Living the revolution

A view of the Georgian opposition movement in post-revolutionary Georgia

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. 2

1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 4

2 BACKGROUND AND PUZZLE .................................................................................................... 6
   2.1 Independent Georgia ........................................................................................................ 6
   2.2 The Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003 ....................................................................... 7
   2.3 Pressure from abroad ...................................................................................................... 9
   2.4 Post-revolutionary Georgia ........................................................................................... 11
   2.5 What is a revolution? ...................................................................................................... 12
   2.6 Puzzle of reasons and actors ........................................................................................ 13

3 FORMER RESEARCH ............................................................................................................... 15
   3.1 Leading theories on electoral revolutions .................................................................... 16
   3.2 The failure of democratization through colour revolutions ....................................... 17
   3.3 Western interests .......................................................................................................... 19
   3.4 Russia’s response ........................................................................................................... 20

4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH ...................................................................................... 22
   4.1 The study of social mass movements – a historical overlook ..................................... 23
   4.2 Defining the social mass movement .............................................................................. 24
   4.3 Approaching the social mass movement ..................................................................... 27
   4.4 The mass movement in its context .............................................................................. 39

5 METHOLOGICAL ........................................................................................................ 42
   5.1 Semi-structured interviews ......................................................................................... 43
   5.2 Implementation .............................................................................................................. 46
   5.3 Analysis of collected data ............................................................................................. 46
1 INTRODUCTION

Starting in Georgia 2003, several electoral revolutions have occurred in post-Soviet states where the authoritarian regime has either failed or strengthened its power. The electoral revolutions in the former Soviet states, widely called “colour revolutions”\(^1\), have followed the same pattern: opposition movements have occurred in authoritarian regimes and based on flawed elections they have risen against the political elite. In some of the cases, the authoritarian regime has tumbled over, in other the opposition movement has failed.

The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, as well as other revolutions in the post-Soviet communities, was at their time considered as a step towards democracy. Still, as time has shown, the revolution became more a shift in power then a lovely walk down the democratic path. The popular uprisings, many times praised by world leaders, were indeed steps towards breaking the post-Soviet path, but the result has more or less been disappointing. The revolution in Georgia did not bring democracy, surprisingly even Georgia’s democracy score fell\(^2\) during the years after the revolution and grew only in the end of the rule of president Mikheil Saakashvili, who was the main actor behind the revolution in 2003.

Much research on colour revolutions has focused on the role of the state, the electoral model and international support (see e.g. Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a; Hale, 2006; Herd, 2005, Hess, 2010). Still, one of the key figures, the opposition movement, has to some extent been left in the shadow. This thesis will analyse some parts of the opposition movement in Georgia during and after the Rose Revolution. The focus is set upon the organization of the movements, mobilization, existing formal and informal networks and collective identity.

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\(^1\)The term “colour revolutions” has been widely used to describe the revolutions that have taken place in the former Soviet states but includes today as well as other revolutions around the world were the opposition uses a color or a symbol as an unifying object. The term “electoral revolution” would be more applicable, still some revolutions take place outside the electoral cycle.

There are two main research questions of this thesis:

1. What are the characteristics of the opposition movement that occurred in Georgia after the Rose Revolution?
2. Can the opposition be defined as a social mass movement or is it merely different actors working for different goals?

Sub-questions of importance I believe might be answered along the way are:

- What are the biggest problems in the Georgian society according to the opposition?
- How has the Georgian political and civic society changed during 2003-2013?

Theories on colour revolutions have claimed that the core of failure or success in electoral revolutions lies within the power of the opposition movements in creating political change (Hess, 2010). Yet, the opposition movement will also be depending on the weakness (or the power) of the authoritarian regime, the electoral model, the diffusion of ideas and the power of the opposition movement to mobilize citizens for demonstrations. Successful revolutions seem to occur in societies where the leaders are weak and the opposition strong, but not without the interference of Western ideas and actors (Herd, 2005). Is the success of the electoral revolution the, as many scholars hold, mostly connected to outbound factors as political system and international support, or are there internal factors within the movements themselves that can affect the outcome? Valuable research has been done on the revolutions in Georgia and the neighbouring countries (see e.g. Demes and Forbrig, 2006; Ishiyama, and Kennedy, 2001; Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009; Margarian, 2007; McFaul, 2006; Ruiz-Rufino, 2008; Sahakyan and Atanesyan, 2006; Valiyev, 2006; Way, 2008). With this thesis I want to take the question deeper, to the participants and leaders of organizations involved in so-called anti-governmental actions. What are the characteristics of the opposition movements and can its structure be defined? Is it a movement or rather different actors taking their causes to the streets? The analysis will be based on explorative interviews with participators from the different parts of the opposition movements, both active in Georgia during the revolution in 2003 and afterwards.
2 BACKGROUND AND PUZZLE

In November 2003 Mikheil Saakashvili followed by thousands of Georgian demonstrators made it to the steps of the parliament hall in Tbilisi. The demonstrators, with roses in their hands, demanded incumbent president Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation. Soon not only the president resigned, but opposition movement leader Saakashvili was elected the new president of Georgia in January 2004. The revolution, soon to be named the Rose Revolution or Revolution of Roses, became the first among many electoral revolutions (as well as outside the electoral cycle) in the post-Soviet countries. During the following year revolutions, some successful other not, in post-Soviet states have appeared also in Ukraine (2004, 2014), Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010), Azerbaijan (2005), Uzbekistan (2005), Belarus (2006), Armenia (2008) and Moldova (2009).

2.1 Independent Georgia

After regaining independence in the beginning of the 1990s, the democratization process in Georgia was under way. Still, as Fairbanks (2004) points out, nationalistic ideas fuelled the independence movements in Georgia and this resulted in complications for structural reforms and institutionalization. The country was also through the 90s and into the 21st century scarred with territorial disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The first president of post-Soviet Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was soon thrown out of office and replaced by the former first secretary for the Communist Party in Soviet Georgia and the former minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze. After the return of Shevardnadze, the opposition in Georgia became loyal to the first independent president of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia, and became so a threat to the new president. The government of Georgia addressed the threats of the quite effective opposition by forming a government party, the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG). Shevardnadze was re-elected in 1996 and 2000. Political status quo was not shaken throughout the years and the Shevardnadze regime kept the presidential party together. In the local elections in 2002, CUG began to fall apart while Shevardnadze did not seem interested in intervening. Only in Tbilisi, the opposition parties made landslide victories and CUG was almost wiped out of the political scene. (Fairbanks, 2004.)
Fairbank (2004) compares the history in Georgia and Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In both of the countries, the first independence movements were considered democratic winds blowing liberal ideas into the former closed societies. The first national leaders, Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Abulfaz Elchibey in Azerbaijan could still not support the development into democratic states and soon former communists (Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan) took over the rule of the countries (Fairbank, 2004).

2.2 The Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003
Tudoroiu (2007) describes Georgia under Shevardnadze as a chaotic country with around 20 percent of Georgia’s territory beyond the control of Tbilisi. The territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was under Russian influence, and the region of Adjara was beyond the control of the capital. After the presidential elections in 2000 both Shevardnadze’s and his party CUG’s support began to erode. The parliamentary elections in 2003 brought new opposition parties and faces to the political life. Some of the most important faces were Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, Salva Natelashvili and Nino Burjanadze. The new opposition leaders did campaign mostly independently, but also participated as a group in demonstrations against Shevardnadze and the CUG government. Already in the parliamentary election of 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili showed excellent skills in addressing different social layers of the Georgian society (Fairbanks, 2004). Both Saakashvili and Natelashvili used a language that addressed nationalists and on a more or less populist base, they promised the people a future that would that would have costed excessively much for the Georgian national budget (Tudoroiu, 2007). The fraudulent parliamentary elections on 2 November 2003 fuelled the opposition in its demonstrations against the Shevardnadze regime. A series of nonviolent mass protests followed in Tbilisi and around Georgia. Shevardnadze chose to not use violence against the demonstrators but called on the leader of the region of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, to organize counter-demonstration in Tbilisi, still this counter-demonstration did not have any effect on the opposition movement (Tudoroiu,

Shevardnadze was considered to repeat the irregularities of the 2000 presidential elections, but nobody had expected the scale of fraud (Tudoroiu, 2007). After the election day of November 2, the opposition refused to accept the outcome and protesters began to gather in front of the Georgian parliament building in Tbilisi. The opposition still had not been able to unify under one flag:

“[T]ensions between rival opposition groups remained strong. While Saakashvili called for the president’s resignation the Burjanadze Democrats initially demanded only new elections. The Labour and New Rights, on another hand, opposed the demonstrations from the very start …” (Mitchell in Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 321).

When Shevardnadze opened the new legislative session in November 2003, Saakashvili together with his supporters took over the building with roses in their hands. The rose so became to symbolize the nonviolence of the Georgian opposition and the peaceful overtaking of the parliament (Fairbanks, 2004). The incumbent president Shevardnadze declared a state of emergency but was the next day forced to resign and Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004. Saakashvili came into office with a support of 96 percent of the votes and the elections were considered free but arranged in a very short timeframe and without real political opponents⁴. New parliamentary elections were held in March 2004 where the former opposition party came to power and Zhvania was appointed as Prime Minister and Burjanadze as the speaker of the Parliament (Tudoroiu, 2007).

One of the key figures in the Georgian Rose Revolution was the youth moment Kmara, which can be compared to other youth movements taking part in colour revolutions. In Serbia during the revolution in year 2000 the youth movement Otpor! (Resistance!) was active, and in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 Pora! (It is time!) gained much publicity. Tudoroiu (2007, p. 322) also points out, that “[a]t least in part, the November 2003 events were possible because a number of prominent NGOs such as the Liberty Institute were trained in the methods and tactics of non-violent political opposition to

authoritarian leaders by Serbian NGOs like the Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) and the Center for Non-Violent Resistance”. The connections between the youth movements in Serbia and post-Soviet states have been confirmed by among other Herd (2005) who shows that the Belgrade-based Center for Nonviolent Resistance has trained activists at least in Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine. Herd (2005, p. 4) claims, that “[t]he networks and relationships among these groups were consolidated by the sharing of media outlets, public relations campaigns, and organizational knowledge.”. He further refers to the relations between the former Serbian Otpor’s leaders who have worked with Ukrainian activist (with support from Freedom House). This resulted in that the learning-process including organizational skills and the opening of local offices, marketing skills and the creation of a logo and symbols as well as the skills to identify the weaknesses in the Ukrainian society and how to address these problems with a key message and slogans became objects for diffusion between the two organizations (Herd, 2005).

2.3 Pressure from abroad
As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 322) points out: “Shevardnadze’s fall was totally unexpected. For the first time a post-Communist regime inside the Commonwealth of Independent States was overthrown by a democratic movement; hence the prompt use of the term ‘Revolution.’”. As will be see further on in the thesis, the organization leaders of e.g. Kmara and Liberty Institute did not have the goal to overthrow the regime, and even for them the final stage of the revolution came as a surprise. The revolution did still not emerge in a vacuum. Foreign funding cannot be overlooked as one of the reasons for the drastic shift in Georgia. Shevardnadze had allowed Western economic aid to flow into the country and the Georgian free media and civil society had developed under Western influence and support. For example, from 1992 until the revolution, Georgia received over 1400 million US$5 in direct aid from the US government and US Agency for International Development (USAID). As Tudoroiu (2007) points out, much of this aid (the US aid but also direct aid from the European Union member states) went directly to the development of the civil

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society, democratic institutions and NGOs. Here the role of George Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI) has to be mentioned. As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 323) points out, not only did the OSI finance the development of NGOs that were active during the revolutionary November of 2003, the Soros foundation actually “promoted the ‘Serbian model’ of peaceful regime change.” It was through money and support from the OSI that politicians and student activists travelled to Serbia to learn how to overthrow an authoritarian regime, among these “revolutionary students” was also Mikheil Saakashvili (Fairbanks, 2004). Fairbanks (2004) also claims, that OSCE, the U.S. Government, the OSI and the EU all were active actors and direct or indirect supporters of the opposition, or at least eager to point and reveal the enormous electoral fraud.

Herd (2005) has also researched the involvement of Western interests during the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi. According to Herd (2005) the involvement of Western interest during the years before the electoral revolutions includes CNVR (Center for Non-Violent Resistance), FH (Freedom House), NDI (National Democracy Institute), EU (European Union), OSI (Open Society Institute), NED (National Endowment for Democracy), IRI (International Republican Institute), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), CoE (Council of Europe) and foreign security services and embassies (U.S. (CIA), UK (MI6), and Germany (BND).

The allegations on American involvement continued in Ukraine the next year during the Orange Revolution. In the Ukrainian case, huge investments had been made to secure the victory of the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenco (Herd, 2005). Herd (2005), who has compared the level of Western “manufacture” in the revolutionary movements, discusses in what extent the revolutions are movements on export. Herd asks himself if the chain reaction will continue, and how far? As we today know, the import of colour revolutions in other post-Soviet states has not been as successful as Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004. In this light, it also interesting to see the urgent resistance of the Russian government against foreign involvement and support inside its own territorial borders. Revolutions and its ideas are object for diffusion and export, and so the knowledge can be used to both support and repress.
2.4 Post-revolutionary Georgia

It has to be stated, that revolution do not automatically lead to democracy. The level of democratization the colour revolutions actually bring has been questioned among other by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). The authors consider the Rose Revolution in Georgia as a good example on an electoral revolution where electoral fraud is addressed by the masses (and with a popular leader) but the incumbent regime rather just only gets a new face and deep reforms for democratization are overseen. The Georgian Rose revolution indeed succeeded, but democratization stagnated anyway.

When Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia after the Rose Revolution, it was widely interpreted, that Georgia was now on the path of freedom and democracy. Georgia’s freedom, civil liberties and political rights rating did increase in the beginning, but already in 2007-2008, the situation got worse⁶. In September 2007, for the first time since the Rose Revolution, rather big non-government protests emerged in Georgia with their peak on 7th of November 2011 concluding in a state of emergency. Up to 100 000 protesters gathered in Tbilisi demanding Saakashvili to resign. The president met the protesters’ demands by announcing early presidential elections for January 2008. Nevertheless, the ruling elite was accused for imposing state of emergency, closing off opposition media and clashes with the protesters. Saakashvili won the presidential elections in January 2008, as well his party continued to rule after the parliamentary elections in May 2008. (Freedom House, 2008).

Tbilisi saw following mass demonstrations in April 2009. The goal of the protests was the same as in 2007, president Saakashvili’s resignation. The protests did still not gather as much participants as in 2007, and the demonstration petered out in the summer. (Freedom House, 2010). The last bigger anti-government demonstrations during the rule of Saakashvili took place in May 2011 (at the time of gathering data for this thesis). Until the end of May, the protesters clashed with riot police and the Georgian society returned to status quo.

President Saakashvili’s rule was a fight against corruption and massive reforms to modernize Georgia. Still, Saakashvili has broadly been criticized for use of excessive force against protesters, his role in the Georgia-Russia War in August 2008 and prison scandals. The electoral process and political pluralism was however established in Georgia, and the ruling elite lost in the Georgian parliament elections in 2012 against the party Georgian Dream. The loss for Saakashvili’s United National Movement meant that his era as president was ending. Saakashvili was not running for a third term in the Georgian president in 2013 and left the country for the US. In 2015, he was appointed as the head of the International Advisory Council of Reforms of Ukraine and later as the Governor of Odessa region.

2.5 What is a revolution?
McFaul (2006) has defined a revolution in the 21st century as beginning from a fraudulent election that creates political instability and massive protests. As a consequence of the fraudulent election, the opposition gathers and uses extra constitutional means such as mass protest to protest against the election output. Due to the political instability created both the incumbent leader(s) as well as the opposition leader(s) declare their authority and victory leading to further political conflicts. In the political conflicts taking place after that both sides have declared victory none of the sides are supposed to use violence. (McFaul, 2006.)

