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How to deal with a difficult past? History textbooks supporting enemy images in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

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This study examines the national division of history teaching in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the war and post-war period. The process of division of schooling into three curricula (Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniak) is presented. Representations of other national groups are central in 8th-grade history textbooks used by the three national communities. 'The others', the members of other national groups of the country, are typically presented through enemy images. This study discusses the strength and influence of hetero-stereotypes of history textbooks and their consequences for reconciliation and reconstruction of a multicultural society.

History typically forms part of the construction of national identity in a society. The history curriculum is designed to tell the story of 'our nation' or 'our state' in different times. The rhetoric used is typically that of 'Finland' or 'Germany' doing something as an active subject of history. From this it follows that textbooks necessarily undergo a major change after significant political changes. In the last 15 years, this has been clearly visible, especially in former socialist countries where the Marxist principle has been replaced by the national organization of history textbooks.

Perhaps the most aggressive change in history textbooks and curriculum has taken place in the former Yugoslavia. Change has been aggressive because many of the new states that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia became warring enemies. Thus, not only was the Marxist principle replaced by the national one in history textbooks but also the group that used to be 'ours' became partly 'our' enemy.

Of all the former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the most complicated case from the point of view of history teaching and curriculum. Since the war (1992-1995), the three major national groups of the country (Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, i.e. Bosniaks) have used different textbooks and followed different curricula. I have analysed history teaching and textbooks as one case study of the presence of history within the society as part of a broader analysis of the meaning of history in post-war
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Torsti 2003). One of the text analyses concentrated on the presentation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in history textbooks used in the last year of obligatory schooling (8th grade). As ‘them’, I understood the other former Yugoslav national groups, those who had been part of ‘us’. One of the findings of the analysis was the centrality of ‘them’ in the presentations, which becomes particularly significant in the light of the definition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multicultural society with three official national groups in the process of both physical and mental reconstruction after a cruel and destructive war.

The books analysed can be seen as reflecting the history teaching and curricula in the war and post-war period from the early 1990s up to the 21st Century. Thus, we can talk about analysing war and post-war history teaching in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the following I will first present the textbooks analysed in my research and describe briefly the textbook check those books underwent, together with other textbooks used in Bosnia in the late 1990s, as a result of the intervention of the international community present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, I will present the main features of the representation of ‘them’ in each of the textbooks and draw some conclusions from the representations and discuss the consequences and effects of them within the society at large. I will conclude with wider discussion stemming from my research on post-war societies and their relation to their past.

**Materials analysed**

At the onset of the Bosnian war (1992-1995), the old Yugoslav school system was still in place in Bosnia, as were the textbooks designed for the federal republic of socialist Yugoslavia. During the war, each local area adopted its own curricula and school books. The areas under the control of the Serb army borrowed books and curricula from Serbia, and the areas under the control of the Croatian forces (HVO) from Croatia. In Bosnian-controlled areas, the production of new textbooks and curricula was initiated, reflecting the ideology of the integral and civic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Magas 1998: 4-5, 8, Lenhart et al. 1999: 11-12, Low-Beer 2001: 216).

The political and administrative divisions that arose during the war were retained in the Dayton peace settlement: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was divided into two entities, the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). The latter consists of 10 cantons of which seven are Bosniak-dominated and three Croat-dominated. RS developed its own centralized educational system and FBiH had a divided system in which each of the 10 cantons followed either Bosnian or Croat curricula depending on the dominance of one or the other group in the canton.

Agreements were signed and attempts taken to unify the curricula and programmes of teaching within the Federation and between the entities in 1999-2002, but with very few concrete results. The international community in Bosnia made education one of its priorities in 2002 and in November 2002 the strategic plan for educational reform, signed by all the ministers of education, was presented to the Peace Implementation Council which funds and
co-ordinates the Bosnian peace process. Laws of re-integration were passed in 2003 and there have been some signs that, over the long run, the educational system, which is divided into three in a country of 4 million people, might become more unified, or at least harmonized. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, education, as it is organized and conceived, has continued to deepen intra-national divisions and aims to create or consolidate ethnically-pure territories (Magas 1998: viii). Children are separated according to their national groups, and in some places one group goes to school in the mornings while the other national group uses the same building in the afternoons (Beecroft 2002). The problem has not been so much the existence of three educational programmes as that the programmes have so clearly served nationalistic politics (Mulić-Bušatlija 2001).

This analysis concentrates on the 8th-grade history textbooks used in the schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999-2000 school year. Istorija (Gaćeša et al. 1997) and Dodatak (Pejić 1997) were used in the schools of the Serb Republic (RS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The book Istorija was published and printed in the capital of Serbia proper, Belgrade. Dodatak was an additional booklet written by a Bosnian Serb professor of history from Banja Luka, the capital of the Bosnian Serb Republic. It was used in the RS only. Bosnian Serbs developed their own 8th-grade book (Pejić 2000) in 2000 which largely followed the structure and contents of the older Serb book. Povijest (Perić 1995) was first published in the beginning of the 1990s and different editions of the book have been used in the Bosnian Croat-dominated schools for the entire decade. Historija (Imamović et al. 1994) was written and published during the war in Bosnia. The book was completed in Sarajevo and then printed in Slovenia – no publishing houses were working within Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time. A new Federation book appeared in 2001 with half-Latin, half-Cyrillic alphabets (Ganibegović et al. 2001). It was mostly a copy of the old texts but now with half written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and it underwent only a few changes in regard to the previous one.

