A nomalies of Aid
A festschrift for Juhani Koponen

edited by

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# Table of Contents

*Preface*  
Learning in development interventions by non-governmental organizations  
*Tiina Kontinen*  
Aid and underdevelopment. Toward an emancipatory development cooperation regime  
*Severine Rugumam*  
State agency and the structure of foreign aid in Nepal  
*Sudhindra Sharma*  
Development or disillusionment? Economic Partnership Agreements and the goals of European Union development policy  
*Marikki Stocchetti*  
Politics and partnership in the Cotonou Agreement  
*Lisa Laakso*  
An aid regime at work: European aid and policy export to Nepal and Tanzania  
*Lauri Sütönen*  
Msitu wa Angai: Haraka, haraka, haina baraka! Why does handing over the Angai forest to local villages proceed so slowly?  
*Irmeli Mustalahti*  
Popular dissatisfaction and the erosion of political support in Mtwara and Lindi Regions  
*Bernadeta Killian*  
Social forms of culture in development  
*Helena Jerman*  
Neo-Pentecostalism in Tanzania. Godly miracles, Satanic interventions or human development?  
*Päivi Hasu*  
Social resilience, urban poverty and sustainable livelihood in megacities of the South  
*Marja Järvelä*  
(Dis)assembling development  
*Jeremy Gould*  
Bibliography of Juhani Koponen’s publications  
Contributors
Preface

Matti Juhani Koponen – Juhani (or Jussi) to family, friends, colleagues and students alike – is only the second person to hold the Development Studies chair at the University of Helsinki. Following the tragically premature death of Michael Cowen in 2000, Juhani took over the reins at the Institute of Development Studies on an interim basis and was eventually confirmed as Professor in 2003.

Despite his relatively recent rise to the pinnacle of Finland’s small community of development scholars, Development Studies has undeniably been Juhani’s life’s vocation for decades. His selfless commitment to the field, and the Institute, have earned him the respect of all who know him. For Koponen, Development Studies is a critical scholarly enterprise, with the emphasis equally on critique and scholarship. His devotion to Development Studies derives, in no small part, from a conviction that better knowledge can make a difference in human affairs. This guiding principle is evident from his writings, his teaching, his administrative style and his active participation in public affairs.

Academic research was not Jussi’s first vocation. One of us got to know him in the 1970s as ‘that journalist at the foreign desk of Helsingin Sanomat who is writing an M.A. thesis on Tanzania.’ The thesis was well received and the foreign desk was soon history. Indeed, history became Juhani’s first academic obsession, leading to thick tomes on precolonial and colonial Tanzania. Koponen probably still considers himself a historian but for more than a decade his academic work has increasingly focused on so-called development assistance. Every now and then one hears rumours of a definitive ‘History of Finnish development aid’ taking shape on his computer hard drive, but Juhani has never been one to rush to press. Meanwhile, he and his various research teams have been methodically analyzing and problematizing the ‘impacts’ of Finnish ‘development interventions’ in a wide range of contexts,
of which Tanzania, Nepal and Vietnam and the forestry sector figure most centrally.

Juhani turns sixty on October 24, 2007. With typical modesty, he won’t be making much of fuss about this biographical milestone. In light of his immeasurable contribution to our common enterprise, however, a group of his friends, colleagues and students have been pleased to compile this Festschrift in recognition of his accomplishments, and to encourage both Juhani and others to continue along the path he has forged.

Despite the title, Anomalies of Aid, this is not a book about development assistance alone. Reflecting Juhani’s wide scope of interests there are a good number of contributions that do not sit easily on the shelf of aid research. Yet, while one is accustomed to extremely heterogeneous festschrift volumes, this one seems to have a certain degree of coherence and even debate among the contributors. This is, we think, a perfect reflection of Juhani’s legacy as a scholar and an academic leader. Under his stewardship, the Institute of Development Studies fosters pluralism and discussion. For Koponen, critique, reflexivity and interdisciplinarity are not merely catchwords; they are something he actively seeks to facilitate and defend.

JG & LS
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Learning in development interventions by non-governmental organizations

Tiina Kontinen

Introduction

Development intervention has been one of the central themes in Juhani Koponen’s work. For him, intervention is one of the dimensions of the very concept of development in development studies (Koponen 2004: 6). According to Koponen (ibid.), development consists of a goal, a process leading to that goal and the intervention in order to initiate the process to reach that goal. Even a quick look at development practice – what is done under the title of development – confirms the centrality of interventionist thinking. Development consists of an uncountable number of development projects and programmes that are considered as instruments to enhance development. Moreover, huge amount of institutions, organisations and mechanisms are devoted to development interventions. Accordingly, hundreds of development experts are defining the overall objectives, development objectives, inputs and outputs of a project in thousands of project planning workshops in many corners of the world.

As long as the development intervention business has existed the question of success and failure has puzzled development practitioners as well as those engaged in
analysing development. One development framework after another has been doomed to failure and new approaches have been introduced. In practice, insufficient planning has made the scapegoat for these failures and increasing emphasis has been put on improved planning mechanisms. Enhancing project planning in order to improve ownership, partnership and participation is one of the most enduring themes in development practice. Without Southern ownership, without equal partnership and participation by the so-called beneficiaries, projects are not supposed to have any chances whatsoever of success. Thus, the recipe for the success seems to be known. Why, then, is it so hard to put it into practice?

“Development” is considered a learning institution that learns from its mistakes in order to improve its policies and practices. However, as Sharma et al. (2004: 218) rightly point out, these accounts rarely explicate a detailed definition of learning. The discourse on learning in development often stays at quite a superficial level. Analyses commonly refer to monitoring and evaluation exercises along the project cycle the results of which are disseminated in a workshop before placing the report in the bookshelf. Learning, thus, remains an ideal goal that is supposed to take place more or less automatically. The guidelines on development co-operation and the civil servants in charge of development funding continue to emphasize that development interventions should be mutual learning processes, but what is meant by learning is not always very clear. In the pervasive “learning-speak” in development it has not been made very clear who is supposed to learn, how the learning is supposed to take place and what is supposed to be done with the knowledge learned (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1894).

When left non-conceptualised, learning easily becomes one of the buzzwords circulating in the aid system: everybody should learn, co-operation should be a process of mutual learning and learning in general is a good and desirable thing. However, not all actors praise learning with such enthusiasm. As Biggs and Smith (2003: 1745) point out there seems to be an explicit paradox in development literature dealing with
learning. The literature is divided into normative and critical genres. On the one hand there are a great number of handbooks and guidelines for enhancing learning based on a positive belief in its possibility. On the other hand, there are plenty of critical accounts stating that no learning whatsoever is taking place in development. Thus, the two extreme poles of “learning advocates” and “learning sceptics” identified in the field of organisational learning in Northern societies (Argyris and Schön 1996: xx) are also found among development practitioners and researchers.

As known to researchers of development, learning is not the only idealistic notion in development discourse. Development tends to turn into idealistic goals and solutions, into rhetoric that are at great distance from the reality (Mosse 2005). One of the recent examples of such idealism has been the growing emphasis given to civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in development practice. NGOs are now performing an important role as distributors of development aid, as service deliverers in the South, as implementers of a wide spectrum of development projects and, increasingly, as active promoters of social change through advocacy work. The increasing emphasis on NGOs has influenced the writing on learning in development. With NGOs’ significant role in development, theories of organisational learning have gained more space in the literature.

In this article I will review discussions on learning in development mainly from the point of view of non-governmental organisations. First, I shortly introduce the discussion on the roles of NGOs in development. Then I depict Gregory Bateson’s (1987) theory of the levels of learning. This theory functions as a frame through which I review some of the literature on learning in NGO-development co-operation. I distinguish between institutional, project, organisational, individual and relationship-based learning and discuss how the idea of levels of learning emerges in these approaches to learning. In conclusion, I ponder on the future challenges of research on learning within the framework of NGO development co-operation.
NGOs in development

Changes in the global geopolitical architecture during last two decades affected development aid and development co-operation. One such outcome was a shift from state-centred development thinking towards a focus on civil society as an agent of development in early 1990s. At that time, disappointment in the ability of the corrupt southern states to promote development, along with the example of civil societies’ transformative power vis-à-vis the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe supported the argument for focusing on civil society. The political agenda of “strengthening civil society” has mostly been realised through increasing support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The development funds allocated for the NGOs both in North and South testified a rapid rise. The NGOs were enthusiastically perceived as some kind of “magic bullets” (Edwards and Hulme 1995) that could fulfil any expectations.

Expectations were plenty. NGOs were seen as effective service deliverers that could stop-gap state failures especially in the fields of education and health care. With service privatization at the core of the structural adjustment programmes driven by World Bank in 1980s and early 1990s, NGOs took more responsibility for arranging basic services in some parts of the developing world (Semboja and Therkildsen 1995). Moreover, NGO were applauded for their ability to work at the grassroots and exercise participatory development. The intermediate role of NGOs between the ordinary people and those in power was emphasised (Carroll 1992), and NGOs were considered schools for democracy.

Support for civil society and NGOs was easily placed at the core of development policies partly due to its suitability to different, even opposing political agendas. For liberals, civil society exemplified a way towards states where individual freedom, free market economy and liberal democracy flourished. For an alternative view, civil society represented a
place for counterhegemonic collective action and critique.\(^1\) Thus, the notion of civil society has been one of the vaguest and most contradictory concepts in development policy. In practice, it has been mainly represented by NGOs, the number of which has drastically increased in developing countries partly as a result of such pro-NGO donor policies.

In terms of North-South co-operation, in the 1990s the NGOs were seen as harbingers of new kind of partnership paradigm in development. The so-called partnership paradigm also championed in official aid discourse implies a shift in the aid relationship towards greater equality and mutuality. NGOs, supposedly providing ways for people-to-people development, were perceived as the forerunners of equal negotiations, participatory development and mutual learning. However, soon a number of analyses showed that unequal North-South relationships were reproduced in the realm of civil society and NGOs just as well as in bilateral aid relations. The Northern partners efficiently modified the agendas of their Southern collaborators (Ebrahim 2003; Lister 2000) and partnership at times became more of a "buzzword" to cover the real power relationship at stake. The voices calling for a "realistic" view on NGO-relationships became louder (Fowler 2000).

The increasing role of NGOs as well as the critique towards their performance has strengthened the pertinence of the concept of learning in NGO development co-operation in different ways. NGOs should learn to be more efficient, more reflective and more able to fulfil the rising promises. In the following I shall discuss different approaches to learning in development NGOs. How, after all, does learning take place?

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\(^1\) These different political points of views have their background in different social and political theories. The liberal view is based on the liberal tradition represented, for example, by John Locke and Adam Smith. The alternative view, for its part, was inspired by Marxism and Gramscian view on civil society (Howell & Pearce, *op.cit.*).
Learning in development

In academic theorising, learning is defined in multiple ways – learning organisms learn in biology, learning systems learn in computer sciences, individual children learn in classrooms in educational sciences, and adults learn in their life-crises in adult education, to mention a few. In development, learning has also played an important role as a goal and means of development. For example, Freire’s (1973) pedagogy of the oppressed showed how learning can be a means to empowerment and development.

Any notion of learning should have an answer to the basic questions of who is supposed to learn, what it supposed to be learned and how the learning is taking place. In my effort of distinguishing different dynamics of learning, I draw upon an account on learning provided by Gregory Bateson in his classical essay “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication” (1987 [1964]). In this essay, his main focus is to classify learning on the basis of hierarchical levels and to represent a systemic view of learning. Bateson’s idea of different learning levels has had a widespread impact on theories of organisational learning, for example. Bateson (ibid.: 287-305) distinguishes three levels of learning that are based on differences in the reactions of the organism to feedback from its environment. Learning I is learning where the organism learns to select from the choices given to it. At this level the mistake that is corrected by learning is a wrong choice from pre-given alternatives and learning refers to picking up the right choice. Learning II implies change in the learning process itself. In learning II, the mistake to be corrected is not a wrong choice but the process by which the choice is made. This kind of learning leads to changes in the set of alternatives from which the choice is made. Learning III is more radical learning that leads to changes in the system of sets of alternatives from which the choice is made. Learning III
is rare since it at times requires questioning and challenging unconscious premises upon which the action is based.\textsuperscript{2}

According to Bateson, learning at all levels can take place simultaneously, and the learning of an organism moves from one level to another. The transition from one level to another takes place in reaction to contradictions at the lower level (ibid.: 303). These contradictions lead to questioning and realising a need for change. At a more modest level, learning is selecting a more appropriate choice; at the most radical level learning is the re-conceptualisation of the environment, the organism itself and the very relation between these two.

In what follows I have categorized accounts on learning in development according to the different agents of learning they refer to. On the basis of the literature, one can distinguish between institutional learning, project learning, organisational learning, individual learning and relational learning in development and examine how these approaches understand learning with respect to the levels of learning presented by Bateson.

\textit{Institutional learning in development}

In development discourse, talk of institutional learning seems to be at its vaguest. While organisational and institutional learning are conceptually separated, the concept of institution is often not clearly defined. Van Brabant (2001: 183-4) defines institutional learning as “changes taking place in the quality of the interactions between organisations that relate to each other in a given context” which is “system-wide and takes place between and across agencies.” He is speaking about institutional learning within the international system of humanitarian aid and defines learning as a change in order to do “development more effectively informed by a knowledge of what works and what does not work” (ibid.: 184). Such an effectiveness-oriented conceptualisation of learning is common

\textsuperscript{2} Bateson (ibid.) cites questioning the Western assumption of a coherent self as one example of Learning III.
in development practice. The rhetoric of “lessons learned” and “best practices” circulate everywhere in the development system (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1984; Biggs and Smith 2000). Evaluations and other studies are supposed to enhance the learning of the entire institution concerning what is the best way to bring about development. The results of institutional learning might be observed in changing approaches and frameworks to development, for example in changing from an economic paradigm into a human development approach.

In accounts of institutional learning, the agent of learning is understood as the whole development institution consisting of a variety of actors engaged in development. How is learning supposed to take place? Most evidently, the institution is supposed to learn by gathering and disseminating information on project successes and failures (van Brabant 2001: 183-184). Institutional learning is based on the idea that learning is facilitated by gathering new information and knowledge that will change the institution’s objectives and the models of working in order for it to perform its tasks more efficiently.

Institutional learning might be situated in Bateson’s category of Learning I. Argyris and Schön (1996: 3) claim that the most basic definition of learning is when an organisation or institution learns “when it acquires information.” According to this definition, a development institution could be considered a learning institution on the basis of the amount of monitoring and evaluation reports, disseminating seminars, workshops and conferences it arranges. Accounts of institutional learning, however, remain weak in theorising the actual processes through which the piles of disseminated information is transformed into changed practices and institutional learning takes place.

Moreover, as for example Smillie (1995: 158) has pointed out, “lessons taught are not always lessons learned” and it is rather the inability to learn that characterizes development institutions. For example, Biggs and Smith (2000) describe
how the lack of participation and ownership have been “lessons learned” since the 1960s, and yet they continue to be among the main issues mentioned in the evaluating reports. Such observations might represent a “contradiction” in Bateson’s sense and lead to some kind of double-loop learning: a fundamental change in approaches and sets of alternatives. For example, the recent shift from project-based aid to direct budget support in official development aid could be interpreted as a seed for such learning. In the sphere of development NGOs, shifts in strategy from providing humanitarian aid for integrated development projects to the building of global social movements, as proposed by David Korten (1990), could exemplify such institutional learning. Such proposals notwithstanding, the bulk of development activities continues to be performed through projects. Next, I shall thus discuss the project as an agent of learning.

The project as a learning process

One of the central discussions considering development projects has been the debate between conceptualising a project as a rational blueprint or as a messier social process. The rational blueprint point of view refers to the idea that projects can be planned beforehand and thereafter they follow an inner logic that produces – to put it simply - planned outputs on the basis of specified inputs. According to the blueprint perspective, a failed project is the one that is not carried out according to plan, and thus produces the wrong kind of outputs and unplanned consequences. The anticipated cure for such failure is an improved planning practice.

In the 1980s, as a critique of blueprint–type development planning started to grow and accounts of a “learning project” approach emerged (Korten 1980). The learning project approach begins with the idea that a development project is an ongoing social process and stresses the importance of flexibility and the ability to adjust projects in the course of implementation. According to this point of view, project plans should be modified according to new observations and
reflection over the course of the project. The need for 
continuous adjustment is based on the observation that reality 
is a complex process that cannot be captured by means of 
mechanical planning techniques that are central to the 
blueprint approach.\(^3\) For example, Rondinelli (1993) suggested 
that rather than ready-made packages, development projects 
should be viewed as kind of policy experiments that are 
learning processes contributing to better projects in the future.

There are some common tools in project work. A project 
cycle and Logical Framework (LFA)\(^4\) have been among the most 
prominent examples. The project cycle model, a rational tool 
for conceptualising a development project, was introduced to 
development some 30 years ago (Baum 1970, cited in Biggs and 
Smith 2003, 1743). Since then, it has been one of the most 
powerful tools in development work. For example, Terve Tvedt 
(1998) conceives the ideal project cycle as a means by which 
different organisations become integrated parts of the 
international NGO-development system. The project cycle is 
based on the idea that in each development intervention one 
can identify certain stages such as project identification, 
planning, implementation and evaluation. According to the 
model, the stages are same in each project, and do not depend 
on the size of the projects or the actors involved. The 
development world is full of handbooks and manuals on how 
to use the project cycle in a somewhat rigid way. However, as 
Biggs and Smith (2003: 1743) argue, the concept of learning 
was initially central to the project cycle. The anticipated 
learning is defined as \((ibid.: 1743-1742):\)

\[
\text{making adjustments during the project cycle in response}
\text{to ongoing events and taking account of past experience}
\text{in future planning.}
\]

\(^3\) For example Upphoff (1996) compares the challenges of social science 
to understand complexity in development with the shift from 
mechanics to quantum theories in physics.

\(^4\) Logical Framework Approach is an efficient tool to plan and monitor 
projects with a strong inner logic. However, it has been criticised on its 
inability to take the changing contexts and the socio-political nature of 
projects into account.
In understanding projects as learning processes, external analysts and researchers sometimes have a strong role. One example of making a project a learning process is so-called process documentation approach (Mosse 1998). This approach refers to a set of practices whereby researchers systematically provide diverse project stakeholders with spaces for reflective dialogue. The process documentation approach underscores the fact that learning and reflection need their own spaces and tools. Usually, people engaged in time-bound project activities are too busy acting and do not have time to take a step back and reflect. If something is not working there is no time to consider the reasons for it; instead, practitioners are urged to try other solutions without reasonably reflection (Pasteur and Scott-Villiers 2004: 194).

In accounts of projects as learning processes, the agent of learning seems to be the “project” itself which is, of course, quite an abstract construction. The results of learning are expected to be seen in modification and changes in the project. Thus, accounts based on a learning process approach are mostly case of Bateson’s Learning I. The project approach itself is not questioned but learning is based on the correction of actions based on feedback from the project environment and the participants. Understanding a development co-operation project as a learning process stresses the importance of trial and error. In the framework of a single project, however, there are also possibilities for double-loop learning. Even if the project framework itself is not questioned, the underlying assumptions, objectives and goals of a project may change quite radically.

In the discussion of NGO development co-operation, some have argued for a radical change that could transcend the project framework. For example, Malhotra (2000) argues for a world beyond development aid and development co-operation in which “development” would mainly be based on joint advocacy and of movements bringing together Northern and Southern actors. This kind of change would also imply changes in the actors themselves – instead of the NGOs with clear organisational boundaries, the main agents would be
loosely connected global networks of civil society actors. That said, currently a majority of development work is still done within North-South axes and by organisational actors. In what follows, I shall review the accounts on organisational learning in NGOs.

Organisational learning in NGOs

Theories of organisational learning have become increasingly important for studies of change in NGOs. The set of theories on organisational development are mostly borrowed from the studies on private sector organisations and management studies. Some theories emphasise organisational learning as a way to gain effectiveness, some concentrate more on organisational culture, while others take a more sociological approach, focusing on interests and conflicts within the organisations (Roper and Pettit 2002: 260).

One of the most prominent theories of organisational learning, also used in development world, is that of Argyris and Schön (1978; 1996). Their theory is based on Bateson’s conceptualisation of learning categories. Argyris and Schön distinguish between two levels of organisational learning: single-loop learning and double-loop learning. The distinction of levels of learning is based on the idea that any organisation has two kinds of action theories: espoused theory and theory-in-use. Espoused theory refers to the explicit theory that justifies given patterns of organisational action. Theory-in-use refers to the theory that is not explicit but can be constructed on the basis of what an organisation actually does in practice. As is common in the organisational world, the strategic rhetoric and the actual actions may differ quite radically. Therefore, in this approach the most important product of organisational learning would be a change in the theory-in-use, not in the explicit strategies or policies. This idea emphasises that a change in strategies and explicated goals does not necessarily lead to change in action. Moreover, it stresses the importance of recognizing the discrepancy between espoused theory and theory-in-use as a source for
learning.

In Argyris and Schön’s theory of organisational learning the role of the organisational environment is important. Learning is based on the feedback-loop between the organisation and its environment. A level of single-loop learning refers to learning in which an organisation improves its performance based on the feedback from the environment within the framework of its existing goals and objectives. Single-loop learning aims at correcting mistakes that hinder the effective accomplishment of the existing organisational goals. It does not, however, involve reflecting upon these very goals and the values that are seen as constituting the basis for action (ibid.: 20). The second level, double-loop learning, is learning in which an organisation reflects, questions and changes its very goals and the values on which the goals are based (ibid.: 21). Double-loop learning is not a simple correction of mistakes in a given framework, but can lead to a change in the framework, values and goals themselves. In development NGOs single-loop learning means, for example, searching for solutions and correcting action within the framework of existing rules and procedures, whereas the double-loop learning would mean questioning and understanding the reasons behind the existing rules (Pasteur and Scott-Villiers 2004: 189).

In development co-operation the very notion of environment becomes relevant. Especially in North-South collaboration, participating NGOs have multiple environments. For example, Fowler (1997) emphasises the immediate environment of Northern development NGOs. Northern NGOs have to learn about the expectations of the public in order to maintain their reputation and ensure future support. Simultaneously, the environment consists of the Southern partner and the beneficiaries in the South, even if their feedback is more mediated. For Southern NGOs, the idea of organisational environment can be even more complex. The immediate environment consists of members, beneficiaries, local governance and legislation whereas the partner organisations in North and the institution of development itself
form a different kind of feedback arenas. As shown in the problematic of multiple accountabilities (Edwards and Hulme 1995), different kinds of feedback can be contradictory and thus lead to ambiguous learning.

Questioning current organisational values is central to the notion of double-loop learning. A change in organisational values precedes the learning and change. In that change, “reflective practice” plays a central role. Reflection of the existing action and values is at the core of the learning. In a similar vein, development actors should be seen as reflective practitioners rather than ready-made experts in development (Schön 1991: 300). The reflective practitioner continuously questions her own practice and has a critical stand also on her own expertise and the wider context within which the work takes place.

Even if reflective practitioners are central to organisational learning, the agent of learning is not an individual but an organisation. Organisational agency has some specific properties. For example, Fowler (1997, 20) defines an organisation as “a group of individuals who allocate tasks between themselves to contribute to a common goal: to exist an organisation needs a purpose and an organisation is made of people who know what their role is.” In development work, thus, an organisation is more enduring than a project even if the organisation might get feedback from the environment through implementing a number of projects.

The organisational learning approach is strong in giving tools for reflecting on current practice. However, even if Argyris and Schön (ibid.: 4) are committed to a normative idea of learning as improvement, the depiction of the process of moving from reflection to changed practices remains vague. In

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5 Schön (1991) discusses a need to understand professional practice in terms of reflection-in-action rather than technical rationality of profession. According to him (ibid, 39-40) technical rationality emphasises problem solving whilst the problems setting should be more in focus. He argues that problem setting should achieve more attention since problems are not ”out there” but they are constructed, for example, on the basis of experienced problematic situations.
many occasions, the role of researchers and action-research conducted by the practitioners on their own practice is emphasised. Like the learning project approach, the provision of spaces for reflection is considered central. Learning requires that actors take a step backwards from their day-to-day activities in order to figure out and reflect on the larger picture. As Eyben (2006: 3) put it, reflective practice in development refers to the “ability to be aware of the dynamics of our social and political environments, reflecting on how these shape our own behaviour and the impact that this has on other people.” In development, thus, we should pay attention to individuals as well as to the social and political environment specific to development activities.

**Individual learning**

While the emphasis on learning in NGO-development literature has mostly been at the institutional and organisational level, some attention has been paid to the individuals engaged in aid work. Still, in different tones all the institutional and organisational approaches subscribe to a view that individual learning is connected to institutional or organisational learning, even if the connections between these two are not straightforward. After all, as Biggs and Smith (2003) observe, the project as a learning process approach tends not to account for the fact that the “project cycle” consists of interactions and actions between human beings. These human beings, both Northerners and Southerners, have different knowledge and capabilities, and face a number of learning challenges in the course of their careers. The distance between institutional challenges and individuals’ capabilities might be quite wide.

Indeed, it can be the case that individuals learn but organisations and institutions do not (e.g., van Brabant 2001). In the development world there are a lot of stories about innovative individuals keen on learning and change that end up frustrated and finally return to their old institutional practices. Edwards and Sen (2000) have criticised the
development learning literature for concentrating too much on learning and change at the institutional level. They stress the importance of “personal and inner transformation and change,” and argue that individual learning is a basis for institutional change aiming at more equal and real cooperation between Northern and Southern actors. They state that change and learning in current development practice requires a radical transformation of individual attitudes and of the behaviour of development practitioners on the Northern side. However, while change according to which “we should love each other in professional as well as in our personal relationships” (Edwards 1999: 219) is easy to agree with, it also remains quite abstract and idealistic.

In his account of learning in NGOs, Ebrahim (2003) takes a different starting point and stresses the importance of the cognitive capacities of individuals in NGOs. The cognitive capacities of individual both enable and constrain organisational learning. In the work of NGOs, a large amount of different kinds of knowledge and skills are needed. For example management practices, such as planning and reporting, require skills and the capacity to acquire these skills. Moreover, skills for networking with different actors – including language skills – have become increasingly important.

Edward and Sen’s (ibid.) account of individual inner transformation describes processes similar to religious conversion, and thus might approach the Bateson’s Learning III with its fundamental questioning and change in one’s world view. The cognitive point of view towards learning presented by Ebrahim (ibid.) moves between Learning I and Learning II. The acquirement of different skills represents the learning of more or less ready-made packages such as project cycle and financial management models.

In Ebrahim’s (ibid.) model of learning, organisational and individual learning is innovatively connected with the wider framework of development institutions. Especially in the ongoing debate on change in the relationship between
Northern and Southern NGOs (see Lewis 1998) it is noted that more focus should be on changes in relationships in which the individuals and organisations are located, and not on those actors per se.

Learning through relationships: Power in NGO development cooperation

Recent work has emphasised the theme of learning in aid relationships (Eyben 2006; Groves and Hinton 2004). Learning in relationships means the reflection and transformation that takes place in the networks and webs of different actors in development. According to this view, is it insufficient to focus on either individuals or organisations; rather, learning should be conceptualised a collective effort taking place in the network relationships of different actors – NGOs, North and South; donors; government officials; and the ordinary people supposedly benefiting from the development activities. The practical tools for such learning include dialogue and interaction through seminars, workshops and emails. The methods of action research have been used in bringing these relationships under consideration. Although advocates of this approach are optimistic about the possibilities of change and learning, they point out that the main hindrance for such learning is the prevailing power-relationship attributed to donor-recipient relationships.

This observation brings us back to the argument that the most important learning challenge in development co-operation is the acknowledgement of, reflection upon and reacting to systemic power imbalances (Ebrahim 2003; Biggs and Smith 2000: 1754). As Fowler (2000:185) notes, any account of learning within development co-operation that does not question paternalism and power relations may lead to improvement in a technical sense, but does not tackle the most important problems inherent in the system. In the same vein, Eyben (op.cit.: 14) argues that understanding power in aid relationships is a prerequisite for any learning leading to true transformation.
The complexity of aid relationships and prevailing power relationships have been conceptualised from different standpoints. Ebrahim (2003) has used the Foucauldian concept of discourse and the concept of field as suggested by Bourdieu in order to depict the wider context of development that affects learning in Southern NGOs. According to him, the international discourse, or field, of development implies factors that govern learning. These governing factors both enable and constrain learning, but nevertheless affect what is learned. The agendas of international development agencies and of Northern NGOs that fund Southern NGOs partly define what kinds of things are considered important for learning. The power relations between co-operating NGOs might also lead to bias in learning (ibid.: 112). Southern NGOs might acquire skills that are more beneficial to the funding system – such as proposal writing, reporting and LFA – than skills important for their work in their immediate environments with their beneficiaries. Additionally, Briggs (2005) has argued that, contrary to the participatory learning approach, it is more likely in development encounters that rural peasants will learn planning knowledge specific to a development system than that development experts will learn local knowledge.

**Conclusion: Levels of learning in NGO development co-operation**

Even a cursory literature review on learning in development such as this reveals multiple meanings and practices related to learning in NGO-development co-operation. Learning refers to individual transformation on the basis of fundamental experiences, to the action-reflection cycle of an organisation in interaction with its environment, as well as to the dissemination of lessons learned within development institutions. In each point of view the agents and the dynamics of learning are different. In practice, the Bateson’s Learning I is the most common one and, by definition, Learning III rarely takes place since it requires fundamental changes in basic premises and creativity – learning something
that is not yet there. Moreover, the time-spans of different levels of learning vary, while the dissemination of a piece of information and learning from it might take a few minutes, fundamental changes in values and frameworks could require decades.

Table 1. Agents of learning in relationship to levels of learning in NGO-development co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent of learning:</th>
<th>Learning I</th>
<th>Learning II</th>
<th>Learning III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institution of development co-operation</strong></td>
<td>Listing mistakes and successes in project framework in order to develop better projects.</td>
<td>Questioning the project framework and searching for alternative ways of working.</td>
<td>Questioning the practice of development cooperation and searching for novel approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A network</strong></td>
<td>Disseminating information on “best practices”.</td>
<td>Identifying and questioning the power in the relationships within the network.</td>
<td>Fundamental redefinition of global power relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An organisation</strong></td>
<td>Trying to find more effective approaches to achieve the existing goals.</td>
<td>Questioning the approach and goals of development work, i.e., shifting from service provision in the South to advocacy in North.</td>
<td>Questioning engagement in development cooperation and its underlying values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A project</strong></td>
<td>Finding best ways to realize well-defined objectives.</td>
<td>Redefining objectives on the basis of feedback from or change in the project environment.</td>
<td>Reconsidering the overall premises of a project and questioning the project framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An individual</strong></td>
<td>Improving the skills of project planning and implementation, including language skills</td>
<td>Searching for different approaches in project work, questioning own values and attitudes.</td>
<td>A fundamental transformation in attitudes and behaviour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 draws together the results of the literature review and hypothetically suggests actions that might potentially lead to learning at each level. The function of such an exercise is to inspire further research in different aspects of learning in NGO development collaboration and to examine ways of combining different agents of learning and different types of learning. The review of the literature on learning in development cooperation also demonstrates that many accounts of learning tend to be normative theories of what should be learned and how the learning should take place. There is a need for more analysis of “real” learning in actual co-operation, in the interaction of individuals and organisations, both North and South, doing development and implementing projects together (Carlsson and Wohlgemuth 2000; Eyben 2006). The emerging challenge, in my view, is to understand how individual learning, organisational learning and learning in co-operation is intertwined in the course of actually doing development, in development interventions, and in connection to the wider system of development.6

The concept of learning is, in general, closely related to the concept of change. While reading the learning literature these two concepts are almost inseparable. Learning implies some kind of change, but not all change is learning. In learning, change is accompanied by conscious reflection, and experimentation of new ways. Moreover, at least the organisational learning approaches and the project learning approach emphasise the potential of outside intervention by consultants or researchers in enhancing learning. Thus, learning is conceptually close to that of development since the practice of development is also based on the idea of “mastering” immanent development by intentional interventions (Cowen and Shenton 1996), facilitated by experts. Additionally, the problematic of non-development and non-learning seem to be close to each others. Thus, a

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6 In Kontinen (2007) this connection is made by through concepts of activity and contradiction that provide a promising way of improving our understanding on the intertwining trajectories of learning in NGO-development co-operation.
challenge for the future is a conceptual clarification of
development, change and learning at different levels in the
context of the actual practice of NGO-development co-
operation. In this effort, we have many lessons to learn from
Koponen’s ideas on development, intervention and
developmentalist complex.

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Aid and underdevelopment
Toward an emancipatory development cooperation regime

Severine M. Rugumamu

Introduction
One major rationale for aid transfers from rich to poor countries in the immediate post-World War II era was to substitute for the lack of developed private capital markets. The scarcity of investment capital, both at the international level and within developing countries, was said to have hindered economic growth and even condemned them to perpetual misery. The once-famous Chenery-Strout. “gap model” (Chenery & Strout 1966: 679-733) had earlier postulated that economic growth in poor countries with inadequate domestic resources and weak institutional and organizational capacity, require additional foreign resources to bridge various resource gaps by providing technical assistance, training, education, managerial capacity and entrepreneurial talents. For poor countries that could not borrow from private capital markets, official development assistance (ODA) was the only predictable source of external financing. All these lofty and unrealistically optimistic expectations, assumed that adequate, quality and predictable foreign aid would be provided, be used for purposes mutually agreed upon by both donors and recipients alike, and be complemented by fair international trade and investment.
regimes as well as more democratic international financial and political institutions.¹

However, other than promoting short-term foreign policy interests of donor countries, the international aid industry has had virtually little else to celebrate. A close examination of the overall impact of bilateral aid tends to belie most rhetorical claims regarding its development objectives. There is, in fact, a growing body of evidence that suggests that not only has ODA failed to mitigate critical problems of extreme poverty and underdevelopment, but quite often, it has helped to debilitate rather than stimulate potential productive energies in most of Africa. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1996) finds that during the 1980-95 period, for example, serious economic decline and stagnation was experienced in 100 poor countries, by reducing incomes of 1.6 billion people. In 70 of these countries the report adds, “average incomes were less than they were in 1980 – and in 43 countries less than they were in 1970” (ibid.: 1). Moreover, in one of the most quoted studies on the impact of aid on development William Easterly (2002), former senior economist at the World Bank, reviewing a forty-year period and a cross-section of over 100 countries, concludes that there is no positive correlation between aid, investment and economic growth.

Those findings are roughly in line with those of Paul Mosley (1987), Ian Vasquez (1998) and the Congressional Budget Office (1997), which concluded flatly that “foreign aid overall appears to have only a marginal effect on development and may even hinder it.” Differently put, instead of generating economic growth, promoting improved standards of living and

¹ Although the transfer of foreign assistance between states is probably as old as the existence of states themselves, the emergence of institutional economic aid programs is essentially a Post-World War 11 phenomenon. The U.S Marshall Aid to war-ravaged Western Europe serves as the starting point in attempting to understand institutionalized aid programs from state to state. They are institutionalized in the sense that aid allocations in donor countries are part and parcel of the national budgetary process and are ultimately sanctioned by parliaments. Aid is, senso stricto, politics. For details see Streeten 1972: 8-12.
sustainable peace, ODA has, almost invariably, resulted into its exact opposite in most of Africa. As will be discussed below, it has degenerated into unprecedented economic stagnation and waste, tyranny and despotism, crippling debt crises, human rights abuse, as well as encouraged extensive foreign interventions in national economic policy management. The obvious and critical questions that ought to be asked are: Why is it that, despite massive infusions of financial and technical assistance from the North, the economic, social, and environmental conditions of Africa, and particularly, sub-Saharan Africa, are dramatically worse off than they were 30 years ago? Were economic development, poverty alleviation, and democracy, the overriding objectives of donor and recipient states in the first place? To what extent has ODA been risk management for the national security and defense policy priorities of respective donor countries? What must enlightened development cooperation policies and strategies be that will be able to reduce harm and create better for and with the African people? It is to the possible answers to these questions that this Chapter seeks to address.

This chapter is divided into five substantive sections. In Section One, the organizing argument of why aid is requested and given is presented. It is posted that as an instrument of statecraft, aid is requested and given in order to advance multiple and often, potentially conflictive donor and recipient interests. This unfortunate policy dilemma helps to expose most of the contradictions that analysts encounter in trying to determine and evaluate the real impact of aid on the publicly stated objectives such as economic growth and development. The actors, rationale and impact of aid on African countries during the Cold War period are presented in Section Two. It is argued that the ideological competition between the two supper powers, the need to win allies in developing countries and their desire to project their power on a global scale drove the scope and distribution of aid resources. In the third section, it is argued that with the end of the Cold War, the rationale for giving aid was reconfigured to promote globalization. The criteria for giving aid, included among others, the promotion of
market economies, good governance, poverty reduction, and the observance of human rights in most African countries. As the volume and quality of total aid increasingly ebbed, donor conditionalities grew stiffer and only “good” performers were largely picked for support. Section Four discusses the role of aid in the period after the New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001. It is argued that these events and the aftermath radically changed the entire aid rationale, actors, and dynamics. Like military assistance, aid and new trade preferences were used to reward strategic allies in the fight against global terror regardless of the nature of the institutional and policy environment of recipient states. The fifth and last section proposes a comprehensive development cooperation strategy that would genuinely support economic transformation, poverty reduction and promote enduring and sustainable peace in Africa.

Organizing arguments

The central argument of this Chapter is that all the talk about the role of aid in economic development, poverty reduction, democratization and disaster relief has almost always been marshaled essentially to rationalize the self-interest motives of various actors on both sides of the aid process. During the last five decades of the post-World War II period, foreign aid, like diplomacy or propaganda, has been used as an instrument of statecraft to advance multiple and, potentially conflicting donor and recipient state interests. Although the predominant rhetorical objectives of the international aid regime were always shrouded in the primacy of high-sounding altruistic motives, namely economic development, disaster relief, solidarity with the poor and oppressed or poverty alleviation, yet almost consistently, the aid administration has persistently revealed the very opposite. In practice, the political, commercial and security interests of donor states have often acted at cross-purpose with the declared developmental objectives. The conflation of the different conflicting interests has been further complicated by the inability of analysts to desegregate relevant
data in order to determine the real impact on every objective. In order to demystify the underlying overriding objective of the international aid regime, Keith Griffin (1991:671) concisely concludes, “aid will follow, as always, not necessarily where it is most needed, but where the dictates of national interests suggest it will be most productive”. The rest of the discussion on the impact of aid, to say the least, is but details.

Secondly and interestingly, it is argued that the explicit and implicit objectives of giving aid have a tendency to change from one epoch to another, from one donor to another, and indeed, from one definition to another of what exactly constitute ODA. To begin with, military aid and enforcement aspects of peacekeeping were excluded from the original Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) aid criteria. Currently, the ODA criteria include them. Even more disturbingly, there is changing donor prioritization, ranking of interests as well as the volatility of aid flows. During the Cold War period, for example, the US aid policy was driven primarily by three major objectives: to support its Cold War diplomacy, further development in friendly countries, and to provide humanitarian relief. With the end of the Cold War, the objectives of US aid-giving expanded to include supporting economic and political transitions in former communist countries, promoting democracy and managing conflict in developing countries (Lancaster & Martin 2004:42-43).

Obviously, in such a highly complicated and diffuse scheme of things, the economic rationale was only one of the many competing objectives of giving and receiving aid. If this proposition is accepted, it is absolutely unhelpful to interrogate the effectiveness of the aid system exclusively in terms of developmental and humanitarian objectives as most conventional mainstream economists often do.2 Similarly, in the contemporary post-9/11 period, the national security

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2 The argument that evaluating the aid systems purely in terms of any single purpose does not assist our understanding of the system is found in Rugumamu 1997:19-87.
interests of donor countries are dominating international relations, with very troubling consequences for poor people living in inconsequential parts of the world. In addition to humanitarian and development objectives, bilateral donors are now refocusing their development cooperation policies to reflect their respective defense and security policies, including counter-terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, organized crime reduction and counter-narcotics, communicable disease control and an array of trade, energy and environmental issues, as well as concerns around social cohesion and immigration. As the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Anna Maria Agnes van Ardenne, belatedly acknowledged, “the distinction between foreign policy and development cooperation is vanishing. It was never very useful to begin with. Aid, politics and diplomacy form a seamless whole and we should not try to pick them apart” (cited in Development Initiatives 2003).

Thirdly and as pointed out earlier, the range of purposes of bilateral donor and recipient governments is much broader than has often been claimed by conventional development thinking. Sir W. Arthur Lewis (1971:12), the 1979 Nobel Laureate in economics, was audaciously blunt about the overriding motives of giving aid: “when you look at the table showing how much each of the one-hundred countries receive in foreign aid, it is a distribution which cannot be defended on any principle of need, size of population, absorptive capacity or any economic test... politics was the chief determinant of aid.” Broadly defined, politics includes all aspects that traditionally fall under the rubric of “vital national interests”. Similarly, subsequent aid critics have concluded that standard debates about the moral imperative for aid are sterile, inconclusive, and irrelevant to the politics of aid. Yet very few critical commentators such as Teresa Hayter (1971) and Cheryl Payer (1982) have been courageous enough to paint aid and development cooperation exactly for what they are – “merely the smooth face of imperialism.” It will be further demonstrated

3 On the politics of foreign aid see Riddell 1987 and Mason 1964.
that the pervasive poverty in aid recipient countries has repeatedly been attributed more to the lack of specific critical resources than to the organic nature and structure of the economies and societies in question. As discussed in the author’s earlier work (Rugumamu 1997: 65-8), this deliberate posing of false questions and proffering of less than sanguine solutions have consistently helped to divert attention away from genuine and urgent problems that afflict African societies and economies.

Fourthly, like donor states, recipient states have their own interests, ambitions and purposes for requesting and receiving aid. Despite the abhorrent dependence that aid often engenders, recipient states have undeclared private interests and ambitions of their own. Above everything else, states in Africa seek aid in order to strengthen and perpetuate their fledgling regimes. Foreign aid generates new factors of power. It provides state elites with much-needed resources to manipulate their respective political environments. It is used to solidify popular support, reward political supporters, neutralize enemies and ultimately, consolidate the elites’ hold on state power. Like donor states, the overriding objective of recipient states has never exclusively been economic growth or poverty reduction, but rather, the imperative of regime survival. Inevitably, public policies in aid recipient countries will often tend to be at variance not only with the often hidden self-interest political agendas of the given recipient state regime but also with some those of their benefactors. Politically visible white elephant aid projects, for example, are likely to make more political sense to statespersons than either economic growth or poverty alleviation. As rational political calculators, African statespersons have not hesitated to use aid resources to pursue competing subterranean objectives including narrow regime interests. Above all, much of donor aid to Africa remains highly conditional on African governments’ acquiescing to donor policy prescriptions that are often of dubious value.
Aid and Cold War politics

During the five decades of the post-World War II period, foreign aid was often promised, given, withdrawn or denied to support ‘trusted ideological allies’ even when some of them blatantly pursued unacceptable domestic policies. Both the capitalist West and socialist East capitalized on the economic poverty and political weaknesses of the South to advance their ideological struggles and rivalries on a global scale. Foreign aid tended to supplement, and to some degree, substituted traditional instruments of statecraft such as diplomacy, propaganda, and the military. The two superpowers assiduously competed to win friends and allies for their respective military and ideological camps. For the capitalist bloc, the mobilizing development ideas were those of economic growth and political modernization. Technology transfer, capital investment, and the establishment of institutions were considered strategic factors for the economic “take-off” in friendly developing countries. As for the socialist bloc, their organizing development ideas included, *inter alia*, the institutionalization of the vanguard communist parties and socialist planning and management of the national economy. Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, both superpowers and their allied European powers sought to establish military and defense alliances with ideological partners in the developing world. In fact, by the mid-1970s, more than two dozen African states had entered into bilateral security agreements with major powers on both sides of the Cold War conflict (Manuruzzamann 1982). Such security cooperation almost exclusively focused on modernizing militaries and security establishments. More often than not, military officers took power, occupying governments in support of elite interests and those of their Cold War patrons.

Like their superpower counterparts, former colonial European powers like Great Britain, West Germany, France, Portugal and Belgium made foreign aid an integral part of their foreign policies and indeed one of the key foreign policy instruments for statecraft. This fundamental rationale remained true whether aid was given directly to governments of
developing countries, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or through multilaterals such as UN agencies or the international financial institutions (IFIs). National aid policies and motives were largely influenced not only by the Cold War rivalries but also by their respective national interests, operational modalities and colonial experiences. One of their immediate post-World War II security objectives was to contain the communist expansion, particularly in their former colonies and territories. And as their respective aid disbursements increased, foreign aid interests grew in importance within their foreign affairs bureaucracies. The creation of Ministries of Overseas Development and Agencies for International Development and other similar institutions in the West established a permanent place for advocates of foreign aid in those countries. When the OECD was inaugurated in 1961, the DAC was also formalized. It became a formal forum where Western donors collectively thought out their aid strategies, articulating long-term directions, changing directions, evaluating results, and identifying needs for stronger efforts.4 In the so-called “Resolution for Common Aid Effort”, members agreed to increase the aggregate volume of resources flowing to developing countries and to share the burden of such increases more fairly. The commitment to increase resource flows was qualified by the mutual understanding to share “in some way not yet specified”, thus making it impossible to regard these commitments as binding obligations (Rugumamu op. cit.:42-45). Although aid categories, objectives and target countries overlapped over time, the vital national interests of donor countries have remained almost the same and indeed predominant. Describing the primary objective of aid in the UK foreign policy during the 1960s, one former British Minister for Overseas Development stated (Morton 1975:52):

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4 For expenditure to qualify as ODA, it has to meet several conditions: it must have economic development or welfare as its primary purpose; it must come from a government and must go to a defined list of developing countries; and it must be a grant or a concessional loan with a grant element of at least 25 percent. For details see OECD 1982:171.
The (aid) program is based on moral considerations and on the interests of the UK which, particularly in the long-term, centre on security, stability and prosperity...It is also a consideration that we have important investment and trading interests in the Third World from which many materials of importance to us are supplied. Balance of payments considerations add to the importance of maintaining and developing these very substantial and other economic interests and of maintaining the stable political and economic conditions on which they depend.

As for medium-sized Western industrial powers with no colonial history, like the Scandinavian countries and Canada, their aid policies had a relatively limited scope. Their governments were largely influenced by the desire to support the liberal economic global order and the international peace and stability which they had helped to establish after the end of World War II. However, deep down beneath their undeclared policies they regarded the Soviet Union expansionism as the major threat to international peace and security. As Olav Stokke (1989:276) succinctly notes, security goal was perceived as an “international common good” for all outside the communist bloc. In a similar vein, Cranford Pratt (1999:14) observes that, given their relatively weak power capabilities in the global system, these states could not directly link their aid policies to respective national security concerns. They could only relate them to the broader international stability norm. The North-South arena offered them a greater scope for articulating distinctive contributions to the international scene than they could have hoped to achieve in regard to national security issues or East-West relations. Moreover, with no previous extensive interactions with the South, in general, and African countries, in particular, these “middle powers” sought to use foreign aid as an instrument to improve their trade investment, and political influence. This observation helps to explain, in part, the enthusiasm with which they have financially contributed to this cause over the years; and in part, as one way of increasing their power and influence in the international aid regime and other related issues.

What was the impact of these bilateral development cooperation arrangements during the period under
consideration? Why were there such wide disjuncture between the rhetoric and practices? Were the key actors in any way moved by persistently dismal performance? The end of the First United Nations Development Decade was marked by the issuance of two major reports of international authorship – the report of the Pearson Commission (Pearson 1969) and of the Tinbergen Committee report (Tinbergen 1970) – which analyzed the progress of the international development effort until the end of the 1960s as a basis for recommendations for the future. The Pearson Commission report summed up the aid program at the end of the first UN Development Decade as follows (Pearson 1969:4):

A good deal of bilateral aid has indeed been dispensed in order to achieve short-term political favors, gain strategic advantages, or promote exports from the donor. Much foreign aid was granted in the 1960s to enable countries to maintain large armed forces rather than to promote economic growth. In none of these cases was the promotion of long-term development a dominant objective of the aid given.