As class and violence, which have traditionally been the two central elements in revolutions, are less and less present in the revolutions of the 21st century, the age of “real revolutions” has come to an end (Tudoroiu, 2007). The use of electronic media and pressure from outside during the reform process in societies of the 21st century so creates “revelections” or “refolution”, not actual “revolutions” as the term has been traditionally interpreted (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 317). Tudoroiu so concludes, that

“[t]he present concept of revolution can be considered as having little or no relation with class, violence or ‘anti-reactionary’ orientation. Rather, it concerns a change of Weltanschauung [the victory of a world view] caused by a major political regime change. Its most likely instruments are mass civil disobedience and/or electoral process.” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 318).
Following the definition of Tudoroiu, it is so questionable to use the term “revolution” in the cases of the CIS-countries. The nature of the successful electoral revolutions in countries as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan could so more be considered as deep reforms, as the structures of the former regimes have remained with only the faces changed. In this research, I will still use terms as revolution, electoral revolution and colour revolution as these terms are used by scholars all over the world. Still, the colour revolutions should not be interpreted or compared with the revolutions in Eastern Europe during the fall of Soviet Union or historical revolutions. Kalandadze and Orenstein’s (2009, p. 1409) definition of a successful colour revolution so stands as:

“…cases in which the demonstrations achieved their original objectives or more – namely, the rerunning of the election, the nullification of the election results, and/or the resignation of the incumbent – and in which the subsequent change of leadership, from an undemocratic incumbent to new democratic forces, occurred as a direct result of the electoral protests.”

2.6 Puzzle of reasons and actors
While scholars have urgently tried to describe and examine the surrounding factors for what kind of society a successful revolution should be acting in, one of the central figure has many times become a peripheral factor. The aim is so to, some extent, address this gap in the research on colour revolutions. The thesis will analyse a part of the opposition movement in Georgia: organizations that have occurred clearly as parts of opposition politics as well as other organizations not directly political. My aim is to present the activities, techniques and goals of Georgian opposition movements during the revolution in 2003 as well as after. The participants are so in the centre of attention.

The main youth movement involved in the Rose Revolution, Kmara, was still after the revolution functioning though its focus changed. My plan with my research was mainly to meet with members of Kmara and gather information about the movement. Still, arriving in Georgia and discussing the matter with former members, professors and activists I understood the puzzle is more diffuse then literature on the theme had provided. My focus so changed to other organizations as well.
Why then not focusing on the events of November 2003, but also the development afterwards? The Rose Revolution happened in 2003, but the process of revolution continued until 2013 when Saakashvili left office. Several attempts to revolt against the revolutionaries have taken place during the years of Saakashvili’s rule. The revolution so gave birth to new revolutions. It has been proposed, that even if the colour revolutions many times have been considered as victories of democracy, they have not been able to support the development of neither the civil society nor the transition to democratic rule (see e.g. Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). Is this because the revolution is actually a product of a society and transition, i.e. an end product and not a start for a democratic way? Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, p. 1404) argue that the reason why the democratic reforms stagnate is “…because electoral revolutions are more often symptoms of the problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills.”. The electoral revolutions often focus on the electoral fraud itself and do not add efforts to the rebuilding of the society and e.g. fight against corruption. My goal is therefore to describe some elements of electoral revolution in 2003 and the ongoing revolution afterwards, not democracy per se. Another reason why focusing on the timeframe 2003-2013 is that many organizations, politicians and political parties supporting/opposing the political elite (before 2003: Shevardnadze, after 2003: Saakashvili) have changed sides. Many of Saakashvili’s supporters have moved back into opposition (or been thrown out), others, who were supporting Shevardnadze, have come to support Saakashvili.

The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 can be considered a successful electoral revolution as the opposition (mass movement, demonstrators etc.) achieved their goal (e.g. confirmed electoral fraud, re-election and the resignation of the ruling power) and this happens on the basis of protests (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). As already stated, the Georgian case do not stand alone but as first among many in a diffusion of revolutionary ideas in the post-Soviet sphere. The cases are not isolated events for the Caucasus. As Tudoroiu (2007, p. 335) comments concerning the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan: “Explicitly inspired by the Serbian movement that led to Milosevic’s fall in 2000, they represent a clear example of international diffusion.”
3 FORMER RESEARCH
There are some leading theories that have been used in research on why the electoral movements have succeeded or failed; the learning model of Bunce and Wolchik, Way’s model of authoritarian instability and Hale’s window of opportunity. The interests of Western states and organizations have often been considered to be crucial to the outcome of the colour revolutions. Further, diffusion of ideas has also been considered as some of the reasons electoral movements have occurred in countries that have a common history (as e.g. former Soviet-states) and are geographically close to each other. As my thesis will focus on movements and participation, the theory will be drawn from social movement theory and will be presented in chapter 4. Social movement theory is an interdisciplinary study within the social sciences that generally seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences. Collectively mobilized resources have been shown to play a significant role in the demonstrations against different regimes around the world.

Much research on the topic has focused on the diffusion of revolutionary and democratic ideas as well as democratization of post-Soviet countries. Much effort has been made to describe the role of the authoritarian regime, the role of diffusion and the role of the civil society (see e.g. Bunce & Wolchik, 2006a; Watanabe, 2007; Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). The study will not cover the fields already researched (authoritarian regime etc.) but focus on the key actor, the electoral movement itself, which somehow has been left in the shadow. As already mentioned, the priority of this thesis is neither to evaluate the level of democracy, or if electoral revolutions even can be considered to be part of the democratization process in a certain country.

Hess (2010) has compared the authoritarian regimes and the activities of the opposition movements during the electoral revolutions in the 2005 parliament elections in Kyrgyzstan and the 2008 Armenian presidential election. Hess (2010, p. 38) finds, “that among theories seeking to explain the causes of color revolutions, those that place primary agency on the strength or weakness of authoritarian ruling regimes and their institutions for maintaining
in-party elite cohesion, strong and highly institutionalized political parties, and effective, experienced security forces, have the greatest explanatory value.”. He further considers that political crisis, the support from international actors (both moral and financial) and democracy-promotion efforts are not enough to effect the regime change if the regime obsesses strong and efficient security forces that are loyal to the political regime (Hess, 2010). His comparison only include Kyrgyzstan and Armenia but these conclusions could also be applied on other electoral revolutions in post-Soviet regimes during the same time span. Besides the three leading theories, also other factors should be taken into account, for Georgia some main factors would be democratization, Western interests and the Russian response.

3.1 Leading theories on electoral revolutions

According to the first theory, the electoral model, the opposition movements learn from other movements in their own country and abroad and by using the tactics, they become effective in their local surrounding. In many cases, these movements also receive outside financial support. Applying these tactics and using the international support (both financial and moral), the opposition leaders have been able to mobilize the voters into the streets and overturning the political regime. (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006a.)

The second theory focuses not so much on the strategic learning of the opposition movement as on the authoritarian instability/stability (Way, 2008). If the ruling authority has control over economic resources and the support of (and control over) institutionalized parties and security forces it will most likely prevail the revolutions occurring. In countries where the links to West are strong or if there are strong interests (e.g. the Baltic States and Eastern European countries on the eve of the fall of Soviet Union) the Western states are to encourage the regime change and support the opposition movement both financially and by political means. If these links are missing, the focus will be on the authoritarian regime and by which means they can oppose the opposition movement. The core of the success to oppose the revolutionary actions lies within the power the authoritarian regime has over the political system by monopolized decision-making (single party system or ruling party with the opposition just in the periphery). (Hess, 2008; Way, 2008)
As Hess argues, “[h]aving a strong, well-institutionalized party thus makes it unlikely that an authoritarian regime will fragment when facing opposition post-election protests” (Hess, 2010, p. 29). As well, the authoritarian regime will use the loyalty of its security forces to protect itself against the opposition movement. In addition, state ownership of enterprises and economical resources supports the regime to remain at power as the regime is able to starve opposition parties and pay off both loyalist and crucial rivals. (Way, 2008)

According to the third theory, certain personalities gain support and recognition during the electoral crisis when the window of opportunity opens (Hale, 2006). This theory is focusing on the role of the president. In many authoritarian regimes, the power elite is highly depended on the good will of the president, who has extensive power and resources. These resources he/she will use to pay off both allies and rivals, be in control over the economic resources of the elite and the opposition and suppress or support (according to his/her own will and interests) organizations and parties. Because of the elite’s dependence on the president’s personal favour, allies are quite unlikely to join rivals’ parties. Still, if the incumbent president’s power decreases, or the president shows will to leave the office, the network of supporters will most likely unravel and the struggle for power begin. When this window of opportunity opens, the former power elite may be willing to join the opposition’s camp as space will be opened for mobilization and revolutionary movements. As this happens, the new opposition will not just be formed by former rivals to the president but also by insiders from the president’s supporting political elite. Hale, 2006; Hess, 2010.)

3.2 The failure of democratization through colour revolutions
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) have analysed cases of electoral revolutions worldwide from 1991 to 2009 and find that successful revolutions do not automatically mean that the development of democratization will flourish in the country in question. They find that not only the progress of democratization not take place in successful cases of electoral revolutions, but “[countries] where electoral revolutions ended unsuccessfully demonstrate no discernible impact on subsequent regime dynamics.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009,
The reason why electoral revolutions does not imply democratization is, according to Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, pp. 1404-1405),

“because electoral revolutions are more often symptoms of the problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills. … While focusing on electoral fraud and the general democratic deficit of political rights and civil liberties in an effort to build a broad anti-regime coalition, they [opposition] do not resolve deeper issues of corruption, clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making.”

The Georgian case demonstrates according to them, “how electoral revolutions tend to be narrow in scope, highlighting surface-level democratic deficiencies such as the elections but not focusing as much on the deeper institutional and structural problems of the regime.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1410). The Georgian case is also a good example on an electoral revolution that was praised by many to be a victory for democracy to more or less be a democratic failure. As Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009, p. 1410) points out, the new president Saakashvili was elected on a “populist platform, and although he certainly had a state-building agenda, he had no clear democratizing program”, what later became the beginning for new protests. Interestingly in the post-Soviet sphere, the Tulip Revolution Kyrgyzstan has not only after the revolution failed to credit the society with democratic ideas, the revolution itself had “no clear and ambitious reform goals; in fact, it has been remarkably leaderless and programless, even in comparison with the other successful revolutions.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1411). The conclusions Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) so make are that fraudulent elections and unpopular incumbent leaders are just the tip of the iceberg of national problems. The political culture does not develop very fast in countries with successful revolutions, and power conflicts, corruption and lack of rule of law continues. Secondly, the revolutions address mostly the fraudulent elections and some visible lack of civil liberties. Still, they tend to be program less and there is no agenda for the development of the country. Thirdly, the power distribution does not become more democratic. As Kalandadze and Orenstein, concludes: “Electoral revolutions are powerful moments of mass protest and civic participation, but their overall lack of effectiveness requires rethinking this strategy of democratization.” (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009, p. 1421)
Tudoroiu (2007) who has researched the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan holds that the weakness of the civil society was the problem that the democratic process in the countries did not develop after the revolutions. The civil society helped to aggregate the protest movements, but according to Tudoroiu (2007), this is all the civil society did. The movements were according to him “initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regime’s political elite.” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 316).

This is why Tudoroiu considers the three mentioned revolutions only as struggle for power between former and incumbent political elite, and even considers the revolutions as “nothing more than failed” (Tudoroiu, 2007, p. 316). Tudoroiu (2007, p. 336) further claims, that for a successful revolution

> “the most important element is the existence of a moderately authoritarian regime … [strongly authoritarian regimes] have the capacity to suppress brutally protest movements in their initial phase … This implicitly means that there are very few chances of further revolutions inside the Commonwealth of Independent States, as most of the remaining states fall in the category of strongly authoritarian regimes.”

Sahakyan and Atanesyan (2006) focus on the role of leaders and points out is that many times old Soviet leader can make comeback in the new political system, and with success. Many new “democratic leaders” that have been trained in West can be seen as naïve in the eyes’ of the people while the old guard is considered to have experience and the same mentality as most of the ordinary population not being taught the “ideas of the West”.

Coming close to core of the problem why the electorate is not willing to support the democratic alternatives can be concluded in one sentence of Sahakyan and Atanesyan (2006, p. 354): “People do not think they need ideologies; what they need is real improvements in their lives.”.

### 3.3 Western interests

The interests of Western states and organizations have often been considered crucial to the outcome of the colour revolutions. Herd (2005), who has researched the level of Western manufacturing of the colour revolutions (and the Russian response), holds that, “[t]his expectation seems rather overblown, distorted by euphoria over the Ukrainian victory
unmodified by more considered judgment. Opposition movements throughout the CIS may well have been emboldened by the events in Tbilisi and Kyiv.” (Herd, 2005, p. 12). While Western organizations do support the development of free and fair elections throughout the CIS, the “idea” that West is trying to export democratic idea through international organizations and NGOs with the colour revolutions as catalyst is according to Herd (2005) allegations that still have not been proved. The theory of allegations he backs up by showing that even if some states and NGOs are working for the spreading of democratic ideas and liberal rights, they are not working uniformly or under the same agenda (Herd, 2005). Further, he holds that it impossible for international NGOs or other organizations to outsource revolutions as the local civic organizations and personalities cannot be imported; the source of the revolution is so according to Herd (2005) in the country itself.

3.4 Russia’s response

The Russian Federation has felt itself insecure while watching the colourful revolutions moving through the CIS-countries. The coup d’état attempts in Yerevan, Baku and Minsk have risen nervous voices in Kremlin as well – when will the “American velvet revolution” reach the capital of Russia? On the eve of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Andrei Vladimirov commented in the Itogi magazine: “The day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kyiv. Tomorrow: Moscow.” (in Herd, 2005, p. 5). The allegations on the support from Western organization were, by no surprise, also most spread in Russia and the battle was not just about Kyiv or Tbilisi but also for the whole Commonwealth of Independent States. According to Herd (2005), Gleb Pavlovsky, president of the Moscow-based Foundation for Effective Politics and political consultant to Viktor Yanukovich’s presidential campaign in Ukraine 2004, has compared the recent events in the Serbia and the CIS-countries with the interference of the White House in Latina America during the cold war. Moscow still considers the CIS-countries as their sphere of interest, and the electoral revolutions are therefore being interpreted as a threat and planned strike against Mother Russia herself. As more and more CIS-countries show interest in Western ideas and protest against incumbent leaders that are on good terms with Kremlin, the Russian political elite feels that Russia is being encircled not by democracy or
other ideology, but of Western interests. That’s why “[f]ear persists that Russia will one day find itself surrounded by states that are members of NATO and the EU” and “Russia’s president also accused the United States of being a “pseudo-democratic” dictatorship and lashed out at the “colonial” behaviour of the West in Eastern Europe” (Herd, 2005, p. 7).

Concerning the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004 and the split between Russians and Ukrainians in the country Herd (2005, p. 14) claims that Moscow has no-one else then itself to blame: “[Putin’s] policy itself constituted a self-inflicted wound.”. Herd (2005) so concludes concerning the myth that West is monitoring and creating colour revolutions on export to CIS:

“the West lacks the ability, never mind, the political will, to conduct such ‘special operations’ … The real threat to authoritarian regimes does not come from foreign NGOs working in concert with Western security forces, but simply from foreign NGOs working inside the country.” (Herd, 2005, p. 14).

While many scholars (see e.g. Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a) consider that the former Soviet Union has become an area for democratization through electoral revolution, Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) do find that the colour revolutions is not a lonely post-communist phenomena. Electoral revolutions and coup d’état attempts are taking place in other parts of the world as well, especially in Africa. Kalandadze and Orenstein conclude:

“What makes electoral revolutions unique is the presence of mass protests in favor of adherence to a key feature of democracy: free and fair elections that give the opposition the opportunity to win. The fact that the people come into the streets to defend their democratic rights give electoral revolutions a sense of legitimacy, internally and internationally, that many other protests lack.” (Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009, p. 1406).
4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH

As the main theories on electoral revolutions in the former Soviet Union have been presented in the previous chapter, we know need a theoretical framework to approach the Georgian opposition movement. This framework will mainly be based on the ideas of scholars as Tilly, Tarrow, Uhlin, Della Porta and Diani.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue, that treating mass movements as just one homogenous group is a too narrow view on the subject. In their research on the role of mass movements in contentious politics, they divide the mass movement into two camps; base for social movements and campaign done by a social movement (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). This division indicates, that even if there is an established network for social mass movements (base) that is trying to achieve political change it is first and only when the movement has a member base, is enough diversified and stable a successful campaign can happen (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). A part of this campaign is mobilizing resources, which has been shown to play a significant role in demonstration against different regimes around the world (see e.g. Andrews et al., 2010). Not just the way citizens are organized, but also the final goal for mobilization and the way of using their influence helps them form into successful movements (Andrews et al., 2010). Social protest organized by a movement struggling for social or political change should further not only be considered as a specific feature of mass movements, but “rather an option, open to a much broader range of actors when they feel their relative position in the political process [has] come under threat.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 28).