Based on discussions with teachers in 30-40 schools and the information available from the ministries of education in Bosnia, it appears that history textbooks also carry the role of curricula for history teaching—typically the teachers receive no other instructions or information. Thus, in conclusion, it can be said that the books analysed in this paper, from the 1999-2000 school year, represent the type of history textbooks and history curricula in use in Bosnia for about 10 critical war and post-war years from 1992-1993 to 2003.

Textbook check

In 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for recognition by the Council of Europe. One of the minimum requirements for accession was the withdrawal of potentially offensive material from textbooks before the start of the 1999-2000 school year. In July 1999, all the ministers of education signed the agreement to do so: The Agreement on Removal of Objectionable Material from Textbooks to be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999-2000 School
Year. In August 1999, a second agreement was signed which established the procedure for removal of the objectionable material: there was insufficient time to produce new textbooks (Low-Beer 2001: 219, Annex I).

The Council of Europe and Office of the High Representative, the Office established for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, formed a commission of trusted Bosnian teachers and academics who represented the three national groups. The group worked for one week behind closed doors with the representatives of the Council of Europe and the Office of the High Representative. The commission of Bosnians identified and issued recommendations concerning the objectionable material which international representatives of the Council of Europe and Office of the High Representative accepted with amendments. There were two categories for the identified materials: either they were to be removed or annotated. Material was removed by blackening the text, and then annotated with the following stamp: ‘The following passage contains material of which the truth has not been established, or that may be offensive or misleading; the material is currently under review’ (Kieffer 2005).

New books were only partly printed for the 2000-2001 school year and it is likely that many schools continued to use the blackened and stamped textbooks. When visiting three schools at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, the old books were still in use in two of the three schools. Stories were also circulating as to how easy it is to read the blackened paragraphs against the window. Thus, these ‘forbidden’ texts gained even more importance as the pupils took a particular interest in them.

The agreement to remove the objectionable material from textbooks concerned the primary and secondary school books in geography, mother languages, visual culture, history, music culture, music, economy and society, and knowledge of society. The books analysed in this research were part of this process. No objectionable material was identified in Historija, the book used by Bosniak-dominated schools: the book did not use terms or phrases directly antagonistic towards other national groups and the interpretations of the book could be considered historically tenable. In Istorija, the book published in Belgrade and used in the RS, one paragraph was to be removed and five pages annotated as questionable. The annotated pages dealt with the history since the new constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974, which was interpreted as an injustice against Serbs. The paragraph to be removed from Istorija (Gaćeša et al. 1997: 157) was deemed to constitute simply propaganda, not a problematic interpretation:

Through the Catholic Church and its fanatical followers, the fight was led against the Orthodox religion and Serbs. It seemed almost as if the situation from 1941 was repeating. Serbian people had to move out of Croatia, Serbs were tortured and innocent people were killed in the same horrible way as 50 years ago. Entire Serbian villages were robbed and burnt down, the Orthodox churches were destroyed, and graves and sacred places desecrated.

In the additional Bosnian Serb booklet, Dodatak, the entire part (5 pages) describing the disintegration of Yugoslavia was ordered to be removed. In addition, the page presenting the events between the two world wars was ordered to be annotated as questionable.
In *Povijest*, five sentences had to be removed; all were hostile to the Serbs and used such expressions as 'Great Serbian aggressors'. In addition, 22 pages had to be annotated as questionable material in that they systematically described Croatia as a 'home country', a view considered intolerable for a Bosnian-used textbook.

**Representation of 'them' in history textbooks**

The representations of 'them' in history textbooks used by the Bosnian national communities were analysed by collecting all references to other Yugoslav national groups in each textbook. By collecting all possible references I wanted to avoid the risk of a more selective and pre-categorized data collection and analysis and to guarantee that such a sensitive topic as 'nation' in today's Bosnia would be treated without risk of selecting only the examples and expressions that support the commonly (and even unconsciously) held views of different national groups. After a test sampling, it was decided to collect only the local references; any other references to nation(s) were rare. The 'local' was understood as South Slavic (Yugoslav). The following presents a summary of the findings.

**Povijest: Bad Serbs and dysfunctional Yugoslavian unity**

In the Croat book *Povijest*, the basic 'others' are the Serbs. The presentation of 'them' can be divided into two overlapping categories: one stereotype refers to the Serbs as a central part and architects of the Yugoslavian formations' considered negative throughout. This stereotype is of a structural nature; the Serbs represent certain (negative) structures. The other analytical category used here is based on the characterization of Serbs as a people or nation. The most common words used to construct this characterization include 'Great Serbia', 'Great-Serbs', and 'chetnik'.

The negative presentation referring to Serbs as architects and leaders of Yugoslavia starts with the description of the planning of the First South Slavic state and the position of Serbs: 'Serbian politicians ... wanted to carry out the union of South Slavic countries by joining them to Serbia so that in this way the new united South Slavic state would have a Serbian name— New Serbia or Great Serbia' (pp. 11-12). *Povijest* also mentions how the leader of the Serbs was not satisfied with the Korfu declaration (which established the new state) because it made it possible that the Serb hegemony would be threatened.

Typical of the descriptions of Yugoslavian formations is the idea of Croats and Croatia suffering. *Povijest* describes the formation of the first Yugoslavia: 'Melting into the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on 1 December 1918, Croatia lost its statehood which it had steadily maintained until then for more than a thousand years' (p. 13). The description of the first Yugoslavia follows for four pages under the heading: 'First expressions of Croat dissatisfaction in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes' (pp. 20-23). Later it is stated that caution in the First Yugoslavia resulted
from the 'existence of Great-Serbian strivings' (p. 29). The creation of the new state is described provocingly in a contemporary drawing or leaflet, considered to be 'from the year of the unification'. In the picture stands an army with horses attacking villagers dressed in national costumes. Many of the villagers are already lying dead on the ground and the soldiers are pictured as shooting continuously. The soldiers carry the Serbian flag and the picture bears the text: 'This is Croatian freedom!' The picture thus clearly presents the Serbs as soldiers and murderers attacking Croats.

