CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA
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Edited by Rehema Kilonzo & Tiina Kontinen
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Introduction: Discussing Contemporary Concerns in Development Studies

Rehema Kilonzo & Tiina Kontinen

As part of the institutionalization of “development” after the Second World War, academia has witnessed emergence of the discipline of development studies. The five decades of the discipline have testified a number of theoretical shifts in considering how to conceptualize the very notion of development, and how to make sense out of the global processes and inequalities. Additionally, the place of development studies within the disciplinary landscape of academia has been continuously debated. Moreover, as a discipline, development studies have had more or less close connections with development policy and practice. Many strands of development studies have contributed to defining the pertinent development problems, and generating suggestions on the ways in which to address these problems.

In this edited volume we would like to take some distance from on one hand, the development problems, and on the other, the abstract theoretical discourses of development. That is why we have selected to address the “concerns” of development studies. We are inspired by development studies being both embedded in theory and having concern on the societal and natural phenomena that contribute to inequalities and human well-being. Concerns, in this volume, refer to development-related puzzles that call for theoretically-informed investigation, and empirically-grounded ideas on how to address these concerns.

Without doubt, the concept of development is a point of departure for the discipline. The central concern in development studies has been to research development processes as affected by array of factors in order to understand the underlying forces. Regardless of time and resources spent so far in development aspects, development studies is still experiencing unsolved challenges, which we refer as “concerns” including: rapid urbanization, political instability, gender inequality, food insecurity, poor governance, global technological gaps, spiraling levels of poverty and unequal distribution of financial and other resources.

These concerns still exist partly because they are addressed in isolation with individual disciplines. For example, the economists deal with poverty in economic point of view i.e. following economic growth standards as their main concern. On the other hand, sociologists address development concerns using sociological lenses without considering other areas like political science, geography and rural development, while all these are areas in development studies. Anthropology has had an ambiguous relationship with development and its interventionists pursues. The agricultural sciences,
forestry, geology, biology and the like add to the complexity of approaches, not to mention the computer sciences and its possibilities in dealing with so-called big data now increasingly available also in developing world.

The contemporary concerns in development studies in this volume are identified and discussed mainly by development scholars with first-hand experience of development. Too often, development studies publications present views of those who mainly research the development of others – the well-off European academics with strong views of what is relevant to the discipline in any chosen time. Partly to challenge this pattern, the themes and topics in this volume are chosen and mainly discussed by scholars, lecturers and doctoral candidates from tertiary institutions in Tanzania and Zambia. The volume is a product of a three year project Developing development studies – Phase II which was funded through a higher education institution institutional capacity building (HEI-ICI) instrument supported by CIMO and the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The main objectives of the project included increased capacity of Institutes of Development Studies in Tanzania and Zambia, especially the academic competency of the staff. The competence included supporting the achievement of PhDs for the staff. In the research interests of the project participants there were a plenty of concerns. Some of those are included in this book, with shorter or longer treatment. The concerns are divided under different themes. These include: Natural Resources, Decentralization and Governance, Social Accountability, and Livelihoods. These themes point out to relevant issues that are currently debated in the development scholarship in the respective countries.

The first section of the volume addresses natural resources concerns, whilst authors are presenting experiences on the mining sector in Tanzania and Zambia. The Tanzania case’s main arguments in this section are country’s readiness to embark on natural gas economy on the part of Tanzania, as it has shown signs of unrest due to this natural resource. It further analyses the contribution of gas to the Tanzania national economy. On Zambia, the author is examining the institutional framework in the face of economic development. It addresses institutional transformation, while assessing the strength of local institutions in managing the crucial resource – copper, which is the country depend on for economic development. Both authors are concerned with development dimensions; and conclude that in order for contribution of the mining sector to be translated into country’s development, there is a need to make bold decisions in policies guiding the sector, come up with sound institutional framework to balance the need of the local and investors.

The second section is on decentralization and governance concerns, where authors are drawing examples from Tanzania ranging from women representation in local government positions, poverty reduction to managing multi-stakeholders processes. Development concerns in this section are centred on decentralization process and its role in development. The main arguments presented by the authors are the escalating nature of decentralization of power, resource and accountability to local levels. Following the discussion, it is obvious while decentralization claim on participation of local
people in development process, the debate in the presented chapters clearly indicate that participation in service delivery; local leadership and poverty reduction have not been observed into its fullness. Finally, all three chapters conclude that in Tanzania as it might be the experience in other African countries, there is a need to have a framework or policy to guide the process.

The third section addresses social accountability in Zambia and Tanzania, while Zambia’s concerns is on externally funded local CSOs, Tanzania brings experience of misconception, misuse and malpractices of corporate social responsibility. Taking the two chapters together in this part, on the one hand SCOs have been regarded as instruments to bring or oversee development process in a specific government system. However, empirical evidence from Zambia experience indicates that it is not the case. On the other hand the Tanzania experiences highlight values that are universally accepted in the business world, which keep human compassion and justice in the centre of development.

Fourth section deals with livelihoods, mainly dealing with policy aspects of development and empowerment. The content is not exhaustive, as each theme as section would have easily accommodated additional reflections within the overall theme. However, volume points out how the concerns related to economic, political and social development continue to be in the center of debate – and calling for further contributions both in the field of research and the politics.

After four substantial sections we reflect on the concerns related to the discipline itself. During our workshop discussions along the way we continuously returned to heated debates on the identity and role of development studies. It became evident that similar concerns in regard to the status of the disciplines were uttered in Tanzania, Zambia, and Finland. Moreover, as our project was a capacity-building initiative we constantly encountered the concerns related to North-South partnerships. Therefore, the final section is titled Debating development studies, and presents a collection of the reflection of the so-called senior project participants; those who sat in the Board of the project and were responsible for designing the contents and modes of cooperation. The section includes experiences from Tanzanian development field, knowledge practices of Northern development scholars in investigating civil society, and a joint reflection about the challenges of the institutional capacity building. This section ends with a reminder from a Professor Emeritus in development studies and a career-long collaborator with Tanzania on how remembering of history is essential to make sense out of the contemporary concerns.

In conclusion, we invite readers to familiarize themselves with the contemporary concerns in development studies, especially as experienced by Zambian and Tanzanian development scholars. However, as the chapters clearly suggest, all the concerns have global connections. Both the global economy and international development aid are involved, in one way or another. Consequently, addressing these concerns at academic, policy, and practical level is also a joint effort where collaboration instruments such as HEI-ICI can provide much needed means and resources.
NATURAL RESOURCES
I Seeing Beyond Natural Gas Exploration in Tanzania

Victor George

Introduction: Mining and Natural Gas in African Context

The African continent is endowed with vast natural resources. It harbors the world’s largest mineral reserves of platinum, gold, diamonds, chromite, manganese, and vanadium (AU 2009). The US Geological Survey (USGS) ranks Africa as the largest or second-largest reserve worldwide for bauxite, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, phosphate rock, platinum group metals, soda ash, vermiculite and zirconium (KPMG 2012). It is estimated that mining in Africa represents about 20% of economic activities and contributes only 10% of the continent's total exports (ibid). Despite the huge potential of mining to contribute to Africans’ income, its contribution remains on the lower side; this could have been attributed to the fact that most of these minerals are exported as ores, concentrates or metals without significant downstream processing to add value and thus fetch more income.

On the other hand, Africa is also known for harboring huge gas and oil reserves. It is estimated that out of 54 countries in the African continent, 16 are exporters of oil, namely Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Chad, Egypt, Tunisia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mauritania (KPMG, 2013). Reports show that Africa’s proven reserves of natural gas have grown from 210 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 1980 to 509 tcf in 2012, representing growth of over 140% (ibid). The amount of gas reserves in Africa is expected to increase further, following recent discoveries of sizable natural gas reserves in Tanzania and Mozambique. The key question to be posed is whether Africa is benefiting proportionately from the resources it has. Experience from other African countries shows that mining and oil has resulted in conflicts, instead of potential economic growth. The inconsistency about the contribution of natural resources in African development brings forth a debatable issue, as to whether new discoveries of gas and oil in African countries, especially in East Africa, will have any significant economic contributions.

Recently East African countries have discovered vast sources of oil and gas. The major share of gas discoveries has been identified in Tanzania. Tanzanians are very optimistic about the new discoveries of natural gas. They have a lot of expectations largely skewed on economic growth and development. The majority believe that the discoveries will increase employment opportunities, improvement in social services and eq-
uitable income distribution. But, on the other hand, others are very pessimistic that the discoveries would probably have the same impact as mining sector such as gold, tanzanite and diamonds. There had been mixed opinions as to whether mining has had a significant contribution to the Tanzanian economy, or not.

For years, Tanzania has been depending much on agriculture as a main source of employment and contributor to GDP. The sector has been employing more than 70% of Tanzanians, and its contribution to GDP averages at 50%, decades after independence. The upcoming of other sectors, such as mining and service in the economy, has been much attributed to the Economic Recovery Programs (ERP) promulgated by the global financial institutions in the mid-1980s. These ERPs that further came to be associated with globalization focused much on removal of direct state intervention in the productive and distributive sectors of the economy and the restriction of the State’s role to its creation, mainly through the manipulation of fiscal and monetary instruments, of an institutional and policy framework conducive to the mobilization of private enterprise and initiatives. Thus, ERP opens up the Tanzanian economy to allow participation of private entities in productive sectors, such as mining and quarrying. It should be noted that Tanzania is one of the countries that have been endowed with a massive reserve of natural resources, including the presence of varieties of minerals.

Opening up the economy was largely associated with massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the mining and quarrying sector. Many Tanzanians hoped that mining would substitute agriculture in the contribution of GDP, and also provide an avenue for poverty reduction. But over the years, its contribution still remained less than 3%, implying that its growth does not involve much domestic economy. See Table 1.

Table 1: GDP Share by Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FDI (U$S Millions)</th>
<th>GDP SHARE BY ACTIVITIES, AT 2001 CONSTANT PRICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture, Hunting and Forest Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>463.4</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>467.2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>387.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>308.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>330.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>447.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>616.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>653.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>744.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>558.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>433.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(URT, Planning Commission Data 2013)
The dream of many Tanzanians of a new era of “honey and milk” has been fading slowly; mining resources have helped the country less than it has seemingly helped investors. To date, Tanzanians are witnessing the closure of some big mining sites, indicating a cessation of activities. To that extent, mining has not been a panacea to poverty and an ill economy, especially at the micro-level (ESRF 2013a). The majority of Tanzanians still swim in the realm of poverty (URT 2010). The story of mining leaves more questions than answers as to where the nation has gone wrong. Could it be a resource curse? Or is it the global politics of natural resources that rules our system? Or was the nation not readily prepared to face the challenges of the mining resources? At the center of these predicaments comes a new hope, “Natural Gas Discoveries”. The aim of this chapter is therefore to assert the status quo of gas discoveries in Tanzania, unpack the country’s readiness about the same, and analyze the future of Tanzania in the gas economy.

New Hope: Discoveries of Natural Gas

The history of natural gas exploration in Tanzania dates back to the past half a century. URT (2013b) indicates that the first natural gas discovery was made on the Songo Songo Island in 1974, and its commercial production commenced in 2004. Another discovery was made in Mnazi Bay in 1982 commencing its commercial production in 2006. More exploration activities are now taking place onshore and in shallow waters, deep offshore and on inland rift basins. Reaching 2012 the discoveries estimated at 43 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF) and valued at $430 billion (ESRF 2013b). By the end of April 2014, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals reported that about 46.5 T rillion Cubic Feet (TCF) had been discovered. The discoveries have a high potential to increase, as more explorations are still underway. The figures place Tanzania as the second largest proven natural gas reserve in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), after Nigeria. According to KPMG (2013), Nigeria is estimated to host 187 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves by 2011. This makes Nigeria the eighth largest natural gas reserve holder in the world. Other countries with huge reserves in Africa are Angola, Algeria and Egypt. ESRF (2013b) asserts that the gas industry in Tanzania will become the biggest industry in terms of value, as well as a powerhouse for employment and as a provision of a reliable energy resource.

The pessimistic view on these discoveries would be over the state of peace and security in the country. Looking at the giants producers of gas in Africa, they are all in the state of unrest and insecurity. Internal conflicts are persistent in those countries. Therefore, while looking at the positive side, the other side should also be addressed. The question here would be why are these countries in a state of unrest? Are the reasons associated with presence of natural gas? Is the gas contributing equitably to the national development? What differences would Tanzania make to prove otherwise? Answers to these questions are very important before escalating hopes on the discoveries of the

Failure of resource-rich countries to responsibly benefit from their natural wealth (Auty 1993)
gas and its contributions to Tanzania development. In line with these questions, the chapter reviews some of Tanzanian actions towards preparing itself to commercialize natural gas.

**Tanzania Preparedness on the Natural Gas Economy: Existing Legal and Institutional Frameworks**

If we are learning at all from the past experiences of the mining sector and its contribution to Tanzania’s economy, then the new discoveries of natural gas that provide hope to the majority of Tanzanians has therefore to be looked at critically. On that view, the Government of Tanzania in 2012 requested a high level scoping mission that included members from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union (EU), Germany, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (URT 2013a). The objective of the mission, among other things, was sharing lessons from international experiences of both successes and failures in managing natural resources as an input to the GoT’s policy decisions going forward. The mission proposed actions in two folds (i) urgent issues with immediate effects and (ii) urgent issues with future potential beneficial impacts (See Box1).

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**Box 1: Actions Proposed**

*Urgent Issues with Immediate Effects*

The mission proposed five actions that it deemed necessary for improvement in the gas industry. The actions included:

1. Development of communication strategy for the gas sector: the strategy among other things will enhance (i) managing expectations, (ii) transparency, and (iii) preparing Tanzanian nationals to seize opportunities linked to the gas sector.

2. Ensuring inter-agency coordination: building strong coordination across agencies and linkages across sectors.

3. Strengthening negotiation, legislative, contract management and monitoring capacity: developing negotiation skills that will enhance mutual benefits between the government and investors in the sector.

4. Fiscal regime: the fiscal terms need both to ensure efficient development and to maximize retention of revenue in Tanzania while maintaining adequate incentives for investors.

5. Unbundling short from medium to long term gas issues: the prospect of large export projects from deep water gas should not divert attention from immediate opportunities to increase domestic gas use in the power sector.

(Continues)
Urgent issues with future potential beneficial impacts.
On the other-hand, the mission proposed five actions that would yield positive future benefits for the country:
1. Steer clear of “Dutch Disease”: Actions are needed to alleviate rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate that drives out other exporting and import-competing industries.
2. Investing in investing: this involves successful investment of gas revenues, and capacity building on efficient investment
3. Investing efficiently and effectively, especially in strategic infrastructure and growth poles to attract private investment and catalyze economic diversification: using gas revenue to promote sustainable development and improving capacity of private investors
4. Updating the institutional and governance frameworks: building sustainable and efficient coordination mechanism between agencies in the sector
5. Managing the environmental downside risks: Ensure implementation of environment friendly projects

In creating these actions, the scoping mission uses cases and experiences from other countries rich in natural gas. These are the lessons learnt from those countries, and the actions provide a platform for commercializing natural gas successfully. The following sub section will elaborate on what has been done, especially on the legal and institutional framework on the context of what was proposed.

Preparing Natural Gas Policy?
Is there a tangible natural gas policy in Tanzania? Currently there is no yes/no answer to such a question. It depends on the milieu of discussion. It is debatable whether to call it a policy or a draft policy. In other sources it is labeled a Natural Gas Policy that was approved in 2013. On the other-hand, when addressing the parliament of Tanzania in his budget speech in May 2014, the minister responsible for gas was quoted as saying that the draft policy is now circulated for comments from stakeholders. Controversy! This might look like a minor thing but it creates questions on whether the clear communication strategy that was proposed is in place. One would expect that lessons from the mining sector would enable Tanzania to have natural gas management frameworks at a very early stage, even before negotiating with investors on the same. Basically, the aim of the policy is/would be to provide guidelines for the development of the natural gas industry to ensure optimal benefits to Tanzanians and the national economy in the short, medium and long term (URT 2013b).
Supportive Investment Climate

Gas investment requires huge sum of money. The “only” means for the Tanzanian government has been to create conducive environment to attract Foreign Direct Investment. To achieve the same, the government has divided the economy into leading and priority sectors providing different incentive for foreign investors. In this case, mining has been included in the leading sector and investors are allowed to import all capital goods duty-free; they are exempted from VAT until start of operations. Furthermore, investors can benefit from a five year tax holiday and 100% capital allowance deduction during income earning years (Mchallo and Koponen 2003).

Oil and Gas Local Content Draft Policy and National Empowerment Policy

The big cry from many Tanzanians also is that the suggestion of the scoping mission has been about the ownership of Tanzanians in the sector. Although the sector requires massive investment, Tanzanians should take part in the value chain, whether as suppliers of commodities or services. Realizing the importance of the participation of

Model Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)

As an addendum to Natural Gas Policy, the government of Tanzania has prepared the Model Production Sharing Agreement that would further guide and facilitate commercialization of natural gas discovery. The addendum forms part of the Production Sharing Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and any investor in the sector. It is within Model PSA that the government and investors know their financial gains. In other words, we could argue that this is where as a nation we know whether we win or lose in the business, keeping all other factors constant. It clearly shows what goes to whom categorically, see Table 2 for the profit distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tranches of daily total Production rates in each of the Contract Areas (MMscf per Day)</th>
<th>TPDC Share of Profit Gas</th>
<th>Contractor Share of Profit Gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 249.999</td>
<td>50.0%*</td>
<td>50.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 499.999</td>
<td>55.0%*</td>
<td>45.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 749.999</td>
<td>60.0%*</td>
<td>40.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750 999.999</td>
<td>65.0%*</td>
<td>35.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 1249.999</td>
<td>70.0%*</td>
<td>30.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250 1499.999</td>
<td>75.0%*</td>
<td>25.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 Above 1500</td>
<td>80.0%*</td>
<td>20.0%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XX%* ; is subject to negotiations

Source (URT 2013b)
local Tanzanians, the government has come up with a draft local content policy that provides guidelines on Tanzanians’ involvement in the sector. This policy is in line with national empowerment policy that envisions empowering Tanzanians to participate in productive sectors of the economy. It has been observed earlier that the contribution of mining to the Tanzanian economy is still limited. Among other reasons attributed to the trend has been the minimum involvement of Tanzanians in the same. Thus, mining does not seem to provide adequate formal employment to majority Tanzanians, or even result in investment of investment! As a result, local content and empowerment policies seems a remedy to the problem of involvement.

**Commercialization of Natural Gas in Tanzania: Actual Practice**

Actual commercialization of natural gas takes a long time. The report from KPMG (2013) estimates the commercialization period ranging between 7-10 years followed by design and negotiations of proposals. The reports suggest further that the peak level for investment would be in 2017-2020 attracting Foreign Direct Investment amounting to $20-$30 bn. Nevertheless, some action has been done in Tanzania to head towards full commercialization. The process towards commercialization has been associated with the following notable issues:

**Mistrust of Government and Citizens**

There had been some mistrust between the government and citizens on the other side. While the majority of Tanzanians needs and have high expectations to be involved in the gas sector, the government had a different thought, that the sector needs huge sum of investment of which only foreign companies can afford. This has been verified by continuous statements from government officials, for example the Ministry for Energy and Minerals was quoted saying:

> “Technically, Tanzanians have no capacity to invest in natural gas exploration,” (Silvester 2014)

Such a statement reminds Tanzanians of the mining sector that foreign companies dominated in ownership. Although the current data on mining license indicates that Tanzania own 70% of the license, foreigners own 25% and 5% is owned in collaboration (URT 2014). But this data aggregates all mining activities in the country. If disaggregation is done on size and capital investment, then all large mines are owned by foreigners. The issue here is not on who owns what, but rather how the government prepares itself to capacitate its citizens so as to engage in the sector. This would make more sense in terms of “investment of investment” on profit accrued from gas. Arguing on the low capacity or inability of Tanzanians to invest in the sectors brings contradiction of the proposed local content policy and empowerment policy all together. The question would be whom are these policies addressing?
**Confidentiality**

All activities associated with the extraction, from negotiation, contracting, to signing of agreements, should be open and transparent (URT 2013a). The disclosure should also include information on volumes extracted and prices of sold products (ESRF 2013a). Experience from other countries such as; Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Liberia, and Peru shows that gas and oil contracts are publically disclosed (URT 2013a). Transparency on contract is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania, but the concept is associated with some difficulties in its implementation. This brings queries on whose benefits does those contract serve? The assumption is that natural resources such as gas are owned by Tanzanians and they should be aware of what is happening in the sector. Recently there has been coverage in the Tanzanian media about a leaked gas contract between the government of Tanzania and Norwegian company StatOil (The Citizen 2014: 2). Worse, the profit sharing on the leaked contract does not conform to the government model PSA. The leaked contract indicates that the government would get a minimum of 30% and maximum of 50% of profit at low and high production capacities, respectively. The actual model PSA indicates 50% minimum and a maximum of 80% share of profit (see figure 1. below). The observed differences in shares trigger alarm to Tanzanians on the need to have open and transparent contracts.

**Comparison of profit gas shares**

![Graph showing comparison of profit gas shares](Source: Adopted from Kabwe 2014)

Source: TPDC website, IMF May 2014 report on Selected Issues, StatOil PSA Addendum 2012, and NRGI computations. Notes: the IMF assumptions of fiscal terms were made in the IMF May 2014 report based on the actual contracts, as stated in the report: “fiscal regime applied reflects broadly the existing fiscal regime, although this is only approximately so given that each signed PSA differs in important aspects.”

**Figure 1: Gas Projected Profit Shares (Source: Adopted from Kabwe 2014)**
High Expectations

The 2012 scoping mission in Tanzania reported that gas exploration and discoveries will not turn Tanzania into a rich country overnight. There are lots of things that have to be done in between to transform Tanzania from an agricultural led economy to a natural gas economy. However, the Tanzanians have a lot of expectations on the new discoveries. History should be a good teacher because early discoveries were made in 1974 and commercialization took place in 2004, almost 30 years later. Little is done on managing the expectations of Tanzanians on the sector. This implies that the national communication strategy on the sector is not in place, or if it has been formulated then its implementation is questionable. A vivid example of this has been witnessed on Mtwara when the local community engaged in a boycott when the Government of Tanzania decided to build a gas pipe line from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. Their argument was on how they would benefit from gas if it were to be transported to another city. Implicitly, this shows how the local community was not prepared enough about the natural gas extraction processes. After negotiations, the government managed to negotiate and implement its project. Looking briefly at the matter, it would seem as if it is over, but more efforts are needed to educate the local community and curb their expectations. Otherwise the sustainability of the project would be at stake.

The Future of Tanzania’s Natural Gas

The status quo of natural gas in Tanzania has been discussed previously. It clearly explains the huge reserve present in the country and preparedness of the nation on harnessing the same. But to this end let us compare the trends of gas commercialization processes to that of mining. The aim of this comparison dwells on elucidating important lessons learnt from mining that could form the basis of improvements on gas. For the comparison purpose the chapter will use analysis from policy forum extracts (see Box 2 below).

Box 2: Mining Development Agreements

At the time of writing, the GoT had concluded seven mining development agreements with various companies to engage in large-scale mining. Of the seven, at least five were entered into before the Mining Act, 1998 came into force in July 1999 and three of these before the Mineral Sector Policy (‘MSP’) were set out in October 1997. However, agreements that were entered into immediately prior to the enactment of the Mining Act, 1998 (in 1997, and 2 in June of 1999), ensure that the rights accrued by the companies would endure in the event that a new law would be enacted repealing the Mining Act, 1979. Further, the Mining Act, 1998 ensures that agreements between mineral rights-holders and the
GoT under the Mining Act, 1979, would remain effective. Importantly, however, this means that a significant proportion of the current mining agreements were executed at a time when the GoT had not yet formally set out its development strategy for the sector and potentially therefore the concluded agreements do not take into account long-term development objectives as later identified by the GoT. Furthermore, the downside of having customised contracts where the state lacks capacity to regulate/administer/monitor contracts effectively makes administration (as well as revenue collection) all the more tasking and complex.

Source: Policy Forum (2007)

The information contained in the box provides three key issues of discussion: (1) entering into agreements prior to enactment of mining acts (ii) entering into agreements without development strategy for the sector and (iii) lack of capacity to regulate/administer/monitor contracts effectively. It could be argued that many problems that have been witnessed (including low contribution to GDP and failure to translate growth of the sector to poverty reduction) in mining sector emanate from the three issues identified. These would be a lesson to the newly discovered natural gas in Tanzania. But what has transpired in natural gas so far does not pose any significance difference with mining. It has been witnessed that some agreements have been entered, contradicting the framework prepared to guide the natural gas sector. The industry is yet to prepare technical staff in Tanzania to foresee contracts and natural gas explorations processes. Furthermore, the majority of Tanzanians have not been prepared to engage fully in the sector in the name of “they don’t have capital”. Comparatively, not much has been done that would differentiate mining with natural gas extraction in Tanzania.

**Conclusions and the Way Forward**

Statistics indicate Africa to be one of the leading continents in terms of natural resources. The continent has been attracting huge foreign direct investment in the same. However, its contribution to economic growth and development is debatable. In East Africa we are now witnessing massive discoveries of oil and natural gas. The discoveries create new hopes for the majority, but also pessimism for others. There are people, especially in Tanzania, who have the perception that natural gas is going to be different than minerals, and will create a lot of employment opportunities and foreign exchange. Others had the perception that, since little effort to differentiate mining from natural gas has been done, no significant contribution is going to be observed with respect to natural gas commercialization.

Changes are inevitable if Tanzania is to benefit from natural gas extraction. Addressing General Conference of Commonwealth Universities in Ottawa, Canada on 17th August, 1998, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere was quoted saying:
Change has, throughout history, been a constant part of human experience, but today change is more rapid than ever before; its implications are very comprehensive, and yet its first approach is often imperceptible.
(http://insiderzim.com/nyerere-on-leadership-and-change/)

The winds of change are blowing towards Tanzania, especially on its natural resources. Massive discoveries of gas are associated with many challenges and changes. Some of these challenges have been addressed in different policy documents and regulations. ESRF (2013b) recommended that in order to realize benefits for the gas sector the following should be adhered: patience, transparency, fairness, ownership and preparedness. While, I agree with all these recommendations, I tend to remind the GoT to implement the proposed actions from the scoping mission. But while implementing the actions from scoping mission, the country should engage on building the capacity of Tanzanians in the area of oil and gas. Massive investment should be directed in educating Tanzanians along the value chain management of oil and gas. Moreover, the government should make efforts to support Tanzanians to engage in natural gas investments. This would make more sense and create synergy between investment policy, local content and empowerment policies. One thing that should be remembered is that: no one loves Tanzania on behalf of Tanzanians.

References
https://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/2014/07/04/tanzania-to-lose-up-to-1b-under-statoil-psa-open-these-oil-and-gas-contracts/
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2 Mining, Institutional Frameworks and Economic Development in Zambia

Simon Manda

Introduction
Debates on mining, institutional frameworks and economic development in Africa are essential for one enduring contradiction: the existence of massive mineral deposits against huge poverty levels reflective of the resource curse perspective (Auty 1994). It is essential that we understand institutions and policy processes shaping mining development on the continent if we are to tackle diverse development challenges facing the continent. The continent possesses 42% of world’s share of bauxite; 38% of its uranium; 42% of the world’s reserve gold; 73% of its platinum; and 88% of diamonds. It also possesses enormous reserves of non-ferrous metals: 44% of chromite; 82% of manganese; 95% vanadium and 55% cobalt (Bush 2008). Despite resource abundance, there still exists despair on the continent that mineral exploitation has insufficiently led to transformative social justice (UNCTAD 2014). In fact, the continent is reported to control only 2% of total world trade; 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and 1% of world’s manufacturing (Kweku et al. 2014). While a new discourse surrounding ‘Africa arising’ has emerged (Ovadia 2014; Radelet 2010); Africa’s development efforts are still largely linked to mineral dependency shaped by the nature and character of the global capitalist system. However, outcomes of the resource-led development vary greatly on the continent. One explanation has been pinned on varying governance qualities across countries with weak institutional structures contributing to negative outcomes (Dollar and Kraay 2003; Rodrick et al. 2002). Additional studies such as that by Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013) of 79 resource and non-resource abundant economies broadly emphasises effective institutional frameworks in the quality of fiscal performance. A study by Mzembe and Meaton (2014) in Malawi finds that existing weak regulatory frameworks are largely exploited by powerful and connected Multi-National Corporations (hereafter MNCs), and that the drive for Corporate Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR) is not always local concerns. Elsewhere, Mason (2014) examines environmental governance in Sierra Leone’s mining sector. While noting that despite recent advances in the area of environmental governance, environment and associated social problems continued to proliferate in the country. Mason places opprobrium on overreliance on neoliberal strategies which he claims insufficiently prioritises environmental concerns. Scholarly efforts such as presented in this chapter should understand and
explain institutions and policy processes shaping mining development on the poorest continent of the world.

This chapter structures its analysis of the Zambian mining sector by tracing institutional transformation over time and assesses their strength as they relate to crucial resource-led development dimensions – fiscal, environmental and safety and labour issues – and economic development. Specifically, we provide a critical review, account and definitive analysis on how policy transformation and mining expansion influence economic development in a fragile mineral dependent country of Zambia. In doing this, we tease out the role of existing institutions, their functionings and how these are framed within the context of mining and development. We conclude by locating Zambia within broader debates on mining and resource control agenda. An argument is made that in going forward, bold, simple, uniform and consistent decisions are required over time in order to create an institutional framework that will balance local and investor interests.

In locating the debate within the structural and institutional perspectives, this chapter focuses on mining and institutional frameworks in one of the poorest economies in the world and SSA – Zambia. The idea that ‘institutions matter’ has for a long time been central to literature on economic and political thinking (North 1990; Voigt 2012). International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank have always maintained that poor countries, like those in SSA, will have to – in their attempt to benefit from globalisation and Foreign Direct Investments in natural resources – get their institutions right. Failure to claw back sizeable mining incentives for economic development is largely presented as a governance and institutional problem (Bush 2007). Institutions thus matter in shaping fiscal, environmental and labour related issues. However, whilst much is known about underdevelopment on the continent, the nature and processes on institutional change (and in some cases absence of these) and their implications on economic development remain less understood (Brousseau et al. 2011; Nolte 2013). As some section of literature relates, what can be considered dysfunctional institutions, their reform (whether they become effective or not) are path dependent, which points to country historical experiences and transformation overtime (North 1990; Nolte 2013). Accordingly, it can be argued – at least in the Zambian case – that existing institutions reflect in a way historical formal and informal institutional structures and decisions taken by then actors.

**Mining in Zambia: a Historical Description**

The history of mining in Zambia can be framed around three main periods: the pre-independence, post-independence (1964-1991) and the post Structural Adjustment era (post 1991).

The emergence of the Zambian Copperbelt (main mining region) dates back to the 1890s with the British South African Company (BSA) (Figure 1). The BSA extended their influence into the region, motivated by the desire for mineral prospecting rights and white settlement (Alastair 2010). The BSA agreed deals with then Rhodesian Se-
lection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation for mining exploration in the then colonial Northern Rhodesia. The formation of the protectorate under British Colonial Office in 1922 and Northern Rhodesia in 1924 in a way consolidated the BSAC’s control on mineral rights in the region (Larmer 2010; Lungu 2008). In Zambia, commercial mining thus started in 1928 with Roan Antelope Mine in Luanshya by private companies: Roan Selection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation marked the beginning of organised local labour force in Northern Rhodesia with 30,000 men employed by 1930. The Zambian mining sector thus provides a rich context for analysing institutional transformation, growth and implications on economic development.

Zambia’s independence in 1964 altered mining operations. First, mining became one of the biggest employers besides inducing related employment opportunities. By 1969, and with support from mining, about 317,150 people were formally employed; 75,546 of which were engaged in the mining sector and 52,150 were directly employed by the duo companies (Lungu 2008; Lungu and Mulenga 2005; Central Statistics Office 2005). Profitability prices internationally permitted the country to generate consid-

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1 By 1969 Zambia attained middle income status. The country could boast about having one of the highest GDPs in Africa—higher than Brazil, Malaysia, South Korea and three times that of Kenya and twice that of Egypt. In fact, in its effort to improve social service delivery and infrastructure, the country could now afford to finance five year development plans (Alastair 2010).
erable revenues for economic development. Soon after, Zambia would attain middle income status.¹ Marking the beginning of economic transformation, Copperbelt suddenly became a new opportunity centre for local people to experiment modern life, raising the need for strong institutional frameworks.

However, driven by President Kaunda’s national consciousness, mineral ownership rights reverted to the state. In 1969 51% of shares in all existing mines belonged to the state.² By 1970 the two major foreign mining corporations - Anglo American Corporation and the Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST) - became Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) respectively. In 1982 nationalised companies were amalgamated to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM). In the year of nationalisation, Zambian copper mines were producing as much as 720,000 tonnes of copper (Figure 2) and allowed for considerable social spending.

With nationalisation, mining contributed over 50% of the country’s foreign exchange and over two-thirds of government revenue. Control over mines incentivised the government to invest and channel profits towards social expenditure such as hospitals, schools and subsidies to state-owned manufacturing companies and consumers. Companies provided incentives to the locals through planned urban dwelling, food rations, health and recreation services for employees. Driven by the state’s monopolistic tendencies over mining proceeds, ZCCM implemented a ‘Cradle to Grave’ welfare policy

² Nationalisation of private enterprises was conducted through the Mulungushi reforms of 1968-1971. In April 1968, Zambia’s economic structure was changed with the Mulungushi Reform. The Government declared its intention to acquire equity holdings (at least 51%) in a number of key foreign-owned firms, that were to be controlled by a parastatal conglomerate named the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) (Rakner 2003; Haglund 2008).
where nappies for new-borns were procured and burial arrangements in times of death later subsidised (Lungu 2008). In part and through deliberate management re-focus -

![Figure 3: Employment in Zambian Mines (Limpitlaw 2011)](image)

away from production for profit to production that guaranteed employment - a lot of Zambians found themselves working in the mines and other social sectors (Figure 3). This mineral dependent economic transformation, however, proved unviable in maintaining existing social service provisions and economic development. Whereas mining profitability collapsed with plummeting world copper prices, expanded government expenditure became unbearable. Payment of development dividends to the state reduced the copper mines’ ability to re-invest in the infrastructure necessary to maintain efficient mining (Limpitlaw 2011). By the early 1990s the country’s per capita income fell by 50%, dropping to 25th position of the poorest in the world (Ferguson 1999). In this period GDP per capita fell to less than $300 with 80% of the population facing extreme poverty. Copper output ratio reduced to about 257,000 in 2000 from about 750,000 in 1973 (Chamber of Mines 2005; Lungu 2008). On the other hand, while social reproduction in subsistent rural areas was affected by shifting social roles predominantly male to women as men drifted towards the 'modernity' in mining towns, prospects of these migrants were becoming uncertain (Ferguson 1999). Protracted economic decline sparked urban food riots and general industrial unrest; an aspect that later proved damaging to UNIP’s political future. This somewhat exemplifies the crucial connection between economic development and political stability.

Shaped by the labour crusade, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under Fredrick Chiluba emerged in 1991. Their agenda included refocusing economic management towards economic liberalisation, privatisation and securing democratic and political transition. This would later turn out to what can be characterised as the final rebellion against socialist ideas, and the emergence of the unassailable neoliberal policies in Zambia (Lungu 2008; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Baylies and Szeftel
These events in synthesis exposed policy fluctuations and regulatory struggles in the country that could historically be traced to the 1930s.

A few years after commencement of commercial mining in Zambia, a great depression shattered the growth of emerging mines and by 1932 the workforce would shrink to a paltry 7,500. This shaped the context within which self-organisation emerged in Zambia. In order to secure decent benefits for the workforce and local communities, and prompted by price fluctuations, trade unions started shaping up (Alastair 2010). So as to secure resource and financial control, Zambia nationalised the mines soon after independence in 1974. Just as the country was to start rejoicing over resource and economic control, global prices plummeted and were to remain at rock bottom till the turn of the millennium. With local agitation for improved living conditions and the incessant pressure from western donor countries, Zambia liberalised the economy and privatised the mines (Alastair 2010). While the country was hesitant to privatise mining, financial power leveraging by International Financial Institutions prevailed. Failure to privatise mines, the World Bank and IMF warned, meant forfeiture of $1bn under HIPC initiative (Malido 2002). Soon after mining liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s, copper prices soared providing a huge profitability opportunity for private investors. In searching for alternative approaches to claw back mining benefits, former President Mwanawasa introduced windfall taxes in 2008. As before, windfall taxes were followed by the dratic fall of copper prices internationally. New taxes - companies claimed - threatened the mining viability and employment base - which was a huge political risk that the government was unwilling to confront (Alastair 2010). The subsequent Rupiah Banda government removed windfall taxes in 2009, only to see prices of copper shoot straight up, leaving policy makers and social commentators unsure about what strategy was appropriate in generating a balance between mining and revenue generation.

These events illuminate deep truths about the struggles over resource control and the potential for economic development in poor countries. Zambia’s development experiences evidence the negative effects associated with even the booms themselves. Zambian mining history suggests that incentives accrue to actors at different levels, and that these are not always local. Research should thus determine the nature of actors and the level that tend to benefit from the booms, and who pays the price of the busts. This is, as the next section shows, compounded by the fact that privatisation in a way failed to alter mining realities in most Sub-Saharan Africa.

Privatisation in Zambia: a Fraught Path of Opportunity?

As in other parts of SSA, privatisation of mines can be linked to the adoption of SAPs in the ’80s and ’90s. In Zambia, SAPs were first implemented under the Kaunda regime focusing mainly on deregulation and restrictions in government expenditure (Hawkins 1991). The resultant depreciation of the currency and continued economic hardships forced Kaunda to abandon these policies in order to embrace a domestic policy framework; the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) in 1987. In this
period the government reintroduced controls and limitations of debt servicing a move that rattled donors and cooperating partners (Wulf 1988). While the economy grew by 3.1% in this period, internal tensions escalated with withheld funding by donors acting as stressors (Bates and Collier 1993). Domestic and international pressure forced Zambia to re-engage the SAPs now under the Policy Framework Paper, and the Economic Recovery Programme in 1989. The emphasis here was privatisation, trade, and agricultural liberalisation (Pletcher 2000). While Kaunda was largely hesitant in his implementation approach, the climax of it all was to come under the Chiluba’s MMD that - leveraging popular support - persuasively implemented SAPs from early 1992 through to 2000 (Alastair 2010).

Diverse factors, such as continued decline in world prices, however acted as stressors to the collapse of ZCCM, sparking privatisation debate. Between 1997 and 1998, ZCCM reported pre-tax losses of about US$650 million, equivalent to more than 20% turnover. Domestic political and public resistance against privatisation were unsuccessful as the World Bank offered financial incentives to the country under HIPC initiative to unbundle ZCCM. In order to qualify for HIPC initiative, privatisation of ZCCM became a requirement. Additionally, at the centre of almost every credit agreement in 1991 and subsequent years became loan conditions that mandated feasibility studies, and most crucially, the sale of mines. Around the time of privatisation in 1998, mining output dropped to about 42% of its level at independence and a third of its peak in 1969 (Adam and Simpasa 2010). The intellectual logic behind privatisation - it was argued - was to rescue loss-making mines out of state hands, thereby creating an efficient and competitive economy. Chiluba’s regime ‘unbundled’ and sold off ZCCM, starting in 1997 and concluding in 2000 (Gewald and Soeters 2010; Simutanyi 1996; Alastair 2010), a process that was to change the country’s course of mining forever.

International Financial Institutions and domestic liberal oriented elite argued that privatisation was to bring efficiency in the mining operations and – by placing mining houses in private hands – relieve fiscal burdens on the part of government. Fiscal performance, management, and employment opportunities, they argued, would increase with privatisation of the mines. There has been an increased investment flow in the mining sector in Zambia in the post-privatisation period, including new investment in Solwezi’s Lumwana by the Australian-Canadian Consortium Equinox since 2008 (Adam and Simpasa 2010). Specifically, there has been a rapid growing Chinese presence in the Zambian mining sector. For instance, by the end of 2010, China’s investment in Zambia was broadly around US$2 billion with the bulk going towards mining, placing Zambia third for Chinese investments after South Africa and United Kingdom. Mining expansion has seen Zambia become the eighth largest copper producing country, with significant potential of entering the top five by 2014 (Human

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3 Three issues that emerged at the core of MMD’s political manifesto included: democratisation, privatisation of state-owned industries and liberalisation of the economy.

4 Investment expenditure decreased to less than a quarter of its value in the 1970s with production prematurely halting in some mines.
Rights Watch 2011). The Chamber of Mines reported that by 2005 the companies were putting in over $350 million a year; new investment production rebounded to 500,000 tons by 2007, and as predictably high as 800,000 tons in 2009. Recent projections indicate that Zambia’s copper production would increase by annual average rate of 8.4% from 2011 to 1.2mt in 2015. Against this background, the government maintains that privatisation has largely succeeded by pointing to: re-opening and newly opening mining houses; booming production that saw the country emerge sixth largest copper producer in the world (2011) equating to 4.4% of global output and experienced in excess of $8 billion of investments over past few years (KPMG 2013). However, benefits from mines have been asymmetrical to production levels, affecting government social expenditure as well as economic development and igniting questions around institutional structures shaping mining investments.

The hurried privatisation tragically undermined the mines for Zambians. Allegations were made about looting of national revenues, negative growth rates, de-industrialisation, deepening debt and increasing poverty. Recently, Agarwal - Chairperson of the British domiciled Vedanta - was quoted bragging that he was raking about $1.5 billion annually from a mine purchased at a paltry $25 million over decade ago – a revelation that ActionAid described as a crime against Zambians. While the social cost of such a donor induced process remains largely unaccounted in literature, there appears somewhat a consensus that the adjustment period was characterised by mass redundancies in Zambia. Formal manufacturing employment buckled from 75,400 in 1991 to 43,320 in 1998 with paid employment in the mining and manufacturing crumbling from 140,000 in 1991 to 83,000 in 2000. Between 30,000 and 50,000 workers were sacked in the period 1992-1996 (Situmbeko and Zulu 2004; Alastair 2010). And Zambia dropped on UNDP’s HDI from 130 in 1990 to 163 in 2001 as GDP per capita dropped from US$720 in 1981 to US$300 in 2000 (GRZ 2001; Gutner, 2010). While former workers faced unpaid pensions, the post privatisation saw casualisation and poverty wages as well as safety problems (I will return to the safety issue later). However, some of the issues that are identified here can be pointed to the nature of the Development Agreements (DAs) that shaped the sale of mines in Zambia.

The DAs that emerged in the post-privatisation era reflected a de facto mining tax structure that exposed a liberal context. This projected optimal tax logic, transparency and deregulation. For instance the new mines were relived from assuming financial and environmental liabilities originally incurred by ZCCM. Each DA established a stability period of between 15-20 years in which agreed terms and conditions would be guaranteed. While remaining generous to mining companies, the ultimate royalty rate of 0.6% of gross proceeds fell way below global averages of between 2-5% and IMF estimates of between 5-10% for developing countries (Adam and Simpasa 2010). While

5 These were later transferred to ZCCM Investment Holding.
Zambia lost huge amounts of resources in this imposed and hurried process, it is important to understand the institutional context within which all these events occurred.

**Mining Institutional Frameworks: Failure of Policy Reform in Zambia or Caution?**

Mining institutions and frameworks are important in order to successfully convert natural wealth into an equitably distributed and improved general welfare. Monitoring and regulation of mining are specifically important for sustainability. However, two quandaries exist at the centre of Zambia’s mining and development agenda: how to support mining in order to create a sustainable and stable employment base on one angle, and support growth on the other. The argument exists that the desire to support employment and growth in non-mineral economy directly conflicts with the need to protect incentives that underpin mining exploration and production in the country (Adam and Simpasa 2010; Bush 2007). However, capacity among institutions charged with the tasks of monitoring and regulating mining activities becomes central. In Zambia, there appears a serious form of capacity challenge confronting government agents charged with this responsibility of monitoring and enforcing mining regulations. Mining regulation has generally tended to fluctuate over time between two extremes: light and extreme touch regulation. The consequences of this can be projected in three major perspectives: the fiscal, the environmental and safety and the labour perspectives.

**Fiscal Perspective**

While fiscal elements are an important feature of natural resource exploitation in LDCs, its existence interacts with institutional frameworks. Fiscal performance matters more to growth in resource-abundant economies, such as in Africa, given the nature of economies that are largely mineral dependent characterised by vast levels of poverty (Anshasy and Katsaiti 2013). However, this performance is dependent upon the quality and strength and institutions of a given country. But as UNCTAD (2014) relates, ‘Africa has low investment rates relative to the average for developing countries also relative to what is considered necessary to achieve development goals’ averaging 18% (1990-1999) and 24% for developing countries. And that between 2000 and 2011, average investments rate for Africa were 19% compared to 26% for developing economies. This in a way affects the way governments in LDCs negotiate incentives from extractives and most specifically fiscal performance.

The DAs in a way shaped the frameworks and concessions granted to mining companies including fiscal, environmental, and labour issues in Zambia. This somehow restricted scope for government influence whilst at the same time leveraging mining companies. From a fiscal dimension, three regimes can generally be analysed in Zambia (Table 1).

