path toward the relaxation of international tensions. As the new strategy also softened the tone with which Moscow commented on foreign media content, it had a profound impact on the Finnish scene.

Towards the mid-1950s the Soviet policy towards Finland had started to follow a strategy aiming for a long-term impact on the Finns’ future by promoting closer and more peaceful ties between the two countries and emphasising Finland’s position as a neutral country. Kimmo Rentola has summarised Moscow’s altered policy well by noting that after Stalin’s death the Russians began to examine Finland more as a friend and a potential ally rather than an ideological enemy like they had done in 1950-1953 when the Cold War was at its hottest. According to him, in the late 1940s the Soviets still had considered the possibility of Finland becoming a communist country as relatively likely.

The impact of the steps taken towards détente by the superpowers in the mid-1950s on the Finnish media scene along with the somewhat more relaxed relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, particularly after the return of the Porkkala Naval Base, has been documented by several scholars. The general view has been that Moscow’s new policy gave the Finnish press increasing confidence to start publishing material that was more critical of the Soviet Union and its policies. This development, often labelled as the time when Western winds blew over Finland, also had a broader effect on the nation, which can be noted by the way the intelligentsia and the

1195 This evaluation was given not long after the offensive was launched by Professor Frederick Barghoorn, a well-known scholar of the Soviet Union, who was later jailed in Moscow for espionage charges. Barghoorn, Frederick C., The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ 1960), pp. 1, 60-64.

middle classes in particular exhibited anti-Soviet sentiments.\footnote{1197} Several popular books critical of the Soviet system, such as Unto Parvilahti’s  *Berijan tarhat*, which covered the former SS officer’s years in Soviet prison camps, and Arvo Tuominen’s memoirs\footnote{1198} based partly on his VOA talks, were published much to the reading public’s pleasure.

American and British actors in Finland naturally welcomed the more liberal publishing policies adopted by the Finnish media, as the development offered them wider possibilities for influencing the nation and its future. The more relaxed global atmosphere did not, however, bring any major changes to the leading Western governments’ general policy towards the small northern country. In January 1954, the National Security Council determined the American objective in Finland as to support “the continuance of an independent, economically healthy, and democratic Finland, basically orientated to the West (but with no attempt to incorporate Finland in a Western coalition)”.\footnote{1199} Although the NSC acknowledged the importance of providing Finland with economic support, for instance by stimulating the import of Finnish products, the Americans maintained their policy of avoiding doing anything that would provoke Soviet countermeasures. This approach was shared by the British, who were no more willing than before to back Finland in any other way than through cultural and informational methods.\footnote{1200} The British Government’s general policy toward Finland in the mid-1950s was based on the strict protection of its economic interests. When it comes to these interests, one could say that the way in which British foreign economic policy towards Finland was formulated mirrored Whitehall’s predominantly pragmatic approach exceptionally well. As Jensen-Eriksen has successfully argued, political considerations of the Cold War had, actually, little impact on Britain’s economic policy towards Finland due to the country’s own economic problems and the Treasury and the Board of Trade’s refusal to use economic methods as tools of foreign policy.\footnote{1201}

The more relaxed period in East-West relations, and those between Finland and the Soviet Union, did not bring any considerable change to the Western powers’ assessment on Finland’s general position, either. In fact, the expanding trade and cultural ties between Moscow and Helsinki made the British and Americans increasingly suspicious of the true meaning of Finnish neutrality. Indeed, the Western powers’ way of thinking led to the following paradox in the assessment of Finland’s foreign policy, at least in Finnish eyes: the more active Finland was in

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1197} Salminen 1999, p. 18.
\footnote{1198} The first two parts of Tuominen’s memoirs, ‘Sirpin ja vasaran tie’ and ‘Kremlin kellot’, were published by Tammi in 1956 and became instant bestsellers. See, for example, Rajala, Panu & Rautkallio, Hannu, Petturin testamentti – Arvo Poika Tuominen todellinen elämä (Helsinki 1994), pp. 374-389.
\footnote{1199} NSC 5403: U. S. Policy Toward Finland, January 12, 1954, RG 273, Entry 1, box 27, NARA.
\footnote{1200} In this respect Minister Noble’s interference in Finland’s internal policies during the Finnish parliamentary elections of 1954 made a curious exception. In March 1954, minister organised a luncheon party at the British Legation during which he presented his own plan over how the new government should be formed to Urho Kekkonen, Teuvo Aura, EERO A. WUORT, Ralf Töngren and Väinö Leskinen. Noble’s aim was to prevent Kekkonen from making a deal that would save his position as prime minister and bring the communists into the government. His candidate for the next prime minister was Sakari Tuomioja. As Kekkonen’s Agrarian Party was successful in the election, the plan miscarried. Töngren became Prime Minister and the communists were still excluded from government, which meant that Noble was rather pleased with the outcome, after all. See, for example, Nevaliivi 1996, pp. 78–80; Upton, Anthony, ‘Finland, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944–55’ in *Ammeluumi (ed.)* 2005, pp. 70–71.
\footnote{1201} Jensen-Eriksen 2005a, pp. 93–109.
\end{footnotes}
its promotion of neutrality and the more successful it was in winning concessions off the Soviets, the more the West regarded it as a mere tool for Kremlin’s policy. The Soviet decision to return the Porkkala Naval Base to Finland in 1955, a warmly welcomed move among Finns, was seen a mere propaganda stunt from the Western point of view. CIA reports from the particular period regularly expressed concerns of not only Finland’s growing economic dependency on the Soviet Bloc, but also of Moscow’s strategy to ‘woo’ rather than pressure the Finns to their side and of the broader aim of strengthening neutralist sentiments in Scandinavia. Particularly the Americans became increasingly concerned about Finland’s symbolic value, as it expected the Russians to use its close trade relationship with Finland as an example of the benefits that could be enjoyed by any capitalist country trading with a communist one.

As concerned as both US and British officials were of developments in Fenno-Soviet relations, they did not consider the possibility of the Finns yielding to demands that would seriously impair their national independence very likely, at least not in the foreseeable future. One of the main reasons for this estimation lay in the Finnish psyche, which was predominantly determined by a strong sense of patriotism. This sentiment was regularly noted in American and British reports on Finland, such as the CIA country estimation report from January 1954, which declared that “the Finns have demonstrated a high capacity to resist economic, psychological, or internal political pressures brought to bear on the by the USSR. Their dislike and distrust of Russia are traditional; their Western sympathies are deep.” Even President Eisenhower shared this view, labelling the Finns "a tough crowd" during a NSC meeting held in July 1956.

The Finns’ strong orientation to the West and their more open criticism of the Soviet system meant that the British and Americans were not that concerned of the possible impact of the Soviet cultural offensive in Finland, at least not in the short term. Indeed, in many respects the mid-1950s was a period when Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy enjoyed their most fertile operational environment. The Eisenhower Administration’s interest in using propaganda as an essential tool in the execution of foreign policy and the consequent establishment of the USIA led to a more systematic presentation of American propaganda themes also in such border countries as Finland. Although the British did not have the luxury of operating with similar kind of resources, their persistent cooperation with the Finns and their ability to adjust their activities to local demands made Britain's overall campaign in the country also a success.

\[1202 'Soviet-Finnish Relations – Post Porkkala’, CIA Staff memorandum No. 76-55, October 19, 1955; Intelligence Memorandum: 'Implications of Finnish Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc', April 2, 1956, CIA/RR IM-424, CIA Office of Research and Reports, both CREST.
\[1204 Besides the Americans, British officials in Helsinki reported regularly about the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. The statements of leading politicians, such as Urho Kekkonen and Johannes Virolainen of the Agrarian Party, were under special examination. For example, M. Creswell to FO, May 25, 1955, FO 371/116278, NA.
\[1205 'National Intelligence Estimate, Current Situation and Probable Developments in Finland during 1954', January 8, 1954, RG 263, box 2, NARA.
\[1206 Before saying this, Eisenhower also pointed out that it was "sort of surprising that Finland could hold out to Soviet pressure". Memorandum: 'Discussion at the 291st Meeting of the National Security Council', July 20, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, box 18, DDEL.
\]
The Finnish press's opportunities to publish more political material originating in the West during a time of lower international tension was quickly reflected in Western informational activities. Between 1953 and 1955, the distribution and placement of British anti-communist printed propaganda in Finland was at its most successful. Material selected from the IRD's Digest to the Legation's weekly bulletin, in particular short news articles and jokes on life in the Eastern satellites, was picked up by a large variety of Finnish publications, while social democratic reporters continued their inclusion of stories on working conditions in the West and on the communist conception of trade union functions.\(^{1207}\) In early 1955, the Legation was averaging as many as sixty placements a month for such shorter items as ‘Working Norms Increased in East Germany’ and ‘Italian Communist Party Loses Ground’ throughout the non-communist Finnish press.

The distribution of the IRD’s background publications had also grown considerably by 1955. *The Interpreter* and supplements of *The Asian Analyst*, for instance, were sent to around twenty politicians on the Legation’s English-speaking lists, while 'Basic papers', 'Basic booklets' and the 'Facts about' series were distributed to ministers, economists, professors and newspapers according to their subject. A number of libraries and the Church Foreign Affairs Bureau were also provided with various publications as were the by now permanent recipients, which included the SDP, the SAK and SYT.\(^{1208}\) The pamphlet *Facts about Communist Front Organisations*, which provided detailed information about communist activities around the world, was given specific attention as it was translated into Finnish and distributed at least through the SDP and SYT.\(^{1209}\)

On saying that the British press operations enjoyed an exceptionally efficient period in the mid-1950s one must always keep the local circumstances in mind. A large share of the material sent by the IRD remained unsuitable for the Finnish market; they were often too long or dealt with aspects of life in the Soviet Union that Finnish newspapers refused to print. As the placement of longer feature articles remained highly difficult, the British officials' shifted even greater emphasis to tailoring the shorter items included in the bulletin to more acceptable form. Some progress was, however, achieved in features as well. Considering that only a couple of years earlier they were not published at all, the average number of placed longer stories, around one a month, represented a step forward. Knowing the limitations of its work, the British Legation gave high value for, in particular, decisions taken at both *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat* to print articles like ‘Cold War Politics’ by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, former director-general of PWE and secret agent, and John Cardwell’s ‘First Soviet Satellite’, which labelled Mongolia as the first

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\(^{1207}\) British Legation to IRD, ‘Possibility of placing more labour material in Finnish publications’, February 10, 1954, FO 1110/690, NA.

\(^{1208}\) M.J. Creswell to H.A.H. Cortazzi, ‘Distribution and use of IRD material in Helsinki’, April 27, 1955, FO 1110/808, NA.

\(^{1209}\) ‘Tosiasioita kommunistien kansainvälisistä apujärjestöistä’, April 1957, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB 19, TA; SYT, box 112, KA.
victim of Soviet imperialism.\footnote{M.J. Creswell to H.A.H. Cortazzi, ‘Distribution and use of IRD material in Helsinki’, April 27, 1955, FO 1110/808, NA; Ilta-Sanomat, December 24, 1954.} The inclusion of the latter article provides an apt example of broader IRD tactics, as no such person as ‘John Cardwell’ actually existed. Even though the department, in general, favoured distributing articles written by famous figures, the use of pseudonyms was often preferred when tackling more specific issues due to the more well-known writers’ reluctance to receive direct instructions over their textual contributions.\footnote{Jenks 2006, pp. 84-85.}

The relatively modest volume of supplied background material and placed longer features leads one to wonder whether the British anti-communist press operations were that relevant in Finland after all, even during a period of greater success. First of all, a short examination of British campaigns in other countries reveals that even in larger countries such as Italy, where IRD propaganda was more apparent and the distribution of, for example, the Italian version of \textit{The Interpreter} was measured in hundreds rather than dozens\footnote{British Embassy, Rome to IRD, ‘Six-monthly report on IRD material volume covering the period September 1955 – April 1956’, FO 1110/899, NA.}, the delivery and publication of printed content was not that much wider when keeping the countries’ size of population in mind. The constant challenge to make the original content more adjustable to local needs was not that unique, either. In Italy, the British, in cooperation with the Christian Democratic Party and the trade unions, took great care in editing the original material to suit the local press, especially newspapers issued mainly in agrarian areas with large communist dwelling.\footnote{British Consul, Genoa to IRD, ‘Report on the use of IRD material during the period June-October 1955’, FO 1110/899, NA.} Along with Finland, seeking consistent delivery channels was also a familiar issue in other neutral countries where the British came across with similar questions regarding the relationship between political newspaper content and censorship. Particularly, the Austrian press was reluctant to publish direct criticism of the Soviet Union during the period of occupation.\footnote{For example, R.S. Scriver to R. Murray, ‘Report of the difficulties of getting IRD material published in the Austrian press’, November 10, 1956, FO 1110/326, NA.}

Although IRD material started to win more coverage after the Austrian State Treaty was signed in 1955, the Austrians’ familiarity of Soviet behaviour and their reluctance to expose people to excessively strong anti-communist propaganda with hardly any news value\footnote{R.A. Burroughs to G.F.N. Reddaway, June 28, 1957; G.F.N. Reddaway to R.A. Burroughs, August 3, 1957, both FO 1110/991, NA.} did in many respects resemble the attitude adopted in Finland.

The British campaign in Finland is placed into another important context when comparing it to the operations performed in other Nordic Countries. It is hardly surprising that IRD activity was considered easier in all of them. Various domestic factors did, however, mean that the British propaganda activities did not always enjoy as smooth a ride as the FO would have hoped for. The easiest path for anti-communist propaganda was, unsurprisingly, paved in Norway where the cooperation with the local labour party made the distribution of material more effective than in various other countries.\footnote{Memorandum by B.J. Ching, ‘IRD activities in Norway’, May 13, 1953, FO 1110/576; British Embassy, Oslo to IRD, ‘IRD Report - First Quarter 1956’, April 17, 1956, FO 1110/905, both NA.} At times the domestic political battle did, however, limit the use of British printed content also in Norway as members of the local conservative party were not
always that happy to distribute anti-communist propaganda unless it condemned their socialist rivals as well. 1217 Another restricting factor was financial. Cuts introduced to British legations' information departments in the mid-1950s in Norway and in particular in Denmark, 1218 meant that the relative importance of the campaign in Finland actually grew during this period.

The way IRD work was welcomed in Sweden, the most important country of comparison, also shows that distributing anti-communist propaganda in a country that was neutral yet free of direct Soviet pressure was not always that straightforward either. British anti-communist operations had got off to a good start in the country, as especially the social democrats were willing to reproduce IRD material and use it for distribution to speakers and incorporation in their party publications. 1219 Towards the mid and late 1950s, however, it became increasingly evident for the British that the Swedes wished to adopt a more independent line also in political reporting based on the resentment of outsiders teaching them what to do and a more balanced presentation of the facts. 1220 By the late 1950s, Swedish newspapers hardly ever published IRD feature articles as they preferred to produce their own original stories. 1221 Furthermore, IRD publications had much fewer recipients than, for instance, in Norway and in fact not that many more than they had in Finland. 1222

All this shows that the somewhat modest figures for the reproduction of longer articles in Finland was, in fact, not that unusual. Whereas in Finland the country’s delicate position placed restrictions for anti-communist propaganda, a number of distinctively local conditions held back the use of IRD content in several other countries. This suggests that at least in terms of placing longer anti-communist articles in European newspapers, IRD propaganda was not as broad an activity in the mid-1950s as the FO would have hoped. The case of Sweden gives interesting evidence about how a more free operational environment for politicians and journalists did not automatically lead to the greater use of foreign content. In fact, the Finnish newspapers’ desire to directly publish privately-supplied foreign articles that were at times even aggressively anti-communist, made the IRD’s work in Helsinki to some extent easier and more effective than that in Stockholm. When one also takes into account journalists’ use of IRD publications as background material, which at least according to the British was broad 1223, the convincing number of shorter IRD items included in Finnish publications, and the propaganda content’s considerable covert and indirect use through organisations like the SAK and SYT,

1217 M.F. Cullis to J.H. Peck, February 18, 1953, FO 1110/576, NA.
1218 For example, G.F.N. Reddaway to A.M. Williams, ‘Inspection of posts in Norway and Denmark and IRD work’, April 27, 1957, FO 1110/1047, NA.
1219 British Embassy, Stockholm, to Northern Department, May 12, 1948, FO 1110/27, NA.
1222 For example, in March 1957 The Interpreter was delivered to only 35 recipients, while the number for Norway was over 300. The figure did grow slightly, but only reached the 60-mark in early 1961. M.F. Cullis to G.F.N. Reddaway, March 5, 1957, FO 1110/1022; H.H. Tucker to G. Randall-Coate, February 20, 1961, FO 1110/1389, both NA.
1223 Although the use of IRD content as background material is impossible to define, the British were confident enough to declare it as particularly broad in Finland. Already in May 1953, Mr McGhie reported that even if Finnish political columnists were not able to use the content as it stands, they were permitted to insulate it to their own writings. FO minute: ‘The Use of IRD Material in Western European Countries’, May 30, 1953, FO 1110/615, NA.
British press operations in the 1950s can without much hesitation be regarded as effective, especially with the local circumstances in mind.

**Expansion Comes to Halt**

Despite a relative breakthrough having been made in Finland, the British were also quick to see new dark clouds emerging on the horizon as far as their propaganda activities were concerned. In a report written in July 1955, Ambassador Michael Creswell noted that the distribution of IRD material containing an anti-Russian slant and attributable to the British Embassy in any way was becoming increasingly embarrassing to the recipient, possibly even having an opposite effect to the one intended, which could impair Britain's relationship with Finns in official positions.\textsuperscript{1224} As a result, a somewhat more cautious distribution policy was adopted. The problem with IRD material, according to Creswell, was also that the anti-communist propaganda the Finns themselves produced was principally directed against their own communist party, while articles of the IRD were written for a wider public and the line between what was anti-communist and what anti-Soviet was often difficult to draw.

British officials in Helsinki were now coming to the conclusion that the warming relations between Finland and the Soviet Union actually prevented a further expansion in the use of IRD material. According to them, the 'Geneva spirit', the return of Porkkala, and Finland's entry into the Nordic Council and the UN had generated an environment in which newspaper editors did not feel free to criticise their neighbour.\textsuperscript{1225} This argument is interesting since the prevailing view among Finnish scholars has been that the return of Porkkala in particular gave Finnish newspapers more confidence to publish material criticising either the Soviets or leading politicians, mainly Prime Minister Kekkonen, who were regarded to cooperate with the eastern neighbours too closely.\textsuperscript{1226} Reading Finnish newspapers from that period shows that the adopted publishing policy was by far more liberal in terms of political reporting than it had been only a couple of years before. Indeed, one comes to the conclusion that the Finnish papers' reluctance to publish even more IRD material had to do more with the content of the articles and their suitability to local circumstances. Moreover, the general atmosphere was definitely changing in Finland; people had had enough of the strictly fact-based hard-hitting political propaganda war. The Cold War battle was gradually taking a more cultural form, which was something IRD officials delivering the printed material did not entirely seem to grasp.

The changing situation was, above all, reflected in the smaller number of Finnish publications printing IRD material. In 1956, short articles on East Germany, the satellites and Soviet cultural difficulties were still frequently reproduced by the Finns, but the activity was increasingly reliant on, in particular, *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Kansan Lehti*, the Tampere-based social democratic paper with a somewhat modest circulation. For instance, *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, earlier the main instrument for British propaganda, published less IRD material than it had done only a couple of years before. The paper had, according to the British, now adopted the

\textsuperscript{1224} M.J. Creswell to P.F. Grey, July 6, 1955, FO 1110/808, NA.
\textsuperscript{1225} H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA.
\textsuperscript{1226} Salminen 1996, pp. 35-36; Suomi 1992, p. 94.
role of being the main organ of one of the two government parties and as a result was not
expected to digress too much from official policy. Furthermore, the publication had not found
an adequate replacement for “Jahvetti” Kilpeläinen, which obviously reduced the number of
included articles written in an anti-communist tone.\footnote{1227} Browsing through editions of \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti} from the mid-1950s reveals that the British estimation was not entirely
justified. While the paper did not include direct attacks against the Soviet Union nor the witty
remarks made by Kilpeläinen, it did give visible coverage to negative developments in Eastern
Europe, such as the mass demonstrations held in Poland in June 1956 that led to dozens of
victims.\footnote{1228} Furthermore, the publication continued its policy of giving a considerable amount of
column inches to both British and American labour issues, such as workers’ social security, a
theme promoted by propaganda units both in London and Washington.\footnote{1229} It would seem that
the disappointment the British expressed over \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti} reflected more the
emerging concerns over the less critical attitude certain leading social democratic politicians,
most notably Väinö Leskinen, were developing towards the Soviet Union rather than an actual
suspicion of the paper’s publication policies.\footnote{1230}

While \textit{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti} reduced its use of IRD content, \textit{Kansan Lehti} turned into one
of the most effective outlets for British anti-communist propaganda. The paper’s desire to
include IRD material was, undoubtedly, to a large extent determined by Arvo Tuominen’s
appointment as its Leading Editor in 1956. As all the sensation over the publication of his
memoirs proved, Tuominen continued to have a significant part to play in the political
propaganda war, both at home and overseas. Both the British and the Americans considered
him as one of their most important contacts in Finland and were in regular contact with him to
discuss the suitability of their content for \textit{Kansan Lehti}.\footnote{1231} The former communist’s insights over
the Soviet Union were also sought after by other international actors, including \textit{The Reader’s
Digest}, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation, which came up with the idea to interview Mr
Tuominen for a talk series produced to discuss Marxism 75 years after Karl Marx’s death.\footnote{1232}
Tuominen’s role as an expert of Soviet matters and communism reached something of a climax
in June 1954 when he gave a lecture on communist parties in Finland and Scandinavia at
Oxford University. The FO might have had its hands on this visit since the invitation was sent

\footnotetext{1227}{H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA.}
\footnotetext{1228}{Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, June 30, 1956.}
\footnotetext{1229}{For example, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, April 14, 1954 & July 11, 1956.}
\footnotetext{1230}{In 1954, the British Embassy started to express concerns over the growing number of non-communist Finns
either visiting the Soviet Union or being in regular contact with Soviet officials. British concerns over Leskinen’s
more impartial attitude to Moscow, which became apparent in an article of his published in Sosialistinen Aikakausilehti, was explicitly mentioned in a conversation between Michael Creswell and Eero Wuori. British
371/116270, NA; Memorandum: ‘The question made by Ambassador Creswell’, by Eero A. Wuori, January 11,
1955, 12 L Englanti, UMA.}
\footnotetext{1231}{For instance in 1957, Tuominen was visited by Ambassador Hickerson and Press Assistant Gilbert Austin, who
wished to discuss the suitability of USIS material for Kansan Lehti. J.D. Hickerson to A. Tuominen, October 29,
1957, AT, box 7 G.F. Austin to A. Tuominen, November 14, 1957, AT, box 6, both KA. The British also ranked
Tuominen as one of their most influential contacts. For example, D.L. Busk to M.G.L. Joy, February 18, 1959, FO
1110/1201, NA.}
\footnotetext{1232}{S. Salminen to A. Tuominen, December 2, 1957, AT, box 14; H. Purre to A. Tuominen, November 11, 1958;
V. Obolensky to A. Tuominen, February 20, 1958, both AT, box 11, all KA.}

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to Mr Tuominen through Rex Bosley, an old friend who also acted as the Finns’ interpreter during his visit.\textsuperscript{1233}

The dissatisfaction the British Embassy expressed over the diminishing number of Finnish publications reproducing British propaganda concerned, above all, Coalition Party-associated papers. From the British point of view, in particular \textit{Uusi Suomi’s} use of IRD content or even straight COI-produced material was much more sporadic than could be expected from a leading conservative publication.\textsuperscript{1234} Again, the British officials’ disappointment does not tell the whole truth about the paper. In fact, \textit{Uusi Suomi} kept publishing plenty of British political content particularly after Eero Petäjäniemi, who was now the paper’s Chief Editor, instructed the paper’s London correspondent Tauno Kuosa to use more content from papers like \textit{The Times}, \textit{The Guardian}, \textit{The Economist} and especially \textit{The Daily Telegraph} with which the Finnish paper continued to have a cooperative agreement.\textsuperscript{1235} Since at least \textit{The Daily Telegraph} and \textit{The Economist} had a close relationship with the IRD, this development did no harm to the British propaganda campaign.\textsuperscript{1236} Indeed, although \textit{Uusi Suomi} did not directly publish a great degree of British anti-communist propaganda articles, most likely partly because of their extensive length, it is probable that the IRD managed to push its message through at least partly due to the publication’s comprehensive use of other British newspaper and news agency material. The inclusion of British propaganda in smaller Finnish newspapers remained a more direct affair. Many of the papers published in the provinces continued to be among the best outlets for British material, as Information Officer David Edwards was happy to declare in public when leaving the country in July 1955. Undoubtedly, Mr Edwards knew what he was talking about as he had visited every single Finnish editorial staff during his three-year stay in the country.\textsuperscript{1237}

As the expansion of reproduced British anti-communist content seemed to come to a halt, the British Embassy again focused on widening its field contacts. Contacting youth organisations and teachers and distributing material to them was particularly eagerly suggested by the IRD,\textsuperscript{1238} but at least in 1956 there was no notable success in this field.\textsuperscript{1239} Even though the British officials posted in Helsinki regarded themselves as reasonably active in anti-communist work, this was another indication that their campaign was once again entering a new phase. When saying this, however, one must emphasise that this change did not take place overnight. Indeed, if in 1955, according to the British, the Finnish press had adopted a more uncritical policy towards the Soviet Union, events taking place in the next couple of years ensured that the Finns were at times more than willing to publish anti-communist IRD material again.

It is also important to note that British anti-communist activities in Finland did not only concern the delivery of printed content. In June 1955, in order to counter the Soviet Peace Campaign, and undoubtedly to boost overall activity, the IRD not only urged British missions

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1233} R. Bosley to A. Tuominen, January 24, 1954; A. Tuominen to R. Bosley, June 15, 1954, both AT, box 6, KA.
\textsuperscript{1234} H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA.
\textsuperscript{1235} E. Petäjäniemi to T. Kuosa, October 1, 1956; E. Petäjäniemi to T. Kuosa, October 9, 1956, both US, box 47, KA.
\textsuperscript{1236} Jenks 2006, pp. 82-83, 86.
\textsuperscript{1237} Hufvudstadsbladet, July 9, 1955.
\textsuperscript{1238} J. Saunders to British Legation, May 9, 1955, FO 1110/808, NA.
\textsuperscript{1239} H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA.
\end{footnotesize}
to expand their influential contacts, but also demanded them to send more intelligence to London concerning communist activities and any weak spots that could be exploited by them. The latter task was relatively easy in Finland as, in particular, the SDP was more than happy to supply the British and Americans with information they collected through their extensive intelligence organisation, which consisted of members from the worker level to the party leadership.

British officials posted in Finland found a chance to resist the impact of the international peace campaign at first hand when it was announced that the communist-run World Peace Assembly was to be held in Helsinki in June 1955. Considering that Britain’s official policy towards such events was usually to undermine their importance, the British Embassy put a considerable amount of effort to protest about the sensibility of allowing such a gathering in Finland since it would, according to Ambassador Creswell, only lead to outside criticism over the country’s true position. When the peace conference was given the go-ahead, the FO made sure that Britain’s presence in Helsinki would not be forgotten during the event by organising a visit by the Royal Navy’s fast minelayer Apollo to the city, a move that Mr Creswell had discussed with the Finnish Foreign Ministry beforehand. At least as the IRD paper prepared over the communist gathering concluded, this operation stole the show from the assembly completely, as most Finnish newspapers gave Apollo extensive coverage while ignoring the communist gathering altogether.

Once again, this was a rather bold claim considering that the American campaign against the peace assembly overshadowed even the British one. In addition to protesting the organisation of such an event in the Finnish capital in beforehand, the US response involved the opening of the USIA’s Atoms for Peace exhibition at Svenska Handelshögskolan in Helsinki, the visit of Chief Justice Earl Warren to the American Days held in Hämeenlinna and the concerts given by the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra in Helsinki, which were the first performances in Finland under the Special International Program for Cultural Presentations. The American objective of moving the attention away from the conference certainly proved successful judging by the number of column inches the Finnish press gave to all of the events, although it has to be said that many local newspapers had decided to give minimum coverage to the assembly regardless of

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1240 IRD to all posts, June 6, 1955, FO 1110/716, NA.
1243 The visit was officially made in remembrance of the 100th anniversary of the Crimean War. When discussing the matter with the Finns, Creswell inquired whether the authorities would oppose similar visits taking place every year. According to Permanent Secretary Rafael Seppälä, no complaints had been made over such visits. ‘Memorandum of the discussion with Ambassador Creswell’, by R.R. Seppälä’, April 13, 1955, UKA, box 21/44, TPA.
1246 For Atoms for Peace, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, May 16, 1955, for Earl Warren’s visit, for example, Uusi Suomi, June 27, 1955, for the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, for example, Ilta-Sanomat, June 26, 27 & 28, 1955.
all the American activities taking place.\textsuperscript{1247} What Washington's highly conspicuous response, from a British perspective, reaffirmed was that by the mid-1950s the Americans were playing in an altogether different league as far as overseas informational and cultural operations went.

**Revealing Communist Injustices**

A brief examination of the content of IRD material reproduced by Finnish newspapers supports the view that in the mid-1950s Finland was not remarkably different from many other countries when it came to the publication of even controversial political content. The British Embassy in Helsinki did not usually provide the FO with detailed lists of articles sent to and published by Finnish papers, but the reports written during this particular period\textsuperscript{1248} make it possible both to two draw some general conclusions of the material the British wished the Finns to read and to examine the articles' relation to other published content.

What stands out when reading the feature articles and comparing them to the original IRD texts are their shorter length and concentration mainly on Eastern Europe rather than the Soviet Union. Even after British information officers had reduced the stories' size and made adjustments to their content, they remained so extensive and informative that they could hardly be missed by the reader. The Finnish newspapers publishing the articles, mostly *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Kansan Lehti*, made the stories even more visible by often placing them next to the editorials and perceivably stating their writer, often a prominent reporter assigned by the IRD. In this way, the publications made it clear that the article in question was by no means written by a member of their staff but a foreign commentator.

The feature articles dealing with Easter Europe usually concerned a certain difficulty in one of the satellites, most commonly in East Germany or Poland. The reports were predominantly factual but they usually included some sort of a personal comment on the problem in a wider context. For example, an article published by *Ilta-Sanomat* in May 1955, with the headline ‘The Red German Army’ rather analytically anticipated the signing of the Warsaw Pact through the growing Soviet influence in the East German Army, but at the same time pointed out how the increasing number of fugitives to the West gave an illustrative picture of the East German Army's morale and of the intense political pressure under which particularly officers were.\textsuperscript{1249}

Reports on the worsening position of East German workers, for instance, concerning their rights to strike as well problems in industrial production and food supplies were even more typical subjects than the army or the number of refugees. News about shortages on foodstuff and other agricultural constraints were often successfully placed in Finnish provincial papers such as *Ilkka*, which in May 1955 published a report according to which only 86 per cent of East Germany’s most essential provisions could be supplied.\textsuperscript{1250} The position of East German workers was

\textsuperscript{1247} In addition to the US, the British observed that a number of leading Finnish papers decided to give minimum coverage to the assembly. ‘World Peace Assembly, Helsinki, June 22-29, 1955’, July 15, 1955, FO 975/96, NA.
\textsuperscript{1248} The following document provides the most detailed list of IRD articles published in Finnish newspapers: H.M. Pullar to H.A.H. Cortazzi, February 11, 1956, FO 1110/921, NA.
\textsuperscript{1249} *Ilta-Sanomat*, May 9, 1955.
\textsuperscript{1250} *Ilkka*, May 23, 1955.
broadly covered in articles such as David Laidlaw’s, another of IRD’s fake bylines, ‘Recalling the East German June Revolt’, which looked back at the rebellious activity that took place two years earlier. According to the writer, the situation had gone from bad to worse since then, as the East German state and the communist party had focused strongly on stripping the trade unions of their few remaining rights. The East German situation was also visibly covered in Julius Gold’s unusually aggressive piece in which he compared the East German leaders’ attitude to tolerance and liberty to that of Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler.

As for the situation in Poland, the difference of opinion between some leading figures of the Polish Church and Vatican on communism was an obvious propaganda weapon for the British also in Finland, as was the popularity of religion and theological studies in Poland as compared to that of Communist-Marxist philosophy. Poland was also used as an example of a communist country in which cultural life was very restricted and almost entirely party-run. A good example of this was a two-series report written by Andrzej Panufnik, the Polish composer who had deflected to Britain in 1954. In his text published in Ilta-Sanomat with the title ‘Composers and Commissars’, Panufnik gave a thorough account of the poor conditions artists faced in communist countries both financially and artistically, and claimed that their only possibility was to succumb to party regulations. An isolated position from any Western influence and the communists’ constant anti-Western propaganda made matters even worse and were among the main reasons why nothing interesting or original had been composed in communist countries, the writer noted.

The British officials’ realisation that the Finns' sensitivity to propaganda made the use of stories based on completely inaccurate information, or crude propaganda, more or less unnecessary meant that such material was rarely even offered to them. This also applied to the shorter news items that were distributed to Finnish newspapers through the weekly bulletin. A list of the short items placed in Finnish newspapers in the latter part of 1955 shows that they also mostly dealt with matters in the satellite countries as well as the decline of communism in Europe. The most circulated items had such titles as ‘Poland's Refugees’, 'Austrian Communists Leaving Party’, ‘Meat Shortage’, ‘History and “Truth”’, 'Arrested in Wismuth Uranium Mines’ and ‘Football Spectators Imprisoned’. In addition to jokes from behind the Iron Curtain and reports on the ever impressive industrial and technological progress taking place in Britain, these kinds of stories made up the core of the British press bulletin's political and economic content in the mid-1950s.

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1251 Jenks 2006, p. 84.
1253 Kansan Lehti, January 18, 1956.
1254 For example, Kansan Lehti, August 28, 1955.
1255 Ilta-Sanomat, June 22, 1955.
1256 Ilta-Sanomat, June 23, 1955. Panufnik had previously dealt with the same topic, as well as the poor standards of living in Poland in general, in two brief articles published in Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat soon after his defection to the West. See, Ilta-Sanomat, August 24, 1954; Helsingin Sanomat, September 1, 1954
1258 For example, Englannin lähetystö - Sanomalehtikatsaus, No. 227, December 17, 1954; Englannin lähetystö - Sanomalehtikatsaus, No. 230, January 20, 1955, both UKA, box 21/44, TPA.
The published IRD articles’ coverage of the Soviet Union supports the view that the mid-1950s was a period when the Finnish press published content that they were not willing to publish earlier. The majority of the anti-Soviet articles criticised the country somewhat indirectly, but some articles included such fierce attacks against its regime that a Finnish writer could not have necessarily written them without any consequences even during this time.

By the indirect criticism of the Soviet Union, I mean the common way with which, in particular, shorter stories placed a specific part of the Soviet system under examination rather than judging it as a whole. This approach was most typically followed in articles on culture. For example, Soviet architecture was criticised, as was social realism, which, according to the article by journalist Armand Rousseau restricted all forms of art, in particular painting, to a point of banality. According to the writer, real emotions were impossible to express in a country where even love songs were forbidden. The strategy of condemning the Soviet Union only indirectly was also followed in articles on difficulties faced by satellite countries as well as in jokes from behind the Iron Curtain, which made fun of the communist system in a pleasant way without hardly any sign of aggression or judgement. The jokes, published in Ilta-Sanomat, were most typically related to inefficiencies in production in the satellite countries, but at times also in the Soviet Union itself. Many of the shorter IRD items reporting about a development in the Soviet Union, such as food supply shortages, were also often relatively neutral in tone as they rarely attacked the communist system, but merely noted some specific facts. In at least one article, published by Ilkka, the writer even gave credit for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union for giving information about their difficulties and, therefore, admitting their existence.

These kinds of examples were rare in the longer stories dealing with communism and the Soviet Union in a more general sense, which made up the most visible anti-Soviet propaganda published by the Finnish press. The articles were most typically broad accounts on the decline of the popularity of communism in both Western and Eastern Europe and included detailed figures for the fall of party membership in every leading European country. These reports were not, however, mere fact lists as they often commented on the gloomy future of communism and the Soviet Union by, for instance, picking up the growing crime rates in Russia and interpreting them as signs of the damaging effects of the communist way of life, as Edward Carran did in an article published by Ilta-Sanomat. Some articles condemning Soviet foreign policy were also published in Finland. The British must have felt that, for instance, political author Peter Calvocoressi’s ‘Neutral Zone Behind the Iron Curtain’ was particularly suitable for distribution in Finland as it claimed that after the declaration of a neutral Austria, it was in the Soviet interest to extend the neutralisation process to other European countries, such as Yugoslavia, Italy and even West Germany, and gradually win them over.

Perhaps the hardest attacks the British made against the Soviet Union in IRD articles published in Finland concerned colonialism, a subject that the Soviets loved to use against

1260 For example, Ilta-Sanomat, August 4, 1955.
1261 Ilkka, May 21, 1955.
1262 Ilta-Sanomat, May 21, 1955.
1263 Ilta-Sanomat, July 13, 1955.
Britain. Articles such as Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart’s ‘Communist Colonialism’ first explained the traditions of British colonial policy and stated, accompanied by favourable comments from leading colonials, that it had prepared ground for home rule in, for instance, India and Pakistan and that in the long run the progress in the colonies was made at the expense of the owner. According to Lockhart, the objective of Soviet colonialism, on the other hand, was to subdue all nationalist ambitions, for instance, in the Baltic States by increasing the number of Russians in ruling positions all over the Soviet empire. “The Soviet policy differs from the tsarist era only for its even greater ruthlessness and it is based on the assumption that Moscow is and has to be the capital of communism”, the writer pointed out.1264

Education was another subject favoured by the IRD that found its way to Finnish newspapers. In one of the more offensive articles, 'David Laidlaw' noted that children in communist countries, in particular the Soviet Union, were subject to party propaganda from a very early age and not able to develop as persons freely and naturally.1265 An even more common theme for the longer IRD items was the examination of Soviet leaders and their ruthless behaviour. An article written by Walter Kolarz gave a thorough account on how after his execution Lavrenty Beria had been used as a scapegoat by the Soviet leadership, allowing it to wash its hands of the gravest mistakes made in satellite policy and the accusations over Russia being a police state. “None of the living communist leaders is as useful to the communist cause in the Soviet Union as the dead Beria”, Kolarz pointed out.1266 The power struggle taking place in Moscow and its consequences were also covered from various perspectives in articles by writers like Robert Bruce Lockhart and Leonard Schapiro. As an expert of Soviet propaganda, Lockhart gave a detailed account on the difficulties the Kremlin faced when trying to re-explain the historic roles of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky in, for instance, school textbooks.1267 Schapiro, another influential person specialising in the Soviet administrative system, analysed how the enforcement of political power through the army and the police had been used during the power struggle.1268 Both the feature articles and the short items also included reports on communism on other continents1269, a development that would become increasingly common in the upcoming years.

When placing the published IRD articles into a larger context, one can notice that they were not always that different from the other foreign content published on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By the mid-1950s, for instance Helsingin Sanomat and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti had only increased their coverage of Finland's communist neighbour both through editorials and foreign news agencies' material. Although the majority of, for instance, Helsingin Sanomat's

1264 Ilta-Sanomat, August 31, 1955.
1265 Kansan Lehti, September 14, 1955.
1266 Kansan Lehti, December 2, 1955. In addition to commenting on Soviet leaders and East European matters, Kolarz's texts published in Finland during this time included, for instance, reports on the problems the Soviet Union faced in its Middle Asian states such as Kazakhstan. See, Ilta-Sanomat, July 27, 1955.
1267 Helsingin Sanomat, March 30, 1957.
1268 Ilta-Sanomat, July 16, 1955.
1269 These articles included John Clews's two reports on communist fronts in Asia and Africa, which noted how important international communist organisations were for the Soviet quest to alienate countries from the West. More specific stories highlighted the situation in various other parts of the world, such as Outer Mongolia. Kansan Lehri, January 11 & January 12, 1956; Ilta-Sanomat, January 21, 1955.
content regarding the Soviet Union was neutral, the use of foreign commentary articles from figures like Walter Lippman and Henry Shapiro, UP's long-time correspondent in Moscow, made sure that the reader was regularly kept informed about recent political and economic developments taking place in the country. For instance, Shapiro's long article series published at the turn of 1953 and 1954 gave a detailed account on the Soviet Union's foreign policy as well as the wage-price relation in the country and the demise of the Stalin cult. An article series on the radical changes required to improve the Soviet Union's agricultural productivity, credited to *The Times*, also provided the Finns with information that could not necessarily been written by a local writer. Also these kinds of reports could easily have been produced by the IRD, and in some cases undoubtedly were, such was their analytical approach to the various large-scale problems with which the communist countries were dealing. What often made the IRD-based articles stand out from the other foreign content was, however, their writers' ability to provide the reader with a more in-depth focus on a single topic. This quality usually made their stories not only more detailed but also more interesting than the broader overviews focusing on, for instance, the industrial outlook in the Soviet Union. In other words, the IRD-produced material offered a level of expertise that often could not have been matched even by the most prominent of political observers.

**US Makes Its Presence Felt**

While the British focused on finding new ways to make the distribution of their individual anti-communist articles more effective, the Americans gave more emphasis on developing their propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland as a whole. The rapid pace at which the USIS's operations had expanded since the early 1950s had made the overall campaign's coordination somewhat troublesome. Furthermore, developments related to Finland's political position, the United States' adaptation of a more evolutionary propaganda strategy and the rise of new media technologies generated the need to examine the informational and cultural programme in Finland in new light.

The first modifications to the operations were mainly made due to inadequate programme coordination. A report on an USIA inspector's visit made in autumn 1955 gave a particularly gloomy picture of the way in which some of the tasks of the USIS/Helsinki were being carried out. In general, the inspector saw that there existed an opportunity for the office to implement a more active programme in the country by, for instance, expanding the areas of cooperation with other posts in the Nordic region. Moreover, he found no evidence of any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme in attaining the determined psychological objectives. As for individual media, the report criticised particularly the motion picture programme for its lack of general planning and detailed instructions for the selection of

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1270 Salminen 1982, pp. 204-207.
1271 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, December 31, 1953, January 10, 1954 & January 19, 1954.
1272 For example, Helsingin Sanomat, June 30, 1955.
organisations to which films were loaned out. The serious deficiencies the inspector also found in the utilisation of IPS special feature material and the promotion of VOA English-language programmes beamed to the Nordic area not only reveal that the officials in Helsinki had started to feel too complacent about their work, but also suggests that the American way of running a great variety of informational and cultural activities from a single office was not necessarily always the most efficient operational model.

The inspection report led to almost immediate changes in the coordination of the US programme. In addition to increasing staff meetings, a special in-service training programme for the staff, including the ambassador, was introduced. As for media activity, the use of motion picture materials was now made more systematic by, for example, reorganising the film library. Moving the USIS Information Centre and its library to new premises found at Kaivotalo in central Helsinki brought a much-welcomed remedy to the difficulties caused by the lack of adequate space. Particularly the latter development indicates that the inspector’s visit led to concrete adjustments rather than mere words written to Washington.