In the three-page chapter entitled 'The position of Croatia in the chains of centralism and Great-Serbian hegemony' (pp. 63-65), Povijest presents the absolute misery of Croats in the First Yugoslavia, which is described 'as expanded Serbia (that is enlarged, Greater Serbia), in which they [Serbs] felt and behaved like Great-Serbs, pressing and tyrannizing other nations'. Povijest also mentions how Serbs enjoyed all important positions from the beginning and the ratio of Serbs to Croats in public state positions is listed separately. In the description of the economy of the First Yugoslavia, Povijest reports that Serbs enjoyed all the benefits while Croats suffered when the value of the currency was changed. Finally, no governmental funds were allocated to developing Zagreb, capital of Croatia, but all the money went instead to the development of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.

In total, Povijest devotes 41 pages (Historija, 23 pages; and Istorija, 15 pages) to local events in the inter-war years, thus the description is very detailed. The basic message of the period is that the system was in all possible ways detrimental to Croats because the Great-Serbian regime, and hegemony, ruled unfairly.

In the Second Yugoslavia, the word 'communist' is emphasized and they are clearly presented as 'others/Them'. The position of Croatia in the new Yugoslavia is first discussed structurally and then interpreted as only formally a federal state:

The power and state arrangements of newly created Yugoslavia were arranged according to the Soviet model as a centralized communist state with inherited Serbian supremacy. In such a state, national manifestation was smothered, especially that of non-Serb nations. (p. 129)

Serb privileges are contrasted with the position of Croats:

In the Federal Nations' Republic of Yugoslavia, in which national equality was also guaranteed with the constitution, Serbs were 'more equal' (more privileged). Serb privileges in the public services were visible throughout Croatia, and the Croats, in the name of ostensible 'brotherhood and unity', had to tolerate their own inequality. (p. 130)

The presentation of Serbs as unfairly privileged in communist Yugoslavia is characteristic. Povijest continues the description of Serbs in socialist Yugoslavia, describing how agrarian reforms caused more Serbs to move to Croatia, 'colonization' (p. 134). Finally, according to Povijest, mainly Serbs and Montenegrins worked in Yugoslav embassies abroad while all the Croats abroad were considered ustašas (the ustaša movement headed the puppet Croat state under German and Italian support during the Second World War) (p. 137). With regard to the 1990s, Povijest once more connects the structural state formations to the Serbs when it recounts how
Serbia introduced a special customs fees on Croatian and Slovene products (p. 147).

As a second analytical category for analysing the 'enemy' image of Serbs in the Croat book, I used the general characterization of Serbs. The presentation of Serbs is negative throughout and the most commonly used references are 'Greater Serbia' and 'Great-Serbs'. Generally, the language used is often colourful and expressive. In a detailed description of the incident, the person who shot the Croat representatives in parliament with a pistol in 1928 is said to have sought 'to protect the interest of the Serbian nation, the interests of their fatherland' (pp. 42-43). After the shooting he shouted 'Long Live Greater Serbia'. Moreover, Povijest indicates that the shooter was treated extremely well in prison and his wife given a special pension. According to Povijest, the assassination showed 'the extreme brutality of Great-Serbian hegemony in the kingdom of SHS'.

In the chapters on the inter-war years, the permanent subjects of the text include 'Serbian hegemony', 'Great Serbs', and 'the Great Serbian regime': the Great Serbs 'persecuted Croats peasants for not wanting to vote'; 'the Great Serbs were persistently against equality'; and so forth. One page displays a picture with coffins of Croat peasants shot by 'Great Serbian gunmen' with the picture caption entitled 'The sacrifices of Stibinja' (pp. 46, 66-69). The book fails, however, to identify Great Serbia, or who the Great Serbs are.

Regarding the period of the Second World War, the common group of 'them', and the negative actors in Povijest, is the group described as 'occupiers, ustašas and chetniks' (e.g. pp. 97-98). In the chapter 'Croatia at the end and immediately after the end of the Second World War' the 'chetnik terror' is presented separately and in detail, and with a direct connection to Serbs. The most gloating description emphasizing the brutality and cruelties of the others is the two-page story of Bleiburg. Here 'they' are the partisans, but the passage specifically notes how the Serbs formed the majority of the partisans (p. 112): 'Before handing over or capturing those masses of soldiers and civilians, partisans (predominantly under the command of honoured officers of Serbian nationality) committed horrible, evil crimes'. The emotional references to the Serbs during the socialist Yugoslavia period (which we previously saw presented as a negative system throughout) are related to the relation between Croats and ustašas:

To fetter and frustrate the Croats even more, they imposed the unfair burden of ustaša war crimes. The number of ustaša sacrifices was so exaggerated that it appeared as though in Jasenovac alone [i.e. the most famous ustaša camp] more Serbs were killed than the number of human sacrifices during the war in the whole of Yugoslavia. (p. 129)

In the presentation of the 1980s, the description of Serbs as Great Serbian nationalists intensifies (p. 140). Povijest mentions how the Serbs were dissatisfied after the constitution of 1974, but managed finally to change it in 1988. Even that, however, was not enough for a Serbia that sought to strengthen state centralization in order to realize 'its hegemonic, Great Serbian interests and weight'. According to Povijest, all this was proved by the anniversary celebration in 1989 of the 600th anniversary of the
Kosovo battle in 1389. As part of the celebration the pretend coffin of Prince Lazarus was carried through Serbian cities and villages.

