The role of REDD+ and FLEGT in land tenure rights in Cameroon

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The consequences of tropical forest degradation and deforestation have gained global political attention due to their contribution on climate change and biodiversity loss. Forest degradation and deforestation are also having impacts on local peoples living in the forests. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and European Union Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) including its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) are two prominent efforts towards reducing the loss of tropical forests. Even though they have different implementation strategies, they both reach for positive change in governance. They are facing similar challenges including corruption, legality of land allocation and lack of secure tenure. Noticeably secure tenure is associated with most of the governance challenges. Several forest rich tropical countries such as Cameroon are participating in these processes to sustainably manage their forests. In Cameroon the rapid population growth together with growing global need for natural resources are driving unsustainable and illegal actions in forest sector. This master’s thesis examines how are REDD+ and FLEGT are contributing on forest governance and securing tenure rights of local peoples, how secure tenure can affect the implementation of the REDD+ and FLEGT processes and in what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals to achieve the goals of the REDD+ and FLEGT. The empirical research is conducted through analysing policy documents and literature as well as interviewing officials and local peoples in Cameroon. The main results are that in Cameroon there are no real political will to address the forest loss, and the local peoples have very little role on protecting their livelihood even though it would be important for them and also for the processes of REDD+ and FLEGT. Also, the government of Cameroon gives a little role for REDD+ and FLEGT in the governance of forest resources. So far, the processes have not had significant influence on tenure condition in Cameroon. The recommendations of this study is for REDD+ and FLEGT to...
concentrate more on education especially in local level since the lack of understanding is hindering the development of both processes. The collaboration and greater transparency between REDD+ and FLEGT would be crucial for their success.

**Keywords**

REDD+; FLEGT; VPA; tenure; forest governance; sustainable common pool resource management; Cameroon
Table of Contents

List of figures .......................................................................................................................... 2
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1. Previous Research ......................................................................................................... 2
   1.2. Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 3
   1.3. Structure of the Thesis .................................................................................................. 3
2. Country Profile of Cameroon .............................................................................................. 5
   2.1. Geographical, Ecological and Historical Context ......................................................... 5
   2.2. Political and Economic Context .................................................................................... 7
   2.3. Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon ..................................................... 9
      2.3.1. Causes and Rates of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon .............. 9
   2.4. Policies and Efforts to Curb Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon ...... 10
3. REDD+ and FLEGT .......................................................................................................... 12
   3.1. REDD+ Globally ........................................................................................................... 12
       3.1.1. REDD+ Process in Cameroon ................................................................................. 13
   3.2. FLEGT Globally ............................................................................................................ 19
       3.2.1. The VPA Process in Cameroon .............................................................................. 20
4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework ........................................................................... 23
   4.1. Forest Governance: definitions and concepts ............................................................... 23
   4.2. Tenure: definitions and concepts .................................................................................. 25
   4.3. Legal Pluralism ............................................................................................................. 27
   4.5. Decentralization ........................................................................................................... 29
       4.5.1. Cross-border governance ...................................................................................... 31
   4.6. Sustainable common-pool resource management ......................................................... 31
5. Methods .............................................................................................................................. 34
   5.1. Study Area ..................................................................................................................... 34
   5.2. Study Approach ............................................................................................................. 36
   5.3. Materials and Data Collection ...................................................................................... 37
       5.3.1. Data collection ......................................................................................................... 37
   5.3.2. Questionnaire Survey ............................................................................................... 38
   5.3.3. Face-to-Face Interviews with policy makers and experts .......................................... 39
   5.5. Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................... 40
6. Results ............................................................................................................................... 41
   6.1. The role of FLEGT VPA and REDD+ in issues related to land tenure in Cameroon ...... 41
       6.1.1. FLEGT VPA ............................................................................................................. 41
       6.1.2. REDD+ ................................................................................................................... 45
       6.1.3. Contribution of REDD+ and FLEGT to secure tenure ........................................... 49
   6.2. Sustainable common-pool resource management ......................................................... 50
   6.3. In what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals? ............................... 53
7. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 55
   7.1. Local level challenges ................................................................................................. 55
   7.2. Governance Level ........................................................................................................ 59
   7.3. Evaluation of the study ................................................................................................. 63
8. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 64
9. References ........................................................................................................................... 66
Annex 1: Questionnaire for the local villagers ................................................................. 79
Annex 2: Questionnaire for the officials ............................................................................. 88
List of figures

Figure 1. Cameroon’s land cover. World Resource Institute (2007) ................................................................. 6
Figure 2. Three phases of national REDD+ strategy. Modified from UN-REDD, 2013 ........................................... 13
Figure 3. The Readiness process in Cameroon. (modified from Figure 1. In Alemagi et al., 2014) ......................... 14
Figure 4. Timeline of Cameroon’s FLEGT VPA negotiations (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014) ................................. 21
Figure 5. Locations of the sites (Google, 2016) ................................................................................................. 34
Figure 6. Perception of the villagers about ownership ...................................................................................... 43
Figure 7. The local people’s planned use of land .............................................................................................. 50

List of Tables

Table 1. Policies and efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon (Dkamela, 2010; Duveiller et al., 2008; Epule et al., 2014) ........................................................................................................... 11
Table 2. Different actors in REDD+ in Cameroon (modified from Alemagi et al., 2014) ............................. 16
Table 3. REDD+ Pilot Projects and Initiatives in Cameroon (modified from Alemagi et al, 2014) ............. 18
Table 4. Different factors of tenure. (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996) ................................................................. 25
Table 5. Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions, Ostrom, 1990 ............................ 33
Table 6. Villages ................................................................................................................................................. 35
Table 7. Main sources of income of the villagers ............................................................................................... 36
Table 10. Local’s perceptions about their rights ............................................................................................... 51
Table 11. Officials opinions on the extent to which tenure rights should be given to the local communities .......................................................... 53
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
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<td>CBFF</td>
<td>Congo Basin Forest Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPM</td>
<td>Consultation Circle of Partners of MINEPDED and MINFOF</td>
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<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>The Centre for Environment and Development</td>
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<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>The Center for International Forestry Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Common Pool Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUTR</td>
<td>EU Timber Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>FODER</td>
<td>Forest and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPIC</td>
<td>Free, Prior, and Informed consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Corporation for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAD</td>
<td>The Institute of Agricultural Research for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>Legality Assurance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINEE</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINADER</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINAS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINATD</td>
<td>Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINCOMMERCE</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEPAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEPDED</td>
<td>Ministry of Env., Protection of Nature and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEPIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Livestock Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINFI</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINFOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Forest and Wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRV</td>
<td>Monitoring, Reporting, Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTFP</td>
<td>Non-Timber Forest Product</td>
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</table>
PES  Payment for Ecosystem Services

REDD+  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, as well as conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks

R-PIN  Readiness Plan Idea Notes (For REDD+)

R-PP  The Readiness Preparation Proposal (For REDD+)

SFM  Sustainable Forest Management

UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-REDD  The United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

VPA  Voluntary Partnership Agreement (for FLEGT)

WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature
1. Introduction

During the past two decades, deforestation and forest degradation have gained global political attention mainly due to their contribution to global warming and loss of biodiversity (Kanninen et al., 2007; Douglas and Simula, 2011; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). Tropical deforestation and forest degradation contribute 12\% of the total annual global carbon emissions (Achard et al., 2014), and in many developing countries, is the main source of emissions (Karousakis, 2006). Tropical deforestation is also a major cause of biodiversity loss (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) and has significant impact on the local peoples who are highly dependent on their forested livelihoods (Tegegne et al., 2016; Christian and Faure, 2014). As a result, the efforts aimed at the sustainable management of forest and climate change mitigation are largely focused on controlling the tropical deforestation and forest degradation.

Two of the most recent efforts towards reducing the loss of tropical forest include the European Union’s (EU) Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and its instrument Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). The FLEGT Action Plan – which was adopted by the EU in 2003 – sets out a program of actions that forms the EU’s response to the global problem of illegal logging and trade in associated timber. The cornerstones of the Action Plan are bilateral VPAs between EU and timber producing countries (European Commission, 2007). On the other hand, in 2005 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched REDD+. It is a mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation but also addresses the importance of conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and managing them sustainably. There are two main multilateral REDD+ initiatives: United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN REDD) and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) by World Bank.

The EU FLEGT and the REDD+ are two distinct policy initiatives, operating under different design and implementation strategies. However, both reach for a positive
change in governance (Angelsen et al. 2008; European Commission, 2003), and both face similar challenges in implementation (Owusu et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Saastamoinen 2010; Bolin et al. 2012). The range of challenges both processes are facing include corruption, legality of land allocation, lack of secure tenure and overlapping land titles (Owusu et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Saastamoinen, 2010; Bolin et al. 2012). Noticeably secure tenure is multi-dimensional problem that is associated with most of the governance challenges (Njoh, 2013).

Several forest-rich countries, such as Cameroon, are participating in FLEGT and REDD+ processes to sustainably manage their forests. In Cameroon, rapid population growth together with increasing global need for natural resources is driving unsustainable and illegal actions in forest sector. Absence of clear tenure and access rights are encouraging people to clear new forested areas for logging but also for agriculture (Awono et al., 2014; Tegegne et al., 2016). Also weak alignment of institutional boundaries is making the land use planning more challenging. Currently, the forest and the tenure laws are under revision to clarify these issues.

1.1. Previous Research

Existing studies (e.g. Geist and Lambin, 2002; Tegegne et al., 2016; Awono et al., 2014) show that clear tenure rights have important role in reducing pressure from natural forests and preventing illegalities. It is perceived as highly important factor reducing deforestation (Tegegne et al., 2016) and incentivizing local people to protect the forests and increasing carbon storage (Bucki, 2014; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). Clear tenure is also vital for REDD+ and FLEGT to make sure the right actors are gaining the possible benefits when implementing the activities of REDD+ and FLEGT (Larson et al., 2013).

Local participation in decision making processes is seen as a crucial factor ensuring sustainability and continuity in securing tenure rights (Carodenuto et al., 2014; Ostrom, 1990) and to increase transparency especially in countries with corrupted governance (Chhatre et al., 2012). The uncertainties with securing tenure and local
participation are prominent in many developing countries (Sunderlin et al., 2014) and are both parts of the social safeguards of REDD+ recognized in 16th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP16) in Cancun 2010. The social safeguards were created to reduce the possible adverse effects of REDD+ and to make sure the REDD+ projects are sustainable, long-lasting and the local habitants are respected (Chhatre et al., 2012). In Cameroon, both FLEGT and REDD+ processes are recent, and both aim to secure tenure especially in local level and increase participation in all levels of governance (Tegegne et al., 2016; Awono et al., 2014; R-PP Cameroon, 2013).

1.2. Research Questions

With the aim of pinpointing the contribution of tenure on deforestation and related issues from the perspective of REDD+ and FLEGT, this study – taking Cameroon as case study – has the main research question of finding out How REDD+ and FLEGT VPA have addressed and regarded the issues of land tenure and what challenges have arisen? To refine the question some additional questions are brought up: How to secure full and effective engagement and participation of national stakeholders on tenure and access rights? How could the coordination between FLEGT and REDD+ be strengthened? In what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals?

The research questions are answered based on the data gathered from literature, policy documents and interviews with officials and local peoples in Cameroon.

1.3. Structure of the Thesis

After the introduction this thesis is structured as following: The section two presents the country profile of Cameroon, and section three introduces FLEGT and REDD+ at international and national level. Section four outlines the theoretical framework, and materials and methods are introduced in section five. Section six presents the results.
of the study, and section seven discusses key findings of the study. Finally, section eight gives concluding remarks and makes recommendations.
2. Country Profile of Cameroon

This chapter introduces Cameroon, first presenting its geographical, ecological and historical context as well as the political ground of the country. Also the state of the forest and the local tenure are introduced.

2.3. Geographical, Ecological and Historical Context

Cameroon is located in Central Africa in the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. Neighboring countries are Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Republic of Congo. Cameroon’s total land area is 475,442 km² and total population was 22.7 million in 2014. (World Bank, 2014). Population growth rate was 2.59% in 2015 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Cameroon’s capital is Yaoundé, which is the second largest city after Douala. The proportion of urban population of the total population was 54.4% and growing by 3.6% annually between the years 2010 and 2015 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).

Official languages are French and English though in Cameroon there are more than 200 ethnolinguistic groups and more than 20 ethnic groups including the indigenous Pygmy people (Topa, 2009).

Nominal GDP was 1488$ per capita in 2015 (International Monetary Fund, 2015) and HDI 0.512 (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). Services form 47.9% from GDP, agriculture 22.3% and industry 29.9% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Forest sector’s share was 6% from the GDP in 2010 (de Wasseige, 2012). From the year 1980 timber has been the second largest export product in Cameroon constituting approximately 25% of the total foreign exchange (Topa, 2009). Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) constitute an important share in domestic and foreign markets and have important role especially in the rural people’s livelihoods (Topa, 2009).
Cameroon’s terrain and climate varies in different parts of the country. There is variation of different landscapes including coast, rainforest, mountains, desert and savanna. Twenty percent of the land is used by agriculture and 42% of the area is forested. Natural resources include petroleum, bauxite, iron, timber and hydropower. Main exported products are crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa beans, aluminum, coffee and cotton. (Central intelligence agency, 2015) The Figure 1 shows...
that the main forest cover of Cameroon is situated in the southern and the southwestern parts of the country.

Cameroon’s forests are part of the Congo Basin, the second largest area of tropical forests in the world. The Cameroon forests are very endemic, and include rare and endangered species such as Cross-River Gorilla, African Elephant and African Western Bongo (Megevand, 2013). The estimated gross rate of deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon between the years 2000-2010 was annually between 0.03% and 0.08% (De Wasseige et al., 2012). After the 1986 economic crisis the deforestation rate increased because of increased amount of farms in rural areas that started to produce land-consumptive food crops and clear forested land (Sunderlin et al., 2009).

Despite the seemingly low rate of deforestation and forest degradation, the threat facing forests of Cameroon have dire consequences because of their role as a carbon sink, biodiversity hotspot and also their importance for local populations who are highly dependent on their forested livelihoods. The deforestation and forest degradation rate is estimated to increase in near future because of growing population, demand for natural resources and agricultural commodities (Tegegne and Lindner, 2014).

