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*Nietzsche & Nihilism*

*Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality*

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ABSTRACT

In the present study, the philosophical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 - 1900) is examined from a concept critical point of view. This is to say that Nietzsche’s conception of the nature and role of concepts is elucidated with an eye on the implications of this conception for understanding his work as a whole. It will be argued that ‘nihilism’, as one of Nietzsche’s key concepts, involves the crisis of conceiving and the challenge of reconceiving.

Nietzsche’s frequent assaults on concepts are not interpreted as embodying an overall anticonceptual position with certain nonconceptual, preconceptual or extraconceptual preferences. Instead, his reconceptualization of philosophical conceptuality has to do with the way concepts need no longer be seen as unnatural entities or vehicles of alienation. They stand close to other human inclinations and, further, to other natural processes, albeit their entwinement with words - the other aspect underlined in this reconceptualization - greatly complicates grasping their function.

Close reading of the new critical edition of Nietzsche’s works, coupled with an exceptionally strong emphasis on the inexhaustible variety of interpretative options actualized in the course of a century of critical reception, enable an overview of the philosopher’s multifaceted œuvre. While there can hardly be said to have been any single dominant reading of Nietzsche that ought now to be revised, the intense problematization of philosophical conceptuality in his writings has not yet been properly acknowledged and elaborated. Neither has it been appropriately recognized that there is a specifically conceptual dimension to the question of nihilism which is worth investigating. Once the conceptual questions, and the special role of nihilism in them, are better understood, Nietzsche’s readers are better off in trying to make sense of this fascinating and disturbing philosopher’s impact on a wide range of contemporary issues.
To Sara
Zuletzt, meine liebe Lou, die alte
tiefe herzliche Bitte: *werden Sie, die Sie sind!* Erst hat man Noth, sich
von seinen Ketten zu emancipiren,
und schließlich muß man sich noch
von dieser Emancipation *emancipiren!* Es hat Jeder von uns,
wen auch in sehr verschiedener
Weise an der *Ketten-Krankheit zu*
laboriren, auch nachdem er die
Ketten zerbrochen hat.
Von Herzem Ihrem
Schicksal gewogen - denn
ich liebe auch in Ihnen
meine Hoffnungen.
F.N.
(KGB III/1, August 1882, 247-8.)
FOREWORD

Nietzsche’s entire corpus and the vast amount of commentary with a great diversity of interpretations are best approached from what I shall call the concept critical point of view. It will be my objective to show that better than other options it makes sense of Nietzsche’s inventions both as to their mutual interplay and their relations with the philosophical tradition. The concept critical treatment seeks to give an account of the philosopher’s key concepts, while interrogating the peculiar ways that these and, a fortiori, the very concept of concept, are conceptualized. In this manner, nihilism will be shown to stand out from Nietzsche’s contributions to reconceiving philosophical conceptuality, since it self-reflectively turns upon the practice of conceiving.

What can be demanded from any viable new approach is that it is capable of maintaining contacts, both cooperative and critical, with alternative interpretations. The promise of the concept critical perspective lies in the way it involves the opportunity to attend to all sorts of conceptualizations, in a variety of more or less philosophically oriented currents, traditions and disciplines, as well as to the serious (philosophical, scientific, technical, artistic, religious, political or other) doubts concerning the possibility, worth or meaningfulness of concepts.

The concept critical approach is designed to be rehearsed in investigating Nietzsche’s thought without claims to either suffocating oneness or paralyzing chaos. Most important, however, it is utilized to make a case for Nietzsche as one of the founders of such a critical strategy.

There are three decisive steps to be taken. Nietzsche’s writings have to be shown to lend themselves, apart from whatever else they may deal with, to an interrogation of the character and limits of conceiving. His innovations must be successfully interpreted as conceptual creations that point back to the problematic process of conceptualization. Finally, nihilism has to be investigated both as one more member in the group of those concepts and as the prominent embodiment of the crisis and revolutionary change in the philosophical conception of conceptuality.

Before outlining the structure of my study I would like to lay down two interrelated principles that will reappear during the exploration. In the epigraph of the present work, attention is paid to the need to free oneself from all kinds of ties that bind. As if that was not enough, one is further urged to liberate oneself from the liberation thus achieved. This is because total emancipation leaves one with nothing to emancipate from, which is a state as illusory as it is also nihilistic.
I shall repeat, in the course of my study, the notion of the ‘emancipation from emancipation’ to account for the Nietzschean tendency to operate with power-related conceptualization. Along with the issues of tyranny, slavery and liberty involved in certain conceptions, and the challenge of arriving at an interested and active practice of thinking, ‘emancipation from emancipation’ also aptly characterizes Nietzsche’s self-reflective, self-critical and self-ironical ways of doing philosophy where first order moves can always be expected to be checked by a second order problematization. The concept critical approach assumes the task of bearing out this distinctive feature of his work.

Closely allied to the concept of the double emancipation there is the question of the ‘revolutionary’ and the ‘radical’. My choice of examining Nietzsche’s texts with a constant stress on the issues of conceptuality surely makes some readers doubt that the forceful or the energetic part of this exceptional thinker is being neutralized by academic conventions. At the same time, it may lead other observers to suspect that a provocative writer famous, in the main, for his creative virtuosity or political misjudgment is being marketed as a serious philosopher worthy of academic assessment. That is why I wish to express that I do not see it as worth trying, or ultimately even possible, through any approach, to tame Nietzsche’s texts or to play down what is subversive in them. But I do attempt to show that the revolutionary in his philosophy is, to a great extent, about a radicalism that is intimately related to conceptual problems. These include the one about the concept ‘radical’. In other words, I aim to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s philosophy revolves around its own constraints and its own effects and, by extension, around the task of radically rethinking the business of philosophy.

It was to his friend Lou von Salomé that Nietzsche expressed his notion of the emancipation of emancipation. While one can only guess the extent to which it may have annoyed this emancipated woman, one can take a look at how Nietzsche came to characterize her. Apart from admitting that she “ist bei weitem der klügste Mensch, den ich kennen lernte” (KGB III/1, Februar 1883, 337), Nietzsche wrote like this:

(KGB III/1, Januar/Februar 1884, 468.)

For better or worse, Nietzsche thought that thinking causes second thoughts in a thinker. His own questioning, at least, was questionable even for himself: “Ich bin einer der Wenigen, die kein Bedenken tragen, sich zu compromittiren: eine sehr bedenkliche Art Mensch!” (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 370.)
Ten years before, he had spoken of his becoming sick of a metaphysical “Kampf mit der Vernunft gegen die Vernunft” (KGB II/5, Juli 1878, 338). Yet, it is not hard to see that Nietzsche’s task was to think about thinking, even though and just because “wir sind im Grunde umgekehrt geschult, nämlich beim Denken nicht an’s Denken zu denken” (N Juni-Juli 1885 38 [1], KSA 11, 595-6). My handling of Nietzsche’s thought will underscore self-reflectiveness and radicalism. These two tend to compromise and denigrate each other, yet they contain what may well be Nietzsche’s most remarkable philosophical achievement.

Further, I would like to enhance a view in which the radical and the revolutionary in Nietzsche are seen as dealing with the extreme, the utmost, the terminal, only as they also point to an emancipation from any emancipation achieved in the daring voyages into the outer limits of thought. What is at stake is a kind of radicalized balance where it becomes as important to avoid conventions as to stay critical to any all too easy deviations from them, and most important to examine conventions. This is the reason for speaking, as I do in my title, of “exploring”. “Exploration” conveys traveling out in order to examine; weighing; searching out in order to investigate; probing a wound; letting or making to flow. To explore is not to let boldness take over the ability to assess, nor to let caution weaken the disposition to find out new things.

In the spirit of the two principles - double emancipation and radicalized balance - , it is my contention that Nietzsche’s thought is approachable from a plurality of angles. If the crudest of alternatives were the modern assortment of historico-critical accounts of either psychological or social variety, logico-analytical reconstructions and phenomenologico-hermeneutical interpretations, all on the one hand, and the postmodern collection of textual strategies, on the other, I would hold that much of Nietzsche’s radical ventures could well be illuminated by the means of each of these interpretative options.

Moreover, I see many new points of contact and plenty of reciprocity yet to be discovered here.

Accordingly, I shall draw from a variety of interpretative traditions. However, the uniquely radical, the peculiarly revolutionary, in those Nietzschean ventures, is precisely that they require, from any method, intense self-problematization for that method to work and to be refined. Since Nietzsche’s philosophical importance, as I construe it, consists in his relentless inquiry into the nature and role of conceptuality, his work presents a test for all approaches to come to terms with a singular thinking activity and, simultaneously, with the fundamental presuppositions underlying these approaches.

Chapter one will contain a discussion of Nietzsche’s life and writings. An overview of the ways his biography has been shaped will be offered (I.a) to create a frame of reference for subsequent reflections that rely, in part, on the awareness of different situations in Nietzsche’s life and on their interpretations
by himself and by others. The same reason applies to the need to introduce Nietzsche’s books (I.b) and the significant questions related to the long and winding history and the present state of the philosopher’s literary estate (I.c). In this last section of the first chapter, I shall also bring forward my reasons for offering all the quotations in the original German form.

Apart from supplying a more or less conventional background for the study, this chapter has special objectives dictated by my emphasis on concepts. With the help of commentary by Nietzsche and his readers, the relationship of life and work, as well as the one between individual works and the whole corpus, will be discussed. Nietzsche’s fate will be contextualized in the general debate on nihilism as a collapse of conceptualization. Moreover, it is the concern for conceiving ‘life’ and the family of concepts related to writing and productivity that counts the most. In underscoring the conceptual challenge of ‘Nietzsche’, the first chapter already exemplifies, to an extent, my concept critical approach.

My uncommonly strong emphasis on the need to canvass the wealth of the reactions to, and reappropriations of, Nietzsche’s legacy is at its strongest in chapter II. In the opening section, there is a concise narrative of the philosopher’s critical reception from the late 19th century to the present day. The next two sections illustrate linkages that have been established between Nietzsche and a variety of other thinkers and traditions (II.b) and of the more specific approaches to his work (II.c). To close the chapter, I shall distinguish the most important debates in the contemporary Nietzsche scholarship (II.d).

Again, there is not just the fairly conventional attempt to set the stage for more detailed and targeted analyses. In part, chapter II is an effort to reconstruct a highly interesting piece of history into a semi-independent part of the study. Yet, the specific reason for my accentuation of reception is this. I aim to introduce the concept critical approach as willing and able to both learn from all the others and, possibly, to contribute to their improvement. Any emphasis that claims to be “conceptual” can only expect to be rejected, unless it is linked with an understanding of the inexhaustible aspects of Nietzsche’s work and the variegated character of the Nietzsche scholarship. The best way to test such an understanding is to try and demonstrate the very richness in the field.

Chapter III is a methodological inquiry into the special demands of a Nietzsche research with a proposition for one suitable itinerary. At first, prospects for a fruitful sense of synthesizing and orchestrating Nietzsche’s dispersed mass of writing are discussed and the topic of conceptualization prepared by discussing the one of forms, systems and wholes (III.a). To begin to clarify the chosen manner of coping with his philosophical transactions, an endeavor is made to elaborate the multifaceted conceptual problematic as it appears in the issue of the vocabulary of conceiving (and of Begriff and
Konzeption) (III.b.1), and in the question of the concept of concept (III.b.2).

By “conceptual problematic” I mean, first of all, the way that philosophers often underline the necessity of concepts but can much less often agree upon what these really are. In more historical terms, the post-Kantian situation in philosophy is characterized by the double indispensability and inconceivability of concepts. One facet of this condition is that there is a large consensus of the importance of language in conception (although it now seems to be weakening from the influence of certain trends in cognitive science), yet there is very little interest in the manifold of the very language of conceiving. Another thing is that conceptuality is the home ground of philosophy, yet it cannot claim it all by itself but has to share it with ordinary life, special sciences, marketing and even certain forms of art and religion. A study of the concept of ‘concept’, of the relations between concept and non-concept, ought to belong to the heart of philosophy. This has been underscored by philosophers as diverse as Theodor W. Adorno, Martin Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze and Stanley Rosen, each in their peculiar ways.

From these elucidations, I shall move on to make sense of the concept critical approach (III.c). It takes its motivation from the simple notion that a philosopher’s conception of ‘concept’ is the key to the philosopher’s concepts of ‘philosophy’ and of other things from α to ω. While the analytical question bears on the manner in which a given philosopher conceives the nature and role of ‘concept’, the historical question relates to the way a given concept is conceptualized in the course of its career and how this path cuts across the paths of different philosophers. Exploiting, in the main, the contributions of Morris Weitz and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the concept critical approach seeks, then, to combine the analytical interest in concepts with the concept historical one. Given the conceptual problematic, the concept critical approach will be as interested in countering or avoiding concepts as it is in expressly forming and endorsing them. Possibilities of this approach are briefly discussed with respect to phenomenology, pragmatism and Marx, while certain connections to Nietzsche are already established.

In chapter IV, the methodological considerations are put to play in exploring Nietzsche. The first test consists of discussing both the previous views of his position in conceptual matters (IV.a.1) and his historical precursors as philosophers of conceptuality (IV.a.2). Although the general feeling remains that Nietzsche is more like a philosopher of symbols, intuitions or words than a philosopher of concepts, the debate over his relationship to conceptuality is much more colorful and multidimensional than that. Likewise, the historical context of his work with the contributions of Goethe, Kant, Schopenhauer, Lange, Spir, Hegel and Teichmüller (to name those who will be consulted) contains abundant insights into the nature of ‘the conceptual’.

Subsequently, outlines are drawn for the Nietzschean concept criticism by tracing the early stages of
his thought (IV.b.1) and by closely attending to the later reflections (IV.b.2). While these interrogations deal with mostly posthumous material, they will be followed by a reassessment of Nietzsche’s books from the specifically concept critical perspective (IV.b.3). Section IV.b is, then, my attempt to demonstrate just how pervasive the conceptual problematic is Nietzsche’s œuvre. Although the argument for the published books as more or less conceptual confrontations, with their respective topics, already involves appreciation of the inherent reconstructive features, it is in the next section that the more positive or affirmative dimension to Nietzsche’s philosophy of concepts will be exposed.

First, the project of deconstructing the barrier between natural and conceptual (in the sense of unnatural) processes will be considered (IV.c.1). As to Nietzsche’s famous creations - including perspectivism, genealogy, will to power, eternal return, overhuman - , Dionysus is chosen to be treated as a case study of his peculiar kind of conceptualizing (IV.c.2). Thirdly, Nietzsche’s elaborations of the nature and role of concepts will be summed up with a special emphasis on their historico-philosophical significance (IV.c.3).

Two dimensions of Nietzsche’s philosophy of conceptuality will be particularly dealt with in this chapter. On the one hand, there is a kind of ecology of conception, as the proper post-Darwinian philosophical view of the process of perceiving and taking cognizance. On the other hand, there is the model of the linguistically and historically approachable conceptual shift, as a grand cultural and social event. Both dimensions can be explored with the help of Nietzsche’s explicitly conceptual reflections.

Undoubtedly, chapter IV is the most decisive part of the present study. It contains my case for the ‘concept critical Nietzsche’. In the midst of the novel standpoints that I hope I’ll be able to establish and the plurality of fresh insights that I strive to put forth, this is the most significant new thing about this exploration.

In consequence, chapter V with its investigation of nihilism, does not so much struggle to come up with unfamiliar things about this concept but to reinterpret its more or less well known properties with the help of the new conceptual problematic. On the other hand, to treat nihilism in terms of the utmost test of conceiving requires one to focus on important aspects of its historical and analytical character that have seldom been recognized. What is more, I aim to show that if there was no such thing as ‘nihilism’, there would be much less reason to dwell on the philosophical issue of the conceptual and the non-conceptual.

The chapter offers a general history (V.a.1) and analytical overview (V.a.2) of nihilism. Nietzsche is situated in both contexts (V.a.3). Thereafter, various proposals for the proper treatment of the pairing
'Nietzsche and nihilism' (V.b.1) are considered, before the concept critical approach can be actively utilized. The goal is to have it communicate with other readings, while making a new case for nihilism as the philosopher’s most decisive conceptual creation (V.b.2). Moreover, it will be argued that nihilism, more effectively than other concepts, sheds light on the tension between the advantages and disadvantages of concepts and, most of all, on the process of conceptuality (V.b.3).

Section V.b consists of a set of concise close readings of Nietzsche’s texts with an eye on the way they bring conceptual considerations to bear on the issue of nihilism and, conversely, the meditations on nihilism to affect the question of concepts. In a more openhanded fashion again, the chapter is finished with an attempt to illustrate the dynamics on reconceptualization as the revolutionary in Nietzsche’s philosophy. This is by done by interrogating what it could mean for ‘conceptuality’, if ‘nihilism’ - as marking the condition of (at least seemingly) “no concepts to make sense of experience” - would be taken as the central concept of Nietzsche’s thought. It is here that the whole exploration will be gone through in an alternative form, the torturous problems rounded off again and the main steps of the argument rehearsed in a different mode. (V.c).

In the “Concluding Remark”, key points of the study are briefly repeated.

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Finally, my thanks go to Outi Hollender for showing me the awful truth of how sweet life can be.
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS: REFERENCES TO NIETZSCHE’S TEXTS


AC  Der Antichrist

DD  Dionysos-Dithyramben

EH  Ecce Homo

“Wiswb”  : Warum ich so weise bin
“Wiskb”  : Warum ich so klug bin
“WisgBs” : Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe
“WisSb”  : Warum ich ein Schicksal bin

FW  Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft

GD  Götzen-Dämmerung

“SuP”  : Sprüche und Pfeile
“DpdS”  : Das Problem des Sokrates
“DvidP” : Die “Vernunft” in der Philosophie
“WdwWezFw” : Wie die “wahre Welt” endlich zur fabel wurde
“MaW”  : Moral als Widernatur
“DvgI”  : Die vier grossen Irrthümer
“DvdM”  : Die “Verbesserer” der Menschheit
“WdDa”  : Was den Deutschen abgeht
“SeU”  : Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen
“WidAv” : Was ich den Alten verdanke

GM  Zur Genealogie der Moral

GT  Die Geburt der Tragödie “VeS”  : Versuch einer Selbstkritik

IM  Idyllen aus Messina

M  Morgenröthe

JGB  Jenseits von Gut und Böse

MA I  Menschliches Allzumenschliches

MA II/1  Anhang. Vermischte Meinungen und Sprühe
MA II/2  Der Wanderer und sein Schatten

N  Nachlass

Nachgelassene Schriften 1870-1873
Nachgelassene Fragemente 1864-1889
Lecture Courses and Other Material

NCW  Nietzsche contra Wagner

UB  Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen

UB I  David Strauss der Bekenner und Schriftsteller

UB II  Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben

UB III  Schopenhauer als Erzieher

UB IV  Richard Wagner in Bayreuth

W  Der Fall Wagner

“N”  : Nachschrift
“ZN” : Zweite Nachschrift
“E”  : Epilog

Z  Also sprach Zarathustra
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I. NIELTSCHE: LIFE & WORK

Mir besteht mein Leben jetzt in dem *Wunsche*, daß es mit allen Dingen *anders* stehn möge, als ich sie begreife; und daß mir Jemand meine "Wahrheiten" ungläubwürdig mache
(KGB III/3, Juli 1885, 63).

I.a Life

Die Welt ist ersichtlich mit wenig Vernunft
eingereicht, das merkt man, wenn man seinen
ogenannten "Lebenslauf" studirt: es "läuft", ja! das Leben
läuft, und kommt bald hier, bald da an
(KGB III/3, Oktober 1886, 273).

What happened to Nietzsche in Turin, in the first days of the year 1889, has been described with the
German word *Zusammenbruch*. The philosopher did not die but suffered a breakdown. Literally,*zusammen-brechen* means to crack conjointly or to shrink together. Hence, the words “col-lapse” and
“im-plosion” are perhaps its nearest equivalents in English. To come to nothing in this way is to fall
apart on itself, to perish through, as it were, a maximum of contraction. This point in Nietzsche’s life
where he could, to use an apt colloquialism, neither get nor keep it together anymore was also the
beginning of his explosive effect on posterity. It was the start for Nietzsche’s making a name for
himself, of his becoming a condensed sign in a series of rapidly disseminating discourses.

In Nietzsche’s notes, there is a remark on the fall of the kingdom of Israel as a *Zusammenbruch* (N
November 1887 – März 1888 11 [377], 172). *Zusammenbruch* is also the word by which observers
characterized, for example, the ruin of the imperial Germany in the closing of the First World War.2
More recently, German newspapers used it as they reported about the events, in Eastern and Central
Europe during the late 1980’s, as the dominant forces were crumbling and tumbling down.3

Since he would discuss the notion of a unified Europe4 (see, e.g., JGB 256, KSA 3, 201-4; cf. MA II/2
215, KSA 2, 647-50; N August-September 1885 41 [7], KSA 11, 681-2; FW 357, KSA 3, 599),
Nietzsche might have been inclined to say that processes of disintegration were unavoidable for
reintegration to have its way. In any case, studying him certainly became a different thing, as the
division of Europe into opposing blocks lost a considerable amount of its determinacy. From the other
end of this broad historical perspective, Nietzsche has been seen as the personification of the “absolute
point of culmination” of the “destructive tendencies” developing after the *Zusammenbruch* of the era of
Napoleon and during the subsequent period of *Umbruch* or regeneration⁵.

Toward the end of the Second World War, the social theorist Alfred Weber came to refer, with the very same word, to a catastrophe he also called nihilism. What is striking is that he spoke about Nietzsche’s *Zusammenbruch* simultaneously with the contemporary *Zusammenbruch* of society, civilization, ideals and values, as all these have been known in the West.⁶ Later, a student of his discussed, in one and the same text, the complete *Zusammenbruch* of 1945, the *Zusammenbruch* of the world of Goethean ideals and Nietzsche’s *Zusammenbruch* in Turin⁷.

Among the distinguished analysts of nihilism, Hermann Rauschning has spoken of the three initial generations to have witnessed this late modern crisis. The *fin de siècle* generation matured in the era of nihilism as “the overwhelming event of” *Zusammenbrüche*. It is defined by romantic enthusiasm and an individualist sense of liberation. This being the prevailing experience until 1914, it was followed by the second nihilism of disillusionment and materialist adjustment to the “reality of a factual *Zusammenbruch*” or “the *Zusammenbruch* of outer order with an awareness that there was nothing that could create order”. The final stage was reached, as the “basis of faith was more extensively” *zusammengebrochen* and technology became the only authority “before nothingness”. In Rauschning’s opinion, Nietzsche was both “the prophet” and “the revolutionary” of nihilism behind these developments. His was a revolution from within: “acceleration and radicalization of an inner dissolution [Zersetzung]” bring about external *Zusammenbrüche*.⁸

The setting does not always have to be so distinctively social or political, yet Rauschning’s account finds an echo in many other interpretations of nihilism. Its psycho-historical features resemble one of the earliest attempts at articulating the issue. In his *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* (1885), Paul Bourget spoke of “an epoch of religious and metaphysical crash”. The French word here is *effondrement* meaning pretty much the same as *Zusammenbruch*. According to Bourget, both the 17th century “general credo regulating each conscience” and the 18th century “force of negation” were lost. As a result, the modern mentality was left with but a sense of disillusioned scepticism.⁹

The power of nihilistic sensibility in the literary sphere is reaffirmed in Bruno Hillebrand’s 1991 monograph on the developments of aesthetical nihilisms. Hillebrand located their modernist origins in the *Zusammenbruch* of, and the *Ausbruch* from, “the compulsion of systems”, with the *Aufbruch* “toward the new coasts”. He described Nietzsche “as the first to have detected the catastrophe of a total Weltzusammenbruch, of the falling apart [Zerfall] of the metaphysical horizon of meaning”.¹⁰

Apart from, if also related to, the politics and aesthetics of nihilism, Wilhelm Weischedel has been
concerned with the religious dimension. He, too, records Nietzsche’s *Zusammenbruch* before moving on to the general implications of nihilism. He seeks to clarify Nietzsche’s philosophical analysis of nihilism as the discernment of the way Christianity was crushed by an inherent conflict. As Weischedel explains it, Nietzsche’s work on nihilism amounts to the insight of the *Zusammenbruch* of Christianity as a specific world-view and a system of morality. The self-undoing took place as the Weltanschauung lost its connection to life, on the one hand, yet having cherished, on the other hand, a truthfulness ardent enough to finally expose its own perversion.11

Although the topic of *Zusammenbruch* contains much that is nationally alarming for the Germans, it has not escaped from English-speaking critics12. Glen T. Martin, for one, treats nihilism as Nietzsche’s experience of “a deep-sea change in the psyche and spirit of Western humanity”. It stands for the modern “metaphysical crisis” or “crisis of meaning” that results in “disintegration” menacing “the very meaning of our language and the everyday certainties in which our lives are immersed”.13 Michael Hinz, for another, chooses his words in line with the original German debate. He even offers a fresh synonym for the key word by identifying Nietzsche’s double task as follows: to fight nihilism and to embark upon “repairing, or in some sense overcoming, the current dilapidated state of Western civilization”14.

The discourse of dilapidation or *Zusammenbruch* - with the aspects of *Ausbruch*, *Aufbruch* and *Umbruch* - involves major changes in all areas of human activity. What the specific instances of the entire discourse share with one another is the sense of disrupted communication between old and new ways of conceiving things and of guiding action. Nietzsche’s notion ’death of god’, in particular, has been related to both a general nihilistic downfall of traditions15 and to “the destruction of ζητήματα”16.

While it is said that Nietzsche’s global mission was to usher people to remodel their lives and values after the *Zusammenbruch* of “old orders”17, the local Turinese episode has come to symbolize the tragic redemption involved in such transformations. There is hardly a better way to grasp the concept ’the Nietzschean’ than by acknowledging the way the character of the succumbent philosopher is taken to represent the course of the Western culture as a whole. The analogy works both ways: 20th-century nightmares seem to require Nietzsche as an ingredient in the explanatory basis, just as he appears to make sense only through the horrific annals of the period. Individual biography could not be more glamorously wedded to general history writing. As for the former chronicle, it could read as follows.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844, in a little Saxon town called Röcken. It had become, after the international agreements in Vienna, part of Prussia. The son was christened after the emperor. Nietzsche’s father, a Lutheran priest, died of a brain damage and its long complications in 1849. Soon thereafter, Nietzsche’s younger brother passed away. Friedrich moved with his mother
Franziska (1826-1897) and sister Elisabeth (1846-1935) to a nearby Naumburg. He developed an early and keen interest in literature, poetry, drama, ancient Greece and, most of all, in music. Apart from mother and sister, Nietzsche spent much time with his grandmother and two aunts, and with friends such as Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug. In 1858, he entered Schulpforta, near Naumburg, an institution renowned for such earlier pupils as Fichte, Schlegel and Novalis. He made friends with Paul Deussen and Carl von Gersdorff. In 1864, he moved on to Bonn to study theology and philology. In his letters, the student told about attending lectures on politics and philosophy, too. He also wrote about his doubts as to the practitioners of theology. (KGB I/2, November 1864 & Mai & Februar 1865, 18 & 58-9 & 49.)

After an academic year by Rhine, Nietzsche followed the philology professor, Friedrich Ritschl, in Leipzig. He stayed there until 1869, excluding the period of military service as anartillerist stationed in his home town. One year’s voluntary service was interrupted, when Nietzsche hurt himself badly in a riding accident. While recovering, he wrote to a friend the following words that mirror the frequent double emphasis, in Nietzsche’s texts, on the bodily and the lexical:

Die Eiterung dauert fort, der Brustbeinknochen ist angegriffen, und heute hat mir sogar der Arzt eine Operation in kaum zweifelhafte Nähe gestellt. Es handelt sich nämlich um die Abstoßung eines ganzen Knochenstücks; dazu will man die Weichteile aufschneiden müssen und dann den angegriffenen Knochen, nämlich das Brustbein “reduzieren”, wie sich der Arzt ausdrückte, scilicet “absägen”. Ist man aber erst unter dem Messer und der Säge der Operateure, so weißt Du auch, an wie einem dünnen Faden das Ding hängt, so man Leben nennt. Da kommt ein Eiterfieberchen - verloschen ist das kleine Licht. [...] Nie wird einem die Hinfälligkeit des Daseins so ad oculos demonstrirt, als wenn man so ein Stückchen aus seinem Skelett zu sehen bekommt.
(KGB I/2, Juni 1868, 289.)

In Leipzig, Nietzsche came across Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, was attracted to the rising German nationalism, co-founded a philological society, worked on a number of Greek texts and met Richard Wagner. His friends included the philologist Erwin Rohde and the philosopher Heinrich Romundt.

From the spring of 1869 on, Nietzsche was professor in classical philology, Pädagogium teacher and Swiss citizen in Basel. He frequented the Wagners and their upper class acquaintances, notably Malwida von Meysenburg and Reinhardt von Seydlitz. The closest of friends he was with the historian of religion, professor Franz Overbeck and Romundt, now Privatdozent in Basel. He spent time with the much respected cultural historian Jakob Burckhardt, too. Through correspondence and occasional reunions, he stayed in contact with his old student comrades, Gersdorff, Deussen and Rohde. And even though conflicts kept on recurring, he continued to meet and to exchange letters with his mother and sister as
In 1870, Nietzsche took part in the Franco-Prussian war as an infirmary, and got seriously ill. Even before the war was over, he came to doubt the German power politics, yet supported the German cultural cause in his first few books from 1872 onward. As a philologist, his promising career was practically over by his first book in 1872, and the same can be said of his tone poetry, too. When it comes to the friendship with Wagner, the decisive break was the first Bayreuth festival in 1876. By the late 1870's, Nietzsche’s health was turning to ever worse. In his holidays, he sought to treat himself by trying different diets and varied climates: Italian and French Riviera, in the winter, and the Swiss Alps, in the summertime, with short visits in Naumburg and elsewhere. In 1879, Nietzsche resigned from his office in Basel and lived the next decade as a senior citizen restlessly seeking for a place to live and write. During the 1880's, he saw his friends, now including especially Overbeck, the composer Heinrich Köselitz and Heinrich von Stein, only quite rarely. Yet, he was an active correspondent. In 1882, he met, thanks to the earlier acquaintances von Meysemburg and the philosopher Paul Réé, a young Russian intellectual Lou von Salomé. Réé, Salomé and Nietzsche shared together a short creative period of time until Nietzsche dropped out, or was dropped out, of the triple.