The most significant development in the attempt of carrying the USIS message over to the Finnish public was the special emphasis placed on field activity, which included American officials’ travels to the countryside and the attempt to build closer ties with prominent locals. The need to have more direct contact with Finns living outside the Helsinki region, the overwhelming majority of the population, had, of course, been realised before, and the ambassador, USIS officers and even Fulbright students had visited some of the leading cities each year. Ambassador Jack McFall took the provincial visits to an altogether new level by setting himself the target of visiting every single Finnish community with over 5,000 inhabitants during his stay in Finland. As a result of his numerous travels, many of which won considerable media attention, McFall had developed a relationship with the Finns that the Finnish-American Society described as exceptionally close when he was forced to leave the country due to illness in autumn 1955. In 1957, the USIS felt that even more should be done for reaching Finns living in the provinces and introduced a special field organisation that was to be managed by a separately appointed field programme officer. The Americans wished to plan the new unit’s activities as thoroughly as possible and made sure that before the launch of any field operation the areas of misinformation they particularly wished to rectify were examined in studies made by the local Gallup Poll organisation Suomen Gallup Oy.

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1274 ‘Final Report on Actions Resulting from the Inspection of USIS Finland’, June 27, 1956, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
1275 Due to the illness that forced him to leave Finland in autumn 1955, Mr McFall missed his target by around ten per cent. Interview with Jack K. McFall, interviewed by Horace G. Torbert, May 9, 1988, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, (http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004mcf01) (March 5, 2013).
1276 See, for example, Hufvudstadsbladet, June 16, 1955.
1277 For example, Suomi-Finland USA 6/1955.
1278 The Gallup Poll studies ordered by USIS/Helsinki, for example, showed that in Lapland 27 per cent of the people polled thought that the Soviet Union had been doing the most to prevent a new world war, while 26 per cent thought it was the US. The study also showed that the US was the country the Finns would like to learn about the
Not unlike the British, the Americans felt that a large network of contacts throughout the entire country would be of real value in implementing an information and cultural programme. The most useful persons for this purpose were, naturally, individuals familiar with the American way of life, such as ASLA returnees, Finnish-American Society members, other former visitors to the US and English study club members as well as leaders of such target organisation as adult education centres, residential folk high schools and the cooperatives. In the latter category, special attention was given to contacting teachers at adult education centres and supplying them with American films and books. Timberjacks working in highly remote areas also continued to be close to the USIS officials' heart, and the mobile film unit visited several timber camps during the busiest part of the season when the camps were filled with men. As for the printed word, the new programme urged field programme assistants to pay more visits to local newspapers and report about their editors' views on the actual value of the American content sent to them. In addition, the assistants were requested to carry with them the standard USIS distribution materials, such as the illustrated maps, sample copies of Aikamme magazine and the Facts about the USA pamphlets, as well the Finnish translations of History of American Labour and American School System.\(^{1279}\)

Of all the expanded field activities introduced in Finland in 1957, the Americans ranked the trips made by Ambassador John Hickerson to the interior towns as perhaps the most successful. Mr Hickerson’s visits to, for example, the cities of Lahti, Jyväskylä and Oulu, and the public meetings held during them attracted good audiences as well as resulted in extensive media coverage.\(^{1280}\) A natural stop for Hickerson was also Haukipudas where a new labour institute was opened in 1957 partly thanks to the CIA money that had filtered through the ICTFU.\(^{1281}\)

The Americans also gave increasing attention to supporting the Finnish-American societies around the country simply because they regarded them as highly valuable public relations organisations for the US. The USIS soon started providing the local chapters with, for example, a larger number of American films as well as taped copies of VOA music programmes. In the mid-1950s, in particular, the societies’ role in presenting and distributing films about the US grew, as many of the films they loaned out, most often the historical documentary Coast to Coast and film director Sakari Kulhia’s Travel Glimpses of the USA, were now screened at Finnish public schools as well. Films, radio scripts and the loan collections of books the USIS library sent to local libraries that hosted English clubs were all used for teaching English to society members. American Fulbright lecturers also assisted in teaching, as did the British Council teacher-secretaries, who partly coordinated the activity. Although clearly lagging behind the British in teaching English, the establishment of a language institute providing qualified language exams at the leading Finnish-American society in Helsinki from 1955 onwards offered the Americans an opportunity to make a proper entry to this particular field as well.\(^{1282}\)

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1279 Ibid.
1280 Ibid.
1281 J.D. Hickerson to E. Antikainen, April 24, 1957, SAK KV 1957, TA, Majander 2007, p. 234.
The changes inspired by the inspector’s report, in particular the introduction of the new field programme, certainly gave USIS activities in Finland extra momentum. Due to the reorganisation efforts, the more liberal general climate drifting over Finland and the emergence of popular culture one can draw the conclusion that the American campaign was at its most successful between 1956 and 1958. Even if the environment had become more favourable for USIS operations, the Americans did not, however, change their basic approach to how they had envisioned their role in the country. The US Country Plan for Finland continued noting, following the lines of the NSC, that Finland was not a country in which the USIS should engage in open ideological warfare with the Soviet Union and that it was not the purpose of the US Mission to convince the Finnish Government to join Western coalitions. Within this framework, the USIS’s objective was to administer a selective programme designed so that it would not expose Finland to retaliatory pressures from the Soviet Union. The Americans wished to follow in the execution of their operations a ‘middle way’, a programme that would be prudent and selective while not being passive or anaemic.

The way in which American documents evaluate the Finnish propaganda environment in the mid-1950s also bolsters the claim that the US campaign was at its most powerful during this period. Officials in Finland did not share the British view that the more liberal breeze blowing over Finland would not necessarily increase the Finns’ use of political propaganda. Although the Americans recognised that Finland remained a challenging country for distributing more controversial content, the founding of SYT together with the expanding global anti-communist movement gave their task of exposing the flaws of communism plenty of valuable support. Among the organisations with a wider international influence was Moral Re-Armament (MRA), the organisation founded by Frank Buchman in the 1930s on the foundation of the so-called Oxford Group. MRA based its ideology on Christianity and morality and acted in the belief that a moral recovery would not only lead to peace but bring economic and social stability to the world as well. In the 1950s, the organisation started to emphasise its resentment of communism, and as a result attracted a number of prominent international figures such as Konrad Adenauer as its supporters.

While no evidence suggests that the US officials and MRA, funded mainly by private businesses, cooperated in Finland, it is clear that the rapidly growing organisation made the American quest of creating a more anti-communist climate in Finland easier. Apart from winning plenty of media coverage, the movement received open support from several actors mainly from the political right, most notably the Coalition Party MP Margit Borg-Sundman. As MRA's activities in Finland date back to the 1930s, this development did not take place

1283 J.J. McTigue to Director of USIA, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
1284 In Finland, MRA’s activities were funded by a number of large businesses and private donors such as Kone Oy, whose President Heikki Herlin strongly endorsed the movement’s philosophy both at the workplace and in his personal life. Besides funding MRA, Herlin took an active part in, for instance, its informational operations. After the movement went through radical changes in the mid-1950s, Herlin became alienated from its work and finished his backing for the activities. Some claims have been cast about the CIA’s involvement in MRA’s funding both in Finland and abroad, but at least Finnish sources do not provide any evidence of this. Michelsen, Karl-Erik, Kone - Perhe, yrittäjyyys ja yritys teollisuuden vuosisadalla (Helsinki 2013), pp. 211-212, 222-224, 266-267, 275, 286; Vesikansa 2004a, p. 63.
overnight. The organisation remained somewhat passive in the first post-war years, but for instance the arrangement of a tour for the industrial play *The Forgotten Factor* and the distribution of Peter Howard's book *Ideas Have Legs* gradually increased its conspicuousness among the public. In the mid-1950s, MRA's increasing activities in Finland included the organisation of film tours for such productions as the Finnish MRA movie *Vastaus* ('The Answer'), which presented the message that workplace conflicts could not be solved through class struggle to tens of thousands of Finns, and the distribution of more books from Mr Howard as well as *MRA:n uutisia*, *MRA:n tiedotuslehti* and *MRA:n kuvalehti*, the organisation's publications in Finland. The latter papers often included thorough analyses of not only Christianity and morality, but also labour issues around the world.

While the expanding anti-communist movement increased the coverage of more controversial issues in Finnish newspapers, American officials in Finland could realign their broader objective of giving more attention to the promotion of the scientific, economic and social achievements of their country. The image of the US being the leading country of innovation and progress was enhanced, in particular, by the distribution of stories on the breakthroughs made in the treatment of cancer, polio and painkilling drugs. The most visible science-related operation in the mid-1950s was the Atoms for Peace campaign, which in addition to the exhibition held in Helsinki involved the distribution of printed material on the numerous possibilities the peaceful use of the atom would bring, the screening of atom-related movies and the donation of a special atom library collection to the Helsinki University of Technology. What was common to all these activities, besides projecting American technological superiority, was that they regarded the United States', and in particular President Eisenhower's, proposal of the establishment of an international agency for the peaceful management of atomic energy as crucial in making the world a safer and more enlightened place. In Finland, as in the rest of the world, the massive propaganda campaign following the proposal had the obvious aim of forcing the Soviets on the defensive again by placing the responsibility for disarmament directly in their hands.

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1285 In the 1930s, a group of Finns started to spread the moral message mainly by importing relevant literature and offering extracts of them for publication in Finnish newspapers and magazines. Ekstrand, Sixten, Tro och moral. Oxfordgrupprörelsen och MRA i Finland 1932-1955 (Turku 1993), pp. 42-65.

1286 For example, M. Borg-Sundman to P. Blake and L. Hemphill, October 1, 1948, Margit Borg-Sundman’s collection, box 9, KA; Invitation to see 'Unohdettu Tekijä', September 15, 1948, Moraalisen varustautumisen säätiö (Currently IofC Suomi-säätiö) (Hereafter MRA), Helsinki, Finland.

1287 The Finnish MRA movie *Vastaus* caught plenty of attention both in Finland and among foreign MRA activists. New versions of it were produced at least in English and Dutch. J. Albert de Brauw to MRA Finland, October 21, 1953; MRA Finland to J. Albert de Brauw, December 3, 1953, MRA. Suomen Kuvalehti, 16/1952; Vesikansa 2004a, p. 62.


1289 Aikamme was particularly eager to include such articles, but they were frequently included by larger papers as well. For example, Aikamme 3/1953.

1290 For example, Ilta-Sanomat, May 16, 1955; Helsingin Sanomat, June 2, 1955.


1292 The propaganda in Finland followed very closely the campaign's two-level tactic, which on one level discredited Soviet peace overtures and on another sought to manage people's fears of nuclear annihilation by cultivating the image of the "friendly atom". For example, Osgood 2006, pp. 154-155.
The growing share claimed by science and technology in American overseas propaganda from the mid-1950s onwards is well reflected by the USIA films from that time period. Documentaries on, for instance, medicine, aeronautical innovations, communications technology and industrial skills were produced in their hundreds and they, together with films promoting American culture, formed an integral part of the USIA’s overseas motion picture campaign. 1293 16-mm films like *Wings to the Future* and *Television in Your Community* were now also presented in the Finnish language, giving viewers an image of the US as a superior player in the commercial airline business and a mass producer of television broadcasts. 1294 The first title, in particular, epitomised the USIA’s quest of presenting the US as a country that offered people of the free world entirely new lifestyle possibilities through the introduction of such innovations as the large American aircraft, which would enable humans to “fly like birds”, and the helicopter, which could be effectively used for, for instance, emergency healthcare and fire fighting also in peacetime.

**Using Surveys as Propaganda Tools**

As US propaganda turned more sophisticated in the mid-1950s, the importance of the USIA’s vast research and analysis division grew. The collection of information from around the world, together with the evaluation of the results of certain publicity campaigns and the general international opinion, started to play a major role in the way in which American operations were planned and executed. USIA officials gave particular attention to the way their country was perceived by people in larger Western Union countries, which, albeit in general complementary, continued to include an element of disdain for its more materialistic values. 1295 The use of evaluation studies and polls as valuable background information was also common practice in Finland. In fact, USIA documents reveal that the USIS/Helsinki engaged in more evaluation than the average comparable posts. 1296

The studies conducted in Finland consisted of larger polls and so-called flash surveys, which were of smaller scale and intended to give a quick overview of public reaction to specific events. At least all the larger studies were carried out by Suomen Gallup, which used its normal statistical methods in their execution. The way the company dealt with its research targets impressed USIA officials, who felt that their wording of the questions and the presentation of results were very well done, objective and easily understood. 1297

The surveys concerning the Atoms for Peace exhibition held in Helsinki in 1955 offer a good example of how the studies were executed and what the Americans wished to learn from them. Similar studies were carried out throughout the world, so in this way they also reflect the US Government's informational strategy on a broader scale. First of all, Suomen Gallup conducted

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1294 The films ‘Wings to the Future’ (USIA 1954) and “Television and the Community” (USIA 1955), KAVI.
1295 This conclusion was drawn, for instance, in a 140-page survey on the image of the US in Western Europe written in 1959, "The Image of America in Western Europe", Office of Research and Analysis, USIA, US President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, Records, 1959-61, box 4, DDEI.
1296 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
1297 USIA to USIS/Helsinki, ‘Usefulness of the “Flash” survey’, March 29, 1957, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.
two surveys on the subject for the USIS/Helsinki, one before the exhibition in April and the other afterwards in July, to discover how successful the event had been. The main purposes of the surveys were to explore to what extent the people of Helsinki were aware that atomic energy is being developed and used for peaceful purposes and whether they had heard of President Eisenhower’s proposal over the establishment of a supranational atomic agency.1298 Exactly the same questions were presented to a sample group of similar size after the exhibition.

As it turned out, there was a clear need for informing the Finns about the way in which the US wished to present the development of atomic energy. According to the first study, the majority of respondents named the US as the country in which most work is done to adapt atomic power to peaceful purposes, but very few knew about the Eisenhower proposal and most Finns supposed that it was of Soviet origin.1299 The second study suggested that the exhibition and the publicity it generated did not bring considerable change to these views. As the percentage of respondents choosing the option ‘cannot say’ for both main questions remained at almost 70 per cent, the results of the atom exhibition were not at least in this respect all that encouraging.

The USIA’s effort to present the US economy as a new form of capitalism developed into another leading propaganda theme of the 1950s. ‘People’s Capitalism’, the slogan describing the American economic system, was deliberately chosen as appropriate to communist discourse, and the campaign suggested that in the US, the workers were themselves capitalists as capitalism provided higher wages, better products at lower prices and greater returns to investment, and the rewards were in general shared by the workers.1300 The USIA had plenty of work to do in this field as international opinion often considered the US system as one based on nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism, labour exploitation and a lack of social protection.

A survey commissioned from Suomen Gallup showed that much of this applied to public opinion in Finland. Conducted in summer 1956 during the very early stage of the campaign, which in Helsinki focused around the steady distribution of printed and visual material on the subject rather than the importation of the USIA's special People's Capitalism exhibition1301, the study suggested that Finnish attitudes towards various economic systems were remarkably similar to those in major Western Europe countries. The Finns, for example, preferred the term ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’, even if for the general public ‘socialism’ appeared to primarily mean social welfare instead of government ownership. In interpreting the survey results, USIA officials came to the conclusion that, as in Western Europe, it would be inadvisable for a campaign in Finland to attack ‘socialism’ under that name and to imply that it is incompatible with People’s Capitalism. The study also suggested that there was a need to make a sharp

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1298 "Knowledge and thoughts of atomic power, Opinion survey in Helsinki conducted by Suomen Gallup Oy in April 1955", RG 306, OR, Country Project Files 1951–1964 (Hereafter CPF), box 27, NARA.
1299 Ibid.
1301 The USIS/Helsinki's decision to withdraw from ordering the exhibition was, above all, based on expense factors, but the office also felt that the USIA presentation was perhaps too simplistic for the Finnish audience, which would be more efficiently served through the distribution of more versatile facts and figures. USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'People's Capitalism', March 1, 1956; Telegram No. 57 from USIS/Helsinki to USIA, March 9, 1956, both Abbott Washburn Papers, 1938-2003, box 20, DDEL.
distinction between socialism and communism in Finland and that the campaign’s emphasis on the fairness of distribution and the absence of exploitation in the US should be continued.1302

USIA officials in Washington appreciated this kind of information highly, but at the same time noted that the 'flash' surveys would increase their validity if it were possible to use a somewhat larger sample of the public, especially in Turku and Tampere.1303 Although the conducted surveys were not the broadest around, they did not go unnoticed in Finnish communist circles. In April 1955 the communist daily Vapaa Sana attacked Suomen Gallup for “operating according to the American pattern and more and more distinctively serving certain propagandistic purposes”.1304 According to Lester Ott, Acting Public Affairs Officer at the USIS, this particular story did them no harm since even criticism of US campaigns would only whet the curiosity of communist papers’ readers, a group the Americans were anxious to reach in any case.1305

The USIA’s evaluation studies and polls carried out in Finland did not only concern upcoming or completed campaigns and exhibitions. The Americans also wished to receive regular information about Finns’ views on international developments as well as US policies.1306 As economic development, and the promotion of European economic cooperation in particular, was a central theme to US policy in the 1950s, Finnish views in this field were also thoroughly explored more than once. A survey conducted in March 1957 must have made happy reading for USIA officials, as it suggested that a clear majority of respondents who had a view on the matter saw that the creation of an economically united Western Europe would have a positive influence on the continent’s development.1307 All in all, documents show that the Americans’ collection of information in Finland was systematic and thorough. As new, somewhat softer, propaganda methods were introduced in the latter part of the 1950s, this data proved highly valuable for the way in which propaganda campaigns and informational operations in general were adapted to local conditions, which in Finland’s case were, of course, exceptional.

**Presenting American Progress and Prosperity**

As the USIS/Helsinki apparently did not provide Washington with detailed lists about the articles it distributed and managed to have published in Finnish newspapers, a thorough content analysis of American print propaganda implemented through the Finnish press in the mid-1950s is more or less impossible to conduct, or at least would require an overwhelming

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1303 USIA to USIS/Helsinki, ‘Usefulness of the “Flash” survey’, March 29, 1957, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.
1304 On this occasion the paper actually did not get its facts straight as it mixed up the ‘Atoms for Peace’ poll with surveys on the following Finnish presidential elections L.R. Ott to USIA, ‘Communist Newspaper Attack on Finnish Gallup Poll’, April 22, 1955, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.
1305 Ibid.
1306 The surveys most typically included studies on the Finns’ impression of the leading powers and their military strength as well as on events such as the Geneva Conference. For example, ‘International Survey, Geneva Conference, July 1955’, RG 306, OR, Multi Country Project Files 1952–63, Western Europe 1952–56, box 1, NARA.
1307 ‘Attitudes of the Finns Towards Some Foreign Countries and International Problems, A survey conducted in March 1957’, RG 306, OR, CPF, box 27, NARA.
amount of work browsing through the papers. A glance at some national and provincial publications does, however, give an indication of what kind of topics the articles provided by the USIS covered and from what angle. More printed details of American propaganda objectives can be obtained by reading, for instance, available USIS-produced pamphlets and the *Suomi-Finland USA* magazine. Particularly the latter publication does not, however, really shed new light to the issue, since by the mid-1950s the magazine of the Finnish-American Society predominantly focused on matters related to the society itself rather than the promotion of the US and its culture. Indeed, when examining American printed content during this particular period, the best option is to concentrate on the field magazine *Aikamme*, which was published specifically for the Finnish environment. In addition to giving valuable information about what the main messages the Americans wished to hammer home to the Finns were, an examination of *Aikamme* is important as its content followed closely the broader themes that the USIA in particular wished to promote throughout the world.\(^{1308}\)

A browse of Finnish newspapers from the mid-1950s reveals that many of them occasionally published USIS-provided articles, although nowhere near as often as reports from private news agencies, mainly UP. Another rather simple discovery is that USIS articles concerning the Soviet Union and Eastern European satellites continued to be highly factual and neutral in tone. They were not only shorter than the British anti-communist ones, but also lacked their harder-hitting comments. A large share of USIS content focused on bringing up the declining popularity of communism in Western European countries\(^{1309}\) along with the increasingly troublesome relationship between communists living in the free world and the Soviet Union, due to, among other things, their conflicting views over official Soviet propaganda concerning the outcome of a possible nuclear war.\(^{1310}\) Some of the political USIS contributions published by *Helsingin Sanomat* and, in particular, *Ilta-Sanomat*, perhaps the most enthusiastic user of such content, did at times present critical comments on, for instance, the Soviets’ true intentions before the Geneva Conference\(^{1311}\) or, as this was a time when the roll-back strategy was still fully embraced in Washington, promises from President Eisenhower to assist Eastern European nations in their quest to regain freedom.\(^{1312}\) All in all, however, one comes to the even surprising conclusion that the content supplied by agencies like UP, including for instance Henry Shapiro’s series on the Soviet Union, provided Finnish readers with much more insight to the flaws of communism than the USIS articles, which, in fairness, were mostly meant to explain US policies and promote American culture. The more profound analysis of developments in the Soviet Union continued to be presented to a small number of Finnish specialists through the pages of *Problems of Communism*.\(^{1313}\)

\(^{1308}\) For a more thorough account of these themes, see, for example, Hixson 1997; Osgood 2006.

\(^{1309}\) For example, *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, May 11, 1955.

\(^{1310}\) For example, *Länsi-Suomi*, May 13, 1955.

\(^{1311}\) *Ilta-Sanomat*, July 19, 1955.

\(^{1312}\) *Helsingin Sanomat*, June 16, 1954.

\(^{1313}\) The publication could only provide background information to Finnish journalists as the included articles written by such familiar names as Immanuel Birnbaum, John Clews, Denis Healey and Leonard Schapiro were, if possible, now even more detailed and academic than before. The topics the aforementioned experts covered during the mid-1950s included an analysis of communist youth organisations, an evaluation of the impact Tito’s policies
As US propaganda in Finland predominantly focused rather on promoting the positive than directly attacking its Cold War enemies, the Americans posted in Helsinki placed high hopes for the influence the field magazine *Aikamme* could have on its readers. As the editor Pentti Lehti declared, the publication, which had the full name of *Aikamme – Länsimaita sanoin ja kuvin* ('Our Time – The Western World in Words and Pictures'), had the general objective of rectifying European misconceptions about the United States while giving its readers reliable information about both the pros and cons of the country as well as its society and culture.1314 As impressive as Mr Lehti’s words were, this goal was only rarely met in real life since the definite majority of the magazine’s content was highly complementary of American society, leaving the more negative aspects in the background. The emphasis given to scientific and technological innovations and their effect on human life, as well as the magazine’s blind belief in progress, might seem somewhat naïve to today’s reader, but they do capture well the mood of the 1950s and give a valuable account on the sort of material that was considered effective in influencing people’s perception of the US.

Reading the first editions of *Aikamme* already reveals a great deal about what kind of matters the Americans wished the Finns to read and what their main themes of focus were. In addition to providing a large number of flamboyant colour photos of life in the US, often including a number of smiling, healthy and successful-looking young people, the magazine included several long feature articles on subjects that were high on the order of importance in the USIA’s worldwide activities. Besides new innovations, *Aikamme*’s main themes can be categorised into economic, labour, cultural, racial and anti-communist issues. The extensive use of Finnish comments on the US was another dimension that was characteristic for the publication.

The structure of the US economy was perhaps *Aikamme*’s leading theme. Several articles focused on explaining the American economy, and its unprecedented success, which was mainly based on private entrepreneurship, technological innovations and the growth of mass consumption. The very first edition pointed out that the American way could be labelled as ‘consumer capitalism’ as consumers, with their healthy salaries, held a key position in the development of the country’s economy.1315 Another article published in September 1956 concentrated on presenting the structure of the economy according to the lines of the People’s Capitalism campaign, noting how ownership of, for example, stock was widely spread throughout society.1316 The magazine acknowledged that there were some weaknesses in the US economy, mainly the occasional emergence of trusts and cartels, but at the same time stressed that legislation enabled the use of effective measures against corporations threatening free competition. In giving plenty of attention to the American economy, *Aikamme* did not, in fact, differ much from other Finnish publications. Economic magazines such as *Taluselämä* by now covered the US economy relatively frequently. The publication went great lengths to trying explaining the reasons behind the dynamism behind the American economy, above all the

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* Aikamme 1/1952.
* Aikamme 1/1952.
* Aikamme 9/1956.
general sense of entrepreneurship, but at the same time acknowledged, in a way not unfamiliar to today's reader, the crisis debt-fuelled consumer spending might generate.

The way in which the expanding US economy was presented in Aikamme illustrates well that labour groups were the magazine's main target. Articles published in several editions emphasised the 'working man’s' considerable pay level and his growing purchase power, which enabled him to buy a proper house, a car, healthy food and other commodities, even a television set. In this context, the magazine published stories about American purchasing habits, including the daily visits to the local supermarket, which was at that time an unfamiliar concept in Finland. Although some of the stories boasted that “the average family’s prosperity would without doubt amaze industrial workers of some of the communist countries”, excessive gloating remained fairly rare as the magazine’s staff knew that this kind of an approach would not impress the Finns. The writers behind stories such as 'The Steel Worker' published in 1953, were often more than happy to point out that the Americans were hard workers and that their well-being is stable but by no means unreasonable.

The importance of the working class for Aikamme was also evident in the way that the magazine gave plenty of coverage for explaining the trade unions’ role in the US and speculating what kind of changes growing automation would bring to working life. General articles on the country and its development, such as 'The Mental Climate in the United States', always highlighted the individualistic aspect of American life and the animosity to anything referring to collectivism. The trade unions were presented to hold a powerful position in the US, although the magazine also reminded that they did not support socialist ideas in the European sense. As for the workers' future, the revolutionary progress made in utilising automation in manual work would, according to several articles, increase the demand for more highly skilled labourers and evidently lead to new arrangements in work distribution, such as a possible four-day working week. These stories, as the general articles on working life, saw labourers’ future as rosy and almost without exception reminded readers about America truly being the land of opportunity.

Stories about Finns living in America supported this cliché. Throughout Aikamme's existence, it published several ‘from rags to riches’ type articles about Finns 'who had made it' in the US. Stories about Finnish immigrants and their life became one of Aikamme's most popular themes and because of them the magazine won plenty of subscribers also from America. The people appearing in these articles were often owners of a small business or shop. Some more successful individuals were also presented, such as Emil Peterson whose construction firm had turned into a massive business.

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1318 Talouselämä 28-29/1956.
1319 See, for example, Aikamme 1/1952.
1320 Aikamme 4-5/1956.
1322 Aikamme 2/1952.
1323 See, for example, Aikamme 2-3/1956.
1324 Aikamme 4/1953.
1325 Aikamme 8/1956.
already been famous before their move, such as Gunnar Bärlund, the former champion boxer who became a bridge builder on the East Coast\textsuperscript{1326}, were also published as were stories about successful Finnish artists in America. Not surprisingly, the world-famous architect Eero Saarinen and his life and work were covered in at least three editions of \textit{Aikamme}.\textsuperscript{1327} A common feature for all these articles was that the Finns living in the US were presented as successful, fairly well earning and, above all, happy with their lives.

Articles that were written by or dealt with Finns visiting the US, such as returning Fulbright grantees, offered an important addition to the favourable presentation of America. Although \textit{Aikamme} from time to time brought the experiences of returning students to the limelight, it gave more visible coverage for eyewitness accounts of American society, which were written by people who had visited the country on a leader scholarship. One of these articles was written by Aarre Simonen, the social democratic MP and later, for instance, Minister of Finance, who had taken part in the Interparliamentary Union Conference in Washington in autumn 1953. Mr Simonen’s visit had included a tour to different parts of the country during which he, in particular, had familiarised himself with American cities and their traffic arrangements. The resulting article was, as all published reports by returning Finns, complimentary to the US, but also, as a somewhat rare feature, recognised some drawbacks caused by the rapidly growing car pool, such as worsening traffic jams and the decline of city centre commerce\textsuperscript{1328}.

Even if \textit{Aikamme}, naturally, promoted all the main aspects of American culture, most visibly the Hollywood film industry and its world-famous stars, the magazine gave jazz music and its popular 'negro' artists a special position. This was rather innovative as the USIA did not start its systematic promotion of the musical genre until the latter part of the 1950s. The history of jazz and its most popular figures were presented in a number of articles as were American artists visiting Finland. The very first report on jazz seemed to concentrate on assuring Finnish readers that this type of music was now very popular, and made perfectly acceptable listening also among white people, “despite its black origins”\textsuperscript{1329}. As time went on, jazz-related articles started to have a more in-depth approach. Although \textit{Aikamme} gave plenty attention to such jazz greats as Louis Armstrong, the composer George Gershwin and his works were given the most sizeable coverage. Especially his ‘folk opera’ \textit{Porgy and Bess} was the topic of several reports\textsuperscript{1330}, which was not highly surprising since the composition, mainly because of its hopeful view of race relations in the US, was used as a propaganda tool by the USIA throughout the world\textsuperscript{1331}.

The improving position of African-Americans was not only promoted through famous artists or athletes. In order to prove that America was, indeed, the land of opportunity for everyone, \textit{Aikamme} published a number of feature stories about black Americans who had built successful professional careers, for example, in public administration. One typical article presented Lois Lippman, secretary of President Eisenhower’s special advisor, and her rise from

\textsuperscript{1326} Aikamme 3/1954.
\textsuperscript{1327} See Aikamme 5/1953, 10/1956 & 9/1957.
\textsuperscript{1328} Aikamme 2/1954.
\textsuperscript{1329} Aikamme 2/1952.
\textsuperscript{1330} See, for example, Aikamme 4/1952.
\textsuperscript{1331} For example, Osgood 2006, p. 226.
obscurity into a challenging job in Washington.\textsuperscript{1332} Even though \textit{Aikamme} in general gave a positive picture about the future prospects of African-Americans, the magazine was sensible enough to admit that their opportunities were not quite yet equal. Racial segregation was never mentioned, but some articles did note that a considerable share of the black population still lived in slums and that gang crime, which was also committed by white people, was a serious issue in the US.\textsuperscript{1333}

While the clear majority of \textit{Aikamme}'s content, including reports on for example culture and sporting events, as well as colour photos of women’s fashion and new cars, merely promoted the American way of life in a favourable light, the magazine did occasionally, and between 1954 and 1956 in particular, publish political articles, some of which held a strong anti-communist element. The more objective or neutral reports, which formed the clear majority of the magazine’s political content, dealt with the US economy in particular and defended its strength and capability to avoid slipping into recession. Another dominating topic was European integration, an idea that the Americans backed wholeheartedly. The Schuman Plan and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were visibly covered by \textit{Aikamme}, which regarded the progress as a significant step in bolstering the European economy and its future unity.\textsuperscript{1334} The economy also held centre stage in articles that could be defined as anti-communist propaganda. In their comments, figures like Professor Alexander B. Heron emphasised the weakness of the communist system and pointed out that the communist economy was nowhere near reaching a level of productivity that would meet even reasonable consumer demands.\textsuperscript{1335}

The limited freedom of people living in communist countries, as well as their quest to resist the restrictions, was another anti-communist theme to which some of \textit{Aikamme}'s stories gave special attention. For instance, Peter Meyer, who commented on the political developments in East Europe for \textit{The New Leader}, pointed out in his article that the younger generations living in Eastern Europe were to a growing extent seeking individualism and inventing new ways through which they could express their reluctance to requisite uniformity. According to Meyer, the communist regimes’ attempt to portray these youngsters as ‘hooligans’, and as victims of the demoralising American influence, only broadened the larger masses’ discontent with them.\textsuperscript{1336} Communism and its impact on society and social interaction were also criticised in special reports on life in leading Eastern European cities such as Warsaw and Budapest.\textsuperscript{1337}

An interesting dimension of \textit{Aikamme} was that it published stories about both anti-communist and anti-American propaganda activities from a somewhat different perspective than many other publications. For instance, a broad article published in May 1954 focused on giving a detailed account on communist propaganda techniques in the field of caricatures and

\textsuperscript{1332} Aikamme 5/1953.
\textsuperscript{1333} On gangs and crime, for example Aikamme 2/1954, on slums and their demolition, for example Aikamme 4/1952.
\textsuperscript{1334} See, for example, Aikamme 4/1953 & Aikamme 5/1953.
\textsuperscript{1335} Aikamme 1/1955.
\textsuperscript{1336} Aikamme 2-3/1955.
\textsuperscript{1337} On Budapest, see Aikamme 1/1955, on Warsaw, see Aikamme 10/1955.
Even greater coverage was given to the American political cartoonist Herbert Block, who made a mockery of communist dictators in particular and was regarded as an influential opinion shaper. The lighter angle to the propaganda war was also complemented by rather harmless jokes and satirical stories on the inefficiency and low popularity of communism in the satellite countries.

The last two annual volumes of Aikamme reflect the publication's policy of mainly promoting the most important aspects of American life even further. Articles concerning Eastern Europe became extremely rare and even the almost uncritical hype of America cooled down to some degree. Pentti Lehti’s editorial from August 1956 stating that Aikamme’s intention was to become a lighter magazine for the entire family outlined an even greater change. A growing share of the published material now concerned exclusively Finnish matters as well as harmless reports on entertainment, fashion and sport. Although Aikamme was never intended to be a highly political magazine, it is easy to see why its lack of more thoughtful material frustrated the Americans throughout its lifespan. In the magazine's final years, the State Department and the US Embassy’s dissatisfaction grew to such levels that it is not difficult to conclude that it stirred up the decision to end its publication even more than its financial difficulties. General Cold War propaganda methods had also changed by the latter part of the 1950s to such a degree that the publishing of a separate magazine could no longer be as strongly justified as during the first years of the decade.

The decision to abandon Aikamme seems rational also when one places, in particular, its later editions’ content into the wider Finnish media context. By the late 1950s longer articles covering the aspects of American society had become an increasingly common feature for Finnish newspapers and magazines. Indeed, when the publishing of Aikamme was ended, the only factors making the magazine stand out from various other publications were the inclusion of anti-communist content, which had become increasingly rare, and the feature articles’ style of writing that was based on treating all things that were American in a manner that was even too uncritical for the increasingly informed reader.

The growing desire of the Finnish press to use long articles concerning the US in the mid-1950s not only made the distribution of American printed propaganda relatively easy, but also, rather paradoxically, gives another reason why an extensive analysis of the inclusion of USIS content is very difficult to make. The fact that Finnish newspapers often left the articles’ true original source unattributed, as was the case for political reports in particular, means that one can only give a somewhat general estimation of the American campaign’s true efficiency in this particular field of activity. When assessing the USIS/Helsinki’s press operations in the mid-1950s, many of the factors that have already been mentioned in relation to the British activities come to mind, in spite of the latter being more focused on distributing anti-communist

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1338 The article noted how cartoons of leading Western politicians, obeying orders given by high-ranking party officials, always followed the same pattern and portrayed, for example, Konrad Adenauer as a Nazi. Aikamme 5/1954.
1339 Aikamme 4/1954.
1340 See, for example, Aikamme 7/1954, Aikamme 10/1956 & Aikamme 7/1957.
1341 Aikamme 8/1956.
propaganda. Firstly, USIS material was actively used by the Finns and in particular by provincial papers operating with smaller resources. Secondly, an overwhelming majority of the content that was reproduced in one way or another can be categorised as ‘white’ or ‘grey’ propaganda in which the focus was on the promotion of certain, usually positively regarded, values. The third factor has to do with the delivered material’s relation to other content published by the Finnish media during this particular period. In the American case, even more than with the British one, the propaganda campaign benefited from the Finnish media’s growing trend to publish rather similar content either by producing it themselves or by using foreign news agency material. What the USIS, above all, did was to provide the Finns with an extra channel for gaining highly detailed information about the US, for which there was increasing demand. Whether this demand was actually mostly created through USIS activity leaves us with another question for which there is no one simple answer.

As with British print propaganda, the extent and the efficiency of the American press campaign can also be evaluated by comparing it to other countries. As the Americans based their operations on rather standardised distribution methods and delivered press content that was to a great extent similar for all countries, the examined country’s special characteristics did not bring as much variation to the activities as in the British case. For example, the USIS campaign in Sweden was not, at least on paper, that different from the one in Finland. Although Finland was regarded as a more critical area for propaganda operations, the Americans’ ability to launch a fairly extensive and successful campaign also in its Western neighbour gives yet another indication that their propaganda activities were by no means restricted to potential danger areas. Research conducted by Mikael Nilsson not only gives proof of American influence in the Swedish press, but also shows that, like in Finland, local USIS officials paid particular attention to forming close ties with the local social democrats as well as newspaper editors throughout the country.¹³⁴² For this purpose, they used the very same methods as in Finland: personal contacts and the delivery of both regular news bulletins and more irregular feature articles. Although there is evidence that not all Swedish newspapers were always enthusiastic about acting as a mouthpiece for the Americans¹³⁴³, Nilsson’s analysis on the extent that USIS-produced material was used by the media both directly and indirectly shows that the Swedes were more willing to use American than British propaganda content, most likely due to their less anti-communist tone. Furthermore, Nilsson’s finding that Swedish journalists only rarely attributed articles for which American content had been used to their true source¹³⁴⁴ supports the view that the use of USIS-produced content in Finland was also much more frequent than official documents reveal.

**Hungarian Uprising Reheats the Battlefield**

The Hungarian Uprising and the invasion by Soviet troops that followed brought some notable changes to American and British propaganda content, also in Finland. Although the

¹³⁴³ Ibid., pp. 333-338.
¹³⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 322, 324, 331.
introduction of more positive propaganda techniques remained the main trend in Cold War propaganda, for a year or so events in Hungary gave the content, once again, a more aggressive tone on both sides of the war over the hearts and minds. In Finland, both British and US officials wished to make sure that the Finns were supplied with plenty of news material about what had actually happened in the streets of Budapest. Particularly the British suspected that the task of protecting Finland’s neutral position could make leading politicians and newspapers downplay the true size of the events.\footnote{1345} This turned out to be an unnecessary worry since, as later research has shown, the Finnish press actually covered the events in detail and expressed their criticism over the Soviet involvement in Hungarian matters rather directly.\footnote{1346} Among the publications revealing the whole extent of the killings in Hungary was \textit{Viikkosanomat}, a \textit{Time}-style magazine\footnote{1347} owned by Sanoma Oy and under the leadership of Aatos Erkko, Eljas Erkko’s son. The publication’s reports left its readers with little room for imagination by printing whole-page images of Hungarian victims lying in the streets.\footnote{1348} Even though \textit{Viikkosanomat} represented the more pro-Western publication in Finland and had included plenty of anti-communist articles in previous years\footnote{1349}, the way the events in Budapest were covered almost throughout the Finnish media could hardly be labeled as overly abstemious. This view is also backed by the strong attack the new leading communist paper \textit{Kansan Uutiset} directed against ‘reactionary’ Finnish newspapers over the way they had "supported the idea of using violence as a tool for reform against the country’s legal government".\footnote{1350}

Even if the British did not fail to acknowledge that the Finnish press was, in general, far more outspoken than the Finnish Government over the Hungarian Uprising\footnote{1351}, the FO felt that more print material regarding Hungary should be available for the Finns. For this purpose, the reports covering the events written by Peter Fryer, correspondent of \textit{The Daily Worker} who was made to resign soon after making his first critical comments over the Soviet activities in the country, fitted perfectly. His articles, which gave a detailed account of communist oppression and the executions that followed the uprising, were picked by, in particular, social democratic newspapers throughout the country.\footnote{1352} The use of Fryer’s extensive coverage of events was not only restricted to simple article publication. The provincial newspaper \textit{Savon Kansa} decided to publish a special edition of a collection of Fryer’s reports, which were then distributed by party

\footnote{1345} This suspicion even led to some inaccurate observations of the situation in Finland. The British Legation’s first reaction to the Finnish approach to the Soviet intervention in Hungary was that the press coverage of the events and the reaction of the Finnish public was damped down by the Government, which in fact was not the case. M. Creswell to FO, ‘All mention of events in Hungary has been kept out of the Finnish Press’, November 5, 1956, FO 371/122383, NA.

\footnote{1346} For example, Salminen 1982, pp. 207, 217-218.

\footnote{1347} Viikkosanomat represented both the American and European traditions of a news magazine, which published extensive articles, most typically travel stories, relying heavily on supporting photographs. Kivikuru, Ullamaaja, Viennaita lehtia. Aikakausilehti ajan ja paikan risteyksessä (Helsinki 1996), pp. 60-61.

\footnote{1348} Viikkosanomat 44/1956 & 45/1956.

\footnote{1349} In the mid-1950s, Viikkosanomat published, for instance, feature articles about life in East Berlin and the anti-Soviet sentiment taking place in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary. Viikkosanomat, 21/1956 & 41/1956.

\footnote{1350} Kansan Uutiset, December 28, 1956.

\footnote{1351} British Embassy to FO, ‘Quarterly Report on Communism in Finland’, February 9, 1957, FO 371/128573, NA.

officials throughout the country. The printing house Savon Kansan Kirjapaino Oy also published a pamphlet Kansa nousi Unkarissa sortajia vastaan, a more compact summary of the universal condemnation of Soviet intervention. In addition to the SDP, this leaflet was placed into further distribution by at least SYT. In 1958, Fryer’s reports were given even more value after the British Embassy arranged for the publication of a Finnish translation of Fryer’s book The Hungarian Tragedy, which to a large extent consisted of his earlier eye-witness reports.

The most visible and effective American contribution to the presentation of the Hungarian Uprising was the screening of the USIA-produced short film Hungarian Fight for Freedom, which gave the viewers a dramatic story of how “the popular revolt against tyranny” was ruthlessly crushed by the additional Soviet troops that “built destruction everywhere” . The film, compiled mainly from newsreel material, gave particular emphasis on both the sufferings of Hungarians who had lost their loved ones and the broad protests that had followed the Soviet intervention in capital cities around the world. Considering how directly the film condemned the Soviet actions in Hungary, and how closely it revealed dead bodies in the streets, it is somewhat surprising that the Finnish Film Censorship Board, still closely guided by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, gave the USIS/Helsinki screening permission. The approval included, typically for the time, the precondition that neither the Finnish nor the Swedish language versions of the film would be screened on television, not least because they called Soviet actions in Hungary ‘brutal’, as the board’s Chairman Arvo Paasivuori explained to Pentti Lehti, who had filed the import application. Existing copies of the film reveal that Hungarian Fight for Freedom had been in heavy use , which indicates that the USIS made the most out of its permission to present the movie to the Finns.

The events in Hungary not only sharpened the Western powers’ political propaganda in Finland, but also made them determine their position in regard to the new Finnish President Urho Kekkonen once again. Kekkonen, whose position was far from indisputable in the first years of his presidency, had for quite some time been examined with some suspicion by US officials in particular. Particularly his, and his Agrarian Party associates’, newspaper comments promoting Finland’s neutrality were closely followed at the US Embassy. What was common for both US and British officials was that they partly blamed Kekkonen, who in general was regarded as sharp and extremely ambitious, for Finland’s unnecessarily subservient attitude

1353 Y. Saaristo to Regional offices, February 13, 1957, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB19, TA.
1354 ‘Kansa nousi Unkarissa sortajia vastaan’, SDP:n tiedotusosasto 1957, HAB19, TA and SYT, box 87, KA.
1355 D.L. Busk to M.G.L. Joy, February 18, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
1356 The film: ‘Hungarian Fight for Freedom’ (USIA 1956), KAVI.
1357 Although the board rarely censored foreign documentaries completely, films like ‘Ninotchka’ remained censored for years to come. Towards the late 1950s the board’s policy continued as rather strict, generating criticism from a number of foreign legations in Finland. R. Oittinen to VETA, January 20, 1958, Ea 4, VETA, KA; Sedergren 2006, p. 71.
1358 A.K. Paasivuori to P. Lehti, March 5, 1957, Da:2, VETA, KA; Sedergren 2006, p. 71.
1359 According to Juha Kindberg, archivist at KAVI, both of KAVI’s existing copies of Hungarian Fight for Freedom, which the archives had received from Adams Film’s collections, had been screened between 500 and 1,000 times. Interview with Juha Kindberg, June 15, 2011.
1360 For instance, in May 1955 the Americans reported in great detail about Kekkonen’s writings on the ‘Finnish line’, published by Maakansa after the signing of the Austrian Treaty, which declared the permanent neutrality of the country. H. Bartlett Wells to SD, May 24, 1955, RG 59, 660E.00/5-2455, Tk 15, Printed copies of records from NARA, KA.
towards the Soviet Union. The elected President’s behaviour during the Hungarian Crisis lifted some more eyebrows both in Washington and London, as he did not, apart from attending a religious concert given in sympathy to Hungary, make any public condemnation over the Soviet actions. Kekkonen's approach to the matter became even more disturbing for Western observers after the execution of Imre Nagy. The British view was that the Finnish leader’s chosen policy prevented some of the moral outcry such actions would have deserved from every free person.