2.2. Political and Economic Context

Government regime in Cameroon is republic and multiparty. President is the chief of the state and is elected by voting for a seven year periods. Cameroon became independent in 1960 after being under colonial rule 76 years. First under the rule of Germany (1884-1919) and then, after the World War I, was divided between France and Britain until independence (Njoh, 2013). In Cameroon there exists mixed legal system of English common law, French civil law and customary law. Cameroon is highly corrupted country having the score of 27 (Transparency International, 2015), and it is negatively affecting the utilization and management of natural resources (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010).
Colonialism changed the land ownership structures. Germans allocated the land so that each family got their own parcels of land and all vacant areas belonged to Germany. After the World War I, French and British tried to transform as much land under their ownership as possible. For example, French decreed that all land that had been unoccupied 10 years is owned by the government (Njoh, 2013).

The colonial rule influenced the land laws, and in contemporary Cameroon there are two independent laws: statutory law and customary law. This has been causing conflicts especially in issues related to tenure rights (Njoh, 2013). The local customary law for example has the first occupant’s right that gives the management rights to a person who first clears the land (Dkamela, 2011). The customary rights are exercised by villages and families and in many cases are inherited (Dkamela, 2011). Customarily owned land belongs officially to the government unless the local owner attains titling through complex legal procedures. Corrupted government officials are driving their self-interest and making titling almost impossible (Njoh, 2013). Most of the Cameroonian’s land belongs to government but some rights such as allowances of non-timber forest product (NTFP) collection are provided for local populations through Forest Act 1994 (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). The Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) is in charge of the forest related licenses and grants.

The Land Act 1974 was to nationalize the land areas but no real change has happened: the customary land tenure coexists with the statutory without legal recognition (Sheleff, 2013). The Land Act 1974 reduced the rights of local populations, especially the rights of indigenous people (Sheleff, 2013) and in 1994 the new Forest Law aimed at restoring some of the rights that colonial and postcolonial rules had narrowed (Topa, 2009). Still especially the rights of communities remain weak, uneven and imperfect, but are better than in many other African countries (Topa, 2009).

The forest law from the year 1994 gives communities the right to manage some forest areas without ownership (de Wasseige et al, 2012). The Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF) can give renewable licenses of 25 years for communities of maximum 5000 ha of forested land. The law also provides 10% royalties from logging profits for communities living near the concession area (Alemagi and Kozak, 2010). The rights of the communities are still very weak, and the process of registering the management
rights under communities has been very costly and difficult (de Wasseige et al., 2012). The customary rights are giving production rights to the local communities to make living from their forest related activities, but since the customary owned land in most cases belongs to the government, their livelihoods are insecure (Dkamela, 2011).

2.4. Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon

There are numerous different reasons for deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon. The main direct causes of deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon include agricultural expansion and wood extraction including formal and informal logging (Tegegne et al., 2016; Epule et al., 2014; Dkamela, 2011; de Wasseige et al., 2012; Megevand, 2013). The areas that have the densest population have also the highest deforestation rate (Epule et al., 2014). As it can be noticed from Fig 1, the forests are mainly concentrated on the South and South-West of Cameroon.

2.3.1. Causes and Rates of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon

In Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa, conversion of forested land into agricultural use is growing because of increasing demographic density and increase in resource demand (Tegegne et al., 2016). Rural cultivation is characterized by ineffective use of surface area, low production rates and unsustainable slash and burn technique that degrades fertile land (Dkamela, 2010; Tegegne et al., 2014). Illegal small scale logging has major role as a cause of forest degradation, and is driven by the urgent need of resources of the local populations. The remote conditions and weak possibilities of distributing more sustainable energy options keep approximately 80% of total population dependent on firewood and charcoal as their primary source of energy. Less than 40% of total population of Cameroon has access to electricity (Tegegne et al., 2016). Fuel wood and charcoal have the largest share in local forest product markets, especially in areas with growing urbanization rate (Dkamela, 2010). Growing population and growing need of energy encourages illegal harvesting and clearing new land. (Tegegne et al., 2016) Commercial logging by large companies
is mainly contributing to forest degradation because of the market driven need for selective logging of certain valuable tree species (Tegegne et al., 2016).

The future potential of Cameroon for producing industrial crops such as palm oil, cocoa, rubber, tea and banana is a threat to forests (Dkamela, 2011; Tegegne et al., 2016). Also expansion of mining activities and mining related infrastructure will pose pressure on forested areas (de Wasseige et al., 2012; Tegegne et al., 2016). Especially the weak alignment of institutional boundaries and government’s inability to proper management and monitoring of forests are driving illegal and unsustainable actions. For example, mining or logging permits can be claimed on protected forest areas (Tegegne et al., 2016).

The weak forest governance along with economic and demographic factors are the underlying drivers of deforestation; corruption, unfair allocation of logging permits, insufficient institutional capacity as well lack of human and financial resources are hindering sustainable forest management (Tegegne et al., 2016; Dkamela, 2011).

2.4. Policies and Efforts to Curb Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Cameroon

Illegal logging and unsustainable natural resource management are prominent threat to Cameroon’s forests (Alemagi and and Kozak, 2010). Overlapping land titles and high level of corruption and the development ‘vision 2035’ of the country are making it challenging to promote sustainable forest activities.

In Cameroon there are many different environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and also the two major international instruments, FLEGT and REDD+ are involved in Cameroon’s efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation. Cameroon is very dependent on foreign aid in its environmental policies since the foreign aid consists 75% of the government’s budget (Epule et al., 2014). The policies and efforts to curb deforestation and forest degradation in Cameroon are introduced in Table 1 (Dkamela, 2010; Duveiller et al., 2008; Epule et al., 2014).
Especially REDD+ and FLEGT have addressed the importance of involving also local people in decision making, and when developing these mechanisms, there have been different workshops and other sessions arranged by environmental NGOs (Somorin et al., 2014; Epule et al., 2014; Dkamela, 2010). However, the local participation in these processes has been only minor, and it has not happened in the scale that was planned (Epule et al., 2014). Despite of the weak representation of local populations in decision making and planning processes, the NGOs have had a clear role in constituting the FLEGT and REDD+ in Cameroon (Somorin et al., 2014).
3. REDD+ and FLEGT

This section introduces REDD+ and FLEGT at global level and national level, briefing the context in Cameroon.

3.1. REDD+ Globally

Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) was first launched at 2005 at United Nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC). In 2007 Bali Action Plan addressed the need to focus also on conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. In 2010 Cancun agreement included these as a ‘+’ to REDD. (Angelsen et al., 2012)

REDD+ is a climate change mitigation mechanism that includes two main initiatives: UN-REDD and FCPF of the World Bank. In Cameroon the FCPF has bigger role than the initiatives of UN-REDD. The different actions of REDD+ include institutional reforms of governance, tenure, decentralization and community forest management. Also addressed are reduced impact logging and establishment of new protected areas. The idea is to change the incentives of people for conserving forests, and payments for ecosystem services (PES) are conditional on the outcomes of protection of carbon stocks and emission reductions (Angelsen et al., 2008). To make sure the REDD+ does not have any adverse effects on social or environmental sustainability, social safeguards were created in Cancun Agreement 2010 (UN-REDD, 2013). These safeguards are assuring that REDD+, among others, respects the rights of local people, protects biodiversity as well as ensures transparency (Peskett and Todd, 2013).

The REDD+ processes is composed of three phases. In the first phase the REDD+ strategy is developed with the help of donors. In the second phase REDD+ strategy is implemented with the help of donors and in third phase the implementation of REDD+ strategy is continued and payments are conducted for verified emission reductions (UNEP, 2010). The three different phases are demonstrated in Figure 2.
The different funders of REDD+ include public, private, national and international actors. Different payment methods include taxes, carbon markets and auctioning of allowances (Angelsen et al., 2012). The funds are targeted for example on capacity building and to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Angelsen et al., 2008).

### 3.1.1. REDD+ Process in Cameroon

The rate of deforestation and forest degradation is distressing and the deforestation in Cameroon is expanding due to population growth and global growing demand for agricultural products. Sustainable forest management (SFM) has been already many years the aim of Cameroon’s government not only to reduce DD but also to maximize social and economic benefits (Somorin et al., 2014). Because of these issues, Cameroon has been engaged to REDD+ since 2005. The first substantial outcome came in 2013 when Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) was validated (Alemagi et al., 2014).

In 2008 the REDD+ finalized its readiness plan idea notes (R-PIN) and launched its first REDD pilot project in Cameroon. The following steps are presented in Figure 3.
Drafting of R-PP involved many different stakeholders for instance the civil society, the media, the research institutions, the private sector, local populations and governmental actors. The preparation of the R-PP started in 2011 and it was finally validated in 2013. The draft was developed with the support of the government, civil society, FCPF and other non-governmental international organizations. UN-REDD was also a major contributor.

According to Mbatu (2015) the key strategies of Cameroon’s REDD+ are to develop the rural populations development through poverty alleviation, payments for ecosystem services (PES), decentralize decision making and also to increase forest monitoring, improve governance and increase capacity building. The REDD+ strategies support Cameroon’s long-term development goals called VISION 2035 (Mbatu, 2015).

The Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED) is in charge of Cameroon’s climate change related policies and is also
in charge of all REDD+ activities in the country. The national REDD+ Steering committee and the national observatory on Climate Change are both housed by MINEPDED (Mbatu, 2015).

The Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) coordinates projects related to forestry, particularly afforestation and reforestation projects. Other ministries that are involved in the REDD+ include Ministry of Finance (MINFI), Ministry of Livestock, Fishery and Animal Industry (MINEPIA), Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD), Ministry of agriculture and rural development (MINADER) and Ministry of Water Resources and Energy (MINEE) (Alemagi and Kozak., 2010).

Together with governmental actors the stakeholders also include civil society such as different NGOs, development partners such as World Bank, private sector and the media. The role of NGOs was to communicate with local populations to gather information from local level and also to share information at a national level. The NGOs also host facilitation meetings with different stakeholders and engage them in designing REDD+ policies (Somorin et al., 2014). In R-PIN very few NGOs were consulted, but in R-PP the NGOs got a bigger role. The private companies, such as agriculture and timber industries are not given a big role in decision making when designing REDD+ strategies (Somorin et al., 2014). The actors are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Different actors in REDD+ in Cameroon (Modified from Alemagi et al., 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>The Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINEPDED</td>
<td>In charge of REDD+ activities in Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINOF</td>
<td>Responsible for forestry related REDD+ activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINFI</td>
<td>Receives and disburses REDD+ funds for REDD+ projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEPIA</td>
<td>Responsible for reducing deforestation from livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINAS</td>
<td>Ensures the equitable benefit sharing from exploitation of natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINATD</td>
<td>Responsible for the local management of REDD+ projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEE</td>
<td>In charge of all bioenergy and other energy sector related policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINADER</td>
<td>Cooperation with MINOF to reduce deforestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAD</td>
<td>Research in agricultural sector for reducing deforestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Ensures consultation and participation of local people in REDD+ process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research institutions</td>
<td>Capacity building through the demonstration of pilot projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development partners</td>
<td>Provide funding for REDD+ pilot projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Conducts feasibility studies for future investments in REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media</td>
<td>Shares information and discusses about REDD+ mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINEPDED has established the institutional management structure of REDD+ that includes steering committee and Technical Secretariat (R-PP, Cameroon, 2013, The REDD+ desk, 2015). The Steering Committee is responsible for making policy and strategy proposals and to validate REDD+ processes. The Steering Committee includes different stakeholders such as government services, civil society, indigenous people and private sector (R-PP Cameroon, 2013). The Technical Secretariat is the operational body of REDD+ and is responsible for all the practicalities and also coordinates and monitors the implementation of REDD+ projects and initiatives. Technical Secretariat also makes sure that all stakeholders including local traditional rulers, indigenous communities, civil society, forest industry and municipal and regional councils are all involved in the development of REDD+ actions (The REDD+ desk, 2015).
To help coordination and cooperation between different ministries, donors and NGOs in Cameroon the mechanism called Consultation Circle of Partners of MINEPDED and MINFOF (CCPM) was created. It sets operational rules, guidelines and practices to achieve sustainable forest management and coordinates REDD+ processes (Somorin et al., 2014).

In Cameroon there has already been a number of different piloting projects and initiatives. The first project was funded by German remote-sensing company GAF AG in 2007. The aim of the pilot project was to monitor the forest biomass and estimate the rates of deforestation and forest degradation. Some other projects are gathered in Table 3.
Table 3. REDD+ Pilot Projects and Initiatives in Cameroon (Modified from Alemagi et al, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Implementing agency</th>
<th>Area of implementation</th>
<th>Duration of the project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REALU</td>
<td>Analysis of the drivers of deforestation -carbon stock assessment</td>
<td>ITA, IRAD, ICRAF</td>
<td>Efoulan</td>
<td>2009-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-poor REDD project</td>
<td>Identify synergies between forest governance and REDD+ Forest tenure benefit sharing</td>
<td>IUCN, DANIDA</td>
<td>Sangha Trinational forest blog</td>
<td>2009-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD ALERT</td>
<td>Identify the drivers of deforestation</td>
<td>ITA, IRAD, ICRAF</td>
<td>Southern central plateau</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change and forest in the Congo Basin: synergy between mitigation and adaptation</td>
<td>Analysis of the vulnerability of Local communities Analysis of REDD+ opportunities</td>
<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>Yokadouma</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation with communities and civil society on REDD in Cameroon</td>
<td>Consultation with local and indigenous communities that are dependent on forests</td>
<td>FFP, CED, RRI</td>
<td>South and East of Cameroon</td>
<td>Implemented in 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cameroon is now in its preparation phase of REDD+ developing its strategies and building the capacity by increasing information among stakeholders (the REDD+ desk, 2015). The framework for REDD+ implementation is in process and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) mechanism has been integrated into use. FPIC promotes fair treatment of rural forest people, and makes sure there are no coercion or manipulation and that all the information needed is provided for communities (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). Also the drivers of deforestation are identified and the national system of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) has had significant progress.
(FCPF, 2015). Still many factors need improvements. The consultation and participation of all stakeholders, especially the involvement of local populations need to be developed, as well as assessments of social and environmental impacts of REDD+ and the design of efficient benefit sharing system (FCPF, 2015; Alemagi et al., 2014).