Nietzsche lived in various locations, most notably in Sils-Maria, Switzerland, and in Nizza. His health forced him to move back and forth between them, and he was ultimately satisfied with neither of them. In May 1888, just over a half year before the Zusammenbruch, he wrote from the wonderful Turin that

in mir ein Hauptbegriff des Lebens geradezu ausgelöscht ist, der Begriff “Zukunft”
(KGB III/5, 318).

It has been said, quite recently, that “Nietzsche addresses a future that he believes will be able to hear him as his own time cannot; and we are that future”18. Indeed, in June 1887, Nietzsche writes to his friend Overbeck about a coming generation, “dieselbe, in welcher die großen Probleme, an denen ich leide, so gewiß ich auch durch sie und um ihretwillen noch lebe, leibhaft werden müssen und in That und Wille übergehn müssen” (KGB III/5, 103). As for the last events of the philosopher - the concept of his immediate ’future’ right after May 1888 - they have become rather familiar, albeit often told inaccurately. An Italian account, from about one month after the death, presented as based on an interview with the philosopher’s hosts, told that things ran smoothly in Turin until Nietzsche started talking peculiarly about the king and the queen paying a visit to his room. Later, by the river Po, the landlord had seen him in the midst of a crowd accompanied by two policemen. According to the story, Nietzsche had thrown himself in the arms of his host who was being informed by other people that the
professor was caught near the university in an intense hug with a horse. Having got some rest, Nietzsche played the piano, unerringly Wagner, and got drunk from a glass of *barbera*. Moments of clarity and weirdness alternated. When Overbeck came, the two friends embraced in tears.\(^19\)

Overbeck escorted Nietzsche to Basel. After psychiatric examination, Nietzsche traveled further to Jena with his mother. The eleven and a half years from his *Zusammenbruch* onward Nietzsche spent, mostly and increasingly, in an unproductive state. After sixteen months in Jena, the incurable Nietzsche was sent home in Naumburg. When the mother died, a few years later, the sister took Nietzsche to Weimar where he died on August 25, 1900.

After a “chronicle” such as this, it can at once be affirmed that writing about Nietzsche’s life has taken place under particularly heavy ideological pressures. The most glaring case is the deifying campaign carried out by his sister Elisabeth Förster. Working in a close connection to the rising forces of the far right, Förster did to Nietzsche’s biography what she did to his posthumous works (see I.c). She created an image of an actually available hero. In one of her biographical efforts, Förster wrote about her inability to mention anything that was “shadowy” about his brother shining so bright.\(^20\) It took a long time to expose her violations and to question her authority. Even those of the early commentators critical to the “devotedness” in Förster’s stance toward Nietzsche, would emphasize the incomparable intimacy. The idea was faithfulness made her into a reliable source from which to draw all the essentials in the formation of the philosopher.\(^21\)

Since Förster’s corrupt ways have been exposed, she has been on the verge of becoming a scapegoat for everything that is questionable in Nietzsche. Ridding one’s readings off from her policies seems sometimes to involve a belief that one is thus freed from all interpretative exploitation. To escape such an unfortunate new prejudice, one critic has said that there is an affinity between Förster’s murderous handling of the Nietzschean pluralities and the way the contemporary academic research murderously reduces Nietzsche’s complexity.\(^22\)

Be that as it may, emancipation from emancipation is called for. All biographical efforts are to be critically examined. Curt Paul Janz’s sympathetic work is recognized as the most balanced and most trustworthy undertaking in this field. It is instructive to briefly compare it to Anacleto Verrecchia’s project. His, in turn, is an overtly antipathetic account of the background of Nietzsche’s last years. It may be said to represent a more rebellious and, in a scholarly sense, more partial work.\(^23\)

Nietzsche was, on Janz’s view, an agreeable person; on Verrecchia’s estimation, not very nice. Janz tells that Nietzsche took good care of his appearance; Verrecchia reports that he didn’t look good. Janz sees
him as desperately seeking for a human touch; Verrecchia describes him as a self-sufficient, windowless monad. Janz’s Nietzsche was especially friendly to women; Verrecchia’s Nietzsche wanted nothing but money from them. He was made of passions, says Janz; he never gave in to passions, says Verrechia. He valued nothing like experience (Janz); he lacked direct experience altogether (Verrechia). According to Janz, Nietzsche went through impossible sufferings; Verrechia undermines the severity of his hard times and stresses the compulsion to complain. For Janz, Nietzsche sacrificed himself to a serious task; for Verrechia, his safe bourgeois existence was strictly regulated by the clock and the barometer. Janz regards the philosopher as prominently a tragic figure; Verrechia is happy to talk about a tragic farce.  

These pair statements might be taken to depict different sides of one and the same person, multifaceted as any human being, yet it is hard to pretend to be able to fully agree with both Janz and Verrechia. Janz is decidedly sober and moderate, and can perhaps be accused of only rendering Nietzsche somewhat too intelligible and too neatly tragic. Verrechia spoils the case he is trying to make by resorting to overwrought satire and unfair one-sidedness, while he, quite specifically, claims to be concentrating on a critical and scientific business of demythologizing.

One crucial difference between Janz and Verrechia lies in the way they proceed from characterizing the person to describing the way he thought. What Janz sees as really outstanding in Nietzsche, is the ability to adapt to various ways of thinking without turning into a plagiarist: he always thought further from whatever “original” he discovered. Verrechia holds that Nietzsche is in no sense original but an “originalist”: he either repeated old dogmas or offered previously established thoughts in new clothing. However, it is perhaps precisely where the sympathetic and the antipathetic reading seem to diverge the most that they also converge the most. What I mean is that both biographers speak in the authority of one who has gone through a breathtaking number of documents pertaining to the daily transactions of an individual and putatively achieved a position from where to judge and explain these actions.

As Sander Gilman, another expert on Nietzsche’s life, puts it, Nietzsche was himself “one of the masters of modern autobiographical self-analysis.” Books like Ecce homo and Der Fall Wagner are milestones in this tradition. Yet, Nietzsche’s letters offer additional material. I shall have a look at them in order to show how Janz and Verrechia may not have fully appreciated the valuable point made by Gilman.

The habit of lamenting that Verrechia detects in Nietzsche is easily demonstrated: “ich bin zuletzt überhaupt ein ungenügsamer Mensch” (KGB III/1, November 1882, 280). In his letters from the Pforta school, the adolescent Nietzsche frequently writes about all sorts of things he is lacking, people he is missing, his bad health and the poor weather. Later, as a student, he would moan about the constant shortage of money. After arriving in Basel, the young professor lets his correspondents know about the
pressures of making acquaintance with so many new faces. From the late 1870's on, the vagabond Nietzsche's letters are filled with descriptions of his physico-socio-mental misery. He would make lists of his inconveniences including distress, sadness, uncertainty, depression and inactivity. There were headache, cold, fever, diarrhea, insomnia, loss of appetite, dizziness, torpor and weakness. (KGB III/5, Mai & Juni 1887, 69 & 93.)

Thus, complaints do form a considerable part of Nietzsche’s utterances. However, Verrecchia not only underestimates the seriousness of many of the sufferings known to have beset the philosopher’s life, but he also overlooks the instances of well being: "[i]ch bin jetzt der dankbarste Mensch der Welt” (KGB III/5, Oktober 1888, 453). Moreover, he does not pay attention to the way Nietzsche also comforts and encourages his correspondents (see, e.g., KGB III/3, Februar 1886; III/5 Dezember 1887, 215) and how he apologizes for the excessive dwelling upon his own affairs (KGB III/1, April 1884, 498).

Most crucially, Verrecchia entirely ignores the writer’s sensitivity to writing about his condition. While Nietzsche calls his life Hundeleben, Hundeexistenz and “unwürdige jämerliche Dasein” (KGB III/3, November 1885, Oktober 1886, 116, 275), he also deplors his too many complaints (KGB III/1, Dezember 1883, 462). He would say how stupid, debasing and even revolting it is to dwell on one’s own grief and dissatisfaction (KGB II/3, April 1874, 214 & III/1 Juli 1883, 415 & III/3 Februar 1886, 154). Nietzsche describes his complaint as a sickness within sickness (KGB III/1, Februar 1884, 472).

When it comes to Janz’s stress on the desperate search of contact, that is also well enough fleshed out in the letters. There is a self-reference to a highly social person being forced to isolation (KGB III/3, Januar 1886, 136). Friends appear only in the form of letters, which makes them look like Platonic shadows (KGB II/3, Oktober 1872, 57). Deprivation, or the “Freiheit von Beruf, Weib, Kind, Gesellschaft, Vaterland, Glauben u.s.w. u.s.w.”, as the requirement of the philosophus radicalis, threatens anyone who is “ein lebendiges Wesen und nicht bloß eine Analysirmaschine und ein Objektivations-Apparat” (KGB III/3, November 1886, 282). It is the “lautlose, nunmehr tausendfachte Einsamkeit” that is the worst, because it has “etwas über alle Begriffe Furchtbares, daran kann der Stärkste zu Grunde gehn - ach, und ich bin nicht “der Stärkste”!” (KGB III/5, Juni 1887, 93-4). Yet, these sorts of utterances are counterpoised by humorous and empathetic ones. Moreover, both the miserable and the joyous expressions are conditioned by a second order reflection upon them. What is the most important is that, in Nietzsche’s more or less tragic letters, distance is taken to the very idea of being a tragic character. In a comforting letter to the friend Köselitz, he writes:

Der Mangel an Gesundheit, an Geld, an Ansehen, an Liebe, an Schutz - und dabei nicht zum tragischen Brummbär werden: dies ist die Paradoxe unsres jetzigen Zustands, sein

22
Nietzsche’s contributions to modern autobiography practically escape from his biographers. It is the larger philosophical significance of those contributions that needs to be elucidated. In his introductory book on philosophy, Wilhelm Windelband writes as follows: “Practical human life is permeated and determined by the prescientific concepts, restored in language, that naively develop through the common apprehension [Vorstellen]. These representations [Vorstellungen] are reformed and made precise by special sciences to fulfill the relevant needs of oversight, order and mastery. Yet, in philosophy, they continue to present a task of forming problems and conducting studies. Just as life, with its prescientific concepts, gives material for any scientific work, so do life and sciences together offer, in their prescientific and prephilosophical concepts, material for the work of philosophy.” Two years before these lines were written, Bertrand Russell had identified the distinguishing feature of philosophy as its ability to “examine critically the principles employed in science and in daily life”. The critical and interrogative force of philosophy is, in Russell’s opinion, likely to “increase the interest of the world”. This is because it shows “the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life”.

One gathers that the connection between everyday life and scientific research was philosophically important to eminent representatives of, broadly speaking, the phenomenological tradition and the analytic school, respectively. It will be among the goals of this study to show the extent to which Nietzsche stands apart from the kind of belief in pre-conceptual Lebenswelt, manifest in both Windelband’s and Russell’s stance. The above reference to the “concept” of future as one’s “main concept” of life gives the clue. Nonetheless, I would also underline here that Nietzsche’s letters provide a wealth of material for considering the question that these two philosophers identified, namely the one concerning the philosophical within the ordinary.

In particular, what may be said to be characteristic of Nietzsche is that the issue of ‘life’ stays close not just to his explicit descriptions of the nature of philosophy but to his actual practice of philosophizing. Not only could he become joyous over at having a fish bone painfully stuck in his throat, because of “eine Abundanz von Symbolik und Sinn in dieser physiologischen Niederträchtigkeit” (KGB III/5 Oktober 1887, 178). He would also make a source of inspiration and a field of interrogation of his long term and full time torments.

The point is made that the elementary awareness of the way things take on a fundamentally divergent shape, according to whatever shape one is in at the moment of perception, has a bearing on philosophical thinking: ”die Gesundheit ist [...] wiedergekommen, mit dem “besseren” Wetter, denn der
Begriff “gut” ist für Meteorologen und Philosophen impraktikabel” (KGB III/5 September 1888, 425). It is that “sonderlich wir Philosophen, die wir allzugeneigt sind, unsere schlechten Erlebnisse zu generalisieren und dem gesamten Leben in die Rechnung zu schreiben, haben sehr dankbar zu sein, wenn wir ein gutes gegen ein schlechtes Erlebnis eingetauscht bekommen: - nun, wir generalisieren auch diese Erfahrung vielleicht etwas unbesonnen, aber das ist weniger gefährlich” (KGB III/3, Januar 1886, 130). Part of the Nietzschean conception of philosophy is to stay alert to the bad habits of philosophizing.

The claim of some commentators that Nietzsche’s praise of 'health' is explainable in terms of his own poor condition31 is made as if no such intense Problematik of health/sickness and ways of thinking was not there in his texts as there evidently is. Already by April 1874, Nietzsche felt himself free to speak about his artwork, his “Philosophie der Krankheit” (KGB II/3, 217). Later, recovering in a spa in order to go back to teach again, he wrote that “[v]iel Schmerzen [...] waren inzwischen mein Loos, ihr Ertragen meine Hauptthätigkeit” (KGB II/5 August 1877, 264). He spoke later about a philosopher’s illness as an argument against that philosopher’s philosophy (KGB III/3, November 1885, 113).

In accordance with these sorts of reflections, Kathleen Marie Higgins combines “Nietzsche’s tragic worldview” with the way life’s “[f]olly and nonsense” are “constant companions” of his Zarathustra. It is about, so Higgins, “experiencing the oddities and accidents of which life is full” in a way that is “not dictated by our recognition of their facilitative or obstructive function”. If there is also room for one to “simultaneously enjoy them immediately”, there is room for “taking a complex attitude toward the experiences of our lives”.32

In his recent defence of Nietzsche’s “radical individualism”, a dominant theme in the early reception33, Leslie Paul Thiele said that Nietzsche’s work amounts to a “philosophical argument” for this very position. Thiele goes on to add that Nietzsche also had an “individualist argument” to support his philosophy which, in turn, is tantamount to “his life”.34 I would withdraw from making a case for Nietzsche’s individualism, for the reason that it excludes important features of his thinking. Yet, I think that Thiele’s suggestion about the philosophy / life connection is fruitful. What I have tried to intimate, however, is that taking Gilman’s point about Nietzsche’s mastery in self-analysis seriously would mean something more specific than that. It means ruminating, while reflecting upon Nietzsche’s life, the Nietzschean analyses given of it. It means investigating the whole discourse of 'life' that commences in his texts and is extended by all those texts to which Nietzsche’s writings relate. To put it more strongly, and with less emphasis on what must sound like an excessively literary point, this discourse is identified with Nietzsche’s life, in as much as an individual is immersed to social reality by the necessarily public exchange of signs.
In a fragment by Nietzsche, “Egoismus” is refuted as an instance of erroneous assumption of an isolated individuality. It is “sociale Einübung” that always already regulates personal views - even the solitary “Denken über uns, das Empfinden für und gegen uns, der Kampf in uns”- as the “Gesellschaft” is internalized. In this context, it is specifically said that, as a consequence of socialization, “wir sind der Kosmos, soweit wir ihn begriffen oder geträumt haben”. In other words, conceptualization, or even the dreamy conceiving, transforms the “Einzigkeit des ego” into a processual and conflictual “Mehrheit” that is one with the rest of the world. (N Herbst 1880 6 [80], KSA 9, 215-6.)

Based on this quotation, talking about the ’discourse’ of life, in Nietzsche’s texts, is not implying anything removed from the historical economic and political forces that condition thought. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s perhaps more or less surprising stress on the social constraints precludes a division into separate spheres of life and literature. Alexander Nehamas has made the boldest interpretation of this issue. He says about Nietzsche that “[n]o one has managed to bring life closer to literature than he did”. Nietzsche’s work/life is handled as an “effort to create an artwork out of himself, a literary character who is a philosopher”35.

What I just quoted and said about socialization as an element of thought does not fit particularly well to Nehamas’s underlining of Nietzsche’s aestheticism. Offering a provocative and helpful instrument of interpretation of the linkage, and even identification, between the lively and the literary, Nehamas is about to lose sight of the social dimension to Nietzsche’s thought. Nonetheless, I find his insight to be advantageous in the way it manages to reintroduce the discourse of ’life’ back to the debate over Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is to the former development of these controversies that I shall turn next.

Now, Nietzsche’s thought was, early on, seen to be one of the first philosophies of life ever set forth. In any case, Max Scheler saw it this way, albeit with a qualification: “Friedrich Nietzsche did not yet possess a “philosophy of life” [”Philosophie des Lebens”]. In spite of that, he hovers over the modern attempts [at such a philosophy] like a secret tutelary spirit.” Accordingly, Scheler finds, in Nietzsche’s pathbreaking talk of das Leben and in his conception of life as an active stream flowing upwards or downwards, an anticipation of Dilthey, Bergson and other later theorists.36

Among Nietzsche’s early readers, thinkers as diverse as Rudolf Steiner, Georg Simmel and Moritz Schlick all emphasized his introduction of Leben to philosophy. From Steiner’s writings, Nietzsche comes through as an astute student of this worldly life who takes his inspiration “from the most powerful, the most immediate impulses of life” and, ultimately, aims over and above, and out of, life37. Simmel, in turn, presents Nietzsche as starting from Schopenhauer’s notion of striving or struggle, yet turning this desperate seeking for an inexistent goal into an evolutionarily reconceived view of life as a
even enough/i32/i32 'philosophy' growing rather/i32/i32 'philosophy' in a/i32/i32 'philosophy'

Yet, it is hardly anything more rewarding than to study just how the questions of 'life', 'philosophy' and 'philosophy of life' come out of Nietzsche's texts. Here, I wish merely to indicate the way to this direction. After his retirement from Basel, Nietzsche did once refer to his task “als Philosoph des Lebens“. In this letter, he told about the need to retreat from, and to return to, the company of other people. He told about having got sick through two forms of metaphysics. There was the philosophical “Vernebelung alles Wahren und Einfachen, der Kampf mit der Vernunft gegen die Vernunft”, and there was the Wagnerian “Barockkunst der Überspannung und der verherrlichten Maßlosigkeit”. (KGB II/5, Juli 1878, 337-8.) These remarks can be compared to Nietzsche’s later one about his “Bürde eines Lebensloosen, zu dem ein Philosoph einmal verurtheilt ist”. The philosopher’s lot involves what Nietzsche characterized as a condition concerning anyone who “sein Leben durch Werke sanktionirt”. Nietzsche described it as his Kunststück “das Leben immer mehr zu vereinfachen”. As he expressed it, he had “für meine Lebensweise keine andere Kritik als das Maß meiner Arbeits-Kraft”. (KGB III/5, März & April & Juli & September 1888, 272 & 284 & 378 & 435.)

Yet, all this frequent and forceful meditation on the issue of 'life' and 'philosophy' has not been the primary reason for Nietzsche’s being connected to the “philosophy of life”. Nor is it the way the speaker of the book Ecce homo displays a gift of telling “mir mein Leben” (EH [preface], KSA 6, 263). It is, rather, the frequency and force of Nietzsche’s term Leben taken to expose his position in the post-Darwinian thought. Selectively speaking, there is the volume with the title Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben and the dramatic character called Leben, in Also sprach Zarathustra, with verses of its own to utter, including the one, in particular, about life as “Wille zur Macht” (UB II, KSA 1, 243-334; Z II/12, KSA 4, 148-9).

In attunement with biologists and other natural scientists of his day, as well as with earlier philosophers
of nature, Nietzsche tended to view the complex organic and inorganic processes of interaction as involving some pattern, or a rhythm. In my view, two primary reasons for his continuing, and disturbing, association with Lebensphilosophie are these. Nietzsche’s writings contain a good deal on the issue of ‘life’ caught, in a given habitat, in the process of increasing vigorousness or decay. These speculations, in turn, contribute to reflections over a naturalistic conception of societal relations. (GT 15 & UB IV 4, KSA 1, 100 & 448; Z “V” 3, KSA 4, 15; JGB 259, KSA 5, 207-8; GM II 11, KSA 5, 312-3; W “V” & “E”, KSA 6, 12 & 50; GD 2 & 3, KSA 6, 67-73 & 78; AC 24 & 43, KSA 6, 192-3 & 217; EH esp. 1:1 & 3:2:4, KSA 6, 265 & 313.)

Nietzsche was, indeed, lined up with Lebensphilosophen. Among this loose grouping, Simmel, Dilthey, Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken kept company with many more notoriously obscure characters all the way from Eugen Dühring through Ludvig Klages up until Oswald Spengler. Oscar Ewald’s Präludien zu einer Philosophie des Lebens (1903), as an early explicit, yet certainly little known, version of this type of thinking, was openly built, to a great extent, on Nietzsche’s insights. These insights were gained from sources the comprehensive tracing of which cannot be a project meaningfully assumed here. In the broadest of terms, what is at stake is the adaptation of the species ‘philosopher’ to its environment modeled by Darwin’s theory of evolution. In chapter II.b, I shall discuss the question of locating Nietzsche in the field of thought and come back to some of these aspects. I hope it won’t blur the very complexity of the issue if I single out here two thinkers that are discussed in many of the Nietzschean passages where the concept of ‘life’ is under scrutiny. In other words, as I mention Dühring and Herbert Spencer, I do not mean to neglect the importance of, say, either the Greeks or Spinoza, Goethe or Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche’s background, but only to establish a perspective that allows a preliminary sense of the problematic.

Spencer might be regarded as a contemporary thinker winding up in trouble with the Darwinian legacy (to which Spencer, of course, both contributed and reacted). As the modern science began to shift the human being from the position of the created and appointed master of nature to the one of an evolved animal with a good hand, philosophers would either cling to old ways of conceiving the basis of moral action or, in one way or another, adjust their views to the naturalized frame of reference. Spencer chose the second alternative and reinterpreted moral issues in evolutionary terms related to the preservation of both the individual and the species. I think that Nietzsche’s harsh words on the British thinker should not blind one from seeing that Spencer’s laudable turn toward combining evolution and philosophy in also recognized.

Nietzsche’s references to him contain recognition of the liberating effects of this new stance. Yet, for the most part, they are rejective and reproachful. The more polemical, the cruder line of criticism
concerns Spencer’s “décadent” dream of the “Sieg des Altruismus” (GD 8:37, KSA 6, 139), while the subtler and more moderate critique involves the way he “fabelt” about once and for all reconciliating egotistic and altruistic impulses (FW 373, KSA 3, 625). What I find the most important, among the remarks on Spencer, is encapsulated in a note from 1880. There, Spencer’s (and Mill’s) achievement is granted but the practice of “moralischen Empfindungen zu formulieren“ is contrasted with the more pressing problem of “wirklich anders einmal empfinden zu können und Besonnenheit hinterher zu haben, um dies zu analysiren!” (N Ende 1880 7 [247], KSA 9, 368-9.)

One finds the notion of the ’emancipation from emancipation’ in action here. Liberation from an aged way of perceiving and conceiving moral aspects requires a further liberation from the liberation. It requires a step toward making sense of the perception / conception itself. Since moral considerations have permeated all apprehension, the idea of immorality is primarily an idea involving reconstruction of the basic perceptual and cognitive setting.

When it comes to Dühring, I would hold that specifying Nietzsche’s relationship to this thinker would be an even urgent challenge for the contemporary research. In the late 19th-century Germany, Dühring was one of the most famous philosophers. As Spencer, in Britain, and Comte, in France, Dühring came to shape, to a great extent, the international positivist current to fit the intellectual climate in his home country. He is a largely forgotten theorist with enough prominence to have once become the shared target of both Engels and Nietzsche, while these two Friedricks did not know each other. What is more, for all his philosophical and economic training, Dühring was a populist and an active political debater.

Written in the summer of 1875, Nietzsche’s notes contain a substantial commentary on Dühring’s breakthrough book, Der Werth des Lebens. In fact, the commentary is a text exceeding the size of any other single sustained discussion in Nietzsche’s fragmented literary estate. Dühring’s book had defined ‘life’ as a mixture of “perceptions [Empfindungen] and imagination [Gemüthsbewegungen]”. It had propagated explicit “practical materialism”. It had warned against “speculative Nichtsthum”, Nichtigkeit, or even Nichtscultus, among the religious and philosophical mystics and praised “healthy” and “heroic” Lebensauffassung and Lebensbehandlung against, in particular, the Judaism.46

Regarding Nietzsche’s early inheritance of Schopenhauer’s nirwanism and Byron’s pessimism, Dühring’s polemic against passivism and negativism was relevant indeed. Moreover, regarding his subsequent preoccupation with the questions of sickness and health, inactivity and pragmatism, nihilism and value, and the negation or the affirmation of life, the book was clearly of considerable importance. The indebtedness is even acknowledged, in Nietzsche’s later book where Dühring is also vehemently attacked for his unsatisfactory account of the origin of justice and for his antisemitism (GM II 11 & III
14, KSA 5, 309-12 & 370; cf. also III 26, 406-7 & JGB 204, KSA 5, 131). In Nachlass, Dühring is also varyingly scorned for, among other things, having exaggerated Schopenhauer’s views (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [51], KSA 11, 161).

What is crucial, I think, is that there is, in the above-mentioned early piece of Nietzsche’s commentary, a double criticism of Dühring’s conception of sickness. He undermines the grave psychological consequences of serious diseases for one’s Lebensziel, as he also fails to see the positive, purifying and improving effects of being out of condition (N Sommer 1875 9 [1], KSA 8, 154). Here again, one meets an instance of the emancipation from emancipation. Even if it was the liberation from a view of life with a resignationist sense of maladies and a nihilist surrender to inactivity that Nietzsche, too, must have welcomed, one ought to move ahead to the second order liberation from this liberation. This is suggested by the way the significance of hardship and toil are appreciated and further problematized.

If it was my general argument, in the context of telling Nietzsche’s life, that one needs to pay attention to the way the conceptuality of 'life' is handled and molded, in Nietzsche’s texts, a sufficiently similar point can be made here. Setting out to study Nietzsche’s relations with various philosophies of life, one is best off keeping an eye on the way these were already emerging in the debates that feed and constrain Nietzsche’s writings that, in turn, critically assess this diverse current.

While Dühring’s book did not explicitly discuss nihilism, Bourget’s Essais did. It can be seen that, in this book, too, organismic notions are brought to bear at the social level. The book commences to make sense of décadence as provoked by Baudelaire. What is striking is the way décadence is related to being inferior when concerning “workers for the grandeur of the country”, yet connected with being superior soon as detected in “artists of the interiority of the spirit”. Bourget criticizes décadence for its debilitating consequences: nihilism, as “the spirit of the negation of life”, is already advanced and the disaster is on its way. Yet, he displays a sympathy incomparable to Dühring’s outrage. He speaks of Baudelaire’s courage to admit his own decadence and to set out to “research [...] all that seems, to simple natures, morbid and artificial in life and art”. He also calls this great poet the “educator” of “a group [...] of distinguished intelligences”.47

I contend that Nietzsche’s philosophical inquiries into nihilism, if they are approached from the broad perspective of the philosophy of life, may be seen as sharing the concern of both Bourget and Dühring, that is, the worry about the rising symptoms of a general nihilistic preoccupation with sickness and death. Yet, zeitkritische inquiries led him somewhere else than in Dühring’s biologic populist or in Bourget’s aestheticist fascination with the loss of energy. Elements in each of these two accounts could be used against one another. While Dühring failed to appreciate the importance of language in
conception, Bourget fell under the spell of language; while Bourget could not move from the idea of accepting *décadence* to overcoming it, Dühring was too obsessed with eliminating it to be able to understand either its causes, its proper seriousness or its stimulation for thinking.

Emphases on the healthy and vital instincts aside, at least some versions of *Lebensphilosophie* were, on the contrary, accused of threatening life, or, in any case, of jeopardizing dignified human life. Consider the way someone like Jack London came to write about 'life'. London knew Nietzsche’s work and told about how he sought to counter the Nietzschean ideas of the ruthless “Superman”, yet his novels contain more glorious depictions of vital powers than there is perhaps anywhere else: “A carnivorous animal, living on a straight meat diet, he was in full flower, at the hight tide of his life, overspilling with vigor and virility. [...] His muscles were surcharged with vitality, and snapped into play sharply, like steel springs. Life streamed through him in splendid flood, glad and rampant, until it seemed that it would burst him asunder in sheer ecstasy and pour forth generously over the world.”

I find the overall scenery of this citation to be there still active and all the time fueling the association of the “Nietzschean” and the “philosophy of life”. Very probably, it is also some such association that Colin Wilson wanted to cast anew, as he once began an article on Nietzsche with a rather similar quotation on life’s majestic internal pulse. After the quotation marks, Wilson told that the *passus* was, believe it or not, taken from Bertrand Russell. He commented that it was “one of the most Nietzschean” passages that he knew of within the entire treasury of modern literature.

Be that as it may, Scheler related Nietzsche to not only Spencer, Fouillé and Guyau but also to “certain race theorists”. The basis for this grouping was, in Scheler’s words, the shared tendency to treat “ethical values and laws as but special cases of the values of life and the laws of life”. Moreover, Scheler made a distinction between Spencer and Nietzsche, since where the former emphasized sympathy and societal progress, the latter had a bent toward idealization of brutality.

Other critics saw it more clearly that 'life' was conceived in different ways according to the interpreters' purposes that could, in part, be traced back to their social status or character. Writing in the early 1890's, one of them held that “materialist world-views” mocking the “nobler sides of the human nature” tend to engender “a nihilistic view of life”. Interestingly enough, this critic calls nihilistic or materialistic 'life' “empty and generic”. On this interpretation, nihilistic implications of materialism could only be avoided by adopting “idealist metaphysics” to which “a good, great life has a natural inclination”. One can see, then, how there was, in the debate over 'life’, an ongoing controversy over 'the natural'.