Urho Kekkonen's policy regarding the Hungarian Uprising did not prevent the Cold War entering centre stage again in Finland, a development which was well evident in newspapers’ publishing policies. British reports from 1957 carried a more positive tone than they had done before the crisis in terms of pushing Britain's message through to the people of Finland. The Embassy saw that the climate in Finland was more favourable to the increased use of IRD material as well. The fact that many Finns had become more outspokenly critical of the Soviet Union did not, however, make the British launch an excessively aggressive anti-communist campaign in the country. Indeed, according to a report by a FO inspector, the Finnish independence of attitude needed no strengthening from Britain as the people were evidently much more aware of the Soviets as a threat. Where the Finns fell short, and where the opportunity for the use of IRD material seemed most obvious, was in the knowledge of events in countries behind the Iron Curtain, the FO again underlined. As a consequence, the material supplied for Finnish consumption should concentrate predominantly on enlightening this ignorance, it was pointed out.

The Finns’ increasing demand for news from the Eastern satellites also encouraged the British to increase the number of outlets for their anti-communist material. In early 1958, the FO approached the Finnish Embassy in London to require if it wished to receive some of the most regular IRD products. Arrangements over the supply of material had already been made with all the Scandinavian missions in London. Although the FO understood that offering its publications to the Finnish Embassy could cause some embarrassment to the Finns, the advantage of having direct contacts in London to help the material reach all the interested political and information departments was seen as considerable. As a consequence, Hugh Cortazzi of the IRD contacted Risto Solanko, Counsellor at the Finnish Embassy, who expressed his interest to receive samples of The Interpreter, The Handbook on Soviet Communism in Theory and Practice and Facts about Communist

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1362 M. Creswell to FO, 'All mention of events in Hungary has been kept out of the Finnish Press', November 5, 1956, FO 371/122383, NA.
1364 'Report by Mr T.B. Shaw', June 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA.
1365 The FO’s view that Finnish newspapers were willing to publish a growing number of articles on Eastern European countries was backed by an extra £100 annual allocation for special translations of IRD material into Finnish H.A.H. Cortazzi to J.M. Leadbitter, 'Special Translations into Finnish of IRD Material', September 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA.
1366 H.A.H. Cortazzi to A.B. Horn, December 17, 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA.
Front Organisations in particular.\textsuperscript{1367} The FO made sure that the Finns could investigate a whole variety of IRD work by also providing them with examples of *The Asian Analyst* and the more ad hoc studies on communism especially in Europe.\textsuperscript{1368}

After contact was made, the FO began to send the Finnish Embassy IRD material on a regular basis. The British decided that mainly the weightier publications, i.e. the ones incorporating research findings rather than the ones which were primarily propagandistic in intention, would be sent to the Finns. In 1958, these included, for instance, the works *Moslems in the Soviet Union and China, Five Years of Collective Leadership* and *From Peasant Farmer to State Labourer*.\textsuperscript{1369} Finnish officials were made well aware that all papers could be used freely as long as they were not referred to by title or in print and that the Foreign Office was not revealed as the documents’ origin.\textsuperscript{1370} After Mr Solanko’s departure from London, IRD publications were mainly sent to Finnish military attacheés. Captain Lauri Koho, Assistant Military and Air Attaché at the Finnish Embassy in 1962, was particularly keen to receive a wide range of anti-communist material. According to him, however, the diplomatic members of the Embassy “had to be very careful to be neutral and were a little uneasy about receiving IRD material”.\textsuperscript{1371}

Another channel for the circulation of IRD material was also opened in early 1958 after the British Embassy in Helsinki reported that one or two leading Finnish correspondents in London could be offered suitable publications. The two journalists who would best repay the attention were noted to be Toivo Heiskanen of *Helsingin Sanomat* and Tauno Kuosa of *Uusi Suomi*. The idea of passing IRD products to Mr Heiskanen was favoured by Eljas Erkko, whereas Mr Kuosa was an old acquaintance of Jasper Leadbitter, First Secretary at the British Embassy.\textsuperscript{1372} Supplying Finnish correspondents with IRD material reflected the constant eagerness on the British side to find more possibilities for pushing its anti-communist message through more effectively in an environment that was gradually becoming more challenging again.

The superior resources US officials had for propaganda activity, albeit suffering from a further cut in 1957 both throughout the world and in Finland\textsuperscript{1373}, enabled the USIS/Helsinki to feed the Finns with a greater mass of written content compared to the British, who relied more on developing personal contacts with Finnish editors and adjusting the material according to their needs. After the fiercest protest over the events in Hungary had died down, the Americans shifted their focus onto countering communist propaganda through specific press campaigns concerning a number of issues back home. The one topic to which the USIS now paid particular attention was racial equality in the US, particularly after the events evolving in Little Rock, which had widely been exploited in communist rhetoric. Like in any other country, USIS officials in Finland gave

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\textsuperscript{1367} Minutes by H.A.H. Cortazzi, January 31, 1958, FO 1110/1030, NA.
\textsuperscript{1368} L. Tuominen to Finnish Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommunistien kansainvälinen toiminta; julkaisuja’, February 17, 1958, 35A, UMA.
\textsuperscript{1369} R. Solanko to Finnish Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommunismia koskevia julkaisuja’, April 23, 1958, 35A, UMA.
\textsuperscript{1370} H.A.H. Cortazzi to Mr Solanko, February 6, 1958, FO 1110/1142, NA, and 35A, UMA.
\textsuperscript{1371} N.J. Barrington to IRD, ‘IRD Material for the Finnish Embassy’, May 11, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
\textsuperscript{1372} A.B. Horn to H.A.H. Cortazzi, January 8, 1958, FO 1110/1142, NA.
\textsuperscript{1373} After some more lavish years, the USIA budget was cut by the senate by 16 per cent in May 1957. In Finland, the USIS budget was reduced by as much as 40 per cent, which in addition to the abolishment of Aikamme reduced the total staff by seven persons. Belmonte 2008, p. 78; ‘Ilmoitus koskien Yhdysvaltain tiedoitustoimiston määritämisestä ja Aikamme-lehtimestä’, September 17, 1957, Amp XV, SUPO, KA.
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great care to ensuring that the damage inflicted by images of the vicious mob surrounding the Little Rock Central High in September 1957 and the arrival of federal troops to protect the black students would be offset by releasing written coverage and pictures of interracial activities.\textsuperscript{1374} Whereas the events that took place in Alabama in the previous year did not cause US prestige in Finland almost any harm\textsuperscript{1375}, the Little Rock incident gave the Americans extensive and at times questionable publicity in a number of leading Finnish publications.\textsuperscript{1376} Even after this, the USIS was not overwhelmingly concerned of the long-term effects the racial troubles might have on the United States’ image in Finland. The vast majority of Finns were in any case regarded as strongly pro-Western and unlikely to be won over by communist rhetoric, at least not in the unforeseeable future. Even the expansion of cultural activities by the Soviet Union and their satellite countries in Finland and the more positive image the Soviets managed to win among the Finns through the launch of Sputnik did not change this view.\textsuperscript{1377}

From the American point of view, more positive developments were taking place in Washington. Unlike in the British case, USIA officials hardly had any special desire to supply the Finnish Embassy with their anti-communist propaganda. The State Department was, undoubtedly, pleased about the Finns having by the mid-1950s sharpened informational activities of their own. This included correcting American newspaper reports questioning Finland’s ability to remain independent. One such incident took place in December 1954, when Finnish Ambassador Johan Nykopp discussed an article published in \textit{US News and World Report} with two of its directors and enlightened them that comments questioning Finland’s ability to resist Soviet demands, even if directed only against then Prime Minister Kekkonen, could harm the country’s political position, which remained delicate.\textsuperscript{1378} As both British and US officials had for quite some time encouraged the Finns to take a more active role in promoting their country not only as neutral, but also as free and democratic, this kind of activity supported their broader objectives as well.

While correcting miscomprehensions about their homeland, the Finns had also started to follow the general trends of American propaganda more closely.\textsuperscript{1379} Even though Finland

\textsuperscript{1374} Belmonte 2008, pp. 78-79. This activity followed broader guidance on the promotion of racial desegregation, which stressed that the continuous progress being made in desegregation had the backing of the overwhelming majority of the American people. USIA to All USIS posts, ‘Desegregation Developments’, March 20, 1956, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 39, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1375} USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Reaction to Alabama Racial Developments’, March 23, 1956, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 39, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1376} In October 1957, the Americans reported with a worried tone that the news from Little Rock kept generating coverage in prominent publications like Suomen Kuvalehti, which continued to report about the situation and labelling it as "nothing short a civil war", weeks after the actual events took place. The article’s main claim was that the opposition to racial desegregation continued to be strong, as it had been throughout American history. US Embassy to SD, ‘Joint Weeka No. 41’, October 11, 1957, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA; Suomen Kuvalehti, 40/1957.
\textsuperscript{1377} The Americans acknowledged that the successful launch of Sputnik had "deeply impressed the individual Finn, even though he may dislike admitting it". This did not, however, change the Americans' overall estimation of Finnish sentiments. US Embassy to SD, ‘Joint Weeka No. 41’, October 11, 1957, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1378} J. Nykopp to E.A. Wuori, December 22, 1954, 5B Washington, UMA.
\textsuperscript{1379} When working as Press Attaché at the Finnish Embassy in Washington in the mid-1950s, Max Jakobson wrote about the various dimensions in American foreign propaganda in several of his reports and letters sent to Finland. For example, M. Jakobson to E.A. Wuori, May 17, 1956, Eero.A. Wuori's collection, box 2, KA.
continued to officially object the international war of words being fought on her soil, Finnish officials no longer regarded Western propaganda campaigns as dangerous to their country’s position as they had done some years earlier. Giving the USIS/Helsinki the approval to launch an overt combat against communism in Northern Finland in 1954, which saw the Americans direct publications, films and exhibitions to the inhabitants of logging camps and communities in the provinces of Lapland, Oulu and Kuopio, epitomised the more open and confident mood of the Finnish Government. Another sign of the new approach was the agreement finally reached between YLE and BBC over the possibility of a BBC reporter also assisting the Finnish broadcaster. Although this marked considerable progress, the fact that YLE still refused to officially credit the reports prepared by Esko Saarinen and Erkki Arni, who both worked for the two radio stations simultaneously, to the BBC shows that a direct association with a foreign broadcaster was still undesirable to the Finns.

Naturally, Finland’s more open cooperation with foreign actors and the more outspoken criticism of communism spreading around the country bore their consequences. The new policy adopted by Moscow did not mean that the Soviets would stop issuing the Finns official complaints about newspaper content they regarded hostile. The number of balloons containing Russian language anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets that the Finns discovered in different parts of the country throughout the mid-1950s gave the Soviets and Finnish communists yet another reason to keep up the tension. Although there is no reason to doubt, for instance, Jack McFall’s sincerity when he told the Finns that he was unaware of the balloons’ origin, the US Government remained the communists’ prime suspect behind the operation when they expressed their protest over the matter. As it turns out, they were not much off the mark, either. At least a large share of the balloons were sent from West Germany by the refugee association Nationalnyi Truduvoi Sojus (NTS) with the intended destination of the Soviet Union, and although Suojelupoliisi at the time regarded its cooperation with American actors unlikely, it is highly probable that the operation was sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), a New York-based organisation heavily financed by the CIA and responsible for

1381 For example, J. Koskiluoma to D. Winther, February 10, 1954; D. Winther to J. Koskiluoma, February 15, 1954; J. Koskiluoma to D. Winther, May 2, 1957; D. Winther to J. Koskiluoma, June 11, 1957, all KK, boxes 7 and 8, YLE, ELKA; Salokangas 1996, p. 53.
1382 During the mid-1950s, Finnish officials received numerous reports of anti-Soviet propaganda material that had fallen in different parts of the country, mainly in Southern, Eastern and Northern Finland. The issue was investigated by both the Finnish Foreign Ministry and Suojelupoliisi. For example, Memorandum: ‘Suomessa heinä-elokuulla 1953 tavatut lentolehtiset’, September 22, 1953; Kaakkois-Suomen rajavartiosto to Rajavartiostojen esikunta, May 3, 1955, both 12 L Neuvostoliitto, UMA; Memorandum: ‘Suomen alueelle pudonneet N.T.S:n propaandalehtiset’, March 18, 1954; ‘Ilmoitus: Lentolehtisiä Vesilahdella’, September 27, 1957, both Amp XXXVI/3, SUPO, KA.
1383 When meeting with officials of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, McFall insisted that he had no idea of where the balloons had come from. His accounts to Washington together with further reports mentioning the issue also give the impression that the Americans in Finland were unaware of the balloons’ actual origin. For example, Memorandum: ‘Neuvostolitonvastaiset lentolehtiset’ by O. Wartiovaara, September 12, 1953, 12 L Neuvostoliitto, UMA; Memorandum: ‘Suomen alueelle pudonneet N.T.S:n propaandalehtiset’, March 18, 1954; ‘Ilmoitus: Lentolehtisiä Vesilahdella’, September 27, 1957, both Amp XXXVI/3, SUPO, KA.
1384 For example, Työkansan Sanomat, October 24, 1953.
1385 Memorandum: ‘Suomessa heinä-elokuulla 1953 tavatut lentolehtiset’, October 10, 1953, XXXVIB, SUPO, KA.
releasing around 300 million pieces of propaganda to Eastern Europe. 1386 The US Embassy’s apparent ignorance of the balloons’ actual origin just shows how the American propaganda war was fought on many fronts without the various actors necessary aware of each other.

New Forms of Culture Spark Operations into Light

If American informational activities were successfully improved in Finland, the exchange of persons programme operating mostly with ASLA and Fulbright funds had turned into one of the most extensive State Department-conducted operations abroad. In order to make the activity even more efficient, the USIS/Helsinki increased the use of both Finnish and American Fulbright grantees in its field programme operations. The Americans also wished to improve the Finnish grantees’ stay in the US, and the content of the orientation programme in particular. For this reason, the USIS developed a separate evaluation programme, systematically interviewing returning grantees about their time in the US and the value their grants had given to their work. 1387 As one of the objectives was to attract more people to apply for the programme from outside the capital area, the USIS cultural officer made field trips throughout Central and Northern Finland publicising and explaining various aspects of the programme. 1388

The most important development that took place in the mid-1950s in terms of personal exchange was, however, the steady expansion of the overall programme. This took place both by an increase in the number of Fulbright grants and the inclusion of Finland in new exchange activities. The number of Finnish undergraduate students travelling to the US reached the forty mark in 1954. 1389 In the area of specialists, the annual figure remained around ten. What was notable about this particular segment was that more attention was paid to younger professionals working not only in science-related fields but also in journalism, in particular. Almost every rising journalist talent catching attention was now invited to travel across the Atlantic, as noted by Simopekka Nortamo, future editor of Helsingin Sanomat, who was awarded a specialist grant after reporting about the Hungarian Uprising in Viikkosanomat in a manner that clearly pleased the Americans. 1390 The number of young Finnish professionals in the US only grew in 1957, after 25 grants were awarded to Finnish trainees seeking to work in either American firms or public sector organisations. 1391 This scheme was put into practice mostly by the Finnish-American Society and the America-Scandinavian Society in New York, which in 1960 finally accepted the former as its full member organisation. 1392

1386 Wilford 2008, pp. 31-34.
1387 For example, L.R. Ott to SD, ‘Educational Exchange: Census of Influence Study for FY Grantees’, January 26, 1956, RG 59, SDDFF 1955—1959, box 2172, 511.60E3/1-2556, NARA.
1389 ‘Board of Foreign Policy Analysis, Finland, Academic Year 1954-1955’, FUSEEC, box 15, KA.
1390 Interview with Simopekka Nortamo (Interviewed by Aleksis Stenvall, August 23, 1986), Sanoma Oy:n historiaprojekti, Valmistuneet historiahaastattelut 1984-2011, PLA.
The growing attention paid to younger people was also evident in other American exchange activities. An increasing number of Finns regarded as potential future leaders took part in the Salzburg Summer School and the Cleveland Youth Leaders Exchange Programme. The latter brought together youth leaders mainly from Europe for a four-month stay to first study American group work methods and then to practice them at, for instance, youth camps and children's homes. As for upper secondary school students, the launch of the Youth for Understanding (YFU) programme in Finland in 1958 soon took the number of Finnish youngsters visiting the US as exchange students to an altogether new level.

The exchange of persons programme had expanded also in terms of leader grant nominations. Whereas a large share of the persons who were awarded a leader grant in the first years of the decade were closely connected to the SDP or the trade union movement, funds were now provided for visits by such figures as Teuvo Aura, who already had ministerial experience, and Tuure Junnila, regarded as a promising conservative politician. This development reflected the US Government’s gradually growing desire to warm up its ties also with Finnish liberal and conservative circles and to attach them more closely to the quest of containing communism. A similar tendency can be concluded from the Ford Foundation leader grants awarded through the American Scandinavian Foundation from 1957 onwards. As the Ford Foundation's International Program, another activity associated with the CIA, focused particularly on the fields of international communications and arts, the first Finns awarded with the grant included, for instance, Uusi Suomi's Eero Petäjäniemi. Increasing investment in Finnish conservatives was a sentiment shared by the British who, for example, invited Junnila to take part in the British Council’s The City of London Course, during which the politician and economist became above all acquainted with the British banking system.

The USIS/Helsinki's cultural section was also reported to be going through an expansion in the late 1950s. The new Information Centre's auditorium was busily utilised by Finnish organisations for lectures, seminars, films screenings and music programmes. The weekly cultural programmes sponsored by the USIS were designed to interest teachers, advanced

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1393 ‘Department of State Instruction: Youth Leader Exchange Program of Cleveland, 1958’, July 3, 1957, FUSEEC, box 19, KA; Executive Secretary, USEF/F to Acting Cultural Officer, US Embassy, October 22, 1956, RG 59, BPA, IEES JRCF, box 2, NARA.
1394 When in 1958-1961 the number of youngsters studying in the US through YFU was 47, the figure reached an annual figure of 200 by the late 1960s. Mämmelä 2011, pp. 49, 66.
1396 It has often been noted that the CIA channelled its money also through the Ford Foundation. Berghahn, however, insists that there is no evidence that the foundation ever accepted the CIA's offer to fund its activities. According to him, the organisation's close contacts with CIA officials together with its funding of such CIA-sponsored movements as the CCF have marred the foundation's reputation. Berghahn 2001, pp. 221-225; Gienow-Hecht, Jessica, 'Culture and Cold War in Europe' in Leffler, M.P. & Westad, O.A. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins (Cambridge 2010), pp. 409-410.
1397 Suomi-Finland USA 7/1956. For more about Ford Foundation's support for media studies, in particular Cold War communications research, see Schwoch, James, Global TV. New Media and the Cold War, 1946-69 (Urbana and Chicago 2009), pp. 62-71.
1398 'The British Council: 'City of London', a course to be held in London from 5th to 18th June, 1955'; T. Junnila: 'Kertomus matkastani Lontooseen 5.5. – 17.6.1955', both TJ, box 69, KA.
students and cultural leaders, and they attracted convincingly large audiences. The popularity of the USIS library, also located at the new premises, was also on the rise. The attendance figures for a nine-month period between 1957 and 1958 totalled 35,494, while book circulation reached 9,017 loans and magazines 10,669 loans. The book collection programme circulated publications on a six-month loan period to as many as 56 public libraries throughout Finland. In terms of library operations in general, the big question had to do with the possible dispersal of the central USIS library and the redistribution of its 11,000 volumes to the circulating library system or to the Finnish-American societies. After contemplating the pros and cons of such a move, the USIA decided that the library should still be preserved as a single unit.\textsuperscript{1399}

The growing library activities were a particularly welcome development for the Americans in Finland, because they had started to underline the importance of the book programme for the overall propaganda effort due to its tactful approach and, hopefully, lasting effects.\textsuperscript{1400} The ASLA funds reserved for books guaranteed that Finnish educational institutions had new high class publications on offer. Although both the quantity and range of the publications was mainly impressive, USIA officials made sure that not any kind of book would be shipped to Finland through them. Relatively strict instructions determined in Washington prevented the Finns from receiving books dealing with certain issues, mainly communism, or people, for instance the radical poet Ezra Pound, and those published by International Publishers, which was listed as a communist agency.\textsuperscript{1401} The clear emphasis was on exporting books dealing with more neutral issues, mostly natural sciences.

Towards the turn of the decade, the share of scientific books sent to Finland under the programme was in fact considered too large in Washington, limiting the availability of books related to language or culture in Finnish libraries.\textsuperscript{1402} Since the demand for non-fictional foreign books was growing strongly in Finland in the late 1950s, this was something of a hindrance to the American campaign. On the other hand, the Finnish publishers’ growing eagerness to launch Finnish translations of the most notable works made sure that a greater variety of American non-fiction became available to the Finns.\textsuperscript{1403} By far the most popular Western book remained, however, the more entertaining and cheaper novel. The increasing publication of translations of works from renowned writers like Ernest Hemingway, John Steinbeck and Norman Mailer, partly implemented in the CIA’s influence\textsuperscript{1404}, made sure that the Finns became familiar with more serious American contemporary literature as well.\textsuperscript{1405} In 1958, the share of American books translated into Finnish reached 27 per cent of all foreign books, only six points behind the British, whose literary traditions were, of course, much greater. By 1963, the order

\textsuperscript{1399} ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1400} US Embassy to SD, ‘Statements to Facilitate Inspection, International Educational Exchange Program’, September 14, 1956, RG 59, BPA, IEES JRCF, box 2, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1401} F.L. Burdette to R.L Riley, February 8, 1955, RG 306, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953-2000 (Hereafter HC SF), box 177, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1402} W.L. Grenoble to M.H. Doyle, March 14, 1960, RG 306, HC SF, box 177, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1403} Higman 2003, pp. 186-192. Although more translations of non-fiction were being published in the late 1950s, the real turning point in, for instance, the social sciences was the mid-1960s when demand for foreign works grew considerably. Aho 2013, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{1404} Gienow-Hecht 2010, pp. 409-410.
\textsuperscript{1405} Jalonen 1985, p. 175.
had already changed: the share of American books made up for 36 per cent, while the corresponding share of British titles had fallen to 26 per cent.\textsuperscript{1406} Considering that as early as in 1955 the share of translated novels overtook that of Finnish works\textsuperscript{1407}, the Finns' knowledge of American literature in particular was growing at spectacular pace.

If the Americans' role in teaching the English language still left plenty of room for improvement, the more frequently produced exhibitions and small paper shows sent from the US gave Finns another valuable opportunity to learn more about the cultural activities as well as the social, economic and political interests of the American people. The growing use of worldwide USIA exhibitions, including Atoms for Peace, in Finland followed the general US Cold War strategy of promoting the positive sides of American culture together with scientific and economic development. Even though the more extensive exhibitions, naturally, caught the biggest attraction in large cities, the USIS/Helsinki made sure that the American message would also be received by the inhabitants of smaller towns by maintaining over forty exhibit windows throughout the country presenting exhibition-related news photographs obtained from IPS.\textsuperscript{1408}

Considering that the British Council had held a number of art exhibitions in Finland in the first post-war years, the Americans entered this field rather late. The first American major art exhibition was not put on show until February 1951, when the Finnish-American Society put a collection of paintings and sculptures of younger American artists who had completed their studies in Paris on display at the Galerie Hörhammer in Helsinki.\textsuperscript{1409} In the mid-1950s, the promotion of American art became rapidly more relevant to the American campaign also in the northern country. This was a direct consequence of the idea of harnessing American modern art into a Cold War weapon, which saw the CIA give large sums to MoMA's International Program.\textsuperscript{1410} The main American argument for using the new artistic movement and in particular abstract expressionism as a propaganda tool was that its rise could be held as proof of the creativity, intellectual freedom and the cultural power of the US.\textsuperscript{1411} This idea was sold to a foreign audience not only through the exhibitions themselves, but also by explaining the concept in pamphlets, books and short films.\textsuperscript{1412}

After the success of the American Home 1953, the next MoMA exhibition including Finland in its tour schedule was 'Twelve Modern American Painters and Sculptors', which was on display at Ateneum in January 1954. This exhibition was also a significant event in Helsinki, drawing several members of Government to its opening ceremony.\textsuperscript{1413} The Finns’ general feedback on modern American art was also mainly positive, with newspapers noting that the exhibition demonstrated how the US was quickly gaining ground in the international art

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\item[1406] Jalonen 1985, pp. 175, 188.
\item[1408] For example, 'Inspection Report, USIS Finland', October 24, 1958, RG 306, RIRR, box 3, NARA.
\item[1409] Suomi-Finland USA 7-8/1951.
\item[1411] Ibid., pp. 263-265; The Independent, October 22, 1995.
\item[1412] For example, 'What Is Modern Art?', RG 306, Movie Scripts, 1942-1965, Entry 1098, box 49, NARA.
\item[1413] The exhibition was successful also in terms of attendance. The figure of 5,000 visitors seems small, but was, in fact, larger than for some other exhibitions held at Ateneum around the time. 'Helsingin Taidehallin Säätiön hallituksen toimintakertomus vuodelta 1954', Vuosikertomukset 1929-1979, HTA, KKA; Helsingin Sanomat, January 9, 1954.
\end{footnotesize}
scene. 1414 The Finns were given the opportunity to inspect another, albeit smaller, MoMA exhibition during 1957 and 1958 when the ‘Thirty American Printmakers’ collection was put on display in ten Finnish towns. 1415 The quest of promoting the US as the leading country of contemporary, and above all individualistic, art was also closely supported by exhibitions organised by the Finnish-American Society and the USIS/Helsinki, which saw to the distribution of another collection of twentieth-century American paintings around Finland in 1959. 1416 The promotion of new architecture was not neglected, either. Indeed, among the other significant exhibitions presented in Finland during the late 1950s was MoMA’s ‘Built in USA II: Postwar Architecture’, a successor to the exhibition organised by the Finnish-American Society in 1945. This collection of modern architecture was displayed in the exhibition section of Sokos Department Store in May 1958 and attended by, for example, President Kekkonen. 1417 Since MoMA decided to donate the entire collection to the Finnish Architectural Museum for permanent use, this was not to be the only occasion when Finns could become acquainted with American architecture. 1418

As much effort as the Americans made to convince the Europeans in particular that their country had plenty to offer in the more traditional arts, in the latter part of the 1950s it became conclusively evident that foreign people’s conception of America was predominately shaped by popular culture. Indeed, the USIA goal of projecting the country as a more sophisticated place than a mere provider of consumer goods, gadgets, Hollywood films and jazz music can be regarded as something of a failure on the old continent. Nations like the French or the Germans continued to mostly regard cultural expressions coming from the US as poor copies of the European originals, no matter what the Americans came up with. 1419 Europeans’ growing hunger for mass products and culture, instead of the ‘high culture’ with which the USIA sought to provide them, clearly makes the arguments over effectively planned and executed American cultural imperialism particularly in the early Cold War period rather inaccurate. 1420

In this sense Finland made no exception. As in the rest of Europe, American officials in the country tried for a long time to do their best to promote their county as a haven for more classic art forms. This was well evident in the type of performers they imported to the country under the Cultural Presentations Programme. After the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra's

1414 The exhibition was most strongly praised in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, which noted that American art was rapidly becoming of such high quality that the Europeans had much to learn. While giving credit to the exhibition as such, Uusi Suomi, on the other hand, pointed out that the collection was not broad enough to capture the whole nature of contemporary art in the US. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, January 17, 1954; Uusi Suomi, January 17, 1954.
1415 In addition to larger cities, the towns where the exhibition was displayed included such smaller localities as Pietarsaari and Lieksa. ‘Thirty American Printmakers: Publicity’, International Program Records in the Museum of Modern Art Archives (http://www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/EAD/ICEf) (January 13, 2013).
1418 Suomi-Finland USA, 7/1958.
1420 Wagnleitner 1994, p. xiii.
concerts given in 1955, the performances made in Finland under the programme in the late 1950s and early 1960s consisted of those by the Robert Shaw Chorale, the American Ballet Theatre, the New York Philharmonic, the one-man theatre group 'Mark Twain Tonight' and the American Repertory Company, starring Academy Award winner Helen Hayes. In spite of the American efforts, the Finns greatly shared the European view that appreciated American mass culture much more than the country's traditional arts.

The mid and late 1950s was the time when Finns became especially accustomed not only with the American model of a consumer society, but also of a larger phenomenon known as the American lifestyle, which became to symbolise modernity, prosperity, high living standards, freedom, peaceful life and, above all, the quest for happiness, in other words 'the American dream'. Now it became more common for leading magazines such as Suomen Kuvalehti to publish reports, some of them from ASLA grantees, marvelling the high level of consumption, the amount of electric equipment in American homes and the possibilities science and automation could provide for further economic growth. All of a sudden, such mass products as jeans, sunglasses and chewing gum made a successful entry into the Finnish market, not least thanks to the modern advertising methods used also in the country. The demand for these goods was obviously triggered by a rapidly emerging youth culture, which evolved around such popular film stars as James Dean and Marlon Brando. Rock and roll music was also finding its way to Finnish shores with both Bill Hayley's single *Rock Around the Clock* and the similarly named film reaching large masses in autumn 1956 and consequently laying a foundation for the actual breakthrough of rock music in the 1960s.

The pace and ease at which Finns adopted various characteristics of American society, such as entrepreneurship and mass culture, has often been explained by their relatively young culture and 'wild west mentality', which saw them embracing new values without prejudice. Even if rock music and Hollywood youth icons did not necessarily represent the primary values the USIA wished to promote in Finland, there is little doubt that their popularity made US presence increasingly powerful in the country. This was gradually understood even by officials in Washington, who towards the late 1950s started to make more use of the popular ingredients of American culture, mostly Hollywood films and jazz music, in their promotion of the US.
This task was made considerably easier by the introduction of television, which would bring American society directly to people’s homes.

While American popular culture flourished in Finland, the promotion of British culture remained on the same level as in the early 1950s. The British Council Helsinki office's lack of funds prevented any expansion of activities and was in August 1954, according to Michael Creswell, so serious that it threatened the organisation's very existence in the country.¹⁴²⁸ This observation was taken seriously by the FO and the BC, which both aimed to convince the Treasury of the need of more adequate funding for operations in the country. Finland was not mentioned in the Drogheda Report, but the FO regarded the allocated annual sum for Helsinki, which had by 1956 been cut by over a third to £11,000, as extremely modest for a country “marching with the Soviet Union”.¹⁴²⁹ As severe as the situation was, Helsinki was still in a better position than many other BC posts in Europe, some of which had been abolished altogether. In fact, the Helsinki office made up something of a final bastion for BC operations in the Nordic Countries since, for instance, in Stockholm inadequate resources had led to various organisational changes, such as transforming the country representative's post into that of a cultural attaché working under the Embassy, the closure of the British Council Library and the establishment of the British Centre, a semi-independent Swedish organisation that promoted British culture and English language.¹⁴³⁰

With all the complaints about the funding cuts having been presented in Whitehall, it is probable that the doubts Mr Creswell's expressed over the Helsinki office’s future were made to persuade London to grant more money for the post rather than actually give an objective account of its ability to survive. The BC representative's annual reports sent from Helsinki to London were likely to have the same objective. They often justified the importance of investing in Finland by making rather dramatic observations about how essential it was for the Finns to nourish their cultural associations with the West as it was for others to co-ordinate their defence by military measures.¹⁴³¹

The conscientious work done in the numerous anglophile societies made the promotion of Britain easier even with smaller funds. The Finns’ grassroots level voluntary work greatly made up for such material setbacks as the British Council’s decision to abolish the publishing of Britain Today, which had been actively distributed by society members.¹⁴³² Apart from the teaching of the English language, still expanding, the societies kept performing their other activities, such as film screenings and library services, and organising British lecture tours and special club events. One considerable development was the foundation of an English language kindergarten at the Steiner School premises in Helsinki, which was hoped to eventually lead to a full-time English school.¹⁴³³

¹⁴²⁸ M.J. Creswell to A. Eden, August 12, 1954, FO 924/1053, NA.
¹⁴³¹ For example, "The British Council, Finland: Representative's Annual Report, 1954-1955", BW 30/6, NA.
¹⁴³² Editor of Britain Today to Undefined subscribers, October 20, 1954, FBS.
¹⁴³³ "The 12th council meeting of the Finnish-British Society", October 15, 1953; 'Minutes of meeting of education committee held at the British Council offices on April 15, 1959', both FBS.
The British Council's opportunities to perform its activities were further narrowed down by the greater share of resources Whitehall was willing to invest in the promotion of trade. Britain's growing awareness of its economic difficulties directed the emphasis of British diplomacy and information activity increasingly towards the protection of the country's commercial interests also in Finland. The emphasis placed on industrial visits to Helsinki was not, however, necessarily a bad thing for the BC, since officials in London became to understand that the promotion of both trade and culture could, in fact, be done simultaneously. The perfect example of this new approach was the British Trade Fair held at Messukeskus, Helsinki in September 1957, for which the BC planned a strong supporting programme of special events.

British officials' main strategy for the fair was to overshadow the previous trade exhibitions held in Helsinki by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy and Switzerland by giving a large-scale display of machinery and heavy plant rather than focusing merely on consumer goods. When the FO and Board of Trade eventually decided to include the British Council in the fair's organisers, they wished to see that the country would win as much positive publicity as possible. In addition to the representation of approximately 500 British firms, a Shakespeare exhibition and an Anglo-Finnish football match, as well as the visit of the Lord Mayor of London, guaranteed the event extensive coverage in the Finnish media. British industry and way of life were also promoted through providing the Finnish press with COI-produced technical and general interest articles as well as publications such as Britain in Brief, which was translated into Finnish and distributed at the fair. Undoubtedly, the extensive cultural and informational programme played a large part in making the trade fair a great success and attracting as many as 240,000 visitors to the Messukeskus set, a figure that even the Americans would envy for years to come. In addition to the general public, the associating Finnish industrial actors were pleased with the British giving a large-scale exhibition, as at least some of them felt that was about time the Finns had the opportunity to see something interesting coming from the West rather than merely the East.

Both the British Council's inability to expand its activities and the growing challenges faced by the British Embassy in implementing a broader anti-communist press campaign, once again, increased the BBC Finnish Service's role in Britain's overall campaign. The fact that the reductions proposed by the Drogheda Report did not have a significant effect on the service (only the half-hour Sunday morning jazz broadcast was abolished) illustrated Finland's exceptional position. Indeed, in the late 1950s, Finnish was one of the few languages spoken outside the Iron Curtain in which regular broadcasts were still provided.

The growing emphasis given to the BBC's Finnish Service did not, however, mean that the corporation introduced a considerably more aggressive policy in terms of the service's broadcasting content. Even though the BBC was receiving more information and advice from

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1434 A. Noble to W. Churchill, 'Anglo-Finnish Economic Relations', May 16, 1953, FO 473/7, NA.
1435 Memorandum: 'Publicity for British Trade Fair, Helsinki', June 25, 1957, INF 12/699, NA.
1436 B.J. Fell to J.M. Leadbitter, July 24, 1957, INF 12/699, NA.
1438 H. Nysten to S. Tuomioja, April 18, 1955, Sakari Tuomioja's collection, box 2, KA.
Whitehall than in previous years, for example as a result of the appointment of a permanent officer liaising between the Foreign Office and the corporation,\(^{1439}\), the FO was in the latter part of the 1950s more willing to recognise that the clear majority of broadcasts to Finland should include ‘straight’ information rather than anti-communist propaganda and that it should ease the pressure on the service. The Finnish Service’s content followed this view conscientiously. While the channel continued to broadcast weekly political programmes, mainly reviews of international events, such analyses on communism as ‘Eastern Europe’ were for some time excluded from the broadcasts. The overwhelming majority of the aired content was now independently produced by the Finnish staff and dealt more with British culture and the English language than politics.\(^{1440}\) For example, the topics tackled by Sirkka Ahonen varied from fashion and Christmas shopping to theatrical plays, food fairs and famous English locations such as Windsor.\(^{1441}\) The greater attention given to such reports, together with Moscow’s looser policies, was directly reflected in the Soviet Union’s decision to reduce the jamming of the Finnish Service substantially in April 1956.\(^{1442}\)

In teaching English to Finns, the BBC’s role was also stronger than before. In addition to the Finnish Service’s own language programmes, the corporation produced two new language series to Finnish listeners in cooperation with YLE accompanied with the textbooks * Practical English* and *English Conversations by Radio*.\(^{1443}\) In all respects the BBC Finnish Service was in the mid-1950s more versatile than it had been when it predominantly focused on news and political commentaries. What had become characteristic also for the station by this time was the open promotion of British industries and products through programme series like ‘British Industries and their Workers’ and ‘Anglo-Finnish Trade’.\(^{1444}\)

**Battle over Finnish Television**

The phenomenal rise of the television offered propagandists on both sides of the Iron Curtain revolutionary ways to influence people's perceptions both home and abroad. News reports, political documentaries, cultural performances, television series and films as well as children’s programmes would all play a vital part in the Cold War mind game. The radio remained the more popular media around the world for quite some time, but many of the most crucial battles over global television supremacy were already fought in the 1950s.

Both the FO and the BBC realised the possibilities television broadcasts offered at an early stage and were willing to launch the broad-scale production of programmes for overseas broadcasts as well as to provide other countries with support in introducing television technology. The lack of sufficient resources, however, held British actors back from making a stronger entry

\(^{1439}\) C.C.B. Stewart to P.F. Grey, February 20, 1957, FO 953/1759, NA.

\(^{1440}\) For example, Radiokuuntelija, 29/1956; Radiokuuntelija 8/1957.

\(^{1441}\) For example, ‘Christmas Rush in a Big Store’ by S. Ahonen, December 19, 1953; ‘Travel Talk: Windsor’ by S. Ahonen, June 13, 1954; List of Programmes, years 1953-1969, all Sirkka Ahonen’s collection, box 1, KA.

\(^{1442}\) At the same time, the jamming of BBC services in Persian, Austria, Turkish, Greek and Hebrew was decreased for some time. ‘BBC Report on Jamming for March and April 1956’, June 6, 1956, FO 1110/854, NA.

\(^{1443}\) Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Ahoin toiminnasta vuonna 1956 (Helsinki 1957), p. 47.

to either field.1445 While the BBC kept complaining about being constantly denied additional funds for new activities, the Americans became the dominating force in the export of television content. Although this seems a self-evident observation today, the fact is that US officials were actually rather slow to understand the true propaganda value global television was going to have, and only gradually started to show interest in German television in particular.1446 All this changed in the mid-1950s when television sets became more common throughout Europe, and the Soviet Union started to regard TV as an antidote to lure listeners away from Western shortwave broadcasts. By building transmitters to the borders of its satellites, the Soviets also made sure that television broadcasts from behind the Iron Curtain could be watched in countries like West Germany, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Afghanistan and Iran.1447

In Finland, both Western powers were deeply concerned that the Soviets would obtain a significant propaganda advantage before a Finnish Service was even launched by the forced importation of Soviet TV sets and the possible broadcasts transmitted through a relay on the Porkkala peninsula. The launch of a Soviet television station in Tallinn in July 1955 only increased these fears. The British, together with many Finns, suspected that the station was not built wholly for the service of Estonia but also with the idea of providing a service to Southern Finland.1448 Ambassador Creswell pointed out that regular TV transmissions from Tallinn made it reasonable to suppose that the sets assembled in Finland would be adapted to the Russian line system and would not be able to receive programmes from the West.1449

Creswell’s suspicions were not eased off even by the British Embassy in Moscow, which assured that the Tallinn broadcasts were mainly intended to the Baltic area and that Soviet television transmissions directed to the home front were comparatively innocuous from the propaganda point of view.1450 The Ambassador to Finland still feared that the Tallinn station might start sending out regular Finnish-language transmissions especially designed for Finland. Furthermore, he saw that even if the programmes were in Russian, one should not assume that there would be little interest in them in Finland as especially young people would follow Russian entertainment with some curiosity. Creswell went as far as to point out that “the tactful use of this weapon (television) could lead to a growing interest in Russia and in the Russian language, especially among young people, and its long-term effects could be considerable”.1451

Amidst all the concerns over the future of television in Finland, both the British and Americans started to strongly encourage the Finns to promote their own television transmissions as quickly as possible. Above all, the BBC prepared to supply the Finns with transmitting equipment in the hope of securing a good market for British television receivers and making the Finnish transmission system compatible with the British one.1452 The FO was also keen to see Finland joining Eurovision as soon as its service was ready for transmissions.

1445 ‘Brief for conversation with Sir Ian Jacob’, March 28, 1955, FO 953/1561, NA.
1446 Schwoch 2009, pp. 35-38, 42.
1447 Ibid., pp. 38-41.
1449 M.J. Creswell to R.H.K. Marett, June 6, 1955, E1/1864, WAC.
1450 C.C. Parrott to R.H.K. Marett, June 10, 1955, E1/1864, WAC.
1451 M.J. Creswell to R.H.K. Marett, June 20, 1955, E1/1864, WAC.
1452 R.H.K. Marett to M.J. Creswell, April 30, 1955, E1/1864, WAC.