The above-quotation aptly sums it all: it clearly shows how different donor agencies and aid recipient states used foreign aid to achieve essentially non-developmental objectives. More specifically, while the late President Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire was reportedly amassing one of the world’s largest personal fortunes using aid-related resources, which was invested in West European financial institutions and in real estates, decades of large-scale foreign assistance left not a trace of progress in his country. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) is just one of several examples where a steady flow of aid ignored, or even abetted, incompetence, corruption, repression, and misguided policies. Mobutu’s donor patrons simply looked the other way! Former US ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1982:51-52) rationalized the US government aid policy by asserting that “right authoritarian regimes, whatever their faults, were natural allies, and potentially reformable. Left totalitarian regimes and movements, however, were irredeemable.” It is therefore little surprising that the Cold War aid politics left behind traumatized societies after years of proxy wars, a legacy of
ineffective aid, partly in the form of loans that had accumulated into large debt stocks and partly in the form of compromised state institutions. Writing immediately at the end of the Cold War, Keith Griffin (1991:678) concluded that, “the debt burden, not economic development, has become the legacy of forty years of foreign aid”.

On the recommendation side, the Tinbergen report notes that although developing countries bear the primary responsibility for their development, their efforts would not be sufficient without increased financial assistance and more favorable economic and commercial policies on the part of developed countries. Without setting benchmarks or deadlines, the report urged the latter to endeavor to provide annual financial transfers to the South to a tune of 0.7 percent of their respective GNI, minimize practices of tying aid, and ensure much closer coordination of trade, aid and private investment policies to promote sustainable development. It also urged multilateral agencies to increase their respective aid portfolios and introduce better modalities for reducing debts.\(^5\) As the following section will amply demonstrate, because the status of the international aid regime has remained essentially a “quasi-regime, with neither binding norms nor principles, critical issues such as aid amounts, proportion of bilateral to multilateral, levels of financial concessionality, or aid tying were left exclusively to the discretion of individual donors (Ruggie 1983:435-36). For example, the quantity of aid (0.7 percent of GNI) represented an aspiration rather than a commitment. In fact, donors were not seriously expected to comply, but the above target was employed as a “devise for nagging any outstanding laggards in the right direction” (Shonfield 1976:11). Worse still, the aid regime has been considered a quasi-regime because the entire aid policy management deliberately and consciously excluded its Southern beneficiaries. The latter remained, literally speaking, on the receiving end, with no substantive decisional inputs on

\(^5\) This target was set by the UN General Assembly Resolution on International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade approved on 24 October 1970. See also Tinbergen 1970.
how the institution was run and managed. A one-sided, patronizing affair, with hopelessly misplaced accountability system as far as the aid recipients were concerned!

**The post Cold War aid regime**

With the end of the Cold War, it was widely hoped that the international aid regime would be significantly de-politicized. It was also hoped that the new global political dispensation would allow rich countries to direct a significant portion of the ‘peace-dividend’ to finance enlightened development cooperation. In fact, for the first time in a long time, the UN together with major powers was able to engineer a series of comprehensive peace treaties and internationally mediated negotiations in war-torn Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador. However, the post-Cold War euphoria was quickly shattered. The motivating rationale for development cooperation in general, and for foreign aid, in particular, virtually disappeared as new threats to states in the West and new development problems, opportunities and agenda gradually emerged. The imperatives of human solidarity, poverty alleviation, humanitarian assistance, and the promotion of democracy and human rights did not possess the same organizing power as the Cold War once had to rationalize foreign aid. It is little wonder therefore that international aid flows in subsequent years went into a secular decline in real terms. The long anticipated peace dividend for development failed to materialize. Rather than increase the quality and quantity of aid to poor developing countries, particularly those in Africa, most donors increasingly focused on their immediate domestic and regional issues. These include facilitating the transition of the former state-socialist societies to market economies, helping immigrants and refugees, cutting the international flow of narcotics, reducing national fiscal deficits, stimulating trade, and improving education, health care, and the like. Paradoxically, African states were repeatedly counseled not only to learn how to do more with less aid, but also to look for alternative sources of development finance (see Rugumamu 2001b).
With the end of the Cold War, the liberal and democratic world view has become hegemonic. A standardized pre-packaged development solution for poor developing countries was no longer a subject for debate, rethinking or resolution. Free trade and investment are the only engines of economic change and transformation. The theory and resulting policy praxes have continually been paraded as a panacea for a broad range of social ills, from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental destruction. For this purpose, we quote Larry Diamond (1995:6-7) on the subject in extenso:

The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with each other. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run, they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to secretly breach agreements. Precisely because they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, within their borders, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

The above quotation is a clear demonstration of structure-blind politics. It is unable to interrogate the basic claim that the well-being of the rich countries is based to a significant extent on wrongful control over the resources of others, disparity in earnings between different parts of the world, unfair terms of trade and pure power politics. Be that as it may, since then, development theory, policy discourse and institutional designs have been largely derived from a single and virtually unchallenged source of intellectual inspiration. The neo-liberal
framework provides a set of broad ideas that define, elaborate and justify the contemporary capitalist order and the ways in which changes can “legitimately” take place within that order. These ideas are the products of the institutional thinking of the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the OECD, and affiliated universities and think tanks that espouse and produce similar ideas and views on economics, governance and politics.

These ideas coalesced within the Bretton Wood institutions to form what came to be popularly known as the “Washington Consensus.” More ominously, from then onwards, the Bank urged bilateral donors to become far more selective and to direct their aid resources only to countries pursuing “sound and sustainable reform programs” (World Bank 1989:14). Evidence of intellectual triumph of liberalism and democracy came in arguments that stressed time and again that these hegemonic ideas faced no credible alternative. Fukuyama’s (1992) celebrated “End of History” essay summed up the liberal democratic triumph as: the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Under those circumstances, and given the overwhelming power of the Bretton Wood institutions vis-à-vis African countries, such recommendations tended to foreclose any debate on development by literally insisting that it was either their way or no alternative. Broadly, the same types of prescription are recommended for all conflicts and contexts, regardless of social circumstances, exigencies or structural factors.6

Similarly, the refocused aid regime came to underscore the imperative of a strong institutional and policy environment as necessary conditions for converting aid resources into economic growth. The new development orthodoxy claimed that

6 The IMF determines the conditions for foreign confidence in a country’s economic prospects and places priority on macroeconomic stability, both as the first task of economic policy and as the context within which all other aid and policy takes place. For an excellent review of Bretton Woods’ role in post conflict reconstruction see Woodward 2002:183-214.
countries with strong performance in respect to those key attributes can absorb higher levels of aid and these were likely to be more effective in converting aid into economic growth and poverty reduction. Consensus grew rapidly within the official development community around the notion that by that there had to be a concentration of aid resources on a few countries that were performing relatively “well” as certified by the World Bank and IMF. As for a large and growing sub-set of lower-income countries that were variously labeled “difficult partners” or “low-income countries under stress (LICUS)”, these were to be relatively isolated from much of the mainstream aid system. Such countries were defined by chronic weak institutions and poor governance systems as well as their vulnerability to unrest, conflict and state failures (see Hewitt & Waldenburg, 2004:19; Maxwell 2005:5). Furthermore, these were countries which, according to the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), were in the lowest two quintiles of CPIA scores. They could only be provided with limited aid support to reinvigorate state-society relations, and promote trust and legitimacy.

The disappearance of the Communist threat signaled not only a radical shift in the global power configuration in favor of the West, but it also triggered off fresh security concerns. The value of most of African states as either ideological spoils or strategic assets in the great power rivalry was dramatically diminished. The military, diplomatic and ODA scale downs were further graphically manifested in a systematic downgrading and/or closure of embassies, as well as deep slashing of development cooperation resources. Not

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7 On the importance of strong institutional and policy environment see Burnside & Dollar 2000: 847-68; Collier & Dollar 1990.

8 CPIA annually assesses the quality of the World Bank and IDA borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction. This controversial framework has 20 equally weighted criteria presenting policy dimensions of an effective poverty reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped into 4 clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies of social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions.
surprisingly, foreign military bases in sub-Saharan Africa were closed down one after another and African states were constantly reminded to fend for themselves. By the same token, formerly heavily aid-supported African dictators in the name of “global peace and security” were quickly abandoned. The Mobutus, Bandas, Menghistus, Mois and Barres of Africa were literally left in the cold: in the new political dispensation and refocused interests, these abominable dictators had outlived their usefulness. With diminished resources at their disposal, almost all post-Cold War “orphan states” fell from grace one after another as a radically new development paradigm came to vogue demanding economic and political liberalization, good governance, administrative decentralization and the protection of human rights, were now paraded as the necessary conditions for requesting and receiving foreign aid. Once again, foreign aid was being used a primary economic instrument to promote donors’ interest rather than genuine development in recipient countries.

Even as the ability to use aid effectively increased in most of Africa by the early 1990s, the international aid levels began to ebb while donors seldom acknowledged, much less attempted to address the systemic structural causes of Africa’s poverty and underdevelopment. More ominously, there was little evidence to suggest that donors were preparing for a sustained increase in their aid budgets to support Africa’s development efforts or to reconstruct economies and societies that had been badly devastated by decades of Cold War-induced proxy wars.9

Strangely enough, huge cuts in aid budgets were accompanied by the slogan ‘trade, not aid’, together with exhortations for countries in the South to participate fully in the global market place. Between 1990 and 1998, for example,

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9 At the U.N.’s Millennium Summit of September 2000, the international community rededicated itself to the Millennium Development goals. At the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, several major donors resolved to halt and significantly reverse the decline in aid. It need hardly be stressed that such lofty commitments have been made earlier!
the overall ODA fell by one-third in real terms (see OECD 2001: table 29). Apparently, the pressure to prune development budgets gradually evolved into a dogma that aid should necessarily be cut. The share of net ODA in the GNI for the OECD countries declined to 0.22 percent in 1998, compared to 0.35 percent in the mid-1980s. The total net disbursement from Europe to sub-Saharan Africa fell from 52.1 percent of the members’ total aid budgets in 1988/89 to 44.4 percent in 1998/99. The cuts were particularly remarkable for big donors like the United States, France and the United Kingdom, who drastically reduced their aid budgets, measured both as a share of their GNI as well as a share of their total budgets that went to Africa. The aggregate result of these changes was that net disbursements to Africa declined markedly. Measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates, the total bilateral aid from the 15 European Union (EU) members went down from $8.8 billion in 1988/89 to $5.4 billion in 1998/99 (Ibid.: table 33).

More specifically, there was a fall dramatically in the real value of E.U. aid to sub-Saharan Africa from $2.1 billion in 1988/89 to $1.6 billion in 1999, measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates. The reduction in the E.U. aid is better appreciated when it is recalled that on 1 January 1995 three affluent countries, Sweden, Austria and Finland, joined the European Union. The decline is even more telling when one compares these figures with what went to other developing regions of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of total E.U. development aid dropped sharply from 61 percent in 1988/89 to 31.3 percent in 1998/99, while aid to other geographical regions grew from 39 percent to 68.7 percent during the same time period. More ominously, “poor performing” countries were particularly hit the hardest. According to one authoritative study, between 1992 and 2002 these countries received 43 percent less aid than predicted by their population and poverty levels, policy and institutional environment (Levin & Dollar 2005).

France, the biggest European donor, reduced its total ODA/GNI aid commitment from 0.63 in 1992 to 0.39 in 1999. Within this shrinking budget, the share of French ODA going to
Africa was reduced from 51.8 percent in 1988/89 to 34.2 percent in 1999. Germany, the second biggest European donor, reduced its ODA/GNI from 0.38 percent in 1992 to 0.26 in 1999, while at the same time, the share of German aid going to Africa was reduced from 31.3 in 1988/89 to 27.7 in 1999. This resulted in a reduction of net disbursement from Germany to Africa from $1.3 billion in 1988/89 to $939 million in 1998/99, measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates. Like France and Germany, the British ratio of ODA to GNI fell from 0.31 in 1992 to 0.23 percent in 1999. Measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates, British aid to sub-Saharan Africa decreased slightly during the 1990s, reaching $784 in 1999. The decline was especially sharp in the United States ODA budget where it was a mere 0.08 percent of GNI in 1997 (OECD 2001, op. cit.: table 29). With the sole exception of Finland, all Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), along with the Netherlands, have had a commitment clearly superior to the rest. These are the only countries which consistently fulfilled the famous United Nations resolution that calls on developed countries to give 0.7 percent of their national income as international aid. Despite the falling level of aid to African countries, the region is still, on average, the most aid-dependent of the major world regions. In 1997, net disbursement of concessional resources to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to US$16.4 billion. Foreign aid as a percentage of the gross GNI of sub-Saharan countries averaged five percent in 1996-1997, down from 10 percent in the 1980s but still the highest of any major developing region (for details OECD 1999). However, it is important to note that these figures understates the real decline since they include debt forgiveness, which is officially counted as aid. This is not really aid since most of the forgiven debt would not have been repaid anyway.

With radical changes in global politics and interests, the direction and composition of aid resources began also to change. As the World Bank study demonstrates the composition of aid flows shifted from project assistance and structural adjustment loans towards humanitarian assistance and peace-building. Emergency aid rose sharply since 1990,
peaking in 1994 at some US$3 billion bilaterally and US$2.5 billion multilaterally, with a further commitment of US$3 billion to peacekeeping. However, the increasing share of aid going to emergency assistance meant that the amount of ODA devoted to promoting development actually declined in the 1990s. It further notes that the pie was not only diminishing, it was also being distributed among a greater number of clients! At the same time, relatively less aid was earmarked for the South, in order to make room for other priority regions. Africa emerged as the net loser in these developments (World Bank 2000: 71-72). This was not the whole story. Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it became increasingly apparent that the former communist countries needed substantial assistance to help manage their transitions to market economies. The Federal Republic of Germany began to concentrate its aid and private investment resources in its own backyard, the former East Germany and other Eastern European countries. These new demands on the EU aid budget drastically reduced the funds available in the long run to regions of less priority, such as Africa.

Critics of foreign aid have welcomed the decline of aid flows, arguing that aid was less effective than private investment and commercial loans in stimulating long-term economic growth.10 They have charged that the foreign aid regime reflected naïve assumptions about world politics and insisted that aid programs should be either related to narrowly defined donor self-interests or eliminated outright. They have further pointed to the dubious Cold War record of subsidizing autocratic regimes, fostering neo-colonialism and inflaming regional conflicts. Still others focus on the self-serving and wasteful use of official development assistance. They have also exposed the pervasive practice in which nearly all of the bilateral aid to Africa was tied to the purchase of over-priced donor goods and services. Furthermore, they have criticized the bloated and often heavy bureaucracies of many aid agencies that often spent much of the aid on themselves and

10 For critical reviews of foreign aid see Thorp 1971 and Hook 1996.
misappropriated funds for luxurious capital-intensive projects that do little to improve overall living standards.

To all these critics, the apparent global rise of private capital as the principal mechanism for transferring resources from rich to poor states has been perceived as an encouraging trend. Paradoxically, as aid budgets became increasingly parsimonious, expenditure devoted to the aid administration of bilateral and multilateral programs increased dramatically. The increase in administration costs reflects, in part, a greater emphasis on social programs, which can be labor-intensive. Higher administrative costs are also a clear manifestation of donor supervision at a ridiculously detailed level. As some Lomé Convention studies have shown, with the end of the Cold War, over and above economic conditionalities, the European Union introduced political conditionalities as well as cumbersome administrative procedures down to fine operational details.

The principle of co-management administration proved more theoretical than real. Development priorities and project planning, and management came to be largely influenced by the donor side, with joint management remaining only on paper. More damagingly, the overall decline in aid was compounded by three related problems. First, the decline was steepest in the poorest countries, with the share of aid going to low-income countries falling from 45 percent in 1991 to 28 percent in 1996. Obviously, this was inconsistent with the internationally declared goal of reducing poverty. Second, basic education and health, two of the greatest priorities in terms of developing more equitable patterns of globalization, accounted for less than 5 percent of the overall aid effort. Finally, a large share of development assistance, 40 percent of the total, was spent on technical assistance, much of it in the donor countries. Ultimately, one is left wondering who is helping whom in the international aid regime (see McQueen 1998:669-692; Raffer 1999:125-142).

Although there are general agreements in the literature on the means to achieve significant poverty reduction, three
disturbing differences of opinion remained unresolved. First, there are issues concerning the questionable legitimacy of external agencies in determining sensitive policy agendas such as the anti-poverty crusade. Arguably, any effective implementation of a major domestic policy requires a well-planned mobilization campaign of key national actors and various political constituencies. In this regard, only national governments with relatively high degrees of legitimacy would have the capacity to mobilize various domestic constituencies for such an undertaking. Rajni Kothari (1993: 152) makes similar compelling arguments concerning the limitations of foreign actors in determining national development policies. He argues that foreign agencies can influence, but not determine, national political agendas. He further warns:

> History has shown very clearly that one cannot constructively transform a society from outside. All genuine social transformations have been initiated from within the society, even though in many cases the genesis for such transformation lay in the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences from different societies.

Second, and more poignantly, it is argued that sensitive policy interventions, such as the anti-poverty agenda, which is driven largely by international agencies such as the World Bank, United Nations Children’s Education Fund, or the United Nations Development Program, is lacking on other important grounds. According to John Toye and Carl Jackson such a policy should ideally be home-grown and command broad national support. As the deprivation of particular groups becomes politicized, they acquire a level of support far beyond what obtained earlier. In other words, enlightened politics and informed broad public discussions are more likely to play a unifying role in the anti-poverty agenda in any country than are foreign international agencies. More specifically, they recommend (Toye & Jackson 1996:57):

> Any international efforts, like that of the World Bank to promote poverty reduction in particular countries must face up to the implications of one very central difficulty. It is perhaps not fully appreciated that the poverty reduction agenda has received high political priority in the now developed countries only at particular historical moments and
under well-defined conditions. Research shows that the attitude of the elite was critical. They took action on poverty alleviation issues because they shared a consensus around three beliefs. These were that (i) the welfare of the elite and the welfare of the poor were interdependent, and the elite was not able to insulate itself from the living conditions of the poor; (ii) the poor did, in fact, have the means to affect the welfare of the elite, principally by three methods namely crime, insurrection and epidemic disease; and (iii) some actions by the state would be efficacious in reducing the threat to the welfare of the elite posed by the behavior of the poor.

Thirdly and finally, the World Bank's prescription for perverse economic integration of developing countries into world markets, and the benefits thereof for the poor, is far from being generally accepted. The instability of commodity prices, the increasing decline in the demand for them in the West, the weak bargaining power of poor countries vis-à-vis the multilateral agencies, and the constraints on economic recovery imposed by onerous debt burdens make it extremely difficult for African economies to grow on the basis of an outward orientation. As earlier noted, since the early 1970s, economic growth in the North has been increasingly associated with new technologies rather than the use of natural resources such as energy, agricultural raw materials and minerals.

Understandably, continued dependence on primary commodities and foreign assistance as engines of development has few prospects, if any. It is against this backdrop that the Bank/Fund revised its near-theological commitment to neo-liberalism and launched, in 1995, new initiatives, the Poverty Reduction Initiative, and later, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC). While the name and nomenclature changed, the add-ons did not make any major dent in the overall thrust of original reform framework. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) came to be known as the “second generation reforms” – to be developed, implemented and evaluated through a mutual dialogue by all key actors. The PRSPs are essentially a more comprehensive package than the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), its predecessor. They include requirements to improve corporate governance, fight corruption, introduce greater flexibility in the labor market,
accession to WTO agreements, introduce financial codes and standards, prudent capital account opening, application of non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, ensure the independence of the central banks together with attainment of lower single-digit inflation targets, creation of safety nets and targeted poverty reduction (Berg & Taylor 2000). It was within the context of such poverty reduction policy focus that the Bank acknowledged the role of the civil society in bringing to the decision-making process their tacit knowledge, perspectives and analysis. The new reforms sought to mitigate the adverse social effects of SAPs. This change of mind was, in part, a response to the now famous UNICEF study, Adjustment with the Human Face (Cornea & Stewart 1987) that had concluded that SAP tended to aggravate poverty; and in part, to the publication and wide distribution of the UNDP Human Development Index\(^\text{11}\) that emphasized the claim that development was much more than simply economic growth.

**The securitization of aid after 9/11**

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on US cities and their aftermath, a big cluster of critical observers in the West belatedly acknowledged that economic growth, security and peace in developing countries were organically intertwined and dynamic aspects of social development. Poverty, alienation and violent conflict in developing countries were increasingly viewed as “threats” to the security of the West. Arguably also, ODA was seen as one of the key tools for pre-emptively defending against these threats by carefully targeting security sectors of poor countries. In reaction to the terrorist attacks, the US government led the way in redefining its security agenda. The “war on terror”, often defined by dubious inter-linking of issues ranging from non-state terrorist networks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, “rogue states” of “the axis of evil” to weak and failing states in developing countries. It has

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\(^{11}\) The HDI was developed in 1990 to measure a complex of life expectancy, literacy, education and standard of living for countries worldwide.
pursued its “war on terror” by employing its full panoply of power capabilities, but has clearly privileged the utilization of military power, directly in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indirectly, in counter-insurgency operations in the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and Indonesia. US has often complemented the use of military force by the employment of economic instruments such as foreign assistance and military aid to confront transnational security threats, in general, and to reward security-strategic “allies of the global terror”, in particular.

This was the beginning of the re-securitization of foreign aid. As the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy (Bush 2002) observed, “poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak states and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” The Strategy further claims that extreme poverty tends to be breeding grounds for despair and violence, which in turn, undermines global peace and security. Since 2002, US aid flows have not only tripled but most of the increase has been allocated to priorities under the war on terror criteria. Ngaire Woods’ (2005: 5-6) definitive study on aid diversion concludes that almost all of the increase in the US assistance (military, economic and ODA) between 2002 and 2004 went to strategically important countries, with the top six recipients of ODA being Egypt, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, Serbia and Columbia. The war on terror was perceived by US policy makers as global, it had therefore to be confronted on a global scale as well. Reflecting on the globalized insecurity, the former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz remarked (cited in Rasmussen 2002:323-349):

Along with the globalization that is creating interdependence among the world’s free economies, there is a parallel globalization of terror, in which rogue states and terrorist organizations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons and materials and know-how.

Since the events of 9/11, the African continent has been tagged as a “soft underbelly of global terrorism” (Rosnau 2005:1; Mills 2004: 157-158). With numerous weak, conflict-ridden and
failed states, Africa has been depicted as one of the major hotbeds of terror and a cause of security concern. There is a growing perception in the West that the continent is a home of numerous porous borders, pervasive corruption, major conduits for arms and drugs smuggling networks and weak police and security establishments, which allow terrorists to move freely and establish basis (Rosenau op. cit.: 1-2). It is against such security perceptions that the Bush administration “elevated” Africa in its rhetoric on global terror, and in more concrete terms, it proposed a number of security-related aid programs to Africa. They include, as will be discussed below, a $5 billion increase in annual foreign aid through the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA); the June 2004 signed free trade agreement with Morocco, a $15 billion US initiative to fight AIDS; and the extension of AGOA beyond 2008. Some critics have warned that US securitization of ODA is likely to shift aid distribution away from where it may have the largest impact on poverty and development (Hewitt & Waldenburg op. cit.).

In responding to the “war on terror”, most European states generally supported the US interpretation of new threats to global security. In its refocused joint security policy (DAC 2003: 9), the OECD Development Assistance Committee asserted that foreign aid was to be guided above all by security concerns. It had an important role to play in “helping to deprive terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions that terrorist leaders feed on and exploit”. Like the US security policy, the EU security strategy interchanges notions of poverty reduction, conflict and peace with those of terrorism and security. Its post-9/11 criteria for allocating aid have shifted discernibly as well. Disbursements have largely sought to reward those states that have committed themselves to “fight a common war against terror”. Just as during the Cold War period, the ODA instrument is, once again, playing a growing and visible role in the security donor countries. Aid disbursement decisions are increasingly weighted in terms of security and foreign policy rather than on developmental and humanitarian goals. Not surprisingly, the most important aid
allocation criteria is virtually no longer the level and scope of need, but rather the recipient strategic importance of states in the war on terror.

**Toward an emancipatory development cooperation regime**

As the discussion in this Chapter has demonstrated, in the contemporary global political economy, global power and wealth structures are skewed and heavily biased against poor countries. The post-World War II governance institutions reflect the power relations and modes of thinking from the time of their establishment to the present. They dominate international agenda, ideology and processes which have a direct bearing on present and future development trends in economic and political affairs. What is required for Africa is to strategize on how to maximize both the voice and power of the South in general, and Africa in particular, in the global political economy.

The express purpose of the proposed dialogue is to evolve new thinking about global ethics that recognizes a ‘duty of care’ beyond borders, as well as within them, and a global new deal between rich and poor states. The notion of social democracy beyond borders seeks to strengthen solidarity between those social forces in different regions of the world that are contesting globalization and are seeking a more just and humane world order. African people and countries as a collective, together with other countries in the South, should actively work with progressive forces in the West in order to place their development agenda at the center stage in international economic and political negotiations. For this to happen, the struggle should be directed at the democratization of international relations, institutions and processes, so that the South can play an active role in all major decision-making institutions.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) For more insights see Falk 1995 and Rugumamu 2005.
It was noted that the rules and regulations that make up the world trading system are biased against the very economies and societies that most need a fair system for development. In redressing this historical imbalance, a new development cooperation strategy driven by a duty of care beyond borders should seek to design and implement a comprehensive aid, trade, investment, debt, technology and power partnerships that underwrites a genuine sustainable development. Economic growth and export promotion in Africa would be chiefly dependent on factors beyond the continent's control. The terms of trade of non-fuel commodities vis-à-vis manufactures have continued to fall and many African economies have suffered tremendous losses.

These losses have adversely affected the sustainable development prospects of such countries due to the fact that they contribute to the debt problem and to persistent poverty in many communities. A deliberate reform effort in the South’s terms of trade vis-à-vis the West through some institutional mechanisms would be required in order to stem or even better, reverse the current South-to-West flow of economic resources. Seriously affected countries would require compensatory and contingency financing without IMF-related conditions or currently compromised ODA flows. The World Bank recommendation of considering the provision of such a global public good, as global commodity price insurance instruments to address the key price volatility problems of developing countries should be aggressively pursued by all genuine development cooperation platforms. Such a multilateral instrument would also help to create conditions for a more equitable trading system, reduce resource wastage and unsustainable consumption patterns, and expand financial resources in Africa for a smooth transition to sustainable development (World Bank 2000).

Irrespective of whether or not Africa's external debt should be repaid, such payments cannot and will not be met given the structural, political and economic constraints that the continent currently faces. If, indeed, economic growth and poverty reduction are at the heart of the emerging development
co-operation crusade, then the very conditions that give rise to stagnation and structural rigidity should be tackled head on. In these circumstances, debts should be paid only as a result of economic growth, not through reduced consumption and austerity as in the current practice. Moreover, realistic debt relief imposed by IFIs and bankrolled by donors must not be conditional upon controversial structural adjustment measures that in many cases have only made the poor poorer. For countries of such limited revenue bases and such intense levels of deprivation, debt payment from Africa to rich countries usually carries high opportunity costs. Such costs are reflected in the notorious imbalances between the ever-growing spending on debt repayment and the declining public spending on health and education in many of the HIPC's. It is also salutary to be reminded that such unpropitious socio-economic realities as well as the exigencies of social justice and morality provide compelling arguments against debt repayment.

Together with debt cancellation, African governments, civil society and the private sector will have to work closely with their enlightened development partners in the West in order to achieve economic growth, poverty reduction, and institutional development. The 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development report, and later, the 1996 OECD/DAC report, *Reshaping the 21st Century*, committed themselves to various noble development ideals. These included, among others, debt relief and poverty reduction. Both reports recognize the fact that, while the primary responsibility for establishing and implementing strategies for meeting social development targets lay with the national governments, an enabling environment for social development needed to be created by the international community. Adequate support, including resources and other forms of assistance, has to be provided by the international community. Surprisingly, rich countries have not taken their commitments seriously; nor have they honored such commitments. In his blunt advice to the donor community Juhani Koponen (2003: 214) notes that “if donors are serious in their quest for poverty reduction, they should also investigate how poverty was overcome in their own countries
and compare such experiences against present-day policy advice emanating from Washington." That will provide an objective starting point for the emancipatory development cooperation.

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State agency and the structure of foreign aid in Nepal

Sudhindra Sharma

Agency and structure

An important debate in the social sciences centers on the relationship between agency and structure. The debate focuses on the problem of how structures determine what individuals do, how structures are created, and what are the limits of structure on individual's capacities to act independently of the constraints it poses. The debate revolves around the kind of limits structure poses on human agency (Abercrombie et al 1994) Structure generally refers to constraints posed on agency, which in turn refers to the capacity for autonomous social action (Calhoun 2002).

Various scholars have argued that agency and structure should be seen as inextricably linked, with neither altogether ascendant over the other. Gidden's structuration theory (1984), for example, is one such approach. It attempts to step back from the long debate within the social sciences over the relative priority accorded to social structure and individual agency.

1 The author is grateful to Laxman Acharya and Binod Bhattarai. Exchange of notes and conversation with them over the years has helped in making issues clearer.
Rather than chose sides, Giddens argues that structures are neither independent of actors nor determining their behavior. Rather they are a set rules and competencies on which actors draw and which, in the aggregate, they tend to reproduce over time. In other words social structures are not simply "facts" that constrain human action; they exist only in so far as they are recognized by agents.

In common usage agency places the individual at the center of analysis. However, collectivities may also be said to possess greater or lesser capacity to exercise agency or autonomous action. Whether it is individuals or collectivities, agency suggests not merely the ability to act, but to act in ways that demand the recognition and/or response by others (Calhoun 2002). The agency and structure framework is, I believe, useful in trying to understand the relationship between foreign aid and the Nepali state. If the Nepali state can be seen to possess agency, Nepali state's dependence on foreign aid becomes an important structural constraint on the state. In the relationship between the Nepali state and foreign aid, I subscribe to the first position with regard to the debate on the relationship between agency and structure: Nepali state's dependence on foreign aid severely constrains its capacity to act.

Agency in the context of the state refers to its will and power to act. It presumes will and political capacity; it refers to the primacy of politics. Agency underscores the proclivity of the Nepali political actors to determine the outcome by themselves. Structure in the context of foreign aid refers to constraints by way of international expectations and finances that set limit upon the Nepali state’s capacity to act. In so far as Nepal receives a high proportion of funds required to run the country in the form of foreign aid, this becomes a constraint on its will to act. The Nepali state, because of its dependence on the donor community, has to take donor preferences and expectations into cognizance and cannot act entirely on its own. In so far as these are forces beyond its control, foreign aid, sets out structures which limit the space for the maneuver
by the Nepali state. It constitutes the glass ceiling, so to speak, beyond which the Nepali state cannot go.

Foreign aid is not the only structural constraint faced by the Nepali state. Historically, since its emergence in the late eighteenth century, the Nepali state had had to contend with the constraints posed by whosoever happens to be the hegemonic power in the south and in the north: in India and in China. For a long period in its history the Nepali state has had to reckon with this structural constraint posed by geo-politics. With the beginning of the era of aid from 1949, and with the Nepali state’s overwhelming dependence on aid to finance its development expense since the 1950s, this has emerged as yet another structural constraint.

The paper explores how foreign aid has limited the capacity of the state in Nepal’s recent history. If foreign aid has indeed restricted the agency of the Nepali state, how it has done so? In this particular paper, the period from the emergence of the Maoist conflict onwards viz. 1996 up to present times is discussed. Through this examination the specific ways in which aid has infringed upon the capacity of the state to act are analyzed and some tentative conclusions are formulated towards the end.

The Maoist insurgency and foreign aid
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), ‘Maoists’ for short, launched their ‘people’s war’ in 1996. During the first few years, the insurgency was limited to districts in the mid-western region and its effects were localized. His Majesty’s Government, as the Nepali Government was then known, did not take the insurgency seriously and dealt with it as though it was a local law-and-order problem. However, following the massacre of the royal family in June 2001 and a series of successive unstable governments since, the Maoists’ insurgency took the shape of a full-blown conflict. The conflict between the Maoists and the Nepali state was exacerbated due to a growing rift between the monarch and parliamentary political parties.
With the escalation of the insurgency by the late 1990s, the donors began to pay attention to identifying the root causes of the conflict. Nepal’s donors saw social exclusion, inequality and lack of good governance as the main problems of the country, simultaneously accounting for both the emergence of the Maoist insurgency and continuing poverty. As the Maoist conflict escalated some donors also toyed with the idea of withdrawing from the country but eventually all donors continued their engagement, though some downsized their programs.

Most of Nepal’s donors understood the Maoist insurgency as being based on certain historical conditions. They have generally considered the failure of past development efforts in providing development benefits to all the people, along with the existing poor socio-economic conditions of the people as having fueled the insurgency. The growing frustration of the people over the failure of successive governments to meet their rising expectations after the restoration of democracy in 1990 is considered to be another important factor. According to donors, the situation was further aggravated by rampant corruption, along with lack of good governance during the 1990s. The conflict was to bring significant changes to the aid strategies of the donors, at least on paper. The country assistance plans/strategies of all donors, especially those formulated after 2000, include the issue of conflict and attempts to respond to it through development strategies.

The government’s reading of the situation, to a certain extent, converged with that of the donors. This was a period when the government was instituting a Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP), and some of the donors’ concerns, especially those dealing with the alleged root causes of the conflict made their way to it. The PRSP was broadened to make it into the country’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002–07). The PRSP/Tenth plan was centered on four approaches: (1) broad-based and sustainable economic growth; (2) social sector development; (3) social inclusion; and (4) good governance. Among its other strategies the government also introduced the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). At the same
time, Nepal’s priorities were influenced by the global paradigm of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

While the Nepali state largely concurred with the donor reading of the insurgency, the military option was not forsaken. As the insurgency escalated the state allocated more and more funds for security-related personnel and expenses. Thus one of the consequences of the Maoist insurgency on the state’s finances, especially as the insurgency turned into a full conflict from 2000 onwards, was the proclivity of the Nepali state to siphon resources from much-needed development activities and reallocate them to security areas.

This can be detected from the anomaly between regular and development expenditure. (It is from the regular budget that the state procures arms, while the donors allocated funds through the development budget). An examination of the government’s income and expenditure from FY 1990/91 to FY 2003/04 provides insights into how the state was trying to divert its investments in development activities into areas such as defense.

Between 1990/91 and 1995/96 there was a steady increase in social and economic expenditure and marginal increase in security expenditure. Even after the launch of the Maoist People’s War in 1996, social and economic sector spending increased. However from FY 2000/01 to 2003/04 there was a decline in economic sector expenditure while security spending has increased.

As the insurgency escalated the government began spending more on security, while internal revenue did not increase. Likewise, the government’s expenditure on development sharply decreased. By 2000/01, the government was allocating less (in both absolute and relative terms) to development and more (again in both absolute and relative terms) to the regular budget, which then could be used for security-related expenses.
Donors sought to understand the conflict as a result of existing poverty, inequality and the failure of past governments to address the socio-economic conditions of the people. This reading underplayed the Maoists’ agency and the ability of the Maoist leadership to mobilize people on the basis of ideology.

As the insurgency escalated, donors adopted specific approaches to maintain operating in conflict affected areas in Nepal such as increasing transparency and using staff from the regions involved. Donors acknowledged that the conflict affected the effectiveness of development cooperation and some were even in the process of realigning future assistance strategies with the evolving political and socio economic changes in Nepal. The interaction between conflict and development and how aid would achieve desired outputs in the

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2 Data courtesy of Laxman Acharya.
face of continued political instability and conflict were being examined. For donors to work effectively in the conflict situation, the acceptability of their programs by both the government and the Maoists was increasingly emerging as a concern.

Due to the insurgency, strategic shifts were discernable among donor agencies. They admitted to 'operating in grey areas between relief and development' activities. Along with community-based approaches, donors adopted humanitarian principals. An example could be the Risk Management Office (RMO) jointly established in 2002 by DFID and GTZ to ensure that programs can be continued safely and effectively without exacerbating the conflict. RMO developed a 'Safe and Effective Development in Conflict' approach which is based on concepts such as 'Risk Management' and 'Do No Harm'. These concepts are generally associated with humanitarian work but have been applied to the development context. A group of donors have also adopted the 'Basic Operating Guidelines' (BOG)\(^3\) while working on development and humanitarian assistance.

As the Maoist conflict escalated Nepal's donors did not question the right of the state to use force to quell the conflict. If at all concerns were raised, these related to the issue of aid fungibility: donor support to development work should not be a pretext for the government to allocate less to development and more to security. This was a time when the heads of government were leaders of the political parties in the erstwhile House of Representatives. With the monarch assuming executive authority and forming a government under his chairmanship much of this was to change.

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\(^3\) **Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG)** is a code of conduct adopted by international agencies in Nepal to carry out programs and to set standards for their programs and staff at the field level. BOG prohibits using development and humanitarian assistance for political, military or secular purpose, refuses to make forced contribution in cash or kind for activities other that development and humanitarian areas and asserts withdrawing from areas where staff and project safety are threatened.
To remain or exit: Aid under the King’s rule

In May 2002 the elected Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, dissolved the House of Representatives, intending to hold a mid-term election within the next six months. In doing this he was exercising his constitutional prerogative as Prime Minister. By October 2002, when he failed to hold general elections as required by the constitution, a constitutional crisis emerged.

The framers of the 1990 Constitution had not foreseen such an eventuality and there were no directions in the statute to guide the state in such circumstances. A constitutional crisis arose in that the major legitimate political players – political parties in the dissolved House of Representatives and the monarch – viewed the situation and the possible solution to the stalemate differently. The political parties asked for a reinstatement of the dissolved house, while the monarch pushed for new elections.

The monarch viewed his role as the custodian of the Constitution and subsequently dismissed Prime Minister Deuba for not holding elections as promised. He then appointed successive caretaker governments. These, however, failed to hold national elections because of the continuing armed insurrection that had engulfed a large part of the countryside. Finally, on 1 February 2005 King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Deuba – who this time around had been nominated by himself – and declared a state of emergency. The king took executive powers and formed a cabinet under his own chairmanship.

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4 The fact that he was the supreme commander-in-chief of the Royal Nepal Army and that the army would remain faithful to his political moves must have been taken into consideration by the monarch when he decided to make this move.

5 Gyanendra became king in abnormal circumstances. In June 2001 a ‘Royal Massacre’ took place in the palace in Kathmandu. According to an official investigation, a drunken Crown Prince Dipendra killed his parents, King Birendra, the queen, and seven other royals before killing himself. Subsequently, the King’s younger brother, Gyanendra was crowned King.
The King's step on 1 February 2005 appeared dramatic but was in fact a culmination of a long series of events taking place on the political scene in Kathmandu progressively overshadowed and curtailed by the Maoist insurrection that has been spreading in the country-side for nine years.

Even as the state got embroiled in constitutional crisis after October 2002, a political crisis had been unfolding in the country for some time. The Maoists who waged war against the state of Nepal from 1996 onwards adopted violence for achieving their objectives. This political party, which was largely a guerilla force, acquired indirect control over large tracts of the country, and posed a serious challenge to the state's monopoly over the instruments of coercion. Though the governments dubbed this political actor as 'terrorist' and the state adopted largely a military solution to what it viewed as the 'Maoist problem', years of military action was not able to suppress of this force. The fact that this 'unconstitutional' political actor seriously challenged the sovereignty of the state by virtue of its indirect control over a large part of the territory fueled political crisis.

By the end of 2002, with the new constitutional dilemma compounding the already existing political crisis, Nepal began to be seen by many in the international community as becoming a ‘fragile state’, generating instability and trouble not only for itself but for its surroundings. By 2003, development efforts were suffering due to the escalating conflict between the state security forces and the Maoists. As early as 2001 the Nepali government had sought to take ‘development’ to core Maoist areas. Accordingly, it had increased spending on the development budget considerably. However, by 2003 nearly half of the development projects in the country were coming to a halt. The multilateral agencies and some bilateral donors encouraged the government to involve the Maoists in development. Print media carried reports telling how Maoists had asked donors to sign-up with them, extorted money from them and threatened their staff.
By the end of 2004 some donors began pulling out from parts of Nepal most severely affected by the rebellion. The U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers packed up and left Nepal after nearly 42 years of service. The German Technical Grant (GTZ) terminated its green road project in Gorkha, Danida suspended a rural electrification project in Kailali and Kanchanpur districts and SDC (Swiss) also suspended some field-level projects (Khadka 2005).

The nature of the development partnerships so patiently built up during the preceding years between the Nepali government, other Nepali partners, and donor representatives were put under severe strain during the spectacular political developments in Nepal that unfolded after October 2002 and came to a head in February 2005. Just as there was a rift among the legitimate political actors in Nepal from October 2002 onwards so, too, was there a difference of opinion among Nepal’s donors as to the course of action they should pursue in the rapidly changing terrain. The rift among Nepal’s donors could be seen, for instance, during the Nepal Development Forum (NDF) meeting in May 2004.

The donors were divided into competing camps; at least two major camps can be discerned. The multilateral agencies and the Americans were in one camp, and the remaining bilaterals in another. To start with, there was concern among the donors whether or not the NDF meeting could be held according to schedule because of the ongoing agitation and violence. The multilaterals like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) favoured the government’s meeting schedule whereas the bilateral donors preferred a consensus between the palace and the political parties before the meeting. A pre-consultation of the eleven donors was held at the Norwegian embassy. These donors included Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland (Khadka 2004). On the eve of the NDF meeting these bilaterals had asked the political parties and the king to come up with a suitable prime ministerial candidate. In spite of the dissention and political turmoil, the NDF meeting concluded with some consensus on
the part of the donors to continue aiding Nepal. Some disagreements arose concerning how the aid was to be disbursed. But most of the bilateral donors actually increased their aid commitment. The donors pledged to provide $560 million a year as assistance under the new poverty reduction strategy that had been endorsed in 2003.

On 1 February 2005 King Gyanendra sacked Prime Minister Deuba for the second time and assumed executive powers. This complicated the situation further and forced the donors to rethink their position in Nepal and in its various internal conflicts. This was particularly so when the king's royal proclamation criticized political parties for misusing their parliamentary privilege and most of the political elite including former Prime Ministers were put under house arrest.

The king's dramatic move heightened donor concern and dissatisfaction over unfolding political events in Nepal. Donors faced the ultimate question in developmental partnerships at the country level: If the partnership is ideally between 'peoples', who is entitled to claim to represent the people and forge partnerships in their name? Each of the donors had originally entered into a partnership with the Nepali government of the day, but what was to be done when the nature and legitimacy of the government itself was being called into question? One option would have been to exit. If partnership is a relationship that is entered into freely, the partners, in principle, must also be free to withdraw. On the whole, donors decided to stay put in Nepal, however, and tried to influence the events the way they saw fit (Sharma et al. forthcoming). The main predicament of most of the donors was to achieve a rapprochement among the 'constitutional forces', i.e., the monarchy and the political parties.

The line taken by many of Nepal's donors after the critical juncture of 1 February 2005 was to continue programmes for which agreements had already been made, but to refrain from signing new agreements. There were, however, some exceptions. The ADB signed a $19 million loan the day after the royal proclamation. The government of Japan, although
expressing its concern about detentions of politicians, agreed to extend grant assistance of over ¥1.2 billion (US$ 17 million) to Nepal for two projects in the latter part of Japan’s fiscal year 2004, which ended in April 2005, because the funds had already been allocated. Though the World Bank also ‘postponed’ its US$70 million anti-poverty budgetary support, it is said that this step had already been decided before the royal coup because of the previous government’s failure to meet reform targets.

Different bilateral donors responded differently to the royal moves. India suspended its arms deliveries to the Nepali army but later on resumed non-lethal military aid. China said that the whole thing is Nepal’s internal matter. Subsequent to the event China began to aid Nepal in a variety of ways, including through direct budgetary support. Nepal’s main European donors said that the King’s political move would make it more difficult to resolve the insurgency.

The EU as a whole took the line that on-going activities would be continued but new ones will be put in hold. It reduced official contacts with the Nepali administration to the level of middle officials. Among the donors taking most vocal critical stands have been the non-EU Swiss and Norwegians, and among the EU members, the Danes. Danida became the first aid agency to announce a suspension of aid to the Nepali government. Though it terminated its aid to rural development projects it said that it would continue to help civil society. The Finns decided to follow the EU mainstream line continuing with existing activities but refraining from new commitments for the time being.

When Denmark expressed disappointment at the lack of Nepali commitment to democracy, some Nepali stakeholders felt that Denmark had reneged on its commitment to Nepal. This illustrates a difference in understandings of the aid partnership concept. Whereas the Danish government understood the partnership to depend on democracy as a precondition, Nepali stakeholders expected a different commitment. Some Nepali officials and newspapers accused
critical donors of double standards and argued that a suspension of civil liberties and other emergency measures had been taken by other governments to fight terrorism, and hence Nepal alone should not be punished for taking such measures. The Nepali government reacted angrily to what it perceived as donor unilateralism. The seven-party alliance, on the other hand, generally welcomed the donors' concerns.

After the king's move on 1 February 2005, the country witnessed a re-alignment of political forces with the seven-party alliance and the Maoists moving closer to one another. Whether it was the question of a constituent assembly or the question of monarchy, the stance taken by political parties had over the months increasingly gravitated towards the Maoist agenda. And this was in spite of the intentions of the donors who wished to see a rapprochement among the constitutional forces, i.e., the king and the political parties.

Nepali Congress, a political party that had professed constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy decided to remove any mention of constitutional monarchy from its statute during the party convention held in September 2005. The United Marxist-Leninist party (UML) has been more equivocal in deciding to adopt democratic republicanism through elections to a constituent assembly.

The leaders of the seven-party alliance and the Maoists then began secret negotiations in India. An understanding was finally reached between the two in November 2005 in New Delhi. In a joint statement released as an 'understanding' between the seven-party political alliance and the Maoists, both sets of actors agreed to establish peace by resolving the 10-year old armed conflict through a forward-looking political outlet, stating that the long struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy in Nepal had reached a very grave and decisive turn in Nepali history (Kathmandu Post 2005).

The course of action proposed by the monarch for overcoming the constitutional crisis as has been previously discussed, was holding local elections for municipality followed by election for the lower house of parliament and then
eventually handing over executive authority to this parliament. And the monarch seemed to be pursuing this line of action seriously. The date for municipal elections was announced for 8 February 2006. This was viewed as a prelude to the national election. With the municipal elections just around the corner, the Maoists, in spite of commitments made in the memorandum of understanding and in order to deter people from participating in the municipal elections, went on a blitz attacking the state security forces and candidates for municipal elections. The Maoists tactics of rejecting election and the seven political parties boycotting the polls paid off when the turnout to the municipal election was 22 percent – lower than had been anticipated. This generated questions on the legitimacy of the exercise.

In accordance with the 12-point understanding, the seven-party alliance (SPA) announced their protest programs against autocratic monarchy and for establishing total democracy. The nationwide protests were to take place from April 6-9, 2006 with the Maoists extending their moral support. The major political parties in the erstwhile House of Representatives had protested against the royal move and had organized agitations and demonstrations in Kathmandu immediately after the king had assumed executive authority; these were not able to gather big crowds. The April demonstrations, in contrast, were much better organized and mass-based. Besides the sister organizations affiliated to political parties – such as trade unions, journalists, lawyers, teachers, NGOs, the business community and other professional bodies – there was spontaneous participation of ordinary people across the country. The SPA, who were strong in urban areas and the Maoists who controlled a large part of the hinterland synchronized their efforts as a consequence of which the masses were galvanized to participate in demonstration throughout the various cities and towns across the country.

6 What this meant in terms of actual politics was deliberately left undefined.
What began as a four-day strike stretched to sixteen days of relentless confrontation between the masses and the state, with the state repeatedly resorting to the imposition of a curfew. On the night of April 21, 2006 King Gyanendra called upon the SPA to form a new government to be headed by a prime minister recommended by SPA. In spite of the declaration of the monarch at the eleventh hour, the mass agitation did not subside nor did the leaders of the SPA accept the king's offer.

Donor differences surfaced also in the final stages of the political confrontation between the monarch and the SPA-Maoist alliance. When the King tried to solve the crisis by asking the SPA to form a new government, most of the donor community – India, China, the US, the UK and EU – quickly welcomed the declaration.