In researching mass movements, we are so facing the broader framework that could, according to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), be divided into base and campaign. When dealing with the base for the mass movements possible questions we could use are 1) What are the underlying reasons for action? 2) Who are the actors? 3) How has mobilization been organized? Accordingly, when dealing with the campaign for the movement we would ask us 4) What actions are being taken? 5) What is the goal of the campaign? 6) What is the reaction? The inner framework for mass movements, mobilization and political action is therefore both complex and diversified. Andrews et. al. (2010, p. 1194) so ask for a
“multidimensional effectiveness models that address their [civic associations’] distinctive qualities” and introduce the term “organizational effectiveness” to the discussion to explain why some mass movements are more successful than others.

Actions (demonstrations, political activism etc.) in themselves are not enough, there has to be a base on which social campaign can evolve. Still, the movement will not emerge in a vacuum, and as has been discussed in previous chapters much research has focused on the external frames within which the movement occurs (political system, level of freedom, electoral models etc.). Also Uhlin (2006, p. 31) has pointed out that “[t]he concept of political opportunities, however, can easily be used for almost any kind of contextual factors having an impact on social movements. Such a broad and vague conception is of little help”. Uhlin (2006, p. 31) so list three main dimensions of political opportunities: the relative openness or closure of the formal political system; the presence or absence of elite allies; the state leadership’s capacity for, and willingness to use, repression.

4.1 The study of social mass movements – a historical overlook

The 1960s saw a dramatic transformation in the study of social movements. Critics had lamented the study of social movements as the research area was considered lacking theory. Parallel with the development of social movements around the word in the 1960s (e.g. American civil rights and anti-war movements, the May 1968 revolt in France and rising environmental and women’s movements), so the study of social movements developed into a major area of research. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)

Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 14) observe, that in the early discussion on social movements and collective actions, actions were defined as “rational, purposeful, and organized”. As well, the central term class was for long considered one of the main underlying reasons as a base for social movements to occur. Today the definition may have become more blur, mainly because relations between organization, network and mobilization have been included in the framework. Tilly (2002) has among others argued that the study of social movement has entered a new era and the scheme researchers today
have is more complicated and overlapping then some decades ago. Tilly so contends, that “[t]he shift in orientation leads to an understanding of social movements as strongly patterned transactions within interlocking networks” (Tilly, 2002, p. 80). The determination of forms and intensity of collective actions has broadly been connected to the political opportunities as well as the political and institutional realities in which the social movements operate (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 16). Della Porta and Diani (2006) further consider that while the social structure of the society has changed, the welfare state has developed, labour mobility has expanded and economic globalization has become a challenge for the state in the 21st century, so has also social fragmentation (continued) to affect collective action and social change. The working class has so expanded, while socio-politico-economic cleavages have remained (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The shift in social movement theory from classes linked to industrial production towards a more covering mobilization of the civil society has so created a new class struggle including e.g. cultural issues and lifestyle and can so be considered more diversified than Marxist theory (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

What then about the “founding fathers” of social movement theory: Marx, Durkheim, Mill and Weber? While Tilly (1978) admits, that the basic understanding for research and theories of collective action can be found in the teaching of Marx, Durkheim, Mill and Weber, he still considers it hard to even find a red a line that would summarize their teachings. Tilly (1978, p. 49) so argue, that:

“[t]he theories at hand clearly lead in different directions. Yet in many areas they are too incomplete or too imprecisely specified to permit either clear confrontations with other theories or decisive testing against the facts. Where they are well specified, furthermore, it often turns out that they are talking about different things: theories of collective choice apply to situations in which the alternatives are limited and well defined; theories of collective behavior refer to what happens when the standard choices are suspended, and so forth.”.

4.2 Defining the social mass movement

At this point, before we will approach the social mass movement, there is some need of definitions. As already stated, it is of help to approach the mass movements with two main
bases for explanation: base for social movements and campaign done by a social movement (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 19) also points out, that the set of questions referring to social movements are not merely peculiar to social movement research, but rather it makes more sense “to talk about collective action at large, rather than social movements.”. This because collective action refers to individuals within the social movement, sharing resources and the same goal, which in their turn can be both collective but also interests of specific reference groups (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, the labelling of the colour revolutions as social mass movements can be criticized, and not only the social movements but also collective action has to been taken into consideration. This as “analyses of collective action and analyses of social movements are inextricably linked.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 19).

As will be shown in chapters on, it is questionable to talk about a homogenous social mass movement in Georgia after 2003, and indeed the question can be asked if what happened in 2003 really was a mass movement or rather a political game with a favourable outcome for the main opposition party. Nevertheless, we are approaching the organizations as a movement, as their common goal is (and has been) the fight against the political elite.

Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 20) describe that there are three main mechanisms that are distinctive about social movements: the conflictual collective action, the dense informal networks, and the collective identity. Further, informal (or formal) networks are, especially in a global world, of big importance and no single organization can so claim to represent a movement alone. On the other hand, it is negotiations, co-work and a common defined strategy that is the ground for possible collective action occurring. The more the action is collective, and not concentrated to a formal organization, the bigger are the opportunities to reach the common goal. Collective identity is further part of the formation of formal and informal networks, as the actors are bound by a common goal and have a common opponent. Still, these links do not necessarily include a common identity. It is therefore not the networks themselves that include a common identity, but it occurs in the resource mobilization and campaigning. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp. 20-24.)
McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 20) have defined a social mass movement as the following: “Complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals”. Wilkinson (1971, p. 27) again has maybe presented one of the most formal and explicit definition by describing a social movement as:

“…a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into ‘utopian’ community … A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the corporate group … A social movement’s commitment to change and the raison d’être of its organization are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement’s aims and beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members.”.

Taking these authors, just representing a part of the field of researchers on social mass movements, we can find some specifics of interest. The social movement should have some kind of formal organization and boarders, but these borders can indeed be blur depending on how the researcher approach the movement. Additionally, a line between social movements, political parties and interest groups should be drawn to separate the movement from other similar objects. The main difference between social movement and parties and other organizations, does, according to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 25),

“not consist primarily of differences in organizational characteristics or patterns of behavior, but of the fact that social movements are not organizations, not even of a peculiar kind … [but] they are networks which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances.”.

A social movement according to Della Porta and Diani (2006) should therefore not be compared with single organizations or groups, as functions as movement strategy, tactics, leadership, membership and recruitment are not the same within crowds and collectives as within e.g. parties or interest groups. Again, the focus is slightly moved from the organization and the structure to the collective identity as this sense of collective identity or collective belonging is the link between the participants and the structure of the organization are built upon collective identity, while in the same time collective identity also appears from the structure and mobilization.
Following this, we can draw a line between social mass movement and social movement organizations. Social movement can still be part of a social mass movement, and among the actors can even political parties, community groups and interest groups be found. Political parties so play a dual role and “will be part of two different systems of action (the party system and the social movement system), where they will play different roles” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 27).

Taking into consideration the different, but alike, definitions on social mass movements it can be concluded, that the social mass movement is built on two foundations: base (i.e. organizational structure, networks) and campaign (participation). The organizational structure differs from e.g. a political party and the borders are diffuse. Still the organization cannot only be a crowd of participants as there has to be some kind of organizational structure (e.g. the difference between a crowd gathered for a concert on the central square or the same crowd gathered for a planned and organized demonstration). The participants gather around one common goal, or against a common enemy (could be an object, but also a physical person). The participants will, to some extent, share some kind of common identity, but this identity does not have to define or strict. A final definition on what a social mass movement is would be a complex summarization of all researcher explaining the phenomena, and it would probably be easier to conclude on what a social mass movement is not, rather than is. At this point, it has also to be stated, that the term social mass movement is applicable on any organized mass meeting its criteria, and the common goal of the movement does not define it as a movement, but rather the organizational structure. As an example a pro-governmental movement supporting the authoritarian ruling elite is just as much a social mass movement as an anti-governmental movement fighting for democratization (i.e., as long as these are not formal political parties).

**4.3 Approaching the social mass movement**

In the next part four different aspects of the social mass movement have been chosen as support in approaching the object for research; organization of the movement, mobilization
of members, existing formal and informal networks and collective identity. These aspects have been chosen on the base of Della Porta’s and Diana’s (2006) view on how to study social mass movements.

4.3.1 Organization and participation

A social movement does not always have to be a formal organization as many times the movement include different interest groups and formal or informal organizations. The social movement can be considered the umbrella of smaller clusters, and by developing symbols and goals, different interest groups gather around one common cause. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) Scott (1981, p. 9) claims, that

“organizations active in social movement fulfill – if to varying degrees and in varying combinations – a number of functions: including participants to offer their services; defining organization aims; managing and coordinating contributions; collecting resources from the surrounding environment; selecting, training, and replacing members.”

Scott (1981) further has divided social movement organizations into three blocks: rational, natural and open systems. According to the first model, the organization has a rather formal structure and includes different interest groups oriented around the same cause. In the second model, the participants are not as much affected by the formal organization as in the first model, but rather, as Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 138) shows, share “an interest in the survival of the system and engage in activities, coordinated informally, to secure such survival”. The third model as of Scot (1981) has an informal structure where participants are not necessarily bound to the organization but through negotiations, the common goal to be reached while the outcome is strongly affected by the local context. As Della Porta and Diani (2006) points out, Scot’s divisions are analytical but not empirical descriptions. This is why elements of all three models can be found within the same organization depending on the level of participation.

The leadership within the social movement organization may differ from case to case; it is either hierarchical, horizontal or a mixture of the both (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Leadership is further not only created through decision-making within the movement but
through the contacts to the outside world: “[L]eadership may be associated with actors’ ability to promote coalition work among movement organizations, or to establish connections to the media and political institutions, which in turn lead to operating de facto as movement ‘representatives’” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 143). Social mass movements might have a tendency towards horizontal structures, but on a public representational level most organization do need a specified leadership (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Nevertheless, leadership within a social movement organization can be rather informal and unlimited, as this leadership is more representative than final. Comparing this to the Rose Revolution in 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili was clearly the leader of the opposition movement, but he was also the leader of his party Movement for National Unity. In this way, leadership can indeed be formal, if the movement or a part of the moment (in the Georgian case opposition party MNU) has an organized structure. Still, even in 2003, there were other party fighting to get to power as well, but Saakashvili turned out to be the strongest leader.

A social movement organization can also be divided in professional and participatory organizations. The first group, professional movement organization, represents a strong and formal leadership and a restricted membership base. In these kinds of organizations, ordinary members do not have much power in changing or affecting the policymaking of the community. Formal or professional organizations do have big opportunities to succeed in reaching their goals, while an established political system may negatively affect the mobilization capacity of such organizations. The second group, participatory organizations, can further be divided into mass protest and grassroots organizations. As the professional organization in many cases has been to be too formal, other organization has chosen a more participation-based informal horizontal structure. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, pp. 145-150.) The ideal profession or participatory organization is still to be found. As will be seen in the Georgian case, the organizations included in this study are according to this division a mixture of both professional and participatory organizations, and leadership in the participatory organization more ad hoc than formal. The ad hoc diffuse leadership in participatory organizations may to some extent be of a positive character, as Della Porta and Diani (2006) argues that a formal structure of leadership, even if in an informal
organization, has in many cases not always been a blessing. Grassroots organizations still often suffer from lack of resources, but have, especially in countries with a low level of civil society, been successful in mobilizing people around a common cause (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

As a movement consisting of organizations, be it then formal, informal or semi-formal, the end of the path still often lies in either institutionalization or dissolvent (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). As Della Porta and Diani (2006) suggest, it is not even necessary for a social mass movement to become “formalized” or institutionalized if it has once already reached its goal. In fact, Della Porta and Diani (2006) observe, that few movements in reality survive for a significant time; some of the dissolve because their needs have been met, other dissolve due to schisms in leadership or demobilization. Additionally, some movements become more moderate, other radicalizes and creates an even more ambitious agenda. Concerning social mass movements with a political agenda, this can be considered a quite normal fate. If the movement succeed in its endeavours, there is no need for the organization structure. Still, the organizations within the movements will not disappear but continue to work for other causes or reconstruct themselves to e.g. institutes or agencies. Social mass movement can in theory also turn themselves also into national parties, if they already were not part of any political party. The further development of the social mass movement is therefore highly depending on the opportunities offered by the political system and the national context.

Individual participation in social movements is not restricted to only membership, but by participating in social movements and their actions, “the political dimension of action intersects and overlaps with the private dimension, to generate the foundations of a specific form of subculture.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 131). The chain of participation is a chain of continuity and in most cases individuals actively participating and sharing the same cause will draw other persons into the same group. The developing subculture is of importance to create the “common we” and individual self-realization, as participation in a movement’s action (should, to be successful) include not only protest actions but also other kind of participation (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).
4.3.2 Mobilization and revolution

Not all mass movements mobilize for revolution. Still, as our focus is set on the Georgian society under Saakashvili and the actions of the civil society’s anti-governmental groups we are facing attempts to revolution. Huntington (1968, p. 264) writes:

“A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence”.

Among others, Tilly (1978, p. 193) still criticize Huntington’s definition (that according to the author stands as the “norm” of definitions on revolutions) to be too demanding, and sets for a simpler one: “A revolutionary outcome is the displacement of one set of power holders by another. That simple definition leaves many reference points available: power over the means of production, power over symbols, power over government.”. Tilly (1978) further points out, that if we use Huntington’s definition of a revolution, or other “demanding definitions”, we could almost consider that a true revolution has never happened. Tilly (1978) so asks, that we should rather talk about revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcomes.

Dames and Forbrig (2006) has in their study on the Ukrainian youth movement Pora! (It is time!) concluded, that the movement not only became a successful tool for mobilizing people in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004 but even synonymous with the Orange Revolution. The framework for analysis that authors use includes six different aspects: framing the campaign and developing Pora’s organizational structure, developing a campaign strategy, training activists and developing a volunteer network, conducting the information campaign, responding to repression, and mobilizing for free and fair elections (Demes and Forbrig, 2006). Further Demes and Forbrig (2006) also points out the development of the civil society in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution, as without this development it would have been hard (maybe impossible) to develop the organization. Once again we see, that a mass movement is not emerging in a vacuum, but there is always
a context that should not be ignored (or over-emphasized).

Della Porta and Diani (2006) so argue, that when separated events of collective action occur in a long-lasting framework and these events can be linked to other separate events with the same common goal or identity, we are very close to a social mass movement. Even if the single event or episodes of collective action fail, this does not mean that it cannot reoccur. As Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 24) points out, if the collective identity has been created and individuals (or organizations) feel that they belong to a cause or a movement, “the revival of mobilization in relation to the same goals [will be] easier, whenever favorable conditions reoccur.”

A social mass movement’s destiny and opportunity to succeed is also depending on the number of participants not only involved in its organization but in supporting the cause officially through e.g. protest actions (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). As Della Porta and Diani (2006) hold, the theory behind “the logic of numbers”, is the same as in representative democracies: the more supporters behind a cause (even if not in majority), the more attention will the interest group draw to it. Here it has to be added, that in most revolutions it is still the majority of the minority that seems to succeed. For a successful revolution, a movement might not need a majority of the citizens (in numbers) out on the streets, but rather a small fierce minority might just as well succeed. Even if the majority of the population will show opposition against the ruling elite, it will not automatically mean that the ruling elite will meet the movement’s demands. In many cases, the ruling elite may change its position, while in other situations it will clash with the movement.

Marches have been one of the main tools used in mobilizing great numbers of supporters to demonstrate the power of the social movement. The minority movement so address the reference group and gain attention while the movement leaders strive to keep supporters committed to the cause throughout the protest actions. To secure that their needs will be met the social movement so has to draw attention towards itself through different media channels. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) Della Porta and Diani (2006) admit that social mass movement do not always represent the majority of the people. This is why “it would
be extremely dangerous for social movements to depend solely on such a logic [the logic of numbers]; a logic which does not in any case fully reflect their own concept of democracy, which emphasizes participation, not majority vote” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 173).

An adopted model of Lipsky to show “the political resource of the powerless” has been created by Della Porta and Diani (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 165-168). The first step in the model is the protest (not necessarily a protest action but rather a demand for change). In these groups, leadership occurs to lead the protest actions and define the common cause. When the target of process will correlate with the realities of the reference group, and when the leadership so can address, through, media, the reference group, a collective action has been born. Media is of big importance as the more visibility the movement gets; the greater the changes are for successful development of its actions. Protests are not the only channel to address the problem and influence on the political agenda, still they highlight the cause and support further action. The modern framework for actions includes boycotts, barricades, petitions and demonstrations. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.) The changing media filed (with the dramatic growth of use of social media) has also given new channels to organizations that lack the needed resource (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Indeed, the use of social media can also mean negativity, as the opponent has all the same channels as the movement.