Now, controversial ethico-political connotations in a “Nietzschean” emphasis on vitality is one thing.
Another thing is that it seems to deny any conceptual understanding of 'life'. Indeed, a position has been ascribed to Nietzsche, according to which concept is that which fixes life and "life, as a concept, is dead". Viewed against such a background, another letter remark can be used to both capture something of Nietzsche’s linkage with Lebensphilosophie and to question the alleged anticonceptual stance. Nietzsche writes to Jakob Burckhardt about their joint problematic of the

unheimlichen Bedingungen für jedes Wachsthum der Cultur, jenes äußerst bedenkliche Verhältniß zwischen dem, was "Verbesserung" des Menschen (oder geradezu "Vermenschlichung") genannt wird, und der Vergrößerung des Typus Mensch, vor allem der Widerspruch jedes Moralbegriffs mit jedem wissenschaftlichen Begriff des Lebens [...] (KGB III/3, September 1886, 254-5).54

I take it as Nietzsche’s problem to study the way moral aspects mingle in perception. The moral intervention in perception calls for an investigation of any intervention whatsoever. At its most demanding, the problem calls for a reinterpretation of perceiving in terms of a notion of perceiving stripped off of all intervening elements. However, the notion of a "positivistically" or "scientificistically" pure perception is, ultimately, mere heuristics. One should proceed from the stage of liberation toward a further liberation from liberation.

In the 1930's and 1940's, by the time Heidegger was preparing, and lecturing on, his conception of Nietzsche, the latter was generally being read through Klages’s and others’ vitalist reappropriations.55 What troubled Heidegger was not so much either materialist or idealist views of life but, rather, the excessive, mystifying preoccupation with the very question of 'life'.56 In point of fact, in around 1919/21, he had already polemicized against a "'vague' concept of life" as a prominent "problematic of the contemporary philosophy", while he, nonetheless, made room for a proper conception of the "essence of life".57 In terms of personal development, it is, thus, understandable that he later turned so violently against all Lebensphilosophie.58

As Heidegger came to put it, all the fuss about "biologism", in particular, was indicative of deeper "thoughtlessness". Quite specifically, Heidegger related the contemporary malaise to "the greatest fear that rules today's world: the fear before the concept". The "multiformed and yet inconceivable" Begriffsangst was, according to one of his most violent diatribes, the reason for the desperate condition where "the entire essence of contemporary language is that of the buzzword".59

Now, Heidegger’s insistence on the fear before Sein that "has never been greater than today" is better known and more readily "Heideggerian" emphasis than the 'fear before the concept'. Yet, I would dare
to propose that the critique of *Begriffsgangst* and *Lebensphilosophie* is his most significant contribution to modern philosophy. Although it touches upon the other, at best, reactionary and clumsily old-fashioned elements in Heidegger’s campaign against his time, the criticism is still very relevant. It might also offer the best argument in favor of the controversial German philosopher’s distance from the senseless tendencies of his time with which he once so notoriously associated his life/thought.

One root for the ’philosophy of life’ that would probably have been tolerable for Heidegger is to be found in Scheler’s teacher’s, Eucken’s 1879 study on conceptual history. Eucken writes that philosophy is about making sense by conceptual means of all there is in human interchange. Philosophical “world conceptions” strive for increased accuracy which will, ultimately, benefit the whole society. In fact, Eucken says that if philosophy wishes to preserve any vital strength, it has to understand the way all of its resources stem from the common life and all of its activities relate to what there is in Leben. At its very best, philosophy can enhance and heighten life.61 This sort of depiction finds its later refinement in Windelband: “Philosophical systems have been called concept poems [Begriffsdichtungen]: and, really, that is what they are, yet not in a pejorative sense of characterizing what is unreal in their conceptual construction but, instead, in the highest sense in which high poetry everywhere is nothing other than life as it is shaped and as it shapes [gestaltetes und gestaltendes Leben]”62.

In Eucken and Windelband, one detects the idea of ’life’ and ’concept’ as not necessarily opposing terms. What I said above about Windelband’s belief in the pre-conceptual would now have to be qualified. Yet, there is no proper account of the relations between ’life’ - as the sole source of the philosophico-conceptual (Eucken) or as the ultimate poeticizing, formgiving, conceptualizing power (Windelband) - and conceptual philosophy as distinct from its living sources or forces.

After the actualization of the Nazi ideology of the Lebensraum, the connection between Nietzsche and Leben has been felt as even more disconcerting than it ever was for Heidegger63. To be sure, there are commentators who feel free to refer to ’life’ as the philosopher’s “central category” without much further ado64. Probably because the English expression “philosophy of life”, especially when written in quotation marks, is taken to be something quite removed from the German *Lebensphilosophie*, some contemporary commentators use it to indicate Nietzsche’s pragmatic orientation as opposed to merely theoretical modes of philosophizing65. Hannah Arendt may be taken to have generalized such a usage. She wrote, in 1958, about Marx, Nietzsche and Bergson as the great “philosophers of life and work” who equated being with life and concentrated on the *homo faber*66.

Then again, it is instructive to see how those trying to rehabilitate Bergson as a “critical vitalist” opposed to naive vitalists can do this by condemning Nietzsche. Frederick Amrine says that grasping
Nietzsche depends on the possibility “to determine what he means by “life””. He concludes: “If Nietzsche stands in any relation at all to the “organic / vitalist tradition”, he is its betrayer. By the time, Nietzsche is through with the word and the concept, “life” is dead. Incipit tragedia.”

In the same attunement, Walter Hof says that Nietzsche fell prey to the negative elements of life. He holds that Nietzsche’s notion of ‘life’ was, “from the beginning, not without an urge to the nihilistic cancellation [Aufhebung] of all certainty, all uniocity, all indigenosity”. Hof also claims that the “desire for the negative”, in Nietzsche, “always” superseded “the desire for the growth of the dynamics of life”. Thus, the philosopher is not to be treated as any “creator of biological vitalism”, but, rather, as a “heroic pessimist” or “nihilist”.

Peter Pütz explains that the “vagueness” of ‘life’ “makes Nietzsche’s critics very uneasy”. Pütz clarifies the Nietzschean notion of ‘life’ as follows. It signifies a “totality” that tolerates contradictions. Where the young Nietzsche speaks of “myth”, the older Nietzsche prefers “life”.

Similarly, Werner Stegmaier cannot refer to Nietzsche’s (and Herder’s) “organological model” of culture without adding that “we have become especially doubtful” about it, because of the Spengler connection. Yet, this does not hinder him from underlining Nietzsche’s commitment to the “life itself”. Nietzsche’s exceptionality lies in the way he did not “presuppose rationality [as the pillar or spine of life] but sought to understand it only out of the measureless, ever-bending life [Maß- und Haltlosigkeit des Lebens]”.

Whereas the opposition between Nietzsche’s insistence on ‘life’, on the one hand, and the traditional high esteem of rationality and conceptuality, on the other hand, has been emphasized by a number of observers, Stegmaier’s alternative was intimated by a commentator of 1926 who held it to be Nietzsche’s task to make Erkennen and Erleben to embrace. Similarly, Mihailo Djurič underlines how persönliche Erlebnis and Denkerfahrung form a united moment of experience. Heidegger, too, writes that Nietzsche, “for the first time, experienced and thought through [erfuhr und durchdachte] nihilism”. Other commentators have identified his life time project to be to investigate self-negating forms of life and to overcome such nihilisms.

From Stegmaier’s perspective, ‘life’, in Nietzsche, neither claims the seat and the crown of ‘reason’, nor wishes to overthrow the intellectual, the intelligible, the conceptual. It is a concept formed in a new way. And this formation involves reconceiving ‘the conceptual’, too.

Joan Aucejo Javaloyas presents it as Nietzsche’s “task” and “principal goal” to “free life [or] becoming from any prejudiced grip [Zugriff] of morality”. More surprisingly, Aucejo expressly addresses the
“concept of life” (*Begriff des Lebens, Lebensbegriff*) in the philosopher’s overall “conception” (*Konzeption*). As she sees it, *Leben* is promoted in Nietzsche’s texts as the criterion of genealogy which she describes as the “center of Nietzsche’s method” dedicated to disqualifying metaphysics and to making room for non-metaphysical thought. “Life” as a criterion marks a shift in the very function of criteria. This is explained by Aucejo as follows. ‘Criterion’ usually means a “certain, more or less clearly outlined point of departure or instance” that is ultimate in the sense that one cannot get any further behind it but from where one can only begin to “rehearse criticism, construction or reasoning”. Yet, *Leben* in the Nietzschean sense appears to be holistic and contextualist in virtue of its rejection of ‘concept of criterion’. It involves “the insight into complex togetherness [Zusammenhang] of totalized “wholenesses” [”Ganzheiten”]“, which causes lack of definition. It can be detected only from “the particular, the concrete and from the melted-in-combinations”, which causes lack of sharpness in the concept. According to Aucejo, Nietzsche’s philosophy appeals to a criterion that cannot function as one and, thus, remains thoroughly problematic, a matter of not only “apprehending the contents” but of “inviting to a confrontation” as well.\(^76\)

Yves Ledure, for his part, holds that “the Nietzschean problematic” is not simply translatable to vitalism. According to him, Nietzsche’s “recourse to the concept of life is not to be purely identified with a reference to the biological as the soil of all interpretation”. It is Ledure’s contention that the “Nietzschean utilization of the concept of life remains, if not problematic, at least mobile”. The “notion” is not restricted to any received discourse of life. It is accorded “the very fluidity of the enigmatic future and of the pluriform existence”. \(^77\)

As though deliberately enlarging the issue at hand, Lars-Henrik Schmidt puts forth the idea of renewing rationality. As he sees it, Nietzsche’s philosophy involves a commitment to *livspraksis* to the degree that “philosophy ought to imitate life”. \(^78\) In Schmidt’s view, Nietzsche’s speciality lies in his insistence on the need to study the “value of our values” and to criticize the misleading opposition between rationalism and irrationalism. Schmidt compares this to Adorno and Horkheimer’s project of “enlightening enlightenment” and to Foucault’s one of “mastering mastery”. Finally, he speaks, without a recourse to Nietzsche’s texts, about “the modern problem as a liberation from liberation [*frigørelse fra frigørelsen]*”. \(^79\)

This line of reading runs counter the one made available by Jürgen Habermas who also speaks of a *Lebenspraxis* with respect to Nietzsche. Less than Schmidt, Habermas relies on his own critical predecessors. As for Nietzsche, he is ready to talk about an autodestruction of thinking, or a “self-denial of reflection”. While Nietzsche is hailed for having discovered “the connection of knowledge and interest”, he is rejected for resorting to psychologism, on the one hand, and for both retaining a
“positivist concept of science” and refining technological imperatives to master the nature.\textsuperscript{80}

One can readily see how Habermas’s interpretation connects to that instance of Nietzsche’s self-reflection, quoted above (see Foreword), where the practice of using reason against reason was identified as the cause of so much trouble and as the ground for vital choices in the thinker’s life. I would suggest that both Habermas and Schmidt point to a crucial dimension, in Nietzsche’s thought, of self-critical interrogation and the kind of ecological interplay between what is called ‘the reason’ and its ever-shifting context. In this section, I have been trying to show that this dimension is also important in coping with the question of Nietzsche’s ‘life’ and, in the further sections and chapters of the present work, I shall try and extend this demonstration.

For the present purposes, the connection between Nietzsche’s ‘life’ and ‘work’ needs additional clarification. It is easy to say that the perplexities of Nietzsche’s biography are rarely properly addressed. There have not been too many attempts at analyzing the interrelatedness of his life and work. One might say that the issue is oddly young for being so old.\textsuperscript{81} Recently, Johann Figl prefaced a fresh edition of Nietzsche’s childhood material. According to Figl, “[t]he interest in the beginnings of his biographical and spiritual way may assume a special value in a philosopher, for whom the questions about the connection of life and thought, and about genealogy and becoming in general, came to be of central significance.”\textsuperscript{82}

Sometimes, as in the case of Julian Young’s recent monograph on Nietzsche’s meditations over the nature and function of art, a commentator may wish to present a “philosophical biography”. As Young puts it, this amounts to “a record of the twists and turns taken by Nietzsche’s philosophy viewed” from the researcher’s specifically developed perspective.\textsuperscript{83} In this way, it is all about, so to speak, the life of a philosophy and not at all about any philosophy of life, or about a philosopher’s life.

One can turn to Weischedel who speaks of a most intimate bondage between Nietzsche’s life and thought, to the extent that transformations in his ideas are “always also stages in his existence”\textsuperscript{84}. Walter Kaufmann, in turn, holds that “[t]he fact remains that his life and work suggest an organic unity”, while insisting on separate analyses and on treating life “only as the background”\textsuperscript{85}. Graham Parkes, for his part, has proposed that, with Nietzsche, one ought to differentiate between life and work, yet it would be a mistake to separate them\textsuperscript{86}.

Gilles Deleuze has tried to elucidate this “complex unity”, this forgotten “presocratic unity”. He says that “[m]odes of life inspire ways of thinking, modes of thought create ways of living. Life activates thinking and thought, in turn, affirms life.” There are philosophical cases where the unity of living and
thinking is virtually lost and replaced by a more antagonistic relationship. Deleuze picks out Kant to embody a life “too wise for a thinker” and Hölderlin to stand for a thinking “too crazy for one that lives”. Nietzsche embodies a rediscovery of the “unity that makes, out of an anecdote of life, an aphorism of thought and, out of an evaluation of thought, a new perspective of life.”

These questions have a direct bearing on Heidegger’s campaign against Lebensphilosophie. Jacques Derrida has underscored Heidegger’s resistance against all kinds of readings of Nietzsche in terms of bios (biographical, biological, biologic). He insists, so Derrida, that “[o]ne will learn who Nietzsche is and what his name says only from his thinking - not from card files packed with more or less refined biographical facts”. In order to reach this dissociation, Heidegger separates Nietzsche’s biography “from the grand questions which stretch the great philosopher to the limit of his powers” and does it in a way that is “very conventional”. Derrida adds that Heidegger maintains “a fairly traditional opposition between biographical factuality - psycho-biographical, historical - and an essential thinking on the order of a historical decision”. The attempt to justify this practice by a recourse to the way Nietzsche names himself and gives his thought an autonomous and unified form does not convince Derrida, since “[n]ext to Kierkegaard, was not Nietzsche one of the few great thinkers who multiplied his names and played with signatures, identities, and masks?”

Elsewhere, Derrida writes that “[t]he academic convention of literary biography presupposes at least one certainty - the one concerning the signature, the link between the text and the proper name of the person who retains the copyright. Literary biography begins after the contract, if one may put it like this, after the event of the signature.” This line of reading finds its most sustained exercise in Derrida’s book Otobiographies. L’enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre. The American declaration of independence signed by Jefferson provides the case for Derrida to discuss “a new problematic of the biography in general, of the biography of philosophers in particular”. It is about interrogating “the dynamis of this edge between the “work” and the “life”, the system and the “subject” of the system’, or between two corpses, two bodies. Nietzsche’s speciality is, so Derrida, that he did philosophy with the risk of putting “into play his name - his names - and his biographies”.

Following Derrida, Henry Staten recognizes the difficulty of speaking about the “real” “Nietzsche” as distinguished from a “textual marker” “Nietzsche”. Yet, he is concerned to keep “the provisional distinction between the real and the fictional [...] permeable”. This is, one gathers, the reason for his refraining “from using such of Nietzsche’s texts (e.g., his letters) as refer us to the biographical Nietzsche” and holding on to a broadly “intrinsic or “formalist”” strategy.

What is left unspecified is the way in which letters point to the “biographical” in the sense that notes and
books do not. Since such a specification is a hopeless task, I have chosen to use all these Nietzschen
texts. The discourse of 'life' teaches that Nietzsche’s problematizations of the concept of 'life' traverse
all his writings. It would seem that Staten, too, tends to retain a conventional concept of biography. By
contrast, Gary Shapiro (who does share Staten’s wariness, as he refers to the temptation to cast aside
the “always already narrativized” Nietzsche and to opt for “the enigmatic Mr. Nietzsche”) is not that
restrained. He makes much of the “sheer quantity” of the philosopher’s “prolific and diverse”
correspondence, of the thinker’s being “hooked in to the universal systems of transportation and
communication” as the “material foundations” of his activities. He even calls Nietzsche, who so
radically disseminated and pluralized himself by all his writings, “the philosopher of the postal age”.

Nietzsche’s correspondence can illustrate an important point here. Since Derrida does not name the
names he speaks of, one may have a look at Nietzsche’s collection of signatures. Far as I can see, it is
somewhere in this very scenery, that Nietzsche’s mastery of the modern biographical self-analysis is to
be looked for. The most notorious signatures appear in Nietzsche’s last letters or so called
Wahnsinnszetel

Nietzsche would also refer to himself as Wald-Einsiedler (KGB III/1, Dezember 1883, 464), Eremit
and Gedanken-Wurm (KGB III/1, November 1882, 273), and call all these “types”. Looking back at
what may have been the greatest disappointment of his life, the conflict with Lou Salomé and Paul Réé,
he claimed to be proud of his “rationelle Typus-Behandlung” (KGB III/1, Oktober 1883, 450).

Similarly, he came to contrast himself with Wagner: ”weil ich mit aller Gewalt mich als Gegentypus zu
der Art Mensch, die bisher verehrt worden ist, präsentire” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 488).
The problematic of ‘types’ is intimately related to the self-naming practices. In order to spell out the lesson of the self-typologies, one could consult Gilles Deleuze. He calls “typology” Nietzsche’s *pièce maîtresse*. This is Deleuze’s opportunity to insist that “the Nietzschean concepts” are not to be interpreted in a one-sidedly psychological sense. As he sees it, Nietzsche’s “type, in fact, is a reality simultaneously biological, psychic, historical, social and political.”

Together with Félix Guattari Deleuze came to draw a lot from Nietzsche’s case in order to develop a notion of “conceptual” *personnages* as the true subjects of a philosopher’s philosophy. Yet, they expressly separated these conceptual characters from “types”, on the grounds that the latter are “psycho-social” and “historical”, while the former are “events” effecting an “auto-position as concept[s]” and “escaping History”.

Deleuze and Guattari have also written as follows: “There is no Nietzsche-the-self, professor of philology, who suddenly loses his mind and supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange people; rather, there is the Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states, and who identifies these states with the names of history [...] A residual subject of the machine, Nietzsche-as-subject garners a euphoric reward (Voluptas) from everything that this machine turns out, a product that the reader had thought to be no more than the fragmented *œuvre* by Nietzsche.”

One is, then, back at the *Zusammenbruch* that Nietzsche underwent in a way that has been seen as anticipating a whole variety of later historical *Zusammenbrüche*. In a more traditional fashion, W. D. Williams once said that “masks” and “roles” and different “voices” for different “contexts” is the technique most characteristic of Nietzsche’s works. It would be a mistake to take Nietzsche as but exemplifying or utilizing these devices. It is, namely, precisely here that Nietzsche’s mastery of self-analysis needs to be appreciated. He writes about being obligated “mich nur unter Masken zu zeigen” and “meine *Rolle* zu spielen und mich vor aller Welt darunter zu verstecken zB. als Basler Professor”, so that “[e]s ist der Humor meiner Lage, daß ich *verwechselt* - mit dem ehemaligen Basler Professor Herrn Dr. Friedrich Nietzsche. Zum Teufel auch! Was geht mich dieser Herr an! - “ (KGB III/3, März 1885, 25 & 30).

His writings contain sustained reflection upon the modern predicament of roles and universalized actorship marking a rupture with the feudalist class-society with strict stratification and solid identities (FW 336, KSA 3, 595-7). A fragment has it that roles are about “Urtheile, Geschmäcker, Neigungen” and intellectual powers suited for the child, the youth, the man and the woman acting in a certain social position and profession. Roles involve particular ways of acting and feeling and “interpreten”. The role is not a personal invention or a choice but “ein Resultat der äußeren Welt auf uns, zu der wir unsere ‘Person’ stimmen, wie zu einem Spiel der Saiten”. It is one’s fate to identify with one’s role: “Wir haben die Affekte und Begehrungen unserer Rolle - das heißt wir unterstreichen die, welche dazu passen und lassen sie sehen. / Immer natürlich à peu près. / Der Mensch ein Schauspieler.” (N Frühjahr 1884
What is accentuated is the interplay between the internalized models due to one’s inevitable socialization through the environing pressure and the challenge of active interpretation and conceptual working on one’s own life. Another Nietzschean notebook entry reads:

Wir haben viele Typen in uns. Wir coordinieren unsere Inneren Reize so wie die äußeren zu einem Bilde oder einem Verlaufe von Bildern: als Künstler. Die Oberflächlichkeit unserer Typen, wie unserer Urtheile, Begriffe, Bilder.
(N Frühjahr 1884 25 [375], KSA 11, 110.)

In coming to terms with this Mr. Doctor Friedrich Nietzsche, there seems, to put it crudely, to have been two basic options for commentators to choose from. Nietzsche’s distinctive techniques of analysis may be the ones to be investigated. For example, Elisabeth Kuhn subsumes Nietzsche’s utterances on the process of nihilism under the rubrics of “Anamnese”, “Diagnosis”, “Prognosis” and “Synopsis”\textsuperscript{98}. Thus, Nietzsche comes out as the physician and psychiatrist of the West.

Alternatively, Nietzsche is not taken as so good an analyst after all, but, rather, as a good patient. As James Collins says, Nietzsche and other philosophers with a high “personal intensity of their thinking and writing”, such as Rousseau or Kierkegaard, provoke “some of their readers to substitute psychiatric for philosophic appraisal”\textsuperscript{99}. Indeed, from early on, Nietzsche aroused not only medical metaphors but clinical psychiatric interest as well. From time to time, it has been difficult to find a comment on Nietzsche without some reference to his becoming mad. If not the “intensity” Collins spoke of, then surely the Zusammenbruch has inspired all kinds of speculation. The philosopher’s thinking has been seen through the eventual course of his life. Next, these speculations will be discussed in order to further clarify the problem of conceptualizing ‘life’.

In 1902, P. J. Möbius published his monograph on the genius going mad. His starting point was this: “either so that his philosophizing made him, at the end, crazy, or so that the mental illness dormant within him first found its expression in his outrageous thoughts”. Möbius determined the disease as effected by both progressive paralysis and original, hereditary abnormality. The conclusion read: "Distrust this man, he is brainsick.”\textsuperscript{100} A little later, an American writer expressed it as his view that Nietzsche’s insanity is “visible, here and there, in his writings”, albeit mainly in the very last ones. Unlike Möbius, this added that the thoughts cannot be disregarded as so many “fantasies of a maniac”.\textsuperscript{101} Again more in consonance with Möbius, a French dissertation was defended, in the 1930's, holding that hereditary syphilis caused Nietzsche’s “ambitious mystic lunacy”. Interestingly enough, the
pathological was felt to reside in “passionate idealism”. 102

One might guess that this genre soon became an outmoded way of writing about the philosopher but this is not at all the case. On the contrary, the debate still continues over whether the madness had begun before the final breakdown and how it had affected the philosophy. 103 In 1980, the biographer Werner Ross couldn’t help but sigh that “[t]he causes of Nietzsche’s madness have been, ever since his Zusammenbruch, speculated annoyingly hither and thither by laymen and professionals, physicians and psychiatrists.” In his review of the relevant literature, Ross is unable to ascertain the definite cause. The syphilitic infection is, according to him, unlikely, because the frugal and scary Nietzsche preferred erotic fantasies. Ross complains about the insufficient psychoanalytical interest in the case, despite the considerable probability that it wasn’t any progressive paralysis, but Nietzsche’s manic-depressive insanity that shattered his brain. 104

Speaking of the psychoanalytical proposals, it is only fair to listen to C. G. Jung who devoted an amazing amount of his own life to studying Nietzsche. Jung said that Nietzsche’s “life does not convince us of his teachings”. He held that Nietzsche’s basic tenet was “a yea-saying to instinct”. But, says Jung, when “the effects of this teaching on the teacher’s own life” are examined, one is bound to conclude that he stood back from instinctive life. He opted for “the lofty heights of heroic sublimity” and could accept no unleashing of the unconscious in himself. According to Jung, the project of detachment and sublimation required painstaking measures taken in organizing daily life and, by consequence, the increasing tension finally shook up Nietzsche’s brain for good. He was, in Jung’s view, a great and important figure but the specific pathological feature of his personality was a chronic heroism bound to end in a cramp. 105

Much later, Alice Miller has claimed that because Nietzsche could not, as a child, express his feelings, in a rigorously conventional, chokingly religious and hypocritically cruel family, he came to channel the repressed infantile urges, both the furious hatred and the overriding joy, to his texts. He never came to terms with, or fought, the real causes of his misery - the cold, stupid and dishonest females of his family and the stringent father who suddenly became inactive and slowly died before the little boy’s eyes. He longed for a father figure and attacked surrogate victims, ideas, world views, women in general. Nietzsche could never understand his own roots. Miller admits the achievements of his “philosophy of life” but poses the question, whether there would be something even more remarkable, had the genius enjoyed more humane treatment in his first years. Nietzsche’s was a life not lived but denied. 106

Jung’s analysis might be used as an antidote for Nietzsche idolatry, while Miller’s account can be credited for forcefully attacking the view Förster had once institutionalized and was, for example,
evidently endorsed by a Nietzsche scholar, in the 20's, who spoke about Nietzsche’s “peaceful and happy childhood, a youth filled with brilliant and proud dreams with a glorious road before him”107.

Yet, what is of prior importance is the general nature of these interpretations. While Miller carries out a classic psychoanalytical effort to trace the adult’s patterns of thought back to the conditions ruling in the presymbolic infancy, Jung diagnoses an incompatibility between ways of thinking and ways of living and speculates in the manner that brings to mind Freud’s ‘principle of nirvana’, or “the radical tendency [of the psychical apparatus] to reduce excitation [internal tension] to zero-point”108. Both Jung and Miller see philosophical convictions as standing for certain weaknesses in coping with the very formation of these convictions.

The Jungian reading could be further substantiated with a recourse to such passages, in Nietzsche’s letters, as these: ”In den Alpen bin ich unbesiegbare, namentlich wenn ich allein bin und ich keinen andern Feind als mich selber habe” (KGB II/5, September 1877, 84) and “in dieser ewigen heroischen Idylle” (KGB III/1, Juli 1881, 100). As for Miller’s persuasive reading of Nietzsche as a child victim of a denigrating cult of obedience, it could be accompanied by Eric Bentley’s words: “A born artist and a born prophet, he was not allowed to live his life. Society provided no man to father him, no woman to marry him, no credible God to protect him, no fame to flatter him.”109 One might also notice how Nietzsche called, if only once and perhaps adhering to practice shared by the students, his professor “Vater Ritschl” (KGB I/2, Oktober 1868, 332). Or, one could recall a remark in another letter of his: ”Es ist mir noch nie gelungen, einen persönlichen Feind zu haben” (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 371).

The biographical projects can be compared to the psychoanalytical ones. Where Verrecchia is close to saying that Nietzsche’s work is just cheap trickery, Jung claims to know what is the core of Nietzsche’s “teaching” and Miller leaves cleverly the nature of the potential true “philosophy of life” open for second guessing. Verrecchia and Jung, in particular, offer rather similar views on the lacking match between the philosopher’s dearest opinions and his most typical inclinations. Verrecchia finds that, the stress on natural drives notwithstanding, Nietzsche’s existence had nothing bohemian, since he never threw himself to the stream of life but lived like a plant in a glass house110.

Jung’s and Miller’s policy of making sense of, in the words of another observer, a man whose “life was spent in thought”111, may correct the depictions of the more philosophical nature but it can also be internally criticized. Kaufmann spoke of how “tempting” it is “to construe Nietzsche’s philosophy as a reaction and a protest against his childhood”. “Yet”, says Kaufmann, “this approach [...] bars any adequate understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy. The thought of a philosopher may be partly occasioned by early experiences, but the conception of strict causality is not applicable here.”112
The critical point I made about Janz and Verrecchia - that they almost ignore the problematizing of 'life' in Nietzsche’s work - can be reformulated here. Jung and Miller, too, tend to go pass the Nietzschean self-reflection on the way to their psychoanalytical conclusions. Contrary to what Miller thought, Nietzsche did discuss the correct explanation of his father’s ruin, and he also specifically worried about his own potentially similar fate (KGB II/5, Januar 1876, 132). As for Jung’s mismatch hypothesis, one could note how Nietzsche writes, in a letter, ”ich habe den Punkt erreicht, wo ich lebe wie ich denke” (KGB III/1, August 1882, 235). This utterance may, of course, be taken to give some justification for Jung’s (and Verrecchia’s) approach, since a prior period ‘beyond the equilibrium of life and thought’ is implied. Yet, what is crucial is that Nietzsche’s text itself exhibits the issue of the interplay of living and thinking and, hence, is not merely a helpless victim of the analyses along those lines.

While it might be that Nietzsche’s eventual catastrope was caused by the success or failure of the heroic repression of uncontrollable internal and external forces - either it successfully repressed his life to a close or it failed to shield him from lethal tension - it is wrong to claim that he does not confront this problematic. The most serious flaw, in the psychoanalytical readings, is that they, largely or completely, ignore the ability of the “patient” to judge for himself and even to provide sophisticated instruments for the shrink. There is a wealth of passages, in Nietzsche’s writings, where he attends to the “aus hundert Gründen ewig problematischen Seins” of his (KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 222).

One might, then, refer to Kaufmann and Collins and proceed to a more philosophical estimation of the thinker’s achievements. Yet, Nietzsche’s career has suggested, to many observers, that it was his philosophizing that caused the philosopher’s illness. There is, say, Vincenzo Vitiello speaking of how “Nietzsche consciously precipitated himself into the abyss of madness”113. There is also Bernard Yack saying that Nietzsche’s two imperatives, of not allowing any debasing conditions and of achieving greatness at any cost, involved a willed contradiction with unhealthy consequences114.