3.2. FLEGT Globally

The FLEGT was published in May 2003 by European Commission. It is EU’s reaction to tackle illegal logging and the trade of illegally sourced timber products. The FLEGT Action Plan targets seven different areas (European Commission, 2007):

1. Support to timber producing countries
2. Activities to promote trade in legal timber
3. Promoting public procurement policies
4. Support for private sector initiatives
5. Safeguards for financing and investment
6. Use of existing legislative instruments or adoption of new legislation to support the plan
7. Addressing the problem of conflict timber

Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) are important components of the FLEGT Action Plan. They are bilateral binding agreements between the EU and a timber producing country that enable cooperation to improve forest governance and regulations related to illegal logging (EU FLEGT facility, 2014).

VPA ensures that the forest law is consistent and promotes sustainable forest management. It also aims to improve transparency and accountability. One important factor of VPA is to ensure the wellbeing of local communities and to link poverty reduction strategies on VPA to achieve the targets of FLEGT (European Commission, 2007). VPA also includes capacity building activities to support regulatory reform in forest governance and to support civil society and government (European Commission, 2007).
To ensure only legal timber is exported to the EU, each timber producing country designs its own legality assurance system (LAS). LAS defines legal timber, controls the timber supply chain, verifies compliance and monitors implementation of actions (EU FLEGT facility, 2014). European Timber regulation (EU TR) is another component of FLEGT Action Plan. The EU TR was enforced in 2013 to prohibit all illegal timber and timber products from entering into EU markets (EU FLEGT facility, 2014). The EU TR requires EU operators to practice due diligence and keeping records so that the origin of every timber unit can be clarified (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014).

3.2.1. The VPA Process in Cameroon

Cameroon is Africa’s largest exporter of tropical hardwood to EU (EU, 2013) and one of the biggest factors affecting Cameroon’s forest are the illegal logging activities (Tegegne et al., 2016). Substantial share of the Cameroon’s timber is exported to European markets, and to ensure the sustainability and legality of the timber EU and Cameroon started their negotiations in 2005 (Serge et al., 2013). The amount of timber exported to the EU has been declining by -10.9% between the years 2004-2013, but Cameroon is still one of the biggest exporters of tropical timber to the EU (ITTO, 2016). The informal pre-negotiations were during the years 2005-2006 assessing the VPA’s ability to increase timber product exports from Cameroon to EU and to help reinforcing already ongoing governance reforms (Serge et al, 2013). More formal negotiations started in 2007 with first national multi-stakeholder negotiations and then bilateral negotiations with EU, and continued until 2009. The signing of FLEGT VPA was done in May 2010 and ratification in 2011. Cameroon is now on its implementation phase of VPA and reforming regulatory frameworks, developing methodology for VPA impact monitoring and LAS system to get the FLEGT licensing and building capacity. Figure 4 presents the timeline of the negotiations of Cameroon’s FLEGT VPA negotiations.
The aim of Cameroon’s VPA is to ensure that all timber is legally sourced, transported and exported and to promote sustainable forest management that supports the livelihoods of local populations (Serge et al., 2013). The VPA process in Cameroon focuses on strengthening forest governance, promoting Cameroon’s timber products, improving Cameroon’s competitiveness in the international markets, encouraging investments in sustainable forest management and strengthening the capacity of forest stakeholders (EU FLEGT facility, 2014).

The Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF) is in charge of negotiating and implementing the FLEGT VPA process in Cameroon. The role of civil society and especially the role of local NGOs has been significant in negotiation processes. The local NGOs have been consulting local populations, but the direct involvement of locals has not been strong (Serge et al., 2013). The private sector, both big and small companies, has been involved through consultative meetings arranged by IUCN (Serge et al., 2013). IUCN’s role is to be a facilitator in multi-stakeholder dialogue (Ngendakumana et al., 2014). Other major NGOs that were involved include German Corporation for International Cooperation (GTZ) and the Forests and the European Union Resource Network (FERN) (Ngendakumana et al., 2014). Other representatives in the negotiation committees include: Prime Minister’s office, the Presidency, Ministry of External Relations, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance. The role of the negotiation committee was to “develop negotiating and draft VPA annexes in consultation with stakeholders” (EU FLEGT facility, 2014) and to facilitate the negotiations between EU and Cameroon.

Figure 4. Timeline of Cameroon’s FLEGT VPA negotiations (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014)
The Joint Implementation Committee is supervising the implementation process in Cameroon. The Committee has two structures; Joint Implementation Council and Joint Monitoring Committee. The Council has a representative from MINFOF and from EU and the role is to decide about the correct implementation of the VPA in Cameroon (VPA Cameroon, 2012; Serge et al., 2013). The consultative structure is Joint Monitoring Committee that is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of VPA as well as facilitating the communication and information sharing between the different stakeholders (VPA Cameroon, 2012) National monitoring committee focuses on the implementation of the VPA on the national level in Cameroon and consists of representatives from the different stakeholder groups (EU FLEGT facility, 2014).

JMC has also set up a working group in April 2014 that aims to develop the VPA process and advance the VPA implementation. The working group includes stakeholders from the governmental level, EU delegation, civil society, employers from the forest sector and has technical advisors from GIZ and EU FLEGT facility (EU FLEGT, 2014).

Independent monitoring is a part of the LAS and it collects information from all stakeholders to gather evidence from illegal activities in the field level (Serge et al., 2013). Independent auditor will complement the work of independent monitoring and assess the performance of the FLEGT VPA in Cameroon (Serge et al, 2013)
4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the study. The framework helps to understand the importance of tenure security and local participation within the framework of FLEGT and REDD+. The framework forms the basis that is used when analyzing the different policy documents and implications of appropriate tenure and land use rights.

Sustainable forest management (SFM) reduces deforestation and forest degradation that are also the concerns of global well-being and targeted by international mechanisms such as FLEGT and REDD+. Another aim of this chapter is to introduce the factors affecting SFM and rationalize how decentralization and local participation can help in configuration of SFM. Especially secure tenure rights have been seen as primary condition for SFM (Siry et al., 2015)

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the concept of forest governance that will be used when discussing about the sustainable forest management issues in Cameroon. Section 2 conceptualizes tenure and different regimes of ownership are described in section 3. Section 4 introduces legal pluralism and its implications and in section 5 the term decentralization is opened up together with the concept of cross-border, multinational governance. In the section 6 the local sustainable management of forest resources is conceptualized through Elinor Ostrom’s principles of common-pool resource management and also the roles of deliberative democracy and participation are defined.

4.1. Forest Governance: definitions and concepts

Different scholars and organizations have given many definitions to governance. Kjaer (2004) comprehends governance as a socially construct institution that includes different rules, norms and codes of behavior and involves interaction between different actors that are linked with each other through different affairs to achieve solutions and opportunities. On the other hand, Bevir (2008) defines governance simply as “all patterns of rule”, and that governance is “all processes of governing, whether
undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language” (Bevir, 2013).

In the context of forest management, the concept of forest governance has been introduced by diverse sources (Mundial, 2009; Proforest, 2014; World resource institute, 2013; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Arts, 2014). Forest governance refers to governing actions of the forest resources autonomously or in mutual interaction between government, markets, organizations and local level (Arts, 2014; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Different actors include stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations, government officials, local communities and international mechanisms such as FLEGT and REDD+ (Arts and Visseren-Hamakers, 2014; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). In many cases the problems arising from the absence of good governance are due to the lack of financial, information and human resources (Knight, 2010).

The indicators of good governance have been introduced by many (e.g., Mundial, 2009; Dietz and Ostrom, 2003; Arts, 2014; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). The control of corruption, impartiality, political stability, rule of law, accountability and participation are characterized as the key indicators that are forming the basis of good and effective governance and as the most applicable features affecting tenure rights. World Bank (Mundial, 2009) defines five ‘building blocks’ that most constitute the concept of good forest governance.

- Transparency, Accountability and Public Participation
- Stability of forest institutions and conflict management
- Quality of forest administration including the willingness to address forest sector issues, corruption control, capacity and effectiveness and forest monitoring and evaluation
- Coherence of Forest Legislation and Rule of Law including the quality of law enforcement, adjudication and recognition, enforcement and respect of property rights
- Economic Efficiency, Equity and Incentives including incentives for sustainable use, penalties for violations and equitable allocation of forest benefits.
(Mundial, 2009)

In this thesis the concept ‘governance’ is understood as all actions of governing and all patterns of rule that are composed by different multi-level actors including government, local populations, international organizations and civil society.

4.2. Tenure: definitions and concepts

There exist many different definitions for the concept of tenure, for example FAO (2002) defines tenure as “who can use the resources of the land for how long and under what conditions” but also that it is a socially constructed institution which is created to regulate and control the behavior of people (FAO, 2002; Bromley, 1989). Tenure is not only ownership, but defines the rights of who are allowed to use the resource as well as how and when the use is allowed (FAO, 2002; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Ostrom and Hess, 2007).

Ostrom and Schlager (1996) identify five different factors that are defining the concept of tenure: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. Table 4 defines each of these factors.

Table 4. Different factors of tenure. (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access</th>
<th>the right to entry in the defined area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>the right to gather the resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>the right to decide the future and the structure of the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>the right to decide who will have access rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>the right to sell or lease either the management or exclusion rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To have full ownership rights, one must obtain all of these five rights. Private forest ownership includes these all, and it can provide incentives for long term investments (Siry et al., 2015). However, in many cases alternative land uses are more profitable than forest conservation and private forest ownership regime is often associated with
deforestation, forest degradation and forest fragmentation (Siry et al., 2015). According to Bromley (1989), private ownership can cause conflicts and create high transaction costs compared to common property regime.

If a person has only the rights of access and withdrawal, he cannot construct own rules of managing the area. His rights are defined by those who have the rights of management and exclusion. If the local rural people have ownership of the forest resources, they will manage the area more sustainably (e.g. Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Hayes and Persha, 2010). Especially the rights of management and exclusion are experienced as necessary (Robinson et al., 2014) and they frame the possibilities what one can do to the resource legally. Without the rights of management and exclusion, the person has no incentives to sustainably use or conserve the area. There is no assurance that the area will be under his usage also in the future but to be conquered by other people (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996; Katila, 2008). In most countries in Africa, for example in Cameroon, the rights of management, exclusion and alienation, are at command of government officials because the land is mostly owned by government (Njoh, 2013). The local rural populations have only the first two of the rights, access and withdrawal.

The rights of rural populations are not respected in most developing countries and they don’t have possibilities to strengthen their rights (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Katila, 2008). In Africa the property rights can be formal or informal and be constituted through different customs, laws, inheritances or religious reasons (Knight, 2010). In developing countries, the government ownership has been linked to corruption, lack of conservation and equaling open access property (Katila, 2008). Borras and Franco (2010) argue that in many cases in developing countries tenure rights are formed by government or non-government actors pursuing towards their own interests without respecting the tenure rights of rural people. For example, in Cameroon the government officials are driving their private gain and taking bribes which violates the control of corruption and impartiality (Njoh, 2013). This and also the ambiguous bureaucratic procedures are making it almost impossible for rural people to justify their land rights (Njoh, 2013). Because of the undesirable effects of governmental control of forests especially many developing countries are aiming to change their forest management from government to forest governance by including
different actors such as civil society and international communities (Arts, 2014; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).

Insecure tenure rights follow the absence of good forest governance (McCarthy and Tacconi, 2011) and are a major reason for deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Insecure tenure rights also make it more possible to dispossess local people from their land e.g. if REDD+ schemes increase the land and carbon values of forested areas (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). EU FLEGT Action Plan identifies secure tenure as important factor to ensure the achievements of its goals, especially the land rights of communities. If the land rights are not mapped and recognized, logging is illegal which reduces sustainable forest management (Dooley and Ozinga, 2011).

Some scholars (e.g. Tacconi, 2007) argue that clear tenure rights are not a panacea to the sustainable use of resources. Local people might not understand the importance of conservation and the consequences of deforestation, and act in a way that is socially accepted in their community even though it might not be sustainable or socially acceptable in global level (Ostrom, 1990). Without incentives to protect forests, agricultural income can be more attractive to local populations than forest conservation (Tacconi, 2007). They can also be easily manipulated to alienate their land for foreigners (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Without sustainable management of the resource it will deplete at an unsustainable rate because of overharvesting (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014).

In this thesis tenure is understood as an institution that is partly defining the behavior of people using the resources. It has different levels of rights that determine that in what extent an individual can exploit the resources, and its different forms are introduced in Table 4.

4.4. Legal Pluralism

legal pluralism as “coexistence and interaction of multiple legal orders within a social setting or domain of social life”. These different legal orders are not equal and usually state recognized orders are more powerful and used for example to claim land as state property against local customs (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).

Legal pluralism is common in many countries that have been suffering colonialism. Before colonial rule the African people had different cultural based systems to define their land rights (Knight, 2010). The colonizers enforced their own rules to suit their own purposes (Knight, 2010) and the local laws were ignored and colonizers imposed local people under their new legal orders (Rantala, 2013) without the approval of locals who were expected to follow the rules (Sheleff, 2013). After independency the local rules were returned but the colonizers’ statutory laws in many cases stayed prevalent even though the customary laws continued to be followed locally (Rantala, 2013). Before colonizers the African populations didn’t have clear property rights and the colonizers supposed all land to be free for taking and claimed vast land areas under the ownership of colonized government (Knight, 2010). Still in many countries in Africa government, instead of local populations, owns most of the land areas.

Customary law is respected in local scale independently without government authorization (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Njoh, 2013) and statutory law provides the legal rights. These two rights are in most cases overlapping and causing tenure insecurity and land allocation issues. For example, the land that is used by locals and which by customary law belongs to them can legally, by statutory law, be sold or leased by governmental officials (Anseeuw et al, 2011). Local populations can be uninformed about the statutory law, and violate the national level rules. This unawareness is one of the major source of uncertainty and insecurity (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002) and for that reason local populations clear the land as to prove that it is occupied, which is the way of declaring customary land tenure in many developing countries (Sunderlin et al., 2009). Many African countries don’t recognize customary tenure rights and lack capacity to define them even when the local populations occupy the land or have inherited it (Unruh, 2008). The overlaps between statutory and customary law can lead to conflicts between government and the local users of the resource (Siry et al., 2015). Knight (2010) suggests that one should recognize these overlaps and start making customary rights equally powerful to statutory rights.
4.5. Decentralization

Decentralization is a form of action that relocates the authorization rights from state control to local users or to lower level in administration (Larson and Soto, 2008), either local administration officers (Siry et al., 2015). If the authorization rights are relocated to communities or individuals Siry et al. (2015) name it as devolution. Here both of these actions are under the concept of decentralization. In many cases in forestry sector decentralization has been seen to reduce transaction costs, increase revenues and increase sustainable forest management practices (e.g. Larson and Soto, 2008) and make policy more democratic and effective (Ribot et al., 2006; Arts, 2014). When transferring decision making power from state to other stakeholders, government gets possibilities to resolve conflicts by those who are mostly affecting on them. Government will stay in strong lead but gives decision making possibilities to other stakeholders as well. Arts (2014) adds that in most cases decentralization, especially over valuable resources, has only been symbolic gesture and no real transfers of rights have happened. The government does not want to leave management rights of valuable timber for local communities and limits the decision making rights of locals or gives the rights to locals who serve the government interest (Ribot et al., 2006).