Along with the logic of numbers goes also the logic of damage (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). While many social movements can be considered peaceful movements, some use violence and destruction as tools to reach their goals. Strikes and boycotts can be considered as soft violence, where the ruling elite will suffer economical loss due to chaos in the society. Violent actions in their purest forms, as e.g. destroying state property, is, though stigmatized, many times “justified often as a symbolic refusal of an oppressive system, but it is also used, as in the anti-austerity riots, to win specific battles, or to obtain media attention.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 174). Della Porta and Diani (2006) further point out, that by using “stigmatized violent actions” (as riots and destruction of state property), the social mass movements have to be careful so their actions will not cause a highly negative response in the society. The regime will also most likely answer on such
behaviour with direct actions that may cause the social mass movement more harm than if they would have used only nonviolent techniques (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). This is a crucial stage, as will be seen also in the Georgian case, as the movement will at some point face the question of rule of law. The dilemma for the movement will so be how to carry out non-violence protest actions if even the non-violence actions are considering as violations of the law? The movement may consider the Constitution or the legal framework as unjust and erroneous, infringing the right of citizens, but where will the movement draw the line for what is rightfulness and what is not? The question will at this point be philosophical, and the line between non-violence and violence blur. According to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 180) it has been shown, that “the more peaceful and institutional a course of unconventional political action is (petitioning, for example) the greater the level of public approval.”. The golden mean is so somewhere between non-violence actions that will be too weak and extreme actions that will hurt the approval among the citizens.

A strategic option for a social movement is shaping a successful protest action where all included forces will be taken into consideration and experiencing themselves as parts of the movement community even if they do not share all the common values of the movement (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The common goal has to be the same, but values and preferences on actions how to reach the goal can differ depending on the participants’ role in the movement. Protest actions support not only the goal of the movement, but also internal aims. By finding tactics that build up common values and a common identity, the movement will be more successful in creating a loyalty and conviction towards reaching the common goal. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)

The diffusion of protest activities between countries and societies, or rather the diffusion of strategic adaption and ideas, is many times crucial for the social movement to succeed or create successful demonstration that will bring them closer to their goal (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; for more on diffusion of electorate revolutions, see e.g. Bunce, V. J., & Wolchik, S. L. (2006b). Diffusion can be both direct or indirect, but the main point is that “[i]deas concerning organizational structure, strategies of action, or definitions of the world ‘travel’ from movement to movement, sector to sector, city to city, center to periphery, and,
on occasion, periphery to center.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 186). Diffusion is more likely to take place between countries that have a high level of geographical, cultural, historical and/or structural similarities. In the 21st century, the use of internet and social media has speeded up the process of expanding ideas through numerals channels of communication. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)

The protest cycle of a social movement include the different steps a movement goes through as well as helps us to understand the evolution of collective action. Protest cycles have been shown to include a peak of the conflict that includes:

“a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution.” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 153).

Della Porta and Diani (2006) also find, that just as in cultures and economies, there are peaks and lows in collective mobilization. According to the authors, the first movement emerging demanding e.g. political change will, even if it fails in reaching the goal, lower the step and risks for future movements. Accordingly, gained victories will most likely support remobilizations (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

### 4.3.3 Networking

Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 115) describes networks as affecting participation in collective action, and links between people and interest groups are important as “social networks are not only a facilitator but also a product of collective action.”. Further, the authors claim, that these networks helps to maintain the action of the movement in the long run. While Della Porta and Diani (2006) consider networks to be a main channel for mobilization and recruitment of people and they may also support protest actions in different places and contexts (i.e. diffusion of ideas and actions). As Della Porta and Diani (2006) points out that interaction with other people sharing the same cause creates networks that are built on mutual understanding and substantiate a “collective we”.

35
Recruitment through networks is still not an undisputed question. In social movement studies it has been pointed out that focusing too much on the role of networks may draw the researcher away from “the transmission of cognitive cultural message”, that includes also the role of media and creating strong emotional impact to draw also strangers’ attention towards the cause of the social movement (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 121). Della Porta and Diani (2006) further find that what is crucial to success is rather the position in the network the movement or its actors possess than the network itself. Any movement still need to have some kind of network base to not be delimited. The findings on the role of networks are so not consistent. Nevertheless, official networks, just as private networks, are both in different ways supporting collective action. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)

Social mass movements are further a product of the context where they emerge. The current assertion, according to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 202), is that “the greater the number of actors who share political power (the greater the checks and balances), the greater the chance that social movements gain access to the system.”. However, a weak state will (if not a revolution happens and the elite is overturned) many times not have the means to meet the demands of the social movements. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 201-206) includes sets of territorial decentralization, functional separation of powers, the characteristics of the public bureaucracy and the power of the state as matters that will affect the appearance and development of social mass movements. Tilly (1978) has further argued, that “[a]ll our inquiries into the forms and frequencies of collective action eventually lead us back to the question of power.” According to Tilly (1978) so the analysis of social movements, mobilization electoral revolutions will not be enough if not power is taken into consideration as an affecting factor. A central variable is the openness of the decision-making process as this is crucial for a social movement to succeed. In a rather open society with healthy democratic political opportunities, the social movement may find different ways to influence policymaking, elections or political results. Still, these opportunity channels can as well be used by other actors (e.g. the opponents of the mass movement) to lobby their agenda and this may become a threat to the movement. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).
The social movement further needs skilled players (e.g. leaders) that support good relationship with the media are able to “market” the common goal. Therefore, networking with media and creating (positive) symbols will support the collective action and raise support for the movement. The autonomy of the media plays here an important role, as a free and pluralistic media field will raise the opportunities for the movement. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). However, does pluralistic communication channels per se imply a supportive actor? In the end, it will be the reference public that approve or disapprove the actions of the movement, however it will be covered. For a positive framework among the reference public the movement should, in theory, control the media or influence on the covering. Still at this point, the independence of the media is questionable.

4.3.4 Collective identity and collective action

Collective identity within the social mass movement is not an autonomous object, nor property but “the process by which social actors recognize themselves – and are recognized by other actors – as part of broader groupings, and develop emotional attachments to them (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 91). Collective identity is so, according to Della Porta and Diani (2006) including shared goals of the group, values, attitudes, worldviews and even lifestyle. It is an essential component in creating a social movement and “[i]dentity plays an important role in the explanation of collective action even for those who see in collective action a peculiar form of rational behavior.” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 113).

The first step in creating a collective identity is identifying the differences between “we” and “the other”. This division will include and define the positive characters of the collective identity in the movement versus the negative characters of the opponent. Here collective identity and the movement network will merge, as the feeling of belonging will make it easier for the participants to face risks and opposition. This is why emerging formal or informal networks support the development of collective identity and vice versa. Formal or informal networks may be part of the organizational structure or ad hoc networks. However, they are of big importance to movements working in complex social environments. Thirdly, collective identity is being linked with the common past. In this
way, the social movement can create a timeline of struggle against the “other”, and connect to a common cause. The movement identity does not have to be excluding other identities, but rather including gathering as many participants as possible under the movement umbrella. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.)

Tilly (1978) identifies five big components in the analysis of collective action: the interests, the organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action. The interests include the gains and losses a certain group can gain from interaction with other groups. When analysing the organization focus is set upon the structure of the organization as well as how committed participants are (Tilly, 1978). Mobilization includes the process and actions made by the organization. As Tilly (1978, p. 7) points out: “The analysis of mobilization deals with the ways that groups acquire resources and make them available for collective action.”.

Della Porta and Diani (2006) further observe, that the creation of a collective identity has to be based not only on homogenization and self-recognition, but also on mutual recognition and social relationships. Positive and negative labelling walks hand in hand. The movement’s leaders abilities to develop an identity to be recognized as “different” has to be weighted up with imposing “negative and stigmatized definitions of the identity of other groups” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 106). Mobilization is made difficult the larger the movement gets and social incentives as prestige, respect and friendship will have to change their characteristics as the group expand (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). If on the other side, the opponent proposes greater incentives, the success of mobilization will further on be obscured. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 24) criticize the question of homogeneity of the actors sharing a certain identity and claim that “social movement identity dynamic [is existing] to that extent that groups and/or individuals feel part of collectivity, mobilized to support or oppose social change.”.

The social movements are not only a phenomena that develops from certain protest events or around certain political questions, but only when collective identity has been developed that brings along a common purpose to a cause a social movement has been established
Collective identity so become a central establishment in the social movement and goes beyond collective action. If collective identity is weak, not only the opportunities of the social movement will be small but even the label of social movement should be questioned (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

Tilly (1978) also argues that in the analysis of collective action there are three overlapping intersecting areas from which we have to begin our analysis. The first area is including a certain group of people and the researcher is interested in how they have been dealing with different questions. The second area of interest is a set of beliefs and how these developed. The third area includes certain actions and why a certain action happened. Tilly (1978) further points out, that analysing collective action often means that we have to deal with at least two, or all three, of the different areas. If the basic unit for our study is a certain group, the researcher is to analyse the beliefs that certain group had. If the basic unit will be a certain event, the researcher will be concerned about at least the group that was represented, as well as actions that happened. Research on collective action in most cases will include all the three areas, and in that case, our basic unit will be the movement, including the certain group we are interested in analysing, the beliefs and values the group had as well as the collective action that developed from that group. (Tilly, 1978.)

Della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that the symbolic invention is a common characteristic among social movements. The movement may so take into its use historical events, social experience, culture and religion and deliberately, or unconsciously, reform these events to fit the particular framework and goal of the movement. These forms of identities do not need to have their roots in the historical context, but rather “mix together symbols and references deriving from diverse social groups to form a new synthesis.” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 109).

4.4 The mass movement in its context
The following model has been created to place the Georgian opposition movement in its context. Even if the focus is on the movement itself, the external framework should not be
forgotten, nor ignored. The model is a modified, and highly simplified, scheme of the ideas of Tilly (1978), Della Porta and Diani (2006) and Uhlin (2006).

On the top of the model we have Tilly’s (1978) three overlapping areas including a group of people, set of beliefs and actions. The group of people in our analysis are different anti-governmental actors in Georgia active under the rule of Saakashvili. The set of beliefs are their common goals including, among others, democratization of the Georgian society, the fight against excessive use of force, political influence and fair elections. The actions are in this thesis are mainly represented by demonstrations, campaigns and movement organization activities. Once these three areas meet we can consider that an opposition movement has occurred, indeed diffuse, but with some kind of structure and framework. Following the line on the left side this movement occurs as a response on a problem, in this study the rule of Saakashvili and the disadvantages the movement finds in that political system.

Once looking into the opposition movement we find several areas of interest (as explained by Della Porta and Diani, 2006), these are symbols, membership, collective identity, mobilization, organization structure, internal and external networks, training of members and campaign strategy. As will be shown, not all of them will appear in the analysis of the interviews, but they all are of different importance for a functioning movement and part of mobilization of the movement.

The mass movement will, in theory, through collective action and with a common goal hereafter move towards a revolution of some kind. Collective action is also seen at earlier stage of the model as collective action defines a movement and vice versa. Collective action, collective identity and common goal are so characterises of the moment in the same way as they are underlying factors developing and defining the movement. At this stage political opportunities and media coverage be affecting factors influencing the potential success (Uhlin, 2006). As Uhlin (2006) list, the three main political opportunities are the openness or closure of the political system, the presence or absence of elite allies and the willingness and capacity of the state leadership to repress the revolution and actions. Just as
the political opportunities, media coverage have a significant but, as Della Porta and Diani (2006) claimed, not final effect on the movement’s future. At the stage of revolution the outcomes are two, failed or successful revolution. If researching the Rose Revolution in 2003 the final result would have been a return to status quo, as within years after the revolution a new movement started to emerge now opposing the post-revolutionary government. In our case the result is neither failed or successful revolution, as this final product is not of importance to the study. Depending on how you define revolution, the second Georgian revolution beginning under the rule of Saakashvili ended in the end of 2012 when Saakashvili’s party was defeated in Georgia’s parliamentary elections. As Saakashvili was not able to run for a third time as president his rule so ended and the political elite was exchanged.
Explaining the movement in its context. Source: Adapted from Tilly (1978), Della Porta and Diani (2006) and Uhlin (2006)
5 METHODOLOGY

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines methodology as either “a body of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline: a particular procedure or set of procedures” or “the analysis of the principles or procedures of inquiry in a particular field”. Methodology further is a way to combine the theoretical framework with the analysis. The following chapter will focus on the procedures being used in this research to bind together theory with practice. Firstly, the method used for collecting the data, semi-structured interviews will be briefly introduced. Secondly, I will present the procedure of working this material into researchable data. To secure the objectiveness of the research and increase validity I will also present how I have approached methodological triangulation. The local culture and doing research as an outsider will also be covered, as well as ethical questions.

5.1 Semi-structured interviews

A semi-structured interview is a method of research used in the social sciences. While a structured interview has a formalized, limited set of questions, a semi-structured interview is flexible, allowing new questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says. The interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has a framework of themes to be explored. (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993.)

The specific topics for the interviewees were prepared in advance, consisting of informal grouping of topics and questions that were asked of the interviewees (see Annex C). Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993) points out that the methodological approach with interviews that are built on discussions on different subjects in social- and behavioural sciences rarely has changed during the last decades, if not centuries. It has been shown, that this method gives the interviewee enough freedom and space to react on the questions and talk freely about the subject (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993). When creating the methodological framework for conducting a research, the researcher has to remember that research is a complex object, existing of different steps. At first, there is the problem for which a

solution is asked for. Secondly, arguments have to be found why it is important to solve this problem. Thirdly, a method has to be chosen that will support to find a solution and implement this decision. When the data is gathered, the collected data should be analysed. (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993).

The problem of my research are the actions and characteristics of opposition organizations. As sufficient information is not available on the internet, and sufficient information needed cannot be gained from former research on the subject, the only way to gain this information is to go to the place of action and collect it on place. By observing the organizations in their context, and discussing the development and structure of them together with leaders and members belonging to them, information can be gained that will be needed for analysing their functions. Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993) argue, that interviews can be used as method in those cases, where research is being made on subjects that are fairly new to the field. Opposition movements are not new to the social science field, but geographically, the Georgian political society is not a high-profile research field. Even if diffusion of ideas and patterns within the CIS-countries are at near hand, the local context have to be taken into consideration.

The focused interview can be considered as a middle way between open discussion and the structured interviews. Its nature can be considered much like the open interview, where a relation between the interviewer and interviewee is created to bring forward memories and sometimes also emotions. The framework for the discussion is still set beforehand, and the researcher has a hypothesis of what he/she will gain from the interview. Forming a hypothesis is part of planning the research and the interviews. (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 1993.) Still, in focused interviews when accent is given on picturing, interpreting and forecasting the interviewee’s actions the need of a specific hypothesis can, according to Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993, p. 40) be questioned. The questions have so to be formed in such a way, that the subject being researched can be approached as easy as possible. The focused interview is so semi-structured, as the themes for the interviews are known both of the interviewer and interviewee. It is still not as strict as a structured interview, as the subject is not fully known and there are holes in this knowledge that the researcher is trying to fill. (Hirsjärvi
As the problem for my research is identified, the process continues with creating themes for discussion and questions. The four themes in my research are the organization of the movements, mobilization, networks and collective identity. According to these subjects I questions were formed that would be of help during the interviews. Hirsjärvi and Hurme (1993) also discuss the classification of questions. According to them, questions can be divided into two groups: fact-questions and opinion-questions. The classification is important, as questions where the interviewer is try to find out facts will give different outcome as questions where emotions and opinions are in focus. The questions can be of both types, but has to at least in the mind of the interviewer be divided so that information can be “located” in the right box.

Aalto (2001) discusses the ontology and narratives in in-depth interviewing in political science. The line between in-depth interviewing and for example semi-structured interviews may be blurred, and I am not taking side if it can be considered as a different methodology or not\(^8\). According to Aalto (2001), a successful research can be made if the researcher knows the context and and identifies the narratives in the interviewee’s stories. In these terms, the whole figure is more important than certain facts, and the researcher has to take into consideration the identity of the interviewee, as he/she influences the story being told. My interviews will lean towards in-depth interviews and the whole picture will be taken into consideration, still it is not a clear research done with in-depth interviews but rather semi-structured. As Aalto (2010) argue, in-depth interviews that may be considered unsuccessful, still tells the researcher something about the nature of the researched object, due to the reflective nature of the method.

