

# **“I, POST-PALESTINIAN ENTREPRENEUR”**

Transformations of subalternity in the “start-up  
nation” of Israel

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<p>This is an explorative case-study on the transformations of the hegemonic self and the subaltern other in the spaces of Israel’s globalising economy. Inspired by the works of Saskia Sassen, the thesis is based on a premise that the modern binary categories of difference may transform in the spaces of global, destabilising the hegemonic state. To study this possibility, thesis collects individual imaginaries of difference from Israel where the state has started to integrate the Palestinians of Israel into the centre of Israel’s start-up economy and the key operations of global capital.</p> <p>The thesis deploys an innovative research design that approaches difference as imaginary, made in the living interaction of materialities, myths and creative sense-making. The data of the study consists of individual narrations of difference, collected from Israeli-Palestinian entrepreneurs and Jewish public officials who work together at the entrepreneurial spaces in Israel.</p> <p>The findings of the thesis demonstrate that the Palestinians of Israel who are included into the entrepreneurial space, seek to reject their Palestinian identity and past in order to escape from the national hegemonic conditions. Through analysing the sense-making of Israeli Palestinians, the thesis demonstrates that the entrepreneurial space systematically expels knowledges of otherness that do not fit into the binary logic of modernity. The thesis concludes that in essence, the entrepreneurial intervention is a tool for reproducing the modern emancipatory image of self through the inclusion of the other. At the entrepreneurial site, it is not fear but the hope of emancipation that motivates Palestinians of Israel to detach from Palestinian narratives and spaces. Zionism, it seems, is able to re-institute its binary categories of difference from within the hope that the global brings.</p> <p>The results of the thesis help to understand the hegemonic dynamics through which Zionism and global capital expand together into subaltern consciousness and spaces of political As imaginaries of entrepreneurial knowledge economy are expanding not just in Israel but throughout the globe, the findings of the thesis may open up analytical possibilities also elsewhere.</p>			
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords Imaginaries, global strategic site, subalternity, modernity, zionism, Palestinians of Israel, entrepreneurship, hope.			

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# I Introduction

*Why this sudden restlessness, this confusion?*

*(..) Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come.*

*And some who have just returned from the border say  
there are no barbarians any longer.*

*And now, what's going to happen to us without barbarians?*

*They were, those people, a kind of solution.*

Cavafy, *Waiting for the barbarians*, 1992 [1911]

*Everybody should have the opportunity to become posthuman.*

Bostrom (2005: 10)

This thesis studies a moment when the borders between self and other are shifting. It takes place in Israel where a national minority, the Palestinians of Israel, has been this far systematically excluded from core functions of the society. They are the “barbarians” in Israel, regarded as backward and dangerous by the Jewish majority (Sion 2014).

The shifts in the categories of difference begin, as the global knowledge economy expands to shape lives deep within the nation-state. Suddenly those who are marginalised by the ethnic state, and those whom it protects and elevates, start working together.

How the myths and materialities that the global brings, shakes the foundations of national categories of self and other is the question that guides this inquiry. In the heart of the study is a paradox: a ‘subaltern entrepreneur’ – someone who is simultaneously a part of a group that is systematically marginalised by an ethnic hegemonic nation-state, as well as part of the knowledge economy: the normative centre of the global capital.

As the “machine of global culture” the knowledge economy spreads new logic of accumulation, images of cosmopolitan borderless world, and a hope that all the problems can be solved through technology (Kunda 2009; Marttila 2013; Beck 2005). In the wildest visions the knowledge economy creates new rational and updated ‘posthumans’ that carry entrepreneurial qualities and unlimited capabilities in order to

conquer the fears of humanity, or even death (Bostrom 2005: 10; Dominique 2015). By shifting the experiences of difference, space, and time the knowledge economy may disrupt the binary identities of a nation: the border between ‘barbarians’ and ‘us’ (Riain 2000; Sassen 1996; Sassen 2003a).

The thesis starts from a premise set by Saskia Sassen. Namely, the idea that national categories of difference; especially the racialised, the ethnised, and stigmatised identities, may become destabilised in the processes related to globalization (2003a). Globalization in Sassen’s reading has the *systematic capability* to create spaces where the powerless and the powerful meet, and can engage in dialogue that could destabilise the borders within and between nation-states (2007).

Such a circumstance is born into the nation-state of Israel where the national minorities – the Palestinians of Israel (PAI) – are suddenly integrated into spaces of the knowledge economy. It is at this moment, when those who have been systematically silenced suddenly find themselves in the centre of the Israeli society and in the centre of global knowledge economy from where this thesis begins.

As the poem of Cavafy (1992) illustrates, borders are needed because of their capability to make “us” and “them”. Without these borders we disappear. For the modern nation-state’s ability to survive the existence of ‘them’ is crucial. Rigid borders manage particularly poorly with paradoxes: people who are ‘us’ and simultaneously ‘them’.

## **1.1. Defining the case study**

Israel is known for two things. The conflict that has been continuing since the state was founded in 1948, and its innovation economy – “the start-up nation” that is envied across the world. The paradox at the heart of this thesis started in December 30, 2015, when the government signed a “five year plan for the economic development of the minority sector” and started to integrate the Palestinians of Israel into its “economic miracle” (Senor and Singer 2009: 9; Inter-Agency Task Force 2016).

The plan promised to invest in total 10 - 15 billion Israeli shekels (4.2 - 5.5 billion USD) to the development of “Arab sector” in the following five years – twenty times more than any government before (Inter-Agency Task Force 2016).

Segregation, expulsion and dependency have been this far the tactics of the state towards its minority (Mendilow 2012). While the PAI do hold the right to vote along with some other democratic rights, they simultaneously face on ethnic basis more than 50 laws<sup>1</sup> directed against their personal and collective rights (Farskah 2008, Adalah 2016a). Inside Israel the PAI are up to university level systemically segregated to their own education system, own neighbourhoods<sup>2</sup> and own health care system that all receive significantly less funds from the government than the Jewish systems<sup>3</sup> (Peleg and Waxman 2011). The labour markets are in practice ethnically segregated, as 95% of the PAI are proletarianised and find employment from low-paid industries, and even within those the PAI receive worse salary than their Jewish colleagues (Adalah 2011; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993). The Jewish majority controls the access to capital, and labour (Yiftachel 1999). They are not allowed to teach their own national history in their schools; instead they study the Zionist<sup>4</sup> – the Jewish national – version of history (Sion 2014). Furthermore, their citizenship can be revoked for ‘breach of trust or disloyalty to the state (quoted in Adalah 2011: 9).

Before the signing of the five year plan, the Israeli Palestinians had in practice been shut from access to global knowledge economy<sup>5</sup> and from such activities as import and export (Shafir and Peleg 2002: 120). Also, they are excluded from senior positions in both governmental and key private sector<sup>6</sup> offices (Abdo 2011, Abu-Saad 2011; Yiftachel 2011). The strategy of the state has, according to Amal, been to isolate PAI from globalisation (2010). Indeed, in Israel the knowledge economy has so far been a

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1 The list of aforementioned laws and 50 other discriminatory laws can be found from Adalah: <https://www.adalah.org/en/law/index>.

2 Historically the government has prevented Israeli-Arabs from moving out of what are known as the “Arab towns” or “mixed cities” – consisting about 3,5% of Israeli area. Today 95% of the Arabs still live in these Arab areas collectively called the “northern triangle” (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). In 2011 Knesset confirmed a bill that allows Jewish communities to decide whether to accept someone to move in to their community based on ethnic or religious criteria (Adalah 2016a).

3 The state funding for development of “Arab neighbourhoods” and housing is ten times larger for Jews than for Arabs; funding for “Arab schools” is 35% lower for Arab schools (The equality index of Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel 2008)

4 Zionism is the national hegemonic ideology that was also the liberation movement of Jews from European anti-semitism. For a critical review of Zionist history, see Masalha (2012).

5 In 2008 only 2 % of Israeli Palestinians worked in high-tech contrast to 14% of Jews. Those who had found employment received 50% less mean income than their Jewish colleagues (Farsakh 2011).

6 According to Adalah (2011), the Israeli Palestinians represent 0.3% in managerial positions within high-tech sector.

Jewish space and the entrepreneurs are celebrated as national heroes for keeping the Jewish state strong (Senor and Singer 2009).

The plan for integration is a significant shift in the ongoing mechanics of silencing and marginalising the PAI. The existence of the PAI, consisting about 20% of the Israeli citizens, has not, as Mendilow points out, only been silenced by the Israeli state, but also by the international community and authorities in Palestine (2012). Evident is the fact that so far there has not been a single peace process or peace plan that would discuss the PAI's role or integrate their needs (Mendilow 2012).

Recent research has become interested in PAI identities, and their integration to peace-making has been raised as the most important step for developing new innovative ways to solve the conflict (Farskakh 2013; Mendilow 2012). Their existence reminds that ethno-national boundaries are blurry between Israel and Palestine and challenge the whole idea of two-state solution that the international community has pledged on (Rabinowitz 2010). As the PAI are integrated into the spaces of knowledge economy in Israel, it is possible that the conditions through which they are made invisible and silenced, within and beyond Israel, could destabilise.

#### 1.1.1. Entrepreneurial development intervention

The five year plan gives birth to unprecedented “global” spaces of co-existence where Israeli Palestinians and Jewish majority can encounter each other. These spaces are what I call "*entrepreneurial development interventions*". They consist of four types of activities funded by the five year plan (Israeli Innovation Authority 2016):

1. Building industrial zones to “arab cities of Israel” with funds of 118 million US dollars so far allocated for this purpose
2. Reimbursing 30 % of salaries of arab employers in transnational corporations for the first three years of their employment
3. Offering 85 % of “seed funding<sup>7</sup>” for start-ups with arab co-founders of up to 500 000 US dollars
4. Entrepreneurial development interventions, led by “arab and Jewish role models”, that teach and encourage entrepreneurship to PAI youth in the arab towns of Israel.

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<sup>7</sup> Covering expenses and risk for the private investors – “venture capitalists” or “Angel investors” that fund high-risk early stage technological companies.

The state allocation of money is significantly increased with funds collected from a) international and bilateral donors such as USAID, UK Taskforce and U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative's (MEPI); b) philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates- and the Rayne foundations and c) transnational corporations such as IBM, Google and Microsoft (Israel Innovation Authority 2016).

The empirical material for this thesis comes from the grassroots of entrepreneurial interventions – from the PAI and Jewish “role models”: PAI entrepreneurs and Jewish government officials who work together to spread entrepreneurship and knowledge economy to arab towns. By collecting what Sassen labels “individual imaginaries” from spaces where the powerless and the powerful meet, the study seeks to uncover potential transformations in the national categories of difference. In total there are eleven individual imaginaries collected from the ‘role models’ through in-depth interviews.

Taking these entrepreneurial development interventions in “Arab towns” as the context of my case study, I follow the example set by Torstick (2000), Sion (2014), Ophir (2002) and Rouhana & Fiske (1995) to study “rare spaces of co-existence in israel” (Torstick 2000: 9). As Sion notes, scholars have recently been starting to pay attention to the rare sites where the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Palestinians encounter each other (Sion 2014). The purpose of these studies is to examine how those encounters shape the ideas of difference and of identities that each group have of each other, and possibly to transform or reproduce the zionist hegemonic ideas of difference. Most of the previous studies have demonstrated systematic failure of these sites to produce understanding or dialogue between the PAI and the Jews, functioning only in reminding the PAI of their inferior position (Torstick 2000; Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). As the previous studies have focused on neighbourhoods and life in universities where the PAI and the Jews meet, there are two features that make the entrepreneurial site unique:

1. It is a site shaped extensively by processes of global capital
2. It is a site at the top of the Israeli society's hierarchy, filled with national pride (Senor and Singer 2009).

The plan to turn the high-tech in Israel into ‘space of co-existence’ – a site where the Jews and the PAI interact in everyday terms – had apparently two reasons from the perspective of the state. The other was economic, the other political. The economic reason was that as Israel applied for OECD membership in 2007 (membership was received in 2010) the OECD commission required Israel to include its minority citizens into its economy (Doron and Arian 2014). OECD estimated that Israel was losing 8 billion dollars every year for the lack of integration and set the integration as a condition for Israel’s membership (OECD 2009). Also, despite being a country with most engineers, researchers and start-ups per capita, the start-up nation is facing serious shortage of engineers. Thus it is clear that successful integration of the PAI to start-up nation can strengthen the country’s economy (Israel Innovation Authority 2016). The political reason emerged already in October 2000, the most violent month of the second intifada, as the PAI took the streets and demanded an end for the occupation of Palestine and equal rights within Israel (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). The emergence of what has been called the ‘stand-tall generation’ – the youth that are ready to resist Israel publicly, has required the state to develop its policies towards the PAI (Rabinowitz and Abu- Baker 2005). Indeed, since 2000 the Israeli state has funded a plethora of “intercultural initiatives aimed to promote mutual understanding, tolerance and friendship” (OHCHR 2008: paragraph 22).

## **1.2. Research objectives**

Applying an indeterminist and explorative approach, this study seeks to trace how meanings and borders between Other and Self transform as the myths and materialities of global transform the conditions of encountering. More precisely the focus is on studying how the meanings of subalternity, presented by the PAI entrepreneurs, destabilise and/or stabilise the hegemonic national Zionist categories of difference.

The study will help to understand how ‘global’ shapes the imaginations about self and other and how the meanings of ‘global’ are negotiated and used to transform the conditions of subalternity. The starting point for the thesis is the assumption that if the conditions of subalternity transform, the hegemonic system transforms too (Bhabha 1994). The findings demonstrate how, motivated by entrepreneurial hope and possibility

of becoming global, the PAI entrepreneurs seek to detach themselves from Palestinian identity. A new “post-Palestinian entrepreneur” is born in the entrepreneurial space.

The results show that as the knowledge economy expands to include the members of marginalised communities, in Israel it simultaneously expels the subaltern collective narratives from its space and fortifies existent conditions of subalternity. The expansion of “global” hope into the lives and consciousness of subaltern entrepreneurs in Israel thus executes zionist dreams. While the findings can not be used to make generalisations, as the empirical data the thesis uses is too thin, they however can be used to develop theoretical possibilities and policy-relevant insights.

It should be emphasised that the processes of entrepreneurialization – the spread of entrepreneurial myths and materials to most intimate areas of human being: knowledge, creativity and consciousness, are anything but limited to Israel. While this study leaves it for the imagination of the reader, it is possible, reciting Sassen, that “extreme cases make sharply visible what might otherwise remain confusingly vague” (2014: 1). As entrepreneurship and technology are becoming the sources of global hope and are reshaping ideas of attractive future and development – it is important to understand the dynamics that may be embedded into this process<sup>8</sup>.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. First the theoretical framework that connects processes of subalternity to history of modernity and to critical studies of globalisation will be presented. After locating the thesis into a theoretical framework the key analytical tools for the thesis are presented. After the theory, the methodological foundations and practical research tools related to collecting and analysing ‘individual imaginaries from below’ are discussed. The context section that follows seeks to deconstruct the myths and materialities of zionism, (Israeli) Palestinian nationalism and global knowledge economy – the *imaginaries* that intersect the entrepreneurial space. The purpose of the analysis is to present the collected ‘individual imaginaries’ from the entrepreneurial site and to analyse their transformative potential and relation to the context. The discussion section focuses on problematising the key findings of the thesis

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<sup>8</sup> See Marttila for discussion on how through entrepreneurialization entrepreneurship expands to shape universities, governments, and civil society (2013).

before conclusion that summarises the results, the weaknesses and strengths of the study, and develops ideas for future research.

## **II Theory**

The purpose of the theoretical discussion is to create a framework that is able to observe transformations in the national conditions of subalternity in a context that is strongly connected to global capital. The theoretical framework takes place in the blurry boundaries between globalisation and development studies (Gills and Hosseini 2017). It is designed to expose how expansions of knowledge economy destabilises the relations, myths and materialities through which difference is made; to understand what kind of visions of difference and subalternity emerge – and finally, whose interests do these visions serve? (see: Gills, Goodman and Hosseini 2016).

The first part of the theory section builds the framework for studying transformations of subalternity between nationalism and globalization. The second part introduces analytical tools for an empirical case-study and develops a civic cosmopolitan possibility – an emancipatory trajectory that can start from entrepreneurial space.

### **2.1. Studying subalternity between national and global**

*How should the Reason be able to understand what is absolutely different from itself?*

Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, 1985 [1844]: 34.

#### **2.1.1. Modern roots of subalternity**

Studying subalternity means studying continuation of modern and post-colonial meanings and practices of difference that produce structural conditions of exclusion and marginalization. To understand the roots of the knowledges and practices that create subalternity, a short exploration to modernity is necessary before defining subalternity.

Modernity, a vague and contested term as such, can be understood as knowledges and practices, tied to European enlightenment and its belief in linear progress, that seek to restructure identities and societies (Mark Taylor 1987). Modernity has often been approached as the root problem of western ideological and material domination

(Calhoun 1995 Delanty 2000). Indeed, it seems that whether one reads studies<sup>9</sup> that seek to find a way post nationalism, post colonialism or post development the key question is the same – how to go beyond or below modernity? The question is the same when it comes to understanding and overcoming subalternity (Bhabha 1994).

The question of how modernity produces identities and manifestations of power has been at the centre of analyses ranging from “post-modernism<sup>10</sup>” to critical studies of globalisation and development<sup>11</sup>, and from post-colonialism to existentialist and dialogical philosophy (Mark Taylor 1987). Modernity, according to these perspectives, turns difference into a knowledge of absoluteness and certainty: crafting universal rules, divisions and definitions about difference (Derrida 1978; Latour 2006). Embedded in modernity is a binary logic that travels to define and divide cultures, races, people and nations into two opposites<sup>12</sup>: Europeans, and the non-Europeans who are lacking everything that Europeans are (Mark Taylor 1987).

Through modernity the non-European came to be described through counter-images of modern/un-modern, civilized/un-civilized, masculine/feminine, mature/immature, rational/natural – the Europeans naturally being on the side of modernity, as it was them who had figured out the mystery of difference (Calhoun 1995; Said 2011; Mark Taylor 1987; Mies & Shiva 2014: 220-225). According to Levinas, modernity’s obsession with universalism and statism produced a logic of “totalisation of difference”, where the inherent pluralism of human beings is forced into rigid categories that elevates Europeans and demeans the rest (Levinas 1969: 36). Kristeva has described this process with a term “abject other”: a process through which the *Self* is constructed through creating an antithesis: an image of *Other* that does not have the absolute knowledge,

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9 From post-developmental perspective, see Pieterse (1998: 345). From post-national perspective, see Delanty (2000).

10 Authors combining post-structuralism and psychoanalysis such as Lacan, Derrida and Foucault have been sometimes branded as “post-modernists” – a rather vague category (see discussion: M. Taylor 1987: 35-48).

11 See: Gills and Hosseini (2017) for discussion of Critical Global Studies (CGS); see Burawoy et al. (2000) for discussion on “Grounded globalization”; see Pieterse (1998) and Escobar (2012) for critical studies of modernity from the perspective of development.

12 The logic of knowledge being achieved by dividing entities into opposites derives according to Heidegger and Mark Taylor from Hegel whose philosophy of system fulfilled the modern dream to tame and to define difference in absolute terms – work that was finalized by Hegel’s philosophy of system (Heidegger 2012: 64 - 65; Mark Taylor 1987). Difference in the philosophy of modernity became a tool for understanding the universal nature of certain phenomena. It received a purpose as an opposite, fulfilling something that was already known.

does not even know himself, and lacks all the good features that the self has (Kristeva 1982: 14; Mark Taylor 1987: 156-159).

Crucially, there is a logic of interdependency between “self” and “other” that the modernity creates. In modernity, the other and his knowledge is needed as the modern self only becomes elevated if it has incorporated unworthy knowledge and unworthy subjects into its system as its counter images (Mark Taylor 1987: 20-22). This modern interdependency of Self through Other is best understood as collective pathological condition that freezes the image of the other and imprisons the oriental “it” into image of a demon, into a nightmare in the collective unconsciousness of the Self (Jung 1931). Vicious circles of power, of violence and of hate emerge from this collective delusion, but also a clear idea of self (Jung 1931: 77 - 96 ; Nandy 1988).

To achieve this incorporation, modernity needs not just a system of knowledge, but a system of power, expansion and governance that reinforces its self-image and keeps the demons outside. Paraphrasing Levinas, while modernity seems universal, it is in fact personal, driven by the European need to reach absoluteness (Levinas 1969: 46). From this need we can find the roots of colonialism and post-colonialism, and the creation of subalternity.

Projects of colonialism, international trade and perhaps also ideas of development and globalization are thus functional not just from material but also from spiritual perspective: reproducing image of a white man and his civilization mission to spread modernity (Kipling 1997; Latour 2006: 157). Crucially, the “wild thought of the unmodern subject of the South” (Levi-Strauss 1962: 268) is, however, never capable of understanding and practicing modernity by itself (Latour 2006: 156). It was the a-priori rational knowledge of the other: the “fact” that the West knew the other and their history<sup>13</sup>, that either legitimated the West to dominate “them” or to help “them” to achieve the higher forms of spirit and universality that the West already had (Hegel 1998: 126, 158; Calarco & Atterton 2010).

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<sup>13</sup> the western knowledge about the other and his history functioned to legitimize colonization and domination, as it was only the West who could help the other to find his destiny. See Marvellous description of this discourse presented by Arthur James Balfour legitimizing the domination of Egypt in these terms in Said (2011: chap 1, sect 1).

As Mies and Shiva (2014) point out, the only available logic for emancipation that modernity leaves for the “other”: the marginalized, the feminized and the colonialized, is by internalising modernity’s logic: re-creating a “new self” through a new “other”. This new other can be found both by creating new segments within societies, or by targeting and turning against the “unmodern” and “barbaric” features of the self. In both cases, the processes of emancipation become projects of “culture war” against self or new segments in society, instead of battles against economic and political conditions created by the ongoing post-colonial modernity (Mies and Shiva 2014: 218-250).

### **Defining subalternity**

In what has become known as “subaltern studies<sup>14</sup>”, the on-going post-colonial mechanics of construction, exclusion and marginalization of the other have been approached through analytical category of the subaltern (Prakash 1994: 1475-1490). Though a contested concept, originally developed by Gramsci<sup>15</sup>, the thesis approaches subalternity as a process where the continuing history of European modernity functions to produce exclusion through semiotic-material projects of nation-states and global capital (Bhabha 1984; R.Young 2016). Subalternity here is understood as a creative and diverse set of practices and knowledges that seek to transform the other into static and pre-known images – a voiceless object instead of a creative person.

Approaching difference through subalternity enables studying both the processes of hegemony – the ideological control of culture that normalizes the asymmetrical relations of power – that seeks to create, exclude and marginalize the subjects who are made “different” and separated from the realms of power (Spivak and Guha 1988; Morris 2010; Bhabha 1984 , Hall 2007), and possibilities of emancipation that can start from re-imagining the meanings of subalternity (Bhabha 1984; Green 2011).

For some writers in subaltern studies, such as Spivak (1992: 29-47), the subaltern is by definition someone who is totally outside the access to hegemony and thus incapable of influencing it. Understanding subaltern not just as a passive, voiceless and excluded

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14 Gramsci is recognized as the “mentor of subaltern studies”. The field has expanded the definition of subalternity into various new directions and has “reinvented” subalternity repeatedly (see: Sivaramakrishnan 2002: 234-56).

15 While Spivak claims that Gramsci meant only the working class with his term, this claim has become convincingly undermined by Green who demonstrates the inherent intersectionality in Gramsci’s original works. (See: Green 2011; Spivak 2005: 479).

victim of hegemonic consciousness, I however, following Green (2011) and Bhabha (1984), regard the subalterns as imaginative beings, holding the keys to the beginning of their emancipation. For Bhabha, especially the racialized national minorities are in a position of ‘proximity’ where they are part of the hegemony and can challenge the system that creates subalternity for its own self-image (Bhabha 1984). The ability to challenge the hegemony comes from the idea that the hegemonic modern system itself is dependent on the subalterns in order to create its self-image, and often also its material survival. According to Bhabha, the subaltern as part of the system is not without a voice – but her/his voice is often hybridized, twisted and appropriated into the hegemonic discourse (Bhabha 1994).

Subaltern is thus not just the “residue” of a hegemonic system, but an integral part of its discursive and material system – a system that carries the power of re-imagining subalternity inside of it (Kristeva 1982: 76, 92; Bhabha 1994). The purpose of the hegemony however is to produce “willing consent” - the conscious and unconscious acceptance of hegemonic truths about subalterns themselves – often as different, unworthy and unmodern. Because of this, the imagination of subalterns – the persons behind the conditions of subalternity – is however often distorted (Bhabha 1984; Green and Ives 2009: 3-30). They, in other words, often internalize the image of other presented to them<sup>16</sup>.

Following Green, the category of subaltern is understood here in a non-homogenous and intersectional category. There are many different kinds of subaltern groups who are inherently as plural as any other individuals (2011). From the perspective of hegemonic power, they are however often sought to present as a uniform and homogenous group. How subalternity is created and how it may be challenged is for Green, as well as for both Hall and Bhabha a contextual question that requires historization and deconstruction of political, social and economic ties through which the subalternity is in its specific contexts made (Green 2011: 387-415, Bhabha 1984; Hall 1996). Furthermore, analytically it requires engaging with the persons who are made and/or are making subalternity, and listening to their histories and world-views.

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<sup>16</sup> See: Fanon 2008.