In the immediate post-SAP period, corporate tax and royalty rates stood at 25% and 0.6% - among the lowest in the world were included. For a long period of time this
was linked in part to the scope of ministerial powers. For instance, the 1995 Mines and Mineral Act gives the mines minister discretion to enter agreements and make decisions without parliamentary authorisation. For instance, recently Finance Minister Chikwanda came under public attack for his effort to amend rule 18 of the Value Added Tax General Rules gazette notice number 86 of 1997. The VAT rule 18 requires mining companies and exporters to produce import certificates from destination countries in order to claim tax refunds. With mining companies claiming they were unable to do so, pointing to their selling via middle men, and that deals remained at arm’s length, Chikwanda moved to amend this rule to allow tax refunds even without proper documentation. This amendment, while reversed by ZRA would have cost Zambia US$600 million. Such legal lacuna not only can they be politically abused, but also affects fiscal performance. The increasing and expanding mining sector in Zambia has added to the complexity of fiscal effectiveness (Haglund 2010). This is compounded by lack of specialist competence and scanty revenue collection expertise by the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). Driven by limited transparency in the sector, the country has become a victim of transfer pricing, tax avoidance and environmental degradation. While donors have provided technical assistance towards Zambia’s adoption of the Extractive Industry Transparency and Initiative (EITI) in 2009 - to integrate principles of transparency and fiscal payments - and establishment of Mining Tax Unit (MTU)

### Table 1: Policy Changes in Last Three Regimes in Zambia.

<table>
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<th>Regime</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
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| President Levy Mwanawasa – 2008 | a. Company income tax rate increased from 25% to 30%  
|                         | b. Depreciation allowance changed from 100% to 25%; losses could now be carried forward maximum 10 years instead of previous 10 to 20 years  
|                         | c. Hedging operations were to be taxed separately from mining operations  
|                         | d. Mineral royalty rate for copper and cobalt changed from 0.6% to 30%  
|                         | e. Windfall tax and Variable Profit Tax was introduced.  |
| President Rupiah Banda – 2009 | a. Windfall tax was abolished  
|                         | b. Tax depreciation reverted to 100%  
|                         | c. Mines could now combine hedging and operating income for income tax purposes  |
| President Michael Sata – current | a. Doubled mineral royalty rate copper and cobalt from 3% to 6%  
|                         | b. Tax depreciation reduced to 25%  
|                         | c. Hedging and operating income were treated separately for income tax purposes  |

Source: Author’s compilation
at ZRA - these are still embryonic and specific results remain unclear. However, what seem to emerge are poor revenue collection systems, unclear tax obligations for mines and consistent political interventions. This in a way reflects common struggles in most SSA. A study by Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013) countries suggests that poor governance, and weak democratic institutions had potential to affect fiscal performance which in turn affected growth and economic development. Bush (2009) in Ghana notes that the existing policy may only facilitate firm’s global strategies at the expense of national level economic development. It thus remains in country level efforts to strengthen local institutions and allow steady fiscal performance.

Environmental and Safety Perspective

Environmental governance in mining has for a long time been central to debates surrounding extractives (Newell 2008; Held and Young 2011). While the environmental governance agenda remains key in international policy debate (Jelin 200; Najam et al. 2006), the environmental governance perspective emerging within the neoliberal perspective has been criticised for shielding actors and businesses, and insufficiently scrutinising investments (Newell 2008; Held and Youn 2011) further igniting debates around regulatory frameworks in weakly governed economies such as Zambia. For a long time Private Sector Development debates have tended to advance the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda, which raises practical challenges given their voluntary nature and challenges of enforcement. Moreover, there appears variations in the way the concept is understood (Mzembe and Meaton 2014; Mzembe and Downs 2014; Acuna 2015). This suggests the environmental dimensions of mining remains discretionary on the part of mining houses.

Zambia has established institutions charged with responsibilities of environmental, health and safety in the mining sector. The Environmental Council of Zambia (renamed Zambia Environmental Management Agency – ZEMA – in 2011) and the Mines Safety Department (MSD) are relevant institutions in ensuring compliance with environment, health and safety regulations in Zambia. Set up in 1992 under the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPACA) of 1990, ECZ was a semi-autonomous body charged with regulating environmental issues associated with such projects as in mines (Haglund 2010). It should be noted that the EPPACA provides environmental protection and control of pollution as well as the establishment of the Environment Council to Zambia (ECZ). The ECZ was charged with the responsibility of protecting the environment. It provides for integrated environmental management, protection, conservation and sustainable management and use of natural resources. Conversely, reporting to the ministry of mines, the MSD’s core mandate is the enforcement of safety regulations, environmental and health issues within mining houses. Through a memorandum of understanding responsibilities and structure has been shared between ZEMA and MSD.

However, shared structure of responsibility has generated confusion in reporting requirements from mines. Driven by rising commodity prices since 2005 and gener-
al mining expansion, regulatory agencies appear severely overstretched in the sector. While mineral extraction exists in almost all ten provinces, the ministry of mines appears active only in less than three. In terms of representation, ZEMA is in reportedly less than 5% of the districts. This suggests that mining activities in most areas still are conducted without legislative oversight and corresponding championing of CSR agenda. Lack of competent capacity has led to irregular regulatory visits to the mines by the agencies. And given the fact that MSD emerges within the ambit of the ministry of mines, failure to discharge duties and indeed regulatory failures have been the direct consequence.

These institutional frailties can be pointed to the largest health and safety incidence in the Chambishi Investment Zone, known as the BGRIMM disaster. BGRIMM was a subsidiary of Nonferrous Metal Industry Foreign Engineering and Construction Company Limited (NFC) - a Chinese owned corporation – with 60% ownership in the company. Operating since 2003, and with a capacity of 6,000 metric tons of explosives a year, BGRIMM was to register one of the most shocking experiences in Zambia’s mining history. The BGRIMM explosive manufacturing plant exploded, claiming little over 50 lives (BBC 2005). The BGRIMM disaster exposed breaches in safety and labour standards in Zambia’s mining, while heightening anti-Chinese feelings (Haglund 2010: 96; Kragelund 2009). Regulatory failures can also be pointed to KCM’s pollution of the Kafue River in 2007. The river is one of the country’s major water sources. While ECZ wanted to bring charges to KCM, the government intervened by exploiting one crucial provision in the EPPA that granted an appealing opportunity to companies that were unhappy with agency decision. The company was instead asked to improve its internal systems and drill boreholes in local surrounding communities. These institutional and regulatory oversights have generally been compounded by the 2007 Environmental Regulatory Reform Agenda, which generally allowed for simplification of licensing procedures and re-assessment of existing standard to reflect ‘modern’ mining procedures. In all this, the autonomy of existing institution remains crucial but elusive in the country (Haglund 2010; Kragelund 2009). There appears a crucial lack of financial, human, institutional and legislative capacity to manage natural resources in the country, resulting in poor planning, and uncoordinated development and exploitation of natural resources (Phiri 2014). This is not unique to Zambia. A study by Elbra (2014) in South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania notes a tendency among mining houses to develop and implement what he calls ‘their own forms of governance’, often in weakly governed state regulations. Mason (2014) has reported from Sierra Leone that while the government appears protective of the mining environmental provisions as they relate to environmental governance, mining houses – through the existing regulations – insufficiently protects communities and their environment. Mason, much like the study by made Elbra (2014), blames this on the country’s dependency on the neoliberal governance framework which appears to champion business interests at the expense of local communities and environment. Elsewhere, Larsen and Mamosso (2013) examine how development cooperation influences the environmental governance of uranium mining in Niger. They argue that
international support has ignored environmental impacts and institutional failures. To them, weak performance of formal institutional structures substantiates the persistence of the easy guesses doctrine and the hard-lived legacy of previous neoliberal reforms. In Sierra Leone, Mason (2014) problematises the neo-liberal environmental governance perspective in the face of heightening environmental and associated social problems. Mason’s argument is that, based on the neoliberal logic, the environmental governance in the Sierra Leone’s mining sector was simply incapable of addressing mine-induced impacts. And that it is the continued reliance of a neoliberal mode of governance that undermines the efficacy of environmental governance for the mining sector. Literature from the governance and institutional perspective appears to stress one important aspect: that institutions matter. These can be and only be a function of bold domestic decisions aimed at strengthening local institutions. It remains difficult to see how environmental governance, which solely relies on a neoliberal perspective of governance, can comprehensively and effectively cater for long term environmental problems in poor countries such as Zambia.

**Labour Perspective**

Investments in mining are often promulgated for employment creation. Through employment creation, dominant arguments from IFIs point to income distribution and access to social services (Bush 2007). Hilson and Osei (2014) find that mining and particularly artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in SSA present enormous opportunities for employment – more than the youth unemployment. Given the challenging problem of unemployment in most Sub-Saharan countries, this feature of employment creation in a way has made most governments agreeable to mining investments. However, employment and labour issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and Zambia in particular remain contentious and politically sensitive.

In Zambia, labour related matters are guided by the Industrial Relations Act in Zambia. This act enshrines workers’ rights, such as collective bargaining and freedom of association. Factory Inspectorate monitors labour practices of firms according to the employment provisions in the Act. Unions, as well as workers, are at liberty to commence industrial actions whenever they felt aggrieved. However, the existence of diverse procedural requirements suggests it is almost impossible for workers to legally strike. This severely erodes not only the legitimacy of industrial actions, but also the power of unions to express grievances. Besides, labour laws in Zambia are not only ancient but also lack specific clarity on what they really entail. This ambiguity creates difficulties in differentiating temporary and permanent employees. A context has been thus created for casualization of labour. As Haglund (2010, p97) notes: ‘it is common to see workers being hired for short periods of time, often with no benefits, only to be discharged once their probation expires and then relieved.’ The Human Rights Watch (2011) in its report: ‘You will be fired if you refuse: Labour abuses in Zambia’s Chinese state-owned copper mines’ documents the nature and extent to which companies exploit legal and institutional weaknesses to exploit and abuse local labour. However,
the employment creation potential of extractive industries remains contentious. Bush (2007) notes that the employment creation potential from mining remains limited, given the profitability drive and international business strategies that are followed by most companies. This suggests that the local institutional context requires strengthening, in order to protect not only labour demands but also to ensure that mining houses incorporate – as much as possible – local development concerns, labour force, including contractors.

Drawing from the three perspectives, it can be argued that the idea of resource-led growth and economic development largely hinges on the need to strengthen institutional frameworks, that for a long time have presented enormous profitability potential for investments (largely foreign) and revenue challenges for the country. This, however, can be blamed on the politics of state interventions which appear a common feature in the country and possibly elsewhere in the region. In Zambia, tax policies have largely been fluid. Pessimists fear that introducing windfall taxes could result in strengthening local currency, which in turn could undermine the international competitiveness of the non-windfall sector of the economy. This, they fear, could further result in an unbalanced pattern of prosperity - Dutch disease. ‘While this - they argue - ultimately poses a challenge to exporters who might find it difficult to compete on international markets, domestic producers on the other would equally find it difficult to compete against [now] cheaper exports’ (Adam and Simpasa 2010). Implicitly, politics of intervention continue to remain high in the country’s mining sector. Institutional and regulatory fragilities can, however, be linked to the neo-patrimonial nature of politics, which in a way erodes formal institutional frameworks (Haglund 2010). The consequence of this in Zambia has been a lack of parliamentary oversight, and the dominance of the presidency in decision-making and ultimately fracturing the state’s capacity on tax collection. This characteristic relegates existing structures to an executant role, as political leadership emerges dominant in shaping change (Soest 2006; Haglund 2010). Policy fluctuations have thus emerged, reflective of the political leadership. For instance, while Kaunda severely controlled policy making in Zambia, Chiluba's MMD made only marginal changes to this historical system. President Levy Mwanawasa’s MMD introduced the windfall tax that was removed immediately after in the subsequent Rupiah Banda’s regime. Just like Mwanawasa, President Banda continued to project a nationalistic logic of governance and controlled appointments and decisions. President Michael of the Patriotic Front (PF) who ascended to power in 2011 lacked clear policy direction. While being critical of Chinese investments prior to the 2011 elections, PF has largely protected Chinese investments in the country and projected them as comparatively 'lesser alternative devils'. Meanwhile, anti-Chinese sentiments have already emerged, with so-called investors displacing local people by taking over jobs and even business opportunities that ordinary Zambians can be engaged. This seems to suggest that mining in Zambia is disempowering rather than empowering. However, it is the policy inconsistencies that greatly undermine institutional potential.
Conclusions: Mining and Dispossession as Central Features in Zambia

Let me conclude by pointing out that the agenda for resource control still lies high in Zambia’s quest for social and economic development. This chapter employed the case of Zambia to examine features of mining institutional frameworks that influence prospects for economic development in the country. Analysis was structured around fiscal, environmental and safety and labour dimensions. Whilst policy appears to fluctuate over time, institutional performance around the three dimensions remained weak, thereby affecting prospects for growth, poverty reduction and economic development. Although endowed with mineral resources and the economy growing at remarkable rates of about 8%, the majority of the country’s population still grapples with basic needs. Policy and institutional shifts have largely aimed at creating investor friendly environment at the expense of local development demands. The fundamentals of neoliberal policy provisions – privatisation, corporate deregulation and free markets – in a way have failed to reflect domestic poverty reduction and an economic development agenda. Instead, they have created complex relationships among varying mining institutions and actors that place local people and community actors in difficult positions to articulate demands. In the absence of financial, managerial, and technological capacity and support structures to harness natural resources, a Zambian resource-led development agenda becomes doubtful, and at another level, far-fetched. While mining expansion adds to institutional demands, complexities in monitoring and regulating the porousness of the current mining institutional framework has created space for investors to exploit local labour laws and transfer profits at will (Alastair and Larmer 2010).

Trade unions have largely become a shell of their former selves, characterised by crucial disconnections with economic development aspirations. Meanwhile, regulatory bodies appear more reactionary as opposed to proactive, thereby increasing the political scope of influence. As Larmer (2010) puts it, policies have tended to oscillate between extreme deregulation and greater state interference; between increasing mining taxes and lowering them; between nationalisation and bailing out struggling private firms; and between continued dependence on western donors and companies and a turn to new sponsors in India and China. This feature in Zambia has only yielded institutional failures and investor uncertainties. Zambia must realise that, whilst it is necessary to change policy regimes to fittingly reflect domestic and global prevailing circumstances, it is too insufficient a move for the country’s future. The country cannot oscillate its policies perpetually in reaction to global price fluctuations. Zambia will have to end this tendency and learn that no company will believe in or take the country seriously, should this policy behaviour persist. Bold policy decisions will need to start taking shape and these should not only be prudent and well-articulated but also simple, uniform and consistent over time.

Meanwhile, narratives about ‘Africa emerging’ still emphasise a resource-led development strategy. While these narratives suggest new political and economic realities for most countries in SSA, they remain simplistic, closed to the real issues facing the con-
tinent, and conceal essential institution gaps. Questions about why African elite fails to implement strategies that challenge TNCs remain crucial. In Zambia for instance, whilst President Sata remained critical of Chinese investments, he was interestingly quick to reassure investors that Zambia was still committed to Sino-Zambia ties, and that the government would not implement policies that would jeopardise Chinese investments. Meanwhile, his Minister of Finance – Alexandra Chikwanda – soon after rebuffed any forms of debate on mining in Zambia, describing all those calling for the government’s re-examination of the mining sector and re-introduction of windfall tax as lunatics. It is unclear what had changed. A context has however been created where investors come to Zambia to invest, riding on grand pronouncements about their plans and abandoning the country later. While decent but sharp forms of work force protests against neo-liberalism have emerged in major mining towns, these have largely failed to yield desired outcomes for workers and local community (Alastair 2010). Legal and policy frameworks have failed to systematically define the actual role of the state in resource management in Zambia, making it difficult to see state intervention in the interest of local people. However, while originally appearing fundamentally different from western investments, the Chinese alternative presents old challenges of mining FDIs: the reinforcement of accumulation by dispossession. As Bush (2010) notes, while China may offer a potential antidote to the World Bank and Western TNCs, this might nibble at the edge of neoliberalism with the role of the state remaining unclear.

At a broader level, IFIs and corporate continuities and practices point to what they believe is the link between resource exploitation and potential for development in Africa, whose centrality lies in policy reforms. African countries are encouraged to design and implement policies aimed at reducing perceived administrative and political obstacles to foreign investments and repatriation of corporate profits. As Bush (2010) observes, the ideological hegemony of modernisation is advanced in order to secure corporate mining licenses. And this is predicated on the claim of promotion of growth and equity, development with justice and sustainability with employment and the provision of a long-term alternative to the resources they deplete and the environmental chaos capital creates.

It is believed that underdevelopment is inextricably linked to failure of integration in the corporate dominated world economy. The Zambian case seems to suggest that this policy shift and associated corporate deregulation has stood in stark contrast with domestic development aspirations. What has emerged, therefore, is the government’s inability to systematically respond to emerging objections in different sections aimed at challenging the status quo. In fact, it would appear that it is the very reform agenda aimed at global integration of Zambia, and indeed Africa, that actually affects the government’s ability to respond to local concerns. Key decisions relating to mines appear not to be made within national politics in Zambia or African states. Instead, these are made externally, in powerful corporate head offices legitimised by IFIs (Bush 2010). A fertile ground has thus been created in Zambia and possibly elsewhere on the sub-region where – without recourse – capital exploit resources, dispossessed local people, abate tax payment and expatriate profits, sometimes under the very protection
of governments or connected political elite and IFIs. Whereas mining corporations appear willing to protect their investments, even with private militia, governments in SSA should remain committed to a development agenda by strengthening domestic institutions.

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DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
3 Women Representation in Local Government in Tanzania: Issues and Challenges

Lilian Mutasingwa

Introduction
Following the lines of development trends, Tanzania is evolving in the context of governance and administration reforms. These reforms have been introduced in the form of decentralisation, democratisation and liberalisation where diverse development conventions, policies and programmes are adopted and ratified and/or domesticated with the aim of achieving equality, participation, democracy and accountability. Since development is people-centred, representation and participation, irrespective of gender, is significant for a nation's development.

In this regard, all these reforms are to succeed if gender equality -meaning both male and female representation and their full participation - is considered and well integrated. In reality, the concept of governance as defined by the World Bank (1992) also acknowledges the integration of gender in development efforts for efficiency and responsiveness. However, despite the higher proportion of female population (51.3%) in Tanzania, their status is much lower than that of men in all areas, including politics (URT 2012). This reality as led to global attention on gender equality in governing institutions, where women are to be ensured equal rights in representation and participation in decision making to widen national development.

Female under-representation in local government makes women unable to articulate the issues that affect their lives in policies and decision-making bodies. Women's participation in local governments can have a particular influence on enhancing democracy, human resource development, policy preference, resource allocation and poverty alleviation (Phillips 1995; URT 2005). In addition, increased female representation in decision making is a matter of justice and equity. Further, the local government acts as an empowering and learning institution for women, thus enabling them to contest for the national leadership positions (e.g. parliament, presidential) in the country.

According to Article 146(2) of the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), the local government has to fulfil its responsibilities by ensuring the maintenance of law and security of the people; uphold democracy in its area and use democracy to speed up the progress of the people (URT 1977:83). Given the fact that the decisions and development related to the community are to be made at the local government level, it is thus important that men and women be contributors and
beneficiaries of the local government services, as such decisions and development have an impact for both. According to the FWCW (1995:1) without the incorporation of women’s perspective at all levels of decision making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved.

Various international conventions, national policies and local women movements have been held to persuade countries to augment women’s representation efforts, and Tanzania is no exception. The URT has signed and ratified various international, regional and national instruments and policies that promote gender equality.

At the international level, Tanzania has signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 followed by a number of sessions for reformation. Article No.7 of the twenty-ninth session addresses women’s political and public rights. It identifies the following aspects that need attention, including: measures to ensure that women have equal rights without discrimination; to vote and be voted for, in all publicly elected bodies; right to vote in all referenda; right to hold public office and exercise all public functions at all levels of government; and, to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country (CEDAW 2003). Another international instrument that Tanzania adopted is the Beijing Platform of Action (BPFA), which advocates for the elimination of all constraints that hinder women’s participation on equal basis with men, through mainstreaming gender concerns in its policies, laws, plans and institutions.

At the regional level, Tanzania has acceded to and ratified the African Union (AU) protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa of 2003 that obliges to ensure the protection of women against acts of oppression, discrimination and marginalization in all forms of social, economic, political and cultural spheres. In addition, Tanzania adopted the 1997 Southern African Development Community (SADC) “Gender and Development Declaration” that put priority on female political participation and benchmarked women’s representation in Parliament at 30% by 2005 and 50/50 by 2010. However, the 30% female representation at the Tanzanian parliament has already been achieved, and the government is now working on a 50/50 benchmark. Tanzania has also ratified the East African Community Charter under a clause that advances the participation of women in all sectors and departments, and prevents all forms of discrimination against women.

At the national level, different policies and strategies have been implemented including constitutional amendments in 1995, 2000 and 2005 that provided a quota or special seats for women at parliamentary (30%) and local government level (33%). Further, the URT passed three laws that promotes women’s rights, namely the Sexual Offences (Special Provision) Act (SOSPA, 1998), the Land Act (1999) and the Village Land Act (1999). The latter two acts were further amended in 2002 by Act No. 2(11), where Land Tribunals were established that require their composition to include no less than four, and no more than eight, members, of whom three must be women (URT 2002).
Additionally, the URT Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children (MCDGC) is responsible for the policy formulation, coordination and monitoring of the implementation of activities through quarterly reviews. It has been mainstreaming gender in all government sectors through gender focal points at regional, district and ward level. In ensuring that these are achieved, the ministry developed the Women in Development Policy (1992) which was reviewed and resulted in the formation of the Women and Gender Development Policy (WGDP) in 2000. The WGDP aimed at empowering women by providing ample opportunities for women in all spheres including politics, leadership positions, management and economic development. In addition, the 2005 National Strategy for Gender Development was developed and is linked to the vision 2025. The vision 2025 aims to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women in all socio-economic and political relations, and culture.

Despite such policies being in place and declared commitment to gender equality and women’s representation in local government, different reports acknowledge the under-representation of women (NEC 2006; 2011). In addition, the number of women who contest for leadership posts and are elected in various leadership positions in district and village councils in Tanzania is minimal (NEC 2011). Further, according to UNDP’s Human development Index of 2013/2014, the country is ranked at 159 - out of 189 countries - and has extremely high levels of gender inequality - ranked 124 out of 182, and 100 out of 187 - with regard to Gender Development Index (UNDP 2014). In this context, this paper establishes the magnitude of women’s representation, whilst highlighting issues and challenges for the women under-represented in Tanzania.

The article is based on a review of information collected from secondary sources which includes research works, journals, published books, unpublished manuscripts and reports. In addition, some information is collected through internet browsing. The article proceeds as follows: first, the policies and legal frameworks of women’s representation at international, regional and national level are discussed, as above. Second, the functions and structure of the local government is explained, and third, the evolution of local government. Fourth, the term ‘representation’ is conceptualised. Fifth, I highlight the situation of women in political parties in Tanzania. In the sixth part, quota - or special seats as a mechanism to increase the number of women representatives in decision-making - is explained. The situation of women’s representation in local government is explained in section eight, whilst section nine highlights the challenges women face in local government. The last section presents the conclusion, where I argue that the demands for women descriptive representation go hand in hand with the demand of women’s substantive representation in local government. This follows the perception that female political presence leads to women’s policy leverage.

**The Function and Structure of Local Government of Tanzania**

The amended constitution of URT (1977: 151) specifies the purpose and functions of the local government in Tanzania. Article 146 (1) stipulates that the purpose of
having local government authorities is to transfer authority to the people. The local
government shall have the right and power to participate and to involve the people
in planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective
areas, and generally throughout the country (URT 1977). In addition, Article 146 (2)
specifies the functions of the local government to perform its functions within its area;
to ensure the enforcement of law and public safety of the people; and to consolidate
democracy within its area and to apply it to accelerate the development of the people.

By incorporating the above articles, the constitution gives special consideration to
both men and women involved in local government functions towards building a na-
tional development. Almost all of the decisions related to the community are made
at the local government level, thus the local government is expected to prioritize the
community’s goals and expectations, and problems and challenges are identified and
tackled. If this is applied, it fulfils the good governance principles of democratic elec-
tions, rule of law, equity, public participation, accountability, integrity and transparen-
cy. Thus, equal representation at this level is legitimate and significant.

The local government of Tanzania’s mainland is comprised of urban authorities and
rural authorities. The former is made up of city councils, municipal councils, town
councils and wards, while the rural authorities consists of district councils, township
authorities, wards, village councils and hamlets. For the administrative and electoral
purposes, all urban authorities are divided into wards and neighbourhoods (mitaa),
while rural authorities are divided into wards, villages and hamlets (Vitongoji) as de-
scribed in Figure 1. (next page).

The wards under the Ward Development Committee (WDC) lies between the Dis-
trict, Village councils and hamlets in rural authorities and between the cities, municipi-
alties, town councils and the neighbourhoods in urban authorities. It is expected to
coordinate development activities and planning at the ward level. The WDC com-
mittee is made up of: the elected ward councillor, who is also the chairperson and a
member of the district or urban council; the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) who is
also a secretary, yet has no right to vote; women’s special seats at the ward level; all the
ward’s village chairpersons; and all Village Executive Officers (VEOs).

The village’s lower level government is made up of two governance organs, the Vil-
lage Assembly (VA) and the Village Council (VC). The VC comprises of between 15-
25 members, including: the elected chairperson; not more than five Ex officio hamlet
chairpersons; the VEO who is the secretary to the council; special seats for women
comprising of not more than 25% of the council members; and other elected members
based on political parties. However, the VEO - a non-political appointed by the WDC
- has no right to vote. The VC is supposed to discuss the development plans and mon-
tor the status of social services delivery. The VA is a meeting where all adult members
(18+) residing in the village are invited to attend. The chairperson and secretary of the
VA is the VEO.

The hamlet is a unit in a village and the smallest administrative unit in a district
council rural authority. The hamlet committee consists of: a political elected chairper-
son; an appointed secretary; and three members of the hamlet advisory committee,
appointed by the hamlet chairperson. The neighbourhoods are similar to the hamlet, except for the fact that they are in a ward urban authority. The neighbourhoods committee is made of a political elected chairperson, a secretary and six members – all of whom are all politically elected. However, the two differ on the selection of its members. The hamlets members are appointed by the hamlet elected chairperson, whilst the neighbourhoods’ members are elected. Yet, the committees of the two have similar functions. They are supposed to work as contact positions between the ward, which is the government structure and the grassroots level. Thus the decision made at the hamlet and neighbourhoods are later sent to the village council for the former and WDC for the later. In addition, they act as local development initiators and are a considerable
Evolution of Local Government

The history of Tanzania’s local governments can be traced back to before colonialism. Before and during the early period of colonialism, the local communities were organised around chiefs and chiefdoms, and councillor elders acted as the major community adviser. During that time, there were no districts or regions except tribal boundaries, and thus chiefdom operated in a located area - known today as divisions - while sub-chiefdoms managed wards and headmen managed villages (URT 2004). During the German rule, the country was set up as a clear provincial district and chiefdom boundaries. In this era, the chiefdoms were abolished and the District Commissioner (DC) post was established. During the British rule, the British took a different approach by enacting the Township Ordinance (Cap 101) in 1920 in urban areas and establishing urban local governments, retaining the DC in the rural areas (URT 2004).

Following the enactment of the Native Authorities Ordinance (Cap 72) by the Native Authorities (NAs), the foundation for an organised local government system was laid down in 1926. This made for the return of chiefdoms, and in 1928 the Provincial Commissioners’ (PC) post was introduced by the colonial administration (URT 2004). As of 1947, the Municipalities Ordinance (Cap 105) was passed by the government to replace Cap 101 (i.e. Township Ordinance), which led to the establishment of the first Municipal Council, Dar es Salaam. Furthermore, in 1953 local government Ordinance Cap 333 - which lasted up to 1972 - was enacted, aiming at introducing the local government structure.

Immediately after independence, very significant changes took place at the local government level which can be explained in six phases. The first phase included the abolishment of salaried chiefs who were used by the British colonial administration; the establishment of local party branches; the temporary abolition of elected local governments; and, the establishment of a villagisation policy (URT 2004). Secondly, the 1972 policy on decentralisation - which focused on strengthening regional and district administrations - transferred central government senior officials and changed the ministerial status to regional commissioner. The third phase which came about in 1976 followed the ineffectiveness of the urban services delivery. In 1980 an urban development policy was passed aiming at strengthening the urban local authorities. Thus, the Legislation was passed in 1982 that led to the formation of the local governments at district and village level in rural areas and municipal and city in urban areas.

The fourth reform was made through the constitution amendment. Article 78 of the amended constitution (1977) states that the seats allocated to women should be distributed on the basis of the proportional representation among the number of constituency seats won by each party in the National Assembly elections, with a minimum vote threshold of 5%. Additionally, following the constitution amendments in 2000
and 2005, the quotas were implemented at local government level in 1994 and 2000 elections where 25% and 33% was set, and in 2005 election was raised to no less than one-third. However, in the 1994, 2000 and 2005 local government elections, the seats were allocated in rough proportional to the number of seats won by each party.

The fifth reform came after government’s move towards decentralisation. This reform focused on restructuring and downsizing regional administrations, and the emphasis was pressed on regions to facilitate and guide local authorities’ projects implementation and services delivery. The sixth - the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP 1) (1998-2008) - followed the poor performance of the local government authorities, poor leadership and management of the councils and weak human resource capacity. The seventh, the Local Government Reform Programme II (2008-2013) with a focus on Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) aimed at contributing to the reduction of the proportion of people living in poverty and improving equal access to and delivery of public services, with the emphasis on incorporating men and women’s participation at all levels of local government (URT 2009). Despite the URT initiatives, several anecdotes and reports point to women’s under-representation and low participation in decision-making bodies (NEC 2011).

All in all, these Tanzanian local government reforms reflect the paradigm shift in development thinking. They represent a transformation from an administratively controlled centralised local government to a people-centred system; and from a patriarchal to a gender responsive system. However, to translate these into practice still remains a big challenge, as the extent to which women benefit and the extent to which their genuine representation in decision making is ensured, is still questionable.

**Conceptualization of “Representation”**

‘Representation’ is a popular word in politics worldwide and in Tanzania in particular, due to the undesirable unequal representation of men and women in leadership positions, where women are under-represented (IPU 2014). Debates on representation aim to address the lack of representation of women in all areas, especially at decision-making levels. This area is crucial for exercising power towards the development planning and process which is fundamental for both male and female transformation. According to Pitkin (1967), four types of political representations are identified, namely: authorised, descriptive, symbolic and substantive. The first imply to be legally empowered to act for others; the second indicates representatives standing for a group by virtue of sharing similar experiences and identity (gender, ethnicity or race); the third signifies feelings of being fairly or effectively represented; and the last implies representing a group’s ideas, preferences and interests. The discussions on female representation dominate the debates of women’s political inclusion worldwide, and Tanzania in particular. This is due to the fact that worldwide, Tanzania is included in key decision-making levels, yet women are underrepresented in local governments’ leadership (UNRISD 2005; Pini and McDonald 2011; NEC 2011).
Since the 1990s, most literature about representation in the political field has focused on descriptive representation; referred to as the politics of the presence (Phillips 1995). This means the numerical representation of women with regard to their diversity (e.g. ethnicity, race, occupation etc.) in decision making. However, recently studies have shifted focus from discussing descriptive representation as a standalone topic to looking at the relationship between descriptive representations and substantive representation, referred to women representatives’ capability in addressing women’s interests (Pitkin 1967).

Given women’s particular needs, interests and concerns arising from their different experiences, politics dominated by men is thus inadequate (Phillips 1991). It has been argued that the small number that women form in legislations worldwide limit their issues and interests to be articulated, thus leading to undemocratic institutions (Phillips 1995; Norris 2004 cited in Dahlerup 2006). The critical mass proponent argues that women will make a difference if a decision making body encompasses 30% or more of women (Dahlerup 1988). However, Crowley (2004 cited in Childs and Krook 2008) criticises the critical mass supposition, and argues that even when women are few in numbers they can make a difference. Different scholars have observed that policy change might not occur even when women reach a decisive number in decision making bodies (Childs and Krook 2008).

Nevertheless, numbers alone do not guarantee the representation of women’s interests, given the fact that women are a divergent group and they might end up representing their party, interests or friends who share the same status (Geisler 2004). Thus the differences that are brought by men’s and women’s experiences make it important for each group’s representation in government to voice their needs and concerns. A difference will only be made when women’s issues are represented, not just by achieving a critical mass. Yet, it may be difficult to determine the effect following the increase of other factors that influence women’s capabilities.

Yet, others have identified institutional norms, legislative inexperience and membership, political party affiliation and external political environment as constraints for women to make changes and for increasing their proportion in elected offices (Childs and Krook 2008; Goetz 2003). A success in the increase of women with regard to their diversity in decision making will depend on women’s capacity to address the existing inequality, and influence policies towards their concerns. In addition, the ability to address the existing cultural and institutional constraints on their participation is vital. Further, a number of researchers have argued that, through women cross-party associations, female representatives unite - irrespective of their political affiliation - to address gender equality in policy processes (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Lovenduski and Randall 1993; Hassim 2003).

Thus, female descriptive representation is significant, especially for enhancing substantive representation, where matters related to them and the communities they represent will be addressed (Dahlerup 1988 cited in Dahlerup 2006). The small number of women in local government impedes this plan and their concerns become perceived as ‘women’s problems’. According to Childs (2006), women’s gender experiences are
shared by women; therefore, the success of female political engagement lies on the preferable women numerical representatives whose experience has a sense of belonging, a strong mutual relationship with women, and who want to see improved changes for women.

In this section, I understand representation as a means to identify and appreciate issues of great importance to women and men, with regards to their diversity in any particular society. The equal representation of men and women at all levels of decision making is significant in identifying and appreciating men’s and women’s differences in policies and programme development and reformation. Women and men have different interests and ideas, and neglecting one presence will destroy the available opportunities of those who are neglected, who to a large extent are women. Furthermore, in a country like Tanzania, equal representation in decision making is very important in setting and implementing the specified basis embodied constitutionally and in the vision 2025, including the observance of various international and regional conventions which adheres to gender equality at all levels.

The State of Women in Political Parties

According to article 67 (b) of the URT constitution, any person shall be qualified for election or appointment as a member of parliament if he/she is a member and a candidate proposed by a political party (URT 1977). This regulation also applies to member of councils at the local government level. According to the Local Authorities (Elections) Act, No. 4 (39) of 1979 a council candidate must have attained 21 years and be a member of a political party. Given the male dominance in most of the political parties’ top leadership, the political parties are still resistant to abiding by the national and international agreements towards gender equality and equity in governance matters. This situation is observed by the party’s formulated rules and standards of evaluation which are organized in male norms, values and styles in party operations. Despite Tanzania’s well established political party act of 1992 which sets the conditions for political parties registration, this act does not recognise gender equality as a condition of provisional registration of political parties (URT 1992).

Despite the constitutional provision of special seats at 30 and 33 percent, it has challenged the political party systems where women are now able to break the glass ceiling and aspire for special seats. The appointed special seats are for women who are supposed to belong in political parties. Even so, with such a regulation and the patriarchal dominance in political parties, capable women continue to be less favoured; indeed, the women selected are those whom the political party leaders have an interest with. When appointed, they are therefore not able to challenge the patriarchal norms and values that continue to manipulate the decision making in political offices. According to Nzomo (1997) the process of party and state and the patriarchal structures in politics hinder women’s participation in leadership and decision-making. Political parties act as women’s gatekeepers in accessing women’s elected positions (Meena 2004).
Further, following multiparty politics, each political party has its own women’s wing. This is what has divided and demoralised women’s collective power towards addressing inequality and the institutional and cultural values that continue to restrict their participation. This situation makes women continue to face challenges in political parties whose leadership is dominated by men. Indeed, in political parties no woman has ever chaired any more than 18 registered political parties in the country (NEC 2011). In addition, it has been very difficult for women to be appointed as candidates through their political parties. For example, during 2005 and 2010 elections women candidates nominated by political parties to contest as members of parliaments were 13% and 18% (NEC 2006; 2011; see Table 1).

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*Source: Modified (NEC 2006; 2011)*
At ward council level, in 2005 and 2010 elections women candidates nominated by political parties to contest as ward councillors were 6.2% and 7% respectively (NEC 2006; 2011; see Table 2). Regardless of the increase, the number of women candidates is still low compared to that of men. Thus, it becomes evident that the majority of women pass through a special seats mechanism (NEC 2006; 2011).

**Gender Quota or Special Seats Mechanism in Tanzania**

Quota mechanism as an affirmative action has been adopted by many countries for moving towards improving the number of women’s representatives in governing bodies. The mechanism, however, is adopted and practiced differently, where three main types of quotas are practiced globally. These are reserved seats, political party and constitutional amendments or legal changes. The first is where political assemblies set aside seats for women which men are not entitled to compete for; the second is where wom-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>2005 Elections</th>
<th>2010 Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>%Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CHAUSTA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>JAHAZI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MAKINI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NCCR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>APPT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>SAU</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>TADEA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>UMD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>UPDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>441</td>
<td>7120</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Modified (NEC 2006; 2011)
en are nominated in a certain percentage through political parties; and, the last is where political parties put forward a proportion of female candidates. The quota system in Tanzania is constitutional as per article 66(1), (b) of the United Republic of Tanzania constitution of 1977, as amended in 1984. However a special mechanism of including different groups in the parliament existed in Tanzania before the introduction of women special seats. In its initiative of including different groups, the ruling party CCM (Revolutionary Party), a precursor to TANU, introduced a ‘National Member of Parliament’ (NMP) during its one party regime in parliament. The NMP was not introduced as an affirmative action toward gender balance but toward the inclusion of community members whose voices and interests were missing from parliament, namely - women, youth, trade unions, cooperatives and the army. During that time there were no female special seats, but women gained access to opportunities through NMP.

Article 78 of the constitution provides that the seats allocated to women be distributed on the basis of proportional representation among the number of constituency seats won by each party in the National Assembly elections with a minimum vote threshold of 5% (URT 1977). Additionally, following the constitution amendment in 2000 and 2005, the quota was increased to 20% and 30% in parliament respectively, and seats were allocated in proportion to the number of votes obtained. Similar quotas were implemented at local government level in 1994 and 2000 elections where 25% and 33% was set, and in the 2005 election it was raised to no less than one-third. However, in the 1994, 2000 and 2005 local government elections, the seats were allocated in rough proportion to the number of seats won by each party. CCM’s mechanism of including representatives from different women’s groups (disabled, NGOs, female intellectuals etc.) at least broadened the base of representation and competition. Following this regulatory act, not all parties managed to obtain special seats for women. As Meena (2004) observed, special seats act as barrier against certain women and parties in accessing such opportunities.

The introduction of gender quotas in many countries acts as the basis for the increase of women in government worldwide. To date there are countries with 30%+ women members in governments including Tanzania (36%), and other countries are closer to the Beijing Platform for Action’s recommendation of 50/50 (IPU 2014). Without quota, the current documented minimal increase in parliaments worldwide (IPU 2014) and in local government in Tanzania (NEC 2011) could not have been achieved. However, different arguments have been raised for and against the quota mechanism. These include the debates that the mechanism is based on favouritism rather than ability (Madanda 2003); that it leads to tokenism and patronage politics (Tripp et al. 2006); that the appointed become accountable to their bosses and not their voters (Reynolds 1999); that it acts as a mechanism to win women’s votes and creates a strong block of women as parliament’s supporters (Tripp et al. 2006); that it excludes some people in society, and does not go beyond gender distribution in tackling inequalities (Tamale 1999); and that it is non-democratic, since it ignores voters’ preferences, (Geisler 2004) meaning that those appointed are the parties, - and not citizens’ – priority. There is limited research to conclude that quotas lower legislators’ quality. However, quotas
raise concerns at local level but have not led to tokenism in proportional representation at the national level (Tripp et al. 2006). Quotas compensate for the impediments that exclude women from their fair share of political seats (Dahlerup 2006). In addition, quotas act as a learning opportunity for women competing against men in powerful future transformations. Thus, quotas work properly when the disputes surrounding it are considered and acted upon.

Women’s Representation in Local Government in Tanzania

The population of women in Tanzania surpasses men, where women comprise of 51.3% and men 48.7% (URT 2012). The United Republic of Tanzania Constitution theoretically guarantees equal rights of men and women to participate in all aspects of public life as stipulated in the constitutions clauses (see Table 3). However, in reality things are quite different as women are still under-represented in all spheres, including politics. According to (IPU 2014) Tanzania is ranked at 22nd globally out of 189 countries with only 36 per cent of women members in the national parliament. While at ward level women councillors comprise of 30.6% (NEC 2011).

In 1985, the first time the election was conducted with the constitution guarantee of 30% of women special seats, the total percentage of women representatives was 9.6% and rose to 31% in parliament in 2010. However, many of these women came through the special seats mechanism, meaning that the proportion of women elected happened at a very slow pace. Indeed, the number of women contested at parliament and council level is low. Using the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections as an example, of the 1,222 candidates qualified for competing as MPs in 2005, only 159 were women; while during the 2010 election of the 1,036 candidates 191 were women (NEC 2006; 2011). Furthermore during the 2005 election, of the 7,561 people who qualified to contest for the councillors’ post, 441 were women; and during the 2010 election, of the 7,934 candidates for the councillors’ post, 559 were women. Though in all elections the available results are not sex disaggregated, female special seats councillors were 2552 and 3335 in 2005 and 2010 respectively (NEC 2006;2011).

Thus the 30% and 33% constitutional guarantee of female special seats at the parliamentary and local council levels is significant in increasing women representatives. Although women’s numbers in local government at candidature, elected and appointed through special mechanisms are increasing, they are still low in comparison with the male candidates and elected members. Additionally, data pertaining to mayors and leaders at neighbourhood (Mitaa), ward and village levels is poorly documented. Yet, one of the local government reform’s documented aims in Tanzania is to increase citizens’ participation in the planning and implementation of development activities. This is based on the perception that local government authorities are more responsive to local needs than the central government (Chaligha et al.2007; URT 2004). Further, alongside this important local level decision-making, positions are held by women; nonetheless, given the male dominated political field in Tanzania, women representatives face numerous problems to make decisions capture women issues. The discussion
**Table 3: Constitution Clauses Regarding Citizen’s Equal Rights in Participation and Representation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>States that:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12(1)</td>
<td>All human beings are born free and all are equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12(2)</td>
<td>Everyone deserves the respect of recognition and his life to be valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13(4)</td>
<td>No person shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law in the discharge of the functions or business of any state office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13(5) For the purposes of this article the expression “discriminate” means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, sex or station in life such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or the prescribed necessary qualifications except that the word “discrimination” shall not be construed in a manner that will prohibit the Government from taking purposeful steps aimed at rectifying disabilities in the society.

21(1) Subject to the provisions of Article 39, 47, 67 of this constitution and of the laws of the land in connection with the conditions for electing and being elected or for appointing and being appointed to take part in matters related to governance of the country, every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected by the people, in conformity with the procedures laid down by, or in accordance with the law.

21(2) Every citizen has the right and freedom to participate fully in the process of decision making on matters affecting him, his life and those affecting the nation.

**Source:** (URT constitution of 1977 as amended in 2005; 16, 17, 19)

below explains factors that account for the under-representation of women in local government.

**Challenges to Women Representation in Local Government in Tanzania**

Although Tanzania has made a significant progress in terms of women’s representation in local government, their access and participation remains low and limited in decision-making processes. Different factors at institutional, systemic and personal level account for disproportionate representation. According to a study by IDS/UNDP (2012) many different factors were identified as impediments for women to contest in elections, including: a patriarchal system (20.3%), lack of confidence among women.
and 20% poverty among women (10.8%), lack of education (8%), levels of corruption (6.8%), favouritism and patronage (6.8%). In addition, male abusive language was also identified as an obstacle to women’s opportunity to win elections. Furthermore, lack of funds for the majority of women for campaigns makes them dependent on either husbands or the political party they are affiliated to, hence being unable to challenge the status quo.

In addition, in a study by Chaligha et al. (2007), women identified cultural and social reasons as a barrier in running for elections. Women mentioned lack of funds, shyness, being afraid of witchcraft and lack of self-confidence as reasons for not being elected as leaders when they contest for leadership positions. The persistence of the patriarchal culture and its manifestations are the main difficulties against women’s advancement to leadership positions and other decision making positions (Koda 2004). This has led to a restriction of women’s emancipation, curtailed from childhood and decelerated by the social and cultural practices that impacts women negatively. This adverse situation has resulted in women having negligible representation and an underprivileged participation in most decision making bodies.

Moreover, the range of structural, and possibly individual, influences on behaviour – such as limited time, socialisation, lack of motivation and lack of confidence - have also served to be major impediments constraining women’s representation in local government (Koda 2004; Meena 2004; IDS/UNDP 2012). Additionally, the nomination procedure of candidates is not clear in many of the political parties and not women friendly (Meena 2004). At the district council level, each authority is required to have women councillors’ special seats of no less than one-third of the total wards and constituencies present in a specific authority (NEC 2006). Following this regulatory act, however, not all parties manage to obtain special seats for women.

**Conclusion**

Following the extensive arguments on equal representation, we can see that the debates globally demand for an increased number of women in government and other decision making bodies. The impact of these debates, however, has led to institutional reforms where a number of measures have been taken. For example the introduction of quota system where a number of countries have managed to introduce such a system in different forms, Tanzania in particular. Yet, most countries have now reached or exceeded the critical mass (30%) and others are close to the Beijing Platform for Action’s recommendation (50/50) through quota or special seats. The debates on women’s equal representation in decision making are now focused on the representation of interests and equal rights, and this has led to uncertainty from representatives, especially women and the feminist discourse. Thus moving from women’s numbers to women’s ability to influence policy for their own needs is the ongoing difficult step that needs international, regional and local intervention to be a success. Further, female heterogeneity, which is brought by party affiliations, education levels, contexts, customs and traditions, should...
be taken into consideration if we aim to see policies that address women’s concerns in relation to their diversity.

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Decentralization Reforms and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania

Ajali Mustafa Nguyahambi

Introduction

Decentralization has been frequently advocated as a means of ensuring more responsive governance processes in response to local needs, due to the reason that citizens should have the opportunity to directly or indirectly influence decisions made in the decentralized structures. The prescriptions of decentralization reforms in developing countries presuppose to offer ideal solutions about the perceived inadequacy of the public sector to deliver, especially at grassroots levels (Rondinelli et al. 1983). However, the state of affairs in the majority of Sub-Saharan countries indicates that the model is too rhetorical to be realized. This is due to the vividly vast gap between rhetorical advocacy for decentralization and the genuine readiness on the part of the central government to devolve authority and resources to local government authorities (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). While livelihoods scholars (Ellis and Freeman 2005) associate decentralization reforms with improved people’s livelihoods, the African experience is yet to benefit from the decentralization reforms, especially in rural settings. Instead, the decentralized administrative structures continue to be deferential and hierarchical, not consultative and interactive, with civil society in their respective localities (Wunsch 2001). Consequently, the key potential benefits from successful decentralization—such as effective articulation of demand at the local level—are hardly possible to be realized.

The search for an appropriate model of a local governance system has been a continuous struggle since the independence of Tanzania in 1961. This is why there has been the introduction (1961), de-institution (1972), re-institution (1982) and reform (1996) of the local government system, with the purpose to enable people to self-develop. In the same vein of understanding, the ongoing institutional reforms in Tanzania strive towards unlocking potential capacities for people’s self-development through local government authorities (URT 2012). Nevertheless, the prospects of a beneficial correlation between decentralization reforms and local level development in the country are yet to be realized. Instead, the essential ingredients for victorious decentralization, such as: the effective articulation and communication of demand at the grassroots level; impartial and independent administrative culture; and different levels of capabilities, are yet to be realized (APRM 2011). This situation has raised skepticism on the systemic context within which decentralization reforms in Tanzania are being
implemented. The fundamental question being asked is that, how do actors, powers and accountability mechanisms influence the efforts to improve rural livelihoods during the ongoing decentralization reform processes?