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Although YLE’s Director Einar Sundström did not regard outside technical assistance as necessary, Finnish officials received valuable information about television transmissions from various Western European countries, including Britain.\textsuperscript{1453}

After it became evident that the Westerners’ darkest fears concerning the Tallinn station were unlikely to materialise, the USIS/Helsinki also adopted a more active role in the matter of television technology and TV sets used in Finland by, for instance, requesting a series of articles from Washington emphasising the ultimate value of Finland adopting a Western television system. USIS officials were also closely associated with the work of the experimental TV station in Helsinki, since it used primarily USIS film material in its test transmissions.\textsuperscript{1454} In December 1955, the Americans were relatively confident that their activities had played a key role in making it highly probable for the future YLE station in Helsinki to operate on West European standards, and that Finnish manufacturers would build the bulk of television receivers for local consumption.\textsuperscript{1455} This development did not, however, stop either the Americans or the British from following with some alarm the Soviet pressure on Finland to adopt Soviet TV standards, which took the form of promoting Soviet television receivers to Finnish citizens so that they could establish a viewing base for Russian television programmes.\textsuperscript{1456}

The fact that Finland initially restricted the import of Soviet TV sets and made a decision to purchase television transmitters from RCA gave Western observers some relief. Contrary to American reports, the ultimate decision to choose a Western television standard was not mainly made as a result of USIS propaganda, but because RCA had offered their system for half the normal price, and because the Soviets were late to make an offer for the French SECAM system, which they used.\textsuperscript{1457} The American victory was not, however, as comprehensive as they must have assumed at first. The Soviet Union quickly made a decision to redesign its TV sets offered for sale in Finland so that they would meet Finnish safety standards, and to develop new televisions capable of receiving both Western and Soviet standard television transmissions. According to the Americans’ interpretation, the reports saying that Finnish TV sets would be for dual-reception use indicated that Finland was willing to allow at least limited Soviet television reception in Finland. “By pricing their sets attractively, the USSR can still hope to attract customers in Finland for their TV sets, and keep alive their desire to have an audience in Finland for Soviet propaganda through television”, estimated a CIA report written in August 1956.\textsuperscript{1458} In the summer of 1957, when YLE was still busy testing its transmissions and the first commercial television programme was transmitted in Finland, it became obvious that most TV

\textsuperscript{1453} M.J. Creswell to R.H.K. Marett, June 6, 1955, E1/1864, WAC.
\textsuperscript{1454} M.L. Moe to USIA, ‘Television Developments in Finland’, October 7, 1955, CREST.
\textsuperscript{1455} ‘Report on Television in Europe’, December 29, 1955, Undefined source, CREST.
\textsuperscript{1456} CIA, Office of Research and Reports, Current Support Memorandum: Soviet-Finnish Television Relations, August 1, 1956, FOIA Electronic Reading Room (http://www.foia.cia.gov) (July 26, 2008).
\textsuperscript{1457} Kortti, Jukka, Näköradiosta digiboksiin. Suomalaisen television sosiokulttuurinen historia (Helsinki 2007), p. 70. Most American reports praised the USIS/Helsinki’s role in Finland’s decision, but at least one OCB report acknowledged that the “bargain price” RCA asked for its system played a decisive part in the process. “Detailed Developments of Major Actions Relating to United States Policy toward Finland (NSC 5403), OCB, June 5, 1956, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-81, OCB Central File Series, box 29, DDEL.
\textsuperscript{1458} CIA, Office of Research and Reports, Current Support Memorandum: Soviet-Finnish Television Relations, August 1, 1956, FOIA Electronic Reading Room (http://www.foia.cia.gov) (July 26, 2008).
sets would be bought from Finnish producers after all. As a result, fears of Soviet dominance in this field more or less vanished.\footnote{H.F. Cunningham, Jr. to SD, ‘Servicing of Finnish Radio TV’, June 6, 1957, RG 59, SDDFF 1955—1959, box 2173, 511.60EA/6-657, NARA.}

The question concerning the Tallinn television station continued to puzzle Western observers even in the latter part of the 1950s. Both the Americans and British feared that the limited selection of Finnish television programmes would only drive several Finns to use the Tallinn frequency and that YLE could, for the lack of other material, find it to a great extent necessary to rely on the Russian and Estonian programmes.\footnote{Ibid.} It now became increasingly clear to the Western powers that YLE and other players in the field should be given even more support and encouragement in their activities, which mostly involved offering them with appropriate broadcasting content.

As the BBC overseas programme production was more or less on hold in the late 1950s, and the corporation’s domestic material was not yet always regarded as to meet Finnish tastes, the promotion of British productions, at first, largely focused on making Finns to transmit British newsreels and documentaries. The more frequent transmissions of British programmes would not have made that much difference anyway, as the number of television licenses in Finland could have still be given in the tens of thousands. As this figure started to pick up rapidly in the early 1960s, the presentation of British programmes became all the more important.\footnote{The number of television licenses in Finland grew with accelerating pace in the early 1960s. By the end of 1962, the number of Finnish TV viewers had already reached 251,195. ‘Finnish Television Activities’, E8/14, WAC.} By then, the BBC gave increasing attention to promoting its productions in Finland in cooperation with the British Embassy and the British Council, which arranged several film screenings of its own for Finnish television notabilities.\footnote{‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report 1962—1963’, BW 30/14, NA.}

After the Americans learnt that Finland was to adopt a television standard compatible with the general European one, they quickly turned their focus on providing Finns with suitable TV programmes. In fact, it did not take the USIS too long to completely exhaust YLE and the small commercial station TES-TV with its backlog of usable films with TV rights.\footnote{‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.} Ambassador Hickerson turned out to be particularly active in this field and urged officials of NBC to provide YLE with film prints of some of the big American network shows. Also with this purpose in mind, Hickerson had emphasised his view in a letter to NBC noting that “I feel very strongly that it will be in our national interest to assist the Finns in every way we properly can to develop television facilities and programmes of their own to offset programmes directed to them from the East”.\footnote{E.G. Chapman to SD, ‘Filmed NBC TV Programs for the Finnish Radio Company, Joint USIS – State Despatch’, April 18, 1957, RG 59, SDDFF 1955—1959, box 2173, 511.60EA/4-1857, NARA.} The American broadcaster was, undoubtedly, easy to recruit to this cause partly since Romney Wheeler, NBC’s Director for European Operations, had met up with officials of YLE already in early 1957 and given them assurances about the company’s full support for the Finnish television service.\footnote{R. Wheeler to J. Rissanen, February 1957; R. Wheeler to E. Sundström, February 8, 1957, both, KK, box 8, YLE, ELKA.}
After NBC agreed that some sample prints would be provided to YLE on a trial basis, USIS officials held detailed conversations with Vilhelm Zilliacus, Programme Director at YLE, over which material he felt was the most appropriate for the Finnish audience. Mr Zilliacus, for example, noted that war series such as ‘Victory at Sea’ might not be suitable for Finnish viewers as he felt that audiences in Finland “have had a surfeit of war stuff”. His true interest was in receiving drama series, particularly those with a minimum amount of dialogue, as translating dialogue was considered difficult. In the end, YLE did transmit Victory at Sea, whereas after closer examination series like ‘The Medic’ and ‘Watch the World’ were not picked for screening when the regular Finnish television broadcasts began in autumn 1957, as they were regarded unsuitable for Finnish tastes. Apparently, Mr Zilliacus would not have made a good fortune-teller since he questioned the suitability of comedy programmes for Finland and was not that enthusiastic about the future of US westerns, either.\footnote{E.G. Chapman to SD, ‘Filmed NBC TV Programs for the Finnish Radio Company, Joint USIS – State Despatch’, April 18, 1957, RG 59, SDDFF 1955–1959, box 2173, 511.60E4/4-1857, NARA.}\footnote{Suomi-Finland USA, 7/1956.} Considering his rather conservative views, it is not surprising to learn that the Americans had already earlier resorted to their usual method and awarded him with a Ford Foundation grant to visit various TV studios in the US in 1956 in order to make the programme director more familiar with American television production.\footnote{H.F. Cunningham, Jr. to SD, ‘Servicing of Finnish Radio TV’, June 6, 1957, RG 59, SDDFF 1955–1959, box 2173, 511.60E4/6-657, NARA.} Among the USIS-supplied series that were aired were ‘Report from America’, ‘Industry on Parade’, ‘This Is America’ and ‘Magic of Atom’.\footnote{Rantala, Juho-Pekka, Uutistoiminnan synty in Wiio, Juhani (ed.), television viisi vuosikymmentä – Suomalainen televisio ja sen objelmat 1950-luvulta digiaikaan (Helsinki 2007), pp. 155-156.} The Americans’ successful entry into Finnish television was well reflected by the continuous interest YLE personnel expressed in receiving test prints of any US commercial programmes that could be made available. The Finns’ inadequate news production resources offered another fruitful channel for the promotion of American content. During the first years of Finnish television, the need for newsreel material was so vast that even clearly propagandistic content was aired without too much hesitation.\footnote{The board was at first in no rush in determining instructions for television content, including USIS films and newsreels. Even though the Americans were now able to provide the Finns with their view of world events, it must be stressed that the majority of foreign content aired on Finnish TV represented white propaganda, as was normally the case during the Cold War.} The opportunity to make YLE broadcast even politically questionable material was also made easier by the Film Censorship Board’s initial disinterest in introducing comprehensive instructions for television content, including USIS films and newsreels.\footnote{The board was at first in no rush in determining instructions for ‘TV programmes mainly because the number of license holders remained so small. As the audience grew, the board launched a policy that was compatible with its film censorship procedures. A.K. Paasivuori to Finnish Ministry of Education, ‘Televisionstyrkissä esitetävien amerikkalaisten katsauslokuviun sensurointi ja veroluokan määrittäminen’, October 5, 1955, Da 2, VETA, KA.} Considering his rather conservative views, it is not surprising to learn that the Americans had already earlier resorted to their usual method and awarded him with a Ford Foundation grant to visit various TV studios in the US in 1956 in order to make the programme director more familiar with American television production.\footnote{Schwoch 2009, p. 80.} All in all, the USIS/Helsinki saw that the field of television provided a golden opportunity for its operations. Its activities in this area were also strongly backed by Washington, which wished to see that “the agency leave no stone unturned to meet the TV needs of the Post”\footnote{‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.}
programmes, either. Indeed, USIS officials, for example, offered YLE some regular production assistance and continued to invite selected TV leaders and professionals to study in the US. They must have been doing something right, since in October 1958 80 per cent of foreign film footage used by YLE was reported to be of US origin.\textsuperscript{1473} The American influence in Finnish news reporting also continued to be substantial, particularly after YLE decided to choose UP as its sole provider of foreign news material after a trial period also involving CBS, the Independent Television Authority and the British Commonwealth International Newsfilm Agency.\textsuperscript{1474} Even though exposing Finns to Western news coverage was, naturally, a significant development, in the long run the way television made the Finns more familiar with particularly American commodity culture can be regarded an even more important process, not least because it, without doubt, made much of Soviet propaganda in Finland more difficult than it had been before the launch of the new technology.

\textbf{Towards Modern Informational and Cultural Promotion}

The introduction of Finnish television reflects British and American activities in Finland in the mid-1950s well since the period was characterised by the phenomenal rise of available popular culture, which took up an increasingly significant role in the Western governments' Cold War effort. Due to the relative relaxation in East-West relations the anti-communist operations also enjoyed exceptional success. The propaganda material published in Finland continued to reveal several injustices taking place in the communist world and focusing on people's better living standards in the West, but as time passed this content started to become slightly old-fashioned and was gradually replaced by a more culturally-oriented message. This was not, however, an even process as indicated by the expansion of political propaganda launched in Finland after the Hungarian Uprising. Even if the anti-communist message was picked up in Finland more openly than before, neither the British nor the Americans were entirely complacent about their campaigns. While the British felt the need to expand their distribution outlets further, US officials implemented a number of new operational methods, most importantly the use of surveys and the new field programme, which made their activities meet the more modern standards of information work.

What modernised particularly the US campaign even further was the growing focus given to popular culture. This was not, however, a fast process and although the popularity of Western culture grew most rapidly during this particular period also in Finland, only part of it was a result of USIS activities in Helsinki. As US officials gradually began to understand the potential of the promotion of popular culture, it gave them the possibility to reach the Finnish masses more directly than had been the case earlier when political messages were distributed mainly

\textsuperscript{1473} ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1474} Although YLE decided to choose UP as its sole provider of foreign news material in 1957, in the early 1960s the Finnish broadcaster also signed deals over receiving content from the joint British-American CBS-INT (Independent Television News) service and AP. After this, there was no shortage of Western news material at YLE. V. Zilliacus to Bank of Finland, August 29, 1957, TV-toiminnan alkuastakirjoja, box 1827; W. Fleisher to E. Raatikainen, July 14, 1962, KK, box 9, both YLE, ELKA; Rantala 2007, p. 156; Salokangas 1996, pp.126-128.
through politicians and politically-associated journalists, who in Finland formed a particularly close set. Even though the British cultural programme started to lag behind the American one due to financial problems and the lack of new incentives, British officials were not entirely inflexible in their activities either, as proved by the idea of giving a highly visible presence to culture during the British Trade Fair held in Helsinki.
8. PERIOD OF TURMOIL, 1958-1960

Dark Clouds Appear on the Horizon

If the mid-1950s was a period when particularly the Americans were able to expand their propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland, due to the relatively stable conditions, the developments that took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s brought radical change to the two Western governments’ overall campaign in the country. The Night Frost Crisis of 1958 and the Note Crisis of 1961 not only altered Britain's and the United States' general policy towards Finland, but also made the implementation of informational and cultural activities in the country even more important and more difficult at the same time.

Before the first of these crises began, things were running relatively smoothly for Western officials in Helsinki. Particularly the Americans felt optimistic about Finland’s ability to maintain its status as an independent and democratic country without undue reliance on the Soviet Union. In his comments for the OCB Progress Report in May 1958, Ambassador Hickerson went as far as to suggest that the time had come for a more active and bold policy towards Finland, which would mean interposing “a psychological alternative to the prevailing impression of Soviet monopoly over the future of Finland”. The British did not entirely share this view, partly as a result of the even more pragmatic policy adopted by Sir Douglas Busk, who was appointed as Ambassador to Finland in May 1958. Soon after his arrival in Helsinki, Busk sent a political despatch to London in which he warned the FO of the risk of Finland drifting into the Soviet Bloc. Although Sir Douglas recommended an increased publicity effort in Finland, as according to his view, “the purpose of our policy should be to prevent opinion from drifting into acceptance of the country’s position as ‘a good thing’ in itself rather than a political necessity”, there was not much that the British were actually willing or able to do.

The Americans’ optimistic attitude to their chances of influencing the Finns’ perception of the world becomes more understandable if one reads an USIA inspector’s report on the USIS/Helsinki’s activities in 1958. The paper indicated that the growing focus given on the execution of the operations and the implementation of the reorganisations programme was still delivering the goods. In particular, the inspector claimed that press operations were reaching new heights of success. The Finnish-language bulletin, now issued four times a week to 260 recipients and composed of topical items, selected briefs and longer feature material, was reported to receive very good pickup both in and outside Helsinki. A part of this success was explained by the more intensive efforts the Americans had made to find new associates around the country. In 1958, the USIS had contacted 95 per cent of the journalists working outside

1475 For details of these developments in Finnish history, see pp. 280 and 313.
1476 J.D. Hickerson to SD, ‘Suggestions for OCB Programs Report’, May 12, 1958, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 35, NARA.
1477 J. Jeaffreson to G.F.N. Reddaway and D.C. Hopson, ‘Brief for Mr Hopson’s interview with Mr Busk on Monday, March 2 at 11.30’, February 26, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
1478 Ibid.
1479 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
Helsinki and made them more familiar of its services, for instance, through the combination of films shows and talks given by the public affairs officer.

Even if the British had for quite some time noted that Finland had become a more difficult environment particularly in terms of anti-communist propaganda, their campaign in 1958 was far from unsuccessful, either. The use of IRD material in Finnish newspapers was in May 1958 still regarded as satisfactory. Furthermore, the British Embassy was particularly impressed with how strongly all leading Finnish non-communist newspapers, with the exception of Maakansa, had reacted to the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958. The way the Finnish press was performing was not, however, enough to bring any change to the view that was gaining increasing support among British officials: that they should give much more attention to the production and promotion of films as well as radio and television programmes than concentrate on expanding the distribution of IRD material which by now seemed a rather unlikely quest.

In the field of films, the Americans continued to dominate the scene. The demand for USIS films was in 1958 nothing short of tremendous, not least because the Finns themselves had become able to import more 16mm motion picture projectors after the foreign currency restrictions had been eased. Furthermore, the increase of Soviet non-theatrical film activities seemed to have a psychological effect on pro-Western Finns, who now insisted on having a Western feature to show in screenings that included Soviet films. In order to provide Finns with appropriate material, the Americans even employed a new interesting method of film evaluation, which saw Finnish experts, for example artists and scientists, rate USIS films and give suggestions for changes that could be made in the narration if a Finnish version were made. Although the main focus was still on reaching the labour movement, the US Government's growing interest in supporting the activities of the political right was also evident, for instance, by the way the USIS loaned out its projectors to the recently established Kansallinen Tiedotuspalvelu, an anti-communist organisation that wished to reach younger people in particular. The screenings set up by Kansallinen Tiedotuspalvelu, which included the presentation of Hungarian Fight for Freedom, attracted large audiences around the country and generated fierce criticism in the Finnish communist press. Similar activities were out of the British Embassy's reach, even if the screening of COI-produced films had made the Film Department the Information Service's busiest section. The unit supplied documentaries to film users throughout the country, most of which were schools and anglophile societies. For instance, in 1956 5,699 film loans were made with the most popular subjects being the royalty, the English countryside and the Commonwealth. These films also made up the core of the British material aired on Finnish television, the share of which was growing in the late 1950s. In

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1480 J. Jeaffreson to G.F.N. Reddaway and D.C. Hopson, ‘Brief for Mr Hopson’s interview with Mr Busk on Monday, March 2 at 11.30’, February 26, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
1481 D. L. Busk to S. Lloyd, June 25, 1958, FO 371/134858, NA.
1483 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
1484 Vesikansa 2004b, pp. 176—177.
1485 ‘Report by Mr T.B. Shaw’, June 1957, FO 1110/1030, NA.
spite of the agreement made between YLE and UP, the British continued to be successful in presenting their view of things also through news material.1486

The radio was the one medium in which the British continued to outperform their American colleagues. The most important developments in the late 1950s were the renewed interest to include a larger share of topical broadcasts in the BBC Finnish Service and, in particular, the launch of more music programmes. In addition to classical music, the British began, rather late it has to be said, to recognise the popularity and importance of more modern music, mainly jazz. This discovery was made only after it became evident that the discontinuation of the weekly half-hour jazz programme presented in Finnish was losing the channel a considerable number of younger listeners, in particular.1487 What the BBC saw as especially alarming was that at the same time the Soviet Union seemed to be waking up to the propaganda value of dance music. Indeed, in early 1959 a relatively large share of music was included in the 42-hour weekly Soviet broadcasts in Finnish.1488 This served as a wake-up call also for the FO, as it was quick to approve the reintroduction of a weekly jazz programme. In May 1959, the Finnish Service’s output was increased to eight and a half hours per week and the share of music programmes started growing. At first, jazz dominated the modern music programmes, but it did not take long for rock and pop music to take over and become one of the main features for which the BBC was, and still is, famous.

Radio operations in Finland was the only USIS activity that continued to give the Americans some headache. The effective placement of VOA-voiced material was restricted by the state-run YLE, which wished to keep all programmes in either Finnish or Swedish and had not the required funds to permit the translation of the normally supplied VOA material. Although the placement of VOA taped music programmes and American plays presented by Finnish radio was on the rise, USIS officials remained dissatisfied with the developments and, mainly in order to encourage the use of more American material and “to ensure the continuation of the radio company’s pro-Western orientation”, they aimed to make closer personal contact with YLE officials. At least some success was achieved in placing the material of the Intercollegiate Broadcasting System’s (IBS) weekly newsletter, produced by Esa Arra, largely because the programme was unattributed and, thereby, did not encounter the usual difficulties faced by a foreign broadcast.1489 As for VOA transmissions in English, the Americans regarded their reception quality as not very good and felt that the programme schedule was still not adequately promoted in the Finnish press. Even these obstacles did not stop ‘Music USA’ from becoming a popular broadcast in Finland. The programme, heard nightly from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. Finnish time, kept winning new listeners by adopting a playing list that by 1960 almost exclusively consisted of jazz.1490 Quickly embracing the

1486 In early 1959 the British estimated that 50 per cent of the first newsreels supplied to the Finns were used. Minutes by D.C. Hopson, March 2, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
1487 According to Cyril Conner, Head of the BBC’s Overseas and Foreign Relations, the service’s listener correspondence dropped by 80 per cent after the programme was ended. C. Conner to T. Peters, March 5, 1959, E40/185/1, WAC.
1488 Acting Head of Central European Service to C. Eur. S., ’Restoration of Finnish Jazz Programme’, January 13, 1959, E40/185/1, WAC.
1489 ‘Inspection Report, USIS Finland’, October 24, 1958, RG 306, IRRR, box 3, NARA.
programme, Finnish music fans were no different from their fellow listeners all over Europe, as Music USA soon turned into VOA's most famous broadcast, attracting an estimated 30 million listeners during the height of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{1491}

In particular, the Americans' confident mood regarding their campaign in 1958 is, in hindsight, somewhat confusing considering that the Soviet Union was at the same time piling renewed pressure on Finland. The communist giant had in 1957 again lifted Finland higher up on its political agenda and increased its financial support to, above all, the SKP.\textsuperscript{1492} The numerous official and unofficial critical comments by Russian officials in 1958, including those given by Nikita Khrushchev during Urho Kekkonen's visit to the Soviet Union, over the Finnish media's publishing policies, film censorship and the bookstores' inclusion of works that could be interpreted as anti-Soviet were delivered in a tone that was becoming increasingly threatening.\textsuperscript{1493} While the Finnish Foreign Ministry was able to control film screenings by instructing the Film Censorship Board to pay more attention to foreign propaganda\textsuperscript{1494}, the more outspoken representatives of the print media remained a more difficult prospect. By the time \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} published the famous work 'Volgan Lautturit' (Barge Haulers on the Volga) by cartoonist Kari Suomalainen, who in Washington was regarded as the Herblock of Finland\textsuperscript{1495}, the Fenno-Soviet relationship had reached burning point and was about to turn a new chapter. As these developments were closely followed by the US Embassy, the buoyancy reflected in reports on the USIS/Helsinki's performance did not necessarily tell the whole truth about American informational prospects in the country. As a whole, the operations were as efficient as they had ever been, but the tightening climate in Finland must have generated more uncertainty among the USIS ranks than they were willing to admit to Washington.

The Night Frost Crisis - Strong Reactions and Readjustments

The Night Frost Crisis\textsuperscript{1496} made both the US and British governments question Finland's political position more than they had done for several years. Particularly the Americans became

\textsuperscript{1491} Nelson 1997, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{1493} Comments on the media also started to become increasingly common again in 1957. The amount of criticism only grew towards autumn 1958, when the Night Frost Crisis truly began. Kähönen, Aappo, The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War. The Finnish Card in the Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959 (Helsinki 2006), pp. 80-81; Salminen 1982, pp. 79-86; 'Memorandum of a meeting with Ambassador Lebedev' by P.J. Hynninen, April 23, 1958; 'Memorandum of a meeting with G.E. Golub' by A. Alhava, October 23, 1958, both 12 L Venäjä, UMA.
\textsuperscript{1494} R. Oittinen to VETA, 'Filmien ennakkotarkastus', January 20, 1958, Ea 3, VETA, KA.
\textsuperscript{1495} Suomalainen's cartoon led to a strong protest by Soviet officials in Helsinki and consequently to the withdrawal of the plan to place a large copy of it on the roof of the Assembly of Captive European Nations' building in New York. For example, Suomi 1992, p. 163; Helsingin Sanomat, October 18, 1958.
\textsuperscript{1496} The so-called Night Frost Crisis, taking place in the latter half of 1958 and early 1959, had its origins in the formation of a new Finnish Government in August 1958. Since the Government, led by K.A. Fagerholm, included such politicians from the right wing of the SDP as Väinö Leskinen and Olof Lindblom, the Soviet Union objected its appointment straight from the outset. Moscow's displeasure with the Government, as well as parts of the Finnish media, led to heavy economic and political pressure on Finland, which ended when President Kekkonen appointed a new minority Government in January 1959. In addition to the Finnish political scene, the Night Frost Crisis can also be placed in the larger international context since the Soviet Union wished to increase stability in its sphere of
again more concerned over the Finnish leadership's ability to prevent their country from gradually turning into a Soviet satellite. While the British shared this worry, they did not see that Finland's position had changed as a result of the crisis as dramatically as the Americans.

In the existing literature, the United States' reaction to the Night Frost Crises has largely been examined from the same perspective as its position to other developments in Finland: the main emphasis has been on the American officials' views on Finland's future position, President Kekkonen's character and his potentiality to main firm under Soviet pressure and the economic support the Americans offered to the Finns.\textsuperscript{1497} As important as all these aspects are for understanding the American way of thinking during this particular episode, placing too much focus on them does not tell the whole truth about the policy the US adopted towards Finland in the upcoming years. While it is true that the Soviet Union's stronger influence in Finnish domestic politics brought new limitations to the methods by which the Americans could support the country, documents concerning US informational and cultural activities in Finland in the late 1950s and early 1960s tell a story of a more active policy. The altered political situation and the fact that Finland was again becoming a clearer target for Soviet propaganda and cultural activities made the USIS operations' importance for the overall US programme in Helsinki greater than ever before.

Above all, the Night Frost Crisis triggered a series of modifications to the USIS/Helsinki's country objectives and working methods rather than produced an instant response from the Americans. Indeed, most of the changes stimulated by the crisis took a year or so to actually become noticeable. The first alterations to US informational strategy in Finland were made already in November 1958 when Soviet pressure on the Finns was at its hardest. The USIS country report reflected the implementation of a more direct tactic by, for instance, including the aim of developing more public understanding of European economic cooperation through the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation), the EPU (European Payments Union) and the projected EFTA (European Free Trade Area) to the service's objectives.\textsuperscript{1498} Although the Americans had encouraged Finland to join such Western organisations since the mid-1950s\textsuperscript{1499}, this was the first time the desire of turning Finland into a more active player in international politics through, for instance, publicity campaigns was openly recognised in a USIS country report.

As for the short-term objectives determined during the time of the crisis, the USIS saw that it should complete its intensive personal contact campaign in order to persuade mass media leaders to increase their usage of USIS output, such as the series of brief pamphlets on US disarmament, labour, agriculture and the American press. The main target groups were also

\textsuperscript{1497} In general, the US saw that the crisis had a damaging effect on Finland's future since as a consequence Moscow now held a much stronger influence in Finnish politics than before. Urho Kekkonen was under special scrutiny; his behaviour was generally regarded as weak and suspicious. The fact that the US decided to offer economic support to Finland shows that Washington was interested at least in testing its ability to assist a free nation to withstand Soviet pressure. The Finnish Government never came up with an official response to the loan offer of $5 million. For example, Jensen-Eriksen 2005, pp. 100-102; Kähönen 2006, pp. 133-136, 145-147; Rautkallio 1991, pp. 241-313.

\textsuperscript{1498} ‘Finland – Country Objectives’, November 3, 1958, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1499} Jensen-Eriksen 2004, pp. 190-191.
redefined. Approaching political and governmental organisations now held top priority, followed by labour groups and leaders in mass media, industry and education. Giving political leaders the main focus concluded the Americans’ new policy according to which assuring influential Finns of at least moral and economic support from the US and convincing them of the dangers their model of neutralism held for the future of both Finland and Scandinavia was done most effectively when performed discreetly or even face to face.1500

The more offensive policy and the USIS’s greater role in protecting US interests in Finland was also evident in the NSC policy statement on Finland dating back to October 1959, which declared that the US should “seek by an appropriate means to strengthen democratic elements, encourage anti-communist segments, and particularly promote cultural resistance to the USSR”.1501 Especially, the ‘encouragement of anti-communist segments’ represented a new approach compared to past policy declarations, which avoided such direct comments. Although it was still apparent to American officials both in Helsinki and Washington that any opportunity for specific political action was rare, their overall sentiment was that a "holding operation" in Finland was no longer recommendable and that the US should try to influence developments in Finland with both overt and covert methods.1502 Finland was not regarded as a vital part of the world for US interests, but complete Soviet domination of the country would have been a heavy blow to Western morale. Therefore, it was concluded in Washington that this development should be opposed as strongly as the local circumstances allowed.

How was the more robust response reflected in the USIS/Helsinki’s everyday operations? Above all, as an intense search for new ways of influence, that is for certain. As the US Government wished to increase its moral support to the Finns and convince them of the benefits of a more active orientation to the West, the USIS campaign became more thoroughly planned than ever before. The activities, whether they concerned the establishment of new outlets for US propaganda, the expansion of the USIS office or the content of distributed print propaganda, were all given specifically defined operational targets that were reported about with greater detail than was the case in the more relaxed mid-1950s.

In forming closer ties with political leaders, the US Embassy’s prime goal was to expand its contacts beyond the social democrats and the occasional representative of Kokoomus towards the Agrarian Party, in spite of the so-called K Line's increasingly dominant influence on the party’s policies.1503 In terms of USIS operations, this activity partly paid off already in October 1958 when Agrarian Party officials, including Party Secretary Pekka Silvola, expressed their wish

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1500 For example, J.D. Hickerson to SD, 'Finland and the Problem of Nordic Neutrality', May 29, 1959, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA.
1501 National Security Council Report, NSC 5914/1, Statement for US Policy Toward Finland, October 14, 1959, RG 273, Policy Papers, Entry 1, box 51, NARA.
1503 The so-called K Line (K-linja) was made up by several influential Agrarian Party politicians, who strongly supported Urho Kekkonen's policies. Above all, the group emphasised the superiority of foreign policy over domestic politics and stressed that following the Paasikivi Line was Finland’s only option as far as foreign policy was concerned. The Night Frost Crisis strengthened the fraction's position in the party considerably. Hokkanen 2002, pp. 454-458.
to start screening USIA-produced films in order to combat communist propaganda in rural areas.  

Another group of Finns to notice the more direct US approach was Finnish army officers. A report sent by the US Embassy to Washington in February 1960 noted that even closer contact should be established between American officials and the Finnish military “in order to help maintain the moral of the Finnish Defense Forces as a strong non-communist element”. In addition to increasing the number of Finnish officials visiting military installations, the “bolstering of Western orientation of Finnish military activities” would soon also include selling US military equipment at discount rates.

The US Government’s growing concern over the Finnish situation after the Night Frost Crisis made the US Embassy also to plan a programme that would see all American officials posted in Helsinki to spend even more time visiting key locations in provincial Finland. The worry over growing communist influence particularly in provincial areas was also taken into account in the field of cultural operations, as more emphasis was now given to “specific groups and organisations vulnerable to communist interaction such as labour, youth, sports and farm organisations.” In October 1960, the American political officer and the information officer made yet another trip to Lapland in order to examine the reasons for communist appeal in the region and come up with solutions to contain it. The subsequent report recommended considerably expanded USIS activities in the north, including the greater use of personal contacts, film shows, television appearances, printed material and returning Fulbright grantees. While stressing that direct public attacks against the Soviet Union were to be avoided, the two American officers described a more extensive campaign in the region as "an excellent testing ground for a subtly-conceived program of psychological warfare chiefly waged by a system of personal contact". Even though US presence in Northern Finland was growing in the late 1950s and early 1960s through, for instance, press contacts, many of the more ambitious programme proposals, including the establishment of a separate USIS branch office in one of the "strategically situated cities" (Kuopio, Kemi, or Oulu), were never actually turned into practice.

Nonetheless, in the late 1950s an updated USIS office was opened in central Helsinki, now known as the America Center. The office continued to act as the central point for informational and cultural activities, attracting more than 34,000 visitors to use its library and auditorium facilities in 1960. The increased significance of the centre and the work of the USIS in general was further reflected in the assessment reports posted to USIA headquarters in the early 1960s. These accounts, in particular, had taken a more professional shape compared to the reports written only a few years earlier. What is most striking about them is the level of detail given to

1504 G.G. Hilliker to SD, 'Conversation with Agrarian Party Officers', October 10, 1958, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 36, NARA.
1507 ‘Dispatch from the Embassy in Finland to SD’, February 2, 1960, FRUS (Washington 1993), p. 566.
the specifically defined USIS goals in Finland and the steps taken for their execution. In 1960 and 1961, the four main objectives in Finland were listed as follows: 1) to increase Finnish understanding and support of US foreign policies 2) to interpret US life and culture in a manner that would increase Finnish confidence in the country 3) to maintain Finnish awareness of the strength of the Free World 4) to demonstrate the dangers to Finnish independence inherent in communist-oriented neutralism. These goals were met with concrete ‘projects’, which varied to some extent according to developments both in Finland and overseas. Most typically, the projects used more traditional operational methods, such as the supply of printed and filmed material on specific foreign policy issues to selected leaders and media representatives, the organisation of cultural events and the generation of closer contacts with labour, agrarian, youth and sports organisations. At times, the projects carried a more specific goal, such as the presentation of the US election campaign, the delivery of media material regarding the US space programme, or the organisation of a student forum series held at the America Center auditorium.1509 The continuously growing lists of operations depict a programme that was energetic and innovative rather than restricted to a routine activity determined by the Soviet Union’s more direct involvement in Finnish affairs.

As can be gathered from the goals listed above, the supply of printed material continued to employ USIS officials the most. The office now translated up to 7,000 words of news items per day besides providing Finnish newspapers and opinion leaders with more in-depth articles and publications on the US as well as international communism.1510 Since the USIS's main objective in press operations was to offer the Finns "a more balanced view of the world", the clear majority of the delivered feature stories and pamphlets continued to focus on the promotion of American society, instead of analysing international developments or political ideologies. The heavily distributed pamphlet, Amerikka Tänään (America Today), presented many virtues related to the US, ranging from workers' earnings and scientific achievements to the achievements of the most accomplished American artists and athletes1511, while other publications, such as Nainen Yhdysvaltain talouselämässä, focused on a single topical issue, in this case the growing number of women working outside the home.1512 Although cultural and educational matters were included in some of the pamphlets, the general trend in USIS publications was to introduce the American economic system as well as industrial and agricultural innovations even more strongly than before.1513 At least from the USIS/Helsinki’s perspective, which obviously was not entirely impartial, the American message was still finding its way through in the Finnish press, if not directly then indirectly as background material. Even the more scholarly anti-

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1511 Amerikka tänään (USIS/Helsinki 1961).
1512 Nainen Yhdysvaltojen talouselämässä (USIS/Helsinki 1961).
1513 For example, Amerikan talouselämä (USIS/Helsinki 1961); Social Security in the USA (Department of Health Education and Welfare 1961); Yhdysvaltain maatalous esittäytyy (USIS/Helsinki 1958).
communist periodicals Problems of Communism and Iron Curtain Briefs were regarded as useful tools for “destroying the glossy image of the movement and the claims of those who espouse it.”\textsuperscript{1514}

As progressive a picture USIS reports from the early 1960s give about the operations, they do include some rather surprising remarks also, most significantly about the use of American material on Finnish television. While the office reminded that almost all of their documentary films had been aired on TV, it recognised that YLE had rather rapidly drifted into a position "left of neutral" and had even become critical of a number of American productions. USIS officials were not entirely happy to see that the vast majority of relayed American programmes were now of the lighter sort, such as ‘Father Knows Best’, ‘Dennis the Menace’ or ‘Wagon Train’, since according to them these productions hardly enhanced the image of the US in Finland as efficiently as the larger inclusion of USIA’s more educational and political documentaries would do. In the more traditional business of loaning out USIA-produced films and film projectors, the Americans fared better and continued to make cooperative arrangements with a number of interesting Finnish organisations such as the Finnish Army Reserve Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, which screened some of the films in more provincial areas.\textsuperscript{1515}

USIS operations' entry to the very core of American ambitions in Finland is particularly evident when going through the overall US Embassy programme activities in Finland. A large number of the pointed tasks, including the promotion of Finland’s EFTA membership, the import of prominent American visitors to the country, the encouragement of Finnish marketing efforts in the West and the increase in contacts with Finns throughout the country, were a direct concern for both the USIS and the US Embassy’s Political Department.\textsuperscript{1516} It is no wonder that American diplomats in Helsinki, including the new Ambassador Edson Sessions, wished Washington to give a higher prioritisation for USIS operations in Finland and invest larger funds in them as well as to launch cross-departmental coordination with, for instance, the Ministry of Labor for their execution.\textsuperscript{1517} Even though no dramatic expansion was made to the USIS/Helsinki’s budget\textsuperscript{1518}, the closer attention given to its operations reflected the growing importance of informational and cultural operations in Finland for the Americans after the Night Frost Crisis.

The more active position chosen by the US towards Finland was in some contrast to the British response to the Night Frost Crisis, which was, not surprisingly, more cautious and pessimistic about Finland’s chances to resist Soviet pressure. The FO’s general conclusion of

\textsuperscript{1514} USIS/Helsinki to USIA, ‘Annual Assessment Report for Period Ending December 31, 1960’, February 28, 1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1515} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{1517} E.O. Sessions to SD, ‘The Priority Status of Finland’, October 26, 1960, RG 84, USEH, CGR, box 41, NARA.

\textsuperscript{1518} The available funds for information services in Helsinki were in 1959 raised slightly to $300,000 after they had been reduced by over 40 per cent in 1958. The budget for the US Embassy for 1961, including USIS operations, was to be re-examined in April 1960. However, no further considerable expansion from this figure seemed likely. W. Willoughby to E.O. Sessions, April 4, 1960, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA; Annex 1 to ‘Statement of US Policy Towards Finland’ (NSC 5914/1), October 14, 1959, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-81, Disaster File, box 67, DDEL.
the Finnish crisis was that there was no political or economic action, overt or covert, that could be taken with any advantage to Finland. Ambassador Busk made particularly gloomy remarks about Finland's future prospects and Britain's possibilities to have any influence over them during his special visit to London to discuss the matter.\textsuperscript{1519} After the situation had calmed down somewhat, Con O'Neill, appointed as Ambassador after Mr Busk, and other FO officials returned to the view that the Soviets were unlikely to be interested in robbing Finland of its independence and that the US Government's concerns of the country's future and reactions to recent events were perhaps slightly exaggerated.\textsuperscript{1520}

While giving a cautious assessment of the Western governments' opportunities to actually have any say on Finland's future, Ambassador Busk reached rather the same conclusion as the Americans: that the only way to have any effect on the Finns would be through informational and cultural operations. The active Ambassador came up with plenty of ideas, not only on how these activities could be improved, but also on how more concrete support could be expressed to Finland through them. For instance, he wished to see British officials encouraging Western international organisations to hold conferences and meetings in Finland, increase the number of British exhibitions and British Council lecturers, and persuade ministers to make visits to Finland. As for propaganda activities, he suggested that Reuters could be urged to include more anti-communist material in their service for the use of the Finnish news agency STT. Although this was seen as the safest way for the Finns to reproduce such items, Mr Busk was given little hope that such an arrangement could be made.\textsuperscript{1521}

These remarks were made during a time when it was becoming increasingly evident that the Night Frost Crisis had had a damaging effect as far as the placement of IRD articles in Finnish newspapers was concerned. An FO official summarised the changed situation somewhat bluntly in a report written in September 1959 by noting that even if it was true that the use of IRD publications in Finland was difficult to assess, the British Embassy now had little opportunity of placing material in the Finnish press.\textsuperscript{1522} The situation had become even worse when it came to the Finnish radio. The Finnish Government's ownership of YLE made the British rate the possibility of "engineering any angled comment in this medium very low indeed".\textsuperscript{1523} Nor was much promise given to the FO's suggestion of making arrangements for the Finns to publish reviews of commercially published anti-communist books that were placed in the Information Section Library for loan to interested visitors, as, according to Busk, such books would need to be outstanding to merit any review at all in the Finnish press.

As the use of newspapers as distributors of the anti-communist message was becoming increasingly difficult, the British had no choice but to take advantage of their other channels for informational operations. In February 1959, FO officials recommended the growing use of the

\textsuperscript{1519} Although Busk was not as sceptical about the true intentions of President Kekkonen and his ability to stand up against the Soviets as the Americans, his main view was that there were some indications suggesting that the Soviet Government was reconsidering its policy of allowing Finland internal freedom. D.L. Busk to F.H. Millar, January 12, 1959; 'Undated FO memorandum on Finland', both FO 371/142870, NA.
\textsuperscript{1520} C. O'Neill to FO, February 8, 1961, FO 371/159309, NA.
\textsuperscript{1521} Minutes by D.C. Hopson, March 2, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
\textsuperscript{1522} G.F.N. Reddaway to A.M. Williams, September 30, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
\textsuperscript{1523} D.L. Busk to M.G.L. Joy, February 18, 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
BBC's Overseas Service as well as the arrangement of more visits to Finland with the view that the IRD could assist in both kinds of activities, especially if the visits were made by people or organisations that could stir anti-communist sentiments. The BBC Finnish Service continued to follow the FO's request, now becoming almost the only channel through which the British were able to spread more political propaganda to the masses. An examination of programmes transmitted in the late 1950s, and in autumn 1958 in particular, shows that the number of topical news broadcasts and political reports was growing fast during this time. Programmes on communism and the Soviet Union were also on the rise again. In addition to the ever-popular series 'In Eastern Europe', the Finnish Service now included several one-off political talks with titles like 'Tough Policy in Communist Satellites' and 'Russia and the Satellites', which reveal enough about their nature. The transmission of this kind of content was by now almost a daily affair and on some occasions, as on October 21, 1958, two programmes that could be easily identified as anti-communist were aired during the same broadcast. The service's systematic summary of Finnish newspaper reports in its transmissions, especially of those published by the communist papers, proves that the station was also willing to respond to local developments in Finland.

As for visits, Douglas Busk's boldest plan was to bring Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to Helsinki on his way back from Moscow in March 1959. According to the Ambassador, such a visit would "hearten the friends of the West in Finland and help to counteract the depressing effect of the Kekkonen-Khrushchev talks." Although both the FO and the Finnish Government warmed to this idea, it turned out that Mr Macmillan's schedule had no room for such a stopover, and the Finns would have to wait for another four years for his visit. In the meantime, both the British Embassy and the British Council focused on encouraging as many prominent British politicians, officials, artists and scientists as possible to come to and sending invitations to Finns who were of a similar stature to visit Britain. The inclusion of Finnish politicians in the conferences held at Wilton Park not only gave the British another channel to impact prominent Finns, but also helped to implement the broader policy of strengthening Finnish politicians' links with their Western colleagues. The first Finns to visit Wilton Park represented the political right and industrial circles, with figures like Niilo Honkala, Teuvo Aura and Tuure Junnila taking part in conferences dealing with, for instance, Western European defence and economic policy, as well as British social policy.

As Finland's political situation placed growing limits to anti-communist activity in the country, the British Embassy re-evaluated its informational operations and made a conscious

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1524 Minutes by G.F.N Reddaway, February 1959, FO 1110/1201, NA.
1525 For example, Finnish Transmission, October 21, 1958; 'Finnish Transmission, November 3, 1958', both P as B: Overseas, European Service, July 1958 – November 1958, WAC.
1526 On this day, the service relayed the 'In Eastern Europe' series and the programme 'Russia and the Satellites' during the same broadcast, 'Finnish Transmission, October 21, 1958', P as B: Overseas, European Service, WAC.
1527 For example, 'Summary of the Finnish Press, May 1957', E3/545/1, File 1, WAC.
1528 Memorandum by T. Brimelow, February 7, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA.
1529 FO to British Embassy, February 16, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA.
decision to give more emphasis to positive publicity and cultural relations. The growing focus
given to the flow of ‘straight’ information did not mean that IRD work was abandoned
altogether. Even though in 1959 the FO did not regard Finland as a promising country for IRD
activities, or even a provider of ‘revisionist’ stories in a similar vein as Yugoslavia, the circulation
of material was kept at the same level as before. The British Embassy made several efforts to
extend the channels of distribution of IRD material, but at the same time stressed that one of
the biggest problems concerning this activity was that so few Finns had a good enough
knowledge of English to benefit from most of the publications.\footnote{British Embassy to IRD, December 14, 1960, FO 1110/1297, NA.} As some potential recipients
were more likely to have a better command of German, a few German-language versions of the
booklets were sent to Helsinki.\footnote{This activity was rather limited, but picked up slightly after the IRD decided that more systematic translations of their publications should be completed in London rather than in Bonn or Vienna IRD to British Information Services, Bonn, February 16, 1961, FO 1110/1297; H.H. Tucker to P.W.R.C. Haley, February 22, 1962; H.H. Tucker to P.A. Rhodes, May 3, 1962, both FO 1110/1487, all NA.}

One of the few English-language publications that the British thought could be effectively
used to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s new expansionary policies was the February 1959
dition of *The Interpreter*, which included a short analysis of the Night Frost Crisis and of
Moscow’s insistence of having even greater influence in Finland’s domestic affairs.\footnote{The Interpreter, February 1959, FO 1059/53.} While the
article was actively delivered and used in many parts of the world, there is no evidence that it
was broadly distributed in Finland.\footnote{One reason for the article’s limited use in Finland was that at least according to the Finnish Foreign Ministry it contained a serious mistake in claiming that the Soviet Union was planning to demand military concessions from
Finland. The Finnish Embassy in London even paid the FO’s attention to the sentence in question. R. Solanko to Finnish Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommunismia koskevia julkaisuja, The Interpreter’, February 19, 1959; T. Brimelow to R. Solanko, February 18, 1959, both 35A, UMA.}

The growing cooperation between Britain and the US in Finland offered some help to the
struggling British campaign. Officials of the two countries started to engage in detailed
discussions on Finland’s more delicate position in early 1961 after the State Department’s
initiative. Although the Anglo-American talks were unofficial and largely speculative, they did
lead to a general agreement over the two administrations mutually supporting the Finns’
association with Western organisations by expanding political, informational and cultural
cooperation.\footnote{Memorandum by R.H. Mason, January 30, 1961; Brief No.4, ‘Anglo-American discussions, Western policy
towards Finland’, both FO 371/159309, NA; B.A. Gutler to SD, ‘US-UK Bilateral Talk, April 14, 1961’, May 18, 1961, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA.} While the collaboration on media activities mostly meant increasing the
exchange of information, the most concrete joint operations were established in language
teaching particularly after the British Council, constantly struggling with resources, gradually
came to accept the inclusion of American support. The USIS/Helsinki’s role grew steadily in
this field, especially after it started to provide British teacher-secretaries with a considerable
amount of functional material and offer assistance in provincial areas.\footnote{For example, ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1959—1960’, BW 30/14, NA.} This development
reflected a broader understanding emerging between Washington and London, which in 1961
led to the declaration that competition in language teaching should be stopped and that Anglo-
American cooperation should minimise the perception of the idea that the two nations spoke a
different language.\textsuperscript{1537} In general the two governments continued to run distinctively separate
operations in Finland, but the growing collaboration in cultural presentations, particularly the
exchange of visitors and lecturers between the Finnish-British Society and the Finnish-
American Society\textsuperscript{1538}, increased the campaigns' interconnection.