### 2.1.2. Between nation-state and globalization

The modern nation-state, more than any other form of polity, carries the binary hegemonic logic of modernity inside of it (Bottici 2007; Bottici and Challand 2013; Mark Taylor 1987; Gills 2006). While nation-states are different they are all driven by a need to create unity, often in ethnic terms (Appadurai 2006). Difference is simultaneously a nation-state's problem<sup>17</sup>, and the source of its identity, power and ability to govern (Bottici and Challand 2013). Nowhere is this as evident as in "hegemonic multiethnic states"<sup>18</sup> where dominant group creates and segregates the "proximate subaltern" by creating an image of abject other and controlling social, economic, cultural and relations to sustain it (Peleg 2007). In these, often post-colonial, states the battle of the selfhood of the nation takes place against the heterogeneity of its own population (Bhabha 1994: 98).

"Globalization" is often seen as a process that transforms the relations through which difference is made within nation-states (Delanty 2011). As the majority of world's conflicts are taking place within the borders of the nation-states, it is perhaps understandable why the idea of globalization has been so actively celebrated as the end of the eternal conflicts about difference (Peleg 2007; Fukuyama 1989, Friedman 2005). Globalization, being one of the most widely used terms in social sciences, is so filled with contradictory definitions and research strategies, that it is necessary to define what this thesis means by globalization before announcing whether to join celebrations about its emancipatory potentiality or not<sup>19</sup>.

Approaches to globalization can be divided into hyper-globalist<sup>20</sup> and critical globalization studies (CGS) that further divide into sub-categories (Gills and Hosseini 2017; Amelina, Nergiz, Faist and Glick Schiller 2012: 219 - 39). As any typology, this too is of an ideal type rather than an accurate description of the evolving diversity and

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17 According to Mark Taylor, the whole history of culture and society is a struggle with "endlessly complex problems of difference and otherness" (MarkTaylor 1987: xxi). As a central question of governance, difference is however particularly a problem of a modern nation-state (Foucault 1977: 113-165). Thus, territory, instead of people, was the core concern of medieval polity; and the ancient greeks in turn regarded difference as something more fluid and changeable. Thus, the boundaries between who belongs and who does not, were not necessarily the focus of governance (Ward 2009: 191).

18 Most of the world's states are of course "multi-ethnic" (Bhabha 1994).

19 See Gills (2004) for discussion on the diversity of globalizations.

20 Another term that is often used is "cosmo-globalist" to describe the same division in globalization studies (Amelina et al. 2012).

rich field of globalization studies. The fundamental difference between “hyper-globalist” and CGS, however, is the extent of the juxtaposition of determinism versus indeterminism embedded in these approaches.

For the hyper-globalists, globalization is a clearly distinguishable historical period, or a cultural-economic transformation, tied to objective changes in the capability of capital to move and cultures to disperse through information and communication technologies (Castells 2011). In these perspectives globalization often comes from “above” and imposes itself on national systems of governance (Beck 1999; 2005). For hyperglobalists, “It<sup>21</sup>” functions to disembed subjectivities from their national realities and denationalize or deterritorialize national boundaries of belonging (Giddens 1991). Globalization thus totally transforms the experiences of time and space, and replaces national relations with transnational or global relations<sup>22</sup>.

In hyper-globalist descriptions, globalization often equals to the transformation of difference into a singular universal nature. Be it the “Hegelian triumph of the western idea” embodied in USA dominance (Fukuyama 1989: 3-4), the “flattening of the world” into equal opportunities through global capitalism, where abundance of opportunities functions to end quarrels about difference (Friedman 2005; 2000; Dollar 2005); the emergence of “world society” through the victory of occidental rationalism (Meyer et al. 1997)<sup>23</sup>; the inevitable “death of a nation-state<sup>24</sup>” (Ohmae 1991); or inescapable diffusion of consumerism and individualism (Sklair 2002). Still for some it is a process leading into inevitable final clash between western and Islamic cultures (Huntington 1997), while for others globalization simply backfires into return of atavistic nationalism<sup>25</sup>, strengthening the national categories of difference (Herod, Tuathail and Roberts 1998: 20). Hyper-globalist views demonstrate that when globalization is given a

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21 See Amoore et al. (2000) for a discussion on how to turn globalisation from the abstract and vague “it” into a concept that can be used to study political transformations and politics.

22 Transnationalism in this case means relations that seem to travel across national boundaries: global would signal a feeling of shared unity and totality with the world (see Burawoy et al. (2000) and Delanty (2011) for discussion).

23 See discussion on Meyer’s “world society” as the embodiment of “occidental rationalism” (Alamuti 2015: 60 - 65).

24 Look at Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen (2005: 8-14) for discussion.

25 Appadurai more eloquently recognises the systemic capabilities of globalisation to increase violence against minorities within nation-states, and pave way for return of hegemonic ethnic nationalism. See: Appadurai (2006).

singular totalitarian character, the analyses about transformations of difference tend to be quite deterministic.

Problems with the aforementioned determinist hyper-globalist approaches are that they tend to see cultural transformations as absolute and singular, rather than as fragmented and contradictory processes (Sassen 2007; Delanty 2011). Secondly, they undermine the flexibility of nationstate(s) and nationalist identities to renew themselves into changing conditions (Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005: 15).

From the perspective of the CGS, globalization is more of a research orientation that studies how globalization is made and imagined, rather than an objective universal phenomena (Gills and Hosseini 2017). Approaching globalization from indeterministic perspective does not mean denying the objective transformations that have been taking place in the structure of capital or in technological development, nor denying the possibilities of trajectories that the hyper-globalists present (Steger 2008). It means that the focus is rather on how globalization is imagined, produced and used in different contexts. From this perspective, the hyper-globalist claims look ideological as they seek to give globalization an automatized logic – a logic that is often used to ideologically create space for the expansion of global capital and its materialities<sup>26</sup> (Steger 2008).

From the indeterminist perspective, there are different kinds of *processes of globalization* and different kinds of *national realities* (Sassen 2007). Furthermore, globalization does not simply impose itself on national realities, but may exist *within national* – erupting within nation-states and shifting its boundaries of belonging (Sassen 2006; Steger 2013). From this perspective, it is also possible that national hegemonic realities or subaltern actors can make futures *from within global* (Hosseini 2013). From this indeterministic perspective that the thesis deploys, the relationship between national meanings of difference and globalization is thus a process of “negotiation” that can produce both hegemonic and emancipatory trajectories – even simultaneously<sup>27</sup>.

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26 Steger (2008) calls this the “imaginary of market globalism”.

27 E.g.. Riain 2000; Burawoy et al. 2000; Kunda 2009.

While globalization as a combination of expansion of global capital<sup>28</sup> and context specific ideas about difference has the power to shape the national solidarities and categories of difference, the direction of this reconstruction is not given (Gills et al. 2016). Thus, contextual studies focusing on *what kind of global capital* and *what kind of national* encounter are needed. Before this contextual information, the relationship between national conditions of subalternity and globalization is impossible to study. This information will be elaborated in the context section of the thesis.

### **Studying a premise “from below”**

This thesis approaches the complex dynamic of subalternity between nation-state and globalization with an indeterministic research orientation that emphasizes creativity of the social actors on the ground. To do this in practice, the thesis utilizes a research orientation embedded in subaltern studies that is the study “from below<sup>29</sup>”. This means that the transforming conditions of subalternity, the dynamics of globalization and nation-state are approached from the level of sense-making on the ground. How globalization, national identities and subalternity becomes imagined by the social actors informs us, *what globalization, nationalism and subalternity in this case are and what kind of emancipatory and/or hegemonic futures they make.*

The thesis is guided by the premise set by Saskia Sassen. For her, globalization signals a possibility of destabilization in the national categories of difference, especially concerning ethnitized, marginalized, stigmatized and racialized categories (Sassen 2003a). Destabilization of these categories would in essence, according to Sassen, signify destabilization in the hegemonic national system that survives by defining subjects into those who belong and those who do not (2008). Sassen’s premise is however indeterministic: such a destabilization may take place, or it may not (2003b). It is this possibility, however, that drives the thesis.

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28 I follow Gills et al. (2016: 3) in their definition of capital: “Capital is a social process, through which surplus value is not only produced and controlled by unsustainable and ‘un-sovereign’ ways of exploiting labour (both manual and intellectual), land (and other commons), nature (non-renewable sources of energy and the Earth’s bio-capacity, including climate), but also by the colonization of communal solidarities (from the level of the household to the world community level)”.

29 Studies from below seek histories that are pushed away from hegemonic discourse. They are often described as “history of the masses” (Ludden 2002: xii). As the boundaries between elites and subalterns may be transforming in the body of subaltern entrepreneur, it is possible that the thesis is in fact a study from above. This remains to be seen.

## 2.2. Analytical tools of the thesis

This thesis deploys three key analytical tools to study transformations of subalternity between hegemonic nation-state and “globalization” in an indeterminist and empirical manner. After presenting the tools, an emancipatory cosmopolitan possibility is defined.

### 2.2.1. Imaginaries of difference

As Grant critically points out, imaginary has become the new catch-all concept describing the dynamics of socio-ideological transformations (Grant 2014). Indeed, there is the “Imaginary institution of society” by Castoriadis (1987); “social imaginaries” of Taylor (2004); “economic imaginaries” of Jessop (2004); “global imaginaries” by Steger (2008) and “global imaginations” by Burawoy et al. (2000); “colonial and postcolonial imaginaries” by Wilkinson and Kothari (2010); and “imaginal politics” of Bottici (2011; 2007). Indeed, in recent years the term imaginary and its reformulations has proliferated into new fields, and unprecedented conceptualisations of “imaginaries” or “imagination” have emerged<sup>30</sup>.

Following Castoriadis, imaginary can be seen a process in which society or a certain “we” becomes to understand itself and what is considered as “normal” (Castoriadis 1987; Steger 2008). The imaginary of “normal” is ultimately a pre-reflective condition of sense-making in certain context: the self-evident sense of economy (Jessop 2004); of globalisation (Steger 2008) of politics (Taylor 2004) and of self and the other, before the thinking and speaking even starts (Bottici 2011; Bourdieu 1990: 54 - 55).

While Bottici and Castoriadis have been developing imaginary into a tool that can observe how social actors are currently producing “normal”, others, such as Taylor and Steger, have been looking at macro-level time- and space-spanning transformations of “normal” (Taylor 2004; Steger 2008). how power to create normal functions and becomes instituted is however in focus for all who use the concept of imaginary. Also, while scholars differ on the extent to which emphasise is put on social actors, material structures, or discourses in the “making” of normal – they all emphasise imaginary as a concept that brings semiosis, materialities and social actors together, and emerges in the

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<sup>30</sup> See: Adam, Smith and Straume (2012).

“lived interaction of discourses and materials” (Steger 2008; 36; Bottici 2011; Taylor 2004). It is thus best understood as a concept that connects the subjective and objective levels of social transformations together (Steger 2013). While for Grant (2014), imaginary is a concept that with its fuzziness takes space from Marxist critiques of ideology, it is here approached as a useful tool for studying the transformations of difference in the fuzzy intersections of myths, materials and creativity.

Combining the indeterminacy and creativity of Bottici’s “imaginal” (2011) with Taylor’s macro level framework of “social imaginary”, that Steger (2008) also adopts, the study develops a concept of “imaginary of difference<sup>31</sup>” that functions to observe how ideas of self and other transform at the entrepreneurial site.

Studying subalternity and its transformation through the lens of imaginary implies that difference is not anything fixed but unconsciously accepted “societal normal” that is constantly being made – and can be remade (Anderson 2006; Castoriadis 1987; 1994). This re-making is ultimately a question of power: a “battle of normal” where different actors from subaltern movements to those in power seek to normalize their categories of difference to the changing conditions of everyday-life (Bottici 2011; Castoriadis 1994; Steger 2008; Anderson 2006). Imaginaries of difference define how self and other is experienced and what conditions of subalternity become normalised.

Following Charles Taylor (2004: 25) and Bottici (2011: 57-63) we can divide the production of imaginaries of difference into two phases that connect the discursive and material structures and the dialogue and creativity of social actors together: 1) the “background imaginaries” and 2) the creative imaginal.

In the first phase (1) imaginaries create the normative conditions where we exist and encounter others. These conditions become normalized as the “background” of everyday life, and give social actors the pre-reflective moralities and sense of how things usually go (Taylor 2004: 24). Nation-state has functioned as the hegemonic “background imaginary” through which normal has been imagined – normal that is seen as being increasingly challenged by the imaginaries of “global” (Steger 2008). Bottici

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31 Difference and its making has been central to several scholars who have deployed imaginary as a concept. These include Bottici (2011) Steger (2008) Taylor (2004) and Castoriadis (1987).

(2011) defines the background consisting of two intersecting structures. These structures are a) Political myths<sup>32</sup> and b) Materialities<sup>33</sup>.

Myths refer to different narratives about normal – they give collectives the explanation of society, history, future and “us” in it<sup>34</sup> (Bottici 2007). Political myths foster the sense of belonging, they create personal and collective origins, as well as desirable visions and fantasies of future (Steger 2008; Bottici 2007: 57; 2011). In a given situation there are always plural myths – of which some are visible and hegemonic, while others are hidden or suppressed (Bottici 2011).

Political myths are in interdependent relation with materialities. This is because myths need a material system of production in order to emerge and survive. Myths in turn try to shape the material world according to their image. As material conditions change, the existent hegemonic myths that define difference are “worked”: reproduced/transformed, often in to forms that explain the transformations but maintain the hegemony (Bottici 2007: 40.).

The background can not itself however reproduce reality or transform it. This reproduction and its potential transformation takes place in the second phase (2): the imaginal (Bottici 2011). Imaginal signifies the active re-imagining and sense-making of the “background” by the social actors (Castoriadis 1994, Bottici 2011: 64). Through the phase of the imaginal, the creative social actors can produce unforeseen emancipatory or hegemonic imaginaries: new pre-reflexive conditions that enable transformative visions, identities, ideologies and practices to grow. The two phases of how imaginaries of subalternity are created are presented in the figure 1 below.


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32 As a concept “political myths” have a Gramscian background: he insisted that myths are not “pieces of paper” but structures that re-produce power (A. Gramsci, *Quaderni dal carcere*, Turin, Einaudi, 1975, vol. 2, p. 1308, translated and quoted by Bottici 2011).

33 For Bottici the myths are more important but here it is following Steger understood that their relation is reproductive (Steger 2008).

34 Myths from the perspective of imaginary do not separate ideological, religious or “modern” explanations as ontologically different. As Steger observes these often work together to shape the “normal” and legitimate the use power (Steger 2008: 245).

Figure 1. Two phases of imaginary



At the entrepreneurial space, the background is consisted of “global” and national imaginaries that are reproduced or transformed in the phase of the imaginal by the Jewish public officials and the PAI entrepreneurs working and making sense of the background together. This thesis is interested in understanding what meanings of self and other – new “imaginaries of subalternity” – emerge through the two phases of creating imaginaries.

Crucial for understanding imaginaries of difference is that there are always plural imaginaries circulating at the background, and volatility instead of stability is their true nature (Castoriadis 1994; Steger 2008: 7). The concept does not expect transformation from purely one imaginary (such as hegemonic nationalism) into another (such as “global”), but the “old” always lives within the “new” (Steger 2008: 190; Goodman, N. 1978:6). How global and national intersect in the living interaction with creative sense-makers is an empirical question according to this perspective.

### 2.2.2. Global strategic site

The tension in the thesis arises from the idea that globalization carries its own imaginaries of difference and conditions of subalternity that may significantly transform the “background” of normal. The global strategic site functions as an analytical tool to a) frame the background: a context where global and national imaginaries intersect, and b) define the transformative capabilities of such a context (Sassen 2002). Globalization from this perspective does not operate on its own scale outside the nation-state, but is

constructed and de-constructed in multiple sites within – and often by – state and other social creative actors on the ground (Sassen 2007).

The global strategic site has, according to Sassen, systemic capabilities<sup>35</sup> to destabilize the “normal” national boundaries of belonging and thus also to transform conditions of subalternity (Sassen 2000: 79-95). The following capabilities can produce both hegemonic and emancipatory outcomes.

### **Producing presence and absence**

The first systemic capability of the global strategic site is to produce *presence* and *absence* of knowledges, histories and subjectivities. It does this by bringing the powerless into contact with the national hegemonic groups and the materialities, discourses, and networks of globalization (Sassen 2006: 315 -319). Subaltern consciousness, that is by definition excluded, may suddenly thus acquire presence and engage with power<sup>36</sup>. Simultaneously that the global strategic site incorporates new subjectivities and localities into circulations of global capital, it has the systemic capability to “expel” identities and knowledges from its area –and blatantly “push people out” – or transform them into forms that are compatible with “global” (Sassen 2014: 221)<sup>37</sup>. The dynamics of expulsion embedded in the expansion of globalisation are defined by Sassen as *predatory formations* (2014). Predatory formations function to expel and destroy knowledges, identities, and ecosystems through processes that seem inclusive but, in reality, are exclusionary in their nature.

### **Transforming the contexts of difference**

The second capability of global strategic site is to cause transformations in the *contexts* and *relations* of difference. As difference is made in relations, this capability may cause fundamental transformations (Delanty 2011). Global strategic site does this by connecting the subjectivities and localities from national space into core functions of

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35 The systematic capabilities differ from the popular “capabilities” category that philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have popularised, albeit in different ways. I, following Sassen, do not use the idea of capability in strictly positive sense like Nussbaum and Sen in their works - in contrast it refers to the productive capability of specific material and semiotic combinations: such as global finance of global cities to transform consciousness’s and manipulate current conditions of economy, biosphere and everyday-life (See: Sassen, Saskia 2010; Sassen 2014: Chap. 3).

36 Global strategic site can for example able subalterns that “are practically immobile” and silenced by the hegemonic states to become part of global politics through networks and discourses of “universal human rights” and “global civil society” (Sassen 2005: 1 - 4).

37 See also Sassen, 1991: chapter 1.

global capital (Sassen 2000: 79; 2015). Through becoming part of “time and space shrinking” networks of global capital, the ties to local relations, local places, language and thus local meanings of difference, may become transformed or pluralised. As relations, place and language are the cornerstones of identity, and connect subjects to their narratives of history and belonging,<sup>38</sup> the emergence of global imaginary may enable re-imagining of self and other at the site and thus produce “a new consciousness emerging from new relations of power” (Vertovec, 1999: 447).

The direction of this transformation has been debated extensively. While some see, that globalization transforms solid and stable relationships into a fluid “world of flow” where humans and things are constantly moving, and self too becomes harder to grasp (Appadurai 1996) – “disembedding” communities from mores that psychologically anchor them together (Giddens 1991), others, such as O Riain and Spencer, emphasize the capability of national and local actors to adapt, negotiate and redefine globalizing contexts creatively (O Riain 2000; Spencer 2007: 71 - 80).

### **Causing dissonance**

The third systemic capability of the global strategic site is the capability to produce anomalies and experiences of “dissonance”. Dissonance refers to a situation when the experienced reality and narratives of it (such as hegemonic imaginary of difference) start to diverge from each other (Sassen 2006: 328; 2002). The hegemonic imaginary of difference and its categorical divisions – accepted as normal by both the subaltern and hegemonic groups – starts to feel unfitting, ambivalent or even paradoxical as the background of those categories transform (Sassen 2002; Bhabha 1994). The ‘subaltern entrepreneur’ is possibly such a paradox. In such case the global strategic site may start to produce what Ong and Collier call “anthropological questions”: who are “we” and how do “we” think and act? (Ong & Collier 2005: 5) Dissonance about difference can thus transform the global strategic site into what Delanty calls “reflexive condition”, a social setting in which the pre-reflective a priori realities about the difference that the national hegemony has produced can be challenged and re-imagined (Delanty 2011: 634, 651). The possible dissonance should be understood as cutting across both personal and societal spheres of life, it is a Kierkegaardian moment of paradox – when reason

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38 For discussion see: Bhabha 1994, Glissant 1997, Giddens 1991; Steger and James 2013: 21.

that creates the “normal” can not describe and control the unknown (Kierkegaard 1993: 203 -212). The ‘subaltern entrepreneur’ could perhaps be such an unknown.

### **Unintended consequences within and beyond the site**

What Sassen describes as a “tipping point” or a “systemic edge<sup>39</sup>” (Sassen 2006: chap 4; 2014) summarises the essence of global strategic site: it is an edge where the paradigmatic knowledge of nationalism ceases to be paradigmatic and faces the unknown, both in the presence of the subaltern and in the presence of global (Sassen 2014). As new myths and materialities leak into the visible arena of imaginal the global strategic site can become a territory of non-established rules – a site where new normals can be imagined (2008). There the national ideas of difference may experience death, metamorphosis or mergence – a territory where “unintended consequences of global”: new knowledges, subjectivities and imaginaries may emerge (Barton 2007: 221). The entrepreneurial space is understood as an edge that increases what I call “tensions of difference”. When bringing subaltern and hegemonic experiences and identities together into interactions with national and global myths and materialities, there are tensions that may emerge – tensions about what ‘normal’ actually is.

Furthermore, the edge, as connected to global, has the systematic capability to spread the emerged reality and transcend it into new environments within and beyond national borders, as it can “code heterogeneous contexts and objects” according to their logic (Franklin, Lury & Stacey 2000; Ong & Collier 2005: 11). In the case of this thesis, this may be a process that Marttila calls the “entrepreneurialization”: the expansion of entrepreneurial myths and materialities (2013). It could, however, also function to spread hegemonic national or subaltern national cultures and materialities.

### 2.2.3. Futures of destabilisation and stabilisation

While the *imaginaries* help us to understand how difference is made and *global strategic site* frames the background where it is made, and defines its capabilities of transformation, it is the third tool that connects these tools back to the question of

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39 Bhabha’s concept of the “space of ambivalence” pays resemblance to Sassen’s concept (Bhabha 1984) and Sennett’s concept of the “border condition” is practically the same concept as the systemic edge and the tipping point (2006: 1 - 5).

subalternity. With futures of *destabilisation* and *stabilisation* we can interpret the imaginal – the sense-making about subalternity in an empirical setting and evaluate its hegemonic/emancipatory significance. As cultural transformations are slow and non-linear, this tool does not claim to “predict” the future, but rather functions to recognise the power dynamics that delimit and open up possible futures at the entrepreneurial site (Delanty 2011).

Following Bhabha and Morton the most significant sign, indicating about the hegemonic/emancipatory futures is whether subaltern knowledge is able to be present in the space of encountering (Bhabha 1994; Morton 2003). If such a knowledge is present, the hegemonic national system and its conditions of subalternity may become destabilised.

#### **Futures of stabilisation: Common sense**

The Gramscian idea of “common sense” is the most fundamental sign of stabilisation of hegemonic national imaginary and its conditions of subalternity in the entrepreneurial space. It refers to a fragmentation of subaltern collective consciousness through (unilaterally) borrowed or unconsciously imposed worldview of the dominant groups (Gramsci 1971). Common sense is essentially a condition that prevents the subaltern from gaining historical and collective awareness about the conditions of subalternity and makes him/her *absent*: both from themselves and from the hegemonic selves<sup>40</sup>. In the condition of common sense, the subalterns are thus not themselves, but the hegemony’s idea of them (Green and Ives 2009: 16). Common sense can take various forms at the site.

#### **Futures of stabilisation: Cunningness**

Cunningness according to De Certeau and Barfuss is a common –usually unconscious – subaltern strategy for survival in public spheres that is dominated by individualist and capitalist culture (Barfuss 2008: 847; De Certeau 1984: 30 - 42). As chances to become respected, have influence or have success are significantly harder for the marginalized,

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<sup>40</sup> As Gramsci puts it, common sense is: “fragmentary ideas, a collage of opinions and beliefs, giving the illusion of a coherent worldview and of acting which is not at all coherent and certainly not critical” (Gramsci 1985: 194).

cunningness functions as a strategy where subaltern tries to hide all the features that tell about his subaltern position to the hegemonic group(s).

Cunningness is a particularly individual tactic that psychologically detaches the subalterns from collective relations, histories, geographies and knowledges that make them de facto subaltern (Barfuss 2008). In this process the subaltern actively hides her/his history from the hegemonic public eye, and from the subaltern self. As De Certeau (1984: 37) describes:

Cunningness today is determined by the absence of a proper locus (...) It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of 'opportunities' and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep.

As long as cunningness remains as an individual – not collective tactic, it destroys the historical consciousness of the subaltern (Barfuss 2008: 841).

#### **Futures of stabilisation: Depoliticisation of subalterns**

Another sign of stabilisation is the process of depoliticisation. In this process the subaltern consciousness would be taken out of the realm of politics. Through depoliticization the subalterns cease to present their problems as political problems, possibly imagining political problems as economic or cultural problems (Teivainen 2002; Ferguson 1990; Steger 2008 180-182). Through depoliticization the subalterns cease to present their problems as problems or start to regard politics in total as an inefficient tool for solving their problems. Depoliticization can function as a tool for strengthening the hegemonic imaginaries of difference, if it manages to transform subalterns into “passive active subjects”: de-political, but potentially economically active individuals (Barfuss 2008: 838 - 840)

#### **Futures of stabilisation: Divergence / trasformismo**

What Delanty (2011: 650) calls “internal divergence of culture” can stabilise hegemony significantly. In such a case the subalterns at the global strategic site would in various ways contrast themselves as a new group that is fundamentally different from the original group (Delanty 2011). A strong performance of new “group-identity” that is different from the “old” and not critical to the culture of the majority would stabilize the hegemony significantly.

Divergence can be a sign of hegemonic politics of “Transformismo”: a transformation where subaltern elite group is created and/or co-opted into proximity with hegemonic culture in order to sustain hegemony (Green 2009). Through inclusion of subaltern leaders, transformismo functions as a hegemonic tactic to strengthen the existent political order and hegemonic norms (Morton 2003: 634). In the close proximity with the hegemony the subalterns may become “re-embedded” with acceptance of hegemonic ideas or even turn against their “original culture” (Green 2009: 393; Morton 2003: 632).