Therefore, this chapter provides critical analysis of the ongoing decentralization reforms in Tanzania, by interrogating the promises existing in the decentralized framework versus their respective challenges and prospects towards improved livelihoods. The chapter starts with reviewing a theoretical sketch of decentralization reforms in order to understand its apprehension in advancing rural livelihoods in the context of developing countries. The institutional and policy framework of decentralization reforms will be revisited, so as to frame the context in which Tanzania is situated. Furthermore, the chapter examines decentralization reforms and their perceived influence in promoting the wellbeing of people in the decentralized structures. In the end, an account will also be made highlighting the challenges for grassroots development in the decentralized framework.

Through content analysis, this chapter utilizes various literatures to address questions such as: how do different actors influence the processes and outcomes of decentralization in Tanzania? How does power proximity among different actors influence processes and outcomes of decentralization in Tanzania? How do existing accountability mechanisms influence processes and outcomes of decentralization in Tanzania? Both theoretical and empirical resources will be reviewed to inform the sets of arguments and conclusions carried in this work. The chapter concludes with a strong conviction that nurturing capacities for self development and improved livelihoods demands, among other things, balanced power relations among local governance actors and accountability in the decentralized framework.

A Theoretical Sketch of Decentralization Reforms in African Countries

During the last three decades, a revolution has been taking place in many countries around the world, focusing on the devolution of fiscal, administrative and political powers to sub-national governments. This wave of decentralization reforms has been influenced by the need for improving the livelihoods of ordinary citizens (poverty reduction) and, more generally, the need for good governance (Martinez-Vazquez 2011). Thus, the major institutional transformations of the last three decades in developed and developing countries have placed many expectations on the role of lower level structures of governance.

Theoretically, countries engage in decentralization processes for different reasons. While some are searching for a more efficient public sector, others (such as socialist economies) are disappointed with performance planning and centralized policies (Martinez-Vazquez, ibid.). Furthermore, decentralization reforms are undertaken in order to contain forces of separatism by defusing social and political tensions within local cultural and political autonomy (Bird et al. 2010). However, a recent trend in developing countries suggests increasing grassroots demands to achieve the democratic
ideals that seem to be inherent in the decentralized framework of governance (Crook and Manor 1998). This is to say, decentralization has generally been considered as the devolution of decision-making powers that give lower level governance structures and grassroots people autonomy to determine their socio-economic destiny (Blair 2000; Crook and Sverrisson 2001).

The customary policy objectives of decentralization reforms in Africa often focus on the ideological principle that is often allied with an intention to cultivate the intellect of self-reliance, the culture of democratic decision-making, popular participation in government, and accountability of public officials to citizens (Rondinelli et al. 1983). This is to say, decentralization reforms for African countries hold many promises, including local level democratization and possibly improved service delivery for the poor (RIPS 2005; Grindle 2007). There is no wonder why decentralization in Tanzania has generally been considered to be a positive step towards making governments more accountable to the people (Seppänen and Virtanen 2008).

Since their independence in 1960s, the majority of African countries have engaged in a progressive decentralization of their states alongside the familiar economic and democratic-electoral reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s. However, analysts and practitioners have noted with concern that there has been dissimilar contours of practices, taking the form of extreme centralization as opposed to the proclaimed transfer of power to the lower level government structures (Ndegwa 2002; Rondinelli et al. 1983). Therefore, instead of an actual pursuit of decentralization (lower level democracy and development), the process has taken the shape of reformulation of state power, focusing on how and where development partners set their priorities and deploy resources (Ndegwa and Levy 2003).

The situation of decentralization reforms today is decidedly different to the majority of countries in the African continent. Either as part of evolutionary administrative change, or arising from dramatic political reforms under donor pressure and programs, the ongoing local governance processes suggests the revival of the most significant features of state restructuring that embrace varieties of decentralization reforms (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). Predominantly, there is an escalating preference for decentralization of power, resources, and accountability to local levels, despite the widely varied underlying processes and results.

Generally, there are four identified policy objectives for decentralization reforms in developing countries (Rondinelli et al. 1983). Potentially, these objectives offer a greater likelihood for participation of the poor and marginalized groups in decision making and in monitoring of government activities. The first objective of decentralization reforms is geared towards reducing the overload and congestion in the channels of administration and communication. In so doing, expectations include trimming down unnecessary delays (government stalemate), improving administrators’ indifference to satisfy their clients, enhancing the level of government’s responsiveness in public service delivery, as well as furthering the quality and quantity of the services it provides. However, the state of affairs in Africa is far beyond the envisaged ideal situation where-
by upward accountability (local to central government) dominates the processes to the extent of compromising service delivery standards (Ndegwa 2002).

The second objective of decentralization reforms is linked to the management of national economic development in a more effective and efficient manner. This objective suggests that with decentralization, there is potential for an increased ability to formulate, articulate and implement national policies. In addition, decentralization will increase the ability of the central government to plan for local programs more responsively, quickly react to unanticipated problems that arise during implementation, as well as complete timely implementations due to cutting down red-tape and ponderous procedures. In contrast, lower level economic growth suggests it has been fragmented, and has not created a direct link between local provision of services and local tastes due to limitations in fiscal decentralization (Oyugi 1990).

The third objective of decentralization is geared at enabling the mobilization of support for national development policies. This has the implication of making the national policies better known at a local level, creating effective channels of communication between national government and local communities. This objective is also concerned with enabling greater participation in development planning and management, as well as promoting greater equity in the allocation of government resources for investment. Conversely, this has not been the case whereby the majority of local government authorities in Africa have been dependent on the central government or donors, hence a limited capacity plan to allocate and manage resources for investment (Chaligha 2007).

The fourth objective of decentralization reform focuses at creating a larger number of skilled administrators and managers at lower levels of governance structures. By doing so, this enables strengthening official knowledge about local conditions; motivates community leaders to take up active roles in activities and processes that determine their welfare; creates better relationships between residents and officials; as well as increasing community solidarity and interest about local development in their respective localities. On the contrary, local government authorities in the majority of African countries suffer from limited administrative devolution, often due to the political hegemony of central government (Ndegwa 2002).

Reflectively, the four objectives above, as identified by Rondinelli et al. (1983), do not rebut the most recently typified decentralizations that tend to be driven by intensely political imperatives, usually linked to a drive to recover or reinvent political legitimacy. The decentralization mode above can be observed in countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan in Asia, as well as Uganda, South Africa, Madagascar, and Ethiopia in Africa. Nevertheless, despite experiences of centralization that are influenced by shades of authoritarian rule, some countries in Africa have put into practice decentralization so incrementally, with changes ranging from the barely perceptible to the more dramatic, but sequential, reforms over time. Countries in this group include Senegal, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. However, these countries need a well-established model of politics that would allow the pursuit of well-organized decentralization, given its implications for political control.
Moreover, a clear understanding of decentralization processes in Africa need to be considered alongside an assessment of key stakeholders and phases of decentralization processes (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). As for key stakeholders, three categories can be analyzed as follows: the first category is that of political elites, which involve political leadership that controls the levels of governmental authority. The second category comprises of bureaucrats within central government, influencing all levels of authority. The third category of stakeholders is that of communities, involving both local elites and grassroots. While acknowledging the three categories of stakeholders as pointed by Ndegwa and Levy (2003), one should not underestimate the role of external actors, especially development aid organizations, who have significantly shaped decentralization policies in several countries.

With regard to the phases of decentralization, three distinct, but not exclusive, phases of decentralization exist in developing countries. The initial phase (engaging decentralization) is fundamentally concerned with making strategic choices regarding the extent of resources and responsibilities that need to be shifted to lower levels of governance structures, as guided by the national agenda for decentralization reforms. The second phase (detailing decentralization) clarifies and rolls out the specific fiscal and administrative mechanisms needed in order to give life to local empowerment authorities. The third phase (sustaining decentralization) is basically an ongoing phase of learning-by-doing, in which the institutional arrangements of the inter-governmental system are continually fine-tuned (Ndegwa and Levy 2003).

From the three phases above, it is important to emphasize that the achievement of the decentralization reforms will depend, among others, on paying appropriate attention to all phases. While decentralization sounds very promising for lower level democracy and development, some African countries have had different experiences that limit the role of local government authorities to be considered as vital channels for promoting democratic governance that responds to citizen’s demands. For example, Chinsinga (2007) describes the decentralized framework of governance in Malawi to be merely political, with limited citizen participation in governance processes. In Madagascar (Vaillancourt 2008), decentralization displays a strong centralizing political tradition which hampers strengthening decentralized tiers of government. The Ghanaian experience of decentralization framework illustrates a sort of paradox of power (Hoffman and Metzroth 2010), wherein political parties fear political decentralization, reasoning that it can lead to loss of political control over certain parts of the country.

Learning from the experiences above, it sound plausible to contend that the meaningfulness of decentralization reforms have to reinforce political participation and improve service delivery, rather than circumscribing to strategic political considerations of various stakeholders in the political arena and in wider society. Essentially, there has been increasing appreciation of decentralization reforms, whereas the discourse on state institutional reform in Africa has been at the center of local governance initiatives. However, the debate has remained rather remote from the evolving realities on the ground. While the continental state of affairs (Ndegwa and Levy 2003) indicates that much has been done regarding technical exposition as to how a well-functioning
decentralized state should function administratively and fiscally, there has been relatively little evidence from actual country-specific pathways to decentralization. The theoretical sketch of decentralization reforms in Africa presupposes to be best nurtured in directions that are both feasible, and likely to sustain a continuing forward momentum. This is to say, the theory and practice of decentralization reforms in Africa are the functions of creating an enabling environment for decentralization, the design of decentralization, as well as paying appropriate attention to the dynamics of decentralization and empowerment.

**Institutional and Policy Context of Decentralization Reforms in Tanzania**

At the outset, decentralization reform policies in Tanzania promise a lot in terms of upholding participatory democracy and local level development in respective localities (URT 1998a). Likewise, literature advances the same argument in favor of decentralization promoting better service delivery, a more efficient government, political stability, and assisting in inter-jurisdictional and other forms of equity (URT and JICA 2008; Chaligha 2007). However, Crook and Manor (1998) argue that there are some prerequisites that local governments have to fulfill for decentralization reforms to be meaningful. This suggests that arguments in favor of decentralization reforms to provide advancements in democracy and rural livelihoods in developing countries are not automatic, unless something is done to facilitate the same.

The institutional and policy context of decentralization in Tanzania can be thoroughly discussed alongside its historical overview reflected in social, political and economic changes taking place in the country (Cooksey and Kikula 2005). It can be recalled that, since the independence of Tanzania in 1961, there have been continuous efforts to restructure local governance, focusing on attaining people-centered governance mechanisms coupled with an attempt to expand the delivery of basic social services. This is also explained by the overall rationale for decentralization in Tanzania, which is linked with the need to bring the government and decision-making closer to the people, to be more responsive and democratic, and to improve services and ultimately reduce poverty (URT 2008).

The institutional and policy context of decentralization reforms in Tanzania can be well linked to an attempt to address poverty reduction in the country. The link is derived from constitutional provision which emphasizes the idea that sovereignty resides in the hands of the citizens where the government derives all power and authority. Therefore, the primary objective of the government is the welfare of the people to whom the government is accountable; and that, the people must participate in the affairs of their government in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. No wonder the purpose of having Local Government Authorities (LGAs) [according to Article 146 (1) of the Constitution, 1977] is to transfer authority to the people. This is a ripe opportunity for people to participate and sustainably address their development concerns, because LGAs have thus been given the power to participate and involve the
people at lower levels of governance in planning and implementation of development programs within their respective areas, and generally throughout the country.

The Tanzania’s policy of decentralization (Decentralization by Devolution) was the policy option chosen as the most effective means to deliver changes in the public sector and in the socio-economic context of Tanzania. The policy, therefore, was geared towards creating a supportive environment of local governance by strengthening LGAs, so that they can spearhead meaningful governance and development processes at large (Ngwilizi 2002). It is important to note that the decentralization policy in Tanzania was part of significant changes going on in the country following the move to economic liberalization, political pluralism and multiparty democracy. This went hand in hand with the adoption of many tenets of new public management systems, already embraced in both developed and developing countries.

In terms of size, Tanzania is a relatively large country that deserves decentralization by devolution in the course of avoiding limited service improvements or poverty reduction, which is not likely to be realized under decentralization by deconcentration and/or delegation (URT 2008). This is to say, decentralization by devolution was chosen as a means of bringing the decision-making on services closer to the people, and to make the government and delivery of services more responsive, effective and efficient. In this regard, it was envisaged that LGAs will operate in a more transparent and democratic manner, reflecting enhanced accountability to the people they are supposed to serve. The policy was essentially founded on four main pillars, namely: fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, political decentralization, and changed relations between central and local governments.

In the course of strengthening implementation decentralization policy, Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) 1999 – 2004 was introduced with the purpose of improving the quality of, and the access to, public services provided throughout or facilitated by local government authorities. This was reinforced alongside with six components as its key result areas. The first was governance, wherein the objective was to establish a broad based community awareness and participation in the reform process, and promote principles of democracy, transparency and accountability. The second component was local government restructuring, and its purpose was to increase the effectiveness of LGAs in delivering quality services in a sustainable manner. The third one was finance that envisaged increasing the resources available to LGAs and improving the efficiency of their use. Human resource development was the fourth component, which focused on enhancing accountability and efficiency of human resources used at LGAs level. The fifth component was institutional and legal framework that focused on establishing the enabling legislations, which would have supported the effective implementation of LGR. Last but least, was the component of program management that aimed at supporting the effective and efficient management of the overall LGRP. It should be noted at this juncture that the goal of LGRP focused on reducing in the proportion of Tanzanians living in poverty by improving their quality, access and equitable delivery of public services, particularly to the poor, provided through reformed and autonomous local authorities.
Making Decentralization Reforms Work for the Poor in Tanzania

There has been a debate—by both the academic community and development practitioners—of what constitutes the challenges and/or prospects for grassroots development in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the context of a decentralized framework, the discussions have been dominated with the conviction that the decentralization policies currently undertaken are unlikely to succeed (Oyugi 1990). This is what Chabal (1998) labeled as a misconception of decentralization reforms, whereas the African state attempts to pursue western-style democracy. Arguably, the embraced decentralization policies in developing countries respond to the crisis of modernity, rather than the desire for participatory development. This is evidenced by the dominance of patrimonial practices within officially legal, rational, bureaucratic framework.

Despite the decentralization rhetoric which presupposes inclusive and participatory mechanisms towards people’s concerns, the patrimonial state has dominated local governance processes (Ngware 1999). On one hand, the legacy of a single party regime might have shaped the attitude towards a state centric mechanism to development processes, as opposed to populace-based mechanisms. As a result, development policies and implementation are controlled by public sector channels and leave no initiatives among local communities, which is why sustainability is rare. Consequently, popular mobilization for self-help (which is said to be necessary for sustainable livelihoods), turns out to be handouts as a reward for loyalty, expressed through passive compliance.

Alternatively, an evaluation of the prospects for a beneficial relationship between decentralization and local level development in Tanzania may entail the examination of a number of elements. While there is much adherence for an understanding of the potential benefits for a decentralized government, little emphasis is given for the need of taking into account not only the principles on which decentralization is based, but also the systemic context within which decentralization is being implemented. In addition, to embrace decentralization policies, dynamics of the reform era have to be considerate of balance of power and accountability between local governments and respective local communities (APRM 2011). Otherwise, decentralization may seem primarily political, which does not give room for the virtues of allowing the voices of local communities to be heard.

The Governance and Civil Service Reform Program, adopted by the World Bank in the early 1990s, explicitly saw decentralization as a primary means of tackling public bureaucracies, which were by and large “patrimonialized” by ruling elites (World Bank 1994). The question, therefore, is whether the adoption of these reforms programs considered the principles of which decentralization is based, and the systemic context within which decentralization has to be implemented, given that it came around as a set of conditionality under SAPs. Substantively, Adamolekun (1999) once pointed that there are no real success stories as far as the improved development performance at the local level is concerned, despite the fact that local governments are covered under the public administration reform efforts in most Sub-Saharan African countries.
Essentially, there is an existing link between decentralization reforms and poverty reduction initiatives. Be it political, administrative or fiscal decentralization, there is optimism that responsiveness to the poor will be guaranteed due to citizen empowerment and participation in decision-making. In this regard, poverty is understood in its multidimensional sense, going beyond the notion of income poverty. With empowerment and participation in decision-making, citizens will be able to influence local resource mobilization and control over local statutory structures, hence the realization of improved public goods and service provisions, and finally the reduction of poverty. Reflectively, three major dimensions of poverty are of particular interest to this study, namely: voicelessness, vulnerability and limited access to social services (Asante 2003).

The Tanzanian local government system is based on political devolution and decentralization of functions and finances within a unitary state (URT 2008). In this regard, local governments are holistic in the sense that they are multi-sectoral. Local Government Authorities, in this case, have a responsibility for social development and public service provision within their localities; to facilitate maintenance of law and order; and promote local development through participatory processes. Looking at the role of decentralized governance structures in Tanzania, it is convincing that through efficient and effective decentralization processes, issues of common concern at grassroots levels of local governance, poverty in this case, can be addressed in a sustainable way.

In principle, the decentralization policy reforms suggest to consider the role of local government authorities in transforming livelihoods of people in their localities. This is reflected in a way of granting local government authorities with autonomy in managing their affairs and in determining their own priorities. Learning from the implementation report of the Local Government Reform Programme (URT 2008), the level of human resource autonomy is still lacking, whereas establishment and personal emoluments remain centralized. Central government still has powers to transfer staff, and in this way capacity building efforts by local government authorities are undermined. This is potentially a challenge for the realization of sustained social development and improvement of service provision, because limited control over council staff can easily negatively affect the level of supervision and coordination of the implementation of council projects and programs.

From the governance point of view, local government authorities have to operate in a more transparent and democratic manner (Grindle 2007). This is of fundamental importance when reflecting on the need for enhanced accountability to the people they are supposed to serve. In Tanzania, democracy is practiced through elections and represented through elected leaders, where there has been significant improvement, despite the tendency of not filling vacancies in a timely manner. In addition, there is also concern that the requirement for party affiliation is harming the lower level of governance and democracy. In this regard, it can be argued that the potential for benefiting from transparency and accountability, which has already been formalized in audits, codes of conduct and standing orders, is being challenged by a new downward accountability framework, which is yet to be realized. However, democracy, transparency and accountability are also promoted through participatory processes and management at
all levels, i.e. O&OD, school committees, open meetings of the full councils, use of notice boards for accounts and project information.

In the course of ensuring improved service delivery to their people in the decentralized framework, local government authorities are tasked with the duty to oversee access and quality of services offered at their respective councils (URT 2008). This is to say, they are responsible to ensure that their staff are more responsible and accountable to their respective councils, in terms of appointment, performance and discipline. In addition, councils have to guarantee enhanced capacity in terms of staff that are better trained in relevant skills. Local Government Authorities in Tanzania have not fully exercised their responsibility related to the recruitment of council staff. Despite the establishment of employment boards, their utilization ends with the recruitment of staff at lower cadres, whereas the staff of some priority sectors, such as education and health, have been exempted from decentralized recruitment. Furthermore, despite efforts by the Local Government Authorities to ensure that properly qualified staff are carrying out the jobs needed, the majority of LGAs are constrained with getting better qualified personnel to fill-in the respective vacancies. This is fundamentally a challenge in the course of making sure that LGAs effectively engage in facilitating the planning and coordination of development activities at lower levels. Consequently, instead of rendering assistance and advice at grassroots levels of governance, citizens are frustrated with un-professional practices caused by less qualified staff.

The importance of financial resources, in addressing development challenges in the decentralized framework of Tanzania, cannot be over-emphasized (Chaligha 2008). It is, therefore, the responsibility of local government authorities to have more financial resources through improvements in their own resource mobilization, as well as central government and donor grants. At this point in time, it is important to highlight that the level of financial management has significantly improved. However, LGAs have continued to depend on central government and donors as main sources of finance, due to limited sources of revenue. Reflectively, this is potentially very harmful for the realization of sustained development initiatives, because councils may not be able to effectively utilize their most powerful tools such as annual budgets and work plans.

The decentralized framework has to ensure that local government authorities are providing more equitable and better quality services, and are facilitating and enabling other agencies to do the same (URT 2008). This is essentially important so as to address challenges facing the voicelessness and vulnerable groups in the community, and hence enable them to have access to social services without any barriers. Likewise, it should also ensure that some relevant national institutions are improving their capacity to enable and empower local governments to grow stronger. In Tanzania, there has been a progressive trend on service indicators and the satisfaction rating among the people being served. Despite the environment of mistrust between LGAs and civil society organizations in the decentralized framework, local government authorities have managed to forge collaborations with some civil society organizations for service delivery.
Conclusions

A number of lessons have been learnt from the analysis of the ongoing decentralization reforms in Tanzania. The analysis informs that there is power asymmetry among local governance actors that marginalizes people at grassroots level from influencing local governance processes and expected outcomes. This situation affects the level of accountability of LGAs to grassroots people, due to the reason that grassroots people get no space to call for performance standards or access to frequent opportunities to express their concerns. Therefore, for the ongoing decentralization reforms to be meaningful in Tanzania, all actors need to be accorded appropriate space for them to be able to participate in all local governance processes that determines the fate of their livelihoods.

With regard to the influence of different actors on the processes and outcomes of decentralization in Tanzania, actors from state institutions seem to be relatively autonomous, as they do enjoy the freedom to make policy and implement operational decisions over the grassroots people. From the situation above, the outcomes of decentralization processes may not necessarily be able to address the concerns of grassroots people, but rather elite groups in the respective localities. As for the power proximity among different actors, and its influence in the processes and outcomes of decentralization in Tanzania, people at grassroots level have had limited interactions with other governance actors. Even where they are said to be represented in the decision-making circles, the genuine interests of grassroots people have often marginalized. Consequently, there has been little influence from grassroots people to hold local government authorities accountable to processes and outcomes of decentralization in their localities.

Since fostering participatory development is one of the fundamental principles of decentralization reforms, there should be appropriate mechanisms of facilitating the participation of the grassroots people in the planning and executing of development plans, and fostering partnerships with civic groups. The mechanism above is very much required in order to create an institutional environment that reflects local demand and conditions, hence, be able to function while reflecting demands for services by the local population. The understanding above suggests that the ongoing decentralization reform initiatives need to focus on giving more autonomy to LGAs in executing their roles, while operating in a more transparent and democratic manner and enhancing their accountability to the people.

Tanzania's experience has demonstrated that it is good to be optimistic in terms of high expectations, especially when such policy reforms are approached as a long term process. There is, also, a noted positive shift in the government system over the last decade, indicating that the decentralization policy is very valuable in attempting to address common concerns of citizens at the grassroots level of governance. For example, the positive sign of LGAs performance, in terms of good governance, has also been linked to an improvement in service delivery in the decentralized framework. Assessment of Tanzania's situation indicates it has demonstrable progress in achieving the visions for leadership, resourcing, participation, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, and improving service delivery. Nevertheless, while there are necessary conditions for
meaningful decentralization reforms in African countries, the specific contextual environment need to be taken into consideration. All in all, appropriate handling of decentralization reforms offers more possibilities for improvements in governance and service delivery, which is fundamental towards poverty reduction. It can be concluded at this juncture that, progress expected in the decentralization reforms is unlikely to be rapid, but the momentum is there and it needs to be catalyzed.

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5 Challenges of Managing Multi-stakeholders Processes in the Decentralized Delivery of Public Services in Tanzania

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Introduction

Improvement of public service delivery has been the continuous effort of every state institution party, as it is a means of maintaining their legitimacy to the citizens. In Tanzania, engagement of multi-stakeholders is widely outspoken and often based on sets of principles inspired by a rights-based approach to development. Despite wide acceptance of the approach, both at national and local levels, the meaningfulness of the multi-stakeholders’ engagement in the decentralized framework of public service delivery sounds less commendable. The purpose of this chapter is to interrogate and analyze the process of implementing MSPs taking place in the decentralized framework of public service delivery in Tanzania. Generally, development and governance processes in Tanzania have been searching continuously for an appropriate mechanism that can ensure not only full involvement of all stakeholders, but also an effective and efficient management of processes that engage those stakeholders (URT 2005). In due course, wide success has been registered by Local Government Authorities (LGAs) by being able to bring together different stakeholders in governance and management processes of public service delivery (URT ibid.). However, the outcomes of public service provision in the Tanzanian decentralized framework demands thorough cross-examination and must be able to address key questions such as: How are MSPs managed in the decentralized framework of public service delivery? What is the intent of MSPs participants and the extent of their roles in the processes? What are the major challenges of managing MSPs among public agencies in the decentralized framework of public service delivery? Therefore, the chapter starts by exploring the policy environment of public service delivery in the country by interrogating the same with some empirical and theoretical perspectives. Specific reflections are shared with reference to the Masasi District, wherein opportunities for meaningful MSPs and challenges of managing MSPs in Tanzania are discussed. At the end, an attempt is also made to give a picture of policy implications and share recommendations for improving practices of handling MSPs while reflecting on secondary education delivery in the district.
Realization of societal change, particularly in relation to sustainable development, depends very much on the constructive engagement and strengthened social capacity of different sectors and interests to engage with each other (Hemmati 2002). Reflectively, with the aim of addressing sustainability aspects of development outcomes, the Government of Tanzania has emphasized the need to engage different stakeholders in governance and management processes. This is reflected in various strategies and policy initiatives, such as Vision 2025, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), as well as National Public and Private Partnership Policy. In view of these strategies and policy initiatives, the focus is to generate synergetic results out of processes that pull in different stakeholders.

Tanzania’s experience of secondary education delivery portrays the existence of serious problems that necessitate the need for participatory interventions. For example, last decade, learning and teaching environment in secondary schools have faced an acute shortage of important school infrastructure and facilities. Likewise, learning and teaching materials, as well as learning achievements, have recorded poor outcomes with an average of below 40% pass rate, especially in community based secondary schools (URT 2007, 2010). Decentralized management of secondary education in Tanzania provides wide room for multi-stakeholder engagement. This can partly be associated with the overriding philosophy of Multi-Stakeholders Processes (MSPs), which is premised on the grounds that meaningful societal development is a function of consensus building, as well as a transparent and accountable manner of decision making (UNDP 2006; Vermeulen et al. 2008; Freeman et al. 2010). This is of paramount significance given the broad unanimity among all the involved members of the group and the importance of transparent and accountable governance. Thus, advocates of MSPs have often associated this governance model with values that embraces the coming together of multiple actors and beneficiaries to participate in the dialogue, decision making, and implementation of solutions to issues of common concern.

Globally, MSPs are increasingly being used as an alternative to address complex development concerns, with a focus on sustainability expected results. In this regard, the importance of MSPs cannot be over-emphasized because, in today’s world, certainly in the west and increasingly elsewhere, there is no single state (government) that is capable of handling all state affairs on its own. This corroborates Hemmati (2002), who argues that no sphere is all powerful, yet each has the power to subvert contributions of the other spheres to which they are opposed. However, the global experience regarding practices of MSPs suggests the varieties of approaches and mechanisms involved. This is to say there is no unified way of handling MSPs, but rather they are situational depending on what the group attempts to address in a specified context (Freeman et al. 2010).

In Tanzania, the management of MSPs is constrained by a binding institutional framework, despite the widespread acknowledgement of their importance inspired by the rights-based approach to development. There is, therefore, a pledge of support from both national and local levels of state institutions (government), despite some
organizational and institutional limitations. As a result, all stakeholders such as the civil society sector, private sector, and donor community, have been responding positively to the government’s call for their effective participation in development and governance processes in general. On the other hand, UNDP (2006) recognizes the importance of bringing together different stakeholders, but cautions that the meaningfulness of MSPs is not assessed on the number and types of stakeholders, but rather the intent and extent of their role in the process. This suggests the imperative of a conductive critical examination regarding management aspects of MSPs and their potential influence on the expected outcomes of the same.

Among others, changing educational sector stakeholders’ mindsets was one of the specific focuses of the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) of 1997, revised in 2001. The ESDP envisioned to enable all stakeholders to be well informed of their key roles in the development of education sector, hence, develop an integrated and outcome-oriented education system (URT 2001a). The Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) of 2004 – 2009 was preceded by the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) of 2002 – 2006. The point here is that SEDP was necessary to enable scaling-up of PEDP successes so as to allow transition from primary to secondary schools. It can be recalled that PEDP is among one of the very successful plans in the sub-sector that celebrated visible successes in terms of doubling class intake with 1,486,628 pupils in 2004; increasing GER by 105%; NER by 88.5%; GPI by 49.9% of girls in 2003; as well as increasing pass rate by 40% from 21% prior to PEDP (URT 2004). SEDP therefore, was premised on eliciting greater participation from grassroots level so as to maximize potentials of all stakeholders such as parents, civil society organizations, private sector organizations, as well as various development partners. This was very important especially in community based secondary schools because it envisaged ensuring the participatory management of secondary education delivery, while creating a greater sense of ownership over outcomes, and consequently strengthening its sustainability.

Multi-Stakeholders Processes: Theoretical Perspectives

Multi-Stakeholders Processes (MSPs) present a number of issues that need to be thoroughly interrogated in the course of understanding how the processes can be utilized towards a more sustainable future. These issues include the rationale, appropriate use and the scope, as well as the key inputs and outputs of the process. Therefore, the sub-section regarding theoretical perspectives explores the literature regarding the use of MSPs with specific focus on its purposes, presumptions, and actual uses and implementation.

In the context of MSPs, rationale for it refers to underlying reasons that necessitate the need for engaging in the group processes (Hemmati 2002). There should be an issue(s) of common concern (Hemmati ibid.) that pulls different stakeholders together, hence necessitating the need for initiating engagement processes. It is only through the clarity of a common concern which can ensure promotion of a wider circle of re-
sponsibility for decisions and actions towards a shared agreement on the purpose and direction of the envisaged MSPs. This is to say, a poorly defined purpose will be vague regarding the potential outcomes of the engagement process as it would become open to different interpretations. Therefore, clarity of underlying reasons offers a reference point throughout the stakeholders’ engagement process as it gives participants an understanding that allows an informed choice about getting involved in the processes (Woodhill 2007; UNDP 2006).

MSPs are regarded to be instrumental in handling societal problems because they enable stakeholders to act as a sounding board, leading to better policy-making and delivery (Hemmati, 2002). No wonder there is increasing acceptance of MSPs built on consensus and mutual trust in response to an agreed set of objectives. Furthermore, MSPs should be able to deal with issues of significance to all stakeholders involved and the agency while responding coherently and appropriately to the issues of concern (Hemmati ibid.). This suggests that MSPs should not be considered as panaceas for any kind of problem because they may not be an automatic substitute for existing governance processes and mechanisms. In this context, MSPs can be used to supplement and complement existing structures, with focus on collective aggregation of problems, and, where appropriate, decision-making and implementation.

According to UNDP (2006), MSPs are by design employed in order to promote inclusive decision-making and a sense of empowerment, hence a greater sense of ownership over its outcomes. In the same vein, Hohnen (2001) considers the rationale behind MSPs to be premised around the promotion of better decision making by ensuring that the views of the main actors concerned about a particular decision are heard and integrated at all stages through dialogue and consensus building. The understanding of the two above calls for the necessity to ensure that the main actors or members of different groups with a direct or indirect interest are fully involved. They should take part in the formal and informal discussion and/or negotiations especially between opposing sides so that they are also part of the deliberations in a given socio-economic context.

The appropriate use of MSPs dwells on the view that everyone involved in the process has a valid view and relevant knowledge and experience to bring to the decision making (Woodhill 2007). By the virtue of the process, all involved actors are considered to be important and necessary, potentially harmful to the process if not taken on board. On one hand, this is partly because of their general awareness and possession of information, facts, ideas, truth and principles which is regarded as extensive knowledge and interests on the tabled issue(s). On the other hand, necessity comes in a way of knowledge and skills acquired through being exposed to the same issue(s) over a period of time. Reflectively, it should be observed at this level that, irrespective of status of stakeholders, the question of participation is very crucial so as to guarantee inclusiveness and avoid rubber stamp stakeholder participation.

The range of MSPs in terms of coverage and activities depend on the purpose as for the issue(s) to be addressed (UNDP 2006). The important thing worth noting here is that the approach aims at creating trust between the actors and solutions that
provide mutual benefits (win-win situation). Dialogue, as opposed to debate and discussion (Tannen 1998), is essentially a part of MSPs because dialogue emphasizes how solutions can be derived from a group of people with diverse backgrounds, expertise, interests, needs, views, and concerns. No wonder it is a tradition in MSPs that the approaches have to be people-centered and everyone involved takes responsibility for the outcome. This is due to the inclusive and participatory nature of the processes that demand stakeholders to have a greater sense of ownership for decisions made, and thus are more likely to comply with them.

Freeman et al. (2010) observed many typologies of participation that need to be considered in the course effective management of MSPs. Put in the continuums of participation, the typologies range from passive to self-mobilization and they are categorized based on: the moment which stakeholders participate (e.g. right from the beginning, only at the end, throughout the entire process); the objective of involvement (e.g. information, consultation, decision-making, and implementation); and desire or perceived impact of their participation (e.g. mobilizing popular support, creating ownership). How better to ensure effective participation, at what level, with what intention and expectations? This question does not deserve a blueprint kind of response, but rather situational and context specific environments.

Case: MPS in Education Sector in the Masasi District

The Masasi District has been selected as a case based on the fact that, just like all other districts, Masasi has been implementing Secondary Education Development Programme (SEDP) Phase I and II. Among others, SEDP I and II aimed at pursuing management reforms and improvement of the quality and relevance of secondary education (URT 2004, 2010). The Masasi District provides experience regarding the challenges of managing MSPs following qualitative data collected in May 2013. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were employed in the course of data collection. Data analysis was purely qualitative, since the purpose was to facilitate detailed analysis of actor’s behaviors and feelings of secondary education stakeholders in the district. For example, while the implementation of SEDP I & II in the Masasi district has increased enrolment of secondary school students from 4504 in 2006 to 12,534 in 2012, it was still equally important to comprehend individual experiences and their feelings regarding opportunities and challenges of managing MSPs in the district.

The context in which the management and delivery of secondary education in the Masasi district holds onto the legal and policy environment is common to all other districts in the country. It can be recalled that the adoption of Education and Training Policy (URT 1995) marked the recent series of initiatives by the government of Tanzania to undertake far reaching reforms through a sector-wide development program in order to address the major challenges in the sector. The government’s desire to improve the provision and quality of education was taken further by developing various strategies, programs and plans to support the provision of quality education services for all.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) (URT 2005) as well as the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 are some major milestones in this regard.

The Tanzania National Vision 2025 has aptly elaborated the indispensability of quality education towards socio-economic development of the country. This being the case, there has been consistent initiatives by the government through different strategies so as to combat ignorance, diseases and poverty owing for greater investment in human capital. Reflectively, the need for greater involvement of all stakeholders (students, parents, local community, private sector, civil society organizations and all other stakeholders) remains to be crucial for the sustainability of expected results (URT 2008).

The goal of NSGRP for the education sector focuses on “ensuring equitable access to quality primary and secondary education for boys and girls, universal literacy among men and women, and expansion of higher, technical and vocational training”. Despite structural and institutional challenges in the management of secondary education, the National Education and Training Policy of 1995 (ETP) offers clear objectives of achieving increased enrollments, equitable access, quality improvements, the expansion and optimum utilization of facilities, and operational efficiency through the system. Thus, the quick scan of the policy environment of education sector in the country indicates the purposive commitment on far reaching endeavors towards improved delivery of quality education.

Given the decentralized management of the primary and secondary education in Tanzania, the policy calls attention for proper and efficient mechanisms for management, administration and financing of education and training. In this regard, more authorities and responsibilities are placed at schools, local communities, districts and regions. The purpose is to ensure enhancement of partnerships in the delivery of education while broadening the financial base and cost effectiveness of education. With regard to education management structures, devolution of authority to respective schools, local communities and Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are part and parcel of the initiatives.

Engagement of a wide range of multi-stakeholders in the management of education delivery has attracted much attention given the importance of dialogue, participatory decision making and consensus building. While multi-stakeholders’ engagement is very important, acceptance and realization of policy outcomes dwell on ensuring a better environment for inclusive and participatory processes. Therefore, government efforts have focused on creating a conducive environment which allows for multi-stakeholders’ engagement and clarity in management of the processes involved and guaranteed. This is to say, it is important to take serious note that the policy environment of education sector in Tanzania needs to improve the quality of the sector coordination, consultative and dialogue processes that enables efficient and effective utilization of potential support from all stakeholders.
Opportunities for Multi-Stakeholders Engagement

Experience from the Masasi District suggests that well managed MSPs pledge a number of opportunities for both engaged stakeholders and beneficiaries alike. The analysis in this chapter has identified four main areas of opportunities which will be discussed in detail. Those opportunities include: guaranteeing the room for inclusive processes, warranting joint action on public concerns, and offering a collective platform for sharing issues of public interests.

Firstly, MSPs provide room for inclusive processes, in the sense that the decentralized framework of public service delivery in Tanzania offers a wide range of opportunities for effective participation and engagement of all potential stakeholders. It was learnt from Masasi District that different stakeholders are engaged in the management of community-based secondary education. In this regard, the District Education Officer was quoted during interview remarking that:

“So many stakeholders do engage in activities that require their participation, and of course, as a district we do encourage them to participate whenever the need arises”.

A good number of stakeholders were mentioned from the business sector (Airtel Tanzania, Vodacom Tanzania, NMB and some individual business men and women), as well as local and international non-governmental organizations (MEF, AMCOS, MAMCU, MANGONET, and MADA, JICA from Japan, READ International from United Kingdom, and PEACE CORPS from United States of America). However, the extent of their engagement was not at maximum level. This is common knowledge (UNDP 2006: 5) that stakeholders’ engagement exists, but the nature of engagement is very much questionable. Sentiments from focus group discussions indicated the further dissatisfaction regarding the extent of engagement. This was learnt from one secondary school teacher during focus group discussions who was quoted observing that:

“There are so many potential stakeholders who do not participate any how even though we need their contribution for development of our school”.

The response above suggested that some important stakeholders are not taking part in the processes, and it is important to take this on board. All the same, it is worth mentioning that the decentralized framework of public service delivery provides room for multi-stakeholders’ engagement. However, while the space for engagement has been well created through different national policies and strategies, much remains to be done to reach the critical milestones for their establishment. In this regard, all stakeholders must intensify their efforts to help make MSPs more meaningful while engaging in existing partnership opportunities in the local context.

Secondly, MSPs provides opportunity for joint action towards public concerns. In this regard, all engaged actors in the process have the potentials to maximize the benefits of coming together with the spirit that, one actor cannot do it all on their own. The Masasi District, for example, demonstrated effectiveness of MSPs in addressing edu-
cational concerns jointly. The heads of schools and respective political officials (ward councilors) appreciated the fact that the problems that faced their schools could not be addressed if left alone to the local government authority i.e. the Masasi District Council. In this regard, one head of school was quoted remarking that,

“Even though there are only few stakeholders engaged by local government authority, their contributions are still very significant for improved delivery of the services in our secondary school”.

The kind of response above emphasizes the need to pull in more stakeholders so that the benefits of joint actions can be maximized, and in turn realize improved learning and teaching environments of community-based secondary schools in the district. For example, the shortage of teachers in science based subjects is a serious problem in the country, especially in rural based secondary schools. At Chiungutwa Secondary School in the Masasi District, the problem was addressed by engaging the PEACE CORPS, the international Non-Governmental Organization which supplied a good number of volunteer teachers, hence solving the problem. This helped the school to address the problem in the short term, while the policy based strategy is underway at national level.

Thirdly, there is also the opportunity for learning from other stakeholders involved in the process. This is to say, MSPs offers apparent opportunities for one stakeholder to learn from others about good practice and what works and what does not within a specific sector or across the sector, to avoid reinventing the wheel. This was also the same in the Masasi District, where dialogue among participating stakeholders offered an exchange of knowledge, skills and experiences among group members. This was important given the nature of group which had members with diverse backgrounds, expertise, interests, views, needs and concerns. In view of optimism for MSPs to facilitate learning among participating stakeholders, one education Officer from the district gave the following remarks:

“Open mind is needed when stakeholders engages with another, because there are some practices that seem to be best on our opinion but not the same if we allow learning from others”.

The sentiment derived from this remark by the education officer suggests that MSPs are suitable for situations where dialogue between the different actors is possible, and there is a willingness to listen to and learn from others to reconcile different interests and reach consensus solutions. However, this does not owe to an uncritical acceptance of ideas or opinions from others without critical reflections.

The fourth opportunity is basically related to offering chances for collective platforms that allow for information sharing among participating stakeholders. MSPs provides for collective platforms that facilitate interactions among multiple actors in the course of looking for solutions to complex challenges and issues that demand collective exertion. It was also learnt from the Masasi District that MSPs in the education sec-
tor made it possible for the sharing of information to take place among participating stakeholders.

“Information is power, how do you expect us to be active participants in the group if there is no accurate and reliable information regarding whatever happening in the group”.

This view as shared by one manager of a civil society organization in the district suggests that MSPs offered a great opportunity for all actors to gain more accurate information about conditions facing the sector within their locality. It can be recalled that information sharing is very important in order to enable stakeholders to have shared understanding of the goal of delivering better and more efficient public services that are coordinated around the needs of the beneficiaries. This is significantly important in a situation where a decision made by one group alone might not be complied with by the other groups, hence the need for decisions that engage with many different stakeholders. The opportunities derived from MSPs are innovative and limitless. More importantly, in this case MSPs enhance a shared vision of relational responsibility towards the attainment of collective solutions and impact to stakeholders.

Challenges of Managing MSPs In Tanzania

As for the challenges, four main categories were identified to have influenced MSPs in Tanzania. First, one serious concern and major challenge of MSPs’ management is adhering too much to the rules and regulations. In this context, consultation activities are primarily subjected to a predetermined set of requirements, and therefore the processes is designed to fit the same. This is not healthy for the processes and expected outcomes either. This is because MSPs demand flexible and friendly settings (IFC 2007) so as to avoid the potential tendency of the processes to be driven by rules and regulations and become a set of public meetings.

Experience from the Masasi District suggests that adherence to agreed rules and regulations among stakeholders is very important primarily due to the fact that group behavior or action requires a set of authoritative principles that guide or govern their interaction. However, it was voiced by the civil society organization that in some cases there was a rigid tendency on the local government side, even where there are no benefits to be accrued towards agreed outputs of engagement. In this line of thinking, one education officers in the district was quoted during interview session remarking that:

“It is better if interaction among stakeholders is guided by relevant policy documents in the education sector and where necessary to devise new rules they have to be in line with National Policies”.

Second, MSPs are also vulnerable to twisted objectives as opposed to actual and legitimate integration of intended core interest of the process. While the success of MSPs
is measured in terms of its effectiveness in building constructive working relationships, it is quite unlikely to accomplish the same if the objectives for establishment are perverted. The experience of MSPs from the Masasi District portrayed the image that stakeholders with power and high influence in the multi-stakeholders processes are likely to provide the basis of successfulness or failure of realizing the objectives of them coming together.

Dominance of power and influence as presented above was of no surprise because it is the legal and institutional obligation of local government authorities in Tanzania that they are the primary actors for discharging public service delivery in the decentralized framework. The data also provides a reflective image of limited level of power and influence from civil society and the private sector. Even though there was concern by district officials that there has been an increasing trend of engagement between civil society and the private sector in the district, efforts still need to be exerted if meaningful contributions from the two are to be realized.

“For us there is no small contribution and for that reason we appreciate contribution from all engaged stakeholders regardless of their dominance”.

The foregoing quoted response from an interview with district education officers indicated that all actors try their best to contribute in the efforts to improve delivery of community-based secondary education in the district. The point of emphasis here is that there is a need to create an environment under which all stakeholders – regardless of their political and economic strength – are engaged without any kind of limitations.

The third potential challenge of managing MSPs is making the process to be the tool for exclusion, as opposed to inclusion. In essence, MSPs should be cultivating a broader and more inclusive process that encompasses a range of activities and approaches (IFC 2007); instead they have recently been understood to facilitate the clustering of actors in an exclusive and disintegrating manner. As earlier argued by Hemmati (2002), MSPs are fundamentally people-centered, in the sense that people need to take ownership and responsibility for them. It was also observed from the Masasi District that MSPs in the education sector were refined to serve their own purposes of addressing common concerns in secondary education delivery in community-based secondary schools. However, the nature of stakeholders’ engagement suggested to have identified some and excluded some based on perception of coordinating group.

“We do not know exactly why we are not part of the group; organizers can stay a better chance to explain this. But, if we are invited we are ready to participate effectively and give our contribution in our possible capacity”.

Response from one manager of a private sector organization implied that MSPs was interpreted to exclude, instead of include, some potential stakeholders in the education sector in the district. This being the case, careful identification of stakeholders to participate in such processes becomes a necessary component, as it assures those with
rights (and therefore responsibilities) and/or interests to play an active role in decision-making and in the consequent activities which affect them.

Fourth, MSPs were also found to be vulnerable for conflict of interest between distinct interest groups. Experience from the Masasi District suggests that some key stakeholders advanced the dialogue for selfish or hidden agendas that hindered the real purpose behind the need for coming together. During an interview with the DEO responsible for secondary education in the district, it was learned that it is very challenging task to convince some stakeholders to agree to engage into those processes, despite their potentials for offering meaningful contribution.

"Not every stakeholder is interested with what we are straggling to address as a group, but rather fulfillment of interest best known to themselves."

The comment above implied that, if the MSPs are not approached with an open mindset and collaborative actions, it can lead to inefficient organization. In so doing, the relationship between and among all stakeholders is expected to be genuine, trustworthy, dependable and positive. In essence, MSPs are characterized by the intention to bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of communication and decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue. In this regard, it was important to assess this feature because effective management of MSPs dwells on the genuine motives of each stakeholder involved in the process. Reflectively, the general comment can be made that there were mixed feelings regarding the motive behind different stakeholders to engage in MSPs. This suggests that some stakeholders were not informed of common goals that need to be addressed as a group, which can be associated with the tendency of some stakeholders to have limited interest in issues being addressed in the MSPs.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The fundamental intention of MSPs in Tanzania has been to ensure participatory governance and management of public services, while creating a greater sense of ownership over outcomes, and consequently, strengthening its sustainability. Experience from the Masasi district has given clear lessons that MSPs need to have a clear purpose, due to the reason that the heart of any sustainable development agenda stems from a common enduring agreement. The clear purpose is instrumental on the ground that MSPs are likely to succeed, especially in the long-term, if they take into consideration the environment in which they operate and ensures ownership by all stakeholders involved. The Masasi case also informs us that, presumably, MSPs are managed towards improvement of quality and sustainability of the public services. Therefore, contemporary uses of MSPs focuses on obtaining wider support from all stakeholders and gathering useful data and ideas that aim at enhancing the public sector reputation, and provide for more sustainable decision-making. As for the implementation of MSPs, it is envisaged that greater cohesion among stakeholders will be ensured while tackling complex problems.
in the public sector service and delivery. Of course, this spirit does encircle the growth of participatory practice and theory. Therefore, in terms of participation, MSPs need to be strengthened enough to allow democracy by encouraging more active involvement by community and all other actors.