Moreover, there are certain commentators ready to celebrate Nietzsche’s Zusammenbruch as the climax of his thought that, according to their conviction, always already was beyond repair, out of reach for any interpretation as but another exercise in administrative normalization. Says Nick Land: ”It is only when the blaze in Nietzsche’s brain-stem fused with the one in the sky above a piazza in Turin that libidinal materialism touched upon its realization.”115 Thus, Land joins, and reshapes, the tradition founded by Pierre Klossowski that has underscored the decisiveness of the philosopher’s final madness. If Land stresses the moment of the Zusammenbruch, Klossowski favored the subsequent Umnachtung116, unproductivity and speechlessness, as the last sign of the philosophical existence appropriate for that “singular complex of energy having the name Frédéric Nietzsche”117. Fascination about the last years of the philosopher is perhaps there at its strongest in Isabelle Prêtre’s novel where the speaker assumes the
role of the silenced Nietzsche. The imaginary diary ends on the dying locutor’s wish to hear Wagner play, as his mother and father come to collect him.118

One may ask, with Olivier Reboul, if the views of Nietzsche as a “case” throw him out of the “community of thinkers”, beyond meaningful communication119. One may also ask, whether such views, be they condemning or praising, prevent one from appreciating Nietzsche’s role in prefiguring this whole problematic. A still better sense of this prefiguration can be gained from the following anecdote. In a rather macabre way, the later series of conjectures about the philosopher’s unsoundness reminds one of Nietzsche’s pre-Zusammenbruch letters, where he told about a rumor going around Germany that “ich im Irrenhause gewesen sei (oder gar darin gestorben sei)”. A fortiori, “[m]an behandelt mich im lieben Vaterlande wie Einen, der ins Irrenhaus gehört: dies ist die Form des “Verständnisses” für mich! (KGB III/5, April & Juli 1888, 290 & 378).

Now, it can be recalled how the famous event of the 'death of god’ was staged in Nietzsche’s Fröhliche Wissenschaft. The “tolle Mensch” addresses freethinking people, in the marketplace, and announces that “Gott ist todt! Gott bleibt todt! Und wir haben ihn getödtet!”, and is, inevitably, taken to be out of his mind (FW 125, KSA 3, 480-2.) Announcing Zusammenbruch really is effecting a clash between conceptions so severe that all communication seems to break down. As it was seen with the explicit terminology of Zusammenbruch, there is a related tendency, among observers, to see Nietzsche’s insanity, the great mind’s going crazy, as equivalent to the way Western civilization lost its sense120. Belonging to those commentators who warn of the temptation “to explain [Nietzsche’s] philosophy as an expression of a diseased mind”, Frederick Mayer says that “in many ways Nietzsche was more sane than his contemporaries, whose madness was much more fundamental and had more devastating consequences than Nietzsche’s sickness”.121

As it happens, Nietzsche’s writings abound of observations about decline and destruction, distress and tension, depression and madness. In February 1883, in the aftermath of the conflict with Réé and von Salomé and the subsequent suicidal reflections, he wrote: “Ich glaube, ich gehe unfehlbar zu Grunde [...] - ich, mit meiner physikalischen Denkungsweise, sehe in mir jetzt das Opfer einer terrestrisch-klimatischen Störung, der Europa angesetzt ist” (KGB III/1, 325; cf. 333). A year later, he said:

It was in Turin, before the *Zusammenbruch*, that Nietzsche thought himself to have finally gotten “einen Begriff” of “mein mir vorbestimmtes Glück”. The solving of the concept of his life just preceded the dissolving of that life and the difference between the two became at least a little more conceivable: “Ich spiele mit der Last, welche jeden Sterblichen zerdrücken würde...” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 474).

Perhaps the commentators’ reflections on “Nietzsche’s case” do not run aground the discourse of Nietzsche’s life and work, but enrich and enhance it. An early critic, Johannes Volkelt, wrote, in a book called *Ästhetik des Tragischen*, about Nietzsche as an example of a tragic figure who cannot be said to have had “external counter-powers” there to work against him and cause the final ruin: “His inner life developed into a depth of discrepancy, to a hardness of antagonistic oppositions, to a cruelty of hurting oneself, of which it is really difficult to have an idea.”122 Difficult it is, as can be seen from the way Theobald Ziegler closed one of the earliest Nietzsche biographies, from the year 1900, with the following words: “Who Nietzsche was [...] that, in any case, I do not know [...]”123.

While Ziegler’s interpretative modesty has its rare and admirable aspects, Volkelt’s depiction manages to point toward self-reflective, even if in the sense of self-torturing, practices. As soon as one does not attend to the ways Nietzsche’s texts already deal with the issues of collapse, and not merely allow themselves to be viewed against the background of their author’s final fall (and new rise), that discourse is surely about to implode, *zusammenbrechen*. If Nietzsche’s self-critical considerations were left unexamined, one could not appreciate the connections between the respective ways that the philosopher and the western culture and society, religion, morality, arts and sciences, or the fundamental concepts on which all these are based, went to pieces for posterity to piece together again.

One may see how Nietzsche writes, in April 1887, about a *Katastrophe* being prepared “mit mir” (KGB III/5, 57-8). And how, a year and a half later, he writes about the coming “Katastrophe meines Lebens” (KGB III/5, 528). Thus, he acted as the first interpreter of the issue of “Nietzsche’s life and work” with much of the by now familiar connections between individual lives and a ruling conception of ’life’, between personal and collective *Zusammenbrüchen*.

Conceptuality and nihilism are the key questions of the present study. This first section has tried to vindicate the view that Nietzsche’s discourse of ’life’ is not antithetical to the discourse of concepts. Moreover, the very depiction of the energetic and productive living forces is inescapably entwined with “coordination” of concepts. If this entails reconceiving conceptuality, it is this reconception that needs to be studied. The *Zusammenbruch* might, then, well be understood as a coming apart of conceptualizations, nihilism as the condition of apparently no viable conceptual means to make sense.
The concept *Zusammenbruch* may be used with no reference to either Nietzsche or nihilism, yet still retaining a flavor that is characteristically “nihilistic” or “Nietzschean”. In 1926, a German author saw an analogy between the fall of the Greek philosophy and the loss of rank that was currently facing modern science. He wrote about “the circumstances where nothing is really certain and everything is possible and, at the same time, everything is also permitted, where there are no more any basis or guidelines, nothing, nothing that would be safe - in a word, chaos, *Zusammenbruch*. It is there in the middle that we stand.” According to the author, one must consciously live through this condition in order to find a more secure basis. This challenge is, he insisted, also the chance for philosophy to regain its primary role lost in the 19th century.\(^{124}\)

This lesson is crucial for my exploration, too. While the last point I wish to make, in this section, is about the *Zusammenbruch* discourse traversing all of Nietzsche’s texts (books, notes, letters), I would also stress the specifically metaphilosophical effort related to this. In trying to conceive a proper way to approach the philosopher Nietzsche’s life, one had better do it by critically investigating the concepts of ‘philosophy’, ‘life’, ‘Nietzsche’ and, at the same time, the very practice of conceptualizing. I have relied on the way the notion of *Zusammenbruch* can bring out the self-reflective features of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It appears in his self-critical preface to the new edition of the 1872 book on the tragic. Suspicion is caused, in the *Selbstkritik*, over the author’s attempt to leave romanticism for a stance that is properly classical and critical:

> [...], wie? ist das nicht das ächte rechte Romantiker-Bekenntniss von 1830, unter der Maske des Pessimismus von 1850? hinter dem auch schon das übliche Romantiker-Finale präludirt, - Bruch, Zusammenbruch, Rückkehr und Niedersturz vor einem alten Glauben, vor dem alten Gotte... [...] (GT “VeS” 7, KSA 1, 21.)

In this sense, *Zusammenbruch* is a phase in a process where false postures of resistance fall off and stubborn commitments are revealed again. In a characteristic Nietzschean fashion, the crucial development is indicated by a scrupulous literary sequence consisting, this time, of the prefixes *zusammen-*-, *rück-* and *nieder-*-. The dynamics of conception is, thus, implied, while the self-ironical tone ensures that the movement of criticism, or the one of reconceiving, does not terminate. In fact, the book on tragedy contains another exploitation of the *Zusammenbruch* motive. A reference is made to Euripides as having escaped being “unter den Keulenschlägen seiner Misserfolge längst vor der Mitte seiner Laufbahn zusammengebrochen” (GT 11, KSA 1, 79). The latterday tragic, Nietzsche, did not avoid *Zusammenbruch*. Thirteen years before the collapse, he had written about “einen förmlichen Zusammenbruch” having caught him in the form of a potentially hereditary “Gehirnleiden” (KGB II/5,
My key points can be summed up as follows. The life Nietzsche lived is not irrelevant to philosophy, even if the danger of biographicalist explanations is to be recognized and countered. The ways that his curriculum has been shaped by recording the events attached to his name are to be carefully examined. 'Nietzsche's case' - the one he "prosecutes" as he criticizes "our shared tradition" - was, early on, being heavily exploited while explaining 'Nietzsche's case' - the one that he "himself is". The various philosophies of life and different psychoanalyses are important, because if one considers using them in clarifying Nietzsche, one is soon to realize that a mutual reassessment is called for. My basic tenet is that regarding the commonly agreed-upon manner in which his philosophy and his life reciprocally suggest an intimate interdependence, one might as well take seriously the kind of ecology of thought that both the Nietzschean philosophy and the Nietzschean life suggest. This is to say that one does well to investigate the surroundings of the philosopher's philosophy (for instance, the discussion on 'life' going on in the late 19th-century Europe) and to explore the conceptualizations by the philosopher (for instance, Nietzsche's concept of 'life' as adopted from the general discussion and from his own experiences, as adjusted to his peculiar philosophical needs and to his need to continue living and experiencing in the late 19th-century Europe).

Nietzsche's work on the conceptuality of Leben is significant for understanding the later debates on this topic and grasping the way that this philosopher philosophized and how this conceiver conceived. As the epigraph of this section has it, life takes on an irregular zigzag course and presents not much linear development to speak of. The Zusammenbruch of Nietzsche only marked a beginning of an unseen success that, in turn, was to run its course of sharply alternating turns. The Bahn or Lebenslauf of 'Nietzsche' is a series of implosions and explosions. The philosopher went to pieces for all the later reconstructors to compose anew. With equal force, he was also condensed or poeticized into a conceptual compound to be, once again, deconceptualized.
I.b Works

Sehr curios! Ich verstehe seit 4 Wochen meine eignen Schriften, - mehr noch, ich schätze sie. Allen Ernstes, ich habe nie gewußt, was sie bedeuten; ich würde lügen, wenn ich sagen wollte, den Zarathustra ausgenommen, daß sie mir imponirt hätten. Es ist die Mutter mit ihrem Kinde: sie liebt es vielleicht, aber in vollkommener Stupidität darüber, was das Kind ist.
(KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 545.)

In a letter, Nietzsche described himself as “ein Denker [...], der sein Bestes niemals in Büchern, sondern immer nur in ausgesuchten Seelen niederlegen kann”. That is why he felt it so absurd to be forced “mit seinen halbblinden schmerzenden Augen “Litteratur zu machen”“. (KGB III/3, Januar 1886, 136.) This utterance is not a unique one. Nietzsche’s would either say that ”ich gehöre nicht zu denen, welche “Litteratur machen” (KGB III/3, August 1885, 84), or ask as follows: “[m]ache ich denn “Litteratur”?“ (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 247).

Once he even claimed that “ich meine eigne Musik (Bücher eingerechnet) immer nur gemacht habe faute de mieux...” (KGB III/5, Juni 1887, 95). While this last remark is important in preventing both the omission of Nietzsche’s musical compositions from his canon and the overlooking of his exceptional emphasis on the interplay of tones and words, it reinforces the notion of ’writing books’ as a disturbing and daunting one indeed. There is also talk, in Nietzsche’s letters, about “meiner zukünftigen “Colonie”“ in Nice with “sympathische Menschen, vor denen ich meine Philosophie doziren kann” (KGB III/1, November 1884, 563). Later, he wrote about his wish to organize with Overbeck and Burckhardt “eine heimliche Conferenz” to find out how his colleagues tackle the dilemma of exchanging most private ideas (KGB III/3, Juli 1885, 62). However, Nietzsche was doomed to write, although he thought that ”der kürzeste persönliche Verkehr wirkt als Correktur auf ein bloß buchmäßiges Kennenlernen fremder Meinungen und Werthe” (KGB III/5, September 1887, 151).

But these very words can be seen as pointing to the challenge of writing better. In a letter from April 1873, Nietzsche spoke of his goal to become a reasonably good writer with a reasonable attitude toward the writerly existence: “ein mäßiger Schriftsteller zu werden, vor allem aber immer mehr “mäßig im Schriftstellern”“. He should gradually overcome his nausea caused by the bookish and the papery and to surmount his correlative, characteristically Goethean admiration for “handelnden Menschen”. (KGB II/3, 142.)
Writing was to be reinvented as an active undertaking. As was the case with many other processes in Nietzsche, the discovery of Turin seems to have marked a rupture or, if one will, a reconciliation in the attitude to his own output, too. At least, it made a difference. Nietzsche wrote to Köselitz:

  (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 515.)

Shortly after this, he sent Köselitz another letter, a passage of which serves as the epigraph of this section. The “loving mother” now suddenly capable of understanding his children, his books, went on asserting that

[j]etzt habe ich die absolute Überzeugung, daß Alles wohlerathen ist, von Anfang an, -
Alles Eins ist und Eins will
  (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 545).

When everything was about to collapse, Nietzsche saw it all coming together. Yet, the interest in his own writings, in critically referring to them and in fashioning them as pairs, triples, sequences or as a whole, had been there longer than that. In this section, I shall introduce, by drawing from his own comments and from what his readers have made of his texts, the works Nietzsche completed for publication. To close this section, I shall address the issue of the writer’s complex attitude to the very work and occupancy of writing and propose an approach to this very complexity.

Nietzsche published his first book after a couple of years of academic service in Basel. The professor’s work was titled as *Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (1872). Many remarks, in Nietzsche’s later writings, emphasize decisive novelties in this book. There should be at least five of these: “das Verständniss des dionysischen Phänomens bei den Griechen” and “das Verständniss des Sokratismus” (EH, WisgBs: DgdT 1, KSA 6, 310) along with “die Kunst als das große Stimulans des Lebens, zum Leben”, “Typus des Pessimismus, den klassischen” and “ein Problem der Psychologie [...]”, das greechische” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [26], KSA 13, 230).

*Geburt* is dedicated to Wagner and it makes extensive use of Schopenhauer. The tone required in the book, as Nietzsche said a little after its publication, had created the suspicion “als ob sie von Wesen aus dem Monde, aber nicht von den Griechen erzähle”. In defence of his radical revision of the undisturbed, calm image of the ancient Greece, he clarified to Rohde: “Die Griechen sind viel älter als man denkt.
Von Frühling mag man reden, wenn man vor den Frühling noch Winter setzt: aber vom Himmel gefallen ist diese Welt der Reinheit und Schönheit nicht.” (KGB II/3, Juni & Juli 1872, 13 & 23.) The book about Greeks, Wagner, Schopenhauer and dominant philological ideals revealed Nietzsche’s double grip on antiquarian research and contemporary criticism\textsuperscript{126}.

In the couple of years preceding his first book, Nietzsche had written several essays (see section I.c) on its key question. He had, in other words, pondered over the two deities, the measured Apollo and the overwhelming Dionysus, operative in the Greek tragedy, culture and thinking. Shortly before the appearance of the book, he had expressed doubts as to its difficult nature: being about music it may not interest philologists, being philological it might not attract musicians and because of both music and philology it can discourage philosophers even to read it (KGB II/1, November 1871, 248). As Joan Linares Chover recently put it, Nietzsche was well aware that his “interdisciplinary” and “impure” debut will disconcert his audience. It was destined to be seen as \textit{obra anormal e inhabitual, texto híbrido} and \textit{escrito magmático}.\textsuperscript{127}

Indeed, \textit{Geburt} was received either with hostility or embarrassed silence\textsuperscript{128}. Ritschl deplored that Nietzsche who was methodologically consistent was now embracing \textit{Kunstmysterienreligionsschwärmerei}\textsuperscript{129}. Most notoriously, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff attacked Nietzsche with his pamphlet \textit{Zukunftphilologie!}, and sought to revindicate scientific education against the Nietzschean aberration. By contrast, Nietzsche was defended by Wagner who had helped to cause the very outrage. Nietzsche himself did not want take an active part in the controversy but coached his friend Rohde, now professor in Kiel, to write the counter pamphlet \textit{Afterphilologie} against Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in order to both rehabilitate him and punish the author of the “Lug- und Trugbroschüre” (KGB II/3, Juni 1872, 8).

Although he was, most of the time, able to confront \textit{Geburt}’s criticism as a chance to acquire “eine Erfahrung mehr […], eine typische Erfahrung” and although he insisted on handling “Wilamo-Wisch (oder Wilam Ohne Witz)” or “Wilamops” “nur als einen Typus”, he described himself to his childhood conrad Gustav Krug as the one who “sich mit “Dionysisch” und “Apollinisich” lächerlich macht”. His goal had been other than to turn into a “Spaßphilolog”, “Musiklitterat” or “Schanedemitglied” in the philological society he had once founded. Nietzsche was getting ready to start another research, in which “es geht darin gar nicht “dionysisch” zu”. (KGB II/3, Juni & Juli 1872, 9 & 30 & 8 & 29 & 17 & 33; März 1874, 210.)

The tension between different aspects of Nietzschean philology is still seen as relevant. Hans Blumenberg, for one, insists that the book that appears to make sense of the birth of tragedy from an
ancient myth is really a “utopian book”, since it is not about what has been but what is to come. As for its actual impact, it has even been estimated that Geburt “was one of the most fruitful works of nineteenth century scholarship”. For all its controversiality, it “to a large extent establish[ed] the direction of later investigations of Dionysus”.

The wild Dionysian fame of Nietzsche’s Geburt notwithstanding, Peter Sloterdijk holds that it is, as a matter of fact, one of the most Apollinian books of the outrageous century. According to Sloterdijk, Dionysus has but the thematic preeminence, in the book, while the dramatic primacy belongs to Apollo. A similar attitude is visible in another recent work, Allan Megill’s otherwise rather merciless reading, where Nietzsche is seen as most concerned with the Apollinian element in culture. In different terms, yet still in the same attunement, Arthur C. Danto finds that Nietzsche is discriminating “hellenized” form of the raw form of Dionysianism dreadful for both the German philosopher and for his Greek heros. William Desmond, too, holds that Nietzsche’s problem was “how we discipline and shape the undoubted dynamism of the Dionysian”. And T. J. Reed, for his part, insists on how Nietzsche’s book deals with the “controlling” of the Dionysian through the Apollinian and with the “transition” from instinctual life to culture.

In 1886, a new edition of the book was published with the title Geburt der Tragödie oder Griechenthum und Pessimismus and the preface “Versuch einer Selbstkritik” in which the text is described as badly written, clumsy, sentimental, femininely sweetened, hostile to logical sobriety (GT “V” 3, KSA 1, 14). Yet, still later in Nietzsche’s texts, the “ungeheuer Hoffnung” voiced in the book was cherished (EH “WsgBs”: DgdT 4, KSA 6, 313) and its effect was described as “etwas Unbeschreibliches, tief, zart, glücklich...” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 545). In a letter, he wrote about Geburt marking, along with Also sprach Zarathustra, “die entscheidenden Höhepunkte meines “Denkens und Dichtens”” (KGB III/1, September 1884, 535).

A recent critic seconds to Nietzsche’s later doubts by holding that the book is “too confusedly eclectic to be very enlightening: it points to important questions but gives inadequate answers”. More approvingly, Hendrik Birus holds that Nietzsche’s self-criticism is more accurate than Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s criticism. The quarrel between the two philologists’ respective interpretations of interpretation can be compared, so Birus, to the contemporary debate between post-structuralist currents and hermeneutics. For him, Geburt is the writer’s debut, yet already a work of transition. What is interesting is that the book has also been read as opening up to the Problematik of nihilism.

In 1873, Nietzsche wrote what was to be his only published contribution to a periodical: “Ein Neujahrswoart an den Herausgeber der Wochenschrift Im neuen Reich” in Musikalischen Wochenblatt.
is a short, unfriendly polemic against contemporary critics who had seen symptoms of megalomania in Wagner. (N “EN”, KSA 1, 795-7.) After various projects, unpublished essays and speeches on the Greeks, and a public address on education, Nietzsche assumed the role of a “national heretic” and wrote a “diatribe” against an appreciated authority of German culture. The book carried the title *David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller* (1873) and presents a detailed critique of the ideas put forth by the aging author of *Das Leben Jesu*. At the same time, it is a protest against the full blown jingoism in the postwar German empire.

It is in Strauss’s more recent book, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, that Nietzsche locates the type of the shallow Kulturphilister standing for the loss of “der reine Begriff der Kultur”. In contrast with this type and with the current German militarist pride, “Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes.” (KGB UB I 1, KSA 1, 159-163.)

At the time, Nietzsche spoke of his *Anti-Strauss* as volcanic lava (KGB II/3, Mai & Juli 1873, 149 & 154). Fifteen years later, he boasted about the “ungeheuer Skandal”, the “großen Sturm” of curiosity it had aroused: “Mein werthvoller Schritt dazu, um mir ein-für-alle Mal Respekt zu garantiren, war mein Attentat auf die deutsche “Bildung” zur Zeit der höchsten nationalen Selbst-Anbetung, bei Gelegenheit eines miserablen aber allseits bewunderten Buches des altersschwachen Strauss”. (KGB III/5, Februar & Juni & Juli 1888, 259-60 & 340 & 370.)

The book on Strauss was to form the first part of the four *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, the second of which appeared, in 1874, under the name of *Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben*. In this work, polemics on culture went on in identifying the degenerated conception of culture as “*Dekoration des Lebens*” and, by contrast, “der Griechische Begriff der Cultur” as “neuen und verbesserten Physis, ohne Innen und Aussen, ohne Verstellung und Convention, der Cultur als einer Einhelligkeit zwischen Leben, Denken, Scheinen und Wollen”. The context is now that of three strategies of historiography: monumental, antiquarian, critical. These are interrogated, while the common double backside of them is articulated as follows: “das Unhistorische und das Ueberhistorische sind die natürlichen Gegenmittel gegen die Ueberwucherung des Lebens durch das Historische, gegen die historische Krankheit” (UB II 10, KSA 1, 331-4.)

Despite this contrast between historical and un/extrahistorical perspectives, Nietzsche’s book, in an early opinion, was itself seen as testifying to the inescapableness of “the historical way of reflection”. Oswald Spengler, the notorious “Nietzschean” history writer, underlined the notion of ‘historical sickness’ and connected it to a vile pessimism manifest in the inability to recognize any more “tasks”. Raymond Aron says that the “essential idea”, behind the work, “still seems valid”, that is, the “simple
Summarizing the worth of the second Unzeitgemäss Wolf Lepens estimates that “Nietzsche’s attack continues to be illuminating even if we remove it from its original context”146, while Stephen Bann is of the opinion that “Nietzsche achieved a remarkable advance” and “shows the way for a succession of analysts which continues up to our own day”147. Among Nietzsche experts, Mark Warren has underlined the importance of the book as an early step on his way toward an approach to history able to link knowledge in the structuring of human practices148, whereas Volker Gerhardt finds “the radically new” to lie in the view that humans and time are of the same origin, that is, the emergence of memory and self-conscious acts are seen as the human being’s decisive alienation from the rest of the nature.149

However, the volume has not simply been welcomed. Of the above critics, Aron, for one, went on to say that although Nietzsche did not “deny the necessity or the merit of erudition” nor, probably, did he intend to separate the different styles of historizing, yet his “theory ran a grave risk: it was easy for it to slip into contempt for learning and truth”150. Bann, too, criticizes Nietzsche for a “false reification of his object when he anchored historical consciousness in the psychological disposition to use the past in different ways”. He adds, however, that Nietzsche’s “analysis does not presuppose a wholly instrumental view of historical-mindedness, since his ‘antiquarian’ position (the one most redolent of early nineteenth-century concerns) implies a continuous dialectical interaction between the mind of the observer and the material vertices of the past”.151

In any case, Nietzsche himself could not enjoy such a lively discussion. He wanted to tell Overbeck, in May 1888, about an Italian reference to his book, “weil Du das einzige bist, der mir bisjetzt ein Interesse an jenen Gedanken ausgedrückt hat” (KGB III/5, 323).

The concluding volumes of the series were monographs on Schopenhauerian and Wagnerian ideals, respectively. Nietzsche was to say that his Schopenhauer als Erzieher (1874) accommodated “das Schema darin, nach dem ich bisher gelebt habe” (KGB III/5, April 1888, 287). In 1875, he had written to an acquaintance that “[d]er Weg von dem Schopenhauerschen Erzieherthum bis zu dem einzelnen Individuum ist noch sehr lang, und selbst das, was ich noch übrigen diesen Weg noch zu sagen habe, [...] ist noch sehr viel. Ein wenig Geduld!” (KGB II/5, Januar 1875, 5).
To be sure, Nietzsche was careful in dissociating himself from his educational model: "die Schrift über Schopenhauer, deren Lektüre ich besonders empfehle, zeigt, wie ein energischer und instinktiv jasagender Geist auch von einem Pessimisten die wohltätigsten Impulse zu nehmen versteht" (KGB III/5, Juni 1888, 340). Still, the idea about a promise embodied by the book and to be kept by its author is spelled out in his letters more than once (KGB III/1, Dezember 1882, 292 & April 1883, 364).

When it comes to Wagner, it is interesting to detect how little of the ever more distrustingly and aggressive tone characteristic of Nietzsche’s notes and letters is audible in the publication Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (1875). The cautious text closes in the idea that Wagner is not to be taken, “wie er uns vielleicht erscheinen möchte”, as capable of seeing whatever is forthcoming, but as “der Deuter und Verklärer einer Vergangenheit” (UB IV 11, KSA 1, 510). An early commentator estimated that one already can read, in this book, at least “between the lines”, all the forthcoming polemics against the opera master\textsuperscript{152}. In Nietzsche’s later self-review, the book is seen to anticipate major aspects of his later philosophy, to the point that the “Pathos der ersten Seite ist welthistorisch” (EH “WigBs” DgdT 4, KSA 6, 314).

Concerning Schopenhauer and Wagner, the inspirations of his, Nietzsche made, in a later letter, the bold claim about his pioneering interpretation of the crucial axis of contemporary thought:


(KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 260.)

He saw his books on these figures as Versprechungen for himself (KGB III/3, August 1885, 75; cf. III/5, April 1888, 287), even Selbstbekenntnisse and Selbstgelöbnisse (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 260). He said it was a revelation, even to himself, that they both “reden nur von mir, anticipando... Weder Wagner, noch Schopenhauer kamen psychologisch drin vor... Ich habe beiden Schriften erst seit 14 Tagen verstanden - “ (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 515). The unity, then, that Nietzsche had distilled, from his idols, had his name on. In a letter from August 1884, he claims that, in the third Unzeitgemäss, he had unknowingly written about himself (KGB III/1, 518). The idea seems precious enough for him to be made public:

In der dritten und vierten Unzeitgemässen werden, als Fingerzeige zu einem höheren Begriff der Cultur, zur Wiederherstellung des Begriffs “Cultur”, zwei Bilder der härtesten Selbsstucht, Selbsstucht dagegen aufgestellt, unzeitgemäss Typen par excellence, voll souverainer Verachtung gegen Alles, was um sie herum “Reich”, “Bildung”,
Contrary to Nietzsche’s plans (N September 1873 19 [330], KSA 7, 520; cf. KGB II/5, Januar 1875, 5), the series did not extend to thirteen volumes, while, according to one explanation, “die Gesundheit sagte glücklicherweise Nein!” (KGB III/5, April 1888, 287). Instead, between Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen and the next book, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (1878), there is not only the longest break in the flow of his publications but, as Nietzsche said, “eine Krisis und Häutung” (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 260). Judged by the letters, his condition was, at the time, particularly lousy and the search for a suitable lifestyle particularly desperate. Things even turned worse, when Nietzsche was finishing the two appendixes for the book, Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche (1879) and Wanderer und sein Schatten (1880). Small wonder if he wrote to his publisher as follows:

(KGB II/5, Dezember 1879, 471.)

Menschliches is structured somewhat differently from the previous books. Beside a concluding poem, both in the first and the last part, plus a prologue and epilogue showing “the wanderer” in dialogue with “his shadow”, the book is divided in shorter, often aphoristic sections or paragraphs, the sum total of them being 1046. The book is scornful toward some of the things more or less evidently appreciated in Nietzsche’s earlier work, notably, metaphysics and, if casually then all the more scandalously, Wagnerian aesthetics. On the whole, it seems to be flirting and allying with a sober scientific tenor. As such, it is a “Denkmal einer rigorösen Selbstzucht, mit der ich bei mir allem eingeschleppten “höheren Schwindel”, “Idealismus”, “schönen Gefühl” und andren Weiblichkeiten ein jähes Ende bereitete” (EH “WispBs”: MA 5, KSA 6, 327).

In 1886, the three texts together with two new prefaces were released as one. Nietzsche referred to the whole as his most easily readable and understandable book, as “eine gute und leicht zugängliche Pforte zu meinem eigenen Gedankenkreise” (KGB III/3, August 1886, 228-9). Still later, he wrote about how it had “mir im höchsten Grade imponirt: es hat etwas von der Ruhe eines grand seigneur” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 515). It must be noted that Menschliches is a work that is seen to prefigure Nietzsche’s later meditations on nihilism. Martin Heidegger states that the book’s two paragraphs on Maschinen-Zeitalter (MA II/2, 278 & 288, KSA 2, 674 & 682-3) already brought the author close to the issue nihilism. Heinz Röttges, too, speaks of “concealed” instances of “the theme of nihilism” in this
The next to come was *Morgenröthe. Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile* (1881). This is how Nietzsche first presented the manuscript, still titled with the indefinite article *Eine Morgenröthe*, to his publisher: "Dies Buch ist das, was man “einen entscheidenden Schritt” nennt - ein Schicksal mehr als ein Buch" (KGB III/1, Februar 1881, 66). Regarding it sunny and erotic Danto places it at the junction where Nietzsche had dropped the irritating authority of a professor and was yet to acquire the even more irritating tone of a prophet.