### **Futures of stabilisation and destabilisation: Mimicry**

Mimicry is a common strategy for survival in colonial and post-colonial societies where the racialized other seeks approval through appropriation of hegemonic culture and pursues hegemonic status symbols. The “mimic man” repeats, imitates and performs the hegemonic ideas about difference, the hegemonic language, hegemonic phantasies and ideas of history in order to become accepted (Bhabha 1984; 1994). The presence of a person that is almost but not quite the same as the hegemonic person can in long term destabilize the dualist imaginary of modern difference (Bhabha 1994: 85 - 92; 1984). If it “breaks down the symmetry and duality of the self/Other, inside/outside”, mimicry can establish an another space of power/knowledge. (Bhabha 1994: 175). However, it can also function as a hegemonic tool to push subalternity to shadows and cause “internalized racism” that easily leads into ideas of self-hatred, self-refusal and mental wounds, as the metamorphosis into a perfect hegemonic self remains impossible<sup>41</sup>(Du Bois 2008). Mimicry can also be a conscious performative subaltern tactic of “passing as a hybrid<sup>42</sup>”: someone who performs to follow hegemonic standards and norms but hides the true identity and memory into spaces where the hegemony can not see (Sion 2014).

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41 See also: Fanon (2008: 175, 177). Du Bois describes this experience as a “(..)sense of always looking at one-self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity (Du Bois 2008: 2-3).

42 Hybridity refers to blending of identities – often in an unconscious way. Performative strategies seek to present such a blending, but are in fact aware of the “own” collective identity (Sion 2014).

### **Futures of destabilisation: Critical consciousness.**

Subaltern can play a critical role in emancipation (Green & Ives 2009: 3, 29). This, according to Gramsci, requires the subalterns to develop what he calls a *critical consciousness* or a *new common sense*: an awareness of collective history where the collective position and exclusion of subalterns and its interconnectedness to actions of hegemonic groups is understood (Gramsci quoted in Green & Ives 2009: 12). Critical awareness is the necessary condition for emergence of transformative imaginaries of subalternity from the global strategic site. It produces destabilization in the hegemonic system of difference as the subalterns no longer conform into the role of subalternity. For the analytical eye the critical awareness will become observable if the subalterns actively present their sense of history and actively portray the historical trajectories that had led to their subaltern positions.

### **Futures of destabilisation: Dialogical acceptance and mutual borrowing**

The most emancipatory sign of destabilisation is that the subaltern can be present in a dialogue with the hegemonic group as equal but different (Delanty 2011: 651). This is because presence, in short, is the first condition for reflection and dialogue - both with self and with the other (Levinas 1969: 188, 213). Presence allows dialogical reconstruction of history, memory and future with the Other (Levinas 1981:29,36). Presence as equal but different requires not just that the subalterns have developed critical awareness, but also that both the subaltern and the hegemonic self are willing to learn from the each other (Beck 2005: 42 - 45; Buber 1970). The willingness to learn can either be an extensive cultural borrowing between two groups or just a mutual acceptance of other as such (Delanty 2011). Even if the relation at first is fairly distant and only “professional”, at the beginning it still might lead into acceptance of Other as different. The dialogical acceptance of the other and his history and mutual learning are thus signs of a future where hegemonic conditions may become destabilised (Delanty 2011).

### 2.3. Possibility of cosmopolitan visions of difference?

*If I can no longer have power over the Other it is because he overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him.*

Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 1969 [1961]: 87.

The last signs of destabilization – signs of mutual acceptance and learning – are signs that can create conditions for civic cosmopolitan<sup>43</sup> visions from below (Delanty 2011). These visions would ultimately be an alternative to modern binary categories of difference and systems that live from them. Civic cosmopolitanism expects that the transformations in hegemonic systems can start from the level of dialogue (Delanty 2011). From a dialogue, where difference loosens its fixed bodily meaning and instead becomes an intersubjective and relational process, made in interaction. Such a dialogue could begin a transformative structural process. Not just in the conditions of subalternity within hegemonic nation-state, but also within the conditions of democracy as it too, especially in Israel, rests on binary categories of difference (Mouffe 2000, Fraser 1990, Delanty 2011).

Emancipation from this perspective concerns not just those under categories of subalternity but also those under categories of hegemony, who are enclosed in solitude and constant fear of the other (Derrida 1978:136). Cosmopolitan dialogue would thus liberate the Jews and the Israeli Palestinians from the counter-images<sup>44</sup> the hegemony has created (Levinas 1981; Buber 1970; Delanty 2011). This kind of dialogue would

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43 Cosmopolitanism itself is of course a fiercely debated term, with a thousands of years old history (see: Appiah 2006 for discussion). In recent decades cosmopolitanism has been understood in various ways ranging from the legalistic cosmopolitanism emphasising the right legal framework as the fundamental source of cosmopolitanism (Habermas 1998: 117-120, 225 - 226;), to economic cosmopolitanism that highlights the role of free markets as foundation of a more humane world (see: Kleingeld 1988) into Held's institutional cosmopolitanism that seeks to build a new supranational framework of democracy, almost like a world government (Held, 1995: 146;). What is common to all these approaches is that their model of emancipation (which cosmopolitanism for them is) starts from above, often from new institutional post-national structure (Kurasawa 2004).

44 Critical cosmopolitanism recognizes that the construction of oppositional identities has often been the source of resistance – mobilizing workers, minorities, right-groups throughout the history for a search of a better tomorrow, but crucially it is also the source of hegemonic modernity – and it is by escaping from these counter-identities where emancipation would start (see: Delanty 2011; Brown 1993: 390 - 410).

start from acceptance of subaltern, not as pre-conceived Other, but as an “alter” – a paradox for the modern though – something that is constantly changing, in infinite process of becoming. Arguably different but arguably part of the self as well. (Levinas 1981:117, 149, 206; Kierkegaard 1993; Jung in Papadopoulos 1992: 180 - 188).

While the vision of civic cosmopolitanism is beautiful, its weakness is its inability to describe material structures in which such a vision could emerge. I suggest as a second premise for the thesis that the global strategic site has the systemic capability to produce experiences of “asymmetrical pluralities” that can produce such a vision. What I mean by this is that the studied context 1) brings together plural materials and myths, and 2) these pluralities are made sense of by the subaltern and hegemonic actors together.

Pluralism in essence is something that the modern national hegemonic system of difference is “philosophically, psychologically, socially, politically, economically and religiously constructed to exclude” in order to sustain itself (Kristeva 1982: 4). This is because pluralism presents a problem to the modern nationalism as it reminds that its myths, materialities and identities of “normal” are just one possibility. Thus, pluralism is the “unknown” that does not fit into modernity’s ideas of certainty (Levinas 1981, Mark Taylor 1987: 187). Pluralism thus signals a paradox from the perspective of modern knowledge. As Kierkegaard (1985: 35) puts it:

The moment individual comes in contact with the Paradox is of utmost importance (..) In thinking of the unknown he participates in something transcending himself.

If such a paradox emerges and is experienced it produces dissonance in the experienced reality – a moment when cosmopolitan dialogue can begin. The emergence of the “paradox of plurality” takes place if the subaltern knowledge and the plural materialities and myths are able to be present for the subaltern and for the hegemonic self.

As the global materialities and myths intersect with national materialities and myths, bringing together a subaltern and an hegemonic group to make sense of this plurality, there is a possibility that difference ceases to look normal and a “cosmopolitan remembering:” the making of unfinished identities, shared histories and futures can begin (Delanty 2009; Gills and Thompson: 2006).

## **2.4. Research questions of the study**

The theoretical discussion demonstrated how conditions of subalternity are tied to modern binary knowledges embodied in ideologies of modern nation-state and in practices of colonialism and its civilization missions. By discussing the different approaches to understand globalization the thesis located as its mission to study transformations of subalternity in a global space inspired by indeterminist premise set by Sassen.

The thesis expects that transformations of subalternity are tied to transformations in the hegemonic system. In practice to study such an interconnected transformation the theoretical discussion developed conceptual tool of “imaginary”. This concept allows studying transformations of subalternity from below – from level of encountering and sense-making. To define the context of study and to understand its systematic capabilities the theoretical discussion introduced the concept of global strategic site. In order to evaluate the emancipatory – hegemonic direction of transformation the signs of stabilization and destabilization were developed. Finally, the thesis created a second premise, claiming that the global strategic site can produce cosmopolitan alternative visions of difference that pluralize national meanings of difference that suppress, not just subaltern lives, but also chances of democracy that allows difference to exist and take part (Mouffe 2000; Fraser 1990). This alternative is in essence alternative to modernity, hegemonic nationalism and to singular rigid understanding of development.

Through theoretical discussion an image of potential “tensions” and “paradoxes” of difference concentrating to the global strategic site emerges. These tensions may emerge as global imaginaries of difference encounter national imaginaries of difference, and subaltern experiences encounter experiences of the hegemonic groups, and also as tensions between “normal” within entrepreneurial space, and “normal” within Israeli society arise. The thesis suggests that what might unbundling at the global strategic site in Israel is not just the categories of difference but the inner paradox of the Israeli state seeking to be both Jewish and democratic at the same time. For these tensions to emerge, however, they need to become experienced and made-sense in dialogue. If subaltern knowledge can be present and visible at the entrepreneurial site, it can have fundamental consequences.

Based on theoretical discussion above the thesis explores following research questions:

1. What imaginaries of subalternity emerge from the global strategic site?
2. How do the emerging imaginaries of subalternity stabilize/destabilise the hegemonic Zionist imaginary of difference?
3. What is the role of global myths and materialities in shaping these imaginaries of subalternity and their transformative potential?

These research questions are used as tools for exploring and problematising how Other and the Self, and relations between them, transform at the global strategic site. As Zionism – the hegemonic nationalism in Israel – is the root of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and barrier to democracy in Israel, the transformation of its boundaries between self and other at the entrepreneurial space could have fundamental effects to processes of democracy and peace in the region.

In order to study how subalternity transforms in entrepreneurial space, and what kind of hegemonic and /or emancipatory futures emerge from the site, the next section develops the methods of the study. The purpose of the methodology section is to explore and explain how transformations of subalternity and hegemonic nationalism can be studied through ‘individual imaginaries’.

### **III Methodology for studying difference**

Linda Tuhiwai Smith describes methodology a “theory of research” that frames the questions being asked, set of instruments to be employed and structures the analysis in all of its phases (1999:143). It is by exposing why certain analytical instruments were chosen, how research was done, and what kind of assumptions and positionalities shaped the process that I hope to give the reader the possibility to criticize the study and follow its logic of argumentation.

This methodology section is divided into four parts. The first part presents the analytical tactic of the thesis and discusses the study’s ontological and epistemological foundations. The second part presents the data of the thesis and explains how it was collected while the third part lays out how that data was analysed. The fourth concluding part focuses on reflective and ethical issues.

### 3.1. Analytical tactic

This thesis is an explorative case study of difference at the entrepreneurial site in Israel (Berg & Lune 2004). Explorative case study means that the thesis is not searching for causal explanations, but rather seeks to raise analytical and empirical observations and possibilities from the data<sup>45</sup> (Yin 2003). They imply that the boundaries between theory, studied phenomena and context of the research can not be strictly separated, but must be developed together (Yin 2003: 13-14); Alvesson and Skölberg 2000: 4). Explorative case studies fit particularly well to research settings that are not extensively studied. Explorative studies can function both for developing and testing theory (Alexander & Bennett 2005: Chap 1).

I approach the research, not just with explorative orientation, but with what Sassen calls the “before method” (2013). Before-method belongs to the family of indeterminist “cross-border methodologies<sup>46</sup>” that deconstruct fixed and static analytical categories (Amelina et al 2012). Particularly it seeks to see through fixed ideas about globalisation, nationalism and identity. The underlying purpose of the before-method is to avoid a priori containing of the empirical reality as “methodological nationalism<sup>47</sup>” and “cosmo-globalism”, that a priori equate identities and societies either with “nation-state” or with universal structures such as the “global network” or “global society<sup>48</sup>” (Sassen 2013).

The analytical tools I have chosen seek to grasp the indeterminacy and underlying instability of normal from below. The “individual imaginaries of difference” are the unit of analysis in my thesis because they are not bounded to pre-given ideas of normal. They urge the researcher to bring together both materialities and myths and creative dialogue when analysing difference and subalternity. “Global strategic site” connects imaginaries to a specific context. It sees the studied context as the systemic edge where there are no clear boundaries between “scales of analysis”, be they global, national or

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45 Berg et al suggest that there are three types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (2004).

46 Traditionally these methods have been used to study people who move across the borders. The field is however evolving into direction of studying movement of contexts and of systems (Amelina et al 2012).

47 The history of going beyond methodological nationalism is not a new phenomenon, brought by critical global and cross-border studies, but it has been challenged throughout the 20th century by scholars such as Marx, Wallerstein, Lefebvre, Wolf, Gupta and Ferguson to name a few. See discussion on the roots of this critique in Amelina et al 2012.

48 see critique of these in: Wimmer and Schiller 2003: 581; Sassen 2007: introduction.

local. Simultaneously the unit of analysis are rooted – not bounded – by the concept of strategic site into specific histories and people, creating demand for case-specific empirical research designs<sup>49</sup>. Subalternity in turn functions as an analytical tactic to study how marginalisation and absence of identities and knowledge is produced, and thus expose relations between hegemonic knowledges and power.

### **Ontological and epistemological foundations**

The ontological foundations of the study can be understood as combination of “hybrid” and “dialogical” ontology (Gille 2012; Märtsin et al. 2011). The key assumption behind dialogical ontology is that the world and identities are *constantly made and re-made in dialogue* (Märtsin et al 2011). It understands world as perspectival – seeing people and groups inhabiting different (but connected) societal realities (Märtsin et al 2011). Dialogical ontology sees subjects as connected to social processes and to others in reproductive way.

The problem with dialogical approaches is that they often fail to recognise the role of non-human elements and structures in the construction of identity and difference<sup>50</sup>. What Gille brands as “hybrid ontology” sees reality and identities as being made in the interactions of material and mythological processes<sup>51</sup> (Gille 2012: 91-3; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105). These ontologies have challenged modern foundations of difference both through analyses that regard materialities such as technology as actors themselves (Latour 2011) and by indigenous ontologies that in plural ways destroy the separation of self from others and from spirits and beings of the earth (Cadena 2015). Connecting dialogical ontologies with hybridity, difference becomes an indeterminist and contextual process of interaction with the mythological, material and living elements of the world. The concept of imaginary in my reading thus falls into this ontology. Paraphrasing Gille, the extent to which materialities and non-materialities produce reality is an empirical question (Gille 2012: 91).

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49 See: Drainville 2013; Amelina et al (2012: 239 - 245) for other examples of such analytical categories.

50 See: Ackerman and Nielsen in Märtsin et al. (2011: chap 4) for an dialogical methodology that incorporates material structures of capital.

51 Here I want to emphasise the word processes as instead of Latourian atomistic “actors” or Marxist “structures”. Processes to me emphasises the importance of studying the role of materialities and myths in their specific contexts, while simultaneously emphasising the connections of certain discourses and materialities to spaces and processes “outside” the studied context.

What follows from these ontological foundations is the notion that reproduction and production of reality can be approached through individual narratives and imaginations. This fits into the logic of deconstruction that focuses on exposing the ways in which narratives function to transform and reproduce social worlds, identities and materialities into seemingly coherent structures (see: Derrida 2004: 69; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 107).

### **3.2. Collection of data**

The collection of data was designed to take place at an empirical situation in which a theoretical yield is high (Maynes, Pierce and Laslett 2012:134). Israel was chosen as the site where to study entrepreneurial intervention inspired by the idea of Sassen that it is at highly politicized and hierarchical conditions – in extreme cases – where “global” and its relation to national regimes of difference could best be studied (Sassen 2014).

The key empirical data was collected on a one month trip to Israel-Palestine in the summer of 2016. The period in question was somewhat tensioned as the past year had seen a growing number of knife-attacks both within Israel and occupied territories<sup>52</sup>. During this time I collected 11 separate personal narratives of difference that became the data of “individual imaginaries of subalternity”.

The data consists of eight interviews with Israeli-Palestinian (PAI) entrepreneurs and three Israeli-Azkhenazi Jewish professionals who work at government supported entrepreneurial programs together with the Israeli-Palestinian entrepreneurs (see appendix 1). From the Israeli-Palestinian entrepreneurs six out of eight were christians<sup>53</sup>. This is significant, as christians are often held as more trustworthy and more civilized in the jewish society than “muslim arabs” (Sion 2014: 2645). From all of the Israeli-Palestinians three (3) were women whereas all of the Jewish narrators were male.

All of the Israeli Jews had served in the elite units of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and had somewhat successful careers as high-tech entrepreneurs before starting to work

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<sup>52</sup> These attacks, performed by young Israeli-Palestinians and Palestinians had left 47-50 Israeli Jews and more than 200 Palestinians and Israeli Palestinians dead by the time of interviews. (For data see: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (24.4.2017) and Atassi (13.10.2015).

<sup>53</sup> Within Israeli Palestinians 82% Muslim, 9% Christian, and 9% Druze (2010 figures) (Sorek 2011).

in the inclusive entrepreneurial projects funded through the 5 year plan. The demographic structure of the interviewees has to be contextualized against the wider demographic patterns in Israeli high-tech: In 2012 there were 85 000 Jewish software developers and entrepreneurs working in high-tech of which 26% were Jewish women. As of the same year there were in total 700 PAI software developers and entrepreneurs of which 70 were PAI women (CBS, 2013). The severe gender-balance issue in my data is partly explained by the proportion of PAI women in high-tech in general and the fact that I was so dependent on gatekeepers –government officials who in practice controlled the access to the data on the ground.

### **Challenges concerning the collection of data**

My initial purpose was to interview ten (10) plus ten (10) Israeli-Palestinian and Jewish entrepreneurs / government officials who in practice work together in shared entrepreneurial space. As I started approaching the PAI entrepreneurs, I soon realized that access to them was guarded by government officials<sup>54</sup>. Later, in Israel I tried to “snowball” my way towards new interviewees and was able to find some. As I conducted the interviews, it became evident that the Israeli-Palestinian entrepreneurs were central nodes in a tight Jewish-Arab entrepreneurial network that seemed very informal, but was in fact connected by government funding. Largely because of relying on contact details received from a few media sources, I had accidentally stumbled on the “official” government entrepreneurial network that was at the heart of the government led plan on integrating Israeli Arabs to the centre of the “Start-up nation”. It was thus the “executors” within dozens of projects of the entrepreneurial development intervention that became the key data of my thesis. I decided that a network that was so connected both to government and to entrepreneurial structures would be a perfect territory to examine the transformations of Zionism and its categories of subalternity at a global space, with premises and tools that to a large extent derive from the works of Saskia Sassen.

The fact that my thesis is so dependent on the data that was gained access through government gatekeepers caused challenges not just when it comes to interpret the data, but also when the data was collected. In Israel these gatekeepers were however in such

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<sup>54</sup> One of them explicitly replied to my email on possible interview that he has to get a “green light” from the government before the interview.

a short time impossible to bypass. As I understood to use their role as a strength in my data, connecting the interviews into the heart of zionism their participation in defining the interviewees strengthens rather than weakens the data.

### **Locations and duration of interviews**

The length of the interviews varied from 90 minutes to two hours. Following Eskola's and Suoranta's advice (2008) the interviews were collected at the locations that the interviewees themselves proposed to me. This should make the situation more pleasant for the interviewee and thus increases the chances for fruitful conversations. All the interviews with the Jewish public entrepreneurs were conducted in Tel Aviv, which is the de facto Start-up capital of Israel and the Israeli-Arab entrepreneurs were interviewed in the "triangle area" in northern Israel where 90 % of Israeli-Arabs live (Waxman 2013).

### **Interview techniques**

The key data is collected through thematic conversations – a technique that aimed for a dialogical sense-making rather than formal questioning. In practice this meant that I had prepared a theory driven thematic structure to my interviews along with few key themes (see appendix 2), but tried not to be tied to it in the conversations. Through open dialogue I hoped to gain access behind the facade of official answers – though I cannot ever be sure if I truly did so.

After a few interviews I realized that a combination of projective and subjective interview techniques was the key for opening up creative imaginations on such a politically and culturally sensitive subject as difference (Eskola and Vastamäki 2001: 26-27). In practice this meant asking projective questions about best possible futures, about the past and its meaning, about personal memories, hopes and fears. By moving between projective questions and personal life narratives I was able to observe movement in subalternity, in the boundaries of belonging, and between the entrepreneurial site and other realms of life in Israel.

### 3.3. Analysis

The analysis of the data is structured to first present, structure and then theorise the creative sense-making on the ground. Different techniques of theory led content analysis are used according to each phase (Berg et al 2004: 325).

In practice the analysis is done through following phases:

1. Deconstruction of the “background imaginaries” at the entrepreneurial site into ideal types.
2. Transcription of dialogues into text.
3. Translation of imaginal from below into central themes and “telos”.
4. Development of theoretical insights and case together.

Before the presentation of the imaginal, the thesis will deconstruct (and thus reconstruct) the “background” of the entrepreneurial site in Israel. Three *ideal types* of background imaginaries are presented: *the Zionist, the Israeli-Palestinian and the global entrepreneurial imaginaries of difference*. In the second phase, the empirical material is carefully transcribed. In transcription, I have marked some emotional and other features that characterize the data (Berg et al 2004: Chap 11).

The third phase presents the creative imaginaries of difference from below with extensive use of individual narratives<sup>55</sup> (Glaser & Strauss 2009). First, narratives are organized into central themes that illuminate how difference and subalternity is deconstructed and constructed by the individual imaginaries. Second, the “*telos*” (the essence) of the imaginaries of subalternity is summarized. The goal is not to simplify and polish the individual narratives into one unified telos, but to rather identify and discuss their pluralities and contradictions (Yin 2003).

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<sup>55</sup> As the empirical material is largely influenced by theoretical preconceptions that see difference as inter-subjective relational category where both human and non-human elements matter, and thus the analysis here does not follow “grounded” approaches, but is actually closer to combination of induction and deduction (Alvesson Sköldbberg 2000: 4-5).

In the fourth phase the research questions and the transformations of “self” and “other” are addressed and interpreted. In this concluding part of the thesis the findings are presented and connected to theoretical framework of the thesis. This section starts with visualising the emerging imaginaries of subalternity into *social maps*: the patterns of relations presented by the interviewees (Clarke 2005: 41 - 5). They are then utilised to explore how hegemonic categories of difference and the conditions of subalternity transform at the entrepreneurial site; how imaginaries of zionism become stabilised/destabilised; and how “global” shapes the emerging imaginaries and their transformative potential.

After these analytical phases, the findings of the thesis will be summarised by presenting both policy-relevant and theory-relevant findings. Through these phases, emerging meanings of the self and the other and the transformative potential of these meanings become analysed.

### **3.4. Reflections on positionality and ethical issues**

Following the “reflexive turn” in social sciences I have aimed to locate reflexivity to the centre of all my methodological choices (Ranta 2014; Rabinow 1977). This reflexivity can be divided into two types: positional and theoretical reflexivity (reflexive methods research). The purpose of positional reflexivity<sup>56</sup> is to reveal how personal motivations and values, and the researches subjectivity, frame and shape the research (Alvesson and Skölberg 2000: 211). Theory-based reflexivity, in turn, explores the connections between relations of power and scientific knowledge production throughout different phases of the study (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Reflexivity is particularly important in research settings that bring together multiple levels of inequalities, histories and power-relations, and deal with marginalized voices (Amelina et al 2012: 243).

#### **Positional reflexivity**

The ideas that led to this study were born out of personal experiences inside the start-up culture. Having worked five years within spaces that were connected to the

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<sup>56</sup> Rabinow says that the purpose is to make visible the public self: “researcher as culturally and historically situated being” (Rabinow 1977: 5-6 Quoted in Ranta 2014).

transnational start-up culture I noticed transformations in my personality<sup>57</sup>. Being constantly connected to what felt were like limitless possibilities and spaces around the globe, fragmented the foundations of my self-understanding and caused conflicts with my close ones. Reading Sennett's *New culture of capitalism*, I understood that my personal experiences were actually quite common within "global workplaces" (2007: 34).

These personal experiences on the other hand helped me to find the topic, and on the other hand constantly caused problems, as I was so close to the subject that I was no doubt inclined to institute my own experiences over the voices that I was supposed to listen to in the analysis.

This positionality necessitated constant reflective practice. I regard the field work as the phase of study that saved the analysis from turning into another extraction and exploitation of "southern" experiences in the self-structuring projects of a white male – a tradition that is anything but unique in the history of modernity and development studies (Said 2011; Easterly 2006). I am indebted to the narrators whom I met, and who were willing to share with me their most private thoughts, fears and hopes. I feel strongly that it was the Other, who took me from what Buber calls the I-I relation: a self that is in monologue (Buber 1970).

At the field, I started to re-design the theoretical foundations of the thesis – moving from top-down Foucauldian analysis, that portrays individuals as victims of discourses, into more flexible and bottom-up direction. Dialogical philosophy and works of Sassen facilitated the move towards an open-ended analytical framework, that gave the rich and contradictory empirical reality the possibility for surprising the researcher. My goal was through analytical instruments to lead me away from the quite negative, preconceived ideas about entrepreneurial culture that I had. This way I could ideally use the knowledge that I have gained experiencing the entrepreneurial culture first hand, but not become bounded by it. I am not quite sure to what extent I was able to escape this positionality – but by sharing it with the reader I give some tools for evaluating the analysis.

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<sup>57</sup> Personality here is understood according to Jung as the complex that bounds the self in to a narrative that pleases the subject (Ehnberg 2013).

Another positionality that shaped my research was the fact that I was studying difference in one of the most politicised contexts globally. Words like “pro Palestine” or “pro Israel” were familiar to me already as a teenager and I remember having strong “pro Palestine” sensations then – without much knowing about the topic. To at least partly escape the a priori political positioning I sought to read different interpretations of history, zionism, orientalism and form starting points to the thesis that would not close the future in ground before the study starts.