\(^8\) Aalto (2001) points out that from the 90s on, in-deph interviewing has become more and more considered as a different methodology due to its focus on radical ontology and narrative character. Still, I consider the method also applicable as “a part” of semi-structured interviews.
5.2 Implementation

The data for the analysis was collected during a three-week field trip to Georgia in May 2011. The time for the sample was chaotic in the capital as heavy protests against the presidential regime was under way. This is visible in the interviews as many interviewers were keen on discussing the happenings that were taking place on the streets. During the weeks, I met with politicians, organization leaders and activists from organizational structures that were active during the Rose Revolution in 2003 as well as afterwards under the rule of Saakashvili. The data consists of ten semi-structured interviews, where I have used common questions for all interviewees, but also given much space to discuss matters that are of importance for the interviewees. The four themes that I used as a framework for the interviews were organization of the movements, mobilization, existing formal and informal network (including partners and sponsors abroad), and relations between organization and opposition movements. A trip to the areas was merely necessary, as information of Georgian opposition movement is hardly accessed anywhere in Russian or English.

During the field trip I also used a research diary, where I marked observations during the interviews and informal discussions that was not be recorded on tape. The interviews were held in English, Russian and Georgian (in Georgian with a translator). As the sample was restricted, I used the “snowball-effect” to get in contact with new people. This kind of sample can, according to Beamer (2002), be used especially if the process of selecting cases is complicated due to the nature of the research.

5.3 Analysis of collected data

The three steps that follows after collecting the information needed are the classification, analysis and interpretation of the material (Ruusuvuori, Nikander, and Hyvärinen, 2010). The three steps are bind together to each other, still separated as different processes in the analysis. The interviews were transcripted with the help of a Russian and Georgian translator. Those interviews that had been done in Russian and Georgian were further translated to English. The first step, classification, was done when the material had been
transcribed. As the material was broad, (about 110 pages written transcripts in English) there was reason to confine it to create treatable data. This was done by looking for similarities, words, phrases and continuing themes so a framework of the material could be created. The themes I chose was 1.) Background reasons (e.g. for joining an organization, for participating in a protest etc.), 2.) Organizational structure 3.) Mobilization 4.) Networking and support. The next step, content analysis, included summarizing, generalizing and analysing the material with a close attention to objectivity, reliability, validity and hypothesis testing. At this point it will be considered, if the material is answering on the research questions. As the thesis is dealing also with historical facts, some information may be forgotten in the interviews and some information misinterpreted. The interviewee will give information as he/she sees it, and put accent on certain facts (Alastalo and Åkerman, 2010). Suggestive information has to be considered suggestive, and not as facts, as Alastalo and Åkerman (2010, p. 391) put it, the researcher should throughout the process impugn not only the collected information, but also his/her own argumentation and facts. When secured about the validity of the research, it is time to move on unto interpretation.

5.4 Triangulation

While reports, archives and observation can be considered non-reactive methods to collect information, interviews are highly reactive, meaning that the researcher by his presence is involved in the collecting procedure and so influence the collected data (Hirsjärv and Hurme, 1993). It can be discussed, if reactive methods are as objective as non-reactive. To secure the validity of the research, I have used different methods. This process, triangulation, can include both reactive and non-reactive methods. Therefore, I have “backed up” my interviews with other data from among others OSCE, Freedom House and former research on the Georgian society. During my field trip, I tried to gain local sources, but due to the language question, this was not a successful project.

Herod (1991) points out, that interviewing foreign elites, rather than non-elites, support the use of triangulation in the research. This because elites may provide information, reports,
documents that are needed for the triangulation strategy. I do not consider my interviewees as pure elites, still it can be considered that they do have more information about the election process and activities of the movements during elections then the average citizen. This way, they can be considered elites in their own context.

To secure the collected data it might be necessary to get acquainted also with official documents, reports and other information not given at the time of the interview. This might be of special need concerning historical events or discussions about topics that are delicate (Davies, 2001). Davies (2001, p. 77) so points out, that “[q]ualitative historical interviewing is really about eliciting first-hand accounts, securing the evidence of witnesses, as it were (with the inevitable uncertainties such a metaphor implies).”. The sources (in my case reports and former research) used should be reliable, and secondary sources (in my case e.g. articles from newspapers) only used as “back-ups”, and not as primary sources.

5.5 The local culture and ethical questions

Opposition organizations leaders can, as already argued, be considered as specialists in their field, i.e. foreign elites. When conducting interviews with foreign elites, the interviewer faces a different local context and problems that might be absent in his/her home country. Herod (1999) contributes to this discussion by reflecting upon the role of the interviewee as an outsider. Herod (1999, p. 314) argues, that it has been claimed that interviewing foreign elites is a “disadvantage because they [the interviewers] can never hope to understand the cultural complexities of that which they are not. In other words, the validity of one’s research is seen to be a reflection of one’s positionality.”. It is therefore important, that the researcher has enough information and knowledge about the local culture. This obstacle I attempted to approach by discussing a lot with people on the streets, activist, students and anyone who would be ready to discuss with me the political situation in Georgia. This was also done as to be successful in networking and gaining access to people I was not possible to approach without the help of locals. Herod (1999) still concludes that being an outsider has its own advantages, as this creates a distance between
the interviewer and the interviewee. The term in itself is not of importance, but rather should the relation between the interviewer and the interviewee involve “a sliding scale of intimacy” as the researcher may achieve a positionality as a “pseudo-insider”, changing sides if so needed (Herod, 1999, p. 326).

Herod (1999) comments, that even if the research in itself has to be transparent, the researcher does not have to be transparent in front of his interviewees. Revealing too much of the researcher’s agenda can have a negative influence on the collected data, and rather the interviewee should feel important and special than just “one among the others”. This question was actual in this research, as I did not hide, neither speak loudly, about the fact that information was gathered from different organization and actors, which in some cases could be considered as enemies. As the Georgian society is highly politicized in their own eyes, I chose in the end not to publish the names of the interviewees as this was partly of no interest for the research but rather the organizations per se were of value. The interviewees gave me the right to publish their names, but even without the names it would be quite easy be figured out who are the political actors behind the answers. The reason for not publishing their names are so only of a stylistic approach.

Gender roles in Georgia are quite clear and this could be felt in the (radical) organizations where I visited where the majority of both participants and leaders were men. I have further not taken gender roles into consideration, but it has to be stated that four of the interviewees were women and eight interviewees men.
THE REVOLUTIONARY ROAD

6.1 Introduction of the interviewees

The interviews were made in Tbilisi from 11-31.5.2011 (see Annex B and C for more information on the interviews).

Among the interviewees, we find two former politicians, six organizations leaders, three activists and one historian. The first politician was working under Shevardnadze as a deputy minister but was thrown out of politics when she refused to support the president on his foreign policy agenda. During and after the Rose Revolution, she was working closely with Saakashvili but later turned down his offer to join the new government. The other former politician has been a member of the Georgian parliament and is now working as a professor.

The six organization leaders are from very different organizations. Two of them are from organizations that were clearly involved in the Rose Revolution in 2003. Several leaders from the organizations joined politics after the revolution while these two stayed in the organizations working.

One organization leader is from a student organization active at the state university in Tbilisi. From the smaller organizations, we have three leaders representing two organizations. One of the leaders is involved in politics but also running an human rights organization supporting families of children that have been killed by the police. The other organization is more radical and actively involved in demonstrations against the government.

From the activist field we have three activists, two fathers of murdered sons and one activist from a radical movement. Additionally one interview was also made with a
Georgian historian.

The interviewees gave permission to publish their names. Nevertheless, the interviewees’ positions (politician/organization leader/activist) are of more value than their names, and so I have chosen to not publish their names but refer to them according to their position (POL – politician, ORG – organization leader, ACT – activist, HIS – historian).

6.2 Why do they protest?

One of the reasons for the successful Rose Revolution in 2003 was, according to one of the former politicians, that not only did the revolution itself draw young people into politics, but also the prospects of doing a political career. The younger generation involved in the ruling party Citizens’ Union of Georgia were supporting Shevardnadze but only to such a point where their own political careers were not threatened. The opposition was, undisputable, powerful and it was easier for opposition parties to work against the ruling elite then e.g. after that Saakashvili had come to power. Mobilization of the opposition took place as politician changed camps to the growing United National Movement or got in close cooperation with Saakashvili (e.g. the second main figure during the revolution, Nino Burjanadze, left CUG for UNM in 2003, as well Zurab Zhvania, also former supporter of Shevardnadze, joined the movement against the ruling party 2003). The strength for opposition was, according to the former politician, the unity they achieved in demanding for new presidential elections. After the revolution, the new ruling party (UNM) invested much in the young generation as they consider this the most influential voting group in the coming years. This as the young and old generation in Georgia have always been the main target for the ruling party as the generation 35 – 55 years generally are more supportive then other generations of the opposition parties. Post-revolution opposition fighting the new ruling party, UNM, did after this struggle in endless attempts to reinvent the Rose Revolution:

“You know in 2003 the opposition I can say that they were even more stronger and active. But first of all Shevardnadze’s government wasn’t so strong controlled because this government [the Saakashvili government] has good experience how to make revolt and they never give you possibility to make this. They control everything.” (POL1)
According to one of the organization leaders, considers that the Rose Revolution was a turning point in the way that the Georgian people express their political will, and the ongoing protests and culture of taking to the streets has after this become nothing extraordinary for Georgia:

“Georgia was always politically active than other places in former Soviet Union. The Rose Revolution just created more freedom and now people think that demonstration is a legitimate form of political expression … [T]here are two types of people, there is one is more oriented on survival and one oriented on self-expression. Before the [Rose] revolution, it was unacceptable to express your opinion you could express your opinion in a family, together with friends but not publicly. It was like in the Soviet Union and the first years after. Today people are more open.” (ORG1)

The same organization leaders continues, that the Soviet legacy has left it scars in the Georgian society and this is today seen for example as weak membership bases in organizations. The organizations that many times consist of only elite groups are therefore facing problems with attracting the masses as the memory of compulsory party membership in Soviet times prevents people from joining organizations today and “people became more allergic to such kind of activism so we do not overcome it”. (ORG1). A former politician also stress, that the Rose Revolution brought with itself a freedom that was highly appreciated and gave the people courage to break with old institutional patterns:

“It [the Rose Revolution] was the first turning point, when someone was allowed, for example, to say to a distinguished professor, "Get out of here, you are no longer interesting to us!" … You break idols and you break people who means something for the people. Now the same process is going. Kmara, the kmara-process is still going.” (POL2)

The never-ending question in the Georgian society is, what kind of revolution really took place in 2003, and was it even a revolution? Many interviewees consider that what happened was not really a revolution, but rather a show where power was, in a democratic light, given to Saakashvili. These claims are based on the claims, that Shevardnadze was never put to trial for the crimes he was accused of during the revolution:

“No, of course, it was a performance. It was a complete performance … and so just Shevardnadze forced this all at one time to show that the democratic forces are here. It was
very convenient and good. This was the only opportunity he had to survive. And the fact that he is alive today, living in the residence again … It was all agreed upon.” (POL2)

“The fact that Shevardnadze, for what he might, he did not want to shed blood. If he would not go away peacefully, there would be bloodshed.” (HIS1)

“But in the end it turned out that he might hand over the power to his successor, but in a different way, in a, so to say, a more sophisticated scheme, because he might not wish to transfer his power Saakashvili and in the end he got a guarantee of inviolability. No one arrested him; there wasn’t a criminal case against him and against his major officials as well (ACT2)

“It was a revolution from the point of view that a lot of people were involved from their hearts, and very much like I, did too, were tired of Shevardnadze’s ruling that last approximately 30 years … And Shevardnadze agreed with it [demand to step down], agreed at the end, because he got a guarantee of preservation.” (ORG6)

Most of the respondents were critical to the ruling government and claimed that the situation in the country had gone worse during the rule of Saakashvili. All interviewees (besides the organization leaders for organizations that were active during the Rose Revolution) complained about elite corruption, infringement on civil rights, low salaries or unemployment, excessive use of force from the authorities, uncertainty about the future of the country and unfair political practices. Two background factors have to be mentioned. Firstly, more or less, the interviewees can all be considered to be in the opposition (even if many of them opposed affiliation to opposition parties). The other underlying reason is clearly emotional. During the days of the interviews, demonstrations were under way in Tbilisi and there were clashes with the police almost every day that created a chaotic situation in the country.

Nevertheless, socio-economic-political factors may not explain the total truth why these organizations have occurred, but there is one theme that repeats itself in the interviews; violence. When asked, what the difference in the society is in 2011 compared to 2003, one activist answer, that it was the first killings that became the starting point:

“It began in 2006, in 2005-2006 they [the police] were killing people, they killed [name], were killing right on the streets, [name], lot of guys. They killed somewhere over a hundred,
130 or 150, too, on the streets, so to say, dead guys. Everything started with this. We protested.” (ORG4)

6.3 Violence as reason for protests
Many discussions highlighted that personal experience of injustice and violence were the main reasons a person decides to become active and participate in some sort of organization. Pressure on the civil society, excessive use of force against citizens, reforms and corruption were all subjects that the interviewees brought up as reasons for resisting the government. However, experiencing personal injustice becomes a catalyst for mobilizing to fight the common enemy.

“After the “Rose Revolution” everything went wrong in Georgia, the government began to frighten people, repressions took place. … 100 young boys were killed in the streets of Georgia. … In such a small country like Georgia, half of a million of people have suspected sentence, just imagine, and the situation in prisons is horrible. They were forging the documents and facts of the cases and putting innocent people in prison.” (ACT2)

The creation of the human rights organization “Save the Life” was a reaction on the murder of a boy in his 20s. According to one of the members of the organization (father of a murdered son), president Saakashvili and ministers of the Georgian government had several times declared that the Georgian police has the right to use arms without warning if someone’s life is in danger. This statement was also confirmed by representatives from other organizations’ leaders, who claimed that in 2005-2006 over hundred people were shot by the police after Saakashvili newly introduced zero-tolerance-politics on crimes, and this became a beginning of protests:

“The new parliament declared no tolerance, to small criminals and to everyone. Shoot, and so to say, don’t let your hand tremble.” (ORG4)

After the shooting of his son, his father tried to recover the case but met resistance. Instead, with the help of others, he created an organization to support other families and work against injustice:

“After all these events, I decided to create an organization, which would save the lives of the people who would go on fighting against injustice. I sold my son’s belongings and gave all
the money to the boys’ families. I have also opened a charity-school for the children whose parents had no money for their education…” (ACT2)

The bridge between these interests of the father of a murdered son and more influencing actors became one of the organization leaders interviewed. The organization leader, also involved in politics and having several other projects, had more channels and opportunities then the father would have had himself. It was never explained what kind of relation the activist and the organization leader had before the funding of the organization, but within the informal/formal network the lonely father was linked to an established political actors and other with a common goal (this “linking” is also explained by Della Porta and Diani, 2016). The organization has collected information, photos and documents on shootings and excessive use of power. Among these are special operations conducted by the government with fatal causes, cases where young men have been killed by police officers under obscure circumstances with later accusations of forged documents and pressure on witnesses. The organization has further collected information on cases where the detainees (polices) in murder cases have been pardoned after just a couple of years in prison. On a government level, they have worked on creating a commission that would specifically investigate these cases. This as according to their statistics about half of the cases with police killings they consider, that the police used excessive force and are guilty to the murders. Other actors, as the Georgian Ombudsman and several non-governmental organizations, have supported the private investigations while many families have been afraid to participate in the work. According to the members of the organization, they have taken upon themselves the role of investigator as they feel that the state is not protecting its citizens:

“We must fight because the killers will not punish themselves, they will not return themselves a verdict of guilty. They were just the serving staff, the orders were coming from the high officials.” (ACT3)