The tentative over morality, already effective in *Menschliches*, continued and intensified now up to a point, in the words of Nietzsche’s later self review, of *Feldzug or Kampf* against morality. The new “decisive” book consisted of 575 relatively compact sections. In Nietzsche’s estimation, this yea-saying work proved to be the one where his task showed itself the first time “als Ganze” (EH “WisgBs”: M 1-2, KSA 6, 329-32). This is compatible with Danto’s view about Nietzsche’s successful transition to a “more architectonic” form.

*Morgenröthe*, too, was prepared for the second edition. It came out in 1887 with a preface describing “einen “Unterirdischen” an der Arbeit” enhancing and completing “die Selbstaufhebung der Moral” (M “V” 1 & 4, KSA 3, 11 & 16).

In 1881, Nietzsche had a handful of comical poems published under the title *Idyllen aus Messina*. The collection opened with the “Prinz Vogelfrei” about abandoning walking for a flight. The final stanza of the closing poem can be seen as completing the self ironical atmosphere of this book: ”Wie mir so im Versemenchen/ Silb’ um Silb’ ihr Hopsa sprang,/ Musst ich plötzlich lachen, lachen/ Eine viertelstund lang,/ Du ein Dichter? Du ein Dichter?/ Stehts mit deinem Kopf so schlecht? - / “Ja, mein Herr! Sie sind ein Dichter!”/ - Also sprach der Vogel Specht.” (I 1 & 8, KSA 3, 335 & 342.)

The next year, *Fröhliche Wissenschaft* was released. This is precisely the point when Nietzsche wrote, as quoted in the previous section, to Burkhardt about having achieved a balance between living and thinking. To Köselitz, however, he wrote much more hesitantly urging his friend to comment “über das Ganze und die ganze Stimmung”, because “my Zweifel ist ungeheuer”. To Overbeck, he said that the book is “in jedem Betracht wider den deutschen Geschmack und die Gegenwart: und ich selber bin es noch mehr”. These thoughts are, in a way, summed up in a description to Rée about the book as his most personal one. (KGB III/1, August 1882, 238 & 241 & 247.)

In August 1885, Nietzsche said that the new book and *Morgenröthe* were “Elite-Schriften für Elite-
Menschen, d.h. für ganz Wenige” (KGB III/3, 81). Three years later, he wrote that they exemplified his “Immoralisten-Litteratur” with “dies und jenes zu lachen” (KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 222).

In 1887, Fröhliche Wissenschaft was expanded by a fifth part, which increased the number of the book’s paragraphs from 343 (out of which 63 were little rhymes, other ones relatively short passages like the ones in the two previous books) to 383. In addition, there was, again, a new preface, a subtitle (“la gaya scienza”) plus a lyrical appendix of 14 poems. Boldly enough, Richard Schacht regards this volume to be the place to look for “the essential philosophical Nietzsche”. For him, it is an attempt to rehearse a new interpretation of the human and natural.157

Rudolf E. Kuenzli looks at the book from another angle. For him, already the fact that Nietzsche came to replace the initial Emerson epigraph of the book by a little rhyme of his own suggests that he “directly announces self-parody”, just as much as it proves the author’s concern in fashioning his publications. Fröhliche Wissenschaft embodies, so Kuenzli, a lesson in techniques that have to do his being fully aware “that all writing is only rewriting, a repetition of socially agreed-upon signs” and, thus, a lesson of why “Nietzsche resorts to parody, to self-parody, to play”. The importance of this carefully structured book lies in its “metalinguistic insights”.158

Although Fröhliche prompts Schacht to emphasize it as the closest approximation to a Nietzschean philosophical investigation and Kuenzli to stress it as the prime example of Nietzsche’s metatheoretical style, neither of them denies the book’s readability. In their varying efforts to underscore the achievements of the work, they would probably agree with a third opinion, according to which Fröhliche is “perhaps the most approachable book” by its author159.

During the year 1886, then, Nietzsche wrote, in addition to the critique of Geburt, prefaces to Menschliches, Morgenröthe and Fröhliche Wissenschaft. He said later that “[n]ichts ist übrigens degoutanter, als sich selbst commentieren zu müssen; aber bei der vollkommen Aussichtslosigkeit dafür, daß irgend jemand Anders mir dies Geschäfte hätte abnehmen können, habe ich die Zähne zusammengebissen und gute Miene, hoffentlich auch “gutes Spiel” gemacht. Die Arbeit eines ganzen Jahrs!” In any case, he told about being glad to be “erst fertig […] und meine ganze ältere Litteratur damit auf die Beine gestellt ist!” (KGB III/5, September & April 1887, 151 & 64.)

Many of Nietzsche’s activities can, then, be seen as contributing to molding his production, to redirecting it. Once, he wrote to his publisher about having omitted prefaces originally, because “ich stand noch zu nahe, noch zu sehr “drin” und wußte kaum, was mit mir geschehn war.” Now he saw the situation changed and wanted to reset the sails for these books inaugurating “das Vorspiel einer

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moralistischen Selbst-Erziehung und Cultur, die bisher den Deutschen gefehlt hat”. Nietzsche spoke of his writings forming “eine fortlauflende Entwicklung, welche nicht nur mein persönliches Erlebniß und Schicksal sein wird”. (KGB III/3, August 1886, 225.)

In this respect, the three books, recently seen to make up a “Free-Spirit-Trilogy”\textsuperscript{160}, can be seen as linked to the problematic of culture and Bildung as this problematic was opened by Geburt and reassessed in Unzeitgemässe. Nietzsche gave the following explanation to his publisher for the need to reshape his corpus:

\begin{quote}

dann ist in der That etwas Wesentliches gethan, um das Verständniß meiner ganzen Litteratur (und Person) zu erleichtern. Und namentlich wird man begreifen, daß wer erst mit mir “angebunden” hat, auch Schritt für Schritt mit mir weiter muß. - \\
(KGB III/3, Dezember 1886, 296.)
\end{quote}

Even before, he had written to his publisher that the prefaces have intrinsic value as his “wings”. He expressed their more instrumental function as effecting “eine wahre Aufklärung über mich - und die allerbeste Vorbereitung für […] Zarathustra”:

\begin{quote}

das Wesentliche ist, daß, um die Voraussetzungen für das Verständniß des Zarathustra zu haben […] alle meine früheren Schriften ernstlich und tief verstanden sein müssen; insgleichen die Nothwendigkeit der Aufeinanderfolge dieser Schriften und der in ihnen sich ausdrückenden Entwicklung. \\
(KGB III/3, September 1886, 237.)
\end{quote}

Working on the new forewords contributed to fashioning the early books such as to have them to pave the way for Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (1883-1884/5). This book consists of “Zarathustra’s Vorrede” and “Die Reden Zarathustra’s”, the bulk of which is rubricated as “Von [this & that]” and almost all of them drawn to a close by the repetitive clause “Also sprach Zarathustra”. The discernible units of text are not very much longer than in the previous books. They are, indeed, much shorter than the ones forming the Unzeitgemässe. Yet, the vocabulary, style and setting, all woven around a central character, make the book different from all the others.

As it has been seen, Nietzsche shaped his output into a progressive development reaching its peak in Zarathustra. Special care was taken to ensure that the readers would make sense of this work with the help of the previous publications. Apart from the question of continuity, there are a multitude of remarks, in his writings, supporting the view of this book as an entirely unique event and a kind of consummation. Mentioning the work (part I) for the first time, Nietzsche wrote to Köselitz about “ein
ganz kleines Buch”, yet adding that it is “mein Bestes” and that there is “nichts Enrsteres von mir und auch nichts Heitereres”. He predicted that the book will cause him to be counted among lunatics in Germany. (KGB III/1, Februar 1883, 322.)


After the completion of the second part, Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck that the two parts will not be properly understood, before the whole is finished and then “erst im Sinne des Ganzen”. He went on advertising the whole: “es handelt sich um eine ungeheure Synthesis, von der ich glaube, daß sie noch in keines Menschen Kopf und Seele gewesen ist. (KGB III/1, November 1883, 455.) To his publisher, he introduced the third part as the “dritte Akt meines Dramas (besser sollte ich vom Finale meiner Symphonie reden)” (KGB III/1, Januar 1884, 466). He wrote that “der ganze Zarathustra” is “eine Explosion von Kräften, die Jahrzehende lang sich aufgehäuft haben: bei solchen Explosionen kann der Urheber leicht selber mit in die Luft gehen”. He spoke of it as “eine Art Abgründe der Zukunft, etwas Schauerliches, namentlich in seiner Glückseligkeit”, as a book so personal that it is “dunkel und verborgen und lächerlich für Jedermann”. (KGB III/1, Februar & September 1884, 475 & 479 & 525.) It was a “Wunderthier”, “unverständliches”, because “er auf lauter Erlebnisse zurückgeht, die ich mit Niemandem theile” (KGB III/3, August 1886, 237 & 223).

If he could spoke about Zarathustra as accessible to everyone and, yet, as sharable with nobody, that is only in line with its subtitle. The ambivalence can be seen in the way the book was finished, too. The fourth part was printed in 1885 but Nietzsche decided not to let it circulate outside a chosen few (KGB III/3, März 1885, 19). The status of this text and its relation to the other three parts is problematic (see I.c). Nietzsche called it, as he had once done with the third part, the finale of his symphony (KGB III/3, Juli 1885, 74). The joint volume published in 1886 had only the first three parts in it.

In 1888, Nietzsche made further remarks on Zarathustra calling it “das tiefste größte Werk des ganzen Jahrhunderts”, “das tiefste und entscheidendste Ereigniß [...] zwischen zwei Jahrtausenden, dem zweiten und dem dritten - “, “ein non plus ultra” among books, “das ’Buch der Bücher’”, “das erste Buch aller Jahrtausende, die Bibel der Zukunft, der höchste Ausbruch des menschlichen Genius, in dem das Schicksal der Menschheit einbegriffen ist”. The work “steht so abseits, ich möchte sagen jenseits aller
Bücher, daß es eine vollkommene Qual ist, es geschaffen zu haben - es stellt seinen Schöpfer ebenso abseits, ebenso jenseits. [...] man kann daran zu Grunde gehen etwas Unsterbliches gemacht zu haben”. Zarathustra had “die unausmäßlich schwere Welt von Tiefe, von Ferne, von Noch-niemals-bisher Gesehenem und Geschehenem” calling for alleviating its pressure but, at the same time, guaranteeing for the author a “todten stupiden Einsamkeit”. Nietzsche boasted to Meysenburg having “der Menschheit das tiefste Buch gegeben, das sie besitzt, ein Buch, gegen das gerechnet die Bücher überhaupt bloß Litteratur sind”. And he also bragged about the sheer economical value of the book: ”An meinem “Zarathustra” allein kann man Millionär werden” adding that it “wird wie die Bibel gelesen werden”. (KGB III/5, Januar-Dezember 1888, 236 & 247-8 & 513 & 585 & 492 & 363 & 377 & 488 & 492.) After these remarks, the additional emphasis commentators put on Zarathustra may seem quite redundant. Indeed, they provoked one critic to say that “one can hardly bear to read his ravings about it” and “some at least of what Nietzsche says along these lines may be dismissed as symptomatic of his incipient madness”161. This sort of abashment is sometimes felt already because of the original text: one reader feels as if reminded of D. H. Lawrence’s most tedious prophecies162. As for the lunacy, one may consult an early commentator on the “madness of an elevated spirit”, in this work: “It is only a beginning madness. - Yet, it is madness.”163

Robert P. Pippin regards the book as accommodating practically everything ever related to Nietzsche, either “negative” things such as post-Socratic philosophy, religion, morality and nihilistic humanity or, on the “positive” side, overhuman, eternal return and postmodern future164. Eric Bentley puts it more compactly: “All of Nietzsche is in this book”165. Gilles Deleuze, Glen T. Martin and Greg Whitlock, for example, have underscored, in their respective accounts, how the question of nihilism finds its best treatment in Zarathustra166.

However, it is quite usual that the book is scarcely taken into consideration in studying Nietzsche. Megill not only stresses the “absolute centrality” of Zarathustra, but criticizes those of his rival interpreters who tend to neglect it167. Kathleen Marie Higgins writes about a panic seizing the critics, always thirsty for arguments and propositions, soon as they are faced with a book that provides significations contextualized in an exceptional way168. Zarathustra experts often aim to show that if the work is experienced as anything but argumentative, it nonetheless has a definitive structure of consistently and orderly successive phases169.

There is a commentator saying that the book is “one of the strangest works that ever came from the pen of a strange man”170. C. G. Jung who have probably spent the most time in confrontation with Zarathustra states, at the very beginning of his marathon seminar, that the book is “a hell of a confusion
and extraordinarily difficult". Anticipating the “panic” Higgins referred to, Nietzsche himself wrote that with *Zarathustra* “gerathe ich nun gar noch unter die “Litteraten” und “Schriftsteller”, und das Band, das mich mit der Wissenschaft verknüpfe, wird als zerrissen *erscheinen*” (KGB III/1, April 1883, 360).

What on earth is it about? When it comes to Pippin’s helpful enumeration, one must notice that, unlike “overhuman” and “eternal return”, the terms “post-Socratic”, “nihilistic” or even “philosophy”, not to speak of “postmodern”, do not occur at all in the text. The question of what it is about can, then, be reformulated, as Richard Schacht does, as “what are we to make of” it?

Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen is of the opinion that “communication” is “the decisive problem” in the book. As if attending specifically to the very problem in any attempt at communicating, Pierre Héber-Suffrin proposes that this work “always surprises and very often discourages the reader”. Nonetheless, he advises that the book is read carefully, since “reading of *Zarathustra* no doubt constitutes the best possible approach to Nietzsche’s thought...”. These views can be seen to be combined by Harold Alderman who does take seriously the book’s title and form. He thinks that *Zarathustra* is the primary way for Nietzsche to be in contact with Western philosophy. It is a metaphilosophical work presenting dramatically the structure of philosophy. Due to its own structure, the book is not so much a set of doctrines but a series of speeches and, at the same time, a study of the limits, scope and styles of human speech. There is a borderline, says Alderman, beyond which languages begin to fail and it is precisely there that *Zarathustra* dares.

This last insight reignites the question of the book’s being simultaneously easy and impossible. One of its critical readers, Robert H. Cousineau, makes a fresh comparison between *Also sprach Zarathustra* and *Principia mathematica*. He claims that as surely as Russell and Whitehead knew they were not addressing just anybody with their classic study, they appealed to universal powers of the intellect in striving for clarity and truth. Analogically, Cousineau holds that Nietzsche was doing something almost unfathomable, while making requests to the shared actuality of human existence.

Exploring the dimensions of Nietzsche’s thought I shall come back to the problem as to what sort of work *Zarathustra* is (see IV.b.3; IV.c.1). But before proceeding to the rest of Nietzsche’s books, I wish to consider the question Martin Heidegger posed in 1954: who is Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*? To begin, not with Heidegger, but with Jung, one is told that studying in Leipzig Nietzsche probably got to know about the local sect there worshipping according to a Persian religion founded by Zarathustra, or, in Greek, Zoroaster. Jung points out that Nietzsche was no specialist in Eastern thinking, yet Zarathustra was no metaphorical or poetical invention of his. In the level of content, Jung mentions about the
Zoroastrian faith the belief that every thousandth year there occurs the coming of the savior. He sees Nietzsche’s teaching to be exactly the one of original revelation.178 While one early monographer, Hans Weichelt, denies any connection between Zarathustra and the ancient Zoroaster179, within anthropological and historical Zoroastrianism research, Nietzsche has been seen as exercising incomparable travesty by exploiting the great prophet for idiosyncratic and unworthy purposes180.

Interestingly, in the context of religions being founded, Nietzsche did refer to his own residence “im heiligen Sils-Maria” as “der Ursprungstätte des Zarathustrismus” (KGB III/1, Juli 1884, 515). He also recommended Ruta Ligure as a place worth visiting, because it is the “einsamste Welt, die ich bisher fand, sehr Zarathustrisch” (KGB III/5, Januar 1887, 5). Not that I recommend taking these phrases in deadly earnest. Soon as one confronts the following quotation, the humorous pathos ought to be revealed. This is Nietzsche’s comment on the considerable earth quake in Riviera ruining, as he reported from Nice, the building where Zarathustra’s parts III and IV were finished: ”Das Haus [...] ist dermaßen erschüttert und unhaltbar geworden, daß es abgetragen werden muß. Dies hatte den Vortheil für die Nachwelt, daß sie eine Wallfahrtsstätte weniger zu besuchen hat.” (KGB III/5, März 1887, 38; cf. Februar 1887, 34.)

But there is more to the Persian connection than that. It has been stated that Nietzsche’s inspiration and source book in conceiving Zarathustra was either Comte de Gobineau’s Histoire des Perses or Max Müller’s Essays, both dating from 1869181. However, his comprehensive knowledge of Greek literature, where the figure of Zoroaster occasionally occurs, frustrates the attempts to ascertain the definite impulse. With a regard to the Greeks, a passing reference is made to Zoroaster in a text by Nietzsche from the year 1873 (N “DpitZgd” 1, KSA 1, 806). Further, an earlier note relates to the king Darius’s victory as the reason why Zoroastrianism did not embrace Greece (N September 1870 - Januar 1871 5 [54], KSA 7, 106). Having but the first part of the book finished, Nietzsche told about being incidentally informed

\[ \textit{was “Zarathustra” bedeutet: nämlich “Gold-Stern”. Dieser Zufall machte mich glücklich. Man könnte meinen, die ganze Conception meines Büchleins habe in dieser Etymologie ihre Wurzel: aber ich wußte bis heute nichts davon.} \]

(KGB III/1, April 1883, 366.)

Two months from that, he accentuated to Köselitz that “”Zarathustra” ist die ächte unverderbte Form des Namens Zoroaster, also ein \textit{persisches} Wort” (KGB III/1, Mai 1883, 378). There is a note book entry worth quoting, from as early as between the spring and fall of 1881, mirroring considerable awareness of the Persian religion and its usefulness for reappropriation:
Mittag und Ewigkeit.

Fingerzeige zu einem neuen Leben.
Zarathustra, geboren am See Urmi, verliess im dreissigsten Jahre seine Heimat, gieng in die Provinz Aria und verfasste in den zehn Jahren seiner Einsamkeit im Gebirge den Zend-Avesta. (N 11 [195], KSA 9, 519.)

At last, in the note books from the spring of 1884, there is the following fragment:


One might latch onto the ideas of prophecy and millennias that Jung already noted. Since Nietzsche came to speak of nihilism as something that would rule for a long time, one could be tempted to establish here a genuine connection, be it taken as a religious mission or an instance of transforming irony or whatever. Based on Nietzsche’s utterances, Elisabeth Kuhn has even outlined a graphic presenting a tripartite sequence from i) the era of Platonic and Christian thinking, ii) through the turning point of Nietzsche’s critique, to iii) to the predicted “tragico-Dionysian” era (1888-2088), with a good many stages in the first and last periods.¹⁸²

The minimal conclusion of the remaining hints could be that the connection of Persia may not be altogether negligible and that Jung’s speculations are not entirely futile.¹⁸³ Yet, in my view, it is hard to ascertain the opinion of one early commentator about Nietzsche as “delving into oriental mysticism”¹⁸⁴. It is much more profitable to point to the closer connections, even if on mostly intertextual grounds. I would suggest that Voltaire, of whom Nietzsche’s epigraph for Menschliches spoke as one of the “grössen Befreier des Geistes” (MA I, KSA 2, 10) and who appears, in a note from the preparation time for Zarathustra, as a European with “umfänglichste Seele” (N November 1882 - Februar 1883, 4 [1], KSA 10, 109), is an important point of reference. Voltaire’s dramatic parodies where action is, as in La princesse de Babylone and Zadig, situated in oriental circumstances, founded a genre of modern philosophical and socio-critical fables. This point ought to be regarded as crucial for Nietzsche’s experimentations with the figure of Zarathustra. (Cf. MA I 221, KSA 2, 182; N Oktober-Dezember 1876 19 [81], KSA 8, 349.) When it comes to the more specific conjunctions, the name of the French composer, Jean Philippe Rameau must be mentioned. His lyrical tragedy Zoroastre debuted in 1749. In a note by Nietzsche, from the year of the publication of the first part of Also sprach Zarathustra, Rameau is referred to as a forerunner to C. W. Gluck who, in turn, came to have his effect on Wagner. (N Sommer 1883 12 [36], KSA 10, 407.)
Moreover, it was, of all of Nietzsche’s recurring reference points, Emerson who studied Zoroastrianism to a remarkable degree. The American studied a book on the subject that had appeared in 1771, in Paris, under the title Exposition du système théologique des Perses I-III.\(^{185}\) Emerson’s interest on the subject was arguably due to Goethe’s related remarks\(^{186}\). In any case, there had been other Germans with something to say about the Persian religion from a distinctly philosophical point of view. The prime example here is Herder who, basing his ideas on that very same French edition, held that, apart from the political aspects of religious commendations, the Zoroastrian faith presented “a kind of philosophical theodicy” having to do with tolerating the dominating concepts of its time.\(^{187}\)

Herder’s case illustrates that the question over the actual process of appropriation or over Nietzsche’s sincerity and self-awareness is secondary to, though perhaps evidently linked with, the one concerning the interplay of meanings conveyed by the introduction of this stranger. In other words, should Nietzsche have confronted Herder’s comment on the Zoroastrianism or not, it remains that his work readily enters in conversation with this, to my mind, fine piece of judgment.

An early commentator spoke of the book’s “poetic clothing that, surely, is more than a cloth”\(^{188}\). The Persia connection should not prevent one from appreciating the less evident linkages that the work has, beginning from the bible\(^{189}\). It was proposed, by another early critic, that Zarathustra is read and its central character seen, in the context of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Goethe’s Faust\(^{190}\). Of the contemporary Nietzsche scholars, Gary Shapiro has spoken of the affinities between Zarathustra and Homer’s Odysseus. Moreover, Shapiro underlines intertextuality, as he characterizes the Nietzschean aphorisms as “junctions in an indefinitely ramified network”. As for Zarathustra, Shapiro writes as follows: “Almost any topic that emerges in the book becomes the occasion for ringing the changes through the succession of parts. This is especially interesting in the case of discourse itself.”\(^{191}\)

Still, the pattern of the character Zarathustra haunts interpretative interest in a way that incessantly harks back to its ancient roots. Pippin refers to “the most common explanation” that, because Zoroaster had invented morality it just had to be him to first discover its being an error\(^{192}\). This just about sums up, in terms of Zarathustra’s most far-reaching experience and most rigorous truthfulness, Nietzsche’s only public comment on the matter (EH “WieSb” 3, KSA 6, 367). Sufficiency similar motivated is Héber-Suffrin’s stress on the irony in the appeal to theologico-cosmological forces of good and bad, as it is “precisely the refutation of this dualism and this moralism that constitutes an essential point of Nietzsche’s thought”\(^{193}\).

Alderman, for his part, recommends the view that Nietzsche is using mystical ideas without being himself mystical\(^{194}\). This reading can be supported by a reference to a fragment of Nietzsche: ”NB.
Zarathustra, sich beständig parodisch zu allen früheren Werthen verhaltend, aus der Fülle heraus.” (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [54], KSA 12, 313.) In roughly the same spirit, Laurence Lampert advises not to mistake this “new age oracle” with Zoroaster of whom Nietzsche differs in rejecting the lunacy of a utopian religion with its ideas of justifying history through its end in last judgment and/or eternal bliss195. At the minimum, the potential appeal to magic and sorcery is countered by Nietzsche’s comment on a spiritist session he took part: ”erbärmliche Betrügerei, welche nach der ersten halben Stunde langweilt” (KGB III/1, Oktober 1882, 269). All this chimes well with Nietzsche’s words to Gersdorff from July 1883:

Laß Dich durch die legendenhafte Art dieses Büchleins nicht täuschen: hinter all den schlichten und seltsamen Worten steht mein tiefster Ernst und meine ganze Philosophie (KGB III/1, 386).

In this light, the idea of Nietzsche as trading all that is “scientific”, in philosophy, for “converging the forms of oriental wisdom of speech and visionary prophecy”196, does not make that good sense. One might ask why the Persian religion or the forgotten fables are there, in the first place, to, as it may seem, hide and confuse serious philosophy. Either they merely camouflage or they take part in the philosophical points. Much of the philosophical and educatory strategy of Zarathustra can be comprehended as related to keeping readers alert to the complexities inherent in mediating philosophical points, in educating.

Another note book entry, one line fragment from spring 1884, reads: ”Entschluß. Ich will reden, und nicht mehr Zarathustra.” (N 25 [277], KSA 11, 83.) This matches the point about serious philosophy as somehow lying behind the smoke screen of the fabulatory setting. Yet, it would entail that Nietzsche’s voice is audible everywhere else than in the pages of Zarathustra. Alternatively, and more promisingly, the fragment points back to the considerations of the relationship between Nietzsche’s life and work. Zarathustra/Nietzsche relation has been an irresistible item for commentators. It was, in point of fact, irresistible for Nietzsche, too. Quite apparently, he was as fond of self references such as “Vater Zarathustra’s” (KGB III/1, April 1883, 358; cf. III/5, September 1887, 146). - or, with the words in the epigraph of this section, its mother - as he liked calling Zarathustra his “verwegenen Sohn” (KGB III/3, September 1886, 237; cf. III/1, Juli 1883, 393 & 406 & III/5, Februar 1887, 34). Small wonder if some authors want to rubricate their works on Nietzsche as Zarathustras Ende or Zarathustras Geheimnis197.

Jung insists that Nietzsche is to be taken as “always identical with Zarathustra”198 and Bentley speaks of Zarathustra as “a simple mask for Nietzsche himself”199, where Magnus, Stewart and Mileur say that “[t]he identification between Zarathustra and Nietzsche is both very strong and ultimately broken”200.
Volker Gerhardt sees that “[i]n his solitude, Nietzsche created “Zarathustra” for himself as companion”\textsuperscript{201}, while John Sallis is happy to write about “the complex dialectical identity that constitutes Nietzsche’s relation to Zarathustra”\textsuperscript{202}. In opposition to Gadamer’s insistence on the difference between Zarathustra’s speeches and Nietzsche’s philosophy\textsuperscript{203}, Henry Staten chooses to call “Nietzsche” and “Zarathustra” “textual markers” indistinguishable from one another. In the absence “of the proper identity of the thinker’s voice”, there can be no separation between real utterances and the ones filtered through a fictional speaker. According to Staten, faith in the “fixed entity called “Nietzsche”” is but a piece of “an entire metaphysics of the self and of conscious intentionality” specifically criticized by Nietzsche. Thus, the choice to omit the distinction between Nietzsche and Zarathustra does not spring from mistaking “a fictive voice for that of the philosopher”. On the contrary, it is a matter, as Staten says, to resist an even more blatant “oversimplification” that renders all the texts beyond Zarathustra unproblematic.\textsuperscript{204}

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari propose that Zarathustra is best conceived as one of Nietzsche’s “conceptual personae”. The general point here is that the personation does not represent the philosopher, but “the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual personae and of all the others that are the intercessors, the true subjects of his philosophy”\textsuperscript{205}.

An illustration of the reading difficulties of Zarathustra is in order before moving on to the subsequent works. Of the famous first speech by Zarathustra on the spirit’s threefold metamorphosis into a camel, into a lion and into a child (Z I/1, KSA 4, 29-31), commentators have repeated that it reflects the author’s personal development\textsuperscript{206}. Erich Heller, for one, refers to it as involving “facets of Nietzsche’s intellectual biography”\textsuperscript{207}. He and other commentators surely recognize the larger symbolical issues in the metamorphoses. Wilhelm Weischedel, for another, refers to Nietzsche’s equal “spiritual path” and goes on to sum up the symbolism: the camel for carrying the tradition, the lion for disillusionment and the need to persevere nihilism, the child for overcoming and renewed faith\textsuperscript{208}.

Yet, as long as one keeps dwelling upon the biographical connection one is likely to miss the point about Zarathustra’s being a collage of texts. Even if the recourse to the author’s experiences is meant to clarify an otherwise messy jumble of excerpts, it ought not to hinder one from investigating the text. In a laudable exercise of critical interpretation, Richard Perkins has come up with another kind of connection for the speech on metamorphoses. Showing how it relates to a 17th century Spanish fable and its later reworkings in German literature, and how Nietzsche’s notes directly attach to these, Perkins is able to describe Nietzsche’s treatment of the old degeneration sermon as a metamorphosis of its own: Zarathustra replaces the received sequence where humans are turned into asses, dogs and apes with his own “regenerative vision”.\textsuperscript{209}
Perkins’s reading is a strong case in favor of a line of interpretation that refuses to undercut writers’ writings. The choice may be open for either stressing Nietzsche’s rigid control of his resources or the uncontrollable forces of signification, endless chains of reference and restless simulacrum, yet the basic lesson remains the same. Whatever philosophical or other conclusions one is about to jump into, from the basis of a text, it still remains the case that the thoughts are presented in writing with its more or less autonomous web of relations. Even though there may be a somewhat uncomfortable intentionalism involved, I think Schacht has a good point to make, as he says that "[i]t is to Zarathustra rather than simply to Zarathustra that Nietzsche would above all have us respond”, yet holding that "Zarathustra is not merely Nietzsche’s mouthpiece or stage-name”\(^{210}\).

One final thing to be said about Zarathustra is this. On the basis of this figure, Nietzsche might be seen as stepping right out of the confines of the philosophical tradition. Yet, the idea of the first Greek philosophers as having been working under the influence of Oriental religiosity, as well as the later pre-Nietzschean cases of spiritual and artistic use of Zoroaster, both tend to intensify a metaphilosophical problematic that many commentators have found crucial in Also sprach Zarathustra. The book even signals highly interesting direct linkages between Nietzsche and his philosophical predecessors, since Zoroaster appears not only in Herder but in the works of both Kant and Hegel, too (see section IV.c.3).

*Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft* (1886) marked, in Nietzsche’s later estimation, the opening of “die neinsagende, neinhuende Hälfte” of his task (EH “WisgBs”: JvGuB 1, KSA 6, 350). For some time, Nietzsche planned to give it out as the second part of *Morgenröthe*, until he decided not to (KGB III/3, Januar 1886, 140 & März 1886, 168). In this respect, it is not surprising that the book is structured and stylized to look like *Menschliches, Morgenröthe* and *gaya scienza*, if only are its 296 numbered sections, the 122 “Sprüche und Zwischenspiele” excluded, mostly somewhat longer than those of the other books mentioned. In addition, *Jenseits* has a preface and a *Nachgesang* called “Aus hohen Bergen”.

To his potential new publisher, the author characterized the work as “ein Buch für geistige Wagehalse und Feinschmecker”, referred to its daring nature but denied any sense of “direkter Angriff”. To Köselitz, he spoke unreservedly about “erschreckliches” work, “sehr schwarz, beinahe Tintenfisch” . Unable to close a deal with others, Nietzsche had it printed by his old publisher, along with the first complete edition of *Zarathustra* (I-III), for which he saw the work serving as “eine Art Einführung in die Hintergründe”. It was to make it impossible to treat the verse book as handling with “Phastastereien und unwirkliche Dinge”. (KGB III/3, Januar & April & August 1886, 141 & 181 & 224.) After reading a provocative review (see II.a), he had the book sent to his old friend Deussen, now a rising critical authority in Indian thought. Nietzsche called it “mein jüngstes und bösartigstes Kind […] hoffentlich
lernt es in Deiner Nähe etwas “Moralität” und Vedanteske Würde, da es an Beidem von seinem Vater her Mangel leidet” (KGB III/3, September 1886, 251-2).


About Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nehamas states that “we don’t know how to read this book”. Its narrative structure, if there is one, is out of reach. According to Nehamas, this is explained by the “sheer brilliance” of a plurality of the passages preventing us from seeing the not so brilliant parts and the relations between different elements. He suggests that the unity of this monologuous, inconclusive and seemingly unorganized, yet sustained and coherent work is to be sought in the narrator being born at the moment we confront the text.211

In October 1887, Nietzsche’s composition Hymnus an das Leben was published. Worked out from his earlier melodies and arranged with the help of Köselitz, this work was the only one of his many musical efforts finished for publication. Nietzsche wrote to Köselitz:

Diese kleine Zugehörigkeit zur Musik und beinahe zu den Musikern, für welche dieser Hymnus Zeugnis ablegt, ist in Hinsicht auf ein einstmaliges Verständniß jenes psychologischen Problems, das ich bin, ein unschätzbarer Punkt; und schon jetzt wird es nachdenken machen. Auch hat der Hymnus etwas von Leidenschaft und Ernst an sich und präzisirt wenigstens einen Hauptaffect unter den Affekten, aus denen meine Philosophie gewachsen ist. Zu allerletzt: er ist etwas für Deutsche, ein Brückchen, auf dem vielleicht sogar diese schwerfällige Rasse dazu gelangen kann, sich für eine ihrer seltsamsten Mißgeburten zu intressiren. - (KGB III/5, Oktober 1887, 179.)

This should make clear that Nietzsche is loading the piece of music with a lot of importance. Such an effect is further enhanced when attention is paid to what he wrote to those whom he sent the work. To the old friend Krug, he expressed the wish of having it presented by a choir in Cologne. Nietzsche spoke about “eine Art Glaubensbekenntniß in Tönen” with “energische Haltung und einen dramatischen Hauptaaccent”. He said that the hymn should be all that remains from his music and that it might “einmal “zu meinem Gedächtniß” gesungen zu werden”. (KGB III/5, Oktober 1887, 182.)

Moreover, what he wrote to the conductor Felix Mottl may well articulate Alderman’s basic interpretation of Nietzsche as studying the limits of language: “ich wünsche, daß dieses Stück Musik
ergänzend eintreten möge, wo das Wort des Philosophen nach der Art des Wortes nothwendig
undeutlich bleiben muß. Der Affekt meiner Philosophie drückt sich in diesem Hymnus aus.” (KGB III/5,
Oktober 1887, 172-3.)

What made the composition even more thrilling was its text. Lou von Salomé had written the poem for
Nietzsche, in late August 1882, after some time they spent together in Tautenburg. At that time,
Nietzsche told Overbeck not only about the “ergreifendes Gedicht “Gebet an das Leben’” but about the
unique “philosophische Offenheit” reigning between him and von Salomé (KGB III/1, September 1882,
256). Already in next September, he was ready to send Köselitz the piece meant for publicity “‘um die
Menschen zu meiner Philosophie zu verführen”. It appears that the composition shared something of the
function ascribed by Nietzsche to his forewords and re-editions. Perhaps for this reason he didn’t
acknowledge, to his friend, von Salomé’s authorship until in the next letter. (KGB III/1, 249 & 263.)
Five years later, this time in the published work, Nietzsche left the lyricist unspecified again. To his
mother, he wrote that he will “schon eine Gelegenheit finden, “dem die Ehre zu geben, dem die Ehre
gebührt’” (KGB III/1, Dezember 1887, 208). The opportunity came no sooner than in the book Ecce
homo where the hymn is described as belonging to the “jasagende Pathos par excellence, von mir das
tragische Pathos genannt”. The pathos, it is said, was distinctive of the period when the work was born
together with Zarathustra. The passage continues:

Der Text, ausdrücklich bemerkt, weil ein Missverständniss darüber im Umlauf ist, ist nicht
von mir; er ist die erstaunliche Inspiration einer jungen Russin, mit der ich damals
befreundet war, des Fräulein Lou von Salomé. Wer den letzten Worten des Gedichts
überhaupt einen Sinn zu entnehmen weiss, wird errathen, warum ich es vorzog und
bewunderte: sie haben Grösse. Der Schmerz gilt nicht als Einwand gegen das Leben: "Hast
du kein Glück mehr übrig mir zu geben, wohlan! noch hast du deine Pein…” Vielleicht hat
auch meine Musik an dieser Stelle Grösse. (EH “WisgBs”: AsZ 1, KSA 6, 336.)

In his sympathetic answer to Nietzsche’s request of commentary and exposure, Mottl did not speak
about greatness. He said that the hymn is melodically not very rich but that, in good hands, it ought to
sound good. Mottl promised to conduct it should he have the chance.212

While most of Nietzsche’s songs date from the early 1860’s, Hymnus an das Leben is a mixture of
choral sections from the year 1874, text and melody from 1882 and final reworkings from 1887. As
such, it may be the musical effort of his that is less reminiscent of the romanticist idiom he was grown
into as adolescent and against which he was to turn in his later writings.213 Nietzsche told his sister about
how much he had laughed as he heard about Köselitz’s Italian acquaintances who had praised the song
as true ecclesiastical music (KGB III/5, November 1887, 193).
In November 1887, he published another book, Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift. It is made of a preface and three treatises, the first of them titled as “Gut und Böse”, “Gut und Schlecht”; the second as “Schuld”, “schlechtes Gewissen” und Verwandtes and the last as “was bedeuten asketische Ideale?” The structure of the work can perhaps be said to combine the one in Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, on the one hand and, Menschliches, Morgenröthe, Fröhliche Wissenschaft and Jenseits, on the other. Most of all, however, it resembles Geburt.

It is a bit strange that this book is rarely compared to the works felt to belong to the genre of moral history. Early juxtaposition can be gained from Friedrich Jodl’s article from 1908. He begins by praising Edward Westermarck, remarks then that the majority of the contributions, in the field, are but preliminary collections of relevant material. Burckhardt’s Kultur der Renaissance is also mentioned in this context. Thereafter, Jodl makes a hostile reference to Genealogie as “a series of lively paradoxes”. In his view, Nietzsche does damage to understanding “complicated development” by applying to it “a few very simple and striking formulas”.214

Later, David S. Thatcher has said that the title of the book is deliberately ambiguous and, according to him, it is naïve of the translators to oppose the prefix “toward” in favor of the plain “Genealogy of Morals”. The word Zur suggests a contribution, or a Beitrag, to the particular field under discussion, while it also creates, says Thatcher, similarly ironical effect as in Swift’s A Modest Proposal.215 Thatcher’s point is, I think, well taken. Nietzsche, who in his letters rarely discussed the problems of his books at any length, sent, to such an authority in idea and church historical matters as his friend Overbeck, a postcard, in which he made quite clear the cautious nature of his new study. At the same time, he could further illuminate the corrective role of personal acquaintance in addressing a book.

(KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 224.)

Sending the first draft to his publisher, on July 17, 1887, Nietzsche spoke of the new work as standing in direct connection to Jenseits von Gut und Böse. He asked for exactly the same editorial measures to be taken, “so daß diese Abhandlung wirklich als Fortsetzung von jenem “Jenseits” auch äußerlich sich
ausnimmt.” Three days later, he wanted the manuscript back, not because, as he told Köselitz, “aus Unzufriedenheit damit, sondern weil inzwischen das Begonnene weiter gewachsen ist und sobald auch noch kein Ende absehn läßt”. (KGB III/5, 111 & 115.)

Later on, Nietzsche was able to speak about the book as “in der That rasch beschlossen, begonnen und fertig gemacht” (KGB III/5, August 1888, 123). He blustered about his extraordinary “Leistungs-Fähigkeit” to finish the book in twenty days (KGB III/5, April 1888, 287 & September 1888, 435). Yet, after having already called it ready, he sent the corrected “dritte (Schluß-) Abhandlung” writing that “bilden jetzt die drei Abhandlungen ein gutes Ganze” (KGB III/5, August 1888, 135). To Köselitz, he spoke of the third part as done “in etwas anderer Tonart, anderem Tempo (mehr “Finale” und Rondo), und, vielleicht, noch verwegener conciirt”. He held that “[d]as Stärkste ist aber die “Vorrede”: wenigstens kommt darin das starke Problem, das mich beschäftigt, zum kürzesten Ausdruck. - “ (KGB III/5, September 1887, 154.)

Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck that now, with Genealogie, “ist übrigens meine vorbereitende Thätigkeit zum Abschluß gelangt: im Grunde gerade so, wie es im Programm meines Lebens lag, zur rechten Zeit noch, trotz der entsetzlichsten Hemmnisse und Gegen-Winde: aber dem Tapferen wird Alles zum Vortheil.” If this makes the book look like a groundwork for something forthcoming, the opposite direction of interest had surely not lost its appeal. When the book was finally printed, in November 1887, Nietzsche repeated the point that it stood “in einer nothwendigen Beziehung” with Jenseits, “zu dessen Ergänzung und Verdeutlichung”. He emphasized that “[m]ein Hauptwunsch bei dieser Veröffentlichung ist, etwas damit zum Besten meiner früheren Litteratur zu erreichen: nämlich dazu einzuladen, dieselbe zu lesen und ernst zu nehmen.” (KGB III/5, September & November 1887, 158 & 186.)

Nietzsche assumed that Genealogie might be of interest “als eine Art Kriegserklärung gegen die Moral”. To Burckhardt, he wrote about “moralhistorische Studien” dealing with “psychologische Probleme härtester Art: so daß es fast mehr Muth bedarf, sie zu stellen als irgend welche Antworten auf sie zu riskiren”. Again, he underlined the work being “im engsten Bezuge” with Jenseits. (KGB III/5, November 1887, 192 & 198.) Not long after this, he even considered another edition of it with the title Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Anhang. Drei Abhandlungen (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 255). Once again, the care for the entire production played a key role in Nietzsche’s actions.

Deleuze regards Genealogie as “Nietzsche’s most systematic book”. He emphasizes that it presents itself not as a series of aphorisms or as a poem, “but as a key to the interpretation of the aphorisms and to the evaluation of the poem”. In a larger sense, Nietzsche’s project is, according to Deleuze, to put the
Kantian critique back on its feet, just as Marx had done with Hegel’s dialectic. In his article on the “Genealogy of Genealogy”, Nehamas compares the book to the second Unzeitgemäss. The connection is located between understanding history or morality as a meaningless “pattern” for the succession of contingent events. In both cases, says Nehamas, something absolute and fundamental is shown to be a definite “reaction to a pre-existent group of phenomena”. The difference between the early and the later work is, according to this view, that the later Nietzsche no longer thinks that to establish meaning is to falsify.

Later, in Nietzsche’s texts, the discerning of a noble morality and resentment morality is underlined as the eminent achievement of Genealogie (AC 24 & 45, KSA 6, 192 & 223). Ressentiment, adopted most likely from Dühring (see N Sommer 1875 9 [1], KSA 8, 176), is, indeed, one of the key notions of the book (GM I 10-11 & 16 & III 15, KSA 5, 270-7 & 287 & 372-5). Danto says that the French word (as used by Nietzsche) is something other than the English “resentment”, since it relates to the explanation of suffering within suffering, to the re-experiencing, through morality, of suffering caused by morality. On the whole, Danto stresses, in Genealogie, the plurality of words having pathological significance. Eric Blondel, in turn, pays attention to the way many of Nietzsche’s key notions are foreign terms that easily evoke questions of etymology which was, in turn, a discipline especially dear to him.

The vocabulary was intensified in Nietzsche’s next book, Der Fall Wagner. Ein Musikanten-Problem (1888), where another French notion figures prominently: ”Was mich am tiefsten beschäftigt hat, das ist in der That das Problem der décadence” (W “V”, KSA 6, 11). Nietzsche told later that this “kleinen boshafiten, aber trotzdem sehr ernst gemeinten Schrift”, published five years after Wagner’s death, was written during his first stay in Turin, in good mood and with a taste so un-German that “es möchte leichter sein, sie ins Französische zu übersetzen als ins Deutsche…” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 419-20 & 426). Later, he spoke of “etwas Lustiges, mit einem fond fast zu viel Ernst”, or of “ein kleines musikalisches Pamphlet [...] etwas sehr Lustiges”, of “ein kleines Pamphlet [...], das vollgestopft von musikalischen Glaubensbekenntnissen ist, - freilich in der riskirtesten Form!! - “ (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 355 & 362 & 368).

Looking back, Nietzsche said that Wagner was “eine kleine aesthetische Streitschrift, in der ich, zum ersten Male und auf die unbedingtesten Weise, das psychologische Problem Wagner an’s Licht stelle. Es ist eine Kriegserklärung ohne pardon an diese ganze Bewegung: zuletzt bin ich der Einzige, der Umfang und Tiefe genug hat, um hier nicht unsicher zu sein.” He spoke of a declaration of war adding that “einen Wagner abhun” was a refreshing duel: “ - ich bin in dieser Frage die einzige Autorität und überdies Psychologe und Musiker genug, um auch in allem Technischen mir nicht vormachen zu lassen” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 425 & 434 & Oktober 1888, 447-8; cf. November 1888, 474.)
The book consists of a preface, main part under the title “Der Fall Wagner. Turiner Brief vom Mai 1888“ with 12 relatively short numbered sections followed by “Nachschrift”, “Zweite Nachschrift” and “Epilog”, respectively. Verse books excluded, Wagner is by far the most concise of Nietzsche’s publications. Concerning the title, Nietzsche wrote once that “[b]öse Zungen wollen lesen “der Fall Wagner’s” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 419). Being finished in his last productive year, symptoms of the escalating madness have been detected by some readers. Ronald Hayman claims, in his Nietzsche biography, that Wagner, the most unstable of Nietzsche’s books so far, reveals mental disorder.

As it was the case with Genealogie, Nietzsche seemed to be worrying about relating the individual book to the rest of his work, “um ihren Zusammenhang mit meiner ganzen Aufgabe und Absicht herauszuheben”. In particular, the addition of the epilogue appeared to him, in retrospect, smart: ”ich habe damit diese Einzelheit “den Fall Wagner” in Zusammenhang mit meiner Gesamt-Tendenz gebracht”, so that Wagner wouldn’t look like a “Curiosum inmitten meiner Aufgabe” (KGB III/5, August & September 1888, 389 & 437-9). He came to think that the “Wesentlichste in der Schrift ist zuletzt nicht die Psychologie Wagners, sondern die Feststellung des décadence-Charakters unsrer Musik überhaupt” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 485; cf. 467). Elsewhere, a prerequisite was specified for the reader: ”Um dieser Schrift gerecht zu werden, muss man am Schicksal der Musik wie an einer offnen Wunde leiden” (EH “WisBs” DFW 1, KSA 6, 357). Yet, its author could refer to the book as “die übermüthige farce gegen Wagner” (KGB III/5, September 1888).

The last new copy Nietzsche got to hold in his hands before the Zusammenbruch was that of Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt. It was officially released not until 1889, but the free copies were sent under Nietzsche’s supervision already in November 1888. This work has a preface in the front, a concluding passage from Zarathustra under the title “Der Hammer redet” in the end and in between a compact narrative on “Wie die “wahre Welt” endlich zur Fabel wurde” plus nine titled chapters, each divided in five to fifty-one numbered paragraphs. As with Genealogie, Nietzsche vaunted that it was done in twenty days, until he rectified: ”Man kan 10 Tage nicht nützlicher verwenden, denn mehr Zeit hat mich das Buch nicht gekostet”. (KGB III/5, September & November 1888, 435 & 481 & 486-9.)

At first, the manuscript was known by the name Müssiggang eines Psychologen. Yet, Köselitz remarked that the stress on ‘idleness’ is “too modest” for the “artillery” at work. Nietzsche admitted that the title didn’t fit. The new one did more justice to that tonality, although the author predicted that it would be understood as but “noch eine Bosheit gegen Wagner...” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 443). In point of fact, the new title had to clear its way through a number of rivals. In the notes, there are other candidates: “Götzen-Hammer. oder Heiterkeiten eines Psychologen”, “Götzen-Hammer. Oder: wie ein
Psychologe Fragen stellt” and “Götzén-Hammer. Müssiggang eines Psychologen” (N September - Oktober 1888 22 [6], KSA 13, 586). The eventual title most strongly reappropriates the name of Wagner’s opera, Göttterdammerung, a work that Nietzsche once described as “Himmel auf Erden” (KGB II/5, Mai 1875, 46).

Charles E. Scott has said that Dämmerung is a handy term signifying both fading and brightening light. It stands both for the light growing dim for the ascetic ideal studied in Genealogie and the light shining for new ways of living, themselves doomed to become idols.224 From this angle, Götzén-Dämmerung seems more like an account of general socio-cultural dynamics than about any particular process of decline.

Nietzsche demanded that the book be printed as “vollkommen der Zwilling” to Wagner. He called it “ein heiteres Buch” that provided with “Viel für Artisten”. It was “sehr ”zeitgemäß: ich sage über alle möglichen Denker und Künstler des heutigen Europa meine “Artigkeiten” “and “über die Maaßen substanzeiche”. He was pleased enough to confess that it “vollkommen erscheint; es ist nicht möglich, entscheidendere Dinge deutlicher und delikater zu sagen...” (KGB III/5, September-Dezember 1888, 411 & 417 & 519 & 434 & 420 & 510 & 489.)

Nietzsche emphasized, in his letters, two aspects of Götzén-Dämmerung: specifically philosophical potential and radicalism. He wrote that it contains “Allerschlimmsten und Radikalsten, obwohl unter viele finesses und Milderungen versteckt. Es ist eine vollkommene Gesammt-Einführung in meine Philosophie.” It displays “eine sehr kühn und präcis hingeworfene Zusammenfassung meiner wesentlichsten philosophischen Heterodoxien”, “meine Philosophie in ihrer dreifachen Eigenschaft, als lux, als nux und als crux” and “meine Philosophie in nuce - radikal bis zum Verbrechen...”. It seemed to him as “die radikalste vielleicht, die es giebt”, “antideutsch und antichristlich par excellence” expressing “eine wirkliche Krisis”, so that “es giebt gar keine entscheidenden, tieferen und, wenn man Ohren hat, aufregenderen Bücher” than this one liable to face difficulties at the border when mailed to St. Petersburg (KGB III/5, September-Dezember 1888, 414 & 417 & 424 & 434-5 & 457 & 472 & 511 & 537 & 535 & 510.)

Bernd Magnus interprets the book as an account of how Western people became what they are. According to him, the story concentrates on philosophy, religion and morality, each understood more broadly than in their academic sense.225 Danto regards it as one of Nietzsche’s best books226. Without exaggeration, Nietzsche’s Leistungs-Fähigkeit can be said to have been enormous. Before January the first, he managed to finish still four other book manuscripts and supervise their printing. One of these he dropped at the last moment (see I.c) but Der Antichrist. Fluch auf das Christenthum, as well as Ecce
homo. Wie man wird, was man ist and Dionysos-Dithyramben must be taken as legitimate followers of the publications so far introduced. Referring to the first two of these, Nietzsche wrote in mid-December 1888 that “die Werke, die im Grunde keine Bücher sind, sondern eine Art Schicksal darstellen werden, sind druckfertig” (KGB III/5, 536).

As for the third and Nietzsche’s arguably “last book”, Dionysos-Dithyramben, one is faced with a collection of nine poems that date from the early 1880’s and the late 1888 edited by Nietzsche up until January 2, 1889. In the third day, the day of the Zusammenbruch, Nietzsche sent a message to Cosima Wagner: ”Man erzählt mir, daß ein gewisser göttlicher Hanswurst dieser Tage mit den Dionysos-Dithyramben fertig geworden ist...” On the first day of 1889, Nietzsche wrote to Paris, signing the letter as “Dionysos”, that by giving his dithyrambs “ich der Menschheit eine unbegrenzte Wohlthat erweisen will” (KGB III/5, 571-2..) In five of the Dithyramben, Zarathustra plays a key role, while, in one of them, Dionysus appears by its name, and not with Apollo but Ariadne. The versing and rhyming, in these poems, are much freer than in Nietzsche’s earlier lyrical work, Idyllen aus Messina. One point of contact between these two publications is the ironical treatment of the poet’s profession, particularly evident in the last poem of Idyllen quoted above and the first dithyramb “Nur Narr! Nur Dichter!” (DD 1, 377-80).

Some of the material has been related to Nietzsche’s reading of Baudelaire. Wiebrecht Ries, too, points out that the “extremely modern artistic character” of Nietzsche’s dithyrambs echoes Baudelaire and even comes close to Mallarmé’s absolute lyric, yet retaining a lot from traditional mannerisms. Ries insists, further, that the work will not become “philosophically fruitful” until viewed “from the perspective of the world as poiesis”, of poetry’s originary signification.

Ecce homo is a book already used above, since it includes reviews of Nietzsche’s works, from Geburt to Wagner, under the title “Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe”. Apart from that, it has preface, untitled page beginning with the words “An diesem vollkommenen Tage” and closing with “Und so erzähle ich mir mein Leben” (EH, KSA 6, 263) and three other chapters. “Warum ich so weise bin, “Warum ich so klug bin” and “Warum ich ein Schicksal bin”, respectively, all divided, just like the preface, in numbered sections. Nietzsche mentioned the book for the first time, in a letter from Octobre 30, writing to Köselitz:

Es handelt, mit einer großen Verwegenheit, von mir und meinen Schriften […] ich möchte gern eine Probe machen, was ich bei den deutschen Begriffen von Preßfreiheit eigentlich risquiren kann. […] Mit diesem “Ecce homo” möchte ich die Frage zu einem derartigen Ernst, auch Neugierde steigern, daß die landläufigen und im Grunde vernünftigen Begriffe über das Erlaubte hier einmal einen Ausnahmefall zuließen. Übrigens rede ich von mir

As such, the book will put “die Frage, wer ich bin, [...] für die nächste Ewigkeit ad acta”. In addition, “in sprachlicher Dingen gibt es har kein größeres Meisterstück als dieses Ecce homo.” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 553 & 513.) On the sixth of November, he wrote to his publisher that “ich habe eine extrem schwere Aufgabe - nämlich mich selber, meine Bücher, meine Ansichten, bruchstücksweise, so weit es dazu erfordert war, mein Leben zu erzählen - zwischen dem 15. Okt. und 4. November gelöst. Ich glaube, das wird gehört werden, vielleicht zu sehr... Und dann wäre Alles in Ordnung. - “ (KGB III/5, 464.)

He described the book as engendered with an “antiken Selbstherrlichkeit und guten Laune”. It was of “absoluter Wichtigkeit” offering, beside “einiges Psychologische und selbst Biographische über mich und meine Litteratur”, the chance “mich mit Einem Male zu sehr bekommen”. Nietzsche saw it linked it to his other works: ”Der Ton der Schrift heiter und vehängnißvoll, wie Alles, was ich schreibe.” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 467 & 470.) Furthermore, he explained Ecce homo, this “unglaubliche Stück Litteratur”, by writing that “[d]ieser homo bin ich nämlich selbst, eingerechnet das ecce; der Versuch, über mich ein wenig Licht und Schrecken zu verbreiten, scheint mir fast zu gut gelungen.” It was “reich an Scherzen und Bosheiten” and “ich trete zuletzt darin mit einer welthistorischen Mission auf. Indeed, it expressed “vollkommen unerhörte Dinge” and “mitunter, in aller Unschuld, die Sprache eines Weltregierenden redet [...] Andrerseits ist es antideutsch bis zur Vernichtung”. Moreover, Nietzsche wrote that ”in sprachlichen Dingen gibt es gar kein größeres Meisterstück” than this book that “geht dermaßen über den Begriff “Litteratur” hinaus, daß eigentlich selbst in der Natur das Gleichniß fehlt: es sprengt, wörtlich, die Geschichte der Menschheit in zwei Stücke - höchster Superlativ von Dynamit...” (KGB III/5, November & Dezember 1888, 471 & 492 & 509 & 512-3.)

Later in December, Nietzsche told Overbeck that he couldn’t even think about the book’s finale without weeping. And it was this work that he spoke of as marking the beginning of “die tragische Katastrophe meines Lebens”. (KGB III/5, 550 & 528.) As one can guess, Ecce homo has been seen to have been “evidently written in the shadow of insanity”230. Of the diagnoses that have been offered, this book makes Erich Heller’s version probably the most tempting: he speaks of Nietzsche being “on the verge of his collapse into insanity, at the onset of clinical megalomania”231.

Sarah Kofman is the one to have recently rejected the labels of craziness. She is also ready to say that
the book cannot really be regarded as an autobiography. Literally speaking, Ecce homo signals both the “death of the autos”, in as much as this is conceived as “stable and substantial”, and the “death of the bios”, as long as life is conceived to originate from one’s two parents. The book is not an autobiography, then, but an exam, test, trial, tentation or experiment to find out if the revaluative philosophy is supportable. Kofman points the way to the “riddle” of accounting for one’s own existence. Rodolphe Gasché has similar considerations to offer. He holds that Nietzsche is utilizing the genre of autobiography only in order to do away with the self-aware subjectivity linked to the Cartesian idea of metaphysical being as presence and, hence, with the very genre of autobiography.

For Richard White, any autobiography involves a self that has become problematical “to itself”. Yet, despite this “inherently philosophical” dimension to all autobiographies, not every one of them takes off from the uncritical basis of “a fixed and substantial conception of the self”. White makes a distinction between such autobiographists as Augustine and Rousseau, on the one hand, and Nietzsche and Sartre, on the other. The latter thinkers no longer “strive to uncover their true self” but, instead, opt for the ironical. This is to say that Ecce homo and Sartre’s Les mots not only give records of personal experiences but, in addition, “call our attention to the problems of autobiography”. In short, their writing results in a “performance” of “self-cancelling autobiography” that confirms “the anti-autobiographical implications of their thought”. White says that “the real individual” is “left out”, since the autobiography “recalls us to” her only “insofar as it points away from her.”

With less confidence in Nietzsche’s achievement, Charles Altieri has addressed the question of the alleged narcissism in Ecce homo. While acknowledging the writer’s ability to inspect his transactions, Altieri points to the problems inherent in the exploitation of autobiography: it is just about impossible to give full credit to the uniqueness of the different representations of the self and simultaneously form a coherent picture of the audience to be seduced into the play of these representations. He says that the refutation of the ideals by self-idolatry shows itself, at times, as a deliberate exercise of strength and, at other times, as a surrender to self-justifying contradictions.

Hugh J. Silverman, too, has his doubts as to Nietzsche’s success. In his view, Nietzsche thinks, in Ecce homo, that he is finally standing in his own shoes instead of letting Zarathustra or someone else replace him. Silverman says that this is, however, not quite the case, since it isn’t Nietzsche the person that appears in the text. What does appear is a “textualized self”, which is precisely the was, not wer, of the subtitle’s key notion Wie man wird, was man ist. Gary Shapiro shares some of these doubts, as he says that Nietzsche is “not altogether successful in his own struggle with metanarrative”. In terms of contextualization, Shapiro refers to Ecce homo as “the most contested and controversial of Nietzsche’s writings.”
Finally, Staten stresses again Nietzsche’s mastery in his task: “Has there ever been a more cunning project of self-representation?” What the reader gets is “hints, allusions, tones of voice”. The one who is supposed to display his own portrait “remains a kind of phantasm or ghost who does not inhabit the text but haunts it”. Staten says, further, that the “disturbing” part of all this is that the phantasm “seems to be the “real” Nietzsche, the only Nietzsche that ever managed to come into being, as though this were not only all that is left of him but also all there ever was.” Staten’s self-critical conclusion reads: “Nietzsche’s writings aren’t a man, or a ghost either, and if they constitute the wiring or plumbing of an “economy” the only libido that runs through these wires or tubes as I read is my own.”

The book Der Antichrist. Fluch auf Christenthum was finished for publication already before Ecce homo and Dionysos-Dithyramben. Yet, it is, I think, best to present the books in this order, since Nietzsche wrote to his publisher, in September 7, 1888, about a necessary delay between his other publications and “jenem ernsten Werke”. He said that “wir Ende nächsten Jahres wahrscheinlich daran gehen müssen, mein Hauptwerk Umwerthung aller Werthe zu drukken.” (KGB III/5, 411-2; cf. 418 & 441 & November 1888, 470 & 480 & 487 & 492 & Dezember 1888, 512).

Even as late as on December 27, he specified that for Umwerthung ”habe ich keinen Termin. Der Erfolg von Ecce homo muß hier erst vorangegangen sein” (KGB III/5, 553; cf. 500, on the possibility, thus refuted, of earlier publishing). In addition, he referred to Ecce homo as “eine feuerspeiende Vorrede” and “das Vorspiel” to Umwerthung (KGB III/5, November 1888, 467 & 482). By these latter remarks, Nietzsche had come to view the finished Antichrist as standing for the whole Umwerthung, which was initially to extend to a four-volume series (see section I.c).