### **Theoretical positionality**

When it comes to theoretical positionality, the connections between my study as knowledge producing practice, and relations of power, I have two major challenges. The first challenge is whether my research actually creates marginality. As I claim to incorporate subaltern voices into my analyses I simultaneously face the danger of silencing other voices and thus creating subalternity through the research design. It is thus crucial to emphasize two matters: first, the voices of subaltern entrepreneurs are not representing other subaltern voices in Israeli society. Indeed, the subaltern entrepreneurs that I interview are possibly on the verge of becoming incorporated to hegemonic structures. As they are the emerging political, social and economic elite within the Israel Palestinian community, it could be argued that by even positing them as potential subalterns blurs the boundaries between subalterns and hegemony – actually marginalising those who are truly excluded (Spivak 1988; Morris 2010). In my more flexible understanding, subalternity is regarded as a continuum of positions and subjectivities produced by hegemony, all aiming towards re-creating subalternity and hegemony as a societal norm.

The Israeli-Palestinian narrators were also largely pointed out to me through the gatekeepers that either worked for the government or were consulting for it. The whole analysis is thus deeply located within the networks of power on the ground, and may quite possibly be contributing to them. Thus, I regard it crucial in my analysis to keep in

mind that the narratives of subaltern entrepreneurs may well be something that certain actors within government want to present.

The second challenge relates to the first. While I am claiming to have constructed a framework that can spot alternative visions of difference from “below” in an open-ended way, I am using largely concepts and theoretical ideas that have been developed in Europe, in relation to modernity. While for example cosmopolitanism indeed long historical roots, it is however an idea that has recently gained attention among western critical scholars as a counter-narrative towards another western globalized idea: nationalism (Delanty and Kumar 2006: Part 3). The risk is that cosmopolitanism functions just as another face of modernity (Delanty 2006: 365 - 369). By using cosmopolitanism as a half-constructed concept, a concept that needs to be developed from below, I however hope to create analytical room for truly alternative constructions of difference. Also, by sharing the real narrations from the ground as much as possible in the analytical phase, I hope to develop a strong and transparent connection between data and my interpretation of it. By letting the narrators narrate in the analytical phase, I at least seek to make space for the readers to make their own alternative interpretations of the empirical material.

### **Ethical issues**

Finally, there are a few ethical issues concerning the sensitive nature of the narratives themselves. Both the Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians explained that they had encountered tremendous amounts of suspicion for working together in a government led project. The Israeli Palestinian had been accused of being “collaborators”<sup>58</sup>

At the time of the interviews the interviewees had no problems with me using their real names in the analysis. Taking in consideration the volatile context in Israel I, however, decided to do my best to ensure their anonymity and instead of real names I use pseudonyms. For the same reason, I do not share too much about their personal background, or reveal the exact projects in which they work.

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<sup>58</sup> A term used within Israel-Palestinian community for those PAI individuals who are co-opted to the government apparatus (Jamal 2011; Sion 2014).

Another ethical issue concerns the informed consent of informants. According to Besnik (1998: 86, 133), the informants should only be included if they give their voluntary informed consent. I sought to ensure this informed consent by sharing the reasons of my study and explaining how I was going to use the information they share with me. The ideal of informed consent is however problematic, as the researcher has the power to re-contextualise the narratives to the analytical framework he/she has chosen (Fabian and De Rooji 2008: 624). It should be emphasised that all the conclusions and insights drawn from the data are solely my own and thus vulnerable to personal biases.

## **IV Context: Deconstructing the background**

This section deconstructs the *background imaginaries* where the PAI entrepreneurs and Jewish public officials meet and work together. Especially the meanings of difference embedded in these myths and materialities are developed. Through defining the background, it becomes possible to analyse how the phase of creative imaginal reproduces and transforms the background it is located into. This section presents first the national myths and materialities at the entrepreneurial site, before moving on to describing the myths and materialities that emerge as global capital expands to shape the encountering between the Jews and the Palestinians of Israel in the global strategic site.

### **4.1. National at the entrepreneurial site**

As Juusola (2005) notes, any time a researcher writes about Israel-Palestine, or national ideologies of Zionism or Palestinianity, the research becomes *political*. In this thesis, a critical post-colonial approach to understanding myths and materialities of Zionism and Palestinianity is chosen<sup>59</sup> (Masalha 2012; Yiftachel 1999; Sion 2014; Frantzman 2014). After presenting the key myths and materialities this section discusses their recent developments in Israel.

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<sup>59</sup> The problem with the post-colonial approach is that it does not often recognize the inherent plurality in Zionism and regards Palestinian national aspirations as somehow “original” and Zionists as invented (Masalha 2012). Following the example set by Anderson, I regard all national movements as imaginary, not meaning that they are somehow fake but that they, as any collective identities, are made in the intersections of myths and materialities (Anderson 2006; Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2005).

#### 4.1.1. Myths of zionism

*When we say 'Jewish independence' or a 'jewish state' we mean Jewish country, Jewish soil, we mean Jewish labour, we mean Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture, Jewish industry, Jewish sea. We mean Jewish safety, security and complete independence.*

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Declaration of independence 14.5.1948 (cited in Lustick 1980 : 88).

*We should form there part of a wall of defence for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilisation against barbarism.*

Theodor Herzl, Der Judenstaat (cited in Polkehn 1975: 76).

Zionism is a movement of survival and self-invention of a nation that led to the establishment of the state of Israel into Palestine in 1948. It is more than anything a european movement, carrying the history of nationalism, anti-semitism and colonialism inside of it (Masalha 2012). Its dream was, and still is, to establish a European modern nation-state in the Middle East. The zionist myths seek to make this dream come true.

The task of zionist, as any national movement, was to create a nation with “single character, single history and single destiny<sup>60</sup>” (Fichte quoted in Kelly 2010: 190-1) Following the logic of modernity, this task largely achieved through creating a new Hebrew self and re-creating the Arab and his history<sup>61</sup> (Rabinowitz 1993; 2002). As Juusola (2005) notes, this required creative restructuring of Jewish history and religion into national myths.

The most important myths of zionism are the myths about the land. For the secular socialists, such as Theodor Herzl: the “visionary of the state”, and to the “father of the state”: Ben-Gurion, the land itself was an active being, providing health, fertility, capability, strength and unity to the Jews (Juusola 2005: 14, 60; Frantzman 2014;). For the religious revisionists such as Jabotinsky and later right-wing and settler-zionists, the

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60 It has to be said that there were also voices among the early nationalist elites that emphasised the nation-states should not thrive for unity, but for diversity, paving the way for modern ideas of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism (look at discussion Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005: 19 - 20).

61 Also, negating the diaspora life and negating the oriental Jews were essential in zionist myths (Frantzman 2014; Juusola 2005) I will, however, focus here on the myths that concerned the Arab others.

land was a “promised land<sup>62</sup>” that should in totality be governed by the Jewish “chosen people” (Juusola & Huhtanen 2002: 25).

Central to the Zionist myths is that the land gives birth to a “New Hebrew man” that, unlike the diaspora Jew, is strong: a “pioneer” or a “farmer” that protects and takes care of the land, like the land takes care of him. Going “back” to the land was thus the path to re-create oneself as a modern and European nation – a recreation that was impossible within antisemitic Europe (Juusola 2005).

One fundamental myth in legitimizing the colonization of Palestine embedded in Zionism was that the land was not just promised, but it was also empty before the Zionist settlers arrived (Whitelam 1996: 40). Thus, all the signs of oriental Arab population and their history presented a fundamental problem for the Zionist mission<sup>63</sup> (Masalha 2012 Frantzman 2014). The key task of the Zionist myths is thus to erase, not just the Palestinian, but also 1400 years of Islamic history. Zionism developed a powerful material and discursive system of what Masalha (2012) calls “memoricide”: destroying of Palestinian history and consciousness connected to the land. Myths about empty lands<sup>64</sup> without people are, as Yiftachel notes, not unique features of Zionism, but essential features of colonial expansion (Yiftachel 1999).

One tactic in “memoricide”, that seeks to separate Palestinians from the land, is the state official label for those Palestinians who remained within the borders of 1948: “The Arabs of Israel”. As Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005: 43) acknowledge, this term not only defines a relationship of ownership between Israel and Arab, but also erases Palestinianity from the identity, replacing a very specific geographical and historical identity with it, with much vaguer and broader concept of an “Arab”.

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62 A land that God in mount Sinai chose for the Jewish people to take care of and never give away, “the promised land” of Israel, that is sacred and should always be tended by Jews, not even rented to others (4. Moos. 33:53).

63 The Zionist literature from present day historiography to school- and children’s books is indeed filled with descriptions of Zionism as a project that made “the desert bloom” by establishing settlements on “swamp lands” and “empty hills” (Masalha 2012: 149; Ben-Amotz 1982: 155). As Alan George demonstrates, in reality the land was successfully cultivated by indigenous Palestinians, and the Zionist reclaimed their lands (George 1979: 100).

64 Francis, who has studied the depopulation of Indians of North-America, has shown how myths about “virgin” or “widow lands” function to legitimate expulsion of indigenous population and seizure of indigenous lands and resources (Francis 1971).

One of the most enduring themes of the Zionist project in Palestine was the notion of European Jews as carriers and transmitters of European *civilisatrice* to the backward orient: the spread of western modernity, enlightenment, reason, modern sciences and technology to an underdeveloped oriental desert (Massad 2004: 61). The civilizing mission concerned both the Arabs and the local Jews and deployed binary categories, such as “veteran–newcomer, decadent–hard working, uneducated–civilized, primitive–modern, clannish–European, dark–light, and Eastern–Western”, to describe the difference between Europeans and the rest (Frantzman 2014). Remarkably the Europeans were described as veteran, and the rest as newcomers. A discursive move that legitimised seizure of indigenous resources (Masalha 2012).

The Arabs in this logic of modernity are divided into “good” and “bad” Arabs (Cohen 2009). The good Arabs as any Arabs are “part of the natural world” and cannot find modernity by themselves, but want to escape it<sup>65</sup>. In order to do this they were, citing the first prime minister Ben-Gurion, required to “forget their background” (Ben-Gurion, quoted in Frantzman 2014: 98). The division into dualistic images and the discourse about saving the Other are the myths of colonialism that Zionism carries within it in order to justify its colonial project (Yiftachel 1999; Francis 1971).

One of the ideas in Zionist myths is that Israel is an eternally persecuted “nation that lives alone” – a nation that is always a victim of antisemitism and has to conquer its enemies if it wishes to survive<sup>66</sup>. The Jewish mythology ties together all the biblical tales of slavery and wrong-doings that have been imposed to Jews, seeing Holocaust just as another chapter in this history of carrying the burden of the “chosen people” (Frantzman 2014). The PAI are the “inner others” that remind the Jews of this history.

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<sup>65</sup> the co-worker of Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau wrote: “the Jews would bring civilisation to Palestine, the same way that the British brought it to India” (Max Nordau quoted in Juusola 2005: 40). Herzl also made a prophecy that through European values, and European technology, the Arabs too would finally taste equality (Herzl 2015).

<sup>66</sup> Indeed, most of the national celebrations commemorate the horrors done against Jewish people and the “miraculous” escaping from those horrors (see Sorek 2011).

There are two existential threats that the PAI as inner other present. The first is the idea of “demographic threat”, and the second the idea of the PAI as “the fifth column”, enemy in disguise (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005: 107; Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005). The idea behind demographic threat is that only with the Jews as majority can Israel be civilized and democratic; the “zionist philosophy of transfer” holds that birth control or even ethnic cleansing is justified in order to keep the majority, and save the future of the Jewish state (Masalha 2012). Also, because the Arabs are the internal enemy of the state, it is justified to deny their democratic rights and segregate them from society (Cohen 2009; Peleg & Waxman 2011: 104-105; Torstick 2000: 153).

The image of the PAI as the demographic threat and as the potential enemy is perhaps best illustrated by a few polls on cultural relations and large-scale studies on stereotypes<sup>67</sup> in the past 50 decades<sup>68</sup>. For example, in 2008 80 % of the Jews agreed that it would be good if there were fewer Arabs in Israel (Rekhes 2007: 207 -208); in 2015 80 % of the Jews felt unsafe and that the existence of the state is threatened by the existence of the PAI (Guetzkow & Fast 2015; Hebrew Channel, 2015). Furthermore, 90 per cent stated they believed that Palestinians had no rights whatsoever to the ‘land in Israel’ (Cohen 2009)

### **Plurality embedded in zionism?**

Zionism has always been a living tradition, where different segments emphasise the aforementioned myths in different ways. For the early zionist, who believed in secular socialist utopia, the key other was someone who could be civilised and turned into a modern being. The right-wing zionists of today, with Jabotinsky as their forefather and Netanyahu as their leading figure today, are more prone to religious interpretations of zionism and thus see the myth of “promised land” as the most important factor keeping

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67 Stereotype according to Bar-Tal is: “a set of beliefs about the characteristics of a social category of people, constitutes a cognitive basis for understanding intergroup behaviors.” Bar-Tal explains that it is a general assumption that stereotypes influence the behaviour towards other individuals and groups in practice (1998: 733).

68 Also: 47 % of the Jews do not want in any circumstances to get to know the Arabs in Israel and the majority of Jews do not want the Arabs in Israel to have any power in deciding matters of national importance (Smootha 2005: 23); 2007 survey demonstrated that 40% of the Jews agreed on the statement that “Arabs should have their right to vote for Knesset revoked” (Nahmias, 2007); and study in 1995 demonstrated that more than 50 % of the Jews think that the Arabs should not live in the same regions as the Jews or that the children of Arabs would go to the same school as the Jewish children (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005).

the Zionist dream alive. For them there is no Palestinian West Bank but a biblical Judea and Samaria that should be part of the totality of “Eretz Israel” - the land of Israel (Juusola 2005).

In recent years Zionism has experienced increased social polarisation (Juusola 2005). A liberal or egalitarian Zionism, that seeks for equality at least on paper, has gained more popularity. This popularity originates from the “New history movement” that has seen Israeli historians taking up the core myths of Zionism and exposing their mythological nature (Pappe 2006, Shlaim 2001, Kimmerling and Migdal 1993). The rise of post-Zionist interpretations within Israel, that condemn Zionism solely as a colonial movement and deny its righteousness as a national liberation movement, has caused a lot of controversy and discussion. On the other hand, the rise of the ultra-nationalist and pro-settler movements into government power has also taken place in recent years – increasing tensions both within the Jewish community, and between them and Palestinians.

What is easily forgotten is that the roots of Zionism were also more plural than what is evident today. The cultural and radical cosmopolitan Zionism, that sought not to become majority or a national movement but remain as minority in Palestine, is but one example of such a plurality. The radical cosmopolitan Zionism was based on Talmud and preached by Martin Buber among others – Talmud that the Zionist leaders replaced with Torah and its hero-figures (Rabinowitz 2000). As Rabinowitz writes, Buber’s vision of ‘Brit-Shalom’ (Covenant of Peace) imagined an open bi-national democratic and equal state (Rabinowitz 2000). As Bergman writes, there are actually two conflicting ideas of what being a Jew is about: one suffers from Amalek-complex and fears and hates the Other, another believes in the Rabbinical teachings of Talmud “he who has fed a stranger may have fed an angel” (Bergman in Benbassa and Attias 2004: v). While in the history of Zionism the “first Jew” has won, this tendency in Zionism as plurality should not be overlooked and still holds possibilities.

#### 4.1.2. Israeli-Palestinian myths of difference

*Despite the setback to our national project and our relative isolation from the rest of our Palestinian people and our Arab nation since the Nakba; despite all the attempts made to keep us in ignorance of our Palestinian and Arab history; despite attempts to splinter us into sectarian groups and to truncate our identity into a misshapen 'Israeli Arab' one, we have spared no effort to preserve our Palestinian identity and national dignity and to fortify it. In this regard, we reaffirm our attachment to our Palestinian homeland and people, to our Arab nation, with its language, history, and culture, as we reaffirm also our right to remain in our homeland and to safeguard it.*

The Haifa declaration<sup>69</sup> (2007:1)

The Palestinian myths seek to preserve and maintain the narratives of Palestinian history, as well as unify and mobilize the diaporic nation, dispersed all over the world, to occupied territories and to Israel since 1948. As in the Jewish myth, the core in Palestinianity is the enemy that unites the Palestinian cause: the Zionist project (Juusola 2005). The essence of this myth is thus to describe Palestinians as an indigenous nation with ancient roots to Palestine, and the Jewish as a European colonial force<sup>70</sup> that took away the land, resources and homes of the Palestinian people (Masalha 2012). While Palestinianity itself is a modern national identity, it carries myths about the land that are centuries if not thousands of years old (Masalha 2012).

The PAI occupy a particularly difficult role within the identity and myths of Palestinianity. On one hand, their Palestinianity is denied by the state where they live, on the other hand the Palestinians within occupied territories have traditionally perceived Israel's Palestinians with suspicion – sometimes regarding them as traitors to the Palestinian cause<sup>71</sup> (Peleg & Waxman 2011).

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<sup>70</sup> Although there are Palestinian historians who describe the conflict as a battle between two national movements and thus hide away the colonial nature of Israel. Walid Khalidi, for instance, describes "Zionism in 1991 as a 'national movement' of the Jewish people (where) "(..) The crux and kernel of the Palestine Problem is the struggle between two national movements: on the one hand, the Zionist movement (and, since 1948, its embodiment, Israel) and on the other, the Palestinian national movement." (Khalidi 1991: 5-6).

<sup>71</sup> However, as Lustick notes, almost if not all the PAI have first-term relatives in the occupied areas (1980).

At the centre of Palestinian myth is *Nakba* – meaning “catastrophe” like *Shoah* – that is for Palestinians the beginning of exile, or the “long absence” (Sanbar 1984; 2001: 87-94). It is the “key site of memory” – the collective event that brings together the Palestinian diaspora<sup>72</sup> (Masalha 2012; Matar 2011: 12). It is arguably the key date in which Palestinianity as a national movement gained unprecedented vitality. Thus, *Nakba* is not just the end, but also in some respects the beginning of Palestinianity<sup>73</sup> (Khalidi 1992).

As Masalha (2012) notes, perhaps the most important factor in the Palestinian myth is the depopulated and destroyed villages. The village is so important in the Palestinian myth that the village of origin became the foundation of identity and solidarity after *Nakba*, replacing the “*hamula*”: a clan-based system that had produced the loyalties and responsibilities of individuals (Masalha 2012: 207). In practice, for example, the Palestinian surnames were changed from clan-based to village-based in order to memorize the village that had been lost (Slyomovics 1998: 4; El-Haj 2008: 72). For the PAI the villages became the private source of resistance, practiced by yearly visits to the ruins of the village, that could be found among new forests planted by the Jewish National Fund (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005).

Reflecting on these myths, it becomes evident that the Palestinian myths for Israeli Palestinians are tools of resisting the “memoricide” practiced by the Israeli state. Emphasizing connections to land, to the village and to the pre-*Nakba* unity of all Palestinians are dangerous tools that challenge the foundational myths of Zionism, and the state attempts to naturalize them. The PAI myths as well as the Zionist myths are ultimately myths of self-creation. The other functions in both myths as the primary source of self.

### **Politicization of Palestinians of Israel**

As Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker emphasise, the role of *Nakba* and the public identification to Palestinian identity has been tremendously growing in the 21st century

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<sup>72</sup> Other key sites of memory are the massacres of Land day 30.3.1976 when Israeli police killed six protesting PAI and Palestinians and wounded hundreds and the two intifadas (Masalha 2012).

<sup>73</sup> This does not mean that ideas of Palestinianity is product of *Nakba* – far from it, the Palestinian national movement can be traced back at least to the mid of 19th century (Masalha 1997).

(Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005: 115). The first two PAI generations living in Israel either hoped for the pan-Arab movement, led by Egypt's president Nasser, to liberate them, or else they sought inclusion into the Israeli state system, and hoped for full democratic rights (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005; Ghanem 2001: 31-32). Hopes that led into disappointment and the emergence of what has come to be known as the “stand-tall generation<sup>74</sup>”

According to Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker *the stand-tall generation* took the streets of Israel at the beginning of the second millennium in the second Intifada<sup>75</sup> (Shindler 2008: 28, Rabinowitz and Baker 2005). Unlike the first Intifada, the second took place also within the borders of Israel, as emerging PAI youth-leaders from the university campuses mobilized young PAI to the street (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005: 130-131). The stand tall generation was, and is, according to Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005), exceptionally vocal about their Palestinianity, unlike any other generation before.

In the years following the second intifada the PAI-resistance to Israeli state has been growing and professionalized. Rise of new PAI NGO's documenting human rights abuses and barriers to democracy has re-translated the Palestinian struggle into search for internationally recognized status as an “indigenous people” (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). In addition, the PAI community has together signed “Future vision documents” and “Haifa Declaration” in 2006 - 2007 that declare that they will cease to take part in state institutions or activities, such as voting, until the state provides full equality and transforms into bi-national state (ceasing to be Jewish). Also, the PAI has demanded an end of occupation and the right of refugees to return from diaspora, West Bank, Gaza and around the world, back to Israel/Palestine. (Masalha 2012: 251; Haifa declaration 2007; Future vision documents 2006.)

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74 In academia the emergence of stand tall generation in post second Intifada came to be known as “the Arab awakening” (see Waxman 2013: 214–229).

75 The riots within Israel and Palestine that grew as the outcome of disappointment both to Oslo peace negotiations in which the (Israeli) Palestinians felt betrayed both by the PA run by Arafat in Palestine and the Israeli government.

#### 4.1.3. Zionist materialities at the entrepreneurial site

As Anderson (2006) has observed, the national myths cannot survive without sufficient material conditions<sup>76</sup>. In Israel the materialities of zionism - how zionism organized resources, capital and labour – was, and is designed to keep the zionist myths alive and turn them into normal experiences of reality (Masalha 2012; Jamal 2010). For the PAI, the materialities shape lives in three different manners: expulsion, segregation and dependency (Frantzman 2014; Peleg and Waxman 2011). The materialities produced not just accumulation of resources for zionist, but more fundamentally amnesia and detachment from Palestinianity to PAI, and thus space for naturalization of zionist myths to Jews (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005).

From the post-colonial perspective Israel follows the classical colonial model: creating a clear distinction between those who belong and those who not, and occupying the critical resources and spheres of life such as labour, land and capital from those who are constructed as not belonging to the polity (Yiftachel 1999, Francis 1971). The transformations in the structure of population and land ownership highlight the colonial dynamics of capturing resources and expulsion of the Palestinian. In the first half of the 20th century Palestinian Arabs constituted approximately 95 - 85 % of the population and owned and cultivated most of the arable land, whereas the Jews constituted only 5 - 8 % of the population and owned 1 % of the land (Khoury, Da'Na & Abu-Saad 2013; Prior 1999). After Nakba all the possessions of those who were expelled or escaped<sup>77</sup>, such as land and houses, were confiscated<sup>78</sup> by the Israeli state and re-distributed to Kibbutzims and transformed into new Jewish settlements (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005: 47). Zionist materialities create a strong ethno-class structure that segregates the

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<sup>76</sup> In the early nationalism these conditions were provided by “print capitalism” – the beginning of mass information systems through which myths about unity could be spread and labour and production organised for national capitalists (Anderson 2006).

<sup>77</sup> There is a narrative of “voluntary transfer” in zionist historiography. According to this narrative Palestinians simply left or were following the orders of neighbouring Arab countries before the 48 war. For decades it has, however, been proved that there were systemic expulsions that included force transfers and massacres realised by Jewish paramilitary forces during the civil war (Masalha 2012).

<sup>78</sup> Those who escaped were held as “present absentees” in state courts that decided on confiscations and re-distributions. The key legislations that enabled this included the (‘Absentee property Law’ (1959) and the ‘Acquisition and competitions act’(1953). The Land Acquisition Law of 1953 later transferred the land of 349 Arab towns and villages - approximately 468 square miles in total under government control (Adalah 2000).

PAI from economic opportunities (Yiftachel 1999; Farskakh 2013). This structure was instituted in pre-state period through Zionist colonies “*Yishuv*”.

The goal of *Yishuv* was to create only Jewish-Zionist labour markets – this was the core of the “Hebrew labour” ideology (Masalha 2012). As Ram has shown, it was only through this highly segregative system that the Zionists were able to create labour markets for the incoming Jewish migrants (Ram 1999). The *Yishuv* raised the Ashkenazi “pioneers” and Jewish farmers into national heroes and created a model of ethnic segregation in the labour markets that still characterises Israel<sup>79</sup> (Yiftachel 1999). As Yiftachel has shown, in practice the *Yishuv*s were not self-sufficient but reliant on wider economy and cheap Palestinian labour; in the minds of the Jews they were, however, “exclusively Jewish bubbles”, and reproduced the myth of an “empty” land (Yiftachel 2006: 54; Shafir 1989; Kimmerling 2003: 22).

According to Peleg and Waxman, the goal of the Zionist leaders has been to control all the sources of employment, trade, import and export in order to dictate the conditions of labour to Palestinians within and outside Israel (2011: 30-35). As a result the PAI have been “isolated from space and time”, and are dependent on the Jewish economic growth for employment and income (Rosaldo 1988: 85 ; Farsakh 2013). The purpose of the dependency is to produce a docile, passive and frightened PAI identity that would not dare to rise against the Israeli state and challenge its Jewish nature (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, Sion 2014). Because of political, economic, social as well as cultural exclusion and dependency that the Palestinians in Israel and in the occupied areas face, a recent, now withdrawn, UN report defined Israel as an apartheid state<sup>80</sup>.