In conclusion, it has been learnt from the Masasi District that MSPs are increasingly becoming primary approach in addressing education problems in the district. By this, it is important to take serious note that engaging multiple stakeholders in issues of their public concern has gained more prominence in recent years, and there is intrinsic value out of the same which is increasingly being recognized (Hemmati 2002). In this line of thinking, Mahroum et al. (2013) identified benefits of group work to include the development of shared views, a wide option of selection, public spirited focus, legitimate decisions and improved intellectual content. Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) are widely used as management practice based on reciprocal stakeholder engagement, rather than unilateral actions from organizational control. Referring to Hajer (2003), MSPs are grounded on the philosophy of a customer-oriented public sector, which emphasizes the governance processes that promotes reciprocal obligations between citizens and governments.

In addition, MSPs provides participating organizations with continuous and productive stakeholder relationships that develop more innovative responses to complex issues, show faster adoption of new ideas, and collaborate more quickly in response to new challenges. They can be used with a wide range of structures and levels of engagement such as global, national and/or local levels. In the context of developing countries, it is increasingly acknowledged that many problems facing managers today demand solutions by means of involving plural perspectives from shareholders and stakeholders. This article is of the opinion that, despite some reluctance of making use of MSPs in the decentralized framework, there is an increasing realization that benefits of the processes creates tangible and intangible opportunities to the beneficiaries. This calls all engaged stakeholders to participate with an open and cooperative mindset towards potential benefits of the processes.

In the light of lessons learnt and conclusion as provided above, the following policy recommendations can be drawn from the Masasi experience:

1. Both the theory and practices of MSPs have proven that there is no one set approach. The exact nature of a given process will depend on the issues to be covered, the specific objectives, the expertise available, the participants and the time and other resources available. However, experience from the Masasi District has proved that attaining fruitful output demands a transparent and inclusive decision making process that in turn becomes instrumental in strengthening stakeholder networks.

2. Furthermore, the input required for meaningful MSPs include, among others, expertise in facilitation, willingness of participants to learn, time to allow trust building, quantitative and qualitative information (depending on tools used), as well as participation of key actors. In this regard, the approaches and techniques employed
have to be based on common sense. It is important also to take note that good planning is a vital part of ensuring a successful outcome, and time must be allowed for the design stage of the process.

3. Capacity strengthening is also worth mentioning. This is to say, the provision of additional appropriate training would be beneficial depending on time, resources, and the type of process. Participants in this regard need also to design the process to fit the specific needs and circumstances. Thus, where necessary, additional training is of importance to create shared understanding of what exactly will take place in the process.

4. Generally speaking, MSPs are still a new and evolving practice in developing countries. Much experience of using participatory processes in Tanzania at the community level is available, but less at institutional i.e. district and national levels. In this case, some guidance on approaches that addresses newness is an imperative.

References


SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Introduction
Governance challenges in Africa seem to offer civil society unparalleled opportunities to make a considerable contribution to development on the continent. The rediscovery of civil society seems to promise a solution to hold governments accountable to their citizens. Theoretically, civil society in Africa is influenced by both the liberal and Marxist traditions of European political thought. Civil society, in the liberal sense, is seen as essential in promoting democratic citizenship. In this context, civil society on the continent has been seen as those who promote and protect the rights and liberties that mark the boundary between freedom and oppression (Dobriansky 2006 cited in Elemu 2010). They are perceived to be autonomous centres of social and economic forces that can act as watchdogs over the activities of politicians and government officials. Civil society consists of both the associations that make up these centres and the enabling environment that permits them to operate freely and effectively.

In the Marxist tradition, civil society is seen as another vehicle (besides the governing class) used to further the interests of the ruling class. Further, embedded within Marxism is Gramsci’s version which emphasises the role of social institutions as structurally complex; either buttressing or challenging state power. Bratton (1994) seem to uphold both views and argues that pressures for political reform in Africa that have undercut authoritarian regimes to some extent have emanated from citizen mobilization, under the banner of civil society.

In Zambia, civil society has been seen as an agent of change dating as far back as colonial times. Civil society, particularly churches and labour movements championed the crusade which saw the liberation of Zambia from colonialism. They also kept their vigilance through the era of Kaunda’s one party state. In the early 1990s, civil society formed the nucleus of the citizens’ movement that spearheaded the introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. Since then, civil society in the country has grown in numbers and areas of influence. Civil society in the country primarily became important in the wake of weak opposing political parties that seem to characterise Zambia’s politics. Civil society has been identified as vital in providing checks and balances to the state. Under multiparty Zambia, it has resisted the manipulation of the constitution on the attempt to change the tenure of presidency in 2001; and it has been
involved in the fight against corruption, poverty and hunger, among other concerns (Corella 2006: 23).

However, most local civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zambia depend on external donor support for their activities. A number of international development agencies and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are dedicating attention and support, both technical and financial, to local CSOs supposedly to enhance their work in influencing development outcomes in the country. Consequently, one criticism usually levelled against CSOs in the country surrounds their accountability. Questions surrounding who CSOs are accountable to tend to work against them in providing effective checks and balances, and also in their attempt to influence public policy debates. Against this background, this study attempts to broaden the debate on civil society accountability by focusing on externally funded CSOs working in the area of governance in Zambia. This study was based on desk studies, interviews and discussions with some local civil society actors in Zambia. The next section provides conceptual clarity on civil society and accountability.

**Defining Civil Society and Accountability**

Civil society is one of the most contested concepts in social sciences. Civil society is seen by many as a part of society (the world of voluntary associations), by some as a kind of society (marked out by certain social norms), and by others as a space for citizen action and engagement (described as the public sphere) (Edwards 2011). The concept is more problematic especially when interpretations fashioned at one time or in one part of the world are transported to another. However, Edwards (2004: 3) contends that civil society engagement can be expressed in different ways according to history and context. It can be traced as a universal expression of collective individuals, at work in all countries and stages of development. CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) defines civil society as: “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests” (CIVICUS 2008: 16). This is the operational definition that is adopted in this paper. However, it is equally important to bear in mind that Zambia, like most former colonised countries, did not have an environment conducive for the emergence and development of a civil society, as is perhaps seen in Western democracies. Nonetheless, even under subjugated conditions, there were some forms of societal self-organisation that operated independently outside the governing colonial power and which attempted to articulate public interest and influence matters of public concern.

Accountability is one concern, famously difficult to achieve regardless of the actor or entity to which it is applied. The concept becomes more complex when it is applied to civil society. This is because of the diversity of the sector and multiplicity of actors with whom civil society engages with (e.g. local communities or grassroots, donor agencies, governments, and other CSOs). However, in general terms, accountability refers to the ways by which individuals or groups are held responsible for their actions. It entails a
duty to explain one’s conduct and to be open to criticism by another (Ebrahim 2003). The next section provides an overview of multiple accountability channels for civil society in Zambia.

**Accountability Channels And Mechanisms for Civil Society in Zambia**

The existence of CSOs is premised on the provisions of the Republican constitution under Part III of the Bill of Rights, Article 21, which guarantees the protection of freedom of association and expression. Zambia is additionally a signatory to the Convention of Civil and Political Rights, which also provides for protection of freedom of association and expression. There is also the Societies Act, Chapter 388 of the Laws of Zambia which provides an avenue for the registration and incorporation of a society and a company limited by guarantee, respectively. The Societies Act directs a newly registered society to: hold an annual general meeting where operations of the society are discussed and reported, submit a copy of the constitution and rules and annual returns to the Registrar of Societies, state any changes in membership, the business, affiliation and assets of the society, and provide accurate details of the society’s activities. In addition, a society must furnish a copy of its balance sheet and audited financial records as well as minutes of its committees and governing bodies through which it operates. Failure to provide such information attracts a fine when office bearers have not exercised due diligence.

Recently, however, there is the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Act of 2009 which has been enacted as premier law, insofar as registration and regulation of NGOs is concerned (Lifuka 2011). The NGO Act, among other things, compels NGOs to declare and reveal their sources of funding and requires all NGO officers to declare their assets. The NGO Act in Zambia has been received with apprehension by CSOs, particularly those in the human rights and governance sector. The Act is seen as a tool maliciously designed to enhance government control, rather than enable civil society to operate freely (CIVICUS 2013).

Besides their obligations to the state, CSOs are answerable to their beneficiaries; the people whose interest they claim to represent. The CSOs account to their members through the dissemination of findings and recommendations on key research activities undertaken. They also account to their members through statutory meetings provided for in their respective constitutions. These meetings include annual general meetings where the elected Board presents reports to the general membership. It is important to note that it is from the general membership that board members are elected and periodical elections are held to usher in new members.

In addition, those CSOs who depend on donor funding are expected to be accountable to donors who finance their activities. CSOs’ accountability to donors is both a legal and a moral requirement; legal in the sense that financing agreements stipulate various reporting and accountability obligations while the moral imperative has to do with maintaining a good working relationship with their funders. Sometimes, civil so-
ciety has to do everything possible to please their funders. For instance, Kaldor (2003: 6) argues that in Bangladesh where CSOs have become such important actors, they have been described as ‘franchise states’ ready to do anything for fear of losing their source of funding. She contends that while CSOs aim to help the poor, their methods are more determined by donors than the poor themselves (Kaldor 2003: 23). In extreme cases, CSOs are ‘handmaidens of capitalist change’ .... [They are] ‘modernisers and destroyers of local economies’ introducing western values and bringing about economicide (Lewis 2001: 32 in Kaldor 2003: 22).

There are a range of accountability mechanisms that are being used by civil society to take responsibility for their organisational structures, operations, policies and activities to meet different demands of ‘upwards’ and ‘downward’ accountability. One of the ways for enhancing accountability among CSOs is the adoption of self-regulation mechanisms. Self-regulatory mechanisms, as a means of ensuring accountability, seem to be preferred by most CSOs in Zambia. Generally, CSOs indicated that working in a sector that seeks to provide checks and balances to government places an important requirement for such organisations to have controls in place, that regulate their conduct and enhances responsibility in their work. CSOs should be seen to be transparent in the implementation of their core business and accountable to various stakeholders that include their immediate constituency, members, and donors among others. Furthermore, it was recognised that CSOs should strive to work within the laws of the land at all times. The respondents emphasised that the intrinsic value of self-regulation lies in the creation of good social reputation and credibility in addition to the promotion of self-empowerment in institutional development. Unfortunately, to date CSOs in Zambia have failed to come up with their own code of conduct. They are still in the process of creating such (Chilufya and Nshindano 2012: 20).

Another mechanism is the use of governing bodies. The role of governing bodies, for instance, is to ensure that the interests and missions of a given organisation are achieved by keeping check of civil society. People who serve in the governing bodies are usually supposed to be prominent members of society who are chosen to help give direction on the operations of civil society. However, some CSOs’ governing bodies are often intertwined with management, and thus riddled with potential conflicts of interest (CIVICUS 2011). Some Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have voting rights on the board, while in others they act as chair. In such instances, CEOs have complete autonomy to decide on strategy and operations. Individual leaders sometimes take over interests of the organisation and shape them in line with their personal interests and agendas. This is partly because of the way some CSOs have evolved; brainchild of one or two people. Some initiators usually have overbearing influence on the decisions of the governing bodies (Elemu 2010). Another challenge with governing bodies is that CSO board members are not felt to be of the same quality as those of corporate sector institutions. Sometimes meetings are not held as provided for in their constitutions and / or internal rules. The renewals of governing bodies are not done as provided in their constitutions. There is also closed membership to some governing bodies as quali-
fications are restricted to members only, and there is no room to open up to individuals who share similar visions (Corella 2006).

Downward accountability to beneficiaries is even more difficult to achieve among CSOs in Zambia. While CSOs purport to represent the interests of their constituency, such as advancing the causes of the poor and oppressed, there is no clearly defined path by which they can be held to account by those they claim to represent their interests. Members of the public cannot just walk into an organisation and ask about where funding comes from or how activities are run. Beneficiaries usually have little or no insight into financial, administrative or decision-making matters. CSOs are generally not required by law or regulations to provide their constituency the necessary control for genuine accountability (Chilufya and Nshindano 2012). Among the mechanisms CSOs use include involving beneficiaries in programmes as well as planning annual general meetings. However, the weaknesses of such processes include infrequent number of meetings coupled with weak or no well-defined mechanisms or information feedback. Engagement of beneficiaries in programmes also tends to be minimal among CSOs in the country.

**CSOs and External Donors Funding: Main Dilemmas**

The research identified a number of challenges related to the external funding for civil society. First, the long term survival and effective implementation of programmes among CSOs is linked to availability of funds. CSOs on their own in Zambia (like in many developing countries) do not usually have enough funds to finance their work. They seek support from others who believe their work is worthwhile and effective (Hull and Holloway 1996). External donors for a long time have been, and are still, the major funders of civil society work in Zambia. It is quite difficult for most CSOs in Zambia to function independently without foreign donor funding (Chilufya and Nshindano 2012; Hull and Holloway 1996). Funding for CSOs from external donors comes in different forms including unilateral direct support through an intermediary, and joint funding models. Donor support to CSOs can be given as core funding to the organisations or to specific projects. The direct support from embassies and agencies to individual CSOs is usually conducted on an annual basis, and through either calls for proposals or through direct proposals to embassies or development agencies (Chilufya and Nshindano 2012). Proposals for funding are written to donors, and very often specific time-limited projects are supported. Donors rarely support projects that go beyond the immediate project requirements. External funding agencies have their own agenda, for what they would like to do support, and the agendas may or may not fit in the aims and purposes of the organisations. Due to donor funding, some local CSOs have fallen prey to those in power, and their agendas, and thus fail to maintain independence in defining and interpreting their own missions.

When CSOs are chosen as working partners with donors, the task of implementing donor financed projects can distort the organisation and change its primary task of protecting and serving the interests of the organisation's members to one of administer-
ing project. Once funded, CSOs have to stick to the business plans (funding proposals) as presented and agreed upon with their funding partners. One challenge associated with donor funded projects is that they demand fashion, risking diverting the attention of the organisation away from fundamental problems. Donors tend to over-emphasise certain elements in the projects to the detriment of actors and structures necessary for implementation of activities. There are very few donors who support institutional development, capital funds and long term partnerships. Some donors refuse to fund structural and overhead costs while the majority of the donor organisations accept percentages between 5 and 10 percent, thus distorting the organisation’s dynamics and internal functioning (Corella et al. 2006: 54). When project specific funding finishes, CSOs usually enter into a period of inactivity, or become less visible as they are preoccupied with report writing and/or proposal for further funding. Reliance on external donors leads to unpredictable existence among CSOs. Sometimes CSOs are delayed in implementing key activities due to delayed financial reporting, which in turn affects the timely receipt of further funding and/or implementing of activities (CSPR 2008). The dependency on external funding leaves CSOs vulnerable to accusations that are not representing Zambian interests.

CSOs seem trapped in a dependency relationship on donors which affects their ability to define and interpret their own mission. Donors have great influence because of their money. There are many local CSOs that may have started very well. However, along the way with co-operating partners (donors) supporting their agenda they have suddenly began to struggle, as donors’ priorities shift to other themes. Moreover, the tendency by donors to provide short-term, project specific support makes long-term planning challenging. More often, programme officers are continually kept busy writing proposals to attract funding whilst at the same time writing reports to justify expenditures for their running programmes. In some situations one programme may be funded by a number of donors who expect the organisation to present separate reports, usually using different reporting formats. This makes some CSOs spend much of their time working on proposals and reports all year round at the expense of substantive programme activities (Elemu 2010: 34).

Similarly, in some instances it does not matter how important a particular issue is, but if a donor says they have no funding for such a programme, that aspect drops off, irrespective of whether it is the most effective way to achieve their objective under specific circumstances. CSOs thus fall captive to power holders, and their agendas get compromised. Sometimes donors want to interfere so much in CSOs operations, threatening CSOs autonomy. There are too many demands on reporting requirements, sometimes to a level where it can sway an organisation from its own operation mandate and lose focus.

Part of the problem is that donor policies keep on shifting from one theme to another. CSOs evolve according to opportunities presented by their surroundings, shaped by funding opportunities by International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) and donor policies (Elemu 2010: 33). This makes CSOs move from one project area to another without even building long-term relationship with beneficiaries of their
programmes. Sometimes donors may just decide to pull out. Decisions to pull out may not be dependent on the CSO performance, but might depend on other outside factors unconnected with the concerned CSO, like donor’s own internal funding constraints or change in policy or sectoral interests. CSOs in the process end up losing the trust of local communities within which they work, especially where their organisational structures are not broad enough to include local beneficiaries in programming activities. Constant shifts also fuel mistrust, particularly on the part of the state taking CSOs to be used to promote donors’ interest in the country.

**Conclusion**

The conclusion drawn regarding accountability among donor funded civil society in Zambia in particular, and Africa in general, is that while donor funding plays a big role in financing CSOs activities in the country, such support poses as a source of uncertainty in the delivery of CSOs programmes and projects. Donor funding leave CSOs locked up in a tight relationship with donors, which sometimes tends to affect their operations and thus their accountability to local constituencies. Without a clearly defined accountability path to their constituents, external funding may lead donors to control agendas of CSOs in the country. One way to enhance their accountability to local constituencies is to use ‘social audits’, in which various stakeholders are involved in negotiating and periodically assessing a set of criteria through which civil society supported projects must be judged. Beneficiaries should also be involved in funding decisions, especially in the case of large institutionalised donors. Further, if CSOs are to preserve their independence, they should persuade donors for a variety of funding mechanisms which give them more control on the use of donor funds. For instance, requesting funds which will build long term sustainability, rather than funds for a specific time-limited project which sometimes ends up swaying CSOs from their overall mission.

**References**


Introduction
Corporations enormously influence our lives in a myriad of ways. Corporations especially embark on organising tasks in our economic life (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993), and their role in society has always been a battleground of political debate and ideological affectation. As Chatterji (2011: 13) said “when selfish means of earning profit is practised by the business world, then society becomes the victim of domination, exploitation and oppression.” Despite our multicultural world, there are certain values that are universally upheld and are acceptable as such; these are collectively known as ‘human rights’. In such a cross-cultural world of business, issues have to be prioritised, keeping always the aspects of human compassion and justice at the forefront. Thus, every age in history has tried to find the symbiotic relationship between the economic man and the social man (Chatterji 2011). Today, one of the prominent attempts of dealing with this dilemma is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

CSR is not a modern discovery and certainly not something that can be accredited to the economically developed countries. Long before the arrival of the Europeans in many parts of Africa and Asia, a donation-to-community culture was practised (Chatterji 2011). The concept once known as “noblesse oblige” (nobility obliges) has experienced a rigorous resurgence since the 1950s (Mintzberg 1986). At the dawn of the 21st century, however, CSR has become one of the most influential topics both in the academic world and in real life practices (Saatci and Urper 2013; Anwar 2013; Greider 1997). In fact, in the era of globalization, amidst corporate scandals which have evoked soul searching among practitioners and academicians (Kashyap et al. 2003; Chikati 2010), CSR is part of both the vocabulary and agenda of people from all walks of life, from academics to professionals, NGOs to consumer groups, employees to suppliers, shareholders and investors (Winkler 2005; Mintzberg 1986), and local residents (firms’ neighbours).

CSR as a concept has not taken roots in Tanzania, but as corporate practice in the country it is a common phenomenon. Successful CSR calls for both the right understanding of the concept and consequently, the right practice. Sometimes it also calls for government coordination and support to make the activities timely and tangible (Diallo and Ewusie 2011). When this role is missing, corporations can use the vacuum
to fill in activities that have little or no use to the general public; yet it gains a name for the corporation. The important role of the state in coordinating and supporting CSR is missing in Tanzania, and this brings about misconception, misuse and malpractice of what could have been an important and useful concept.

In this book chapter I will examine the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, look at one successful CSR project in India and then conclude by investigating at bad practices in Tanzania. I will then offer recommendations on how those practices can be avoided to allow for a version of CSR which is of mutual benefit to business and society.

**The Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility**

Society and business have a social contract in which there are rights and obligations, and trade-offs for both parties. It is a question of give and take; as Chatterji (2011: 17) argued, although business has the bigger responsibility of philanthropy, we must also keep in mind that each stakeholder has reciprocal duties with others, and the consuming community also has the obligation to make the trade-off between cost, sustainability and integrity. Different stakeholders also cannot be driven by their selfish interests alone because each stakeholder has an important role to play, and one cannot be destroyed for the benefit of the other.

Chatterji (2011) also maintained that society is increasingly turning to corporations for help with major social problems, such as poverty and urban affliction. Business is also rewarding society by providing knowledge and skills of carrying out business and understanding modern societies in a more organized way. CSR is of mutual benefit to the companies and local communities which are beneficiaries of projects that started as CSR activities. However, CSR must go beyond philanthropy, as unethical behaviour sometimes makes society extremely tolerant and insensitive. Business has then the responsibility either to be extra vigilant to avoid catastrophes, or to take advantage of the familiarity with unethical behaviour in pursuing unethical activities (Chatterji 2011).

Since 1998, World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) dialogues with diverse stakeholders throughout the world has revealed that CSR means very different things to different people, depending upon a range of local factors including culture, religion, and governmental or legal framework conditions. There can be no universal standard (WBCSD, 2015). WBCSD thus defined CSR as the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically, and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the employee and their families as well as of the local community and society at large (Okusaga 2007; Petkoski and Twose 2003).

CSR is seen more and more as a way for companies to engage with their external environment to develop linkages between business strategies and societal stakeholders’ impact strategies (Browne and Nuttall 2013; Saarci and Urper 2013). Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are becoming common in low-income markets, such as in Africa, searching for their legitimacy and growth opportunities (Egels 2005). In an attempt to attain legitimacy to operate in some places such as Malaysia, MNCs are building
public housing and income supports (Greider 1997). In India, this attempt is in the form of religious grants, building wells and rest houses, and commissioning relief work in times of disaster so as to gain social status, developing infrastructures, education, arts and culture, public welfare, and many others (Chatterji 2011). In other places like Ghana, Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania, it is in areas such as health care, water and electricity supply, job creation, sale of good quality but cheap products, social and recreation clubs, building schools, dispensaries, giving scholarships, sponsoring sports and local NGOs, donations to vulnerable communities such as people living with disabilities, victims of disasters, minorities, and many other ways (Lungu and Mulenga 2005; Barrick News 2010; Diallo and Ewuse 2011; Lunogelo and Mbilinyi 2009; Mbogora 2003 Kivuitu and Yambayamba 2005; Chikati 2010). All these forms of support are collectively known as CSR.

Kumar and Balakrishnan (2011) upheld that since 1990, CSR lobby groups or interested parties have grown to a commendable level. Examples of such groups include the World Economic Forum (WEF), World Business Council for Sustainable Development, UK- Business in the Community (BITC), US- business for Social Responsibility, Global Reporting initiative (GRI) in Amsterdam, Corporate Citizen Research Centre in Australia, Quality Associates International Inc., which developed the Social Accountability norms SA 8000, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in Switzerland which has established standards on the Environment, Risk Assessment, Food Safety and Sustainability elements; European Foundation for Quality Management (Belgium) and Malcolm Baldrige Excellence Program (US), to name just a few. In addition, several organisations worldwide have the so called “CSR Season” on-going and associated budget as well, regardless of how they have understood and customised their CSR practices for creating the maximum benefits to the society (Kumar and Balakrishnan 2011). This cornucopia of lobby groups and interested parties points to the fact that CSR has become popular, and the business community is seeing the concept as a way to link their businesses to the society; whether for altruistic reasons, business (profit) reasons, or any other reason.

To the companies, CSR became a business opportunity due to its capacity in improving corporate image and brand (Maignan and Ferrell 2004; ATE 2012; Diallo and Ewusie 2011). CSR serves as an identity, and also for strategic planning of the company by not only fulfilling economic profit but also contributing to the growth and development of society and environment (Salleh et al. 2013). Thus, Drucker (1984) suggested that corporate social responsibility and profitability are not incompatible, but social opportunities that can in fact be converted to business opportunities. Drucker’s argument is that corporations should turn social problems into economic opportunities, benefits, and ultimately into wealth.

Corporations are pressed by one concern: survival of their businesses; and thus may find it in their interests to go beyond the requirement of the law (Lombard 2011; Reinhardt 1999; Kreitner 1995). In doing so, corporations actively shape their stakeholders’ environment (Egels 2005). In this case it is more progressive to think of environmental sustainability, which is part and parcel of CSR, as a shared responsibility
of business and consumer (Brinkmann 2004). CSR is therefore corporations’ way to construct and control consumers’ behaviour and market. Creation of taste for environment protection and sustainability is one way of shaping customers’ demand (market) for their products (Crouch 2006; Lombardo 2011).

Association of Tanzania Employers -ATE (2012), which is tripartite forum comprising of ATE on one side and government and trade unions on the other, confirmed that CSR has many advantages to the local community. It can offer financial contributions, it can also make some of the business’s product or services available free or at low cost to charities and community groups. CSR looks for opportunities to make surplus product and redundant equipment available to local schools, charities and community groups. It can as well offer quality work experience for students (job shadowing). What can make CSR sustainable is its ability to use the business’s experience to help a local school, charity or community group become more efficient and entrepreneurial. CSR can also be used to support local sports, cultural or other community activities; it can be used to donate money to local charities and invest in community development such as investments in roads, schools or hospitals (Insyirani et al 2013; Chikati 2010). Through CSR, corporations can use some of the marketing budget to associate the business or brand with a social cause. Lungu and Mulenga (2010) argued that corporations see CSR as ‘good for business’ since it can enhance the sector’s “social license to operate” . This is because it reduces risks to production, posed by disputes and tensions, by maintaining good relationship with the local communities around their business activities.

CSR, as good as it may seem, is at times abused by corporations. In India, for example, CSR began when merchants became involved with temple charity, and yet used these temple grants to increase their business. It was a practice for merchant families to keep some of their profit for charitable purposes. Since they were respected and trusted as a result of their charity work in the communities, such merchants came to occupy important social positions, which again made their business more profitable (Chartterji 2011). Thus charity, and indeed CSR, was - and still is - being used by some companies and business people to penetrate into new localities and create respectable social identities, which again further helps to entrench authority over commercial enterprises (Chartterji 2011; Rudner 1995).

Example of a Successful CSR Project in India

Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL) was ranked number one in the Asia-Pacific region and in India. It is a company dealing with the supply of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCGs). HUL believes that that the worth of a company is also in the services it provides to the community. On the backbone of this belief, HUL has created a number of community services ranging from hygiene, nutrition, enhancement of livelihoods and reduction of greenhouse gases to water footprint. HUL had decided to help the neighbouring farmers of its soap factory in Khamgaon village in India to become financially independent. The project started as a pilot of watershed management on a five-hectare
land to prevent soil degradation and conserve water. The result of this was the creation of a veritable greenbelt forest of about 6,300 trees.

Looking at the results, HUL was encouraged to extend the project model to a neighbouring village, Pakhed. This time, starting with initial investment of Rs 80 lakhs, HUL teamed up with TERI and Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation. The model was to prevent loss of vegetation that resulted in the lack of fodder for cattle, and soil erosion. Thus, trenches and gullies were built, check dams and wells were constructed, and selected species of trees were planted to capture water before it flowed away. The rubble was used for bunding, and grass was planted to reduce run-off and to conserve soil. Several check bunds and gully plugs were constructed on the narrow drains running through the plot.

The project benefited about 2000 people and about 120 landless farmers. Their income increased as much as three times. The corporation also helped women to form 32 self-help groups, which were able to collect Rs 352,000; the amount that was used to help local schools to give computer training. These developments reduced migrations from the village; as many as 95 percent of the people wanted to stay back after the project was a success. HUL’s head of CSR said that the company developed the programme according to the needs of the people. He said that although they had other CSR projects elsewhere, they knew implementing similar projects everywhere in India would not make sense as every region has its individual needs.

In Pakhed, the company mobilised the community to put aside some funds from their income for the repair of dams. The annual income of the farmers in the area covered by the dams increased from around average of Rs 36,000 to approximately Rs 85,000 per year, per farmer. This has been attributed to the availability of water facilitated by the project. This initiative received appreciation at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. It is clear that such kinds of initiative helps to solve various social issues such as poverty, farmer suicide, migration to cities, and under-utilisation of land. With the increase of income, these farmers are certainly future loyal customers of HUL products, and the benefit of brand building is simply enormous.¹

HUL’s project shows its seriousness in the amount of it money invested; the way it formulated (defined) the project; and, ultimately, its implementation. The project came as a result of people’s problems and not the company’s problems. The project is not even a compensation for any damage done by company’s business activities; it was not geared to clear the name of the company. When companies want to solve their problems using CSR, the first clear indication is when they want to implement the same project everywhere they go. HUL defined their CSR with problem of the local people, thus the projects had the local people at its centre. To avoid developing dependency on the company, HUL involved the people by mobilising them to contribute in sustenance of the project in case there is breakdown.

¹Source: This has been adapted from Madhumita Chatterji (2011).
In addition, HUL also instilled the sense of responsibility for other projects in the community such as education, thus when women in the self-help groups collected money, they contributed to children’s computer education in the local community. One project generated another project, thus the project was not static but rather dynamic with sense of growth. To improve the whole issue, HUL was able to bring in another company to team up to help the local community. In terms of results, there is a very clear difference in terms of income of the members of the local community, before and after the start of the projects. Thus it can rightly be said that HUL’s CSR project contributed to the improvement of the life of the local community.

HUL’s CSR project was geared to help the whole community, not just a segment. When a corporation claims to give something to the community, it should really be for community and not just a few individuals in the community. Projects to help communities should try in every way possible to incorporate every member of the community in the formulation, implementation and benefits of the projects. CSR projects need to be comprehensive and not just a one-time do-good event.

**CSR Malpractices in Malawi**

In Malawi a company called Paladin was accused of going around communities making direct payment to village chiefs, putting local leaders in its payroll so as to undermine local decision making (Rajat 2007). In some places, companies have gone further to even corrupting government officials, such as ministers and members of parliaments. Some communities have been given unfulfilled promises on upgrading infrastructure in areas by companies, especially those dealing with extraction of minerals. Such promises are becoming more and more common, but little is said about negative impacts of the process of extraction (Rajat 2007).

In Tanzania some individual business people and owners of corporations have used such practices of CSR in local communities to gain political careers, such as those of Member of Parliament (MP) and even ministerial posts. This is not only happening in Tanzania; Chartteji (2011) gives evidence that merchant gifting has been a strategic ploy trend to gain political influence and easing relationships with rulers for a long time in India.

Though the CSR concept and its practices are not without critics, it remains instrumental in benefitting society in compensating the imbalances and improving the social values such as those of health, safety, literacy, poverty, etc. (Kumar and Balakrishnan 2011; Chikati 2010). Therefore, when we look at the future of Tanzania beyond the Millennium Goals, we can project CSR in the scenario as one of the possible ways to finance development in the country. However, there is evidence that CSR in Tanzania is doing poorly with some activities failing, others rejected by local communities and some showing disappointing results (Egels 2005; Emel et al. 2012; UK Essays 2014). One of the reasons that have been extensively argued as contributing to the failure of CSR (possibly rejection) is the non-involvement of the stakeholders in decision making processes (Diallo and Ewusie 2011; Freeman 1984). Stakeholders are said to be
vital in the survival and success of any corporation (Freeman et al. 2004; Friedman and Miles, 2002), therefore they should not be kept aside.

**CSR Malpractices in Tanzania**

In the following section, I will demonstrate the challenges that CSR encountered in Tanzania, resulting in different malpractices. The first challenge that resulted in bad-practice is the definition of the very term. The term ‘CSR’ had been ill-defined, mal-practised and mismanaged by both corporations and governments. It has been abused from left to right by companies and the communities who are supposed to be beneficiaries of CSR projects and from centre by the government. Therefore, the abuses are at times intended, and at other times are out of ignorance about what CSR is.

The second challenge is the issue of unclear policies on CSR. The existence of unclear policies on CSR, or the absence of those policies, leaves room for abuse by companies that rush to claim CSR for their own advantage. Such advantages can be in the form of advertising their products or promoting their brands. Some companies use CSR as a strategic tactic to gain public support for their presence in markets, and this helps then to sustain a competitive advantage over others by using their social contributions to provide subconscious advertising (Gachanja et al. 2013). The unclear policies also allow some companies to take advantage of inviting top government officials to officiate different business functions, thus indirectly advertising companies’ products. This is done without the officials knowing that they are being used for advertisement. However, there might also be cases when these top government officials are aware but choose to look the other way for private gains. While these officials benefit from these companies the community members represented by these government officials are left empty handed and resentful. When there is ignorance on the part of the government or communities, companies tend to take advantage of the situation (Lungu and Kapena 2010).

The third challenge is the abuse of OECD guidelines. Looking at OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2000; Lungu and Mulenga 2005), companies are expected to contribute to economic, social and environmental progress, with a view to achieving sustainable development. They are also to respect the human rights of those affected by their activities, including the employees and the host communities, and in addition encourage local capacity building through cooperation with local communities, including local businesses. Companies are also asked to refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions that are not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to environment, health, safety, labour, taxation financial incentives or other issues, and also develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management systems that foster the open relationship of confidence and mutual trust between companies and the communities in which they operate.

OECD guidelines also direct companies to encourage business partners and other associates, such as suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct which are in line with corporate governance and socially responsible citizenship.
Companies should in addition avoid improper involvement in local political activities and they must refrain from discriminating or disciplining an employee who makes bona fide reports (whistle blowers) to management or competent public authorities on practices that contravene the law (Lungu and Mulenga 2005; SARW 2010). While these principles are clear and known, few corporations in Tanzania adhere to these principles. This problem of non-adherence has a long history worldwide from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to International Trade Organization (ITO) which both left MNCs unregulated.

The fourth challenge is the absence of the central role of the state. In absence of the central role of the state, OECD guidelines remain non-binding in Tanzania, with companies abusing CSR practices. The first area of CSR malpractice in Tanzania is disclosure. CSR demands that companies disclose their activities that affect the communities around them both positively and negatively; this is what is termed as ‘transparency’ in Corporate Governance (Masuku and Moyo, 2013; SARW 2010). In fact the CSR of a company will only be correctly perceived by the public if its social and environmental value is transparent (Gachanja et al. 2013). However, a good number of companies in Tanzania are reluctant to share information about their businesses and their activities that affect communities around them.

In Tanzania these challenges contribute to different abuses. For example, one of the important principles when conducting CSR is that a company must be transparent. However, while claiming to do CSR, companies such as MIC, Vodacom, CRDB, Barclays Bank, Geita Gold Mine, Africa Barrick Gold Mines and Williamson Diamond Mines give all the reasons for non-disclosure policies of their companies. While behaving this way, the activities of some of these companies had harmful effects on the communities around them. Companies such as mobile phone service providers were engaged in different activities such as the building of signal towers, selling scratch cards, transferring money, selling mobile phones and so on, that affected the lives of people. In this case, it was the right of society to know about these practices, and the responsibility of the companies to distribute the information.

Mining companies in Tanzania were also known for refusing researchers the access to information about their activities. This is the case with Africa Barrick Gold, Geita Gold Mine and Williamson Diamond Mines. Banks such as Barclays and CRDB also react in similar way. While transparency/disclosure is one of the principles of CSR (Crowther 2008; Lungu and Mulenga 2005), refusal to disclose information about business activities by companies is rampant in Tanzania, which leaves leeway for CSR to be a tool to propagate business endeavours. Companies were called to create a relationship of mutual trust with communities around their areas of operation, but companies in Tanzania such as Africa Barrick Gold Mine, Geita Gold Mine, Williamson Diamond Mine, Barclays, CRDB, Vodacom and Tigo are creating relationships of mistrust and enmity. Some have deprived local community members of their land and social services such as schools, roads, water sources, etc as was done by mining companies. After depriving the communities of these resources that are vital to them, they then gave back a bit of the same services in the name of CSR. For example, Geita
Gold Mine took part of Nyamalembo village primary school, later it built a hostel for a girls’ secondary school as part of its CSR programme (Emel et al. 2012). It also released poisonous water into villages’ water sources underground, and then provided seasonal tap water as its CSR project. Similar examples were seen with Mtibwa Sugar Company, Barrick Gold, among others.

The banks such as CRDB, NBC and Barclays and mobile phones service companies such as Vodacom Tanzania, Tigo (MIC), Airtel and Tanzania used CSR to boost their businesses, to recruit new customers and advertise their brands with little or even no cost at all. Mobile companies would start different competitions where callers were deducted money with promises of different prizes, such as cars or houses to lucky customers or even a whole community. While billions were reaped in such kinds of initiatives, only a token was spent for the community. Some of these CSR initiatives were a mockery to the civilised world; companies that made billions of dollars such as Airtel Tanzania gave few books to few schools, and called it giving back to the community.

The absence of clear rules and regulations ensured that corporations behaved without responsibility (Frome 2013). Though CSR is defined as doing more than what the law requires companies to do, practices show that CSR actually allows abuses and dodging from even those requirement that fall within the law. Sometimes companies in Tanzania could not adhere to even standard business practices. One of the mobile phone service operator companies gave handsets to members of parliament. From the outside, such a move could simply be brushed aside as a marketing strategy, but a closer look reveals a problem for such top level law making institution to receive gifts from companies. After receiving such gifts, the institution is left compromised, unable to remain neutral when discussing bills that would directly or indirectly affect companies in the category of gift-giver. They would most probably be biased and bend themselves in favour of the gift giving company or its sector, thus succumbing to corruption. These kinds of manoeuvres contributed to companies in Tanzania looking clean on paper and appearing commendable in paying their taxes and contributing to community development, while in practice these same companies are actually dodging the very basics of rules and regulations in the country. The mobile phone service operators and mining companies were leading in these bad practices of evading taxes; launching CSR with a big bang, but with little or no benefit to the local communities.

CSR is about doing more than what the law demands (ATE 2012; Kreitner 1995; Lungu and Mulenga 2005), but companies in Tanzania were avoiding even what the law stipulated. This already casted doubts on the authenticity of their CSR commitment. Even when it came to internal CSR, whistle-blowers were not tolerated and many times were intimidated; this was clear when the management of some companies involved in this study were afraid to give information related to CSR in their companies.

In short, CSR in Tanzania presented a contradiction between what companies actually did and what they claimed to do. While corporations had good literature on their CSR programmes, there was little to show in terms of what had been done and how it benefited the communities. The deprivation done by mining companies in terms of
land, pollution of water sources and other resources shows that the whole question of livelihood of the natives was unspeakable (Emel 2012). Number of companies in Tanzania do CSR by giving a few scholarships, classrooms, helping NGOs sporadically and white elephant projects of water and electricity such as those done by Geita Gold mine and African Barrick Gold. Others by planting trees such as Williamson Diamond Mine and vegetable gardens by Artumas Group. All these are done amid companies enjoying paying little tax or tax free business operations in the country. This illustrates that these companies’ CSR amounted to nothing but mockery to the local communities and the people of Tanzania.

In terms of employment, a similar situation existed. Companies in Tanzania tended to minimise labour instead of being labour intensive. Even those Tanzanians employed in managerial posts were only used as a bridge to someone else. The natives in the positions could not make decisions that were called for by the offices they held. They were simply rubber stamps and monuments for the outside world to see that a company had natives in its managerial positions, which also made transactions with local public offices easier and in addition reduced and diffused conflict with the surrounding communities. At times, even the salaries of the local managers were lower than the expatriates who were in lower cadre in the same company. These cases were observed with ABG, Geita Gold, and Williamson Diamond Mines. This however, does not mean other corporations studied did not have similar practices.

It was also common in Tanzania to see top government officials invited to open or inaugurate functions of private corporations such as those of banks, mobile phone service operators, mining, and many others. These functions were used by companies to send a PR message to the general public. It was easy for the local public to trust a company that was perceived to have been trusted by high level government officials. Take for example a mobile phone service operator that had a function and it invited the president who posed with a certain mobile phone brand model. This would be a big bang advertisement for both the phone brand model and the company that hosted the function. In fact it would be conceived as prestigious to do business with a company that a top government official had done business with. Yet, the question is, what did the community gain in return for the use of this public office in the advertisement of the brand and the company? Did the public officials know about these advertisements they indirectly made, were they being used out of ignorance or did they individually get paid and forgot about the public members (society) they represented? Those officials holding public offices should consider public benefits when called to officiate companies’ business functions; indeed, the offices they hold are public, and in attending these functions, the officials are spending time that should have been used to serve the public.
Conclusion

In a globalizing world, business creates a need for people to buy products and not create products to fill the needs of the people (Frome 2013). CSR can be used as a means to create those needs. Banks such as Barclays, CRDB and mobile operators such as Vodacom and Tigo boast about providing education on finance, entrepreneurship and loans. While this was true, these companies deal primarily with finances (including mobile phone services operators with their mobile banking) thus one wondered where the boundaries between CSR and normal business would be. When banks hold seminars on loans or entrepreneurship, they are creating a need in the society; a need that is filled by provision of their services. Their CSR is thus a market oriented venture that puts community problems second. To do away with such practices, the state has to come in and enact its role of coordinating and support.

With the amount of wealth that corporations produce daily, largely from its stakeholders, it is only logical to expect tangible results when these corporations decide to allow growth to trickle down. However, as it is now, the so called the process of trickling down is itself another process of accumulation that has little to no effect on the general public. In addition, the general public has little to no say in the whole process of both formulation and implementation of projects geared in making sure that global growth benefit all. The success of CSR as a programme to make business benefit the public should start with the involvement of the public in decision making. Involvement of community members in making decisions puts power of development to the people. The involvement would make sure that the projects are timely, relevant and deliver maximum impact to the target population (Diallo and Ewusie 2011). The state too should partner with the private sector to bring about community development and not be a competitor or bystander. As a competitor, the state becomes unreliable and a corrupt partner who is not ready to deliver. A state should be an owner who knows about his problems and is ready to work on them. It should not leave everything to the private sector and be seen as if it has delegated its duties to a partner who is not well equipped and not meant for the job. The state should stand with its people by formulating policies that embrace its people, and act by changing old policies that embrace the private sector at the expense of its people. There has to be a regressive rolling back of the state in the partnership between communities and corporations.

CSR offers both opportunities and challenges in Tanzanian development. Opportunities and challenges are for both corporations and communities involved in CSR projects. Despite misuse by some companies, there is already a good will that companies could cultivate and reap benefits offered by CSR. Communities should as well build on this good will, and trust the companies as partners in development.
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LIVELIHOODS
8 Placing Social Development at the Centre of Africa’s Economic Growth and Livelihoods Nexus

Rehema G. Kilonzo & Edwin E. Ngowi

Introduction
A major characteristic of the interdisciplinary field of development studies since its establishment in the 1940s has been a series of sea-level changes in analytical thinking about the process of development itself (Potter et al. 2004). This search for new theoretical conceptualisations of development has been mirrored by changes in the practice of development in the field. As such, there has been much debate and controversy about development, with many changing views and highly contested strategies. However, the dominant view for the last couple of years has been that social development in Africa has been side-lined to economic growth (Desai and Potter 2011). This chapter provides a deep discussion while drawing on examples from the existing literature on social development and economic growth.

Development as a general term has been interpreted into two ways. One is economically orientated, dealing mostly with economic structures, and the other is social, focusing on improving the capabilities of people’s daily lives and their well-being (Crush 1995). The economic interpretation follows the framework that assumes the behaviour of the individual to be rational, self-interested and market oriented. The hypothesis is that these individuals live outside historical, social and geographical contexts (Piron 2004), and as a result, the conditions of development in some developing countries go unrecognised. Despite efforts to enhance social policy in African states, economic criteria continue to dominate policy design, as is the case in many developing countries. This brings challenges regarding models of development, partly a result of structural adjustment economic reforms that increased their influence in development policy processes. This made the reforms extend from managing resources and ensuring financial practicability, to establishing the strategic directions for medium and long term growth (Sen 2000).

Furthermore, development is a highly-contested concept; multilateral agencies often use economic measures such as GNP per capita to assess development. This results in situations where national-level measures hide important spatial and social inequalities that are based on social development. While the two strands (economic development and economic growth) need to work together in attaining sustainable development, more aspects need to be considered (Jones 2000). The global financial and economic
crisis has exposed the vulnerability of the gains, however small, achieved in development on the African continent, and show that they need to be strengthened. The concern is that certain development objectives will not be fully achieved, hence the need to measure development in both growth and social aspects.

Often, development is taken for granted and thought about in terms of technological changes (Kilonzo 2011). Development scholars approach the idea of development positively, because it brings material and psychological improvement as human beings learn how to manipulate the natural world (Kabeer 2006). This is a result of human beings’ tendency to evaluate development in terms of material outcome and gain, for instance, income, goods and services. Nevertheless, while enjoying the “goodness” of development, one needs to consider the effects of the process (Willis 2005). The axiom that nothing happens without economic growth is seen as the core principle of the dominant development paradigm. However, the qualifier that growth is necessary, but not sufficient, for social development constitutes a departure from that principle. This chapter insists that achieving and sustaining broader development outcomes rest not only on the pace and nature of economic growth, but also on the progress made in the social sphere. As such, one can understand development as mankind’s ambition to change, and the outcome of changes can be assessed in terms of what people and specific nations gain in the impact of the process.

The impact of development is associated with colonial history in most developing countries. Many observers of development believe that much of the gap that exists between developing and developed countries today is a result of both colonialism and current development systems and projects (Adams 1993 cited in Crush 1995).

Development in many developing countries, especially on the African continent, is modelled as a national process. The major development programme can be interpreted as a key historical event for change. It is also necessary to emphasise that social development covers both theory and practice; that is, both ideas about how social development should or might occur, and real-world efforts to put various aspects of development into practice.

Development has to be contextualised in terms of what ordinary people experience in their daily lives, and how development as a process has shaped their lives politically, socially, and economically. The axiom underlying this theory as an approach to social development is that citizens should have opportunities to participate in a wide range of activities, if they choose to do so. In order to have everyone on board, institutional or structural barriers to participation need to be minimised, as they obstruct access to power and the decision making that affects people’s daily lives, such as livelihoods options and human rights (Kabeer 2006).