In the part describing the events of the 1990s (pp. 150-152), the thoroughly anti-Serb presentation spares no words. The chapter entitled ‘The war of Great-Serbian Power against Croatia’ begins by presenting both Yugoslavias as Great Serbian projects. It mentions that the Great Serbian politicians were alarmed when socialist Yugoslavia started to decay. From that point on, Povijest describes the events with constant references to Serbs. The following presents a sample of the expressions used:

- They [i.e. Serbs] all talked openly about the creation of Great Serbia, which would, as they imagined in their lust for foreign territories, include BiH and large parts of Croatia.
- In their oppressor-like expansionism, Great-Serbs [i.e. followers of the idea of creating Greater Serbia] got away with the politics of genocide in those areas stated for the creation of the ethnically-clean area (which meant expelling or killing Croats, Muslims, and all remaining non-Serbian national groups in those areas, so that only Serbs would remain).
- Great-Serbs, rebellious Serbs in Croatia, spread various untruths to justify their procedures with these powerful fabrications.
- They emphasized that Serbs were ‘jeopardized’, but nobody and nothing jeopardized them. On the contrary, they had jeopardized peace, order, security and the lives of others with their barricades, attacks, robberies, and assassinations.

The rebellious Serbs were a ‘barehanded’, unarmed nation. Yet those rebels were armed not only with light weapons, but with heavy arms also, which they had got from Serbia and from the so-called confederal ‘Yugoslavian people’s army’.

- Serb terrorists and the so-called ‘Yugoslavian people’s army’ (under the command of the Great Serbian generals and politicians) committed many and more crimes in Croatia.
- In their hatred towards everything which is Croatian, the Great Serbs tried to kill as many people and destroy as many material goods as possible.
- They slaughtered, shot, hung, massacred, robbed, burned, and transported people to numerous collective camps not only in Glin and Knin, but also elsewhere, even in the territory of Serbia.
- Serbia, which started, supported, and managed it all (with the help of its terrorist groups, the so-called ‘Yugoslavian people’s army’ and their public media) maintained, and deceived the world into believing, that it is not at war. (pp. 150-152)

Through the Greater Serbian idea, Povijest concentrates on portraying the Serbs as expansionist and having a lust for territories. The acts of Serbs are presented as violent and harsh, thus constructing the idea of barbaric Serbs. Povijest’s description also includes the presentation of Serbs’ self-image as consciously false, trying to establish an image of jeopardized and unarmed victims not at war. Thus, Povijest describes the Serb strategy as one of
presenting themselves as victims; their hatred towards Croats is seen as the Serb motive for war.

**Istorija: Serbs' anti-Croat spirit**

The presentation of other South Slav nations in the Serb-used textbook *Istorija* focuses on the negative description of Croats. Another group mentioned, mainly in the context of the last 30 years, is Albanians. Except for Croats and Albanians, other national groups—except for the Montenegrins, who are seen as parallel to Serbs throughout the book—barely receive mention. The anti-Croat presentation concentrates on two issues: the ustaša state and the Catholic Church. The references to Croats before the Second World War are insignificant; they do not conform to any particular pattern and were neither constant nor consistent.

For their part in the Second World War, the Croats are described as traitors (Gaceša et al. 1997: 103). The language hardens and negative references to Croats intensify when *Istorija* comes to describe the ustaša state (Gaceša et al. 1997: 106):

The ustašas, being extreme nationalists, chauvinists, and racists, tried to build their country and its institutions based on the example of Hitler's Germany. They would use all possible methods to create an ethnically pure state. They would say that the Serbs were different from the Croats in terms of religion and race, and this is why they liquidated them, converted them, and expelled them from the country.

Here, *Istorija* describes the Croat ustašas as destroying other nations, and with such expressions as 'racist' and 'chauvinist'. The crimes committed by ustašas are described vividly and in detail. In 1942, 'Besides these mass killings, hundreds of women, children and old people were sent to concentration camps—the camps of death—and most of these were in the territory of the Independent Croatian Country'. The reference to Croats is clear when discussion involves 'the Croatian Country'. *Istorija* also presents the Jasenovac camp in detail as 'the camp of death' which will forever remain in the memory of the Serbian people. Referring to ustašas as subjects, *Istorija* comments that 'they' called the camp 'the concentration and work camp of Jasenovac' and that 'they' buried bodies in mass graves (pp. 120-121).

A separate chapter concentrates on religions under the title 'Religions in Yugoslavia: Reasons for division and quarrels on religious grounds' (p. 96). The chapter emphasizes how the different attitudes of the churches were significant during the Second World War. The Catholics (Croats) are strongly blamed: 'The Roman Catholic Church, and to some extent the Muslim organization, wanted Yugoslavia to fall apart and they supported the occupation, the establishment of a Croatian state and genocide of the Serbs in it'. *Istorija* tells how the Orthodox patriarch was kept in jail in the Dachau concentration camp, and how more than 200 Orthodox priests were also murdered 'in this massacre'. The Roman Catholic Church did not blame anyone. On the contrary, it tried to convert a large number of Serbs during difficult war.
conditions to Roman Catholicism. When discussing the ustaša movement, Istorija also emphasizes (p. 106) how the highest representatives of the Catholic Church never even tried to say anything against the ustaša. Thus, here the Catholic Church and the Croatian state are connected, with the church presented as supporting the ustaša state. The chapter on religions in Yugoslavia concludes by linking the presentation of the Catholic Church to the events in recent history:

the hostile attitude of the Roman Catholic church towards Yugoslavia has not changed much during its 70 years of existence ... The Roman Catholic church also thought that the rights of Roman Catholics would be in danger because they lived in a country where most of the people were Orthodox. This is why the Vatican was among the first to accept the separation of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia. (p. 96)