Dealing with the Change in Political Landscape

The one topic to which British and Americans kept returning during their talks was Urho
Kekkonen and the possibilities to influence his policies. The Night Frost Crisis had only
increased particularly the Americans' suspicions over the President's abilities to resist to
threatening Soviet dominance. While the British regarded Mr Kekkonen as a more complex
figure who was not only intelligent but also a patriot\textsuperscript{1539}, the general American view was that he,
and in particular his growing collaboration with the Soviet leadership, was a key weakness that
could turn out to be costly to the Finns.\textsuperscript{1540} After considering a number of options on how to
deal with the President, including openly supporting his opponents, which could lead to either
his removal from office or a reduction of his authority\textsuperscript{1541}, the Americans started to admit that
Kekkonen's re-election as President in the 1962 elections was probable and that establishing a
closer relationship with him would be increasingly vital.

Even if influencing Finland's most powerful man through unofficial channels turned
increasingly relevant for the two Western governments in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
quest of establishing contacts with him had been lifted onto their agenda some years earlier.
This had suited Kekkonen well, as he sought to strengthen his political position as well as to
increase his information channels. For making closer contact with American actors, Kekkonen
used his right-hand man Kustaa Vilkuna, who managed to form ties with NATO and CIA
officials during his travels in Central Europe. Previous research suggests, however, that these
contacts remained somewhat distant and unfruitful due to Soviet pressure.\textsuperscript{1542} Indeed, it would
seem that the British fared much better in forming a close relationship with the Finnish
politician. Mr Kekkonen’s long-time acquaintance with intelligence officers, most notably Rex
Bosley\textsuperscript{1543}, offered the British Government one more channel to influence the President.
Michael Creswell also managed to form a confidential relationship with him. This became
evident in 1957 when Kekkonen accepted the Ambassador's proposal for the formation of an
unofficial channel between him and London that would provide the President with British
intelligence information on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{1544} Considering that Kekkonen, a heavy reader by

\textsuperscript{1537} Arndt 2005, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{1538} For example, S. Laukkanen to R. Hughes, December 14, 1962, FBS.
\textsuperscript{1539} For example, C. O'Neill to R.H. Mason, February 15, 1961, FO 371/159309, NA.
\textsuperscript{1540} R.M. Melbourne to W.G. Burdett, 'Comments upon the talking paper for US - U.K. discussions of Finland',
April 4, 1961, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1541} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1542} For example, Herlin, Ilkka, Kivijalasta harjahirteen. Kustaa Vilkunan yhteiskunnallinen ajattelu ja toiminta
(Helsinki 1993), pp. 248-256.
\textsuperscript{1543} For the relationship between Urho Kekkonen and Rex Bosley, see, for example, Suomi 1990, pp. 197-198.
nature, had already been a regular recipient of the Press Bulletin as well as the IRD’s background material when Prime Minister, the British were successful in ensuring that the Finnish leader would always be fully aware not only of their policies but also of broader international developments.\footnote{During his years as Prime Minister, Kekkonen was often included on the Legation’s IRD material distribution lists. Kekkonen’s archives also held a number of British Press Bulletins from the mid-1950s. UKA, box 21/44, TPA.}

After the Night Frost Crisis, the US campaign of acquainting Kekkonen with Western policies, aimed to make him view his own policies in a different light, involved providing additional American reading material, including the Rockefeller Report ‘The Challenge of the Democratic Idea’, which was presented to him by Ambassador Sessions.\footnote{SD to US Embassy, Telegram No. 150, September 19, 1960; SD to US Embassy, ‘Presentation materials’, September 30, 1960, both RG 84, USEH CGR, box 41, NARA.} Although in 1959 the Americans also managed to create a direct information channel between the US Embassy and the President that was similar to the British one\footnote{Suomi 1992, p. 245.}, certain mutual suspicion and even dislike characterised the relationship between Kekkonen and American officials in Helsinki for some years to come.\footnote{If the assessment of Kekkonen and his policies was largely negative in tone, the Finnish President’s opinion of the American ambassadors was not that complimentary, either. In his eyes, both John Hickerson and Bernard Gulner were simply ‘fools’. The short-term ambassador Edson Sessions, on the other hand, won Kekkonen’s approval, perhaps partly because he was not a professional diplomat. Kekkonen, Urho, Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1 (ed. Suomi, Juhani) (Helsinki 2001), December 1, 1961, p. 450. See also, for example, Rautkallio 1992, p. 20; Suomi 1992, p. 242.}

As for Britain at the turn of the decade, Douglas Busk was particularly clear about his mission to convert President Kekkonen into a more pro-Western way of thinking. The Ambassador was not afraid of approaching Kekkonen on other matters, either, and his unofficial discussions with the President became almost a regular feature during his stay in Helsinki.\footnote{Jakobson, Max, Veteen piirretty viiva – Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953–1965 (Helsinki 1980), pp. 173–174.} Mr Busk’s successor Con O’Neill shared the view that the British should exert maximum influence on Kekkonen in order to convince him of the strength of the West, but at the same time was under no illusion that any decisive change in the President’s overall attitude could be achieved.\footnote{C. O’Neill to R.H. Mason, February 15, 1961, FO 371/159309, NA.} Both ambassadors were successful in convincing the FO about the advantages of inviting Mr Kekkonen for a state visit, an idea that Mr Busk had advocated ever since it became apparent that Harold Macmillan’s visit to Finland was not in the offing. While seeking to arrange the President’s visit to London, Mr Busk also checked that his American colleagues were contemplating a similar move, which turned out to be exactly the case.\footnote{D.L. Busk to T. Brimelow, June 2, 1959, FO 371/142870, NA.} The Americans’ first reaction to the Night Frost Crisis had been to arrange President Eisenhower to Helsinki for a stopover during his planned trip to Moscow, a move that won support also from the Finnish Foreign Ministry\footnote{The Finnish Foreign Ministry, not unlike when arranging Macmillan’s unmaterialised visit to Finland, supported the idea of inviting Eisenhower to the country and, in fact, played an active part in the process in order to}, but as this did not materialise\footnote{The Finnish Foreign Ministry, not unlike when arranging Macmillan’s unmaterialised visit to Finland, supported the idea of inviting Eisenhower to the country and, in fact, played an active part in the process in order to}, their eyes turned to bringing the suspicious Finnish head of state to Washington instead.\footnote{The Finnish Foreign Ministry, not unlike when arranging Macmillan’s unmaterialised visit to Finland, supported the idea of inviting Eisenhower to the country and, in fact, played an active part in the process in order to
The split in the Finnish labour movement, both in the SDP and the SAK, also had a direct impact on Western activities in Finland. The development pushed Finland higher on the agenda of, for example, AFL-CIO's International Affairs Committee, led by the federation's president George Meany, which in February 1960 recommended more assistance to the Finns through the federation's Special Purposes Fund. The fear over the growing popularity of communism within Finnish labour circles once again renewed the American desire to channel more financial and moral support to Finnish social democrats. This time around, finding the most effective channel for the distribution of CIA funds was much more complicated than before. While large sums of money, thanks to the relentless efforts of Olavi Lindblom, continued to flow to the right-wing members of the SDP, support was provided to the fraction led by long-time chairman Emil Skog also after the formation of its new party, the Social Democratic Union of Workers and Smallholders (Työväen ja Pienviljelijöiden Sosialidemokraattinen Liitto, TPSL). This group became particularly important for the Americans after the SAK began to turn into a battleground between the so-called Skogists and the communists. When the trade unions that had left the SAK formed their own new central organisation SAJ (Suomen Ammattijärjestö) in November 1960, run by right-wing social democrats, it soon became the natural target of investment for CIA-originated funds. This also meant that the leaders of the new trade union federation, including General Secretary Jaakko Rantanen, with whom the Americans quickly established a close relationship, were to receive their share of both USIS/Helsinki publications and international trade union propaganda provided by the ICTFU.


1553 Urho Kekkonen's official invitation for Eisenhower to visit Finland "if an opportunity presents itself in connection with the trip he was to make to the Soviet Union in June 1960" was eventually rejected in spite of the strong backing of Ambassador Sessions. In his view, a short stopover from the President would have been of highest political importance in order to "provide a base for the US to regain lost ground in Finland". The decision to unaccept the invitation was justified to Eisenhower by noting that such a stop would require additional stops in the other Nordic countries and that a visit to Finland might adversely affect the impact of his trip to Moscow. Telegram No. 397 from E.O. Sessions to Secretary of State, January 29, 1960; Telegram No. 406 from Helsinki to Secretary of State, February 5, 1960; Telegram No. 427 from E.O. Sessions to Secretary of State, February 8, all White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Records 1952-61, box 5; Memorandum for the President by C.A. Herter, 'Invitations to Visit Certain European Countries in Conjunction with Your Forthcoming Trips to Paris and the Soviet Union', February 2, 1960, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dulles-Herter Series, box 12, all DDEL.

1554 E.O. Sessions to SD, 'Proposed US Program for Finland', February 2, 1960, RG 84, USEH, CRP, box 41, NARA.

1555 Memorandum of International Affairs Committee Meeting, February 10, 1960, RG 18, IADC, F, Series 1, box 1, GMMA.

1556 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Olavi Lindblom was often in contact with not only Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, but also, for instance, George Meany, either asking for more support from the AFL-CIO or thanking for the funds already sent. For example, O. Lindblom to G. Meany, March 15, 1961; O. Lindblom to I. Brown, March 7, 1960; both RG 18, IADC, F, Series 1, box 1, GMMA.

1557 See, for example, Rautkallio 1996, pp. 150-154.

1558 For example, O. Becu to All affiliated organisations in Europe, January 31, 1961 & February 8, 1961; H.A. Tulatz to Certain affiliated organisations, January 15, 1962; E. Savage to J. Rantanen, June 4, 1962, all Suomen Ammattijärjestön arkisto (Hereafter SAJ) box 27, KA.
As covert as the Americans wished to keep the SAJ's connection with the CIA, the funding arrangement was revealed already in 1967 when a former employee leaked it to the public. The foreign money sent to Finland led to somewhat confusing situations already in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as for example Emil Skog managed to gain simultaneous funding from both the US and the Soviet Union. This kind of double funding also concerned the SAK publication Päivän Sanomat, which the Americans still regarded as an anti-communist publication in the late 1950s. The shift in the source of outside funding from the US to the Soviet Union could not be unnoticed in the newspaper's content. Whereas in 1958 and 1959 Päivän Sanomat covered a large amount of Western topics, such as statements made by AFL-CIO and the TUC, two years later the paper included more articles either of Soviet origin or written by Finnish communists commenting on, for instance, the doomed future of capitalism around the world.

At the turn of the decade, the Soviet Union's role in the Finnish media and cultural scene continued to be much larger than that of a mere funder. In addition to newspapers, the Soviet officials' criticism on Finnish media content was again directed onto films with the Finnish movie theatres decision to screen Hungarian Fight for Freedom instead of the Hungarian account on the uprising, Igy Történt ('As It Happened'), generating strong complaints from the Soviets. The ending of the actual crisis period did not bring any notable change to Soviet behaviour, as representatives in Helsinki continued to make regular remarks to Finnish politicians over the screening of "American films with clear propagandistic intention" in a number of theatres. As for the Soviet Union's own activities, the emphasis was directed on expanding cultural cooperation with Finnish actors from all classes of society.

Generally speaking, neither the Americans nor the British were too concerned that the largely Western-oriented Finns would change their overall attitude to life as a result of this activity. Indeed, their worries concerned more of pushing their message in a tightening environment rather than witnessing Soviet propaganda winning more approval among the public. In January 1961, however, the US Embassy noted that there was a growing concern among pro-Western Finns that the U-2 incident and the shaken belief in American technological superiority as a result of Soviet space achievements "had lost ground forfeited in the Finnish public mind." The growing number of Finns visiting the Soviet Union under various cultural programmes was also something that Western officials followed with some anxiety, realising that the magnitude of this exchange was something they would never be able

1560 In September 1967 Niilo Honkanen, research secretary at SAJ, sent a circular letter in which he revealed the way CIA money was channelled into the federation. According to him, in 1967 the SAJ was receiving 720,000 Finnish marks a year. The revelation was well covered by the media, but the SAJ denied the funding arrangement. N. Koljonen to SAJ Board, September 29, 1967; 'Statement made by SAJ Council', October 29, 1967; both SAJ, box 111, KA; Bergholm 2007, pp. 348-352; Rautkallio 1996, pp. 174-176.
1565 Virolainen, Johannes, Yöpakkasista juhannuspommiin (Helsinki 1982), pp. 253-254.
1566 R.M. Melbourne to SD, 'An Assessment of the Finnish Situation", January 5, 1961, National Security Files, box 70, John F. Kennedy Library (Hereafter JFKL), Boston, Massachusetts, US.
to match.\textsuperscript{1567} Yuri Gagarin's visit to Finland in the summer of 1961, officially as a guest of SNS, was arguably among the Soviets' most successful propaganda moves, which the Americans also followed with some envy.\textsuperscript{1568} 'The lead taken by the Soviet Union in the conquest of space was the one topic with which US officials seemed deeply irritated, not least because Gagarin's space flight was fully exploited in the propaganda activities of both Soviet officials in Finland and local communists who, for instance, handed Finnish workers printed leaflets covering the flight almost immediately after it had been conducted.\textsuperscript{1569}

One of the most effective ways for the two Western governments to react to the expanding Soviet activities was to turn the Finns' eyes to the Soviet Union's recent activities both home and abroad. The Berlin Crisis of August 1961 provided an obvious topic for anti-Soviet propaganda in Finland, just as in other parts of the world. The USIS/Helsinki's campaign on Berlin included the organisation of an exhibition at the America Center, the screening of related USIA-supplied documentaries and newsreels to journalists and civil servants and the distribution of 12,000 copies of the pamphlet \textit{The Berlin Crisis}\textsuperscript{1570}, which presented post-war developments in the divided city and declared West Berlin as being "the lighthouse of freedom in a gloomy sea of totalitarianism".\textsuperscript{1571} In addition to political developments, particularly the Americans started to attract more of the world's attention to Soviet censorship policies and used such banned books as Boris Pasternak's \textit{Doctor Zhivago} as propaganda tools also in Finland.\textsuperscript{1572}

When responding to Soviet propaganda, both the British and Americans acknowledged more than they had done in the mid-1950s that excessively strong attacks on the Soviet Union should be avoided to prevent the Finns from falling into unnecessary trouble. As a result, finding the right line in propaganda content became even more of a balancing act. On the one hand, both Western embassies wished to support anti-communist activities and distribute suitable material through a number of channels, but on the other, they laid great stress on trying not to be associated with any activity regarded as too aggressive. An example of an operation that the Americans felt went too far was the MRA pamphlet 'Ideologia ja rinnakkaiselo' (\textit{Ideology and Co-Existence}) that was posted to every Finnish home in autumn 1959. The publication, originally meant for American readers, emphasised the dangers of communist peace propaganda and promised that the introduction of a deeper sense of morality would make class struggle unnecessary.\textsuperscript{1573} The whole operation caused a great sensation, leading to the Soviet

\textsuperscript{1567} R.M. Melbourne to SD, 'Soviet and Satellite Activities in Finland', January 31, 1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1568} Besides participating in the SNS' 'Friendship Days' held in Kemi, Yuri Gagarin visited Tampere and Helsinki where President Kekkonen gave him an official reception. Gagarin's stay in Finland was a huge event attracting large crowds and generating plenty of media coverage. For instance, 'Pöytäkirja SNS:n puhemiehistön kokouksesta', August 3, 1961, Puhemiehistön pöytäkirjat, box 40, SNS, KA; US Embassy to SD, 'Report of Cultural Exchanges between Soviet Bloc and Finland', November 29, 1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 28, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1569} 'Suojelupoliisin ilmoitus, No At 281, SKP:n perusjärjestöjen toimialojen järjestämä laaja lentolehtien järjestö, Suojelupoliisin arkisto, Helsinki.
\textsuperscript{1570} USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Annual Assessment Report, 1961', March 1, 1962, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1571} 'Berliini 1961' (USIS/Helsinki 1961).
\textsuperscript{1572} Cull 2008, p. 174. US officials in Helsinki were particularly pleased to see how widely Pasternak's forced refusal to accept the Nobel Prize he won for the book was covered by the Finnish media. US Embassy to SD, 'Joint Weekly', November 21, 1958, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 38, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1573} 'Ideologia ja rinnakkaiselo', MRA:n tiedotuslehti N:o 11/1959, Erikoisnumero, MRA.
Union's official protest and the strong condemnation not only by Finnish communists but also by other political parties and even the church. 1574 As for example President Kekkonen linked the MRA with American propaganda in general 1575, which resulted in more press statements critical of the US, the Americans regarded the whole episode as particularly damaging to their objectives in Finland. 1576 Even though various US governmental departments had expressed their interest in cooperating with the MRA at least on the domestic scene, in Finland American officials now wished to distance themselves from the organisation's activities as far as possible. The same applied to a great extent to Whitehall's policy towards the movement. 1577

The overall behaviour of the Finnish press gave the Americans and the British more reason to feel relatively confident about the Finns' ability to resist if not directly the Soviet Union, at least President Kekkonen's policy of appeasement, as the Westerners saw it. Since newspapers like Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet had published several critical comments on the handling of the Night Frost Crisis 1578, particularly US officials remained fairly positive about the future. Although according to them self-censorship in Finnish newspapers did occur, especially in the way many publications preferred to take quotations from the foreign press on Soviet affairs instead of writing critically about the country themselves, the Finnish press's consistent inclusion of a large amount of Western content was regarded as a healthy sign. 1579

As an example of this, Uusi Suomi's cooperative agreement with Time-Life guaranteed that at least topical American news reports and articles on American culture continued to be visibly covered by the Finnish press. 1580 Uusi Suomi brought its Western sympathies forward also with a special EFTA supplement published in June 1961, which focused on presenting Britain's industry and foreign trade as well as British-Finnish relations as commented on by Ambassador Con O'Neill. 1581 In this way, the Finnish paper contributed to one of the main British informational tasks of the time, which first involved convincing the Finns as well as other

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1575 Even before the distribution of the pamphlet, Kekkonen had developed a very reserved attitude to MRA, labelling the movement as the tool for US foreign policy around the world. Kekkonen's reaction to 'Ideologia ja rinnakkaiselo' was fierce and resulted in him writing a strong letter of criticism to those responsible for its delivery. Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1, December 13, 1958, p. 157; Jalovaara 2007, p. 121.
1577 In spite of being impressed with the magnitude MRA operations, the FO first defined its attitude towards the movement as 'neutral'. By 1962 British officials were categorically discouraged from dealing with MRA members in anti-communist activities. J.O. Wright to Mr. Marett, April 26, 1960, FO 1110/1331; C.F.R. Barclay's minutes: 'IRD's view of Moral Re-Armament as an anti-communist weapon', April 18, 1962, FO 1110/1581, both NA.
1580 The cooperation between Uusi Suomi and Time-Life was based on the latter's practice to send advance copies of its editorial content to the wire services and foreign correspondents in New York. The number of translations of Time-Life articles published in Uusi Suomi did not go unnoticed to some readers, who complained that, for example, the article 'Cuban Che' was a direct copy of the original. L. Keyworth to E. Petäjäniemi, December 30, 1957; E. Petäjäniemi to L. Keyworth, January 2, 1958; J. Toivonen to E. Petäjäniemi, August 20, 1960, all US, box 48; 'Pöytäkirja Uuden Suomen neuvottelukunnan kokouksesta', January 7, 1958, Eero Petäjäniemi's collection (EP), box 3, KA.
EFTA members over the sensibility of Finland joining the trade area\textsuperscript{1582}, and after the Finn-EFTA deal had been signed in February 1961 advertising the greater number of British products now available to them.

*Uusi Suomi*’s editorial content also offers a good example of the increasingly problematic position in which Finnish newspapers found themselves after the Night Frost Crisis. Albeit rare, the paper’s criticism of the Finnish Government and its foreign policy provoked, for instance, Urho Kekkonen to make several hostile comments to Leading Editor Eero Petäjäniemi in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{1583} At the same time, the more right wing of *Uusi Suomi* readers and members of Kokoomus expressed their outcry over the paper’s handling with the Government, communism in general and, indeed, the Soviet Union, which they felt was toothless.\textsuperscript{1584} Acting in between the more restricted editorial freedom demanded by, above all, Kekkonen and the wishes of party officials as well as loyal readers was a situation in which a number of Finnish newspapers would increasingly find themselves in the upcoming years.

**Culture Enters Centre Stage**

As British and US officials learnt that their chances of having any impact on Finland through political means, or indeed the media, became to some extent more limited in the late 1950s, both embassies recognised strengthening cultural links as one of the few, if not the only, methods they had left to encourage the Finns to resist Russian encroachment. The increasing attention on cultural diplomacy at the turn of the decade was not only a symptom of the situation in Finland, but also followed the two Western governments’ policies in a larger context. This was the period when the Cold War truly turned more into a contest that was performed through cultural activities, symbolic gestures and East-West cooperation rather than mere crude political propaganda.\textsuperscript{1585}

The Western governments’ relationships with indigenous societies illustrate well the great differences between the approaches the two campaigns had adopted in Finland by the late 1950s. US officials in Helsinki emphasised collaboration with the Finnish-American Society with greater intent than ever before. The Americans made sure that their renewed interest in cultural presentation on the grassroots level was not a mere gesture of sympathy, either. The

\textsuperscript{1582} See, for example, Aunesluoma 2011, p. 209.

\textsuperscript{1583} Kekkonen’s letters and phone calls, sometimes made by his adjutant, to newspaper editors became more frequent again in the 1960s. For example, U. Kekkonen to E. Petäjäniemi, September 10, 1960; U. Kekkonen to E. Petäjäniemi, April 29, 1963; ‘Telephone conversation between R. Grönvall and E. Petäjäniemi’, May 12, 1960, all EP, box 1, KA.

\textsuperscript{1584} In the late 1950s and early 1960s *Uusi Suomi* received a number of complaints from actors like Tauno Jalanti and Tuure Jurnila, according to whom the paper no longer represented party values and was too soft when reporting about the government as well as foreign news. T. Jalanti to E. Petäjäniemi, April 13, 1959, box 1; T. Jurnila to Uusi Suomi, ‘Uuden Suomen ja Kokoomuksen suhteista’, January 26, 1961, box 3, both EP, KA; Vares 2008, pp. 383-385.

\textsuperscript{1585} In addition to the cultural exchange agreement signed between the US and the Soviet Union, Britain launched its cooperation with a number of communist countries as a result of a conscious decision made to influence the Eastern Europeans through the slower methods conducted by the British Council. I.T.M. Pink to K. Szarka, ‘Hungarian Cultural Programme’, January 23, 1962; B.M.H. Tripp to S. Viederman, ‘Note on British Council activities in connection with Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary’, February 6, 1962, both FO 924/1431, NA.
most significant development was the USIS/Helsinki's increasing involvement in language teaching in the various local chapters. Particularly, hiring more English teachers from the US and the establishment of a summer seminar for their Finnish colleagues, both activities that would have been impossible without USIS support, gave this activity some eagerly desired stimulus. USIS officials cooperated with society members also on the organisation of the annual American Days by displaying their own exhibitions and providing assistance in inviting prominent visitors to the festivities. The greater value now given by the Americans to the event was well evident in the way Ambassador John Hickerson insisted on bringing the 686th Air Force Band stationed in Germany, known also as 'The Ambassadors', to play at the America Days in Joensuu in 1958 after the orchestra's performances in Lappeenranta in 1956 and Vaasa in 1957 had generated wide appeal among younger Finns, something to which the Americans were drawing greater attention.

Whereas the Americans only expanded their cultural cooperation with the Finns, the relatively slim resources with which the British had to operate brought considerable change to the British Council's main tasks in Finland, which throughout the 1950s had included the projection of Britain in general, the promotion of the English language and the support given to the network of anglophile societies. Although the importance of these societies, some fifty of them in 1959, as venues for social activities and, above all, for learning the English language was undisputed, the BC's decision to adapt a more passive role in supporting the societies' activities was introduced gradually. The British felt that there no longer was a similar kind of need to encourage spontaneously-sprung Finnish-British societies as there had been in the first post-war years when the societies "provided a needed emotional outlet by means of which it could be demonstrated that Finland stood in desperate need of friendship with and from the world in general and with Britain in particular". In 1961, the Council stressed that it should no longer artificially sustain life in the smallest moribund societies by providing them with, for example, lecturers and films, and deliberately passed the initiative to the Finns themselves. Naturally, all this did not mean that support, usually in the form of teacher-secretaries, was no longer provided to larger societies on request.

As the British Council no longer regarded anglophile societies as its number one priority, the focus was gradually moved to other areas. In 1962, the Council determined strengthening its relationship with the universities and other educational bodies as its main task, ahead of supporting the Finnish-British societies. The other listed primary objectives, i.e. to make known and develop the use of the library and to make a significant contribution to cultural life

1586 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisten Yhdistyksien toiminnasta v. 1957'; 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisten Yhdistyksien toiminnasta v. 1961', Vuosikokousten pöytäkirjat, box 2, SAYL, KA.
1587 E.G. Chapman to SD, 'Thirteenth Annual American Days Festival, Joensuu, Finland', September 26, 1958, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 28, NARA; Suomi-Finland USA 4-5/1959.
1588 'The British Council, Finland: Representative's Annual Report, 1958–1959', BW 30/6, NA.
1590 Ibid.
1591 C. O'Neill to Earl of Home, June 20, 1961, BW 30/14, NA.
in general, not only in Helsinki, but also in the provinces, show that the British were increasingly giving thought to suitable methods for projecting their country.

The British Council's role in the field of education was by no means restricted to lobbying for an increasing number of English lectureships or expanding the number of scholarships and the exchange programme for both Finnish and British students and academics. Indeed, the Council, for example, provided constant support for institutions such as the Teachers’ Training College at Jyväskylä and, in a more general sense, sought to form a warm relationship with the Finnish student bodies and encourage exchange between the students of Finnish and British universities. In order to accomplish the latter objective, the BC was deeply involved in schemes for the establishment of special relationships between, for example, the Universities of Turku and Southampton and Helsinki and Hull.\(^{1593}\) What the British Council felt was crucial in expanding all educational cooperation was the fruitful relationship formed with the Finnish Education Minister Heikki Hosia, whose visit to London in January 1961 produced a reciprocal visit from his British colleague, Sir Davis Eccles in May 1961.\(^{1594}\)

The conditions for all kind of British Council activity certainly remained favourable in Finland. On several occasions BC representatives, almost with a sense of surprise, pointed out that in spite of Finland's political neutrality, the Finnish people felt themselves part of the West. The interest in studying English kept growing year after year and the British estimated that there must have been few countries in the world where enthusiasm in learning the language was greater than it was in Finland. In this area the British, rather arrogantly, continued to claim that they almost had a monopoly in Finland. In spite of all of the newly emerged American effort, it was not until 1968 that US officials were reported to have made a serious effort to influence English language training by appointing teachers to schools.\(^{1595}\) For instance, the facts that in 1960 the University of Helsinki was reported to have the largest English department in Europe and that two bookstores in the city centre of Helsinki jointly claimed to have the largest range of English books in any European bookshop outside Britain also indicated that the demand for BC activities could not have been described as being anything but vast.

While Ambassador Busk strongly stressed the importance of using the British Council's resources in a country so exposed to Soviet influence as efficiently as possible, he felt that the Council was lacking the drive to do so. Particularly worrying, noted Sir Douglas, were the limited use of the BC library, the slow expansion of Finnish-British societies and, above all, the inadequate number of visitors from Britain.\(^{1596}\) According to the Ambassador, visits by lecturers were of the greatest value and should be given top priority "in a country besieged by visitors from the East".\(^{1597}\) For this reason he felt that arrangements should be made for distinguished people visiting the Soviet Union under British Council auspices to stop in Helsinki on their way to or from Moscow to meet professional and scientific bodies and, when appropriate, to lecture to Finnish-British societies. Mr Busk did not deny the importance of the BC sending musical

\(^{1593}\) 'The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961—1962', BW 30/14, NA.

\(^{1594}\) 'The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1960—1961', BW 30/14, NA.

\(^{1595}\) 'The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1967—1968', BW 30/14, NA.

\(^{1596}\) D.L. Busk to Earl of Home, August 3, 1960, FO 924/1351, NA.

\(^{1597}\) D.L. Busk to Earl of Home, November 9, 1960, BW 30/8, NA.
and theatrical manifestations and exhibitions to Finland, either, but he was frustrated to see that a large number of exhibitions sent to the three Scandinavian countries never made it to Finnish shores.\footnote{D.L. Busk to Earl of Home, August 3, 1960, FO 924/1351, NA.}

Even though a large share of Busk’s criticism resulted from the limited resources available, the Ambassador’s report did serve as something of a catalyst for the British Council. Particularly the arrangement of more frequent visits by senior British figures to Finland was taken into account at the Foreign Office.\footnote{A.A.F. Haigh to L. Phillips, January 9, 1961, BW 30/8, NA.} Indeed, the following years produced a much richer catalogue of visits by prominent British lecturers and artists. For example, in 1962 Finland was visited by several British experts especially in the fields of medicine and drama, which was to become a particular area of focus in the upcoming years. The establishment of the Drama Department at what was then known as the Finnish Theatrical School in September 1962 was one interesting development in which the British offered their valuable expertise.\footnote{The visits of theatre companies also became more frequent with the visits of the Royal Shakespeare Company made in 1964 and 1968 as particular highlights. ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1962—1963’, ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1967—1968’, both BW 30/14, NA.}

The British Council’s relocation to larger and more central premises in Eteläesplanadi in July 1961 also had an immediate effect in terms of expanding its cultural activities. The number of library members and borrowed books grew particularly fast, the latter figure reaching almost 12,000 in 1961.\footnote{‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961—1962’, BW 30/14, NA.} In addition to benefits of a more central location, one of the principal advantages of the new premises was that they offered room for lectures, film shows, recitals and other such activities. For example, the majority of the weekly meetings of the Helsinki Finnish-British Society were now held on the BC premises.\footnote{‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1962—1963’, BW 30/14, NA.} Besides the new premises and the growing number of British visitors, the other significant step of progress recorded by the Council in the late 1950s and early 1960s included the growing number of international congresses held in Finland.\footnote{For example, ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1959—1960’, BW 30/14, NA.}

The fact that after several years of inactivity the British Council returned to the field of visual arts in Finland by organising two exhibitions on twentieth-century art shows that the Council was now not only in a better position to import such collections, but that the British were also at least to some extent ready to reinvent their cultural programme rather than carry on focusing merely on the promotion of literary works from the likes of Charles Dickens or Oscar Wilde. Both the first exhibition on English modern graphic art, opened at Ateneum in June 1960, and the collection ‘English Aquarelles and Drawings from the Twentieth Century’, also on display in other major towns in 1962, presented an overview of new works from entirely new artists as well as more established names such as Henry Moore.\footnote{‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1959—1960, Appendix B’, BW 30/14, NA.} Although the Americans continued

\footnote{Exhibition programme: ‘Englantilaisia akvarelleja ja piirustuksia xx vuosisadalta’, box STA/AT/62, Ateneumin taide museon arkisto, Suomen taideakatemian säätiön arkisto, KKA; Helsingin Sanomat, June 23, 1960.}
their promotion of modern art, most notably through MoMA's 'Modern American Drawings' exhibition held at Taidehalli in spring 1962, the BC activities did, at least according to newspaper reviews, confirm that the US was no longer the only forerunner in the presentation of contemporary visual arts.1606

As the increased activities suggest, to say that the lack of adequate resources held back British cultural operations in Finland would to some extent miss the point. Once again it has to be noted that the funds provided for British Council activities in Helsinki continued to be comparatively high.1607 More extensive Foreign Office support was, however, far from being axiomatic, which meant that the British Embassy in Helsinki continued its constant plea for extra funds for cultural diplomacy by determining the significance of such a move. For example, Ambassador Con O’Neill defended the need for more resources in June 1961 by noting the following to the FO: “In any foreign country the activity of the British Council on the cultural front can play a big part in maintaining good relations and increasing British influence and prestige. In Finland, which is Western in culture and outlook, and needs and desires to maintain the closest possible contact with the West – but with which, because of its neutrality, it is impossible to establish political links – the British Council has a particularly important role to play. It cannot do so on the cheap”.1608

Even though the British managed to step up their cultural operations in the early 1960s and carry out a reasonably successful programme, their, in real terms fairly narrow, resources always made the task difficult. Furthermore, the expanding cultural activities of other countries in Finland meant that Britain faced growing competition in the field. The BC agreed with the general description of Helsinki being ‘the world’s smallest metropolis’ as the capital was frequently visited by soloists, conductors, orchestras and ballet ensembles from several European countries.1609 The British were, to a certain point, pleased to report about the growing efforts made by the United States and France, but the reaction to the growing operations of West Germany was somewhat more complex. The West German Government started in the late 1950s to invest more in cultural diplomacy also in Finland, for instance by organising a number of impressive film festivals, musical performances and special exhibitions.1610 The opening of a Goethe Institut branch in Helsinki in October 1963, in particular, symbolised a new beginning in Finnish-German relations. In general, the British were satisfied with the renewed German activities, but a feeling of emerging rivalry and even envy can be sensed from the way they reported about the much larger number of scholarships and bursaries the Germans were able to offer to Finnish students or the decision to again grant students of the German School in Helsinki the possibility to gain matriculation certificates in accordance with

1606 For example, Uusi Suomi, July 10, 1960; Aamulehti, February 27, 1962.
1607 In the middle of all the complaints made over the size of funding, the British Council’s annual budget for Helsinki had by 1961 been expanded again, now to £22,000. Memorandum by R.H. Mason, January 30, 1961; Brief No.4, ‘Anglo-American discussions, Western policy towards Finland’, both FO 371/159309, NA.
1608 C. O’Neill to Earl of Home, June 20, 1961, BW 30/14, NA.
the regulations applicable in West Germany.\textsuperscript{1611} The Germans were also regaining lost ground in the field of language. Indeed, when telling the story about the expanding popularity of Anglo-American culture and English language in Finland, one should not forget that in 1960 around a half of Finnish school children still learnt German as their first foreign language.\textsuperscript{1612}

As for the cultural activities of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the British were not particularly worried about their magnitude or long-term impact.\textsuperscript{1613} East Germany made something of an exception due to the growing cultural competition in which it started to engage with the West Germans also in Finland.\textsuperscript{1614} The impact of this campaign did not as such concern British officials, but they wished to convince the Finns that it was not in their interest to give East Germany a free hand in distributing excessively anti-Western propaganda in the country. Although his task remained a part of British operations in Helsinki, by the 1960s the British Embassy had adopted a somewhat more patient approach to communist countries' propaganda in Finland compared to the strongly responsive policy it had practised ten years earlier. This became evident in February 1959 when both the US and France made a formal protest to the Finnish Foreign Ministry over the hostility some drawings displayed at an East German art exhibition expressed against their respective countries, but the British decided to resort to mere unofficial criticism.\textsuperscript{1615}

As much as the Americans increased their cooperation with the Finnish-American Society, the exchange of persons programme remained overwhelmingly the most important part of the USIS's cultural and educational section. The steady growth in the number of people visiting the US through the various exchange programmes had by now become a truly worldwide phenomenon as the US Government had started to invest even more in bringing promising young people to their country.\textsuperscript{1616} Although the Americans transformed, for instance, the Leader Program into a global activity, one should remember that between 1950-1962 over 60 per cent of the grants awarded under this category were given to Western Europeans.\textsuperscript{1617}

In relative terms, Finland continued to enjoy a greater share of the exchange of persons programme's activity than most other countries. In addition to the rising number of students and scholars spending time in the US, the Americans now paid particular attention to two groups of Finnish people: specialists and youth. For the former group, US officials identified media, marketing and management professionals as the individuals they regarded as the most


\textsuperscript{1612} Saarinen 1999, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{1613} This rivalry saw the East Germans organise their own film festivals, art exhibitions and trade fairs as well as open a cultural institute in central Helsinki in November 1960. Putensen 1999, pp. 97-109.

\textsuperscript{1614} British Embassy to S.H. Hebblethwaite, 'East German propaganda exhibition in Finland', March 11, 1959, FO 371/142802, NA.

\textsuperscript{1615} Various surveys made on the long term impact of the Fulbright programme in particular had convinced the Americans of the significance of presenting their country to potential world leaders. For example, 'A Report to the President on the Educational Exchange Program under the Fulbright Act by the Board of Foreign Scholarships', Department of State Publication 6832, June 1959, FUSEEC, box 2, KA; Sussman, Leonard R., The Culture of Freedom. The Small World of Fulbright Scholars (Savage, MD 1992), pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{1616} Scott-Smith, Giles, Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-70 (Brussels 2008), p. 40.
suitable for their overall foreign policy objectives. The ASLA-Fulbright programme, together with the Ford Foundation, enabled an even more impressive number of prominent Finnish journalists and influential media directors, such as Aatos Erkko and Jussi Koskiluoma, to visit American shores. While the Americans also placed increasing emphasis on inviting more representatives from the political right and centre to their country, the traditional target group, the social democrats, was hardly neglected. A good indication of this was another ASLA leader grant awarded to Väinö Leskinen in 1959, which he used for a three-month trip “to learn about the US as a holiday destination, to get more acquainted with the trade unions and observe the planning of new hospitals”.

1961 was a particularly busy year in terms of bringing Finnish leaders and specialists to the US. One of the main reasons for this was the 'Operation Neutrality' campaign that the State Department had launched for increasing long-term activities that would hopefully undermine the Finns' concept of neutralism. Not only was the number of grants awarded to Finns increased considerably, but at the same time various special projects were executed. One of these schemes led to the invitation of a group of Finnish marketing trainees to the US, while another saw representatives of fifteen Finnish youth organisations cross the Atlantic. The American objective of having at least some kind of an impact on future Finnish leaders was, without doubt, hitting its goal as can be concluded from the fact that out of the ministers in office for example in 1970, almost 50 per cent had spent some time in the US. The exchange of people programme also managed to reach leading politicians coming to power in later decades with the most famous example being long-time Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, who won a Fulbright scholarship to study at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, in 1960-1961. While it might be too much to say that this experience reshaped his political ideology completely, not many people can define his foreign policies as having been anti-American.

The objective of associating with younger Finns was also taken into account when awarding grants to Americans wishing to work or study in Finland. In this area, developing and expanding American Studies as a discipline remained as the number one priority. The number of professors and lecturers travelling to Finland to teach American civilisation and literature continued to grow steadily. At the same time, the Teacher Development Programme also

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1619 ‘List of Grantees FY 1959’, FUSEEC, box 167, KA.
1623 Tarkka 2012, p. 103; Rislakki 2010, p. 179.
1624 In his memoirs, Lipponen makes no secret of the profound impact the year he spent in the US had on him and his understanding of the world. Besides the versatile courses he took on philosophy, US history and sociology, Lipponen praised the way the many travels and jobs he took around the country reshaped his view of America also. In fact, he even considered moving to the country permanently. Lipponen, Paavo, Muistelmat I (Helsinki 2009), pp. 102-123.
flourished, as US officials underlined the long-term importance of increasing Finnish teachers’ knowledge of American society and educational methods. This operation now included awarding grants to Finnish teachers, ranging from elementary and secondary teachers, to vocational school teachers, as well as funding, for instance, an American professor to the Jyväskylä University College’s Institute of Special Education. Another dimension in increasing American influence in Finnish youth was the growing cooperation in the field of sport. This collaboration saw an exchange programme arranging a two-week coaching session given to the famous Finnish basketball team Panterit by Ohio State University’s basketball coach Floyd S. Stahl. These kinds of short visits only show how more specific and thoroughly planned the American specialist programme had become by the late 1950s. In addition to cultural activity, ranging from lectures on negro spirituals given by sociologist Zelma George and support provided to the Finnish theatre to more general book exhibitions, the exchange programme also provided funds for prominent American politicians who wished to travel to the small northern country. The most visible visit took place in July 1958 when leading Democratic politician Adlai Stevenson made a four-day stop to Finland as a Ford Foundation grantee on his way to Moscow.

One key aspect to, in particular, the US campaign in Finland throughout the study period was the gestures of goodwill expressed to the Finns. Besides encouraging Finland to promote its culture abroad, the Americans wished to give the country the message that they appreciated its history and national character. The sense of goodwill that many Americans felt towards Finland was, of course, a consequence of the widely advertised claim of the northern country being the only state to pay its entire First World War debt to the US. While this dimension of ‘Finnish honesty’ continued to be emphasised, the US Government took the importance of providing at least moral support to the projection of Finnish culture and history into account also in a number of other contexts. For instance, the Americans assisted the Finns in presenting...