The king's step was to take Denmark, a donor that had been very vocal against the king, by surprise. Denmark was among those who had quickly welcomed the declaration and seemed surprised that the demonstrations by the masses against the monarch continued. On the other hand, donors such as Japan and Norway, which had much longer aid relationships with Nepal as a country and not simply as a democratic state, waited and did not respond right away. These donors such as Japan, Switzerland and Norway, remained silent either due to caution or because they sensed the public's unwillingness to acquiesce to the King's demands.

During the next few days, mass demonstrations intensified in magnitude. Finally on the night of April 24, 2006, King Gyanendra succumbed to public pressure. He acknowledged the people's sentiments in the mass demonstrations, affirmed peoples commitment to total democracy and declared the revival of the House of Representatives.7

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7 The King's restoration of parliament did not invoke any constitutional clause but was implicitly legitimated by political necessity.
The massive demonstrations in Kathmandu and other parts of the kingdom between April 6 and April 25, 2006 had been aimed against 'autocratic monarchy' and for establishing 'total democracy'. However, what this meant in terms of actual politics was deliberately left undefined. Once the movement was successful, both the SPA and the Maoists were to claim credit for mobilizing the masses and to espouse the course of action that should be pursued by the new regime.

The outcome of the people's movement of 2006 was not something the donors had wished or anticipated. While they had called for a rapprochement between the king and the political parties, the turn of events brought the Maoists, an 'unconstitutional' political actor and a force that had initiated a rebellion against the Nepali state, into the center-stage. The turn of events led to a rapprochement between the seven-party alliance and the Maoists and marginalized the monarch.

**Political events since April 2006**

Direct rule by the king, which commenced on 1 February 2005 ended in April 2006 when, under relentless pressure from the masses, the monarch reinstated the House of Representatives that had been dissolved some two-and-a-half years earlier by the then Prime Minister. The forces that came to the centre-stage in Nepali politics subsequent to the peoples' movement – the seven-party alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) – had reached a consensus on the ways and means for overcoming the constitutional and political crises facing the country. This consensus revolved around an elected constituent assembly drafting and then ratifying a new constitution. The SPA and CPNM envisaged such a new constitution formulated through such as measure then becoming the new governing framework for the country. Holding elections for the constituent assembly then became a necessary condition for resolving the twin crises facing the country.

Political events after the peoples' movement of April 2006 moved rapidly. The SPA nominated Girija Prasad Koirala as the
Prime Minister in April 26, 2006. Late in the evening of the same day, the Maoists issued a statement declaring a three-month unilateral ceasefire. This was reciprocated by the Koirala-led SPA government. The first session of the dissolved House of Representatives was held in April 28, 2006 in which the SPA leaders presented a proposal for formulating a new constitution on the basis of constituent assembly. In April 30, 2006, the second session of the House of Representatives unanimously approved the proposal for constituent assembly. The SPA formed a seven-member cabinet of ministers on May 2, 2006.

On May 3, 2006, the government removed the 'Red Corner' notice and terrorist tag on the Maoists, declared an indefinite ceasefire and invited the Maoists for peace talks at the earliest. The government also decided to dissolve the local municipality bodies constituted after the municipal elections held in February 2006. On May 4, 2006, the Maoist chairman Prachanda issued a press statement accepting the offer made by the government to hold peace talks. Likewise, on May 5, 2006, the government formed a five-member commission under the chairmanship of Krishna Jung Rayamajhi to investigate into atrocities committed by the ministers, security persons and civil servants of the royal regime against pro-democracy demonstrators.

The declaration removing the king's executive authority was presented at the House of Representatives on May 18, 2006. According to the declaration, the House of Representatives would be the sole body on which the sovereign rights of the people rest. The proclamation declared Nepal as a secular state and renamed His Majesty's Government as Government of Nepal and the Royal Nepalese Army as the Nepali Army. The Cabinet was now the entity to appoint the army chief, this authority previously being vested in the king, and the king no longer holding position as commander-in-chief of the army and Security Council. The proclamation also disposed the existing Royal Council and all the works of the council that would from henceforth be performed by the House of Representatives. The existing law on royal succession was
also disposed. While the palace budget under the new dispensation would be fixed by the House of Representatives, the king's property would also be taxable. Provisions of the 1990 constitution giving the monarch discretionary powers in certain cases were also nullified.\(^8\)

To pave way for longstanding Maoist demands for elections to a constituent assembly, the government conducted the first round of talks with the Maoists in which a 25-point Ceasefire Code of Conduct was approved. Series of peace talks took place between the government and the Maoists to chart out modalities for holding elections for constituent assembly. Likewise, the Koirala government made swift, sweeping changes intended to accommodate long standing Maoists demands, which give many in Nepal the optimism that perhaps things will go right this time.

On June 16, 2006, the first round of the summit talks between the top leaders of the ruling SPA and CPN Maoist concluded in Kathmandu. Both sides agreed to invite the United Nations to help and monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides. In his first public appearance, the Maoist chairman Prachanda said that his party would like to see an interim constitution and interim government within a month and elections to be held for constituent assembly by April-May 2007. The both sides agreed to form a six-member committee to draft an interim constitution.

The second round of the summit talks between the SPA and the Maoist leadership began on October 8, 2006. After some rounds of negotiation the SPA and the Maoist entered into an agreement, which paved the way for formal entry of the Maoists into the peaceful political mainstream. The agreement mentioned about how to reach the consensus on monarchy, arms management, interim constitution, interim parliament, interim government and electoral system for constituent assembly.

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\(^8\) For more details on the 18th May Declaration of the House of Representatives see *Himalayan Times* 2006.
On November 21, 2006, Prime Minister G. P. Koirala and the Maoist chairman Prachanda were finally able to sign a peace accord that brought the decade-long armed insurgency to an end. In the peace accord, the SPA and the Maoists expressed their commitment to write an interim constitution, form an interim parliament and government, and hold elections for the constituent assembly by mid-June 2007. The accord explicitly noted that the first session of the constituent assembly would decide on the fate of the monarchy by a simple majority. It also expressed that the United Nations would be asked to verify and monitor arms of the both sides and army management. The UN would be asked to observe the constituent assembly elections as well.

On 28 November, 2006, the government and the Maoists signed the 'Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies'. The two sides also agreed to form a nine-member Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee comprising three members each from the government, the Maoists and the United Nations (UN). The UN formally approved the agreement on arms and armies management between these two sides on 8 December, 2006, when the special representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal, Mr. Ian Martin, signed.

On 15 January, 2007, the House of Representatives promulgated the 'Nepal Interim Constitution 2063' replacing the Constitution of Nepal 1990 as promised by both the SPA government and CPN (Maoist) in the November 21 peace accord. Then the House of Representatives announced its dissolution. The interim constitution has a number of distinctive features. For the first time in the history of Nepal, a constitution has been written and promulgated by the people's representatives and has sidelined the role of the monarchy. Some legal experts have criticised the interim constitution for concentrating too much power on the prime minister and curtailing the independence of the judiciary and other bodies. However, most political parties and activists see the decision to concentrate power on the prime minister as the best approach possible during the transition (International Crisis Group 2007). Also on 15 January, a 330-member interim legislature
(the term used in place of 'interim parliament'), including 83 representatives from the Maoists, was formed. At its first meeting, which was held immediately after the dissolution of the House of Representatives, the interim legislature unanimously endorsed the Nepal Interim Constitution 2063. The legislature will exercise law-making powers until the constituent assembly is formed. It can amend the interim constitution by a two-thirds vote. More importantly, its power is not limited to transitional tasks; in fact, it can vote on long-term legislation as well (International Crisis Group, 2007).

In the meantime, on 23 January, 2007, the UN Secretary Council unanimously approved Resolution 1740, which established a UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) with a 12-month mandate. Its mandate includes five major tasks: (1) to monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepali Army (NA) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); (2) to assist the parties through the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) in implementing the peace agreement on the management of the arms and armed personnel of both sides; (3) to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements; (4) to provide technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a constituent assembly in a free and fair atmosphere; and (5) to provide a small team of electoral monitors to review all technical aspects of the electoral process (International Crisis Group 2007).

The interim constitution was formulated and the legislative parliament that included the Maoists convened on 15 January 2007, which in turn led to the formation of a new government that included the Maoists. Yet, the government was unable to hold the constituent assembly elections at the stipulated date. The inability of the government to hold elections was due to events overtaking the Tarai region. Soon after the endorsement of the interim constitution by the interim legislative-parliament, some Madhesi political leaders demanded that it be amended in order to take into account the concerns of the Madhesi people. Non-violent Madhesi groups such as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and groups espousing violence such as Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha
along with the Madhesi leaders of dominant political parties subsequently called for mass action. In Eastern and Central Tarai, the Madhesi peoples heeded to these calls as a consequence of which there were massive political mobilizations. The main demands of the protesting groups were for proportional representation, the delimitation of election constituents on the basis of population and a federal state structure.

One of the unintended consequences of the transition and the peace accord between the state and the former rebels has been the decline in the presence of the state security forces. There is a general perception that the law and order situation is deteriorating. The media regularly report stories of theft, robbery and extortion in urban settings, while in the hinterlands, with the state security apparatus virtually absent, media report how the villagers are at the mercy of criminal elements. Stories of serious lapses in law and order reported in the media generate and reinforce the impression that law and order has seriously weakened.

In response to the demands of the various agitating groups, a bill was registered on 18 February 2007 to amend the interim constitution with a view to incorporating the issues raised by Madhesi and Janajati activists. The bill was subsequently approved. This amendment paved the way for moving towards a federal democratic structure, holding constituent assembly elections using a mixed-proportional system, re-delineating constituencies in acknowledgement of the increased population in the Tarai, and representing all marginalised communities, like Madhesis, Janajatis, Dalits and women, at all levels and in all sectors of the state proportionally. Likewise a new date for the constituent assembly was set for November 2007.

**Donors after April 2006: Consensus and quarrels**

After the people's movement had marginalized 'autocratic' monarchy, brought the Seven-Party Alliance to the helms of the state and the Maoist rebels into the political mainstream,
Nepal’s 33 development partners – donor countries and organizations – spared no words in praise of Nepal’s peaceful transition. There had been a lot of commitment on the part of the donors to assist Nepal in the difficult transition into a post-conflict democracy. The eight-party government (meaning the SPA-Maoist alliance) had expected peace-dividends, windfalls in the form of increased aid from its donors but that, however, was not to be. The weekly newspaper, *Nepali Times*, captured the mood aptly: ‘Peace without dividend: Donors talk the talk but don’t yet walk the walk’ (Bhattarai 2007b).

Government data suggests that there had been no substantial changes in bilateral aid during the first eight months after April 2006 compared to the period preceding it. During the same period multilateral aid tripled; this was largely due to the fact that funds were released based on old commitments rather than fresh grants. During the past 3-4 years, support from the donors – including grants and loans – generally accounted for about 25 percent of the budget annually. The difference between this 25 percent and the new amount would indicate the real “peace dividend.” Surprisingly, donor disbursements have remained at this level, which goes to indicate that there has, in fact, not been any real peace-dividend.

That the donors have given only lukewarm support becomes obvious if one examines the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF). Created by the government in January 2007 the NPTF comes closest to a fund created specifically for Nepal to access the peace and development dividend. Intended to mobilize funds to strengthen peace and restart development it seeks to support the rehabilitation of displaced people and Maoist fighters, rebuild infrastructure destroyed by rebels, hold constituent assembly elections and support law and order. However as of late August, NPTF was able to attract a meager US$14 million into the basket. Of the 20 bilateral countries that deal in Nepal, only five – Britain ($4.8 million), Finland ($4 million), Denmark ($3.6 million), Norway ($2 million) and Switzerland ($1.5 million) had made contributions to the NPTF.
Even this money has already been allocated to the Election Commission.

Among Nepal’s various donors, the largest peace-dividend had come from India – a country that is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). That India has made the largest contribution over the past year and a half can be ascribed to its role in the transition of April 2006 and its immediate interest in seeing to it that its neighborhood is stable.\(^9\) India’s initial economic package announced in June 2006 was $25 million. Besides this it provided $100 million in soft-credit, and pledged to increase annual outlays from $1.6 million to $37 million. India also wrote off military hardware loans that it had been giving over the past several years (Bhattarai 2007a).

India, however, has not put any money in the NPTF. Although Indian aid had increased over the past several years and particularly so during the last one and a half years, its spending as a donor has not been institutionalized and much continues to depend on the discretion of the embassy diplomats. Neither has the United States put funds into the peace-basket. Despite the fact that the US is one of Nepal’s major donors and spends annually around $50 million, much of the fund is channeled through intermediary US firms. Since the modality does not involve the funds flowing through the Nepali government coffers, it is difficult to ascertain how much has come in and how much has flowed out as high salaries for its advisers. China and Japan, other important donors, have agreed to support in kind. Japan has gifted the Election Commission various election-related items valued at $1.2 million while China as promised in-kind support valued at $1.3 million (Bhattarai 2007a).

Some in Nepal see the donors as fractured and as cantankerous as Nepal’s political parties. As a magazine put it: ‘What donors will never admit is that they are as fractured and

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\(^9\) After all, the 12-point agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists had been done in New Delhi at the behest of the Indian government.
cantankerous as are the political parties, and therefore unable to agree on a common approach to aiding the Nepali process' (Bhattarai 2007a).

The National Planning Commission earlier in the year had prepared a three-year planning document on reconstruction and development aimed at economic recovery from the conflict. It had proposed a budget of $2.5 billion. Only a small proportion of this has actually been committed by the donors. Likewise the Finance Ministry had made a request at a conference in London in March 2007 asking for aid including loans to the tune of $721 for the current fiscal year. Though the British aid agency DFID raised its commitment from $60 million in 2005/06 to $79 million in 2006/07 and to about $95 million in 2007/08, others have not. In contrast to what the donors allege as the inadequate preparations by the government, Nepal's donors had proposed a 'Peace and Development Framework (PDF)’. This framework, among others, recognizes that peace and development are not exclusive and that basic services must reach the villages to enhance peace. Donors allege that the Nepali government, involved as it is in putting out sporadic bush-fires, has not taken this up with the required seriousness that it deserves (Bhattarai 2007b).

The Nepali government is displeased with the donors for not putting their money where their mouth is. Others who have watched the donors over a period of time concur that by and large Western donors tend to denigrate the Nepali political process, and do not give enough credit to the political parties. However, on the part of donors, there could be several reasons why they are not putting in more than what they already have, into the peace-basket at this particular historical juncture.

First is the question of what would be the right kind of aid modality in a post-conflict transit context. Donors are apprehensive that the issue of 'fungibility' of aid may be very real in a basket-funding arrangement, especially in a post-conflict transit context. In a basket-funding arrangement the government of the day, and particularly, the concerned
ministry, has unhindered access to funds, while other partners in the coalition may not do so. It could also provide a pretext for the government to reallocate its resources away from the much needed priorities to other sectors. Likewise, there could be a possibility of the funds provided through donor assistance not getting to the local levels where the funds are needed the most.

Though the basket-fund approach is generally preferred by recipient governments, in the post-conflict situation that Nepal is transiting today, it may not be the best of approaches. A more conventional aid modality – such as the project-modality – may hold better prospects for the utilization of such aid. Among others, these provide less possibility for the funds to be siphoned off for various unstated purposes. Likewise it could lead to greater control over expenditure by the donors and focus on delivering tangible outputs rather than spending the funds, which may be a real danger in the situation that Nepal finds itself today.

A second reason why donors are not allocating funds through the government apparatus could be because of the absence of local all-party peace councils at the district and village levels. In a context where there are no locally elected government bodies, how to channel funds locally could be tricky. A compromise solution is the local all-party peace councils, which could be a viable means of taking funds to the people. The inability of the government to institute this may be another reason why the donors are hesitant to directly support the government.

A third issue is the apprehension towards the Maoists, an important party in the coalition. The Maoists, in spite of their rhetoric have not demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and norms. This becomes evident through the behavior of their various sister organizations such as the Young Communist League (YCL), which are continuing with their threats and extortions. Likewise, the Maoists still have not returned the houses and properties of the people forcibly occupied during the conflict.
Donor's apprehension towards the Maoists was substantiated by Maoist ministers. Ministries headed by the Maoists have tried to revoke decisions of previous governments leading to complications in the executions of projects. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, burnt its fingers in dealing with the Maoist minister in the Physical Planning and Housing Ministry, who decided to review the Melamchi water-supply project, which the ADB had been involved in since 1998.

A fourth reason is the political parties themselves. Perceiving political parties as being authoritarian and undemocratic, some of the donors had sought internal democracy among the major political parties. This does not seem to be forthcoming.

Finally, there is the issue of the legitimacy of the government. The people power movement of April 2006 for all of its positive achievements has not been an exercise in ballot. The government formed subsequently has not been an elected government. At the end of the day, an important benchmark of democracy is periodic elections. How long could a 'people power' last without being mandated by the people through an election, is something that the donors are increasingly concerned about.

**Conclusion: Aid and state agency**

The paper has discussed the relationship between foreign aid and the agency of the Nepali state. The relationship between the two indicates that on the whole the former (i.e., foreign aid) has tended to limit the latter (i.e., the agency of the Nepali state). Foreign aid does indeed appear to be a structural constraint on the Nepali state's capacity to act. On the basis of the materials discussed it can be argued that foreign aid does pose as an invisible boundary that constrains the state.

However, this should not be construed to imply that the foreign aid regime prevents the Nepali state from acting in whatsoever a manner it so desires. The recent history of Nepal
exemplified by the king’s 1 February 2005 unilateral action – suggests that the state has acted. In other words, even though the Nepali state is heavily dependant on foreign aid, this dependence does not preclude political action.

Undertaking a unilateral action is one thing, carrying it through, however, is another. Well within a year and a half, the king’s government collapsed. What could be surmised from this is that dependence on the foreign aid regime serves to ensure the viability or otherwise of political actions. In other words, the Nepali state (being sovereign), in principle, can act the way it wants, but if that act goes against established donor norms or expectations, there is a very real likelihood of it being aborted. It is in this indirect or round about way that foreign aid acts as a structural constraint.

The foreign aid regime has not always exerted this great influence. As Nepal’s past 60 years of history attests, it is only with the demise of the cold war that the aid regime has come to have such a hold. Since the post World War II there have been major transitions that the Nepali state has moved through: these include 1950/51, 1959/60, 1989/90 and 2006. The end of the Rana regime and the beginning of democracy in 1950/51 had as much to do with the backing from independent India as domestic constituencies represented by the insurrectionary activities of the Nepali Congress. The foreign aid era had already begun prior to this juncture (in 1949 after President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program). The Nepali state, however, had not entered the regime and was not dependant on it whatsoever. Rather than foreign aid per se, it was India’s political role that led to a decisive outcome at this particular juncture of Nepali history.

Although the Nepali state began receiving aid during the 1950s, the state had a considerable degree of autonomy. This is exemplified for instance by king Mahendra’s unilateral actions in 1960. During this period the United States, India and a couple of European donors had begun aiding the Nepali state and the Nepali state’s dependence on aid to meet its development needs had increased over the years. Though what
king Mahendra did – dissolving the parliament, imprisoning the popularly elected Prime Minster and banning political parties – went against established international conventions, foreign aid continued the way it did, which in turn, implies that Nepal's donors did not punish the king for his unilateral actions.

Another important watershed was in 1989/90. This period that was ushered in after the demise of the Cold War coincided with the growth in popular assertion and uprooting of totalitarian regimes worldwide; this moment in history is also popularly known as the 'third wave' of democracy. Though there were some voices that championed for the donors suspending all aid (alleging that aid had resulted in giving continuity to the authoritarian regime), donors generally continued what they did. The fact that the monarch quickly responded to popular demands and that the interregnum was short and smooth meant that there were no confrontations between the Nepali state and the donor community.

In all of these transitions, with the exception of 1959/60, India's role was of paramount importance. In 1950/51, a compromise was struck between the Ranas, the Nepali Congress and King Tribhuwan at the behest of New Delhi. When King Mahendra took unilateral action in 1960, New Delhi did not take this well. However, due to a major Chinese assault in the Indian territories in the Himalayas, India's security became vulnerable, and in the interests of security in the larger region, New Delhi came around to accepting the king's moves. In 1988 the year-long economic blockade imposed by India led to deterioration in the Nepali state's capacity to deliver basic services, which in turn, spanned the 1989 popular movement for the restoration of multi-party democracy. And finally, the genesis of the second popular movement of April 2006 was in the 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists that was signed in New Delhi in November 2005 and of which India was the facilitator; had it not been for New Delhi's behest the two dramatically different political forces would not have come together.
As a donor in Nepal, India has gone through a checkered history. Though it was a significant donor in the 1950s, its role declined since 1960. What the events leading up to 2006 and the events subsequent to it reveal, is the emergence of India as an important donor in Nepal. The recent commitments made by India attests to a growing role it envisages for itself as a donor in Nepal. The commitment it has made subsequent to April 2006 indicates that it would be investing three to four times more than it had during the past. Even before the people's movement, India had pledged to implement some major projects related to transportation and security such as strengthening four major border check-posts along the Nepal–India border, constructing 22 link roads, including 14 large bridges, to link the East–West Highway with major cities of the Tarai region and others. This is an inkling of the things to come.

What the discussion on foreign aid also reveals is that the pressure by the international community towards the Nepali state is not simply by way of allocating funds. Though funding is the most obvious or visible way it adopts other, more subtle means. This is by setting up of normative standards, which the Nepali state may choose to ignore at its own peril. It is the pressure to conform to the international norms that is no less a compelling force than allocating funds.

Even as this paper is being written, there is a new turn in Nepali politics. The Maoists who have long championed elections for the constituent assembly that will draft and ratify a new constitution have said that the date set forth by the government for the elections is not convenient for them and have unilaterally moved out of the coalition government. The donors have made known their preference for the election to be held on time and have warned the government that if things continue to drift, the very legitimacy of the government may be called into question. Prime Minister G.P. Koirala is firm on holding the elections, but if the Maoists do not let the elections happen or if the election cannot be held for whatsoever reason, it is unlikely that the government will continue indefinitely. The
Nepali state behaving whatsoever the way it wants to is one thing, but continuing on that course is quite another.

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Development or Disillusionment?

Economic Partnership Agreements and the goals of European Union development policy

Marikki Stocchetti

Economic Partnership Agreements: One tool, two targets

The on-going negotiations on the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) demonstrate once again how setting goals for development policy is a much easier task than agreeing on the actual means to get there. According to the European Commission (EC), the EPAs are meant to constitute an integral part of the implementation of the European Union (EU) – African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP)\(^1\) Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000). They are regarded as integral because of their expected positive impact on development through trade in ACP regions and countries.

In particular, these “economic partnerships” should facilitate the achievement of the overarching goal of EU’s development policy and the Cotonou Agreement – poverty reduction, and eventually poverty eradication – in a way which is both consistent with sustainable development and the

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\(^1\) ACP constitutes 79 member states of which 48 are from Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific states.
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.²

According to the Article 1 of the Cotonou agreement, the pursuit of these objectives should be conducted through an integrated approach which takes into account at the same time political, economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of development. This integrated approach is further guided by fundamental principles of equality and ownership between the ACP and EU partners, participation that includes both state and non-state actors, dialogue between the partners as well as differentiation according to the needs of each ACP state and regionalization to promote co-operation between the ACP countries.³ Moreover, all the parties “shall refrain from any measures liable to jeopardise these objectives.” These terms were also to apply to The New Trade Arrangements section of the Cotonou Agreement, which provides the basis for the current EPA negotiations.⁴

The conventional explanation by those in favour of EPAs – and the EU commission in particular – stresses that the EU-ACP economic relations need to be changed for two main reasons. First, according to the Commission, there is a mutual recognition by the main Parties that “existing trade preferences have not promoted the sustainable development or integration into the world economy” (COM 2005d: 3). Especially, this quotation refers to the non-reciprocal market access arrangements which have been inadequate to reverse

² See the Cotonou Agreement, Article 1 Objectives of the partnership and European Consensus on Development: par. 5.
³ See the Cotonou Agreement: Article 2 Fundamental principles.
⁴ In essence, EPAs are described as trade agreements which are being negotiated between the European Commission (EC) and six ACP regional groups, which do not however coincide with the existing regional bodies of regional integration. Four out of six of the EPA configurations are Sub-Saharan African where the need for poverty reduction is particularly pressing. The negotiations are to be concluded by the end of this year as stipulated in the Cotonou Agreement. Once (and if) in place, the six separate EPA agreements are expected to replace the unilateral, non-reciprocal trade preferences that provided the ACP countries with so-called preferential market access to EU under the successive Lomé Conventions.
the declining share of ACP countries’ exports at the European market. Second, and perhaps more acutely for the EU, the current trade preferences are inconsistent with the prevailing international trade rules as defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore need to be changed. What is considered particularly problematic is that the non-reciprocity aspect of the Cotonou Agreement is not in line with the WTO’s so-called “enabling clause”. To ensure WTO compliance the EPAs are to be regional free trade agreements that set out reciprocal liberalisation of “substantially all trade within reasonable length of time” between the EU and ACP partner regions. In the context of EPAs this has come to be understood as roughly 90 per cent of trade that should be liberalized within 10-12 years (EP 2005: 8). There has been a WTO given waiver in place allowing EU-ACP unilateral preferential agreements to exist, but this waiver expires at the end this year which puts strong pressure particularly on the ACP side (ODI 2007 and Bilal & Rampa 2006). However, the European Commission sees no contradiction here. On the contrary, the EC considers it possible to tackle both the objectives of poverty reduction and trade liberalization under the EPA free trade agreements. Moreover, the EC sees that “reforming” the EU-ACP economic relations in line with WTO rules will also improve EU’s contribution to the set development policy goals. In a sense, for the European Commission the proposed free trade EPAs are to play a double function in governance of two fundamentally different global policy processes – on the one hand, EPAs are to contribute to

5 Under the “enabling clause” industrial countries are permitted to give unilateral non-reciprocal preferential treatment to just two categories of countries: either, all LDCs, or all developing countries. As the ACP group is a mix of the two types of countries, therefore the original preferences are incompatible with current WTO rules. Therefore, under the proposed EPAs the trade relationship between the EU and ACP regional groups will be based on reciprocity and EPAs will be governed by GATT Article XXIV rather than its “enabling clause”.

6 EPA groups consist of six ACP regions: CEMAC plus Sao Tome and Principe (Central Africa), ECOWAS plus Mauritania (West Africa), COMESA minus Egypt and South Africa (East and Southern Africa), SADC plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (Southern Africa), CARIFORUM (Caribbean) and Pacific ACP States.
poverty reduction and on the other hand, they are to reinforce WTO-led economic governance\(^7\) in the area of international trade.

At the same time, scepticism prevails on the ACP side. Critics of the EPA agreements agree on changing the EU-ACP economic relations but for quite different reasons. The ACP countries, together with the European Parliament Committees on Development and International Trade as well as various NGO platforms, perceive market access measures as inadequate to advance development in ACP countries and stress so-called supply-side constrains\(^8\) within the ACP states which make it unlikely that major part of the ACP countries producers can benefit from the market access. Further, the critics point to the unequal trade rules, as well as to the high and distorting level of EU’s own protectionism which in their view hinder possibilities for development through trade in ACP countries. These critics fear, inter alia, that in the current international setting allowing the EU increased access to the ACP markets by liberating “substantially all trade” will have a negative impact on the development of local producers and industries as well as on public revenues of the ACP states. Therefore the EU approach is more likely to lead to growing inequality instead of the achievement of the joint development goals.\(^9\)

The criticism on EPAs has been further reinforced by the failure of the WTO Doha Development Round as well as the consequent debate on the current international trade rules’ impact on development. However, while the multilateral trade

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7 On the concept of governance, see Ba & Hoffman 2005.

8 By supply-side constrains is generally referred to factors such as poor economic infrastructure, unfavourable investment climate, weak institutions, lack of trained work force that prevent developing countries from taking advantage of trade liberalization, see more Bilal & Rampa 2006.

9 This position is largely shared by the ACP states, the European Parliament as well as various NGOs both in Europe as well as in the ACP Countries. Compare for instance ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2006, EP 2005, EP 2007, Oxfam 2006 and Stop EPA campaign of 171 NGOs.
negotiations are on hold, the EU is aiming at further trade liberalization through EPAs on bilateral basis even beyond the required WTO compatibility.\textsuperscript{10} Although, the text of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement already sets out EU – ACP parties’ accord to conclude new World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, progressively removing barriers to trade and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade and development,\textsuperscript{11} a mutually acceptable interpretation of this commitment were left to the actual negotiators to find.

At the core of the disagreement has been the interrelationship between development objectives and the nature of the proposed EPA trade agreements. In this debate, the positions of the main parties: the EU – represented by the European Commission/DG Trade – and the ACP group appear as worlds apart. Yet, all the parties seem to indeed agree that EPAs are first and foremost about development and that so-called “development dimension” should be central to the future EU-ACP economic relations.\textsuperscript{12} However, how this “development dimension” is conceptualized and how it relates to the very objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development have been a subject of an unparallel debate.

In this chapter, I will address the EPA debate from the point of view of discourses related to the “development dimension”. I claim that each party interprets development objectives and EPA negotiations according to its own discourse of “development dimension”. Or, more precisely that distinctive type of discourse of EPA “development dimension” defines a) the social context of the negotiations, b) the object (the

\textsuperscript{10} Namely, the EU has proposed inclusion of so-called new trade issues known also as the Singapore issues which include investment, competition and public procurement that were rejected by developing countries at the multilateral WTO level.

\textsuperscript{11} See the Cotonou Agreement Chapter 2, New Trading Arrangements, Article 36.

\textsuperscript{12} In the EPA debate it has become commonplace to make references to “development dimension” by participants across the board when preconditions for development or expected development outcomes of EPAs are discussed.
possible content of EPA agreements) and c) the expected implications of EPA agreements on development. In line with Agnew’s and Corbridge’s definition (see Grainger 2004: 283-284), I see these discourses as a historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories and beliefs on which parties constitute their positions. Finally, I have inferred these general discourses from the documents and statements of development and trade policies which guide the EPA negotiations.

My contribution will focus on the EU statements regarding the interrelationship between EU’s development and trade policy objectives that define the “development dimension”. In particular, I will discuss the way in which the EU legitimizes its promotion of EPA free trade agreements both in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and the WTO rules. In order to do so, I will first look at the nature of the development policy goals as stated in the Cotonou Agreement. Then, I will move to discuss the EU’s commitments to these goals and third, I will analyze the EU understanding of the interrelationship between these goals from the point of view of policy coherence as presented in the EU’s new trade agenda Global Europe and in the European Consensus on Development policy statement as well as in the Commission’s Communications on the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Fourth, I will map out the key elements through which the EU constitutes development dimension in its EPA negotiations position, and finally I will conclude with short analysis of the EU conception of the development dimension with respect to the stated development policy goals.

**Contending goals of the Cotonou Agreement**

Translations of objectives and principles of any given policy into practice is a complicated process. It is especially difficult when the objectives and principles are just nominated or defined so broadly that they are left open to various interpretations. This is very clearly the case with the key objectives of the Cotonou Agreement – “poverty reduction”,

“sustainable development” or “the world economy” to which the ACP countries are meant to be integrated into. Despite of these difficulties, the way in which the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement are declared in the text suggests that there is a *shared prior understanding* between the Parties on what the objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development imply and how the integrated approach to pursue these goals should be governed as it is not otherwise explicated in the text. This joint understanding of the objectives is supposed to come from the references made to certain international agreements in the preamble of Cotonou Agreement. Yet, the debate around EPAs demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between the parties on the very purpose of the EPA agreements both with respect to the poverty reduction objective and integration into the world economy goal. Regarding sustainable development, the question appears even more complicated.

When we start to look at the reasons for the conflicting visions on EPAs, we may first look at the nature of the international agreements the Cotonou Agreement refers to. These include the pledges of the major UN Conventions and first among these the preamble lists the Rio Declarations on sustainable development. On the other hand, the Cotonou Agreement also refers to the commitments made within the framework of the World Trade Organisation. However, the issue of compatibility of agendas of these two international organizations has been itself a subject of a large policy debate.

Regarding the Rio agenda on sustainable development, what is important to note for the purpose here, is that the thinking behind “sustainable development” is largely based on the Brundtland’s notions of sustainable development as

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13 These include The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Statement on the Forest Principles.

14 For contesting views in the WTO - Sustainable Development debate see e.g. Haxton & Olsson 1998, Dresner 2004 and Sampson 2005.
defined in *Our Common Future* report by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The WCED report also discusses the role of international economy and how it should be changed in order to promote sustainable development (WCED 1987: 2-18). At the core of the report is the idea of balance through integration of economic, social and environmental aspects of development which is needed to tackle poverty and inequality within the limits of world's ecological system. The report defines poverty and inequality both as the planet's main environmental problem as well as main development problem (ibid.: 3; 5-6). Moreover, the report presents as a fact that the faith of the world's ecological system and world economy are interlocked, which urgently requires policy integration of the three main aspects of development and respective institutional change to carry out this integration. The policy integration is of particularly importance with respect to economic growth and its equal distribution which WCED sees as crucial both for developing countries and the international system as a whole. At the same time growth should be directed to be socially and environmentally sustainable and the report states that it is largely the responsibility of developed countries to mitigate the harmful consequences of growth (ibid.: xii; 31-32; 5-54). In this paper, I adopt the Brundtland's claim on poverty and inequality as the core challenge for sustainable development. This claim is particularly challenging if we address it in the context of the international economy.

With regard to the “world economy” of the 1980's, the WCED report singles out factors that have hindered sustainable growth in developing countries. These obstacles include trade barriers in the wealthy nations and in many developing countries, unfair terms of agricultural trade and subsidize practices in the North, depressed commodity prices, protectionism, intolerable debt burdens, and declining flows of development finance (ibid.: 6-17). According to WCED in order to alleviate poverty and to build basis for sustainable
development, these trends must be reversed \textit{(ibid.: 17)} – a quest that has been echoed twenty years later in the debate around EPA negotiations and WTO-led international trading system.

Obviously, many actors while adopting a commitment to sustainable development have not embraced the full agenda as envisaged by Brundtland’s commission. What makes the question of promoting “sustainable development” particularly difficult is the way by which different actors have been able to use the concept for their own purposes by creating and changing priorities between “environment, economic and social” dimensions or simply using the “sustainable development label” without specifying its indented content. This has also made it possible for the World Trade Organization to become one of the key promoters of “sustainable development” while advancing its main agenda of trade liberalization.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast to the UN organizations and agreements, the WTO operates with \textit{binding} rules on global trade which gives to the commitments made at the WTO unique legal standing in comparison to UN-led pledges to pursue development targets. Furthermore, these international institutions have each their own agreed principles, norms, rules, procedures and programmes that govern the activities and shape the expectations of the actors in specific issue area (Grainger 2004: 283). However, in terms of broad development goals, the agendas of these two organizations tend to increasingly overlap although their original mandates have remained unaltered. This has been particularly the situation after the launch of the WTO Doha Development Round Agenda in 2001 which was followed by the UN Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 where participants agreed on promoting “mutual supportiveness” between sustainable development and trade liberalization (Ayre & Callway 2005: 15-16).

\textsuperscript{16} On the WTO as a promoter of sustainable development, see Sampson 2005.
However, for many scholars of sustainable development the attempts to superficially consolidate free trade and sustainable development have been worrying. Their fears are based on the free trade related tendency to lower environmental standards for short term economic advantage, to intensify the use of natural resources, to encourage consumption as well as to increase environmental impacts from transport of goods. In addition, it is seen that free trade also exposes developing countries to international competition which can prevent them from developing their own industries and which drives small local producers to the wall (Dresner 2004: 46-49; Elliot 2006: 109-113). In addition to the social and environmental development concerns related to the current WTO-led trading system, criticism emerges also within economists’ circuits. For instance, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005: 111-114) have presented an alternative “Agenda for a true Development Round” according to which world trade system as well as the Doha Development Round could be reformed in order to promote development and poverty reduction. Similarly, Sunanda Sen (2005) points to the contradiction of how theoretically discarded principles of free trade are still in use to push trade liberalization in developing countries while developed countries themselves have adopted new approaches for strategic trade and growth. Borrman and Busse (2007) have looked at this phenomenon in the context of EPAs from the point of view of institutional quality as a precondition for beneficial trade liberalization. They argue that current EPAs imply major risks for the vast majority of African ACP countries due to their lacking regulatory capacity that is needed to take advantage of the reciprocal trade agreements.

Interestingly, the EU has made commitments both with respect to the WTO and UN-led processes towards poverty reduction and sustainable development with legal obligations based on its founding treaties. Particularly interesting for the purpose of this contribution are the terms according to which the EU perceives the interrelationship between these commitments. Therefore, in the following section, I will address the objectives of Cotonou Agreement in the larger
in institutional context of EU’s Development and Trade Policies. I will mainly look at the issue from the point of view of policy coherence which I regard as a crucial precondition for any policy integration.

**EU commitments to poverty reduction and the principle of policy coherence**

The status of development policy as a common EU policy was established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1992 known as the Maastricht Treaty with juridical basis and common objectives. Although the Maastricht Treaty provided a new institutional foundation for the policy, it was build to govern already existing and expanding aid and economic cooperation relations formed since the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Community development policy was defined as complementary to policies pursuit by the Member States with three main objectives: the promotion of sustainable economic and social development of developing countries; their smooth and gradual integration in the world economy; and campaign against poverty in developing countries (Article 130u/177).

In addition to the principle of complementarity in the Treaty, two other principles were laid down to support the pursuit of the policy objectives. These formed the so called triple Cs': complementarity, co-ordination and coherence which were later completed with a fourth C component: consistency of EU’s external relations regarding security, trade and development policies. At the same time, the Council and the Commission became the representatives of single institutional framework of the Community as legal personality with power to enter into international agreements. This was

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17 Title XVII Development Co-operation Articles 130u, 130v, 130w, 130x and 130y. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provided amendments to the TEU but did not change the content for development co-operation. Note that in the Amsterdam Treaty Development Co-operation is dealt under Title XX, with new numbering of the Articles 177 (ex 130u), 178 (ex 130v), 179 (ex 130w), 180 (ex 130x) and 181 (ex 130y).
most clearly the case with Community policies exercising sole Community competence such as External Trade Policy. Common policies were also formulated within “pillars” of shared competency between the Community and the Member States such as Development Policy whereas more intergovernmental-based approach prevailed in Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Regarding the coherence principle referring to the relations of development policy objectives and other EU policies, the Article 178 (Ex Article 130v) of the Treaty states that:

The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.

After the establishment of the EU development policy, the policy objective of “campaign against poverty” has been made even more central by EU’s involvement in international development processes. These processes include, among the most important ones, the UN’s Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); Financing for Development in Monterrey; the commitments made at WTO Doha Development Round of international trade; as well as at the World Summit on Sustainable Development and during the processes around aid effectiveness and donor harmonization (COM 2005a: 3-4).

With respect to the commitments made to support Millennium Development Goals, the EU has pledged to achieve them by the year 2015 both at the Community as well as at the Member States levels (COM 2005b: 3). In this context the objective of “campaign against poverty” has been redefined as poverty eradication. At the same time the principle of coherence has become one of the main tools to govern the process towards this goal in EU’s development policy.

This shift was consolidated in the first joint development policy statement in the history of the EU called “the European Consensus” which was adopted by the EU Commission, the Parliament and the Member States presented at the Council of
General Affairs and External Relations in November 2005. Building on the Maastricht Treaty, the European Consensus Statement (par. 5) formulates the objectives of the EU Development policy as follows:

The primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

To this end, the EU development policy first of all builds on two main means to the poverty eradication objective. These are, first, increased aid and secondly, governance of EU’s non-aid policies by policy coherence for development (PCD) principle (The European Consensus: par. 9). Regarding the former, the EU has set a common timetable according to which the annual EU aid would double by 2010. The European Consensus Statement nominates Africa as the main beneficiary of this commitment to increased aid as the EU promises to allocate at least half of this additional aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.: par. 23).18 With respect to the so called Policy Coherence for Development in the European Consensus Statement (ibid.: par. 9), the EU has restated the coherence principle of the Maastricht Treaty and committed itself to ensuring that it shall take into account and make sure that all implemented EU policies support development objectives, an issue to which we will next turn to. This commitment has been formulated as follows:

We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives.

The general principles which were later on incorporated in the Policy Coherence for Development approach were originally

18 In addition, the EU-Africa Strategy (2005) names Africa as the first priority for implementation of the Commission’s “MDG package” as defined in COM 2005a, 2005b and 2005c.
launched at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in the beginning of the 1990s and from there it has developed into a larger area for debate which has spread to include academic work and civil society campaigns.\textsuperscript{19} The debate over policy coherence for development has largely revolved around the observation that development aid and development co-operation in their traditional forms \textit{will not} lead to poverty reduction \textit{if} other policy sectors simultaneously contradict the pursuit of development policy objectives.\textsuperscript{20}

According to the definition of the DAC, the principle of policy coherence in its narrowest sense implies that the \textit{objectives}, \textit{strategies}, \textit{mechanisms}, \textit{intentions}, \textit{motives} and \textit{outcome} pursued within a given policy framework are consistent with each other and are at the minimum and – most importantly here – not conflicting with \textit{objectives}, \textit{strategies}, \textit{mechanisms}, \textit{intentions}, \textit{motives} and \textit{outcome} of other policy frameworks of the system (OECD 1996: 8).

Against this institutional background, the case of EU’s Trade policy and Development policy is particularly intriguing. Both are policies of the same political system and legal entity but they are implemented by different agencies within the European Commission. Namely, the policy formulation and implementation in these domains are conducted by DG Trade and DG Development which have very diverse missions and policy goals. If we look at the Economic Partnership Agreements in this institutional setting, we may note that the issues dealt in the proposed EPAs cover both domains. From the point of view of the Cotonou Agreement, its objectives as

\textsuperscript{19} See Forster & Stokke 1999 and Hoebink 2004 for studies and definitions of policy coherence. For Civil Society Campaigns see e.g. Call for...(website), CFFA (website), Eurocoherence (website), Stop EPAs (website) and WIDE (website).

\textsuperscript{20} In this context especially the interrelationship between OECD countries’ \textit{agriculture} and \textit{development} policies is seen as one of the crucial cases in point. Regarding the efforts to poverty reduction, the implications of domestic agricultural policy, agricultural trade policy as well as regulatory policies affecting agricultural production and trade have been addressed and found very problematic in the recent studies by the OECD, see OECD 2005a, OECD 2005b and OECD 2006.
well as development aid provisions the EPAs situate in the
area of EU development policy but in terms of their form as
free trade agreements they are regarded as an issue of EU
Trade policy and thus competence of DG Trade.

In the following section, I will discuss the
interrelationship between the trade and development policies
as defined in the key EU statements regarding the respective
policy goals. I will look at the issues from the point of view of
EU’s notion of policy coherence which I see problematic and I
claim that the limits of the EU approach to policy coherence
constrict also the EU understanding of the development
dimension.

**Trade and Development: Competing goals or
compromised coherence?**

As defined in the previous section, the main objective of EU
development policy is to eradicate poverty and promote
sustainable development *outside Europe*. In terms of its
“instruments” development policy comprises development aid
and cooperation in various overlapping economic, political,
environmental and social sectors. In order to improve the
development policy impact, the EU commitment to policy
coherence for development principle should make sure that
the EU policies in other sectors than development policy also
support or at the barest minimum – do not contradict the
development policy objectives. If we look at the EU’s trade
policy agenda as defined in the Commission’s DG Trade
formulated Communication “Global Europe” (2006), it first
seems that EU’s self-interest driven trade discourse could not
be consolidated with EU’s development policy agenda. However, I will come to note that in the EC discourse of these
trade and development policy statements a trade-led consensus prevails which takes over the development goals.

While the EU development policy targets are set outside
Europe, the trade policy objective is first and foremost to build
a *Global Europe* by reinforcing EU’s own competitiveness,
growth and job creation in the global economic system which according to the DG Trade are essential conditions for economic prosperity, social justice and sustainable development within Europe (Global Europe 2006: 2). The advancement of EU’s trade agenda is to be done by “opening markets were European companies can compete abroad while rejecting protectionism at home and promoting fair trade abroad”. The latter “fair trade” policy task is to be conducted through the WTO-led multilateral trading system (ibid.: 6-7). Moreover, the EU’s trade strategy text states that the EU’s trade policy also seeks to contribute to development goals and maintains that coherence in this respect is vital to strengthening the EU’s global role (ibid.:2). Again, how this coherence that is to strengthen EU’s role also contributes to development objectives is left unspecified.

However, what is clearly advocated in the new trade strategy text is that EU’s trade policy model is not only suitable to serve EU’s interests, but it is also assumed that liberalization and increased competition in the multilateral trading system work also for the EU’s developing country partners regardless the huge differences in the size and stage of the economies as well as the societies as a whole. Therefore, DG Trade states further that progressive trade opening is an important source of productivity gains, growth, job creation, that is seen as essential factors in reducing poverty and promoting development (Ibid.:6). However, preconditions for this kind of economic development are not discussed. These assumed positive economic impacts are also what the DG Trade regards as the very essence of the EPAs.21 In general, the DG Trade’s position to Free Trade and Association Agreements is that while these arrangements have reinforced economic and regulatory ties with the EU as well as supported development objectives, the EU’s own trade interests have been less well served (ibid.: 10-11.)

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21 Here the EPA negotiations are presented in the context of the other planned bilateral Free Trade and association agreements between the EU and Central America and Andean Community.
With respect to the on-going EPA negotiations, this statement increases ambiguity. First, the formulation suggests that the primary function of Free Trade Agreements is to reinforce economic ties with EU and only secondarily to support development objectives. Second, the current Free Trade Arrangements have contributed to these objectives but they have not sufficiently promoted EU’s own trade interest. Since the EPAs are yet under negotiation, this argument might mean increased pressure to include EU’s trade interests into the Economic Partnership Agreements. However, based on the DG Trade vision of mutual benefits through increased competition and trade liberalization, there is no conflict between trade and development goals. Therefore, the EU’s discourse reinforces the conception that coherence prevails between the trade and development policies.

If we address the trade and development policy objectives from the point of view of EU’s development policy discourse, the interrelationship between the two appears even more ambiguous. It is interesting to note that on the one hand, the European Consensus Statement stresses the importance of policy coherence principle for the achievement of the development policy goals and restates EU’s full commitment to this principle. What is more, the statement acknowledges that there is need to advance policy coherence for development in a number of areas and nominates trade as the first of these sectors which are likely to affect developing countries (European Consensus: par. 35). But on the other hand, the European Consensus Statement expresses up-front strong support to “a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of the Doha Development Round and EPAs” with no single critical reference or concern with respect to EPA process or the international trading system (Ibid.: par. 36).

On the contrary, the statement describes the latter as “open, fair, equitable, rules-based which takes into account the interest and concerns of the weaker nations” (ibid.: par. 36). In this context, the development policy statement puts pressure on the ACP Countries to reform and liberalize their markets in a way which is very concretely linked to the on-
going EPA negotiations, whereas the larger context of the international trading system reflects more an idealized EU vision of the WTO than the current WTO setting with the suspended Doha Development round. However, European Consensus statement contains a list of measures that the EU is willing to use in order to pave the way for the EPAs. These measures include additional assistance for trade capacity-building, sequenced market opening, addressing special and differentiated treatment as well as preference erosion. In addition, EU promises quota and tariff access for LDC countries and mentions CAP reform, asymmetry and flexibility as facilitating factors in the implementation of the EPAs (ibid.: par. 36).

In the discourse of EU’s development policy documents the role of development aid, essential and necessary though it is seen to be, it is also regarded as insufficient to achieve poverty reduction, let alone poverty eradication. This emphasis is particularly strong in the Commission’s official communications regarding the EU’s contribution to UN Millennium Development Goals. Therefore; in these documents the EU development policy argumentation increasingly builds on assumed positive synergies between development policy and trade (COM 2005b: 9). However, at the same time, the EU states that its non-aid policies especially in areas such as trade, agriculture, fisheries, food safety, transport and energy have all a direct bearing on the ability of developing countries to generate domestic economic growth, which at its turn is at the basis of any sustained progress towards poverty reduction (COM 2005a: 7). To which extend this direct bearing is perceived as policy incoherence is less explicit.