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79 In the 21st century the ethnic segregation in labour markets can be verified through statistics: 95% of the PAI are proletarianized, occupy Israeli societies lowest strata and find employment from low-paid industries, and even within those the PAI receive worse salary than their Jewish colleagues (Adalah 2011; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993); the per capita income for the PAI is 7 700 dollars while for the Jews it is 19 900 (Shalev 1998); The amount of PAI children below poverty line is 60 % while for Jewish children it is 15% (Peleg and Waxman 2011); in 2015 the employment level of Arab women was 24.8 % while the comparable figure for Israeli Jewish women is 62.4 %. So far the PAI have in practice been shut from access to high-tech, import and export (Shafir and Peleg 2002: 120), and they are shut out of senior positions in both governmental and key private sector offices (Abdo 2011, Abu-Saad 2011; Yiftachel 2011). According to Peleg and Waxman (2011:3 30-35) the disparities within labour and socio-economic status are direct outcomes of government policy that seeks to segregate the labour markets.

80 The report was conducted by two leading critical scholars Richard Falke and Virginia Tilly. The report caused a great debate and was finally withdrawn by the pressure of the Israeli state and its ally the US (see: Reimann 2017).

Apart from exploiting the labour, the strategy of the dependency has also been a strategy of co-optation, where Israeli state created Israeli-Palestinian and Palestinian elites, and provided material benefits for them and for their villages and towns in return for security information and control over their own population<sup>81</sup> (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). The concentration of all the resources to the Israeli state allowed thus the state to create “good Arabs” among the Israeli-Palestinian and Palestinian population (Cohen 2009). These good Arabs helped to strengthen the “white man’s burden” of the liberal Zionists and re-inforce binary logic of the Jews as “modern” and Arabs as “un-modern”.

#### 4.1.4. From Yishuv to Start-up nation

In 1985 after a major fiscal crisis Israel began to transform its economy from state-led model inspired by the Yishuv towards a liberal and global “start-up nation” that bases its economic growth on innovation ecosystem that is able to attract foreign investments<sup>82</sup> (Senor and Singer 2009; Shalev 1998). This “economic miracle” of Israel was started with the free trade deal between the USA and Israel – a deal first of its kind for both of these nations (Grandinetti 2015). Throughout the following decades, the state has systematically deregulated capital markets<sup>83</sup>, cut corporate taxes, and directed state subsidies to export-oriented start-up companies and to what Shalev calls the “showcase foreign investments”: massive support programs for transnational companies considering to invest in Israel<sup>84</sup> (Shalev 1998). Liberalisation policies did not, however, mark the end of foreign aid that had been the source of Israeli economy since its independence (Juusola 2005). Quite on the contrary, both the military and other aid that

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81 These projects of co-optation included foundation of the “board of trustees” between 1948 - 1949 among PAI elite. Later “the Mukhtar system”, where Israeli state elected local leaders to represent their villages. Co-optation has also included making deals with Palestinian business elite and PA-leaders in order to corrupt and control them (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005: 67).

82 From independence to mid 1980’s Israel’s economy was based on state owned agricultural, textile and manufacturing industries that were kicked off with international aid and war reparations paid by Germany. The end of state-led economy began in the first years of 1980’s as Israel, driven into a bank stock crisis in 1983, reformed its economic system according to the doctrines of free market liberalism (Grandinetti 2015). The crisis was the beginning of “Israel’s economic miracle” and the birth of a start-up nation (Senor & Singer 2009).

83 Prior to 1985 the state was the primary source of capital. While it is still vital through its subsidiary programs to high-tech sector, the state has, step by step, opened up its capital markets and introduced an investor friendly “new Shekel” in 2003 that is now freely convertible currency (Doron and Arian 2014).

84 State subsidised new Intel R&D centre for 600 million dollars in 1990. Subsidiary so large that state’s Investment Incentive Law had to be changed in order to make it legally possible (Shalev 1998)

Israel receives particularly from the USA increased significantly as the state liberalised its restrictions on capital and privatised its state-led economy (Shalev 1998).

The transformation was highly successful, turning Israel into a world renowned “start-up nation”: a centre of innovation for the transnational high-tech companies risk capital looking for new investments (Shalev 1998). The state however remained as the central player in the start-up nation as innovation became organised through its institutions<sup>85</sup>. The key institution through which innovation became organised was the military service that was re-organised into research and development centre of future start-up companies and innovation: with almost 80% of Israeli start-ups originating from military (Senor and Singer 2009). The transformation to entrepreneurial economy was thus strongly a state-led project, and still is, as the investments to R&D, subsidies to transnational and local companies as well as connection between military-industrial complex and private businesses create the foundations of Israeli start-up nation (Senor and Singer 2009).

Between 1985 - 2008 high-tech industry grew 7 % per year leading the economic growth in Israel and making 50 % of the country’s industrial exports in 2015 (Farsakh 2013; Innovation Authority 2016, Senor and Singer 2009). Between 1990 and 2000 the Israeli managed to attract practically all the most significant high-tech companies and financial institutions<sup>86</sup> to invest and set up some of their core R&D functions to Israel, with most of the companies being from the USA<sup>87</sup>. The success of the start-up nation becomes evident from the facts that outside of the USA, Israel has the most high-tech companies listed in NASDAQ, has the largest numbers of start-up companies in the world and leads the world in venture capital investment per capita.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> State remained as a central player also through the funding instruments it developed. Promising to cover up to 60-90 % of early research phases for start-up companies and by providing major tax reliefs and subsidiary programs for transnational companies if they invest in Israel (Senor and Singer 2009).

<sup>86</sup> Today there are more than 250 R&D centres of major transnational high-tech companies in Israel. These include the world’s most valuable companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon and Microsoft. The finance companies include Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, Credit Swiss First Boston, Merrill Lynch, CalPERS, Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, and AIG (IBP: 2012: 228 - 236).

<sup>87</sup> According to Senor and Singer the relationship between the USA and Israel is crucial to the success of both countries. They write: “There are 350-400 research centers of the most esteemed companies in the world; Intel has 10,000 people here, IBM has 2,200 workers here, HP has 6,000 employees in Israel, and Broadcom and Cisco also have a presence (...) This connection to American companies is what built all these research centers that provide experience and training and create new jobs” (Senor & Singer 2009: 36).

<sup>88</sup> In 2015 I Israeli high-tech mergers and acquisitions (M&As) rose to \$7.2 billion from \$5 billion in 2014 (increasing total value 44% in one year). See: PWC 2015.

As Israel opened its doors to global capital, it also opened its doors to myths and materialities of knowledge economy. What these myths and materialities are and what they signify from the perspective of difference is the purpose of the following discussion.

## 4.2. Global at the entrepreneurial site

*For now, I like the feeling of being home in a lot of places, that there are lots of places where I belong, (..) That you belong all over the world rather than a little part (..)*

- Esther Dyson, CEO - Internet Corp (quoted in Steger 2008: 179)

The transformation of Israel's economy is approached here as being part of the expansion of a "knowledge based" or "post-industrial" economy – referred here simply as the knowledge economy (Jessop 2004; Kunda 2009). Raising human creativity as the most important source of value, industries such as high-tech have become the "normative core" of capitalism – defining the essence of "global" culture (Sennett 2007; Marttila 2013). As knowledge has become the most valuable factor of production the culture of global capital spreads into most private spheres of life – creativity and consciousness (Jessop 2004; Sennett 2007). The emergence of knowledge economy is part of the "third wave of capitalism" that re-defined what knowledge<sup>89</sup> from the perspective of capital is, and how value is extracted from it (Burawoy 2015). This section presents the key materialities and myths of knowledge economy imaginaries of difference that are an integral part of its expansions (Burawoy 2015; Sassen 2007). Through this discussion, it becomes evident that imaginaries of knowledge economy can destabilise national and communal solidarities.

### 4.2.1. Materialities of the knowledge economy

The origins of the "third wave" and the knowledge economy are tied to systemic changes in the structures of global capital, most important of these being the growing

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<sup>89</sup> In the third wave also nature, money and labour were re-commodified together forming the dynamics of the knowledge-economy (Burawoy 2015).

role of finance and the emergence of information technologies<sup>90</sup>. What makes the knowledge economy the “normative core” of global capital is its ability to create “super profits” with minimum workforce (Jessop 2014). As Sennett (2007: 84) puts it:

The most prominent and productive fields of capitalism: finance, high-tech and top services need only small group of experts and entrepreneurs to produce super-profits.

This capability has fundamental effects on the ability of nation-states to control their system of production and thus difference (Jessop 1993). Most importantly it leads into new “economy of the talented few” where only the most talented are needed to produce super-profits (Sennett 2007:89). Nowhere is this as evident as in the capability of start-up companies, employing just dozens of people to create “exits” worth billions of dollars<sup>91</sup>. Automating and digitalizing phases of production or just by developing apps to smart-phones the logic of the “talented few” ultimately destroys work through ex-commodification of labour (Sennett 2007).

Ex-commodification refers to expulsion of entities from the markets: people and sectors of production that are doomed untalented or not potential by the new impatient capital in search for innovations (Bauman and Donskis 2013; Burawoy 2015). Indeed, while value of industries that are in service of digitalized logic of accumulation has skyrocketed, the value of mass production has been steadily decreasing<sup>92</sup>. What seems to be tied to super-profits and ex-commoficiation of labour is polarization and the growing inequalities between and within nation-states<sup>93</sup>, the transnationalisation of

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<sup>90</sup> From 1980s to end of the first decade of second millennia the financial assets grew from representing 119 % of worlds nominal GDP into representing more than 370 % of the GDP in 2009. Between 1990 and 2006 the number of countries where financial assets exceeded the value of the country’s GDP more than doubled, from thirty-three in 1990 to seventy-two in 2006. These changes originated from the dismantling of the Bretton woods system in the 1970’s See: Sassen 2014: 136 - 150.

<sup>91</sup> For example, Instagram – a social media app, was bought for 1 billion dollars by Facebook when Instagram had just thirteen employees and is now estimated at 50 billion dollars valuation. In comparison, the Japanese camera-industry giant Kodak, had almost 70 000 employees as it crashed in 2012. (NewStatesman 2014)

<sup>92</sup> the value of manufacturing has been descending globally from 26.6 % in 1970 to 16.2 % in 2010 (Atkinson and Ezell 2012) and the value of high-tech exports have more than doubled from about one trillion to more than two trillion dollars between 1990 - 2014 (World Bank 2017).

<sup>93</sup> According to OECD data: the average Gini coefficient of disposable household income reached 0.318 in 2014, compared to 0.315 in 2010. This is the highest value on record, since the mid-1980s. In OECD countries youth has replaced elderly as the group of most risk at poverty (OECD 2015).

elites<sup>94</sup>, the slow disappearance of middle class within OECD economies, and the growing gap between productivity and real wages, labour and capital<sup>95</sup> (Piketty and Goldhammer 2014). What according to Sassen (2014) is taking place, is a fundamental shift where the space of economy and space of politics and belonging within it shrinks, and a majority of areas and people are no longer needed. Combined with knowledge economy's ability and need to expand, these dynamics of expulsions may be deeply destabilising for the national narratives of unity and boundaries of belonging.

Jessop has problematised these dynamics through the idea of a competitive state, a system of governance that seeks to attract global capital but may simultaneously destabilise the fundamentals of national belonging (Jessop 1993). First, as the competitive state seeks to open up the boundaries for those who are viewed as the most talented, the encountering with strangers increase and belonging becomes insecure. Second, in order to attract transnational investments, the competitive state develops tax policies that seem attractive from the point of view of the global capital. Third, as the knowledge economy makes products for the global markets – seeking for instantly scalable global innovations, it is less interested and dependent on the local realities or local consumption (Jessop 1993; Sassen 2014). Fourth, instead of universal services that are viewed as creating passivity, the competitive state is interested in “capability approach” that at least partly replaces collective responsibility for the responsibility of individuals who are expected to direct their entrepreneurial life projects (Marttila 2013; Salais 2003). In such a process those who are marginalized and most dependent on welfare services are naturally in even more vulnerable position (Marttila 2013).

All in all, as Sennet (2008) notes, the new logic of accumulation challenges the experience of national unity and collective belief in progress that was produced through system of mass production. Indeed, for the nation-state, the era of mass production provided its material base of unity as it needed as many people as possible to take part

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<sup>94</sup> Globally, the finance-led entrepreneurial economy has created unprecedented concentration of wealth: the new transnational elite representing 1% of global population controls more financial resources than the rest 99% (Sassen 2014; Credit Suisse 2015). Indeed, as economist Owen Bardner notes, the biggest problem of the 21st century is the economic, political and social marginalization attached to techno-financial “development” and marketisation (Bardner quoted in Keeley 2015: 39).

<sup>95</sup> The shift in almost all OECD countries between 2000 and 2015 (Ireland as an exception) has been a growing disparity between wages and capital returns. Less and less of income generated by economic growth now go to workers than to owners of businesses (Keeley 2015: 46 - 47).

in the processes of consumption and production (Delanty 2006). Paraphrasing Rose (1996: 165), in the new economy the collective objectives of economic growth, employment, development and social security become outsourced from collective systems to entrepreneurial individuals and their creative capabilities.

Israel, the world's leader in knowledge economy is able to balance its destabilitative effects, at least to some extent, with massive military and other aid coming from the United States (Shafir 1998). Still, while the export-led economy in Israel has been growing<sup>96</sup>, the poverty has increased (from 15 % in 1996 to 22 % in 2008) within Israel (Farsakh 2011). This has at least partly resulted from liberalization of the economy, cuts in welfare services, rising prices of housing and the lack of jobs created by entrepreneurial growth<sup>97</sup> (OECD 2011). There has also been a remarkable concentration of wealth with twenty business-families controlling 30 % of the business market shares in Israel by 2010 (Farsakh 2013). According to Ram the high-tech sector has created a new elite into the social map of Israel and pushed aside the old industrial and agricultural elites (Ram 2008). While there are many destabilizing material dynamics included into knowledge economy, from the perspective of the nation these destabilisations can to some extent be negotiated (Sassen 2014). The fact that Israel has tied its start-up nation to the military service: as the military functions known as the “top university of becoming an entrepreneur” can be seen as a sign of Israel's capacity to connect the global and national materialities together (Senor & Singer 2012).

The most important materiality that is attached to knowledge economy from the perspective of difference is, however, its need to expand and include new subjectivities and new markets under its regime (Sassen 2014). Tied to this expansion is the logic of expulsions that may fundamentally challenge the experience of national unity.

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<sup>96</sup> The value of Israel's export industry has grown more than 6 % yearly since 1994, with its value rising from 15 % in 1994 to more than 72 billion dollars in 2008. The high-tech sector has grown more than 7 percents yearly since 1993. (Rivlin 2010: 260.)

<sup>97</sup> The structural change from labour intensive agriculture (in 2000 the share of agricultural exports were 3 % while in 1970 they were 16 %) to start-ups is problematic when it comes to jobs: high-tech is responsible for about 20 % of total industrial output but only 9 % of business sector employment comes from high-tech according to OECD (see: OECD 2011).

#### 4.2.2. Myths of knowledge economy

By understanding some of the basic dynamics of materialities of knowledge economy, its myths become easier to grasp. The expansions of knowledge economy seek to reach the most intimate levels of individual consciousness: issues that are reflected, hopes and futures that are imagined. Processes of consciousness become the central source of value from the perspective of capital. The consciousness needs to be commodified into a space of markets and factor of production. In order to become commodified, the mind – or any other entity that is the source of value for the markets – needs to be dispossessed, developed, and only after these steps, marketized (Burawoy 2015). The “entrepreneurial myths” of the knowledge economy are *the tools* through which intimate knowledge can be transformed into a factory of innovation. The myths of the knowledge economy, creating space for markets, are concentrated into the character of the entrepreneur (Marttila 2013). These entrepreneurial myths and their relation to difference are presented here.

One of the key myths that drives the knowledge economy is the cyclical entrepreneurial process of self-destruction and re-birth. *Rebuild the Self* is the mantra of entrepreneurialism (Sennett 2008). This idea of infinite self-destruction and re-birth comes from Joseph Schumpeter, the father of “creative destruction”. For Schumpeter, an entrepreneur was someone who “renews and destroys himself constantly, believes in himself and does not wonder about the reasons for change (..) but rather acts” (quoted in Ohyama, Klepper and Brguinsky 2009: 1; see also Sennett 1998: 18).

The ability to destroy oneself requires certain capabilities that form the normative core of globalising entrepreneurial myths. These according to Sennett and Kunda are first and foremost, the ability to take risks, the ability to trust and take responsibility of oneself, and the ability to want freedom from all forms of collective oppression: the government, the nation, family, traditions as well as relations with places and people who deny you the right of self-creation (see Kunda 2009: 66; Sennett 1998). The self-reliance that the competitive state needs, is thus at the centre of entrepreneurial myths.

As an outcome of self-destruction and creation, the entrepreneurial myth promises to deliver “a new man and a woman” that are simultaneously scientific and rational, and capable of dreaming beyond what is perceived as possible (Kunda 2009: xii). Indeed if one chooses the right mindset: to take risks and depart from what is normal, one is promised not just wealth but also transcendence of spirit into an “upgraded human being” (Dominique 2015). Therein lies an opportunity to become better than human, a post-human that by connecting to the entrepreneurial networks of technology will know no sickness or sorrow (Bostrom 2005). Through technology everything that has remained as a mystery – as unknown will be known (Dominique 2015; Marttila 2013). And through this, the post-human will finally taste what freedom is like (Bostrom 2005).

Becoming the entrepreneurial post-human is the opposite of what Jung means by becoming self – someone who, through life of dreams, nightmares, sickness and health, learns to widen the area of unknown – of the other in self, instead of conquering it (Jung 1985). The entrepreneur in essence is a figure of conquest, of self and of unknown.

It is through this myth of re-birth that the knowledge economy seeks to commodify the most private spheres of life: creativity and reflection – even personhood (Burawoy 2015; Sennett 1998). The question of the impacts of this intrusion have been debated fiercely in academia. As Kunda eloquently puts it, the debate concerns whether the entrepreneurialization of consciousness leads into “self regained or souls lost” (Kunda 2009: 15). From the perspective of the nation-state the constant self-creation produces both an economic possibility and a threat as the self that emerges may not fit into the national categories of difference.

The promise of entrepreneurship is not just the emergence of new human, but emergence of a new society (Kunda 2009, Sennett 1998). Beck argues that entrepreneurship and technologies are the “new imaginaries of global hope and unity” that spread together with the expansion of knowledge economy (Beck 2005: 15). This hope promises a society where technology and the right mindset help us to solve the biggest societal problems for good (Beck 2005). The dynamics of expulsion are not part of this hope.

Within entrepreneurial imaginary, technology saves humanity from war, hunger, poverty and even death (Marttila 2013; Dominique 2015). The power-struggles and petty-politics of nation-states end as the power of technological progress is unleashed (Kunda 2009; Dominique 2015; Bostrom 2005). As Steger notes, the expanding capital needs a “market globalist” narrative: a higher normative promise that legitimizes that material expansion itself (Steger 2008). According to this narrative, the technological development of past decades has turned the world “flat” – meaning that any individual with the right mindset can now tap on to the benefits of globalization. As Steger notes, technology in this imaginary is framed simultaneously as a-political, neutral and rational – and as western, European or American, as they are the cultures that have found rationality and progress from technological development (Steger 2008).

Marttila (2013: 9) argues that these myths enable the knowledge economy to expand constantly to new markets, a process he calls “entrepreneurialization”. In this process, not just economy but also other spheres of life, ranging from civil society to politics, receive a role in the makings of innovation. Thus, the entrepreneurial myths absorb identities and spaces to respond to its hunger for innovations (Marttila 2013). Through the processes of entrepreneurialization the processes of governance, development<sup>98</sup> and democracy also may receive entrepreneurial roles (Marttila 2013; Mawdsley, Savage & Kim 2014). In this trajectory, the cultural transformation through becoming an entrepreneur is the answer to all the problems of the old world (Dominique 2015). The promise of entrepreneurialization is a massive acceleration in speed into rational future without politics and societal problems (Marttila 2013).

Another, perhaps the most important myth when it comes to destabilizing national categories of difference, is the cosmopolitan promise of entrepreneurship (Beck 2005: 14). Celebrating the value of difference and the end of national boundaries that prevent difference from coming together is at the foundation of entrepreneurial myths.

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<sup>98</sup> Entrepreneurialization of development can be seen as the continuation of modernisation theories that viewed cultural transformation into entrepreneur as the key mechanic for achieving development. See especially: Bert, 1964 but also: Mclelland (1961), Lerner (1958) and Hagen (1962.)

Difference in entrepreneurial myths functions as the key factor of production. Difference is able to cause dissonance and shake the boundaries of normal that are needed in order to expand into the “unknown” or to the “edge of chaos” where innovation takes place (Gardner quoted in Senor & Singer 2011: 84, 99; Baumol, Litan and Schramm 2007; Baumol 1996). The entrepreneurial myths thus celebrate and need difference and anomalies<sup>99</sup> (Sennett 2007; Baumol et al 2007). Difference in entrepreneurial imaginary becomes the most importance competitive advantage of any social group – it is the engine of creativity: source of post-industrial accumulation of capital (Kunda 2009: 82).

While celebrating difference, entrepreneurial myths emphasise the importance of “being global” in order to have success (Kanter 2014). As the transnational corporation sells same products everywhere, it needs innovations and people who are not trapped by their local identities and ideas (Levitt 1983: 92-102). Much like Marx’s proletariat, the entrepreneur thus, in this mythology, has no fatherland.

Whether the entrepreneurial myths function as a “school of cosmopolitanism” where all subjects can sign up as different – turning the world into borderless home for all<sup>100</sup>, or wether it creates “fake cosmopolitanism” where difference is commodified and transformed into homogenous jet-set individualism, is another debate going on in academia (Beck 2005; Sassen 2014; Saxenian 2007).

In Israel, it seems that the state has so far been able to connect its national myths and entrepreneurial myths together. This is evident in the national pride about the “start-up nation” and that the terms “pioneer” and “farmer” that were used to describe the heroes of the Hebrew labour and Yishuv are used with little modification to describe entrepreneurs (Senor and Singer 2009). They are known as *pioneers and farmers of high-tech* (Senor and Singer 2009). Ram however suggests that behind the national pride there are a growing amount of those who feel abandoned by the state (2008).

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99 Unlike in the Weberian bureaucratic myths where anomalies and difference stand in the way of efficiency.

100 For Saxenian the entrepreneurial economy marks an end to the geographies of dependency and centre-periphery relations (2007). For Sassen the new economy also is made in economic centres and discourses about its freedom from power relations are dangerous myths (2014).

Indeed, according to him, the global materials and myths have created space for radicalisation and polarisation within Israeli Jewish population (2008).

The Palestinians of Israel have, however, all been in the outskirts of the start-up nation. The tactic of the state, according to Jamal (2009), has been to isolate the PAI from global connections and opportunities. This tactic seems to now be ending as the PAI are integrated into the “start-up nation” according to the five year plan.

Many scholars have indeed predicted that the “arrival of globalization” will be the end of hegemonic zionism (Ram 2000; Juusola 2005; Farsakh 2013). Juusola goes as far as claiming that “it is probable that Israel will develop towards same direction that western countries in general – signifying the development towards western liberal democracy”<sup>101</sup>. This, according to Juusola, is because of “the general effect of globalisation (..) the liberal economic policies will inevitably decrease the influence of state and increase individualisation in Israel (..) rigid national ideologies fit poorly to modern times” (2005: 279-280). The analysis section will demonstrate whether this prophecy seems legitimate or not.

### **4.3. Summarising the background at the entrepreneurial site**

The discussion of the context demonstrated that imaginaries of zionism, Palestinian nationalism and entrepreneurship all carry distinct myths and materialities of difference. In zionist imaginary the myths create an elevated European self that is the source of civilisation. Deploying the modern colonial myths there is a strong binary logic embedded in zionism where self is created through other. Land is the central entity through which zionist self emerges and becomes fulfilled. The myths have paved the way and legitimised a material system that systemically erases Palestinian connection to land, and conquers Palestinian labour and resources into production of zionism.

In Palestinian myths, the land is also the source of self. Another source is the Nakba when Palestinian national entity is destroyed according to Palestinian imaginary. The

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<sup>101</sup> It has to be said that this was written before the return of atavistic nationalism to Europe and states – the trajectory that some foresee coming.

Palestinian self is created through preserving the connection to the land and to the villages of origin and resisting the state of Israel that is seen as external colonial force without any connection to the land.

Entrepreneurial myths seek to produce an individualist and global entrepreneurial subject who transform their consciousness into source of innovations. Entrepreneurial myths like Zionist and Palestinian myths are ultimately myths of liberation. The entrepreneurial liberation is about emancipating from communal relations that suppress the individual spirit. Entrepreneurial myths celebrate difference and cosmopolitan borderless world.

The materialities of entrepreneurial expansion are anything but inclusive: causing expulsions through inclusion. The entrepreneurial expulsions, myths of cosmopolitanism and new ideals about global individual can cause fundamental destabilisations both in subaltern consciousness and in the hegemonic imaginary. How these myths and materialities are made sense of, and transformed into meanings of self and other is analysed in the following sections. The next section presents the creative imaginal at the entrepreneurial space in Israel.

## **V Analysis: Imaginal at the entrepreneurial site**

When discussing with the interviewees, it takes an extra effort to get behind the start-up lingo. Almost all of the interviews begin with a sort of “pitch” that clearly shows how excited the interviewees are about the entrepreneurial intervention. Using the start-up lingo, they imagine new identities and a future full of promises. Simultaneously there are borders drawn: people, issues and thoughts that do not belong to the entrepreneurial space nor to the future it creates.

Analysis of the imaginal is divided into two parts that seek to give an overview of how difference is imagined from below. Part I does this by presenting the themes through which difference is imagined at the entrepreneurial site, while part II discusses data’s

telos: what is the logic and essence of how difference is presented in individual imaginations.