Many individuals, especially local indigenous people are not given legal rights and possibilities to take part in decision making and implementing policies even though it is seen important by many scholars (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009). Deliberative democracy is a form of action that encourages participation of local people in the political processes and evaluates their values and priorities to make their word count (Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009). Deliberative democracy is helping communities to address their problems and governments to find ways solving them. Deliberative democracy increases equity, accountability, transparency and responsiveness and strengthens the mutual understanding between government and local populations (Hartz-Karp and Briand, 2009).

Ostrom suggests that the local people may need some external assistance to make their word count (Ostrom, 1990). Siitonen and Hämäläinen (2004) are suggesting participatory methods as external assistance to create arena where all stakeholders can communicate. Participatory methods are different facilitation, learning and
involvement tools that achieve to find a common goal among different stakeholders. Participation has been seen to have great efficiency, good level of equity, low transaction costs and help in decentralizing natural resource decision making (Siitonen and Hämäläinen, 2004). Same kinds of ideas are expressed by Daniels and Walker (2001). They introduce collaborative learning as a purpose of public participation, and as a potential for mutual learning through involving all stakeholders. They promote collaborative learning in cases that are complex, but where improvement must be achieved. Using methods that include collaborative learning local people can get possibilities to make their words count in affairs concerning them. They tell that “collaborative learning has a role to play in incorporating the voices of all parties in both the local and national policy areas.” (Daniels and Walker, 2001) Also Woodhill and Van der Vugt (2011) present in their principles for multi-stakeholder processes the importance of effective communication between the different stakeholders.

Participation is important both to FLEGT and REDD+ implementation and enforcement. It makes sure the plans target right problems (Colchester, 2006) and also builds trust among local level participants (Dooley and Ozinga, 2011). Tenure and local participation are addressed in both FLEGT and REDD+ as important factors affecting deforestation and forest degradation. This framework forms the basis to analyze which components are the most crucial ones to target and to see if they are targeted in FLEGT and REDD+ documents as well as in Cameroon’s legislations.

Local effective and transparent management promotes REDD+ implementation and enforcement as well as sustainable forest management (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). Local people who have rights of management and exclusion have been managing forests more sustainably and valuing more conservation than when government has those rights. (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990). Also when comparing to many centrally authorized protected forest areas, locally managed forests have lower deforestation rates (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012) because people have tenure security and then feel responsible over the resources (Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990). Without sustainable management of the resource it will deplete at an unsustainable rate because of overharvesting (Hardin, 1968; Arts, 2014).
4.5.1. Cross-border governance

Until early 1980s governmental control in environmental issues was promoted internationally but then noticed ineffective because of insufficient resources for management (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). New global efforts are forming governance that exceeds the borders of government (Arts, 2014). These efforts are interventions targeting to influence on environmental issues and are seen gaining involvement of multiple actors as well as promoting social learning (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). For example, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), certification systems and market directing tools are bringing the global sustainability objectives to local level (Arts, 2014). The new actors in forest governance are non-governmental organizations, civil societies, international institutions and organizations as well as local people who are involved through participatory methods (Arts, 2014).

4.6. Sustainable common-pool resource management

Ostrom (1990) introduced eight principles that ensure sustainable management of a common pool resource (CPR) such as forest. These can be seen in Table 5 on the next page. Common-pool resource can be defined as a resource from where it is difficult to exclude users and where the increase in the number of users decreases the number of available resources (Steins and Edwards, 1999). Common-pool resource can be owned by government and have a status of open access resource, or it can be owned or managed by a community (Ostrom, 1990). The positive utility gained from using the resource is always bigger than the negative utility since it is shared with all the people extracting the resource (Hardin, 1968). This will eventually result in over-exploitation and degradation of the resource (Hardin, 1968). In this case, credible commitment fails and short-sighted profit-seeking occurs. If there are no clear rules on how to manage the resource sustainably, for the users it is same as permitting non-sustainable usage (Ostrom, 1990). Clear and legitimate rules are important in defining who can use the resource and to have sanctions for breaking the rules (Ostrom, 1990; Siry et al., 2015). If the local populations have the possibility to participate in developing the rules and the rules are adapted to local context the rules are more enduring and people are more likely to follow them (Ostrom, 1990; Siry et al., 2015).
When comparing to government forest ownership regime, communally managed forests have lower deforestation and forest degradation rates ((Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Chhatre and Agrawal 2009) because people have tenure security and then feel responsible for the resources (Arts, 2014; Ostrom, 1990).

In the Ostrom’s principles (1990) the individuals who have rights to use the forest have legal status of doing so. This means that the rights are recognized also by statutory law in addition to customary law. There exists a clarified document in which the usage period and permitted amount of extraction are clearly defined. Every person knows his or hers share of the resource, and the permitted actions only include those that are useful for the people and do not harm the resource permanently. The people who have usage rights for the resource must take part in planning and decision making, and they must inform others about the condition of the resource. All the people know about sanctions that follow when conducting wrong or harmful actions. The people using the resource have an effective conflict-solving mechanism, and a possibility to organize their management and governance over the resource without accountancy to external authorities e.g. state actors.
Table 5. Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions. (Ostrom, 1990)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Clearly defined boundaries</td>
<td>Individuals/households who have rights to withdraw resource units must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions</td>
<td>Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of resources units are related to local conditions and provision rules requiring labor, material and/or money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Collective choice arrangements</td>
<td>Those affected by operational rules can participate in modifying them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Monitoring</td>
<td>Active auditing of CPR conditions by monitors accountable to appropriators or are appropriators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Graduated sanctions</td>
<td>Dependent on the seriousness and context set by officials accountable to appropriators or are the appropriators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>Rapid access to low cost local arenas to resolve conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize</td>
<td>Rights to organize institutions are not challenged by external government authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Nested enterprises</td>
<td>Only for CPRs that are part of larger systems. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Methods

This section presents the materials and methods used in the study as well as the approach chosen and the limitations of this study.

5.1. Study Area

The questionnaire survey was conducted in six villages in Southeast Cameroon. The villages were part of two different Payment for Ecosystem services (PES) projects, the other conducted by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the other by Centre for Environment and Development (CED).

![Figure 5. Locations of the sites (Google, 2016).](image)

In the Figure 5 is presented the locations of the sites. The blue star on the left marks the approximate location of the CED site Nkolenyeng, and the yellow star on the right marks the approximate locations of the WWF sites. The other CED site Nomadjoh is situated near the WWF sites.
In WWF sites four villages were visited from which three were Bantu dominated and one was Baka dominated. From the two CED target villages the one, Nomadjoh, was Baka dominated and the other, Nkoyleng, Bantu dominated. The characteristics of each village can be found in Table 6.

Table 6. Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Total Inhabitants</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Total forest area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nkolenyeng</td>
<td>CED</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1042 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomadjoh</td>
<td>CED</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1942 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messok-Messok</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1480 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndimako</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etekessang</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3135 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoulabot</td>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3254 ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CED sites were established in 2011, and the PES contract is renewable in 5 years’ periods. The payments were supposed to be given annually, but that has not been the reality so far. The villagers have got some money and incentives, but not all that were promised. The objectives of the project were to decrease deforestation and forest degradation as well as protect biodiversity and develop the communities. The projects are piloting projects of Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) and are targeted to these areas because of severe threat of deforestation and forest degradation. Also the WWF sites were established in 2011 and are renewable in 5 year’s periods. The primary objectives were to conserve biodiversity and maintain carbon stocks in the forests. The main sources of income of the villages of both CED and WWF sites are presented in Table 7.
Table 7. Main sources of income of the villagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and livestock</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest products</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all of the villages the NGOs had formed different groups with different activities such as apiculture, agriculture, pig breeding and moabi oil processing. One group was trained to monitor the forests by GPS mapping. All of the villages were community forests in government owned land in rural, remote, forested areas. The drivers for deforestation were unsustainable exploitation of timber and other NTFPs as well as unsustainable cultivation of cash crops.

Within the projects, the community forest area has been divided into different categories such as undisturbed forest, degraded forest, agricultural land and possible sacred sites. The projects have trained the members of the village to monitor the state of the forest, and according to the level of conservation, payments are given.

5.2. Study Approach

This thesis employed a case study approach to investigate and provide answers to the research questions. Yin (1994) defines case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Gillham (2000) adds that case study seeks evidence from a single case to find answers for the specific research questions using multiple different sources of evidence to get sufficient data. A case study focuses on understanding and describing the
phenomenon, having the limitation of small sample size that can make it difficult to generalize the findings (Woodside, 2010).

The case study was conducted in South-East Cameroon’s rural forested areas of total six villages that have had PES piloting projects of Centre of environment and development (CED) and World wide fund for nature (WWF) since 2011. The villages were chosen strategically, because it represents well the PES projects of Cameroon that are not yet very well established (Saldana, 2011).

5.3. Materials and Data Collection

This study employed mixed methods for data collection, by combining content analysis and literature review, questionnaire survey and interviews. Mixed methods is a research strategy that answers the research questions by using different sources of both qualitative and quantitative data collecting and integrating the different data in a same study. (Greene et al., 1989; Hesse-Biber, 2010). The term “multimethods” is used when combining either two qualitative methods or two quantitative methods together (Hesse-Biber, 2010). To support the used methods, triangulation was also used to ensure the validity of the results (Mills et al., 2010). The triangulation was established between the documents and the interviews.

5.3.1. Data collection

The data for this study comes from three different sources: content analysis and literature review, interviews at local level with rural populations and indigenous people and also with Cameroonian experts and policy makers. The results from content analysis and literature review were used to develop protocol for questionnaires and interview surveys.

Quantitative data can be used to statistical analyzing and its reliability and validity can be tested. The benefit of qualitative data is to cross-check the data and have in-depth understanding of the research results (Hesse-Biber, 2010). In this study the data from interviews with rural villagers is handled with quantitative methods. The data from
interviews with officials is qualitative, and is used to support the findings from content analysis of key policy documents and the data from interviews with villagers.

Content analysis has been given many different definitions from different scholars. Bryman (2008) defines content analysis as an “approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner”. Bryman (2008) highlights that the key features are objectivity and being systematic. Content analysis can be both qualitative and quantitative (Saldana, 2011). In this study, the contents of policy documents and interviews with officials are handled both by quantitative methods by systematically searching and highlighting keywords and phrases. The interviews with officials and the local populations are also used for quantitative study by choosing interesting topics and phrases that support this study. The questionnaires for both groups can be found in the Annex.

After the literature review the context specific content analysis consisted of the policy documents of REDD+ and FLEGT as well as the Cameroonian operative legislations and the drafts of the coming legislations. The data was analyzed in Google docs by searching relevant phrases from the documents and sorting them under different thematic areas from Theoretical Framework. The phrases and thematic areas were formed from World Bank’s (2009) building blocks of good forest governance, Ostrom’s (1990) CPR principles and Ostrom and Schlager’s (1996) different factors of tenure which are all presented in chapter 4. These sections were then analyzed and compared together with Cameroonian legislations and the interviews with officials. The results can be found on chapter 6.

5.3.2. Questionnaire Survey

The questionnaire survey was conducted in two levels: with rural populations and with experts from different organizations and ministries. The main emphasis with expert interviews was on the concept of forest governance, and in the local level questionnaire the focus was on the principles of sustainable local forest management. The questionnaire survey was composed of both open ended and closed ended question items.
From the six villages the total sample size was 150 interviews. The questionnaire consisted of 4 different thematic areas and took from 20 minutes to over an hour each. The questionnaire can be found from Annex. The interviews were done face-to-face with the help of translator, in most cases inside the respondent's housing. Most of the questions were fixed-choice, but there were also open-ended questions. The questionnaire can be found in Annex. To have triangulation for the data from interviews, in each of the village also focus group discussions were conducted. In each discussion group there were 10-15 participants, both women and men and young and old. The discussion group discussions were recorded. The data of the interviews was analyzed with Excel using descriptive statistics to analyze the empirics.

5.3.3. Face-to-Face Interviews with policy makers and experts

The number of interviews in policy level remained low because of lack of resources in the projects and schedule constraints. The total number of conducted interviews were 13. The targeted individuals included ministry officials in different ministries as well as project coordinators and NGO experts. Additionally, one interview was conducted with official from a logging company that was operating in the area of the target villages. The interviews were done during October and November 2015 and conducted face-to-face. The benefit from a face-to-face interview is to be able to ask additional questions during the meeting.

For each official there were planned questions that were systematically asked from every one. In addition, there were questions that were targeted to each individual subject to their area of expertise. Since the interviews were semi-informal and the officials talked from their own point of view, the interviewer was asking also spontaneous questions that helped to understand the thoughts of the official more precisely. The officials were chosen as key-informants, who were supposed to have key information about the subjects of this thesis. This key-informant method is not to present the opinions of the whole informant group but to gather the information they personally possess (Lavrakas, 2008).
The officials were kept anonymous and no personal information was collected. The officials were for example from WWF, CED, IUCN, CIFOR, FODER and MINFOF, MINEPDED and MINEPAT. There were both foreign experts as well as Cameroonians. The interviewed persons were asked for their consent for recording, and only one of them declined. In addition, with recording, notes were taken during the interviews.

The data from the officials were analyzed by using Google docs and Microsoft Word. First the recorded interviews were transcribed and as with the policy documents, the data was assorted under different thematic areas that were later combined in analysis with the contents of policy documents. The different thematic areas were modified from World Bank’s (Mundial, 2009) building blocks of good forest governance that are presented in Chapter 4. The data from local level was analyzed in Microsoft Excel. First the answers were translated from French to English and then inserted into Excel. The data was then further analyzed using the descriptive statistics to analyse the empirics.