1628 In April 1959, Zelma George, noted sociologist, lecturer and singer gave a 14-day tour that was arranged jointly between USIS/Helsinki and the Finnish-American Society in cooperation with Finnish institutions of higher education. The tour generated extensive and favourable coverage both in the Helsinki and rural newspapers. US Embassy to SD, ‘American Specialist Program; Dr. Zelma George’s Visit to Finland, April 2-16, 1959’, May 28, 1959, RG 59, Records of the Plans and Development Staff, Evaluation Branch, 1955-1960, Lot 62D 321 CU/EV, box 27, NARA.
1629 In the late 1950s, the US influence in Finnish theatre was also growing. One decisive reason for this was the work of F. Cowles Strickland, who lived in Helsinki in 1957-1959 as a Fulbright grantee. During his time in Helsinki Mr. Strickland, former theatre teacher at Stanford University, taught future actors and even directed one play, Thornton Wilder’s ‘The Matchmaker’, at the Finnish National Theatre. News Bulletin: ‘Theatre Fulbright in Finland’, written by F. Cowles Strickland, April 1960, CU, CPP, box 50, UAL. For book exhibitions in Finland, US Embassy to SD, ‘Educational and Cultural Exchange: FY 1961’, August 14, 1961, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
1630 The fact that Stevenson’s stay was arranged jointly by the US Embassy and the Finnish-American Society gives yet another indication of the closer cooperation in which the two actors had engaged. 'Kertomus Suomalais-Amerikkalaisten Yhdistyksen toiminnasta v. 1958', Vuosikokousen pöytäkirja, box 2, SAYL, KA; Suomi-Finland USA 3/1958.
the works of Jean Sibelius. Whereas the BBC devoted a number of special programmes to the composer's achievements, the Americans' support to the cause materialised, for example, in granting Dr. Harold E. Johnson a Fulbright research scholarship to write a biography of Sibelius, which was eventually published in 1959. A more direct example of expressing support to the Finns was the project in which the US Embassy in Helsinki, with the help of the USIA and the State Department, saw to it that the Champions of Liberty US postage stamp series issued a stamp in honour of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. The issuance of the stamp, published in the 1960 series, was marked with twin ceremonies in Helsinki and Washington. As the project was widely covered throughout the Finnish media, US officials felt that it strongly contributed to the quest of "demonstrating American interest in Finland and the common cultural heritage and identity of political beliefs shared by the two countries". The USIS/Helsinki also fulfilled the task of showing greater interest in Finland by keeping prominent Finnish politicians, such as Väinö Tanner, up to date about what had been written about them in American publications.

The American Trade Fair held at Messukeskus, Helsinki in May-June 1961, known as 'Amerikka Tänään' (America Today), gave USIS officials an excellent opportunity to present their country to the Finnish public. Even though the fair focused mostly on presenting American businesses and consumer products, the promotion of American culture and way of life was given centre stage in promoting the event. The fair's supporting programme included such attention-seeking events as performances of the air force's Skyblazers jet team, concerts and parades by the Air Force Band and basketball matches played by the Harlem Globetrotters. The American presence was also highly visible in the streets of Helsinki through posters of Uncle Sam as well American goods displaced at department stores and other shop windows.

Although the American Trade Fair caught plenty of attention, the event did not quite live up to its expectations. One of the central themes for the exhibition, i.e. to present the Finns with products that most of them had never seen before and such potentially large-selling equipment as the colour television, was not presented adequately enough, the Americans concluded. The Finns, on the other hand, claimed that most of the exhibited products were already available to them. Whereas the American Home 1953 was unanimously praised, now some Finnish publications, such as the economic weekly Talouselämä and Kotiliesi, devoted to

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1631 Over the years, the BBC aired a number of programmes on Sibelius and his music. In 1955, the BBC wished to produce a TV film to mark Sibelius' 90th birthday, but the project never materialised due to the composer's old age. Y. Kaarne to Finnish Embassy, March, 19, 1955; A. Vartia to Foreign Ministry, June 29, 1955; both 41E Englanti, UMA.
1633 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Annual Assessment Report for Period Ending December 31, 1960', RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
1634 For example, H.F. Nelson to V. Tanner, May 2, 1961, Väinö Tanner's collection II, box 5, KA.
1636 E. Cox to The Councellor of Embassy, 'Suggestions for US Trade Fair in Helsinki', October 10, 1960, RG 84, USEH CGR, 1936-1962, Entry UD 2440, box 148, NARA.
household life, directly criticised the displayed products and even questioned American taste for home decoration. While these comments could be interpreted as some of the first symptoms of Finns becoming slightly more critical of everything related to the US, the fact that the same exhibition had previously been presented in Moscow, with the title 'People's Capitalism', partly explains why it seemed outdated to the Finnish market. The visiting numbers for the fair backs the notion of an exhibition that was poorly adjusted to local conditions. The figure of 116,000 paled in comparison with what the British had achieved in 1957 and was even 4,000 smaller than the number of people the Soviets managed to attract for their exhibition in 1959, which must have been a great embarrassment to the Americans.

CIA-Funded Activities Find Their Way to Finnish Shores

Although in recent years our knowledge of the sheer magnitude of CIA operations around the world, and also in Finland, has decisively increased, the continuing classification of a great number of agency files as secret makes the evaluation of its activities to some extent guesswork. What we do know about the CIA and the significance of its activities regarding Finland concerns by and large its role as collector of intelligence as well as a financier. The former, of course, comprised the agency's core activities also in Finland, a country seen as one of the important centres for gathering information about the Soviet Union's military bases and the country's technological developments as well as about communist activities in general. In collecting intelligence, the CIA continued to receive plenty of help from the Finns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The exchange of information between Suojelupoliisi and the CIA kept increasing during this period, which can be concluded, for instance, by the way the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn was handled. The Americans also received a flurry of reports on, above all, Finnish communists from organisations like the Finnish Foreign Ministry, SYT and the SDP.

When discussing Finnish actors' relationship with the CIA, the topic must be placed into the right historical context. In the Cold War decades, the agency's strong involvement in Finland resulted, naturally, in a growing number of connections established between its officials and Finnish politicians and civil servants. Whereas the Americans used the information they received for intelligence and propaganda purposes, the Finns engaging in discussion with them did so

1638 In addition to criticising the decoration's taste and the lack of new household equipment, Kotiliesi was particularly irritated with the fact that the few new products on show at the exhibition, such as the electronic oven, could not even be purchased. Ibid.; Kotiliesi 13/1961; Talouselämä 23/1961; Pantzar 2000, p. 172.
1640 In particular, Talouselämä's commentator felt that the Americans had underestimated the Finns by putting up a show based on mere superficiality and meant for a third world audience. Talouselämä 23/1961.
1642 In December 1961, Anatoli Golitsyn, KGB officer posted in Helsinki, applied for asylum in the US from Frank Friberg, head of CIA operations in Helsinki. Golitsyn was quickly moved to Washington where he gave information concerning Finns with KGB connections, including such notable politicians as Urho Kekkonen and Emil Skog. During the incident, the CIA and Suojelupoliisi busily exchanged information between each other. Rentola 2009, pp. 25-45.
1643 For example, Rislakki, Jukka, Erittäin salainen - Vakoilu Suomessa (Helsinki 1982), p. 332.
mainly for political and ideological reasons, not unlike their compatriots who were in regular contact with KGB officials. As forming contacts with foreign officials posted in Helsinki was a natural part of the 'political game' in Finland, the public revelations that are every now and again made by the Finnish media over certain politicians' CIA contacts are as a rule drawn out of proportion. The last piece of information about which the Finnish press reported in a sensational tone was based on a lecture given by Kimmo Rentola, in which he mentioned that figures like Väinö Leskinen, Max Jakobson and Johannes Virolainen had shared information with CIA officials in Helsinki mainly in the 1960s and 1970s.\footnote{See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, June 14, 2013.} For anyone familiar with Finnish politics during the Cold War decades this claim could not have come as a total surprise, particularly with regard to Leskinen and Jakobson. When one takes into consideration the US objective of increasing contacts with Agrarian Party politicians, particularly those not belonging to the 'K Line' group, there is nothing scandalous about Mr Virolainen's appearance on the list, either. In addition to collecting political information from Agrarian Party politicians, the Americans wished, above all, to convince them of the importance of forming coalition governments with the social democrats and excluding the communists. In order to make Virolainen, who already had profound ministerial experience, more acquainted with their country, the US Embassy even awarded him a leader grant twice, which the Finn declined from using.\footnote{Virolainen was awarded the ASLA Leader Grant for 1960 and 1963. E.O. Sessions to J. Virolainen, December 3, 1959; R.M. Hughes to J. Virolainen, March 17, 1964, both Johannes Virolainen's collection (JV), box 14, KA.} In the early 1960s, Virolainen was also a regular receiver of IRD material. At one point this caused some confusion among IRD officials, as they felt that someone with Mr Virolainen's sympathies was not a suitable recipient of, for instance, \textit{The Interpreter}.\footnote{By Virolainen sympathies the officials presumably meant his then relatively close ties with Kekkonen and support for his foreign policy, E.R. Allott to B. Spencer, April 13, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA.} Even after the British Embassy decided that providing Virolainen with IRD publications was unlikely to serve any purpose\footnote{The British Embassy explained Virolainen's inclusion on the list by noting that in Finland private sympathies may not always coincide with outward appearance, but in the end agreed to stop supplying him with IRD content. B. Spencer to E.R. Allott, April 17, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA.}, the politician continued to receive such COI-produced publications as \textit{Commonwealth Survey}.\footnote{J.B. Denson to J. Virolainen, October 21, 1959: B. Spencer to J. Virolainen, July 13, 1964, both JV, box 5, KA.}

The lack of detailed information about CIA operations in Finland also restricts one from making a thorough analysis of the agency's involvement in propaganda operations in Finland. At present, neither conclusive documents showing how much exactly the CIA influenced the journalistic line of, for example, AP, UP, NBC or \textit{Time-Life}, nor reports on how much of this material was actually reproduced in Finland are available. As has previously been noted, the agency's impact on propaganda and cultural diplomacy around the world was so conclusive that it is safe to say that a considerable share of even non-USIA-produced American journalistic and cultural products available in Finland, including films, magazines and books, particularly the ones published by Praeger\footnote{For example, Lindfors, Jorma & Rislakki, Jukka, \textit{CIA – Selvitys Yhdysvaltain tiedustelupalvelun toimista maailmalla ja Suomessa} (Helsinki 1978), p. 394.}, had the CIA's handprint on them in one way or the other. The agency's involvement in propaganda operations in Finland was not limited to this kind of indirect impact, either. The late 1950s and early 1960s was still a time when the CIA placed a
small number of selected personnel undercover in USIS offices. Considering that the share of CIA agents at the US Embassy in Helsinki was exceptionally high, the close cooperation between the intelligence agency and the USIA was more than obvious in the country. Indeed, as some of the American press attachés posted in Helsinki had direct CIA connections, it is often more or less impossible to distinguish the two agencies' operations from each other. What the CIA's strong involvement in the USIS/Helsinki's propaganda activities clearly indicates is that the intelligence agency's role in Finland was much more complicated than that of a mere collector of information, as it has traditionally been viewed.

In the late 1950s, the CIA's influence in Finland grew also through the organisations it supported. The rise of cultural operations to the very core of anti-communist activities in Europe expanded, in particular, Congress for Cultural Freedom activity. Forming a larger network of notable authors and academics to discuss topical events and condemn communist policies now became the organisation's primary task. Northern Europe was one of the areas in which the CCF wished to invest more, since activity in the region had clearly lagged behind as compared to many parts of Central Europe. The Congress had two offices in Scandinavia, in Copenhagen and Uppsala, but the scale of their activities left plenty of room for improvement. The relatively slow pace at which CCF activities were implemented in North Europe did not, however, mean that they were altogether insignificant. In Denmark, the local CCF committee, for instance, organised cultural evenings and cooperated closely with the political and cultural magazine Perspektiv. In Sweden, the local CCF sub-branch, Svenska kommunittén för kulturens frihet, also attracted a respectable number of authors and other intellectuals from the non-communist left as its members and published its own magazine Kulturkontakt, which voiced strong criticism of the repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as the situation in South Africa. CCF-related content was also to some extent used by the broader Swedish press, most notably Dagens Nyheter, whose Editor-in-Chief Herbert Tingsten was among the leading Swedish CCF activists.

Finland's relation to the CCF was somewhat limited throughout the 1950s. This is hardly surprising as, for instance, opening a separate office in Helsinki would have been a highly controversial move given Finland's sensitive situation. Furthermore, Finnish cultural personalities' international connections were so scarce that it prevented the organisation from having almost any influence in the country. No Finns took part either in the CCF's founding meeting in Berlin in 1950 or the large international conference held in Milan in 1955. When

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1650 Arndt 2005, p. 221.
1652 Ibid., pp. 400-404.
1653 The establishment of a single Scandinavian office was proposed in 1952, but the disagreements between the Danes and the Swedes prevented turning the idea into practice. Philipsen, Ingeborg, 'Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark 1953-1960' in Scott-Smith & Krabbendam (eds.) 2003, pp. 239-241.
1654 Ibid., pp. 242-248.
1657 'Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit: Teilnehmer am Berliner Kongress', June 1950; "The Future of Freedom" - Fifth International Conference Sponsored by The Congress for Cultural Freedom, Milan 12-17 September 1955,
Finnish actors were involved with CCF-associated persons, it mainly took place in a Scandinavian context. In addition to Finnish authors and academics travelling mostly to Stockholm to take part in some CCF-sponsored cultural event, on some occasions the congress headquarters in Paris offered funding for lecturers visiting Scandinavia to include Finland in their itinerary. Otherwise, CCF activity in Finland was largely restricted to contacting certain influential individuals, for instance by posting them CCF-sponsored publications. Among the Finnish intellectuals to receive these magazines was L.A. Puntila, Professor of political history and an active anti-communist, to whom the CCF, via the USIS/Helsinki, started to offer *Der Monat* in 1955.

Towards the late 1950s, the CCF started to pay even more attention to the north. In 1960, the congress finally opened a separate Scandinavian office in Copenhagen under the leadership of librarian and journalist Jörgen Schleimann. Besides making the Danish operations more effective, Schleimann gave great care in increasing CCF contacts throughout the northern region. In the late 1950s, acting still as the unofficial representative of the CCF in Scandinavia, he made at least two trips to Finland. During the first visit in March 1958, Schleimann, for instance, talked to Arvo Tuominen. Their meeting resulted in the Dane writing an article on communist politician Yrjö Leino's controversial memoirs that was published in several CCF-funded papers. Schleimann's second trip to Finland in January 1960 was devoted to forming more contacts with Finnish journalists from papers like *Hufvudstadsbladet* and *Uusi Suomi* as well as with such authors and literary critics as Tuomas Anhava.

While Schleimann was expanding his contact network in Finland, CCF work related to the country also increased through the committee in Sweden. In the late 1950s, Swedish CCF activists started to invite a greater number of Finnish intellectuals to their country to take part in various cultural programmes. Among the events receiving three guests from Finland was the young writers' conference held in Stockholm in January 1957 that was attended by Tuomas Anhava, Jörn Donner and Jouko Tyyri. An example of an activity specifically designed for Finns, and closely followed by CCF headquarters, was the organisation of literary evenings in Stockholm and Uppsala in November 1959 given by four Finnish Swedish-speaking poets, Gunnar Björling, Rabbe Enckell, Solveig von Scholtz and Bo Carpelan. This was not the only CCF-sponsored activity in which Carpelan, later to become one of Finland's most highly-regarded authors, took part in Scandinavia. In the previous year, he had already lectured on...
Finnish literature at the University of Uppsala at the Swedish committee's request. In spring 1961, he was invited to participate in a seminar in Norway, which was made possible with CCF funds posted from Paris.

The quest of involving Finnish actors more closely with the international activities of the CCF took another leap forward in 1960 when the international authors' conference in Copenhagen was attended not only by Carpelan and Tyyri, but also by Kai Laitinen, critic and Leading Editor of the literary magazine *Parnasso*. The intention of this event was to hold a discussion on writers' relationship with the welfare state, which would eventually lead to the publication of a book on the same topic. As the CCF felt that the conference had included representatives from too many cultural backgrounds, it came up with the idea of arranging a separate session on the issue for Nordic authors. For arranging such a meeting, Pierre Emmanuel, French poet and CCF official, contacted Jouko Tyyri, whom he now regarded as the most active Finnish contact. Mr Tyyri agreed with Mr Emmanuel's suggestion and organised the seminar in Helsinki in November 1960 under the name 'The Writer and Society'. The increasing cooperation between Finnish and Scandinavian authors opened the path for the CCF to contact more Finns also from the world of academia. The Congress was now finally able to attract Finnish participants to its worldwide conferences, as was the case with the Berlin Conference of 1960 for which invitations were sent to two Finnish academics: Heikki Waris, Professor of social policy at the University of Helsinki, and Tuttu Tarkiainen, Professor of political science at the Yhteiskunnallinen korkeakoulu ('The School of Social Sciences').

As the Finns' association with CCF activity remained somewhat scarce in spite of their growing participation in various conferences, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the organisation's strongest impact on Finland was generated by the expansion of its publication activities. While CCF-associated publications, above all *Encounter*, had been received and at times even used by larger Finnish newspapers, the foundation of the new Forum Service in autumn 1957 increased the flow of available material. As the CCF's publications had previously been directed to small cultural and intellectual circles, the aim of the news service was to reach the broader masses more directly by offering expert analyses of political, cultural and intellectual developments to newspapers and magazines around the world free of charge. That the service was formed under the general direction of Melvin Lasky, former Editor of *Der Monat*.

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1664 *Svenska kommittén för kulturens frihet - Årsberättelse 1958*; SKFKF, box 2, ARAB.
1665 G. Stang to I. Katz, April 8, 1961, CCFC, Series III, box 33, UC.
1666 For example, P. Emmanuel to B. Carpelan, August 3, 1960, CCFC Series II, box 101, UC. For Kai Laitinen's report on the conference, see Helsingin Sanomat, October 7, 1960.
1667 P. Emmanuel to J. Tyyri, September 20, 1960, September 30, 1960 & October 10, 1960, all CCFC, Series II, box 101; P. Emmanuel to J. Schleimann, November 21, 1960, CCFC, Series III, box 33, all UC.
1668 P. Emmanuel to J. Tyyri, October 10, 1960; J. Schleimann to S. Charles, both CCFC, Series III, box 33, UC.
1669 J. Schleimann to K. Laitinen, June 3, 1960, CCFC, Series II, box 101, UC.
1670 Articles originally published in *Encounter* were re-produced in a number of leading newspapers in the 1950s, including Helsingin Sanomat. The inclusion of *Encounter* material was not very extensive and was usually made by shortly referring to the original stories. The reproduction of some of the longer articles did, however, offer an addition to the readers' conception of such issues as the discriminated position of Soviet composers. See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat, August 15, 1954 & March 27, 1959. For the Soviet composers, see Ilta-Sanomat, June 23, 1955.
1671 J.C. Hunt to B. Stenberg, October 10, 1957; N. Nabakov to Undefined recipients, October 23, 1957, both SKFKF, box 2, ARAB; Coleman 1989, pp. 101-102.
and upcoming Editor of the *Encounter* as well as one of the driving forces behind the CCF, not only ensured that the distributed material contained articles from a great number of prominent academics and journalists, but also that the content did not follow a single pre-determined angle through which developments were explained.\(^{1672}\)

Not that long after the Forum Service had started to run at full force, its content reached Finnish newspapers. Partly due to the contacts Jörgen Schleimann had managed to forge during his visits to the country, the service, along with other new CCF publications, such as the *Soviet Survey* and the *China Quarterly*, was at first offered to papers like *Hufvudstadsbladet*, which was of special interest to Schleimann due to its extensive coverage of international affairs\(^{1673}\), and *Usni Suomi*, to which the CCF started to deliver two 'Forum features' a week from October 1959 onwards.\(^{1674}\) *Ilta-Sanomat* also soon became one of Forum's most effective outlets by using the delivered content right until the service's connection with the CIA was revealed by *Ramparts*.\(^{1675}\) The cooperation with all of these newspapers also took the form in the CCF offering several ad hoc articles on issues they saw as interesting to Finnish readers, such as Mr Schleimann's travel reports from West Africa.\(^{1676}\)

Enlightening their readers was not only the task of CCF publications dealing with cultural and political issues. The Congress also wished to make sure that the academic world was not neglected and started to distribute a biannual *Science and Freedom Bulletin* to universities around the world.\(^{1677}\) This bulletin reached Finnish shores in the early 1960s when a number of Finnish professors throughout the country were added to its mailing list.\(^{1678}\) Among the magazines the CCF wished to be distributed more extensively in Finland was also the Swedish committee's *Kulturkontakt*, but its delivery and sales figures remained modest mainly due to the constant financial difficulties in which the magazine found itself.\(^{1679}\)

In spite of managing to conquer column inches in some of Finland's leading newspapers, the CCF realised that cultural magazines could give considerably more coverage to its printed content. After making contact with Kai Laitinen, *Parnasso* appeared as the most likely outlet for CCF material, particularly as it regularly included writings from Anhava, Carpelan and Tyyri, among others. The Congress now started to provide Laitinen with a number of publications\(^{1680}\) and, according to Rislakki, even offered to purchase the magazine.\(^{1681}\) These efforts did not,
however, produce formidable results. *Parnasso* stayed in Finnish hands and apart from occasionally dealing with some of the topics CCF publications had covered, the inclusion of Congress material remained rare in the early 1960s. This did not entirely change both CCF and US officials' view that Mr Laitinen's role as the editor of a leading cultural publication was significant enough to maintain close contacts with him. In 1961, Laitinen was invited to the Harvard International Seminar, yet another programme backed by the CIA, to convince promising younger foreigners of the cultural virtues of the US in addition to its materialistic superiority. The Finnish critic's report on his experiences of the seminar indicates that in his case this objective was met.

As *Parnasso* did not quite live up to the CCF's expectations, the organisation continued with its mission of finding influential actors from the Finnish intellectual circles who would be interested in reproducing printed content. After discovering that Reijo Wilenius, founder and Leading Editor of *Katsaus*, a cultural magazine that would later become the official publication of the Kriittinen korkeakoulu educational and cultural association, had expressed his desire to cooperate with the Congress, CCF officials in Paris did not hesitate to contact the rising philosopher. Soon after the first samples of CCF material were sent to Wilenius, *Katsaus* noted that it had been granted the formal right to use articles from *Encounter*, *Preuves* and *Der Monat* as well as the Forum Service. The magazine took full advantage of this opportunity and started including the delivered content on a fairly regular basis, the first being a translation of Iris Murdoch's essay 'Against Dryness' that had been published in *Encounter*. Other published CCF material included writings from Arthur Koestler and an article series on developments in five African countries by journalist Brian Crozier, who was also a regular contributor to the IRD. Although a magazine of small circulation, in *Katsaus* the CCF had found a publication that was willing to reproduce its content and able to reach members of the Finnish intelligentsia. The only thing that seemed to bother Schleimann and his colleagues to some extent was that the magazine had adopted a rather generalistic approach in covering cultural matters rather than being the more bold literary critic the CCF would have preferred it to be.

Another Finnish magazine to publish some CCF-originated articles was *Tilanne*, a publication founded to present 'the third way' in leftist ideology which opposed many of the leading

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1682 *Parnasso* did relatively often refer to literary reviews and essays published in, for instance, *Encounter*. One example of this was the Finnish publication's review of Iris Murdoch's novel 'A Severe Heart', which was examined by taking extracts of her essay published in the *Encounter*. One could, of course, argue that in a broader sense *Parnasso* did serve the CCF's interests in Finland under Laitinen's leadership by generally embracing and promoting literary modernism. See, for example, *Parnasso* 8/1961.


1684 Besideles being pleasantly surprised by the level of the organised debates, Laitinen noted how his seven-week stay at Harvard had made him understand how versatile American culture was also from the literary perspective. This impression was only enhanced through the new contacts he made with American publishers and booksellers for instance when visiting San Francisco. The growing flow of American books to *Parnasso* is likely to have increased the number of American titles reviewed by the magazine. For example, L. Ferghnetti to K. Laitinen, Kai Laitinen's collection, Kirjekokoelma, box 802, Kirjallisuusarkisto, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura; *Parnasso* 7/1961.


1687 N.W. Aldrich to R. Wilenius, March 1, 1961 & June 15, 1961, both CCFC, Series II, box 80, UC.

1688 P. Emmanuel to J. Schleimann, November 21, 1960, CCFC, Series III, box 33, folder 4, UC.
The CCF content included in the magazine supported the task of challenging the old ways of leftist thinking by, for instance, questioning the simple, uncritical way in which the Soviet Union was perceived in the West. What makes examining *Tilanne* particularly interesting are the many claims that its cooperation with the CCF was not merely restricted to the exchange of journalistic content. For example, Hannu Rautkallio has, based on his interview with Frank Friberg, former head of the CIA post in Helsinki, claimed that the publication was partly funded with CIA money. Jaakko Blomberg, who worked as *Tilanne*’s sub-editor, has noted that while no evidence of foreign funding exists, the termination of the magazine around the same time as the CCF ended its activities can be regarded as perhaps more than just a curious coincidence. The absence of *Tilanne* from any lists regarding CCF-sponsored publications, on the other hand, supports the view that no money was received at least through the Congress headquarters in Paris. Of course, CIA funds could have been infiltrated to the Finnish magazine through other channels. The fact that *Tilanne* did exactly what US officials and the CCF wished Finnish leftist writers to do, namely causing disunity among the communist ranks, gives more reason to believe that the publication received at least some foreign financial backing in addition to the funds it received, among others, from SYT. The tension *Tilanne* caused in leftist cultural circles led directly to the SKP’s decision to establish a cultural magazine of its own. Among the people fulfilling this task was the famous radical poet Pentti Saarikoski who emphasised that the publication, which became known as *Aikalainen*, should not compete with *Tilanne* as such, but be rather based on "a larger cultural programme that would institutionally be tied to political and social programmes and openly promote Marxism".

Although CCF work in Finland was small-scale and had only an indirect impact on the Finns, it would be too harsh to say that it was meaningless. The operations increased international contacts within the Finnish cultural and academic circles and offered an alternative channel for Western anti-communists to stir Finnish cultural discussion. Even if CCF operations were nowhere near the size of either the USIA or the IRD, their subtle style of approaching Finnish intellectuals was precisely the kind of activity on which the CIA wished to spend its money. The opening of a Scandinavian office in Copenhagen made the activities concerning Finland more effective, but the decision made in 1962 to give up the idea of having national and regional committees and concentrate on working through personal contacts,

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1689 This policy was determined in the first edition of *Tilanne*, which declared to promote open international discussion on the theoretical and practical sides of socialism free of any political party. This discussion included the rather direct denouncement of Stalinist despotism and criticism of Finnish communists for limiting the open exchange of opinions. For example, *Tilanne* 1/1961, *Tilanne* 1/1962, *Tilanne* 2-3/1962.
1690 The article on the image of the Soviet Union in the West was based on a story published by the CCF-sponsored Survey and an article published in the New Statesman in May 1962. *Tilanne* 5-6/1962.
1693 For example, ’A list of CCF-sponsored magazines’, Undated, George F. Kennan Papers, box 21, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, NJ, US.
1694 Vesikansa 2004b, p. 238. The plan to use the publication for breaking the communist camp was so significant that it was followed closely by Urho Kekkonen’s associate Kustaa Vilkuna, who, undoubtedly, informed the President about the matter. ’Suunnitelma Tilanne-lehden käytöstä kentällä’, Undated, Kustaa Vilkunan arkisto, box 21, TPA.
instead, again took the operations further away from Finland.\textsuperscript{1696} This did not bring CCF work in Finland to a complete standstill, since the organisation continued to encourage the Finns' international exchanges by, for example, partly funding the annual international writers' conference held in Mukkula, Lahti.\textsuperscript{1697}

Of course, the CCF was not the only organisation involving Finns while receiving CIA funds in the late 1950s and early 1960. A growing number of Finnish students were taking part in the activities of the International Student Conference (ISC-COSEC), and by doing so accelerated the younger Finns' internationalisation process also in a broader sense. Apart from personal contacts, the international student organisation's presence became evident also in printed form as its publications \textit{The Student and Information Bulletin} became available for students at, for instance, the University of Helsinki.\textsuperscript{1698} All this gave an additional dimension to the, albeit indirect, influence the CIA had on Finns through the numerous agency-affiliated foundations sponsoring Finnish students' visits to the US and presenting funds to several Finnish universities.

**Renewed Tension in Finland Alerts the Western Powers**

In conclusion, the developments taking place in Finland in the late 1950s had an extensive impact on British and American informational and cultural operations in the country. The Night Frost Crisis made the Western governments see Finland's future again in a more negative light, which resulted, in particular in the US expanding its overall campaign and making it more direct. As the new political situation started to place new restrictions on the use of the printed word, the Americans began to make considerable changes to the way their activities were planned and implemented. The greater investment in contacting representatives of the Finnish media and youth throughout the country indicates Washington's desire to find more innovative ways to increase its more long-term influence in Finnish society. The most important development resulting from both changes in Finland and new Cold War propaganda strategies was, however, the even greater importance cultural factors started to play in the Western administrations' overall campaigns. This was also evident in some CIA-backed organisations' growing presence in Finland.

That the change in the Finnish environment had a strong impact on Western informational operations also indicates that in the Finnish case domestic factors often determined the nature of the activities to a far greater extent than international developments or policies drawn up in Washington and London. Indeed, the late 1950s and early 1960s to some extent resembled the late 1940s more than the mid-1950s in the sense that Western actors were once more facing greater difficulties in having the Finnish media to pick up their anti-communist message. Even if this change was a significant one, its impact on the American and British presence in the country should not exaggerated. The Finns remained overwhelmingly Western-oriented in their world view, and both British and American officials knew that a partial exclusion of more controversial news items from Finnish newspapers would do little to change this even in the longer run.

\textsuperscript{1696} Philipsen 2003, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{1697} Rislakki 2010, pp. 183-184.
\textsuperscript{1698} Kolbe 1993, pp. 540-543.
9. INTO A NEW ERA, 1961-1962

Note Crisis and the Tightening Propaganda Environment

If the Night Frost Crisis had made both US and British officials increasingly worried about Finland's position as a truly independent country, the Note Crisis proved these fears justified in many Western eyes. The crisis and its consequences not only had a profound impact on Finnish domestic politics, but also altered the British and American approach towards the country as well as undermined its international position. For Western propaganda, the years following the crisis marked a clear turning point in the operations' scale, nature of execution and reception.

The Note Crisis began in dramatic fashion when President Kekkonen was informed about the Soviet Union's note to Finland while he was on holiday in Hawaii a couple of weeks after his official meeting with John F. Kennedy. The discussions with the American President formed a part of Kekkonen's tour of the West, which both the British and the US administrations had started to organise a couple of years earlier. In May 1961, the idea of bringing the Finnish leader to Britain finally turned into reality when he visited London and met with Prime Minister Macmillan. This visit famously produced a brief communiqué according to which Britain "expressed her understanding towards the Finnish policy of neutrality". Since its signing, this declaration has been celebrated in many Finnish circles as proof of Western support for the foreign policy Kekkonen led with great conviction. When one looks at the situation from a Western perspective, however, this declaration can be interpreted as being more of an act of goodwill. As far as the British Government really was concerned, Finland's position in regard to its eastern neighbour remained far from neutral. When one estimates the true value of the British 'recognition of Finnish neutrality', the different objectives the parties had set for these meetings should also be kept in mind. Whereas British and American officials aimed to get to know Mr Kekkonen better, perhaps convince him of Western power and potential support to Finland, and to learn about his views on developments in the Soviet Union, the Finnish leader's goal was to win some public understanding for his policies from the West, which would strengthen both his national and international pedigree as well as offer him some space to manoeuvre his foreign policies. Mr Kekkonen prepared for this task conscientiously by for instance hiring John Haycraft, an English teacher provided by the British Council, to live as a member of the President's household in spring 1961.

1699 The Note Crisis began on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet Union handed a note to Finland in which it, based on the FCMA Treaty and referring to the threat of war, proposed consultations in order to secure the defence of both countries. This threat of war was connected to West German militarisation and the Berlin crisis. The Soviets postponed any military consultations after a meeting between President Kekkonen and Nikita Khrushchev in Novosibirsk in November 1961. The crisis had a great relevance not only to the international situation, but also on Finnish domestic politics. After the note was postponed Olavi Honka, a leading candidate to challenge Kekkonen in the 1962 presidential election, withdrew his candidacy. As a result of the crisis and Honka's withdrawal, Kekkonen was re-elected with an overwhelming majority. See, for example, Meinander 2012, pp. 342-344.


1701 For example, Suomi 1992, p. 383.

Kekkonen gained more or less what he wanted also from the two meetings with President Kennedy in Washington. Although the discussions between the two focused mostly on the Berlin Crisis, Kennedy and, in particular, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured the Finnish leader that the US Government understood and respected Finland's desire to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union and did not wish to interfere in Finnish affairs in a way that would harm this relationship.\(^{1703}\) Again, this statement should not be interpreted as proof of American approval of Finnish foreign policies let alone neutralism as such, but rather as a mere notification of how the US wished to see Finland's position. In reality, US officials remained neither convinced of Finland's possibilities to remain impartial or truly independent in the long run nor impressed with the potential scenario in which the concept of neutralism won increasing support in Europe.

The first Western reactions to the Soviet note over military consultations reflected more of a sense of alarm than total surprise. Both the US and the British governments took the situation seriously and contemplated the matter in various forums. Although it is not entirely irrelevant for this study to speculate whether Urho Kekkonen had, in fact, been behind the note in order to ensure his re-election, or indeed if the West was aware of his possible involvement\(^{1704}\), the question can be covered by noting that the Western analysis of the situation would have been more or less the same under both scenarios in any case: that Finland and its leadership was now kept on an even tighter leash by the Kremlin than before.

The Americans were again more willing to do something concrete about countering this kind of an outcome. On the eve of the Mr Kekkonen's trip to Novosibirsk to negotiate the situation with Mr Khrushchev, US Ambassador Bernard Gufler delivered a message from John F. Kennedy to the Finnish President in which he repeated US support for Finnish neutrality and gave promises for political and economic assistance.\(^{1705}\) The British response was once again more restrained than that of her main ally. During his meeting with Kekkonen, Ambassador Con O'Neill merely acknowledged that the British Government supported Finland and its policy of neutrality and assured the Finnish leader that NATO would not violate the country's borders.\(^{1706}\) This approach was more highly respected by Kekkonen himself, who felt that the Americans' understanding of the situation was, once again, weak, and that their promises put the Finns into an awkward and embarrassing position.\(^{1707}\)


\(^{1704}\) For years, a number of Finnish historians have speculated on Kekkonen's role in the Note Crisis. Many, among them Hanna Rautkallio, claim that Kekkonen had planned the note together with the Soviet Union in order to strengthen his political position and ensure his re-election. Rautkallio also suggests that both the US and Britain soon became well aware of this involvement. Others, above all Juhani Suomi, have denied these claims and noted that Kekkonen was actually embittered by the note and its timing. See, Rautkallio 1992, pp. 249-255; Suomi 1992, p. 485.


\(^{1706}\) Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat 1, November 21, 1961, p. 447.

To declare the British policy with regard to the Note Crisis entirely passive would, actually, be incorrect. The crisis saw the FO discuss its Finnish policy and the possible measures, including propaganda operations, that might be taken more thoroughly than during the Night Frost Crisis. The essential question was whether the British really wished the Finns to adopt the same attitude as they had done under Soviet pressure in 1939 or if it would feel that a calmer approach was more sensible. At the height of the crisis, the Northern Department’s intention was to do something through Sweden. FO officials felt that they could, for example, endorse Swedish comments warning the Russians that the more they sought to gain control over Finland, the more Sweden might gravitate towards NATO. The option of using the more robust reactions in the Scandinavian press and promoting unattributable publicity designed to strengthen resistance in Finland was seen as the most effective way of action as far as informational activities went.\(^{1708}\)

This way of thinking was shared by the Americans, who also felt that they could stimulate the Swedes into taking a more active role in resisting Finland from succumbing to Soviet dominance. The State Department even instructed US Ambassador J. Graham Parsons to meet with Prime Minister Tage Erlander in order to persuade him to offer the Finns, or mainly the SDP, help in averting communist gains in the Finnish parliamentary elections held in February 1962.\(^{1709}\) The Americans were not really surprised to see that not much came out of these discussions and that the Swedes remained predominantly passive during the whole incident.\(^{1710}\)

The idea of including Sweden to forward the British cause regarding Finland fitted well with the IRD’s wider objective of cooperating with the Swedes in the world of propaganda. Although the use of British anti-communist propaganda in Sweden remained fairly scarce, due to the Swedes’ own extensive production of international news\(^{1711}\), IRD officials in London, including Ralph Murray, felt that the wider Cold War front required extending the collaboration on anti-communist propaganda into neutral countries, and Sweden in particular.\(^{1712}\) While this plan was not realised in 1961, due to obvious political and practical reasons\(^{1713}\), a couple of years later, somewhat surprisingly, officials of the Swedish Foreign Ministry suggested cooperation in the exchange of propaganda material concerning Africa and Latin America in particular.\(^{1714}\) This initiative resulted in several Swedish embassies as well as the Swedish Foreign Political Institute and, finally, the local social democrats distributing IRD material.\(^{1715}\) If British and American officials were left somewhat disappointed with Sweden’s passive attitude during the Note Crisis,

\(^{1708}\) ‘Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet developments’, November 21, FO 1110/1400, NA.

\(^{1709}\) SD Telegram to American Embassy, Stockholm, January 18, 1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL.

\(^{1710}\) Telegram from American Embassy, Stockholm to SD, January 20, 1962, I.D. Battle to M. Bundy, ‘Memorandum of the Current Finnish Situation’, January 25, 1962, both National Security Files, box 70, JFKL.


\(^{1712}\) The main argument behind this was that Sweden’s international position made the country and its activities more acceptable to neutralist opinion. R. Murray to J. Coulson, February 13, 1961, FO 1110/1389, NA.

\(^{1713}\) J. Coulson to F.R.H. Murray, February 21, 1961; F.R.H. Murray to J. Coulson, March 27, 1961, both FO 1110/1389, NA.

\(^{1714}\) R.T. Eland to C.S.R. Barclay, October 2, 1963; C.S.R. Barclay to R.T. Eland, November 29, 1963, both FO 1110/1649, NA.

later cooperation between the three governments was, undoubtedly, warmly welcomed by them, not least because it also had an impact on developments in Finland. This was particularly the case in the field of military affairs, as Sweden played an important role in exchanging military information with Finland and arranging contacts between Finnish and NATO officials, which would expand considerably in the 1960s and 1970s.\footnote{Recent research has showed that Sweden cooperated closely with NATO already in the mid-1950s by for instance providing the organisation a secret flight path over Sweden. The military cooperation between Sweden, Finland and NATO also started around the same time, accelerating in the 1960s. For example, Holmström, Mikael, Den dolda alliansen. Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser (Stockholm 2011), pp. 123-126, 163-188, 442; Nilsson, Mikael, 'Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s Infrastructure', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 303-307.}

Naturally, the FO’s final instructions for the handling of the Note Crisis depended on the outcome of Kekkonen’s talks with Khrushchev. However, even before the negotiations started, the FO had decided that the distribution of ordinary IRD material in Finland should be increased. The other operations on standby included, yet again, the dissemination of suitable material on the Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1948 in Finland and Scandinavia and “making use of other possible covert IRD activity to counter the effect of the Soviet move on Finland and the other Scandinavian countries”.\footnote{'Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet developments', November 20, 1961, FO 1110/1400, NA.} As the circulation of IRD content in Finland in 1961 was somewhat low, the idea of influencing Finnish political parties more directly by providing parliamentarians with suitable material through, for example, the IPU was also presented at FO meetings.\footnote{Minutes by M. Russell: 'The Soviet-Finnish Crisis', November 24, 1961, FO 1110/1297, NA.}

One of the most interesting aspects of the Note Crisis-related discussions held at the FO concerned the possibility of influencing President Kekkonen more directly, a mission continuously regarded as difficult even by covert means. This time, the intention was to convince the President through the diplomatic channel that no such military threat existed from the West as described in the Soviet note. The FO also had ready plans for how to influence Mr Kekkonen in case Soviet pressure on Finland became even more acute and if the President was finally forced to include communists in government. In this kind of a situation, it was reported, the British might make use of a valuable, unnamed, contact in the Finnish Secret Service “who saw a lot of the President and might be the channel by which we could feed ideas to the President particularly on the dangers of a communist takeover”.\footnote{'Record of a meeting held in Mr Mason’s office on November 20, 1961, to discuss recent Fenno-Soviet developments', November 21, 1961, FO 1110/1400, NA.} The fact that the FO also contemplated the possibility of stiffening resistance in the Finnish Armed Forces gives yet more proof on not only how serious British officials considered the situation to be, but also on their desire to at least attempt to do something about it this time.

Even though the tension between Finland and the Soviet Union eased after the talks between Kekkonen and Khrushchev, and the covert measures described above were unlikely to have been taken, the way the Note Crisis was solved and, in particular, the way the whole episode had a direct influence on domestic politics in Finland, i.e. strengthening Urho Kekkonen’s position, left neither the British nor the Americans under any illusions of the country’s political position. Neither Western government was convinced that the agreement

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Kekkonen reached with the Soviet leader would end Soviet pressure on the Finns, on the contrary. The Finnish President's role as the Kremlin's trusted man only increased Western worries over the Soviets, or at least the communists, eventually seizing power in the country.1720

The way Urho Kekkonen's firmer hold on power in Finland, which became fully evident after his re-election as President in January 1962, affected British and American informational and cultural operations only increased the Westerners' concern of the country's future. Kekkonen was now able to place the Finnish press under even tighter control by convincing Finnish newspapermen that it was neither in their nor their country's interest to upset the Soviets with their comments. In particular, British officials in Helsinki were quick to note how the Note Crisis saga had restricted their possibilities for the distribution of anti-communist material even further. The Finnish press's reluctance to publish almost anything that might provoke the Soviet Government rapidly pushed the number of IRD articles included in Finnish newspapers down to levels not witnessed for quite some time. By late 1962, the success reached ten years earlier in the use of anti-communist material already seemed a distant memory. According to Information Officer Ray Muston, the Finns were more painfully than ever aware of their country's delicate position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The practice of newspaper self-censorship on Soviet Bloc affairs was now true even when Finland's interests were concerned, he observed.1721 Almost the only criticism of Soviet events in Finnish newspapers seemed to take place through quoting the foreign press. The slowing down of anti-communist activity in Finland could also be noted in the distribution of IRD's background papers, which remained at the same level it had been for some years already. The Interpreter had some twenty recipients in 1962, while for example The Asian Analyst and International Communist Front Organisations were sent to approximately ten people. No real changes were made to the list of recipients, either.1722 A growing problem for all propaganda operations was, as Muston successfully pointed out, that “the Finns would quickly resent any activity on our part in this country which seemed designed to alter or cast doubt on Finland's neutrality”.1723

This useful observation captured something essential about what the Finnish environment would be like for years to come. The political leaders' desire to defend the country's neutral position and friendly relations with its mighty neighbour became so strong that, in addition to domestic media, they became even more sensitive about what the foreign press wrote about their country than they had been during the previous decade. In order to improve Finland's global image, which had become particularly tarnished in the aftermath of the Note Crisis, the Finnish Foreign Ministry gave embassies abroad instructions on how to answer to accusations over the true nature of the country's neutrality and the Soviet Union's growing involvement in

1720 According to CIA estimations, while the Soviet Union wished to use Finland as a "show-case" to the world as an example of its magnanimity, the Russians were also likely to continue with their strategy of keeping Finland gradually moving toward greater subservience to them. Staff Memorandum No. 71-61, 'Finland Between East and West', November 28, 1961, CIA Office of National Estimates, CREST.
1721 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
1722 IRD material continued to be sent mainly to the leading non-communist newspapers and prominent politicians from the National Coalition party and the SDP, British Embassy to IRD, 'Distribution of IRD Material', September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
1723 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, September 10, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
its domestic affairs. Writings published, for instance, by *US News and World Report* was precisely the kind of publicity the Finns both felt was incorrect and wished to avoid. The paper famously suggested that Finland belonged to countries in which the press was under political control, as well as claimed that the Soviet Union was forcing Finland to purchase Russian aeroplanes, missiles and technology in order to make an ally of its western neighbour. An article published by *Reader's Digest* in November 1962 was also a something of an embarrassment to the Finnish leadership, as it dealt with the way Urho Kekkonen had enhanced his position by taking advantage of the Note Crisis. On this occasion, officials of the Finnish Embassy in Washington complained about the inclusion of such a story to colleagues at the State Department even before it was published. The Finnish protest did not end at that, as direct criticism over the article was made both to the *Reader's Digest*’s representative in Washington and its editors in Pleasantville, New York. Naturally, this had little effect, and the inclusion of a slightly altered version of the article in *Valitut Palat* in February 1963, with the blessing of Eljas Erkko, only increased in particular Kekkonen’s dismay of certain American publications’ way of handling Finnish affairs.