Using the perspective of the “before method” the analysis seeks to understand, in an open-ended way, what knowledges, identities and materialities are included, and what are pushed away from the entrepreneurial space by the individual imaginations, and how zionism becomes stabilised and destabilised. After this analysis “from below” we are able to connect the empirical data into theoretical discussions about difference and its transformations in the spaces of “global”.

### **5.1. Part I: Making sense of self and other at the entrepreneurial space**

This section presents the central themes through which difference is constructed “from below” in the discussions with the PAI entrepreneurs and the Jewish public officials at the entrepreneurial space.

The discussions were conducted with eight mid-aged PAI entrepreneurs who all work either as hired by the government, or as pro bono volunteers and role models to the PAI youth and future entrepreneurs in Arab towns. These entrepreneurs are:

1. Amal, a software developer and a start-up entrepreneur from Nazareth (government)
2. Laila, a former civil society activist and a start-up entrepreneur from Nazareth (pro bono)
3. Emile, a former municipal leader and a start-up entrepreneur from Nazareth (government)
4. Salim, an entrepreneur, just returned from the United States and settled in Nazareth (government)
5. Daud, a highly successful start-up entrepreneur from Haifa (pro bono)
6. Nadia, a civic activist, a part-time start-up entrepreneur from Nazareth (pro bono)
7. Anton, a successful start-up entrepreneur, a consultant in government projects from Nazareth (government)
8. Hud, a successful start-up entrepreneur from Kafir Quasim (pro bono).

In addition to the PAI entrepreneurs, I interviewed three Israeli Jew public officials, who are all former successful entrepreneurs, now planning and executing the entrepreneurial development interventions with the Israeli entrepreneurs. These public officials are:

1. Ilan, a former military elite unit leader and a start-up entrepreneur in management position within entrepreneurial government projects
2. Erez, a recent government employee, working from the ministry for economic development of the minority sector
3. Alon, another recent government employee, working from the ministry for economic development of the minority sector.

### 5.1.1. Imagining high-tech

In the narratives of PAI entrepreneurs, high-tech is the new universal, a “global culture”. For them, the most exciting feature about this culture is that it is neutral, open and free of racism.

I started to study the Silicon Valley and the Tel Aviv's ecosystem and take the ideas from there. And I learned that the start-up world is very open - it doesn't matter where you come from. So I became really excited. I started to create this entrepreneurial community around Arabs in Israel. (Salim)

Amal describes the same revelation happening to her after graduation. She emphasises how unique high-tech is, when compared to other realms of life in Israel:

High Tech all over the world has a similar culture, there is no discrimination or anything like that. And what is most important, there is no history of discrimination within this culture, so arabs and Jews can all start working together without discussing all the time about history.

For Amal and the other PAI entrepreneurs high-tech is not only a culture that accepts diversity: it needs diversity, because it is a competitive advantage. As Emile puts it: “In high-tech it is all about creativity, and all the research shows that more there's difference in teams, the better the level of innovation”.

For PAI entrepreneurs high-tech and entrepreneurship is exactly what Beck (2005) describes: a global imaginary of hope. For them, it is a culture where difference transforms from burden into an advantage, and history no longer matters.

## **Leaving “Arab mentality”**

The overall dream of the PAI entrepreneurs was to become global, and join the high-tech culture. High-tech as a global culture emerges in imaginations as a standard through which to evaluate Jewish and Arab cultures. What became very evident in the discussions with both the Jewish and the PAI who worked in the entrepreneurial space was the idea that it is Arabs who have to transform, if they wish to join the global culture.

We need to become global like American, German or Jewish culture. (Salim)

For the interviewed entrepreneurs, both the Jews and the PAI, the “Arab culture” or “Arab mentality” is the key underlying problem that prevents PAI from joining high-tech, and thus causes inequality, poverty and segregation in the Israeli society.

## **Leaving village, leaving backwardness**

One of the problems in “Arab culture”, according to the PAI narrators, is that it produces what Emile calls “local thinking”. This, however, is not acceptable in high-tech. For Hud, it is simply because high-tech is all about being open to the world, something that the “Arab culture” is not (Hud). For Daud, the difference between Arab culture and high-tech culture is, that Arab culture is straight up “xenophobic” (Daud). Salim verified this idea by explaining how high-tech works:

In high-tech you work with Europe, you work with everyone. You need to have VC’s and investors, angels and partners. So it’s not your family-life, it’s global business (..) it’s not so easy for Arabs to think globally.

When I asked, what is this “local thinking”, the PAI entrepreneurs started to teach me about the nature of “Arab mentality”. The narratives are told as if the PAI entrepreneurs were describing a distant tribal lifestyle, something that they have already left.

Arabs are very very connected to the land. They have this romantic relationship with the environment, there’s nothing logical about it. They have romantic relationship with the olive tree, and little rocks in the river. They like their ceremonies. They like to live in these own villages and with their family. (Anton)

Salim also tried to explain this special connection to me and its relation to Israel-Palestine situation:

(..) it's something deep - so the whole issue about this conflict is about this Arab-belief that they belong to this land.. they are connected in a way that they believe this olive tree knows them, and they can talk to this tree and no one else can..and that they know the land and the land knows them.Sso it's really deep inside this traditional idea.. They belief that they belong to the land, and the sea, and the trees - that they are part of them. Not just that the land belongs to them.

Salim continues that the ways the Arabs feel about the land is totally opposite to how any other cultures feel about land: ”(..) and this is not nationalism, it is not like ‘hi I come from German’, it is not logical like that” (Salim). Salim later describes to me that the arabs are just pretending that they know nationalism or democracy – according to Salim, they do not really understand them.

Nationalism and democracy for Arabs..It is like trying to describe to a blind man what it is like to see. But without eyes you can not see. (Salim)

Salim and Emile both explain that the source of this Arab mentality is the Arab village, where time has stood still for centuries, and modern ideas have not yet come. To live in these villages is something unimaginable.

In the Arab villages, its just crazy. I couldn't live there.. because you know. Everybody's just sitting and doing nothing and watching you and your actions. You can't do whatever you want to do. People there.. they like it. (Daud)

### **Jewish public officials on ‘Arab village’**

While it becomes clear that the PAI entrepreneurs are creating space for zionist myths of the “empty land” as the Arab connection to land is portrayed as illogical, unmodern and “crazy”, they are not the only ones telling these tales. Indeed, for the Israeli public officials, the village is also a source of culture that ultimately prevents the Arabs from joining the Israeli society.

It's a very patriarchal village-society and the father is the king and the women are nothing.. and they don't they care about the Arab society as a whole, they couldn't care less about the wider community.. about a stranger who's an Arab, about wider economic development, they don't care. It is very rural, and very wild, like 1000 years ago. (Ilan, laughing)

Alon confirms Ilan's thoughts about Arab mentality and its connection to land:

I should not say this but the Arabs are not like saints..they have their own culture. .which is very rural and racist, like a clan-society.. so if you come from some clan, or some region you are not welcome.. it's like casts. (Alon)

The narratives about the village at the entrepreneurial space suggest that the Arabs are unable to join the benefits of globalization because of their unique and “illogical” relation to the land. Particularly interesting is how the Arab relation to the land is described as being totally different to nationalism, nationalism being a modern and “logical” intimacy to land. In the narratives about the “Arab society”, it is evident that time has not been moving “forward” in the villages, and that “rural” practices remain. It thus seems that it is not just space, but also time, that is under pressure from the entrepreneurial perspective – if the Arabs want to evolve, they need to leave the illogical local time and space: to leave the “blindness“, by which they are bound.

The” politics of space and time”, that Riain speaks about in his study on transformations of belonging in software companies, arguing that there is a growing pressure to negotiate with spaces and times that the “global” brings, seems to fit into narratives of the land (Riain 2000: 200). In Israel-Palestine these narratives are in the core of Zionist and Palestinian identities.

Discussing the experiences of history with the PAI entrepreneurs supports this interpretation.

### **Leaving history**

Becoming a PAI entrepreneur requires the ability to leave the history behind and focus on the future instead. Daud, coming from a family that was torn apart by Nakba in 1948, describes how he did this:

History is one of the problems that I have solved. I don't worry about history. I'm focusing in the future. I have a book in my shelf that is about my family: about the story of 1948 - it's a great story. Its a tough story - not a sad one, because when you read it, you see the end. When you read it, you think to yourself, what will be the end of this story (..) But I know the end. I am the end.

The entrepreneurial space has disembedded Daud from the troubling past, echoing the market globalist idea about the “end of history” where old structures have been wiped

out by global unlimited possibilities (Fukuyama 1989; Steger 2008). *He* has solved history.

Hud verifies Daud's thoughts by giving a postmodernist account of history as a choice:

And some people still have this problem.. because of history.. they say that I'm an Arab in Israel, there's racism and war so I can't have success. These are self-put boundaries against success! This is a way of convincing its just better to be lazy and be hide behind your parents' traumas.

All of the PAI entrepreneurs are middle aged and, have parents who experienced Nakba. While Masalha insists that for the PAI 'al-nakbah' still continues, it is clear that for these PAI entrepreneurs it does not (Masalha 2012).

### **Leaving and finding self**

According to the PAI entrepreneurs, the Arab mentality prevents the Arabs from practicing the most important resource in high-tech: creativity. Amal explains that the only thing that high-tech culture demands is that "you know what you want, you dream and act, you take risks and you are trustworthy". However, what "living in the collective continuum" does, as Salim describes the life of the Arabs, is that "they do not know what they want, they do not have any dreams and they do not know even themselves".

When Salim tries to explain to me that the key problem the Arabs should solve is themselves, he draws a stick figure with a huge belly to a blackboard and writes "Arab mind" inside of it. Pointing in it he says:

I am half an entrepreneur half a shrink (laughing). This is what I am in fact trying to change, this immaturity, this backwardness (..) it's really hard to change, because it comes from inside, from inside the person.

According to the PAI entrepreneurs, what this inability to know oneself produces is the lack of ideas that are not innovative enough (Hud, Salim). It becomes clear, that at the entrepreneurial site the maturity and creativity of the Arab mind is evaluated from the perspective of the markets, and the pressures of self-destruction and -creation grow.

The PAI entrepreneurs have themselves already left their old selves behind, by leaving for the “great unknown” (Salim). This, however, was not easy, says Nadia. She had to leave the previous life “behind”.

I had to find another sphere of life, sphere where I am encouraged and supported. (Nadia)

As Kunda notes, the idea of being a pioneer traveling to the unknown, is an integral part of entrepreneurial myth. Often this requires cutting of relations of “collective oppression” and building new relations, just as Nadia has done (Kunda 2009).

### 5.1.2. Two tales of the white man’s burden

The imaginations present interesting versions of the colonial ‘white man’s burden’. Following the logic of modernity and colonialism the Other is imagined as incapable of helping or transforming himself (Latour 2006). To become civilized, the Other thus needs the guidance and example of the Self that is already modern (Latour 2006; Bhabha 1994). Surprisingly, it is however not just the Jewish public officials who conceptualise themselves as carrying the white man’s burden – also the PAI entrepreneurs embodying “a global mindset” are bearing one. The variations in these two tales of the white man’s burden reveal important dynamics in the ways new “selves” and new “others” are created at the entrepreneurial site.

#### **Jewish tale of the white man’s burden**

In the Jewish narrative of the white man’s burden the Other is the whole Israeli Arab culture, and helping this culture to transform is a matter of Jewish national responsibility, echoing the early civilization mission of Zionism. Alon explains the origins of this burden by summarizing the history of Israel:

In the Israeli independence war 1948 all the smart people and the city people they left<sup>102</sup>, so they all left..So what we got was like people from the fields, uncivilised farmers.. So not like the Israeli people who came from Europe and democracy (..) And then you add more than 50 years of uninterested.. thats why we are here. They have not changed, because we have not cared.

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<sup>102</sup> The narrative of history that Alon gives seems to reproduce what critical historians Finkelstein (2008), Masalha (2012) and Pappe (2016) among others label as state-mobilised “voluntary transfer narrative” according to which Palestinians of 48 simply left by themselves.

It is worth noticing how Zionists are described as coming from democratic backgrounds, when in fact they were mainly coming from places such as Poland, Russia and Germany, and had never lived in democratic regimes (Frantzman 2014). The Jews of Palestine and from around the Middle East do not exist in these imaginations at all. The Zionism the public officials describe is Zionism of colonization, civilization and survival – not of a religious redemption. Both Erez and Alon present Zionism as a colonial movement – which is, however, justified because the “strongest won” (Alon) and because “Arabs would live in the middle age if it wasn't for us” (Erez). It is thus not surprising, that dehumanizing colonial language and modern binaries are actively used in the narratives of public officials:

They don't look you in the eye like Jews, their speech is incomprehensible. This is why I wanted to be in this Ministry and in this project because it's like you have to take care of the weakest link, it's like in the family with the child, he can't manage without you. And we have neglected them for so long. (Erez)

Ilan, however, says that the the Arabs themselves should seek help from Jews:

You can't change someone if he doesn't want to change. It's like the same that you go to psychological therapy, if you are sick - you won't heal unless you want to change.

While the public officials are committed in helping the Other to transform, there is a threat of expulsion weaved into this help. Both Alon and Erez explain that the demographic trends that are leading into situation where 50 percent of Israeli population are either Arabs or orthodox Jews:

The Arabs have big families.. and they multiply all the time.. what is actually means is that that they take the welfare and the benefits. So they don't produce but they take a lot. It's a huge problem that lot of the benefits are like universal. So this plan<sup>103</sup> ..We need them or we cannot afford them. (Alon)

By constructing the Jews as enlightened and the Arabs as passive, child-like and even inhumane, a modern dualist narrative of self and other is constructed (Latour 2006; Said 2011). For the Jewish public officials, carrying the white man's burden means fighting two battles simultaneously. One against the Arab culture, and the other against “religious Jews” (Alon). For public officials, the religious Jews do not understand the

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<sup>103</sup> The five year plan

new zionist mission – taking care of the economy. Thus, both Ilan and Erez deny the worth of annexing West Bank to Israel, as it would be an economic burden in the future. Where they do align with religious zionism, is in their idea of encouraging the PAI to leave from Israel.

For me the end goal in itself is that the Arabs make global connections and that they find jobs from cities like New York or Berlin, normally they never even dream of this but stay here.

While denying the worth of religious zionism, they however reproduce its “philosophy of transfer” by presenting that the arabs have two options: “they have to start producing value or find opportunities from somewhere else” (Ilan). Following the colonial logic, the white man’s burden presents itself as help, but simultaneously realises economic and political goals of the hegemony (Latour 2006). More than anything else, it is a prelude to violence (Nandy 1988).

### **The white man’s burden of PAI entrepreneurs**

Interestingly, the PAI entrepreneurs tell a story of a white man’s burden, too. This is significant, as the whole zionist system has been constructed to negate their similarity – their modernity and whiteness (Khoury et al. 2013: 34; Rouhana 1998). The PAI entrepreneurs regard themselves as evidence that metamorphosis to modernity is possible. How this metamorphosis is achieved, is by creating a *new other*. Their transformation thus follows the logic presented by Mies and Shiva: it is only by creating a new other that the unmodern subject can reach partial emancipation (Mies & Shiva 2014: 225-26). This new other has many faces.

Most important of the “new others” is the “traditional Arab” who still is bounded by his Arab mentality, Arab space and Arab time. The transformation is done by teaching the “traditional Arab” what they call “soft skills”.

Self-put boundaries are stuff that we are trying to eliminate. With soft skills we give them ‘yes you can attitude’, and give them right character and give them the right framework to pursue their dreams. (Daud)

While the PAI entrepreneurs with their own stories verify, that becoming modern is possible, without help it is, however, unlikely: “it requires so much work that 99 percent

of people can't do it by themselves. That is why we need to help." (Anton). In the narratives of Emile and Anton, Christians themselves, the "Muslim Arabs" need a bit more help usually.

Emile in Nazareth explains to me, that it is not just the Arab culture that can be transformed through entrepreneurship. He urges me to think about the refugees coming to Europe and Israel. Refugees form another face of the "other" in their narrative of the white man's burden.

You could make this parallel between refugees and Arabs here. They are both people who are on a boat, traveling towards a place and culture that is totally unknown to them. So what they need is a friend that has already made the same trip. So we act as role models, someone who they can relate to and trust and someone who knows how they feel. (Emile)

The difference between refugees and Palestinians in the Palestinian myth is, of course, that Palestinians are indigenous people. This, however, does not stop Emile from making the parallel. Later Emile, Anton and Salim separately tell me with pride that they often host ambassadors and diplomats and public officials who come from France, from Belgium, from Canada and from the US.

They come here to learn from us. How we help Arabs to have self-belief and become innovative. (Salim)

The emergence of the refugees as "others" is interesting when compared to the the history of Israel, where Azkhenazis have needed Mizraham to become modern, and for the Mizrahi jews it has been the Georgian, the Moroccan and later the Ethiopian jews who have functioned as the new other against which to elevate oneself (Burg 2008; Frantzman 2014: 182-183). Frantzman has deducted, that it is probable that the refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers may function as "others" to Israeli Palestinians in the future<sup>104</sup> (Frantzman 2014).

It is, however, evident that the PAI entrepreneurs need the help of the Jews to transform the Arab into modernity<sup>105</sup> – they are thus not self-sufficiently modern and white,

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<sup>104</sup> Recent surveys indicate that the non-jewish migrants referring to migrant workers from Asia and Africa are becoming the new other also among Jewish majority. While 56 % of Jews object living close to migrants "only" 47 % oppose living next to arabs according to Hermann et al. (2013).

although they carry the burden of it. Indeed for Daud, becoming entrepreneur requires mimicking the Jews:

I realized that it's the Jewish mentality that makes them so good. And I have learned this mentality - I have practiced it. I think all the Arabs have to if they wish to be good entrepreneurs.

When I ask how does one learn it, Salim replies:

I'm trying to learn the Jewish thinking - I watch how they speak, how they compete and I learn it. But I'm not a psychologist so its by practice.

Other PAI entrepreneurs describe characteristics and other factors that make Jews such good entrepreneurs. These characteristics include "Chutzpah", that Emile describes as the Jewish urge to constantly learn; the boldness to fail, and to support those who have failed (Amal); the national spirit of survival, and a strong military are described as the factors that make the Jews good entrepreneurs.

Laila, a former civil society activist, presents a different kind of narrative. For her, the Jews are not global as such, but they, too, have become global through high-tech: "for some reason, Jews that work in high-tech tend to be different than other Jews. They are open and accept all kind of people".

While the PAI entrepreneurs envy the maturity and creative capabilities that the Jews attain in the army, they however draw clear boundaries, when I ask whether they would go there now if they were younger. As Daud explains: "they spy on Arabs, I don't think Arabs should go there." Despite these clear boundaries, the elite unites of military for them are the necessary partner without whom modernizing Arabs and "becoming global" could not be reached. As Daud says: "it can't be done without them".

The ways in which the PAI entrepreneurs recreate themselves can be seen as a process that Burawoy et al. describes as "negotiating" new identity in a global space (Burawoy et al. 2000; Bhabha 1994). As the PAI entrepreneurs distance themselves from "normal" or "traditional Arabs", they simultaneously distance themselves from Palestinian

identity. In these discursive acts of distancing and self-creation the PAI entrepreneurs reproduce the Zionist imaginary of Arabs. By differentiating themselves from these “traditional Arabs”, they however simultaneously could cause dissonance in the Zionist logic of dualism – the logic that the Jewish public officials maintain by describing all the Arabs as the same. Creatively, the PAI entrepreneurs also present themselves as a group that can help, not only Arabs to become modern, but also European states in the “refugee-crises”.

### 5.1.3. Surviving the daily life in high-tech

Discussing the daily life in high-tech with the PAI entrepreneurs exposes some major contradictions about claims made above about high-tech and the Jewish culture. While the PAI present high-tech culture as free of racism, their experiences paint a contrasting picture.

#### **Racism and non-racism**

Being all about the similar age, the PAI entrepreneurs graduated from Israeli universities at the turn of the millennium. As it was the period of second intifada and 9/11, many of them realised that there were no jobs for Arabs in high-tech.

When I studied in Technion<sup>106</sup>, there was the October events<sup>107</sup>, revolutions by Arabs in Israel and later also the 9/11 - a big conflict.. so when I finished my degree it was really hard to find company that would recruit an Arab.. so no one answered me. (Nadia)

As Nadia tells, later she found work “from a liberal Jew” who, however, agreed to pay her only one third of the payment that her Jewish co-workers received. These experiences of not finding jobs or getting lower salaries in high-tech are familiar to most of the interviewed PAI entrepreneurs. Once a job is found, different kinds of problems arise:

Personally, I know that is not easy to work as a minority in a majority owned company and represent your political ideas - no matter how liberal and humanist they are. So even to be for human rights it's sometimes impossible. It is really hard. (Amal)

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<sup>106</sup> University in Haifa.

<sup>107</sup> Nadia refers to the most violent month of intifada. Between 7th and 9th day of October Israeli police shot Israeli Palestinian demonstrations with open fire, killing 13 PAI. The October events are held as the culmination point when the “Stand Tall” generation was born (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005).

When asked what kinds of situations Amal remembers about not being able to present political ideas, she elaborates:

I went through two wars while working in a start-up (...) When you get to a room where people just said that 'we need to bomb Nazareth' it is so weird (...) I put some pictures in Facebook that say that "stop violence and violence is not a solution". One of my co-workers took it and went to the CEO of the company and said that I'm speaking against Israel and speaking against Jews and there was a meeting where manager said that everyone got their freedom of choices after work but here I can not say offensive things.

For Amal, this meeting, however, was humiliating and very offensive.

I was really feeling bad about what happened and later on I stopped presenting my ideas. Not in Facebook or anywhere. (Amal)

Amal's story is somewhat chilling, as it seems to imply that also in high-tech the Arabs are expected to act following the "good Arab" -model: being muted, invisible and lacking any political ideas (Sion 2014: 2641; Cohen 2009). Others have had similar experiences. Emile and Daud tell me about the time of the second Lebanon war (2006 - 2007). Emile had a job in one of the R&D centres of global high-tech company in Tel Aviv at that time.

During the war the company had "discussion sessions" every week about the war. They used these sessions to compile information about our political views and before I understood this, I got fired. (Emile)

Daud's experiences were not as brutal:

When I was working in the big high-tech companies.. the workers look at me that he's an Arab, he can't be trusted.

These experiences of Daud and Emile support the findings of Ailon and Kunda (2009), who studied identity politics of transnational corporation in Israel. What Ailon and Kunda found was that the transnational corporation applies a "one company approach" that is presented as global, but in practice adjusts its culture to follow the national hegemonic norms (2009: 704-5).

## Survival strategies

The most common survival strategy when faced with racism and exclusion is simply not to care and be silent.

You should you know - close ears and live with it. Nobody will come and be violent against you - its just talk. So just close your ears. (Daud)

Daud also adds that it is good “not to speak Arabic all the time” (Daud), suggesting that also in the entrepreneurial space speaking Arabic marks you as an outsider in Israel (see Sion 2014: 2641).

Amal has clearly been thinking about facing racism from a strategic point of view:

I was not happy with silence so I understood that I need to present my ideas in a way that don't show me.

As I asked what she means by not showing her, she explains her strategy:

Like I take an article written by someone Jewish and present that. Like I present me through Jewish words and ideas. Because as an Arab I can't criticise the government but when it comes from the Jewish, it's easy (..) To my students<sup>108</sup> I say: leave your ideas to yourself, no one need to know what you really believe.

Amal's strategy is highly creative. She uses a strategy of “passing” that is common in situations where subaltern faces the colonial logic (Sion 2014). Passing signifies concealing normal information about one's ideas and actions (Sion 2014: 2640 - 643). Amal does this in order to make invisible those traits that are used by the hegemony to confine her in to the group of the Other (Spradlin 1998: 598). Passing, like cunning tactics in general, are nonetheless individual tactics and while they might feel political, they lead into depolitical outcomes, evident in Amal's advice to her student not to speak their minds.

Talking with Amal more on the matter of being tactical in everyday-life brings further tactics into light:

I have heard from my friends: “I don't say anything that I believe or not. In job they do not need to know.” Other guys, I think they are young, take it to the extremes. They pretend to

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<sup>108</sup> Here Amal means the PAI youth that she mentors in entrepreneurship and in high-tech.

be similar to the Jewish. Try to change themselves in order to be accepted. Talk like them, look like them and everything. They become Zionist in their ideas and they are loud about it.

As I ask Amal why cannot the Arabs be Zionist, she humorously says it is the most stupid question she has ever heard, before clarifying:

When you are Arab you can't be Zionist.. these guys start to really say that we should destroy Palestine and Palestinians. I don't know what they really believe but you know, some people are strategic.. they want to get something, like acceptance and success (..) And I don't know what Jewish society prefers: people who act or people who are real and act accordingly to what they really believe.

Amal's experiences speak of uneasiness – for her, living in the border condition brings pressures and uncertainty. The narrative about young guys suggest that some PAI entrepreneurs employ the tactic of a “mimic man” copying the colonial behavior and mind in order to become accepted. As Bhabha notes, the power of colonial mind is, however, based on separating the Self from the Other – often finding ways to mark the mimic man as different (Bhabha 1984; 1994; 1996). It is clear that being an Arab at the entrepreneurial space is not easy.

## **5.2. Part II Telos: Becoming smart**

One of the most common words used to describe how entrepreneurial intervention changes society is the word ‘smart’. It seems that the idea of “smartness” creates a narrative and a structure to sense-making at the entrepreneurial site. “Becoming smart” is the central idea through which power operates, and relations of self and other transform.

Becoming smart is what drives both the Israeli Jews and the PAI at the intervention; they do, however, mean partly different things by it. Examining the narratives at the entrepreneurial space reveals, that the interviewees are indeed describing what at least for them is a systematic strategy for a social transformation.