In the late August 1888, Nietzsche had received a long letter from Carl Fuchs, occupying some 18 pages of the KGB. Interrupted in his “Mönch-praxis”, Nietzsche did not welcome Fuchs’s musical reflections: “Briefe über “Phrasierung” an den Philosophen der Umwerthung aller Werthe!... “.“[J]enes außerordentlich ernste Werk”, he wrote elsewhere, deals with “horrible Detonationen [...] daß man aus der ganzen Litteratur ein Seitenstück zu diesem ernsten Buche in puncto Orchersteklang (eingerechnet Kanonendonner) findet”. (KGB III/5, September 1888, 409 & 441 & 443.)

He wrote that Götzen-Dämmerung had been intended to give appetite to this “unabhängigste Buch, das es gibt”. What is more, Wagner and Götzen-Dämmerung were “in der Hauptsache nur Erholungen von der Hauptsache: letztere heißt Umwerthung aller Werthe”. (KGB III/5, September 1888, 410 & 417 & 420; cf. 426-7 & 434.) What else is one to conclude except that Zarathustra is quite evidently being rivaled and equaled by another book. Despite his stress on the seriousness of the project, Nietzsche seemed to be able to, simultaneously, joke about it, as here, to Seydlitz:
Mein innerer Haushalt steht ganz und gar im Dienste einer extremen Unternehmung, die, als Büchertitel, in drei Worte zu bringen ist “Umwärzung aller Werthe”. Ich sinne öfter über die Maßregeln nach, die die Toleranz Europas gegen mich erfinden wird: eigens ein kleines Siberien mit künstlicher Eis-(und gelato-)Bildung construiren, um mich nach Siberien verbannen zu können...

(KGB III/5, September 1888, 424; cf. 426 & Oktober 1888, 462.)

The talk of the European tolerance being tested occurred, as seen above, with Ecce homo, too, and it had actually been there, as seen, in relation with Jenseits. And when Nietzsche writes about Umwerthung - “das größte philosophische Ereigniß aller Zeiten”, “dieser radikalsten Umwälzung, von der die Menschheit weiß”, as a task, “wenn sie verstanden wird, die Geschichte der Menschheit in zwei Hälften spaltet” or “die Zeitrechnung verändert”, or about “eine Energie und Durchsichtigkeit, welche vielleicht von keinem Philosophen je erreicht worden ist” and “Leidenschaft des Problems” - one recalls similar ways of speaking about Götzten-Dämmerung, Ecce homo, Zarathustra and even Morgenröthe.

(KGB III/5, September-November 1888, 447 & 426 & 447 & 453 & 491-2 & 434.)

This raises the question as to the peculiarly novel nature of Antichrist. It becomes more pressing when one takes a look at the review of Jenseits given in Ecce homo. There, the “nay-saying” half of the task is called “die Umwerthung der bisherigen Werthe selbst, der grosse Krieg, - die Heraufbeschworung eines Tags der Entscheidung” (EH “WisgsBs”: JvGuB 1, KSA 6, 350). If the Umwerthung was at work already in 1886, what is so unique about it that a book under that name should be released in 1889? What is so unique about it, if the test of what is allowed or the dissecting of world history could as well be carried out by other books? In my view, a promising reply could be that just as Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Umwerthung aller Werthe is a notion that goes beyond the limits of the book plan known by that very name. The first time in Turin, in May 1888, Nietzsche had already written to Köselitz:

Lieber Freund, vergeben Sie mir diesen vielleicht zu heiteren Brief: aber nachdem ich, Tag für Tag, “Werthe umgewerthet” und sehr ernst zu sein Grund hatte, gibt es eine gewisse Fatalität und Unvermeidlichkeit zur Heiterkeit. Ungefähr wie bei einem Begräbniß...

(KGB III/5, 317.)

Something of the fatal seriousness of Umwerthung is detectable in Nietzsche request for Meysenbug to assist in finding a translator for Wagner’s French edition. In a letter from Paris, she told of taking action in lending a helping hand, but gave also a judgmental, though moderate, critique of the book241. In exchange, Nietzsche sent her, the author of Memoiren eines Idealistin, four hostile letters, one of them amounting to both an all out attack against this old friend of his and an articulation of Umwerthung:

Denn Sie sind “Idealistin” - und ich behandle den Idealismus als eine Instinkt gewordene
The notion of *Umwerthung* applied, however, to much lighter occasions, too. Having tried to convert Köselitz into an operetta enthusiast by claiming, for instance, that his *Der Fall Wagner “ist Operetten-Musik...”*, Nietzsche made the observation: "Sehen Sie wie weise ich jetzt werde! Wie ich selbst die Werthe meines Freundes Köselitz umwerthe! (KGB III/5, November 1888, 478-9.)

Once he wrote that “in meinem unterirdischen Kampfe gegen Alles, was bisher von der Menschen verehrt und geliebt worden ist ( - meine Formel dafür ist “Umwerthung aller Werthe”) (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 248). He spoke of *Umwerthung* as “meine Formel für einen Akt höchster Selbstbesinnung der Menschheit”. The “ungeheure Aufgabe, die *Umwertung aller Werte*” obligated “der tiefste Geist” to be “auch der frivolste”: “das ist beinahe die Formel meine Philosophie: es könnte sein, daß ich mich schon über ganz andere “Größen” auf eine unwahrscheinliche Weise erheiter habe...” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 503 & 516-7.)

The project of *Umwerthung* and its eventual outcome, *Antichrist*, seemed to mark for Nietzsche a major qualitative rupture in his production. Although one can hardly say anything more than what was already contained in the comments on the other works, there is something that makes it stand out from the rest. Nietzsche was making preparations, not only for the publication of the book after a strategic period of time following other works, but the simultaneous printing of “Übersetzungen der “*Umwerthung*” in 7 Hauptsprachen durch lauter ausgezeichnete Schriftsteller Europas” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 487).

The book was to be such that it “schlägt das Christenthum todt, und außerdem auch noch Bismarck...”, so that through translations he could “mein Schicksal zuletzt von keiner kaiserlichen Polizeimaßregel abhängig machen”. Nietzsche had written that “Christ sein - um nur Eine Consequenz zu nennen - wird von da an unanständig. - “. About the other consequences, he revealed later that “*[s]iegen wir, so haben wir die Erdregierung in den Händen - den Weltfrieden eingeräumt... Wir haben die absurden Grenzen der Rasse Nation und Stände überwunden: es giebt noch Rangordnung zwischen Mensch und Mensch und zwar eine ungeheure lange Leiter von Rangordnung.” (KGB III/5, Dezember & September 1888, 534 & 426 & 502.)
Yet, as Gary Shapiro says, *Antichrist* tends to repel even those otherwise concordant with Nietzsche’s efforts. In Shapiro’s opinion, this is explained by the fact that the book is often estimated as the one most indicative of mental derangement. Referring to its connection with the *genre* of the polemical historiography of religion, as those related to the study of the historical Jesus, which was mastered by such eminent scholars Nietzsche had criticized as Strauss and Renan, Shapiro claims that what is most striking about Nietzsche’s book, is, however, its self-referentiality. In this respect, Shapiro holds, it does not deviate from his other works and, then, cannot be excluded from his canon. Every one of his writings dwells on the problematic of how it is to be read and how it exists as a slice of writing.

Although he does speak of a certain obsessiveness inherent in Nietzsche’s critique, Pierre Bourdieu’s words can further strengthen the case Shapiro is making for *Antichrist*’s importance. He sees the book as attacking the priestly hypocrisy and the strategies set forth by a priest to absolutize and consecrate himself. As such, says Bourdieu, there is to be seen, in *Antichrist*, not so much a critique of Christianity but, rather, a critique of the delegate, since ministers, too, are incarnations of the delegate. Bourdieu’s view could, then, be taken to strengthen the case for the inclusion of *Antichrist* in Nietzsche’s canon. In fact, there are those who are ready to treat the book’s exceptionality, at least in some respects, rather in terms of superiority than in terms of aberration. Walter Kaufmann, for one, said that “the *Antichrist*, however provocative, represents a more single-minded and sustained inquiry than any of Nietzsche’s other books”.

Pierre Bouidot has confessed that “I love Nietzsche’s total renewal of thinking in each of his books.” Usually, these books have been divided to match the more extensive phases of their author’s life and thought. According to Peter Heller, for example, *Geburt* and *Unzeitgemässe* mark the early stage, in the author’s career, dominated by aesthetical metaphysics. *Menschliches, Morgenröthe* and *gaya scienza* make up the middle period characterized by critique of metaphysics, reproach of artistic genius and appreciation of the questioning rationality. Heller takes that the rest of the books to stand for the latest phase distinguished by prophetico-polemical praise of life forces, supermorality, nobleness and metaphysical postulates.

John Andrew Bernstein, for his part, considers *Morgenröthe* as Nietzsche’s first mature work, while Mark Warren speaks about fully matured Nietzsche only from the year 1882 on. Stanley Corngold defines the “axial period” from 1882 onward, whereas Oswald Giacoia Jr prefers to use the retirement from Basel as the key dividing line in the Nietzschean *œuvre*. Julian Young, in turn, has proposed a division into four “main periods”. It is important to see how the discerning periods is no neutral activity but intrinsically entwined with other interpretative preferences. In this context, as in many others, Nietzsche laid himself the groundwork for all the interpreters to build upon. In the writings of the late
1880's, Geburt appears as “ein Jugendwerk voller Jugendmuth und Jugend-Schwerkunth [...] mit jedem Fehler der Jugend behaftet” (GT “VeS” 2, KSA 1, 13), Unzeitgemässe as “Jugendschriften in gewissem Sinne”, while Fröhliche Wissenschaft and Morgenröthe are referred to as “meine mittleren Bücher” (KGB III/5, Juni 1888, 341). Then, there is Nietzsche’s distinction, mentioned above and followed by some commentators, between the “yea-saying” and “nay-saying” books with Zarathustra as the last of the former ones and Jenseits as the first of the latter.

What is more important is that Nietzsche worked tirelessly on reshaping his production both in real time and in retrospect. Kuenzli has, laudably indeed, paid attention to “Nietzsche’s care in composing and structuring his works”. Moreover, Nietzsche’s frequent talk about the development or progression of his work suggests that, for him, it all was, increasingly, about fashioning a whole. Already in April 1883, he wrote that “[g]ar zu gerne möchte ich auch noch den Stil meiner älteren Schriften reinigen und klären” (KGB III/1, 359). For one thing, he was to see Geburt as tightly linked to his later engagements. For another, he was eager to make pairings of his books, including the attachment of Morgenröthe and Jenseits testifying against many groupings by his commentators. In one tripling, referring to the chemist Justus von Liebig’s pathbreaking innovations in modern household products that were being marketed with serial visualizations from Wagner’s operas, he even combines Morgenröthe, gaya scienza and Zarathustra “unter den Begriff “Liebigschener Fleischextract”“ (KGB III/1, März 1884, 488). The 13 planned parts of Unzeitgemässe serving as the most obvious example, Nietzsche had an eye for the modern sense of serialism and for the correlative importance of keeping the audience satisfied but hungry for more.

Considering his development, Nietzsche once made the claim that “[d]er jüngere Nietzsche ist niemals über den Punkt-Wagner mit dem “älteren” Nietzsche im Widerspruch gewesen” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 517). Furthermore, although Nietzsche left Unzeitgemässe outside his otherwise extensive editorial reworkings, he accommodated, in Götzen-Dämmerung, a chapter called “Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen” and was upset to observe that the early series had been left out of his bibliography in the backside of the volume on Wagner (see KGB III/5, September 1888, 439).

I think that one of the most pressing questions about the constitution of Nietzsche’s output is to interrogate the significance that his reshaping efforts have for the understanding of the interdependence of the individual publications. More locally, it is the question about the comparative weight of Zarathustra and Antichrist, respectively. While the position of the former is reasonably safeguarded as Nietzsche’s masterpiece, the latter is, despite its being the “definitive version” of the project of Umwerthung aller Werthe, a text not given much public notice either by Nietzsche (because of his breakdown) or by his readers (because of their uneasiness). Yet, does not the preparatory undertaking...
Nietzsche felt to be so crucial pave the way for both Zarathustra and Antichrist? Does not the latter, then, mark an opening into a new phase, or at least, into a revaluation of the previous works? Or should it be counted as just one of the “writings of 1888”, yet nonetheless marking a stage, together with Wagner, Götzen-Dämmerung and Ecce homo, different from its forerunners, a kind of a “stormy final”? In what follows, I shall pursue this problematic.

It can be said that Nietzsche thought his Zarathustra to determine, in a sense, the worth of both his previous and subsequent books. To Burkhardt, he wrote that Jenseits “dieselben Dinge sagt, wie mein Zarathustra, aber anders, sehr anders - “. Elsewhere, he claimed that it was “eine Art von Commentar zu meinem “Zarathustra”. Aber wie gut müßte man mich verstehn, um zu verstehn, in wie fern es zu ihm ein Commentar ist!” (KGB III/3, September & October 1886, 254 & 270-1.) Sometimes, one gets the impression as if ‘the Zarathustrian’ had absorbed the earlier and the later books, different as they would seem to be, and turned them all into interpretative riddles. Nietzsche once spoke once about the “Fragezeichen-Inhalt” of Jenseits presenting “sphynxartige und stummgeborene Probleme” (KGB III/3, Oktober 1886, 266). This would mean that not only is Zarathustra a “hell of a confusion” (Jung). Staten is right in criticizing the simplistic dichotomy: “we must extend to the reading of Nietzsche’s philosophical” texts the same kind of “literary” attention that is obviously appropriate to Zarathustra: attention to dramatic context, tonal shifts, ambiguities, conflicts between what is said and the motivational forces inscribed within what is said, and the system of entrances, exits, and interactions of personae.

Both “Jenseits von Gut und Böse” and “Zarathustra”, as terms or concepts, appear in the lyrical appendix of the expanded edition of Fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW “LdPV”, KSA 4, 649). The motive of the midday, Mittag or große Mittag, is crucial to Nietzsche’s Zarathustrian imagery. Lebens Mittag! Zweite Jugend-Zeit! is also an essential recurrent image, in a poem Nietzsche gave to his friend Stein, “Einsiedlers Sehnsucht” (KGB III/1, November 1884, 564). Making itself at home in vertical, luxuriant and illuminative thrusts, in Nietzsche’s texts, the motive takes part in the discourse of sun, shine, light, height, growth, summit, apex, zenith, perfection. Appropriately enough, Zarathustra opens with the scene of the thirty-year-old Zarathustra, in the mountains, speaking to the sun: ”Was wäre dein Glück, wenn du nicht Die hätttest, welchen du leuchtest” (Z “ZV” I, KSA 4, 11). Further, the first part closes with a scene of great midday (Z I “VdsT” III, KSA 4, 102), quite like the fourth part (Z IV “DZ”, KSA 4, 408) featuring, in addition, the speech “Mittags” (Z IV, KSA 4, 342-5). I find it tempting to agree with E. Imafedia Okamafa that Zarathustra’s very first réplique, spoken to the sun, is where “Nietzsche is at his literary and philosophical best”. In any case, the point about the interdependence of Nietzsche’s works can be made here. Consider Götzen-Dämmerung’s most concise chapter, the story of an error. It culminates in the scene of the double destruction of the so called “true world” and its opposite, the
“apparent world”. What follows is a parenthesis:

(Mittag; Augenblick des kürzesten Schattens; Ende des längsten Irrthums; Höhepunkt der Menschheit; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)

(GD “Wd”wW”ezFw”, KSA 6, 80-1.)

Into the midst of the polysemic Zarathustrian Mittag are also drawn the other works. The figure of Zarathustra enters, not only in Götzen-Dämmerung, Ecce homo and Dionysos-Dithyramben, but in Fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW 342, KSA 3, 571), in Geburt’s later preface (GT “VeS” 7, KSA 1, 22), in Jenseits and Genealogie (JGB “AhB” & GM II 25, KSA 5, 243 & 337), as well as in Wagner (W “V” & A, KSA 6, 12). Conversely, “Morgenröthe” (cf. Z “V” 1, KSA 4, 11) and “Wanderer” (cf. Z “V” 1, KSA 4, 12 & Z III “DW”, KSA 4, 193-6) appear in Zarathustra, while Jenseits and Zarathustra meet, as seen, in the poem “Sils-Maria”, in gaya scienza. The Dantean notion of ‘midday’ is, as Deleuze proposes, not “an equilibrium or reconciliation”. Nietzsche defines this focal point, instead, as a “conversion”. In Deleuze’s vocabulary, this is a conversion “of the negative into its contrary”.

Nietzsche writes that Zarathustra brings “zum ersten Male meinen Hauptgedanken in eine Form” (KGB III/1, Februar 1884, 477). However, even after finishing this unifying masterpiece, he put the affair like this: ”Alles, was ich bisher geschrieben habe, ist Vordergrund” (KGB III/1, Mai 1885, 53). How is the remark about Also sprach Zarathustra as but preliminary work to be understood in the face of its seemingly unquestioned status as the mountain top of Nietzsche’s production?

This question becomes urgent when it is realized that, from 1887 on, there are, in Nietzsche’s letters, many passages about the transition to something absolutely new, about “mein ganzes “Bisher” ad acta zu legen”, “ein Strich-drunter-ziehn”, “eine neue Entfremdung”, “eine noch höhere Entpersönlichung”, by which all else except the task is violently and painfully “abgebrokkelt oder auch abgestoßen worden” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1887, 209 & 214). It was about “mich von meiner Vergangenheit zu isolieren, die Nabelschnur zwischen mir und ihr zu lösen” (KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 221). Is this done at the cost of Zarathustra’s uniqueness? How does Antichrist relate to this point in the Nietzschean heavens directly overhead to an observer?

The word “Antichrist”, too, appears in many of Nietzsche’s textual intersections. In Ecce homo, it is given as the speaker’s self epithet (EH “WisgBs” 2, KSA 6, 302). With that signature were also finished (and/or sent) Nietzsche’s letters, in December 1888, to Bismarck, the writer Ferdinand Avenarius and Cosima Wagner (KGB III/5, 504 & 544 & 551). In point of fact, however, Nietzsche had written to von Meysenbug, already at the time of finishing the first part of Zarathustra: ”Wollen Sie einen neuen Namen für mich? Die Kirchensprache hat einen: ich bin - - - - - - der Antichrist. Verlernen wir doch ja das Lachen nicht!” (KGB III/1, April 1883, 357). The notion ’antichrist’ cannot, then, be disqualified as
Nietzsche’s very last weird invention. His words to Köselitz, shortly after the von Meyenburg letter, shed more light on the name:

Auch die erste Besprechung des ersten Zarathustra, die mir zugesandt wird (von einem Christen und Antisemiten, und, sonderbarer Weise, im Gefängnisse entstanden) macht mir Muth, insofern auch da sofort die populäre Position, die einzig an mir begriffen werden kann, eben meine Stellung zum Christentum, gut und scharf begriffen ist. “Aut Christus, aut Zarathustra!” Oder auf deutsch: es handelt sich um den alten längstverheißenden Antichrist - so empfinden es die Leser. […] ich bin einer der furchtbarsten Gegner des Christenthums und habe eine Angriffs-Art erfunden, von der auch Voltaire noch keine Ahnung hatte. (KGB III/1, August 1883, 436; cf. 438.)

Antichrist contains passages on Zarathustra and Zarathustra (AC 53 & 54, KSA 6, 235-7). Whatever one is to make of the relation between the books and the figures - e.g., that antichrist is Nietzsche’s conceptual persona\(^\text{259}\) - they seem to enable and empower one another. What seemed to occupy Nietzsche, looking back and looking forth, was to do what there was to do, so that Umwerthung “nicht wieder solchem absurdem Stillschweigen begegnet wie mein Zarathustra” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 412).

I began this section by referring to the undermining attitude Nietzsche entertained toward his writings. In the course of this check up on the way he treats them, it has turned out that he tried to appreciate his work in more ways than one. Where the disappointment of Geburt is illustrated by Nietzsche’s outspoken preference of “wirkliche Produziren” over theorizing (KGB II/3, Juli 1872, 29; cf. April 1874, 214), there seems to have been a steadily growing fondness of one’s own production. The letter remark from 1873 about the challenge of becoming more tolerant toward writing can be taken as a fairly happy prediction of Nietzsche’s gradually evolving positive self-interpretation of his books. Zarathustra and Hymnus stand out as the works most devoid of the despicable sense of “making literature”. They connote action, animation and the strength of solitude, instead of denoting nothing but disconcerting idleness, choking breathlessness and isolation. These works, as the others, were publications but their qualitative difference seemed to enliven the whole output and, at times, transmute it, as a whole, into something other than “literature”. In my view, and reacting to Nehamas (see I.a), it would seem that it all was, for Nietzsche, as much, or even more, about making “literature” live than turning life into literature. It was about reconceiving the related conceptions of writing.

My suggestion is that the problem of the fortuitous nature of writing was a sustained one in Nietzsche. Biographically speculating, it was fueled with the fact that he had had plans of training himself in music. The 1872 point about “real producing” was made to the musical friend Krug. And as late as in May
1888, Nietzsche spoke grievingly to Köselitz about his insufficient ability to express his ideas concerning music: "Mir fehlt ein Jahr exakten Musikstudiums, um nur wieder die Sprache dafür in die Gewalt zu bekommen - “ (KGB III/5, 317). More generally, the problematic of expression could be seen in his earlier writings, as in the phrase about “diese unglückliche Differenz zwischen Theorie und Praxis” (KGB I/2, April 1866, 123). This offers background for Nietzsche’s enthusiasm over the intense time of “philosophical openness” he shared with Lou von Salomé. This is how he wrote to Overbeck:


Das Nützlichste aber, was ich diesen Sommer gethan habe, waren meine Gespräche mit Lou. Unse Intelligenzen und Geschmäcker sind im Tiefsten verwandt - und es giebt andererseits der Gegensätze so viele, daß wir für einander die lehrreichsten Beobachtungs-Objekte und -Subjekte sind.

(KGB III/1, September 1882, 255-6.)

I find, then, that the bridging of the cleft between theory and practice, or conceiving and experiencing, cuts across both the issue ‘Nietzsche and his work’ and his thinking as a whole. The best encapsulation for the triviality / challenge is found in Paul Valéry: “theory marrying practice, - hence the reciprocal modification of the conception of one by the conception of the other”261. In the aphorism, “conceptions” are not held hostage by “theory”, but, rather, conceptuality is what unites theory and practice. It is my goal to show how investigations and experiments in this direction belong to Nietzsche’s greatest philosophical achievement.

My more local contention here is that when Nietzsche, toward the end of his productive life, came to appreciate his works and see them as a meaningful whole, it all enabled him to see his whole output, not just Zarathustra, Hymnus an das Leben and Umwerthung aller Werthe, as manifesting some kind of bridging at work - of the cleft between theory and practice, the creative and the critical, the ideatic and the material, the conceptual and the experiential. The discovery of Turin marked for Nietzsche a new chance of perfection in his work. In the spirit of his ecology of thinking that was sketched above (see I.a), he spoke of a coincidence of the “optimum von Existenz” and the “enormen Steigerung der Arbeitskraft” (KGB III/5, September 1888, 428). This can be used in explaining Nietzsche’s increasing tendency to reduce the split and separation within his own production. It is best to speak about a chance, since Nietzsche did write to Fuchs, in July 1888, about too great a “Kluft” between Zarathustra and the
subsequent works: "Ich treibe seitdem eigentlich nur Possenreißerei, um über eine unerträgliche Spannung und Verletzbarkeit Herr zu werden” (KGB III/5, 359).

His stance toward conceiving *Zarathustra* and *Hymnus an das Leben* comes close to the way he had described the effects on him by Bizet’s *Carmen*: "ich habe in diesen 4 Stunden mehr erlebt und begriffen als sonst in 4 Wochen” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1887, 212). Nevertheless, a year later from Turin, Nietzsche wrote that: "Auch habe ich in meinem ganzen Leben zusammengenommen nicht so viel geschaffen als hier in den letzten 20 Tagen - wer weiß! lauter Dinge ersten Ranges... Und ohne einen Schatten von Ermüdung, vielmehr bei vollkommener Heiterkeit und *guter Küche.*” (KGB III/5, 507.)

All this did not mean any peaceful reconciliation with the occupation of “making literature”. But it could have meant the radicalized vision of writing and conceiving. Along with the emphasis on the need to see Nietzsche’s books in their distinct individuality and with an eye on the special care that their structuring reveals, my interest in the present section has been in the discourse in Nietzsche’s writings on his writings. He was not only a very productive philosopher but one who let his productivity affect his philosophical thinking. As I demonstrated, he worked probably just as hard for his books to function as readable and accessible books and to make them empower each other in order to assert the development of one recognizable yet elusive master of philosophical writing, as he ever did in writing and composing them.

Questions of the significance of producing and public exchange of ideas will even intensify as I move on to make sense of the way Nietzsche’s texts have been edited. Nietzsche finished a number of books, and planned to write a plurality of others, while he also philosophized on the conceptuality of all that was related to the promises and limits of 'book-ness' of books. As he said about *Ecce homo*, it "geht dermaßen über den Begriff ‘Litteratur’ hinaus, daß eigentlich selbst in der Natur das Gleichniß fehlt” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 513).
Nietzsche would not only forcefully elaborate his texts under preparation and finishing. He supervised correction, printing and distribution, reviewed his writings, put them in contact with each other, brought them together to produce sequences and wholes. In short, he was the first to edit Nietzsche’s work.

Actually, Nietzsche was, for a long time, his own publisher, too. Through Wagner, Nietzsche had made acquaintances with E. W. Fritzsch who was to issue, in Leipzig, three of his first writings, before being driven into the state of bankruptcy. His copyrights were bought by Ernst Schmeitzner in Chemnitz. It was hardly due to the vicious recurrence of the phoneme “tz” but Nietzsche could never really cooperate with Schmeitzner. In May 1883, anxious to wait for a word from the publisher, he had to ask for the copies of his book in the words of the epigraph of this section. Having heard about Schmeitzner’s reply he told Overbeck:

Herr Schmeitzner meldete jüngst, die “äußerst wichtigen” Verhandlungen und Reisen in Sachen des Antisemitismus machten, daß der Verlag zurückstehn müsse - die sämtlichen Exemplare des Zarathustra, eingerechnet die Freiexemplare seien noch in Leipzig! - Bravo! Aber wer erlöst mich von einem Verleger, der die antisemitische Agitation wichtiger nimmt als die Verbreitung meiner Gedanken? (KGB III/1, Juli 1883, 393.)

Nietzsche had become economically dependent on a businessman whose transactions with antisemitist propaganda he could not accept. In addition, he thought that his books will decay in the hands of the publisher who “sendet keine Redaktions-Exemplare, er macht keine Anzeigen usw.” (KGB III/1, November 1884, 557). He tried, in vain, to have his production bought by another company, since “[s]o lange das Buch [MA] in dem Antisemiten-Winkel steckt, wird kein Exemplar mehr verkauft” (KGB III/2, Januar 1886, 142).

But chances for the switch were slim, since “der unverschämte Schmeitzner, (der einen Begriff von meiner Nothlage hat und sie zu seinen Gunsten ausnützt) verlangt den unverschämten Preis von 12 000 Mark - “ (KGB III/1, Juni 1886, 196). Eventually, Nietzsche did get rid of Schmeitzner, as the newly recovered Fritzsch bought back the copyrights. But from Jenseits on, Nietzsche was himself forced to
cover, with the help of occasional donations, the costs of printing and distribution administered in Leipzig by the company of C. G. Naumann:

(KGB III/3, September 1886, 239-40.)

In November 1888, there appeared in Fritzsch’s musical weekly magazine an article “Der Fall Nietzsche” written by a certain Richard Pohl. Because of having let “einer alten Gans wie Pohl” write about the “ersten Menschen aller Jahrtausense”, Nietzsche severed his relations with Fritzsch. This he did in a dramatic letter that ends like this: “Und der Verleger des “Zarathustra” nimmt gegen mich Partei? / - In aufrichtiger Verachtung / Nietzsche” (KGB III/5, November 1888, 477.).

In subsequent weeks, he made enquiries about the price of his writings and possibilities of raising money in order to buy, or have Naumann buy, his rights from Fritzsch. Nietzsche was sure to be soon able to acquire independence and get his writings from a publisher having “nicht den geringsten Begriff davon, was er besitzt”. (KGB III/5, November & Dezember 1888, 483-98 & 519-20 & 526.) The case was not closed before Nietzsche went insane.