As stories published in their newspapers and magazines indicate, the general sentiment among Americans over the direction towards which things were moving in Finland was that of disappointment. The developments in Fenno-Soviet relations did not, however, directly restrict the USIS/Helsinki’s activities in the country as much as they did the British officials’ chances of distributing IRD propaganda. American reports from the period after the Note Crisis continued to present the reader with an image of a relatively effective and successful informational programme. USIS officials did acknowledge, not unlike their British colleagues, that the nature of Finnish neutrality did have a limiting effect on how directly the policies of, above all, the Soviet Union could be condemned in their distributed content. In general, however, they were fairly positive about meeting their main psychological objective, which was now defined as: "To strengthen the confidence of the Finns in themselves, the US and the Free World in order to stem the Soviet influence in and over Finland which endangered the country's freedom of action." This goal reflected closely the many reactions the Note Crisis generated among State Department and US Embassy officials that called for more active American reassurance to the Finns that the West had not written their country off.

In press operations, the relatively confident mood at the USIS can be mainly explained by the fact that the great majority of American content distributed to the Finns remained neutral in tone. Even if more controversial themes were increasingly avoided by many Finnish newspapers, they continued to display great demand for Western news articles as well as longer

1724 These instructions followed the Ministry’s earlier decision to introduce a more centralised structure for Finland’s incoherent overseas informational operations in order to, among other things, bring greater efficiency to correcting misunderstandings of the country’s political position. Soikkanen, T. 2003, pp. 243-245, 358-359.
1726 A. Vartia to M. Jakobson, November 19, 1962, 5B, UMA.
1727 R.R. Seppälä to M. Jakobson, December 13, 1962; M. Korhonen to Editors of Reader's Digest, December 13, 1962, both 5B, UMA.
1728 Rautkallio 2010, p. 353.
1730 For example, Telegram from US Embassy to SD, January 11, 1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL.
feature stories. According to USIS officials, their office even managed to have a considerable impact on the way international developments were covered in the Finnish media. The best example of this kind of thinking was the American claim that they had a direct and strong influence in the way the Cuban Crisis was reported in Finland. In USIS officials' eyes, the special 'gridirons' explaining the US Government's analysis of Soviet intent and American moves that were dispatched to editors played a decisive role in the Finns' interpretation of the events. The coincidence that the news directors of each of the two Finnish television networks happened to be in the US at the time on USIS-recommended grants producing footage regarded as favourable to American policies also supported the view of a successful campaign around the incident.\footnote{Ibid.; Pernaa, Ville, Uutisista hyvää iltaa. Ylen TV-uutiset ja yhteiskunta (Helsinki 2009), p. 56.}

A closer examination of the coverage given to the Cuban Crisis in Finnish newspapers reveals that this claim was something of an exaggeration. The way in which leading newspapers such as *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Uusi Suomi*, *Hufvudstadsbladet* and *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* commented on the developments was fairly balanced in tone, rather being inclined to the US. While it is true that publications continued to use UP and AP content to cover the events, and therefore offered a Western perspective to their readers, none of them directly condemned the actions of the Soviet Union.\footnote{For example, *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 24, 1962; *Uusi Suomi*, October 24, 1962; *Hufvudstadsbladet*, October 24, 1962.} The outcome of the crisis was in general greeted with great relief and an observation that sense had finally prevailed in the diplomatic superpower battle.\footnote{For example, *Helsingin Sanomat* October 27 & October 28, 1962; *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, October 30, 1962.} The fact that the Americans on two occasions complained to the Finns about the way the leading Agrarian paper *Maakansa* had claimed that the US was "rattling arms" in Cuba even before the actual crisis had escalated, first to Foreign Minister Veli Merikoski while he was visiting New York and later to President Kekkonen in Helsinki\footnote{Maakansa not only accused the US for its war-risking policies, but also labelled particularly some of *Helsingin Sanomat*'s writings during the Cuban Crisis as "irresponsible". SD telegram to Secretary of State, October 8, 1962, RG 59, SDDFF 1960–1963, box 1856, 760e.5611/10-762, NARA; B. Gufler to Secretary of State, December 14, 1962, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL; Maakansa, September 28, 1962 & October 25, 1962.}, not only shows how seriously the Americans took the matter, but also indicates that not even they felt that all coverage was favourable to them, after all. Although not many publications agreed with the view presented in *Kansan Uutiset*, which first strongly accused the US for causing the danger of war and then praised the Soviets for saving the world\footnote{For example, *Kansan Uutiset*, October 24, 1962, October 25, 1962, October 29, 1962 & October 30, 1962.}, the Finnish press in general abstained from giving credit to either of the superpowers for risking a global conflict.

The coverage of the Cuban Crisis is a good indication of the broader publishing policies adopted by the Finnish press in the early 1960s. Even if, as Esko Salminen has noted, Finnish newspapers increased its criticism of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the Night Frost Crisis and the Note Crisis\footnote{Salminen 1996, p. 36.}, content published in the latter part of 1962 suggests that particularly the British were correct in observing that Finnish press had again adopted a more cautious policy. News concerning Eastern European and Soviet affairs had by now declined in
number, and the nature of political commentary in general seemed to have calmed down from the rather fierce form it had adopted in the 1950s.\footnote{In addition to previous research and Western documents, this evaluation is based on the six leading Finnish newspapers published between September 1, 1962 - November 15, 1962 that were examined for this study. During this period, very few articles dealing with East Europe could be assessed as being critical to the communist regimes.} Helsingin Sanomat, which by the early 1960s had managed to become an even more dominant player in the Finnish media field, formed something of an exception as it continued to include a great number of political commentaries of Western origin and criticise the Finnish foreign policies when seeing it appropriate. This approach was embraced at the State Department to the degree that when Eljas Erkko died in February 1965, a drafted letter of condolence praised the way with which the newspaperman "had used the full influence of his paper to explain objectively US policies and actions, and to counter vilifying propaganda directed against the US by the Soviet Union".\footnote{Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy by B.H. Read: 'Message of Condolence to Patricia Seppälä', February 24, 1965, National Security File, Country File: Finland, box 169, LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.} When saying that the publishing policies followed by Helsingin Sanomat differed from other Finnish papers, it is important not to overemphasise this matter. The great majority of Finnish newspapers continued to be reliant on foreign news agency content for covering international developments. What was different, however, was that the more extensive critical articles on world events seemed to diminish in number in most leading papers in the early 1960s. This trend would only strengthen as the decade went on.

The USIS/Helsinki also discovered that something had changed in Finland when running its film operations. The Americans had for some time been relatively content with the policy of the Finnish Film Censorship Board, regarding it as fair to all importing counties, but the ban on the USIA-produced documentary Cuba Waits in early 1963 raised their eyebrows once more. In USIS officials' view, this move indicated that criticism of the Soviet Union, and in particular its leadership, was no longer tolerated by Finnish authorities. The reasoning behind this claim was that the Finns had had no problems in approving Berlin Wall, the USIA film on the Berlin Crisis, which, although critical, did not contain similar specific references to Soviet leaders as the latter movie.\footnote{The large amount of lighter American films and series aired in Finland reflects the broadcast content during the first years of Finnish TV also in a more general sense. As the production of broadcasters' own television programmes was still taking its first steps, foreign films were used to fill the gaps. Foreign fiction, dominated by American productions, was often if not the largest then the second largest programme group aired by YLE and Tesvisio. In broadcasts shown by MTV, the share of foreign fiction programmes in 1960 was as high as 38 per cent. Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Abn toiminnasta vuonna 1961 (Helsinki 1962), pp. 83-84, Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Abn toiminnasta vuonna 1962 (Helsinki 1963), p. 75, 78-80; Aslama, Minna, Hellman, Heikki, Lehtinen, Pauliina & Sauri, Tuomo: 'Niukkuuden aikakaudesta kanavapaljouteen. Television ohjelmisto ja monipuolisuus 1960-2004' in Wiio (ed.) 2007, pp. 68-70.} As the clear majority of USIS-distributed films were in no way controversial, the tighter censorship policies had only a limited effect on American operations.

In television, American productions continued to dominate the foreign programmes aired in Finland, but fictional films and series rather than political documentaries made up an even greater share of the content than before.\footnote{In YLE's news programmes, American topical productions fared much better, in particular after the Finnish channel's news department extended its daily broadcasts in the leadership of Erkki Raatikainen. As YLE's foreign news} In YLE's news programmes, American topical productions fared much better, in particular after the Finnish channel's news department extended its daily broadcasts in the leadership of Erkki Raatikainen. As YLE's foreign news
coverage was dominated by American and British material, Western influence on Finnish news production kept growing, while coverage of the Soviet Union remained very rare.\textsuperscript{1741} YLE's inclusion as a full member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in 1960 only enhanced this development. Even if Finland was at first relatively passive in exchanging programmes with the other member countries\textsuperscript{1742}, the flow of international news coverage through the satellite technology introduced by Eurovision in 1962 and its inclusion in YLE's broadcasts soon put the Finns in touch with world affairs in a way that they could not have even imagined only some years earlier.\textsuperscript{1743}

What measures did the US and British governments take to make their informational and cultural operations meet the new circumstances? The answer to this question is, again, closely related to the resources available to their officials. As the Americans operated with sums that were by now manifold to those accessed by the British, they were able to extend their campaign in Finland and even introduce new forms of operation. The British, on the other hand, had to settle for trying to make their existing informational operations more efficient by, for instance, finding new partners and distribution channels.

The once again expanding American investment in USIS operations in Finland can, first of all, be concluded from the growing size of the America Center. By 1962, the office already had an operating budget of $175,000 and employed a total of 29 people, 21 of them locals.\textsuperscript{1744} This enabled the Americans not only to extend their library, lecture and exhibition services to the Finns in Helsinki, but also made it possible for embassy officials to make more trips to rural areas and establish new contacts with Finns living in them, like they did in Eastern Finland in April 1962.\textsuperscript{1745} The larger available resources also helped the USIS to increase its flow of printed content to Finnish newspapers and political leaders in the form of bulletins, separate feature articles and pamphlets. In order to tie closer contacts with Finnish workers, still regarded as a key group for USIS operations and Finland's future for that matter, in 1962 the Americans launched a new monthly labour bulletin in Finnish, which sought to increase Finns' knowledge of the American labour movement and "strengthen the feeling of identity and comradeship between American and Finnish workers."\textsuperscript{1746} As the new bulletin, which included both IPS material and articles written from a more local angle, quickly received plenty of praise from Finnish trade unionists and reached a total circulation of 2,000, it is safe to say that it provided a more efficient outlet for American labour-related propaganda than its predecessors had ever done.

The importance of influencing Finnish youth was something that became even more strongly underlined by officials both in Helsinki and Washington, particularly in relation to the exchange of persons programme. This focus followed directly the State Department's policy to

\textsuperscript{1741} Pernaa 2009, pp. 26-27, 54.
\textsuperscript{1742} For example in 1961, YLE exchanged much fewer programmes than the other Eurovision broadcasters. Although particularly children's films were actively aired by YLE, the channel used only 8.9 per cent of all offered content. 'Eurovision Programme Statistics', EBU/Ohjelmavaihtotilastoja 1961, Kansainvälinen toiminta, box 8, YLE, ELKA.
\textsuperscript{1743} Kertomus Oy Yleisradio Aho toiminnasta vuonna 1962 (Helsinki 1963), p. 76; Pernaa 2009, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{1744} 'Background paper: The USIA Program in Finland, 1962', Undated, National Security Files, box 70, JFKL.
\textsuperscript{1745} R.M. Melbourne to SD, 'Trip to Eastern Finland by Embassy Officers', April 11, 1962, RG 59, SDDFF 1960–1963, box 1854, 760e.00/4-1162, NARA
\textsuperscript{1746} USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
give more consideration to younger potential leaders in grant selections. In 1961, plans for a separate Young Leader category were introduced, and the following year saw the announcement of the 'Emphasis on Youth' programme in American embassies around the world.\textsuperscript{1747} The stronger investment in influencing future leaders made it possible to invite another twelve university student leaders for a five-week stay in the US "to bolster their opposition to continuing Soviet attempts to win additional levers of influence over Finnish youth."\textsuperscript{1748} Furthermore, the USIS field program officer made closer contact with Finnish youth organisations by organising special events at the America Center and giving lectures to them in their respective regions as well as by providing them with USIA-produced books and brochures. This activity established the relationship between the Americans and Finnish youth organisations to such a degree that in 1962 the USIS was for the first time invited to participate in the activities of the Finnish Youth Boards. During this particular year, the USIS field program officer also took part in a meeting of professional youth workers and the bi-annual Congress of Youth Leaders, while at the same time being also in closer contact with trade union youth sections.\textsuperscript{1749}

The growing American activity concerning Finnish youth, as well as the exchange of people programme in general, epitomises the strategy the US Government adopted towards the northern country in the early 1960s: as the opportunities for implementing more direct political propaganda had become somewhat limited, increasing attention was given to influencing a greater variety of people with the longer term impact in mind. Another good example of US activity based on this motive was the establishment of so-called sister city affiliations between American and Finnish towns. Launched in co-operation with the Finnish-American Society, the sister city project was regarded in Washington as an important part of the People-to-People Program, which sought to encourage ordinary Americans to develop friendly contacts with like-minded foreigners in order to convince them of the "basic goodness" of the American people.\textsuperscript{1750} As many other Cold War-related US activities, this particular project was warmly endorsed by American city officials, and rather quickly several leading Finnish towns started affiliating with a community located on the other side of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{1751}

The British objective of making their informational operations more efficient was related to the growing frustration among embassy officials about the diminishing circulation and use of IRD publications in Finland as well as the shortage of suitable contacts that might take advantage of the material. Specialist commentators and students, normally typical recipients of IRD content, seemed almost nonexistent in Finland from the British viewpoint. The number of newspaper editors wishing to receive some material did, however, rise to some extent in the early 1960s due

\textsuperscript{1747} Scott-Smith 2008, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{1748} USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
\textsuperscript{1749} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1750} For example, E.S. Chambers to O.W. Nordstrom, July 29, 1960, Mark Bortman Papers, 1956-67, box 22, DDEL, Osgood 2006, pp. 232-233.
\textsuperscript{1751} As early as in October 1958 it was reported that several leading Finnish communities had started to affiliate with an American counterpart. For instance, Helsinki's news sister city was New York City, Tampere's Houston, Texas and Turku's Phoenix, Arizona. USIS/Helsinki to USIA, October 22, 1958, Mark Bortman Papers, 1956-67, box 22, DDEL.
to the British Embassy’s constant efforts to seek new distribution channels. The British were, for example, able to stir up the Social Democratic Press Agency’s (Työväen Sanomalehtien Tietotoimisto, TST) interest in several IRD publications. The FO, however, blocked the circulation of material to the papers the agency serviced due to the rule according to which “the distribution of IRD papers should always require a reasonably confidential relationship between the Information Officer and the recipient”, which was not the case on this occasion.

As no real success was achieved in finding new distribution channels for their printed propaganda, the British Embassy provided a greater amount of material to the organisations and individuals for whom they had been supplying content for years already. The archives of, for instance, the SAK, Kokoomus and SYT suggest that in addition to providing these outlets with the more typical IRD publications, the British delivered them with more ad hoc IRD pamphlets dealing with such issues as the nature of leadership in the Soviet Union, the position of the workforce in communist countries and the Berlin Crisis, as well as new issues of, for instance, *Facts About Soviet International Front Organisations*. At the same time, the supply of COI-produced material on the British political and governmental system and newspapers like the *Manchester Guardian* also seemed to have picked up. What the available archived British publications from the early 1960s also show is that the British Embassy was by no means the only actor to extend its supply of printed content to the Finns. Both leading British political parties seemed to deliver more of their political pamphlets to their respective sister parties in Finland. Particularly the Conservative Party increased its flow of information to Finland by providing Kokoomus with topical pamphlets published by the Conservative Political Centre and more in-depth booklets produced by the Conservative Research Department.

Even if the British managed to increase their delivery of political propaganda to certain organisations, the narrowing possibilities for spreading the anti-communist message around in Finland made it increasingly obvious for the British Embassy in Helsinki that the focus of their informational activities should be on providing the Finns with positive information about British society. As a result, the British gave even greater care to emphasising the favourable aspects regarding British institutions and culture, as well as the British Government's position on a number of domestic and international issues. Among the themes receiving growing attention was also the economy. When the campaign for Finland's EFTA membership was over, the British redirected more of their informational efforts to emphasising industrial and economic growth in Britain and, above all, the high quality of British companies and their

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1752 R.F. Muston to D.R.M. Ackland, October 30, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
1753 D.R.M. Ackland to R.F. Muston, November 14, 1962, FO 1110/1529, NA.
1754 For example, the pamphlets: 'From Marx to Khruschev' by Walter Kolarz, undated, and 'The Workers' State' by Margaret Dewar, May 1960, both box 334, 'Facts About Soviet International Front Organisations', October 1964, box 89, all SYT, KA; 'The Meaning of Berlin', 1962, KK, Ee, PTA.
1755 For example, the pamphlets 'The Organisation of Political Parties in Britain' by H. Atkin to J. Rantanen, March 25, 1960, SAK KV 1960, TA.
1756 Most of these publications focused on the 'Tories' position in regard to domestic issues such as the welfare state, science and education, but at times some of them also commented on international topics including China's relationship with the UN and the discussion over worldwide disarmament. For example, the pamphlets: 'Welfare State Developments', March 1961; 'Blueprint for Disarmament - Britain's Proposals Outlined'; 'The International Situation', Notes on Current Politics (NCP), Number 23, December 1960; 'Education and Training', NCP, Number 2, January 1961; 'Science and Technology', NCP, Number 8, April 1961, all KK, Ee, PTA.
products. This development followed closely the British Embassy's involvement in the promotion of British businesses to the Finns, which was increased in the late 1950s and the early 1960s in order to secure markets for the most important fields of British exports to Finland, namely oil, coal, coke and motor vehicles.  

Shifting the focus from the distribution of anti-communist propaganda to the promotion of British society, above all, made the British Council's role in Britain's overall campaign in Finland even more essential than before. As the decade went on, even Foreign Office officials started to come to terms with the ever-growing political importance of cultural activities in Finland. A FO memorandum from June 1964 summarised this sentiment well by declaring the following: “The Finns are a particularly receptive audience, and the Russians cannot object to their accepting Western cultural manifestations. We should keep the present standard and volume up as far as possible.”

Cold War Comes to Town

The World Festival of Youth and Students held in Helsinki in summer 1962, the location of which was another reflection of the Soviet propaganda strategy giving more emphasis to more open international interaction, made a remarkable exception to the somewhat cautious policy both the US and British governments had to follow in their propaganda operations. During the festival, particularly the Americans' objective was to counter communist propaganda as effectively as possible and to ensure that no such event would be organised again in a Western country. The propaganda war fought between the communist and Western camps in various facilities and the streets of Helsinki gave the Finns a rare glimpse of the increasingly fierce Cold War battle over young people's hearts and minds. The vast US investment in anti-festival activity made the event the CIA's largest direct propaganda effort in Finland.

The story of American operations during the event has been rather extensively covered in a number of Finnish studies, particularly Joni Krekola's recent book on the festival. Examining Western operations is important also for this thesis as its provides valuable information about CIA involvement in propaganda operations and about the great variety of actors the US was able to use for its anti-communist campaign even in Finland during such exceptional circumstances. As previous studies have somewhat underestimated both the role of the

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1758 ‘Summary to Helsinki despatch No. 36 of June 5, 1964: The political importance of cultural manifestations in Finland’, BW 30/8, NA. 
1759 The way the communist festival had changed from a celebration of communism and the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era to an event in which a more free exchange of opinions between the visitors was at least to some degree encouraged was already evident at the festival held in Moscow in 1957. This development was only enhanced by the decision to organise the following festivals in neutral countries, first in Vienna in 1959, and then in Helsinki in 1962. See Koivunen, Pia, Performing Peace and Friendship. The World Youth Festival as a Tool of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy, 1947-1957 (PhD Thesis, University of Tampere 2013), pp. 227-231, 341-343.
USIS/Helsinki and the British Embassy during the festival, this thesis also offers some new light on the overall Anglo-American response to the event.

For American and British officials, the approval given by the Finnish Government to organisers to bring their festival to Helsinki was yet another sign of its leniency towards the Soviet Union. Both Western governments expressed their objection to the Finnish leadership over the festival, and particularly Con O’Neill pleaded strongly to the Finnish Foreign Ministry that the whole event should be cancelled.1761 As this always seemed rather unlikely to happen, the US and British administrations started to plan their propaganda activities during the festival well over a year before its opening ceremony.1762 The Americans took the initiative by discussing the matter at the secret Psychological Operations Panel held in Frankfurt in June 1961 and by gradually implementing some pre-festival activities, such as distributing critical comments on the event to the American, Finnish and international press.1763 As British officials were also requested to express their views about the measures they felt were appropriate to take in Helsinki, the coordination of the anti-festival activities was by no means as strictly an American affair, as previous studies might suggest.

Earlier accounts on the American operations during the event have, first of all, revealed how in order to combat communist propaganda the CIA granted $125,000 to Gloria Steinem, head of the organisation Independent Research Service (IRS), who was in charge of the agency’s cultural programme in Helsinki. The funds enabled as many as 160 young Americans to travel to Finland with the intention of challenging the festival guests’ arguments and spreading American propaganda material.1764 The cultural programme focused largely on the 'Young America Presents' exhibition and its jazz concerts, while the printed CIA-funded material included the anti-festival newspaper Helsinki Youth News, printed in three languages with a circulation of 30,000, as well as numerous magazines, booklets, cartoons and books, including an atlas, which presented Finland as a country “in which communists cause instability”.1765 Other activities in which the Americans were involved included running the IRS International News Bureau and the jazz concerts given in smaller venues around the city.1766

Among other scholars, Rislakki suggests that the CIA’s operational methods were not always all that innocent: he claims that the anti-festival demonstrations and riots that took place in Helsinki before the festival had even begun would have been set up by the agency. Although this argument is unproved, the fact remains that the CIA was strongly involved in the resistance of communism during the festival. In this quest it was not by any means alone. Indeed, long

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1761 Mr O’Neill let the Ministry know about Britain’s view on organising a communist festival in Finland in February 1961 and November 1961. ‘Memorandum written by J. Hallama’, February 17, 1962; Memorandum: ‘Englannin hallituksen toivotukset ja näkökohtia nuorisofestivaalien suhteen’, January 16, 1962, UKA, box 21/95, TPA.

1762 W.B. Cobb to B.A. Gufler, ‘US Paper: 8th World Youth Festival - Helsinki’, April 17, 1961, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 42, NARA.


1764 For example, Lindfors & Rislakki 1978, p. 387.


before the event started, the Americans were already in direct contact with Finnish student circles over anti-festivals activities. In addition to the central student organisation SYL, organisations like SYT and VAL were also closely involved in protesting against the event, first by encouraging people to boycott the festival, and later on by deciding to follow a policy of passive resistance by distributing anti-festival material mainly to a local audience. Although the CIA-backed activities regarding the youth festival primarily targeted foreign visitors, as well as the general international opinion, the agency’s strong involvement suggests that it was prepared to invest heavily in anti-communist propaganda operations in countries exposed to communism particularly during exceptional events.

The omission of USIS activities from previous research is likely to have resulted from their nature of execution. Unlike the independent American associations that were able to act more freely, the USIS was again restricted to follow a rather cautious policy in its operations in order to avoid giving governments or unfriendly local elements grounds for claiming that the US was carrying anti-festival agitation or that it was briefing local festival delegates. As the official American and British actors had a background role in the execution of the anti-festival campaign, it is worthwhile to examine them in more detail. First of all, the support the USIS provided to the American activities taking place in the field was greater than it has perhaps been earlier realised. Thanks to the central location of the America Center and its library, the USIS was able to offer an important base for both Finnish and American anti-festival activists and easily provide them with additional printed material that they could hand out to festival delegates. The available printed content included books on American economic, political and cultural life as well as USIA-produced pamphlets on the American position on such topics as co-existence, disarmament, nuclear testing and colonialism. The content in question was defined well before the festival and ordered in advance from Washington and the USIS posts in London and Stockholm. The USIS/Helsinki also organised some activities of its own, for instance the screening of USIA films, including Friendship 7, a one-hour documentary on astronaut John Glenn's orbit flight that was shown to specifically chosen Finnish labour and youth leaders as well as newspaper film critics a week before the festival. This film fell directly under one of the broader propaganda themes the Americans were increasingly investing at the time, i.e. their ability to beat the Soviets in the space race.

The USIS also provided assistance to the Program for Young American Culture of Yale University in the implementation of the Young America Presents programme held at Atenuem. The exhibition was a curious combination of modern American art partly gathered from MoMA's collections, more precisely the catalogue under the name 'Recent American Paintings and Sculpture', and daily jazz concerts by several highly rated artists. This mixture turned out to be a highly successful one, since the exhibition, or in reality mainly the jazz bands, offered

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1767 Krekola 2012, pp. 54-56.
1769 H.F. Nelson to SD, August 26, 1962, Joint State-USIA Message: Eight World Festival of Youth and Students', August 26, 1962, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 44, NARA.
1770 Ibid.; Two telegrams from US Embassy to SD, July 13, 1962, RG 84, USEH CGR, box 44, NARA.
something that most of the festival visitors had never been able to experience in their home countries. Thanks to the great interest it generated among foreigners, the total number of visitors to Young America Presents exceeded 32,000. Newspaper reviews of the exhibition were also mainly positive, with *Helsingin Sanomat* stating that the way Young America Presents was able to contact both Finnish and foreign youngsters made up for the few surprises the actual paintings and sculptures were able to offer. The observation of the actual exhibition presenting only a few things that had not been seen earlier could have been a reference to MoMA's 'Modern American Drawings' exhibition the USIS/Helsinki and the Finnish-American Society had assisted to organise in Helsinki earlier in the spring. Even though this exhibition reached a much smaller crowd, only some 2,000, its impressive itinerary suggests that it may have actually been of higher quality than the American presentation of modern art during the communist festival.

As the USIS also gave extensive commentary on the event to both the Finnish and international press, it is safe to say that in spite of its low-key presence, the official American informational organ played an active part in the anti-festival campaign. The festival was also taken into account in USIA activities around the world, as each of the information agency’s most important overseas posts received orders to increase their attention to youth and student audiences before and during the event. The USIS/Helsinki was naturally in a key position also when the Americans tried to make sense of what had actually happened during the intense summer days and nights in Helsinki. The joint US Embassy-USIA report written after the event noted, above all, that the anti-festival activities carried out by both locals and foreign visitors together with the local public’s general indifference to the event made the communist mass meeting nothing but a big failure.

What has also been overlooked is that the communist youth festival gave the British a much desired opportunity to expand their activities and experiment some new methods of operation. The FO’s view was that, as during previous similar festivals, the British Embassy as well as the information offices of other Western embassies, should be equipped with both positive and objective material in a variety of languages for the use of visitors from uncommitted countries in particular. The detailed way with which FO officials discussed what kind of content foreign embassies should be able to offer potential visitors indicates that by the early 1960s the British Government had increased its cooperation in informational operations not only with the US but other Western governments as well. In the months leading to the Helsinki Festival, the British shared their views most extensively with other NATO members planning to engage in some kind of activities before and during the event, most notably West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.

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1774 USIA to Principal USIS posts, ‘International Youth Activities’, May 23, 1962, RG 306, OR, CPC, box 5, NARA.
1776 J.G. Taylor to R.F. Muston, February 22, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA.
1777 S.J. Rose to T.C. Barker, March 2, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA.
The British complemented the anti-festival newspaper *Helsinki Youth News* by printing some thousands of copies of the IRD’s more simple factual pamphlets, which clarified such themes as ‘The Record of Colonialism’, ‘Aid to Underdeveloped Countries’ and ‘Aid to Students’. The British information officer made the pamphlets, with the imprint of ‘Index Ltd’, available for open distribution to the public and for personal distribution to newspaper editors. As for books, since the USIS focused considerably on the distribution of commercial literature, the British decided to concentrate only on a couple of relevant books that they wished to be made available in Helsinki bookshops in the leading European languages. These publications included *Moscow Diary* written by Francis Sejersted, a Norwegian student from Moscow University, and *A Student in Moscow*, the IRD-produced booklet by the Nigerian A. Amar.

The British Embassy agreed with its American counterpart that the Helsinki festival turned out to be less successful than expected, mainly due to the hostility and indifference shown by the Finnish public. The British also gave credit to most Helsinki-based newspapers for not publishing any news of the festival. The activities of Britain and other Western governments also had an important role to play, the report concluded. In addition to the anti-festival paper, the several competing attractions launched in Helsinki during the festival, which in addition to the American projects most notably included an exhibition illustrating the working of Swiss democracy, were regarded as significant factors in the successful containment of communist propaganda. In this particular case, both British and American views on the success of their operations seem largely justified, considering that Helsinki became the last non-communist city to host the youth and student festival. While their campaigns were by no means the only factor behind the decision to organise the event in strictly communist countries henceforth, the Anglo-American objection to the festival, undoubtedly, had a strong impact on it. One reason for this was that the two administrations’ campaign against holding a communist mass event on their side of the Iron Curtain continued for quite some time after the festival delegates had left Helsinki. Apart from supplying a great number of articles evaluating the communist gathering to newspapers around the world, the Americans and British also analysed the events in their more scholarly propaganda publications, *Problems of Communism* and *The Interpreter* respectively. Both journals claimed that the festival had been a great failure to their organisers and correctly predicted that it was to be the last of its kind in the West.

While the communist youth festival brought the Cold War right to the Finns’ doorsteps and exposed them to more open communist and anti-communist propaganda, the event’s long-term effects in Finland remained relatively slim. Rather soon after the open war of words, images and sounds was over, propaganda activities in the country returned to their normal cautious and

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1778 IRD to R.F. Muston, March 23, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA.
1779 Ibid.
1780 P.D. Stobart to Lord Home, ‘The 8th World Youth Festival’, August 17, 1962, FO 1110/1610, NA.
1781 The articles published in Problems of Communism and The Interpreter were also closely translated and analysed by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, which shows both that Finnish officials remained highly interested in all publicity concerning their country and that they followed both anti-communist publications closely. Finnish Foreign Ministry Memoranda: ‘Foreign Officeen julkaisun analyysi Helsingissä järjestetyistä VIII nuorisofestivalista’ by R. Palas, August 24, 1962 and ‘Amerikkalainen jälkiarviointi Helsingissä järjestetyistä nuorisofestivaliesta’, November 23, 1962, both UKA, box 21/95, TPA; Problems of Communism 5/1962.
somewhat limited mode. It would, however, be wrong to say that the festival had no influence on the American and British operations in Finland. Perhaps most importantly, the event gave both US and British officials more experience of coordinating informational activities not only as a two-party basis but also in cooperation with other Western governments. The implemented anti-festival activities also deepened the relationship between Finnish youth organisations and, in particular, the USIS even further, a development the Americans regarded as highly important for future activities.1782

1963 and Beyond

A short review of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in the mid-1960s is necessary in order to evaluate how the operations discussed above can be placed in a wider context. The summary not only provides an analysis on the effects the profound changes taking place both in Finnish society and British and American operations in Finland in the late 1950s and early 1960s had on the two Western campaigns on a long-term basis, but also helps one to understand just how exceptional the period examined in this study actually was.

Above all, both American and British documents from the mid-1960s reveal that in terms of anti-communist propaganda in Finland, the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a definite turning point. After the Note Crisis had finally cooled off, Western officials in Helsinki wrote increasingly pessimistic reviews about the environment in which they were supposed to arrange their operations. In particular, British information officers gave detailed accounts on how the growing dominance of Urho Kekkonen and the K Line he represented, together with younger generations' more radical ideas, made the practice of traditional anti-communist propaganda even more of a challenge. As many of the leading Finnish newspapers were by now using more of their own material to cover foreign affairs and were not that willing to cause more disturbances to Finnish-Soviet relations by including content that could be interpreted in Moscow as controversial, the demand for heavy political articles produced by the IRD, or by any other official foreign actor for that matter, continued to diminish. These developments made the British increasingly use the concept of self-censorship when defining the Finnish press's publishing policies and the broader reasons behind them. US officials also observed the growing significance the practice of self-censorship was, yet again, starting to have in the country, but even more often they wished to catch the State Department's attention to the "Finnish style of neutrality", or "Finland's unbalanced neutrality", which placed increasing restrictions for American operations.1783

The wide practice of self-censorship did not mean that no anti-communist articles were published by the Finnish press or that the British and Americans had given up all hope of them doing so in the future. Both Western governments continued to reshape their informational activities according to the changing circumstances. In October 1963, for example, the British Information Officer Ray Muston was pleased to report that the FO had provided the British

1782 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', February 12, 1963, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 27, NARA.
1783 For example, 'Country Plan for Finland', approved April, 26, 1963; USIS/Helsinki: 'Country Plan for Fiscal Year 1965', July 12, 1965, both RG 59, CU, PRCS, boxes 27 & 28, NARA.
Embassy with booklets that were more suitable to the Finnish environment in the sense that they did not directly slant communist practice.① While the British focused on delivering the Finns with content that would be more suitable for their particular environment, the Americans continued to rely on the power of their superior resources. The USIS/Helsinki now paid more attention to increasing its links with representatives of the media, defining them a number one priority group rather than politicians. This policy saw the American deliver with even more of their printed and visual content to the Finnish media and increase the organisation of special events and exhibitions for local journalists and book publishers.

Although some articles covering wider international themes were published by Finnish newspapers, a great deal of the IRD’s regular articles and scripts sent to Helsinki were in the mid-1960s considered unusable in the prevailing political climate. A particularly worrying development for both the British and American activities was the SDP’s increasing attempts to discard the incubus of its incapacity for government office because of its anti-Sovietism. This new policy also meant that the social democratic newspapers were becoming increasingly uneasy about publishing anti-communist material. By 1965, with the exception of Kansan Lehti, they hardly ever reproduced material that was highly critical of communist countries.②

Although the British must have felt exasperated by the limited possibilities of IRD work in Finland, even in the early 1960s they were not convinced that any increase of anti-communist activity was desirable or in Britain’s best long-term interests. The main body of local opinion remained firmly opposed to communism and, as was pointed out in a FO report sent from Helsinki in April 1964, “there seems to be a real danger of devaluing our currency in other directions if we are seen to be too “propagandistic” in the ideological field”.③ This approach had some effect on the British Information Service’s practices, as it decided to only translate articles that either had a distinct local interest and/or a possibility of reproduction because of their subject matter or manner of treatment. In the British view, only stories that were comparatively sophisticated (for example, those that poked gentle fun at the communist system) or that criticised communism or its aims vis-à-vis China rather than the Soviet Union were likely to meet any success.④

By 1965, the possibilities for British propaganda operations were already seriously limited. The changing policy of the SDP, together with the British position that it was not considered wise to give an impression of dissatisfaction concerning the orientation of President Kekkonen’s foreign policy and an interest to influence public opinion to that end, enhanced the view that the Embassy should redirect its energies somewhere else. As all this happened during a time when promoting exports were given even greater priority in British informational activities in any case, it is no surprise that a greater share of the Information Section's focus was shifted onto commercial publicity.⑤ Towards the late 1960s, the situation had changed to such

① According to Muston, the material covered themes from the international perspective, mentioning in the appropriate context where communist practices were invidious and contrary to what was good to the world R.F. Muston to IRD, October 22, 1963, FO 1110/1659, NA.
② B. Spencer to E.R. Allen, April 5, 1965, FO 1110/1916, NA.
③ B. Spencer to IRD, April 8, 1964, FO 1110/1786, NA.
④ Ibid.
⑤ B. Spencer to E.R. Allen, April 5, 1965, FO 1110/1916, NA.
an extent that export promotion more or less dominated the section's work, while virtually the only objective for the distribution of IRD material in Finland was to keep a small group of selected Finns up to date with developments in the communist camp, which might not come to their notice through the normal channels of information. 1789

Compared to the actual study period, Britain's diminishing anti-communist activities in Finland also began focusing on other areas altogether, a development that evolved from both the difficulties in having propaganda material published and the IRD's desire to launch more versatile operations. The Faculty of Journalism at the School of Social Sciences in Tampere was one of these fields. Together with the Americans, the British aimed to combat the faculty's communist tendency by inviting its leading scholars to Britain and the US, by providing it with British lecturers and by donating books to the school. Some success was achieved in this area as Professor Raimo Vehmas gave his consent to these arrangements during his visit to Britain, which was preceded by a stay in the US. 1790 While this operation provides a good example of the new methods through which British and American officials were now working, it also gives yet more proof of how the narrowing possibilities for having their anti-communist propaganda published in Finnish newspapers made the two governments work even more closely with each other. The inclusion of West Germany in the coordination of the activity in question suggests that this collaboration was also expanded to other NATO countries. 1791

A brief look at the IRD articles published in Kansan Lehti in the mid-1960s confirms the British claim that only material dealing with communism on other continents besides Europe now had any realistic chance of being reproduced. Details about distributed and published material show that the British occasionally sent some anti-Soviet articles to Finnish newspapers, but they were almost never reproduced. The very few articles about developments in East Europe that were still published included journalist C.F. Melville's 'East German Angry Young Men' 1792 in which he claimed that East German youth would not support the current regime as long as Walter Ulbricht isolated them from the rest of the world.

The clear majority of the IRD material published in Finland in the mid-1960s dealt with China and the country's policies and culture. China had by now become a valuable tool that could be used, for instance, for the criticism of socialist realism. 1793 As with stories on Europe, many of the articles commenting on Chinese policies clearly reflected the change that had taken place in Cold War propaganda over the years. For instance, a report on Prime Minister Chow's claims regarding China's growing aid to underdeveloped countries calmly presented the facts about global development aid rather than directly condemned the policy or the communist country in itself. 1794

1790 R.F. Muston to B. Spencer, September 3, 1965, FO 1110/1916, NA.
1791 B. Spencer to E.R. Allen, April 5, 1965, FO 1110/1916, NA.
Above all, IRD articles distributed to the Finnish press in the mid-1960s show that by that
time British propagandists were putting less effort into attacking rivalling countries or their
social systems than in the more aggressive 1950s, and that the main focus of informational
activities was shifted to presenting Britain as an ever active player in world politics. This
development, a rather general one in Cold War propaganda, saw an increase in the amount of
‘straight’ information about Britain distributed to foreign actors at the expense of more
propagandistic material. The trend became even more evident as tension between East and
West was even further reduced at the time of actual détente starting from the late 1960s. The
change that took place in British informational policy was no sudden process, either. As early as
1964, a FO steering committee report on the effects of communist countries’ policies on British
overseas informational operations noted that while, for instance, IRD activities still offered a
valuable dimension to British policy, such international developments as the emergence of
polycentrism, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the rapid growth of nationalism in Africa made it
vital to readjust British propaganda to the changing environment.\(^{1795}\) For example, Lord Strang’s
extensive inspection of IRD activities recommended that the efficiency of the unit’s operations
needed to be increased by introducing the production of regionally-specific propaganda content
and by expanding the department’s collaboration with other FO branches.\(^{1796}\) Together with the
idea of focusing on the more positive projection of Britain, through for instance its scientific
achievements\(^ {1797}\), this view won plenty of support among FO officials and was influential in
making Britain’s overseas informational operations meet the more sophisticated approach now
favoured in the Cold War propaganda war. Even though in the Finnish case local circumstances
determined to a great extent the scope of British propaganda, the broader policies defined in
London also had a direct effect on the operations in Helsinki. The change that the new strategy
generated was so distinctive that it reaffirms the conclusion that the period examined in this
study was truly exceptional in terms of political propaganda.

The effects that the altering international climate and the more cautious policy that the
Finnish leadership adopted towards the Soviet Union had on American operations in the
country were not as dramatic as in the British case. The State Department’s growing attention
on the overseas promotion of the US through more positive methods, together with the
continuous introduction of new media technology, most importantly television, enabled the
Americans to increase their informational activities and make their presence felt through a
greater variety of channels. The USIS’s desire to form even closer contacts with representatives
of the Finnish media not only reflected the growing concern the Americans had on the Finnish
newspapers’ publishing policies in the 1960s, but also indicated that they felt that they were still

\(^ {1797}\) Science started to play a more central role in British overseas propaganda already in the late 1950s when FO officials began to feel alarmed by the success of Soviet science and its use in Soviet propaganda. The growing concern led to the FO and the Joint Intelligence Bureau requesting extra funds from the Treasury for the establishment of a liaison channel for coordinating anti-Soviet science propaganda. FO minute by P.M. Foster: ‘Countering Soviet Scientific Propaganda’, December 30, 1957; H.S. Young to R.W.J. Hooper, May 22, 1958, both FO 1110/1080, NA.
in a good position to influence at least their coverage on the US. Indeed, the Country Plan for 1965 claimed that while informational material including open anti-Soviet statements could not be widely used in Finland, official texts of important foreign policy statements, even when describing US policies versus communist ones, were still heavily distributed and had a great impact on Finnish editors whether or not they were printed. This estimation can be regarded as perfectly credible considering the close relationship the Americans had managed to build with some of the leading Finnish journalists in the 1960s. The fact that USIS officials held detailed talks with editors of Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet directly after the Note Crisis had begun shows that this connection was already strong in the early part of the decade. The main change taking place in the mid-1960s was that the Americans now gave even more attention to spreading their influence to newspapers published outside the capital region.

While American officials in Helsinki shared their British colleagues' concern over the SDP's new policies, they seemed more willing and able than their British colleagues to actually form new contacts with Finns that would make up for the social democrats' diminished enthusiasm for anti-communist propaganda activity. As a result, the trend of using more right-wing actors for distributing American political propaganda grew even stronger in the mid-1960s with such anti-communist figures as Georg C. Ehlnrooth now being increasingly contacted by not only the USIS/Helsinki, but also by the likes of Jay Lovestone, who encouraged the Finn to write about President Kekkonen's policies to the Free Trade Union News. Ehlnrooth's growing cooperation with the Americans is hardly surprising considering that by the early 1960s he had already visited the US several times, first as a young reporter and then as an ASLA Leader Grantee. The influential American politicians and journalists Ehlnrooth was able to meet during his trips had had a decisive impact on his future political ideology, which he predominantly based on Anglo-American conservative traditions, including a hatred for communism. One of the increasingly few Finns who were outspokenly critical of Kekkonen became an arbiter of political reports not only for the USIS, but also for, for instance, US News and World Report, which provided him with reports on communism from around the world. Even if it was useful for the Americans to receive such assistance, the cooperation with Ehlnrooth shows that even they had to settle for working with relatively marginal political figures after the SDP's interest in reproducing harder hitting propaganda waned.