The most outrightly hostile language is, however, used when describing the actions of Croats and Catholics in the 1990s:

The role of the Vatican’s politics in the ‘Yugoslav syndrome’ is also significant. The fight was led against the Orthodox religion and against Serbs with the help of the Catholic Church and its fanatical followers. It seemed almost as though the situation from 1941 was repeating. Serbian people had to flee from Croatia. Serbs were tortured and innocent people were killed in the same horrible way as 50 years ago. (p. 157)

The other enemy group in Istorija, the Albanians, are mainly referred to negatively in the presentations of the last 30 years. Regarding the 1974 constitution, Istorija states that ‘Albanian separatists pressured Serbs and Montenegrins to leave their property and to move out in order for Kosovo and Metohija to be ethnically clean’ (pp. 153-154). The same description is repeated later, where Istorija mentions how a secret separatist organization later named ‘The Kosovo alternative’ started working and ‘still works to tear down the constitutional organization in Serbia and Yugoslavia’. The education system became Albanian, as well as local television, and that children started considering Albania their home country instead of Yugoslavia. ‘The history has been falsified for a long period and the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were shown uncritically, and Serbia and Yugoslavia were blamed for the low standard of living’ (pp. 154-155).

Finally, Istorija refers to the Albanians as it tells how the spread of nationalism was first observed in Kosovo and Metohija in 1981, when the ‘Albanian masses, according to the instructions of separatists and secessionists, acted very aggressively, demanding their republic’ (p. 155). Thus, the presentation of Albanians is entirely negative.

**Dodatak: Croats hating the Serbs**

As in Istorija, the negative references to ‘them’ in the Bosnian Serb additional booklet for history teaching, Dodatak, mainly involve Croats, but also Muslims. Before the First World War, when describing magazines published in BiH, Dodatak mentions (Pejić 1997: 16) the Croatian Diary which ‘wrote and asked people to hate Serbs and Yugoslavia in general’.
After the assassination of the Austrian Prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the beginnings of the First World War, "Dodatok" tells how the Croats and Muslims robbed and demolished the shops of the Serbs. A magazine entitled "Croatia" wrote: 'People are declaring a life-or-death struggle over the Serbs and their exile from the country. We have to deal with them once and for all and destroy them. The Serbs are angry snakes and you are safe only when you kill them!' (p. 22).

In the chapter on the events in Croatia in the 1990s, the Croats are referred to as 'ustaša' several times. "Dodatok" talks about 'ustaša methods', and a new country that 'functioned in all areas of political and social life like the former country of the ustašas'. The use of 'ustaša' rhetoric here parallels the campaign of the Serb propagandists in the 1980s against the Catholic Church and Croats which Anzulovic (1999) has analysed. Croats are further described as 'clerical-nationalists' and Croatian soldiers are said to have:

- killed Serbian women, children and old people in the most horrible way,
- they burned their houses and destroyed everything that belonged to Serbs,
- the lines of refugees were bombed by Croatian planes, and innocent women, children and old people were killed. (pp. 27-28)

The chapter entitled 'Civil war in BiH and the formation of the Serb Republic' presents a threatened and unfairly treated Serb nation against the oppressive Croats and Muslims (p. 29). After the first multi-party elections, 'Muslim and Croat delegates joined the coalition and made all decisions without the Serb delegates and damaged the Serbs. In a number of gatherings, Croats and Muslims tied their flags together and threatened the Serbian people'. "Dodatok" claims that because of the danger of separation from their brothers in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the Serbian People's Assembly but Muslims and Croats voted to separate BiH from Yugoslavia without respecting the wishes and interests of Serbs. Thus, "Dodatok" represents the referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (where Bosnian Serbs also lived) as 'their' referendum. The war is described as 'the attacks of the Muslim fundamentalists and Croat Cleric-nationalists' against Serbian people. "Dodatok" also mentions that there were mujahedins from Islamic countries who massacred Serbs (p. 29). Finally, "Dodatok" tells how the Muslim and Croat armies, together with NATO, undertook a brutal offensive against the Serbs Republic and burned houses and killed people who failed to escape (p. 30).

_Historija: Serb enemy images less central_

The Bosnian textbook _Historija_ generally concentrates much less on presentations of others as enemies than the other texts and emphasizes more the Bosnian dimensions of history. Typically, however, the 'others' throughout the book are the Serbs (and Montenegrins, often referred to along with Serbs). The Croats, the other main 'they' within Bosnia, are only rarely referred to when _Historija_ discusses the state formations which mention all three national groups and their positions.
The treatment of the Serbs begins (Imamović et al. 1994: 8) with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. According to Historija, 'it was done by Serbian nationalists' and started the First World War. When discussing the First World War locally, Gavrilo Princip, the assassin of Franz Ferdinand, is described as 'a member of a group of nationalistic Serb youngsters who belonged to the organization called Bosnian Youth (Mlada Bosna)' (p. 17). Historija mentions that the murder caused demonstrations against Serbs in Sarajevo and in some other places.