5.5. Limitations of the Study

The study has many limitations, mainly because of the challenges of cultural and language differences and the limited time period for research in Cameroon. The number of interviews with the officials remained low (n=13) and this could have implications to conclusions drawn. The data from officials is mainly to support the literature review and content analysis of the policy documents. It can also be possible, that the officials did not speak up their true thoughts maybe not wanting to show their organization or institution in bad light. For example, one official clearly stated that “illegalities do not come from the ministry” even though there is clear empirical evidence that the government of Cameroon is very corrupted and accepting bribes especially in the forestry sector (Njoh, 2013; Transparency International, 2015). The limited time with the officials might have caused that not all of their thoughts and ideas were expressed during the interviews. The challenges with rural local population were mainly the language barrier and their lack of understanding of the basic concepts such as ownership or tenure.
6. Results

The key findings of this thesis are presented in three sub-sections: 1) the plans of FLEGT VPA and REDD+ processes in the context of tenure in Cameroon; 2) challenges in forest governance sector; and 3) extent to which rights should be given to local communities.

The chapter 6 gives answers on the basic research objectives such as how to ensure the full and effective engagement and participation of national stakeholders on tenure and access rights and in what extent the rights should be given to locals.

For the sake of clarity, a term ‘official’ is used when referring to the policy level officials, and ‘villager’ when referring to the populations interviewed in rural forested villages of Cameroon.

6.1. The role of FLEGT VPA and REDD+ in issues related to land tenure in Cameroon

This sub-section explains the contents of the FLEGT and REDD+ policy documents in the context of Cameroon as well as presents what the officials told about the plans of FLEGT and REDD+ for tenure and how REDD+ and FLEGT can contribute on clear tenure rights of rural populations.

6.1.1. FLEGT VPA

FLEGT Action Plan identifies strengthening tenure rights as a part of the key policy tool and also as a goal. The Cameroonian VPA acknowledges the need for secure tenure rights, and they are addressed mainly through the rights of access and withdrawal to create clear boundaries on the resources that are allowed to be harvested. The boundaries for logging operations for companies are defined in Annex VIII:

- there is clear delineation of areas where forest resource rights have been allocated and the holders of those rights have been identified
• the forestry entity respects the logging rules in the land authorized for logging

Annex VIII also states about the tenure rights of local communities

• Respect for parties legal tenure or rights of use of land and resources that may be affected by timber harvesting rights, where such other rights exist.

In addition, the forest law from 1994 gives legal status for community forest and delimits the maximum size of the forest to 5000 hectares. The community forest contract is renewable in 25-year-periods and the community is allowed to cut and sell timber in within the boundaries set by the government. Table 4 presents the different levels of tenure. In community forest the withdrawal and management rights are limited by government, and there are no rights for alienation. According to Ostrom and Schlager (1996), if there are no management rights, the group has no assurance about future and this lessens the probability for acting sustainably. The forest law gives only limited user rights to the community.

The officials did not think boundaries as a problem, stating that the boundaries of community forestry were clearly defined and respected. The problem about land that was allocated for logging operation by MINFOF was with overlapping land titles: different ministries are planning different activities under the same land areas. All the officials mentioned unclear land use planning including overlapping of titles as a problem in Cameroon. Thirty-one percent of the officials mentioned overlapping land titles and lack of transparency as significant challenges in Cameroon. Also the difficulty with customary and modern law was mentioned in 38% of the interviews with officials. They raised up an issue that all of the locals do not understand what land is theirs and what belongs to government. This is not surprising, since from the interviews with villagers it was noticed that 53% from the population had no education or only elementary education, and only 15% had college level education. FLEGT VPA also addresses the importance of transparency in Annex XI in Article 19: “ensure that the work of the JMC is transparent, and that the associated information and results are accessible to the public”. Transparency is important factor in both FLEGT and REDD+, and also one of the factors in World Bank’s (Mundial, 2009) building blocks that are defining the good governance in forest sector.
From Ostrom and Schlager (1996) one of the key factors of tenure is exclusion. The rights of exclusions are addressed also in VPA: Other users [should] respect for other parties’ legal tenure or rights of use of land and resources that may be affected by timber harvesting rights where such other rights exist. This has problems in multiple levels. The first thing is that in Cameroon the Customary law is not recognized even though the local rural people follow it. What was noticeable from both the interviews with officials as well as with the locals is that the local people do not know their rights. They follow their traditions and are not truly aware who is owner of their land and how and who can use the forest. For example, 26% of the villagers surveyed mentioned that they own the land, even though it was community forest owned by government. Only 17.8% from the villagers stated that government owns the land. Figure 6 presents the perceptions of the forest ownerships of the villagers.

Figure 6. Perception of the villagers about ownership

Cameroon VPA recognizes the importance of the tenure rights of community forests when conducting loggings in their forests in Matrix 6:

- **the community is the beneficiary of a legally awarded community forest and a management agreement signed with the administration**
- **the community is organized in the form of a legally recognized legal entity**
- **The community is the beneficiary of a legally awarded community forest and a management agreement signed with the administration**
The importance of the respect for the community rights was raised within the officials and with the villagers.

Participation and engagement of local communities including indigenous people is an important factor in Cameroonian VPA. Also the incentives for local communities to participate in sustainable forest management and FLEGT are stated in Article 2 as to “create and encourage economic opportunities for resident local communities and local enterprises” and to “strengthen the capacities of actors in Cameroon by encouraging the creation of a favourable climate for investment in the sustainable management of forests”.

The interviewed officials reported that the incentives from the development projects are insufficient for the local people, but also for the whole Cameroon to sustainably manage the forests and participate in the FLEGT process. Forty-six percent from the officials told that public participation is a problem because it is not sufficient in their opinion. Also the interviewed villagers reported that, in their opinion, the locals were not included fully in the planning and decision making processes. Participation is considered as crucial factor ensuring the secure tenure and sustainable forest governance (Ostrom, 1990; Mundial, 2009; Carodenuto et al, 2014) as well as being important for implementing both FLEGT and REDD+ (Colchester, 2006).

FLEGT VPA states in Article 16 that “Cameroon shall regularly consult Cameroon stakeholders on the implementation of this Agreement, within a National Monitoring Committee or through other consultative platforms, taking into account its legislation on the forest and fauna scheme and all the laws and regulations in force governing access to information, public participation and access to justice on environmental matters”. The Cameroon VPA (2011, Annex VIII) identifies the following key stakeholders:

- the representatives of the administrations involved,
- members of parliament,
- the representatives of the forestry communes (having their own domain, with a domain assigned to them by the State or beneficiaries of the forestry tax),
- the representatives of civil society organisations,
- the representatives of the private forestry and timber sector,
the unions that are active in the sector.

To have full participation, consultation with only representatives is not following the FPIC guidelines.

Since FLEGT VPA’s major target is in the forest sector, the VPA concentrates on the legality of the logging operations so that all actions happen in legal, sustainable and deliberate manner. The main pressure is to improve governance and through that process also reduce poverty and have development. Existence of community forests and their rights are noticed and taken into account. Also the need for local participation in decision making is noticed. VPA considers different governance factors important, but do not heavily concentrate on them. One of the officials told that FLEGT follows the forest management plans and legislations, and if the forest is not under any plan or the planning is unclear, FLEGT cannot work properly.

6.1.2. REDD+

In the context of tenure, the Cameroon R-PP (2013) has targeted three main aspects: (i) enhancement of government’s rule of law and coherence; (ii) participation of locals in planning, decision making and implementation; and (iii) recognition of tenure rights.

Though the Cameroon R-PP (2013) highlights the participation of the local indigenous people, it is mentioned that only seven percent of the regional consultation participants were indigenous people. The R-PP further elaborated the role of local participation:

- in addition to their official presence on the steering committee ... the indigenous peoples will participate during various discussions and in decision making concerning the strategic options to be adopted, according to the consultation plan that will be developed (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 13)

- particular importance will be given to the indigenous peoples with consultations that will be conducted according to an appropriate methodology. the principle is to obtain the free and prior consent of the stakeholders using participatory-focused planning methods that encourage
listening and the integration of local knowledge allowing the local communities to be active participants and not passive beneficiaries (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 30)

- the participatory process will also make it possible to ensure transparency in decision-making, improve the empowerment of the players, involve them in making decisions and in the implementation and monitoring-evaluation of the actions (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 26)

During the fieldwork, it was observed that the consultation plan mentioned in R-PP was not yet put in place. Even though there were plans to have REDD+ work as a bottom-up - mechanism, this is not yet achieved. Forty-six percent of the officials asserted that participation is a problem, and 23% of them mentioned that locals even do not know what is REDD+ and its benefits. This also came up during questionnaire surveys. Seventeen percent of the villages participating in the Carbon PES project population were not aware of the project. They also did not have wide understanding about the reasons and benefits of the project. Forty-six percent claimed that they were not consulted during the preparation phase, and 25% was not satisfied with their own involvement.

REDD policy documents do not consider tenure as crucial issues, though the respect of property rights in the context of customary law and community rights were mentioned few times:

- community forests and communal forests will be given serious consideration and specific actions may be dedicated to them [such as] strengthening the management of community forests and identification of the conditions in which communal forests could guarantee over time a reduction of deforestation and degradation (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p.56)

- needs expressed by local and autochthonous communities point in the direction of harmonization between modern land law and customary land law in order to take into consideration the concerns and needs of local and autochthonous communities: facilitation simplification of procedures to acquire land titles (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 58)

- [there exists] inadequacy with respect to the rights practiced by the local communities. its application is thus uncertain, and the conflicts involving
disputes between traditional practices and the regulations are increasing continually (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 42)

In Cameroon there already exists some piloting REDD+ community projects that are trying to bring development to the communities. In Cameroon, the poor governance with strong vested interest of political economic elites in the natural resource governance is slowing down the REDD+ process and making it complex.

Cameroon forest tenure law from 1994 states that “Community forests shall have single management plans approved by the services in charge of forests. Such plans shall be drawn up at the behest of the communities concerned in accordance with conditions laid down by decree. All activities in a community forest shall comply with its management plan.” The proponents of PES projects covered in this study have given attention to sustainable management of community forests by forming different sources of income that were supposed to give incentives for stopping illegal activities. On the other hand, the PES projects delimited conservation zones from the community forest areas, and trained the villagers to monitor the status of their forest themselves. The villagers were informed that if they do not respect the boundaries of the conservation zones, the payments the PES project will be reduced accordingly. The threat of not having the full payments from the PES project was supposed to be an incentive for sustainable forest management and forest conservation.

The difference between customary and modern law is still a concern for 23% of the officials. The literature also paints it as a big problem in Cameroon (Njoh, 2013). Furthermore, what could be noticed from the villages is, for example, that the local people did not know who owned the forest and for many of them even the concept of owning the forest was unfamiliar. A representative from a logging company that was operating in the same area that the target villages were situated told that even though there are clear negotiations with the villagers about the coming logging operations, they still break the formed rules by entering into the areas of felling. This comment supports the idea that the villagers find it difficult to understand the rules and boundaries regarding the forests ownership and tenure.
In the governmental level lack of resources were seen as one of the main contributor as listed in Cameroon’s R-PP as causes of deforestation and forest degradation. This came up from the interviews with officials but also in the documents of R-PP:

• the laws are not adequately applied in Cameroon for various reasons. this situation has adverse effects on the state of the national governance. the most common problem related to forest governance is the absence of any regulations and the insufficient capacities of the human and financial resources (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 37)
• forest governance in Cameroon remains weakened by the insufficient enforcement of laws on sustainable forest management (R-PP Cameroon, 2013, p. 46)

When interviewed the proponents of the PES projects of CED and WWF, the problem with insufficient financial and human resources came up. Also the villagers raised that as a problem and stated that they want someone to stay with them in the village to be present and manage the project. The villagers also wanted to have more incentives from the projects which was not possible at this stage of the projects.

Thirty-eight percent from the officials told that a key problem with tenure rights is the lack of political will. The governance actors do not have adequate urge to apply the laws and tenure rights for the rural population. Two of the officials also mentioned that the state does not want to give full rights to the community so that the state can stay in lead and control the land better. This corresponds well with the Cameroonian land law from 1974 which states that “The State shall be the guardian of all lands. It may in this capacity intervene to ensure national use of land or in the imperative interest of defense or the economic policies of the nation”.

Overlapping of the land titles and lack of coordination between different land use strategies and policies were also noticed. As mentioned in chapter 6.1.1., when analyzing FLEGT VPA, 31% of the officials were worried about the overlapping land titles. Also in literature this came up as a major problem (Njoh, 2013). Cameroon’s R-PP (p.42) states that: “The use of forest space is governed by forest zoning. the mining code is, for its part, operational and awards mining permits without necessarily referring to the other existing sectors. the same is true for the farming code and the farming policy, which have their own ambitions, unrelated to the other uses of space”.

48
6.1.3. Contribution of REDD+ and FLEGT to secure tenure

The Challenges are looked through the World Bank’s ‘Building blocks for forest governance’ and the data is gathered both from the interviews with officials as well as with the rural population.

The officials were asked about their perceptions on how REDD+ and FLEGT can contribute to the tenure security in Cameroon. Thirty-one percent of them told that as yet there has been no contribution from either of the mechanism to tenure. Two of the officials stated that FLEGT has no connection with tenure, and having secure tenure has no connections with FLEGT VPA. Other officials about FLEGT told that FLEGT can improve the existing rights and enhance the level of respect of the tenure rights. Nonetheless, one of those FLEGT officials still stated that FLEGT can even jeopardize community rights if the communities shall have possibility to make contracts about their forests with logging operators. This can cause unfair agreements with companies and degrade the forests of the local communities.

Some of the officials (31%) were worried that REDD+ is not having real impact in the preparation of the forestry law draft. The present law or the new draft of forestry law does not take PES into consideration as it does take the forest exploitation. The new law aims to clarify the past law and refine the definitions and concepts of different forest titles. The new forest law also aims to delete the limitation of the size of community forestry and define the rights autochthonous people to vulnerable people. In addition, the new law adds requirements for evidence of customary ownership by demanding signature of the relevant customary authority to prove the customary ownership of land area.