Together with the investment in media contacts, the focus the Americans gave on Finnish youth was the other main trend that only became clearer in the 1960s. American reports from the early and mid-1960s reveal that the USIS paid growing attention to reaching younger people living both in cities and rural areas. Besides enhancing their contacts with youth organisations, the

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1799 SD Telegram from B. Gufler to Secretary of State, November 1, 1961, National Security File, box 70, JFKL.
1802 For example, US News and World Report to G.C. Ehlnrooth; Undated letter named by Mr Ehlnrooth as "Kommunismen III, January 1965 - November 1966", GCE, box 82, KA.
Americans increased their emphasis on youngsters when determining the kind of people they would like to see visiting Finland under the Specialist Program. For example, in 1963 American personnel in Helsinki came up with plans of arranging a number of professionals in the field of theatre, dance and music to Finland. The goal also was to expand Finnish-American cooperation in the field of sports by encouraging a greater number of American basketball, ice-hockey, swimming and track and field coaches to spend time in Finland and share their knowledge with local youngsters. In the field of literature, the Americans wished to introduce more controversial figures to the Finnish audience. The idea was that such names as J.D. Salinger would appeal to university students in particular and stir a lively discussion between them. As it turned out, at least Mr Salinger was not very keen on becoming involved in such activity, and the Americans had to settle for presenting authors from an older generation to the Finns. The four-day visit Nobel prize winner John Steinbeck made to Finland in autumn 1963 as a touring State Department Specialist en-route to the Soviet Union was a particularly impressive event, generating plenty of interest among Finnish writers, journalists and students.

From the American perspective, the ASLA-Fulbright programme remained their most effective channel to influence Finns of all ages throughout the 1960s. Figures for awarded grants in the 1960s show, however, that the expansion of the exchange activity had come to a halt in the early years of the decade, which can be regarded as the programme's heyday. The main reason for this was not that the activity was viewed as unimportant in Washington, but that the costs for bringing foreigners to the US had risen considerably. Inspection reports reveal that State Department officials were not that impressed with the direction particularly the educational exchange programme had taken by the mid-1960s, either. The programme for Finland was criticised, for instance, for lacking systematic coordination when naming suitable grantees, for not using visiting American Fulbright scholars as productively as possible, and in general for unnecessary bureaucracy. These insights made American officials both in Helsinki and Washington pay more attention to making the programme more simple and systematic.

When saying that the Americans were more successful than the British in their informational and cultural operations in Finland in the 1960s does not mean that they did not face a number of problems of their own. The USIS office in Helsinki also started to suffer from budget cuts, which for instance led to the closure of the America Center auditorium. This became as a particular blow for USIS film operations, which in the mid-1960s were also being held back by the lack of supply from Washington as well as some American officials' reluctance to screen

1804 USIS/Helsinki to USIA, 'Country Assessment Report', January 9, 1964, RG 59, CU, PRCS, box 28, NARA.
1805 'Educational and Cultural Programs between the United States and Finland. A Summary Report of the 1966 Review and Evaluation of the Fulbright - ASLA Programs', Undated, CU, Organization and Administration (OA), box 17, UAL.
1806 The adjustments made to the programme included advertising the Finnish environment to a greater number of academics, expanding the American Studies discipline taught to Finns and introducing new alumni activities for former grantees. For example, US Embassy to SD, 'Educational and Cultural Exchange: Country Program Plans and Priorities for FY 1966 and FY 1967', June 6, 1965; US Embassy to SD, 'Educational and Cultural Exchange: Annual Report for Finland for the Fiscal Year 1966, September 8, 1966, both CU, PR, box 317.; 'Annual Program Proposal of the United States Educational Foundation in Finland for the Program Year 1967', CU, OA, box 17, all UAL.
films that they regarded as "sheer propaganda", and therefore unsuitable for the Finnish environment. The propagandistic label a growing number of Finns had started to give to USIA-produced films also made their placement on Finnish television an even more difficult task. As annoying as these problems were to the Americans, they did not, however, unsettle the superior position USIS-distributed features screened by the Finnish-American Society, in particular, continued to have in Finland compared to the short film activities of other governments. Although particularly SNS increased its film operations again in the 1960s, the popularity of the screenings remained small, with the exception of Russian and Eastern European children's animation movies, which many Finns greeted warmly.

As for propaganda content, both the reality of the Finnish environment and the broader Cold War developments made the Americans emphasise their governmental policies, in particular US foreign policy and the race issue, as well as their economic progress even more than they had done during the previous decade. In order to make sure that the publicity campaigns met their goals and people's image of the US remained positive, the USIA again increased its use of international opinion surveys in the mid-1960s. As a result, the execution of economy-related informational operations became even more systematically planned also in Finland. Explaining American policies only grew in importance with the progression of the Vietnam War and the anti-American sentiment that had increased in Europe as a result. In Finland, the criticism directed against the US war effort remained relatively small, even though the number of demonstrations, organised mainly by university students, did to some extent grow towards the end of the decade. Otherwise, the presentation of scientific achievements continued its rise to the very core of American propaganda. Due to the lead the Soviet Union had managed to take in the space race, the US space programme and its presentation to people around the world became almost an obsession to the Americans. In Finland, the progress made by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was promoted through printed pamphlets giving highly technological details about spacecraft development and such special USIA exhibitions as 'USA - The Scientific Revolution', which presented US astronauts' space walking accomplishments alongside American achievements in other fields of science, most notably medicine.

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1808 The fact that many of the films held by sections of SNS remained completely unused illustrates the true position the society's operations continued to have in the eyes of the wider public. Interview with Juha Kindberg, June 15, 2011.
1812 Space...US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (USIA 1965).
1813 The exhibition was ordered from Washington for the America Days held in Turku in September 1965 and was presented together with the short film 'U.S. Astronaut Walk in Space'. The exhibition was also displaced in Helsinki later that month. C.B. Blosser to USIA, 'Report on the exhibit "USA - The Scientific Revolution"', November 4, 1965, RG 306, Exhibits Division, Records Concerning Exhibits in Foreign Countries, 1955-67, NARA.
The most notable development for both American and British operations in Finland that already began in the late 1950s and only continued to strengthen in the 1960s was that cultural matters gained growing significance in their execution. In the case of the US, this twist followed a broader policy change defined by officials in Washington. Unlike ten years earlier, even the most conservative American official now seemed, partly due to growing Soviet competition, to fully understand the true value the promotion of popular culture could have on their country's future world position. As a result, the budget for the Cultural Presentations Program was expanded and the State Department's role in, for instance, selecting jazz musicians for future world tours grew. These kinds of developments were something of which officials coordinating British overseas cultural operations could only dream. Due to the ever diminishing resources allocated for such activities, the British had to settle for making their presence properly felt in well selected parts of the world. The political developments in Finland ensured that the country belonged to this category and that in the mid and late 1960s the British Council in Helsinki continued to enjoy relatively large operational budgets that enabled the office to at least maintain the scale of its traditional activities involving the promotion of British culture and the English language.

Even if both Western governments continued to invest in cultural promotion in Finland, by the mid-1960s their campaigns had taken distinctively different shapes. While the Americans had adopted a more open attitude to the presentation of rising popular culture, the British relied on promoting their institutions and traditional forms of art. The difference in approach became well evident during and after the visit of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to the America Days in Helsinki in 1963. The Americans were proud to report about the vast number of activities related to the event, which in addition to the more traditional USIA exhibitions on American books and education, included several performances by the US Air Force Band and the now 17-piece dance band The Ambassadors, a ticker-tape motorcade in honour of Mr Johnson in central Helsinki and a Texas-style barbeque at the Kaivopuisto park, but the British Council representative felt that the show had gone too far to the Finnish sense of fitness, which favoured more dignified presentations and gestures such as the ones carried out by the British during Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Finland earlier that year. The more traditional approach followed by the British cultural effort in Finland did not, however, mean that the British Council was unable to take advantage of the increasingly common medium of television. Already in the early 1960s, the BC achieved some significant progress in the field of English language broadcasts, as particularly the language series ‘Walter & Connie’, shown by

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1816 For Macmillan's visit to Finland in August 1963, the British had three principal objectives to gain Urho Kekkonen's insight to Soviet foreign policy, to convince the Finnish leader of Western power and to settle some of the problems regarding British trade with Finland. The British decided not to carry out a broad promotional publicity campaign during the visit, and apart from the news conferences and a television interview given by Macmillan to YLE, their presence during the event remained rather limited. P.A. Rhodes to C.A. Thompson, April 23, 1963, FO 371/171682; 'The British Council, Finland: Representative's Annual Report 1962—1963', BW 30/14, both NA.
YLE, became highly popular. The share of British productions shown in Finland could, however, never match the daily exposure of American input on Finnish television viewers at the time, if not through the USIA's more political documentaries then at least through the screening of Hollywood-produced films and TV series as well as musical performances.

**The Beginning of Finlandisation?**

The forcefulness of the change taking place in the Finnish media environment in the early 1960s leaves us with one broader question that is relevant for this study, namely whether the term 'Finlandisation' could be used to describe the nation's behaviour during this time. Before seeking answers, it is highly important to stress that the objective of the discussion below is not to provide a thorough analysis of the term or its possible use for explaining the characteristics of Finnish society, or to observe the behaviour of political figures in that era. Indeed, the goal here is to approach the term and its use from a Western perspective. Therefore, the focus is merely on answering whether the term, as controversial as it may be, could truly illustrate the reasons for Finland becoming a less fertile environment for Western political propaganda during the given time frame. While it is true that Western scholars have not held as much interest in the post-Cold War Finlandisation debate as the Finns, and the concept in itself is rather vague, I believe that since the term has been so widely used in accounts about Finland's position during the Cold War and because it is closely connected to the concept of self-censorship, its total exclusion from this study would be something of a shortcoming.

When assessing the question introduced above, one should note that Finlandisation is a complicated and broader concept going beyond mere self-censorship. The term was often used in political discussions in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s describing a certain political process as 'to become like Finland'. Under this concept, a country such as Finland is formally independent but highly influenced by pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. Therefore, one could say that a nation that experiences Finlandisation loses part of its sovereignty and mitigates its criticism of a larger country. Although the word has mainly been used as a negative term to express Finnish weakness as well as concern over the situation of other Western European countries, Finland's performance during the Cold War has also received some understanding.

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1819 The usual motive shared by the first people using the term, such as political scientist Richard Löwenthal, was to reflect the feared effects of the withdrawal of US troops from West Germany. Even though Finland’s policy towards the Soviet Union was rarely directly criticised, using the country as an example of loss of sovereignty can hardly be interpreted as a neutral statement about the Finnish situation. At least the Finns saw the term as offensive and tried their best to rectify it. For example Klinge, Matti, "Ecce Finnia Tridentem! – Tässä Suomi valtikkasi!" in *Bäckman, Johan (ed.), Entäs kun tulee se yhdestoista? Suomennaisen uusi historia* (Helsinki 2001), pp. 35—41.
1820 For instance, Hans-Peter Krosby has claimed that Finland should not be judged if one does not understand the geographical position and history of the country. Finlandisation has also been seen as an example of Realpolitik, in which Finland’s policy was based on an acknowledgement of the realities behind power politics and the position of the country. Therefore, not all scholars see Finland’s politics during the Cold War as negative or biased towards the Soviet Union. Some say that under the situation the practised policy was rather clever, and recognise that Finland strengthened its relations also with the West at the same time. Salminen 1988, p. 275; Maude, George, *The Finnish...
The concept of Finlandisation has obviously penetrated Finnish society much more profoundly than has been the case in other countries. It is more closely related to the criticism of the political culture in the country. Many people say that Finland was, in fact, on its knees in front of the Soviet Union: its behaviour was too friendly and the nation practised unnecessary self-censorship, among other things. For many Finns, Finlandisation meant a sort of a voluntary acceptation of certain limits and norms in order to gain something.\footnote{Valkonen 1998, p. 34.} This kind of behaviour was, of course, not at the least spontaneous, but followed the Finnish leadership's quest to create an institutionalised system leaning towards the Soviet Union. As many people followed this way of thinking, some even sincerely believing in it, one can say that an understandable caution in Finland at times gave way to unnecessary humiliation, especially in the 1970s.\footnote{Lilis 1988, p. 137.}

Scholars have held some mixed views about the time period for which the term Finlandisation could be used to describe the nation's conduct. Although the term is often used to describe the political position of Finland in the 1970s, some have argued that the concept has its roots in the late 1940s. Back then, in particular J.K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen frequently reminded newspaper editors about their responsibility in foreign policy matters; as a consequence, a new kind of a political culture began to gain ground in Finland.\footnote{For example, Jukka Nevakivi sees Urho Kekkonen's first appointment as Prime Minister in March 1950 as the catalyst for the process towards Finlandisation. Nevakivi 1996, p. 15; Salminen 1988, p. 272.} Hannu Rautkallio has placed the beginning of Finlandisation to Kekkonen's appointment as President in 1956, seeing this event as a catalyst for a process leading to the Soviet Union's greater interference on Finnish domestic matters through the Finnish leader.\footnote{Rautkallio 2010, p. 25.} On the other hand, commentators mainly from the political left have claimed that the Finnish media was by no means as 'Finlandised' in the Cold War years as it has been generally assumed and that the use of them the term, or even self-censorship, for any period is inappropriate.\footnote{Nordenstreng, Kaarle, 'Me, media ja menneisyydenhallinta' in Bäckman (ed.) 2001, p. 219.}

The rapid, systematic manner in which most Finnish newspapers reintroduced self-censoring practices in the early 1960s suggests that this period was among the most decisive in the Finlandisation process. In other words, no matter how vague and controversial the concept may be, when examining Finnish society during this particular era from a Western perspective, in particular vis-à-vis the changes in the operational environment that forced British and American actors to realign their strategies, with hindsight it can be suggested that the use of the term in this context is, by and large, valid. The political leadership's strong grip on the press resulted in exaggerated caution, which would fit the term's characterisation. The newspapers' avoidance of criticism of the Soviet Union or the Finnish Government's adopted foreign policy was also far more evident during the early 1960s than in the 1950s, or even the late 1940s. At the same time, it must be emphasised that the developments leading to more systematic self-censorship and flattery of the Soviet Union were only at their early stages. Furthermore, the

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Finns' extensive use of international news agencies made sure that foreign news reported in their country in the 1960s and 1970s mostly continued to follow the same pattern as in other Western European countries in terms of reported topics. The distinctively greater and more positive coverage given to Eastern European news in Finnish media during this time\textsuperscript{1826} does, however, indicate that a rather profound change had already taken place in the country.

When using the term Finlandisation, one must also remember that the behaviour of many Finns during the Cold War was mainly just a cover. Although their actions often followed official recommendations, in their hearts they remained very much anti-Soviet and pro-Western. Several Finnish officials' activities, at times even behind the political leadership's backs, illustrates that for many Finlandisation was a mere fabric to please the Soviets and maintain consensus in foreign policy. Operations related to cultural diplomacy gave the Finns the opportunity to express their views in a slightly more open fashion. In this field, the Western orientation continued to dominate even during times when closer cultural cooperation with communist countries was more strongly promoted by the political leadership.

**Political Propaganda Gives Way to Positive Promotion**

From the perspective of Western propaganda and cultural diplomacy, the early 1960s reaffirmed many developments in Finland that started to take form at the end of the previous decade. The Finnish Government's closer relationship with the Soviet Union restricted the publication of Western anti-communist propaganda even further and dampened the Finnish press's criticism of Moscow and its policies. This was evident, for instance, during the Cuban Crisis when the majority of newspapers refrained from commenting on the Soviet Union's actions in negative light. The altered situation was a blow to the British political propaganda operations in particular, as they continued to predominantly rely on analyses of the injustices in the Soviet Bloc. As the new multifaceted informational policy defined in Whitehall during the first half of the decade placed more attention to the promotion of British products and culture, the limited possibilities to distribute an anti-communist message in Finland did not, however, harm the British Embassy's informational activities as seriously as the case would have been a decade earlier. As for the Americans, their reactions to the changing propaganda landscape, albeit at first rather panicky, reflected a degree of confidence over their possibilities to influence the Finnish nation also in the future. The USIS/Helsinki's increasing contacts with Finnish politicians, journalists, academics and youth organisations ensured that American presence remained strong even after the practice of political propaganda had, again, become a tougher prospect.

The way in which both domestic and international developments reshaped informational and cultural operations in Finland from the early 1960s onwards had a decisive impact on all foreign governments' future operations in the country. Although the Cold War was nowhere near over and would again enter more intense periods, the more aggressive political propaganda implemented in Finland, as in many other parts of the world, particularly in the 1950s would no

longer play as central a role as before. The new way of thinking on both sides of the conflict brought the more positive promotion of culture, ideas and images through traditional and the increasingly popular new art forms centre stage. As this development strengthened, it also enhanced the broader trend that saw the importance of official, government-led propaganda gradually diminish and give way to a more spontaneous and coincidental forms of informational and cultural activity.
CONCLUSION

The main finding of this thesis is that by implementing extensive propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in the country, both Britain and the United States were willing to support Finland's attachment to the West in the first Cold War decades more actively than it has often been realised. The relatively large amounts of work and money invested in these fields indicates that the two Western governments' Cold War propaganda campaign was not only confined to larger Western European countries, but extended into more peripheral countries like Finland, both geographically and politically located between East and West.

The fact that the political measures of supporting Finnish independence were largely restricted only increased the importance of the Western powers' informational and cultural activities in Finland. The methods and channels used for these operations were to a certain extent the same as in other parts in the world. However, Finland's unique international position required both the British and the Americans to make considerable adjustments to their standard propaganda and cultural diplomacy procedures. In the field of propaganda, in particular when distributed through the Finnish press, the broad practice of self-censorship in Finland, as well as Finnish legislation, made the execution of the operations more challenging than in many other countries.

Because of this, British and American standard propaganda material was often as such unsuitable for the Finnish environment, and the possibility of executing wide-scale propaganda activities was to some extent limited. Both the British and the Americans themselves recognised that due to Finland's delicate relationship with the Soviet Union, they needed to follow a predominantly subtle and sensitive approach in their informational and cultural operations. As a consequence, the Western powers confronted a constant dilemma in Finland: how to support the Finnish nation's ties to the West and expose the defects of communism without encouraging the Finns too much or causing them difficulties in their relationship with their mighty neighbour. Even though officials from both countries were well aware that Finland did not always offer the most fruitful soil for propaganda operations, they put great care in carrying out these activities and making them as appropriate as possible for the Finnish environment.

This study shows that in readjusting their operations to fit local circumstances, both Western governments showed a great deal of innovation and flexibility. While the British stressed the importance of working through local contacts and tailoring their output to local needs, the Americans launched a great number of entirely new programmes and practices, some of which were more successful than others. The operations and their implementation were determined by broader Cold War developments and the British and American informational and cultural policies that reflected them, but most of all by the Finnish-Soviet relationship.

The Soviet Union's strong influence in Finnish society made the Western operations more vulnerable. It also meant that, at times, the broader changes in Western operational policies did not concern Finland, whereas on other occasions they had a stronger impact on the activities in the northern country than in many other parts of the world. The introduction of anti-communist propaganda in the late 1940s is a primary example of a development that had a much
slower effect on activities in Finland, while the intensity by which cultural diplomacy was pushed higher up in British and American operational strategies after the Night Frost crisis in 1958 and the Note Crisis in 1961 was greater than usually was the case.

It is also safe to say that the Western campaign in the country was, in general, successful. Both governments were in most cases able to find ways to reach their target audiences and convey the preferred message to them even when faced with outside restrictions and problems related to funding. In anti-communist propaganda, British and American activity was largely limited to delivering the message to their specific target groups, mostly consisting of members of labour organisations, rather than seeking for maximum visibility. With this context in mind, the operations can be ranked almost as successful as the more overt programmes related to cultural diplomacy. In making all activities more efficient, the Finns played a central part. The majority of the nation was clearly Western-orientated, showing great interest in British and American news reports and cultural products. This formed a solid platform for any activity launched by the British and US governments. The Finns' close involvement in the operations' execution, both directly as producers of propaganda and indirectly as its distributors through the media and political parties, also played a key part in making the content more appropriate for the local market and increasing the activities' overall credibility.

In Britain's case, the propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations carried out by the Legation, the BBC and the British Council were highly effective despite their rather slow start. All three actors had their specifically defined roles in day-to-day work, but the close liaison between them enabled the British to plan their activities thoroughly and use the most appropriate channels and methods as efficiently as possible. This was extremely important for the execution of a believable informational and cultural programme as available resources for such a task were somewhat limited.

In press operations, the majority of the material the British Legation offered to Finnish newspapers focused on reporting factual matters and presenting British society in a positive light. The establishment of the Foreign Office's anti-communist unit Information Research Department was, however, a welcomed move among British officials in Helsinki, as they felt that its material could be of much use in Finland due to the Finns' limited possibilities for obtaining objective information about developments in Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union. Considering Finland's sensitive position and the practice of self-censorship, the placement of the IRD's anti-communist material in Finnish newspapers was, generally speaking, even surprisingly successful, especially in the early 1950s.

Listener research reports suggest that the BBC's Finnish Service also carried out a successful campaign in Cold War Finland. The praise the service received for its objectivity and accuracy shows that there was great demand among Finns to learn about international developments, above all in Eastern European countries, through a foreign medium as their own sources were not always regarded as reliable. The Foreign Office's wish to add some 'political punch' to the Finnish broadcasts led to a somewhat classic struggle between the FO and the BBC, which constantly emphasised its independence in decisions concerning broadcast content. The majority of the Finnish Service's content remained impartial in tone, but the inclusion of such
centrally-produced series as ‘In Eastern Europe’ meant that the service played a part in the FO’s anti-communist propaganda campaign. As previous studies suggest, however, the projection of British culture and in particular jazz music broadcasts played as important a role as did the anti-communist talks in the long-term propaganda effort; this was also clear in the Finnish case.

The relatively meagre funds available for British Council activities around the world made the promotion of British culture and language a less straightforward affair also in post-war Finland. When saying this, one should also point out that the complaints made by British officials over their resources were not always justified, given that the Helsinki office enjoyed greater funding than many other posts. Be that as it may, one of the greatest British breakthroughs during the study period was achieved in the field of English teaching. The replacement of German as the first foreign language taught at many schools gave British cultural activities an enormous boost, even if the influence of the German language remained strong in the Finnish educational sector for quite some time. The British Council played a vital part in increasing the popularity of English as it supported the numerous Finnish-British societies around the country, and made the sound decision to appoint teacher-secretaries to the largest ones of them. The line between propaganda and cultural diplomacy was particularly thin in many of the BC's activities and is, in fact, often impossible to draw. This was particularly the case in the early 1960s when the Council's role in projecting Britain was finally boosted, partly due to the changing situation in Finland and partly due to larger developments in Cold War propaganda.

As most American activities were conducted by the US Legation in Helsinki, mostly by the USIS staff, the coordination of daily tasks was easier than in the British case. On the other hand, one could argue that because of this, the Americans were not able to specialise in various areas as profoundly as their British counterparts. The superior resources available to the Americans, naturally, enabled them to perform operations on a much broader scale. As for press operations, according to an American estimate the extent of USIS-based material published in Finnish newspapers reached saturation point in the early 1950s. In spite of this, the Legation confronted similar problems as their British colleagues in pushing their anti-communist message forward and even questioned the freedom of the Finnish press. As US officials in Helsinki felt that the working class, i.e. the primary target group, could not be reached effectively enough, they introduced new channels for the distribution of their propaganda. Both the VOA Finnish Service and the Finnish-language field magazine *Aikamme* were distinctively tools of American propaganda. The fact that neither of them lasted for many years illustrates how difficult an operational environment Finland was. USIS short films loaned out to all parts of the country fared much better. The industrious ways the Americans were able to find for their presentation and distribution made this activity among the most effective in Finland.

Undoubtedly, the United States’ most successful operation was the exchange of persons through the ASLA-Fulbright programme. The exceptional scale of this activity clearly captured the State Department's desire to attach influential Finnish individuals closer to the West and to influence Finland's societal development on a long-term basis. In addition to acknowledging the programme's impact in the long run, the Americans emphasised the benefits scholarship holders, both Finnish and American, could bring for reaching the shorter term propaganda
objectives and were eager to use them and their favourable comments on the US with this purpose in mind. The ASLA-Fulbright programme was also regarded as an excellent channel for having both direct and indirect impact on the development of Finnish politics as well as the modernisation of industry and business, rather than merely influencing the perceptions of individuals inside academia.

An evaluation of US propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland is made significantly trickier by the large number of actors involved and especially by the omnipresent influence of the CIA. It would appear that the agency was at least indirectly involved in a great deal of the activities, mainly as their financier. It is unlikely that it took active part in defining any of its front organisations’, such as the Congress of Cultural Freedom, activities concerning Finland. On the other hand, everything is not yet known about the CIA’s true involvement, especially as comes to propaganda. The agency’s role during the youth festival in Helsinki in 1961 gives some indication of the CIA’s true abilities in this area, although one has to remember that in this particular case the primary target group of the activities were foreign festival visitors, not the locals.

As the British and US governments ran two predominately independent campaigns in Finland, it is worthwhile to make some general remarks about their execution. A direct comparison between the two operations would not be fruitful due to their different size, but on the other hand the degree of efficiency the British were able to accomplish in their campaign throughout most of the study period shows that the size of available resources did not mean everything.

Whereas the US Government focused on carrying out a somewhat similar propaganda campaign as in many other countries, the British Government needed to come up with new ideas for promoting its message. Especially in the field of press activities, British officials seemed to be more active in finding ways to make their material more appropriate for the Finnish environment and discovering new channels of distribution by establishing close contacts with, for instance, Finnish newspaper editors and politicians. The USIS/Helsinki, on the other hand, based its work largely on supplying Finns with Washington-produced bulk material without making any major changes to its content, except in special cases.

Another major difference between the two Western powers and their activities in Finland concerned their relationship with Finnish organisations. A number of American actors were willing to provide financial support to Finnish organisations, mainly the Social Democratic Party and the trade union organisation SAK, along with their propaganda activities, which were regarded as crucial in the battle against communism. The British, on the other hand, refrained from doing this. The lack of resources offers the obvious explanation for this, but FO documents also suggest that the decision not to give indigenous groups any direct financial support was, most of all, a strategic one, following the view that it was best for the British Government not to become too closely involved with local actors. Above all, the cooperation with the Finns concerned the distribution of overt press content and the more covert anti-communist material.
In spite of the different strategies adopted in the direct financial backing of Finnish organisations, the Americans and the British shared one essential characteristic in their policies towards the northern country: they both were willing to invest considerable funds in their Helsinki-based activities. The categorisation of Finland as one of the important 'frontier countries' made sure that the sums directed to the British information services in Finland, even if in real terms fairly small, remained among the largest in Western Europe when taking the size of population into account. The steady expansion of USIS operations in Helsinki suggests that Finland's rank as one of the countries particularly exposed to communist aggression closely determined the size of US funds allocated to the country, as well. Indeed, it would seem that the amount of American money invested in propaganda operations abroad was in line with the sums handed to foreign organisations; in other words, the largest amounts were most likely invested in areas, including Finland, in which local actors also enjoyed the greatest American financial support. Without precise information about the volume of CIA funding or the annual budgets of USIS offices around Europe, this is, however, only a rough estimation. Indeed, it could well be that the caution American officials often followed in the distribution of anti-communist propaganda kept the funds allocated to US information operations in Finland slightly smaller in relation to the covert support of local organisations.

As for cultural diplomacy, the British Council's active role in language teaching was something the Americans really envied. As in propaganda operations, the USIS noted that the British way of operating, including numerous field trips around the country and liaison with several Finnish authorities, was more active and flexible than their own. By the late 1950s, the Americans had become aware that their role outside Helsinki was rather invisible and consequently introduced a special field programme to rectify things. In educational exchange and art exhibitions the situation was the opposite. British officials knew that they could never match the scale of the ASLA-Fulbright Programme or the larger Museum of Modern Art-related exhibitions displayed in Helsinki.

The two Western campaigns also took different paths. Britain's activities were of great importance after the first post-war years and during the early 1950s when anti-communist propaganda was introduced in its full scale, but started to fade after both the country's international position and operational resources weakened. US officials, on the other hand, were slow to launch broader activities in Finland, but when they started doing so in the early 1950s, their impact on the Finns grew convincingly. For this, the USIS had wider developments to thank for, mainly the expanding popularity of consumer and youth cultures, which drilled an image of the American way of life to the mind of every Finn, especially after television started to become more common in the early 1960s. At this point the cooperation between the British and Americans in Finland was also expanding, especially in the field of language teaching. In general, however, the liaison between the two Western powers remained somewhat limited throughout the study period and was mostly restricted to sharing information and discussing broader political objectives.

Even though British officials in Helsinki put more effort than the Americans into making their propaganda content more suitable for Finland, and the anti-communist material produced
by the IRD was, in general, more sophisticated than that of the USIE/USIA, the overall propaganda content of the two governments was highly similar. Both campaigns predominantly emphasised the positive aspects of their respective societies and culture as well as the benefits of democracy in general. As both the FO and the State Department were quick to learn that an aggressive campaign was unnecessary in the Finnish case as compared to other Western European countries, British and American propaganda in Finland focused more on the distribution of ‘straight’ information and the projection of their societies. The US campaign was particularly effective in this field, as the USIS/Helsinki constantly bombarded the Finnish press with articles praising the American economy and the high living standards of the 'Average Joe', and the country's scientific achievements, as well as the general American message of freedom and opportunity for all, including African-Americans.

Otherwise, the broader informational and cultural policies determined in Washington and London were closely reflected in the campaigns launched in Finland. In particular, the adaptation of a more evolutionary propaganda strategy in the late 1950s was evident, for example, by the way the Americans organised many of their worldwide exhibitions, such as ‘Atoms for Peace’, also in Finland and started to use Gallup surveys for reshaping their operations into more sophisticated form. In distributed content, the USIA-produced material began from the late 1950s onwards to give increasing emphasis on American popular culture, particularly jazz music, and more general topics such as equal opportunities in the US. The British Government also made some modifications to the nature of its operations in Finland, but they were rather a result of its diminishing resources for informational activities and changes in the Finnish environment than a broader change in general strategy.

Although British and American propaganda in Finland can in general be labelled as ‘white’ propaganda, i.e. objective truth-telling from an open source, the reasonably successful placement of anti-communist articles in Finnish newspapers, together with the transmission of political radio programmes and the publication of the American field magazine, indicate that a fair share of the content clearly belonged to the category of ‘grey’ propaganda, i.e. the distribution of biased information and partial truths from an indeterminate source. The difficulty to push direct criticism of the Soviet Union for publication in Finland only increased the share of this type of propaganda. Indeed, the British and Americans as well as the Finns were more or less forced to develop a new way of attacking the Russians and communism in general indirectly, namely by directing the sharpest sting at the smaller Eastern European countries. A very small share of Western propaganda in Finland could also be called ‘black’ as the true source of the stories was sometimes disguised. Furthermore, the covert and indirect distribution of hard-hitting anti-communist material through indigenous agencies was also likely to include misleading information.

The success of British and American press operations depended on the effectiveness of their distribution methods and channels and, above all, the Finnish general climate at a given time. Some clear trends can be recognised in how the British and US governments were able to promote their message in the exceptional Finnish environment. The first post-war years were a time when the Western governments concentrated mainly on developing their operational
methods. During this period, British and American propaganda remained small-scale activity and focused on informing the Finnish nation about the governments’ policies. As the Cold War heated up in the late 1940s, Western propaganda activities expanded also in Finland. After the British learnt what IRD material was appropriate for Finnish newspapers to publish, they were able to launch a relatively extensive press campaign especially in the early 1950s. This was the time when US press operations also turned into higher gear. The distribution and placement of British propaganda was at its most successful between 1953 and 1955, when the inclusion of IRD content by the Finnish media was, in fact, rather on the same level as in other comparable countries such as Austria and Sweden. For a brief period in the mid-1950s, Finnish newspaper editors were not that keen on undermining the Soviet Union mainly as a result of the return of the Porkkala Naval Base. Nevertheless, this tendency proved temporary since the more liberal period of 1956–1957 offered increasing opportunities for pursuing the Finnish press to publish anti-communist material. The final four years of this study period, 1958-1962, were plagued by two political crises and an internal power struggle in Finland, which had a profound impact on the Western operations’ future form.

The periodisation made above largely supports the hypothesis presented in the introduction of this study, i.e. that Western anti-communist propaganda in Finland in the 1950s, the most aggressive decade of the Cold War, was not restricted by self-censorship as much as I had previously concluded. Even if the most successful period for anti-communist operations were the immediate years after Stalin’s death, evidence indicates that already in the early 1950s, partly as a reaction to the Korean War, even harder Western propaganda was finding its way to Finnish recipients. This was made possible by the more active position a large number of Finnish politicians and journalists took in the fight against communism and the close cooperation they had developed with British and American officials in Helsinki. The lines of self-censorship continued to determine what could be published in the northern country, but both Finnish and Western actors found several ways to go round them. While the British and Americans started to deliver the Finns with more press content that had the possibility of being reproduced, they also expanded their distribution of more covert material for the political battle on the grassroots level. Finnish newspapers supported the cause by attacking domestic communists and including a greater number of news articles of Western origin informing readers about injustices in Eastern Europe or explaining Western policies more thoroughly. The Finnish press’s heavy reliance on foreign news agencies’ international news reports only increased the use of Western government-led propaganda, even if the exact degree of official guidance to which these stories were subjected remains open.

The more strict publishing policies introduced by many Finnish newspapers in the late 1950s and early 1960s formed another major turning point. This study agrees with previous research noting that the Night Frost Crisis was a definite turning point towards the practice of tighter self-censorship, but points out that particularly the British anti-communist campaign showed some signs of fading already a couple of years earlier. The Night Frost Crisis' impact on Finnish behaviour was not immediate or all-encompassing, but more of a beginning of the process that the Note Crisis and Urho Kekkonen’s firmer hold on power enhanced. The new political
culture did not favour almost any criticism of the Soviet Union and its policies. From the perspective of Finnish newspapers' publishing policies regarding more controversial political content, the change taking place in the country was so forceful that one could argue that the political behaviour later labelled as Finlandisation had already taken its foothold in Finnish society in the early 1960s. As a result, the British and American anti-communist propaganda activities became extremely challenging, and a larger share of the informational activities started to focus on cultural matters and the promotion of economic interests, instead. This development was not entirely the result of the domestic situation in Finland, but also reflected a broader trend in the Cold War image battle, which was based more on cultural promotion than directly attacking the enemy. The changed propaganda environment in Finland and, in particular, its effects on Western operations in the country in the upcoming decades could offer a natural starting point for further study, as could the closer examination of a chosen Finnish medium, for instance the press, the radio or television, from a Western perspective.

Although a reliable assessment over the true influence of the Western powers’ propaganda and cultural operations in Finland is all but impossible and beyond the scope of this study, some rather general observations can be made on this matter. Both British and American officials certainly felt that in addition to successfully reaching the Finnish masses and increasing their knowledge of the Western way of life, their operations also had the desired impact on Finland’s general development and the Finnish nation’s perception of the world. The Americans were particularly keen to stress the broader psychological effects of their campaign in Finland, especially in terms of Finns’ increasing sympathy to the West. Although US officials were also ready to recognise that any reliable measurement on the effects of cultural and informational work was hard to obtain, they did take some credit for having a decisive impact on preventing Finnish ‘political wavers’ from turning to communism. For example, the support given to the SAK was regarded as having played a key role in the successful campaign of blocking communist dominance in the trade union movement. The British only rarely speculated on their activities’ psychological and concrete impact but they, too, were convinced that what they were doing was highly effective and, for example, the BBC listener reports gave some justification for this belief.

In retrospect, it is relatively easy to agree with the view that British and American efforts to influence the Finnish nation in the first Cold War decades hit their target. The Western powers’ considerable activity in a number of informational and cultural fields certainly gave Finnish politicians and the nation as a whole an expression that the country was not entirely left alone in its struggles. This obviously built Finland’s confidence in the long run and enhanced the Finns’ cultural affiliation with the West. Cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and the media played its part in accelerating Finland’s post-war development and its rise into a prosperous industrialised country. Thanks to Western cultural and informational activities, the Finns certainly learnt a great deal more about other parts of the world than they would have done otherwise.

One could also argue that the British and, in particular, the American goal of explaining the ‘Western way of life’ through concepts like individualism, free entrepreneurship and equal
opportunity, was rather easily met in a country like Finland, whose people dominantly welcomed such ideas and were rather familiar with them in any case. Finland also provided fruitful soil for the ever-growing number of cultural products imported from the West. Indeed, the role Western films, literature, music and sports played in reshaping Finnish society, and catalysing the emergence of an altogether new kind of youth culture in particular, should not be understated.

One could, of course, also ask whether an extensive informational and cultural campaign was necessary in a country like Finland, in which the nation was culturally orientated to the West and had a strong resentment of the Soviet Union. What was the point of spreading anti-communist IRD material or introducing an exceptionally large Fulbright programme if Finnish people were in any case bombarded with Western culture through private firms and overwhelmingly pro-Western in their thoughts anyway?

The answer has both a psychological and a political dimension. The first has to do with the main justification for Britain's and the United States' engagement in such activities, i.e. to provide moral support to the Finns and enhance their independence and ties to the West. One could say that the British and American cultural and informational operations, which at their simplest meant ‘showing the flag’, built up to long-term investments in Finland’s future. The political dimension is, above all, related to the Western powers’ estimation that their work was essential for blocking the expansion of communism in Finland. Considering the Finns' pro-Western sentiments and resentment of communism, this activity was always based more on preserving these attitudes rather than creating new ones. It would be too much to say that the Americans and the British restrained the popularity of communism in the country, but one could argue that without their active efforts in the fields of culture and information, and their support to Finnish non-communists, this task would have been more difficult.

When examining the reasons behind the British and US governments' operations in Finland, one naturally has to keep in mind that the Western powers did not expand their cultural and informational activities in Cold War Finland only because of ideological reasons or merely as a gesture of goodwill, but mainly because it was in their political and economic interest to do so. Even though cultural and informational matters have traditionally been regarded as inferior to wider political and economic issues, their importance in supporting broader governmental policies and goals should not be underestimated. Indeed, the significance of the cultural and informational dimension in the implementation of the two Western governments' overall policies towards Finland was so great that I wholeheartedly agree with the increasingly common view presented on the first pages of this study that in the assessment of Cold War history, ideological and cultural matters should be given greater importance and examined further. In other words, Cold War Finland offers a perfect example of a situation in which the more indirect and long-term measures of influence were given a more decisive role in the protection of two foreign governments' interests than it has previously been understood.

An examination of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland in the early decades of the Cold War also endorses a number of earlier conclusions about the Western powers' activities in these areas, as well as their general Cold War policies. Both governments saw it vital to use propaganda and other informational operations, as well as
various cultural activities, to enhance their support in the Cold War battle not only in communist satellites, but first and foremost in Western Europe, including neutral countries such as Finland. This study also supports the view that although the US and Britain were close allies during the Cold War, their cooperation in informational and cultural activities was based more on sharing information than ground-level collaboration. Indeed, the fairly limited cooperation between British and the Americans in informational and cultural operations in Finland suggests that the image of the West as a greatly homogenous Cold War bloc is somewhat misleading, especially as far as these kinds of ground-level activities go. The great number of, in particular, American actors operating in the field made the effective coordination of all operations such a challenging task that one also comes to suspect that at times it was to some degree neglected and that the various organisations acted predominantly according to their own strategies.

Even if this made the execution of propaganda and cultural diplomacy a rather complicated affair, the Western powers’ activities in Finland also draw an image of their Cold War machinery being adaptable enough to come up with fresh methods for the distribution of suitable information and for having an influence on people’s opinions by using various cultural channels. The fact that both the British and the Americans were able, even if after a period of confusion, to present a strong but at the same time not too provocative an image of their countries complements the view that both Western governments were willing to invest strongly in the successful execution of their operations. The Western powers’ ability to run a considerable anti-communist propaganda campaign in such an exceptional environment as Finland shows that as the Cold War progressed, officials of the two governments rapidly learnt a great deal about the execution of propaganda and cultural diplomacy and about national characteristics. They also came to realise that methods in informational and cultural operations had become increasingly sophisticated, especially after the introduction of new media, in particular television.

Although British and American officials were not always able to operate in Finland as broadly as they would have wanted, their campaigns followed closely the governments’ wider strategies in the ‘battle for hearts and minds’, which in turn were direct consequences of general international developments. An examination of British and American activities in the northern country also indicates that they followed the Western powers’ general policies in the sense that the importance of information and culture, more broadly the ideological and psychological dimension of international relations, in accomplishing the top priorities was strongly emphasised.
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Kansan arkisto, Helsinki Finland (The People's Archives) (Central archives of the Finnish left-wing labour movement and popular organisations)
Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (SKP)
Kulttuuripoliittinen jaosto
Tiedotusjaosto

Keskustan ja Maaseudun arkisto, Helsinki, Finland (KMA)
(Centre Party and Agrarian Archives)
Kansainväliset asiat ja kirjeenvaihto
Maalaisliiton sanomakeskus
Puoluetoinisto
Lähetettyjä kirjeitä
Kuvataiteen keskusarkisto, Helsinki, Finland (KKA) (Central Art Archives)
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(Parly copies in Niklas Jensen-Eriksen's possession)

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Kaleva
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(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WoO_qhiM4fQ) (March 5, 2014)
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With These Hands (1950)

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Abstract

The study examines British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during the first decades of the Cold War, more precisely between the years 1944 and 1962.

As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, both Britain and the United States sharpened their informational and cultural activities throughout the world. The general goal of these operations was not only the promotion of culture and the ‘Western way of life’, but also the containment of communism. For the distribution of anti-communist propaganda and the projection of culture, the British used printed material prepared by a special Foreign Office unit, BBC broadcasts and operations executed by the British Council, while the Americans relied on material produced by the United States Information Agency (USIA, until 1953 USIE), including Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts. The United States also emphasised the importance of the exchange of people through, for example, the Fulbright Programme.

The two Western powers’ operations were also conducted in exceptional environments such as Finland, in which the country’s complex relationship with the Soviet Union meant that the distribution of anti-communist propaganda, for example, through Finnish newspapers was always going to be a sensitive affair. Although the British and Americans knew that the majority of Finns resented communism, they were constantly worried about finding the appropriate methods to promote their message to the broader masses. In addition to informational and cultural activities, Britain, and in particular the United States, through the CIA, also supported the anti-communist work of some Finnish organisations.

The general objective of this study is to discover the nature of British and American propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland. The focus lies on their breadth, closer traits and the channels used in their execution. Furthermore, the aim is to discuss how certain characteristics of Finnish society, such as the widely accepted practice of self-censorship, affected the Western powers’ operational methods. Some emphasis is also placed on examining the effects of these activities and comparing the two campaigns with each other.

The study is predominantly based on archived documents of the British Foreign Office, the British Council, the BBC, the US State Department and the USIA. Furthermore, records filed at numerous Finnish archives provide valuable information about the Western operations' distribution processes, while certain Finnish newspapers and magazines make up essential sources for the examination of propaganda content.

This study comes to the conclusion that both Britain and the United States carried out reasonably extensive propaganda and cultural diplomacy operations in Finland in the first Cold War decades, and as a consequence supported the country's independence and attachment to the West to a greater extent than has been previously recognised. The placement of British anti-communist articles in Finnish newspapers was especially successful in the early 1950s. The BBC Finnish Service broadcasts, which included anti-communist output, were also rather warmly welcomed by the Finns as were the operations of the British Council, despite its fairly slim resources. In addition to press operations, the Americans were able to influence a considerable number of Finns especially through USIA films, television programmes, the exchange of people and other cultural operations. The Finnish political crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s restricted Western activities and forced the countries to find new methods of operation. Despite this, the impact British and American informational and cultural activities had on Finnish society can be regarded as substantial.