### **5.2.1. Emancipation through “becoming smart” – the PAI narrative**

The ways in which the PAI entrepreneurs conceptualize smartness are divergent and partly contradictory. Nonetheless, there are significant general patterns in “becoming smart” from which it is possibly to start. Their “theory from below” shines light to the obvious contradictions in the PAI narratives that have been presented earlier.

There seem to be six principles upon which the PAI version of “smartness” is based on:

1. Technology as a teacher
2. Entrepreneurialization of civil society
3. A-politics of the talented few
4. Mutual learning
5. Win-win loyalty
6. Unintended consequences.

### **Technology as a teacher**

In their theory of smartness, the high-tech has an “automatized logic” that transforms both Arab and Jewish cultures towards more tolerant forms. As Emile explains, entrepreneurial intervention is about “living together through the example of technology” (Emile). Technology is described as an actor, with its own negotiation power to turn people smart.

High tech is very logarithmic in its way of thinking: you think about the risks, about the results, about the way you do processes..so we all start to think this way..this is the way we start to deal with all the problems and processes..not just in business but in life. (Amal)

Hud, too, constructs the materialities of entrepreneurship as “automatically” teaching people to solve societal problems:

Working in high-tech is about solving technological problems. You learn to think systematically and rationally about all the issues in life. So technology shows you how to solve technological and societal problems – this is the idea.

Technology also distances oneself from issues that are too personal:

When you are part of the ecosystem, you speak international language, think about customers all around the world everyday, you start to realize that world is not this little box in Israel. You’ll become smart when you plug in! (Emile)

For Hud, Amal and Emile, it is clear that the technology is not just a teacher to the Arabs but also a teacher to the Jews. As Amal puts it: “you see how the Jews transform through technology. They become more open and tolerant.” For Hud, too, it is a process in which both Jews and Arabs learn to think in a “smart and rational way” (Hud). Technology in these imaginations creates a platform for encountering and “having a new kind of dialogue”, as Emile puts it. As long as the PAI entrepreneurs are able to increase the number of situations where Israeli Arabs and Jews enter the space of technology together, the rest is “automatised” (Hud).

Clearly the myths about technology as a neutral and emancipatory force are internalised by the PAI entrepreneurs.

### **Entrepreneurialisation of civil society**

For smartness to become a part of daily lives, there are structural changes that need to be done according to the PAI. One of these is to transform the Arab civil society towards not just supporting, but focusing their work on creating entrepreneurial interventions<sup>109</sup>. The PAI entrepreneurs make a clear distinction between smart tools and traditional tools for social change. According to Emile, Anton and Laila, traditional tools include intifadas, revolutions and politics in general. As Daud says:

The key revelation in becoming entrepreneur is, that revolutions do not work, they only bring misery.

Laila, who took part in preparing the “Future Vision” declaration (2006) now works together with the government in the entrepreneurial intervention and believes that it brings equality and democracy to Israel. She emphasises, that the Arab civil society has learned from Arab Springs and Intifadas that those kinds of approaches are useless.

The narratives of the PAI entrepreneurs are filled with frustration and bitterness for the PAI civil society. Emile and Anton both tell how it has demanded “hundreds of meetings”<sup>110</sup> to convince the Arab leaders and civil society in Israel that entrepreneurship works as a way to “accelerate development” (Emile, Anton).

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<sup>109</sup> As I had not thought about civil society’s role in entrepreneurial intervention, its importance in the theory of smart came as a total surprise to me.

<sup>110</sup> The suspicion was mostly about the role of military in the entrepreneurial interventions according to Emile.

For Emile, the emergence of entrepreneurial interventions has been a battle against “peace and love -activists” and human rights organisations that “just talk and never do” (Emile). According to him, a real change is now coming: the government has just promised to fund<sup>111</sup> four new entrepreneurial centres in Arab towns and the number of Arab entrepreneurs and engineers working in high-tech is steadily increasing<sup>112</sup>. Emile tells that many civil society activists now work for or with them.

### **A-politics of the talented few**

It seems that becoming smart requires the PAI entrepreneurs to neutralize themselves from wider Palestinian identity and to distance themselves from politics all together. The paradox is, that in their theory of “smart” this is the only way to achieve emancipatory political outcomes. Anton and Emile both strongly separate entrepreneurial intervention from politics. Emile even seems angry as I ask about whether there is anything political in what they do.

This is not a matter of political action (..) We do not want to solve all the problems between Israel and Palestine, and the problems of Syria and Ukraine and all. We want to encourage and empower the Arab society through technology and entrepreneurship... And that's it! We won't speak about the problems and conflict. That's it! (Emile)

To Emile, it is clear that, as Israeli citizens, the Arabs are entitled to economic success. Distancing from the Palestinians is a way of highlighting the Israeli identity instead of Palestinian. Anton also makes a clear distinction between Arab entrepreneurs of Israel and the Palestinians:

We believe in shared equal society through economy.. and we wont speak about West Bank.. West Bank and its people are not part of Israel like we are in our perception. We are citizens of Israel. (Anton)

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<sup>111</sup> Hud also describes the change in the civil society: “And what is good is that we are witnessing the whole civil society changing. These initiatives are getting more funding and people see that this co-existence and business co-operation works. So there are lot of new civic projects focusing on Arab entrepreneurship and Arab-Jewish co-existence in business. There is a whole wave of entrepreneurial civic projects and the State is backing us up because its a necessity.”

<sup>112</sup> According to Geektime article by Gabriel Avner (9th March 2016), Israeli Arabs comprise only 4 % of the estimated 100,000 strong civilian high-tech sector. This figure, is a significant improvement from the 0.5 % of the PAI that was involved in high-tech in 2008. This figure I could not, however, affirm from government or other sources.

It is interesting, that when asked about politics, the first thing that the PAI entrepreneurs do, is distance themselves from Palestinian identity and issues. When Emile compares the problems of Palestine to Syria and Ukraine, it becomes clear that he publicly demonstrates his belonging to Israel. This is done by fiercely adapting the Zionist identity of Arab of Israel and the geographical borders that goes along with it (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005).

For Laila, the silence about politics is a smart way of first becoming economically self-sufficient, and earning the respect of Jewish society. She says that it is “smart not to present oneself as a threat” (Laila). Becoming wealthy produces “dignified citizenship” in her strategy, something the “middle-class Arabs” now have in Israel (Laila). For her, the emerging middle-class will realize justice because they do it “in not so contradicting and tense way” (Laila).

For her, as well as for other PAI entrepreneurs the “radical Arabs” or the “crazy Palestinians”, as Daud puts it, present a real threat to their strategy:

They rock the boat, they go and scream that they are Palestinians, and use violence. This only brings problems to Arab cities. (Daud)

After claiming that entrepreneurial intervention is not political, Anton, Emile and Daud present it as an efficient way to build peace:

I’m a big believer in bottom up -change. Before it was either these peace talks or all these uprisings and clashes. I do not believe in either of them. I believe that when you bring 10 Jews and 10 Palestinians together, not the hippies or the politicians but logical entrepreneurs to create a start-ups that will change everything. (Anton)

It is telling how Anton describes entrepreneurial co-existence as a “bottom up” project, simultaneously denying the value of mass movements, such as uprisings. Here the key logic is, that if power is placed into the hands of the “smart people”, then also the political dreams will come true:

High-tech and anything that is based on academic and smart people are more capable in problem solving. And once you know how to solve technical problems you know how to solve problems between people too. The more barriers we break between smart people the more barriers we break in society! (Daud)

The politics of the masses, whether uprisings or peace talks led by (somewhat) democratically elected leaders, are portrayed as a waste of time in these imaginaries. It is implied, that if political problems would be given to the hands of “logical” entrepreneurs, the conflict would be over.

### **Mutual learning**

Despite all the high-tech -cliches of high-tech being a global culture and assertions that the Jews too - at least within high-tech, value difference, there is a silent, cautious way in which the PAI entrepreneurs place hope on the transformation of Jewish culture and Zionist ideas. Laila explains how through daily life in high-tech the Jewish and the Arabs learn to appreciate each other’s cultures and habits, such as different types of food, or ways of greeting. Amal and Nadia suggest that there is a skill that the Arabs, because of being minority, have achieved that the Jews do not have:

Being a minority makes you develop certain awareness of other cultures. You are more conscious. Jews they sometimes forgot to listen. In high-tech if you do not listen you might not get the deal. (Amal)

Notably, this is not a skill that the PAI entrepreneurs actively teach to the Jews: rather, it is a skill that the entrepreneurial life in a mechanical manner teaches to the Jews – through Arabs.

The idea that high-tech automatically creates moments of cultural borrowing and learning can be understood as a weak signal of cosmopolitanism in the entrepreneurial space (Delanty 2011: 642). The most important feature of cosmopolitanism is, however, lacking: the ability of the PAI entrepreneurs to be openly present as themselves in the entrepreneurial space. As the entrepreneurs themselves paint a picture of the “traditional Arab”, with colours provided by Zionism, – they end up playing the role of the “good Arab”, and thus reproducing Zionist image of the other (Cohen 2009). All that is left in the toolbox of transforming the Jews is the logic of an automatized transformation, where there are no actors, but just serendipitous moments of cultural borrowing.

### **Showing loyalty, fast.**

One aspect in the theory of “smart” is that the PAI become useful and needed by the Israeli state and by global capital. When asked, all of the entrepreneurs agree that the main reason why they are integrated is economic.

It is not like state suddenly loves Arabs, they need us. The economic development of Arabs and the economic development of state is tied together, and the Arabs need to become plus instead of minus. (Emile)

There is a strong sense of urgency with all the PAI entrepreneurs that I spoke with to deliver results. Globalisation has brought them possibilities, but also a sense of a “once in a lifetime opportunity”, as Salim phrases it. Along with the urgency and the excitement the narratives speak of fear – that they might be excluded if they fail. Indeed, the threat of “not becoming exploited” by the global capital and by the Israeli state looms over the PAI entrepreneurs as their biggest fear (Burawoy 2015).

Nothing would enforce one’s status like making an exit to global markets and bringing money to Israel. Daud dreams of Arabs being the next “economic miracle” of Israel saying: “we can be the unicorn, unicorn of Israel”. While the Future Vision documents declared that the Palestinians of Israel have every right for equality, it seems that in the entrepreneurial space, the right to belong needs to be earned (Future Vision 2006). This seems to support Sassen’s idea that citizenship transforms in global spaces towards more market-oriented forms, replacing self-evident rights with “effective nationality” where right to belong need to become earned (Sassen 2003b: 5). Such an idea, as Michael Young notes, is most lethal for those who are already in the most vulnerable positions (M. Young 1958).

This need to show loyalty and worthiness goes even further at the entrepreneurial space. The competitive advantage of the PAI entrepreneurs is their connection to Arab countries – a connection that can be used to open up Arab markets for Israel.

The issue of opening Arab markets is critical because of the Arab boycott against trade with Israel or with Israeli citizens is officially still being practiced by members of the Arab league (Weiss 2015). There are two stories told that imply that PAI entrepreneurs are actively helping Israel to bypass boycott. Amal and Salim tell that they have helped

several PAI entrepreneurs to establish a firm to Ramallah, West Bank, “from where it is okay to do business to Gulf countries” (Amal). Also, as Salim says, Arab investors from a Gulf country are investing to Israeli Arab companies.

And we also have investments from the Arab peninsula, because the Arab Israeli have better ecosystem and technology.. so they are ready to make investments. But for these investments we need to register a new company for our entrepreneurs and register it to Virgin Islands or somewhere in Ramallah because they can't show that they come from here. But the investors know that the companies are from here and there are Jewish and Arab people behind them.

The need to show loyalty to the state and the need to have success thus drive the PAI entrepreneurs to situations where they actively break the principles of boycott movement that is cherished by PA authorities in West bank and in Gaza.

### **Entrepreneurial dreams, unintended consequences?**

As we discuss the long-term dreams that the PAI entrepreneurs have, most dreams are strikingly individual. For Salim, it is about living a “global life”, which means first working hard and making the exit and then “enjoying the good life” that includes traveling and skiing in France (Salim).

For Laila, the dream is the ability for her kids to go to Tel Aviv, “and feel like they own the place” (Laila). For Amal, it is about achieving economic freedom, especially from men and from village life – to be free to go “where-ever and when ever” (Amal). For Emile, it is about making new friends who think like he, and “seeing the beauty of the world” (Emile). For Daud, it is about his kids: “that they, like their father, believe that they can become anything they want and have success” (Daud). For Nadia, it is about having the income level where she can choose the “best school”, and the “most healthiest food” for her kids (Nadia). For Hud, it is not regretting anything when he is old, knowing that “I reached my full potential” (Hud). Perhaps it is the dream of Anton that summarises what they all want:

That I won't be regarded as an Arab, but as an entrepreneur who is respected. (Anton)

The dream is to become post-Arab and post-Palestinian. To escape the local relations, local time and local space, and most importantly the local Self and be free. There is no dream that is more humane.

Almost everything about their dreams would signal a jet-set cosmopolitan identity that is so individual and so connected to global possibilities, that the critical awareness of Palestinian struggle is forgotten or actively pushed aside. It is however Laila, who offers an alternative interpretation. This is the logic of the “unintended consequences”. Laila is extremely aware of the possibility that the state seeks to “shape our identities, even normalize us”. Despite this, she believes that: “sometimes from bad something good is born” (Laila). These unintended consequences for her are outcomes of pride and a sense of dignity that she can feel in Nazareth:

We have Microsoft, Amdocs even Cisco, and you should see the people. They are proud and they carry themselves differently.

According to Laila, economic growth brings pride, and pride brings new position for making demands. As I ask her, is not this idea built on a highly uncertain foundation, as it is dependent on global high-tech companies, she says wittingly:

Uncertainty is the foundation of our life. I believe this is the only way to bring equality. That there are Arabs who the Jewish respect.

In her logic, high-tech and emerging middle-class “turns the Arab voices more diverse” (Laila). Pride and sense of dignity disrupts the image of the Arabs that the Jews have, and forces them to face themselves in a mirror (Laila). There are two paradoxes in her strategy. First, she invests her hopes on a materiality that, instead of creating middle classes, destroys them (Sassen 2014). Second, how can the image of the Other pluralise, if the other is hidden and negated by those who are included.

### 5.2.2. Control through “becoming smart” – the zionist narrative

While the data about the Jewish public officials is very skew, it sheds a light on what the purposes and tactics of entrepreneurial intervention are from their perspective.

Alon describes “smartness” as a democratic way of changing the culture:

I can say that you have to do these in a smart way. So to build incentives to change the culture..So you have to build incentives that will change the behavior in a smart way. So this is the democratic way of changing how people act and think.

He further elaborates how the entrepreneurial intervention does this on a practical level:

The main thing is to be exposed to the Jewish and start-up society.. you can do it with incentives. So if he comes to the city of Tel Aviv where the money is to meet the investors (..) And these people, these networks are based on military service. So he gets immersed to these ideas and these networks.. So it's all about managing the personal level, that's the new politics. (Alon)

Using the start-up lingo, Ilan describes this “new politics” as “lean governance”, referring to the idea that politics are “prototyped” before “scaling them up” (Ilan). He seems to think that this prototype works:

I'm optimistic. I have a very materialistic way of seeing the world. With material you can change the thought: so if someone lives good, he has a good life, he has hobbies and he can travel, so he has more mild political opinions and he can take part of the society.

When I ask, does not the volatile nature of high-tech also jeopardise the Jewish state, Ilan strongly disagrees. For him, high-tech is a way to make the country less affected by “terrorism and conflict” (Ilan). By producing innovations for global economy, the economic growth is thus seen as disconnecting from the local instability. Ilan’s idea is supported by the bestseller “Start-up Nation” that celebrates how Israel’s state, through high-tech, has found a way to “divorce security threat from economic growth opportunities” (Senor & Singer 2009: 149). Senor and Singer prove it by showing how in the years 2002-2004, when the violent attacks<sup>113</sup> grew significantly, there was also a significant growth in foreign investments<sup>114</sup> for the Israel high-tech sector (Senor & Singer 2009: 148 - 149).

The imaginary of “smart”, presented by public officials, seeks to produce what Barfuss calls economically active, but politically “passive” identities, and simultaneously *de-terrorize* economic growth from local problems (Barfuss 2008). The global nature of knowledge economy is thus described as securing Zionist interests. Indeed, the public officials think that in the long run, if entrepreneurial intervention can fix both political

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<sup>113</sup> They refer both to second Intifada and the second Lebanon War.

<sup>114</sup> Between 2000 - 2004 foreign investments to Israel tripled (Senor & Singer 2009: 149).

and economic problems of the state, “it makes Arabs understand or at least accept that this is a safe-haven of Jewish people and that taking part in building it they can have prosperous lives.” (Erez).

If the Israeli Palestinians internalize this message, then for Alon the future truly is a future of co-existence. Belonging is thus conditioned with zionism.

Israel can become the example of the world: we have Jews, Christians, Muslims – everyone here, living together making their own dreams come true.

It seems that the Jews as well as the PAI at the entrepreneurial space believe that the “automatized” logic of entrepreneurial materiality will produce the outcomes they both seek. For both of them, the main goal is to “modernize Arabs” in order to live together. In the version of smartness, presented by public officials, becoming entrepreneur signals becoming immersed in zionist networks and ideas. Palestinians, “plugging in” to global, are thus simultaneously plugging in to zionism.

## **VI Conclusion**

This thesis has studied individual imaginaries at a global strategic site where the powerless can encounter those with power. Through an exploratory case-study approach the study sought to analyse transformations of self and other through following research questions: 1) what imaginaries of subalternity emerge at the entrepreneurial space, 2) how do the emerging imaginaries of subalternity destabilise and stabilise zionist imaginaries, and 3) what is the role of the global in shaping the emerging imaginaries and their transformative potential.

The conclusion is divided into three sections. The first section connects the collected “individual imaginaries” into exploring the dynamics behind the research questions and develops theory and case together (Yin 2003). The second part summarises the policy relevant, and theoretical findings of the thesis, and develops them further. The third and last section discusses the limits of the study and suggests few suggestions for future researches.

## 6.1. The birth of a ‘post-Palestinian entrepreneur’

The individual imaginaries demonstrate that the entrepreneurial site functions as a territory where transformative visions of self and other become imagined. This section summarises the meanings of subalternity that emerge at the site, and the hegemonic/emancipatory dynamics embedded into those meanings.

Based on empirical data, I argue, that the entrepreneurial site gives birth to a new subjectivity, the “Post-Palestinian entrepreneur”. While for the PAI entrepreneurs this metamorphosis is filled with hope for a better future and emancipation, it is in fact, hope that is coded with Zionist interests. The following discussion demonstrates that the subjectivity of the post-Palestinian entrepreneur is born, as the PAI imagine the “global” as a path of collective escape from repression and discrimination. In fact, their “global” is Zionism in disguise. The section demonstrates, that the ability of Zionism to hide within the expansion of knowledge economy brings unprecedented hegemonic dynamics to the Israel-Palestine region.

### 6.1.1. New other, old self

The Jewish public officials’ and the PAI entrepreneurs’ conceptualisations of self and other, and the borders between them, differed significantly. In their creative appropriation of the white man’s burden the PAI entrepreneurs seek to create a new self and a new “us”. In order to reach this metamorphosis, the PAI entrepreneurs create *new others*: “refugees”, “traditional arabs” and “radical arabs” or “crazy Palestinians”. The difference between the smart and the “new others” is then the modernity that belonging to a “global” space and connecting to “global” technologies produce. The myths of the global become internalised by the PAI and create a powerful hope for escape. Indeed, the “global” signifies a possibility for emancipation, of leaving histories and spaces of discrimination behind. It offers a soothing amnesia from the on-going processes of systemic discrimination and occupation in Israel.

The birth of a new “smart” subject is thus simultaneously the denial of Palestinian identity, and expulsion of subaltern knowledge and subjectivity from the entrepreneurial space. Reproducing the binary categories of Zionism in order to emancipate themselves, the PAI entrepreneurs thus reproduce conditions of subalternity. Creatively the PAI

entrepreneurs thus detach themselves from all that the hegemonic zionist imaginary has marked as unmodern – and re-territorialize themselves to the side of modernity. The social map of subalternity that the PAI entrepreneurs imagine is presented below.




Figure 2. social map of subalternity / PAI.

The PAI social map of subalternity presents a striking contrast to studies on the self-identification among Israeli Palestinians. Their imaginary defies the pattern that speaks of consistent increase among the PAI to self-identify themselves publicly as Palestinians<sup>115</sup> (Khoury et al. 2013). Also, by detaching from villages and collective histories, they cut the roots of communal and local identities through which they have sought to identify themselves (Rouhana 1993; Bishara 2001). Indeed, there is no single occasion in the data where Palestinianism, hamula<sup>116</sup> or village is mentioned in order to describe one's belonging to a social group. By presenting themselves as Israeli Arabs the PAI entrepreneurs make space for zionist myths of the "empty land", where only 'mixed people' roamed before the zionists arrived to operate. A myth that is anything

115 Studies show that self-identification as Palestinian is growing, and is most common among highly educated people and among the "stand tall generation" (Khoury et al 2013; Mendilow 2012; Abu-Saad, Yona, & Kaplan, 2000; Diab & Mi'ari, 2007; Rouhana, 1993; Smooha 1984, 2005). However, Smooha is an exception here, as he claims that self-identification as Israeli is growing over the decades (2010:18).

116 the large extended family that has been an important source of identity and memory (Mendilow 2012).

but unique in the history of colonialism. As some of the entrepreneurs explicitly separate their existence from the West Bank, or even portray the occupied territories as a foreign country, the Zionist category of Israeli Arab becomes the new norm.

What Masalha describes as ‘memoricide’: a process in which material and discursive connections to Palestine identity are erased, fits perfectly in the active discourse on “leaving” and “becoming smart” that the PAI entrepreneurs deploy (Masalha 2012; Kimmerling 2003: 214 - 215). Only in this case it is not directly the Israeli state that is executing the memoricide, but the Israeli Palestinians themselves. By denying the worth of subaltern knowledge to enter the entrepreneurial space the PAI entrepreneurs reshape the Zionist policy of segregating (Israeli) Palestinians from time and space into segregating knowledge about Palestinianism from the global time and space (Amal 2010).

The Jewish imaginaries of subalternity make it clear that the PAI entrepreneurs fail in their creative mission to separate themselves from “backwardness”. Indeed, their globalism and modernity is not recognised by the Jewish public officials. The distinctions that the Jewish public officials, however, do make are between “good arabs” and “bad arabs” and religious and modern Jews. As they all come from Ashkenazi background this is hardly surprising. The Jewish social map of subalternity from the entrepreneurial space is presented below:




Figure 3. social map of subalternity / Public officials

The imaginary of smart, that the Jewish public officials present, reproduces the emancipatory narrative of zionism. It takes zionism back to its secular dream of building a European outpost to middle east that, not only protects the Jews, but also civilises the arabs<sup>117</sup>. The PAI “subaltern entrepreneurs”, only by thankfully existing, turn this myth into reality.

Crucially, it is not just the emancipatory narrative of zionism that the imaginaries of the PAI entrepreneurs produce through becoming “modernised” at the entrepreneurial space. They also reproduce the *emancipatory narrative of the global* that is extremely important for the expansion of capital: the idea of the flat world that anyone can join if they choose to (Freidman 2005; Steger 2008).

It seems that a combination of the following entrepreneurial myths is internalised into the PAI entrepreneur’s “emancipatory” vision:

- A. Myths of self-destruction and creation
- B. Myth of the end of difference in entrepreneurial space
- C. Myth of the neutrality and emancipatory power of technology.

Zionism is able to endow its interests into this entrepreneurial facade of neutrality and “imaginaries of hope” it represents (Beck 2005: 60). It is the neutrality and the hope of “smartness” that motivates the PAI to leave their Palestinian identity, relations and knowledges behind. The data indicates that interests of zionism are becoming realised through the “global” the PAI imagine.

There is, however, a pattern that can eventually disturb the reclaimed Jewish self-image. This is the critical awareness that the PAI women entrepreneurs present in interviews. Indeed, all the women narrators wonder about possible politics of identity management behind the “inclusive” intervention. Currently they, however, hide their criticism

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<sup>117</sup> In fact, they take Zionism back to its roots, and pay resemblance to the character of ‘Rashid Bey’ that Theodor Herzl dreamed of being; the “local arab” in his futuristic novel “Aultneuland”: an engineer that marvels the technological advances of Europe (Jews) and has no emotional connection to the land (2015). The only thing motivating Rashid Bey is to improve the material standards of life, improvement that expansion of zionism can provide (Herzl 2015).

behind cunning tactics. Despite their hope of emancipation through the “global”, the women entrepreneurs are simultaneously filled with doubt and uncertainty of whether this tactic will work; whether the zionist system will *see* them as different. Their critical awareness may be a sign of the “double vision of a migrant”, where the one who travels as an outsider into a new context is able to see through power dynamics (Levinas 1969: 33). The PAI women's doubts about normalisation are characteristic problems of the “mimic man” – the psychological burden carried by those who consciously transform their inner being to follow the requirements of power, but fear that they are still doomed as different (Bhabha 1984; Fanon 2008; Du Bois: 2008). In the moment of disappointment this energy and doubt that the women entrepreneurs have been hiding may either materialise into individual crises or into collectively re-articulated and re-imagined transformative visions (Jung 1985). For some reason such a critical awareness, or psychological burden, is not performed by the PAI men.

#### 6.1.2. Deconstructing “global”

This thesis was based on the premise of Sassen, that suggested that globalization can destabilise the national categories of difference (2003a). Clearly, the emergence of the “post-Palestinian entrepreneur” who seeks to leave national identity behind supports Sassen’s premise. However, it seems that this destabilisation can be strikingly one-sided: internally destabilise and fragment the subaltern collective identity, while strengthening the hegemonic national imaginary. The ‘Other’ thus becomes destabilised and unbundled but the ‘Self’ and boundaries it is based on remain fixed, unbothered by the internal divergence of the Other. The post-Palestinian entrepreneur thus becomes only “another otherness” in the hegemonic system (Ahmed 1998: 98-99). As a result, the hegemonic zionist imaginary becomes stabilised through the “global” and space for its myths and materialities to operate emerges.