It is also important to mention that after the 1960s, the African development landscape was guided by the basic-needs approach, which directed the allocation of public resources to social sectors. Moreover, the approach insisted on ensuring transparency and the meaningful participation of all people, especially the most disadvantaged, in decision making. This bold move occurred in the context of the growing prominent role of the state in the economic sphere, with governments taking a commanding posi-
tion in important segments of economic activities and laying the foundation for rapid economic transformation. The combination of these policies resulted in significant improvements in social development in much of Africa.

However, in the 1980s, some changes in policy occurred in most developing countries. The focus shifted to an orthodox growth policy, which argued that economic growth should be the first priority, with the assumption that the effects would trickle down to all segments of the population. As good as those changes could appear, it needed to support the social aspect of development to make it complete.

Furthermore, the human-rights based approach acknowledges the central role of the development agenda and is particularly relevant to the concept of social development. When using the human-rights based approach, government’s policies, programmes and plans to promote livelihoods and development in general are centred on the people. By applying this approach, governments and development partners are not only interested in promoting human rights on a moral basis, but also recognise that this approach fosters a more inclusive social development process.

In this chapter, therefore, we argue that for development to be meaningful in the African continent, it is important to have economic growth and development and social development, complementing each other. The central argument in this chapter is whether economic growth can trickle down and be realised without being complemented by social development. This chapter is necessary to bring adequate and deserved attention to social development, at a time when relatively recent and strong economic growth has not been translated into broader improvements for people’s economic development.

Towards Development as a Multidimensional Concept

The social and economic development of the world’s poorest countries is perhaps the greatest challenge facing society at the present time. Over one billion of the world’s population live in absolute poverty; the same number suffers various degrees of malnutrition, and millions have no access to safe water, health care or education (Desai and Potter 2011).

People’s standards of living are commonly measured by the total amount of goods and services produced per head of the population, what is called the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (or gross national product - GNP per capita, if net income from abroad is added). This, in turn, is determined by the number of people who work, and their productivity. The economic growth of countries refers to the increase in output of goods and services that a country produces over an accounting period, normally one year (Thirlwall 2006). If a country is said to be growing at 5 per cent per year, it means the total volume of its domestic output (GDP) is increasing at the same rate.

Economic measures such as GDP and GNP per capita are used to assess development. Nevertheless, they conceal important spatial and social aspects based on development. The growth of a country’s economy should imply the process of economic (and social) development of living standards, and not per capita income alone. Growth
is a necessary condition for the social and economic development of nations; however, it is not a sufficient condition, because an aggregate measure of growth pays no attention to how the output is distributed among the population. It gives little attention to the composition of output, and it hardly provides indications about the composition of output (whether the goods are consumable, investments or public, such as education and health provision). It barely provides room for suggestions on social environment, in which the output is produced. In short, the growth rate of nations cannot be taken as a measure of social welfare, because the livelihoods option for people is a much broader than the level of income alone (Thirlwall 2006). The process of social and economic development is defined in terms of an increase in society’s welfare. Moreover, a concept of development is required which embraces not only economic variables and objectives, but also social objectives and values for which societies strive. Sen (1983 and 1999) argues in a similar vein that economic growth should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as the means to achieve a much wider set of objectives by which social and economic development should be measured.

In this case, development is a multidimensional concept which embraces multifarious social and economic objectives, concerned with the distribution of income, the provision of basic needs, and the livelihoods option for the people. While the eradication of poverty and the narrowing of the rich-poor country divide remains one of the great challenges of the post-millennium, economic growth in poor countries is not enough by itself for development to take place when viewed in a broader framework. This supports Sen’s ideas on development, and shows the disadvantages surrounding the belief that, in order to function effectively in the modern world, people require a range of capabilities for livelihood options, not just monetary income. According to Sen (2000), material wealth is a means, and not the end, to strengthen people’s four main capabilities for promoting livelihoods: survival and long healthy lives; knowledge; access to resources necessary for a decent standard of living, and participation in the community. If they lack, or rate low, several capabilities, then their choices will be severely constrained. They will be “disadvantaged” and their “functioning’s” will be unsatisfactory. This approach is far removed from the traditional concept of poverty as low income and/or low consumption, and focuses on development in its multiple dimensions of capability and functioning.

In Sen’s conceptualisation, a person has no genuine freedom to choose different ways of living his/her life – different careers, leisure activities, family arrangements etc – unless he/she has ‘capabilities’ in terms of development, such as: reasonable levels of education, health, income and social networks. In this view, to be poor is to lack freedom, human rights, and be impoverished in the context of the society in which one lives. Sen’s capabilities approach has had major implications on development, poverty and the policy responses to deprivation in its different dimensions. Clearly, the capabilities approach is relevant to the social development challenges facing Africa. The concept also has similarities to those discussed in this chapter. Sen (2000) insists on the need to place social development of the excluded groups in the context of the capabilities approach.
The perspective of social development of the excluded groups reinforces, rather than competes, with the understanding of poverty as capability deprivation. We have argued that if the idea is carefully used, there is much to be gained from using the perspective of social development in analysing the deprivation of basic capabilities and in assessing the policy issues that follow from these diagnoses (Sen 2000: 46). Therefore, under the prominent perspective of social development, the expansion of these and other capabilities for livelihoods option, besides being intrinsic, also entails instrumental value to enhancing productivity and promoting economic growth (as defended by the human capital formation or human resource development theories). Clearly, social development requires human development since the capacity of individuals is a prerequisite for their livelihood.

Development, Livelihoods Options and Human Rights

In search of a better understanding of people’s livelihoods, there have been various debates over many years. These arguments has been emphasising on the importance of social development for livelihoods option and learning from the development discourses associated to social development.

In Africa, one of the major reasons for poor indicators of social development reflected on poor livelihoods options is the incapacity of governments to formulate, implement and assess existing policies (Mkandawire 2007, 2005). In most instances, the poor planning and implementation of policies is a result of a lack of stakeholders’ participation. This brings challenges in the implementation of activities that promote social development, especially when different groups in society, i.e. marginalised ones, hardly participate in different livelihoods options and decision making process affecting their daily lives in general (Bourguignon 2004; World Bank 2008). This is to say, political participation and decision making are important aspects of social development reflected on livelihoods options, which are operationalised when applied to conditions of particular groups of people (Sen 2000). Political participation as a development process is inseparable from cultural, ecological, economic and spiritual environment. Social development is linked in promoting peace, freedom, stability and security as part of livelihoods, both nationally and internationally (Mkandawire 2007). The link results in two policy outcomes, including:

1. The provision of essential services such as education and health services; a means of livelihood, such as a job and money; vital but intangible things, such as peace, security and human rights

2. The spill over effects of providing such services which places greater well-being as the underlying rationale in the pursuit of economic growth. For economic development and growth to be realised in African countries, there is a need to put in place new innovative ways and policies to address social development and their accompanied challenges, which will be realised through people’s improved livelihoods.
Reflecting on the overall social development and economic growth situation, a large proportion of the population in Africa remains extremely limited by their livelihoods options, which is in contrast to the situation in developed nations. In Africa, especially south of the Sahara desert, poverty is not necessarily physical or economic in nature, but rather the product of a seamless web of interrelated factors in income, social and cultural practices. As Ferguson (2008) puts it, “poverty is not a gene”; it is either created or enhanced by certain social situations and processes.

A fundamental assumption for this claim is that social development is a historical process deeply rooted in the culture, values and psychological systems of individual nations and communities (Sidaway 2007). People do not live only by economics standards, public order or science and technology. They have their own beliefs and concepts of development, and ways of improving livelihoods. Poverty, contrary to development, is accompanied by minimal livelihood options, which affects economic growth. Poor people are often excluded from participating in social, economic and political areas of life, since these processes do not necessarily involve harmony, but rather define how power is utilised. Therefore, when one looks critically at social development, there is a need to analyse it together with the existing social structure (Bigsten and Shimeles 2007).

Supporting this argument, Ferguson argues that African development cannot be discussed in isolation from the modernisation narrative (Ferguson 2008). He further points out that African people’s lives inhabit a social landscape shaped by modernist projects. While this does not mean that they enjoy the conditions of life they are used to, or the one that is imposed by powerful development partners, it is important to forge a partnership between the two, reflecting on social development. For Ferguson, development is about socio-cultural differences, global hierarchy, and historical time. For actual social development to happen, differences in culture need to be blended together, instead of abandoning some to embrace the other.

Livelihoods and Social Development Nexus
Social development and livelihoods nexus constitute the enabling environment that allows individuals to translate their economic features into social and personal welfare. For example, an individual living in a society characterised by extreme physical insecurity and conflict may find it impossible to start a business or attend college, regardless of their personal and social initiatives, skills and tenacity. Security and safety, therefore, constitute part of the enabling environment which allows the agent to realise their improved livelihoods, and therefore development.

For security and safety, the ability of socially excluded households to generate adequate income to meet their welfare needs is constrained, due to limited access to productive resources; including land, credit, physical and financial assets; limited employment opportunities; and lack of adequate skills. From a human rights perspective, social development helps to reduce inequalities and improve the right to education, health, and food, and hence improved livelihoods. Social development is also justified
on the grounds that it has to substitute for widespread market failure where some groups are excluded on social and economic factors such as gender, age, disability, or poverty (Slater and McCord 2009). Social development is an investment in people that yields positive benefits to society.

**Policies and Instruments to Promote Social Development in Africa**

For many decades, social policies in Africa were considered in their reduced form as a provision of services and “residual” compared to economic policies. This was particularly evident during the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s (Ortiz 2007; Kpessa et al. 2011). Slowly, governments and development partners have recognised that social policies are a cornerstone of their development strategies and play not only an instrumental role in promoting an inclusive economic development process, but also have an intrinsic value in terms of the rights of citizens to live a life they value. A positive aspect is that, at the institutional level, the global and regional commitments reveal that social development is increasingly moving from a secondary role within the development agenda towards a more central and intrinsic function in policymaking. More specifically, the notion of what social policy and development represent have progressed from the provision of basic social services, such as education and health, to becoming more integrated and multi-dimensional.

African countries have responded to global and regional commitments to advance social development. The public and socially vulnerable groups can only benefit from the international, regional and sub-regional instruments if countries take action to integrate the commitments into their policies, legal frameworks and sectoral strategies, and implement them effectively. Together with the other priority areas of improving livelihoods and the promotion of full employment and decent work, social development is recognised as an overriding objective of social and economic growth. The aim of social policies is to create “a society for all”, in which all individuals, with rights and responsibilities, have active roles to play. It aims at fostering stable, safe and just societies, where all human rights are respected and individuals enjoy equality of opportunities.

The social policy framework for Africa should be a major step forward for African countries, as it advocates for development to create a stable and just society, the promotion and protection of human rights, non-discrimination, and the active role of governments to provide the people with basic and social services for economic growth. Most governments in Africa have adopted constitutions that take on board the provision of human rights for all, including socially excluded groups, and gender equality to foster social development. The constitution guarantees equality before the law and non-discrimination; some also mandate their respective states to embark upon affirmative action measures to remedy existing social policies.

There are both intrinsic and instrumental justifications for advancing social development. A socially developed society has intrinsic values of cohesion, participation and an effective common vision that includes the promotion of economic growth and
livelihoods options. In Africa poor social policies are often seen as the direct result of poor livelihoods options which hinder people's participation in economic, social and political spheres of life. Besides generalised poor livelihoods, options include: income inequalities; unequal rural-urban development; unequal distribution of assets, such as land; discrimination based on gender, race, disability and ethnicity; unequal access to social services; lack of social protection strategies; conflicts and instability; market failures; and unenforced rights (ECA 2008). Therefore, in order to address the situation, African countries need to adopt social development policies that seek to reduce inequalities, promote access to basic social services, education and healthcare for all, and increase the participation and integration of social groups in decision making.

The achievement of social development outcomes has a bearing on economic growth. The attainment of better health and improved education leads to improved quality and productivity of the labour force, and a peaceful and secure environment, hence positively affecting economic growth. Additionally, the newly recognised role of social development is to improve and sustain the social policy that binds citizens to governments and which rests on mutually agreed rights and obligations that advance common interest. The principles of social integration such as inclusion, cohesion and accountability are increasingly becoming part of the public discourse in many African countries. Social development can be achieved only if economic growth among the nations is just and sustainable, economically, socially and environmentally (Ocampo et al. 2007).

**Conclusions and Reflections**

African countries have recognised international and regional commitments that promote social development. Although some progress has been made in translating these commitments into action on the ground, this remains a challenging task. Therefore, a coherent people-centred approach to economic growth, noting the importance of social development, is the key to creating a society for all that actively supports people's livelihoods and generating productive employment for all.

Creating a “society for all” is a goal that may seem impossible, but achieving this is crucial for Africa. Social development is the underlying condition that will enable societies and individuals to fully participate in activities in all domains of life, be they political, economic, cultural, and all other areas. Failure to achieve social development is likely to lead to social fragmentation, increase disparities within societies and thus undermine the cohesion needed to avoid conflict and promote cooperation. Social development is crucial to the African countries that are characterised by these disparities. The economic growth, social development, and overall social and economic progress can be realised when such disparities are addressed. Therefore, just social policies must become a top priority for African governments, civil society and all stakeholders in social development. African governments should ensure that social policies are securely embedded in national development plans and are adequately financed; promote an enabling environment; build capacities; and foster partnerships.
This chapter proposes social development as the most relevant concept of economic growth for African countries. Firstly, Africa is permeated with vertical and horizontal inequalities caused by differences in income, ethnic backgrounds, gender and age, to name but a few. Although the chronic and persistent poverty levels in Africa are the most evident feature of inequalities, the analysis provided in this paper points to a more composite index of deprivation that creates a seamless web of discrimination, exclusion and poor livelihoods options that social development can address. Secondly, social development reflects adherence to regional and global commitments on economic growth. African countries have to reflect their commitments by mainstreaming social development issues into national development plans, PRSPs and sectoral policies; developing policies on vulnerable and marginalised groups; developing and implementing legislative measures; establishing institutional structures; implementing social protection measures; allocating resources; and improving governance and participation of vulnerable groups in development processes. However, despite the existence of these regional and global commitments, their translation into tangible achievements of social development on the ground has not materialised. This is partly because of inadequate political will, poorly designed social policies, limited implementation of the policies due to lack of human and financial resources and limited links to national development plans and livelihoods options. Based on these arguments, to successfully implement the commitments and policies aimed at promoting social development, African countries and other development stakeholders need to undertake social policy-research, based on fostering strong social development.

References


Introduction

In Sub Saharan Africa, women are more involved in agricultural activities than their male counterparts. It is noted for instance that about 73% of women in the region are involved in export and cash crops, as well as market gardening; 16% in post-harvest tasks, and 15% in agroforestry. In Tanzania for example, over 90.4% of active women are engaged in agricultural activities, producing about 70% of the country’s food requirements. They are also actively involved in the production of cash crops and in household activities. Most of these jobs involve strenuous, manual and highly time-consuming undertakings (URT 2013). Despite the fact that women are a fundamental component in African agriculture, agricultural policies in the region have overlooked this gender element (Boserup 1970; Saito and Spurling 1992; Gladwin 1997). Low participation of women in the policy making process, as well as in accessing extension services, implies that aspects pertinent to women are continuously neglected in the planning and execution of agricultural policies and programmes. Notwithstanding legislative and tenure improvements for smallholders’ sake, placing women in disadvantaged situations still manifests. Access to and ownership of land among women farmers, for instance, is one case in point (FAO 1988). Poor participation of women in agricultural policy and decision making is, among other factors, associated with their time constraints and contested responsibilities, let alone the critical question of control over incomes from investments in new agricultural technologies, export crop production inclusive (Blackden et al. 2008). Segregation of women from playing a central position in agricultural policy making and practice can be traced back to colonial times.

From early in the colonial period, state policies have drawn African men away from their villages and into low-wage urban or plantation-based jobs. Men remaining in the villages have been diverted from food-related tasks by the expansion of export crop production. Given that men rather than women have the power of choice in these matters, ‘male work’ has been increasingly identified with paid work. Rural men have shifted many of their traditional subsistence activities, especially those in food production, to their wives and daughters. In the subsistence sector, men’s input into food farming has been progressively limited to initial field clearing, although in the market sector it has, on an occasional basis, expanded into specialty food production. But even
where men produce food for the markets, in the overwhelming majority of cases women are responsible for feeding the family (Henn 1983). The responsibility of women in rural economic aspects does not only end with production and feeding the family, but also in day to day decision making and planning. Most of the labour and decisions for many agricultural undertakings in Sub Saharan Africa for instance, are female centred (Saito and Waidemann 1990). This does not only apply to food, but also to cash crops and livestock husbandry (Maigida 1992).

Since women’s labour is spread over several agricultural and domestic tasks, such as head-loading, domestic chores, agro-processing, and off-farm market undertakings, their work load is twice as much, or more, than men’s in most rural households (Mbilinyi 1991). For example, women spend an average of six hours a day on tasks including cooking, food-processing, and fetching water and firewood. Following the growth of women’s proportion of total household cash income from farm proceeds in the 1970s, conflicts over distribution of the income also rose (Mbilinyi 1991b; Whitehead 1990). Women were, under the oppressive influence of patriarchal ideology of motherhood and wifehood, coerced to cater for household and family needs using their monetary incomes (Mbilinyi 1994). The motive behind state and donor’s introduction of patriarchal farming systems among the peasantry was in an attempt to guarantee constant supply of cheap labour and cheap agro-commodities, as well as social control machinery. In Tanzania for example, gender biased policy has seen women farmers oppressed not only in areas of production, but also access to resources, services and income distribution.

In that view, women’s access to productive resources (land, water etc.), supportive services (marketing services, credit and labour saving facilities etc.) and income arising from agricultural production in Tanzania is severely limited by social and traditional factors. This in turn has hampered their capability and efficiency in the agricultural sector. While social and legal measures are being taken elsewhere in the government machinery, the ministry responsible for agriculture has vowed to target its extension, research, and training and advocate credit services to rural women in order to enable them to contribute effectively to agricultural production. The strategy is expected to strengthen labour saving technologies by encouraging cooperation among women and by supporting their participation in planning and management of development programmes (URT 1997). This policy mission is justification that, for quite a long time, the affairs of women farmers have never been given serious consideration.

This chapter aims at assessing the implication of agriculture policy in Tanzania on women farmers. The chapter is divided into three main sections: the first section is a historical overview of agricultural policy in Tanzania and its implication on women farmers; the next section looks at the position women occupy in the current agricultural policy environment; the third section provides some recommendations on ways to elevate women farmers’ position in the context of Tanzania’s agricultural policy, followed by some concluding remarks.
Agricultural Policy and Women Farmers in Tanzania: A Historical Overview

Colonial and Pre-Arusha Declaration Era (1921-1967)

Soon after assuming administration of Tanganyika in the 1920s, the British gendered divisions of labour had started to emerge, characterised by specialisation of commercial crops for export by males in areas proximal to market and physical infrastructure. Female-based labour was intensified in the production of food crops for domestic consumption and sale, as well as a share in export crops. Together with this trend emerged several types of cheap labour systems, especially family labour that was predominantly female and children-based. Other systems included migrant, casual, and peasant. To a large extent, indirect rule policies such as customary marriage, inheritance and property rights systems were pivotal to the creation of family and peasant labour systems that were female-dominated (Mbilinyi 1994). This was not a uniform situation across the colonial agricultural sector, since the situation was rather different among European settlers and corporations.

The British administration encouraged and supported the development of farming systems among European-based corporations and settlers (Bowles 1980; Raikes 1978). Control of the most fertile land was under capitalist farmers who also benefited from price subsidies and other government support, including research and extension services. These developments among European farmers came at a cost to local farmers, as the colonial government was able to contain the growing class of local farmers (the majority of which were women) using oppressive racial and gender discrimination mechanisms, such as denied individual land ownership and access to credit (Mbilinyi 1994).

In effect of such colonial policies, a new farming system under patriarchal domination was conceived. Success of this would come to depend highly on the unpaid family labour of children and women with their male counterparts playing a supervisory role (Henn 1988). The patriarchal farming system was meant to replace modes of production that preceded the colonial era. Control of resources and female-dominated labour was now positioned under male heads of households, denying women and other family members’ property rights that they enjoyed prior to the introduction of colonial administration (Amadiume 1987; Etienne and Leacock 1980). Married women were also excluded from membership in cooperatives by government officials and peasant cooperative leaders. This went hand in hand with women’s exclusion from accessing markets as well as inputs and extension services (Mbilinyi 1994). Women’s deprivation did not end with their confinement to being mere labourers, as oppressive mechanisms prevailed to ensure that they (women) remained as such through mobility control.

Labour (women and youth) mobility was controlled by several administrative mechanisms instituted by the local administration, which consisted of chiefs, household heads and village leaders. For a married woman to travel from home areas, she was required to obtain a ‘permission letter’ from traditional leaders. Similarly, it was prohibited for unmarried women to reside in urban centres or labour camps in plantations and mining centres. To ensure that most women stayed on the farm in the hinterland
and in marriage, the colonial administration imposed a series of policy and legal systems on Africans. In that view, tribal marriages were introduced strategically to deny women their customary (usufruct) rights to land and other resources, as well as income from rendered labour services (Mbilinyi 1994; White 1990). In the next section, the chapter looks at women farmers’ affairs and agricultural policy environment during the period after the Arusha Declaration to mid-1980s when Structural Adjustment Policies ensued.

Post Arusha Declaration Era (1967-1985)

As part of the implementation of socialism policy under the Arusha Declaration, the resettlement programme that was implemented by the Tanzanian government reportedly disrupted local farming systems and adversely affected incomes, as well as causing famine in some areas. This situation led to resistance from peasants, including women and young men who constituted the majority of labourers. Strategies employed included boycotting official state marketing agencies and refusing to grow cash crops for export. In response, the state had to institute compelling measures including: reinstating ‘colonial’ by-laws that coerced people to grow preferred crops, applying certain farming practices and selling produce to formal markets as far as the state was concerned (Mbilinyi 1994). Similar to colonial times and early days of independence, women farmers were not spared in this policy initiative.

Women were particularly targeted as recipients of this initiative, since most would become implementers of the villagization programme by contributing labour, equipment and raw materials. The role of the government entailed the provision of agro-extension officers and inputs among other services. Trade and production opportunities were taken up by a few women who manipulated the socialist ideology and specific donor-led programmes like ‘women in development’ (WID) aimed at women empowerment. This saw increased societal polarisation into cliques; enterprising women and men on one hand, and the majority of young women and men obliged to work as casual labour on and off-farms on the other (Mbilinyi 1994).

Finance for these small holder farming programmes was sourced from the World Bank and other donors, then channelled to beneficiaries through Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) later on Cooperative Rural Development Bank (CRDB) as soft credits (Baltzersen 1986; Payer 1983; WB 1981). Farmers repaid loans through deductions from crop payments. These crop programmes were, however, opposed by farmers, especially women who formed the majority producers due to a number of factors including: low returns, delayed payments, inefficient leadership, corruption, antagonistic relations between state and peasants, and more importantly, gender-based oppression and exploitation of women and youths (Mbilinyi 1974, 1988, 1991). There was also a continued lower provision of credit to women compared to their male counterparts (Mbilinyi 1990). The next section makes an attempt to position women farmers in a contemporary agricultural policy context.
**Post Liberalism Era (1990s and 2000s)**

The reign of the 1980s agriculture policy came to an end around the mid-1990s, with the introduction of the 1997 National Agriculture and Livestock Policy. Among other aspects, the policy was generally set to improve small-holder farmers’ well-being. Pertinent to that, the policy aimed at, among other things, promoting access to land, credit, education, as well as information among women and youth, though little - if any - impact was made on the ground during a decade and a half of policy implementation. Women, who dominated small holder agriculture, remained behind in a multitude of ways, such as low productivity, inferior technology, gender insensitive land tenure mechanisms, and overdependence on rain fed agriculture. Similarly, by the mid-2000s several policy changes affecting the development of the agriculture sector had taken place at global, regional and national levels, necessitating the review of the 1997 policy that gave way to the current 2013 National Agriculture Policy (URT 2013, 1997).

The 2013 policy came at a time when an overarching goal of the country was to turn agriculture into an efficient, competitive and profitable industry that would ensure the improved livelihoods of Tanzanians and broad based economic growth. In order to realise this goal, the government set out to ensure that as much land was put into production as possible, because out of 44 million hectares of arable land only 24 percent is cultivated under the predominance of subsistence agriculture. This employs the majority of women farmers in Tanzania who cultivate between 0.2 and 2 hectares. This move would entail the promotion of medium and large scale commercial farming. The policy set a minimum growth rate of 6 percent for the goal to be realised (URT 2013).

Looking at the direction which the current agriculture policy has taken, it is very clear that those targeted to benefit from it are not small holder farmers, the majority of which are women, but middle and large scale farmers who are able to afford medium and large scale agriculture operations that require huge capital infusion, the latest technology, agricultural expertise which is very expensive, enough land and so on. It will be very difficult for a female small holder farmer to afford these policy challenges. Therefore, the policy does not offer any potential for the emancipation of small holder farmers especially women. To the contrary it creates the environment for displacement of women from the farm and turning them into serfs in medium and large scale private farm holdings. It is only a few local and foreign investors who have sufficient resources keep up with a trend the policy is taking.

**The Position of Women Farmers in Tanzania’s Agricultural Policy**

**Role of Women in Agriculture**

Agriculture is an important source of employment for 84% of economically active women and 80% of economically active men (Blackden and Rwebangira 2004 cited in Ellis et al. 2007). More than 46% of GDP and 54.3% export earnings are generated by the agricultural sector, made up of mainly smallholder farms of between 0.2 to 2 hectares that depend on family labour, and particularly on women in the areas of food crop production, marketing, and processing of agricultural products (ibid). It is esti-
mated that the ratio of males to females in the agricultural sector is 1:1.5. Women in Tanzania produce about 70% of the food crops and also bear substantial responsibilities for many aspects of export crops and livestock production. Affairs of women farmers in Tanzania are affected by a number of aspects, as the following sections illustrate.

**Extension Service Provision**

The first two decades after independence saw the introduction of several approaches of delivering extension services in Tanzania, including the creation of training centres for farmers, introduction of settlement schemes and progressive farmers, and application of demonstration plots. However, these approaches eventually proved a failure and could not achieve the intended goal of agricultural growth in the country. Apart from that, the fact that women formed the majority of food and cash crop producers was completely ignored in these policy initiatives, rendering them gender-blind, hence their failure. It was not until the late 1980s when the government took action to ensure that extension services delivery approaches were overhauled. This was implemented under the National Agriculture Extension Program (URT 1997). Policies that ensued thereafter stipulated that the extension service would be demand driven: thus addressing farmers’ and other beneficiaries’ needs. It was further stipulated that although the extension services would be directed to all farmers, special attention was to be given to women in recognition of the critical role they play in family household management and food production. Therefore, targeted messages and other innovative methods for reaching women were to be initiated (URT 1997: 11). One of the strategies to ensure strengthened extension services in the current policy, for example, is promoting participatory approaches and gender aspects in the provision of extension services (URT 2013: 14).

Despite the noted policy readjustments in provision of extension services in Tanzania, especially to such special groups as women, some studies have proved otherwise. Ellis et al. (2007) argue that women have very little access to production resources. It is noted for instance that 91% of women farmers in Zanzibar North do not use agricultural inputs at all, 86% do not have access to formal means of credit, and 80% have no access to extension services. Mbilinyi and Nyoni (2000), on the other hand, contend that a top-down conception of extension service provision contradicts reality. The viability of small holder production has depended primarily on the initiative of local producers, in the context of a dramatic decline in support from the government, and the growing inaccessibility of ‘modern’ farm inputs. It is further stressed that there is an urgent need for on-site innovation, under the concrete conditions of low income small scale production.

**Land tenure**

The agricultural sector is the main user of land resources in Tanzania. The sector is characterised mainly by smallholder farmers, the majority of which are women. About 3.8 million smallholder farmers are in rural areas, cultivating about 4,180,000 hec-
In order to modernise and develop agriculture, it is of paramount importance that land tenure systems assure smallholder farmers access and ownership of land. In regards to access to land, the policy states:

All citizens shall have equal and equitable access to land; in order to enhance and guarantee women’s access to land and security of tenure; women will be entitled to acquire land in their own right not only through purchase but also through allocation (URT 1997: 27). The government shall facilitate equal access to land to both men and women (URT 2013: 30).

Notwithstanding their contribution in agricultural activities, women are estimated to own only one-fifth, or about 19% of the titled land in Tanzania, with an average land holding size of 0.21-3.0 ha, compared to 0.61-7.0 ha for men. Insecure land rights discourage women from making the necessary investments in their land that would increase its productivity and economic value (URT 1994 cited in Ellis et al. 2007).

Moreover, in spite of the protection given to women under the formal legal system, the practical reality is that customary norms that protect clan land from alienation outside the clan, traditionally vest control of property to men. This practice has continued to influence decisions and practices concerning ownership, control and access to land, particularly in rural Tanzania. There is evidence that establishing women’s rights to land under the land act at the village level has been problematic, with some reluctance shown in some districts. Where village land councils have been established, women’s representation is not always as stipulated in the law, and there have been cases where women sitting on adjudication organisations alongside their husbands and relatives, choose to remain silent for fear of contradicting male relatives (Oxfam et al. 2005 cited in Ellis et al. 2007).

Budgetary Allocations

The mostly hyped contribution of agriculture to Tanzania’s GDP ought to be reflected in the context of budgetary allocations to the sector as well. However, that is not the case especially when one considers a trend of budgetary allocation(s) to the sector over the years. Mbilinyi and Nyoni (2000), for instance, note that the total of Tanzania’s central government expenditures on agriculture and economic services were drastically cut during the late 1990s, relative to the early 1990s and previous decades. This casts doubt over the government’s willingness and commitment to the implementation of the agricultural policy, bearing in mind that “agriculture is the backbone of the Tanzanian economy” (ibid.2000). As pointed out in the policy document; “central government expenditure on agriculture and natural resources has remained below 2% of the GDP”. Findings by the Tanzania Gender Network Programme (1999) establish that government expenditure on agriculture as a percentage of the overall GDP dropped from 4% during 1972-76 to 0.5% in 1997/98. The policy document also affirms as follows:
Government expenditure on agriculture in Tanzania is far below compared to other countries … which spent an average of 11.6% of (their respective GDPs) during 1984 and 1988 (URT 1997: 74).

Apart from that, a budgetary constraint, especially in agricultural R&D-is still stressed in the recently introduced National Agricultural Policy of 2013. It is noted in the policy as follows:

There is an inadequate public and private investment in agriculture training, research and extension. The government has agreed to allocate 1 percent of national budget for R&D but currently only 0.3 of the sector’s budget is allocated to R&D; as a result, agriculture in Tanzania is characterised by limited technology demand and delivery channels (URT 2013: 4).

As a result of meagre budgetary allocations to the sector, government commitment to the support of agriculture is far below what it derives from the sector in the form of foreign exchange earnings, and general contribution to GDP. During the period from 1987-1998, agriculture production ranged from 47.9 to 50.7% of total GDP, and its share in total export earnings ranged from a low of 50.1% in 1990 to a high of 64.9% in 1994 (TGNP 1999). The contribution to GDP would have been greater, if the total amount of unmarketed or unpaid work (mostly done by women) in agriculture and related activities had been included (ibid).

Women’s Role in Policy Formulation and Decision Making Process

Sources of information from the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MAC)¹ indicate that a top down process of decision-making has characterised policy formulation in Tanzania, as one ministerial official noted in Mbilinyi and Nyoni (2000: 19) as follows:

All designs and formulation of the agricultural policies and objectives have always been the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The Ministry through soliciting views from major stakeholders (ministries, institutions, private sector, international organisations and non-governmental organizations) formulated the policy and later organized workshops to discuss the policy and improve it. After the workshops, the policy paper was prepared and forwarded to the Permanent Secretary of the MAC and later to the Minister for approval.

However, the authors pose the question; to what extent were the people and other stakeholders involved? It is concluded that sufficient participation by the grassroots and other stakeholders in the policy making process was amiss. It is clarified therefore

¹ Currently, the ministry is formally known as The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives
that neither farmers nor livestock keepers were invited to the consultation workshops, be they large commercial growers or low income small holders (ibid. 2000: 19).

Apart from the grassroots’, and particularly women’s, denial to play a central decision making role in policy formulation, they also are side lined in terms of decision making regarding access to and use of resources, notably land. For instance, Henn (1983) points out that women do have land rights, especially the right to produce food on their husbands’ farms, but for the most part they do not control land use. They cannot, for example, decide to grow export crops for their own use on their husbands’ or fathers’ farms. Export crops bring much higher returns to labour than food crops, but because women cannot control the use of land or the income from export crop production, they are effectively cut off from the more lucrative forms of rural economic activities. Under these circumstances it is quite apparent that deliberate initiatives are to be made so as to emancipate small holder women-led farming systems in Tanzania. The next section highlights a number of opportunities that, if taken into consideration, may propel the affairs of small holder women farmers in Tanzania high on the agenda.

Towards Making Agricultural Policy Supportive of Women Farmers

Village Cooperatives

One intervention window proposed by Henn (1983) is the Village Cooperative Model which offers considerable potential for overcoming the persistent inequalities women face under traditional social relations of production. Henn further establishes that the work-point principle of equal pay for equal work is a powerful means for overcoming women’s excessive labour burdens in subsistence agriculture. This possibility brings out the necessity for integrating village women into the cooperative planning processes. If women are to participate in, and benefit from, the communal control of village resources, their opinions cannot be represented by the votes of their husbands or their fathers but women themselves.

Technological Assistance

Modern technology, including fertilisers, pesticides, improved storage, field-to-house transport and decent roads could help, but because modern technology must be purchased, it is not really accessible to women. Rural women normally earn very little cash, and what they do earn must be spent providing the bare necessities of contemporary village life—salt, kerosene, cooking pots, and school books for their children (Bukh 1979; Henn 1978). In sum, most African women lack the time, help and modern technology necessary for achieving a significant expansion of their food production. This is no reason, however, to ignore their important potential as suppliers of the urban market. If women discover an effective opportunity to increase the productivity of their food farming, processing, storage, and marketing systems, they are, according to a widening body of evidence, eager to increase their output (Fortmann 1977; Tinker 1981; Staudt 1982). As long as women can manage to exploit such opportunities and
retain control of their earnings, an increase in their food production can lead to an improvement in rural nutrition and living standards.

In order to reach women, Henn (1983) suggests that many integrated rural development projects should attempt to provide convenient village water sources, grain processing equipment and improved energy sources, all of which can raise the productivity of domestic work. This ‘technological approach’ to alleviating women’s excessive labour burdens is widely approved by governments and international aid agencies. Women themselves find labour-saving technologies an essential resource which can potentially allow them to respond to new economic opportunities. Provision of a village water supply, improved food processing and cooking equipment, better farm implements, pest controls, storage systems and field-to-village transport aids (to replace women’s back baskets and head loads) all help to improve women’s labour to more productive activities.

Henn (1983) reiterates that the government can promote these changes by stimulating the production of labour-saving inputs for the local rural economy and by supporting agronomic and economic research on the problems of small-scale farmers. It is, however, cautioned that these steps alone will not solve women’s productivity problems. Appropriate goods and services for rural investment cannot be continuously provided unless their principal consumers control a cash income of sufficient size to purchase those goods and services.

**Access to Credit**

Access to credit is another area that some scholars find instrumental, if improved, when it comes to enhancing conditions of women farmers. According to Gawaya (2008), there have been attempts to raise the issue of discrimination against women in credit provision in the Southern Africa region. Access to credit from commercial banks is a challenge for most rural women, due to the conditions imposed on lenders by the banks. In encountering this challenge, efforts have been made to introduce development banks in the rural areas where women have been given special attention. Donors have also funded NGOs to offer micro-credit. Gawaya notes, however, that this success is not possible for all who receive micro-credit. Initiatives on microcredit for women have gone on since the 1970s, and yet the conditions for rural women generally have continued to decline. Findings have shown that for some, the social and economic context in which they take loans does not make it possible to develop a business successfully. Micro-finance is an inappropriate development intervention in the context where people’s livelihoods are coming under stress, and this is often the case in disease and HIV-affected populations, with high levels of illness and mortality.

**Access to Information**

Research by COWI (2007) showed that for women, timely and adequate information to inform business decisions is limited. Farmers need information on a variety of issues, including information related to markets, agricultural products, and improved seeds.
The Ministry responsible for agriculture is the main source of support, by providing an extension services, new improved technologies, affordable credit, seed, and improvement of market access. Yet, due to cutbacks in such services for farmers, government support to farmers is minimal (ibid. 2007). Women benefit to an extent from this general support. However, communication from the district to the rural areas is weak, and women are much less likely than men to receive the information they need. In addition, there is no evidence that there are systematic and targeted measures in place to enhance improved technologies for women farmers (Gawa 2008).

**Market Access and Food Processing**

According to Gawaya (2008), access to markets can be viewed in four ways: as physical access, which relates to infrastructure—for example, roads, or railway networks; as social access, related to local customs, norms, and practices that may constrain women from marketing their produce (for example, the burden of care for the family, or beliefs and practices that may prevent women from going far from home); as technical access, related to women’s ability to read and interpret documents, or levels of literacy; and as financial access, related to women’s ability to pay for goods and services in order to transport and sell their produce. Based on Gawaya’s description of market access, one can clearly see that the largest percentage of women farmers in Tanzania have a long way to go to reach a point where they will have reliable access to markets.

In respect to physical access for instance, Guyer (1977) compared the farming patterns and cash incomes of women in two villages among Beti people of southern Cameroon and Haya of North western Tanzania with contrasting situations of market access. One village was situated along a paved road to the capital city of Yaoundé; the second a kilometre walk from a dirt road which was often impassable during the rainy season. In both villages, women complained about problems of declining soil fertility, crop diseases and pests, and insufficient male help in clearing fields. Nonetheless, women in the village with reliable, year-round access to a large urban food market regularly produced three times as much food for sale as women in the less well situated village (ibid.) Guyer’s study, therefore, does show that even unmodernised women’s farming systems have the potential for substantial increases in output. Investments in rural roads and marketing facilities would tap a considerable reservoir of agro-produce.

**Realising Women’s Reproductive Rights**

Article 14 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: the Rights of Women in Africa gives priority to health and reproductive rights of women. The majority of women especially among African societies cannot decide on issues related to contraception (Abreu and Salomao 2005). While women in rural areas remain unable to determine the size of their families, their ability to participate in agriculture or other productive work remains constrained by the constant need to find alternative child care, and the possibility of unplanned pregnancy. Unmet reproductive rights are therefore a fundamental constraint on rural women’s productivity, which is rarely rec-
ognised by agricultural policy makers. Women take on the primary role in child care, and any productive activities they undertake on or off the farm have to be combined with child care, or they must find alternative forms of child care to allow them to concentrate solely on production. Unfortunately, the policy environment is not responsive enough to these challenges, and does not make the link with agricultural and rural development policies (Gawaya 2008).

It is clear from this account that women desperately need support from the government to balance multiple demands on their time. There comes a time when additional work, of all kinds, can no longer be absorbed into the existing workloads of household members. The government should recognise the key importance of supporting women to focus more on production by providing essential basic services which will give them more free time (ibid. 2008)

**Participatory Policy Formulation**

The preceding section(s) clearly implies that women farmers are denied active participation in the policy making process. As suggested by Mbilinyi and Nyoni (2000), the process should involve participation of all stakeholders, including the grassroots and smallholder farmers and livestock keepers. This is important since the successful implementation of the policy involves everyone, and requires everyone to have a sense of “ownership” of the policy. Participation in the policy making process can be facilitated by the use of participatory research approaches and/or participatory poverty assessments.

**Conclusion**

This chapter assessed the position of Tanzanian small holder women farmers in agriculture, by reviewing policy related challenges and available opportunities for improvement to make agriculture policy more supportive of women farmers. Several policy related challenges facing women farmers including insufficient extension services, male-dominated land tenure arrangements and meagre budgetary allocations, were noted. Also, the chapter reviewed the implications of agriculture policy on supporting women farmers, especially by addressing these challenges. The role that women can play in affecting better policies and decision making processes that would benefit them was also noted in this chapter. The chapter concludes that agriculture policy in Tanzania is still women-blind, despite the fact that they (women) form the majority labour base in small holder farming. In an attempt to address this missing link in the agriculture sector, the chapter offers three key recommendations. One is the involvement in policy formulation and decision making of readily available communities/groups, especially women who are engaged in farming activities. Two, there is still abundant land that can be utilised for small holder women-led agriculture, should the government and stakeholders embark on helping women utilise it effectively under fair legal and tenure arrangements. The third aspect entails the involvement of women farmers
in land use mapping and planning, to ensure equal access and availability of this key resource.

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10 Community-based Wildlife Management Programmes and Livelihoods in Zambia: Empowering or Disempowering Local Communities?

Chrispin Matenga

Introduction
Wildlife management has undergone fundamental transformation, from the traditional pre-colonial model through colonial state-control to the current community-based management model. In pre-colonial times, the customary resource management regimes were hailed for allowing African tribal communities to live in a symbiotic relationship with wildlife animals. During that time, local people harvested animals under the control of traditional authorities mainly as a subsistence resource, and to a lesser extent for trade (Mano Consultancy Services Ltd. 1998). The colonial model is said to have imposed a top-down state control of wildlife that established protected areas (parks and reserves) which excluded human use, what some called ‘fines and fences’ (Gibson and Marks 1995) and others, ‘fortress conservation’ (Adams and Hutton, 2007). The immediate post-colonial model continued with the colonial-style top-down management. However, in the 1980s, the top-down models began to change through programmes that tried to involve the local communities in the management of wildlife. The current model, in its part, combines state control and community-based wildlife resource management initiatives. Mosimane and Aribeb (2005) note that customary resource management regimes broke down with the interference of the colonial and post-colonial resource use policies. The current community-based wildlife resource management initiatives, often labelled as ‘people-centred’, were mooted with a view to reverse the erosion of the traditional African systems of resource management.

In Zambia, the management of wildlife has followed the typical historical pattern described above. In this chapter, I focus on the latest stage of conservation models, and examine its realisation in the particular context of Zambia. The chapter specifically focuses on the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) programme implemented in Zambia in 30 Game Management Areas (GMAs) from the 1980s till 1998, when the programme was transformed into the Community Resource Boards (CRBs).

Thus, the main question(s) the chapter addresses are: to what extent have these community based wildlife management programmes, promoted in the GMAs, been shaped by local priorities and patterns of resource use? How do community based wildlife management programmes affect local livelihoods in the GMAs? This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section debriefs land use in Zambia’s protected areas, i.e. the GMAs and the national parks. Section three discusses the country’s community
based wildlife programmes in the GMAs. The fourth section examines the livelihoods impact of ADMADE/CRB programmes by focussing on the economic, social and political dimensions of livelihoods. Section five is a conclusion. This chapter draws upon a mass of published and unpublished literature, and a series of original research studies undertaken by this author in some of the GMAs between 1998 and 2013.

**Community Based Wildlife Management**

The community based wildlife management initiatives in Africa developed in tandem with a general worldwide movement, from traditional state control to increased involvement of local communities in management of conservation areas. This led to the coining of the term ‘community-based conservation’ (Johnson 1997: 392). Counterpart terms such as ‘community-based conservation’, ‘community wildlife management’, ‘collaborative management’ and ‘integrated conservation’ and ‘development programmes’ with similar principles are used (Adams and Hulme, 1999). Sometimes referred to as ‘conservation for people’, this new discourse in wildlife management developed in the 1980s in response to the social ills of fortress conservation (Adams and Hutton 2007). The fortress conservation, or ‘fine and fences’ approach, was condemned for denying customary resource users the right to manage and use their wildlife. Feeling a deep sense of injustice, customary resource users resorted to illegally hunting of wildlife animals. The illegal hunting by the customary resource users thus pitted them against state authorities.

The community-based approach to wildlife management was legitimised by a succession of international conventions and agreements by the global environmentalist movement, led by international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) between the 1980s and 1990s. Of note are the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, followed by the 1987 Brundtland Report. The Brundtland Report, also known as Our Common Future, especially made the idea of linking conservation and sustainable development into an internationally accepted global goal (Hutton et al. 2005). In 1992, the United Nations (UN) Earth Summit (Rio Conference) carried forward the process of creating a global framework for sustainable development, although the resulting Earth Report subtly “transformed the agenda of the Brundtland Commission into a more technocentric agenda responding to the needs of capital and global elites” (Amanor 2008: 9). In other words, the Earth Report reflected a neoliberal agenda whereby sustainable development would be achieved through free market policies with governments, global policy centres, multinational corporations, NGOs and ‘communities’ playing a pivotal role (ibid.: 8). The interests of the development agencies (such as the World Bank) and the donor communities concerned with community-based natural resources management - especially the wildlife sector - lie in the promotion of the market. As observed by Adams and Hulme (1999), the logic is that the market as opposed to the state permits the economic values of conservation resources to be unlocked, and therefore correct the perverse incentives of the past in order to achieve the sustainable development.
The new approach sought to reverse the ‘top-down’, centre-driven conservation by focusing on the rural people who have immediate links with resources and therefore bear the costs of conservation (Western and Wright 1994). At the heart of the new conservation discourse was bringing back the local resource users to participate in their management and sharing in benefits. Two outcomes were, therefore, expected from community-based conservation - the maintenance and preservation of habitats and species on one hand, and the improvement of social and economic welfare of the local community, on the other (Little 1994 in Johnson 1997). Different models of community-based conservation projects/programmes, which seek to link wildlife conservation with rural poverty alleviation as well as encouraging community participation, have emerged in the southern African region. Most known among them are: the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, the Natural Resources Management Programme in Botswana, the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) in Namibia, the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) and currently, the Community Resource Boards (CRBs) in Zambia.

Wildlife Conservation in Zambia

Conservation of wildlife in Zambia can be classified along three main periods. First is the colonial and immediate post-colonial period from 1890 to 1979. The second period consists of the ‘first generation’ community based wildlife management, from about 1980 to 1998. The third period is the current one, since 1998 to date, that characterises legal reforms that were supposed to institutionalise the community based management in the wildlife sector.