Historija emphasizes the differentiation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. According to Historija, Franz Ferdinand's murderers were in direct contact with officials in Serbia. It is emphasized that Bosnian Serbs remained loyal to the existing system:

In BiH the feeling of fear dominated, especially among the Serb citizenry, and a group of Sarajevan Serbs led the way with the Orthodox Metropolitan visiting the deputy president of the country government in Sarajevo and expressing their loyalty and devotion to the Austrian emperor, and to the Austro-Hungarian state already on 1st August 1914. (p. 18)

The presentation of the Serbs changes, however, when Historija starts to describe the First World War (pp. 19, 21). Anti-Serb sentiment is said to have grown as a result of the anti-Austrian politics of Serbs: 'Instructed by the experience of Serbian-Montenegrin attacks in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims established their different 'protection forces' to defend themselves in the event of more such attacks'.

In a unit entitled 'Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav question', the presentation of Serbs begins to point towards the idea of Greater Serbia. First Historija describes how the Serbs 'emphasized that in this war Serbia was fighting not only to take care of its sovereignty but simultaneously to liberate "all non-liberal brother Serbs, Croats and Slovenes". Emigrant Yugoslavian politicians viewed the intentions of the Serbian government with great reservations 'which later proved justified'. It also mentions that the greatest Croat politician of the time, Frano Supilo, 'because of the suspicious attitudes' of the Serbian president, wanted 'to clear the question of Great-Serbian hegemony in the future state' (pp. 27-28). Thus, the clear message is that the Serbs cannot be trusted; even though they claimed to want to liberate the brothers, the suspicions of others later 'proved correct'.

Historija presents the Serbs entirely negatively when dealing with the interwar period (pp. 54-55). The terror against Muslims is emphasized. References to the doers are rare yet clear: the Montenegrins are said to have killed Muslims in Sandžak; and about the Serbs, it is said that 'the Serb army neither could nor wanted to prevent that'. Historija also refers to the village of Šahovic where Muslim women and children are said to have been killed, and mentions that 'in the place where Šahovic once stood now lies the Orthodox village of Tomašević'. Thus, Historija connects the atrocities perpetrated in Šahovic to Orthodox Serbs.

In the years before the Second World War, Serbs are described as having been against the movement that sought Bosnian autonomy: they supported 'the idea of Serbian supremacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (pp. 74-75).
The language hardens when discussing the Second World War. Under the subtitle ‘Chetnik genocide towards the Muslims in BiH’, Historija states that:

Serbian-chetnik genocide toward Muslims has deep roots. On the one side, it is unreasonable religious hatred and intolerance, and on the other, the will of Serb ideology and politicians to create an ethnically-clean territory at any cost. Therefore from the beginning of the war 1941, they carried out a systematic liquidation of Muslims, that is, a genocide. (pp. 96-97)

Chetnik documents are referred to and cited, using such expressions as ‘homogenous Serbia’ and ‘cleansed of non-Serb elements’.

There are, however, no further comments about Serbs in the Second World War beyond the above-mentioned half-page sub-chapter on the chet-nik genocide. The chapter on the local events of the Second World War concentrates on the partisan-led war of liberation and on the formations of the anti-fascist movement.

In the text discussing the period after the Second World War, Serbs do not figure as a particular enemy group. By contrast, in the chapter about more recent history, Historija describes the Serbs as enemies and destroyers:

Great-Serbian nationalists tried to prevent it [the declaration of independence] frightening the nation by accumulating a vast army and heavy armaments … [The opposition] broke into open military aggression, carried out against our country by Serbia and Montenegro with the help of the former Yugoslavian national army and the terrorist formation of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To realize the plan of ‘Greater Serbia’, everything that was not Serb was destroyed. (pp. 129, 131)

It is worth noting that Historija describes Serbia and Montenegro as the main aggressors and clearly isolates the Bosnian Serbs as a group. As part of the aggressors, Historija sees only those Bosnian Serbs who were from the SDS party led by Radovan Karadžić. Historija presents that party as a terrorist formation, suggesting that only extremists participated in it.

### Enemy images legitimize societal division

Ahonen (2001: 25) has defined historical stereotypes as images created in public discourse (e.g. in school textbooks) to strengthen the identity of a group: either ‘ours’ (auto-stereotypes) or ‘them’ (hetero-stereotypes). About hetero-stereotypes Ahonen writes: ‘The most powerful hetero-stereotypes are enemy images. They are used to legitimize and provoke hostilities among groups.’

As we have seen, the representations of others as hetero-stereotypes, anti-images, were part of the presentations of all three Bosnian national groups, yet the intensities differed. The national groups that had been enemies in recent past were portrayed negatively through their actions in history. As a result of this kind of approach, the reinforced stereotypes serve to maintain and justify the hostile attitude towards the others.

Common to the hetero-stereotypical enemy images of all the books was the connection between the present and the past. Several direct cross-references across time were used (Imamović et al. 1994: 96, Perić 1995: 7,
110, Gačeša et al. 1997: 96): the Serbs ‘had to defend their rights again with guns’, ‘the Serb-chetnik genocide on Muslims has deep roots’, ‘The Catholic church has not changed its attitudes much in 70 years’, ‘what they [i.e. chetniks] did not succeed in achieving then, they tried to achieve with an aggression towards the republic of Croatia in 1991’. The story of Montenegrins killing hundreds of Muslims 70-80 years ago in one village was concluded by telling that now in the place of that village stands an Orthodox (i.e. Serb) village called Tomaševo (my emphases).

In addition to direct references, indirect references to the present situation were also part of the presentations. The atrocities committed by Albanians, chetniks, ustašas, and so forth were described using similar terms for the historical atrocities typical of the recent affairs. There was also an indirect reference to the present when Istorija discussed Albanian children considering Albania as their home country because they used Albanian schoolbooks in the 1970s and 1980s.