Also two of the officials stated that REDD+ cannot contribute on tenure security but the others told that REDD+ can give support on strengthening the tenure rights. Majority of the officials (62%) stated that REDD+ is a valuable tool to communicate with the locals; for FPIC, consultation and sensibilisation. It has given new resources to share information between different actors and learn from each other. REDD+ was also noted to be helpful in forming the benefit sharing systems among rural population as well as helping civil society and other Climate Change related
actors to have cross-sectorial platform for communication. One official told that the main benefit from REDD+ was to get international money and knowledge for forest conservation. On the other hand, some scholars (e.g. Phelps and Agrawal, 2010) are worried that REDD+ might reduce the possibilities of locals to contribute on their livelihoods and decrease the level of decentralization.

6.2. Sustainable common-pool resource management

Ostrom and Schlager (1996) define five different factors that are defining tenure: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. The visited villagers have mainly rights for access, withdrawal of some resources and exclusion, but their perceptions about their rights were different, what can be noticed from Table 8. The majority of officials (79%) stated that the locals should have ownership rights. Some officers still noticed that there should be at least some control over the resources even though the locals own it, so that misuses or illegal land leases over the resource. When interviewed the villagers, they had different views of what they would do if they owned the land they use. In Figure 7 are listed the different uses for land when asked what they would do to it.

![Figure 7. The local people’s planned use of land](image)
Seventy-seven percent of the villagers stated that they will not lease the land for companies if they own it. Eighty-eight percent of the villagers also told when asked that if they owned the land it would be at least somehow important for them to conserve it, use it as a timber resource (80%) or use it partly for agriculture (97%). Furthermore, it can be noticed from village survey that they did not have clear understanding about their rights. Even that they had rights of access, withdrawal, management and exclusion, they did not feel that way. From the table 8 it can be seen what the villagers’ perception about the tenure rights is. Tenure cannot be secure if the villagers don’t know what their rights are and what are not.

Sixty-eight percent of the interviewed villagers had perception that they can exclude outside users from using the resource and 66% that they can manage the forest as they want (Table 8). Sixty-six percent also thought that if someone is using their forest resource, they can have compensation. 35% from the interviewed villagers stated that they are the owners of the land, which tells about the low understanding about the tenure rights they have.

**Table 8. Local’s perceptions about their rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Perception of the villagers of having the right</th>
<th>The rights in the community forest contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal other</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal trees</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>To some extent but only collectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the continuity of the sustainable common-pool resource management, Ostrom (1990) defined eight principles that should be followed (Table 5).

The community forests had clearly defined boundaries, but again the perception of the villagers varied. Only 11% of them told that the area of community forestry was clearly bounded. What comes to congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, the working groups that were created for PES projects to give incentives for protecting the forests were not all suitable for local conditions, and the coordinators did not provide enough training for locals to gain from the incentives, such as from pig breeding program.

The collective choice arrangements in the villages were handled through so called ‘entities’ that were chosen to make decisions on the behalf of the communities. In addition, each village has village chief and head of the community forestry. According to PES project proponents, when the PES projects were introduced to the villages, the facilitators were trying to inform all of the villagers and take them into the decision making. However, 17% of the villagers were never heard about the PES project, and 25% of them were not satisfied about their participation in the planning of PES projects. Entity was also the conflict resolution mechanism of the villagers.

The monitoring of the resource was conducted so that the PES projects trained the villagers themselves to monitor the state of the forest resource with the equipment they provided for the villagers. For those who broke the rules of community forests, there were sanctions, although the interviewed villagers told that it is not very likely to get caught when doing illegal activities such as cutting trees without permit.

Even though there were the entities and leaders in the communities, there were also external authorities in the villages because of the PES projects. Despite of the PES project officials, the rights to organize institutions are not challenged by external government authorities even though they helped the villagers to new institutions inside the villages such as activity groups for having additional income. Ultimately, it was the villagers who were making the decisions about the projects by themselves.
6.3. In what extent should the tenure rights be transferred to locals?

When asked about the most important right the villagers want to have for the forest or what they would like to have, 11% stated property rights. Mainly the answer was to have withdrawal rights (30%). One of the problem encountered during the data collection was that villagers faced difficulty in answering imaginary questions e.g. like “what if you had…” or to understand abstract concepts such as ownership.

Some officials (31%) stated that no ownership or additional rights should be given to the communities. The main argument for that was that there are enough rights for the communities - but they are not secure or that the locals do not know their rights. Some officials (54%) were of the opinion that the locals should own the land, but 15% told that there should be some external control even though the ownership would lay with the locals. From the officials, 15% stated that the locals would not sell the land if they owned it and if they felt secure over it. This means, that the locals can be sure that the area is under their use also in the future with the same resources. From all the officials, 54% expressed that the locals do not know what their rights are. For example, one of the coordinators of the PES projects explained the situation: “Problem is that they do not understand. We explain, and in the end we notice that they do not understand”. The Table 9 presents the arguments from officials about the local ownership of forests.

Table 9. Officials’ opinions on the extent to which tenure rights should be given to the local communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No ownership/Additional rights</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals should own the land</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own the land but have external control</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals would not sell the land if owned</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals do not know what their rights are</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some officials (23%) asserted that the traditional and customary land rights of local and indigenous communities were not respected. One official stated that there should be more compensation rights, and other stated that the user rights are most important for the locals. One suggestion was that the locals should not own the land, but it should belong to a certain project that would make sure the land is not used for wrong purposes. Especially WWF in Cameroon considered the rights of community forests important, and was establishing new community forest areas. The villages in Ngoyla-Mintom project that are evaluated in this study were also community forests established by WWF. Neither the WWF nor the locals owned the land, but WWF helped the villages to get security over the area and maintained the user rights by forming the community forest contract. WWF also incentivized the villagers to sustainably manage their forests. Through these kind of projects especially REDD+ could make contribution for the factors the officials proposed as challenges. On the other hand, FLEGT could concentrate on having the traditional land rights under the knowledge of the ministries to reduce the overlapping land titling over the traditionally owned and used land areas.
7. Discussion

The results of this study show that even though there is ongoing process of both FLEGT and REDD+, the progress is very slow and yet has had no influence on the tenure rights. In Cameroon there is already ongoing process of drafting new tenure and forest law, but these three processes have no proper communication between them. The achievements thus far compared in the delay of the FLEGT and REDD+ processes are multi-level problems. The greater part of the officials claimed that REDD+ and FLEGT can have influence on the tenure rights of local population.

The aim of this section is to compare the results with previous research findings from different countries participating in both REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes and to critically evaluate the research objectives, research approach and the methodology. This chapter is organized as follows: the first section describes the overall challenges of the study, second subchapter focuses on the challenges in governance level and the third subchapter handles the local level.

7.1. Local level challenges

Sunderlin et al (2014) argue that it is most important to involve those in REDD+ processes who are living in the forests, since they are the ones who are implementing the possible projects and also losing or gaining from them. The one of the objectives of PES projects considered in this study was to create incentives to conserve forests and one of the aim was also to create more secure tenure.

One of the most significant problems of tenure rights at the local level is that the local population does not have clear understanding about the tenure conditions. As stated earlier, the locals do not know their rights or who owns the land that they are using. Access to knowledge is important factor defining who can use the resource or not (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). If the perception of the villagers is that there is no secure tenure, they do not keep their forest as if the tenure was secure. Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) reported that increased autonomy and secure tenure of local communities contributes to increased forest conservation increasingly. Arts (2014) also mentioned
that if the tenure is secured, the local populations feel responsive over the forest. When asked villagers to define ownership, they said it is something that prevents others from entering their forest area, and gives the freedom having the forest for themselves, freedom to do what they want with it. It came out that in some cases the villagers have had problems with excluding outside users what should be the right of their community forest. When asked about the perceptions, 68% of the villagers told that they have the exclusion right. The most important right to them was withdrawal (30%), access (19%) and property rights (11%), and only 5% mentioned exclusion as the most important right. One explanation for this inconsistency between information is again the lack of education. ‘Ownership’ and ‘right’ are concepts that are difficult to comprehend for the local villagers. Sunderlin et al. (2014) point out that the problems to exclude outsiders is not prominent only for Cameroon even though they state that in Cameroon the tenure insecurity is highest from the studied countries: Tanzania Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam. They present that in Tanzania as well as in Cameroon the outsiders are usually from neighboring villages whereas in Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam the outsiders are also large-scale commercial farmers (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Robinson et al. (2014) are arguing that rights of management and exclusion are experienced as necessary in communities. The projects of CED and WWF are pursuing to have greater number of community forests in the areas they are already working, and to guarantee that all the rights are followed. The majority of the officials were on the opinion that it is important for the local communities to have rights over the forests they are living in. On the contrary, 31% of the officials stated that no additional rights should be given to communities and that the present state is sufficient.

The lack of education could be observed in the visited villages. As stated earlier, 53% from the interviewed locals had a very low level of education or no education. From the interviews with locals it came out that especially with Bakas the education is a difficult matter. There are no sufficient education opportunities in the villages, and if the parents send their offspring to neighboring Bantu-dominated villagers, the Baka children easily get mistreated. This does not encourage for education. Another factor that is hindering the education is the use of alcohol in the rural villages. The villagers did not understand alcohol being harmful, and because the greater part of the villagers started to get intoxicated towards the evenings it was difficult to conduct the interviews. During the field work in the villages, it was observed that alcohol had very
bad effect on the villagers and it also reduced their capacity of understanding. For example, the consequences of logging were very difficult for them to understand because they had so big craving for money and instant benefits. In this kind of situation, it is not maybe the best option if the locals can decide everything by themselves since it is difficult for them to think long-term benefits and they might negotiate contracts that are not beneficial for them. Then again, it is not acceptable to let someone decide over them in the country of high level of corruption and self-benefit seeking officials. The statement that local management reduces pressure from unsustainable use of resources (Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014; Panayotou and Ashton, 1992) needs to be critically examined in this situation.

Development and education are relatively difficult to bring into the communities since their remote location. The road infrastructure is very primitive and almost impassable during some times of the year. The logging companies have been building roads mainly for their own purposes but the road culture is very hostile. However, the roads do not bring benefits or development for the communities who have only few motorbikes and no cars and the closest urban areas are hours away. Compared to Bantus, Bakas are more illiterate and thus it is difficult for them to understand what their rights are or possible benefits or consequences. One Baka prominent issue was that the Bantu considers Bakas as a slaves. The Baka does not have as much decision making power as Bantu, and they are not respected as much as Bantus in communities. From the villages studied, tenure insecurity was higher in Baka dominated villages than in Bantu dominated. Even it was stated in 1994 Forestry law that inside the community forest there is protected areas that should not be used for agriculture, and even it was the rule of the PES projects, 32% of the villagers still stated that they understand at least to some extent if someone cultivates in the zones of conservation.

Robinson et al. (2014) conceptualized the impact of tenure on deforestation through economic theories. From the viewpoint of game-theoretical models, insecure tenure increases the costs of protection and causes lower optimal resource stocks or deforestation. Optimal investment models as well as cost-benefit analysis shows that insecure tenure lowers forest stocks and optimal forest rotation models such as Faustmann model suggest that insecure tenure shortens optimal timber rotation and makes people favor more agricultural activities (Robinson et al., 2014). Seventy-seven
percent of the villagers stated that agriculture is their main income. Attempts to increase government control can cause increased insecurity in tenure rights, deforestation and land races (Robinson et al., 2014). Insecure tenure also encourages seeking short-term profit from land such as agricultural income or illegal activities, and discourages investments on long-term that would reduce deforestation and forest degradation (Damnyag et al, 2012). From the interviews with villagers it can be noticed that they do not want to lose their forest. They state that they want to conserve the forest for their children and grandchildren, and that if they owned the forest, they would conserve it better. Along the same line, 56% the villagers stated that in case of survival, they would do illegal activities and break the forestry rules and exploit the natural resources.

Government's inability to properly manage and monitor forest sector is encouraging illegal and unsustainable actions and weakening the security of tenure in rural areas. Governance failures disable good transparent decision making and enable illegal land acquisitions, so called land grabbing (Anseeuw et al., 2011). Increased craving for food, biofuels and timber is changing the land use rights from local populations to large-scale commercial use. Without legal ownership the rural populations have no possibilities to fight against dispossessions of land or exploitations of their resources (Knight, 2010). Especially the lack of political will and corrupted officials are stated as challenges in Cameroon’s forestry sector. The government is driving development objectives as stated in the country’s development ‘vision 2035’, leading to growing need of natural resources by allowing forest exploitation in growing numbers. The customary land rights of local population are not respected and the titling procedure is so complicated that the locals do not have resources or knowledge to get their ownership a legal status. Self-benefit driving officials or village heads are negotiating unsustainable logging contracts that do not benefit the greater part of the communities. Concerning PES projects, 17% of the villagers had not even heard about the projects. Lawlor et al., (2010) state that if the populations are engaged to (REDD+) projects, the projects will be more effective and will reduce deforestation and degradation by engaging the population to conservation objectives.

Carbon markets are demanding land for reforestation and carbon storing (Anseeuw et al., 2014). Legality is important for land acquirers because they don’t want to risk their
investments on ownership issues (Anseeuw et al., 2014; Barro and Franco, 2010). In many cases the land acquisitions are defined as illegal because governments are providing buyers land areas that are occupied by locals, and by customary law owned by them, without their consent (Knight, 2010). Sometimes the same land area can be allocated to different land uses and interest groups. Land grabbing is not only ethically questionable but also has negative impacts on livelihoods and deforestation and forest degradation (Anseeuw et al., 2014). One of the officials stated that the locals are very afraid of land grabbing. In other interviews this did not come up as a typical challenge in Cameroon. However, in the conversations with the officials it came up that there have been situations that government has prohibited mining or logging permits in areas that have been inhabited by rural populations. On the other hand, the conversations with state actors did not reveal this, or either land grabbing, present in Cameroon.