The leader of the organization “Save the Life” has focused on fighting political violence and murders committed by the police and officials. To raise public support and draw attention to their agenda, the members are together with the families of murdered family members organizing rallies in remembrance of the victims. The leader consider the practice of administrative arrest, where the administrative detention has been raised from 15 days until 90 days, as one of the big problems in all anti-governmental rallies. Administrative
detention is so a powerful government weapon against protesters, as they can be kept away from the street for months. Besides the organization Save the Life, the organization leader has also founded an institute on equality, which has been addressing international organizations and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to raise cases against the Georgian state. As a result of the organizations actions the ECHR has in one case concluded, that president Saakashvili wrongly pardoned an officer sentenced to prison for killing an innocent citizen\(^9\). Another goal has been reducing the numbers of killings, which he claims has been successful:

“…together with families [lists the names] and some others, we have achieved a seriously reduced number of, I will not tell that it’s not happening at all, it does, but rarely, seriously reduced the number of murders in the street, killings, which directly where encouraged by Saakashvili.” (ORG6)

The question about Georgian prisons is also a recurrent theme for discussion. The stories from the interviewees included stories about maltreatment, torture, deaths in prison and unequal sentences where some citizens were imprisoned for murder only a couple of years but counterfeit gave much longer sentences:

“Why is it necessary that everybody will go to prison, you can give financial penalty, you can [do it some] other way, some ultimate penalty. And why prison, why do we have so many people in prison?” (POL1)

According to the organization leaders and activists, there has under the rule of Saakashvili been an abnormal growth of arrested and imprisoned citizens. In cases where a person is brought to trial procedural agreements are used to arrest other persons, as well sentences are doubled, or tripled, which creates situation where a citizen sentenced for theft can receive a sentence on up to 20 years. While in prison, the prisoners are subject to torture and a health threatening conditions including tuberculosis and infections. The prison conditions in Georgia were later highlighted in 2012 after the Gldani prison scandals when videos were shown on national television of detainees being physically and sexually abused

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Another organization leader considers that even if the government can be criticized for its actions the rule of law still has to be respected. The organization, already active during the Rose Revolution, has always spoken for non-violence actions, and if protesters take to violence means against the police forces the authorities have the right to answer to protect themselves. After the clashes between the police and anti-government protesters in May 2011, he comments:

“It was completely legitimate and government can use as much force as they need to quickly crash this [protest] … It’s completely justified to use force against such kind of people, especially when they are armed and when they are violently resistant. And my concern is that they are not arrested and not put in jail. I think in order to somehow prevent such kind of illegal things in the future the violent should be punished” (ORG1)

Pressure on the civil society seems also to some extent increase support among citizens who are not participating in rallies but due to escalations may rethink their decisions. When the historian interviewed for this thesis was asked if she was ready to go the protests against the government she hesitated, as she could not see the clear message of the opposition. Still, if the pressure will increase, she would be ready to go to the streets:

“If government use forces, of course me and others will go. All people are there, all politicians may be there. But if government make like this position, that it will wait. I also will be waiting.” (HIS1)

6.4 Movement organization

The youth movement Kmara’s role as a leading force behind the Rose Revolution is among some of the interviewees seen as highly important, though research has found it playing a slight secondary role and its importance has been questioned (Lincoln, 2012). Nevertheless,

10 The Gldani prison scandal resulted in protests in Tbilisi and the government was claimed to not have taken action in time even if warnings about the prison situation had been raised before by both local and foreign human rights defenders, as reported by Eurasia. (Available: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65929. Last accessed 10th April 2016). Overall prison population fell radically by almost 60% between year 2011 and 2013 to a level even lower then after the Rose Revolution, according to National Statistics Office of Georgia. (Available: http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=602&lang=eng). Last accessed 16th April 2016)
the movement was relevantly big and consisted of around 3000 members with a core group of 100 persons coordinating and monitoring projects, organizing trainings, representing the organization in media etc. One of the Kmara-leaders recalls, that in the beginning the organization was mainly a student organization active in the capital, but later, with the help of the government of Shevardnadze it also took up activities in the regions and the number of members increased. The movement was in close affiliation with, among other organizations, Liberty Institute, who supported the organization in the beginning, as well as with Serbian Otpor, where the movement’s members underwent training. Just as the Liberty Institute, Kmara’s main goal was not to overthrow the government but to secure democratization in the future. The organization’s leader comments, that even if the transition after Shevardnadze has been harsh to the Georgian people, she herself foresaw the way to be tricky and reforms are always painful. Still, the new government never finalized their reformations and this is according to her because the falling support frightened the elite to go through with their plans. Indeed, also former members from Kmara and the Liberty Institute got involved in politics after the revolution, as it had not been possible for them to influence politics under Shevardnadze. The Kmara-leader was also offered a position under the new government but considered the political lifestyle of compromises reluctant:

“As for me I go on criticizing the government as I always did, when I was in Kmara. I think that Kmara was created because it was necessary in that period, the government didn’t give us another choice. … I just want to say that our purpose must not be to fight against the government; we must fight for a better life and better conditions.” (ORG2)

Another organization leader was just as the Kmara-leader offered a high position, but refused, as he could not consider himself working for a government that in his eyes was legitimate:

“And the last offer was to become the [deputy minister]. All the time I refused, because in my life I will not be working there, where at first I would be required to act against my principles and to act against the law. … That’s why I didn’t go there and began to fight for the same principles, for the same ideas, for which fought before the [Rose] Revolution.” (ORG6)

Liberty Institute is a Georgian research centre and civil rights NGO founded in 1996 that together with the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) played a
significant role during the Rose Revolution (Kandelaki, 2006). According to one of its leaders, the institute was founded to support the civil society by focusing on questions as civil liberties, freedom of speech, religion, justice and human rights. The institute was closely affiliated with Kmara during the revolution and together with the Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association supported Kmara both technically and logistically but also with legal services where so needed (Kandelaki, 2006). Nevertheless, the institute was not mainly participating in the demonstrations to bring down Shevardnadze:

“No one was ready for the revolution and thought realistically that the revolution might happen. … No, we’re not against those plans of revolution, we were preparing for the Presidential elections that was scheduled in 2005 … Till the last, maybe just 3 days before, I was not for revolution. It depends how you define revolution.” (Ramishvili, 2011)

After the revolution, many of its leading figures joined politics, while other members stayed and worked for the institute. After 2003, the institute has shifted its focus to policy research, but finds it problematic to attract funding for its activities as the field of organizations applying for foreign funds has drastically grown in Georgia. National support is according to the institute’s leader totally out of the picture.

Another organization evolving solely for anti-government actions is the Civil Front (formerly named 7th of November in memory of the declaration of state of emergency during the demonstration in November 2007). The organization (in 2011 consisting of 100 active members, mostly young people) were organizing demonstrations around homes, villages and cottages of government officials and participated in protest actions against the government. The organization is on the streets of Tbilisi considered radical and this has created problems as not all opposition forces have agreed on co-working with it due to their tactics. The members still claim that it is there constitutional right to defend themselves against the riot police:

“This is because we always say that we will protect our rights. If the government will terrorize us, beat, torture … arrest us and so on, we will not succumb to this because it is our right, because we do not violate the law. We certainly not.” (ORG5)
From 2009 on many of its members were found guilty of crimes against the government and, according to the organization’s leaders, served sentences as political prisoners. At the demonstrations in May 2011 when the interview was made, the organization had nonstop for four months actively protested against the government and as the leaders commented, “were sleeping, walking and eating together” (ORG5). The organization is working in cooperation with several opposition parties, but the leaders stress, that the co-work is non-official and more of a supportive character where they for example join the opposition parties’ rallies:

“We can say that we are working with all those who are fighting for their rights and fighting much, so to say really struggling, and not, as some opposition leaders believe that we should change, change by, how to say it, by legitimate elections and then Georgia would ratify the elections…” (ORG4)

Civil Front’s actions are, according to the leaders, not violating national laws even if their members are sentenced to prison. The opposition parties and other organizations are focused on reforming the society by democratic means and negotiations, while the Civil Front consider that it is only by concrete actions the society can be changed:

“Nothing radical, nothing illegal, we do not throw these Molotov cocktails or something, yeah. We just do not keep silence, not keeping silence and they just hate us. … We can achieve nothing by talks. … We will respond to it [by force], definitely. Because we did not violate the law, have not violated yet, and will not violate. But if they provoke us, it is our constitutional right to defend ourselves.” (ORG4)

“Every Georgian is a politician” was a phrase that could often be heard in Tbilisi. The Georgian society is by many interviewees characterized for a high level of political participation; even if membership in organization is low, participation in anti-governmental

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11 The concept “political prisoner” was largely used by activists and civil rights organizations for any person that had committed a crime at demonstrations or in acts that were clearly anti-governmental. Becoming a “political prisoner” was of the other members seen as something honorable and those who had been sentences to prison, if only for a couple of days, spoke proudly about it. In 2013 almost 200 political prisoners were released under a new amnesty law, according to International Federation for Humans Rights. (Available: https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/georgia/Georgian-political-prisoners-13043. Last accessed: 25th April 2016)
protests is high. Universities were during the Rose Revolution one of the main places where both governmental and anti-governmental forces were recruiting members (Kandelaki, 2011), and some existing non-political organizations restructured due to the political situation. One of the many organizations existing within the Georgian universities was Fair Future, founded by a student at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. From the beginning, the organization leader was involved in a student organization focusing on cultural questions, but with the political turmoil in the country, he and his student fellows created the new organization in 2007 to participate in “new generation politics” with a political agenda (ORG3). According to the organization leader, the university became politicized during the rule of Saakashvili, and because he belonged to the opposition, he was prohibited to participate in some activities and meetings at the university. This concern was also raised by the Kmara-leader interviewed, who claimed the student unions also under the rule of president Shevardnadze were hindering students from joining Kmara. As a result, many students were afraid of being expelled from university if they would become politically active. The organization Fair Future itself was, nevertheless, not touched by university nor outside actors. The students organization was only one among other communities existing at the time, and according to its former leader, the success of keeping the organization untouched by the government was that its agenda was not focused on smearing the government and the President (unlike other student organizations) but on reporting both positive and negative views on the ongoing political situation.

The organizations included in the thesis are far from homogenous; many times the only common factor that can be found is the implacable hatred for the political elite. Most interviewees still acknowledge that if the opposition will not be unified against the common object of hatred it will fail in its endeavours. In this political game, also the government tries to crack the “invented” homogenous opposition by creating schisms among the different actors:

“…because when there is authoritarian rule and a chance to regime change is serious, serious confrontation between the opposition parties are always, always, profitable for the government. Of course, I don’t like many of them [other opposition actors], but I will keep to myself until the time when the government will change. (ORG6)
The same theme, common enemy, is many times reflected in the stories on Shevardnadze. The interviewees that were politically active already in 2003 agree that the opposition was more united in 2003 than afterwards, but this does was not because all forces supported Saakashvili but merely they were against Shevardnadze. The opposition in 2011 is, according to some of the interviewees, split and incapable of finding a common language. Further, the society has changed so, that the possibilities for a political career have individualized also the politicians and opposition leaders are now running their own race instead of a common race. Closely with this also stands the political consciousness of the people, which one of the former politician finds lacking and even if participation is high and the Georgian society is quite active. The society is so robbed of real politics in favour for opposition leaders competing for power, and the democratic development has stagnated. One of organization leaders comments, that the Georgian society is indeed highly individualized, and even if it was possible to gain common support for demonstrations against Shevardnadze in 2003 this base for a similar opposition movement has been harder to find ever since:

“Yes, of course in 2003 it was more united and I think it was not really revolution. It was a spectacle, it was the play, play on the stage I think. … The opposition nowadays they are not together … The bad stuff that in Georgia everyone wants to be the first. So because this the opposition is not standing together.” (ORG3)

6.5 Support and coverage
Both former politicians and organization leaders interviewed agree that foreign support has been a part of the Georgian society ever since the renewed independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Support from the US, and mainly from the Soros Foundation, for the civil society began already in the 90s but after the Rose Revolution the support was mainly addressed to the government. The importance of Soros Foundation’s support to the civil society and organizations as Kmara is confirmed by a former politician, while she consider that overall Western support has altered during the years. After realizing that democracy was not increasing in the country, the war against Russia in 2008 and after the end of Bush’s presidency, the support no longer was for a person (as the support from Bush had
been indirectly to Saakashvili) but changed to opposition programs, investigating journalism and programs activating the civic society:

“I think the attitude changed a little, because they realized that they spend a lot of money but this country cannot became like, what it is, a beacon of democracy.” (POL1)

One of the organizations leaders partly blames the West for not having the right knowledge about the Georgian society. Even if he admits, that western organization do not have an obligation to be part of the Georgian society or fully understand the internal conflicts, support still goes to actors that rather meets the West’s standards then the needs of the Georgian society:

“I said most of civil society organizations are depended on founding and the problem is that these foreign donors have no clue what is going on here and have priorities [that ] significantly differ from the needs of this society. So you can get some founding for some project and nobody from our society knows that you are working for their needs. Because some fancy things which are popular in influenced countries are absolutely detached from this reality …” (ORG1)

For youth organization Kmara the question of funds was crucial, as in the beginning the members had to pay everything from their own pockets. The members were not paid salary, but the department leaders of the organization received financial support according to their experiences and knowledge. Kmara, anyhow, got in contact with Soros Foundation and through another organization received funds for training 600 regional members in “demonstration behaviour”:

“The training were made in 3 stages, we were teaching young people how nonviolent demonstration should have been made, we were explaining to each of our members that it was impossible to answer with violence on violence, it was very important.” (ORG2)

The Civil Front claimed that all the money they were using came from their own members (some members even sold their cars to support the organization). At some point, the organization had asked for funding from Soros Foundation but were rejected funds as, according to the organizations’ leaders, they were too much involved in politics. They claim, that for the same reasons also other Western actors have been reluctant to support the activities of the organization. The members are working as volunteers for the organization
with no salary, the only need for money is mainly for transportation of the members to the office or out on the field.

An organization that received national support was the student organization Fair Future. Even if the organization was not affiliated to any political party, it received funds from politic actors. The organization was sponsored by Arkady “Badri” Patarkatsishvili, a famous Georgian businessperson that before his death in 2008 was closely involved in internal politics in Georgia:

“[H]e was sponsoring us and he was paying us money but I even didn’t remember even one fact that they tell us ‘do this or do this’. They never order us what to do. We have the meeting with this group who was working with Badri Patarkatsishvili and we ask them for money, for sponsor, they ask us the goal and what we are going to be plan. We showed the plan, they say okay, it’s quite normal and they decided to sponsor. But they did not touch us, they give us full freedom.” (ORG3)

The interviewees often referred to the media as being controlled by the government and some of the respondents had personal experiences of being shut out of media because of their political views. One former politician that also worked as a journalist recalls how she was shut out of the media work after she turned down president Saakashvili’s offer to become a minister in his government:

“And then one day, Saakashvili said to me, you will be the [minister], but you should support our plan that is, that is, the entrance to Tskhinvali, armed, indeed. I said that never, I'm not going to support this plan that will destroy Georgia. And then I had to say goodbye to my duty and to the University … for me TV was closed, public services were closed to me and I was almost considered an enemy of the people.” (POL2)

The media field has become unsatisfactory in the country since the Rose Revolution, and according to some of the politicians and organizations leaders, independent television channels have been shut down or are in the possession of pro-government actors:

“But I think that there is also some democracy, I cannot say that you cannot gather, some protest and nobody have you, you can publish something in newspapers. Of course TV is controlled by government. ... Newspapers are not controlled so much … So this is like the generally, this how to say, discipline for implementations, some rules are strong.” (POL1)
National TV-channel Rustavi 2 is by most of the respondents claimed to be the key pro-governmental channel, while the TV-channel Imedi was seen to be independent until 2008 when it was overtaken after the death of its owner, the Georgian media tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili. Only local TV-stations as Caucasia and Maestro (among others) are mentioned as independent, these channels still are not broadcasting in the whole country. Regarding radio channels there is only one (Radio “Palitra”) radio channel that broadcast nationally that the interviewees consider independent, the local radio stations differ in their objectivity. According to the interviewees, printed media has been attacked by both taxation and claimed governmental monopolization of distribution networks that obstruct the media houses and possibilities to function. Several journalist have been hit and injured during rallies, additionally, the interviewees have information on journalist that have emigrated after being threatened and are now considered to be political refugees.