However, in order to advance policy coherence for development in the area of trade both at the multilateral WTO and bilateral EPA levels, the EU development policy documents list out issues that the EU promises to tackle.

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22 The specific MDG and coherence documents include COM 2005a, 2005b, and 2005c 132, 133 and 134.
These issues include, for instance, support measures to EU agriculture (e.g. export subsidies and price-support), market access for agriculture, industrial goods as well as services, elimination of tariffs and tariff peaks, antidumping and fishery subsidies (COM 2005a: 5-8). In sum, the EU refers only to measures that are thought to be trade-distorting by the WTO. To certain extend these measures –if truly put in place– can also have a positive development impact. However, what is important to note here is that the EU is considering the interrelationship between trade and development exclusively in terms of trade liberalization. As for instance Khor (2006) and Goodison (2007) point out, mere removal of “trade-distorting” effects to advance trade liberalization is not sufficient enough to guarantee positive impact on development and poverty reduction.23

From the point of view of development goals, this trade-led conception limits decisively the EU quest for policy coherence with respect to its development policy objectives and thereby questions the adequacy of the EU approach to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development. The extent to which policy coherence for development is defined is directed by the WTO rules, rather than development objectives. However, the EU discourse presents the WTO compliance as part of the process of advancing development goals. Drawing from this analysis on the interrelationship between trade and development, I will next turn to assess the EC position at the EPA negotiations and the construction of development dimension to the proposed Economic Partnership Agreements.

23 This is particularly the case with EU’s agricultural subsidies which the EU has been able maintain high by changing their form from price-support to WTO compatible income-support that both Khor 2006 and Goodison 2007 discuss and claim that EU’s reforms have been insufficient to remove the negative implications of EU’s agricultural policy on development country producers.
The EC partner in the EPA battle and the limits of the development dimension

The complex process of negotiating EPAs began in 2002 with the Council providing the Commission’s DG Trade with a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU whilst on the ACP side guidelines for negotiations were agreed by ACP Trade and Finance Ministers. The first round of actual negotiations took place between the EU and all the ACP countries in order to agree on issues of interest to all regions followed by a current round between the EU and regional groups to address thousands of regionally specific issues and commitments. Progress and problems at these fronts were aimed to be assessed in mid-term review in September 2006. However, already the first round of negotiations was marked with difficulties in translating the spirit and principles of the Cotonou Agreement to the negotiation process and did not lead to formal ACP-EU agreement. In the following, I will briefly discuss the main elements that define the EC EPA negotiations stance with respect to the expected “development dimension”.

It can be safely assumed that each party in a negotiation has its own view or discourse which defines their negotiations stance. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreement, the EC enters into negotiations with certain aims, desires and beliefs based on EC officials’ understanding of the nature of the social change the economic partnership agreements should bring about, what are the contexts where they are to be applied and why a change is needed. Based on the previous sections of this paper, inferences about EC general discourse on development dimension are made in the following by identifying three aspects of the EC negotiations stance:

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24 The so-called “Joint Roadmap” documents between the EC and each regional grouping define the organization of the parties for the negotiations. The EC organization is based on the Treaty Establishing the European Community. The European Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU, represented by the Commissioner of Trade, on the ministerial level, and a senior official of DG Trade on the ambassadorial level. Preparations on the technical level will be co-ordinated by the geographical responsible unit in DG Trade.
a) EC’s dominant paradigm which defines its general attitude to the subject under discussions

b) EC’s primary goal which is what it wants to gain from the negotiations, and the achievement which it may make concessions on other topics, and

c) EC’s minimum acceptable compromise, which is its “bottom line” and the ultimate limit on its freedom to negotiate.25

At the level of broad guidelines, EC’s dominant paradigm can be inferred from its Trade and Development Policy Statements as discussed above. The EU expresses strong support to trade liberalization and increased competition which it regards as beneficial both for its own trade and development policy interests and thus also for the ACP partners. Reciprocity per se is not considered problematic if market liberalization takes place gradually. The rational for reciprocity rests on the principle that the liberalization of ACP markets towards the EU is expected to increase competition within ACP economies, reduce price for consumers, and stimulate investment as well as transfer of technology and knowledge (Bilal & Rampa 2006: 41). What follows is that the EC is in addition willing to include so-called New Trade issues of competition, investment and public procurement into the EPA agreements which the EC sees as reinforcing elements to the EPA packages.

However, the phase by which the gradual progress should take place is directed by the WTO rules and not by development needs of a specific ACP country or region. To discuss and assess the development benchmarks in terms of the advancement of poverty reduction goal is not EC trade competence and it is to be therefore excluded from the actual negotiations. However, according to some key officials of the Commission, the EU itself does not have any offensive interests vested in EPAs that would conflict with the poverty reduction goal (Wunenburger 2.10.2006; Manservisi 4.12.2006 and Dihm 2007). Even the suggested inclusion of New Trade Issues is compatible both with the EC’s Global Europe Trade Agenda and necessary for EU’s development through trade

25 See and compare with Grainger 2004: 283-292 on positions to Climate Change negotiations.
approach. In the reform of the EU-ACP economic relations, the EU will assist ACP countries in adjustments costs and capacity building. But negotiating on additional aid and cooperation are regarded as matters of the shared competence between the DG Development and the Member States and they should be therefore kept out from the actual free trade negotiations agenda. Thereby the development issues form a parallel agenda but they are not directly integrated into the free trade discussions. In order for EPAs to deliver their expected development benefits, they should be part of economic and development policy reform of each ACP State. In sum, EPAs are seen as the main instrument of economic and trade co-operation, closely linked to the political and development finance aspects of the Cotonou agreement (COM 2005d:3; COM 2003).

**EC’s primary goal** with respect to the EPAs is to conclude Free Trade Agreements and certain WTO compatibility in line with its Trade Policy. The EC can however consider making concessions regarding the New Trade Issues. In addition, what the EC promises to ACP countries as part of the Free Trade Agreement include increased market access, gradual and asymmetric trade liberalization to protect fragile sectors, removal of non-tariff barriers and support trade facilitation and deeper regional integration. It also considers reforming measures regarding export and price-support subsidies as required under the WTO rules.

**EC’s bottom line** can be described with two words: WTO compliance. This would imply a reciprocal Free trade agreement to open the ACP markets to the minimum level necessary to secure WTO compatible economic relations. However, the EC’s interpretation of the WTO rules is very strict and it has not showed willingness to explore alternatives to reciprocal free trade agreements.

In order to draw the limits which define the EC understanding of the development dimension, we may look at three factors. First, the EC assumes that development impact will follow the adoption of the trade liberalization paradigm in
the ACP countries. Second, this impact will be supported by development measures that will be negotiated outside the free trade agenda by DG Development which will consist of traditional elements of EU-ACP economic partnership, namely development co-operation programmes and (possibly some additional) aid to increase ACP countries’ trading capacity as well as to reduce the costs of the adjustment periods. However, aid and development cooperation at the Community and country levels should be formulated in line with EPAs and not vice versa. Finally and most importantly for this chapter, what remain absent in the EC position are considerations that would imply changes in the prevailing EU trade liberalization paradigm. It appears as if development – the goal – is meant to adjust to the EPA instrument and not vice versa.

**EC’s development dimension - ACP’s development disillusion**

The EC’s conception of the EPA development dimension is limited by two main assumptions. First, development in terms of advancing the poverty reduction and sustainable development objectives will follow if the ACP countries adopt the trade liberalization paradigm. Second, this process can be supported with parallel development agenda of aid and cooperation. However, even though the development agenda should be closely linked to trade policy, the EC does not consider policy integration necessary. This is because at the level of policy statements’ discourses the EC sees that the interrelationship between its development and trade policy objectives is harmonious as such.

This approach is further enhanced by the EC notion of policy coherence for development that the EU is willing to pursue within the limits of the WTO directed trade liberalisation in order to profit from the EC envisioned synergies of trade and development policy. As a result, there is no need to call for policy integration between trade and development policies which would imply fundamental changes in both policies. Instead, the EU aims – first of all – at meeting
the WTO compliance and to reduce “trade-distortion” rather than policy coherence that would be based on its development policy objectives. In this respect, the EC has made a decisive choice to prioritize its commitments made at the WTO framework over the UN-led processes to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Of course this is not surprising if we compare the status of the UN declarations with legally binding WTO rules. However, given that the EU has made binding commitments to poverty reduction and sustainable development in its founding Treaty as well as in the Cotonou Agreement, the issue is much more complicated. I claim that this prioritization of one goal to the detriment of the others raises fundamental questions of governance in the EU policy-making.

In the light of the EU discourse, the EPAs seem more appropriate to support EC’s trade policy agenda than the original development goals. Therefore the EU understanding of the development dimension is more likely to cause development disillusionment than to advance the development policy objectives. The challenge to the EC vision does however emerge from three fronts. First, the debate on alternative visions to free trade paradigm contests the basic EC assumptions. Secondly, the development goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development thinking challenge EC’s one-dimensional trade-led approach. However, it is matter of political will to promote a paradigm change. Unfortunately, at the present this will is not sufficiently strong due to the prevailing consensus on development and trade goals within the EC. Lastly, and most importantly here, the legitimacy of the EC stand to EPAs is strongly questioned by the ACP partners of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This has led to a paradoxical situation that I see as the core of the EPA conflict. The tool that was to facilitate the achievement of the development goals is regarded as contradictory to the very purpose of the ACP-EU Partnership and the Cotonou Agreement by a number of legitimate parties both in the ACP states and in Europe. This is a contradiction that the European Union must face.
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Politics and partnership in the Cotonou Agreement

Liisa Laakso

Introduction

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the European Union and 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states signed in June 2000 is structured on three pillars: aid, trade and the political dimension. The political pillar was soon praised as the most important innovation of the whole partnership (Vanheukelom et al. 2006). Although the main goals of the agreement: poverty alleviation, the promotion of sustainable development and the integration of the ACP states into the world economy, do not directly relate to the political dimension, all activities conducted in order to achieve these goals can be linked to it. This linking, more than anything else, relates to resources and to attempts to improve the efficiency of aid (see Koponen & Mattila-Wiro 1996). The agreement allows withdrawing or redirecting of funding reserved for development activities if the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of law or good governance are violated.

Withdrawing development funds from a state can be harmful, at least from the point of view of its rulers. Yet the concept of partnership in the title of the agreement points towards a mutually beneficial relationship between sovereign states. Therefore, if the economic pressure of the EU challenges de facto authority in any of the ACP states, the very idea of partnership is also challenged.

My aim here is to look at the tension between partnership and the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement and its impact on the actual implementation of the agreement. Although only Title II (covering Articles 8-13) of the agreement is explicitly devoted to the political dimension, the focus of this paper is on the changing use of Article 96, that stipulates when and how aid can be withdrawn or redirected due to political reasons. I will overview the cases where Article 96 has been used between 2000 and 2006 and look at more in detail the case of Zimbabwe, where partnership has been particularly contested.² However, before going to Article 96, it is useful to clarify the notion of partnership and its interpretations, as well as the historical development of the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement.

The concept of partnership

Partnership is a familiar concept not only in the corporate sector, but in international relations, too. It is used to describe the relationships between governments, NGOs, local authorities, research institutes, multilateral organizations and private companies. This is particularly so in the field of development cooperation, even though development cooperation entails highly differing power relations of donors and recipients (see Fowler 1998, 140). In this regard, the EU-ACP cooperation is not an exception. The concept of

² The analysis is based on an evaluation study on coordination and coherence in the application of Article 96 commissioned by the government of the Netherlands (Laakso et al 2007a). This paper also utilizes a series of Discussion Papers by ECDPM published in August 2005 (Bradley 2005; Mackie & Zinke 2005; Mbangu 2005; Hazelzet 2005.)
partnership is mentioned 52 times in the 100 Articles of the Cotonou Agreement and nine times in its Annexes and thus ranked before such issues as gender and sustainability (Raffer 2001, 3, 17). In fact, partnership has a long history in the EU-ACP cooperation stemming from the special connections between the European powers and their ex-colonies. The predecessors of the Cotonou Agreement, the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000), were internationally applauded as instigating a culture of partnership and dialogue. The ACP countries were entrusted with a role in the management of the development resources provided by the Europeans, while the European powers secured support from their ex-colonies in the context of the cold war rivalry. The EU/EC, however, adopted a neutral stance with regard to political affairs in the ACP countries, let alone such cases as Idi Amin’s Uganda.

The concept of partnership is not easily defined. The international solidarity movement influenced it in the 1970s and 1980s, but since 1990s the question more often has been about efficiency and sustainability in development cooperation (Lister 2000, 228). In both cases the first connotation of the concept of partnership is positive: Development partnerships are not enforced relations. However, they are not entirely voluntary either. Although the initial decision to engage in cooperation might be voluntary, once that decision has been taken, it becomes an obligation to all parties or at least withdrawing from the cooperation would be costly. It also has to be noted that the possibilities of countries to choose whether they want to be donors or recipients of aid are very limited$^3$ - as is the alternative of remaining outside such organizations as the World Bank and the United Nations, the most active generators of the partnership discourse. As far as the question is about development needs, partners are brought together by a certain kind of urgency; a discourse of needs and urgency is typical in development cooperation documents, including the Cotonou Agreement and official papers related to it.

$^3$ China, is a significant exception. It is a developing country receiving development aid, but also a donor - although an unconventional one in Africa in particular.
Furthermore, partnership is expected to be mutually beneficial, but it is not necessarily based on equality. Consequently the notion of partnership can justify cooperation within unequal relations (Abrahamssen 2004, Gould 2005). An early example is the racist discourse in Southern Africa. The 1965 Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was ideologically founded on partnership between African and European populations as an alternative to majority rule. Godfrey Martin Huggins, Rhodesian Prime Minister before UDI and Ian Smith’s era gave an infamous description to this partnership as one between “a horse and its rider”. It is never easy to state whether the partnership legitimises the existing unequal power relations or whether it strengthens the subordinate partners (see Lloyd & Rowan, 2005). This concerns also the relationship between political dimension and poverty alleviation. Without rule of law, respect for the human rights and the democratic empowerment of the poor, alleviation of poverty is difficult. Yet inequality and poverty are not only problems within states, but also between states. Pressure for democracy, rule of law and human rights might promote poverty alleviation within developing countries, while their effect on the empowerment of poor states, and on ending international poverty, might be the opposite.

Even though partnership is an unspecific and flexible concept with regard to the power relations and decision making structures, formal agreements define explicit responsibilities, rights and obligations. Partners are assumed to have their own identity and are accountable to their own constituencies or stakeholders and they need to convince them of the costs and benefits of partnership arrangements. With regard to comprehensive agreements like the Cotonou Agreement, costs and benefits might vary depending on the issue area in question. Furthermore, the points of reference for different actors, even within one party of the agreement can diverge. There is seldom a fixed or common understanding of even the key principles of the agreement, but dialogue and frequent reviews of the agreement are necessary for the cooperation to continue. The Cotonou Agreement, which lasts for 20 years,
contains a clause allowing it to be revised every five years, known as the Mid-Term Reviews. The first revision was made in 2005. Among other things this included new stipulations to the Article 96 as will be explained later.

The specific implications of partnership for Article 96 cases can be approached by asking whether invoking Article 96 is perceived as based on a common understanding or whether it is seen as a unilateral decision by one party (the EU). In addition, we should ask whether both parties consider the use of Article 96 to be beneficial for their own interests and objectives. If unilaterally invoked and if benefiting only the EU, partnership-rhetoric might indeed rather legitimise the subordinate position of the ACP countries than empower them.

**The political dimension of ACP-EU partnership**

ACP-EU relations were affected by pressures to pay attention to human rights and democracy after the end of the cold war. The Maastricht Treaty of the European Union in 1992 introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to EU external action. A human rights clause was to be included in all EU agreements with third parties. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and rule of law were listed as essential elements of the Lomé Convention IV in 1995, providing for the first time a legal basis to withdraw funds from an ACP country that did not respect these elements (Article 336a). EU aid had previously been suspended without formal procedures or a legal basis for a few ACP countries. This had been criticised for lacking transparency. Article 336a resulted in some two dozen cases of aid withdrawal. For the EU they reflected sensitivity to taxpayer concerns; for the ACP side the question was about an erosion of the principle of partnership (Vanheukelom et al. 2006).

In 1996 the European Commission launched a broad-based consultation process to guide the negotiations of the

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4 Same five-year periods are followed in the financing that is available to the ACP states through the European Development Fund (EDF).
successor agreement to the Lomé Convention. The results of this process were published in the so-called Green Paper (European Commission 1996). According to the Green Paper, the principle of partnership had “come up against a number of difficulties.” It had “proved hard to put initial intentions, based on the principle of equal partners, into practice” due to conditionality and the EU tendency to decide for recipients “like other donors” (1996: 39). Different perceptions between the ACP and the EU were making the management of the development resources of the EDF time-consuming and ineffective. However, in spite of these critical notions, political conditionality became even stronger in the Cotonou Agreement (Raffer 2001: 16-17).

In addition to incorporating the essential elements introduced in Lomé on human rights, rule of law and democratic principles, governance was added as a new “fundamental element” of the partnership in Article 9. Also the EU approach towards conflict prevention and security policy was specified. Article 11 commits the signatories to an integrated policy of peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It emphasises the importance of being engaged with conflict affected partner countries. The EU has recognised elsewhere that isolating countries can lead to state failure, which in turn is related to several conflict risks, including that of terrorism. In the EU Security Strategy this is articulated through the notion of “preventive engagement” (Solana 2003: 2). The Communication on Governance and Development (European Commission 2003) further clarified the commitment to stay engaged in “difficult partnerships.” Following this line of reasoning would imply that the EU respects the principle of partnership and cooperates even with governments that are violating agreed principles. There is a potential tension between this approach and withdrawing aid after invoking Article 96.

Article 8 establishes the important principle of political dialogue. The objective is “to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas” as well as “preventing
situations arising in which one Party might deem it necessary to have recourse to the non-execution clause.” By stating that regular, comprehensive, balanced and ongoing dialogue should lead to “commitments on both sides” it builds on the presumed equality of the partners. Article 8 notes that dialogue is not strictly regulated: “The dialogue shall be conducted in a flexible manner. Dialogue shall be formal or informal according to the need, and conducted within and outside the institutional framework, in the appropriate format, and at the appropriate level including regional, sub-regional or national level.” This makes the actual use of the instrument quite complex. According to Vanheukelom et al. (2006, 2), during the negotiations ACP partners were concerned about the lack of clear guidance on how and when political dialogue on (perceived) violations of essential elements would transit from Article 8 into Article 96 consultations. ACP side also feared that this would increase conditionality and be implemented inconsistently.

As already noted, Article 96 falls outside the Political Dimension (Title II) section of the Cotonou Agreement. Yet it is closely associated with it, since it can only be invoked when the essential elements spelt out in Article 9 have been breached. Article 96 has a sister article, Article 97, which concerns the fundamental element of good governance. So far this has been used only once, in the case of Liberia, and even then in connection with Article 96.

Article 96 stipulates that if one party violates the essential elements, a “concerned party” after having sought to resolve their differences through the political dialogue called for in Article 8, may invite the violating party to consultations. The point of the consultations is to conduct an examination of the situation with a view to seeking a resolution acceptable to the parties. If no agreement is reached, the concerned party may take “appropriate measures” against the other party, which it deems to be abusing the essential elements. “Appropriate measures” can be restricted to diplomatic steps or “smart sanctions”, but can also involve the suspension or redirection of aid or the imposition of further conditions. Appropriate
measures can include also positive actions like supporting free and fair electoral processes.

Although the language of the article notes that either party can invite the other party to formal consultations and instigate appropriate measures against it suggesting that the question is about equal partners, its practical implementation tells another story. Without exceptions the party using this instrument has been the EU while the “targeted” party has always been an ACP state.

**Understanding Article 96**

James Mackie and Julia Zinke (2005) flesh out the different interpretations given to the nature of Article 96. While the EU wants to see the consultation procedure as an ultimate means for resolving differences through deepened discussions, the common perception is that of a “sanction article” not only on the ACP side but also in civil society. Because the provision has been invoked only by the EU in response to violations of the essential elements on the ACP side, and because there is no case of consultations which would have led to an agreement without appropriate measures, Article 96 looks like an instrument of sanction to be used by the EU against ACP states.

The EU and the ACP states altered some parts of Article 96 during the 2005 mid-term review of the Cotonou Agreement. The ACP group proposed that the decision to start consultations should be a joint EU-ACP decision. The EU did not accept this, but agreed to add a provision for “intensified dialogue” under Article 8 before moving to Article 96: “All possible options for dialogue under Article 8” must be exhausted before Article 96 is invoked. Furthermore, this dialogue should be “systematic and formal” which diverges from the tone in Article 8 which also implied informal dialogue. It was also stipulated that representatives of the ACP Group and of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly may take part in the political dialogue. Exceptions to this requirement were “cases of special urgency” (like coups d’état) and cases
where “there is persistent lack of compliance with commitments taken by one of the Parties during an earlier dialogue, or by a failure to engage in dialogue in good faith.”

In addition, the mid-term review extended the timeframe for consultations from 60 to 120 days, which was seen to be more feasible. The idea of partnership was strengthened by the stipulation that the Joint Council representing the EU and ACP states can lay down additional arrangements with regard to the stages of the consultation, benchmarks and targets.

**Invoking Article 96**

The Cotonou Agreement gives a rigid description of the process of invoking Article 96. This provides the EU Commission the purely administrative role of proposing consultations to the Council whenever a breach of an essential element occurs. In reality, however, the Commission implements a case-by-case approach adjusting to the specific circumstances of each country and Member State’s views and thus establishes a political role for itself. The Commission is not eager to propose consultations if it is not clear that the Member States would support it. Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 has been the only case where the Council decided against the proposal of the Commission to start consultations. The reasons related to the very serious situation in Côte d’Ivoire and to the fact that the EU was involved in the UN peace process there. However, also the uncooperative attitude of the Ivoirien government eroded the usefulness of Article 96. The threat of civil war was acute. In such a situation it was seen that the EU had more leverage to influence the peace process in the country by maintaining as normal relations as possible.

There is no evidence of systematic bias or double standards, however. The influence of the ex-colonial powers is particularly interesting. After comparing EU reactions to almost 500 cases of human rights violations between 1989 and 2000 (mostly before the Cotonou Agreement), Hadewych Hazelzet (2005) concluded that former colonies in general were not shielded from sanctions, but became subject to harsher
sanctions than countries that had not been colonies. Hazelzet found that the degree of human rights violations was a more powerful factor than the interests of the EU (i.e., if an ACP violating country was a previous colony of an EU Member State, or had significant trade relations or strategic importance to the EU). As the level of human rights violations increased the likelihood that the EU would suspend its cooperation increased, too.

However, the Hazelzet study also showed that there was variation among the ex-colonial relations. While former French and British colonies were no more or less likely to be sanctioned than countries that had not been colonies, the former colonies of smaller Member States experienced sanctions most often. Furthermore, the degree of sanctions applied varied, being softest in the case of the former colonies of France. Hazelzet concluded that those punished most harshly were not defended in the EU Council by their former colonizers, with the exception of France and, to a lesser extent, Britain, which made efforts to protect their former colonies (ibid.). Partnership, thus, seems to be affected by historical colonial links and the relative power of the EU Member State in question.

It is important to pay attention to situations where invoking Article 96 is not proposed in spite of severe and well-documented violations of the essential elements; a case in point is EU election observation mission reports about flaws in the electoral process in Ethiopia noted by the European Parliament (2006). From a pragmatic point of view this is not surprising, as the commitment of the authorities of the ACP country concerned is one of the key factors determining the positive or negative outcome of a consultation procedure (Mackie & Zinke 2006). There is no willingness to use the instrument if prospects of its usefulness are low. As with aid conditionality in general the problem, of course, is that its mechanical implementation implies that EU development aid is most likely to be withheld from countries where such an action is least likely to have an impact on the government (Morrissey 2004). Governments that are violating human rights and democratic
principles almost by definition do not feel accountable to their citizens or the international community. In such cases the EU approach instead might be on attempts to tailor the cooperation so that it could strengthen positive rather than negative development in the country in question. In this regard partnership is indeed a significant bargaining factor in the EU-ACP relations.

In the most unstable political situations like wars or fragile periods of peace negotiations or peace processes, Article 96 would probably not be very useful either. An example of this is the case of Sudan. “Silent diplomacy” can be more effective than a consultation process that attracts public attention. Furthermore in countries in conflict, regular EU development cooperation has usually been decreased substantially due to reasons of insecurity or logistical difficulties. If only humanitarian aid is left, there is little with which to put pressure on the authorities of the ACP country in question. Member States might also consider other multilateral forums to be more appropriate than the Cotonou framework to undertake action. The EU can impose sanctions following UN Security Council resolutions or support UN-led peace processes, for instance.

As a consequence the EU is patient towards continuing problems with regard to the essential elements in the framework of Article 96. There are countries which have had a poor record in human rights and democracy for a long time, but with which the EU has not been willing to invoke Article 96. However, a sudden erosion of the political situation seems to rapidly lead to the use of the instrument. It can be noted that the EU has used the instrument consistently in all coup d’état cases.
Article 96 in practice

Until the end of 2006, Article 96 was invoked eleven times: with Zimbabwe, Fiji, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Central African Republic, Togo, the Republic of Guinea, Mauritania and Liberia. In Liberia, Article 97 was also referred to. The list confirms the findings of Hazelzet that the former colonial powers have not prevented their ex-colonies from being invited to consultations. Among the consultation countries, there have been former colonies of France, United Kingdom, Portugal and Germany.

Ex-colonial powers, however, have had an active role in the negotiations and have influenced the content of the appropriate measures, the timing of consultations and other actions the EU might take. The United Kingdom (although not alone) was active in pressing the Commission to propose consultations with Zimbabwe in a speedy manner. France delayed the process in the case of Guinea. Portugal, in turn, pressed toward the decision to send an election observation mission to Guinea Bissau. The relative importance of ex-colonial powers stems not only from their material and/or cultural interests, but also from the practical fact that they have embassies in their former colonies while most EU Members States have not.

In half the cases the reason for invoking Article 96 has been a coup d'état. The other half consists of violations of democratic principles alone or combined with violations of human rights. The time span that has been needed before normalisation of relations has varied, but only in two cases (Côte d’Ivoire in 2001 and Togo in 2004) this happened already the following year. In the case of Haiti this took five years and in the case of Zimbabwe the process is lasting even longer.

With many countries one can ask why the EU did not start consultations before the coup d'état, when there was already information on violations of human rights and democratic principles. The Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau and

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5 Detailed descriptions of all ten cases and the consultation process are available in Laakso et al 2007b.
Mauritania performed poorly with regard to human rights, democracy and rule of law already before the coup. The EU can easily be accused of applying Article 96 only when a violation of the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement became too obvious, but ignoring continuous or slowly deteriorating violations of the principles. However, in these cases the EU had issued statements condemning the political situation and it had also kept the door open for political dialogue. This means that Article 96 has usually been considered as an instrument of last resort instead of an instrument that could be used in order to prevent major constitutional crises. Consultations are initiated in a reactive manner only after flagrant breaches of the essential elements have taken place. Zimbabwe is an exception in this regard, but also an example that has been particularly damaging for the ACP-EU partnership.

With regard to the outcomes of the consultations, one has to note that the list of commitments that the ACP country will have to comply with reflects the often complicated and gradually developed situations. While consultations are considered an instrument of last resort, they are – with good reasons – conducted in a comprehensive manner. Since the process never immediately leads to the intended outcome, the end result is a long list of issues needing improvement before appropriate measures (sanctions) can be lifted and relations normalised. Even in cases of clear-cut coup d'état the background is usually marred by political, social and economic problems. Balancing between what is feasible and what is desirable before relations can be normalised is not easy. Even when desired by both parties, the exit is a delicate contest between sovereignty (for the ACP state) and credibility (for the EU).

Appropriate measures that are positive in nature, of course, are different in this regard. The possibility to normalise relations after a deep crisis or even coup d'état through the use of Article 96 have made it a window of opportunity for the ACP side. Increasingly there are cases where the ACP states have actively cooperated in invoking the Article. These include Central African Republic in 2003, Guinea Bissau in 2003, Togo
in 2004, Guinea in 2004 and Mauritania in 2005. Guinea Bissau and Mauritania were actually rewarded with an increase in aid in support of the democratic transition process. Furthermore in cases of coup d'état, invoking Article 96 has sometimes been the first international reaction giving de facto recognition for the new government (in spite of its illegal character). Only in the case of Fiji did the EU not negotiate with the coup leaders or the interim government that they put in place.

Appropriate measures can also be limited to monitoring. The most important mechanism is election observation. All cases where Article 96 has been invoked have raised the issue of free and fair elections. In cases of coup d'état, holding democratic elections is a key for constitutional rule and normalisation of relations with the EU. Without exception the other cases (motivated by the “standard reason” of violations of democratic principles) have also centred on electoral politics. One could therefore expect that the EU election observation mission would be a rule rather than an exception during the period between consultations and the lifting of appropriate measures. This, however, is not the case.

Sometimes, however, election observation has played a role preceding the Article 96 process. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the EU initially wanted to send in observers, but in the end withdrew from the process due to conditions it could not accept. Guinea, in turn, is a case where the EU, before deciding to invoke Article 96, considered the possibility of election observation and sent a mission to the country to investigate electoral preparations. In the end, the government of Guinea did not invite the EU to observe its elections and the EU also concluded that conditions were not conducive to free and fair elections. Election observation is, of course, meaningless if the process can be judged not to be free and fair beforehand. In this respect it requires at least some respect for democratic principles.

Only the elections in Guinea Bissau (2005), Liberia (2005) and Mauritania (2006) have been observed by the EU between
consultations and the lifting the sanctions. The fact that these are recent cases suggests that election observation is becoming an instrument to normalise the relations between the EU and an ACP state experiencing political crisis. Significantly, too, the EU sent election observers to Haiti and Fiji in 2005 after the normalisation of relations with these countries. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the EU has used other positive measures to support the electoral process, including assistance given to domestic observers.

In general, one can note that the EU has become increasingly hesitant to use Article 96 if the government of the ACP state in question is not cooperative. Between Zimbabwe in October 2001 and the Central African Republic in June 2003 the Article was not invoked a single time. The first two new cases after 2002, the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau, were clear coups d'état. With one exception (that of Guinea) all of the post-Zimbabwe cases have been conducted in a positive atmosphere: either at the ACP country's own initiative (Guinea Bissau, Togo and Mauritania) or with a de facto government eager to legitimise its unconstitutional regime by normalising relations with the EU (Central African Republic). This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that while serious human rights violations and lack of rule of law were observed in 2004 in Côte d'Ivoire almost at the same time as the Togo case, the former, as noted above, was dropped without a decision to open consultations in the Council in spite of the Commission proposal. The latter, at the initiative of the Togo government, was pursued. Guinea is also a special case as there the EU actually used consultations to find a legal basis for the decision of one EU Member State (Germany) to block the planning of further development cooperation with the country. In that case the sanctions (or appropriate measures) actually preceded the decision to start consultations. In order to understand the critical role played by Zimbabwe since 2001 it is useful to look at that case more in detail.
The case of Zimbabwe

EU-Zimbabwe relations started to deteriorate towards the end of 1990s along with growing economic problems and political tensions in the country, although the EU and Member States had supported human rights, elections and the media as an important part of their development cooperation for a long time. After a majority of Zimbabwean voters rejected the government proposal for a new constitution in the 2000 referendum, the government started to support a campaign of forceful acquisition of the properties of white farmers. The EU expressed criticism and called the government to hold free and fair elections in May 2000. It also pressed the Zimbabwean government to accept EU observers. However, even before the EU Election Observation Mission entered the country, the EU criticized the campaign period as not enabling a free and fair election. The Zimbabwean government reacted by ruling that certain European nationalities (including Swedes and British) were not allowed to participate in the observation mission. This was not acceptable for the EU, which then decided not to observe the elections.

The ruling party, ZANU(PF), won the elections and the intimidation of the opposition continued ahead of the 2002 presidential elections – as did the criticism of the EU. The EU Delegation and Member States’ embassies in Harare started discussing the possibility of a dialogue under Article 8 in September 2000, with some Member States advocating a direct move to Article 96. The Commission provided the proposals for consensus and in February 2001 a request was made to the government of Zimbabwe to start an Article 8 political dialogue.

According to the EU, Zimbabwe did not live up “to its previously good reputation regarding the essential elements” (European Commission 2001, 2). Commissioner Poul Nielson and President Mugabe decided in Brussels in March 2001 to conduct a dialogue under Article 8. This would have been led by the Heads of Mission in Harare. Over the following few months, five meetings were held in Harare, but the only subject that was discussed was the agenda. At the end of June the
Zimbabwean government pronounced itself ready to start the dialogue. The EU General Affairs Council noted the following aims for the dialogue:

- an end to political violence, and in particular an end to all official encouragement or acceptance of such violence;
- an invitation to the EU to support and observe coming elections and full access to that end;
- concrete action to protect the freedom of mass media;
- independence of the judiciary and respect for its decisions; and
- an end to the illegal occupation of properties.

Member States took an active role in determining the critical approach of the EU. The UK, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany took a “hard line.” Sweden, which held the EU presidency in the first half of 2001 was particularly important. France, however, opposed invoking article 96, but left the EU-Zimbabwe policy largely to the British. Zimbabwean perceptions of the lead role of its old colonial master were reflected in its eagerness to refer to the injustices of the colonial past. This, in turn, appeared to be something that neither the EU nor the British government were prepared to discuss within the Cotonou partnership.

In September 2001 a land reform conference was held in Abuja, Nigeria, where a number of Commonwealth countries and the UNDP entered into an agreement with the government of Zimbabwe. For a short while there was some optimism on the part of the UK in particular. However, Zimbabwe’s failure to start implementing the Abuja Agreement soon made the UK and the whole EU tougher again. The Commission started preparing a communication to the Council and Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge visited Brussels in October, but this did not help the situation. A few days later the General Affairs Council considered the Commission’s proposal and approved the opening of an Article 96 process. According to the Commission it was “hardly realistic to expect an early reversal of present policies” in Zimbabwe (European
No effective dialogue had taken place within the Article 8 framework.

At least partial explanation for the haste of the EU was the forthcoming elections and its eagerness to have an influence on the arrangements of the elections. The Council set a two-month time limit for Zimbabwe to progress on the above mentioned points before taking appropriate measures.

The Zimbabwean government argued that the real EU agenda was regime change in Zimbabwe and that this was dictated by the UK, which was already implementing sanctions by conditioning its bilateral aid to Zimbabwe. For Zimbabwe the EU move was unilateral and a poor example of the spirit of partnership. This feeling was exacerbated by the inability of the EU to be represented in the first consultation meeting in 2001 by a delegation of as high a level as was sent by the Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe sent five ministers to the consultations, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EU delegation did not include representatives at the ministerial level, but was led by the Spanish Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the EU. For the Zimbabweans, the lower level of the EU delegation indicated a lack of respect, in spite of the EU's explanation that it was the result of busy timetables and the length of time taken to reach an agreed date.

There were several issues where the EU wanted to see improvement. While a comprehensive approach was in line with EU development policy, it turned into an unworkable list of wishes when used in conditioning aid and cooperation, not least since some of the issues had been tolerated in the past and in some issues the Zimbabwean performance had actually improved when compared to previous years. Furthermore, as the Zimbabweans very well knew, there were ACP countries where the human rights situation, for instance, was worse, but which still were not invited to consultations. However, leaving some important issues out of the consultations would have signalled that the EU was not concerned about them.

Zimbabwe referred to the partnership principle in the Cotonou Agreement, the need for a deeper EU appreciation of
the problems Zimbabwe had with land reform and the urgent need to restore UK-Zimbabwe collaboration on the land reform program. The EU sought access for observers and the media to the elections in addition to a government plan on “its actions on all points covered by the discussion” within one week. The EU was to review the situation at the General Affairs Council on 28 January. Zimbabwe sent the requested letter on 18 January. The EU subsequently noted that “essential elements” were not respected, and announced its intention to impose sanctions if

- Zimbabwe prevented the deployment of an EU observation mission, prevented this mission from operating, or prevented the international media from having free access to cover the election;
- there was a deterioration of the human rights’ situation or attacks on the opposition; or
- the elections were assessed as not being free and fair.

Zimbabwe invited foreign observers and an EU observer team led by former Swedish minister Pierre Schori’s arrived in early February. The Zimbabweans, then, indicated that certain EU nationalities, including Swedes, would not be acceptable. Schori was unable to remain in Zimbabwe and had to leave only a week after his arrival, just before the General Affairs Council meeting of 18 February 2002. The Commission and the Council secretariat were already preparing the papers for the passing of sanctions against Zimbabwe. The EU, thus, was not waiting for Zimbabwe’s response, even though the aim of the consultations had been to try to solve the problem. The General Affairs Council meeting resulted in an agreement to conclude the consultations and to adopt appropriate measures, since the human rights situation, electoral policy and rule of law in the country had not improved.

Zimbabwe argued that there was a dispute between Zimbabwe and the EU and wanted to invoke Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreement which allows disputes between parties to be submitted to the Joint Council of Ministers for settlement. The question is about a standard stipulation in international agreements, the use of which in this context surprised the EU.
The dispute, however, was not solved through this mechanism either.

The General Affairs Council's decision to impose “smart sanctions” against high officials of the Zimbabwean Government (who were believed to be in a position to influence government decisions) was a unilateral foreign policy measure. The sanctions consisted in travel restrictions and freezing the assets of “Cabinet Ministers, Politburo Secretaries, Deputy Ministers, Assistant Secretaries of the Politburo and the spouse of President Mugabe.” The EU also forbade the sale of arms to Zimbabwe, and the 9th EDF for the period 2002-2007 was not signed. Every year since 2002, the EU has decided to maintain the appropriate measures with minor changes such as the individuals listed on the travel ban.

Aid has been directed towards social sectors and cooperation with civil society. Relief aid has continued. In some respects direct support to the people has exacerbated difficult relations between the EU and the government, because the EU is viewed as seeking to influence the constituency of a government without involving it. The Zimbabwean government, in turn, seeking to gain mileage from humanitarian support, has provided it through its own structures so that it would be viewed as government support to the people. This has irritated the EU.

Smart sanctions have made it difficult for the EU to conduct dialogue with Zimbabwe. Also the dialogue between the EU and Africa has been harmed by the EU-Zimbabwe dispute. The EU has tried to solve practical problems on a case-by-case basis. For instance, it agreed to move one EU-SADC meeting scheduled for Copenhagen to Maputo because of the travel ban. France, in turn, invited Mugabe to an Africa Summit in Paris, because it did not want to damage its relations with Africa over the Zimbabwe issue. On the other hand, a decision by the European Parliament not to allow two Zimbabwean ministers to access their buildings resulted in the last minute cancellation of the 4th Session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 2002.
The government of Zimbabwe tells the public that the country is under illegal sanctions (because they are not endorsed by the United Nations). The common perception amongst Zimbabweans is that aid has decreased as a result of these sanctions. Although the Zimbabwean government recognizes that the EU and its Member States are still investing in the social sector, it does not praise the EU for excluding humanitarian aid, aid benefiting the people and economic relations from the appropriate measures. The government's view is that the measures are negatively affecting the economy. The UK in particular bears the brunt of this. The smart sanctions have also divided the Zimbabwean civil society, including the churches and the opposition. Some believe that sanctions should be extended if they are to be really effective. Others believe that they are making things worse. Some argue that there is need for education of the citizens so that they know that the economic problems in Zimbabwe are not due to smart sanctions.

Nothing has formally prevented an Article 8 political dialogue from proceeding. However, little dialogue has occurred between the Member States and Zimbabwe. Some of the ambassadors of the EU Member States are trying to promote dialogue with government ministers, but for many Europeans the current line of ZANU(PF) is anti-West, which makes dialogue impossible. The views of the Member States and the Commission differ to the extent that some Member States argue that any Article 8 discussions need to be initiated by Member States and such discussions have not been conducted, while other Member States are of the opinion that there had been such dialogue. The Commission, in turn, regards all of its interaction with the Zimbabwean government as dialogue referred to in Article 8, and has conducted preparatory discussions for the 10th EDF also in order to enhance political dialogue. Commissioner Louis Michel, for example, met with Zimbabwe’s Ministers in Gaborone and again in Brussels in 2006 during the ACP Ministers of Finance meeting.

The appropriate measures have been maintained much longer than was initially hoped and predicted among the
Member States. In preparation for an exit strategy, the EU set out benchmarks already in 2003 according to which any positive moves on the side of the government of Zimbabwe could be assessed. The benchmarks are consistent with the initial concerns of the EU and are comprehensive. Although this is an internal EU decision, the benchmarks have been communicated to the Zimbabwean government. The feasibility of the benchmarks has been discussed in the EU, but it has not been able to soften its approach in the fear of losing its credibility.

In spite of being officially behind the common EU policy, the Member States' opinions differ. This has become clearer as the Zimbabwean crisis has deepened. Government-owned media in Zimbabwe has exploited opportunities to show that there are dissident voices in the EU; the new Swedish ambassador was quoted as saying that smart sanctions have hit the poor. A MEP was also quoted as saying that land reform was the real issue behind the sanctions. While some representatives of civil society (labour unions, parts of the church and human rights groups) and the opposition see a firm basis of the EU focus in the Cotonou Agreement, the view of some other representatives of Zimbabwean civil society (including the private sector) is that it was primarily the acquisition of farms that irritated the UK, and that in spite of being comprised of Member States with different views the EU adopted the UK position.

The EU has also attempted to coordinate its policies with SADC. However, the SADC policy of non-interference has not allowed its Member States to openly interfere with Zimbabwe's internal dispute and for SADC the priority has been to avoid the isolation of Zimbabwe. Many in Africa view Mugabe as a hero, and in addition to this, as the eldest incumbent president and a liberation war leader he is not somebody who could easily be advised by other African leaders.
Conclusions

Invoking Article 96 for Zimbabwe was a unilateral decision by the EU. The overall experience of the use of Article 96 there can be considered negative in the sense that various stakeholders are frustrated. The situation is also affected by the EU’s inability to form alliances with Zimbabwe’s neighbouring countries and Zimbabwe having become a problem in the EU-Africa relations. The problems relate to the antagonistic and uncooperative attitude of the government towards the donor countries. The more difficult the situation has become, the more evident it is that EU Member States hold different opinions about the usefulness of the sanctions. What keeps the EU united is a shared fear that it would lose credibility if it changed its policy. The issue of credibility seems to prevent the EU from radically revising its strategy even when the results have been negative.

There is evidence of a learning process based on the experiences of the Zimbabwe case in ACP-EU relations which has strengthened the idea of partnership. This instigates a move from an emphasis on conditionality and sanctions towards positive measures aimed at normalising relations between the EU and an ACP state that is experiencing or has experienced political crisis. While the EU has become more careful or hesitant in invoking Article 96 after the case of Zimbabwe, the ACP countries, too, have learned to use the instrument to their advantage and have come to see the benefits of Article 96 as a window of opportunity. The exception of the most recent cases in this regard is the Republic of Guinea, where the government considered the consultations to be a sanction or at best inappropriate foreign interference in its internal affairs.

The normalisation of relations is pivotal after an unconstitutional rupture like a coup d'état. This view is illustrated by the cases of Fiji, Central African Republic, Togo as well as Guinea Bissau and Mauritania where the authorities of the ACP countries concerned were cooperative. In those cases, one could argue, invoking Article 96 is commensurate
with the principle of partnership. A positive outcome has followed appropriate measures that at least to a certain extent have empowered the government and enabled it to present its own agenda.

For the EU an important motive for invoking Article 96 with an ACP country violating the principles of the Cotonou Agreement has become the assumption that the consultations and appropriate measures eventually imposed will have a positive impact on the situation. It is evident that the decision to invoke Article 96 is dependent upon the perceptions the EU has of the political will of the ACP country to respond to its concerns. This means that the EU is not consistent when applying the criteria of essential elements and the fundamental element of the Cotonou Agreement. Behaviour where the EU consciously avoids entering into a stalemate situation with “difficult partners” reflects the objective of “preventive engagement” mentioned in the EU Security Strategy. With difficult partners it is better to look for other ways of influencing human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance than Article 96.

References


An aid regime at work
European aid and transnational policy export
to Nepal and Tanzania

Lauri Siitonen

Introduction
The European Union (EU, consisting of the European Community and the Member States) is not only the leading provider of development aid, but also the major source of transnational policy-export. Whereas the former fact is a consequence of the simple economics of scale, the latter can be derived from the origin of the Union and the character of its borders. The Union is an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) – even more than any national state – that is built on shared norms and values. Ignoring or violating these norms and values would make the whole endeavour futile. The norms include democracy, multilateralism and social responsibility, among others (EU 2003; EU 2006). Some of the values are declared as universal, such as democracy and multilateralism, whereas it remains an issue of debate to what extent the norm of social responsibility resonates beyond the borders of the Union.

Which brings us to the ‘fuzzy’ character (Christiansen et al. 2000) of the EU borders. Accordingly, the simultaneous enlargement and exclusion have led to a continuous
reconstruction of the ‘intermediate’ regions around the Union as separate from the ‘inside’ of the EU and the regions ‘beyond’. Both the intermediate regions and the regions ‘beyond’ are targets of significant policy-export. However, since the EU lacks a comprehensive policy towards region-to-region relations, foreign policy initiatives tend to lack coherence. In particular, there seems to be considerable discrepancy between the universal norms the EU claims to promote, on the one hand, and the changing nature of its policies towards different regions, on the other.

A number of questions can be posed: How were European foreign policy norms constructed in the first place? How were they transmitted through European development policies? How were the norms adopted by the recipients of the European aid? The aim of this chapter is to review and extend research into these questions. It starts with a short review of the state of the art in international democracy promotion. Thereafter the construction of norms in European development policy will be studied within the context of the evolving international aid regime. Subsequently, an analysis of different kinds of European donor states and their different development policies will follow. Finally, a tentative discussion on the transmission and adoption processes will conclude the paper.

Democracy promotion in developing countries: The state of the art

With the consolidation of democracy and the democracy promotion as an international norm, a literature on democratization has flourished since the 1990s. Different types of analysis are available, from broad international relations theorizing to political theory to micro-level concerns over the effectiveness of political aid projects (Youngs 2004: 27). As democratization is closely linked with politics, as well as with overall social development and security, it draws interest in various academic fields, such as the Political Science, Development Studies and Security Studies. However, usually
these links have been examined separately, each field of study focusing on its ‘own’ area of specialisation.

It is not my aim to present an overall review of this literature here (see, among others, Schraeder 2003, Youngs 2004). Instead, I wish to pay attention to two major flaws that may limit our understanding about democratization as a social process, particularly in the developing countries. First, the focus of the analysis often remains on the democracy promotion projects, instead of democratization processes (Schraeder 2003: 24; Hossain et al 2003; de Zeeuw 2005). More often than not, the focus is limited to the efforts of individual donor countries. In the democratization literature, issues of flow tangent with the larger theoretical question known as the internal-external divide: to what extent are democratization processes influenced by internal factors vs. external factors? This in turn leads to moral and political questions over the legitimacy of external agents’ interventions in democratization processes.

Second, there is a bias towards certain regions, such as Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, while the democratization processes in more populous but less wealthy regions of the world, such as South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa receive much less attention. Thereby the links between poverty, extreme inequality and persistent internal conflicts and the construction of democratic governance are not given due attendance. As a consequence, the two flaws may lead to misguided ideas concerning the roles of internal vs. external factors in democratization processes, as well as to limited understanding about the global dimensions of such processes.

In order to overcome the internal-external divide and the regional bias within the democratization literature, an attempt is made to shift the focus from individual democracy promotion efforts to democratization processes that take place in an international environment characterised by norm guided

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1 The tendency can be partly explained by externalist reasons: funding for research on democracy promotion projects is provided by organisations running or funding such projects.
behaviour of the major international actors. What follows is an analysis of the international norm structure that guides both the democracy promotion and democratization processes.

**The construction of norms in European development policy**

The Council, the Member States, the European Parliament and the European Commission have asserted that

> Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation: it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries (EU 2006: 1).