7.2. Governance Level

The government-based management has proved to be problematic in Cameroon because of the multiple difficulties such as corruption and overlapping land titles. What came up in the interviews with officials, the main problem with tenure rights in Cameroon is the lack of political will to make changes and reforms. The reasons that government officials do not want to give full ownership rights to locals are numerous; they might want to have possible benefits for themselves and they want to stay in control over the forest resources, even governmental control has been stated as problematic solution for natural resource management (Ostrom, 1990, Anseeuw et al., 2011). The officials as well as the R-PP for Cameroon (2013) identified challenges such as lack of transparency, overlapping land titles, insufficient public participation, corruption and lack of incentives for sustainable forest use. These all are parts of the Building blocks of good forest governance from World Bank (Mundial, 2009). Sunderlin et al. (2014) underline that tenure must be addressed to reward the person who is in charge but also to identify the person who is accountable in case of failure. It seems that in Cameroon there are the people who should benefit and get rewarded from the positive outcomes, but it stays unclear who truly is in charge if there are problems with land allocation.
REDD+ might not yet have a significant contribution at the governmental level or in drafting the new laws, but it has started many piloting projects in Cameroon, and established platforms for civil society to work towards development and conservation objectives. As Ostrom (1990) outlined, the locals need some ways to get their word count, and REDD+ can be an external facilitator to help in this process. Somorin et al. (2014) remind that the NGO’s that are working for REDD+ can have more knowledge than state actors, and that they are working as an important link between the locals and the government’s actors. Also the awareness and information about REDD+ processes are spread at every level through the NGOs (Somorin et al., 2014). For example, in Republic of Congo the NGOs distributed data about both FLEGT and REDD+ processes for stakeholders and promoted the transparency by facilitating participatory meetings with both actors (Proforest, 2014). Daniels and Walker (2001) introduce the collaborative learning that involves all stakeholders and transparently gets the information to every actor. In Cameroon this kind of action would be crucial in order to have the actors from FLEGT and REDD+ to cooperate more effectively. Cameroon’s R-PP (2013) raises up the notion that lessons should be learned from other frameworks such as FLEGT VPA, but so far this kind of learning has not been very active. Especially important for these processes would be to measure and monitor forest resources together in order to more efficiently allocate resources (Proforest, 2014). Somorin et al (2014) argue that for REDD+ in Cameroon it is absolutely vital to involve also private sector that is a significant driver of deforestation and forest degradation. Since it is already taking part in FLEGT this is also one point of possible cooperation between different actors in Cameroon’s forest sector.

The lack of cooperation is also prominent not only between FLEGT and REDD+ processes but also between other actors. Somorin et al (2014) and also Dkamela (2011) suggest that MINFOF should take a bigger role in REDD+ processes together with MINEPDED and other ministries.

An officer from a logging company claimed in a discussion that his company is working in collaboration with a local NGO and sensitizing rural villagers and explaining their rights to them. He told that before conducting logging operations in the surroundings of a community forestry, his company requires that there are people from every age group and both sexes to be heard and asked of what they want for
compensation. The officer told that certification and FLEGT has made these things better. He stated that now it is easier to sustain continuous communication between the company and the communities and prevent conflicts. Now they know it is important to stop illegal activities, not only logging but also poaching, and raise awareness that illegal activities are not sustainable. There are also unexpected auditings from NGOs that are checking that everything goes as planned. Based on this interview it seems that FLEGT is having some influence on securing the tenure in sites that are near logging operations. Similar reports were heard in the interviews with villagers. Even though REDD+ promotes FPIC guidelines, it seems that in reality it is more difficult than in theory. Even though the coordinators of the PES projects in told that they have informed the locals about the coming projects, the results show that the knowledge was not comprehensive. Sunderlin et al (2014) underline that following FPIC is very crucial to effective REDD+ processes, even though it can be a challenge to explain all the concepts to the locals. They tell that in some REDD+ processes the project coordinators do not even tell the locals what is REDD+ so that the communities’ expectations do not raise too high. In the villages of CED and WWF the project was known as PES, but the locals did not have clear understanding about the coming benefits. Also some payments were delayed which may reduce the confidence on the projects. It is very important to involve all the stakeholders even if it may slow the process, because it will make it more effective in long term when all of the stakeholders have adequate knowledge about the hoped outcomes of the projects as well as the means to achieve the outcomes (Proforest, 2014).

In 1999, Campbell introduced Planner’s triangle which shows how equity, economic growth and conservation conflict in governance. If there is a need for economic growth and conservation, the result is a resource conflict. Those who crave for economic growth are resisting the regulations for exploitation and those who crave conservation want to conserve the resources for present and future (Campbell, 1999). In Cameroon the government’s urge for development goals is hindering the conservation efforts in a time that they are most needed. Campbell finds problems also when equity and conservation values conflict. He is discussing how the poor population is not having any incentives on protecting the nature but either the governmental level is not having incentives on protecting the nature. In many cases the conservation has been seen slowing the economic growth and growing inequalities between rich and poor nations.
(Campbell, 1999). This problem represents Cameroon’s situation well. REDD+ is trying to give incentives to local populations for conservation through PES projects even though the projects are not yet working well. The incentives for government for conservation cannot be seen yet, and they are not articulated in the existing REDD+ policy documents. REDD+ is trying to give incentives to government by creating value and markets for the carbon that are stored in forests (Somorin et al., 2014). On the other hand, FLEGT addresses that incentives for sustainable forest management and reduction of illegal logging, are coming in form of growing income for state when the state can have their share from the incomes of logging operations. Additionally, the reduction of corruption and growing transparency are increasing efficiency of government and can work as an incentive. One hindering factor for functioning FLEGT VPA in Cameroon is that the timber export from Cameroon to EU is declining, and the main exporter, China, is not taking part in FLEGT (Chan and Peng, 2015).

As brought up earlier, two officials stated that the government wants to stay in control over the land and does not want give full ownership over the land to local communities. This is contradicting with the notion of many scholars (e.g., Ostrom, 1990, Ribot and Peluso, 2003) that the local management brings sustainable forest management more likely than government management. Arts (2014) sees government ownership of natural resources causing overexploitation, insufficient management, illegal activities and corruption. As Ostrom (1990) states, the government wants to own the forest to reduce unsustainable exploitation, but this has not been working effectively (Ostrom, 1990, Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Local management is seen having positive social benefits such as greater equity, democracy (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) and justice (Arts, 2014). Natural resources are important to local populations because it is their main source of income whereas for government it is one of the sources of wealth (Ribot and Peluso, 2003), and especially the densely forested areas and valuable timber species are declared for government (Arts, 2014).

Even though REDD+ has been seen as an instrument for transferring the management rights from government to local level (Arts, 2014) and in Cameroon has been promoting community forest management through PES projects, Arts (2014) argues that REDD+ is not promoting decentralization but only strengthens centralized management of forest because the communities are dependent on external authorities.
and donors. The projects evaluated in this study had the problem that even though the contract had been made, the incentives for forest conservation were insufficient and did not reach the village as often as promised. In the interviews in the village it came up that there were people in the villages that started to lose trust in the projects. Ostrom (1990) reminds that for effective local management it is important that all of the participants have similar interests. This was already problem from the start, since two of the villages had to be divided in two; those who were in favor of logging and those who were in favor of conservation.

7.3. Evaluation of the study

This study consists of three different sources of data: the content analysis of key policy documents, expert interviews and householder interviews in remote forested areas of Cameroon. The data from rural villagers is numerous and represents well the villages that have just started the PES projects. Also the data for literature review and content analysis of key policy documents was comprehensive and vastly analyzed. The chosen approach supports the decided research objectives satisfactorily. All of the research questions are not comprehensively answered, due to the problems with interviews as well as the incompletely chosen study approach and questionnaires.

The new findings apply mainly to the villages visited, and cannot be vastly generalized. The time spent in data collection was not sufficient, and more data would have improved the quality of the study.

The specific challenges for the local interviews were the cultural and linguistic differences. In most cases the interviews were conducted with translator and that might have influenced the results. Also the translators themselves might have influenced to the results with their own opinions that they imposed to the respondents even though they got training for their duty. All the respondents did not have clear understanding about the issues, for example tenure itself was a matter they did not understand well
8. Conclusions

Cameroon’s forest resources are disappearing and there are no real political will to address that. The government is driving its Development 2035 objectives and states clearly that they do conservation only for development, not for conservation. If the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Kuznets, 1950) is considered, the conservation is not in the prior objectives of state until the hoped growth is achieved and the state has enough wealth to consider also environmental values. Cameroon is now reaching for economic growth and the priority is not on conservation.

In Cameroon, the local populations have very little role in protecting their livelihoods. The rural populations are very dependent on their livelihoods, and it was for example stated in one focus group discussion that forest is “notre vie, notre route, notre l’école, notre l’hôpital”; our life, our road, our school, our hospital”. They have their own natural religion and sacred sites in the forest and they have also conservation values. Especially the Bakas are considered as ‘guardians of the forest’. As stated earlier in this thesis, scientific studies (eg. Ostrom, 1990; Arts, 2014) have reported that governmentally managed forests are not as sustainable as locally managed. Also, as shown in the Result section of this study, for the locals it is important to own the forest and to have possibility to exclude outsiders. This could be one point of focus for both FLEGT and REDD+ to achieve their wanted targets. The land issues in Cameroon are very complex at many levels, and to solve the complexity Cameroon might need some external help. The incentives of REDD+ and FLEGT for both Cameroon’s government and local populations to conserve the forested areas need to be sufficient to accept the external help and change the land use and planning mechanisms.

The forest and tenure laws are now under revision in Cameroon, and the worry is that conservational values are not taken enough in consideration. The rate of deforestation and forest degradation is growing and there is a severe pressure on natural resources. The government of Cameroon has not given very big role for civil society or REDD+ on drafting the new laws, and both the FLEGT and REDD+ are not given big role in the governance of forest resources. Especially REDD+ has still a long way to go for taking part in managing the forests and the process has been remarkably slow. The role of private sector in deforestation is high in Cameroon, and to have it involved the
incentives must be created for both government actors and private sector operators to sustainably and ethically use the forest resources. This would be an advantage to both REDD+ and FLEGT to achieve their targets and the mechanisms should find ways to cooperate in this sector.

Both FLEGT and REDD+ are addressing tenure in their international and national plans. However, neither of the mechanisms have had significant influence on the tenure conditions in Cameroon. The situation concerning tenure rights in community forests are not alarming, but the locals’ erroneous perception about their rights is causing unsecure tenure. Furthermore, the locals feel they cannot exclude outsiders from the resource and they wish they could do whatever they want for the forest they perceive as their own. If there are establishments of new community forest projects in Cameroon, there should be good plans for giving alternative options for income if their rights of using the forest are reduced and the locals do not feel free to decide over themselves. The government of Cameroon already has policies for community forestry, but external help is needed to help the locals establishing community forest areas. Cameroon has great potential to conserve its forests and community forest projects are a good way to harness the locals to protect their surroundings. If the locals feel secure over their forests, they are more likely to sustainably use them and conserve them. Both FLEGT and REDD+ in Cameroon should give more attention for securing the tenure of locals to achieve their targets.

To make a difference, REDD+ and FLEGT could concentrate on the education of local populations, since the lack of understanding of the basic concepts is prominent in the villages. Information sharing and education are factors that benefit both mechanisms and should be considered as key factors when establishing collaboration between FLEGT and REDD+. Collaborative learning that should involve all the stakeholders including government, NGO’s as well as REDD+ and FLEGT would bring more transparency and could speed up the projects since there would be more knowledge and information available. REDD+ in Cameroon have stated that they should learn from FLEGT VPA, and to have this kind of collaborative learning between the processes there should be first greater transparency between the mechanisms. Also some teamwork is needed to share the documents and make plans together for the targeted areas to have greater efficiency.
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Annex 1: Questionnaire for the local villagers

Enquête Ménage sur l’évaluation des sauvegardes au Cameroun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site du projet:</th>
<th>WWF</th>
<th>CED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village/communauté:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexe:</td>
<td>Feminin</td>
<td>Masculin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre total de ménages:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superficie totale des terres (ha):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La superficie forestière totale (ha):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niveau de education</td>
<td>Elementaire</td>
<td>Secondaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenu total/an (CFA):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Les principales sources de revenus pour le ménage:

1*  2  3  4  5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture et élevage</th>
<th>Forêt et non forestières</th>
<th>Chasse</th>
<th>Le travail salarié, boutique, entreprise</th>
<th>Autre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*1 signifie la plus importante source de revenus pour le ménage

1. Questions en relation avec le consentement libre informé préalable des individus sur les projets FLEGT/ REDD+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Ne sais pas / autres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Connais-tu de quoi il s’agit dans le Projet?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Si oui, quel est le but du projet ? (Ex. forêt de protection, conservation etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Est-ce que les villageois ont été impliqués dans la prise des décisions quand le projet devait ou ne devait pas être implémenté ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment les décisions pour rejoindre le projet ont-ils été prises ? Qui décide ? (Ex. assemblée de la communauté; Leaders etc…)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Est-ce que les villageois ont été impliqués dans la phase du planning des activités du projet ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Les villageois ont-ils été impliqués dans la phase de mise en œuvre du projet ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Avez-vous été informés de vos droits?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.1 Droit de bénéficier des activités?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2 Droit de participer à la prise de décision?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3 Autres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Comment avez-vous été informés de vos droits ? Qui vous a informé ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Avez-vous été autorisés de rester et de ne pas proposer les activités du projet?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.9 Est ce qu’on vous a donné assez de temps pour considérer les informations fournies ?

1.10 Qui avait participé au processus de prise de décision? (tout le village, leader de la communauté, etc…)

1.11 Connaissez-vous les termes de l’entente du projet?

1.12 Quelle est la durée de l’accord du projet ?

1.13 Connaissez-vous la superficie du projet (ha)?

1.15 Y a-t-il des règles communautaires pour la gestion des forêts?

1.16 Si oui, êtes-vous accord avec ces lois?

1.17 Êtes-vous satisfait avec votre niveau de participation dans les projets ?

2. Questions liées à la perception des villageois sur comment la REDD+ et les concessions forestières seront bénéfiques pour eux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Ne sais pas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offre d'emploi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Améliorations des moyens d'existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avantages écosystémiques directs Ex. PFNL, bois de feu, du fourrage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renforcement des droits fonciers et application de la loi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renforcement de la participation dans la prise de décision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avantages des infrastructures Ex. routes, des écoles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avantages écosystémiques indirects Ex. protection des sols et qualité de l'eau, protection de la biodiversité</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réduire l'exploitation forestière à grande échelle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autres:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Questions relatives à la formule de partage des bénéfices équitables, non discriminatoire et transparent

3.1 est ce que la participation au projet a mis de limites sur vos activités familiales? Si oui comment?