6.6 Mobilization, risks and networking

The student organization Fair Future was mobilized during the demonstrations in November 2007, formerly focusing on cultural questions now clearly taking stand against Saakashvili. Fair Future had only seven official members (the founders) but consisted of many participants working for the organization. The demonstrations, followed by a 15-day state of emergency, marked the turn of the tide for one of the leaders:

“So it was bad, the most difficult day in my life when we went to the demonstration on 7th of November [2007]. It was like the place where, was like, I don’t [know] how they were looking at themselves at this… police, they were like hitting so much the people were like … it was quite difficult and quite hard.” (ORG3)

After the November-protests the leader and his fellow students restructured the organization and founded a new one, which they named 1978 in remembrance of year 1978 when the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR attempted to change the constitutional langue in Georgia to Russian. This became the last student organization for the organization leader, as he felt that political participation had a negative effect on his life and future careers. Nevertheless, after university he realized that his former political activities were
still affecting his life as many young opposition members have been arrested, imprisoned or facing problems in their careers because of their involvement in politics:

“But now I’m back to Georgia and I was looking for job, looking to get the job, but the problem why I cannot get the job because is that everywhere I went I worked with students organizations … so you are opposition. So there is no place for opposition students and people who are opposition, they are sitting at home.” (ORG3)

The Civil Front consists (in 2011) of among 100 active members. It is not easy to get a clear picture what a “member” means to them, but presumably, that is a person who stays close to the organization and participate in the actions. Mobilization of members for an action happens quick, and during times when there are demonstrations under way the team stays together to mobilize immediately. One of the reasons, why 20-30 persons are always stays together is because the authorities bug their phones and to gather members by phone would not be an option. Being arrested at demonstrations is for the protesters something that you have to prepare for. One of the leaders comments after days of protests in 2011:

“Some of us would been arrested, it’s a fact, we will see. … We know that four or three people from the organization will be arrested. And others will get repressed. And today students were beaten. This will continue every day.” (ORG5)

The protests are still not only places where only anti-government protesters gather. Many organization leaders and activists talked about anti-opposition forces mobilizing against the protesters. Another feature of these anti-opposition forces were “civilian spies” in the rallies and around the city centre that would later report on demonstrators:

“And they [the government] have a lot of such people [civilian spies], they give them salary. These people have big salaries and that’s why they are many, police have salaries and such people have salaries as well.” (ACT1)

Before the revolution in 2003, Kmara was mainly mobilizing members in the universities, but according to one of its leaders, this was problematic as some students were from families supporting the ruling elite. Additionally, other students’ movements supporting Shevardnadze were also recruiting student into their rows. Nevertheless, the common goal was to influence on the upcoming presidential elections and this added members from the universities and also from outside to the organization:
“Some people believed that we would achieve our purpose, some people did not. But a lot of them used to say: “We come to Kmara, because we believe in you.”” (ORG2)

Kmara-members so used, consciously or unconsciously, informal networks to recruit members. Personal connections and people involved telling other people about the movements, have been shown to be part of the networks needed for a successful movement (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Kmara was also active in connecting with other parties and actors. As a result of the negotiations was a plan “10 Steps to Liberty”, signed by all opposition parties. The plan demanded that whoever (from the opposition) comes to power the part would have to fulfil the agreement including reforms, civil rights and freedoms. The leaders of Kmara got an offer from Saakashvili to officially join his party UNM and even if their goals correlated, the offer was turned down as the leaders did not want to work under the influence of any political actor.

One of the interviewees, a former female politician has after her political career tried to influence the society by her scandalous approach and vulgar statements on the political elite. Her books on Georgian life and politics have been widely praised, but also criticized. Her way to politics began in 2001 when she founded a non-governmental organization for protection of ethnic minorities. The organization, My Georgia, soon caught president Shevardnadze’s attention and called for her to become a deputy minister. With a long history with Saakashvili before the Rose Revolution and during the revolution, they worked closely together and she promoted him in her broadcasts before she was banned on national television after her refusal to become a minister. One of the problems she found in the new ruling elite was the young leaders’ lack of experience and unprofessionalism. The same unprofessionalism she sees in the new opposition:

“These [Saakashvili government] are, first of all, young people who do not understand nothing, have not passed any school, that is who we are … it is generally a kindergarten. All the people who were standing in the street, just now … it will be dangerous if they come to power.” (POL1)

The question of membership is still tricky, as the line between official member and participant is blur. The leader of Liberty Institute points out, that the institution has never had any members (not even during the Rose revolution), even if it was participating in the
demonstrations. This also is reflected in the answer of an activist (that was known to have been a member and closely affiliated with the organization) when asked if he worked for Kmara during the revolution in 2003: “No, I participated. Personally I didn’t support Saakashvili, but I supported revolution.” (ACT1).

The local culture and history are many times reflected in the answers of the interviewees. Georgia’s uniqueness is being stressed, and the history of Georgia is being used as an argument that the people indeed is democratic, but it is the political elite that is corrupted, and so “not real Georgian”:

“So we have democracy in our mentality … Our King David the Builder went into mosques, synagogues, respected all of them. We have it. But Misha Saakashvili just tries, tries to erase it, tries to change the mentality of the people … Georgians will not exist without faith, without traditions. You know, and it should be protected, good, and old, that for so many centuries we exist, we must save it.” (ORG4)

“You know, you probably have been at a feast in Georgia and seen there the toastmaster. Our country does not chooses a president, but a toastmaster. … We choose a toastmaster, we have the Caucasian mentality.” (POL2)

6.7 Georgia and the world

Georgia’s relations with Russia are highlighted as soon as politics are discussed. This thesis is not focusing on Georgia’s foreign politics but as most interviewees chose to blame both Russia and the Western countries for the “failed democracy” I consider it of importance to also bring forwards some comments on this theme. Russia is considered to stand behind the scenes and negatively influencing the Georgian society in all ways possible:

“And everybody says, I do not know whether it is right or not, but even Russian political scientist themselves say that the whole process…whole process led by Russian parts, Russian official parts. I can’t say.” (HIS1)

Many interviewees are using the words “sold to Russia” when commenting on Georgia-Russian relations. These statements are interesting, as it has been shown that Russia’s part of foreign direct investments in Georgia has been sinking and Georgia no longer has an
energy dependency on Russian energy (Kapanadze, 2014). Nevertheless, Russia is being raised of the interviewees as a foreign power investing in the country and so “buying out” Georgia:

“Georgia of course was already sold to Russia a long time ago, but what about this Europe, NATO, I think they do not take us … why they need us, for what?” (ORG3).

“This is the kind of two-faced policy. All have been sold, all is being sold. And Russia buys everything. Then why scold Russia. We already criticize Russia and if we do not want anything from her, of course we do not want to be part of the Russian Empire, what nonsense! But why do we sell everything to Russia? That is terrible.” (HIS1)

“We are long ago already sold to Russia, the rest is a game.” (POL2)

Also West gets severe criticism both for supporting Saakashvili to power and later leaving Georgia to deal with its own problems. Even if the organizations receive support from Western organizations, address the ECHR and to some extent agree that membership in the EU and NATO is a positive goal, some of the interviewees find the West’s interference in Georgian politics weak and faulty:

“When this injustice was happening in our country, the international organizations didn’t know anything about it, they didn’t see it and for them Georgia was just a country with its democracy struggling against criminals. … Saakashvili has made good PR but the real situation in our country is very far from democracy in Europe and the USA.” (POL1)

“I think that we should ask the West to fold the current situation in the country, because they lobbied Saakashvili when he came to power.” (ORG4)

6.8 Religion and society

The Georgian Orthodox Church was another occurring theme that I find of importance to highlight. The Georgian Orthodox Church has a great historical place in the Georgian society with it roots from the 4th century. The head of the church, Catholicos Elias II (also transliterated as Ilya or Elijah) has lead the community since 1977. The church has today a great influence on the society and among young Georgians a personality cult has developed.

around the Patriarch. As part of the collective identity, the religious institution seems to play an interesting role as something pure and holy against the corrupted and dirty government.

“The only thing now, though, if you have something pure left for Georgia – that’s the Patriarch. This because everyone has some sort of attitude towards religion. I say that I am probably half-atheist. I cannot go to the churches, I do not believe that you have to visit all these festivals, perform all these liturgies … For me, the Patriarch, it is a holy man, that is the only thing that remains something pure and suddenly here they are talking shit about this man! You just do not have the right!” (POL2)

“But the Patriarch cannot come and say that I hate the government, because if you will say something bad of the government, the whole Georgia will come and stand with the Patriarch and then it will begin the war between Georgians inside, so he will not let this. … [S]o the Georgian Patriarch is everything for whole Georgia.” (ORG3)

“Patriarch - he is a holy man, the holiest. I do not know what we would have without him, I do not know.” (ORG5)

Most respondents talking about the church commented on the role of the Patriarch and his reluctance to support the government during the ongoing demonstrations. The Patriarch was supporting Saakashvili when he came to power, but took distance towards the ruling elite later during the oppositions’ protests against the president. Nevertheless, according to some of the organization leaders, the church is supported directly by the government and receives annually funds from the state budget to keep its voice down in state affairs. The church yet receives criticism for the religious power it exercise on the people in the name of freedom and democracy as it has continuously supported the forces fighting against the government:

“For example, in 2009 opposition gathered thousands of people on the Dinamo stadium and took them to the Trinity Church, that people went out and followed opposition because Ilia The Second was going to bless them. … Unfortunately, we often see that our patriarch is busy doing some comments about politics, which is not his function.” (ORG1)

Another interviewee finds, that the Patriarch’s position is not too choose side or call the people to a battle against or for someone, but should rather be an institution of peace and reconciliation:
“The Patriarch should always call for calm and for people to come to terms and everybody would go to the same way. … But the fact that a man whom the most of the society trust, they look forward with hopes to the Patriarch.” (HIS1)

One of my respondents who was most critical against the Patriarch is in Georgia infamous for her loud criticism of the Patriarch as she has claimed, that Moscow uses the Patriarch to put pressure on Tbilisi. Among other accusations, she has accused the Patriarch for his misuse of power, that the election of him in 1977 was not legitimate and that the churches are hiding former criminals and rapists as clerics (who escaped to the churches in the 90s). The reaction from the church has not been merciful:

“I criticized him and it caused the stir. Ilia The Second, instead of asking the people to calm down, said that it was the coming of Antichrist. The priests said that I was against the whole church and I was just criticizing our patriarch. … The problem of our society is that Georgian parish consists mainly of the youth, they don’t know neither the newest history nor the history of orthodoxy, they are just the fans of our patriarch.” (ORG2)

Also Kapanadze (2014) mentions the connection between the Georgian and Russian Orthodox Churches, but does not go that far as claiming the Russian state would somehow try to influence in Georgian affairs through religious institutions. Still, Western liberal values are not correlating with the teachings of the church, and this might create painful schisms once Georgia is trying to fulfil the legislative reforms needed for closer ties to the European Union (Kapanadze, 2014). In addition, another organization leader claim, that Russia is pressuring the Georgian state through its backdoor and pushing its agenda through it:

“[I]t’s not our Government, it’s the Russian government [who] is using the church as a political tool.” (ORG1)

To what extent Russia is influencing the Georgian state through the Georgian Orthodox Church will not be elaborated in this thesis, still the fact stands that religions has an important place among Georgians and the church can, and could even more if it so desires, put pressure on the ruling elite.
7 DISCUSSION

In the former chapter, some parts and organization of the Georgian opposition moment were approached and at this point, there are four area in focus. The first is the framework of conflicts and cleavages that have triggered the development of the movement and the actions taken. Secondly, we are approaching collective identity and the formation of “we” against “the other”. Thirdly, we are facing the process the movement go through where values, interests and ideas turn into collective action. This part also includes methods used, symbolic production, mobilization and its risks, existing networks and identities within the movement. Last, one should not forget the social, political and cultural context the movement is emerging in and how these factors are effecting its possibilities to success. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006.).

In the background we still have the research questions and sub-questions of importance for the studies:

3. **What are the characteristics of the opposition movement that occurred in Georgia after the Rose Revolution?**

4. **Can the opposition be defined as a social mass movement or is it merely different actors working for different goals?**

Sub-questions:

- What are the biggest problems in the Georgian society according to the opposition?
- How has the Georgian political and civic society changed during 2003-2013?

While researchers often have sought the answer on emergence and development of social movements by looking at the relationship between the challengers and the power holders, Tilly (2002, p. 80) point out that it is of big importance to look further and seek “analogies and connections between social movements *stricto sensu* and other political process likewise involving contingent identities, historically constructed frames of shared understanding, and variable political opportunity structure-phenomena such as nationalism, revolution, ethnic conflict, and creating of transnational institutions.”

We should therefore approach the movement as a unit including its context (the surrounding political society) as well as other factors that are affecting the movement.
The data for the analysis have been 10 semi-structured interviews, collected in Georgia in May 2011. As has been pointed out, the development of large protests in Tbilisi in May 2011 are also reflected in the (sometimes highly emotional) answers of the interviewees. This background factor has to be taken into consideration, as emotional statements of organization leaders during days when some of their members have been beaten could have been quite different a month before, or after, the demonstrations.

The revolutionary waves with non-governmental protests flowed through the country mainly in 2007, 2009 and 2011, but the protesters never succeeded in their demands (resignation of the president). Only in the parliamentary elections in 2012 president Mikheil Saakashvili’s party gets defeated by Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Movement and a peaceful transfer of power happened. According to some of the interviewees, it was the unity found in the opposition movement that made it possible in 2003 to achieve its goals, but this unity has not been found afterwards. This view still is not supported by former research on the Rose Revolution, where it was considered that there were deep tension in the opposition movement (Tudoroiu, 2007). The fact, that former organization leaders from visible organization as Liberty Institute and Kmara after the Rose Revolution joined politics also means, that these leaders possess information and knowledge how to create an anti-government revolution and can so actively combat new attempts to revolution. The thesis does not include interviewees with former “revolutionists” that later got involved in politics, for a covering picture of the diffusion of ideas from opposition movement into ruling elite this would be of interest.

Political and civil freedoms are of big importance to most of the interviewees and there are accusations about elite corruption (even if corruption over all in Georgia had decreased dramatically due to Saakashvili’s reforms, the interviewees still claim, that elite corruption has occurred instead), infringement on civil rights, unemployment and excessive use of force from the authorities. It seems like that even if the respondents claim that the ruling elite put pressure on the civil society and there the arena for opposition politics is restricted, it has become easier to express ones opinion and the society has become more individualized. Still, a result of the individualization may be, that there are more possible
leaders and the movement is unable to unify and stand behind just one leadership. In the surge of the Rose Revolution, a discussion has also occurred in the Georgian society on the authenticity of the revolution. Among most of the interviewees we find accusations, that the revolution was not a real democratic revolution, but only a transfer of power from Eduard Shevardnadze to Mikheil Saakashvili in a democratic light. Still, returning to the definitions on revolution presented in the second chapter, the Rose Revolution in 2003 follows the scheme set for revolutions of e.g. McFaul (2006). Again, the events in the Georgian society in 2003 do come closer to Tudoroiu’s (2007) definition, where the author claims that the so-called revolution was merely a structural reform. This claim stands as a fact also for the interviewees and becomes a cause for the organizations to justify their actions and anti-government demonstrations; as the democratic revolution was a fraud, the government is not legitimate.

Besides socio-economic-political factors, violence is pointed out as one of the main problems in the society. As Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 26) states, collective identity “prevails on links of solidarity and loyalty which can exist between individuals and specific groups or associations.” Personal experience of injustice and violence become a catalyst for participation in, and founding of, movement organization and demonstrations. In these discussions on violence, there are traces of collective identity. Participants find themselves as victims of the regime, and by connecting through formal or informal networks, they find communities and organizations where they can scare their own tragedies and together work against the common opponent. In a timeframe, the first police shootings took place in 2005 – 2006, and after this several organizations began to work to protect citizens, raise public support and address national and international organizations for support in solving the killings committed by police officers. Victimizing so creates a clear “we against them”-theme, where the citizens are treated unfair by an illegitimate ruling elite. While the former organization movements Kmara and Liberty Institute clearly advocate non-violence actions against an illegitimate power, organizations as Civil Front consider that it is their constitutional rights to defend themselves against the authorities. This way they claim that they do not break the law even if their members are sent to prison. Civil Front’s radical actions are, as Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 165) puts it, “unorthodox forms of action”.

74
Their activities are not supported by all organizations, still they are fighting the common enemy and for the same cause. Della Porta and Diani (2006) have further claimed that civil obedience and proclamation of different or new values can positively affect public opinion, especially in societies where there are small changes the regime will change without interference by the people. Civil Front’s member do to some extent consider it an honour to be imprisoned, as this is for them a confirmation of their political activity. Participation in actions and demonstrations involves risks for the members, still with the support of the organization they seem ready to take on these risks. The border between extreme actions and actions having support by the society still seems blur, and as Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 179) claim: “Protest leaders must avoid action that is too extreme if they are to win over their target groups within the public, but in doing so they run the risk of losing confidence of their protest constituency.”.