This statement provides for at least two possible readings, each one corresponding to the classical determinants of the aid policy. One refers to donor interests, such as security and economic gains. The other refers to the moral obligation of the donor states towards the less well-off states. This division has its equivalent in the realist vs. idealist divide familiar from the classical treatises on international politics. (Neo-)realists claim that our politician-prince seeks security in the first place and therefore donor interests are bound to determine aid policies. Those opposing realism usually point to the fact that the aid policy behaviour of many donor states deviates from their expected national interests (Stokke 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Siitonen 2005; Hoebink and Stokke 2005). Constructivist theory has paid attention to the possibility of foreign policies being guided by international norms. Particularly in situations where a state does not know its interests, international norms may provide the state with directions and goals through norms attached with certain identity (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 2000).

The concept of an international aid regime as the normative guide for development policies has been proposed by a

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2 Let us note that this does not in any way deny the possibility of acting against the international norms, as exemplified by terrorism or illegal wars, even within or by the most powerful state. It is only claimed that most actors most of the time pay attention to the international norms and expect it of other actors as well, which in turn renders the existence of an international society possible.
number of authors. Some others remain less convinced that the sum of bilateral aid relationships would qualify as an international regime (Ruggie 1983). Still others claim that regime analysis only limits our vision of power and domination as the basic structures of international relations (Strange 1982). Nevertheless, the concept has been fruitfully applied in various international issue areas. For instance, it has helped in explaining why aid programmes were simultaneously launched in practically all Western industrialised countries at the beginning of the 1960s (Lumsdaine 1993). Similarly, the idea of an aid regime helps in understanding the continuity of the aid system vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the Third World movement and the oil crises in the 1970s (Krasner 1985), debt crises in the 1980s (Wood 1986) and the end of the Cold War (Hook 1995; Wood 1996).³

Particularly since the early 1990s, donor states and international development organisations have shown uniform international behaviour more than ever before. Democratization and respect for human rights were introduced as conditions for future aid during the 1990s. The shift took place simultaneously by almost all donor states and development organisations, thus indicating the existence of an international aid regime. In 2000, the declaration of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) established further global consensus on the international development agenda, adding poverty reduction to the ‘appropriate’ goals for development aid.⁴ The MDGs were adopted by all the major international development organisations as well as the donor and recipient states. In short, for a moment it looked like there was an unprecedented global consensus on the ‘appropriate’ goals of the development policy.

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³ It is only fair to note that there are significant differences in precision and content how the cited authors define their aid regimes.

⁴ The primary goal in the list of the Millennium Development Goals is to halve poverty in the developing world by 2015. For the MDGs, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Let us note in passing that in 1973 the then president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, set the goal to eradicate poverty by the year 2000 as the major goal of development (Leftwich 2000: 70). This time the goal is only to halve poverty.
The global consensus on development policy, if there ever was one, did not last very long. In the name of the so-called international community, the community of donor states soon found even more important use for their aid. With the end of the Cold War, ‘new’ hazards loomed large and they were seen to challenge our own economic and political security through mass migration, epidemics, drugs, terrorism and organised crime. Addressing these kinds of challenges not only provided the development policies with additional justifications (OECD 2001; EU 2003). They also linked the aid regime with the new security paradigm.5

Building on the idea of an evolving aid regime, the question is how the regime succeeds in combining democracy promotion with poverty reduction and security concerns. What follows is an analysis of the international democracy assistance regime that conditions interaction between international actors in the aid relationship. In addition, the corresponding European development policy norms will be indicated. The European Consensus (EU 2006) will serve as the major document for the EU development policy.

The conventional definition of an international regime involves “implicit or explicit norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982). However, the regime rules and norms are hard to differentiate conceptually (cf. Donnelly 1986). Furthermore, because of the bilateral nature of most aid, international decision-making procedures are hard to find, except perhaps in the case of the EU-ACP relationship.6 Therefore the tentative international democracy assistance regime may be better formulated in terms of principles, rules, standards and guidelines:

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5 The new security paradigm partly incorporates new elements, such as economic, environmental and social aspects of (redefined) security to the old paradigm, partly extends the scope of action from the purely domestic realm to the regional and even international spheres. The analysis draws from Paris 2001.

6 The state of the matter is a consequence of the monopolistic structure of development assistance: those states who ‘sell’ aid do not ‘buy’ it, and those that ‘buy’ aid only seldom ‘sell’ it.
Principles are matters of general understanding. In other words, they are ‘nested’ in more general ‘meta-regimes’ of the international society. They also define the overall goals of and provide justifications for the states to act. The overall principle and goal of democracy assistance are well captured in the following characterisation of the international relations at the turn of the millennium: “first, democracy’s status as the predominant form of political governance within the Westphalian nation-state system; and second, the emergence of an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behaviour.” (Schraeder 2003: 22). Similarly, the EU has declared that its “development policy will have as its primary objective ... the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights”. (EU 2006: 8).

Previous analyses have found three further general justifications for democracy promotion: promotion of human rights, the development imperative and the idea of democratic peace (Hakovirta 2000). Human rights are clearly a meta-regime in the sense that, unlike in the case of democracy, there are international agreements that define the contents of the (civil and political) rights and the obligations of the states vis-à-vis them. The dominant Western understanding is that democracy is the best guarantor of human rights, especially civil and political rights. The correlation between the two is clear although far from perfect. However, this is partly a vicious circle, insofar as both democracy and human rights are understood in the liberal sense and thereby one necessitating the other (Hakovirta 2000: 193). Let us note that the EU acknowledges “the essential oversight role of democratically elected citizens’ representatives,” which comes rather close to the democracy in the liberal sense (EU 2006: 3).

The development imperative is perhaps less well established, yet constitutes a widely shared understanding among the states and international organisations. The development imperative is the corollary of what Juhani Koponen has coined as developmentalism, or “that complex of ideas, discourses, ways of action, institutions and other structures that has grown around
relationship between democracy and development has been the subject of systematic inquiries at least since the 1970s (Sorensen 1988: 64-92). The correlation between the two is contended and partly ambiguous, depending on the definitions of the concepts. In the MDG, the development imperative was reformulated as poverty reduction. Similarly, another primary objective of the EU development policy is defined as “the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs”. (EU 2006: 8)

Finally, democracy promotion is justified with the Kantian vision of democratic peace. Notwithstanding some contrary evidence, the idea has been presented as the contribution of the international politics to public policy (Siverson 2000). Furthermore, democratic peace also serves as a meta-principle in the US and EU defence strategies. In the EU development policy, it is stated that “EU action for development ... is in the interests of wider peace and stability ...” (EU 2006: 7).

**Rules** are standards of behaviour in terms of rights and obligations. In the issue area of democracy assistance, the first rule sets that democracy promotion is considered an accepted and even necessary component of international behaviour of the states. Yet, general customary law does not as such make any obligation for states to be democratic. European democracy promotion commitment was made in a 1991 Development Council resolution and then incorporated into mainstream foreign policy through the Maastricht treaty(formally, the Treaty on European Union) in 1992 (Youngs 2004: 2). The second rule

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8 See UN: *Agenda for Democratization*, para 21. According to Skordas (2003:335-337), “However, this does not mean that ‘democratic governance’ does not exist in general international law. It exists as a *sui generis* legal-political general principle.” Furthermore, it “has a firm political foundation in the activities of international organizations and a certain customary basis, at least in the broader Euro-atlantic region, Oceania and Japan.”

9 A similar pledge to provide assistance for elections and other democratic institutions was made by the OECD, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States (ibid.).
concerns the respect for human rights, which is considered a *sine qua non* for any contractual relationship. Accordingly, all the EU agreements on trade or aid with the third countries have since 1992 contained a clause stipulating that human rights are an essential element in the relations between the parties. The third rule draws from the general aid regime and maintains that donor states consider it their right to choose the recipients of their aid and to set the conditions for the future aid. In general, recipient states have no right to claim for assistance. For the continuation of aid, they have the duty to show their overall commitment and will to promote democracy and good governance. In the name of the principle of ownership of development by the partner countries, the EU considers developing countries to “have the primary responsibility for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising their own resources, including coherent and effective policies.” (EU 2006: 3).

**Standards** set prescriptions for the policies in terms of clearly defined targets. They are met to the extent that the policy targets are met. The standards concerning the civil and political rights are probably most clearly defined, those concerning the economic, social and cultural rights tend to be less so. Accordingly, the organisation of regular, fair and equal elections is a clearly defined standard. Instead, participation in the elections is less clearly defined, since low participation may be a consequence of political or social reasons; from arbitrary prevention to negligence to various social and economic hindrances (illiteracy, marginalization etc.)

As for the amount or share of assistance allotted to democracy promotion, no standards are set. During the 1990s, democracy assistance increased faster than the Commission’s total aid budget. However, in relative terms, it represented only about one per cent of EC development assistance by the year 2000 (Youngs 2004: 31). Nor is the allocation of such aid to different kinds of recipients prescribed in any way. Donors

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usually make these decisions by themselves. Collectively, they, however, expect the recipients of aid to follow certain common standards. Accordingly, recipient states are expected to participate in political dialogue with the donor states, as well as regularly show development in democracy, human rights and good governance. The dialogue is usually restricted to these issues and the criteria are nonnegotiable. Should a recipient fail to fulfil to meet the conditions, the continuation of assistance will be discussed and, unless a satisfying outcome can be secured, assistance terminated.

Guidelines define desirable policies and practices. In order to say whether policies are in accordance with the guidelines, the longer-term tendencies towards (or away from) the desirable practices have to be examined. Indicators of democratic development are many and no overall agreement on the 'quantity' or 'quality' of democracy has been made. At least following criteria tend to be popular: democratic institutions (elections, political parties, parliament etc.), popular participation, civil and political rights, etc. International organisations, such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), have developed more or less sophisticated means for measuring democracy, but these have not been given official status.11

Altogether, there seems to be a quasi-global consensus on democracy promotion as an international norm that guides the foreign policies of the states that identify themselves with the international society. The interesting character of the tentative regime is that the three principles that the regime is justified on have a very different status. Human rights are taken as a sine qua non for any democracy in the liberal sense. Less human rights automatically means less democracy. Instead, insofar as democracy is seen as conducive to development, there is not necessarily a similar element of reciprocity here: Does less development affect the quantity or quality of democracy? Furthermore, insofar as poverty reflects the lack of development, the question is whether poverty frames the types of democracy.

11 For the IDEA, see http://www.idea.int/
Similarly, there is no automatic reciprocity between peace and democracy either. If democracy adds to the possibility of peace, does lack of peace affect the character of democracy? *Ceteris paribus*, how does a fragile peace influence the possibilities of democracy?

When returning to the argument stated above – that international norms may provide states with directions and goals through norms attached to a certain sense of identity – the question is how the norms under examination mould the identity of the EU. The expectation is that at least for the European Community, international norms offer a clearly defined international identity and thereby goals for action. For the member states, too, the norms may add to their international identity, either directly or as a member state. In the following the identities and corresponding goals will be scrutinized.

**On different European donors and approaches**

Let us start with the notion that EU’s external relations are based on a ‘dual system’ (Youngs 2004: 28-30). Trade policy is within the Commission’s exclusive competence. In contrast, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established in 1993, is intergovernmental, with decision making by consensus. Development assistance, in turn, incorporates the dual system with part of the ‘European aid’ being channelled through the Commission, but member states retain their sovereignty over bilateral aid programmes. Accordingly, we can speak of common European approaches to poverty and democracy both at the level of the community and the member states, whereas any approach to stability expects intergovernmental consensus (See below Table 1.)

Furthermore, there are different kinds of European donor countries and European approaches: the Community and the Member States, the Member States vs. the ‘other’ Europe (Norway, Switzerland); large vs. small European states; those with or without a colonial history; northern vs. southern Europe. Such distinctions may serve in analysing how
international norms are formulated in development policies and transmitted as policy-export to the recipients of aid.

When focusing on aid, the major international norms partly draw from the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and are closely linked to the donor community’s commitment to provide increased funding for development. The EU is committed to provide assistance to developing countries at the target level of 0.56 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2010 and 0.7 % by 2015. Furthermore, at least “half of this increase will be allocated to Africa, while fully respecting individual Member States’ priorities in development assistance.” (EU 2006: 5).

Table 1: Major actors, issue areas and possible European approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue area</th>
<th>Major actors</th>
<th>Official EU goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms of trade</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>Commission, Member States</td>
<td>Democracy promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU claims to be the leading source of development assistance, providing over half of the world’s aid (EU 2006). This claim, however, needs some clarification. The EU consists of the European Community and the Member States. Correspondingly, ‘EU aid’ consists of Member States’ contributions that are channelled either through the Commission, bilaterally or through other international organisations. The annual volume of official development assistance (ODA) that is channelled through the Commission is only equivalent to the annual volume of ODA from a large

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The EU 2006: 5. 12 Poverty reduction as a goal of EU’s trade policy is discussed by Stocchetti, this volume.
Member State.\textsuperscript{13} The volume of ODA from the Member States varies considerably, even when the twelve new Member States are excluded. In 2005 the ‘old’ fifteen Member States contributed, on average, US$3,700 million (or 0.44 as a percent of GNI).\textsuperscript{14} Whereas France, Germany and the UK each contributed to over $10,000 million; Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal each provided less than $1,000 million.

In addition to the huge differences in scale, the allocation of bilateral aid significantly differs from one Member State to another. When excluding debt cancellation to Iraq (usually counted as ODA), the top ten recipients of ‘real’ assistance varied immensely between the Member States. In this connection, however, it may be well placed to focus on the poverty orientation of the aid. For practical purposes, the poverty orientation of an aid programme can be defined both quantitatively, in terms of aid to poor countries (least developed countries, or LDCs, and other low-income countries, or LICs) and qualitatively, as aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{15} The share of ODA to LDCs varied between 80 percent (Portugal) and 20 percent (Austria), with the EU average falling at 39 percent of all aid. There was much less variation in aid proportions destined to LICs, which comes as no surprise given the much larger number of countries in this group. In both cases, aid from the average EU country was consistently more poverty-oriented than the OECD donors’ average.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} In 2005, the net ODA of the Commission was 7,555 MEUR, compared with that of Germany at 8,112 MEUR or France at 10,025 MEUR. Source: OECD (2007).

\textsuperscript{14} In current terms (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{15} Both definitions can be debated. For a discussion on poverty orientation as an aid regime norm, see pp. 78-79 and 83-84 in Siltonen (2005).

\textsuperscript{16} The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD comprises Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, and the 15 ‘old’ EU member states as well as the Commission. OECD aid averages 35% to LDCs and 20% to LICs, against the EU averages of 39% to LDC and 24% to LICs (OECD 2007).
Similarly, the share of aid to Sub-Saharan Africa varied strongly, from 88 percent (Portugal) to 6 percent (Greece), with the EU average being at 47 percent of total ODA. Since most of the countries in this region belong to the group of LDCs there is strong overlap between the two aid policy norms. Let us note, however, that the average EU country allocates almost half (47 percent) of its aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, against the OECD average of 33 percent (OECD 2007).

Insofar as comparative aid data indicates any genuine poverty orientation in European aid policies, the possibility of social responsibility could be confirmed. There are, however, obvious historical and geopolitical reasons for the European countries to strengthen their relations with Africa, particularly for the former colonial powers and the countries of southern Europe. Therefore a comparison of the aid policies of two European non-Member States of the EU, Norway and Switzerland, is justifiable.

As far as their contribution to development financing is concerned, Norway is known as the world leader and Switzerland can be categorised as an average donor. They both allocate aid to LDCs and to Sub-Saharan Africa at the same level as other European countries. For example, in Nepal, Norway was the sixth and Switzerland the seventh largest donor. In Tanzania, Norway came as the eight and Switzerland the twelfth (out of 22 OECD/DAC member states). This simple comparison gives further evidence to the poverty orientation of European aid.

There is, however, a particular phenomenon among the European donor states; the significant difference between small and large donors. There is long-term evidence confirming that small donors on average were more generous towards the Third World than donors in general (Hoadley 1980; Siitonen 2005). That is, of course, in relative terms (ODA as a percent of donor Gross National Income (GNI)). In absolute terms the smaller donors, by definition, are seldom able to provide similar quantities of aid as the larger ones. The correlation between the donor size (GNI) and the ODA/GNI was clearly negative.
over the two past decades. Against all odds, variation in donor size (GNI) explained poverty orientation even better than variation in donor wealth (GNI per capita). With a closer look, it comes clear that it is particularly the northern European small donors that largely explain the tendency. Then again, smallness as such does not suffice in explaining aid behaviour.

Accordingly, there is growing evidence in favour of the claim that domestic structures may help explain variation in foreign policy behaviour, particularly in the case of development policies (Stokke 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël & Thérien 1995, 2000; Siitonen 2005). Among the domestic structures that best explain variation are the institutional attributes of the welfare state and a closely related variable, cumulative partisan strength (i.e. the number of years a leftist political party has been in government). Correspondingly, there are three ideal solutions for combining democracy with inequality and poverty: liberal, statist and equalitarian. In the liberal solution, the state is expected to encourage market and subsidise private welfare schemes (as in Australia, Canada and the US). In the statist solution, the benefits are attached to class and status (with Austria, France, Germany, and Italy as examples). Finally, the equalitarian solution is based on universalism and extends the benefits also to the middle classes (with the Scandinavian countries as primary examples). The idea is that domestic solutions may help in explaining and understanding how problems are perceived and the solutions transmitted abroad. The question is, whether such differences help in explaining variation in the means and ways of policy-export.

**European approaches to democracy promotion**

The EU has a double role in a sense that whereas it is a major source of transnational policy export, the Union itself is characterized by the changing nature of its policies towards

17 The solutions correspond to what Esping-Andersen (1990) has named as liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare-state regimes.
different regions. These identities, in turn, correspond to different values and norms, such as democracy and human rights, social responsibility and multilateralism as well as stability. Some of the values, such as human rights and democracy, are declared universal and considered reciprocal with each other. Others, such as development or stability, are seen either as instrumental to democracy or sometimes as the outcomes of democracy.

As noted in the introduction, there seems to be a considerable discrepancy between the universal norms the EU claims to promote, on the one hand, and the changing nature of its policies towards different regions, on the other. Furthermore, European approaches to democracy promotion mean different things in different regions. From an analytical point of view, the different approaches can be presented as a continuum of policies, from the least to the most coercive: 18

1. Democratization by persuasion: classic diplomacy as well as the provision of foreign aid to non-associated countries and the threat of withholding aid and other economic sanctions

2. Democratization by association: political conditionalities to the potential applicant countries and associated countries

3. Democratization by force: indirect (covert and paramilitary) and direct military interventions

The method of persuasion is the least coercive and contains various means, from technical advice to diplomatic persuasion and pressure to economic rewards and punishments. As such, it comes close to what Liberalism stands for: rational choice by rational actors. The idea is that the rational leaders of states concerned should accept political changes as the cost of rewards that Europe will offer. Europe is only committed to assistance and support for democratic development as long as the conditions are met. Otherwise the method works according

18 The continuum draws partly from Schraeder 2003: 26; partly from Hossain et al. 2003: 18-22. An alternative way is to present the methods as a dichotomy between ‘positive’ and ‘coercive’ approaches, as in Youngs 2004: 21-26.
to the logic of exclusion: neither promises for additional aid, nor memberships are on offer.

The method of persuasion is being mainly applied to the developing regions that have been excluded from potential association and membership of the EU: developing countries in Asia (excluding the Mediterranean countries) and Latin American countries (excluding the Caribbean countries).

The method of association offers the same means as the method of persuasion plus the possibility of association or membership. It is more coercive in a sense that in addition to pressure and economic punishments, the method also includes the threat of loss of associate or candidature status. The logic of enlargement expects an applicant state not only to change its political system but also to adopt European policies in various areas of social life (environment, education etc.). Elements of this form of policy export are gradually included in associative relations as well. However, since the applicant states are given the equal rights of membership, this method can be considered more equalitarian than liberal. Similarly, the associated states are given a clear commitment for continued assistance and, at least in principle, the option to collectively negotiate on the conditions of assistance.

Whereas membership in the EU is clearly defined, the number of possible candidates for membership remains disputable.\(^{19}\) Indeed, “the external borders of the European Union (EU) are becoming increasingly difficult to delineate as it exports policies to states beyond its own membership” (Christiansen et al. 2000: 389). The method of association is being used most coercively towards potential applicant countries such as Turkey. It also applies to the ‘near neighbourhood’ of the EU: Eastern European countries between the EU and Russia, the Near East and the Mediterranean countries.

Furthermore, policy export affects the associated ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Political conditions

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\(^{19}\) For the moment, membership is limited to ‘European’ states, the definition of which, however, remains a politically disputed matter.
were first included in the Lomé IV (1990-2000) convention, which set respect for human rights as the condition for the continuation of the association. The Cotonou convention of 2000 (for the years 2000-2020) added political dialogue and further political conditions (Holland 2002:197; for the background, see Laakso, this volume; also Grilli 1993).

Democratization by force is the most coercive method and may include various forms of military intervention. In its extreme mode, it encompasses military occupation, political settlement and usually some sort of aid package.\(^\text{20}\) It is most clearly linked with power politics and thereby also to the colonial history of European powers: Historically, colonial domination was justified by a promise to address ‘tropical anarchy’ in southern countries (Sampson 2002). Today, the fear of anarchy is again being used as justification for ‘humanitarian interventions’ in the South. Such interventions may combine peace-keeping operations, humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management, including democratization.

European Rapid Reaction Force was created by the end of 2003 to intervene in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. So far the Force has been deployed only once outside Europe, to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The currently planned operation in Darfur, Sudan, is likely to be an even larger operation.

All in all, the simultaneous logic of enlargement and exclusion in different parts of the world contribute to the different roles and identities of the EU. The inside of the Union is dominated by democratic peace. Towards the ‘outside’ regions various methods are being used, depending on the status of the region. The ‘intermediate’ regions tend to be an object of more coercive methods; at the same time attention is being paid to the institution building and thereby to prevailing inequalities and poverty in the countries concerned. In

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\(^{20}\) Historically, we know at least two cases, Germany and Japan, which were democratized by force (Burnell 2000). The more recent cases, Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, have proved to be much more challenging and, at least so far, much less successful examples.
contrast, the regions ‘beyond’ are treated either with association or persuasion. The expectation is that in both cases the opening of the market and good governance will take care of inequality and poverty. Finally, the most coercive methods, such as cutting all aid or democratization by force, would be applied only to states where stability is at stake and therefore the approach is one of maintaining the status quo. A comparison of different approaches to two recipient countries, one with an associated status and another without, may provide further evidence to the matter.

Norm transmission and adoption in Nepal and Tanzania

In order to analyse the role of European aid in norm transmission, it appears fruitful to make the distinction between norm transmission and norm adoption. A norm has been transmitted when the prescriptions embodied in a norm become part of the domestic political discourse; it has been adopted only when the prescriptions have made constitutive effects on the state practices. (Cf. Checkel 1999). The question is how different modes of norm transmission concerning democracy and poverty reduction contribute to the adoption of international norms and, thereby, to the possible consolidation of democracy. Two recipient countries of European aid, Nepal and Tanzania, will serve as examples.

By the size of their populations, Nepal (27 million) and Tanzania (38 million) are middle-sized nations (see Table 2). Population growth is very rapid, however, with the population having almost doubled in both countries during the last two decades. In geographical terms, Nepal is a rather small whereas Tanzania is middle-sized. Economically both are relatively small and poor economies and categorised by the UN as least developed countries (LDCs). Human development was ranked low in both countries, around 0.5, which corresponds to a ranking around 150 (out of 177 countries in 2006).
Table 2: Nepal and Tanzania compared, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (thousands)</td>
<td>26,591</td>
<td>37,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (US$ billions)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$)</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Life Expectancy (in 2004)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literary Rate (%) (in 2004)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development index /Rank</td>
<td>0.527 /138</td>
<td>0.430 /162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP 2006.

As recipients of ODA, Tanzania is far more successful in attracting foreign aid funds than Nepal. For each Tanzanian, aid accounted for $39.30 in 2006, whereas the average Nepalese only received $15.80. The European Union accounted for over half (53.7%) of all the ODA to Tanzania from the OECD area over the years 2001-2005. The UK (15%) and the Netherlands (7%) contributed most, with Japan (6%) as the third largest donor. During the same period, Nepal received almost half (41%) of all ODA from the Commission and the member states. Japan (18%), Germany (12%) and the UK (12%) were among the leading donors. Accordingly, the EU can be said to be the leading source of development aid in both countries.21

Tanzanian democratization is a major example of the aid regime at work. The common understanding is that already before any donor state or international organisation formally set democracy as a condition for future aid, the government was prepared to lead the country to multi-party democracy. In 1992, after almost three decades of a single-party authoritarian

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21 Figures calculated from the data in OECD (2007).
rule, the ruling party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) readily accepted that it was time to introduce pluralist democracy in the country. Since then, three multi-party elections were held (in 1995, 2000 and 2005). In the mainland Tanzania, the elections were considered peaceful and relatively fair and free. So far, the leading party CCM has managed to gain a clear majority in all the votes. (Hossain et al. 2003: 84 ff.)

In contrast, the autonomous island state of Zanzibar, which was united with mainland Tanganyika in 1963 to become the United Republic of Tanzania, offers a different view to the aid regime. The major opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF) has consistently refused to recognize election results. After mass demonstrations and violence in 2001 that led to over 20 people dead and emigration to the neighbouring Kenya, the EU cancelled aid to Zanzibar. The fear of Islamists taking over power in an independent Zanzibar seems to have effected the decision. Aid was, however, again resumed after an agreement between CCM and CUF was brokered in 2001. Still, the political situation continues to be fragile.

As an ACP country Tanzania is a signatory state of the Cotonou Convention. And the EU is represented by the Commission and the member states. During the 1980s, the donor countries pushed hard to convince the Tanzanian government to accept an agreement with the World Bank and to give up its policy of socialism and self-reliance. Under pressure, and conscious of the economic setbacks and the related growing discrepancy between socialist policies and actual practices, the government accepted the agreement and started liberalising the economy. This experience was a major lesson for the elites, who found themselves increasingly dependent on foreign assistance. It also gives a clue to why the elites were so ready to introduce multi-party democracy.

The Nepalese democratization began 1990 as a classical bottom-up revolt against the traditional ruling elite that lost much of its credibility. The process, however, turned into political instability and civil war in 1996 and has resulted in more than 13,000 deaths in ten years. The conflict reached the
level of civil war although it was consistently called a ‘Maoist revolt’ by both the government and the donors. Most donors, however, see the conflict in Nepal as being inherently political in nature. The Maoists have been successful in incorporating the striking inequalities and the cause of ethnic minorities into their struggle (Hossain et al. 2007). The war has only recently ended.

After February 2005, when the King of Nepal dissolved his government and resumed absolute power, most donors remained in the country but declined to make new commitments. With a cease-fire and the formation of an interim government in early 2007 consisting of the old parties and the Maoists, Nepal has a new opportunity for democracy. The donors, however, have taken a reserved attitude and continue to try to keep stability and the status quo.

Conclusions

This study set to ask how the European Union combines its role as the leading provider of development aid with its role as the major source of policy-export. The focus was on two recipient countries; Tanzania with an associated status and Nepal without. The tentative outcomes of analyses of the two case countries are as follows: In the case of top-down democratization, as in the mainland Tanzania, the European approach to norm transmission was liberal at the best. Except for some technical aid, no serious attempt was made towards institution building, which could respond to the prevailing inequality and poverty that can threaten the consolidation of democracy. In the case of bottom-up democratization, as in Zanzibar and Nepal, the European approach focused mainly on stability and thereby only strengthened the status quo. In both examples, the ‘bottom-up’ represents the ‘wrong’ type of political forces (the Islamists in Zanzibar, the Maoists in Nepal); both of these, however, successfully raise the issue of inequality. Therefore, although democracy as a norm has been fairly successfully transmitted, the possibility of norm adoption
depends on how the problems caused by growing inequalities can be solved.

References


Msitu wa Angai: Haraka, haraka, haina baraka!
Why does handing over the Angai forest to local villages proceed so slowly?¹

Irmeli Mustalahti

Introduction
Various terms are used to describe the transfer of the management of natural resources from government authority to local people. In the literature, “community forestry” and “participatory forestry” seem to be the most common terms for people’s participation in forest management. In Tanzania, participatory forest management (PFM) is considered as an overall term for participatory forestry models. The central issue in Tanzania is that local people participate in developing objectives, plans and rules for the use and management of their village forests or co-management forests. Co-management refers to joint forest management (JFM) in which local people manage forest areas on behalf of, or together with, the central government or local government authorities (White and Mustalahti 2005).

In the early 1990s, PFM in Tanzania was piloted on unreserved land where village communities gained jurisdiction over forest resources through the declaration of village land

¹ This paper is based on my PhD thesis (Mustalahti 2007) and is part of an umbrella research project under the Institute of Development Studies in Finland entitled ‘Does Finnish Aid Matter?’ I would like to thank Professor Juhani Koponen for supervision and comments throughout my work on my PhD thesis. It was a great experience to work with his research project. I would also like to thank PIPS, Lindi Region, Liwale District Council and Angai villages.
forest reserves (Wily and Dewees 2001). Assisted by the governments of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and international NGOs, a large number of PFM projects were implemented in various parts of the country. Inspired by these pilot projects, a massive body of policies and legislation in support of PFM was enacted from 1995 to 2003. These included the 1995 Land Policy, the 1998 Forest Policy, the 1999 Land Acts, the 2001 Forest Programme, and finally the 2002 Forest Act (URT 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; 2001; 2002). Tanzanian forest policy and legislation has been renowned for being very supportive of PFM (Wily 2001; Wily and Dewees 2001). From 2003 onwards, the implementation of PFM has progressed under a national forest programme (NFP). The programme currently targets 50 out of Tanzania’s 114 districts with funding from Government of Tanzania and the World Bank, Denmark, Finland and Norway but also increasingly supported by NGOs and the private sector (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006). It is estimated that 3.7 million hectares, corresponding to approximately 10 per cent of the total forest area, was under some form of PFM by 2006 (Blomley 2006).

PFM has progressed swiftly in many areas where the forest resources are of relatively low value (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006; Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005; Wily and Dewees 2001; Iddi 2002). However, the process has been much slower in areas with high value forest resources (Mustalahti and Lund forthcoming). In spite of this positive development towards PFM, handing over valuable forest resources to village councils is still problematic and seems to proceed very slowly. The Angai forest in Southern Tanzania is a clear example of this. While I worked with the Angai villages, my Tanzanian counterpart, a senior forester used to say: “Haraka, haraka, haina baraka”. This means that rushing does not bring blessings to anything you do. Dondeyne et al (1998) also conclude that there are no short cuts to sound forest management, and that villages in the Angai area need long-term technical assistance from the district administration.
However, there seems to be little incentive and motivation to ensure capacity in sound forest management, and this obstructs the implementation of PFM. In Tanzania, PFM implies a transfer of the right to tax forest resources to the village level, and financially constrained districts resist this transfer (Mustalahti and Lund forthcoming). Indeed, a benefit-sharing regime for areas with valuable timber is disputed (Wily and Dewees 2001). This paper aims to analyse why a benefit-sharing regime for the Angai area has not be put in place, and why the handing over of valuable resources to the village councils proceed so slowly.

**Conceptual framework**

PFM seems to have difficulties in sustaining local people's participation; several obstacles still exist at the local and national levels that make it difficult for the local people all over the world to participate in natural resource management, secure their rights in decision-making, gain access to land tenure and valuable natural resources, and ensure markets and investment opportunities related to natural resources (Brown et al. 2002; Larson 2003; Walker 2004; Taylor 2005; Hyakumura and Inoue 2006). Mayers and Bass (2004) argue that, through the decentralisation of forest management, the central-level problems are merely displaced to local level, and bureaucracy is transferred from the central level to the subnational level. Participatory and decentralised forest management cannot guarantee the rights of the local people without developing various aspects of governance. Even if devolution occurs, the transfer of powers is often meaningless, as it (a) only encompasses marginal policy areas, (b) does not include financial provisions necessary for local government to actually fulfil its obligations, or (c) after a short period is followed by deliberate attempts to re-centralise rights to resources and revenues (Nhantumbo 2000; Schackleton et al. 2002; Larson 2003; Ribot 2003; Ribot et al. 2006).

While Tanzania is renowned for its progressive approach to people’s participation in forest management, it is also
recognised how challenging it is to implement PFM which calls for local people’s access, rights and participation, as well as to upscale and sustain these frameworks nation-wide after phasing out external funds from donors (Mustalahti 2006; Mustalahti 2007; Blomley 2006; Blomley and Ramadhani 2006; Lissu and von Mitzlaff 2007; Lewis et al 2000). It is argued that ‘participation’ is a politically desirable and ambiguous development idea and is often unimplemented because the idea calls for contestation (Mosse 2001). According to Chambers (1989), a first step for people to claim their rights is information and then encouragement through advocacy organisations and the judicial system.

I approach this investigation by looking at history of contestation, advocacy organisations, and the legal recognition of people’s right over the natural resource in Angai area. The empirical study included participant observation methods: In 2000-2001, I was working in the area as a development worker and observing day-to-day activities in Angai area. Participant observation in anthropology aims at understanding people’s lives. In contrast, a ‘participant’ in participatory research refers to people’s involvement in the research process. In the case of Angai, through participatory research and participant observation methods I aim at both. In the beginning I was a development worker, later on a researcher and observer; in the future I would like to continue participatory action research in the area. In the Angai area, an action-oriented research approach originates from the forest boundary demarcation process in 2001 (see below). The idea was that during the process, through which villages obtain legal management right to the forest areas, long-term research in the same area could observe the impact of PFM on the sustainability of the forest management activities. It is currently unclear whether funding will be available to continue the action research process in the area.

**History of the Angai process**

Liwale District, in Southeastern Tanzania, is one of the less populated parts of the country. Over 50% of the district is
under the Selous Game Reserve. In 1988, district population density outside the game reserve was less than three persons per square kilometre (Dondeyne et al. 1998). Forests and wildlife are the most important natural resources in Liwale. Out of the 37 800 km² of Liwale District, Angai forest area covers 1 388 km² of mostly miombo woodland with some high-value timber resources, such as Brachystegia and Julbernardia and Pterocarpus angolensis, locally known as mninga. Mninga is heavily logged in some areas and is already depleted, and loggers have moved on to mtindo (Julbernardia globiflora). Also mpingo (African Black Wood, Dalbergia melanoxylon) is heavily logged in the area.

In the Angai area, each of the 13 villages has a population of roughly 1,000 - 3,000 people and the surrounding villages are located more then ten kilometres from Angai forest. Use of the land close to the villages is very intensive, based on shifting cultivations and permanent fields of cashew trees together with food crops. People use forest products, such as firewood, timber and non-timber products, in their everyday life, and for example the name Angai means poisonous roots, which people are still using during food shortages. The roots are collected in the forest and need to be boiled with water several times in order to get poison out. After that the root will be dried, and used in a way similar to cassava, mainly as flour for local porridge.

In 1993, the District Council of Liwale proposed to gazette Angai forest as a Local Government Forest Reserve (LGFR). The motivation of the district authorities for creating a forest reserve was to generate additional tax revenue. This is in step with the Tanzanian policy, which encourages District Councils to generate income. If the area becomes a LGFR, under the jurisdiction of the District Council, the Council would receive the part of the tax revenue now paid to the central government. The intention of the District Council was to increase the share of tax revenue collected from the timber dealers who are licensed by the district authorities to harvest in the forest. In 1994, the Liwale District Council approached the Rural Integrated Project Support (RIPS) programme to get
assistance to establish a LGFR. RIPS, a development cooperation programme between the Governments of Tanzania and Finland, operated in Lindi and Mtwara Regions since 1988 until 2004. During the final phase of RIPS, the main purpose of the programme was to facilitate the institutionalization of participatory approaches and democratic principles in the two regions. RIPS supported the idea of improving sustainable forest management in Liwale District, and was willing to assist on the condition that instead of simply setting up the LGFR, RIPS could support the 13 village councils to come more involved in sound forest management. RIPS argued that people's participation in forest management could improve the incentives for local villages to protect forests and trees, and thus prevent the degradation of forest resources (Johansson 1996).

During the years between 1994 and 2000, there were various steps towards PFM in Angai area. There has been a misunderstanding of interests between the district authorities and the villagers, and until 2000 the district authorities reverted to their original idea of establishing a LGFR. Various meetings, including interviews with check-point guards and lumber-jacks were edited into a video, “Msitu wa Hangai”, the forest of Angai. RIPS used this and other short participatory videos in national, regional, district and village level in order to report all the discussion and agreements during the Angai process. This was recognised to be very powerful tool to get people at different levels commit themselves to the process and agree the decisions.

A brief history of the events since 1993 has been the following. In 1995 workshops and meetings were held by facilitators from Lindi region, Liwale district and RIPS in order to reach a consensus between 13 villages and the district authorities concerning who should manage the Angai forest. In 1995, it was agreed that four villages (Ngunja, Ngongowe, Nahoro and Nangano) could be selected as case study villages to start the pilot project. The aim of the pilot project was to introduce the PFM model to the area, and to ensure sustainable use of the natural resources and clear system of
collecting the local taxes. In Ngunja and Nahoro, the facilitators carried out livelihood analyses which show how important the forest is for the villagers and how people benefit from both timber and non-timber products (Dondeyne et al. 1998). In Nahoro and Nanagano, villagers also carried out a forest inventory and drew up forest management plans in collaboration with scientists from Naliendele Agriculture Research Institute. Later on, the forest management plans were presented in a workshop. The plans contained a five-year timber-logging rotation scheme based on 8 blocks. During the workshop villagers and district authorities discussed but could not reach a consensus on how the revenue should be split between the District Council and the villages. However, the parties decided to continue negotiations between the different stakeholders.

In 1997, meetings held in the villages of Likombora, Mkunya, Mihumo, Ngongwele and the villages said that they do not agree with any decisions that would make Angai forest a LGFR. Also, the Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRC) in all the 13 forest villages said that they were not able to collect taxes from all of the logging operations because of intimidation by high-ranking district officials. Problems had also arisen as a result of a border dispute between Nahoro and Lilombe, and villagers claimed that a businessman had avoided paying the tax to either of the villages. Villagers were also complaining about the District Council's decision to reduce the amount of tax levied on sawed planks from 100 Tsh to 60 Tsh.

In 1998, the following points were agreed upon by Liwale District Council and RIPS: (a) a letter will be sent to all 13 villages explaining the process and options in working towards the Angai forest management by villagers, (b) a summary of logging license procedures will be sent to the 13 VNRCs with a sample of the all papers involved in the process, (c) if and when Village’s General Assembly meetings are held, the district forest officer will ask for an invitation and will tape the discussions on the Angai forest, (d) the district forestry officer will report weekly to the district natural resources officer of all
the extension activities in Angai villages, and (e) a standard system of village receipts will be instituted in the Angai villages. However, none of these activities were implemented by District Council, and in 1999, the district authorities turned back to their original idea of establishing a LGFR.

In 2000, RIPS hired a new development worker, the author of this paper, for two years. The main target was to facilitate the PFM activities, particularly in Angai forest, and to build up capacity and practices under the local government in Liwale District Councils. My main task was to start a fresh dialogue between the village, district, region and national levels in order to work out the best future option for Angai forest management. The first step was for a group of participants from the villages, district, region and RIPS to take part in National Forest Programme workshops in Mtwara Region. Later on representatives from the Ministry of Forestry and Beekeeping came to visit Liwale and took part in Angai workshops organised in Liwale District. During these workshops the district authorities and villages reach a consensus.

In September 2000, the decision was to establish an Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (AVLFR), managed by the 13 villages with collaboration of district authorities. A number of actions were agreed upon during discussions and different meetings. All 13 villages had a village meeting about the village land title deeds and management arrangements of Angai forest, and the minutes of meetings were copied to the district authorities. Later on, representatives of villages, members of each Village Councils and VNRCs, organised a meeting with the district authorities and agreed on future arrangements, e.g., the demarcation of 13 villages. Finally, the villages applied for the demarcation of the AVLFR, and for legal land certificates for village lands of 13 villages.

At the end of December 2000, Liwale District Council approved the villages' proposal concerning a Village Land Forest Reserve and issued the villages' land certificates. The District Council also appointed representatives from the
Forestry and Beekeeping Division at Lindi Region and RIPS to advise the District Technical Staff during demarcation and other activities. The village governments together with their village councillors and ward officers were responsible for agreeing upon and marking boundaries between the villages. The farmland boundaries between the different villages were clear to village governments, but the main areas of conflict were found during the boundary process in the forest. Working in the forest was also dangerous because of wild animals and the risk of malaria, and the dry season was too short to demark all the boundaries. The regional survey team started the boundary process in 2001 but due to their limited manpower could not carry it out on time.

Finally, the actual survey and mapping was done by the Ministry of Land and Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. After the survey and mapping, i.e., from 2004, Liwale District council has continued to establish the AVLFR in accordance with the Forest Act No 14 of 2002 and the Land Act No 4 of 1999 with financial and technical support from RIPS (2001 – 2003) and later from the National Forest Programme’s Coordination Unit Support Project (NFP) (Kaale 2005). Villages with their own forest management area that constitute the AVLFR are: Nahoro (32,727 ha of forest under VLFR), Nangano (4,046 ha), Kibutuka (4,652 ha), Kiangara (1,572 ha), Kitogoro (8,578 ha), Mtawatawa (11,531 ha), Mikunya (2,159 ha), Liwale B (6,737 ha), Likombora (19,694 ha), Mihumo (12,947 ha), Ngongowele (7,333 ha), Nguja (6,008 ha) and Lilombe (20,786 ha). The total land area of the 13 villages is 479,131 ha most of which is under miombo woodlands. The total population of the 13 villages in 2002 was 22,843 people and the average forest area per person considering the AVLFR alone was over 6 ha as compared to the average national figure of less than 1 ha of indigenous forest per inhabitant (Kaale and Simula 2004).

For several years, the main debate concerned the distribution of tax revenues between the district and village levels. In Angai, under the auspices of a non-PFM benefit-sharing arrangement, the central government could receive a
royalty of TSh 25-50,000 per felled tree, the District could receive TSh 205 for every piece of timber produced in the forest, while the villages received TSh 60 per piece of timber, a rate which was earlier fixed by the Districts. When the 13 Angai villages finally got certificates for their VLFRs in 2005, central government and the district lost all rights to such levies. According to local forest experts and calculations based on field observations in the area, 0.7-1.0 m$^3$/ha of timber could be harvested per annum on a sustainable basis in Angai. Based on interviews and transect walks in the forest, it is estimated that half of the 1,388 km$^2$ of Angai could be allocated to timber production, implying that a maximum of 68,885 m$^3$ of saw logs could be harvested on a sustainable basis. Using average royalty rates and estimates of costs related to harvesting and transportation, we come up with a potential annual profit of approximately USD2 million (USD30 per m$^3$ of sawn log).

Because of an earlier lack of technical and political support from the District Council, RIPS advised the 13 villages to establish a local advocacy organisation. During a workshop in 2001, representatives from 13 villages established a union between 13 villages accordingly and invited representatives of the District Council to be its partner. In order for the union, later on called MUHIMA (Muungano wa hifadhi ya msitu wa Angai, Union of the Angai Forest Reserve), to start its operation, the roles and responsibilities of MUHIMA needed clarification. Capacity building was also necessary. There are several issues which need to be taken care of. For example, where and how often meetings should be organized, how villages will finance the meetings and transportation, to whom and how MUHIMA will report, etc.? During the village meetings in 2001, it was agreed that the constitution should go to the Village Assembly Meetings for feedback. Also the Liwale District Technical Staff was to provide their comments before sending it to a lawyer and the full District Council for approval. The registration was to be undertaken after all comments were combined and the final draft of the constitution was ready. To date, the union has not been
registered, and according to interviews in 2005, MUHIMA only convenes if the District Council calls a meeting and covers the meeting allowances.

The next step is that the 13 villages, in collaboration with the District Council, should prepare a forest management plan for the AVLFR, in which sustainable levels of logging for each village will be established. District and central government authorities have not allowed the village Councils to reap any benefits before having prepared a thorough inventory and forest management plan. The District estimates that such an inventory would cost TSh 180 million (USD180,000), which cannot be financed by the District or the villages in their current situation. One straightforward solution might be to allocate a smaller area to the villages so that they could harvest enough timber to pay for the inventory and management plan for the limited area. In July 2007 this alternative was discussed in a workshop between village participants and district representatives. Nonetheless, future activities are still quite unclear for both the villages and the District Council, and they are expecting technical and financial support from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and donor organisations.

**Key findings**

Unlike many other parts of Tanzania, AVLFR has the unique advantage of existing valuable forest resources. In most other areas the main task is to create forest resources through restoration efforts. However, the past 13 years have passed without reaching the goal of economically sound and sustainable PFM in the area. Experiences from Liwale show that in spite of a relatively conducive legal framework and political support, administrative discretionary powers deployed against PFM constitute a massive constraint on implementation. Sub-national administrations seem to have few incentives and little capacity, both of manpower and finances, to ensure information and benefits in participating villages, and this obstructs the implementation of PFM.
In the case of Angai, the district, region and national levels invested little of their time and financial resources during the past 13 years, nor did they provide extension services in PFM, except in the periods where pressure and payments from donor projects existed. Instead, the district administration obtained additional funds through timber royalties, as well as through non-reported revenue-collection which is often considered more or less normal. During 2000 and 2001, when I worked with the Liwale District it was obvious that district technical staff, councillors and villagers were entangled in various patron-client relationships with traders of forest products. A crucial problem in Tanzania is that in remote districts, civil servants do not always report timber royalties. This is justified by the claim that these un-reported payments compensate their low salaries and extreme working conditions. Lindi Region is among those regions with serious corruption cases related to natural resource management. Some cases have been more silent and hidden, while others have received national publicity through newspaper articles and reports related to illegal logging issues during 2006 and 2007 (Milledge et al 2007). Liwale had it own case after I finished my working period with the Angai process: The Liwale District Forest Officer suddenly disappeared, and later on there were rumours that he had taken the un-reported royalties and gone to Europe with me.

In 2005, during my last visit to Angai villages, VNRCs were not satisfied with the Angai process. The PFM process had aimed at developing an effective forest management model in the Angai area. However, it seems that PFM has not been effective way to protect the forest resources and promote improvements in local livelihoods. This is because the legalisation of boundaries and the establishment of a Villages Land Forest Reserve in the area have entailed been a lengthy process, and have been highly dependent on the quality of the local government's institutional capacity. The District Council did not have the technical and financial capacity to provide the needed services for the villages.
The difficulty is to implement the laws, regulations and guidelines, and to support PFM at the lowest level of government through community-driven processes facilitated by sub-national administration. The way the PFM proceeds in Tanzania indicates that where forests have less commercial value and deforestation is more visible, the government and districts have been more concerned with the increasing participation of local people in the forestry sector, and are thus ready to fulfil the objectives of PFM. In those areas where valuable forest resources are still available, the benefit-sharing agreements have run into bottlenecks. Economic benefits are fundamental with regard to participation in the management and protection of forests; poor people simply cannot afford to spend their time on forest protection if the net economic output is negative, and they would rather utilise forest areas for agriculture and harvest the valuable timber illegally.

It can be questioned whether PFM decreases or increases rural poverty. For example, in case of Angai, villagers were required to invest time and labour in many meetings, in the boundary demarcation process, and in forest protection and management operations while tangible incentives remained scarce. Villages are legally entitled to utilise forest resources and collect fines and fees from the extraction of forest products from the AVLFRs. However, as the example of Angai has shown, the utilisation of forest resources is complicated. A village may have legal rights to a resource but still cannot utilise it due to the prerequisites for utilisation, such as forest inventories and management plans which needs external technical and financial capacity.

In Tanzania, district administrations seem to lack incentives, motivation as well as human and financial resources to promote capacity and ensure benefits in participating villages. The consequence of this is that the districts neither invest their limited time and financial resources, nor do they provide extension services in PFM. The only exception is in the cases where pressure and payments exist from NGO and donor projects. This obstructs the implementation of PFM. The risk is that local communities do
not have access to information and the needed capacity to legally access and control natural resources.

Villages might benefit from timber resource by providing labour and getting wages from illegal timber operators, but this does not mean that they are participants with decision-making rights and the ability to affect sound forest management and protection. In case of Angai, villages lack the capacity to carry out technically sound forest management and they do not have ability to control the resources in their locality. The district administration has continued to oversee forest management and enforce the license-tax system related to forest products trade. In order to tackle this problem, the Liwale District Council is still seeking external funding to improve extension in the Angai villages. In the Angai case, the local institution, MUHIMA may serve as an extension provider in the long-term although, at the moment, they still require long-term capacity building in order to strengthen the union.