Borrowing the terminology of Moscovici (1988: 221-222), the presentations of ‘them’ in history textbooks can be defined as polemical representations. In contrast to ‘hegemonic’ and ‘emancipated’ representations, polemical representations are determined by the antagonistic relations between the members of society, and are intended to be mutually exclusive. Such representations do not serve any form of reconciliation process within a society which, according to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, intends to be multinational and multicultural. A multicultural society can better tolerate several different auto-stereotypes, conceptions of ‘us’, than find a way for hostile hetero-stereotypes, enemy images of national groups belonging to the same society to co-exist.7

**Effect of history teaching**

The school textbooks of former Yugoslavia have been the subject of increasing interest in recent years in the context of Southeast Europe. Thus, the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) hosted several workshops on history teaching in Southeast Europe in 1999-2001 (Koulouri 2001, 2002), and the conclusions are generally similar to those reported in this paper:8 teaching is divided, interpretations are ethnocentric, the superiority of one group and the inferiority of the others is central, as is the victimization of ‘our’ group. In particular, Serbian and Croatian books have been considered uncomfortably close to political propaganda. A Bosnian history teacher, Katz (2001: 64), who has participated in workshops organized by CDRSEE, concluded that the first step towards understanding and accepting the differences between the different groups would require revised definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. As in this study, Katz has also noted how the textbooks often equated the past with the present, thus leading children to determine the future based on the past.

Hopken (1997: 93, 96-97) has also noted how history education in the former Yugoslavia has continued to be just as dogmatic as in the Tito era, offering no alternatives for the pupils. According to him, the aim of the education has not been to develop civic identity but to supply political elites
with legitimacy. In his view, the post-war history education seems to pave the way for the future confrontations.

Yet, despite similar conclusions in regard to the contents of the textbooks, we can question the conclusions about the possibility of history education ‘determining’ futures. Thus, in the CDRSEE workshop, the scholars representing various former-Yugoslav countries suggested that school history is ineffective because it cannot compete with family history, or influences from the media, newspapers, and so forth (Koren 2002: 201). Even though brotherhood and unity had been central to history education in the former Yugoslavia, everything that happened in the 1990s repudiated these values.

However, while it is true that school history can hardly compete with the other media channels transmitting the knowledge of the past, what this argument fails to take into account is that in the Bosnian post-war situation, textbooks and other channels of influence reinforce each other, i.e. their interpretations and presentations are similar. School books enhance the effect of other media, and *vice versa*, because their presentations resonate together. This was most likely different in the former Yugoslavian case when at least family stories often contradicted the stories of school history textbooks, thereby reducing the effect of the textbooks.

### Consequences of divided teaching

The national starting point in the teaching of and curricula for history can be seen as one form of *identity politics*, which Kaldor (1999: 78) has defined in terms of movements mobilizing around ethnic, racial, or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power. In contrast to the *politics of ideas*, which for Kaldor involves forward-looking projects, identity politics tends to be fragmentary, backward-looking, and exclusive. Such politics are based on the reconstruction of heroic pasts, the memory of injustices, and sometimes psychological discrimination against those labelled differently from ‘us’. The success of such identity politics in Bosnia is all the more telling when we remember that Bosnia had to reconcile three or four different conceptions of history as part of the modernization process. Furthermore, as most Yugoslav scholars have pointed out, Bosnia appeared as the most pluralistic of all the Yugoslav republics.

Deeply-dividing identity politics are most problematic in traditionally multicultural communities where living together is ’objective inevitability’, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to creating mental barriers and hatred, the division created by the politics of history has also had immense practical consequences. The divided schooling, and history teaching, are among the factors that greatly inhibit the return of refugees to their pre-war homes in post-war Bosnia. Parents have not wanted to return to areas where the children would be subject to history teaching suggesting that their own national group is evil or inferior. The ethnic maps of Bosnia before and after the war, together with the numbers of returned refugees, demonstrate how the return of refugees has been one of the central problems of the Bosnian peace process. Schooling, among other
institutions, must be arranged in such a way that it supports the viable society rather than deepens the divisions, which in turn makes the functional society impossible.12

**Post-conflict nations and the past**

I wish to close with wider discussion stemming from this study: How do post-war nations come to terms with their past and what should be taken into account as part of that process?

Education should be recognized as a long-term building block of a functional civil society. As a consequence, schooling, and in particular the teaching of subjects such as history and religion, should be subject to public interest and decision-making. Thus, schooling should be an integral component of such political documents as the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the Bosnian war. Kaldor (1999: 134-135) has argued that investment in free media and education is essential to stop relentless particularistic propaganda in the process of constructing an active civil society: 'These conditions are much more important than the formal procedures of democracy'. Without such preconditions, elections can end up legitimizing the warring parties—as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton. Soule (2000: 21), drawing on a study of the effects of civic education on the attitudes and behaviour of youth in Bosnia, has suggested that civic education can foster positive changes in young people's skills, attitudes, and values.

The importance of opposing the diverging tendencies in education in a multicultural society is supported by experience and research in Northern Ireland. Thus, a study from the late 1990s (Brocklehurst 1999) concluded that the segregation of education and prejudices in teaching have long played key roles in sustaining that conflict. Indeed, many educationalists have argued that schools are the main contributory factor to the conflict through their institutionalized segregation.

Thus, the research in Northern Ireland would suggest that in the long-term, nationally-divided schooling and the teaching of history through 'us' and 'them' as hostile groups, and with great emphasis on wars, can become the central factor in maintaining conflict. School is a central form of political socialization for young people. Such analyses further highlight the importance of acknowledging the power of history politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elsewhere, when the aim is to find solutions to the conflict.