Youth organization Kmara’s symbol was widely known during the Rose Revolution in 2003 and afterwards. The white fist on a black background with the word ქმარა (Geo. Kmara!; Eng. Enough!) written under it was almost identical to the Serbian youth movement Otpor! (Resistance!). Civil Front used textiles (caps, t-shirts etc.) with slogans written on them to identify with each other. Even during the demonstrations in 2011, the “Kmara-fist” was used on different posters and flyers, in different colours but still the same style. These symbols are, and have been, part of unifying objects constructing collective identity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006).

Is the Georgian opposition network of different actors in 2011 than a mass movement? We find characterises of a social base (as Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, argue there should be both a social base and campaign), but the campaign do not directly emerge as a result of the movement, but rather as fields of interest of different actors. The different organization included represent different areas of the civil society. Civil Front is mostly active in mobilizing members for demonstrations. Save the Life again is a human rights organization with an agenda supporting families of murdered children and counteract police violence. Student organization Fair Future (not active in 2011) was focusing on seminars and cultural events, but also participated in demonstrations. Two of the main organizations during the
Rose Revolution (Kmara and Liberty Institute) play only a secondary role, if any, in the demonstrations in 2011. Kmara and Liberty Institute were not active in the demonstrations in 2011, but were both addressing civil right issues and working for a more open society. Even if these organizations had a different member base and different agendas, their common goal was a change in the society, but the means how this would happen and how it should happen differs radically. For a collective “we” there are so only traces, and the only common the new Georgian opposition movement organizations had was a common enemy, the ruling elite (this remark can be questioned in the case of Liberty Institute, as the organization leader to some extent expressed support for the authorities in e.g. the clashes between violent protesters and the police). Della Porta and Diani (2006) discuss that it might be of importance to talk about collective action rather than of social movements, and this might be true also for the movement in Georgia in 2011. Still, can different actions of different actors be considered as collective action? Collective actions could be the demonstrations, but as they are not organized of the movement per se (as there is no official opposition movement), we face the fact that even collective action can be questioned. In the end, even the common goal or the common cause stays unclear. What they are against is more visible, than what they are for. Comparing the movement with McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) definition (that is broad and including), we again find traces of a movement, but with unclear leadership, blur boundaries, and almost non-existing degree of organization. Could this be the reason why the mass movement in 2003 succeeded but the emerging movement after the Rose Revolution did fail repeatedly? The data cannot answer on this question, but for further research, this would be of interest.

The organization members, former politicians and activists highly emphasize the negative development of the Georgian civil society and the restrictions in political influence under the rule of Saakashvili, but do not really come forward with the solution on the problems. It seems like the focus have shifted since 2003, and this is why the movement in 2011 is not able to create a common goal that would include all the actors needed for a successful revolution. In 2003, the object of hatred was Shevardnadze, just as the object of “all evil in the country” in 2011 in Saakashvili. Nevertheless, the opposition movement in 2003 had a more defined (political) leadership; in 2011 this unifying leadership is missing totally of the
The only organizations that have a clear member base and speak about specific members are Kmara and Civil Front, even if Civil Front also seems to mobilize people for demonstrations that are not their specific members. For most organizations it so more accurate to talk about participation then about membership. Membership in the Georgian opposition movement’s organizations in this study are so vague and undefined. Partly, we can in the organizations find traces of “multiple affiliations”. As, Della Porta and Diani (2006) claim, “overlapping affiliations” or “multiple affiliations” where a member is participating in different organizations is in social movements nothing uncommon, rather this can be a positive feature as this supports the spread of information between different actors and organizations. Concerning membership the claim “social movements do not have members, but participants” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 26) should not be forgotten. Clear membership is of interest, but not crucial for a social movement. This is visible in the answer of the organization leader from Liberty Institute when he quickly answers, that their organization has never had members. Still, as Della Porta and Diani (2006) also states, participation should not be reduced to only one single demonstration or action, but should rather be continued and including as the participant will by time get the feeling of belonging. This just as the leader of Kmara, who remembered that people came to their organization because they believed in it. Believing in an organization does not mean you have to join it, but implicitly these new members felt that membership indicated belonging, or vice versa. When it comes to the logic of numbers (Della Porta and Diani, 2006) there are no final numbers on how many citizens participated in the demonstrations in 2003, 2009 or 2011 or at other occasions when large numbers of people joined the street. At some point, the number do not tell us little about the perspective for success, as a small intense crowd in theory could be as successful as a big loose one.

It is not clear, if there are formal and informal networks existing between the Georgian movement organization included in this study. The Georgian opposition movement in 2011 seems rather deconcentrated and unlinked. Della Porta and Diani (2006) acknowledge that not all movements that will take their common cause to the streets will survive the clash
with the opponent, and a well-structured movement organization support a successful outcome. Nevertheless, the organizations are involved in different separate networks, that support their agenda and field on interest (e.g. Save the Life have both national and international contacts helping them in researching their cases on murdered citizens; Kmara cooperated with Serbian Otpor through Liberty Institute). Informal networks can be found to that amount, that some of the organization mobilize members for common demonstrations.

It can be discussed, to what extent the restrictions on media have influenced (negatively) the actions and possibilities of the Georgian opposition movement’s organizations. Della Porta and Diani (2006) hold, that the media channels and media coverage is of importance for successful actions. There was media coverage of the demonstrations in 2011, but to what extent media coverage was objective this thesis will not be able to answer on. The interviewees remained sceptical to the level of freedom of TV- and radio channels, but additionally, social media channels as Facebook, Russian Vkontakte, YouTube, twitter etc. are used to spread information. This might be a reason, that even if media coverage is restricted, the information still reach the most of the population. As an example still can be told the coverage of the demonstrations outside the parliament house in May 2011. The government had given time to the protesters to leave the Rustaveli avenue in front of the parliament until midnight 25th of May, as 26th of May was the Independency Day of Georgia and a military parade was planned to take place in the city centre. National TV-channels broadcasted live during the evening and closer to midnight the both “trenches” of demonstrates and police were still untouched. When the police, followed by water cannons, began to move towards the protesters a quarter to midnight the transmission was interrupted.

A specific characteristic of the Georgian society, compared to e.g. Ukraine where also opposition movements have appeared, is still the size of the country and the population density in the capital. The population of Tbilisi is 1,1 millions, which make up almost a
third of the whole Georgian population\textsuperscript{13}. A demonstration in Tbilisi would not go unknown in the capital nor in any parts of the country even if all media channels would keep quiet about the happenings. The close family relationships in the Georgian society also play an interesting role. Sahakyan and Atanesyan (2006) have in their article on community relationships and social structure in neighbouring Armenia concluded, that the cult of family is strongly represented in many former Soviet state and should not be neglected when explaining political behaviour. The same strong family cult can also be found in Georgia, where family relationships are holy and even if individualism is rising the broader family (including grandparents and close relatives) is still an undisputed authority and protection. Family support so play importance, and this control also promote the spreading of news from one citizen to another.

Creating a collective identity is a process of including and excluding, promoting the group’s participants and a negative identification of members standing outside the group or the group’s opponents (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In the Georgian case, the cultural context should not be forgotten. Among the interviewees, and also on the streets, the words “real Georgian” were used as characteristics of an ethnic Georgian, behaving according to local cultural and social norms. On the other hand, if they consider someone a bad host or a person who was not behaving according to the norms this person would be “not a real Georgian”. These words was also used by one of the interviewees for Saakashvili, when he remembered the rich Georgian history and how their ancestors had respected all religions and different kind of people, but how Saakashvili was, compared to them, “not a real Georgian”.

Other common statements, that might not be part of collective identity, but still forms the framework for how the opposition actors look on the surroundings is their relations towards West and Russia as well as their relations to the Georgian Orthodox Church. Russia is highlighted as intervening in the society buy “buying out” Georgia from the Georgians. These accusations are of interest in the light of the ruling elite (and to some extent Western

\textsuperscript{13}As of first of January 2016, there were 3.7 million people living in Georgia, while the population in Tbilisi only is 1.1 millions, according to National Statistics Office of Georgia - (Available: http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=0&lang=eng. Last accessed 15\textsuperscript{th} April 2016)
leader) accusing Russia of intervening in the society by supporting demonstration against the ruling elite\textsuperscript{14}. Russian intervening is so used by the authorities to explain why the protests occur, while the opposition movement members claim, that it is the government that has “sold” the country to Russia. West is being consider as both a possible helper, but also a traitor. Many respondents express feelings of despair. They consider that the world community has forgotten the Georgian people and that the Western countries do not care about the future of Georgia and believe only in Saakashvili and his words.

The role of the Georgian Orthodox Church is interesting, but to use religion as an influencing factor for revolution deeper research should made into the theme. In the interviewees, there are still traces of a very high trust to the church as an institution, and especially to the Patriarch. For the interviewees, the church stands as something holy and pure in contrast to the corrupted and evil ruling elite. Nevertheless, there are also accusations that the Georgian Orthodox Church as being used by Russia as a backdoor to influencing on the Georgian society.

\textsuperscript{14} During all the demonstrations in 2007, 2009 and 2011 the ruling elite blamed Russia for intervening in Georgian internal affairs. (See e.g. Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-protest-idUSTRE74P4BC20110526, Last accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} April 2016)
8 CONCLUSIONS

This research on characteristics of the Georgian opposition mass movement emerging in Georgia after the Rose Revolution brings some answer but also a lot of questions. The movement organizations as an unity do have traces of a social mass movement or collective action, but is far less united as during the Rose Revolution in 2003. Membership and mobilization patterns are indistinct, but the waves of attempts for political change in especially 2007, 2009 and 2011 still indicates an ongoing process of protest. Nevertheless, there are different goals of interest, rather than a common goal.

The closest to a common goal that can be found among the Georgian protesters in 2011 is the resignation of the president and a demand for higher level of political freedoms and civil liberties. Strong formal networks are not found among the organizations included in the study, and the “opposition movement” seem rather diversified. The organizations in the research differs from each other and are active in different fields, though the ruling political elite is pointed out as the main reason for the problems in the society. Experiences of violence seems to be a strong part of collective identity, as well the organization leaders and members opposing the ruling elite define positive characters for the member base included in the opposition movement as against the corrupted and unjust authorities. Another result of interest is the influence of the Georgian Orthodox Church, still this factor would need more research to evaluate the power of religion on politics in Georgia.

As we today know, the Georgian protesters never succeeded in their endeavours with the help of demonstrations, but only through democratic elections. Will the Georgian society, now through the “real” electoral revolution in 2012 when the regime of Saakashvili was defeated, be safely established on the path of democracy? Time will tell. Already during the chaotic days in 2011 when protesters clashed with riot police on the street in Tbilisi, opposition leader Irakly Alasani commented:
“…the era when politicians can just call people on the streets is over. Georgia is building a new political culture. People want to determine Georgia's future through elections.”\(^{15}\)

Are the days of colour revolutions so over? Numerous organizations, political activists and opposition movements all over the post-Soviet sphere have learned the colourful tactics, so as well have the ruling elites. As last years have shown, also Georgia’s neighbour Russia has been eager on law reforms and restrictions that could, to some extent, obstruct a Russian colour revolution. Diffusion of ideas do happen, both among opposition actors as well as the ruling elite. President Saakashvili was not overturned through the same tactics he himself used to came to power. Was this because he had learned his lessons? Any leader, looking to succeed with a revolution or to suppress one, will have some lessons from Georgia. Nevertheless, in 2014, the ruling elite in Kiev was forced to meet the demands of Ukrainian protesters, still sending the country off on a road of civil war, political chaos and economic crises. What would have been the result if the Ukrainian protesters would have awaited the promised early elections? Would Ukraine, just as Georgia, gone through a peaceful transfer of power? Indeed, the political game for power and influence in the post-Soviet states is more complicated then at a first sight. Therefore there is a need for further research on areas as foreign influence as well as local factors that might not be part of diffusion of ideas.

The political game in the post-Soviet sphere is so a game including political actors, organization movements, influence of Western and Russian interests, as well as diffusion of ideas, lessons and opportunities. Still, the people always remain one of the central actors.

### ANNEX A: POLITICAL ACTORS IN GEORGIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burjanadze, Nino</td>
<td>Left the ruling party in 2003 and became an opposition leader. Has served as acting head of state of Georgia twice between the resignations of presidents and presidential elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanishvili, Bidzina</td>
<td>Georgian businessman serving as Prime Minister of Georgia 2012–2013. Founded and led the Georgian Dream coalition that won against the United National Movement in the 2012 parliamentary elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natelashvili, Shalva</td>
<td>Leader of the Georgian Labour Party. Supporter of Saakashvili and part of the opposition in 2003 but later became an opponent to Saakashvili.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okruashvili, Irakli</td>
<td>Minister of Defence of Georgia 2004–2006 under President Mikheil Saakashvili. In 2007 Okruashvili began to criticise the incumbent president and formed the opposition party Movement for United Georgia. After living in France on political asylum he returned to Georgia in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patarkatsishvili, Arkady</td>
<td>A Georgian business tycoon for long time active in Russia. Fled prosecution in Russia and was given political asylum in Georgia. Supported Saakashvili during the Rose Revolution but already from 2006 on supporting the opposition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zhvania, Zurab  Former speaker of the Georgian parliament, left the parliament and ruling party, Citizen’s Union of Georgia, in protest against president Shevardnadze in 2001.
ANNEX B: INTERVIEWEES

Place of interviews: Tbilisi, Georgia

Time: 11-31.5.2011

Interviewer: Sami Rantamäki

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Profession/status/sex</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Length of interview</th>
<th>Language of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.5.2011</td>
<td>Former politician, professor, female</td>
<td>POL1</td>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.5.2011</td>
<td>Former politician, journalist, female</td>
<td>POL2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28.5.2011</td>
<td>Organization leader, male</td>
<td>ORG1</td>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.5.2011</td>
<td>Organization leader, female</td>
<td>ORG2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.5.2011</td>
<td>Organization leader, male</td>
<td>ORG3</td>
<td></td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.5.2011</td>
<td>Organization leaders, males</td>
<td>ORG4/ORG5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.5.2011</td>
<td>Organization leader, male</td>
<td>ORG6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25.5.2011</td>
<td>Members of organization, male</td>
<td>ACT1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.5.2011</td>
<td>Members of organization, males</td>
<td>ACT2/ACT3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.5.2011</td>
<td>Historian, female</td>
<td>HIS1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All interviewees were informed of the use of the interviews and gave the right to publish their names and citations. Some of the interviews were made in Georgian with the help of a translator, other were made in Russian and English. The sample was gather with the so-called “snowball effect” as it was not possible in advance to locate the contacts needed. A template for the interviews was used, but most of the interviews followed a very free structure and the template was altered considering the experiences and history of the interviewees.
ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS
TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEWS

Introduction to the theme

Presentation of the interviewee

Organization of the movement/organization
- How is the movement organized?
- What support has been given to the movement from abroad?
- What support did they receive nationally?
- What other movements were (are) existing, what kind of relations exist(ed) between the movements – which one were (is) the ”leading movement”?
- Who had (has) the leadership?
- Were (are) there branches of the movement?
- What kind of organization structure did (do) the movement have?

Mobilization
- How were members recruited?
- What means “membership” in the movement, i.e. who is considered as a member?
- How many members did (do) the movement had (have)?
- Were there special places (e.g. universities, internet forums) where recruitment happened?
- How did e.g. state universities look upon students joining the movement?
- Were all the members joining the protest actions?

Existing formal and informal networks
- What are the networks with other youth movements in 1) the country 2) abroad
- Did the members attend training programs in the country or abroad? What kind of programs? Who were the sponsors of these programs?
What relations did (do) the movement have with the foreign actors as Soros Foundation and Freedom House? Are there other sponsors?

What “models” were used in the protest actions and from where did these models have their origin?

Movements’/organizations’ relations to opposition parties

Did the organization a) develop as a branch of the opposition movement, b) develop by itself and later become a branch of the opposition movement, c) develop as a branch of the opposition movement but “run its own race”, d) develop by itself and not consider that it has the same agenda as the opposition movement, or e) different situation?

What are/were the official relations between the opposition movement and the organization?

What are/were the unofficial relations between the opposition movement and the organization?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