Deconstructed from the individual imaginaries, the “global” in entrepreneurial site is not the a monolithic totalitarian “globalisation” that comes from “above” as Beck and some other hyper-globalists suggest (Beck 2005; Beck 2005, 61-62; Friedman 2005; Ohmae 1996). Rather, the global is made by, and coded with zionist interests. The national is thus able to manage future transformations *from within global* (Hosseini 2013) Functioning through the global, zionism manages to turn global strategic site into

anything but a “territory of non-established rules”, and instead fortify its rules and categories of normal (Sassen 2000).

In result the boundaries between what is global and what is Zionist become blurred in the subaltern consciousness and the boundaries in the hegemonic consciousness remain strikingly rigid<sup>118</sup>. The idea of Levinas, that “modernity presents itself as universal but is in fact personal”, transforms at the entrepreneurial site into a form where globalisation in the imaginations of the PAI entrepreneurs presents itself as universal but is in fact Zionist (Levinas 1969: 46). The entrepreneurial site thus produces “common sense of global”, forcing the PAI entrepreneurs either to forget or hide their critical awareness.

### 6.1.3. Coding and depoliticising new contexts

The individual imaginaries suggest that entrepreneurial logic and hope of emancipation expands from entrepreneurial site into new territories. The findings support Sassen’s ideas about global strategic sites having the systematic capability to code new contexts according to their logic (2000). This process of ‘entrepreneurialization’ stabilises the hegemonic imaginary by expanding, not only in to subaltern consciousness, but also to subaltern “spaces of political” –the sources of Palestinian identity, dialogue and political mobilisation (Fraser 1990, Mouffe 2000).

The expansion into the subaltern spaces of political exposes that knowledge economy and Zionism are in mutually reproductive relationship in Israel. The expansion focuses into spaces that benefit both knowledge economy and myths and materialities of Zionism. This pattern becomes evident by looking at the spaces where knowledge economy seems to expand from the entrepreneurial space.

These spaces are:

1. The PAI civil society
2. The Arab boycott
3. The Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations
4. “European refugee crises”.

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<sup>118</sup> Thus, unlike Giddens and Bauman suggest, the global does not simply disembed and turn everything to fluid, but can leave the hegemonic boundaries untouched (Giddens 1991; Baumann 2000).

### **Civil society**

From the perspective of zionism, the PAI civil society is the internal enemy that seeks to destabilise the “normal” within Israel (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005). In recent years, the state has systematically cut funding channels from human right organisations that critique the state (Adalah 2016b). Indeed, the Israeli Palestinian human rights organization Adalah has warned that “anti-democratic laws<sup>119</sup>” accepted in 2016 may turn the 2017 into a year when draconian measures to control the Palestinian civil society and to decrease the space of grassroots activism are taken to a next level (2016b). From the perspective of knowledge economy, civil society possesses knowledge, creativity and connections, that could be utilised in the processes of accumulation more efficiently. Indeed, it has been the dream of market globalists to absorb the “social capital” of civil society<sup>120</sup> (Fukuyama 1989).

### **Pan-Arab boycott**

The pan-Arab relations in turn have traditionally been a crucial source of (Israeli) Palestinian identity and resistance to the Israeli state (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker; Amal 2010). The Arab boycott to trade with Israel has been understood both as a symbolic gesture of support for Palestinian struggle, and as a tool that could actually destabilise the Israeli state in an effective way (Grandinetti 2015).

The narratives about bypassing the Arab boycott through the connections of the PAI entrepreneurs demonstrates the extent of the pressure to show loyalty to the hegemonic nation-state in the space of inclusion. Bypassing the Arab boycott, and opening Arab markets to Israel would naturally serve the expansions of knowledge economy and the economic growth of Israel. It could also depoliticise the boycott and fortify the status quo when it comes to Palestine. Indeed, there are signs in the Arab-media and in

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119 These laws include: “Expulsion of MKs” Law: which allows a majority of members of Knesset (MKs) to oust a serving MK, “Anti-Terror Law,” which Adalah fears will be used to suppress and criminalize legitimate political protest and humanitarian and cultural activities by Palestinian citizens of Israel and “foreign funding law” that seeks to cut funds from civil society actors who challenge the Jewish nature of the state.

120 For a market globalist description on how the social capital of civil society is useful for capital and “development, see: Fukuyama (2001).

research made by Weiss (2015) that the elites in arab countries and in Israel publicly tell a narrative of boycott but actually do trade<sup>121</sup>.

### **Peace negotiations**

The PAI imaginaries seek to replace the “peace and love activist” and political processes with *smart peace* done by entrepreneurs. They imagine a peace process, not only as an opportunity to open up markets, but as a market opportunity in itself – a process Rabinowitz calls “privatization of peace” (). These sort of imaginations pluralise and fragment the PAI “stand tall” voices, thus reproducing the status-quo (Rabinowitz 2010). This is a system that may not just politically, but also economically be the best for the Israeli state, as it is able to maintain its materialities of dependency in the occupied territories<sup>122</sup>. From the perspective of the knowledge economy, peace negotiations function as possible markets that the PAI entrepreneurs can open up.

Theoretically this mutually reproductive relationship between zionism and knowledge economy can be understood through Burawoy’s process of commodification (2015). Commodification of knowledge – the most intimate areas of identity and self – is simultaneously dispossession of Palestinian identity and Zionisation of subaltern consciousness,. The entrepreneurial intervention seems to take the role of traditional development intervention by preparing “backward” consciousnesses and spaces for the expansion of markets (Ferguson 1990).

### **Refugee crises**

Crucially there is a fourth place where the logic of entrepreneurialization seems to expand. This is the space of “European refugee crises”. As it has been explained above, teaching the European governments how to transform refugees into entrepreneurs is a source of pride for the PAI entrepreneurs. It is a proof of their metamorphosis into

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121 Weiss writes that “There are indications that some Arab League countries publicly support the boycott while continuing to quietly trade with Israel” (2). In recent decades there have indeed been stories in newspapers that claim that the boycott has not been really enforced in decades: Orly Halpern, “Arab Boycott Largely Reduced to ‘Lip Service,’” Jerusalem Post, February 28, 2006, Dina Ezzat, “Boycott Israel? Not so simple,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, April 11-17, 2002. Also paper by Weiss suggests that arab public officials from boycotting countries anonymously commented that the boycott is not enforced anymore in a systematic way (Weiss, 2015: 2). The findings here support these ideas.

122 According to Farsakh (2013: 125), between 1970 and 1990 Israel has benefitted 16 billion dollars (about 10 % of Israel’s GDP in 2010) from dispossession of water and land resources and exploiting Palestinian labour.

modernity. What the expansion into “refugee crises” however seems to suggest, is that the hegemonic dynamics of entrepreneurial intervention are not just product of zionism, but products of modernity (that exists within zionism too). The Palestinians and refugees both become the objects of intervention because their otherness needs to be controlled and reproduced. The modern self-image within Zionism originates from the modern European self that also is currently destabilised by the uncontrolled presence of the other. This self needs to be reclaimed, by simultaneously controlling the Other and creating an emancipatory, elevating idea of self. The expansion of zionism through entrepreneurial intervention into subaltern spaces of political can be summarised as the process of depoliticisation and re-modernisation of the Other.

As the expansion commodification and de-palestinianisation in Israel take place through actions of subaltern entrepreneurs, it is evident, that they are co-opted into makings of zionism and makings of modernity. They set in motion a process of *trasformismo* where they institute themselves and their communities under hegemonic imaginary (Green 2009). The “culture war” they are waging is a war against plural otherness in their selves (Delanty 2011).

### **Negating plurality**

In the theory section, it was suggested that global strategic site could create conditions of “asymmetrical pluralism” – conditions where modern binary categories could pluralise into cosmopolitan possibilities.

The tactics that the PAI women entrepreneurs deploy correlate with signs of cosmopolitanism presented in the theoretical section. They search for moments of cultural borrowing and mutual learning where the Jews and the Arabs would learn how others eat and the Jews would learn “cultural awareness” from the PAI.

However, as the PAI entrepreneurs enter the space by reproducing the zionist myths about “Arab mentality”, they prevent the space from turning into “reflexive space” (Delanty 2011). Thus, the other is reproduced as a static image, and the hegemonic self cannot encounter anything that is “unknown” to it – preventing the hegemonic reason from facing the paradoxes and pluralities of the Other (Kierkegaard

1985; Kristeva 1982). The first conditions of cosmopolitanism – the presence of other as unknown is not fulfilled (Levinas 1969). Hence, not the hegemonic self, nor the subaltern Other is liberated from the violent interdependent relations and imaginations of post-colonial modernity (Jung 1931; Nandy 1988).

The findings demonstrate, that the hope that Beck (2005; 1999) and Delanty (2011) invest on globalization's ability to expose the binary logic of modernity is not fulfilled in this case. The entrepreneurial space turns pluralism to dualism before the interaction has even begun.

To conclude, while the existence of PAI entrepreneurs as such is an anomaly in Israel, a condition that could produce new kind of encountering, the PAI entrepreneurs make their best to normalize this anomaly by cunningly hiding their experiences of racism and discrimination. The systemic capability of the global strategic site to create absence materialises into absence of Palestinian identity and stabilises the hegemonic Zionist as normal<sup>123</sup>.

The inability of the presence of the PAI entrepreneurs to cause dissonance at the hegemonic consciousness could also be related to the entrepreneurial myths that have the power to commodify the meanings of difference. Difference is essentially a factor of production in the myths of the knowledge economy. “Unknown” may thus become characteristic of the entrepreneurial spaces and lose its capacity to produce dissonance.

The observation that the entrepreneurial space can accommodate Zionism, but not Palestinian knowledges, opens up a possibility to theorise how the deeper mythological mechanisms of modernity function in entrepreneurial intervention. Using the terminology of Gills, the inability to accommodate Palestinian knowledges and presence may be that at least some of them are “ontologically incommensurable<sup>124</sup>” with

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<sup>123</sup> The entrepreneurial intervention seems to continue the logic of the “old Yishuv” where exclusively “Hebrew labour” was the ideal, and the economy was always highly dependent on Palestinian labour, infrastructure and products (Shafir 2011). The urge to cunningly hide oneself possibly takes away the destabilitative power of the entrepreneurial space – turning it into “new Yishuv” where the (Israeli) Palestinians are needed but not seen.

<sup>124</sup> The concept and process of ontological incommensurability originates from Gills and I learned it in insightful discussions with him. The concept will be developed in forthcoming publications of Gills.

modernity. This becomes evident when the PAI entrepreneurs describe the “traditional” relation to land and to olive trees. There is an ontology of seeing land and nature as active beings themselves. In the entrepreneurial space this “living relation” turns “backward” and “unmodern”. Clearly it is a myth that is not compatible with modernity’s “rational” ideas of “nature” that is something that the Self owns, not interacts with (Mies & Shiva 2014). It thus seems that the modernity within “global” negates the indigenous knowledges that live within Palestinian identity.

Such an ontological incommensurability is not anything unusual in the encountering between indigenous knowledges and expansive hegemonic modernity dressed up as emancipation and development<sup>125</sup>.

## **6.2. Findings: the predatory imaginaries of hope**

The purpose of this section is to summarise the findings of the thesis. At the end of this section, a new theoretical concept that summarises the hegemonic dynamics of entrepreneurial intervention is presented. The concept supplements an existent theoretical category developed by Sassen.

### **6.2.1. Policy relevant and theoretical findings of the study**

The findings of the thesis can be divided into policy relevant findings and theoretical findings. The purpose of the policy relevant findings is to strengthen the praxis<sup>126</sup> of the thesis by delivering findings that can be used by civil society actors and other voices within and outside Israeli society that seek for peace and democratization of the state.

There are two policy relevant key findings in the study:

#### **1. Depoliticisation: The entrepreneurial intervention in Israel functions to depoliticize civil society.**

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<sup>125</sup> See: de la Cadena 2015 and Gudynas (2011)

<sup>126</sup> Praxis refers to active engaging with every day-life and power as an academic responsibility: speaking and acting together with individuals (see: Gramsci (1971) and Habermas & McCarthy (1977)).

The findings show strong pattern of growing pressures to “entrepreneurialize” civil society. This process is implemented by the Israeli Palestinian entrepreneurs but it is the result of the need to show worthiness to the competitive Zionist state. Contextualised against the recent draconian laws to control the Israeli Palestinian civil society, the entrepreneurialization functions as a cunning tactic to reach the same depoliticising ends with less coercive means. Findings suggest that the PAI “Stand tall” elite and civil society that has been celebrated as the key actors in solving the Israel-Palestine conflict is becoming strikingly depoliticised as they “become global”. (Mendilow 2012; Peleg and Waxman 2013).

**2. Co-optation: The entrepreneurial development intervention seems to weaken the Arab boycott against Israel by creating incentives for the PAI to help the Israeli state to bypass the boycott.**

The threat of not becoming included into the start-up nation drives Israeli Palestinians to show loyalty to the state in the most creative of ways. The data suggests that there may be a pattern of Israeli Palestinian entrepreneurs helping the Israeli state to bypass the Arab boycott movement. This is, according to interviewees, done by setting up subsidiaries to Ramallah while in reality the operations are run and profits claimed in Israel. These findings support earlier research of Weiss (2015). The growing pressures to show loyalty can be interpreted as the emergence of “effective citizenship”, where citizenship is no longer a self-evident right, but loyalty and productivity are required for the right to belong (Sassen 2003). The urgency to show loyalty to the state creates conditions for divergence and *trasformismo*: birth of a new Post-Palestinian entrepreneurial elite that advances government agenda (Green 2011).

The policy relevant findings are supplemented with theoretical findings of the thesis. These findings are:

**1. Stabilization: Entrepreneurial site produces an alternative vision of difference of “becoming smart”, that challenges and reinforces the hegemonic boundaries of belonging**

As findings demonstrate, the entrepreneurial intervention gives birth to a new category of difference – “the smart people”. Through smartness, Israeli Palestinian entrepreneurs imagine radically alternative identities where they form a “we” together with the Jews. Simultaneously they, however, create “new others”, and turn against their collective

identity and memory as well as zionist hegemonic imaginaries of difference. The critical awareness performed by the PAI women, however, proofs that there might be dynamics of destabilisation hidden within the space of inclusion.

## **2. De-Palestinianization: Zionism and global imaginaries are in reproductive relationship and expand together to fragment and depoliticise subaltern consciousness and spaces of political**

Results indicate that the expansion of knowledge economy and expansion of zionism strengthen each other. It seems that there is a pattern of de-Palestinianization and Judaization attached to the commodification of subaltern knowledge. The systemic capability of global strategic site to code new context according to its logic spreads this expansive process of commodification and Judaization to the spaces that traditionally have functioned as sources of Palestinian identity and political action (Franklin et al. 2000; Ong & collier 2005: 11).

## **3. Zionization: Imaginaries of “global” carry zionism inside of them**

The findings challenge the analytical and practical separation of “global” and “national” by demonstrating how both zionism and PAI entrepreneurs seek to manage future transformations from within the global. Findings indicate that currently it is zionism that has been able to endow its materials and myths into the PAI imaginary of “global”. It seems, that the entrepreneurial myths on the emancipatory capabilities of technology and the urge to destroy and recreate the self creates a “smart” facade of neutrality into which zionism can hide itself.

## **4. De-Cosmopolitanization: The other as “unknown” is not present at entrepreneurial site, preventing the possibilities of cosmopolitan outcomes**

The subaltern is not able to be present at the entrepreneurial site as a plural human being, or as carrier of subaltern collective consciousness – both regarded for cosmopolitan emancipatory outcomes. By not being able to be present as “unknown”, the hegemonic categories of Self and Other become fortified, and cosmopolitan futures buried (Kierkegaard 1985, Buber 1970, Levinas 1969).

The findings of the thesis suggest that with entrepreneurial hope and inclusion Zionism can achieve the same results as fear and segregation. The hope for emancipation, that motivates the PAI to leave their subalternity, is however nothing unique. It is the same hope that can also be found from academia. This hope motivates hyper-globalists who imagine a flat world that anyone can join (Friedman 2005, Fukuyama 1989). It leads Israeli experts to regard globalisation as Zionism's "Achilles' heel" (Farsakh 2013), or even predict that hegemonic Zionism cannot co-exist with global economy and its values (Juusola 2005). As academics take part in the production of the global hope, its capabilities to cause delusions on the ground becomes fortified.

### 6.2.2. Predatory imaginaries of hope

This final section on findings develops an analytical concept for understanding the transformations of self and other in the interactions of global and national imaginaries, and sense-making in global strategic sites. The tool is based on the "predatory formations", a concept developed by Sassen (2014).

Sassen's term describes how, embedded into finance-led processes of inclusion, there are systemic mechanisms of expulsions: labour, wages and spaces of production are becoming expelled (2014). Clearly, also difference is becoming expelled. While Sassen's concept traces how the expanding material foundations of "global" create predatory mechanisms of expulsions, the concept presented here traces how *hope* functions as a hegemonic tool, not just to serve the material hunger of capital, but also to stabilise the mythological foundations of modernity. The concept exposes how modern self, within the national and the capital, is regained through first including the other and then expelling everything that is *unknown* in other. This inclusion creates the opportunity to systematically re-create the emancipatory images of the Self in Zionism and capitalism. This process I label as *the predatory imaginaries of hope*.

The predatory imaginary of hope as a systemic process is visualised below. There are five phases through which imaginary of "predatory hope" operates:




Figure 4. Predatory imaginary of hope

1. The subalterns are included to the space of hegemonic nationalism and global capital. Hope of emancipation functions as the mechanism of inclusion.
2. Through inclusion the subaltern knowledges become dispossessed and commodified by national-capitalist development intervention.
3. All the knowledges that are characteristic to the original culture became “unmodern” or “illogical”. The Other turns against the original culture and seeks to erase marks of subalternity – transforming the Other from unknown into a pre-known modern “it”. At this point modernity expels everything it cannot consume and the hegemony is able to negate the knowledges and subjectivities of resistance.
4. Through reproducing the image of the Other the subalterns take part in producing the emancipatory civilising and inclusive self-images of capitalist and Zionist systems. The pluralities between national and global imaginaries become stabilised as their unified Self emerges through Other. Both other and the self become *re-modernized and instituted into binary relation*.
5. The subalterns connect the predatory hope into their *spaces of political* in order to prove their value, modernise their roots and reach emancipation. The predatory imaginaries of hope expand to new contexts, “purifying” them from knowledges that are “*ontologically incommensurable*” to modernity. As a result, both the Self and the Other are denied ethical transcendence from violent cycles of modernity.

The logic of predatory imaginaries of hope indicate that it may well be, as Jung suggests, that in the expanding “scientific” modern cosmology of Self, there is no room for the *unknown Other* (1931). To erase this Other the expansive logic of knowledge economy constantly seeks new territories and subjectivities that are unknown to it, and seeks to institute the Other under hegemonic imaginaries – *both for its material and spiritual hunger*. Ontologies that are incommensurable become expelled, others transformed into fixed images that create the Self.

The entrepreneurial myths about accepting difference and cherishing anomalies enables modernity to expand efficiently over the *unknown*. Indeed, these myths create hope that alternatives can exist within spaces of knowledge economy – and thus entrepreneurial modernity is welcomed by those at the margins. The self-destruction of Others that the thesis demonstrates proves that, unlike hegemonic nationalism, alternative knowledges and alternative subjects cannot co-exists in the modern sediment of certainty, that expands through the predatory processes of capital.

### **6.3. Limitations of the study**

Following Sassen, this thesis deployed an explorative indeterminist framework into studying transformations of self and other in a space where global and national imaginaries intersect. By deploying indeterministic framework, the thesis was able to deconstruct meanings given to globalization “from below” and show how expansion of the knowledge economy and the expansion of zionism are in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Approaching difference as imaginary, the thesis was able to trace how the interactions of global and hegemonic national myths and materialities produce future transformations, as well as the creative ways in which the social actors seek to make better futures for themselves through the global.

What can be seen as the major limitation of the study is that it exists within the networks of power of the state of Israel. Almost all of the interviewees were pointed out to me by government gatekeepers. The narrations that I have presented may thus be narratives that the Israeli state wants to present.. Indeed, Israel has a history in seeking

to normalise conflict through brand campaigns and the public relations tricks”<sup>127</sup>. By being aware of this possibility I sought to spend enough time on analysing and reflecting the narratives that I was presented with.

The second major limitation is that as my study takes place in the space of inclusion, it turns silent those who are excluded in Israeli society. In future research studies on the spaces of inclusion should be supplemented with studying the spaces of exclusion. As making of exclusions is part of the expansion of knowledge economy, studying such spaces would probably enrich the findings significantly.

The third limitation of the study derives from its objective of the study: the transformations of difference. As Delanty notes, cultural transformations are such slow processes, that they may only become observable once enough time has passed (2011: 641). As the entrepreneurial development interventions had started only six months before my field work, it is probable that new cultural patterns will emerge later. Furthermore, as the study was based on such a thin data, only eleven in-depth interviews, there is nothing conclusive that can be said on the basis of the findings. For these reasons the result of thesis should be regarded as a source of inspiration for a future research.

### 6.3.1. Starting points for future inquiries

The findings raise analytical possibilities that could function as the beginning of future inquiries. Indeed, there are two core observations that the thesis raised but could not answer with its analytical instruments.

The first relates to the critical awareness that women entrepreneurs present in the space of inclusion. Why are the studied women able to practice / perform critical awareness unlike the PAI men and how do they seek to utilise it are questions that future research should take on.

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127 See discussion about “pinkwashing” the mechanism through which Israel uses gay rights as a tool to brand its image as peaceful and democratic nation (Ritchie 2015).

The second observation relates to the mechanisms of how the entrepreneurial space expands to code contexts of otherness according to its logic. Studying how the entrepreneurial interventions expand to “European refugee crises” and possibly play a role in the “self-making projects of Europe” seems like a fruitful future line of inquiry.<sup>128</sup>

Theoretically the future studies would require stronger combination of theories of political economy and theories of consciousness. What I would be inclined to suggest is to combine Burawoy’s sociological Marxism<sup>129</sup> with Jungian theories of the creative collective (un)consciousness (Burawoy 2013; Jung 2014). Starting from Jung, rather than from Freud as the Frankfurt school and Foucauldian inquiries and many others have done, would perhaps better observe the emancipatory and cosmopolitan possibilities growing out of creative sense-making on the ground. This could strengthen the systemic capabilities of the research setting to actually develop tools for observing transformative emancipatory and hegemonic visions of difference in the new predatory expansions of the knowledge economy.

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128 EU commission has requested for private consultancies to design an European scheme that serves “entrepreneurial refugees” see: Ecorys (2016).

129 This approach combines Marx’s theory of accumulation, Polanyi’s (2009) focus on experience of marketisation (and thus also expulsion) and Gramsci’s insights on transformations of civil society and relations between hegemony and subalternity.

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# Appendices

## APPENDIX I: Overview of interviewees

Date & place of interview	Name of respondent*	Age	Occupation	Religion
21.6.2016 Kafr Quassam, office	Amal	40s	A software developer and a start-up entrepreneur	Muslim
25.6.2016 Nazareth, restaurant	Laila	50s	A former civil society activist and a start-up entrepreneur	Christian
20.6.2016 Northern Israel	Emile	50s	A former municipal leader and a start-up entrepreneur	Christian
14.7.2016 Northern Israel, office	Salim	60s	An start-up entrepreneur	Muslim
5.7.2016 Nazareth, office	Daud	50s	A highly successful start-up entrepreneur	Christian
3.7.2016 Northern Israel, office	Nadia	40s	A Civic activist and a part time start-up entrepreneur	Christian
10.7.2016 Haifa, office	Anton	50s	A successful start-up entrepreneur and a consultant in government projects	Christian
10.7.2016 Nazareth, office	Hud	50s	A successful start-up entrepreneur	Muslim
21.6.2016 Tel aviv, bar	Ilan	40s	A former military elite unit leader and a start-up entrepreneur in management position within entrepreneurial government projects	Jewish
16.7.2016 Tel Aviv, bar	Erez	30s	A recent government employee, ministry for economic development of the minority of the minority sector	Jewish
2.7.2016, Tel Aviv, bar	Alon	30s	A recent government employee, ministry for economic development of the minority sector	Jewish

\*In order to protect the anonymity of interviewees no exact information is given

## APPENDIX II: Interviews: key themes

### 1. Background info

Key question: What kind of background are you coming from?

Topics: Age, work history, family history (including places of residence), education, own descriptions of “group(s)” and “identity(ies)” one associates him/herself with.

## **2. Personal and collective histories and high-tech**

Key question: How do you see the history of this region?

Topics: Becoming entrepreneur, personal phases in life, meanings and narratives of history.

## **3. Defining what entrepreneurship and high-tech is and what it is not**

Key question: What is entrepreneurial culture like?

Topics: Becoming an entrepreneur, entrepreneurs / other people, entrepreneurial skills and qualities, entrepreneurial solutions.

## **4. Narratives of belonging**

Key question: What relations are most important to you? Who do you understand – who understands you?

Topics: Home towns / religion / nation-state, relatives, friends, travelling, myths and culture.

## **5. Personal and collective problems**

Key question: What kind of fears do you have? What problems would you solve, if you could?

Topics: discrimination in high-tech, conflict / high-tech, conflict / own life, problems of own life & culture & economy & politics, whose problems should be solved and how?

## **6. Personal and collective dreams**

Key question: What is your biggest dream? What would a perfect life be like? What would the perfect society be like? What can be done to get there?

Topics: Economy, prosperity, conflict, family.