In order to ensure facilitation and extension during PFM processes, contributions from donors have been crucial, but not always sustainable. In Tanzania, the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) has highlighted the fact that a high level of donor dependence is a barrier to effective up-scaling of participatory forestry and the long-term financial sustainability of activities (URT 2003). Their view is that improved revenue generation and retention procedures are needed and villages should accept increasing responsibility for financing PFM, and for the long-term costs of managing village forest resources. The basic idea is that PFM could reduce the costs of forest management for government. However, it has been also recognised that establishing a VLFR in Tanzania currently consumes so much time, skills and financial resources that District Councils are not able to facilitate and finance boundary demarcation processes, forest inventories and management planning through district budgets (White and Mustalaiti 2006). In most cases, there is still a need for external facilitation and financial support, which originated from central government or donors.
An increase in both central government and community contributions will be central for the sustainability of PFM. In Tanzania, only a small share, 10% of the revenue from timber export, is collected annually, and these funds have the tendency to remain in the national treasury (Milledge et al 2007). It is also commonly known in Tanzania that royalties from natural resources disappear on the way to the treasury, or before the funds are supposed to be distributed to local governments or communities. The result is the unfortunate reality that very little extension and facilitation is carried out in PFM areas without donor funds. For example, in Angai villages the extension activities have been only carried out during periods of donor funding. During my interviews in Liwale, district authorities emphasised that the District Council has very limited financial resources to carry out extension and facilitation related to natural resources management. The reality is that distances in the Angai forest area are so long that just travelling to the villages consumes a lot of financial resources from the District Council.

Even external financial support for the forestry sector cannot always solve extension and human resource problems. In Liwale, in spite of financial support from different donors, the Forestry and Beekeeping Division was for several years unable to appoint professional foresters to stay in Liwale and facilitate PFM activities. There were several reasons for this, such as infrastructure conditions in the district. There is now a new Bachelor-level forester in the district, but working conditions are still hard. In Liwale, there is a high risk of malaria, and the water and food situation is still difficult in some periods of year. In these conditions it is hard to expect that government officers and their families would be willing to stay there permanently. Often key factors influencing PFM may lay outside of forest sector. The implementation of health sector programmes, government investment plans for rural areas, and government salary policies may be more important for the nation's forests than donor support or specific forestry policy and legislation.
Conclusions

Long-term national government and donor commitment is still needed to assist communities build local advocacy organisations that can assert the rights and ability of local villages. Short project periods do not support the institutionalisation of PFM in local communities. After all the donor funding in PFM, national and local governments have difficulties to ensure long-term technical support. In these conditions, PFM may take several years to begin producing concrete results in village livelihoods even when valuable resources are available.

PFM requires people to change from shifting cultivators to forest managers who see themselves as responsible for the local resources and actively claim access to information and benefits from the resources. Rural people in Tanzania are slowly beginning to demand extension services, to express their dissatisfaction towards District Council services, and to mobilise their own efforts to protect and utilise natural resources in a sustainable way. In Angai, it might be still too early to judge the PFM; local communities need time to develop local institutions and their capacity.

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Popular dissatisfaction and the erosion of political support in Mtwara and Lindi Regions

Bernadeta Killian

Introduction

This chapter is about political support for the Tanzanian government among the people of Mtwara and Lindi regions. Mtwara and Lindi are two of 26 regions of the United Republic of Tanzania. The two regions are located in the southern part of the country and they are usually referred to as ‘the South’. According to the 2002 national population census, Mtwara and Lindi are home to about two million people of different ethnic groups including the Makonde, the Makua, the Yao and the Mwera.\(^1\) About 90 percent of the people in each region are engaged in small-scale agriculture. Like other regions in Tanzania, over the past decade, Mtwara and Lindi have undergone profound political and economic reforms after three decades of one-party rule and socialist experimentation. During periods of one-party rule as well as during the new era of multi-party politics, Mtwara and Lindi have formed a strong and predictable support base for the incumbent regime.

Mtwara and Lindi regions are among the least developed areas in the country. Hence, the ‘South’ typifies not only the regions’ geographical location but also their economic stagnation. According to the 2006 Poverty Status Report, some

\(^{1}\) For discussion about the history of the peoples of Southern Tanzania, see Koponen (1988) and Liebenow (1971).
of the districts in Mtwara and Lindi regions have the highest rates of under-five mortality per 1,000 live births in the country, i.e., 1 child in 4 dies before reaching the age of five (Status Report, 2006: 19). According to the household budget survey conducted in 2000/01, more than half the population in Lindi region (53%) and 38 percent in Mtwara are below the basic needs poverty line (Poverty and Human Development Report 2005: 55). In addition, districts with the lowest literacy rates in the country are also found in Lindi and Mtwara (Poverty and Human Development Report, 2005:59). Many years of poor communication infrastructures resulted in the isolation of the regions from the rest of the country thereby affecting their economic potential.

The low level of development is reflected in the state of public opinion of the people in the South. In general terms, the Southerners are regarded as being politically passive, inattentive citizens and an uninformed public. Over the recent years however, the emergence of multi-party competitive politics accompanied by improved communications in media, telecommunications and transportation seem to have transformed the state of affairs. All this has provided an avenue for people in the regions to express their concerns and discontent towards their government. Yet questions remain; Given the socio-political and economic changes, what is the level of people’s satisfaction with their government? To what extent do Mtwara and Lindi continue to constitute a social and political base for the incumbent party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)? Is there a connection or disconnect between popular satisfaction/ dissatisfaction and the level of political support? These are the questions that this chapter sets out to address.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents an analytical discussion on public opinion and political support. This will be followed by the presentation of findings drawn from surveys in 2004 and 2006, followed by some conclusions.
Public opinion and political support

The tradition of gauging citizens’ opinion and attitudes towards various political phenomena is beginning to take root in Tanzania. As a result of the fundamental socio-economic and political changes that have taken place for over a decade now, public opinion is increasingly recognized as politically important. It should be recalled that the political atmosphere of a single-party system did not provide a conducive environment for examining citizens’ political attitudes, opinions and orientations. The repression of opinions that accompanied state monopoly of the media, made it difficult to rigorously assess citizens’ sentiments toward their political system.

However, things have changed in recent times. The liberalization of the economy since the mid-1980s has opened up new opportunities as well as new challenges, thereby shaping people’s values and attitudes. The pluralist political system introduced in 1992 has brought in its wake freedom of speech and association. The emergence of opposition parties coupled with flourishing independent media has provided the public with information on policy choices and alternatives. In addition, competitive multi-party elections have significantly enhanced the role of public opinion in policy-making. As a result, public opinion studies are now on the increase largely in response to the ongoing democratization process (Bratton et al., 2005; Killian, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Chaligha et al., 2002; Mukandala & Killian, 1996; Mushi & Mukandala 1997).

Why is it important to assess citizens’ opinions and attitudes towards political phenomena? It is widely acknowledged that citizens’ support for a political system plays a critical role in determining the structure and performance of political institutions. In democratic politics, citizens’ attitudes may either enhance or undermine the legitimacy of political processes. Indeed, citizens’ dispositions toward authority “drive to the very heart of what democracy is all about” (Diamond, 1993:12). It is therefore imperative that citizens’ opinions and attitudes toward their political system be periodically assessed.
in order to ultimately determine the extent of support for the political system as a whole.

The process of opinion formation has been a contested area among social scientists. Traditional public opinion research has tended to regard the public as being uninformed and uninterested in politics (Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964). This view is increasingly being challenged by new research findings. Hutchings, for instance, points out that in fact, “under the right circumstances, voters are surprisingly well informed on the issues that they care about”, and indeed, collective public opinion is often informed and influential (Hutchings, 2003: 2, 6-7) Also, there are marked variations among the public in terms of their levels of political interest and political knowledge. This is largely due to the fact that for many ordinary people keeping informed is a costly undertaking. As Converse correctly puts it, “it takes information to get information” (Converse 2000: 334) Thus, political and economic literacy is important for ordinary people’s ability to form and express their opinion and in enabling them to make a connection between their life satisfactions and their support for a new political regime (Bratton et al., 2005: 34)

Zaller, moreover, points out that in the process of opinion formation, two main elements are critical: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and a predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it. That is to say, “every opinion is a marriage of information and predispositions” (Zaller 1992: 6). Information about some aspect of public affairs can be derived from elite discourse, e.g., politicians, government officials, journalists, activists, experts and policy specialists, media, etc., or from family or friends. However, many people tend to have little desire to comprehend all the information that goes their way beyond their personal experience, and hence they are likely to focus on selective issues that matter most to them and those that relate to their interests, values and motives. As Zaller correctly argues, “for citizens are more than passive receivers of whatever information that comes their way. They possess a variety of interests, values, and experiences that may affect their
willingness to accept or resist persuasive influences” (Zaller 1992: 22) Zaller further argues that when there is no variation in elite discourse, the members of the public are most likely to adopt the dominant elite position as their frame of reference in forming their opinion. But when there is a sharp divide in general ideological or partisan predisposition in elite discourse, public opinion will reflect the differences with the most politically informed attentive members of the public mirroring most sharply the ideological divisions among the elite.

Having formed an opinion about an issue, how does this translate into political support? The concept of political support is more complex than it sounds and has generated heated debates among political scientists (Almond & Verba 1965; Easton 1965, 1975, 1976; Converse 2000; Muller & Jukam 1977; Rogowski 1983). Debate has focused on various themes including challenges of deriving meanings out of public opinion surveys in general as well as the complexities of making distinctions between attitudinal versus behavioural support, incumbent versus system support, as well as on the indicators and measurement of political support. This chapter applies the most widely used conceptualization of political support developed by David Easton. Easton (1975) makes the distinction between ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ support. Specific support is more performance-based as it relates to people’s evaluations of “what incumbent political authorities do and how they do it” (ibid.: 437). In this case, citizens can be dissatisfied with the political authorities and discontent with the policies and their living conditions.2 Yet, as Easton points out, at times, political discontent is not always, or even usually a signal for fundamental political and social change. Diffuse support entails generalized attachments of citizens to the political system which are “more fundamental in character because they are directed to basic aspects of the system” (ibid.). Diffuse support “consists of a reservoir of favourable attitudes

2 According to Easton (1975: 438), political authorities include all public officials from chief executives, legislators, judges, local and central government administrators, policemen as well as institutions such as legislatures and courts.
or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants’ (Easton 1965: 237). In this case, people can rate the performance of Parliament as very poor (specific support) while not demanding fundamental changes in the political regime or constitution (diffuse support). Based on this understanding, this chapter confines itself to the ‘specific’ type of political support as expressed by people’s evaluations of the performance of the incumbent executives including the President and the cabinet, as well as institutions such as local government, courts, the legislature, the Police force and the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)

This article uses two separate data sets collected in two opinion polls carried out in September 2004 and October 2006 in four selected districts in Mtwara and Lindi. It should be pointed out that both opinion polls were conducted in all 26 regions in the United Republic of Tanzania. The surveys were conducted by Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), a programme of the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. The nation-wide sample for each survey consisted of 1,300 respondents randomly drawn from different walks of life. For the purpose of this chapter, only data from Lindi and Mtwara regions are used for analysis. Comparisons between Mtwara, Lindi and other regions in Tanzania Mainland will be done only when deemed necessary to make a certain argument more evident. Moreover, as the study deals with people’s evaluations of political authorities and institutions, comparisons are restricted to regions on the Tanzanian mainland (excluding Zanzibar) as they all share similar political institutions and processes.

Nachingwea (Lindi) and Mtwara urban (Mtwara) were randomly selected districts in the 2004 opinion poll. Mtwara rural (Mtwara) and Kilwa (Lindi) were randomly selected districts for the 2006 opinion poll. In both surveys, the sample was randomly drawn using a three-level multistage sampling. The levels include districts, villages/streets, and respondents. All the levels were randomly selected. In each district, 50 respondents were randomly selected from randomly selected
villages (for rural settings) or streets (for urban settings). The data is analyzed by using cross-tabulations. It is equally important to point out that these surveys, though at times conducted in the same districts, have used different samples. Hence, any comparison must be tentative, while enabling us to observe the general patterns and trends of people’s opinion and their orientations toward the political system.

**People’s satisfaction/dissatisfaction and political support**

*People’s evaluation of incumbent government performance (2004)*

The 2004 opinion poll asked respondents to express their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the incumbent government and its institutions. As Table 1 shows, the rate of people’s satisfaction with the government performance in both regions was remarkably high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(722)</td>
<td>(209)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(1047)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixty-four percent and 90 percent of respondents in Mtwara and Lindi respectively reported that they are satisfied with the

---

3 The question was stated as follows: “How do you evaluate the performance of the government in power? Are you satisfied, somehow satisfied or not satisfied?”

4 The rate of people’s satisfaction is demonstrated by the percentage of those respondents who reported that they are ‘satisfied’ with the performance of the incumbent government.
government in power. Indeed, Lindi’s rate of satisfaction was the highest among all the regions in Tanzania Mainland. This high rate of popular satisfaction among the respondents in Lindi and Mtwara toward the government can largely be attributed to the progress that was made at that time in the construction of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lindi-Mtwara road and the completion of the Benjamin Mkapa Bridge over the Rufiji river.

The construction of the bridge commenced in 1998 during President Benjamin Mkapa’s first term in office. It was completed in August 2003. The completion of the bridge marked the most visible contribution of the Mkapa’s presidency to the South.\(^5\) The 2004 survey asked the respondents to mention the most important legacy of the outgoing President Mkapa who was finishing his term in 2005.\(^6\) Of the respondents in Lindi, 71.5 percent, and of respondents in Mtwara, 55.3 percent mentioned that they would remember President Mkapa for improvements in the roads and particularly the Rufiji Bridge. Thus, the high rate of satisfaction might have been a result of President Mkapa’s commitment to solving the persistent problem of the poor road network in the South. Since independence, the people of Mtwara and Lindi had been demanding a government intervention in constructing the Dar-es-Salaam-Lindi-Mtwara road, but without success. Promises were made but not fulfilled.

As a result of this major infrastructural development, President Mkapa, who originally comes from Mtwara, secured an overwhelming victory in both regions in the 1995 and 2000 elections. In the 1995 elections, President Mkapa secured 81 percent and 83 percent of the total presidential vote in Mtwara and Lindi respectively. Likewise, in the 2000 elections,

\(^5\) The Mkapa Bridge, which is the longest in Tanzania, is believed to be the second longest bridge in Africa after the Nile bridge in Egypt. The bridge stretches for about 970 meters over the Rufiji river. The total cost is estimated at US$34 million. The government of Tanzania contributed about 24 percent of the total cost. Other financial support was received from OPEC, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (www.zana.gov.zm).

\(^6\) The question was stated as follows: “For what legacy will Tanzanians remember President Mkapa?”
President Mkapa secured 89.7 percent and 82.2 percent of total presidential votes in Mtwara and Lindi.

Moreover, even with the high rate of satisfaction towards the incumbent government and clear political support for the ruling party, 86 percent and 73 percent of respondents in Lindi and Mtwara respectively acknowledged that there are unresolved socio-economic and political problems which still call for the government’s attention. In the same opinion poll, the respondents were asked to mention one major persistent problem that the government had yet to solve. Water shortage was cited as the main problem by half of the respondents in Lindi region. On the national average, Lindi has the highest number of people with no access to safe water. In Liwale district for instance, only 8 percent of the population have access to improved water supply. This is far below the national average of rural households with access to improved water which stands at 42 percent (Poverty and Human Development Report, 2005: 68). Poor access to higher education was the problem ranked second among Lindi respondents. There are only a few secondary schools in Lindi and while Lindi is among the regions in the country that are doing well in the performance of standard seven graduates, the existing secondary schools cannot cater to their numbers (Poverty and Human Development Report, 2002: 53)

In the case of Mtwara, corruption was the problem cited most frequently, by about 23 percent of the respondents. This was followed by a lack of credit/loans (11%). Variations in the ranking of the identified problems may partly be explained by the fact that Nachingwea district is largely in a rural setting compared to Mtwara urban. A list of all the problems mentioned is shown in Table 2.

Thus, despite the high rate of satisfaction with the overall government performance as indicated in the 2004 opinion poll, there were other pending socio-economic and political of great concern to people of Lindi and Mtwara. With the completion of President Mkapa’s term, campaigns for the 2005 elections could have provided the opportunity for people of Lindi and
Mtwara to re-examine their political choices in response to their needs. The election results of 2005 may shed some light on the extent of political support for the government among the Southerners. Equally revealing are people’s evaluations of the newly-elected President Kikwete and his government as indicated in the October 2006 opinion poll.

**Table 2: Persistent problems the Government has yet to solve (2004)**
(Percentages and actual number of respondents in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Mtwara</th>
<th>Lindi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No problems</td>
<td>27.3 (12)</td>
<td>14.0 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>22.7 (10)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water shortage</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>50.0 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor health services</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor access to higher education</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20.0 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor primary education</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>9.1 (4)</td>
<td>4.0 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor roads</td>
<td>9.1 (4)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of credits/loans</td>
<td>11.4 (5)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor marketing of crops</td>
<td>6.8 (3)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary contribution</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of agricultural inputs</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfulfilled promises</td>
<td>2.3 (1)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100 (44)</td>
<td>100 (50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While it is perhaps too early to make firm conclusions, both the 2005 election results and the 2006 survey findings tend to indicate some signs of a declining level of political support toward the incumbent government among the people of Mtwara and Lindi.


Political support for the incumbent government seems to have declined both in Mtwara and Lindi. As Table 3 shows, although President Kikwete received a comfortable victory in Lindi and Mtwara over his opponents in the opposition, compared to the 2000 elections, the share of CCM’s presidential votes in the 2005 elections declined in the two regions.

**Table 3: Presidential election results in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections in Mtwara and Lindi** (results in percentage)\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>79.09</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>73.99</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) Reports, Tanzania National Election Commission Reports*

\(^7\) CCM = Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party); CUF = Civic United Front; Chadema = Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Party for Democracy and Development, Tanzania); NCCR-M = National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi/Change; TLP = Tanzania Labour Party; UDP = United Democratic Party.
The Civic United Front (CUF) seems to be increasing its share in Mtwara and Lindi. CUF’s presidential candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba, seemed to have made significant inroads by increasing his votes in Mtwara from 3.5 percent in 1995 to about 17 percent in 2005. Similarly in Lindi, CUF’s presidential votes rose from 5.5 percent in 1995 up to about 23 percent in 2005.

Parliamentary election results also show a declining trend of the level of political support toward the incumbent party, CCM, in Mtwara and Lindi. Although CCM has been able to retain all of the constituencies in Lindi and Mtwara in the 2005 elections, the percentage of total parliamentary votes has declined. As Table 4 indicates, CCM’s total share of parliamentary votes in Mtwara declined from 84 percent in 2000 to about 76 percent in 2005. Likewise in Lindi, the percentage of votes declined from 78.5 percent in 2000 to about 71 percent in 2005. Compared to the 2000 elections, CUF’s total parliamentary votes in the 2005 elections increased four times in Mtwara and doubled in Lindi.

Table 4: Parliamentary Election Results in 2000 and 2005 (results in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCM</th>
<th>CUF</th>
<th>Chadema</th>
<th>TLP</th>
<th>NCCR-M</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara 2000</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi 2000</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In certain constituencies in Lindi, the opposition party, CUF was able to wage stiff competition against CCM candidates in the 2005 elections. CUF demonstrated its electoral strength in Kilwa South (41.5%), Mchinga (40.4%), Liwale (42.6%) and
Lindi urban (39%). In Mtwara, CUF secured significant amount of votes in Tandahimba (23%), Mtwara rural (18%) and Newala (17%). Also, the NCCR-M candidate received about 30 percent of votes in Mtwara urban constituency. Clearly, although the opposition parties are still far below the incumbent party in terms of votes’ share, they seem to be expanding their electoral base in the South, an area that is traditionally known to be a CCM’s stronghold.

A year after the 2005 elections, REDET carried out an opinion poll assessing people’s evaluations of the performance of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete’s government. President Kikwete came to power as the most popular candidate in the new multi-party competitive elections, defeating his opponents by obtaining over 80 percent of votes cast in the Union presidential race. In general, the majority of Tanzanians seem to have placed a great deal of hope in President Kikwete for dealing with social, political and economic problems.

The coming of President Kikwete to power marked the fourth CCM’s administration since independence.8 Whereas the level of popular satisfaction with President Kikwete’s government has remained more or less the same in Mtwara, it has significantly declined in Lindi. Table 5 shows that, whereas in 2004, 90 percent of the respondents in Lindi reported that they were satisfied with the government performance, only 58 percent had the same view in 2006. In Mtwara, the rate of popular satisfaction with the government performance has not changed substantially from 2004 (64%) to 2006 (63%). What is most striking is that while the respondents in Lindi and Mtwara seem not to be extremely thrilled with the performance of President Kikwete’s government, the rate of satisfaction in other regions remains very high. The incumbent government’s performance received high satisfaction rates in such regions as Tabora (92%), Kagera (90%), Mwanza (86%), Kigoma (86%), Dodoma (84%), Mara (82%), Tanga (80%) and Iringa (80%).

Table 5: People’s Evaluation of President Kikwete’s Government Performance (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(718)</td>
<td>(239)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(1045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both regions, moreover, people’s evaluation of government institutions such as the cabinet, the police, Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), the judiciary, local government and parliament seem to be rather low. The satisfaction rate of each of these institutions is below 35 percent. Thus, the respondents may have been satisfied with President Kikwete himself rather than with his cabinet and other institutions.

Table 6: People’s Evaluation of President Kikwete’s Cabinet Performance (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(364)</td>
<td>(382)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(216)</td>
<td>(1044)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked about the performance of President Kikwete’s cabinet, only 24 percent and 8.4 percent of respondents in Mtwara and Lindi respectively reported that they are satisfied with the cabinet performance (see Table 6). More revealing is the fact that almost half of the respondents in Lindi did not
have an opinion on the performance of Kikwete’s cabinet. The most popular answer among the respondents was, “I don’t know”. Yet, they expressed their opinion on the functioning of other government institutions.

Regarding the performance of the courts, a significant percentage of the respondents in Mtwara (41%) and Lindi (39%) were not satisfied with the performance of the courts in their areas (Table 7). Delays in court proceedings and alleged corruption may have been a reason behind the low rate of satisfaction. Indeed, corruption was cited as number one problem by the respondents in Mtwara in the 2004 opinion poll.

Table 7: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Judiciary (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>(344)</td>
<td>(324)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>(1044)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the success of the PCB in combating corruption is yet to be seen. It is estimated that Tanzania loses approximately 20 percent of its entire budget to corruption every year, equivalent to the total funding allocated by the government to the education sector in 2006 (Haki Elimu, 2007). As Table 8 shows, the majority of the respondents interviewed reported that they are not satisfied with the performance of the PCB. In fact, Mtwara ranked third in the rate of dissatisfaction with the PCB after Dar-es-Salaam (58%) and Kilimanjaro (52%). Also, a significant percentage of respondents in Lindi and Mtwara seem not to know much about the PCB. People’s assessment of
the police force and the parliament is also low (see Tables 9 & 10 in annex). About 39 percent and 28 percent of the respondents in Lindi and Mtwara respectively said that they are not satisfied with the performance of the police force.

Respondents were also asked to evaluate the performance of their local governments. Since 1999, reforms in the local government have been under way geared at promoting good governance based on political and financial accountability, democratic procedures and public participation.

Table 8: People's Evaluation of the Performance of the Corruption Prevention Bureau (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(194)</td>
<td>(236)</td>
<td>(362)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
<td>(1043)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in the legal and institutional framework have been effected in regional and local administration. Various Local Government Acts of 1982 were amended in February 1999 through Act No. 6 of 1999 to give effect to new centre-local relations. The amendments stress good governance calling for democratically elected local leaders and enhanced transparency in the conduct of council affairs as well as greater accountability of the councils to the people. Councils have become critical players in the implementation of pro-poor policies under the ongoing poverty reduction strategies.

Legal and institutional changes notwithstanding, the findings seem to indicate that majority of the respondents are not very pleased with their local governments. Table 11 indicates that 40 percent of the respondents in Mtwara
expressed their dissatisfaction with local government. In fact compared to all regions in mainland Tanzania, Mtwara had the highest percentage of respondents who reported that they are not satisfied with local government performance. In Lindi, about 47 percent of the respondents reported that they are somehow satisfied, and 24.5 percent said they are not satisfied.

Table 11: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Local Government (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>(449)</td>
<td>(389)</td>
<td>(162)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(1040)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, it is striking to note that peoples’ satisfaction with the performance of the ruling party is comparatively lower in Lindi and Mtwara than in other regions in mainland Tanzania. Overall, about 62 percent of the respondents in mainland Tanzania reported that they are satisfied with the performance of the ruling party. When data is disaggregated by regions, Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma and Mbeya turned out to have the lowest rates of satisfaction in the Mainland. Only 46 percent in Mtwara and 44 percent in Lindi expressed their satisfaction with the performance of the ruling party. The rates are even lower in Mbeya (10%) and Ruvuma (34%). Yet, in all other remaining regions in mainland Tanzania, respondents’ satisfaction with the performance of CCM stands above 50 percent. The highest satisfaction rate was recorded in such regions as Tabora (88%), Mwanza (84%) Mara (84%), Kagera (84%), Tanga (78%), Arusha (76%) and Morogoro (72%).
Do people’s assessment of the incumbent government and its institutions affect the way people identify themselves with the ruling party in Mtwara and Lindi? Self-identification data from the 2004 and 2006 opinion polls indicate that the number of the respondents who identify themselves as members of CCM is declining. Indeed, the number of those who identify themselves as members of opposition political parties and non-members is rising. Tables 12 and 13 (in annex) represent these trends. Whereas in 2004, 78 percent of respondents in each region of Mtwara and Lindi reported that they belong to CCM, in the 2006 opinion poll, 70 percent in Mtwara and only 44 percent in Lindi said that they belong to CCM (see Figure).

**Figure: Party Membership 2004 & 2006**

![Party Membership Graph](image)

**Conclusions**

The findings clearly seem to indicate that there are some changes in the political orientations among the people of Mtwara and Lindi regions. Whereas the overall national electoral performance of the opposition parties is on the

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9 ‘Other’ includes the percentage of those respondents who said they belong to opposition political parties as well as those who said they are not members of any political party.
decline, ironically, they seem to be expanding their electoral base in the South. However, compared to other opposition parties, it is CUF that seem to be favored by a significant segment of the electorate in Mtwara and Lindi. This trend may be partly attributed by the relatively low level of satisfactions with the performance of the incumbent government among the people of these two regions. Perhaps, the people in ‘the South’ are beginning to make a connection between their life satisfactions and support for a political regime. Only time will tell.

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## Appendix

### Table 9: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Parliament (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
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<td>40.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(10)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
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<td>39.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(421)</td>
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<td>(103)</td>
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<td>(1034)</td>
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### Table 10: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Police Force (2006)

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<th>Region</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somehow satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<td>(9)</td>
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<td>(14)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
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<td>22.4</td>
<td>38.8</td>
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<td>(49)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Mainland</td>
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### Table 12: Membership in Political Parties (2004)

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<th>Chadema</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>not member</th>
<th>other parties</th>
<th>total</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39)</td>
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<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<td>(50)</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39)</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(50)</td>
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<td>Tanzania mainland</td>
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<td>(5)</td>
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<td>(1041)</td>
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### Table 13: Membership in Political Parties (2006)

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<th>CUF</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<td>(50)</td>
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<td>Lindi</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania mainland</td>
<td>72.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Social forms of culture in development

Helena Jerman

Recent anthropological studies have shown that individual accounts of the past demonstrate how the social permeates the personal (Hautaniemi et al 2006; Cole 2001; Skultans 1998, 2001; cf. Tonkin & Whitehouse 1995). This makes social memory a complex but necessary site for studying the dialectics of individual and social processes. More specifically, social practices through which informants enact their memories combine elements between history and memory. With Jennifer Cole’s (op.cit.: 8) pithy comment, “What is remembered as ‘tradition’ is perhaps the most ‘modern’ construct of all” I will take the reader to a small village in the Coast Region of Tanzania. But first, some additional background that are important for the context of this essay.

A multitemporal perspective

This essay links my ongoing work (Jerman 1997) to an earlier culture research project in Tanzania, called Jipemoyo.1 This

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1 Jipemoyo, “to give oneself heart” (1975-1981), was the first culture research project conducted between the Tanzanian government (The Ministry of National Culture and Youth) and a foreign academic
earlier project aimed to realize the development potential of the residents of the western Bagamoyo District in the Coast Region of Tanzania, encouraging villagers to take initiative in solving their own problems by utilizing their own resources. In this process, past and present were intertwined. Within Jipemoyo, my study on the development of ethnicity (Jerman 1997) applied a multitemporal approach considering the ways in which, for example, events, concepts or persons are perceived (by informants or various archives) at any given time (cf., Macdonald 2002). Pursuing these ideas, I am presently involved in a study on the negotiation process of identity focusing on social memory, mobility and belonging in a new context: the Russian Finnish borderland (Jerman 2006).

Juxtapositioning the development of ethnicity in a Tanzanian context with crossing the Russian-Finnish border together with informants, concretely and mentally, is methodologically powerful. Representing complex configurations of time, space and long series of events, fieldwork in Tanzania as well as fieldwork 'at home', have convinced me that what is relevant in ethnographic research is what people themselves find important and that, notably, it cannot be identified in advance. The researcher has to follow informants. This has recently been strongly emphasized by a number of anthropologists doing ethnographic research (e.g., Johannes Fabian, George Marcus, Judith Okely, Sharon Macdonald 2004). Hidden structures have to be detected, and this is one of the methods to do it.

During the early 1980s there was a debate among anthropologists and historians focusing on nationalism and the nation-state as historical inventions or constructions (Gellner 1964; 1983; Anderson 1983). These discussions were also linked to a debate on the invention and the imagination of 'tradition' (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Ranger 1993). Further, the notion of culture had been undergoing "some of the most radical rethinking since the early 1960s" (Dirks et al. 1994: 3).
The Russian anthropologist Nikolay Girenko’s path-breaking article (1983) on the dynamics of cultural changes in East Africa during the 19th and 20th centuries challenged conventional definitions on culture, which identified cultural differences or similarities with social differences or similarities.²

All this added important aspects to the ethnicity debate initiated by Fredrik Barth whose definition of an ethnic group stressed its essence as a form of social organization. In his important contribution, Barth (1969) stressed that ‘ethnic’ groups must be studied not as isolated communities but in relation to one another. Suggesting that the present role of ethnicity in the African context is different from what it was during colonialism and the pre-colonial period, Girenko posed a relevant question (to Barth as well as to other researchers dealing with ethnic processes). He asked: ‘What are the social forces behind ethnic boundaries?’ i.e., what are the social and cultural implications of these phenomena in different contexts?³

Applying this question pertaining to African pre-colonial, colonial and independence history Girenko’s idea of culture as a phenomenon came to form the backbone of my study on the development of ethnicity in Tanzania. Conceptualizing culture as a system of historically developed material and perceptual forms in which life is enacted, I explored how externally assigned identities are perceived, contested and negotiated in relation to their own contexts. This demanded an analysis of the relationship of the social and the cultural, i.e., the ways social forms of culture survive over time and how they are perceived. In this process it was important to distinguish between the social and cultural as relatively independent phenomena, which however, are inconceivable

² Girenko elaborated, however, on this theme already in 1977 when writing on aspects of the ethnic development in Unyamwezi in the 19th century (Girenko 1977). It bears noting that a critique similar to Girenko’s appeared in the West in the 1990s; see, for example, Friedman 1994.

without one another. Finally, considering the problematic task of interpreting cultural phenomena, my ethnographic material required diachronic analysis as emphasized by both Girenko (1986) and the historian Juhani Koponen (1986).

Introducing notions of change into the analysis provided the basis for a multitemporal approach. A constructivist perspective (see Young 1993) enabled me to assess the historical and cultural context of the development of ethnicity within a Tanzanian context. In my view, this approach to culture as a form or forms in which relations between people, between people and things, or between society and nature are exercised is useful when trying to find a way to understand development as a bridge between historically developed cultural forms.

Jipemoyo based its work on a participatory research approach. The research team recognized that ‘researched people’ are active producers of knowledge. Such an approach was designed principally to study local enactments of culture in relation to the social, political and economic changes taking place in the country. The Arusha Declaration published in 1967 implied, in the words of president Julius Nyerere’s that “we are Tanzanians and wish to remain Tanzanians.” Tanzania was the society that should form the basis from which the state building had to take the first steps to independence (Nyerere 1967: 18). Hence, the construction of a specific Tanzanian national identity took place within a definite social space: the links between the present and the past of a national collectivity was crucial.

Attempts at villagization, i.e., urging people to form village settlements on a cooperative basis had started already prior to the Arusha Declaration. Now, however, it was explicitly given a more convincing ideological motive stressing people’s own responsibility for setting up villages “of their own free will (to) live together and work together for their common good” (Nyerere 1974: 37). The most intensive phase of the

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4 On participatory research as an ethnographic method see Donner and Nasoro 1979.
villagization process took place during 1973-1976. The implementation process from 1973 onwards allowed the regional authorities the right to determine in which areas people should live. People who had formerly lived in scattered settlements were gathered into new or old extended villages.

However, the government's plans to reshape Tanzanian society ignored existing social organizations and traditional systems of services. This meant that, from above, there was a stark demarcation line between the traditional and modern. Administrators interpreted the reasons to resistance by the villagers as traditionalism and not as a possible reaction to directed development (Anacleti 1996: 72; Swantz 1997: 36; cf. Swantz 1987: 6-7). This was in contradiction with Julius Nyerere's ideas according to which the nation had to use the traditional system and was to be built upon its three fundamental principles, which permeated the customs, the manners and education of the people (Nyerere 1968: 337-340). The Tanzanian historian A.O. Anacleti suggested that research, for instance, into the ways people during this time were adopting and organizing patterns of land ownership would have helped to increase the social and economic acceptability of villagization. Evidently, 20 years after villagization, people were returning to their old homesteads and re-creating their own structures. The sociologist Sam Maghimbi (1995) has shown that there was no empirical evidence for Nyerere's interpretation of traditional African villages as cradles of freedom, equality and unity, thereby justifying ujamaa.

**Villagization and before**

Ever since pre-colonial times with its longstanding exchange of people and goods between the coast, the islands and the hinterland, the societies of Jipemoyo's research area had undergone transitions in many ways. Interestingly, when describing the development of his country, a local elder

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5 These were, in short, love, i.e., respect and obligation; common property; and obligation to work (Nyerere 1967: 8-9).
illustrated these transitions by drawing five lines in the sand in front of his house. These lines symbolized peoples who in the history of the area had confronted each other. Commenting upon each line which symbolized his own people, the original inhabitants of the area, followed by the Arabs, Indians, Baniani and the Europeans (in this order) he succeeded in describing invaders and immigrant groups using superior technology and who in this way had forced the inhabitants to reformulate their identity. In other words this man's presentation contained political, economic and social implications attached to activities of different groups of people. With hindsight, it is possible to speculate that had the villagization process been introduced and carried through by invaders or immigrant groups, the man would have drawn a line for it.

Much has been written about the failure of the ujamaa policy, which ultimately manifests the difficulty of transferring concepts from one context to another (Swantz 1997: 36). Apart from this, I wish to call attention to the commendable main aim of the villagization process: to improve the living conditions of the people by centrally providing services like health, education and water. The fulfilment of a basic need like water, for example, was a most essential task in the Jipemoyo research area, specifically in Miono village. For long periods there was only water which officially had been condemned as unsuitable for human consumption, mainly because of its being very saline. Also wood was scarce because of dense population: to find a bundle of wood demanded a walk of about five kilometres. Obtaining firewood had formerly taken place in an ecologically sustainable way allowing for reproduction of forests.

An episode and its implications

Villagers in the western Bagamoyo District seemed to use different forms for their community's continuity in order to preserve it. I will now make an attempt to show that these forms, rituals, for example, are cultural manifestations of belonging, be it ethnic, local or national. At the same time the
enactment of cultural forms (directly observable or perceived) encompass specific aspects of the ongoing social process, the rapidly developing society. Leaning on my field notes I will relate an experience from the Miono village in the Bagamoyo District in 1977.

“In the afternoon of the same day, when walking in the village we met Juma Nasoro. He was a local specialist in ngoma and traditional medicine. He said that “he had been called to come” and asked us to come with him to come and look at the snake, the one that had killed a man in the shamba, field. Now another man had killed it. Juma had told me earlier that he had a gift of ‘calling’ the snakes. Some days ago he had tried to ‘call’ snakes after the calamity but the ‘killer’ had not come to him, only some other snakes.

“We followed Juma and on our way he told us the following story: A man from a nearby village had gone to his field, and the shed there, in Juma’s words: “alipofika, shamba, kibanda”. Children were playing nearby the kibanda. Then the man saw the snake. When the snake saw the man it stood up. The height of it was equal to the man. The man took a long stick (as long as himself) and beat the snake three times. Two times the snake rose as high as the man but at the third time and the third beat the man succeeded in killing the snake.

“When we reached the courtyard of the TANU office the dead snake was on the ground.6 About sixty people were gathered around it, men, women and children, all wanting to see the black snake. The head of the snake was cut away and fastened with a cord to a long stick and the cord was also tied to the corpse of the snake. An elder, mzee, began to measure the length of the snake by walking step by step alongside it. He repeated this many times, counting his steps every time and saying: nane na kasoro, eight and a half.7 The crowd agreed upon this. He had big feet.

“After this people made room for Juma Nasoro. Squatting, he started attentively to examine the snake with his hands and he said: “it is dangerous. It has sumu, poison”.

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6 As the events unfolded during the following moments that afternoon I asked Juma Nasoro for permission to fetch my camera from our house and take some pictures to which he consented.

7 This makes about two and a half metres.
Picture 1. Juma Nasoro, local specialist in traditional medicine, music and dance, demonstrating the snake to people in Miono village. Photo Helena Jerman 1977. JPA.
Picture 2. The procession on its way to the bomba, well. Photo Helena Jerman 1977. JPA.

Picture 3. Juma Nasoro extracting the poison bags of the snake. Photo Helena Jerman 1977. JPA.
Then he took the snake and the stick and walked, followed by the crowd, to the market place and he stopped in front of the shop.

"In reply to my question why the head of the snake had been cut off Juma answered that it was *maana yetu*, their way, and that he would tell me afterwards what that means specifically. After a while the measuring of the snake started again...

"After this Juma showed where the *sumu* of the snake was, pointing to a point halfway on the body. Then he opened the mouth of the snake and showed its fangs. During this demonstration a *mzee* beside me lamented: ‘Babu yangu umekufa’ indicating that this snake had killed his father...

"Now Juma took the snake again and started to walk slowly, with dignity. The crowd was now dispersing but all the children and a few elderly persons followed Juma in a procession. He walked towards the closely situated *bomba*, the well, and stopped for a while. Next he reached the house of *Mzee* Ramadhani. In the village this house was commonly called the *utafiti* (research) house being the residence of the Jipemoyo researchers who rented it from *mzee*.

"He stopped again and showed the snake to the people surrounding him and to new passers-by. Then the procession continued with Juma first, the villagers next and in the end of the line my colleague Kitolero and myself. When, after a while, we reached the *hospitali*, the local dispensary, Juma stopped. Again he exhibited the snake to the people around him. He stood there for a few seconds, immobile and after that he continued his path, followed by the villagers towards his house. When we reached it, a new phase of the event commenced. Juma forbade the children to be near the snake, which he laid on the ground and the children gathered around it. Juma indicated the danger of the work he intended to do next."

I will briefly round up the last phase of this event without going into the details of the subsequent occurrences. A deeply concentrated Juma Nasoro proceeded now meticulously with specific procedures, which comprised, among many other things, the extraction of the poison bags. From time to time he addressed the surrounding persons with various warnings but
he also involved us with some information. I also asked him a few questions about the procedure and what seemed vital items in the ritual. In all his replies to me he added: maana yetu, our meanings (of that). He told us when he was ready. It was obvious that he wished us to leave the place. A third phase was about to begin, but obviously it was meant only for professionals: two of Juma’s colleagues, i.e., specialists in traditional medicine, arrived to his house at that very moment.

What can we learn from this episode? There was something that I had failed to notice, despite my full participation in the event. I was so immersed in Juma’s doings, including the accompanying rituals that I became blind to some important contextual implications of the event. Only much later, and thanks to my colleague, ethnomusicologist Philip Donner, when he read my detailed notes and called my attention to what I had written down, did I realize the role of the three important elements of the event i.e. water, education and health.

The three key elements of the new postcolonial society of Tanzania, symbolized here by the water pump, the researchers’ house and the dispensary, thus played a major role in the event. Bearing in mind that a change in the cultural content (the social process) does not always presuppose a change in cultural form, I will conclude with some suggestive comments. The main actor of the event, the local specialist in traditional medicine, music and dance, showed that development could be seen as a process in which villagers participate creatively. He did this by juxtaposing old and new forms of culture. As key symbols for the new society the bomba, the utafiti house and the hospitali represented the new system whereas Juma Nasoro’s enactments of local social and cultural practices embodied local knowledge. In other words, what we interpret here as culture is the combination of elements between history and the embodied nature of social memory. More specifically,

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8 Acknowledging my interest in the endeavour he, while showing the bowl with the poison, also expressed his own wish to explain to me some of the meanings of the procedure and the items the following day.
culture is a cross-section of the social dynamics with the social permeating the personal.

It is possible for cultural forms to withstand pressures of change and adapt to new conditions without losing their significance to people. Arguably, forces of development, whoever or whatever they are, have to relate to peoples’ conceptualizations of their social reality (cf., Swantz 1995: 135). Evidently, forms of culture are slow to change in comparison to their content. Forms or system(s) of forms from past times, enabling the continuity of culture, are not in contradiction to cultural forms of the present as long as they are compatible with a new socio-economic reality. An adaptation to socio-economic transformations can, however, be difficult and result in a break-down of a cultural system. Alternatively old cultural forms will be unreceptive to innovations and lose their function. After thirty years it remains a task for new empirical research to investigate if the dynamic social and cultural practices encountered at the time of Jipemoyo, are compatible, or not, with change within this social context.

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Neo-Pentecostalism in Tanzania
Godly miracles, Satanic interventions or human development?

Päivi Hasu

Introduction
A global wave of Pentecostalism has been sweeping across all of Africa during the past few decades.¹ This Christianity is now attracting the urban middle class, the young and the relatively well educated as well as the rural poor across the continent. The world wide estimate is presently over 500 million Pentecostal-charismatic Christians (Robbins 2004: 117).² Though Pentecostalism’s dramatic expansion has left almost no part of sub-Saharan Africa unaffected, the extent of its growth varies across the region. Many of Africa’s most populous and politically significant countries reflect this trend. According to the estimates, more than 20 per cent of the population of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa,

¹ The fieldwork on which this essay is based was conducted in June - July 2007. I thank Professor Juhani Koponen for his support and for offering me the opportunity to air my thoughts during the time when we were both doing field research in Tanzania. I also want to express my gratitude to my assistant Mr. Geoven Festo Rwiza, who with his local knowledge made this study possible. This study was funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto).

Kenya, Zambia and Uganda are Pentecostal-charismatic. In Ghana and Nigeria, the growth has been particularly dramatic. Throughout the world, Africa included, 1980s and 1990s witnessed a complex, globally expanding web of Pentecostal networks whereby flows of people, preachers, money, ideas and images circulate with growing speed and intensity. Simon Coleman has suggested that the globalisation of Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity has three key dimensions: It refers to the use of mass communications media in disseminating its ideas, images and other media products across the world. It refers to an organization that promotes internationalism through global travel and networking, conferences and big churches that function like international corporations. There also tends to emerge a global meta-culture of Pentecostal praxis that transcends locality and displays striking similarities in different parts of the world (Coleman 2000: 65-69). This Christianity that also purports to address questions of prosperity is now flourishing in the declining African economies.

A scholarly discussion of the connection between the Pentecostal form of Protestantism and the neoliberal, capitalist economy has been taking place during the recent years. This essay touches upon several themes derived from the works of Max Weber: Religious ideas of the Pentecostal form of Protestantism, rationalism and (dis-)enchantment, charismatic leadership, and neoliberal economy. It is about religion and market economy in Tanzania; the way that Pentecostal ideas of prosperity and the existence of demonic forces are articulated in the present-day neoliberal economic setting. Pentecostal Christianity and its prosperity gospel are here interpreted in the Geertzian spirit, as a model for and model of lived reality. Religious beliefs and ideas inform the ways that economic circumstances are perceived, interpreted and acted upon in specific social and historical contexts. Furthermore, lived reality gives rise and shapes religious beliefs and ideas (Geertz

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3 For Tanzania, no statistics are available.
This discussion is situated in the wider context of globalization and locality.

In Tanzania, there have been two important trends since mid 1980s that have contributed to the rising popularity of the Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity; the intensification of Muslim activities and the economic reforms of the country. Tanzania is one of the world’s poorest and most highly indebted countries. The neoliberal policies of structural adjustment of the 1980s and early 1990s sought to dismantle the regulation that was seen to constrain market forces in many postcolonial African economies (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 29). The Structural Adjustment Program and the liberalization of the economy have resulted in increased unemployment and a lowered quality and availability of social services. This has taken place in the context of marked poverty (Munga 1998: 37). In 1999, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank announced that SAPs would be replaced by poverty reduction strategies (PRSP). Since 2005, the country has followed the development frame of National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) to promote growth and reduce poverty.

Whereas earlier forms of popular Christianity helped African peasants and labour migrants come to terms with the demands of capitalist imperialism, contemporary Pentecostalism responds to another kind of socioeconomic context and enables African adherents to come to terms with neoliberalism. Furthermore, as David Maxwell has demonstrated, there are areas of congruence between neoliberalism and Pentecostalism: Key traits of the Pentecostal character such as the sense of personal destiny, self-worth, self-reliance and positive attitude help the adherents to operate on the unpredictable markets that require entrepreneurial initiative, self-motivation, and flexibility with which to face insecure living (Maxwell 2005: 28). Maxwell explains the prevalence of Pentecostal doctrines not in terms of false consciousness but as a means of enabling the adherents to make the best of rapid social change. He suggests that for some, the doctrines bring about social mobility. For others,
they provide codes of conduct which prevent them from falling into extreme poverty and destitution. For all they provide a pattern for coming to terms with, and benefiting from, modernities' values and institutions. Pentecostalism appears to offer its adherents the chance to change their responses to the limiting conditions that the neoliberal structures create (Maxwell 1998: 351; 2005: 28).

One way of changing the responses to the limiting conditions emerges from the way that conversion and becoming saved transform individuals and restructure families. For many of the African poor struggling with the effects of the neoliberal economy this popular religion appears, for instance, to restore the nuclear family as a defence mechanism. There is often the emphasis on changed character; notions of fidelity, hard work, teetotalism and peaceful temper are intended to re-socialize converts by drawing them away from the world of sin into a family-orientated life (Maxwell 2006: 201). The new codes of conduct among the saved often result in an all-round betterment and better managed household economy in the form of more regular income and improved family relations. Often as well, the believers benefit from the material support of the fraternal networks of fellow believers. The ethos stresses coping and avoidance of extreme poverty.

Theologically, the shared elements in the broad variety of the Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity are baptism of Holy Spirit and the charismatic gifts of the individual believer such as speaking in tongues, healing and prophecy. Pentecostals describe their churches as ‘full Gospel’, meaning that believers are filled with the Holy Spirit in a way that was promised to the early Christians in the books of the New Testament; that is they have access to miraculous power, the gifts of the Spirit, including rites of healing and casting out demons (Brouwer et al 1996: 5).

Many of the charismatic churches and ministries are characterized by prosperity gospel, also called faith gospel or health and wealth gospel according to which a true believer has the right to health and wealth, and can obtain these blessings
by a positive confession of faith. Another, equally important and frequent feature of African charismatic Christianity is its well developed demonology and the deliverance prayers and practices. The emphasis put on these aspects varies from one church to another. I will here discuss the ways that prosperity gospel and the concerns over demons get an expression in the Tanzanian realities, through discourse on godly miracles, workings of Satan and the agency of human beings.