Concerns about the need to conserve wildlife in Zambia, as in other developing countries, date back to the early years of the 20th century, just after the British colonisation in 1890. At the time of the British occupation, the colonial authorities had learnt that chiefs (traditional rulers) had traditional hunting grounds in which they were allegedly killing wildlife, indiscriminately. The colonial authorities thus felt a need to protect wildlife (Protected Areas Information Service 1993). In their quest to protect wildlife from the ‘natives,’ the colonial administration introduced the Game Ordinance in 1925 which was the forerunner of many other wildlife legislations that provided the creation of game reserves, national parks and controlled hunting areas (Dodds and Patton 1968; IUCN 1976). Since that time, the colonial policy regarding the use and management of national parks and game reserves, therefore, supported a ‘protected areas’ approach that excluded (local) human use. By virtue of the colonial game laws enacted since the 1940s, ownership and management of wildlife in the country became totally vested in the colonial state, effectively dispossessing the indigenous people of their cultural heritage. Wildlife utilisation under the colonial game law favoured white settlers. The complete disregard of the culture and livelihoods needs of the indigenous people living within, or close, to the newly established protected areas led to their cultural and socio-economic marginalisation. The alienation of the indige-
nous inhabitants from the wildlife, which had for long been an integral part of African existence, evoked a deep sense of injustice (Mwenya et al. 1990).

Following independence in 1964, the new government did not depart from the colonial policy in wildlife management. In fact, subsequent guidelines issued by the post-colonial government regarding the use and management of national parks and GMAs supported the protected areas approach of ‘fine and fences’ under the stewardship of a government department- National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) (Dodds and Patton 1968). During the 1970s, the government in fact expanded the protected areas further by declaring more national parks. The Game Management Area Declaration Order, 1971 provided for the creation of a new category of protected area, namely, the Game Management Area (GMA) originally called controlled hunting area (CA) in the colonial period. Today, the protected areas for wildlife cover a total of 23 million hectares representing an estimated 30 percent of the country’s total land area (GRZ/MENR 1994). The wildlife estate is comprised of 19 national parks and 34 game management areas (GMAs). National Parks cover 6.4 million hectares, representing 8.4 percent of the country’s total land area while GMAs cover 16.6 million hectares accounting for 22 percent of the total land area. This vast wildlife estate puts Zambia among Southern African countries with the largest protected areas. In line with such policy, national parks were established to preserve certain sections of the country’s indigenous environments for the enjoyment and education of the general public. No human settlement or major developments are allowed in the national parks except infrastructure such as roads, rest areas and other non-permanent structures. Areas surrounding national parks containing significant numbers of game animals were designated Controlled Hunting Areas by the colonial authorities in 1938 (Astle 1999). These areas that later came to be known as GMAs were established as ‘buffer zones’ around national parks, on land often considered agriculturally marginal and used for subsistence cropping or livestock grazing by local inhabitants. The GMAs span some of the most socio-economically deprived areas in the country (Donahue 1997). The principal objective of establishing GMAs was to prevent disruptive land-use practices, while conserving wildlife within these areas at the optimum variety and abundance commensurate with other land uses (IUCN 1976).

The government’s approach of central government control and policing (patrolling and road-blocks by wildlife scouts) thus, as during the colonial times, divorced indigenous communities from the management and utilisation of wildlife resources. Inspired by a deep sense of injustice, the local people saw little incentive in respecting the wildlife law. They began to poach in defiance of the law and when they could, assisted external commercial poachers in exchange for small gifts (Mwenya et al. 1990). As the spectre of poaching, especially the commercial type, took its toll during the 1970s, much of the 1980s wildlife in most GMAs was placed under serious threat of depletion. With limited financial resources, lack of equipment, transport constraints, and too few trained personnel, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) suffered humiliation by uncontrolled poaching prompting a fundamental reversal of protec-
tionist conservation thinking, characterised by 'top-down' models of development and resource protection in the GMAs.

The second period of wildlife management in the country was concerned with bringing back the customary wildlife resource users to participate in the management of wildlife, and also derive benefits from its use. To avoid the pitfalls of the 'top-down' approach to wildlife conservation cited above, it became imperative that local communities living in Game Management Areas (GMAs) should again participate in and bear the responsibility for the management and utilisation of wildlife resources, as was the case prior to colonialism. The objective of the NPWS was to ensure that the needs of local communities were satisfied while guaranteeing wildlife conservation (ibid). On the basis of this thinking, two major parallel initiatives, testing different models for involving local communities in sustainable use of wildlife resources, commenced during the first half of the 1980 decade: the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) programme for Game Management Areas (GMAs) and the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP). Both initiatives grew out of the Lupande Research and Development Projects between 1979 and 1984 in Lupande Game Management Area in the South Luangwa Valley (Lungu 1990; Astle 1999).

The LIRDP, which has now changed name to South Luangwa Area Management Unit- SLAMU), has remained confined Lupande GMA. In 1987, the ADMADE programme was adopted as the official government instrument for promoting and enforcing wildlife conservation in GMAs by the government wildlife department (Mwenya et al., op. cit.). The basic premise for the ADMADE programme was that communities in GMAs will interact responsibly with wildlife so long as there are tangible benefits accruing for them from the exploitation of the wildlife resource. This philosophy, as it came to be referred, has been implemented in more than 30 of Zambia’s 36 GMAs. The philosophy was intended to offer a realistic and cost-effective approach for conservation through partnership with local communities in the management effort. The ADMADE initiative was predicated on two principles. The first principle was that revenues generated from wildlife resources return to local communities in form of cash for community development initiatives and direct employment in wildlife utilisation related activities within GMAs. The second sought to establish a system of user rights, with defined rights of access to wildlife resources for the communities inhabiting GMAs or living around national parks (GRZ/MENR 1994).

In terms of the first principle, it seems that not all GMAs operating under the ADMADE/CRBs programme are able to generate revenue. Only about 10 GMAs rich in wildlife have been able to generate a 'satisfactory' level of income. The rest of the GMAs classified as "depleted" receive little or no income at all (Tilley 1995). Revenue earned by each GMA is a function of the number and type of wildlife hunted, and the value of the concession awarded to a Safari company (Hachileka et al. 1998). Further, the benefit sharing formula was decided by the state arbitrarily. Under ADMADE, 50 percent went directly to government central treasury, 37.5 percent to the NPWS for game management in the earning area and administration and overheads, and 17.5 percent to the respective GMA communities for community infrastructure projects. As
will be elaborated further below, the inability to generate satisfactory levels of revenue from wildlife compromised the smooth implementation of the programme as the cash benefits or social infrastructure expected by the local communities would not materialise to any satisfactory level. In regard to the second principle, the evidence shows that as before, user rights for the local communities remained vague as the state remained in control and determined what wildlife quota a community can access in any hunting season. The communities were often regarded as lacking capacity to undertake certain wildlife management 'technical' functions, such as quota setting and animal census, and these have effectively remained in the domain of the state through the wildlife department. Consequently, therefore, commitment on the part of the local communities in conservation of wildlife waned and in most GMAs poaching continued as before, whilst at the same time the government was facing a severe economic downturn and the wildlife department remained underfunded by the central treasury.

The third period of wildlife management in Zambia was characterised by legal reforms in the wildlife sector that sought to transform the wildlife department, and usher in a more democratic and effective community based wildlife management system. During the last half of the 1990s, a debate about the future direction of community-based wildlife management became the subject of many workshops in Zambia. As indicated in one document that originally elaborated on the ADMADE programme: “... the institutionalisation of ADMADE programme will be to legitime it by enacting its various components, into the Wildlife Act of Zambia” (Mwenya et al. 1990). Thus, in 1998, a major donor assisted restructuring exercise in the management of wildlife was undertaken, with the enactment of a new law to govern wildlife management and conservation. The new legislation - *Zambia Wildlife Act, 1998* - transformed the NPWS into the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) a body corporate, with a view to make it more effective in wildlife management. A new *Policy for National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia (1998)* was passed. In this policy, the government recognised the intrinsic strength of the ADMADE philosophy whereby local people and other landholders including the state were accepted, at least theoretically, as the best custodians of the wildlife and other renewable resources on their land (GRZ/NPWS 1998: 9).

ZAWA was expected to share in partnership with the local communities the responsibilities of management in the GMAs, and to enhance the economic and social well-being of local communities in these areas by Community Resources Boards (CRBs) (GRZ/NPWS 1998a). The establishment of CRBs was meant to alter the earlier ADMADE approach to wildlife management and benefit sharing at the community level and to give legal standing to the local community institutions in wildlife management. The establishment of these local level institutions in the GMAs represent the first ever legal framework that provides for community participation in the natural resource management in the country. A CRB comprises between seven to ten elected representatives. Under this new system the traditional chief of an area does not sit on the board, but merely serves as a patron. The chief appoints two representatives among the so-called elected members to the board. The removal of the chief from the board
was meant to forestall the local chief’s alleged undue influence in local level decision-making, in wildlife management and distribution of benefits.

ZAWA collects and disburses all revenues derived from paid safari hunting concession fees and licenses. Only minor changes have taken place in the revenue-sharing from the ADMADE system since the transformation of the NPWS into ZAWA. In the ZAWA/CRB benefit-sharing scheme, 50 percent of the revenues earned is retained by ZAWA, 45 percent is meant to go to the respective GMA communities while the remaining 5 percent is given to the local chief(s) of the earning GMA (GRZ 1998; GRZ/NPWS 1998). However, the ZAWA approach to wildlife management has lamentably failed to live up to expectations, and the whole wildlife sector is near to collapse as revenues from safari hunting are either not at satisfactory levels to allow the smooth functioning of the institution, or there has been sheer mismanagement. The CRBs collapsed, having been disbanded by ZAWA in many GMAs following its high indebtedness to the former by failure to remit the community share of the wildlife generated revenues.

Community Based Wildlife Management and Livelihoods

Given this context, the overriding question this chapter asks is: how does community based wildlife management affect local livelihoods in the GMAs? The claim is that community based wildlife management is a ‘win-win’ deal for both the state and local communities in the GMAs. Yet there are questions raised as the conservation programmes fundamentally transform the relationships between people and wildlife and land, and affects the community. In this section, I now turn to examine these changes, asking who wins and who loses from these conservation development programmes.

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. At the core of the livelihoods approach are the different types of livelihood capitals or assets, popularly known as the ‘asset pentagon’, and how they can be converted into sustainable livelihoods. These assets are human capital, natural capital, physical capital, financial capital, social capital, and many more, arranged in form of a pentagon (Bebbington 1999; de Haan 2012). All these capitals are cardinal in analysing impacts of wildlife management on local people’s livelihoods in wildlife areas. Livelihoods are multi-dimensional and complex (Scoones 2009; Chambers and Conway 1992) and to get a full appreciation of impacts and outcomes we have to explore economic, social and political dimensions (Friedmann 1992; Scheyvens 1999).

Economic dimension

As already noted above, the areas in which ADMADE/CRBs programmes are being implemented are essentially marginal agricultural regions and characterised by poverty. ADMADE/CRBs were thus promoted as a medium through which wildlife management was to be integrated into the rural economy for the economic benefit of the local communities through wildlife related activities. Since the narrative about wildlife utilisation being a potentially viable economic land-use option in these agriculturally
marginal regions gained ground from the mid-1980s, much development efforts by
government, donors and development agencies have been to promote wildlife con-
servation-related activities in these areas, as opposed to agricultural development. Yet,
continued prioritisation of wildlife management in GMAs is not always greeted posi-
tively at the local level. Concerned about crop destruction and human deaths by prob-
lem animals, local communities have objected to wildlife conservation at the expense
of their livelihoods.

For close to three decades now, there has been nothing to show for the efforts of
these community-based wildlife development projects in alleviating rural poverty or
sustaining peoples’ livelihoods. Safari hunting, the main income generating activity
for ADMADE/CRBs has generated very low incomes, effectively forestalling the eco-
nomic benefits that are expected to trickle down to local communities (Chisulo 1995).
As observed above, most GMAs have low wildlife populations, with only about 10
out of 36 GMAs being relatively well stocked. This has resulted in low to no incomes
realised from safari hunting for the majority of the GMAs. At the inception of these
initiatives during the 1980s, the anticipated revenue base was largely from elephant
products. Shortly thereafter, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) was passed, and Zambia imposed a ban on the trade of elephant
products (WRI, UNEP and UNDP 1992) thereby seriously eroding the resource base
for these programmes (Chisulo, 1995).

As detailed above, the benefit-sharing mechanism adopted by ADMADE/CRBs
programmes without consulting the local communities further imposed significant
limits to the level of financial benefits that would eventually trickle down to the pro-
ducer GMAs. Under ADMADE, the communities received 17.5 percent of the total
revenues generated from wildlife utilisation in each GMA, while under the CRBs they
receive 45 percent. While there appears to be an improvement in the community share
of revenues under the CRBs programme, these are still far too inadequate, received
late, in piece-meal and in most cases, not received at all. ZAWA is in a financial co-
nundrum, as donor interest has waned for the wildlife sector in Zambia and the little
revenues generated from safari hunting and licensing fees are monopolised by the au-
thority. Further, under the ADMADE/CRBs programmes communities do not receive
any household cash dividends. The LIRDP that developed together with ADMADE
tried to incorporate the dividend approach but failed as the cash dividends were too
inadequate to meet households’ needs for the respective communities. However, under
the CRBs programme, only the traditional chief receives five percent of the revenues,
and that can be quite a substantial amount income accruing to a single person in some
GMAs.

Even though most GMAs are characteristically marginal agricultural regions, agri-
culture has remained local people’s principal economic activity and one of the main
sources of their income. A research by Hachileka et al (1998) in Lupande and Mumb-
wa GMA established that the local communities felt that the objectives of the commu-
nity-based wildlife projects did not reflect their immediate needs, such as food security
and health services. In fact, the research established that the local communities were
not prepared to reinvest a substantial amount of their community share of revenues in wildlife management. This shows that local communities in these areas had not prioritised wildlife resources within their resource base. Astle (1999: 87) equally observes, in a survey carried out by the Provincial Planning Unit in Mambwe area of the Luangwa valley in 1990, that “...almost half of the people identified lack of food as their most serious problem, nearly a quarter said lack of good water, the same fraction identified lack of transport, and the remainder wanted more implements and other inputs for farming.” Tilley (1995: 12), at a community workshop to identify land-use plans for the improvement of the GMA in Namwala, also noted that the participants generally felt that “...their immediate needs were improved food supply, water, health and education. The means for achieving these, through wildlife generated funding, was only considered to be a vague future possibility.” Further, a survey undertaken by Matenga and Kapungwe (2002) also established that agriculture was the major source of income for the local communities in Chiawa and Bangweulu GMAs both implementing ADMADE/CRBs programmes.

Given the fact that local communities’ economic livelihoods have not been dependent on wildlife generated revenues, is it not the case that the importance attached to conservation in these areas is detrimental to the development of subsistence agriculture, thereby exacerbating local peoples’ economic marginalisation? The wildlife utilisation land-use option has, in the main, failed to deliver the economic benefits promised to the local communities by the conservation development programmes. For the GMA local inhabitants, wildlife utilisation has no comparative financial advantage over other land-use options such as agriculture. Other indirect economic benefits such as employment under the CRBs programme have been insignificant as only a few village scouts are employed. The village scouts in most cases have not received their salaries since ZAWA has failed to remit the community share of the revenues, and in some GMAs, such as Chiawa, some elite and often foreign managed conservation agencies have decided to foot the wage bill for the village scouts.

**Social Dimension**

The architects of the ADMADE programme identified the development of community infrastructure projects such as - school classroom blocks, health centres and hammer mills - as a way of sharing the benefits from wildlife utilisation. Such community infrastructure was expected to instil a sense of community cohesion, because all would benefit from services provided from locally managed resources given that the government had failed to provide such services satisfactorily. Since the revenues generated from safari hunting have been far too inadequate, the provision of such infrastructure took extraordinarily long to complete for the community to appreciate it (Hachileka et al. 1998; Tilley 1995). Further, research has revealed that while infrastructure projects have been undertaken in the ADMADE/CRBs project areas, in comparative terms, their level of provision does not in any way supersede similar infrastructure provided in other similar rural areas without such programmes (ibid). ADMADE never distrib-
uted income dividends to local communities, while LIRDP that tried to incorporate the dividends approach failed, as the cash dividends were far too inadequate to make any meaningful contribution to households’ needs. Further, community projects of infrastructure type, such as health centres, schools and grinding mills, have oftentimes allegedly been located in close proximity to the chiefs’ palaces, thus excluding the majority of the local community members from easily accessing such infrastructure.

This has caused resentment and hatred by those communities not in close proximity to the chief’s palace, since they do not access these facilities easily. The inherent conflict that follows has resulted in loss of respect for traditional leaders, especially chiefs, in some areas.

As already mentioned, most of the GMAs have experienced very small economic returns from the programme with only very few community members, and largely male youths benefiting in terms of employment as village scouts. These few jobs often go without pay, and wages are received with the benevolence of conservation agencies found in the GMAs.

Meanwhile community members have to contend with the costs of living with wildlife, such as crop destruction, human loss from problem animals, and the restricted access to some resources such as game meat. The unfulfilled benefits and costs to the local communities have left them confused, frustrated, disinterested or disillusioned with the community-based wildlife initiatives. This frustration is well illustrated by one headman in one of the GMAs where ADMADE/CRB programmes is being implemented:

This ADMADE thing is alien to this area; it is worrisome because it appears it is only concerned with conserving wildlife at the expense of the livelihoods of the people; hippos and elephants are destroying bananas and maize which we need to make a living; now some people are forced to leave their homes to camp by their crop fields in the night to guard their crops. Before ADMADE, animals never used to bother us so much as NPWS would chase or kill problem animals; at the inception of this ADMADE, people were not suspicious, so they just agreed with its establishment; now people are fed-up with what they have seen, with what has come up from this project.

**Political Dimension**

The ‘first generation’ community-based wildlife management programme – ADMADE – had community representation by way of a Sub-Authority Committee that was the most important political structure as regards wildlife resource issues in the GMAs. At the time, much power was vested in the traditional chiefs. The ADMADE Sub-Authority committees were largely composed of community representatives who were allegedly handpicked by the local chiefs. Traditional rulers (chiefs) were an important link in ADMADE affairs. Since chiefs have historically been identified with their sub-

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1 Senior Headman Mushonganhende, personal communication, Mushonganhende Village, Chiawa GMA, 07/07/1998.
jects, the programme, therefore, sought to engage the community in wildlife activities through their traditional leaders. It was generally assumed that chiefs understood the needs and aspirations of their subjects and were better placed to convince their subjects about the need to conserve wildlife in their areas (Mwenya et al. 1990). Consequently, ADMADE vested much greater power in the chiefs with regard to ADMADE activities at the GMA level. For instance, chiefs were given powers to appoint members of the ADMADE Sub-Authority Committees, as well as community members to undergo training as village scouts. As Gibson and Marks (1995) observes “… Chiefs used these initiatives to secure more power for themselves rather than to facilitate local participation for wildlife”. In short, community participation in the ADMADE programme was seen as lacking as the local level committees were allegedly dominated by the chiefs’ close relatives and allies, and, therefore, these committees were viewed as not reflecting a representation of a broad range of community interests. Even with the new CRBs with ‘democratically’ elected members, the chiefs appoint two representatives and the presence of such traditionally appointed members is just as bad as was the case when members were handpicked.

Regarding the management of wildlife within GMAs, the government departments still hold much of the management responsibility ostensibly that local communities do not have the capacities to do so. Wildlife policing, animal census, quota setting, licensing etc. have remained the domain of the state. Therefore, while theoretically people living within GMAs share responsibility for wildlife management with the wildlife department, in practice they have a very limited formal role in decision making over the use of locally managed wildlife resources (Steiner & Rihoy 1995). The fact that ZAWA has secured a monopoly over the pertinent wildlife management responsibilities, communities’ voice in wildlife management has been rendered insignificant. While the legal framework under which ADMADE was managing wildlife was often cited as one of the major limitation to effective community participation, the legislative changes of 1998 that brought a new wildlife law to institutionalise wildlife management under a new participatory structure has practically failed to bring about community participation and the promised socio-economic benefits to the local communities.

The CRBs, as was the case with ADMADE sub-authority committees are, therefore, simply told what has been decided by the state. For instance, decisions on whether safari hunting and local resident hunting should be allowed for any particular year and how many animals are allocated have remained top-down. To illustrate this point, nearly every new Minister of Tourism under the successive governments has imposed a ban on safari hunting and local resident hunting and/or interfered with the awarding of the safari tenders. In 2002, the Minister of Tourism disregarded the tender procedure for the allocation of the 2002 safari hunting concessions. The Minister nullified the tenders that were awarded by the legally constituted committee, comprising ZAWA, Zambia National Tender Board, Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, representatives of traditional leaders in GMAs and other stakeholders and instead awarded the concessions “administratively” himself (The Post 2002). In 2012, with the coming of a new government, the new Minister of Tourism again unilaterally
banned safari hunting and local resident hunting. In 2014, only safari hunting has been allowed and local resident hunting that is supposed to benefit some local GMA community members remains effectively banned. Therefore, as noted by Steiner & Rihoy (1995), while theoretically people living within GMAs share responsibility for management of wildlife with the wildlife department, in practice they have a very limited formal role in making decisions over the use of locally managed wildlife resources.

**Conclusion**

What can we conclude about the hitherto, implemented wildlife-based community conservation programmes in Zambia? It is hard to criticise the wildlife utilisation development projects established in Zambia’s GMAs. These programmes have been the subject of many learned papers and research. Theoretically, the community based conservation programmes represent a radical, if not revolutionary departure from the fortress conservation approach, which did not take into consideration the needs of communities living adjacent to protected areas. Practically, however, the programmes have operated as ‘top down’ programmes initiated, planned and implemented externally by the wildlife department, international conservation agencies and donors, and facilitated locally by the all-powerful traditional chiefs and other local rural elites.

We can, therefore, conclude that community based wildlife conservation development programmes like ADMADE and CRBs have been more or less a public relations exercise to defuse local opposition towards the state wildlife conservation agenda. The ultimate purpose for these development programmes has been, to say the least, preservation of wildlife species and habitats in line with the wishes of international conservation agencies, international donors and national government. Ecological necessities and potential economic benefits from conservation and utilisation of wildlife have served to legitimise the establishment of the wildlife conservation development programmes without paying due regard to the livelihoods priorities of the local inhabitants in the GMAs. It follows from this, therefore, that although the promotion of social and economic welfare has been one of the stated and intended outcomes of community-based wildlife conservation development programmes, in ADMADE and CRB programmes, this ideal has not been hitherto realised. While community members have to contend with the costs of living with wildlife such as crop damage and human death, while continuing to hope that their welfare would improve one day, the private safari hunting companies, international conservation agencies, the state agencies, and local rural elites continue to profit from such programmes at the expense of the majority traditional landholders. The much promised benefits from these community-based wildlife management programmes, both in their older versions (under ADMADE), and the newer versions of ‘democratically’ constituted institutions, market oriented and private sector dominated (under the CRBs), have proven to be elusive and have been difficult to realise in practice. Instead of improving the livelihoods of the local communities, the community-based wildlife utilisation programmes have in fact accentuated their economic marginalisation as they have ignored the development of agriculture, one
of the main livelihood strategies for the majority of the people living in these regions. The new Patriotic Front (PF) Government in March 2015 abolished the ZAWA arising from the operational challenges the body corporate has faced since its establishment in 1998 and will now exist as government department in the Ministry of Tourism (Lusaka Times, 2015). It remains to be seen how community interest will be taken into account in the yet to be announced new wildlife management regime.

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DEBATING DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
II Developing Development Studies in North-South Partnership: How to Support Institutional Capacity in Academia

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Introduction
Institutional capacity building has long been one of the key terms in international development (Kühl 2009). Capacity building of state institutions and civil society organizations is considered an important means to enhance ownership of development processes, as well as to take distance from the traditional donor-recipient relationships. Consequently, institutional capacity-building has been on the agenda of North-South partnerships between academic institutions in the so-called North and South. In this context, capacity building has set out to build more equal relationships, for example in research collaboration. Emphasis has increasingly been on the collaborative definition of agendas and joint dissemination of research inputs in academic publications. Such efforts have been seen as a contrast to old practices, where agendas were set by Northern institutions, and Southern partners often played the role of data collectors for case studies. (See Carbonnier and Kontinen 2014; 2015).

Despite quite remarkable changes taking place in North-South relationships in academia, there are still hindrances to genuine collaboration. Most importantly, the funding schemes often attempt to combine the aspirations of both academia and development aid, sometimes leading to contradictory objectives and failures in this particular attempt. Funding from academic research agencies considers first and foremost the scientific quality, leaving little room for capacity building, whilst aid funding is often restricted to institutional capacity and excludes research and teaching activities. A number of North-South collaboration projects have to cope with different logic from these institutional fields (cf. Greenwood et al. 2008) in their search for the best ways to enhance institutional capacity in academia.

In this chapter we reflect on our experience of institutional support to higher education institutions in the context of the project Developing Development Studies (DDS),

phases I and II, which was not left untouched by the above-mentioned dilemmas. The project was implemented first from 2011 through 2012, and second from 2013 to 2015, in a partnership between the universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä from Finland, the University of Dar es Salaam from Tanzania, and the University of Zambia. Moreover, a few representatives from the University of Sokoine and University of Dodoma in Tanzania participated. The project was funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, through the Finnish Higher Education Institutions Institutional Capacity Building Instrument (HEI ICI).

The project aimed at strengthening the discipline of Development Studies at the universities in Tanzania and Zambia, and it had three components: staff development, curriculum development and administrative development. The staff development component involved upgrading the qualifications of the staff members – in the departments for Development Studies at the Southern partner universities – to PhD level. Over the course of the project, six international workshops were held at all partner locations – in Lusaka (2011), Jyväskylä (2012), Dar es Salaam (2012), Helsinki (2013), Bagamoyo (2014) and again in Lusaka (2015). Moreover, the project involved longer study periods in Helsinki, participation in the international conference in Development Research, financial support for fieldwork and conferences, as well as contributions to Development Studies libraries and computer facilities. The Development Studies curricula were developed for BA, MA, and PhD levels, and in Tanzania a national meeting for all institutions teaching Development Studies was conducted, resulting in the establishment of a national association for Development Studies. Staff from the University of Zambia also attended the meeting in Tanzania, to share their experiences. Additionally, an international office was established at the University of Zambia in order to strengthen the capacity to take part in international collaboration for student exchange and research. The project was administered by the University of Helsinki, although the management decisions were made at a project board with representatives from all the participating universities.

While it is quite simple to list the different activities conducted, it becomes trickier to reflect on the contributions that these different activities have made to the very institutional capacity of the participating academic institutions, let alone the capacity to debate the development policy issues of entire countries, as indicated in the objectives of the funding instrument. In the earlier version of this text (Komba et al. 2015), we reflected on the challenges of the institutional capacity building in a North-South context experienced in the first phase of the project. In what follows, we revisit the challenges and related changes that occurred during the second phase. We reflect on the contributions of the project under the following themes: development researchers who assume the role of development practitioners; building a collaborative project management procedures; theories and templates typical for development; and the notion of growth in an institutional capacity. In conclusion, we argue that the best way for institutional capacity building is to enable all academics to be part and parcel of the global academic community.
Development Researchers as Development Practitioners

A particular aspect of the institutional capacity building project DDS was that it was implemented under a funding instrument that followed the logic of development aid. The project planning and reporting followed mainstream development aid tools, such as Logical Framework. Moreover, the objectives of the project were to align it with the goals of the Finnish development policy, and further, with the international development goals. Academics in Development Studies often treat the institutional practices of development aid as objects of critique, rather than their own frames for action. As development researchers developing Development Studies through a development aid instrument, we were often more than confused about our concept of development in its different theoretical and practical meanings.

Certainly, we had some faith in the possibilities of intentional development (cf. Cowen and Shenton 1996). Without this belief, we would not have begun the effort in the first place, and continued, despite the challenges experienced, into the second phase. At the same time, we were periodically more than conscious about the lessons learned from existing, critical research on development interventions. As research has shown, development projects are continuous processes of negotiations and compromises between different values and interests (Long 2001). They are also crashing points of different logics, such as the intended project logic versus the recipients logics revolving around taking advantage of the extra resources provided by any development project (Olivier de Sardan 2005). For the Northern partners, the awareness of the overall “will to improve” characteristics of development (Li 2007), and the tendency to simplify complex situations into technical problems solvable with project activities (Ferguson 1994), led to overall carefulness of not to simplify the issues.

Moreover, for some Northern partners this was the first experience to step into the shoes of a development practitioner and occupying the role of the thoroughly criticized Northern “partner”, and therefore, it was an experience of immense learning. Overall, we wanted to avoid rigidity and be open to changes. We perhaps aspired to be more searchers than planners (Easterley 2004), in an effort to react to different needs that emerged during the process. However, we often found ourselves behaving as planners: we had a plan to implement, budget to spend and reports – along the donor guidelines – to be written, on time. In the pressure of implementation and reporting deadlines, it was easy to forget this critical stance and concentrate on the activities without a thorough consideration of the broader picture.

However, during the project we did not turn into full-time development practitioners. In contrast, we continued to be development researchers, teachers and administrators at our home institutions. The institutional capacity building project, thus, was an additional activity for all the participants, including the so-called “beneficiaries”. As the project aimed to improve the quality of Development Studies teaching and research in the partner universities through supporting the qualifications of the staff, the main participants were Development Studies lecturers. Lecturers usually have an enormous teaching load, sometimes with classes of up to 1500 students, and were not released from the regular duties to participate in or work on the DDS project.
At the same time, the lecturers felt the pressure to qualify with PhDs, as most of the participants were not doctors at the beginning of the project. Additionally, there was an increasing pressure to publish in international journals and fulfill the institutional result indicators. Simultaneously, due to budget constraints, there was limited access to these same journals, and no possibilities to regularly update library collections or to participate in international conferences. Therefore, the efforts made to be members in the international academic community and qualified contributors to local development were often hampered by lack of time, means, access and funds, which were all included in the “institutional capacity”.

In hindsight, despite the challenges, our role as Development Studies professionals attempting to “practice development practice” was a positive feature. Being at different stages in our careers also enabled us to cope with, and even overcome, knowledge asymmetries typical to development interventions. As development practitioners and participants in academic institutional capacity building, the Southern partners surely had more expertise and knowhow; but, to some extent, we all were equally newcomers in implementing this particular project scheme.

Towards a Joint Understanding of Knowledge

In most development practices, there are frequent moments of unease that stem from the donor-recipient relationship, the power imbalance and the reluctance to spoil the working relationship by asking uncomfortable questions about the agenda, ownership, and money. There is a wealth of academic, critical literature on development aid and on the descriptions of development partnerships as one of mutual trust, with open communication, shared objectives and joint accounting (Brinkerhoff 2002; Mancuso-Brehm 2004). However, when dealing with a real life project, and partners that we mutually like and respect, discussing the “elephant in the room” was more difficult than expected, despite our insights from literature. These questions were related both to the nature of knowledge advocated in the project and the ways the project management was realized.

In our case, the major activities were seminars, where local researchers’ own projects were discussed from different points of views. During these long conversations, it became clear that the collaboration could facilitate an enhanced awareness of the importance of transparent and reflexive processes and practices in research. The local scholars had to be the experts of their own research areas, and the group of seniors could witness the journey, hopefully contributing relevant advice on how to proceed. The topics of different research projects were so varied that the teachers were not the experts in each and every subject area. Accordingly, the stereotype of a Western professor trying to feed a pre-formulated truth to reluctant recipients, and maintaining a position of an ultimate authority in the classroom, was not the pedagogy of this project’s seminars. During the second phase especially, the classroom interaction consisted only of mutual debates, rather than ready-made presentations.
The teachers encouraged students to constantly pursue new and better knowledge that only open-minded scholars could find, despite pressures to follow paths already taken in previous research. This approach meant enduring uncertainty. At times, the reluctance to provide ready-made answers seemed to disappoint students looking for an exact answer to questions about methodology, such as the “right number of participants” in a focus group discussion. Scholarly uncertainty is difficult for everyone, especially junior academics, to endure. While this is a feature that unites academics everywhere, and at each career stage, university researchers and lecturers in Development Studies are destined to tackle the extra burden by the sheer virtue of the discipline. Development Studies is faced with constant demands regarding societal relevance. We are expected to provide answers in the context of increasing societal expectations. In the workshops, we came to realize that all scholars fight with a sense of inadequacy, and long for certainties. High quality teaching, then, helps participants to cope with the process when answers are slow to generate and may remain only tentative.

Even with an agenda that emphasizes contextualized, locally rooted knowledge production as a key ideal, our project was not left untouched by the struggles over research agendas. The theoretical and methodological frameworks discussed were, at times, those that were of interest to Finnish scholars, and not necessarily that of the students. In the beginning, the themes in a number of workshops were designed merely by Finnish teachers, with little assigned contributions from senior staff from Southern partners. However, this pattern was changed towards the second phase of the project. More complications were brought by the diverging agenda of the local supervisors of the students, following the fact that a number of students were conducting their PhD in a research project, funded for example, by Danish or Norwegian research institutions, with their own agenda. Additionally, with Development Studies being a multidisciplinary field, the epistemic assumptions behind the guidance given to participants not only varied, but conflicted; creating less fruitful uncertainties and tensions. At times, the lack of research ownership and the multiple changes in research topics reflected the conditions set by external research funding.

Therefore, an important part of enhancing the institutional capacity locally was developing the skills on how to cope with the research process, especially the skills of enduring the anxiety when confronting the slowness of progress in research, multiple demands and agendas. This capacity to cope, we realized, should be seen as an expertise in itself. Such expertise needs to be developed and nourished like any other fact-based or practical skill. We did not teach, for example, the ideal role or the number of civil society organizations involved in local decision making in Tanzania, but we did teach skills on how to find out and interpret the number, in the light of selected social theories and empirical evidence. Therefore, important skills involve constant reflexivity, adjust to new interpretations, change perspectives emerging from the interface between existing literature and the empirical realities on the ground, and have the courage to suggest new insights and concepts. This requires the skill to temporarily tolerate the position of not-yet-knowing.
Often such skills are not recognized as expertise, but seen as weakness, and something more tangible is required. Yet, if the aim is to support locally-rooted knowledge practices, the focus on capacity building needs to be on coping with the challenge of openness and constant learning, developing courage to listen to local voices and needs, and interpreting them to a wider audience. These are internationally-shared academic characteristics that are not specific to Development Studies, but, as we argue, Development Studies scholars should be particularly motivated to foster these skills. What became apparent in our project was that an active engagement between local and foreign researchers helps to ask new, challenging questions, and identify new uncertainties in a positive manner.

**Collaborative Financial Management**

A particular aspect where uncertainty became evident in an unfruitful way was the financial management of the project itself. We could not escape the typical challenges of development project management. These general challenges, which are well-identified in research literature, include delays in money allocations at the beginning of the project, accompanied with non-flexibility in extending the spending, and delays in reporting. The funding institution and the higher education institutions at both ends of the collaboration have their own management procedures to follow, before money allocated to a certain project can be used. In our case, the first delay was over six months. In a two-year project, this meant one quarter of the project duration. There were a lot unnecessary uncertainties and delays in the actual money transfers, reporting and following the budget, especially during the first phase of the project. At times, there seemed to be no accurate information about the money spent and remaining, and further, about the guidelines from the funder to which kind of activities it could be used.

Even if uncertainty might be an asset in academic terms, in financial management such uncertainties are certainly a loss of money and time. Whilst the funding relationship can be criticized as an asymmetrical power relationship, the adequate transfer, spending and financial reporting might also be considered as a joint effort, which we consider as a good example of a need to increase institutional capacities on both sides. It is a downside that there was no capacity-building allocated to the financial administration staff in any university. For sure, academic staff are not usually the best experts in bookkeeping and financial management, but they were in a position of translating the funder’s demands to the management staff.

During the second phase, clearer procedures were developed; a budget of each activity was to be planned in a due time, approved by the board, and reported after the activity in order to keep a continuous track of the spending. The project board had representatives from all the partnering universities. During the second phase, the board conducted regular monthly meetings via Skype, as well as storing all the documents in a shared online storage space. Using technology facilitated the collaborative decision making. However, the continuous collaborative management was not without its challenges and frustrations. At times, four busy professionals spent hours trying
to get the Skype connection to work and be able to hear something else than a slow “h..e..l..l..o..o..o” echoing from the other continent. However, at times the connections worked perfectly, and the habit of regular meetings was an important feature of collaborative decision-making. The continuous interaction constituted an important contribution towards everybody’s institutional capacity in dealing with such collaborative management.

Capacity Building as Participation in the International Academia

Capacity building initiatives usually include so-called ‘technical aid’, referring to the contributions of Northern experts in South. In this project, there was also an aspect of Northern expertise provided, especially in the intensive courses. What were the contributions made by the visiting Northern experts? In some situations – for example when students debated about the structure of the thesis, the role of hypothesis in a PhD, or the safe choice of methodology – any professor could have settled the discussion. The professor’s role was to convince the students that they were all correct – but, in different ways – and guide the class to connect with the core questions in methodology, and engage with literature. However, for example, in the department of Development Studies at the University of Zambia, none of the teaching staff held a PhD at the beginning of the project. Therefore, the teachers lacked the authority and experience to comfort an uncertain researcher at the beginning of the PhD process – highlighting the sense that being confused or lost is not necessarily negative, but in many ways may in fact be productive. One can convincingly say that there is light at the end of the tunnel, only if one has made the journey through a tunnel oneself. Visiting teachers can be needed in settings where local PhD holders are not found. As our project continued, however, those who had finished their PhD shared the anxieties and challenges of those still in the process. They provided an encouraging example on how one can complete the task, since everyone had had a chance to follow their progress along the way.

The second reason why non-local teachers may be needed in seminar rooms is the simple fact that non-local participants and teachers are needed in most seminar rooms in the academia. All universities struggle to internationalize in order to gain new influences, perspectives and ideas. Outsiders’ views help one to look at their own case study with fresh eyes, and it may help to contrast one’s case with a similar one from across the globe. This is something academics always do, but development aid funding may be crucial when a university is not adequately resourced. North-South collaboration is seeded not for the reason that the South needs lessons from the North, but because academic collaboration and exchange is considered vital for academic development everywhere. The global South should be included in such circuits of exchange as equal partners, be it with aid funding if necessary. Aid funding may be crucial in the creation of these seminar rooms. It can also provide opportunities for the teachers from the partner universities to visit Northern seminar rooms. Importantly, with the project funding, Southern scholars can gain access to libraries and conferences to update their
knowledge on recent development research conducted on their respective countries and beyond.

A third reason for the importance in exchanging expertise has to do with resources and origin: from the stand-point of a Nordic scholar, it is important for us to engage in a discussion on how social science theories that are mainly generated in the West – often in Anglo-American contexts – are translated and transformed. In some ways, Finnish academics are also in the margins of global theorizing, although we have access to literature and contacts. This applies to Development Studies in a specific way, since the scholarship tends to be hegemonized by countries with a colonial past. Together, scholars across the globe can, and should, take the task of contextualizing theory and truly internationalize it in a non-hegemonic and non-imperialistic fashion. This requires reaching the next level of “collaborative reflexivity” in theorizing.

For the Finnish partners, the project has definitely been a much more demanding and enriching experience than a simple outpouring of pre-existing knowledge. New insights and ways of thinking about academic knowledge production, expertise and development practice emerged out of the collaboration. This kind of learning by doing actual development work is extremely thought provoking and inspiring for our expertise in Development Studies in Finland. While the teachers in the Finnish field of Development Studies are an obvious beneficiary, we do believe that a collaboration of this nature could be beneficial to any academic discipline in our era of internationalizing academia. If globalization means genuine engagement with scholars from the global South, and not just transactions of capital and goods, then these projects are a gateway to a deeper engagement and mutual understanding of contemporary challenges and power relations.

As research was not included as an allowed activity, and we had to focus solely on capacity building as defined by development aid funding, the Finnish participants were, strictly speaking, demanded by one Ministry (Foreign Affairs) to practice activities that are not actually included in our work descriptions as defined by another Ministry (of Education). Here, again, we encountered an important reminder of discussions on the lack of policy coherence in Development Studies literature. This lack of coherence created another frustration in our project: the simple lack of time that all participants suffered from – we were not freed from our regular duties to do HEI-ICI work. In universities, time is the scarcest resource, and the funding instrument enabled activities, yet gave no extra hours to a working day, nor made it possible to alleviate the pre-existing workload. Often the choice ended up with doing HEI-ICI work over a night-shift, or came at the cost of our real tasks, own students and research. The lack of time to engage in societal/global impact activities, like HEI-ICI work – which would, however, be a really meaningful activity - is a constant frustration in contemporary academia of growing demands and student numbers, and diminishing personnel resources. Ironically, it seems like the excellent funding idea developed by one government sector, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was undermined by another key ministry, the Ministry for Education, which, however, has the ultimate power over universities’ staff time allocation.
Participation in Global Academic Community as Main Means to Institutional Capacity

Let us revisit our initial question of how to support the institutional capacity in academia, in the contexts of Development Studies and North-South relationships. First, we should probably do away with the strict distinction between North and South, and strive for a conceptualization of a global Development Studies community. Second, the basic tools needed for academic institutions such as computers, internet access, books and software are important, and should form a natural part of any institutional capacity effort if the lack of such basic means exists.

Third, however, such tangible tools do not wholly suffice in achieving academic capacity. The professionalism in teaching, research and influencing the development policies requires a wide variety of skills and capacities. These, of course, include substantive skills in areas of contemporary research. In order to gain this, the members of the academia should have access to latest research publications and research funding, in order to participate in the creation of the latest knowledge. This partnership is already taking place, and the capacity is being built among institutions; yet, is it enough? Does it service the needs of a North-South relationship? Answers to these questions are rather complex. There is a need to enhance collaborative evidence based research on one hand, to enable collaborators to deal with existing development issues, and different ways of disseminating available research findings while translating them into action on the other hand. This includes both conventional and transformative ways. We would have liked to have deepened our learning through collaboration in actual research projects, yet this is a feature that is not currently allowed within this funding instrument. Such a rigid separation of capacity building in higher education, vis-à-vis research, is unnecessary and frustrating. Our capacities are tightly connected to research, and one learns by working together, rather than being lectured on academic competencies in a classroom.

Fourth, it is not only substantial skills and capacities that are needed. In our current world, crucial capacities include reflexivity, flexibility, and networking skills. Just as these can be considered capacities of individuals, they are also, to a great extent, institutional capacities. Long and non-flexible bureaucratic procedures, as well as laxity to reflect and develop institutional procedures, may hinder efficient collaboration on both sides. Moreover, positive uncertainty and continuous questioning of the nature of knowledge are needed. Additionally, curiosity, courage and patience to produce new knowledge are crucial capacities in academia. We can share the knowledge needed, in terms of teaching and research exchange programs, among academia.

These capacities are not of special concern in the South, but need to be constantly defended and rebuilt everywhere. Yet, they demand resources. Nor are they capacities that can be built one and for all, in any one individual capacity building project. However, individual projects—including collaboration in the core activities of academic research, teaching and societal impact - contribute to the institutional capacities of each participating organization. These have a long duration. The institutional capacities of higher education institutions all over the world are related to the capacities to conduct
quality research and provide excellent education, combined with the struggles related to the adequacy of time and other resources. In our view, the best way to support higher education institutions is to support the staff to be able to engage in global research and the teaching community.

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Disciplinarians vs. Development Studies: A Return of Ethnocentrism in the Academia?

Colman Msoka

Introduction

Development Studies (DS) has once again been attacked by disciplinarians. As in many occasions in the past (Anderson and Kathryn 1999, Oakley, 1999), the attack is on the position and relevance of Development Studies in academia. The attacks are focused rather than general, as was the practice in the past. The attacks centre on whether individuals, trained as DS experts, are able to be good academics and train the next generation of scholars in this field. Unlike in the past when outsiders were the main enemies of Development Studies, this time, as we cruise deeper into the 21st century, fellow insiders - the people who have taught DS for years, risen through the ranks and become well paid professors lecturers and researchers - are up in arms against their own making – against the very generation of scholars they have trained over the years.

Some seniors are questioning the capabilities of academicians trained as DS experts and specialists to teach DS. Note the shift here; they are not questioning the relevance of the field, but the capabilities of the people trained in the field to train the next (third?) generation of scholars. Indeed, by asking about interdisciplinary trained academics, they are quietly questioning the relevance of Development Studies as a field of study and the relevance of interdisciplinary programmes in general. In fact, they are questioning the strengths and capabilities of Development Studies and other interdisciplinary programmes, in preparing a rounded scholar who is able to train the next generation of scholars. This strange behaviour is not only witnessed in DS, but in all interdisciplinary fields of study in general, perhaps reflecting on the prioritisation of single disciplines over interdisciplinary fields (Szostak 2002, Field and Lee 1992).

This questioning raises a number of issues to those in the field of Development Studies, such as the academic rigor, the theoretical and methodological orientations of the field, and perhaps even the human capacity of experts in the field to train others. Although the attacks are not new and they frequently resurface after a period of time, the trend suggests that there is a need to re-articulate the main thesis of what development and interdisciplinary studies is all about (Sumner and Tribe 2008), its historical development, theoretical and methodological course and major debates in the field periodically. This will help young scholars to learn about the historical background of the field, and at the same time provide space for DS seasoned scholars to pass down the vital values and tools they have used over the years in order to protect the field.
What is new, however, is that the attacks are from within the field itself, attacking own combatants instead of strategizing against the enemy. Perhaps it is a reflection of waning interest in interdisciplinarity which was at one time a top and trendy agenda in universities and colleges forums (Bauerlein, 2005).

It is unfortunate that the attacks this time around are coming from inside rather than outside, and this makes the work even tougher. In an ideal situation, experts working in this field are not only the champions of DS, but the first defenders of its turf. Insiders are informed of the logic of DS as a field, its strength, and the gap it fills in academia. Technically, experts in DS are expected to assess facts, and develop a roadmap that will be used to strengthen DS. As insiders, it is not expected that they will sabotage Development Studies but use time, opportunities and other resources to strengthen it.

The Case
As pointed out above, some insiders in Development Studies have joined with disciplinarians to argue that Development Studies should be taught by experts trained in different mono-disciplines, such as Economics, Demography, Political Science, Sociology, or Geography, depending on the content of what one wants to teach. In this case, the argument raised is that these experts, each in their own mono-disciplines, should bring expertise to students and not the combined crafts from different disciplines which the market and the students want. While students are looking for interdisciplinary programmes, it is argued that mono disciplinarians should teach interdisciplinarians. To advance the case advocates of this position are insisting that young scholars aspiring to teach Development Studies should train in a specialised mono-discipline economics, political science, etc which they will then teach. It is further argued that interdisciplinarians do not have sufficient depth of teaching fellow interdisciplinarians. The irony is that disciplinarians are encouraged to teach interdisciplinary fields of study with a hope of producing inter-disciplinarians. This argument can be pulled in several directions and therefore opens several questions or views. One view is that the argument suggests interdisciplinary academics are not good at teaching their own fields and/ or preparing the next generation of interdisciplinary academics. This is to say that interdisciplinary experts, with a stock of inter-disciplinary techniques, are not good in their own right and cannot be used to pass their skills to the next generation. This is a controversial view to a well-established field such as Development Studies. As Field and Lee (1992), pointed out, perhaps interdisciplinary programmes have failed to document their contribution in the academia or are slow in doing so and hence attracting this kind of criticism.