3.2 est ce qu’il y a un conflit interne dans la communauté par rapport au projet? Si oui, quelles sont les raisons?

3.3 est ce que votre famille reçoit un avantage en participant au projet? Si oui, quels sont les bénéfices (financiers et non financiers exp. Intrants agricoles, renforcement des capacités).

3.4 Qu’est ce qui a été mis sur pied pour partager les bénéfices du projet dans le village? Depuis quand?
3.5 Est-vous satisfait du processus de décisions? Si non quelle sont les problèmes ou inconvénients du procédé de distribution? (Ex. le manque d'information et la participation, la livraison irrégulière des fonds, etc.)?

3.6 Qui est impliqué dans la gestion?

3.7 Selon vous quel peut être le meilleur mécanisme de partage des bénéfices? (exp. L’approche de partage des bénéfices par ménages, approche communautaire)

3.8 À votre avis, qui devrait bénéficier des activités des projets?

3.9 Quelles est la nature de la contribution non financière? Comment sont-ils montés et à quelle fin?

3.10 Selon vous quels sont les impacts négatifs et/ou positifs du projet maintenant et dans le futur?

3.11 Quel devrait être le rôle des autorités locales administratives et traditionnelles dans les processus de partage des avantages?
1. L’accès actuel
   a. Quelle est la distance la plus proche de la zone de la forêt vous utilisez?
   b. toute la communauté utilise la même forêt ? (YES/NO)
   c. Qui est propriétaire de la terre que vous utilisez? Comment avez-vous obtenu les droits ? Ex. le patrimoine ou éclaircir la terre.
   ______________________________
   d. Qui est propriétaire des arbres que vous utilisez?
   e. Questions relatives aux droits existants
      
   As-tu
   OUI | NON
   1. des droits d’accès
   ii. des droits d’accès
   iii. des droits du retrait
       le droit de prendre des arbres de la forêt pour la cuisson
       le droit de prendre des arbres de la forêt pour la construction
       le droit de vendre des arbres
   iv. le droit de prendre d’autres produits de la forêt
   v. droits de gestion (décider de la gestion / l’avenir de la forêt)
   vi. droits d’exclusion (qui peuvent accéder et utiliser la zone de la forêt)
   i. les droits de propriété (de posséder et vendre)
   iii. Les droits à indemnisation (les droits à la justice ou de compensation lorsque l’État décide de supprimer l’un des droits ci-dessus)

   f. Lequel des droits ci-dessus sont les plus importants pour vous? __________________________

   f. Pensez-vous que ce projet REDD + / FLEGT pourrait vous aider à sécuriser le droit que vous avez mentionné ci-dessus? Comment?
   __________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

   g. Si vous possédiez la forêt , l’utilisiez-vous différemment que vous utilisez maintenant?
   __________________________________________________________________________

2. Questions concernant la documentation des droits

   Avez-vous un document clair sur les droits conférés | OUI | NON
   Y a-t-il des limites claires dans le document
durée des droits d'utilisation par exemple années

taille de la zone

de location de la zone

le montant et la fréquence de la récolte autorisée

3. Questions sur l'expropriation de la terre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>OUI</th>
<th>NON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y a-t-il eu de l'expropriation de terres en raison du PSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y a-t-il eu de l’expropriation de terres en raison des entreprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a-t-il affecté votre bien-être</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avez-vous été indemnisé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Avantages de la terre

a. De un à cinq, comment voulez-vous valoriser ce qui suit comme des moyens d’obtenir la valeur de la terre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avantages</th>
<th>pas du tout</th>
<th>pas spécialement</th>
<th>bien</th>
<th>assez</th>
<th>beaucoup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>des arbres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paiements pour services écosystémiques PSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>location de terrain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. REDD+ et FLEGT

a. Quel genre de projets que vous pensez serait bon d'avoir qui permettra de réduire la déforestation et la dégradation des forêts ( perte de forêt ) ?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

b. Quels sont les facteurs assurant que vous serez avec le projet à l'avenir ? par exemple les soins de santé, l'éducation, l'eau potable, des produits agricoles tels que les semences

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

c. comment les projets peuvent contribuer à les droits d’accès, d’usage et de propriété serait devenu plus sûrs, à votre avis?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
6. Impacts

Y at-il eu des améliorations avec la projets?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUI</th>
<th>NON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

à l’état de forêt

dans les moyens de subsistance de la population locale (Ex. le développement communautaire, écoles, centres de santé)

dans le partage de l’information

dans le renforcement des capacités

dans les droits d’accès

dans les droits d’usage

droits de propriété

Dans une autre? Où?

7. Pensez-vous que les projets peuvent réduire la déforestation?

ENQUETE SUR LES VALEURS DES FORETS COMMUNAUTAIRES ET LA CONFORMITE À LA LOI FORESTIERE AU CAMEROUN.

Section 2. Valeurs et Conformité à la Loi

1. Cette série de questions concerne votre opinion personnelle à propos du code forestier. Je vais lire quelques affirmations et vous me direz si vous êtes d’accord avec ces affirmations. Vous avez quatre options : Désaccord total (SD), désaccord (D), Accord (A), Accord total (SA).

a) Vous violerez le code forestier :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Si les agents forestiers accident et bénéficient des ressources forestières et vous n’êtes pas autorisé (justice)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Si briser les règles améliorera votre vie communautaire (sens de la communauté)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Si briser les règles améliorera votre situation financière (économique)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Si briser les règles est l’unique option pour assurer votre survie (survie)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Si les concessionnaires forestiers coupent plus d’arbres qu’ils ne sont supposés et vous vous n’êtes pas autorises (justice)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Si les membres de votre communauté accèdent à la forêt et en bénéficient et vous non (justice).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Si obéir aux règles est difficile et couteux (économique)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Si la loi va contre ce que vos ancêtres vous ont enseigne (tradition)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Si la loi enfreint vos pratiques religieuses (religion)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Si vous êtes sure que personne ne saura (rationalité)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Parce que vous pensez que les règles sont injustes et bénéficient juste aux riches et aux puissants (justice)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autres (À spécifier):</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Vous obéirez au code forestier si:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. Si vous recevez des compensations/récompense pour avoir protégé la forêt (économique/rationnelle)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25. Si la forêt que vous protégez est votre propriété privée (vous appartient) (économique/rationnelle)  

26. Si vous voyez les offenseurs sanctionnés (rationalité, crainte de la loi)  

27. Si c’est une décision collective par la communauté et non une obligation “des autorités” (participation, gouvernance)  

28. Parce que la forêt a le droit d’exister pour son propre bien même sans bénéficier à la population (valeur intrinsèque)  

29. Si les règles protègent les sites naturels sacrés et les bosquets (spiritualité)  

30. Si les anciens (personnes âgées dans votre famille/communauté) vous ont encouragé à obéir au code forestier (tradition)  

31. Si les leaders religieux ont prêché que violer les lois et les règles est un péché et une offense à Dieu (religion)  

32. Afin de préserver les forêts pour vos enfants et les enfants de vos enfants (valeur future de la forêt).  

33. Parce que la violation du code forestier pourrait laisser sans ressources des populations dans votre communauté (éthique, sens de la communauté)  

34. Parce que l’environnement sera plus sain et beau (esthétique)  

35. Parce que la désobéissance pourrait causer la dégradation de la forêt et affecter l’air, l’eau et le sol (environnement).  

36. Parce que la désobéissance pourrait laisser les animaux (chèvres, moutons et faune en général) sans leur habitat et le fourrage (environnement).  

Autres (à spécifier):…  

2. Ces questions concernent votre opinion à propos des règles forestières spécifiques et s’ils devraient être obéis, désobéis, changes, etc. Si la question de quelque manière vous embarrasse, vous pouvez refuser de répondre.

Pensez-vous que les choses suivantes sont faites dans votre communauté?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Les populations coupent les arbres sans permission</th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Quelque peu vrai</th>
<th>Pas vraiment</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Refus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. Les populations coupent les arbres sans permission</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)?

Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Les populations cultivent dans les réserves forestières</th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Quelque peu vrai</th>
<th>Pas vraiment</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Refus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41. Les populations cultivent dans les réserves forestières</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)?

Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>La population ne suit pas les règles de gestion des feux, ce qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse.</th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Quelque peu vrai</th>
<th>Pas vraiment</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Refus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42. La population ne suit pas les règles de gestion des feux, ce qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Si oui / quelque peu vrai: pourquoi (dans quelles situations)?

Si non/pas vraiment: pourquoi pas?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprenez-vous les membres de votre communauté lorsqu’ils:</th>
<th>Comprends</th>
<th>En un certain sens</th>
<th>Ne comprends pas</th>
<th>Refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43. Coupient les arbres sans permission</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Si “Comprends” /“En un certain sens”: Pourquoi?
Si “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas?

44. Utilisent les réserves forestières pour le champ

Si “Comprends” /“En un certain sens”: Pourquoi?
Si “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas?

45. Ne suivent pas les règles de gestion des feux qui pourraient causer des feux de brousse

Si “Comprends” /“En un certain sens”: Pourquoi?
Si “Ne comprends pas”: Pourquoi pas?

Effectuez-vous vous même les actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Seulement en cas de situation difficile</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Autre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. Couper les arbres sans permission</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Si oui/en situation difficile: **Quand**.
Sinon: **Pourquoi**?

41. Cultiver dans les réserves forestières?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Seulement en cas de situation difficile</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Autre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41. Cultiver dans les réserves forestières</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Si oui/en situation difficile: **Quand**.
Sinon: **Pourquoi**?

42. Ne pas suivre les règles de gestion des feux, ce qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Seulement en cas de situation difficile</th>
<th>Non</th>
<th>Autre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42. Ne pas suivre les règles de gestion des feux, ce qui pourrait causer des feux de brousse</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Si oui/en situation difficile: **Quand**.
Sinon: **Pourquoi**?

**Section 3. Raisons pour la conformité (Obligation et Légitimité)**

**Dissuasion:**

3. Cette série de questions concernent les agents forestiers dans les collectivités et le travail qu’ils y effectuent. Supposons que vous avez commis quelques fraudes forestières. Quelle est la probabilité que les agents forestiers le découvrent et vous sanctionnent dans chacun des cas suivants?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tres improbable</th>
<th>Assez improbable</th>
<th>Assez probable</th>
<th>Tres probable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46. Dans le cas où vous coupez des arbres sans permission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Dans le cas où vous cultivez dans les réserves forestières.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Supposons que vous avez été attrapé commettant certains délits forestiers. Quelles sont les *trois sanctions les plus communes* auxquelles vous vous attendez de la part des agents forestiers ou des CFCs, pour les délits suivants ? :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Couper les arbres sans permission</th>
<th>Cultiver dans les réserves forestières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les soudoyer)</td>
<td>- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les soudoyer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Amende financière</td>
<td>- Amende financière</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice</td>
<td>- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Saisir les équipements et les produits</td>
<td>- Saisir les équipements et les produits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…(4)</td>
<td>…(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de maïs) ...(5)
- Détruire ma propriété (cultures/champ)......(6)
  Autres:.................................................................
  ........
  -

#### 51. Votre action a causé le déclenchement d’un feu de brousse

- Aucune sanction (Comme on peut facilement les soudoyer)...(1)
- Amende financière …………………… (2)
- Arrêt et poursuite devant une cour de justice (3)
- Saisir les équipements et les produits …(4)
- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de maïs) ...(5)
- Détruire ma propriété (cultures/champ)......(6)
  Autres:.................................................................
  ........

---

5. Quels sont les **trois sanctions (punitions) que vous craignez le plus** (que s’ils arrivent vous seront le plus préjudiciable) ?

- Arrêt et convocation à la police.................................................................1
- Amende financière............................................................................... 2
- Saisie de l’équipement et des produits par les agents forestiers.............3
- Paiement en nature (ex. chèvre, mouton, sac de maïs)..........................4
- Désapprobation des membres de la communauté ..................................5
- Etre convoqué chez le chef et les notables pour votre action ..............6
- Affronter la honte de vos voisins pour avoir commis pareil offense.........7
- Destruction de vos propriétés (cultures, champ).....................................8
- Autres: ..................

**Section 4. Légitimité**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>52. Etes-vous satisfait du travail des agents forestiers en général?</th>
<th>Pas du tout satisfait</th>
<th>Pas satisfait</th>
<th>Satisfait</th>
<th>Très satisfait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pourquoi?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>53. Pensez-vous que les agents forestiers méritent le respect de la communauté?</th>
<th>Ne méritent aucun respect</th>
<th>Méritent un certain respect</th>
<th>Méritent un grand respect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pourquoi?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>54. Pensez-vous que les agents forestiers prennent des décisions responsables et justes lorsque quelqu’un viole le code forestier?</th>
<th>Toujours</th>
<th>Couramment</th>
<th>Rarement</th>
<th>Jamais</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pourquoi?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>55. Pensez-vous que vous et d’autres personnes comme vous sont traités: de la même manière, mieux ou plus mal que d’autres, par les agents forestiers?</th>
<th>De la même manière</th>
<th>Mieux traités</th>
<th>Mal traités</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pourriez-vous m’en dire plus à ce propos:
Annex 2: Questionnaire for the officials  

present state of FLEGT and REDD+  

• How FLEGT/REDD+ addresses the questions of tenure rights?  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

• What are the plans to enhance the rights of tenure for under REDD+/FLEGT processes?  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

• What is the current progress of revisioning the rights and does REDD+/FLEGT have certain role in that?  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

• What are the key challenges to enhance the tenure rights in Cameroon?  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________  

• What are the ways that REDD+/FLEGT can contribute on tenure security?  

______________________________________________________________________________  

______________________________________________________________________________
What do you think are the main challenges of FLEGT and REDD+ processes in Cameroon? e.g. money, tenure rights, education…?

- What is the way to ensure full and effective engagement and participation of national stakeholders on tenure and access rights.
  - in the local level

- in the policy level

TENURE AND OWNERSHIP

- to achieve the targets of REDD+/FLEGT, what rights do you think would be reasonable to give to the local communities?

COOPERATION BETWEEN FLEGT AND REDD+

- What is your opinion about the current level of cooperation between REDD+ and FLEGT actors?
What do you think are the reason for the level of cooperation?

OUTCOMES

10. What have been the major improvements after FLEGT and REDD+? Has FLEGT/REDD+ contributed to better condition of forests, livelihoods of locals, transparency etc