Prosperity gospel is a theological idea commonly shared by many of Africa’s Charismatic churches. It has it that God has met all the human needs in the suffering and death of Christ and that every Christian should share the victory of Christ over sin, sickness and poverty. A true believer has the right to the blessings of health and wealth and these can be obtained through a positive confession of faith. Material success is the sign of God’s blessings. Several American TV evangelists contributed to the development of this idea. A. A. Allen taught that God is a rich God and that those who want to share in his abundance must support God’s servants. Oral Roberts added the idea of seed faith; one prospers through planting a seed in faith and the return of that will meet all the needs (Brouwer et al. 1996: 26-27, 171; Gifford 2001: 62). In Africa, these teachings are being applied and modified in a radically different kind of context. They find resonance in the traditional African religions and preoccupations about material wellbeing. The approaches to faith gospel in terms of the local and the global have ranged from analysing the homogenising influence of the American originated gospel to the analysis of the more local, African born concerns (eg. Brouwer et al.; Maxwell 1998). The growing influence of prosperity gospel has implications for the formation of capitalist attitudes and activities (Maxwell 1998: 350).

Besides prosperity gospel, the second central feature of Pentecostalism is its concern for demons and spiritual warfare.

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4 Some of the best known published works of the American prosperity evangelists are for instance: Kenneth Copeland, The Laws of Prosperity, 1974; Gloria Copeland, God’s Will is Prosperity, 1978; and Kenneth E. Hagin How God Taught me about Prosperity, 1985.
In African cultures, belief in spirits, witchcraft and spiritual agency is widespread. Correspondingly, a highly developed demonology has evolved in the modern Pentecostal Christianity. Daily life is seen to be dominated by an ongoing struggle between God and the local, demonic territorial spirits (Brouwer et al. 1996: 169; Robbins 2004: 122). Success and advance can be blocked by demons that maintain some power over the Christians and prevent advancement. An important feature in understanding affliction is therefore the emphasis on the existence and activity of demons. Satan is perceived as the ultimate cause behind the existence of evil. Physical calamity and sin are desired and designed by Satan but God can also allow or permit misfortunes (Munga 1998: 112-113). Deliverance by prayer is designed to rid believers of demonic influence.

Several scholars have suggested that Pentecostal-charismatic culture has a unique characteristic of at once preserving its distinctness from the cultures into which it comes into contact and yet, engaging those cultures on their own terms. Its forms are similar in many parts of the world and yet it is diverse in its content; it is local and global at the same time. Generally, Pentecostalism tends to preserve indigenous spiritual ontologies by preserving people’s beliefs concerning the reality and power of the spiritual worlds from which they have broken away (Robbins 2004: 128). It is the very struggle against local culture that proves how locally rooted it is. It is de-territorialized and local at the same time because it is an uprooted local culture engaged in spiritual warfare with its own roots (Casanova 2001: 437). Authors have thus used Pentecostal-charismatic culture to support both theories that construe globalization as a process of homogenization and those that understand it as a process of indigenizing differentiation.

It is perhaps then for these reasons that charismatic Christianity so effectively deals with people’s concerns; it takes local beliefs, perceptions and existential concerns seriously and is able to deal with them. Pentecostalism appears to be able to contain the occult much better than established mission
churches. While the latter prefer not to talk about the powers of darkness in public, or even regard them as superstitious figments of popular imagination, Pentecostal-charismatic churches take seriously the threat of such powers. By taking such forces and powers seriously the Pentecostal and other charismatic churches have moved close to the experience of many Africans, closer than the white missionary churches ever could with their denial of the existence of such agency (van Dijk 2000: 11).

**New Pentecostal churches in Dar es Salaam - Efatha**

The number of new Pentecostal churches has increased also in Tanzania. Although Pentecostalism appeared in Tanzania in the early decades of 20th century in the form of Holiness Mission, Assemblies of God, Swedish Free Mission and ELIM Pentecostal Church, it was first during 1970s when it started spreading more rapidly. As the consequence of the challenge presented by the Pentecostal churches, Charismatic revival has been allowed to exist also within protestant denominations such as the Lutheran church. A distinction is usually made between the older Pentecostal churches and the new Charismatic churches and ministries. Today, there are a number of big, relatively new Pentecostal churches and ministries in Dar es Salaam. For instance, Full Gospel Bible Fellowship, located in Mwenge, is lead by Bishop Zachary Kakobe, Assemblies of God, Mikocheni-B is lead by Pastor Dr. Gertrude Rwakatare, and Word and Peace Organization (Wapo Mission) is founded and managed by Bishop Sylvester Gamanywa. These and many other new and independent churches tend to form loose associations for cooperation and networking, often also internationally.

One of those new churches is Efatha, an independent, vibrant and rapidly growing church located in Mwenge, Dar es Salaam. As do most Pentecostal churches, also this one leans heavily on the personality, vision, and charisma of its founder and leader, Josephat Elias Mwingira, who wants to be addressed as Apostle and Prophet. He is a charismatic leader
and claims to have direct connection and communication with God. Efatha church – Efatha meaning to be opened – was established by Mwingira in 1996.\(^5\) Before becoming saved he was, among other things, in Tanzanite mining business at Mererani mining community outside Arusha, and in 1992 while at Mererani, he got the calling from God. He is Catholic by his background but studied later at the Mwika Lutheran Bible School in Kilimanjaro. That is where he also started revivalist fellowships. His first service took place in 1994 and he then gathered about 150 people. In December 1995 God gave him the permission to leave the Lutheran Church and Efatha Ministry was officially registered in May 1997. The church in Dar es Salaam was started in 2003 with 50-60 people. In 2005 there were over 10,000 people and there are over 300,000 estimated followers now in the whole of Tanzania. Efatha has started churches also in Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. The organization is carefully planned according to Mwingira’s vision, and he uses both spiritual and financial advisors to support him. A registered company, Efatha Foundation, was established to administer the investments. Efatha runs various projects and owns vast areas of agricultural land in different parts of Tanzania. The large plot in the middle class area of Mwenge where the main church is located is by itself enormous in its financial value.

The church has three aims: to heal Christians through prayer, to deliver people from physical and spiritual disorder, and to prepare the church for the end times. According to Mwingira’s testimony and visions, he was taken by an angel to the heaven to go and see Jesus and God (Mwingira 2005). He was given a nine point program of how to implement the given tasks. He was to start a Bible school to educate religious leaders. He was to arrange services to deliver people from the powers of darkness, witches, witch doctors, ancestral sacrifices, as well as all sorts of harmful traditional practices. He was to have healing services with a holistic approach to

\(^5\) In Mark 7: 34, ephphatha, the Greek form of a Syro-Chaldaic or Aramaic word, means "be opened" in the sense of being delivered.
healing; to treat social problems, even those affecting the entire country as well as illnesses and other crises of individual people such as problems in marriage, family, income and health. He was also to teach the word of God. He was to prepare singers, choirs and people able to perform prayers. He was to start schools and thereby educate new generations of saved leaders. This would take place at all levels from nursery schools to universities. He was to start new churches and places of worship. He was to conduct seminars and meetings as well as start new services of various kinds such as hospitals, radio programs, TV programs and production of publications of different kinds.

Efatha has been broadcasting on three different TV channels throughout Tanzania. In June 2007, however, the church officially launched a TV station of its own, Trinity Efatha Network Television (TRENET), after a few years of fund raising. This station is now second religious station in the country after Agape TV Network. On the same week the church inaugurated a bank of its own although the license was then still to be delivered by the government. The church also intends to launch a weekly newspaper as well as a radio station. Furthermore, the future visions include a university, hospital, airport and a phone company. When I interviewed Josephat Mwingira in June 2006 he proudly presented the first sketches of a ten storey office building that Efatha is intending to construct.

Mwingira takes pride in announcing that Efatha does not rely on foreign aid, donations or funding but that all the funds are raised among its own Christians. The sums of the weekly collections, tithes and offerings, are not publicized but the general understanding is that they is not below 15 million shillings (over €8,000) and can be up to 50 million (almost €30,000) on a good week. Christians have also purchased shares of Efatha Foundation with a rumoured estimate of are as high 15 billion shillings. The principle of giving in order to receive is of supreme importance at this church. Constant emphasis is placed on the need to work hard and be successful in order to be able to make donations. One of Mwingira's
leading ideas is to bring up Christians to hard work and self-reliance: “I have managed to raise Tanzanians to hard work and economic self reliance”. Mwingira thinks of himself as a skilful manager of the economy: “I am an economist”. On the competitive religious market successful churches are sometimes criticized for their ways of making money.

According to its program, Efatha organizes conferences and seminars. One such occasion was organized in June 2007, and the week culminated in the launching of the TV station and the bank. Two cabined members, the Minister for Labour, Employment and Youth Development, Hon. Capt. John Chiligati, and the Minister for Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, Hon. John Magufuli honoured the occasion with their presence. During the week international guests taught and preached to both leaders and lay Christians. The main speakers were Dr. Mensa Otabil, a famous Ghanaian religious superstar, Dr. Tayo Adeyemi, Nigerian born leader of the New Wine Church in the UK and pastor Randy Morrison, a Trinidad-originated leader of the Speak the Word Church International in Minnesota, USA. It may not be accidental that there was not one white preacher present. The overarching theme of the week was the empowerment of the Tanzanian Christians and their way away from poverty to prosperity. Although some of the central areas of Efatha are prayer healing and deliverance, prosperity teachings and the teachings on giving in order to receive are of greatest importance as are issues of empowering the Christians. At Efatha, deliverance is to be understood broadly aiming at a general well being and prosperity in life. The appearance of Mensa Otabil is by itself a strong indication of the importance of these matters at Efatha. Furthermore, one may ask whether there are radically new winds blowing in Tanzania in terms of the economic ideology of the charismatic churches.

A Ghanaian visit

Mensa Otabil is a Ghanaian religious leader in his 50s; one of the most prominent Pentecostal leaders on the African
continent. He is also a business man, a business consultant and the Chancellor of the private university Central University College that he has founded. He started his International Central Gospel Church in 1984 in Accra and draws about 7000 people on Sunday services, which are popular among the educated urban middle and upper middle class. He has extensive media activities and is a popular speaker on TV. Apart from being a churchman and the head of several hundred churches, he is also a business consultant. He is a board member of several Ghanaian and international companies including companies dealing with pharmaceuticals and computers: “I train business men. Not just Christian business men. I teach some of the top business men in West Africa. I run a consultancy for them. I train their top management staff from banks to mining, to multinational companies.”

Otabil has the other one of his two doctorates from the Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, USA. Apart from Oral Roberts, another one of the early influences on him was Kenneth Hagin, one of the founding personalities of prosperity teachings in USA. Otabil has published several books, one of them titled “Four Laws of Productivity”. There he presents the four principles of prosperity: be fruitful, multiply, replenish the earth and subdue it. In his book “ Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia: A Biblical Revelation on God’s Purpose for the Black Race” he instils pride on the black people who, according to him, are inclined to regard themselves as inferior to whites (Gifford 2004: 113). These were the key references of his teachings in Tanzania.

Otabil is passionate about African development. People should have zero tolerance for underdevelopment because

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6 In 2003 Otabil established his own consultancy company, ‘Otabil and Associates’, which develops, organises and markets leadership training seminars and workshops for several large banks, Unilever and other multinationals (de Witte, forthcoming)

7 Behind these ideas lies the African Pentecostal concern over “Dominion Theology” that also Otabil underlined while speaking in Dar es Salaam. According to this theology, there is the need and right for believers to exercise domionion over earth’s resources for the benefit of humanity (Larbi 2002: 157).
underdevelopment is man-made and not God-made; it is man-made, self-inflected and self-imposed. It will not be rectified by tithing, anointing with oil or by God’s miraculous intervention. It is caused at least partly by deep seated values and practices, and will be rectified only when Africans themselves address them (Gifford 2004: 130-131). Otabil’s thinking appears to be rather radical in the context of Tanzanian Pentecostal Christianity. He gives very little space to demonic forces in interpreting and explaining the emergence of poverty and underdevelopment. In his mind, underdevelopment is caused by human decisions and actions – rightly so, many might say. Accordingly, the Ghanaian problems are not the results of demons, witches or ancestral spirits and curses. Neither are they caused by slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism or the International Monetary Fund. Those problems cannot be solved by anointing or godly miracles and interventions. According to Otabil, the problems of underdevelopment are partially caused by deep-rooted cultural values and practices. They can be solved only if Africans themselves take the problems into their own hands (Gifford 2004: 130-131). Otabil emphasized human agency, cultural factors and the significance of human labour in creating development and prosperity. Actually, during the seminar at Efatha, Otabil’s friend and fellow preacher pastor Randy Morrison placed the perplexing but simple question in front of his Tanzanian audience: “Why do you give so much credit to Satan for your (business) failures?” This is revolutionary in the Tanzanian charismatic context where godly miracles on one hand and the satanic agency on the other, are significant aspects in conceptualising human fortunes and misfortunes.

Otabil’s teaching in Dar es Salaam was based on the book of Genesis. As he said, the first thing that one learns from that book is that God is a working God; his work produces results, he is a producing God, he is a creative God, he is a God who does things. And man has been created as his image, as a working and creating man. According to Otabil, Africa is the most continent anointed and Africans pray most, more than any other people on earth. They are most anointed but Africa is
also the poorest – why? How do you develop the nation? How do you develop the national economy?

The answer is: Switch on the light and you can see clearly, you can start solving problems. Light represents knowledge and understanding. If you do not know and understand you can not solve the problem. Don’t be ignorant; do not let anybody make you ignorant!

I am fed up with underdevelopment! I believe God created us for something better. We will see strong business men. We are not going to sit here and only receive investors from outside. We will also see Africans to invest. The days of small business are gone. You will see big money; you will see millions of dollars! --- Get ready! You are going to see a new story in Africa. The old picture is gone and the new picture is there! You will see churches do things that you never thought churches would do. Preachers doing things you did not think preachers would do. --

- Many of us Africans have grown up in an atmosphere of poverty and scarcity. Atmosphere of little thinking. Atmosphere of inferiority complex. People who have been raised in abundance they do not have the sense of scarcity. You have to ask God to change your environment for you from scarcity to abundance! If you have spirit of scarcity you may become envious and you do not want anybody to get ahead. People do not want to see others to be blessed.

The inferiority complex must change. Africans think that we do not deserve much. It started from the past before the white people came with our own forefathers. They did not value the life of others. They made us believe we were nothing. But then the white men came and the colonialism. And we were told we are nothing. The white men left. Then we got independence but our leaders told us we can have nothing. From past to the present we have been reduced in value. When a black man sees the white man he instantly thinks the white man is wiser. That is why the government goes to foreign consultants. We are ready to see foreigners to become kings rather than our own people. When god raises a leader among us we want to bring him down. In that atmosphere nothing grows.

Most black people do not invest their money in the future. They spend and waste their money fast. They throw their money away. If you are going to be rich you must save and invest! To save and to invest are the two important principles of prosperity. But most Africans do not have savings and investments. They have nothing behind them. We depend on others to do things for us. That must change! In Africa there is the environment of dependency!
God has brought you into an atmosphere; a new atmosphere is being built in this house. It is not the atmosphere of the old Tanzania. It is not the atmosphere of scarcity but of abundance! Some of you will have more money than your government. Your government will borrow from America but you will give to America. You will start banks and own hotels, airlines and universities! You have so much ability inside you! You have businesses, books, hotels, airplanes, shipping lines, computer businesses consultancies, hospitals sitting inside you. As God created so will you create; new companies, businesses, investments, franchises! You will invest in Hong Kong, Australia, Europe. Get ready! Your business will not end in Tanzania; it will go out of Tanzania! Not just to Kenya but also to Uganda because the God is bigger than East Africa. Break the fear, be bold, be strong, stand out for God and see him do mighty things for you! He will change the atmosphere! In this church I sense that this is a new atmosphere. God has brought you into the new. Forget about the old! In the past it was illegal to be prosperous in Tanzania. Those days are gone for ever!

The way you think determines the things that you attract. Poverty is not in our pocket but in our mind. If you are poor in your mind you will attract poverty around you. There are people in Tanzania and the only thing they see is poverty because they are poor themselves. Poor people attract poverty around them. And you attract of your kind. We are on African continent. It is a poor continent. The poverty is not on the ground but it is in the people. All over Africa the condition is almost the same: poverty, poverty, poverty; country after country among the black people. When other people come - whether Indian, Arabs or white people - they come and they create wealth. And we live in the same land but we create poverty! The problem is not the land or the geography. The problem is the atmosphere of the people! The understanding of the people makes them what they are. If things do not change in your mind you can live in the midst of prosperity but still create poverty!

Godly miracles, satanic interventions or human development?

There are several areas of interest in Otabil’s teachings in Dar es Salaam. First, he refutes or at least plays down many principles of Pentecostalism such as the agency of demons and the possibility of miracles that still today remain so prevalent in the Tanzanian Pentecostal Christianity. Second, He places an emphasis on detrimental cultural factors on one hand and the
empowerment and black consciousness on the other in explaining and interpreting (under-)development. And third, he speaks about the significance of human labour, rationalism, disenchantment.

In Tanzania, most Pentecostal preachers focus on health and wealth through divine intervention, miracles, seed-faith, prayer and spiritual power. Mensa Otabil, however, takes matters further than what the Tanzanian public is used to by contesting many of those principles. In his work on the Ghanaian Pentecostalism, Paul Gifford has also looked at Otabil’s message in quite some detail. Otabil generally refutes many features common to charismatic Christianity: there is no space for oil, there is no anointing, no healing, no witches, no demons, no prophetic gifts, and little stress on the miraculous (Gifford 2004: 119). People do not become failures through witches, wizards or demons; they become failures because of choices made by themselves or on their behalf. In his teachings human responsibility replaces demonic control. Human beings are not victims of circumstances; human beings are products of choices (Gifford 2004: 121).

Otabil has made culture the prime focus of his theology and his criticism of the emergence of underdevelopment. But at the same time, he is a passionate advocate of empowerment and black consciousness. He is critical of some of the African cultural practices and suggests that they hinder development or may even be the cause of underdevelopment. Otabil has listed strongholds, people’s assumptions, desires, understanding and values that are part of what is generally labelled as culture. They include such features as inferiority complex, tribalism, cultural stagnation, idolatry and fetishism, village mentality, ideas of leadership and apathy (Gifford 2004: 125; also de Witte, forthcoming). In Tanzania, he specifically addressed the inferiority complex and to some extent, wrong and negative leadership. Otabil differs from many other charismatics in his commitment to the mental liberation of black people in the world, to true independence, freedom, and self-esteem and he has become particularly well-known for his brand of Black consciousness to the point that Larbi has
termed his thinking as “African-Pentecostal liberation theology” (Larbi 2002: 155). De Witte has argued that what makes Otabil’s particular vision on modernity so powerful is his synthesis of concepts that are commonly thought to be incompatible: He brings together cosmopolitanism and African identity by bridging the perceptual gap between being African and being modern and developed. He also integrates spiritual power and rationality: in order to be successful, you need both (de Witte, forthcoming).

Otabil, like Mwingira, draws from many of the themes discussed by Max Weber in his writings on Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism (2004) such as the premises of a neoliberal economy, the meaning of work, investment, rationality and the (non-)existence of magic and miracles. Furthermore, they both embody charismatic leadership, in both the theological and sociological sense. That is what Weber described as a type of authority not based on traditional, inherited power or on rational-bureaucratic power, but on an extraordinary personal quality and a special gift of grace. In her careful analysis of Otabil’s work and activities, Marleen de Witte has demonstrated that Otabil creates himself as the embodiment of his message and that that for a large part his charisma is constituted by conscious self-presentation, PR strategies, stage performance, and protocol (de Witte forthcoming). And Mwingira is a quick learner.

Otabil insists that development comes from hard work and not from miracles. As de Witte has so lucidly illustrated, he focuses on success, achievement, self-development and personal improvement; success comes through human agency. His preaching presents an intriguing mix of born-again ideology of personal transformation, African consciousness and self-development discourse characteristic of management and consultancy literature (de Witte forthcoming). Otabil and Mwingira seem to be different from many other religious

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8 De Witte has an excellent discussion on Otabil’s project of creating distinction and charisma, and presenting himself as a cosmopolitan in her dissertation manuscript, chapter two: Mensa Otabil: Marketing charisma, making religious celebrity.
leaders Tanzania who do not, in the same way, counsel their people to work hard, plan and order their lives properly. Quite the contrary, their messages tend to centre around the words and phrases “miracle” and “in the name of Jesus”.

It is a widely held perception that many of the new churches do little to encourage work ethic (Gifford 2004: 158). Otabil also places considerable emphasis on the importance of education, knowledge and information as the source of light in solving human problems: “We have to attack ignorance and illiteracy as though they were the devil himself. Don’t hide behind binding ignorance and casting it out in Jesus’ name. You cannot cast out ignorance in the name of Jesus. You cast out ignorance through education” (Gifford 2004: 122). In Otabil’s teachings one can recognize a sense of work, entrepreneurship and business in particular, as ‘callings' to be done well. Christians should have the will to work hard and not spend the income on light-heartedly but to invest part of the income in their other income generating activities and their future. And yet, at the same time there is the aspect of showing off one’s wealth. As Meyer has suggested, it is the strong emphasis on becoming prosperous and showing off wealth distinguishes Pentecostalism from early modern ascetic Protestantism (Meyer 2004: 460).

Weber’s studies attempted to explore one phase of the emancipation from magic, a phase when people began to rely more on scientific investigations as the way to truth (Weber 2004[1930]). This was ultimately to result in a decline of the use and belief in magic, God, and myth, and a rise of secularization. Weber used the word rationalization in different ways. Rational action is based on the most efficient means to achieve a given end. He also used the term rationalization in a more general sense as the opposite of enchantment. An enchanted world is one filled with mystery and magic. Disenchantment, then, refers to the process of emptying the world of magical or spiritual forces. Both secularization and disenchantment have been taken to refer to the narrowing of the religious or spiritual elements of the world. For Otabil, naturally, disenchantment it is not about secularization.
Rather, those ideas refer to playing down the agency of demons whereas spirituality still remains. In order to be successful, one needs both spiritual power and rationality. No matter what Mensa Otabil was intending to convey to his Tanzanian audience about rationality and knowledge, contemporary Tanzania remains unlike early modern Europe: (dis-)enchantment, charisma and magical thinking are very much part of one and the same picture.

**Conclusions**

In this essay I have discussed three central areas that have featured in the study of contemporary Pentecostalism in Africa: the question of localization of a global movement; Pentecostal theological principles of prosperity gospel and demonology, which feed, finally, into the question of Weberian themes of the relationship between a certain kind of Protestantism and neoliberal economy, of rationality and disenchantment.

The world has witnessed a globally expanding web of Pentecostal networks. Evangelization, the most important activity of Pentecostalism, is reflected in the social organization and the movement of globetrotters; flows of people, preachers, money, ideas, images and other media products circulate with growing intensity in the global Pentecostal networks. The organization promotes internationalism through travel and networking, conferences and churches that function like corporations. The Pentecostal praxis that transcends locality displays striking similarities in different parts of the world. Some scholars have maintained that Pentecostalism replicates its doctrines, organizational characteristics and rituals wherever it goes. And yet, there is something more fundamental to the simultaneous global and local dimensions of Pentecostalism. Conversion and becoming saved connotes a complete break with the past. Pentecostalism struggles against the local culture and ontologies by virtue of its notion of continuous warfare whereby the local spiritual entities come to represent the demonic. It is the very struggle against local culture that proves how locally rooted Pentecostalism can be.
This paradox raises the question of continuity and rupture in Pentecostalism.

Godly miracles on one hand and the workings of Satan on the other are an essential element of the Tanzanian charismatic Christianity. They are recurrent themes in the testimonies of Christians. Human life, well being and prosperity are perceived in terms of miracles and the satanic interventions. It seems, however, that new winds are blowing in Tanzanian Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity as some of the religious leaders are trying to build a new mindset with their Christians; a mindset that in many ways reflects the Weberian themes of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. The Ghanaian religious superstar, Mensa Otabil, emphasized empowerment, human agency and the significance of human labour in creating development and prosperity. In those teachings human responsibility and disenchantment replace demonic control. Development comes from human labour, not from miracles. Themes of empowerment and black consciousness, being African and cosmopolitan at the same time, are heavily present. Integration of spiritual power and rationality is necessary; reason, knowledge and scientific thinking are vital. But in many other cases the messages provided by religious leaders centre around such words and phrases as ‘miracle’ and ‘in the name of Jesus’.

Contemporary Pentecostalism is a highly successful popular religion. Its success is based on a set of ideas and practices that address adherents’ existential concerns for meaning and empowerment. Pentecostalism offers adherents the chance of changing their responses to the limiting conditions that the economic macro-structures create. It offers hope and lived solutions in the struggles against intensifying poverty, marginalization and insecurity, problems that arise out of structural conditions. The religious rhetoric and neoliberal principles of market economy, ideas of prosperity and the markets are articulated in the present Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity in Tanzania (Hasu 2006). Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity and prosperity gospel are models for and models of people’s lived reality. Religious ideas inform the
ways that contemporary economic circumstances are interpreted and acted upon in the neoliberal setting. Furthermore, the lived realities of Tanzanians give rise to and shape their Pentecostal beliefs and ideas about salvation and success. The African economies conform to the rules of a global network of business and finance. Global capitalism fuses hope and hopelessness, possibility and impossibility, and the neoliberal age emphasizes a privatized and an individual rather than a communal sense of salvation and prosperity. For the majority, there remains the sense and the experience of impossibility, hopelessness, even despair, that emerges from the failed promises of affluence and success. That is the view of the global economy of consumer capitalism from the misery of the margins.

References


Social resilience, urban poverty and sustainable livelihood in megacities of the South

Marja Järvelä

Introduction

Rapid urbanisation has been one of the most conspicuous features of social development during recent decades. Simultaneously, the urban population of the world has shifted from the first world dominance to third world dominance. Currently, more than 60% of all urban dwellers live in the Third World (Porter & Sheppard 1998, 429). Also, the population growth rate in “megacities”\(^1\) of the South is startling. For example in Lagos, Nigeria the population was

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\(^1\) A megacity is usually defined as a recognized metropolitan area with a total population in excess of 10 million people (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megacity). I use the concept of megacity throughout this article with some reservations. The critical question is whether the term is appropriate to describe and associate with the highly controversial reality experienced especially by the urban poor of these cities. However, in relation to the overall size of these urban agglomerations (many of them rapidly increasing their population) this notion seems to be more powerful and up to the point than referring only to large cities (see more about the issue e.g. Castells 1996, 403-404). To some extent I will use the notion megacity and large city alternatively.
about 300,000 in 1950, while today there are more than 10 million inhabitants and their number is expected to double in two decades. Globally, there are currently 20 cities with population more than 10 million, most of them in the developing world. However, it is important to recall that predominantly developing countries are among the late urbanizing areas and Africa in particular (Torstensen et al. 2001).

Even if it is plausible that urban population in the large cities of the South will still increase remarkably in the near future, there are reasons to doubt the highest estimates presented at international experts’ forums (see e.g., Cohen 2006; Drakakis-Smith 1995). Arguably, the metropolises of the South are concentrations of wealth and power in their regions - and some of them even in the world scale. However, an important part of the population in these cities is living in alarming poverty and, therefore their growth may encounter limits in case the disadvantages of growth clearly and permanently exceed the benefits (Porter & Sheppard 1998: 443; Kuvaja 2007). In these cities urban poverty is striking not only in terms of lack of sources for sustainable livelihood but also in the multiple manifestations of deficient social and physical infrastructure (Cohen 2006; Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005). For example the scarcity of water sources and the daily expenses of acquiring safe water display an increasing limitation to the quality of every day life. Furthermore, the pollution of the local water resources and the inadequate hygiene facilities all add to the vulnerability of health situation (e.g., Hope & Lekorwe 1999). It has been estimated that one third of the world population lives in slums. This imposes a huge challenge to urban policies, especially in development of housing, employment and infrastructure. Thus, rural to urban migration becomes less tempting because only few of the migrants have a fair opportunity to attain the “good life” in their urban destination (Porter & Sheppard 1998: 443).

From the everyday life perspective rapid urbanisation implies a considerable social transition in Third World societies. In terms of social order one may speak of turbulent
disorder in social values, norms and patterns of action as they all need to be adapted to new urban circumstances that are also in flux (Järvelä 2006). In developing countries everyday life has traditionally been organised through local communities having social and cultural patterns of their own as well as a structure of local leadership. In urban areas, where mobility is an important trait, community life increasingly acquires some hybrid characteristics in the meaning of combining a variety of traditions brought in by different migrants as well as by the more permanent local dwellers. In low income housing areas new elements of community survival strategy and self-help are being organised through adopted and modified social roles of gender, ethnicity and kinship. Urban case studies reveal that women are often in key role in organising new patterns of self-help practices in the very challenging everyday circumstances to secure as much as possible health and shelter for their families (Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005).

This paper seeks to conceptualise community resilience in view of the undertakings of local people in view of their pursuit to secure sustainable livelihood and viable living environments at urban premises. The author claims that the current state of defining and analysing urban poverty circumstances from the local community perspective still leaves a lot to be desired. In social sciences urban poverty has been documented through both striking statistics and impressive narratives, but less analysed theoretically and comprehensively in the context of everyday life as perceived and experienced in local community by urban dwellers. In view of the Millennium Development Goals, Habitat II blueprint and Local Agenda 21, it is pertinent to also try to conceptualize the multitude of development interventions performed under the rubric of poverty reduction and sustainable development from the empowerment perspective of “squatter citizens” (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004).
Several years ago, I worked with a Finnish research network ENHICA\(^2\) that made considerable efforts at defining community and social sustainability in urban (and rural) circumstances, mainly in West Africa (see Järvelä & Kuvaja 2006). While detecting a feasible conceptual understanding of a local development cycle, the research team argued that the socio-cultural assets of local community should be perceived – as a point of departure - emphatically in terms of resources for social development rather than as barriers (e.g. Rinne-Koistinen 2003; Kuvaja 2007). In pursuing this idea we found a rich variety of reflections and empirical studies supporting the idea of learning about the stakes of local sustainable development through analysing the pursuit of local people for sustainable livelihood and viable living environment. For example the concept of *civic entrepreneurship* as presented by Tariq Banuri and Adil Najam (2002) refers strongly to both community and dialogue in the development process. Nevertheless, there seems still to be a missing link in conceptualizing community from a perspective of mobilizing bottom up resources for local development. This is important since we (and many others) have concluded through many case studies that communities (and not only individuals/households) should be empowered in order to strengthen local initiatives for sustainable urban development and livelihood (e.g., Carley & Smith 2001).

Thus, as a conclusion from the previous research experience with the ENHICA team I find myself still searching for new conceptual tools that could effectively grasp the link between community and action in the pursuit for sustainable urban development and sustainable local livelihood (cf., Carney 2002).

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\(^2\) ENHICA stands for *Environment, Health and Information Activities for Communities in Africa*. The network was founded in 1995 by Dr. Mikko Korpela (University of Kuopio) and Prof. Marja Järvelä (Univ. of Jyväskylä). The core research activities were performed during the years 1998-2003 and included several field work periods, mainly in Nigeria.
Very recently, in another research team under my direction we came across the concept of social resilience (Adger 2000; Folke 2001; Langridge et al. 2006) while tackling the conceptual challenge of analysing the present community dynamics in some heavily natural-resource dependent rural communities. More specifically, I was inspired by the work of this other research team that is currently researching the social impacts of wood procurement in forestry villages of Northwest Russia (Södor et al. 2005). In this particular context the concept of social resilience appeared to us as a perfect tool for community studies when analysing the current social dynamics of villages adapting to change under external pressure. The forestry villages in Northwest Russia have recently been in the middle of a major period of transition involving modification in their basic local assets, such as labour, skills and patterns of management. Obviously after the collapse of the Soviet regime there has been a deep-going reorganisation of productive capital. As a result, the communities experience simultaneously external stress emanating from the recent effects of globalisation on the industrial sector as well as from major transitions in the institutional settings of public management both on national and local level.

Thus, reaching out for understanding social resilience can be taken not only as analytical task but also as a practical matter. In its core meaning resilience equals coping with change. Usually, we perceive more social change in urban rather than in rural communities. Therefore, I assume it is worth trying to apply the concept of social resilience to urban communities as well. Looking into recent literature it was, in fact, easy to find numerous examples where the concept of social resilience has been successfully applied to rural communities, especially to those highly dependent on natural resources (e.g., Adger 2000). However, there are reasons why it is not obvious that the concept of social resilience can be applied as effectively as a theoretical tool to case studies addressing sustainability issues in urban communities. In urban milieu, these reasons may be related to complexity and
(lack of) social cohesion, for example. In any case, my aim is in this paper to test the applicability of this concept in the framework of sustainability issues of urban communities in the particular context of megacities in the South. The focus will be mainly on urban communities most vulnerable in terms of poverty and inadequate living environment.

The article is organised as follows. In the next section, I will discuss key definitions of social resilience, especially in relation to the origin of the concept and a variety of different contexts where the concept has been introduced. In the following section, I explore some empirical case studies and present them as examples of different ways of using the concept of social resilience. A particular point is made about difference as concerns rural and urban communities. Another issue of importance is to analyse the particular characteristics of urban communities in their pursuit of social resilience. Furthermore, urban mobility and migration are briefly addressed as a particular issue. Section 4 will discuss local development and social resilience from the point of view of community empowerment and participation. This is certainly the most challenging part of the article, because it seems that subjective powers or stakeholder roles have not as yet given all the voice they should/could have in relation to evaluating social resilience in these communities. However, this is a very important aspect to be covered since sustainable development needs local participation to be both effective and legitimate. It also brings up the issue of local “political resilience”, and perhaps even the concept of “resilient institutions” as an analytical option.

**Social resilience – definition and discussion**

W. Neil Adger (2000: 347) defines social resilience as “the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change.” In his presentation there is a strong
parallel with the ecological definition of resilience³. Furthermore, he is discussing social resilience in the framework of defining the relationship between social and ecological resilience. As to empirical analysis he is referring mainly to cases of rural community development even though his core definition of social resilience does not delimit the type of communities in regard to the scope of the analysis.

Adger makes another important choice in defining social resilience with reference to groups and communities and not to individuals as actors. Nowadays we tend to think – especially in modern societies – that there are specifically individuals (not groups) that either do or do not cope with current social change (e.g. Beck-Gernsheim 1996). We also tend to presume that only rural communities – if any – may appear clearly as communities while urban spaces are more complex and their inhabitants more mobile in ways that prevent the foundations for important social cohesion to appear in these spaces (see Castells 1998: 60). However, this is not the whole truth, since urban structure may well include something of functioning communities or even ‘villages’ in more or less distinctive local districts. Curiously, this is most conspicuously seen in gated communities that assemble some of the wealthiest people into new residential areas (Kuvaja 2007). Simultaneously, it is less clear how strongly poor people associate to carry out the functions of village life in an urban context and how symbols are attached to a particular urban milieu.

Especially when we keep in mind the idea of an urban environment or urban milieu, we might find strong evidence that some people share particular cultural and functional aspects related to their living environment or neighbourhood where reciprocity has been one of the traditional organising principles (Harvey 1973: 281). I suggest calling this the homestead principle of organising everyday life connecting local inhabitants to a particular urban space and to each other in

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³ Ecological resilience has traditionally been defined as the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures (defined as alternative stable states) (e.g. Gunderson 2000).
urban districts (cf., Kuvaja 2007: 52-53). When discussing megacities of the South, we may also ask whether urbanisation equals modernisation in these spaces in ways similar to Europe or the United States. Or would local community, perhaps, be even more important in explaining the social dynamics of African cities than has traditionally been the case in modernised Europe and US? In countries of early industrialization one aspect of modernisation is associated with residential anonymity and with an individual’s right to seek ‘concealed’ privacy, even if this also has raised controversies about the basic character of urban life.4

The relevance of community in urban circumstances of the South will be discussed more empirically in subsequent sections. Here it suffices to conclude that there is not necessarily a predetermined discontinuity between the social significance of community and the space between rural and urban areas. Obviously distinctions and specifications need to be made, yet those should be based more on regional and historical context than be determined by the essence of the type of community. Anyway, it is relevant – in this context – to conceptually follow Adger’s suggestion denoting social resilience primarily – and in general - as a qualifier of a collective unit (such as community) rather than that of a singular actor (such as an individual).

In discussing the social organisation of the community, Adger refers not only to social groups but also to institutional architecture and to social capital – albeit in very general terms. Importantly, these may indeed be considered as quite decisive assets of any community when assessing the functioning of the social system in circumstances of stress and disturbance (c.f. Banuri & Najam 2002: 56-57). Whereas Adger works in the field of human geography, a social scientist would probably like to focus even more on functional networks within the

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4 From the point of view of sustainable development the issue of controversy in European urban policies has been the accelerated urban sprawl related to the search of privacy, quality living environments and reduced housing costs in ever more distant suburbs or “commuter-towns”.

community. Furthermore, from the point of view of the social scientist the conflicting interests of different locally active stake-holders are especially relevant when discussing the internal driving forces emerging in cases of external pressure (e.g., Jenkins & Smith 2001). By recognising and identifying internal stakeholders, eventual local development initiatives would be fully identified and not minimised in the final analysis.

Of course, in the globalising world there are good reasons to be concerned about the external forces bringing about pressure towards social change in local communities. This is, moreover, historically the main foundation for the need for a new analytical tool such as social resilience. However, the social dimension of change is not only related in manifold ways to other dimensions of development, such as ecological development, but also includes some complex dynamics of its own within the community in focus. In fact, understanding the complexity of local internal dynamics has always provided firm foundations as well as controversies within social sciences. This view has been shared widely among social scientists at any rate since Emile Durkheim (1987: 116) presented his *sui generis* argument on the explanatory power of the social dimension that has been adopted as a fundamental principle of sociology.

As to current discussions about defining social resilience, Adger makes an additional strong point about the importance of the *political* dimension. Simultaneously - and somewhat surprisingly - he refrain from explicitly mentioning the economic dimension of transition in his conceptual paragraph. In spite of this the economic dimension does enter vigorously into discussion as soon as he starts to refer to empirical cases. Considering the immense power economic driving forces play in the world today – extending their impact into the everyday life of the poorest urban communities – one may take a critical position in regard to any definitions of social resilience that do not take an explicit position in regard to the significance of economic factors. Consequently, I would organize my definition
of social resilience in a community in a slightly different way than Adger proposes.

First, considering both the internal and external driving forces of social change I suggest that the political aspect of the pursuit for social resilience is likely to assume some distinctive principles of social order and organisation in any community. However, when speaking specifically about the core of the social dynamics in regard to social resilience one should start the analysis by making a distinction between socio-economic and socio-cultural resilience. The socio-economic aspect refers to the social organisation of productive assets, such as property rights and the social form in which labour is delivered in the community (wage labour, private entrepreneurship, etc.). The socio-cultural aspect identifies the social norms, social morality and social identities of a community in symbolic terms.

Thus, there are clearly two principle aspects to be covered within the social resilience discourse. The one is to answer what is feasible and functional in socio-economic terms when coping with external stress, and the other aspect addresses the question of what internal reorganisation of social order is acceptable and legitimate in view of prevailing local community and culture. In general, we may then ask what makes a social organisation at the community level highly resilient - in either socio-economic or in socio-cultural terms, or both. As regards social change we can also ask how much stability a human community needs to be socially resilient (cf., Adger 2000: 359).

Proposing this priority implies not minimizing the political dimension. Rather, it gives high priority and a chance to implement social resilience with reference to the sustainable livelihoods of the local people. I consider this priority to resonate with the overall ideas of sustainable development and the principles of local Agenda 21 in particular, because it acknowledges the need for endorsing bottom-up local policy. As to the targeting of political resilience in particular, it is also important to bring the issue of “resilient” local institutions to the agenda. However, this implies a huge task of conceptual
work that cannot be accomplished within the scope of this article.

**Vulnerability and social resilience in large cities of the South**

The hurricane disaster in New Orleans in 2005 showed clearly how vulnerable big cities can be in the clutches of natural powers even in the richest country in the world. From the point of view social resilience an event such as the impact of hurricane Katrina clearly implies chaos in an urban area where striking social disorder is most likely to appear. Even if the risk of similar catastrophes may be on the increase due to climate change, it is not the purpose of this article to tackle occasions of major emergency and disaster connected to natural hazards. While these disasters most often mobilise the world community on the basis of a global alert, these emergencies are exceptional cases in view of the challenges of exploring social resilience. I put this example forward mainly because, in the current literature, coastal communities in general have often been introduced as foremost examples of communities to be studied from the angle of resilience (e.g., Berkes & Seixas 2005). In such research social resilience is often not the main issue, although it remains an important part of the multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary effort aimed at finding solid solutions to socio-environmental crises or major risks.

Regardless of the status of communities – whether they are rural or urban – coastal agglomerations are very interesting from the point of social resilience. On the one hand, coastal resources are attractive for economic growth and they support an increasing proportion of the world’s population (Adger 2000: 352). On the other hand these areas are highly vulnerable to floods, pollution and storms. Adger introduces the case of coastal fishing communities as an ideal example of the

5 In sociology there is a special research field addressing these exceptional situation called sociology of disaster mainly taught and studied in the United States. See e.g. Erikson 1994; Dyson 2006; Pelling 2003.
situation where communities, even if depending on a single ecosystem, may be quite resilient in that they are capable of diversifying their economies. This may be true yet, according to our experience, economic growth and rapid urbanisation in coastal cities might involve radical changes in the livelihood assets of local people. For example traditional fisheries are very vulnerable in the midst of such developments (Järvelä et al. 2001).

In the late 1990’s during our pilot research in West Africa we discovered that coastal artisan fisheries were highly endangered through both ecological deterioration and socio-economic impoverishment. In Lagos the lagoons in the peri-urban regions were invaded by water-hyacinth, seriously harming fishing activity but also radically changing the aquatic environment. Further, we were told in Accra that lagoons were used as dumping sites resulting in similar deteriorating effects on fishing activities and on the livelihood of fishermen's households. The haul was diminishing and the fishermen had to look for a better catch by going further out to the open sea. This, however, required better boats that they seldom could afford. Thus, urbanisation may bring about a vicious circle especially from the point of view of traditional inhabitants and from the point of view of artisanal fisheries in particular. These communities may lack not only socio-economic means to secure their position in the modernisation of fishing business, but also remain without adequate socio-cultural assets while trying to cope with change, e.g. by finding other employment, as their level of education is ordinarily very low. From the local livelihood perspective the demise of local artisanal fishing may have harmful effects on local employment as well as on the standard of nutrition among the poor (c.f. Johnson 2007). In more general terms a hypothesis has been introduced addressing the distribution of benefits to rich and poor households in case of the conversion of traditional production into alternative uses of natural resources and productive space. Poor people are generally more dependent on traditional products than are rich households, and the latter thus receive most of the benefits of eventual conversions (Adger et al. 2000).
One of the most peculiar examples of this development that was explored by the Finnish ENHICA research network is a fishing village is Ebute-Ilaje in Shomolu Lagos. As described by Kristiina Kuvaja (2007), this village – trying to survive on the edge of a lagoon located at the heart of Lagos – was quite successful in combining another economic activity with fishing, namely sand excavation. The community had found an innovative yet dubious way of extending its living environment into the lagoon by claiming land through filling the lagoon with household waste, some part of which was actually brought in by the local government (Kuvaja 2007). In that way the village seemed to be able to reach a new level of social resilience while, however, simultaneously taking an obvious risk with the community’s ecological resilience. The example of Ebute-Ilaje shows very clearly how paradoxical the situation in an urban low-income district may be with regard to social resilience and vulnerability.

The Ebute-Ilaje case is informative not only with regard to the tension between social and ecological resilience. It also serves as an example of the difficulty in making a clear-cut distinction between rural vs. urban community. Since the “village” Ebute-Ilaje is spatially located at the heart of the megacity Lagos, one would certainly call it an urban district. However this community is clearly trying to prolong its way of life based on the direct exploitation of natural resources. In the low-income housing areas of the large cities of South this is not exceptional even if Ebute-Ilaje has found a rather peculiar approach to coping with the pressure of urban development. Generally speaking, we can observe a rich diversity of rural extensions into urban spaces in megacities of the South. Poor people, in their acquisition of food and other necessities of life

6 The Ebute-Ilaje community is described more in detail in the PhD. dissertation recently presented by Kristiina Kuvaja (2007) Living the urban Challenge, Sustainable Development and Social Sustainability in Two Southern Megacities.

7 The concept of vulnerability is often used to describe the insecurity of individuals, households or communities in face of a changing environment (e.g. Moser 1996, Miles 2001).
in these cities, often resort to imitating rural ways of life (Thys et al. 2005). Urban agriculture\textsuperscript{8} is a current phenomenon persisting even in the fringes of the megacities in South. This implies a constant struggle over land-use not only to securing housing but also for other purposes such as gardening and small-scale cattle raising.

Curiously, poverty and ways of life driven by necessity may appear amazingly similar in the rural and urban South. It is common that livelihoods in these circumstances are not based on regular wage labour or on steady private entrepreneurship, but rather on subsistence agriculture, gardening, raising domestic animals and petty trade of a great diversity of items (e.g. Hope & Lekorwe 1999; Englund 2001, 94). From the present European perspective we tend to perceive these urban “substance economies” performed by millions of people as marginal, and therefore examples that ought to vanish from sight in order to give proper space for modernisation take-offs. Thinking like this are we, in fact, expecting the developing countries to repeat our historical experience of industrialisation, giving opportunities to masses of migrants from the countryside? Is this at all realistic when thinking about the livelihoods of the millions of poor in the present megacities of the South? Or should the present megacities and their “urban villages” look for alternative “post-industrial” trajectories of development towards improved social and ecological resilience?

However, the target of increasing social resilience in deprived communities and social groups of the megacities in the South can be understood as an immediate goal to be targeted not only by development interventions but also by the

\textsuperscript{8} Urban agriculture is an industry located within (intra-urban) or on the fringe (peri-urban) of a town, a city or a metropolis, which grows and raises, processes and distributes a diversity of food and non-food products, (re-) using largely human and natural resources, products and services found in and around that urban area, and in turn supplying human and material resources, products and services largely to that urban area. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_agriculture; see also http://www.ruaf.org/node/513
local inhabitants themselves. This is in fact what is currently happening in many urban communities. However, the task may be in many cases overwhelming since local people are often left alone with their initiatives and not supported enough by the local authorities or other stakeholders holding powerful means and assets for development (e.g. Drakakis-Smith 1995, 672; Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005). Following Amartya Sen, we frequently refer to the freedom of poor people as a “solution” in the meaning that people should be allowed to lead “lives they have reason to value” (Sen 1999: 85). Yet, what would this freedom mean in more concrete terms from the social resilience perspective? In the urban circumstances of the poor districts of Southern megacities freedom is quite an abstract word unless it is accompanied by more concrete access to public utilities and services necessary for sustainable livelihood. In case these facilities are available, then the trajectory of increasing social resilience would signify a more concrete development strategy where people themselves could have a bigger say on whatever could be a feasible community performance in terms of sustainable livelihood and social order at their local premises.

Hence, social resilience appears to be a useful conceptual approach. In the current situation of megacities of South it can be considered a relevant alternative, much more concrete in view of a community than the general idea of freedom connected to the capacities of individual citizens. This is most obvious in regard to the socio-economic aspect of development that connects a great variety of employment (including self-employment) to social resilience in the urban space serving both internal and external customers (Hope & Lekorwe 1999). There is a greater challenge in understanding the socio-cultural aspects of everyday life as a resource to be mobilized amongst urban villagers to enhance social (and ecological) resilience (Rinne-Koistinen 2004). Empirical evidence seems to support the idea that people are following a homestead principle trying to cope with hardship of many kinds in their neighbourhoods and that are, in fact, quite clever in resolving even very challenging situations (Kuvaja 2007). Therefore one could
highlight the need for more rigorous studies of the cultural aspect of these ‘urban villages’.