One of the foundations of this view, as hinted above, suggests that the best instructors of interdisciplinary fields are single-discipline academics. This is a position that puts all interdisciplinary fields - Development Studies, Population Studies, Environmental Studies, African Studies, European Studies and Area Studies in general - at an imminent risk of dwarfism. The central threat of this approach is that using single-dis-
cipline academics to run interdisciplinary programmes is limiting the growth of the fields. The chain of growth in the field is always broken, and thus creates a dependency on outsiders. Promoting this kind of dependency is sabotaging for the future of interdisciplinary fields, and it will be a disservice to future generations and the future of interdisciplinary studies and research. Given the current attacks, from both inside at outside the field of development studies, it is crucial that the old guards who have successfully groomed and protected the field over the years should be brought back to guide the young ones. Development Studies as a field is one of several interdisciplinary fields which are increasingly becoming more relevant due to the growing complexity of modern times. The problems in contemporary society require combined methods, theories, skills and approaches in order to solve them, as they are not outcomes of a single cause. What might be advanced in this context is how critics have been measuring the weakness of the interdisciplinary trained expert in teaching interdisciplinary programmes.

The goal in this argument is to help disciplinarians and their supporters to recognise the unique position, benefits and power of interdisciplinary studies in the contemporary period. The attempt is not to discredit single disciplinary studies or respond to their attacks, but to help them understand that interdisciplinary programs such as Development Studies fill a unique void that cannot be satisfied by mono-disciplinary studies (Feilzer, 2010, Bauerlein, M. 2005, Nissan 1997). DS is at the intersection of Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science, and Economics. It has components of History, Geography, Human Rights and Education. Persons trained as Development Studies scholars and researchers have a unique angle of looking at issues that cannot be obtained in a single discipline. Repko (2014) points out that students trained in interdisciplinary programmes as such are given the tools to think holistically – a system of thinking that takes on board context - and that such students are taught to relate the smallest parts of the system to the whole.

**Ethnocentrism in the Academia**

The concept of ethnocentrism in the academy is not new, and it recalls the long standing disciplinary wars in the past where different disciplines discredited others by pointing out their faults. In wars, as it is commonly known, the goal is for one group to subordinate the other and pose as the leading group. The goal in this disciplinary war is to paint a picture of how weak a particular field(s) or discipline(s) is. This is also the case with methodological orientation, where paradigm wars were fought over years (Mingers 2004). Quantitative methodologists have always worked hard to discredit qualitative methodologies, questioning their scientific and empirical robustness. In these wars, interestingly, both sides end up gaining more ground because the war tends to push actors to valorise their turf, improve their tools and approaches in justifying what they do.

In the paradigm wars, Mingers (2004) notes that wars have been fought for a long time, but at last a ceasefire was agreed at the dawn of the 21st century. He notes that
the agreement came as a result of an unforced force of better argument, or simple
exhaustion, on both sides, and both sides recognising the legitimacy of the other's
position. Mingers’ (2004) point is not very different from what happened in the dis-
ciplinary wars, which have been running for years, and some of us have accepted the
unannounced ceasefire. Both single disciplinary based and interdisciplinary fields of
study have a unique space in academia. While interdisciplinary fields cannot replace
disciplinary based studies, and coexistence is what has to be considered, it is not sur-
prising that some individuals are still running guerrilla wars.

This article does not make new ground in the disciplinary and inter-disciplinary
wars, but rearticulates key points in the case of grounding the debate and drawing the
parameters. What is known in these wars is that disciplinary wars in practice tend to be
beneficial for the attacked discipline much more than for the attacking one. Common
battle grounds have been theoretical and methodological approaches (Oakley 1999;
Upham 2005) and thus lots of refinements occur in these areas. These wars emerge
when members of one discipline are of the view that their concentration is the best
and begin to point fingers at others. This view might generate lots of controversies but
the key is that it helps to open up a space for the attacked discipline to have time to
reflect on its strengths and how to consolidate them, as well as its weakness and how
to address them. To scholars, criticisms are always good as they open up opportunities
to do research.

Disciplinary vs. Interdisciplinary Approaches

The establishment of disciplines as the mode of knowledge production in the late 19th
century has allowed single discipline scholars to not only control the content of each
discipline but also the organisation of it (Henry 2005). Single discipline scholars thus
feel that they have authority over the way in which knowledge should be produced
in universities and colleges - departmentalised. Of note here is that single discipli-
nary-based studies in academia tend to have discipline boundaries, specific methodo-
logical and theoretical approaches and techniques of looking and handling problems.
Disciplines are in many ways powerful total institutions and determine how their sub-
jects interpret reality, unless students are exposed to other ways of critiquing their own
discipline. Disciplines have special methods of collecting data, and analysing the infor-
mation, concepts and theoretical orientation used in interpreting the findings.

A discipline shapes and limits the perspectives of its members. Given the defined
discipline boundaries, it is suggested that the way in which issues and problems are
looked at should be defined along the lines of the discipline, which is not only narrow
in design but also promotes disciplinary silos (Repko 2014). Although siloization has
its benefits, such as bringing a deep analysis and insight to an issue, it has its own in-
built problems. It ignores other contributing factors that interact together with other
factors and have a confounding effect in the final analysis. Scholars trained in these mono
disciplinary silos tend to be ill-informed of other ways of thinking and approaches that
have to be considered when making decisions that are related to socio-development problems.

When single discipline scholars conduct research they use their traditional approaches, concepts and theories; this method limits them in addressing complex issues that demand an interdisciplinary approach and hence they leave complex problems partially addressed. Although there are specific disciplinary checks and balances, efforts to solve social problems from a mono-discipline carries biases from their respective disciplines. Looking at problems from a single perspective is perhaps the explanation why there are so many failures in solving development problems because in reality, development problems are not discipline bounded. Single discipline scholars have been very good at dismissing interdisciplinarians with arguments that they may know everything, but are experts of nothing and possess a shallow knowledge. The reality on the ground is that development problems are explained by a complex set of issues, not a simple few. Knowing one or two aspects deeply is not good enough because they interact with other aspects in a complex manner.

Inter disciplinarians look at issues from the eyes of several disciplines together because they were and are trained that way. DS as an interdisciplinary field borrows knowledge from Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology. Others include Human rights, Geography History and Public Health. The interaction of approaches from these disciplines enhance the ability of DS scholars to address complex problems facing communities such as recurring poverty, stagnated development, corruption and malfunctioning systems of governance.

DS gives tools of analysis that allow scholars to look at development problems in a comprehensive manner instead of running in silos. As noted before, social and development problems in the real world are not bounded by disciplines. Growing problems of youth unemployment, crime, crisis of values, drug use, weak governance institutions, civil wars, and similar other problems can be explained by various disciplines but it can be explored more comprehensively by interdisciplinary fields such as DS. As is the saying “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”, these problems can be better examined if looked at comprehensively rather than narrowly in parts.

**Attacks on Interdisciplinarians (Studies)**

Attacks on interdisciplinary studies by disciplinarians are common (Henry 2005) and they are not likely to end soon or in the near future. So long as there are these two groups, disciplinarians and inter-disciplinarians, healthy clashes will continue to occur and re-occur sporadically. The important question that needs to be looked at is: why are disciplinarians attacking interdisciplinarians? Do such attacks make any difference or contribute anything in strengthening interdisciplinary programmes? Although these are small questions that can be ignored, in serious academic debates it is important to explore the logic of these attacks. Partly it is because by doing so, it helps to look at the foundations of various fields of studies, development studies included, and the foundations individual disciplines.
As a unified group, members of each discipline are there to protect their turf. Discipline based departments at universities would like to recruit young scholars in their disciplines and arm them with their own tools - their methods, theories, and paradigms. It will be strange for them to promote inter-disciplinarity while they have their own discipline. It is on this basis that I am disturbed by attacks from insiders, the people who have been trained and are training in Development Studies. Those in the interdisciplinary fields are expected to attract new subjects, train the next generation of scholars and defend their turf rather than shooting them down. Thinking and reflecting more on these internal attacks produces a number of responses. Perhaps even after years of teaching in DS, the internal attackers have not discovered the strengths of inter-disciplinarity. Furthermore, the fact is that they joined DS from their respective disciplines and they have continued to remain faithful members of their disciplines over the years. They are agents of their home disciplines trying to recruit more new members by destabilising independent fields.

More importantly, the new trend where instructors of interdisciplinary fields advocate for disciplinary training of the next generation of trainers suggests that over the years of their lived experience, they have remained good technicians of their own disciplines rather than rounded scholars. While technicians need guidance from experts, university scholars are expected to be independent and critical, informed of new developments, and innovators and thinkers/producers of knowledge. The process of globalization has made many conceptual issues, theories and approaches fluid and complex, and leaves mono-disciplinary approaches facing critical challenges.

To promote their influence, disciplinarians would not only trumpet what is good in their own disciplines, but they would cross over and look at what is not good, weak or bad with their close competitors/rivals. These rivals are people who borrow and use some of their techniques, methods, theories and even concepts but do not identify or belong to their camp. Fields of studies such as development studies, which borrow from some disciplines, are thus easy prey.

As noted, complexity of social, economic, political and development problems combined has rendered specialists of different disciplines powerless in addressing these issues unilaterally. The condition today calls upon more and more students to join interdisciplinary programmes, in order to build the required expertise. Even the job market is responding to the need of interdisciplinary trained candidates. This is because such individuals have a big picture of issues and they are able to think outside the box.

Interestingly, inter-disciplinarians are not at the forefront attacking disciplinarians to argue for people to join their inter-disciplinary fields. It is the realities of the time that are pushing people to consider interdisciplinary studies. My home institute, the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, receives applications to join the Master of Arts in Development Studies from candidates trained in accountancy, nutrition, home economics, education, archaeology, history, political science, economics, statistics, sociology, geography, tourism, community development, gender studies, and social work, to mention but a few. Despite their mono disciplinary
background, they find development studies attractive and the right programme to pursue. Their driving force is what is needed to be looked at.

The growth of inter-disciplinarity is perhaps one of many unintended consequences of globalization. Globalization has produced new problems that are very complex and require an interdisciplinary approach to solve them which are superior to the present ones, able to take what is good from the current approaches and use it further (Kinchelele 2001). Mounting informality, youth unemployment, declining values, corruption, fundamentalism, extremism, radicalisation (the clash of civilization), terrorism, narcotic trade, organised crime, money laundering and intrastate conflicts (civil wars) are some of the examples of current problems which cannot be addressed by one discipline. At this juncture, it is important for interdisciplinary to stand and articulate the relevance of inter-disciplinarity in the present times. The goal of doing so is not to discredit others by pointing out what is bad with them (academic ethnocentrism) but to articulate the unique position of interdisciplinary studies. Dissenting against others would not do us any good. The fact that DS and other fields of studies borrow from a number of disciplines, reminds us that we should not invest in discrediting them. Inter disciplinarity is the way to move forward according to the dictates of the time and thus time should not be wasted in attacking others.

Are Inter-disciplinarians Doing Enough to the Society?

Although debates and attacks are common in the academic world of rival programmes/disciplines and inter-disciplinary fields, it is prudent to find out the reasons behind the attacks against Development Studies. An inquiry into this would shed light and would not only guide our responses to our rivals, but also help us to reflect and question why insiders and outsiders are targeting Development Studies. I am not suggesting in any way that DS is weak, but it is important to examine and take note of the lines of attack. There could be two explanations; one that inter-disciplinarians are doing too well to threaten disciplinarians’ space, and secondly that they are not doing enough to showcase their positions and/or relevance (Field and Lee 1992). The guess here is that inter-disciplinarians are a threat to single disciplines, for it is common practice now to look at development problems from a multi perspective angle, because development problems are not discipline-bound. The line of causality is not linear and there are several turning points that complicate the solutions. This reality puts inter-disciplinarians at a vantage point that allows them to work in numerous cases, if not all.

Looking as the second explanation, it is time to ask even more tough questions. Are we doing enough work in teaching, research, consultancy, policy advice, etc.? Doing so has several advantages, not only in contributing to solve different problems but also by bringing the visibility of the inter-disciplinary fields of study in the academia. Visibility is important to both colleagues and fellows in the disciplinary and inter-disciplinary fields of study. Moreover, DS for example, exists for a purpose and therefore we must always strive to meet that purpose - to question issues, policies, status quo and practices as well as to conduct studies that will answer problems of development from
an interdisciplinary perspective (Sumner and Tribe 2008). Given the mission of DS, the society expects a lot from DS and development research. Doing enough for the community would mean doing what the community expects, and that would valorise the relevance of interdisciplinary studies. That would not only be a contribution to the community, but it would also help to educate disciplinarians working in interdisciplinary spaces to see the relevance of interdisciplinary trained scholars and the depth of the rigor (Sumner and Tribe 2008).

**Disciplinarians Teaching Inter-disciplinarians**

The chief argument which is advanced by disciplinarians inside inter-disciplinarians’ space is that for the purposes of training, disciplinarians are good at teaching their own narrow disciplines and it is here that they would deliver best results. This implies that where expertise in a particular field is needed from a specific discipline, an expert from that should be used. Looking at it quickly suggests that students will gain good training from experts. Moreover, although it is not explicitly said, the encoded message here is that disciplines are more logical and coherent for training purposes than are interdisciplinary programmes. This is very appealing, but there is a fundamental flaw with this thinking. It does not require a good eye to see that teaching interdisciplinary fields piece by piece is not a good approach as the field is integrative by design (Szostak, 2013, 2007, 2002). It requires a fundamentally different approach and style of teaching, and it cannot be assumed that it can be taken piece by piece. Szostak (2002) point out very clearly that interdisciplinary studies and research cannot be held to the same standard as single discipline ones because by nature they are very different. Political science is not sociology or economics. Moreover, doing so implies that students of interdisciplinary fields will be given their training in silos from political science, sociology, economics, anthropology, public health and other areas since the experts are not trained to break their silos. In fact these kinds of trainers would not be able to help their students to think beyond these silos because they lack integrative skills. Besides being influenced by a single disciplinary perspective, students would not be well equipped to solve complex issues because they do not have skills of combining or working with several disciplines together. It requires a person who is trained from an interdisciplinary perspective to be able to help nurture young ones both in theory and methodology.

Interdisciplinarity has to be clearly understood to help streamline this argument. It is about the integration of several disciplines in order to better understand a complex topic that need to be addressed from different angles (Szostak 2007, 2013, Grosskinsky 2008, Sumner and Tribe 2008). Interdisciplinarians have their own research methods, and dozens of theories and perspectives to follow in conducting their works. Szostak (2013) page 34 gives us a good example of what is interdisciplinarity:

* A process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession. …
Interdisciplinary studies draws on disciplinary perspectives and integrates their insights through construction of a more comprehensive perspective.

This approach need to be taken by scholars, trainers and students of interdisciplinary programs, development studies included. According to this, interdisciplinary studies, unlike mono disciplines, are more comprehensive as they integrate different insights. The best instructors of interdisciplinary fields, I would argue, experts equipped with interdisciplinary teaching and research skills. They know the needs of upcoming scholars as well as the reality on the ground, and they can help to marry the two. Seniors even know the strengths and weaknesses of the field and how to survive, and thus it is surprising to hear that some seniors are against interdisciplinarians training fellow interdisciplinarians. Leaving this responsibility to a disciplinarian is not doing justice for the field, the students, nor the general expectations of the community. On a lesser note, it must be pointed out clearly that custodians of interdisciplinary fields are inter-disciplinarians themselves and not disciplinarians. Duties of a standard custodian are well known in society and thus we do not want to re-articulate them here.

A continued use of disciplinarians to train future experts in inter-disciplinarians fields has a structural problem that need to be looked at cautiously. Such trainers will tend to impact young scholars and students’ disciplinary values that have informed their learning over the years and hence expand the paradigm wars (Gage 1989). This will leave the interdisciplinary programmes young, immature and even dwarfed as there will be no research and development initiatives specific to advance the field (Sumner and Tribe 2008) and address complex issues with the required rigor (Grosskinsky 2008, Kincheloe, 2001). The recruited disciplinarians who promised to help nurture interdisciplinarians over the years have failed to change and they have continued to be mercenaries of their own disciplines. Whose mistake this is, is a question that will remain unanswered for some time because the intention to use single disciplinary academicians to train in interdisciplinary fields was good. A change will not happen quickly if there are not enough experts. Disciplinarians will retard and even dwarf the progress in developing own research methods, techniques, perspectives theoretical orientation and concepts. The presence of a good pool of interdisciplinary scholars trained by fellow inter-disciplinarians would allow growth of the field, and in this case development studies and development research.

References


Introduction: Ambiguities and Reflexivity in Development Studies

The diverse chapters of this book demonstrate the extremely wide range of concerns relevant to development studies. The variety and complexity of concerns result also in a need for a multifaceted pallet of research approaches and methods. Development studies (hereafter DS) as an interdisciplinary research field is characterised by ambiguities in its methodologies and research conduct. In this chapter we argue that these ambiguities stem from an awareness of three different relations that characterise DS: its unique relationship with well-established disciplines, its status vis-à-vis development policy and practice, and its colonial, imperialist and neo-colonial legacies. Each of these aspects affect the methodological choices and research practice in DS which continuously seeks methodological inspiration from a variety of sources, covering social, political and economic sciences.

Not surprisingly, the ambiguous position towards other disciplines had led to recurring debates about the true nature and disciplinary characteristics of DS. The methodology of DS escapes clear boundaries, creating ambivalences of what constitutes discipline in terms of relevant knowledge and proper knowledge practices (cf. Latour 2004). In DS, the methodological choices are, by tradition, based on the nature of concern rather than a disciplinary canon. Such a practice enables a multidisciplinary approach to complex concerns, but it also creates a risk of promising more than can be delivered. When attempting to employ a holistic approach and embrace everything from individual consciousness via cultural aspects to global economic structures in

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1 A thorough discussion about disciplinarity is outside the scope of this article. For example Repko (2012: 16) defines interdisciplinary studies as “a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline, and draws on the disciplines with the goal of integrating their insights to construct a more comprehensive understanding”. He distinguished (ibid. 18–21) interdisciplinarity from multidisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, where the former does not aim to integrate different disciplinary insights, and the latter attempts to go beyond the disciplines in search for unity of knowledge. DS, thus, is interdisciplinary since it tackles with “development” by integrating different disciplinary perspectives. However, many research projects in development studies are also multidisciplinary without an aim to integrate the perspectives.
regard to a certain concern, we might set ourselves up for an impossible task that tradi-
tional disciplinary thinking protects the researcher from.

However, it is not only the disciplinary ambivalence that sets challenges for the
methodological choices. Additionally, DS as a field of research is more or less commit-
ted to addressing global inequalities and social transformation, and thus, continuously
encounters the question of policy relevance (Green 2012). In addition to academic en-
deavours, DS often explicitly discusses concerns relevant to development policy makers
and other so-called stakeholders, who often expect to receive useful recommendations
to facilitate and justify intervention designs (Kingsbury et al. 2012; Sumner and Tribe
2008). This commitment is often questioned, but nevertheless, has a strong hold of the
field and offers a particular legitimacy in comparison to disciplines with longer histor-
ical legacies and clearer identity.

Finally, DS continuously constructs its identity vis-à-vis its ambiguous relation to
colonial legacy. On the one hand, it reconstructs the colonial trusteeship and the nor-
mative commitment of “searching for the best for others” (cf. Cowen and Shenton
1996). On the other hand, it upholds the responsibility and capability of research in
the global South to address relevant concerns with appropriate approaches. The need
for balancing acts in addressing this legacy is required both in the academic North-
South research practice (cf. Carbonnier and Kontinen 2014), and in the realm of de-
velopment policy, rich with global agendas and conditionalities (Gould 2005). While
development research is quite explicitly involved in both neo-colonial and anticolonial
practices, it consequently discusses the notions of eurocentrism and coloniality more
than other disciplines (e.g. Bhambra 2014). This can be seen as a particular strength of
DS and its potential contribution to other fields.

These three ambiguities – the first related to interdisciplinary character, the second
connected to the balancing between rigorous knowledge production and policy rele-
ance, and the third requiring balancing with colonial legacies – result into a continu-
ous identity work in DS. The multi-layered ambivalence leads to constant negotiations
on boundaries of different epistemic communities (Haas 1992: 3) in the search for
common areas. This negotiation includes, for example, accusations of simplicity and
lack of rigour in knowledge production conducted for the purposes policy relevance,
or the too complicated nature and “not-usefulness” of the academic research for pol-
cy-makers and development practitioners (Green 2012). Moreover, it sets particular
challenges for reflexivity. If the practice of development searches for reducing uncer-
tainty, and simple and implementable solutions, what is the stand of development
researchers? How do we practice reflexivity if the field we study seems to refuse to?

Reflexivity is considered an inherent feature of academic research in general (Mer-
ton 1949; Popper 1957), and of anthropology in particular (Clifford 1986), especially
since the “reflexivity turn” in the 1980s (e.g. Bourdieu 1992). For example in its Fou-
cau;:t-inspired take, reflexivity posits that there are no foundational truths to be taken
for granted, but all factualized accounts about the social are to be opened for critical
investigation as to their truth/knowledge claims, including scholars’ own conceptual
frameworks (Foucault 1972). Reflexivity concerns also the researcher’s relationship to
the subject of research, including the power inherent in the research relations. For example, the discussion on the “ethnographic gaze” in post-colonial encounters rewards special attention to the conceptual and actual imperialism in research practice (Ahmed 2000). A parallel debate brought forth by the feminist theorists (e.g. Harding 1991) has drawn attention to the notion of positionality.

This view challenges the traditional virtue of objectivity in academic research and argues that research is always conducted from a number of positions which should be openly reflected upon. Additionally, the so-called practice turn in the social studies of science has shown how scientific knowledge is a product of certain knowledge practices, referring to conduct of knowledge production situated in particular knowledge communities and knowledge producing machineries (Knorr Cetina 1999; Longino 2002).

Taking reflexivity, positionality and knowledge practices seriously is of utmost importance for DS, especially since the stands taken are not only theoretical, but also political with specific interventionist goals (Kapoor 2008). The ethnographic methodology as currently used in DS provides an interesting showcase for a reflexive treatment of the methodological ambiguities in DS (see reviews in Gardner and Lewis 1996 Venkatesan and Yarrow 2012; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Mosse 2014). Ethnography subscribes to certain knowledge practices, somewhat different from the expert and participatory conducts that Green (2012) associates with development practice. However, the ethnographic knowledge practices in DS do not always coincide with those of anthropological ones. Especially, ethnography in DS constitutes its objects and fields in different ways. Moreover, its knowledge practices do not necessarily entail the “lone fieldworker” in a certain location, nor share the belief in the possibilities of producing knowledge on intellectual basis, distanced from power, like the ideals often attached to anthropology (ibid.: 54). Additionally, unlike anthropology which tends to distinguish between actors’ and researchers’ categories and thus enables new interpretations, DS faces the risk of merging these two (ibid.: 44).

DS works with conceptualised issues such as “inclusive development”, “gender equality”, “project impacts”, and “household livelihoods” that have been already set at the beginning of the research process. Sometimes these categories also coincide with those produced by knowledge practices in development apparatus, which has the tendency to categorise the world through ever-changing “buzzwords” (Cornwall 2007). The ethnographic approach enables reflexivity on the buzzwords and opens space for the production of new categories also in DS.

For our purposes, a rough distinction can be made between ethnographic inquiries in locations where development takes place or is sought for, and ethnographies of development practice itself. The latter approach has examined how knowledge practice in the development industry tends to technicalize inherently political phenomena (Ferguson 1994; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Li 2007; Gould and Marcussen 2004); often ignores the multiple interests, logics, interpretations, and consequent negotiations, and specific power relations in a process (Mosse 2005; Long 2001; Olivier de Sardan 2005); and has a habit of overlooking the power relations between different types of knowledge.
(Ferguson, ibid.; Chambers 2014) and its very production of the “objects of development” in post-colonial contexts (Escobar 2011; Eriksson Baaz 2005).

The aim of this chapter is to provide personal reflections as senior DS researchers at Finnish universities on the ethnographic conduct situated in the territory between different epistemic communities, and suggest a few central elements about the DS profession. Oinas has entered development studies from a disciplinary background in sociology, and Kontinen from adult education and organisation studies. Kontinen’s experience is an example of research within the so-called development machinery, especially in the international organisational system of development NGOs (cf. Tvedt 2002; 2006). Her reflection is based on two particular experiences. The first is a long-term, multi-sited ethnography on the collaboration processes of selected small Finnish and Tanzanian NGOs in Morogoro (Kontinen 2007): The second is a more hit-and-run organisation development work on the monitoring and evaluation at a Finnish NGO and its partners at different locations, including Finland, Kenya and India (Kontinen and Robinson-Mondaca 2014). Oinas’s experience comes from her work on gender and health in Finland and, with more relevance to DS, HIV medicine. Here the focus will be on her latest study on voluntary HIV treatment counsellors in South Africa (Oinas 2012; 2014) with fieldwork conducted in 2009 and 2011, although backed with a decade’s research experience mainly in the same neighbourhoods around the Cape Town metropolitan area. In what follows, we discuss the distinctive features of conceptual reflexivity, empirical sensitivity and political awareness as shown in our own research conduct. In conclusion, we reflect on the disciplinary nature of DS and maintain that it indeed has a specific character of its own², even if it also is unusually prone to borrowing from other disciplines.

**The Interdisciplinary Ambiguity: Conceptual Reflexivity**

Certain features of conceptual reflexivity are part and parcel of DS due to its habit of borrowing from other disciplines. Our specific conceptual reflexivity is needed, first, to position an individual research project vis-à-vis of the theories and concepts of other disciplines; second, to clearly distinguish between the analytical concepts and the “buzzwords” of the development apparatus; and third in investigating the ways the “alien” concepts are encountered in the field locations. The first aspect includes reflex-

² With this article we, however, do not intend to close the debate on the more specific issue of what interdisciplinarity then means. The issue of whether development studies is an actual, even if broad, discipline of its own or just a space for scholars from diverse disciplines to meet, is an ongoing, unsettled, and in many ways fruitful open-ended debate globally. It was thoroughly discussed in the workshops of this project. Openness, of course, also is risky and leads to threats. For example, Rehema Kilonzo observes that Development Studies Departments/Institutes in some higher learning institutions in Africa are treated as coordinating units instead of academic institutions in their own right, unequal to more traditional disciplines defined in 1800th century Europe, even if since Julius Nyerere’s rule Development Studies as a subject has had a firm standing – a few courses are obligatory to all students regardless of field - in Tanzanian universities.
ivity when applying concepts from, for example, sociology, economics and political sciences, in the contexts different from those that the theories primarily address. DS has a tendency of applying existing categories and is interested in their manifestations in different contexts, clearly breaking from some of the most hard-core anthropological accounts on what constitutes good ethnography (cf. Agar 2006). The second aspect considers the reflexivity on the ways the notions used in development policy and practice circulate in research and practice, and how they are interpreted and used by different epistemic communities. The third challenge comes from the need to reflect the colonial legacy and the knowledge encounters between western academy, global policy, and the local contexts.

In civil society research, specific contextual reflexivity is needed when using categories such as “civil society”, “NGOs”, “social movements” and “rights”, which are all embedded in certain traditions of political sciences and first-and-foremost used to analyse western, modern societies, and are not necessarily able to capture the dynamics of organisation, for example, in African ones (cf. Lewis 2002). At the start of Kontinen’s PhD project in 1999, the notion of civil society and NGOs experienced their peak period in DS. A huge number of Northern researchers travelled to conduct fieldwork in Africa and Asia in an attempt to investigate local civil society. Many, however, encountered Kelsall’s (2004) problem of not finding a real “civil society” to investigate when entering their field locations.

Civil society is a typical example of a concept central both to the academic community and development apparatus, gaining different meanings to those knowledge regimes, and, functioning as the basis of aid funding allocations in the era of “supporting civil society”. In Kontinen’s experience, in the late 1990s the momentum proved to be illuminating for an ethnographer interested in the practices within the aid machinery. The notion of “NGO” had just extensively arrived in the Tanzanian town Morogoro, and there was a lot of enthusiasm among educated people to establish one (cf. Gibbon 2001). The ideal category of “NGO” as a voluntary, non-profit organisation open for everyone willing, clashed often with the founding members’ income aspirations in regard to the increasing aid funding available. The mushrooming NGOs combining development efforts with sources of income for the founding members, often consisting of same extended family, were soon condemned as briefcase NGOs and not “real” representatives of civil society. For a development researcher, however, proving the “genuineness” of civil society was not as important as examining how, by whom, and through which kinds of organising processes the “NGOs” and “civil society”, were constructed and established.

Additionally, in our fieldwork both in Tanzania and in South Africa, it became apparent how people on the ground were highly skilful in appropriating and using the global terminology. It obviously fitted their claims and experiences, or was made to fit by local interpretations. For the analytical purposes, then, a clear division between the North and the South, jargon and lived experience, was not a useful interpretative dichotomy. For example, among the HIV activists the language of transnational alterglobalization movements, alongside the home-grown but internationally well-spread anti-apartheid
struggle discourse, was prevalent and well-integrated to personal life-histories (Jungar and Oinas 2011). The social movements language increasingly adopted also buzzwords from the then emerging human rights jargon. During the early 2000s’ heated campaigning in South Africa, the HIV activists’ language clearly distanced itself from the development apparatus and NGO jargon and used a political movement repertoire, but also took a depoliticizing tone when needed, for example for international funders.

Language travels well and seeps into everyday life practices and organisational culture. The researchers’ task, then, may be not to simply identify categories and their origins used on the ground, but reflexively analyse the meanings generated through concepts in a contextualising reading. Conceptual sensitivity means reflexive analysis of the translation of a certain vocabulary, from the global academic, as well as development policy or funders’ discussions, to local practices, and the shifting meanings the very same concepts generate in local practices.

Empirical Sensitivity: The Ethnographic Method as a Loose Principle of Conduct

In DS, as well as in any empirical social science, conceptual reflexivity is always geared towards not only disciplinary theoretical debates or development jargon, but also to the context. Conceptual reflexivity goes hand in hand with empirical sensitivity. As the notions and guidelines used in development practice and policy tend to universalise issues, development research should be attentive to the complexities of different contexts. Green (2012) argues that the contextualisation in development work is often realised through far too short a period of participatory knowledge creation. In participatory exercises, contra to the original epistemological aspirations of participatory development (Chambers 2008; 2014), the so-called beneficiaries and other stakeholders are invited to participate in the analysis of the needs and design of the interventions through pre-designed grids that often remain alien to the actual needs and wishes of local communities.

Green (ibid.) contrasts participatory practice with anthropology that is characterised by long-term fieldwork, including living with the research subjects for an extensive period of time. For non-anthropologist development researchers, empirical sensitivity means often ethnographically inspired methods which, consequently, create a need for continuous positioning vis-á-vis the anthropological ideals of fieldwork. For example, long-term participant observation may not be realisable for DS scholars, who often deal with a number of geographical locations at the same time. Is DS ethnography doomed to be a second class, failed anthropology?

3 We should also remember that it is not only in the development apparatus where the politics of funding in regard to concepts is relevant. No matter how “neutral” and value free academia claims and wishes to be, the phenomenon of politics related to theoretical and methodological trends applies to it too. Engaging with more or less “trendy” theoretical debates may, no doubt, affect success in funding applications for researchers.
We argue that DS considers the definition of the field and the kinds of fieldwork conducted, differently from classical anthropology. Therefore, it attempts to conduct its empirical work in a rather different manner even if drawing from the rich anthropological tradition. The traditional ethnographic approach presupposed living in a certain distanced location, “field”, for a sufficient period of time. In contemporary anthropology, also, notions such as multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) have challenged this prototype. In research on development NGOs, the approaches vary from close organisational ethnographies of selected organisations (Igoe 2003) to multi-sited ethnographies tracing the processes (Crewe and Harrison 1998) and networks (Riles 2001), embracing connections between the headquarters of international organisations and remote communities.

In Kontinen’s PhD work, the “field” was defined as the international NGO development system, which was illustrated by four collaboration projects between Finnish and Tanzanian NGOs. The projects were understood as developmental trajectories (Hutchins 1995: 372) characterised by continuous co-construction of the object of collaboration (Engeström 2005, from the initial idea identification to planning and implementation in different locations in Finland and Tanzania. Therefore, the approach was ethnography of processes rather than communities, organisations or geographical places.

In Oinas’s work on HIV activism the “field” could, in classic anthropological tradition, have been the activist organisation, its offices and demonstrations in Cape Town, with perhaps a focus on the leadership, or a few activists’ everyday lives and life-worlds. But, it appeared to us that a more fruitful approach was to extend the “field” to the intra-agency of networks, ideas and practices, thus viewing the field as the shifting landscape of HIV policy, from the South African health minister’s statements to global activist lobby, media and public campaigning in not only Khayelitsha and Muizenberg but San Francisco, Geneva and Nairobi. This wider focus, or non-focus, was geared towards unfolding events that shape the social and material worlds of the epidemic, where activists are one crucial actor, but only one in a larger network (Oinas and Jungar 2009).

In both cases, the process and network type definitions of “field” led to messy and uncertain paths. Reaching the “saturation” point of data was difficult as the network of actors contributing to processes seemed to be endless. To reach full certainty on how activist politics are generated, what influences what and how agendas are developed is unattainable. In Oinas’s case, there was a palpable risk of romanticising activist heroism and the leadership, especially as we consciously chose not to investigate internal struggles of the organisation, but focus on the public agendas of the movement (Jungar and Oinas 2010).

Consequently, the fieldwork in such cases did not consist of long-term participant observation and “going native”, but rather visiting the field in various locations and working on the internet. Kontinen’s “fieldwork” included staying altogether 11 months in Tanzania, and included interviewing a number of actors and participating in the practice within “development apparatus”. This meant attending and recording hun-
dreds of hours of meetings and workshops typical to the apparatus, in various settings in Finland and Tanzania. Such luxury of time and resources to be allocated to fieldwork has never been realised in the more advanced stages of her research career. The second fieldwork under scrutiny here was conducted in a framework of a two-year research project funded by a Finnish agency, in between the duties of the senior lecturer at the university (Kontinen and Robinson-Moncada 2014). This “fieldwork” consisted of interviews and workshops organised by a Finnish NGO and its partners in Kenya and India. For practical reasons, the individual interviews were conducted during one-week “impact workshops” with those members of NGO staff who happened to attend the workshops, and took place during workshop breaks, breakfasts and evenings. The interviews were considered illustrative examples of the organisational culture of the international organisation, rather than representative of the national offices and specific locations. They also provided illuminating data, for example on how the Ugandan NGO staff attending a workshop in Kenya spoke about their work in a similar way with the Sri Lankan staff in the workshop in India.

A similar journey can be identified in Oinas’s choices. The first post-doctoral study during 2002-2004 enabled eight months of intensive fieldwork in South Africa. That felt like too short a field visit at the time, yet, can be seen as a luxury compared to the available time later, as a more senior researcher. Oinas’ data collection took two weeks in 2009 and one in 2011, meeting with the same voluntary HIV counsellors twice with a two year interval, and re-interviewing most of the original 20 women. An important backdrop is the decade of visits to the same neighbourhoods. The study does not qualify for any definition of proper “field work” but, important, especially during the second visit when the interviews reaffirmed the initial findings of the first round, it gave the strong feeling that interesting and informative data on an important development issue was being gathered even during these very short, haphazard visits. A short time frame can also mean intensity and focus.

Her approach departs from the ideal anthropological ethnography, yet, it has ethnographical elements. The data consists of short thematic interviews as well as daily visits to clinics and homes of patients. The interview study is informed by observations, embodied sensations, discussions with patients, activists, administrators and researchers during the visits, and hours of reflecting diary writing at night (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007). It focuses on HIV medicine, but attempts to follow the flow of events and the guidance given by the real experts, the people living in the community, as well as the experts and policy makers occupying the corridors of power.

The interviews are specific, very limited accounts that by no means bring out the richness of lives affected by HIV in a township. This was a conscious choice; an explicit wish to avoid pressure on the informant to tell an authentic, full biographic narrative about an experience of illness, but enable a focus on treatment practices that make HIV biomedicine possible, meaningful and successful (e.g. Oinas 2012). With a focus on the practical, the informants appeared as experts in everyday biomedicine rather than marginalised poor whose victimisation was (again) depicted by a scholar. The focus on practices of the research subjects to counteract victimisation and marginality
and engage in wider assemblages of HIV politics, including local, national and global networks of power was an outcome of both the research design and the content of the interviews (Oinas 2012).

The different conducts of fieldwork also pose different dilemmas in regard to the questions of distance and proximity in relation, first, to the subjects of research, and second, the development machinery. In Kontinen’s PhD project, interacting with the same NGO activists in Finland and Tanzania for over three years inevitably led to delving, to some extent, into their personal lives. Living in a Tanzanian town with a husband and two small children, driving a torn-out Toyota Hilux and giving “lifts” to research subjects on the way to meetings and workshops, and spending time together in local restaurants opened entry points to everyday life. The individual interviews provided quite an intimate space where people told their life stories in connections with the NGO activities, and were sometimes full of laughter; sometimes tears. A close, trustful relationship with individual subjects enabled also access to information about disputes between different parties. The reflection considering distance became also relevant in occasions such as research participants asking for funding for their children’s school fees, or NGO activists using research interviews as a cover story for an extramarital relationship. In such cases, a border of non-involvement in the personal lives of subjects had to be drawn.

Oinas’s more distanced approach differed from Kontinen’s; each approach representing typical, and justifiable, methodological paths in DS. In Oinas’s approach inevitably a lot of interesting data was lost. Empirical sensitivity in Oinas’s work, however, meant also reflexivity on what kinds of questions can be posed during fieldwork in order to maintain an ethical, rigorous yet ethnographic approach. DS tradition does not automatically serve us with a ready set of questions and angles, but it alerts us to sensitivity to a context; its clichés, history and multiple presents.

**Political Awareness: Unavoidable Power of the Research**

The third characteristic of DS, we argue, is political awareness. This means being conscious of the political elements at each stage of the research and development practice. With DS being unique in its more-or-less close connection with development policy-making, and the funding decisions made within the industry, researchers need to reflect on their position vis-à-vis the aid system at large, and the exclusions and inclusions in their research conduct. Development researchers are more or less part of the development system, travelling back and forth between the epistemic communities of the academy and practice.

In her PhD fieldwork, Kontinen explicitly attempted to take distance and remain somewhat of a neutral observer. However, being a researcher in between Finnish and Tanzanian NGOs and posing a working knowledge of Kiswahili, she encountered continuous suggestions to translate between the parties. Translation referred not only to the languages, but also to explanation of cultural aspects, donor demands, and in conflict situations, persuading the other party to understand ones viewpoint. These
expectations led to continuous reflection on how not to take sides, and how to deal with trust in multiple relations. In the beginning, Kontinen was at times considered merely a “spy” who should be talked to with cautiousness, and whose access to different meetings should be restricted, whilst later many actors started to view her as an ally who could be invited to join the “after meeting beer” with informal interaction.

Moreover, during the course of the research, the analysis of historically-formulated power relations and the notion of trusteeship as a legacy of colonialism became apparent (Kontinen 2007; 2003). This theoretical contextualisation enabled sense-making out of the sometimes quite absurd dynamics between the interaction of Finnish and Tanzanian partners. While scholars in other disciplines are probably likely to historicise and challenge silences and discourses in terms of violent legacies, in DS the awareness of history and multiple presences of a constructed past is constantly reminded and can be seen as a unique skill, an “attunedness” that comes through training.

Additionally, in DS there is a particular awareness of the politics of inclusion/exclusion when conducting research in locations that are traditionally marginalised as subjects of knowledge in global knowledge production. In very practical terms, reflection is needed about any potential advantages or disadvantages for those included in research, and the implications of the decisions. In Kontinen’s PhD fieldwork, many NGOs were disappointed if not included, as they considered research as an opportunity to be involved in international networks. In the short-term staff interviews of her more recent project, she struggled in order to interview everybody attending the week-long seminars as all participants expected their points of views to be included.

In Oinas’s research the question of how the researched communities benefited from the research was constantly present. At times, the participants explicitly asked: “Will you now go home and make a career of my suffering?” These neighbourhoods are saturated with celebrities and scholars, both foreign and local, creating tensions not only between locals and scholars, but different leagues of scholars too. Local academics try to remind well-funded Northern scholars that individuals cannot be rewarded for participation in research, as that distorts the possibilities of local researchers conducting research with small budgets, as well as pointing out the usual suspicion that monetary rewards in resource poor settings may distort information.

More often than not, the people we study live rather different lives from our own. Even in the case of someone studying her “own culture” often a class difference emerges due to her university education. Some suggest that scholars should engage the local communities in the research as much as possible (Appadurai 2006), while others argue that there is always an epistemic divide between the objects and subjects of research, and the task of the scholar is to acknowledge it and bear the responsibility for a careful, yet partial and inevitably limited interpretation (Lather 2007). Both approaches are possible, and in the concrete ethnographic work of DS, they probably overlap.

The inevitable inequalities when gathering data are painful to witness and embody, but cannot be wished away or changed by personal engagement however much one would like to be the case. Individuals can be temporarily compensated in terms of food, drinks and promises. For Oinas, the personal-political-ethical outcome of more
than a decade of reasoning during research visits to similar areas has been that scholars bear a political-ethical responsibility to conduct high-quality research with hopefully important outcomes on a much more general level than the acute needs of that particular community. The responsibility towards the community at a time cannot be more than what constitutes a reasonable attempt to be a decent human being. Acknowledging the desire to do more, and dealing with the emotional burden of not being able to, is part of the training to be a development scholar.

Finally, when engaged with organisations and individuals active within the development practice, development researchers inevitably encounter dilemmas related to representation and the potential consequences in research reporting. All writing has always an audience, and the message changes with the style. As development researchers the language of communication for these constituencies varies immensely. The practice of reporting back to the communities has gained ground recently, as well as the obligation to brief policy makers on our findings. These audiences require linguistic repertoires different from the academic style, and both have potential consequences in revealing in-depth analysis of the situations. At worst, the analysis of actual dynamics of aid interventions, for example, might lead to decisions by policy-makers to cut the funding because of the messiness and side-tracks reported. Therefore, in the specific field of DS there are situations where transparency in reporting might be compromised for reasons of consequences. One way of avoiding difficulties in being able to anonymise the organisation or individual at risk of exposure is to always collect data in multiple settings - leading back to the issue of depth and duration in ethnography.

The politics of writing have to do not only with ethics, as in for example guaranteeing anonymity, but writing and reporting involve also a more general attitude of respectful theoretical framing – tying back to the theme of theoretical reflexivity. For example, in Oinas’ work about people living with HIV at a time when there was no medication available for the poor, victimhood was not to be sentimentalised or fetishised, depicted in such a way that it was attached to an individual as a personal trait. The promise of a DS approach to powerlessness, for example, is that it is not seen as a personal shortcoming, as in psychologising approaches, or a cultural trait as in ethnocentric approaches, but something to be carefully analysed, for example as an outcome of historical circumstances shaped by global political economy.

Conclusions: Epistemological Leaks as Part of the Profession

In this chapter we have reflected on the research practice in DS from the perspective of ethnographic research and our own research experiences on civil society. On a basis of our reflection, we argue, that the “disciplinarity” of development research does not consist of a certain set of theories and methodologies as is the case with traditional disciplines, but is related to the specific dilemmas, relations and questions – epistemological leaks – that the development researcher has to tackle in their research conduct.

While, for example, anthropology can limit its objective in a way that makes it possible to characterise difference between its epistemological conduct and that of de-
development practice (Green 2012), for DS this boundary becomes problematic. DS operates in the moment of change, and the typical epistemological mode of operation is an examination of fluidity and encounter. All research, of course, includes constant struggle to shift between rigid professional practice and an open, curious encounter with the unknown, which also profoundly challenges the researcher’s knowledge and tools, but we argue here that these struggles are especially important in DS.

Disciplinary professional rigidity offers scholars representing more well-established disciplines a standpoint and a toolkit that creates a firm ground to ask certain questions – but then again, only these questions. DS with its multidisciplinary nature offers fewer boundaries compared to disciplines like sociology, anthropology, or economics. By its nature, DS demands us to tolerate the struggle between the limiting gaze of scholarly disciplines allowing casting scrutiny on certain objects and not others, and openness to what emerges in the “field”. At times, when our work seems too all-embracing, we may envy the rigidity and toolkits of traditional anthropology or economy. However, in this chapter we wish to suggest that by remaining in the middle of the struggle, and enduring the balancing act, we generate different – not better but different – knowledge compared to the others in the fellow disciplines, working in the same villages or NGOs, for example.

When our rigidity leaks it makes us aware of the epistemological permeability on at least three levels. First, we often feel that we cannot gain full certainty and be rigorous enough in our own research practice. The ethnographies we conduct remain incomplete because we cannot capture it all: we witness histories of the present, past events re-emerging, and traditions invented. The constant flux of events escapes saturation of the data. But, importantly, despite the sense of not capturing a totally adequate data set, we more often than not find surprisingly interesting data relevant to our concerns. Second, due to multidisciplinarity, DS grids are multiple and conflicting. We have to choose, yet without much help from the DS canon. Third, our field leaks; in the empirical life of our informants few constants may be found. For example, in ethnography of aid the intervention lacks boundaries in both time and place. A narration that simplifies and structures is necessary, but in the actual unfolding of events little is clear-cut. “Our people” change, both literally and metaphorically. In terms of individual experiences, every scholar needs to decide and justify in each project how intimate the relationships should be; how close to individuals one wishes to attempt to go.