What measures could be taken? After decades of segregation, the spirit in Northern Ireland in the 1990s emphasized the need to improve communication between the schools. Three main strategies have been advanced: curricular initiatives; inter-school links; and the development of integrated schools. 'Education for mutual understanding' and 'Cultural heritage' have also become compulsory cross-curricular themes (Gallagher 1995).13 Thus, the experience in Northern Ireland suggests that measures can be taken— even after a long tradition of hostile segregation—if the serious consequences of the segregated education are acknowledged and are understood as linked to the 'objective inevitability' of living.
Secondly, and more particularly, the power of history and its presentations should be acknowledged in conflict and post-conflict nations and societies. Examples of other countries outside Bosnia support this. Thus, in 1990, Israeli and Palestinian history textbooks were characterized by scholars as presenting 'misconceptions, exaggerations, distortions and other unrealistic elements that contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict' (Pingel 2003: 343). Recently, more than 10 years later, some changes have occurred (Pingel 2003: 349): instead of having negative stereotypes of Israelis, new Palestinian textbooks attempt to avoid giving a clear picture of Israel and Israelis while promoting jihad and martyrdom and presenting the Palestinians as a peace-loving, harmonious nation. On the Israeli side, strongly negative opinions on Palestinians have decreased. Thus, history textbooks remain a powerful source of dispute and continue to sustain the conflict, even if not as directly as in 1980s. It has been noted (Mathias 2002: 437-438), however, that the overall change in textbooks in Israel resulting from growing criticism of intellectuals and educationalists has already caused some textbooks to incorporate a more critical view on Israel and a revisionist approach on the War of Independence and Palestinians. This suggests that a demand for pluralism and a departure from the national state-oriented approach within a society can enable a more critical and pluralist treatment of the past in a post-conflict situation. However, typically, this can only happen when enough time has passed since the conflict.

Of course, several factors influence how the past is dealt with in post-conflict situations. One influencing factor is the question of guilt: Pingel (2003: 363) notes how the post-Second World War history disputes between, e.g. Germany and Poland, have been easier to solve than, e.g. between Israel and Palestine or among the Bosnian national groups. In the case of Germany and Poland, the question of guilt for past crimes and injustices was resolved as both sides agreed that the German National Socialist system was to blame. Yet, based on a survey, Sander (1995: 185-196) has argued that the most effective tools in constructing and strengthening the negative image of Germans in Poland after the Second World War were elementary and secondary schools.14

A good and concrete suggestion for finding ways to deal with the past in post-conflict societies has been put forward by Pingel (2003: 366) in the Israel-Palestine context: the case of Israel and Palestine should be discussed together with other conflict or post-conflict examples, e.g. Northern Ireland, Cyprus, or South Africa after apartheid. The comparative context can enable a critical dealing with a difficult past more easily than can a purely national discussion. The timing can be critical; this study has shown how history can be used as much for 'unscrupulous exploitation and manipulation' as for 'analytical and critical orientation for the future' (Immonen 1996).
Notes

1. I have translated all the quotations from textbooks used in the paper.
2. Generally the methodology developed was based on the principles of Pingel's (1999) UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision, and in particular on the chapter 'How to conduct a project: methodological issues and practical guidelines' (see Torsti 2003: 163-165).
4. Lehti (2000: 133-134) has argued that the Serbs were the only ones seeing the conflicts in former Yugoslavia as clashes of civilizations; this viewpoint suited their aims.
5. In a study of primary and secondary school history textbooks, Baranović (2001: 20) concluded that Serbs are most often mentioned as an enemy in the Bosniak textbooks.
6. It can also be noted that this finding also seems true when discussing other periods of history in different grades. In her analysis of former-Yugoslavian textbooks, Karge (2000, 2002) mentions how, particularly in the Croat and Serb books, the idea of perceiving other ethnic groups as a threat to one’s national existence can be traced back as a *leitmotif* from the Middle Ages to modern history.
7. For example, it is possible to arrange practical functions, such as schooling, to support the separate auto-stereotypes of various groups as part of creating a viable society. However, this becomes impossible if the hostile hetero-stereotypes of ‘others’ dominate the identity-construction of those various groups.
9. For the features of history culture, see Torsti (2003: 117-140).
10. The term was used by Kržišnik-Bukic (2001: 113) who argued that an awareness of objective inevitability of living together in Bosnia and Herzegovina has ripened in the years after the Dayton Agreement.
11. The ideal of unification is at the heart of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and, therefore, is among the major goals of the international community in Bosnia. Naturally the return of refugees is crucial to such an ideal.
12. Doubt (2000: 143) has accurately noted how the functional society was killed as a result of the Bosnian war. Rather than emphasizing the genocide he would call the war a ‘sociocide’.
13. Of the three-mentioned strategies, integrated schools can be assessed based on the level of attendance. The first integrated school in Northern Ireland was established in 1981. By January 2002, the number of integrated schools had increased to 46. About 4% of the school population of Northern Ireland attended such schools in 2002. See Conflict Archive in the Internet (CAIN) Web Service (n.d.).
14. The most recent example of acknowledging the power of the presentation of history in post-conflict situation comes from Iraq, where history textbooks were revised in November 2003 under the leadership of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority. The texts were not only totally ‘deSaddamized’, but all potentially controversial topics were also deleted. This deletion included anything critical of the US, and generally most of the modern history of the Middle East that has affected Iraq (‘Teaching history in Iraq’ 2003).

References