**Development, participation and self-help: the problem of resilient institutions**

Political resilience refers to the capacity of political institutions and organisations to take decisions in order to enhance overall community resilience. In critical discourse on development, the lack of good governance, bureaucracy and corruption are often cited as major barriers of local development in the South. Since the Rio Conference in 1992 local sustainable development has been politically articulated through the aims of increased democracy and participation. Furthermore, Local Agenda 21 was approved by the World Summit to break the path towards the local implementation of sustainable development. In view of endorsing democracy and participation one of the key principles was the recommendation that local governments should increasingly refer to their constituencies in their pursuit of sustainable development. Within the discourse on the implementation of sustainable development the concept of political resilience does not appear frequently, especially not as applied to the local level. Therefore, discussing political resilience in a local context makes a particular challenge for academic work.

Referring back to the importance of the socio-economic aspect in social resilience an important implication for the grassroots is to promote locally sustainable livelihoods in every culturally feasible and legitimate way. However this is not enough when pursuing social resilience at the community level. What is equally urgent is to encourage and indicate institutionally responsible actors that can support and reinforce sustainable development, simultaneously empowering local people in their own stakes. This is what I would call political resilience at the community level. Thus, political resilience is an essential part of social resilience, where improvements are urgently needed (cf., Toner 2003, 773). In the current situation urban communities in the megacities of
the South either lack proper organisation and good governance or are without sufficient means to meet local demand for basic public services and infrastructure. Unfortunately, low-income housing areas often lack both of these assets (Mitlin & Satterthwaite 2004: 246; Kuvaja 2007).

Recently, there has been a strong tendency to look for new partnerships for action involving community stakeholders, the market and the state in view of endorsing sustainable development and reducing poverty and deprivation (Jenkins and Smith 2001). From the grassroots perspective the most essential proposal has been the central role that has been given to NGOs in local development. It is true that civil societies in most countries, including countries of the developing world have invited thousands of NGOs to meet a great variety of social and ecological challenges (Banuri & Najam 2002). Probably millions of projects have been implemented and assessed. Nevertheless there is still a lack of scientifically systematized information about the performance of such interventions and, in particular, about the efficiency of NGOs in these interventions. Have they in fact succeeded in mobilising local inhabitants on permanent bases? Can one consider after a critical assessment that local people really have been empowered through these projects (e.g. Korhonen 2006)? Hence, what is actually the contribution of these new partnerships to local political resilience?

To summarise I would argue that there is still much to learn and to be improved about the political resilience of the local institutions in charge of sustainable development and sustainable livelihood. To support my argument I will briefly discuss two recent case studies presented in my research team, both in the framework of urban studies concerning megacities in the South. The first case is concerned with the vital issue of access to safe water on a daily basis. Here our experience in Amukoko, a shanty town in Lagos, shows clearly that no one partner or local stakeholder is able to provide safe water for a low-income community and that the adequacy of self-help is an important issue. The second example concerns housing rights in Lagos where dramatic evictions are not exceptional. The
empirical research experience shows that when major property
erights are at stake communities can be very vulnerable and
that the basic needs of citizens are sometimes not respected
even by public authorities.

In the late 1990's Eva Rinne-Koistinen (2004) carried out
extensive field work in Amukoko in the Ajeromi/Ifelodun Local
Government Area of Lagos, with the aim to tackle the problem
of safe water acquisition in a megacity shantytown. The
starting point was to learn through methods of qualitative
inquiry about the significance of local knowledge in coping with
the very challenging circumstances of everyday life. Amukoko is
a very densely populated area with an estimated population of
320,000 consisting of a mixture of all major ethnic groups, with
a predominance of Yoruba (MSF 1996.) Amukoko is located in a
swampy area and there are two big canals ordinarily filled with
stagnant water and waste. The streets are often nearly
impassable, with a poor drainage system and huge refuse
dumps. Almost every available space is built-up with concrete
houses (face-me-face-you houses, e.g., Kuvaja 2001) containing
10-15 rooms with an average of 8-12 people per room. Many
houses lack toilet facilities, water and a solid waste disposal
system, leading waste to be dumped in the drainage or burned
in the backyards. Household water is normally bought from
water vendors or drawn from the wells located in the
compounds (Rinne-Koistinen 2004).

In these circumstances, self-help in every day life is a
dominant strategy for survival (Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen
2005). It became obvious to our research team that local
population – women in particular – had their own security
measures in relation to water available for different household
purposes. We showed that local knowledge is an important
asset not only individually, but also in terms of social trust in
securing safe water. Thus, local knowledge can be understood
as an important element of social resilience. As to political
resilience the situation left much to be desired. Some
researchers had already expressed doubts about the feasibility
of a centralized water delivery system. Consequently, it was
obvious that the political resilience of the water supply system
is quite a complex issue and should be addressed at the level of local management. Even though local inhabitants were quite able to make adequate assessments about the quality of water, they still lack means to secure a supply of safe water on their own terms. In fact, much of the water supply was sold in retail through secondary markets and it was important to have guarantees and trust in this system. A further problem was posed by price definition, since it should allow the inhabitants to be able to purchase a sufficient quantity of water. From the political resilience point of view, the problem we detected in our study was the lack of institutional efficiency in bringing together local stakeholders in solving the water issue. Obviously, the current water management system was not politically resilient.

The second example is, perhaps, even more startling from the point of view of social and political resilience. Abidemi Coker performed a study in 2006 on the role of NGOs in protecting housing rights in Lagos. Her case study was partly motivated by an eviction in December 2005 in which 8,000 people – mainly government workers – were left homeless, and given no alternative accommodation and no financial compensation (Coker 2006). This incident was the culmination of a longer process where a few high-rise residential buildings owned by the state government were sold to private companies. After a complicated political process in which a public bid was included to give a chance to the sitting residents to buy the flats had failed, all tenants were forced to leave in spite of a legal process that was initiated in support of the sitting tenants’ housing rights. It became obvious that the government was not interested in following the rule of law or in respecting internationally recognised housing rights. This case – unfortunately – was not the only one in recent the Nigerian history.

Simultaneously, two major NGOs were active in the protection of housing rights in cases such as the one described above. Both of them (Socio Economic Rights Initiative – SERI, and the Social and Economic Rights Action Center – SERAC) expressed the objective of promoting economic, social and
cultural rights. This is done through advocacy, research, monitoring and documentation. Lawyers have an important role in these organisations, and this becomes particularly evident when eviction cases are taken to court. Recent experience shows, however, that even the most influential NGOs are not powerful enough to protect the housing rights of the people. Abidemi Coker (ibid.), who had access to important information though performing an internship period in SERI, found at least two major elements of failure in the political resilience of the current housing sector management. First, local governments were almost totally unable to secure housing rights in their communities due to lack of resources and adequate staff. This has to do with the general tendency of shifting responsibility for social infrastructure to civil society and to NGOs in particular (ibid.: 52). A second concern arose from the fact that the two NGOs were not cooperating with each other. Again this can be acknowledged as an element of deficient political resilience. Since there are hardly any other institutional actors capable of raising a significant performance in favour of the housing rights, it would be most likely contribute to political resilience if they could at least unite their forces (ibid: 64).

Thus, if there is a main lesson we have learnt about community and political resilience through these two case studies, it seems to refer to the particular weakness of local political institutions. From the point of view of political resilience the most urgent and decisive impediment for social resilience and sustainable livelihood is the unwillingness to take responsibility and mobilize a joint effort in an appropriate institutional setting that would meet the particularities of the local community. Therefore the next issue to be tackled in the social resilience discourse is to define criteria for “resilient institutions” at the community level.

**Conclusion**

Simone (2001: 48) holds that decentralisation provides greater political manoeuvrability for mitigating urban crisis. Indeed,
the urban circumstances in large cities of the South have often been described in terms of crises with reference to crumbling physical infrastructure and to strikingly inadequate school and health care facilities. While local authorities are often accused of being unresponsive in regard to the basic needs of the local population, it is also true that these governments have a serious shortage of funds. According to Simone this situation renders their powers to manoeuvre “largely fictitious” (ibid.). Agreeing with that, it is important to add that in the present circumstances it seems evident that political resilience can never be attained by simply delegating task of solving the urban crisis on one single actor, such as the local government. Consequently, a major challenge for the social scientist is to thoroughly analyse the plausible multi-actor setting that could be institutionalized locally with regard to mitigate urban crises and promote sustainable livelihood and social resilience.

Hence, in the extremely vulnerable urban circumstances of the mega-cities of the South, political resilience seems to be an indispensable condition for any major improvement of social and ecological resilience at the community level. Analytically it is – of course – important to address even more individual and particularized household survival strategies that may be supported through specific mobility strategies, e.g., through inward and outward movement in search of better livelihood (cf., Kuvaja 2007). Yet, reducing vulnerability and eradicating poverty in the whole community entails not only individual actions and actors but also community input (such as physical and social infrastructure) in terms of effective sustainability strategies. In general this has been recognised, e.g., in many policy programmes such as Local Agenda 21. However, the pursuit and trajectories of actual implementation remains unclear unless the pattern of local actors and their mutual organisation and joint efforts are made explicit.

Thinking about the challenge for social scientists of understanding social resilience, it becomes evident that we are here talking about potential “actors of change” taking key positions in combating the urban crises in general, or some specific elements of vulnerabilities of urban life. With regard to
political resilience at the local level in particular, the first task seems to be to clarify the concept and find its core relation to the current mainstream discourse on participation as well as on institutional and civil rights and responsibilities.

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[http://www.ruaf.org/node/513](http://www.ruaf.org/node/513) (Why is urban agriculture important?)
[Dis]assembling development

Jeremy Gould

We may [thus] draw some general conclusions on the nature of Assemblages… On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 88).

The focus should be…on methodological examination of how the developmentalist complex is actually working and what it is producing (Koponen 2004: 12).

The aim of this essay is to sketch a conceptual scheme which could inform empirical enquiries into the algorithms of selectivity and translation via which evidence about social realities in aid recipient contexts (‘developing countries’) is converted into the policies of dedicated aid agencies. I suggest that these algorithms of selectivity and translation, along with the special modes of agency that create and deploy them might be thought of as properties of a socio-epistemic assemblage termed ‘development.’ The task that this formulation proposes is congruent with Koponen’s proposal (above): to examine how
'development' actually works and what it produces. In the first instance, this essay is concerned with the effects of 'development' in academic Development Studies. Even within this narrow remit, the ambitions are modest and will inevitably fall far short of the agenda for the study of assemblages sketched by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 504): 'In each case [i.e., for bodies and enunciations] it is necessary to ascertain both what is said and what is done.'

**Development Studies**

Development Studies, as a normative, problem-oriented, interdisciplinary endeavour (cf. Koponen 2004: 5) claims commitment to social progress, to the betterment of the human condition, to identifying the means and mechanisms of 'development' that will bring about virtuous social ends. Such a definition is extremely seductive; who among us is not appalled by global inequity and mass suffering? Who would not want to participate in redressing these injustices? The paradox inherent in this formulation is that for the notion of 'development' to provide Development Studies with coherent scientific substance it must simultaneously be both objective reality and an instrumental agenda. We must be able to identify actual instances and mechanisms of 'development', while conceding that not all manifestations of social change can be exemplars of 'development' (progress) in equal measure. To justify its self-assigned mandate, Development Studies must be equipped to distinguish between better and worse conditions for the possibility of development.

For better or worse, this is hardly feasible. Were the histories of societies to follow predictable patterns, and were we able to discern these patterns and able to adjudge in real time which would lead to virtuous outcomes and which not – under such circumstances it might, perhaps, make sense to speak of 'development' as an analytic tool. Each generation, to be sure, produces those who claim the ability to discern such historical regularities, only to have subsequent analysts find their prescriptions and predictions – even when harnessed by state
apparati as the basis for ‘policy’ – to be misguided. By now we should have learned our lesson: the intrinsic instrumental imperative of ‘development’ systematically undermines its capacity for analytical objectivity. Predisposed to find the magic equations of ‘development’, scholars of ‘development’ rush to judgment and ignore the contingency and indeterminacy of social change. The contemporary field of Development Studies, so constituted, generates endless and competing versions of virtuous prescriptions for social betterment, with no stable, consensual criteria for adjudging their relative value and for choosing between them. As a result, this competition for the normative high ground, whereby we are asked to choose between rhetorical ephemerals (poverty reduction vs good governance; state regulation vs free markets), becomes itself the focus of debate, perverting the theoretical and methodological tools of the trade and at the expense of empirical social analysis.

*The complexity of development*

‘Development’, then, will never be defined to everyone’s satisfaction; we will never have normative consensus over virtuous means and ends. Quite the contrary – despite recent political pacts around such developmental objects as the Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declaration, we have never been further from intellectual agreement about what ‘development’ entails. The key to development is growth or stability; innovation or respect for values; free or regulated markets; private activism or representative democracy; rational governance and/or rule of law; better health and more education vs. biodiversity and global justice – each on its own or in any variety of combinations. This is not simply a question of diverging interests, i.e., the effect of conflicting actor orientations. Rather, the impossibility of defining ‘development’ stems in essence from its ascribed nature as an epiphenomenon.

Indeed, debates about ‘development’ are, for the most part, carried out on the level of society as a whole. Development
is conventionally construed as a property of ‘society’, as a process by which a society or some of its essential aspects change from one condition to another. The UNDP Human Development Index, whereby ‘development’ is the aggregation of variables spanning every dimension of social welfare, exemplifies this tendency. For all its whims of fashion, there is marked consistency in the way Development Studies resists the ‘piecemeal’ and ‘incremental’ theorization of ‘development’ – narrow, i.e., disciplinary theorizations will always be found to sin against a ‘balanced’ and holistic vision (e.g., Nederveen Pieterse 1999). This conceptual holism is a powerful epistemic achievement and is perhaps the strongest argument in defence of conventional Development Studies. By constituting a discursive field within which various models must compete at the level of ‘society’, Development Studies tends to pre-empt reductionist claims for the greater good that loose sight of the organic social whole. It is a genuine achievement that academic Development Studies has largely resisted attempts to endorse growth at the expense of equity, security over freedom, or immediate consumption to the detriment of the long-term health of the planet.

In the field’s constitutive holism resides, however, a fundamental epistemological problem that undermines these achievements in the long run. This is the fact that any attempt to model, explain or define ‘development’ must inevitably be the simplification of a virtually unlimited object, i.e., ‘society.’ Even without the insights of ethnomethodology (Garfinkle 1968), common sense tells us that there is no end to the possible iterations of social facts. To appropriate ‘society’ (as a precondition for defining ‘development’) we must of necessity, simplify. And, as we know from recent social analyses of science (i.e., Mol & Law 2006), any attempt at simplification will inevitably engender complexity as competing simplicities

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1 The epiphenomenological view of development has other problematic knowledge effects as well. Among these is the temptation to use aggregate measures of ‘development’ to generate ordinal hierarchies of peoples and places with strong normative connotations: who wants to be associated with “the least developed countries” or be “in the top/bottom 5% of the HDI”?
‘interfere’ (Haraway 1991) with each others’ narrative structures.

Competition among simplicities generates complexity over time. This is a general pattern, but it naturally plays out in specific historical circumstances. The end of the Second World War was a formative period for the emergence of both Development Studies and a global development industry predicated on the notion of ‘development’ as a social epiphenomenon. At this stage, the simplifying abstractions of academic economics dominated the constitution of ‘development.’ The pioneer development economists introduced, inter alia, factor productivity, market performance and human capital as the pivotal variables of development. Almost immediately, however, scholars in a range of academic fields of knowledge challenged the quasi-hegemonic role of economics in the theorization of Development Studies through myriad competing simplifications. These competing views have continued to evolve along relatively discrete trajectories: in sociology (pursuing its concerns with modernity), in political science (concerned with government), in anthropology (with its metaparadigm of cultural relativism), and so on.

The perceived complexity of development has emerged in the interstices of these competing simplifications. Consider, for example, attempts to exorcise the incommensurability of good governance and market rationality as ‘developmental’ axioms – thus generating bridging concepts like ‘informality’ and ‘social capital’ in the borderlands of economic, sociological and political simplifications. Now, then, here is the crunch: Such transdisciplinary engagements do not resolve definitional problems; rather they contribute to the (re)production of ‘development’ as an empirically irreducible, i.e., a foundationally ‘complex’ phenomenon. For a field of inquiry that identifies itself as interdisciplinary and problem-solving, such an excess of inevitable and irreducible complexity is somewhat awkward, to say the least. Instead of interdisciplinary dialogue and theoretical refinement we get concerted efforts at boundary maintenance – both within Development Studies (between, say, anthropologists and
political sciences regarding values and institutions), and between Development Studies and its neighboring fields (international relations, environmental studies, science and technology studies, etc.). It is through such self-referential ‘debates’ that reductionist accounts of development compete for the epistemic high ground.

**The development industry**

What drives the competition over the socio-epistemic privilege to speak authoritatively about ‘development? Discursive one-upmanship is not, one suspects, driven by an eagerness to claim credit for the achievements of the development industry. Sixty years of ‘development’ and countless trillions of dollars in foreign aid have hardly made a dent in the structures of global inequity (Easterly 2006). The instrumental programme of development has little to commend it in empirical terms, and is probably complicit in the deepening of global injustice and growing disparities of welfare. More children, and parents, will go to bed tonight sick and hungry than ever before in the history of humankind.

Career concerns – academic merit, recognition, enlistment and school-building – certainly play a key role in entrenched territorial reflexes. Bourdieu would have much to say in this regard (cf. Dezalay & Garth 2002). But basically, I suspect, it is the banal materiality of ‘development itself which fuels the conceptual border wars. One hundred billion dollars in public allotments annually are ploughed into ‘development’, a sizable chunk of which is deployed to enrol political support for its own perpetuation. Indeed, the industry owes its existence to political fiat. Only under very exceptional circumstances – such as Finland’s deep fiscal crisis of the early nineties – do the levels of public aid spending vary significantly from year to year. Yet, the development industry’s resources are still predominantly generated within national polities, and the symbolic capital of academic credentials remains important in the mobilization of public resources for foreign aid. On the other side of the coin, few working in the field of Development
Studies are immune to the allures of ‘development’ resources – grants, commissioned studies, generously remunerated consultancies and ‘missions’ to exotic places. Indeed, industrial ‘development capital’ is a valuable and convertible currency in the academic world of Development Studies: the recognition of one’s work as authoritative by the development industry can often be converted directly into academic merit.

One could no doubt make a case for the complicity of Development Studies in the failures of the development industry, but my point is rather the opposite. The knowledge practices of Development Studies – embedded in the vain pursuit of an equation with which to engineer the virtuous evolution of society as a whole – are themselves an effect of the development industry. In the first instance, the notion of ‘development’ as a metastructural engineering project reflects the perspective of an imagined community of Western states on the threshold of the Cold War. Widespread ‘poverty’ and ‘ignorance’ were then (as now) seen as nutrient augur for enemy combatants (during the Cold War these were called Communists), and thus as grave threats to both capitalism and democracy. It was only in the overall transformation of the underdeveloped societies that ‘freedom’ (Western civilization) could prevail. This vision was grafted onto academic space where a generation of repatriated colonial civil servant/academics transformed it into the intellectual project of Development Studies (see Kothari 2005).

The triumphalistic project of post-war Development Studies has never managed to escape its intellectual origins. The vision of ‘development’ that resided at the core of Cold War foreign policy has largely retained its epistemic contours at the core of the field. At the same time, Development Studies has remained hostage to the strategic interests of Western, capitalist states through shifting schemes of incentives and mechanisms of enlistment. Of course, the strategic interests of capitalist states have themselves evolved since the formative days of ‘development’ in the 1950s and 1960s, reflecting changes in the nature and organization of capitalism itself. Individual national states have ceded large tracts of their
strategic authority to supranational bodies – public agencies and private corporations – themselves beholden more to global actors and logics than to national bourgeoisies. Indeed, it compounds the dilemma of Development Studies that time is passing by its constitutive vision of a metastructural societal engineering project: The policies and practices of ‘development’ are today less and less about the transformation of societies than they are about the management of ‘populations’, irrespective of national boundaries.2

And yet, it would be a mistake to reduce the knowledge practices of ‘development’ to capitalist or Western interests. In this respect the constructivist critique of neo-realist international relations theory (e.g., Wendt 2000; see both Siitonen and Laakso, this volume) has a valid point. The strategic interests of rich, capitalist countries are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the existence of the development industry. Where constructivist international relations theory goes awry is in its reduction of the non-strategic dimension to ‘values.’ The claim that Northern nations cooperate – e.g., to promote ‘development’ in the South – due to a convergence of values is based on an attractive premise, but suffers from tautological reasoning. International mechanisms for the allocation of public resources to ‘development’ can only express the existence of a value consensus were there some empirical link between rhetoric and reality, i.e., between foreign aid and poverty reduction. Lacking such evidence, it makes little sense to see the Millennium Development Goals, for example, as a genuine expression of a shared commitment to halving poverty by the year 2015. If this were truly the intent, the rich-country parties to the MDGs would hardly resist so stubbornly reforming inequities in the international trade regime that is universally known to be an important cause of poverty (cf. Stochetti, this volume). Developmental values no more explain the actions and enunciations of the development industry than a commitment to ‘freedom’ on the part of the US,

2 On the biopolitical and security concerns of ‘development’, e.g., Duffield 2001.
Britain and their allies explains their invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Where neo-realist ‘strategic interests’ (in energy) go a long way toward explaining American policy in Iraq, the same kinds of interests cannot read be read off the MDGs. Constructivist theories are correct in rejecting opportunistic state interests as an explanation for development policy formation. But the way they resolve the causality of policy formation goes an analytical step too far. By substituting the structural construct of values for the interested agency of states, the explanation errs on the side of structural determination: Agency is lost through the cracks. If not to the strategic interests of states, then, where should we look for the assertive forms of agency informing and shaping the production of ‘development’? Our answer to this question will depend heavily on how we problematize the development industry. This essays argues for a view of development as a ‘machinic’ configuration of bodies and ideas, agency and enunciations. Publics in rich countries from Finland to Japan mandate their governments to spend billions on ‘development’ year after year. In Europe alone, twenty-thousand professionals are employed to spend this money. Its main outcome is ‘policy’ – understood as astronomical volumes of text produced to mobilize, regulate and justify the moneys it spends. But underlying and propping up ‘policy’ is an enormous gallery of subsidiary products – practices and artefacts, without which the development industry could not perpetuate itself, could not continue to produce ‘development.’

‘Development’ – critical legacies

What kind of object does ‘development’ offer empirical social science? What sorts of analytical tasks does this perspective imply for Development Studies, and what sorts of analytical tools might be commensurate with these tasks? The existence of Development Studies as a (semi-)institutionalized field of knowledge presents us (academics, practitioners, citizens) with an intellectual-political challenge. The challenge is to ‘turn the telescope around’ and direct the concerns of contemporary
social science at the development industry – that is, to accomplish the inverse of what occurred at the formative moments of Development Studies in the middle of the twentieth century. Instead of maintaining a field of Development Studies constituted around the managerial/biopolitical concerns of late capitalism, one could envision the subversive redeployment of intellectual and institutional energies now held hostage to ‘development.’ I would like to suggest the interrogation of the conditions of the possibility of the development industry itself as such a subversive agenda. This inevitably directs our attention to the knowledge practices through which the industry constitutes itself and the empirical objects toward which it is oriented.

*The idea of ‘development’*

This is not an entirely new idea and it has important intellectual precursors. Structural marxist analysis of the 1970s, enthralled with the work of Louis Althusser, were convinced that ‘development’ was pure ideology and that the real underlying agenda could be revealed through an expose of the material conditions of its capitalist production (Taylor 1979...). The ideological-critical thrust of the structuralist tradition resurfaced in reconstituted foucauldian garb in the late 1980s (Marglin & Marglin 1990, Sachs 1992, Escobar 1995).³ For these writers, ‘development’ was a form of knowledge/power wherein discursive ‘rules of enunciation’, that is, the way truth claims can be formulated, exercise violent powers of exclusion. The texts of the development industry, from a Harry Truman speech (Sachs) to a project document for a development intervention in Lesotho (Ferguson 1990) could all be read as evidence of the marginalizing effects of ‘development’ toward non-European populations. This critique of ‘development’ expressed a deep suspicion of ‘eurocentrism’ and was, as a whole, totalizing – and not a little nostalgic for a romantic, pre-industrial past.

³ Foucault was a student of Althusser although the teacher disowned the student after the ‘idealism’ of *The Order of Things* (Foucault 1972).
The seminal *Doctrines of Development* by Mike Cowen and Bob Shenton (1996) represents a fundamental break with these approaches. Cowen and Shenton problematize ‘development’ through a pair of analytical distinctions – between *ideas* and *doctrines* of development, on the one hand, and between *immanent* and *intentional* development on the other. Breaking with contemporary critiques of development, the focus of their analysis is not on a discursive, textual, reality, but on capitalism itself, in richly theorized rendition. The interpretative frame for their analysis reflects a strong Hegelian current: the emergence of development as an ‘idea’ in the minds of men prefigures its historical manifestation.

Along these lines, Cowen and Shenton trace the history of ‘development’ through economic, political and theological debates in post-Enlightenment Europe. They identify ‘development’ first as an incipient idea, embedded in the revolutionary, ‘immanent’ transformation of European society by the emergence of a mode of production based on capital. They then proceed to flesh out its emergence as a *doctrine*, manifesting the needs of local bourgeoisies (and the states they control), to intentionally control the effects of spontaneous capitalist development for the labour force (i.e., regulating the supply of surplus labour). Through this analytical strategy, the authors turn critical attention away from ‘development’ as a totalizing discursive formation, to the specific relationship between class-based states (as the regulators, or ‘trustees’ of social change) and the ‘agency of development’ – an immanent social force in the history of capitalism.

While magisterial in its execution, the compellingness of their analysis stands on the merits of the author’s Hegelian angle on history. While in its substantive views the analysis owes more to Marx than to Hegel, *Doctrines of development* shares its German ancestors’ common metastructural perspective on Humanity (society) as the transcendental Subject of History. The developmental agency of capitalism is a property of society as a whole and represents a disembodied, transcendental historical force. This position provides rich access to the economic and conceptual history of capitalism, to
which the authors make a radically original contribution. Yet, for contemporary purposes, it becomes increasingly difficult to make the connection between the transcendental agency of 19th century national capitalism and the policies and practices of ‘development’ in the global South. As Southern labour transmogrifies from being ‘surplus’ to being endemically ‘redundant’ with respect to the needs of capitalist production, the tension between intentional and immanent development loses much of its cogency.

The critical leverage point of Cowen and Shenton lies in their notion of immanent development – it provides a normative counterpoint to intentional efforts to regulate immanent capitalism against its own spontaneous energies. Cowen and Shenton show how mediating interests can intervene in the form of ‘trusteeship’ to confound the immanent agency of development; this occurred in Kenya, most notably, where colonial trustees undermined capital accumulation through paternalistic efforts to preserve the authentic social relations of the ‘tribal’ population. In contrast, the critical leverage point deployed by Escobar et al. – a notion of discursive eurocentrism – is essentially nostalgic: all that remains beyond eurocentricity is an ahistorical sense of authenticity – indeed, seen through the Hegelian lens of Cowen and Shenton, the critique of development as ethnocentrism stands accused of a paternalistic trusteeism similar to that of British colonialism!

Cowen and Shenton’s apology for development as an analytical category would appear to toss Development Studies a life preserver. One could even speak of two alternative strategies of salvation. On the one hand, DS might constitute itself as the science of immanent development. Its task is to map and theorize the ‘agency of development’, something rather closely akin to the ‘laws of motion’ (as Marx and Lenin were wont to say) of capitalism. Putting aside the fact that critical political economy already has this base covered, such a strategy falls prey to the critical observations (about the banes of complexity and engineering) discussed earlier. Seeing development as immanent (a position that many would find it
hard to defend), if anything, confounds the problems associated with theorizing development as a normative epiphenomenon.

Alternatively, *Doctrines of Development* suggests a framework for the study of ‘development’ as the analysis of ‘intentional development’ stripped of the instrumentality of conventional Development Studies. Thus the analysis of ‘development’ would not aim at producing ‘knowledge for policy’ but would be primarily concerned with how the ‘idea’ of development is translated into policy via specific forms of human agency.

*A socio-epistemic assemblage*

Drawing on a set of parallel conceptual manoeuvres in anthropology and science & technology studies (both of which draw on Deleuze and Guattari, see ingress), I suggest that we think of ‘development’ as an Assemblage.⁴ By referring to ‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage I am, first of all, making an explicit break with the convention of perceiving ‘development’ as an historical epiphenomenon. ‘Development’ in this sense is not a qualitative property of society; rather, ‘development’ is the product of specific, delimited social practices. ‘Development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage is constituted from two inseparable elements: one is epistemic – ‘development’ is the ensemble of ideas that is pulled together via discursive and non-discursive acts (‘enunciations’) that evoke the notion of ‘development.’⁵ The other element is social,

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⁴ Cf. the notion of ‘ethno-epistemic assemblages’ espoused in Irwin & Michael 2003.

⁵ The formulation ‘discursive and non-discursive practices’ derives from Foucault. At first blush, his invocation of discourse and its negation would seem to counsel analytical attention to all possible events – hardly a very helpful methodological guideline. In my understanding, however, the pairing of discursive and non-discursive practices points to the importance of the ‘inaudible’ routines and inanimate artefacts that accompany discourse and provide its institutional ambience – i.e., both the things and practices that make discourse possible and those that ‘fill in the silences’ between audible/legible discourse.
and doubly so: first, because ‘development’ is a public discursive fact, a figment of the social imaginary; and second, because the act of achieving a socio-epistemic assemblage – a configuration of bodies and enunciations – implies the agency of embodied social actors. In other words, this notion of ‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage is at once a configuration of ideas, practices and actors.

The fashionable (cf. Marcus & Saka 2006) notion of assemblage is not evoked here as an explanatory concept. It assignment to the notion of ‘development’ tells us little about what kind of an empirical entity ‘development’ might be in substance. The idea of assemblage does, however, provide us with a kind of mapping device for approaching ‘development’ empirically. Briefly, thinking of ‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage suggests a number of basic coordinates.

Following the original formulation by Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage has two dimensions. Horizontally, an assemblage is ‘machinic’ in nature: it is constituted out of heterogeneous elements that have been made to ‘come together and consolidate’ (DeLanda) by processes external to the constituent elements. But an assemblage is not a machine – no one has designed it; no one owns it; no one is fully in charge. Reading into Deleuze & Guattari we can infer that an assemblage is not purely human, but relies to a large extent on non-human, i.e., technological agency (cf. Latour & Woolgar 1979). An assemblage produces its outcomes through the collaboration of intentional and unintentional agency; some of the intent is embodied in human form, some is hardwired into technological artefacts (a word-processing program ‘intends’ to produce documents; an organizational incentive scheme

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6 I am explicitly limiting the notion of development to public representations. As will be clear, I will be further privileging representations evoked by specialized development scholars and, by the same token, to dedicated private and public development agencies. This is for pragmatic reasons. There is such an enormous body of text revolving around the notion of ‘development’ that its makes sense to focus on these core sites. One could also argue that Development Studies departments and journals, along with dedicated development agencies, constitute key ‘political locations’ (cf. Gupta & Ferguson 1997) in public controversies about social ends in the South.
‘intends’ to produce motivation). By the same token, the agency of both human and non-human actors generates unintended outcomes. Human and non-human agency ‘comes together’ in an assemblage to produce specific outcomes – this is what gives it its apparent coherence – and we know it through its products and through its technologies of (re)production.

Deleuze & Guattari tell us that an assemblage’s vertical axis relates to its stability or instability. This is expressed through the concepts of territorialisation and deterritorialization. Territorialization, for all its geographical connotations, is not about space/time integrity – D&G are clear about this. Rather, it refers to the properties of the assemblage which work to stabilize its intrinsic heterogeneity: the recurrent practices, norms, routines and habits, as well as the incumbent technologies and artefacts around and through which agency is coordinated.

Deterritorialization refers to factors that work against the stability of the assemblage – practices and artefacts through which heterogeneity reasserts itself: resistance, contradiction, tension, conflict. D&G indicate that deterritorialization is constitutive of an assemblage. This formulation suggests a hint of autopoiesis, but a functionalist reading gainsays the spirit of their ‘nomadological’ sensibility (ibid.: 23-4). Rather, one should see deterritorializing elements as working against fixed structure and boundaries. Such destabilizing acts and ideas are unimaginable irrespective of the assemblage and its logics, but are not implicated in its coherence, its persistence. In other words, an assemblage is not intrinsically a static, water-tight, functional entity. It encompasses destabilizing elements that stand in provocative juxtaposition to the practices that give it coherence and stability. The extent to which any empirical assemblage exhibits functionalist properties depends on how it is constituted and upon the contingent specifics of its relationship with its environment. ‘Development’ may appear more or less autopoietic from different perspectives, at different sites and at different times. Its political fragility or unassailability can only be ascertained through empirical
study: neither the stability nor the instability of ‘development’ is predicated by the notion of assemblage itself.

The act of assembling ideas and actors involves a finite selection of a virtually limitless universe of possible elements – the past fifty years have demonstrated clearly that there is, in principle, no limit to the ideas and actors which could be associated with ‘development’. This implies that a socio-epistemic assemblage is both process and logos. There is no instantaneous calling into existence of ‘development’ – it is put together of pieces over time. Perhaps this time is simply the duration of reading a policy document, or of giving a lecture. It could also be the much grander duration of a ‘paradigm’ or epistemic epoch during which certain concepts and causalities become taken for granted, as a quintessential mode of ‘understanding, acting, relating’ (Foucault 1994: 598, cited in Rabinow 2005). Irrespective of the duration of the process (and its spatial integrity, or lack thereof), some logic of selectivity is inevitably in play. While possible assemblages of ideas and actors are limitless, cognitive demands for consistency and coherence conspire to ensure that any given assemblage can be characterized by some sort of logos. Are such patterns of selectivity arbitrary and contingent, or can we identify continuities, and the operation of specific interests at work? This is another issue to which we must return later.

In a sense, the notion of epistemic assemblage merely confirms what social constructivism and, with much greater rigor, ethnomethodology have long insisted – that our understanding of social reality is contingent upon language and is mediated by sets of practices embedded in specific modes of agency and in concrete matrices of social relations. But these claims for thinking of ‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage point beyond generic constructivist premises to a critical historicization of ‘development’. For these purposes what is needed is not so much a genealogy of the notion (à Cowen & Shenton), but a mapping of the conditions for the possibility of development’s quasi-hegemonic assemblage. Very briefly, I believe that at least the following conditions should be taken into consideration:
• the specific historical conjuncture (structural asymmetry as a condition for and outcome of global capitalism)
• the specific work that 'development' is required to perform at this conjuncture, i.e., managing ('depoliticizing') a grossly unjust and politically volatile order of asymmetrical wealth, power and esteem;
• the specific sites where the assemblage coalesces, i.e, the infrastructural nodes and social matrices that constitute the quasistatal development industry; and
• the specific forms of 'development agency' via which the assemblage is accomplished.

**Development agency**

'Development' as a socio-epistemic assemblage is constituted through specific forms of *embodied social agency.* This agency animates the 'horizontal' axis of the assemblage – the intersection of bodies and enunciations. Let us call the energies expended in the achievement of the assemblage 'development agency.' Certain basic facts can be easily recognized about development agency, many of which have already been noted in passing. Development agency is, among other things,

a) A 'postcolonial' phenomenon. Development agency is historically embedded in the asymmetries of wealth and power established through the colonial order. Development agency is both a product of colonialism and an important if secondary\(^7\) mechanism for the ‘transformative reproduction’ of postcolonial asymmetry.

b) Development agency is embodied primarily in dedicated 'development agencies.' Such agencies vary immensely in size, organization and political accountability. Some are public (like USAID or the World Bank) while others are private (like the Open Society Foundation or Save the Children). Development agencies are also embedded very differently in politico-legal jurisdictions: some are accountable to national regulation (SIDA), some to transnational conventions (UNDP) while others are transjurisdictional, i.e., in practice they fall outside of any established jurisdiction (Oxfam, Aga Khan Foundation).

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\(^7\) The mechanisms by which capital organizes production and exchange on a global scale being primary.
c) Development agency is manifested in specialized ‘developmental’ roles or functions embodied by individual or corporate social actors. Such functions (departmental chief, desk officer, policy analyst, monitoring and evaluation consultant) have a strong structural quality (they exist irrespective of individual volition), but are naturally instantiated and reconfigured under the impact of the individual agency that animates the function.

d) Development agency works through skills and expertise embodied in a semiprofessionalized\(^8\) corps of ‘development agents.’ Academic Development Studies has a formative, if not determinate function in the production of this expertise.

e) Development agency is a normative-instrumental project. Due to the structural discrepancy between its ambitions and its achievements, the credibility of development agency is constitutively in crisis. Because ‘development’ unavoidably undermines itself – it cannot both maintain global asymmetry and eliminate it – it is constantly in search of new rhetorical-ideological justifications to uphold its self-styled moral aims.

These justifications are contingent, ‘surface’ phenomena – they play out primarily in volatile arenas of quotidian political rhetoric. Yet, such enunciations are both enabled and constrained by structural conditions: the knowledge practices through which ‘development’ produces itself and its working environment.

\[\textbf{Practices and products: The vertical axis of ‘development’}\]

Development agency is characterized by a wide range of knowledge practices. Of specific interest here are those by which ‘evidence’ becomes ‘policy.’ In abstract terms we might postulate a set of patterned mechanisms, or algorithms, by which representations of reality in recipient countries (data) are selectively appropriated as pertinent facts (evidence) and

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\(\text{\footnotesize \(8\) The level of professionalization varies immensely. Indeed, the markers of professionalism are themselves in constant flux. This flux is largely the outcome of two parallel trends in the development industry: one of ‘ngoization’ (e.g., Lang 1997), by which activist movements are colonized by development agencies through the outsourcing and subcontracting of developmental activities; and secondly, through the progressive devolution of developmental functions within development agencies to citizens of recipient jurisdictions (see below).} \)
further translated into guidelines for action (policy). To understand the algorithms of selectivity and translation via which evidence is converted into policies and practices – we must start with the empirical knowledge practices associated with the exercise of development agency.

The current social scientific interest in knowledge practices has emerged at the interstices of anthropology (e.g., Riles 2006) and science studies (Mol & Law, *op.cit.*). Indeed, there is an emerging movement in both fields that would tend to define their substantive interests specifically in relationship to knowledge practices. It is somewhat surprising, then, to note the lack of a systematic problematization of the concept in this emerging literature. This may be due to a reticence to engage with the original source of the term which is likely to be commercial management studies (see Prusak 2001). Rather early on, at least by the 1960s, business analysts were actively interested in how the ways that knowledge was managed affected productivity. Such interest was manifest in research about organizational learning and communication (see Kontinen, this volume) and in experiments with different storage and retrieval systems (Alavi & Leidner 2001). What distinguishes the business management approach to knowledge practices from that of the current social scientific interest is the relationship to knowledge. For business studies, knowledge is largely a given. There is more and less useful knowledge, but its production is not problematized. What characterises social scientific concerns with knowledge practices

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9 Guidelines or policies are subsequently subjected to further processes of selectivity and translation as they are (or aren't) 'implemented' in 'the field.' While problematizing these processes of implementation is a vital precondition for mapping the dynamics of development agency, the scope of the present essay doesn't allow for extending the analysis into this realm (but see Mosse 2005; Lendvai & Stubbs 2007 for kindred analyses).

10 “Increasingly, economists, strategy academics, and commentators agree that a firm can best be seen as a coordinated collection of capabilities, somewhat bound by its own history, and limited in its effectiveness by its current cognitive and social skills. The main building block of these capabilities (or unit of analysis, if you prefer) is knowledge, especially the knowledge that is mostly tacit and specific to the firm” (Prusak, *op.cit.*: 1003).
practices is precisely the contingent nature of knowledge and a desire to problematize the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’ become constituted as knowledge and, hence, the basis for action. While this general concern with the contingency of knowledge has been central to the social sciences since Foucault, Derrida and others instigated the ‘post-positivist turn’ in the 1970s, what distinguishes the current wave of interest is its systemic ethnographic application to modern sites of knowledge production and consumption such as bureaucracies, firms and laboratories (Latour & Woolgar 1979, Marcus 1998, Riles 2000, Coelho 2005, Anders 2005, van Gastel & Nuijten 2005.)

What we can infer from these and other recent studies (Knorr Centina 1999) is that a knowledge practice is not an empirically discrete entity, spatially or temporally separate from the everyday flow of events accessible to ethnographic observation. Practices related to the production, storage, retrieval and consumption of knowledge are ubiquitous forms of social interaction in any organization. Rather than try and elaborate a theoretical framework for the analysis of developmental knowledge practices (for which the ethnographic data is still rather thin), let me propose a heuristic taxonomy with which one might begin to organize the chaotic empiria which an ethnography of ‘developmental’ knowledge practices would inevitably confront.

The territorialisation of ‘development’

The socio-epistemic assemblage of ‘development’ might be seen to achieve a modicum of stability and coherence through three sets of knowledge practices. These ‘territorializing’ mechanisms can be tentatively characterized as opaqueness, order and objectification:

- **Opaqueness** – Inaccessibility to public scrutiny is a primary property of the ‘development’ assemblage. The knowledge wielded within the development industry has conventionally been secreted behind the dual veils of foreign policy confidentiality and commercial discretion. Behind the barrage of glossy reports, upbeat websites and colourful public
spectacles (largely outsourced to client organizations) lies a shadowy world of opaque paperwork – confidential policy memos; limited distribution ‘drafts’ for official documents; tendering dockets; personnel files, and so on. With the growing subordination of development to security concerns, the shadows surrounding ‘development’ are deepening.

- **Order** – Development agency is largely embedded in bureaucratic organizations where managerial order is a primary raison d’être. It is in the production and maintenance of order that the territorializing mechanisms exercised by development agency are at their most profuse. A great deal of this ordering relates to personnel management (job descriptions, incentive systems and related career-trajectory arrangements). Much of this, again, is an expression of the tireless search for efficiency (much accentuated as new public management procedures have colonized the industry). At a very general level, one could speak of two kinds of ordering practices: those related to vertical relations among actors (hierarchy), and those concerned with day-to-day horizontal interactions within an agency (procedure).

- **Objectification** – The fundamental existential dilemma of ‘development’ derives from its normative-instrumental character. The self-justification of the development industry – i.e., the basis for its access to public rents – is based on claims its leaders and main functionaries know they can never fulfil. This engenders an incessant need to conceal the arbitrary political nature of its rationalizations through various objectifying practices. Such practices can be bureaucratic – they can relate to procedural rules; they can invoke professional expertise, as when ‘absolute poverty’ is linked to ‘a decline in biodiversity’ or ‘growing insecurity and violence.’ Objectifying knowledge practices often revolve around the production and graphic presentation of statistical information. Finally, the language of ‘development’ – a set of ‘discursive regularities’ governing the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies (Foucault 1972) – is naturally fundamental to the coherence of the assemblage.

As we have learned, the territorialisation of an assemblage is in constant tension with inevitable deterritorializing tendencies. Against opaqueness we have practices responding to the objectifying rhetoric of accountability, ownership and participation; against order one can posit counterhegemonic strategies related to timing, scale and style (Gould 2005). There is no limit to the range of factors that might work to destabilize the mechanisms of objectification: indeed, any legible
perversions of the language, expertise or moral claims of ‘development’ could have that effect.

**Excursus: The language of ‘development’**

Development agency is most easily identified through its discursive traces: it is most tangibly in acts of speaking and writing that ‘development’ is assembled as an empirical entity. As an approach to examining the nature of the language of ‘development’ it can be useful to think about the social – i.e., communicative – context in which development agency is deployed. In this regard, I found these EU/OECD statistics on the spatial composition of EU ‘development staff’ quite interesting (Table).

The significance of the extensive devolvement of operational tasks to ‘locals’ is open to many interpretations. At first blush, the increased employment of local staff lends credence to the notion that donors are actively promoting greater ‘recipient ownership’ of EU policy prescriptions. But just as obviously, the global devolution of the EU’s neoliberal agenda to a legion of functionaries drawn from countless educational, socio-cultural and linguistic backgrounds in dozens of countries can have other outcomes as well.

**Table: Staff in some European development agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>donor</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>field/ expat</th>
<th>field/ local</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>6,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>3,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>2,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU total</td>
<td>10,004</td>
<td>4,446</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>22,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EU/OECD: EU Donor Atlas 2006*
Clearly, promoting the ‘harmonized’ and ‘aligned’ aid programmes prescribed by the Paris Declaration requires the radical streamlining of the conceptual apparatus framing the performance of development-related tasks. Just as development agents must work through uniform models, they must also have access to a common language. What kind of a language is this?

The nature of the contemporary language of transnational development policy is a rich area for study. My own excavations have suggested two tightly inter-related characteristics which might be termed consensualism and desemanticization. I have no doubt that there is much more than can be said along these lines.

Consensualism, embodied in terms like partnership, harmonization and alignment, reflects the need of the transnational development industry to deflect any doubts about the inevitability of its prescriptions. Development policy rhetoric cannot entertain the possibility of divergent interests or, which is in effect the same thing, of alternative policy regimes. The consensualism of development policy thus represents, to paraphrase Chantal Mouffe (2000), an ‘attempt at insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of value’ – and hence, a ‘misguided search for a final rational resolution’ to fundamentally divergent interests.

Desemanticization (e.g., Ivackovic 2006) is a consequence of this dilemma. Since the interests of donors and the recipients are not perfectly congruent – any more than the interests of donors and recipients among themselves would be identical – the language of development policy must be systematically perverted to accommodate the systematic lack of correspondence between concept and reality. ‘Partnership’ must be desemanticized to encompass the gross empirical asymmetries of assets and leverage between donor and recipient; ‘multiculturalism’ must be retooled to invoke a hierarchy of divisive ethnonationalisms. And so on.

The insulation of policy from politics is thus not a contingent or accidental outcome; it is a structural feature of
the nature of 'development.' This has profound implications for the study of 'development.' What, for example, does this imply for attempts to engage ethnographically with policy processes? What are the costs – politically, socially, psychologically – of attempting to translate a desemanticized language?

Conclusions

Koponen (op.cit.) advocates for a field of Development Studies that focuses on the engineering aspect of development agency, on its ‘interventions.’ The argument outlined here takes a different tact. In order to understand how ‘development’ actually works, and what it produces, we must begin with development agency and its knowledge practices. We can only begin to understand ‘development’ when we can see how its agents have succeeded in maintaining, as Koponen (ibid.: 6) observes, an ‘ideological conviction about the desirability of ‘development’ and the concomitant moral imperative to foster it through development interventions.’ This moral imperative cannot be taken for granted, nor can it be gleaned through the examination of engineering blueprints (policy) and the projects (interventions) they engender. Policies and projects are only one of product of ‘development’ and ephemeral ones at that (e.g., Mosse 2005). More crucial to the essence of ‘development’ are the epistemic conventions, social technologies and coordinating artefacts without which the production and reproduction of ‘development’ could not be achieved. ‘Development’ is much more than a ‘complex of discourse and action,’ (Koponen loc. cit.), and much less than a belief or ideology (ibid.). To grasp the effects of ‘development’ one must look beyond the projects done in its name and the rationalizations espoused for its existence, to the knowledge practices through which these projects and claims come to appear natural and compelling to the development agents who carry out the work as well as to the taxpayers who foot the bill.

There is no doubt that we need ‘political ontologies’ (Hardt 1990) of the projects development agency engenders in practice. But before we can begin to trace the effects of these
projects in the world, we need to better understand the conditions of their possibility. Postcolonial development studies may have failed in this task, but its very failure is a compelling argument why we must keep on trying.

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### Juhani Koponen: A select bibliography 1974 - 2007

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<th>Year</th>
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<td><em>Kehityksen tutkimus ja tutkimuksen kehitys.</em> Puheenvuoroja suomalaisesta kehitys- ja kehitysmaakeskustelusta. The study of development and the development of research. Notes on the discussion on development and developing countries in Finland</td>
<td>(with Lauri Siltönen), Helsinki: Kehitysmaatutkimuksen seura.</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td><em>Saksan siirtomaavallan kehityspolitiikka nykyisen manner-Tansanian alueella 1884-1914 ja sen vaikutus Tansanian kehitykseen</em> The development policy of German colonialism 1884-1914 in mainland Tanzania and its impact on development</td>
<td>Helsinki: Helsinki University.</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td><em>Effects or impacts?</em> Synthesis study on evaluations and reviews commissioned by Finnida, 1988 to mid-1995 (with Päivi</td>
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1 Compiled with the kind assistance of Märta Salokoski.


(b) Articles

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