Additionally, a DS scholar is obliged to take the political dimensions of her project seriously. It may not be evident in the data at face value. For example colonial legacy may need to be considered in the interpretation of the structures behind a failed development intervention or as a root for impoverished situation. However, even if preoccupied with social inequalities, it is important to resist taken-for-granted dichotomies of real local people versus the powerful policy makers. Rather, we can study the policy formation, lobbying, civil society agency and global connections as networks of power where there are no clear cut pre-existing divisions between the powerful and the underdogs, the good and the bad guys. This could even be seen in the HIV clinic setting, where one would assume educational and professional boundaries are at their clearest.
If DS does not prioritise one group only, but studies an entangled web of relations that constitute change in unexpected ways, we may study a focused phenomenon (e.g. HIV biomedicine). Yet the “field” inevitably leaks into other arenas, like the everyday lives in communities, the WTO decision processes, UN resolutions and global economy. We cannot allow ourselves to study the implementation of development projects only, or the view of the voiceless only, because our interest lies in a series of changes that are reflected in the scattered, sketchy data that consists more often than not of embodied awareness, observations, interviews, documents, websites and leaflets – the list goes on. The field is hard to define, and even harder to “finish”.

In conclusion, in professional DS conduct, each researcher is obliged to build a unique personal professional identity with methodological skills from a variety of choices taking into consideration the need for reflexivity, positionality, and research practice. We work between epistemological and methodological camps. In this chapter, we have argued that the choices every scholar needs to make include theoretical reflexivity, empirical sensitivity and awareness of the politics of research and its outcomes. Since development research does not offer strict guidelines, the explicit awareness and ability to reflect on the above-mentioned elements constitutes an important professional skill in itself.

References


Development Studies and History: Two Tales and Some Tasks

Juhani Koponen

The interdisciplinarity of development studies has pushed history to the periphery. There was a time when both academic and popular explanations of underdevelopment gave pride of place to historical and external factors, such as colonial exploitation and the imposition of dependency from global economic forces and structures. Now, those days seem far away. The explanations have shifted towards contemporary and internal – bad policies and institutions, poor governance and leadership, rent-seeking and corruption inside developing countries. While discussion on the respective explanatory value of the latter rages in development studies, history has been sidelined. Development scholars have left debates about such crucial themes as the historical emergence of global inequalities, or historical origins and evolution of political and social institutions, to economic historians and other scholars. Even worse, development studies has failed to come to grips with development’s own history. Our developmentalist complex – or however one wishes to call the combination of ideas, resources, organisations and practices that has grown around the notion of development – forges relentlessly ahead. Its self-understanding is that of an innovative, forward-looking activity. Whatever lessons it draws from its own experience are mostly based on superficial ad hoc knowledge. The result is that much of what appears new in these efforts turns out, on closer inspection, to be something that has been tried before, forgotten, and reinvented: old wine in new bottles. In its ideological commitment to provide knowledge useful for development, development studies has adopted the same ahistorical attitude and failed to reflect on its own past and that of development as idea and practice more generally. This arguably has led to what can be called ‘a collective amnesia’ in development.

In such a situation the first remedy is to maintain that history matters, and call for a greater infusion of historical knowledge with development studies. That is what I have maintained for a long time and will continue to do in this paper. This is the easy part, and few should have problems with it. But even for those who agree on the import of history, it is by no means self-evident when asking about what is the history that matters, and how does it matter? What do we mean when we speak ‘historical’ knowledge or ‘historical’ causes? If it were merely bringing in the dimension of change in time, almost all knowledge of development would by definition be historical, and I am making the case to the contrary: hardly any is. In this paper, I approach these questions by
briefly reviewing the outlines of two debates about history and development and teasing out some of their implications. I will argue that many of the questions they have opened up are still there waiting to be further tackled, but if development studies is going to contribute to these it faces some major tasks. It has to combine issues and insights from longer-term historical analyses into its present shorter-term, more localised concerns;¹ and it has to take seriously the history of development itself. I believe that development studies needs both a long-term vision and that sort of concrete empirical knowledge that history can produce, and it also needs some humility and scepticism that historical awareness brings with it. History, for its part, needs fresh questions, concepts and explanatory models from social sciences, and those dealing with the issues of development mostly come from and through development studies. After all, history does not explain anything: it should rather be explained itself.

‘Old Debate’: Rise and Fall of Underdevelopment and Dependency Theory

The original argument of what became known as underdevelopment and/or dependency theory (for the sake of brevity, UDT) was simple and powerful, and it still reverberates. The poverty of today’s Third World or global South was seen not as underdevelopment, lack of development, and the task was not simply to trigger and accelerate development in order to ‘catch up’ with more developed countries, as claimed by the previously fashionable modernisation theory. Rather, the sorry state of the poorer countries was the result of an active historical process of underdevelopment. The basic driving forces of differential development processes were located in capital accumulation on a global scale that were seen to accumulate wealth in one part of the world and drain it from the other part, producing poverty. Different countries had been integrated into the emerging world economy in a differential manner during the centuries of European economic expansion and colonial rule, and the consequences had been different. In the famous words of Andre Gunder Frank: “Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of contradictions in the world capitalist system.” (Frank, 1969/1971: 33). Or, as put even more forcefully in the title of Walter Rodney’s famous book: it was about How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.² ‘Flag independence’ had been toothless in the face of such formidable forces: the obvious conclusion was that overcoming underdevelopment demanded a conscious strategy of disengagement – even ‘de-linking’ – from the economic system that had been produced and continued to produce.

¹ This is what I have earlier advocated under the label of ‘multiperspectivity’, see Koponen 2005: 34-35.
² Rodney 1972. A Guyanese historian, later tragically murdered in his homeland, he wrote the book when teaching in Dar es Salaam. It must be seen as a programmatic work which does not quite do justice to the fine quality of his original historical scholarship.
From their earliest origins in the hands of Indian economic nationalists such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Latin American dependistas these views had in their 'marxified' form in the late 1960s and early 1970s grown into what seemed a more or less coherent theory and a formidable intellectual force. Its influence radiated widely. In European and Third World academia the theory had conquered the minds of many among the younger staff and students; and it was in this atmosphere that most of the development studies institutes and teaching programmes that are still operating in North-Western Europe and in Africa were created. This was so even in Finland at the time when I embarked on my road to the world of development. But its impact went far beyond the academia; it struck responsive chords among many practitioners and politicians. It was not necessary to understand or even know the finer theoretical points; imperialism and exploitation seemed to be the name of the game across the globe. The expanding international news coverage networks streamed graphic pictures of the struggles of the Vietnamese and Southern African people’s movements to TV screens in faraway homes. The international high point was reached with the declarations of New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the UN General Assembly in 1974 in the shadow of the first oil crisis. They took for granted that the Third World states held sovereignty over their natural resources and had the right to nationalise them at will.

The fall of the theory was almost as dramatic as its rise. Being subjected to growing criticism from the late 1970s onwards, in about a decade it crumbled down and ended up a spent force. In academic debate it was soon found that actually it was no theory at all; if anything, it was a motley collection of differing views concerning the origins and causes of Third World poverty and more or less realistic suggestions for the ways and means to overcome it. The same point was presented, on different grounds, both from the orthodox Marxist left and from the liberal right. In the words of an exasperated critic, although several Marxist critics had made much of the fact that UDT was not rooted in a rigorous application of Marxist economic theory, “unless one lives in a thoroughly Manichean world of proletarian truth and bourgeois error, the point is surely that is not rooted in any rigorous body of deductive-type theory” (Booth 1985: 761). For a theory, it was seen to suffer from conceptual sloppiness. It was not clear what such key concepts as ‘dependency’ or ‘exploitation’ meant. Also, the solutions suggested and attempted varied. While some advocated a socialist revolution, others went into mainstream politics or international organisations. One even became the President of Brazil (Cardoso) on a liberal ticket by defeating the candidate of the united left.

3 British colonialism was accused to plunder Indian riches through over-taxation, loans, and remittances and bring them back morphed into capital in order to further exploit and drain India by in the famous wealth drain theory, developed by Naoroji in a slew of speeches and publications in the late 19th century and brought together in 1901 (Naoroji 1901/1988).
4 For a balanced overview, given due merit to indigenous Latin American contributions, see C. Kay 1989.
5 Underdevelopment and dependency theory’ was a label bestowed by outside critics. Colin Leys’ 1977 article, reprinted in Leys 1996, did much to popularize it. I follow his usage.
The theory, however, did have a core belief, to which all under its conceptual umbrella subscribed: that developing countries are not going to repeat the history of developed countries because the conditions are different, and as parts of capitalism in the world system they are involved in exploitative global relationships. A key concept behind most analyses was that of economic surplus. As defined by Paul Baran, a North American (Neo) Marxist economist as early as 1957, there are two types of such surplus: actual, which means the difference between the current output and the current consumption of a society, and potential, which is the difference between what could be produced under given conditions and what might be regarded as essential consumption. Baran’s own views about this were clear. He thought that the principal obstacle to the development of poor countries was not shortage of capital. What was short was actual economic surplus that would have been productively invested. The potential economic surplus was large; the principal developmental obstacle was the way it was utilised in excess consumption of the upper classes, hoarding, and the maintenance of vast bureaucracies and military establishments. (Baran 1957: 22 f., 226-228) But in many other analyses it never became quite clear what was the surplus in question and which was mechanism by which exploitation was supposed to drain it from the countries concerned and produce underdevelopment in them.

For the early economic nationalists such as Naoroji, it started with colonial plunder through taxation and remittances of official and non-official Europeans, leading to a vicious circle. Similar sentiments were echoed in later literature, with the difference that while Naoroji, himself a short-time member of the British parliament, was at pains to recognise the “great, noble, elevating and civilizing” effects of English education and law and order, and suggested that the drain was an aberration, the result of “un-British” policy (ii-iii), the postcolonial writers have been much less grateful for colonialists. Rodney shot down the view that besides exploitation and oppression, colonial governments on the other hand also did much for the benefit of Africans and developed Africa. “Colonialism had only one hand – it was a one-armed bandit.” (1972: 223) Others emphasised that foreign trade was the main mechanism to transfer value from less to more developed countries, but gave differing explanations for it. The empirical finding of a secular trend of deterioration of the terms of trade between more and less developed countries, made by independently Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer, could be explained by the neoclassical concept of ‘income elasticities’ between industrial and agricultural goods.

Frank, in his early work, posited a mechanism very different from this. He saw the world polarised into a chain of metropolitan centres and peripheral satellites where the former expropriated economic surplus from the latter and appropriated it for their own development (Frank, 1969/71, pp. 33, 174-175). It was a powerful metaphor and remained such in the absence of a convincing historical analysis of how the chain actually transferred surplus. A theoretically even more ambitious notion

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6 I.e. when consumer incomes rise, the demand for the industrial goods (e.g. cars) grows more than that for the agricultural goods (e.g. potatoes). The trend itself has later been questioned; obviously it has been there but held only for certain periods and appears now be a thing of the past.
was called unequal exchange. The evocative concept was coined in the early 1960s by the Greco-French economist Arghiri Emmanuel. It is akin to the well-known merchant principle of "buying cheap and selling dear," but he extends this to South-North trade as a whole and brings in the labour theory of value in its Marxian form where also labour power is seen as a commodity having value. When it is being bought below its value in the South and exchanged with something that is sold above its value in the North, an exploitative relationship is seen to be formed as 'value' and transferred from the South to the North through trade (Emmanuel 1972). While this raised pertinent questions about the differential determination of wage levels in developing and developed countries, debates were drowned in the intricacies of Marxist value theory.

A further flaw quickly pointed out by perceptive critics was that 'underdevelopment and dependency theory' treated very superficially the actual social and cultural forces and structures and their dynamics in the underdeveloped countries, attaching neat labels to them without really going deeper into the messy historical realities or asking why the potential surplus was not larger than it was. In due course, it actually spawned some detailed research in the social and economic history of several developing countries – something of which deserves credit – but much of this was low-key thesis work by graduate students and took time to break publicity. Meanwhile the great debate was conducted mainly by economists and political scientists; anthropologists and social historians were few, and joined late. A main theoretical tool in this discussion was not the concept of surplus but that of mode of production, although in practice much of it revolved around one limited aspect: the issue of the degree to which these countries could be seen as having the defining features of capitalism. This rather scholastic-sounding issue in fact gained a decisive political and strategic meaning to those whom the answer defined whether the next task was to complete capitalism first, or whether the time of socialism had already arrived. Frank's bold generalisation, made on the basis of studies about more economically advanced countries such as Chile and Brazil, of the whole Latin America being capitalist was soon challenged by the observation that the colonisation of Latin America had been a feudal affair and if capitalism was growing it happened both in the ex-colonial masters and ex-colonies. In Africa, few dared to suggest that capitalism prevailed but obviously there were elements of capitalism around (e.g. Rodney 1972: 235). A more innovative use of the mode of production concept was made by a theoretically oriented practitioner, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the liberation struggle of Guinea-Bissau. His problem with colonialism was that it had violently usurped the freedom of the development process of colonised peoples' productive forces, and thus denied their active role in history. This was a suggestive idea that inspired much of my own research on Tanzanian precolonial and early colonial history (Koponen 1994, pp. 23-24).

In spite of its perceived flaws, the questions raised by underdevelopment and dependency theory inevitably penetrated the more traditional historiography of imperialism and industrialisation. In particular, it raised, or revitalised, the question of what empirical evidence there was about the actual role in which exploitation – however defined – and expropriation of the surplus of the Third World countries through the
slave trade and colonialism in European economic development, especially its great turning point commonly known as the industrial revolution. Why was it Europe that industrialised first, and not for example China which was technologically the most advanced region in the world probably until the 15th-16th century? Had the profits from the slave trade and the spice and silk trade with slave-produced silver and from slave plantations in the Americas gone into capitalist industrialisation in England and elsewhere in Europe? That this indeed had been the case was forcefully argued already in the 1940s by Eric Williams, a Caribbean historian who later became the long-time Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago (Williams 1944). More recently Frank, after having left Pinochet’s Chile and turned into a peripatetic world historian, suggested that the mechanism had been more indirect yet decisive. Only gold, and especially silver, from the American mines had enabled Europe to trade with Asia and thus buy “themselves a seat, and then even a whole railway car, on the Asian train”. Otherwise they would not have had any chance of competing there (Frank 1998: 277, 282).

In professional academic historiography, such views were for a long time rejected or neglected. Few historians bother to deny that Europe did receive raw materials, capitals and markets in their colonies as well as products from slave-worked plantations and mines in the Americas and profits from the slave trade. But it has been claimed that the significance of the colonial trade and the slave business appears economically speaking rather marginal, and the claims have been backed by impressive-looking figures (Bairoch 1986; O’Brien 1982, 1997). Most of the colonial trade was conducted by the Spanish and Portuguese, not by the British whose colonial empire remained a thin network of plantation areas and trading posts scattered on small islands and along the coast of North America, West Africa and India until the late 18th century when the Indian conquest began in earnest, and then Britain was already industrialising. For Spain and Portugal, such profits that were gained led to no signs of any industrialisation at that time, but were appropriated and used for warfare in Europe and invested in conspicuous consumption, including the building of magnificent cities – as any visitor to Cadiz, Sevilla, or Lisbon still today can testify. Scholarly debate about the origins of industrial capitalism continues to keep economic historians busy; emphases in explanations range from technological factors (Allen 2009) to cultural (Landes 1998; McCloskey 2011), some trying to combine them (Goldstone 2002). Meanwhile, a “new orthodoxy” has given up the idea of British economic transformation having been a compressed revolution of explosive nature between 1750 and 1850 and regards it as a much longer process unfolding across a quarter of a millennium, c. 1600 to 1850 (Woolcock, Szreter and Rao 2011: 26).

Despite the academic critique, some of the basic ideas of UDT have in fact been carried on by world-system theorists, such as later Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein and their followers7, but as development theory, UDT was finished. I think it was ultimately due to its poor performance as a guide to development practice. Both of its main streams failed to live up to their promise. Economic nationalism could not

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7 His magnum opus The Modern World-System has now reached the year 1914 with its fourth volume. For a shorter introduction, see Wallerstein 1983 and 2004. Frank and his collabora-
withstand the profound changes in the world economy which, ironically enough were set in motion in the 1970s by the same events that in the short run led to the emergence of the NIEO. The first oil crisis started an unsustainable boom of lending and borrowing of Eurodollars, which resulted in the debt crisis and handed the initiative back to the Empire. Socialism and self-reliance failed to produce prosperity in their milder forms (Tanzania, Cuba) and where ‘de-linking’ was taken to the extreme, the results were nothing but catastrophic (Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, North Korea). Capitalism continued to flourish and those who in one way or another chose to integrate towards it were rewarded, such as the East Asian NICs, China and Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the block built around it collapsed. At the same time, the boom of academic Marxism in the West waned. Marxist theorists were unable to agree among themselves who the immediate enemy was and against whom the revolution was to be directed. Scholastic debates about value theories lost whatever relevance they may have had. What may have been perfectly logical conclusions from the premises of Marxist value theory were not necessarily much appreciated by overworked and underpaid workers toiling in Southern sweatshops. Marxism as a whole was condemned as a variant of old-fashioned functionalism, in which whatever happened in society was explained away by seeing it somehow necessary to capitalism (Booth 1985: 773).

The ‘New’ Debate: Getting to Denmark

Now there is a new tale in town. Economic development is no longer about structural properties, capital accumulation, and expropriation and appropriation of surplus. It is about institutions, incentives, and rent-seeking. In the words of Douglass C. North, an American economist and economic historian, there is now consensus among economists that “success in economic as well as in political developments depends primarily on improving institutions.” Things like abundant capital and natural resources, or educated populations have not led to development success unless institutions have not put them to good use, North and his collaborators argue. (North et al., 2013: 1) In development policy this has taken the form of forceful promotion of what has become to be known as good governance. What started in the 1980s as a World Bank induced attempt to develop depoliticised means to more efficiently intervene in the internal processes of the borrower states (Williams and Young 1994), has grown into a hegemonic master concept that holds the promise of providing the key to the development of poor countries. While other developmentalist fads like people’s participation and local ownership have waxed and waned, the belief of the donors in the transformative power of good governance for development has held for a quarter of a century. At the same time, good governance has subsumed ever more dimensions under its umbrella, so that it now embraces all the good things from human rights and anti-corruption efforts to democracy and the rule of law. The belief is that if these are put in order, development...
will follow. Thus, aid to poor countries is made conditional to adopting them. Another North American academic luminary, the political theorist Francis Fukuyama, has used a Nordic metaphor: the contemporary developing countries and the ‘international community’ supporting them are facing the task of “getting to Denmark” – meaning an imagined society that is “prosperous, democratic, secure, and well governed, and experiences low levels of corruption” (Fukuyama 2011/2012: 14; 2014: 25), and naturally, but not noted by Fukuyama, without its consumerist economic base.

There is only one snag. It does not seem to work – the way to get to Denmark cannot be found on our maps. “Most people … have no idea how Denmark itself got to be Denmark.” (Fukuyama 2011/2012: 14) Development does happen in many parts of the globe but most of it takes place where the role of good governance, spurred by development assistance, has been marginal. The most obvious success stories like China and Vietnam carefully ignore its demands. The most heavily aided poor countries in Africa and elsewhere may grudgingly implement donor-imposed governance ‘reforms’ and show decent rates of economic growth with some improvement in a number of socioeconomic indicators, all most probably to some extent induced by aid flows. Still, they seem to have been stuck in basic poverty, low productivity and messy governance without a sign of imminent structural breakthrough. New ‘democratic’ political institutions are shot through with patronage and clientelism, and corruption remains rife. Donors continue to put their money in good governance in the lack of better alternative, but scholars are becoming sceptical. Although we may know a good deal about what makes for successful development, “we know very little about how to get there,” North admits (1997: 1). As outside-imposed reforms fail to understand the logic by which developing countries work, “they often fail to produce development and sometimes exacerbate the problem of violence” in them (North et al., 2013: 328). Or as two other high-profile North American historically-minded economists, Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, put it: “Attempts by international institutions to engineer economic growth by hectoring poor countries into adopting better policies and institutions are not successful because they do not take place in the context of explanation of why bad policies and institutions are there in the first place.” (2012: 447)

The search for such explanations obviously raises new historical questions, the most obvious of which is: where do our institutions historically come from and how have they evolved? And the question has two sides: it is not only why Afghanistan, Haitis and Somalias have bad policies and institutions but also how Denmark came to be Denmark? And although no direct link comparable to that in underdevelopment theory is suggested, might there still be some connection between these two master processes? Such new questions call for new historical knowledge, and a reassessment of old. One might assume that academic historical research must have produced libraries describing various aspects of state formation processes in Denmark, and even Somalia, and if these have not left much of a mark in development policy discourse it may be because few development scholars bother to read them as they take for granted that

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8 For introduction to a small part of contemporary discussion, see Koponen 2015.
their relevance does not match the labour input needed to burrow through them. And no doubt many of them are long and detailed and not seldom tedious; Fukuyama has a point in reminding of the popular characterisation of much historiography as ODTAA – ‘one damned thing after another’. (2011: 22) Historical studies are particularistic by definition; they deal with particular places and times and normally do not try to extract larger patterns and trends beyond them. And they seldom make their underlying theory explicit; sometimes they even believe in having none. Frustrated by this, what might be called a new history of institutions has emerged, which openly displays its theoretical underpinnings. Significantly, this has been conducted by neither by professional historians nor interdisciplinary development scholars but by scholars from other fields, mainly but not exclusively economics, of whom I, in this paper, discuss North and his collaborators, Acemoglu and Robinson, and Fukuyama.9

The theory on which the new institutionalist history draws is as staunchly evolutionist and market-oriented as the modernisation theory, but unlike in the latter, here capitalism is not expected to unfold on its own like a natural force. Intentional human intervention and agency and historical contingency play crucial roles. In contrast to the generic belief of capital accumulation being the basic engine in development, which of course is a core idea of Marxist economics but by no means confined to it, this is more of a Smithian argument of economic growth spinning out of actions of more or less rational individuals working for their own advantage through expanding markets, provided that circumstances, or institutions, are right.10 The concept of institution employed is stretched to the extreme – it encompasses all the ‘rules of the game’ in the society, be they formal (e.g. laws) or informal (e.g. norms).11 These shape or “structure” incentives – political, social or economic – that guide human interaction. This again shapes the way societies evolve through time and provides the key to understanding historical change. In addition to institutions, organisations are also essential, and North insists on keeping these two conceptually separate. Both structure human interaction but if institutions are like rules of the game, organisations are like players. Anyway, institutions and organisations are inextricably intertwined and historically transmitted through path dependence. The latter is interpreted to mean not only that the choices

9 North is often taken as economic historian but he insists of being an economist by education and background, and is a Nobel laureate in economics; Fukuyama’s disciplinary background is commonly introduced as political scientist and political economist.

10 To what extent it is fair to call UDT Marxist at all was subject to huge debate, in which its basic difference to classical Marxism became clear – the latter had a much greater trust in the developmental potential of capitalism. As for Adam Smith, this is a Brennerian interpretation, see Brenner 1997.

11 This is North’s definition (e.g. North 1990,: 3-4) Although criticised by Fukuyama as too broad, “encompassing everything, from the U.S. Constitution to my habits of selecting ripe oranges” and conflating formal and informal institutions (2011/12: 531), Fukuyama’s own is hardly much narrower: institutions are “‘stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour’ that persist beyond the tenure of individual leaders” … or … “rule(s) that persist over time … “ (2014: 6, 9).
of the present are constrained by the legacy of institutions of the past, but also that institutions give rise to organisations whose survival depends on the continued existence of the very same institutions (North 1990: 51-52).

Another hallmark of this approach is that it operates with the notions of ‘rent’ and ‘rent-seeking’ rather than those of exploitation and surplus. If there is exploitation in economy, it is seen as happening through ‘rents’ and not through any drainage of surplus. (cf. Rajan) This is a very particular concept of rent that has nothing to do with your payment to your landlady; it refers to an unearned windfall gain, incomes that are above ‘normal’ in some sense. In the realm of perfectly efficient markets, there are no such rents as the markets allocate the resources to the most productive use and the participants are rewarded justly, according to their respective contributions. But such a realm does not exist outside the most simplified economic models and ‘rents’ are seen to throw a spanner in the works: they introduce market distortions and allow some participants to gain more than their fair share. Much confusion has been created by the fact that this common ground has given rise to two quite different conceptions of how rents work in an economy. The good governance agenda of mainstream development policy is fixated with rent-seeking. Here, rents are seen as such windfall gains or excessive incomes that certain companies or individuals grab from market distortions created by government intervention, such as import licensing. Not only are such rents a loss to the society but their availability foments a scramble of rent-seeking and promotes corruption as the actors compete to gain access to the rents. The markets, and by implication the whole economy, will not function properly and development is blocked. Against this rather neo-liberal conception, those leaning more on classical political economists, in our case notably North, argue that by no means all rents are unproductive and growth-retarding (see also Khan and Jomo 2000: 5-8, 21 ff.). Innovation, for instance, is a recurrent source of rents. Under competitive conditions, the pursuit of rents from innovation increasingly leads to their erosion and furthers new innovation and thus Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. Government industrial policies may favour genuinely productive enterprises. Rents may arise also from redistribution of ownership to more productive hands, such as what happens in land reform. Seeking such rents is “ubiquitous characteristics of human behavior.” In this view, whether rents are good or bad for development thus depends on their nature and the use into which they are put (North et al. 2009: 23-24; North et. al 2013: 6-7, 336-338).

Building on this, North has, with his collaborators, constructed what they call a “conceptual framework” which purports to explain how countries move not only forward, but also sometimes backwards, along a continuum of ‘orders’, and how the transition from what is called Limited Access Order (LAO) to what is called Open Access Order (OAO) takes place. Although the writers deny suggesting any teleology, these rather convoluted concepts barely disguise the fact that this is a fairly traditional stage theory. It believes that almost all societies go through similar phases in their

12 These concepts are from North et al. 2013. In North et al. 2009 they were called ‘natural states’ and ‘open access societies’, respectively.
development and can end up in a basically similar society which, not surprisingly, very much conforms to ‘Denmark’, i.e. the ideals of liberal capitalism. It most probably overemphasises the role of violence and its control in human history. But it has some more innovative features, including that it not only declares that the working logics of different orders are different but also makes a start of elaborating on them; and that it gives a plausible and empirically testable proposition of the ‘doorstep conditions’ for transition from LAO to OAO. As all present developing countries and emerging economies, i.e. poor and middle income countries, are lumped together under the LAO label, in more conventional terms this means the transition from developing to developed country status.

In an OAO, impersonal social relationships, protection of property rights and the rule of law support open access and competition. All citizens have entry to economic, political etc. activities “as long as they fulfil the (impersonal) requirements” (North et al. 2013: 16), and the end result is economic and political development. But the path is long and tortuous, and shadowed by an ever-present threat of violence. No development can occur unless violence is controlled and managed, and social orders differ in how they resolve this task. In OAO it is trusted to a ‘Weberian’ state which has acquired a monopoly of legitimate violence as an outcome of a long historical process. In a LAO, it is much more difficult. LAOs can be (1) fragile, (2) basic, or (3) mature, and they can move back and forth along this continuum, relapsing because of outbursts of violence or political repression (including nationalisation). But they are all run by privileged elites who do not allow equal opportunity to all to organise themselves. They bargain with other elites in order to avoid armed conflict and form “dominant coalitions” between them. Privileges, such as exclusive rights to trade, or a monopoly on key products, generate rents. When their value rises and they are given to individuals and groups that have access to violence it creates incentives to cooperate, rather than to fight. Gradually, members of the dominant coalition find it in their interest to expand impersonal exchange. Elite privileges are turned into rights and the use of the language of rights takes on. Organisations gain a life beyond its individual members; they become “perpetually lived”. A major such organisation is the state, assuming the responsibility for the control of violence. These are the “doorstep conditions” for the transition from mature LAO to OAO. Building such conditions may take centuries; the transition itself occurs swiftly, in fifty year or so. While LAOs can move back and forth within their own category, once the great transition from a LAO to an OAO has happened, there is no return; at least so far in history none has been reversed.13

A competing approach has been offered by two American ‘historical economists’, Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson (AR), who conduct an analysis of global development during the last millennium and little more in terms of juxtaposition of “in-

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13 What historians would regard a major regression, the relapse of civilised Germany into Nazism and perpetrator of holocaust, is explained away by taking Germany of in the 1930s as a “very mature LAO” and see it to regress a basic LAO under the Nazis. North et al 2013: 14.
Inclusive” and “extractive” institutions. In their magnum opus Why nations fail? (2012) AR wish to show “how history has shaped by institutional trajectories of nations” and how “inclusive institutions emerged in some parts of the world and not in others” and (2012: 429). Political institutions are deemed inclusive when they are “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” while among economic institutions “secure private property rights” are central, since no one will invest and raise productivity without such rights. One historical example after another is marshalled in to show that where “inclusive institutions” rule they lead to “virtuous circles” of pluralism and prosperity (starting from England after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688) whereas with “extractive institutions” in place the circles turn vicious. Extractive institutions are those that fail to protect private property rights and the main modern methods of ‘extraction’ are seen in central command and crony capitalism (2012: 400). The latter are particularly prevalent in Africa but also met elsewhere, from Argentina to North Korea. Reluctantly, they admit that some growth may happen also under such institutions (notably the Soviet Union from the 1920s to 1970, recent China, Vietnam, etc.) but this will not be sustainable if they do not change. Extractive political institutions do not allow innovation, and by making political power highly coveted they encourage political competition and instability. The cycles, however, are not simple, predetermined cumulative processes; they can be easily reversed. Historical change is always gradual and happens in small steps through “institutional drift.” Small, initial differences acquire big consequences when they intertwine with “critical junctures” such as revolutions or the discovery of the sea route to America and India. By far the most consequential of such junctures was the Industrial Revolution; but the pre-existing institutional differences determined which parts of the work were able to benefit from it. Yet history is not destiny: contingency always plays a major role. (2012, esp. pp. 110 ff., 136, 180, 427)

From the point of the view of a historian, this approach is much to be preferred to the early regression exercises over 500 years with which Acemoglu and Robinson, together with Simon Johnson, embarked on this project. They traced “extractive institutions” by using such esoteric variables such as the mortality of European bishops, soldiers and sailors in colonies as ‘proxies’ and correlating them with GDP per capita figures at the end of the 20th century (Acemoglu, Simon and Robinson 2001; id. 2002). But at that time, they also recognised the role of other factors besides institutions, such as resource endowments; and in the definition of “extractiveness” one could even hear echoes of underdevelopment theory. Now all this has been hoovered into the institutionalist paradigm. Economists applauded the early contributions for their econometrical innovativeness, but historians were less impressed. Clearly they were left vulnerable to accusations of ‘compression of history’ (Austin 2008a, 2008b) and consigning 500 years of history into a big black box (as readily acknowledged by AJR themselves, 2001: 1395). The big book has the advantage of a much fuller and more balanced empirical coverage and the interaction between ‘critical junctures’ and

14 Austin (2008a: 997), not a great fan of AR, even claims that it has become “perhaps the most discussed contribution to the economics of growth and development since Arthur Lewis’ model of development ‘with unlimited supply of labour’.”
‘institutional drift’ and the emphasis on the role of contingency rescues it from the crudest path dependence straitjacket. But despite the narrative form, the logic is still that of statistical analysis. The main proof that “inclusive institutions” lead to economic growth and development and “extractive institutions” do not do so is taken from the apparent correlation between these variables (although the book has been carefully cleaned of any equations, presumably not to scare off the broader buying public). And ultimately their argument is monocausal and highly voluntaristic. They maintain that ultimately the poverty of the poor countries is a deliberate choice of their rulers. For reasons of their own, “those in power make choices that create poverty.” This happens not by mistakes or ignorance but by purpose.” (2012: 68) Such a sweeping claim would have warranted much more, and very different, evidence than presented here.

While North, Acemoglu and Robinson are economists who have written about developing countries and should at least to some extent be known in development studies15, the third high-profile writer discussed here, Fukuyama, though well-known as such, is more of a newcomer to these circles. So far he has been famed, and perhaps somewhat unfairly ridiculed, as a writer who claimed that history was coming to its end in the early 1990s with the triumph of liberal capitalism. He has since revised his views but not lowered his ambitions or dimmed his visions. Most recently he has produced two thick tomes on political order and political decay, in which he wishes to trace not only the emergence and evolution but also the decaying of political institutions from their earliest beginnings to present-day U.S. politics. On the way, we are even briefly revealed how Denmark became Denmark (the decisive factor being adult literacy supposedly introduced by the Lutheran church as early as in the 16th century). (2011/12: 431-434)

Political order means for Fukuyama the state, rule of law, and mechanisms of accountability (of which the major ones are parliament and democracy). These interact constantly with economic institutions, as political development is only one aspect of broader socioeconomic development (2011: 441; 2013: 40, 37). But the institutions do not unfold at the same pace; some precede others. Rule of law is critical for economic development; it guarantees clear property rights and contract enforcement. As the institutional interplay proceeds, intentional human action produces unintended consequences: different institutions often seem to be the products of a long concatenation of historical accidents that no one intended or foresaw. Corporations arise initially as religious and not commercial organisations. Modern administrative and taxation structures of the states emerged as a result of the need to mobilise resources for warfare. The point is that institutions may emerge and evolve for one reason, and later take on quite another, yet adaptively beneficial function. (2011/12: 449, 478-479)

Among our writers, Fukuyama stands out in regard to the temporal depth of his vision. He reaches back to pre-human times, to our primate ancestors among whom he finds the earliest origins of our political institutions. For Whatever Hobbes, Rousseau and neoclassical economists may say, human beings did not start as isolated individuals

15 In particular, the World Bank has taken them into use. Both North’s and Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s work was employed in World Development Reports of 2002 (on the markets) and 2006 (on equity and institutions).
coming later together under a social contract or invisible hand of the market; humans are social animals and they were socially organised from the start. Social and cultural evolution follows the pattern of biological evolution selecting traits among the available variation, with the important difference that human beings “exercise some degree of agency over the design of their institutions”. Kin selection and reciprocal altruism are seen as the two main principles of human sociability; their impact can still be seen in the prevalence of patronage and clientelism in our political institutions, and not only in developing countries. When the first humans walked out of Africa some 50,000 years ago, they began to diverge quite dramatically in terms of culture as they settled into a variety of ecological niches. But at the same time there was a process of general political evolution at work: culturally diverging people faced similar organisational problems and came up with parallel solutions, going through transitions from band-level to tribal level societies and further to states, and developing legal systems and institutions of accountability. Besides cooperation, also competition, violence and war have an important place in this schema. Fukuyama believes that human beings have a natural propensity for violence. Although greater productivity was an important spur for transitions, especially the transition from a ‘free’ tribal society to a ‘despotic’ state-level society was difficult, and for Fukuyama was far more plausibly explained by the needs for physical self-preservation than by economic interests. Further, violence has played a central role in the emergence of many institutions associated with modern states: sometimes “violence is the only way to displace entrenched stakeholders who are blocking institutional change.” (2011: 437 ff., quote 456; 2013: 524-525)

The Tasks: History of Development

Such bold visions over millennia are a far cry from the fragmented grassroots work in which the “rediscovery of diversity” drove development studies after its “impasse” in the 1980s and the simultaneous rise of neo-liberalism and post-development (Schuurman, ed.). Development scholars went into field examinations of various facets of interventions related to the new fads such as NGOs, rural development participation, gender, and sustainability. The ideological “counter-revolution” denied that there was any specifically a ‘development’ dimension in economics and mounted a frontal attack on all forms of state intervention; and radical scholars on the left now drifted into post-development, reducing all ideas of and any attempts at development into devious governmentality techniques used by Western capitalist powers to keep the potentially rebellious Third World social forces under surveillance and control (Sachs, ed.; Esco-bar 2012). Historical questions faded into the background. Only the world systems theory, with or without hyphen, tried to keep the focus on the long-term historical roots of development but drifted far away from not only the practical concerns of development policy and intervention but also the immediate Third World social realities. Its Wallersteinian version was, if possible, even more functionalist than UDT. Wallerstein only added a meso-level category of ‘semi-periphery’ into the otherwise basically Frankian metropolis-periphery scheme and continued to locate all the driving forces in
the metropolitan capitalism, thus denying any independent agency of peripheral social forces. Frank himself, for his part, ended in declaring that all notions like development, dependence and capitalism are all “procrustean and empty categories” because they are derived from an Eurocentric perspective and “have no foundation in historical reality, that is in “universal” history, “as it really was” (Frank 1989: 336). A few writers however, who, while being inspired by the basic ideas of the approach, took actual economic and social conditions and forces in the peripheries seriously were able to produce useful studies on the modes of incorporation of various countries into the global economy. A case in point is the German peace researcher Dieter Senghaas, whose work on the integration of the Nordic countries (Denmark given an explanation different from but not necessary incompatible with that of Fukuyama, with emphasis on free family enterprise and economic integration through sustained rise of the degree of processing of exports) has weathered the intellectual storms reasonably well. (Senghaas 1982)

The works such as those by North, Acemoglu and Robinson, and Fukuyama thus bring the long-term historical perspective back to the mainstream development discourse and make a new, historically sensitive contribution to it, and development scholars will continue to overlook them at their own peril. To be sure, their contribution hardly is as cataclysmic as claimed by the most ardent fans. The argument that time, institutions, and organisations matter in socio-economic development is hardly big news outside economist circles (and probably neither inside them; rather North’s contribution to economics has been to made them compatible with the fundamental neoclassical starting assumption of scarcity and competition and hence amenable to the analytical tools of micro-economics). North’s definition of institution is all too broad and blunt and needs to be elaborated with the help of such traditional social science notions as values, norms and roles (Portes). Yet his work contains insights, such as the suggestions about the mutually constitutive interaction between institutions and organisations, and the historical emergence of the ideas and language of rights from elite privileges and bargains, which deserve close attention. Acemoglu and Robinson build on the basis laid by North, and argue that if there was something in colonialism which influence is somehow carried onto the present day it must be found in the institutions, although they treat the transitional processes much more lightly. Fukuyama’s emphasis on the biological basis of human sociability and its influence on our present-day political institutions represent the kind of thinking that clearly, and in my mind deservedly, is on rise in social sciences and which our older dominant culturally-dominated approaches must face and tackle. All these writers rightly remind us of the darker sides of social processes which development discourse easily belittles or overlooks. Regression and decay are possibilities as open to societies as progress and development and historical contingency always plays a role. Violence can never be completely excluded. All give emphasis to human agency, although they do not always quite practice what they preach. In my view, Fukuyama makes an absolutely crucial – if by no means novel16 – point in that how our institutions presently work does not nec-

16 He builds on the famous argument by Charles Tilly that the European state formation was
cessary have much to do with how they historically emerged. Few, if any of them, were
planned for their present purposes. This takes us to the heart of the developmentalist
dilemma – the possibilities and limits of human intention and agency.

Yet, these works leave a lot to be desired from the point of view of historian. Histor-
ians take a certain historical process to study as a whole, trying to account for all
the relevant factors and weighing their relative importance on the basis of the available
evidence. They collect ‘simple’ facts from their sources, re-conceptualise and combine
them into more complicated ‘historical’ facts and make causal claims on this basis.
They are not expected to pick historical examples from widely varying times and places
to support the general claims while overlooking the larger processes from which they
are taken from. But this is exactly what Acemoglu and Robinson – and Fukuyama to
a lesser extent – do in their books; it is ‘story plucking’ in terms of Fredrick Cooper’s
typology of the ways of doing ‘a-historical history’. Another of his methods, ‘epochal
fallacy’, is relevant when comparing societies in completely different historical envi-
ronments. (Cooper 2005: 17-20) To be sure, historians are keen to periodize processes,
but their periodizations are outcomes from their inductive reasoning: the past consists
of innumerable amount of histories which come together in varying combinations.
Historical time is seen as differentiated; in addition to irreversibility and repeatability,
it also displays “contemporaneity of non-contemporaneous” (Koselleck 1979: 94).
And the historian’s approach to causality is different from that of a quantitative social
scientist. Rather than seeing it consist of individual causes invariably followed by their
effects, historical social processes can be seen to be flowing from a number of causal
factors, meaning factors that are conditioning, determining and influencing the flow of
events. Some of them may be regarded as primary, some as secondary causes, and they
tend to work in shifting combinations. The same causes can lead to different outcomes
in different contexts. In such a setting, an attempt to firmly attribute one cause to one
effect is a chimera and “path dependency” in the Northian manner is a poor guide to
help historical understanding especially for development interventions. “Rather than
a firm path … historians view history – the past – more as a flowing river of fluid and
swirling potential … never finished,” writes of a group of historians funded by the
World Bank to promote dialogue between history and development policy. “A policy
intervention, therefore, is like pouring a chemical or a dye into this flowing stream. It
joins, diffuses, gets diluted and may or may not change the colour of the water in the
intended fashion.” (Woolcock, Szreter and Rao 2011: 27)

I would also argue that, the fate of underdevelopment and dependency theory not-
withstanding, the research agenda raised by is no means exhausted. Even under the
present-day high degree of globalization there is no reason to give up its basic idea of
different societies not repeating one evolutional model way of development but to hav-
ing to find their own, different ways under the prevailing circumstances. This should
be evident to any scholar of development history of peripheral countries, whether pres-
ently ‘developed’ or not. A good start has already been made in the study of differences

historically driven by the needs of monarchs to wage and finance war: “War made the state and
the state made war”. (2011/12: 110-111, 327; 2014: 10).
in development trajectories between earlier and later industrialisers, albeit so far mostly from a shorter-term, political economy perspective. The focus has been on the internal and external determinants of economic development with emphasis on the role played by what is called the developmental state.\textsuperscript{17} Also, the old issue concerning the contribution of periphery to European development is hardly closed. Looking at the process of early English industrialisation, a good case can be made for the view that for some products and some periods the peripheral and colonial contribution was actually quite considerable. It is fairly clear that colonial markets had a dynamic effect in providing room for growing exports, as happened with British cotton in the early phases of industrialisation. For the role of the colonial profits we do not have conclusive calculations available, but if we turn towards insights from the chaos theory, from which we know that extremely small differences in the starting conditions may produce striking differences in the end results, it is advisable not to shrug off the impacts of any factors without closer investigation, however minor they may quantitatively seem. For raw materials, the discussion has been revolutionised by the argument of the American historian, Kenneth Pomeranz. According to him, there was not much systematic difference in the economies of England and China, or rather the most advanced parts of these, Lancashire and the Valley of River Jangtze, in the 17th century, but a few factors finally tilted the scale for England and against China. Some of them were internal, as a wave of technological innovations, but some were external such as the gains from colonial trade, especially raw cotton for manufactures. Pomeranz argues that the conquest of America made it possible for the British to start a large-scale cotton cultivation that would have been impossible back home for ecological reasons: there simply was not enough suitable land for it, and Britain had to acquire the needed “ghost acres” in America. Instead, Britain had ample amounts of coal; and combining these together we come to a ‘coal and colonies’ explanation: both colonial resources such as cotton and internal resources such as coal were crucial for the British industrialisation (Pomeranz 2000). And if we accept the new ‘orthodox’ longer-term view of industrialisation mentioned above, thinking the period of ca. 1600 to 1750 as the one laying the foundations for it, then the riches collected from the colonies through mercantile colonialism and supposedly put to unproductive use gain a quite new meaning (cf. O’Brien 2012: 525-527).

Thus much work remains to be done, and to tackle the above issues the task is now to combine and fuse longer and shorter term analyses and global and local perspectives. Yet, if development studies is going to contribute to the dialogue between development and history, further tasks remain. Above all, development studies has to come to grips with the history of development itself, and its own history; something that has been largely absent in the debates. As should be clear from above, I believe that the history of development is made up of many ingredients. While no doubt much valuable work have been undertaken in regards to some of them, so far it does not add up to a coherent picture. Global histories of long-term political and economic development – histo-

\textsuperscript{17} For a sample to start with: Amsden 2001 and 2007; Kohli 2004; and Wade 1990. The all acknowledge their debt the the pioneer of the field, Gerschenkron 1962.
ries of everybody, any time – have become something of a growth industry, and shelves have been filled by big names.\textsuperscript{18} However, these writers do not see development in the way it is understood in present ‘developmentalism’: as a complex of discourse and action permeated by the notion of development. They take it as a process in time, or sets of intertwined processes, with geographically and socially unequal outcomes. Historical studies that consider development as a complex are surprisingly few, and speak past each other.\textsuperscript{19} They tend to use selected historical evidence instead of conducting a full-scale historical analysis. The same is true for the few existing attempts to bring the “lessons of history” to bear on present-day development problems.\textsuperscript{20} They are prone to same tendencies of story plucking and epochal fallacy as the works discussed above. Our understanding of major developmentalist institutions is improving thanks to an upsurge of voluminous studies, but many of them suffer from an opposite problem, the ODTAA syndrome, being packed with empirical data at the expense of analysis. Their quality varies, some being meticulously researched and informative, others surfing more on the surface.\textsuperscript{21} Colonial development continues to inspire new work, some of it quite illuminating (see e.g. Hodge, Hödl and Kopf, eds. 2014 and Duffield and Hewitt, eds. 2009) and even development studies has begun to reflect on its colonial origins (Kothari, ed. 2005). But the field remains as fragmented as that of the rest of development studies. The task here is now, while not giving up the search for relevant empirical detail, to bring the various strands together and connect them with a larger intellectual, mental and material history of development. It naturally is a tall order, and the end result may not be a very glorious history, but only in this way can development studies help historical research to fulfil its greatest promise: that it will provide some historical sensitivity; awareness of which are the things that are easier to influence and change, and and which will take more effort and more time.

\textsuperscript{18} The recent wave was started by Diamond 1997 and Landes 1998 although Bairoch must be considered as the trailblazer. Somewhat different perspectives are represented by Gerschenkron 1962.

\textsuperscript{19} Arndt’s works (1981, 1987) are basic but somewhat bland. Nisbet’s fine study (1969), despite its title, does not really deal with development but basically with progress. Two major more recent and much more adequate attempts at dealing with histories of development, those by Cowen and Shenton (1996), and by Rist, do not even refer to each other.

\textsuperscript{20} As best exemplified by Chang (2002) and Reinert (2008).

\textsuperscript{21} The two thick tomes on the World Bank (Lewis, Kapur and Webb 1997) represent the former, while the quality of the 17 volumes of the mammoth United Nations Intellectual History Project seems to be less consistent.
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This edited volume introduces selected concerns in contemporary development studies from the perspectives of Tanzanian and Zambian scholars. The volume is a product of a three-year project Developing development studies – Phase II which was funded through a higher education institution institutional capacity building (HEI ICI) instrument supported by CIMO and the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The participating institutes included Universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä from Finland, Universities of Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and Sokoine from Tanzania, and the University of Zambia. The main contributors represent the young generation of development scholars who teach at the Institutes of Development Studies.

The book is divided into five sections. The thematic sections deal with concerns related to natural resources, decentralization and governance, social accountability, and livelihoods. After four substantial sections, the identity of the discipline itself, its knowledge practices, disciplinary relations and history are discussed. The volume is an inviting introduction to issues struggled with in present development studies. The chapters provide a prism to the contemporary development concerns that are to be addressed both at local and global arenas.