On the contrary, everything was wide open. In agreement with both Nietzsche’s mother and Overbeck, Köselitz began working on the first Gesamtausgabe for Naumann. Five volumes appeared, until Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth Förster managed to get the copyrights in 1895. After her husband, the antisemitist activist Bernhard Förster, had committed suicide, she came back from South America where the couple had established an echteutsche colony. There was an immediate conflict with Overbeck and hard negotiations with Köselitz. Partly from economical reasons, partly because he had been the trusted amanuensis of Nietzsche capable of reading the philosopher’s handwriting, even at its sloppiest, Köselitz came to work for her in editing Nietzsche’s over 5000 sheets of Nachlass. Förster grounded Nietzsche-Archiv in 1894, assumed the name Förster-Nietzsche and began the systematic exploitation of her brother’s legacy until her death in 1936. 263

The work on the second complete edition ceased, too. Before the editor, Koegel, was fired, he had succeeded in arranging a volume length thematical compilation of Nietzsche’s notes and, during this project, discovered Förster’s tendency to falsify sensitive material. Koegel made secret copies of some texts that she ordered to be omitted. The next editorial undertaking, Grossoktavausgabe, proved to be
more effective: its twenty volumes appeared between 1899 and 1926 edited by Seidl, brothers Horneffer, Holzer, Weiss, Crusius, Nestle and Köselitz with Förster in the lead. The speciality in this series lay in the tripartite Philologica and in the reassembling of fragments.²⁶⁴

Nietzsche’s works were further issued under Förster’s command in Kleinoktavausgabe consisting of 16 volumes (1899-1912). The more important Taschen-Ausgabe with its eleven volumes was finished by 1912. It rearranged Nietzsche’s literary remains, according to the chronology of the published books. Köselitz saw to its preparation, until he broke off from the archive in 1909.²⁶⁵ These editions were followed by Klassiker-Ausgabe (1919) and what maybe the most famous edition, Musarionausgabe, combining Taschen-Ausgabe’s chronological organization and Grossoktavausgabe’s textual basis. By 1929, it extended to 23 volumes and had a more prestigious twin appearing in expensive, exclusive form. Musarion was edited by the brothers Oehler, who were related to Nietzsche’s mother, and Würzbach who quarreled with Förster on the need to check the manuscripts.²⁶⁶

These Gesamtausgaben were by no means the only and, in an important sense, not the most decisive editorial efforts Förster set out to do. At the same time the most unabashed fakery and the most successful project was her enterprise in delineating Nietzsche’s life and times. To this purpose, she edited, with Köselitz, Seidl, Scholl and Wachsmut, during the first decade of this century, collections of Nietzsche’s letters by readdressing some of them to herself and omitting or destroying inconvenient material. This work was meant to support her massive biographies, the largest of which came to be Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches I-II (1895-1904).²⁶⁷

When it comes to Nietzsche’s manuscripts, the fourth - along with Götzen-Dämmerung, Ecce homo and Antichrist - book of Nietzsche’s very last strivings, Nietzsche contra Wagner, a collection made out of relevant passages in his earlier writings and a short preface dated as “Turin, Weihnachten 1888”, was issued in 1889. This was done despite Nietzsche’s decision, in the second of January 1889, to withdraw from publishing it. (KGB III/5, 571.)

What is much more fatal is what happened to Ecce homo and Antichrist. The former was published no sooner than in 1908, as an expensive luxury edition with crucial omissions. The same version was later reproduced in Grossoktavausgabe. Köselitz had described the omitted parts to Overbeck as giving him “the impression of too great self-intoxication or altogether redundant disgust and unfairness”. Förster, for her part, found the same material plainly sick, albeit she said that the papers occasionally contained “beautiful remarks” about the “fantastic identification” with Dionysus and Jesus and about the faults of the author’s closest people. This material was destroyed, yet Köselitz did secretly copy some of Nietzsche’s notes. The section three of the chapter “Warum ich so weise bin” with its hostile remarks on
“meine Mutter und Schwester” was among the passages saved by Köselitz and formed the basis of his later conflict with Förster. Köselitz’s copy was found only as late as in 1969.268

Although Nietzsche had revised his plans for *Umwerthung aller Werthe* and came to regard *Antichrist* as tantamount to the whole *Umwerthung*, Förster and Köselitz entertained - knowingly, since they excluded from their editions letters with explicit counterevidence - the false notion of a hidden Hauptwerk. In a decisive letter from 1893, Köselitz reasoned correctly that *Antichrist* had transformed, in Nietzsche’s hands, into “the whole book”, yet he drew the conclusion: ”But despite this, the consequences of this transvaluation [of Christianity, as carried out in *Antichrist,*] for morality, philosophy and politics must surely be expressly presented: nobody would be in the position to think out these consequences, - hence, the tremendous preparative work by your brother for the other 3 books of transvaluation must be organized [...] and unified into a kind of a system.” Thus, discarding Nietzsche’s final words on the matter, misusing his earlier plans and latching on the idea of a unified system, they justified the arbitrary compilation and tendentious marketing of the non-book “Wille zur Macht. Umwertung aller Werte”. As for *Antichrist*, it was, then, wiped out as an individual work.269

The first “Wille zur Macht” compilation, exhibiting 483 sections in four parts, was released in 1901 edited by Köselitz and brothers Horneffer. The latter were to criticize Förster’s management and proposed the less flashy, more correct title “Unveröffentlichtes aus den Umwerthungszeit” which she rejected. As a consequence, the final version was worked out by Köselitz and Förster. One thousand and sixty-seven paragraphs appeared in 1906 and were reproduced in *Grossoktavausgabe*. An abridged popular edition of “Wille zur Macht” was also published (1921) with 696 sections and the subtitle “Eine Auslegung alles Geschehens”.270

It has been said that Förster’s project of the “Wille zur Macht” book “can really be seen as Frau Förster-Nietzsche’s own will to power”. She exerted major influence on the Nietzsche scholarship, on the popular image and on the ideological availability of his brother. She was admired by major researchers, her name was often mentioned as a Nobel prize candidate, she was given an honorary doctoral degree at the university of Jena, Adolf Hitler visited her in Weimar and made a donation of 50 000 marks for the plan of the monumental Nietzsche hall.271

Förster’s astonishing success aside, what was Nietzsche’s plan that came to be so heavily exploited? His literary remains indicate that a book on “Wille zur Macht” had been in preparation from, at least, the late summer of 1885 on. The double title “Wille zur Macht. Umwerthung aller Werthe” was conceived about a year later. A public reference to the forthcoming work was made in *Genealogie* (GM III 27, KSA 5, 408-9). It was in the autumn 1887 when Nietzsche began numbering and rubricating his ever expanding
material into separate sections for the book. They amounted to 374 items. Not a half of these was exactly reproduced in Förster and Köselitz’s compilations. The last plan Nietzsche made for “Wille zur Macht” dates from August 1888, which was when finally he decided to publish what he had. Yet, by September, he gave up the idea and went for Götzten-Dämmerung and Umwerthung aller Werthe instead. This latter work, in turn, he came to consider as completed by the finished Antichrist.272

Ominously enough, the first complete edition project that had a scientific, text critical promise was being prepared within the confines of the Dritte Reich. Between 1933 and 1942, such more or less eminent figures, as Mette, Schlechta, Hoppe, Koch, Emge, Jesinghaus, the Oehlers, Otto, Heyse, Spengler and Heidegger, each worked some time as editors, in Weimar, as the Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe reached nine volumes. Förster was no longer in charge and the edifice she had erected by institutionalizing his brother’s work, was gradually being questioned. Otto, for instance, made the first attempt at dissoluting “Wille zur Macht”. However, there was, by now, a much more powerful institutional machinery to guard its own interests. Although the editorial work was done in close contact with the national socialist government, it was finally frozen as an unsafe enterprise.273

There were related battles, too. Even though Förster and the Kröner company fought over the copyrights, in the late twenties and early thirties, their deeper interests seemed to coalesce. In 1914, Förster had written, in a Berliner paper, about his brother as an incomparable friend of war. In addition, she published a booklet titled as Nietzsche-Worte für Krieg und Fried and disseminated it with the power of 165 000 copies during the first world war. Another one of her selections was Nietzsche’s prophetische Worte über Staaten und Völker (1927). In this light, Kröner’s issuing of Zarathustra’s “war edition”, along with Fichte’s Reden an die deutschen Nation, seems but a continuation of the established editorial policy. Förster’s invention of the Hauptwerk was essentially corroborated by the professor and national socialist Alfred Baeumler who insisted, in his appendix to the Kröner “Wille zur Macht”, that it dealt with the very substance of Nietzsche’s thought absent from the masquerade of the other works. This idea was taken up and developed by Martin Heidegger, although he had distanced himself, at least to a degree, from the Nazi movement by the time of his famous Nietzsche lectures.274

Anyway, it wasn’t until 1956, when Karl Schlechta published his Werke in drei Bänden that the non-book “Wille zur Macht” was rejected in favor of the critically based chronological presentation of Nietzsche’s notes from the 1880’s. Significantly, Schlechta was the first to use the correct title of Nietzsche’s late book, Antichrist. Fluch auf Christenthum. He also revealed some of the abuses of the correspondence. His work was continued and improved by Mazzino Montinari and Giorgio Colli who started out to edit Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW with books and notes 1967- & KGB with correspondence 1975- ; both series will still be continued) appearing in German, Italian, French and
Japanese and exhibiting Nietzsche’s literary output with specified dates and accompanying philological commentary for each textual unit. After Colli and Montinari it is Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi (KGW) and Norbert Müller and Annemarie Pieper (KGB) who have seen to the editorial project. Curt Paul Janz’s life time achievements in studying Nietzsche’s correspondence, biography and musical legacy stand in close relation to the critical edition project. 

In exploiting his brother’s legacy, Förster may be said to have established a one-sided picture of Nietzsche’s personality and career, issued counterfeit, unreliabe and misleading editions of his texts, froze, hid and demolished original material and glorified her own role. Needless to say, she claimed to be working truthfully with first hand material: "I am always very distrusting toward recollections of later time". Moreover, she linked Nietzsche’s accomplishments to an ideology that he detested. Nietzsche’s loathing for Schmeitzner’s antisemitism was no unique event. He had said to his sister that by marrying an “Agitator in einer zu drei Viertel schlimmen und schmutzigen Bewegung” and assuming the antisemitist bias she “herausgesprungten ist aus der Tradition des Bruders” (KGB III/3, Februar 1886, 148). He summed it up to his mother:


It is certainly a matter worth emphasizing that Nietzsche’s anti-antisemitism was so important for him that he saw his fate as a philosopher to be tied to antisemitism. He might have been wrong in holding that antisemitism stood in the way of his influence, when, after all, her sister could successfully combine the name Nietzsche and the antisemitist ideology. The black irony lies in the fact that, for all his reputed prophetic dispositions, Nietzsche could not possibly foresee that both the antisemitist sister and the antisemitist publisher, this time in one and the same person, would come, by feigningly reappropriating and contriving his tradition, to take sides against the author of Zarathustra.

David Marc Hoffmann has investigated the editorial history of Nietzsche’s work and presented a case with stupendous socio-cultural stakes. As a part of this research, Hoffmann has gathered the pieces of an oppositional activity against the Weimar legend industry stronger than Koegel’s, Horneffers’ and Würzbach’s disobedient behavior within it. One can justifiably talk about the counteraction in Basel, based on Overbeck’s work and his personal archives, as a “corrective against the Weimar Nietzsche.
mythology” and as the “groundwork for a historical and critical understanding of Nietzsche”. 278

Overbeck refused to help Förster, in her biographical work, nor did he allow his letters at her disposal. Before his death, in 1905, he had commissioned all his material to be stored in the university library of Basel. His student and friend C. A. Bernoulli, together with Overbeck’s widow Ida, campaigned with publications and legal action against Weimar until his own financial ruin. This tradition was later continued by Ernst Podach’s critical work on Nietzsche’s last writings and last years. 279

There were writers and scholars, such as Hofmiller, Weiss, Naumann (nephew of the head of the company circulating Nietzsche’s books) and H. Mann, who criticized heavily Förster’s actions. Close to the Weimar circle for some time, Rudolf Steiner became one of the first to question the work being done there. In a couple of journal articles from 1900, he defended Koegel (and Nietzsche) against Förster’s violations but the authority of the archive was hardly shaken. 281

As a symbol of the major change, Schlechina paid a visit to Basel in 1937, where he was given the chance to freely study local documents. That was the first audience by any Weimarian Nietzsche authority, ever since Förster’s failure to have Overbeck and Bürckhardt to cooperate with her in 1895. Schlechina was to give the most devastating critique of the editorial policy in the Weimar archive. However, in terms of the influence of this institution, its “tragedy of a world historical dimensions”, the “turbulent and fatal history of the Weimar archives” was only about to reach its peak. 282

In the Nuremberg trials, the French prosecutor verbalized something of the magnitude of the matter: ”By no means do we want to confuse the latest philosophy of Nietzsche with the very brutal simpleness of the national socialism. Yet, Nietzsche belongs to those ancestors the national socialists justifiably called upon, because he, on the one hand, was the first to exercise a coherent critique of the traditional values of humanism and, on the other hand, because his vision of the domination over the masses by the unconstrained masters already anticipated the Nazi regime.” 283

If Förster’s Nietzsche industry and those who were to dwell on its most horrific outcomes both held that Nietzsche’s thought forms a unified and coherent whole, it is easy to understand the need felt by many interpreters to study his works from other angles and with different aims. Let this be a general reminder of the way in which questions pertaining to edition and reception have substantial interpretative significance.

Mazzino Montinari wrote, in 1976, that the question of the so called Hauptwerk, “Wille zur Macht”, is settled and research can move on to investigate Nietzsche’s thought. 284 Yet, the controversy is still
relevant. While the majority of scholars have found the Colli-Montinari edition as the only authentic source of Nietzsche’s writings, the success story of “Wille zur Macht” has not ended. One turn in this affair came in 1930, and it was one against Förster’s monopoly but still not one for the better. Kröner exploited the liberation of the printing rights and started the marketing that has, with the help of numerous re-editions and translations, kept up the image of the book as Nietzsche’s masterpiece. “Wille zur Macht” has appeared, even in the 1990’s, as new editions in German, French and Italian with explicit claims that it is the philosopher’s major work.285

The problem at stake can be illustrated by a recourse to a case of wide influence. It is amazing how, in 1987, such an outstanding authority in historical research as E. J. Hobsbawm can utter something so strange as the following. He speaks, namely, about the philosopher Nietzsche’s “own writings, and notably his most ambitious work, The Will to Power”, and fails to add any modification whatsoever. One may also add that his fairly negative estimation of Nietzsche notwithstanding, Hobsbawm ends up in assuming an overtly Nietzsche-inspired approach to the complexities of the late 19th century.286

Alternatives in fighting against the image of the non-book vary. Whereas some people still go on using some edition of it and many critics seem to wish that it be forgotten, a notable Nietzsche scholar, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, only recently, demanded a new critically annotated edition of “Wille zur Macht”287.

To be sure, Nietzsche’s notes from the 1880’s, or his notes in general, his letters and the works Ecce homo and Antichrist are not the only posthumously published texts of his that are susceptible of controversy. There are the two early (1870) writings on tragedy, “Die dionysische Weltanschauung” and “Die Geburt der tragischen Gedankens”; a privately printed work Sokrates und die griechische Tragoedie (1871); five prefaces dedicated to Cosima Wagner from Christmas 1872; the two treatises from 1873, “Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne” and the unfinished “Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen”; the fourth part of Zarathustra (1885). In addition, Nietzsche’s public speeches “Das griechische Musikdrama” and “Socrates und die Tragoedie”, from 1870, and “Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten” (1872) were not circulated before his death.

“Wahrheit und Lüge”, “Philosophie” and the five prefaces, in particular, have interested commentators. Already in 1903, they were published in Musarionausgabe as “Philosophenbuch”. This collection, too, has often been cited as “Nietzsche’s work” and it has been translated, notably, in French with lasting effects.288

The status of Zarathustra’s fourth part is best assessed here. In KGW, all the four parts are integrated
into one work and the general tendency among interpreters seems to be to accept the whole quadruple as forming a whole. Alderman stresses the extreme importance of the fourth part. Likewise, Deleuze calls it l’essentiel. Héber-Suffrin handles it as the part where the time is ripe for the speaker to address and measure his contemporaries. Schacht speaks of Zarathustra’s arrival at the maturity “only at the conclusion of the final section.” Higgins lays even greater weight upon it: ”Zarathustra has regained his understanding of what his work is all about”. Magnus, Stewart and Mileur also use the fourth part extensively for their own purposes. Similarly, Shapiro refers to the part IV as “fulfilment”, if only to say that, there, the book “calls its own narrative into question”. In contrast, however, Lampert and White endorse the idea of the part three as the book’s final word.

I think it is wise to keep in mind that from around the time Nietzsche was finishing the part IV, he had to face the necessity to pay for the printing of his work. The unsharable property of his thinking and the strategies developed for the sake of hinting at the inexpressible, the unintelligible can be seen as being intertwined with the practical imperatives of Nietzsche’s “state of emergency”.

Something of the problematic of the status of Nietzsche’s Nachlass has transformed into a more general question of the legitimacy of using Nietzsche’s literary estate. There are those who hold that unpublished material, or the posthumous “Wille zur Macht” compilation, is to be studied, if one wants to come to terms with Nietzsche’s genuine philosophical thought instead of his books that are only so many masks the philosopher chose to wear. Some say that Nietzsche as the author of the posthumously published notes is a philosopher, while Nietzsche as the author of the books he had time to publish is an artist. Yet, there have been those who hold that notes ought to be abandoned for books, non-contextual readings for contextual ones. Others state that the notes conceal “nothing new”, nothing that was not already contained in the published works.

Julian Young, for one, has insisted that, given the quarrelsome situation, each interpreter should openly expose his/her “Nachlass-policy”. As for himself, Young underlines what he sees as a fundamental difference between the private and the public, in Nietzsche, and holds that one is justified in taking an “act of publication” for an “act of affirmation”.

Bernd Magnus distinguishes between “lumpers” and “splitters”. Lumpers see Nachlass as no complex affair. According to Magnus, these interpreters, such as Danto, Heidegger, Jaspers, Müller-Lauter and Schacht, point a place for Nietzsche in the philosophical tradition, as they see it, and proceed to justify the adopted locating policy by forcing their way through stylized books to the fragments that function better as propositions in construing arguments. The non-book “Wille zur Macht” has been their pet and playmate. On the other hand, splitters like Hollingdale, Montinari and Strong acknowledge the
dislocating thrust in Nietzsche’s books and consider that Nietzsche withdrew from publishing anything he couldn’t fashion as he wished. Magnus says that he himself is trying hard to be a good splitter. 303

Magnus’s stance might suggest that he opposes all use of the notes. Question remains open, since, for instance, he fails to refer to Schlechta as the father figure for all splitters. But for all his critique of lumping, Magnus has insisted, elsewhere, that “we simply must leave the textual stone age of Nietzsche scholarship. This means for me that we simply must have an English language equivalent of the Colli-Montinari KGW. That will be an important antidote to the “anthological” mentality which has spawned the non-book The Will to Power.” 304

Magnus’s point is rather close to that of Deleuze who, already in 1965, differentiated between three sorts of problems concerning the editorial quandary of Nietzsche’s texts. He did this, since he found Schlechta tending “to mix” them all into one. First, there is the role of falsifications. In Deleuze’s view, it was probably not that central to the practice of Förster. Secondly, about “The Will to Power” that “is not Nietzsche’s book”, Deleuze said that it is “very important that all the plans be published” by Colli and Montinari and “especially, that the ensemble of the notes to be the object of a rigorously critical and chronological edition; this is not the case with Mr. Schlechta”. Thirdly, and this is where Magnus would probably feel the risk of blurring an important distinction, Deleuze sees that if it is thought, as does Schlechta (the classic splitter Magnus ignores), that Nachlass “does not contain anything essential that would not be included in the works published by Nietzsche” it would make questionable the whole practice of “interpreting the philosophy of Nietzsche”. 305

Rudolf E. Kuenzli could represent those who, nonetheless, continue the quite sharp distinction between Nietzsche’s books and notes. He not only strongly criticizes the tendency, in the scholarship, to “ignore the works which Nietzsche published”, but he also says that favoring the notes means losing the meaning of Nietzsche’s writing, “we stop his dance of signification, which puts all their [the works] assertions into question”. 306 Henry Staten, in turn, represents those who use both the books and the notes in arguing their case for Nietzsche: “I also freely avail myself of the notes published as The Will to Power. Whatever the problems of their relation to Nietzsche’s thought as a philosophical doctrine, and whether they might be tentative, in process of revision, or relatively finished, the libidinal economy to which they belong is continuous with that of the published texts.” 307

Alexander Nehamas, for his part, writes that “there can be no single answer to the question of priority” between unpublished material and the published works. This is because the notes “bear roughly the same relationship to his published works as a whole that these works bear to one another”. On Nehamas’s view, the reliance on “The Will to Power” may not involve any false conceptions of it as constituting
Nietzsche’s authentic work, nor entail simplistic misreadings, but, as in his case, it merely marks the acknowledgement that “all his writings are relevant to his interpretation” and that “[t]he importance of each text [...] must be determined separately in each individual case.”

While I think that Nehamas is right in insisting on the merit of individual inspection of texts at hand, at a given moment, and on the need to see their relations as problematical, I cannot, having been differently indoctrinated, concur with his view that a collection called “The Will to Power” “has become, for better or worse, an integral part of Nietzsche’s literary and philosophical work.” To be sure, this conviction involves the laudable insight that the editorial history cannot be ignored in assessing Nietzsche’s thought. Yet, if the KSA (the handy version of KGW) had existed only for some months during Nehamas’s research, it has been there now for fifteen years. I think its contents are about to become what is integral in Nietzsche. In any case, this is something I’d like to enhance.

The English language equivalent of the Colli-Montinari edition, forcefully demanded by Magnus and others, has now, at last, began to appear. By the fall of 1998, Stanford University Press had published two volumes, including a fresh translation of Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. One may readily presume that the Colli-Montinari project is going to mould the English-language concept of ’Nietzsche’ anew.

At this point, I need to defend my somewhat unusual and undoubtedly inconvenient manner of giving the quotations of Nietzsche in their original German form. There are two principal reasons for this procedure. First, I want to stress the importance of using the most reliable, most up-to-date and most complete edition of the philosopher’s writings. Since the Anglo-American KGW is, as yet, in its early stages, many of the passages that I cite in this book are simply not available in English. Thus, by their sheer appearance, the pages of the present study demonstrate how unfortunate the situation still is for the Nietzsche scholars in the English-speaking world. The project of preparing the English language version of Colli-Montinari edition involves a promise that is not only philological but genuinely philosophical as well. There are great many outstanding Nietzsche scholars in the English-speaking world who have to publish their texts by using material that is inferior to that of their, say, French-speaking colleagues, even if they themselves read Nietzsche in German.

The following questions lead to the more substantial point: i) why not using those fresh English translations that exist?, ii) why not supplying other citations from Kaufmann’s (and others’) older translations with important words in square brackets and relevant observations in the text or notes? and iii) why not translating the rest of the quotations oneself and perhaps attaching the original KGW text aside or in the footnote?.
I think that the more advanced Anglo-American KGW will probably make a strategy along these lines possible. Yet, the specific interpretation argued for in the present study draws from Nietzsche’s peculiar use of his mother tongue to the extent that the original German utterances are not likely to lose their prior magnitude. There is a kind of consensus that one of the fundamental things about Nietzsche’s historico-philosophical role is his exceptional grip on language. In due course, I shall try to make a case for his philosophizing with the very vocabulary of *Begriffe* and *begreifen*. At least for the time being, using and promptly revising the available English translations with footnotes would result in an all too burdensome presentation. I also trust that the new English translations will become meaningful objects of criticism for a concept critically oriented reader. However, Nietzsche’s foreign audiences deserve the service of his interpreters in showing how his thought was intimately related to his means of expression.

As for the option of translating all quotations according to my own interpretation of them, I feel that it would be unwise. There is little point in my producing an ensemble of Nietzsche passages that will only stand in an uncomfortable and embarrassing relation to the evolving KGW with its expert translators. After all, I am far from entertaining any notion of failure on the part of Kaufmann or the most recent translators. It is good that one has Kaufmann’s editions and it is even better that one will have the entire English language version of the Colli-Montinari edition.

One thing deserving additional attention here is that many *quellenkritische* studies on Nietzsche constantly come up with ever more amazing ground texts for the unspecified quotations and paraphrases that had been thought to be Nietzsche’s original statements. For the present study, it is important to see how Elisabeth Kuhn relates Nietzsche’s final rejection of the “Wille zur Macht” plan to the withdrawal “from publishing his history of European nihilism”. In Kuhn’s view, it follows from the dispensing with the planned book with its sections on the development of nihilism that “Nietzsche’s philosophy of the European nihilism remains, in its entire dimension, *Nachlass*”.  

The point is a little too strongly put. Nihilism can be reconstructed, to an important degree, from the published books. What is clear, though, is that nihilism belongs to the subjects that call for intensified reflection on the books, the unpublished material and their mutual relations. In this study, I shall ruminate and utilise just about any of the various sorts of texts ascribed to Nietzsche and published in *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. What may be striking and unusual in my practice is the extensive use of his letters, the practice that I sought to defend in section I.a.

In this last section of the first chapter, it has been my aim to underscore the following points. To be able to assess, and to take part in, the famous debate over the distinction between Nietzsche’s books and his posthumous notes, one does well to chart the stages of editing the philosopher’s texts. Of course, there
would be much less promise in this, unless one has clarified the sequence of works Nietzsche got to finish. Having done that in the previous section, it was my priority here to make sense of the philosophical significance of the question of editions. Giving my full support for the necessity of using the Colli-Montinari edition in order for one to be able to come up with reliable interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy, I also had another thing to insist upon. It is important to see, namely, that there is a continuum from the Nietzschean discourse of writing to the Nietzschean discourse of publicity, from the discourse of authorship to the one of the audience. Just as Nietzsche offers not only a series of books but as well a series of utterances on the conceptual problematic of books (and writing and production etc.), he also edited his œuvre and left behind an ensemble of reflections upon this project, too. From the issue of editing, in turn, one is lead to the one of reception.

I do think that it is enlightening and even necessary to quote from Nietzsche’s books, notes and correspondence to be able to speak about and study the various discourses his texts engender, discourses in which his thought is put in motion and where the readers are to be confronted with their singular approaches, arguments, concepts, vocabularies, styles. Yet, my strategy will be to try to recognize and problematize the nature of these different types of texts and their potential interrelatedness. The preliminary case for this strategy should have been made by now. It is the other readers and the ways of reading actualized in the turbulent history of Nietzsche’s critical (and uncritical) reception that I shall now turn to.
Chapter discussion can be divided into four main sections. The historical variety of reading Nietzsche, the alternatives of placing him in the story of philosophy and among other thinkers, the more specific ways to cope with his works in various currents and disciplines and, finally, the persistent controversies surrounding his legacy are all accorded separate discussions.

Questions of reception are not dealt with here in order to promote some particular variant of the methods deriving from the broad tradition of ‘reception theory’. If, however, this tradition is associated, as has been proposed, with “a general shift in concern from the author and the work to the text and the reader”, it can be seen as a part of the larger setting of the present chapter. What I tried to convey in chapter I about Nietzsche and his writings, is now studied from an angle that may be taken to exploit the ‘reception theoretical’ notion of the ‘text’ as “an unstable commodity”, “as a function of its readers and its reception”. At the minimum, to approach Nietzsche through those who have utilized his legacy is to come near a tradition that seeks to trade a “conception of an objective and eternal work [...] with a unique structure and a single, determinate meaning” for a manifold “of models in which the essence of the work is a never-completed unfolding of its effective history, while its meaning is constituted by the interaction between text and reader”. 312

Like I said, however, my interest is not in endorsing any specific view put forth by Iser, Jauss or other important authors. It has been said that, among different Rezeptionstheorien, there is little “conceptual unanimity” regarding the most crucial issues such as the difference between Rezeption and Wirkung. I would not want to pretend to be able to solve these problems in a study dedicated to other concerns. Moreover, the criticism often presented against this intellectual current, namely, that it “ignores the power relations inherent in any socially mediated text or social exchange”313, is, in my view, more or less to the point, and, at any rate, one from which I wish to preserve my treatment.

The reasons for making sense of the Nietzsche-Rezeption can be presented as follows. Section I.a made much of Nietzsche’s rise to fame as an event that, simultaneously, dispersed his thoughts all over the vast
field of modern thought and condensed him into a handy sign with which to make quick illustrations or to produce instant effects. The present chapter provides an appropriate occasion to show that this really is the case. Today’s Nietzsche scholarship and the other contemporary spheres where his work is used tend to operate with what is often historically thin sense of the formation of current convictions. A related perception is that while it is difficult to have certain contemporary philosophical debates involve Nietzsche, he seems almost inextricable from certain other quarrels. I would hold that both the Nietzsche-less and the Nietzsche-full discussions would profit from attending to the ways Nietzsche’s significance and availability have been felt at different junctures in the course of the past hundred years.

Since my new proposal for coming to terms with Nietzsche will involve drawing from great many earlier interpretative strategies described in the present chapter, it is only in order to say that I do not mean to imply that the reception problematic would have been completely ignored by Nietzsche scholars. It is said, for example, that what makes Nietzsche’s “immense influence” understandable is the fact that his “work is perhaps the most immediately accessible of any profound thinker”. Yet, it may remain unfathomable, since, “[w]ith the exceptions of Paul Celan and T. S. Eliot, one can hardly find a major literary figure who, in one way or another, was not inspired by the work of Friedrich Nietzsche”.314

T. J. Reed, for one, insists that literary history and criticism continue to be useful in making sense of Nietzsche’s reception, because they are specialized in “indirect” influences and metaphoric connections important for the philosopher’s own technique as well315. J. P. Stern, in turn, writes as follows: “In speaking of a literary or philosophical influence, we are faced not with a single, unitary concept but with a bundle of diverse relationships. [...] In many instances, we had better speak of the example of Nietzsche.”316 Should one feel the recurring stress on the “literary” to be excessive, an antidote is dosed by the intellectual historian Dominique LaCapra. He holds that none of the actual or conceivable “disciplines” can claim a full control over Freud, Marx, Joyce or Nietzsche317. Sometimes the point is made in the way that, to quote another commentator, “[o]ne can justify almost anything by quoting Nietzsche”318. Alternatively, Nietzsche “can be evoked over, for and against everything there is on the earth”319. Or, as still another observer puts it: “Nietzsche’s fascination has not been broken. Every critic and supporter finds, in Nietzsche’s writings, his own quotation”320.

Yet, it is one thing to say that Nietzsche is versatile, accessible and usable. Another thing is to show just how his work has been read, how this availability has been produced, taken shape and utilized. I am seeking to have my specific approach to communicate with other interpretative options. Therefore, it becomes imperative to undertake a reconstruction of the century of Nietzsche’s legacy.
In 1994, *The Economist* reported that “Nietzsche is not dead”\(^{321}\). A hundred and fifty years had passed since his birth. In one of the many seminars held to mark this anniversary, Gianni Vattimo submitted a paper where he wrote that rather than to re-evocate or make present this untimely and posthumous philosopher he would turn the attention to the ways Nietzsche is being read today\(^{322}\).

While Margot Fleischer pointed out, recently, that “the philosophical Nietzsche reception is yet to be canvassed”\(^{323}\), Stephen E. Aschheim’s investigations of Nietzsche’s impact, on the contemporary scene, could suggest that such a comprehensive account is scarcely possible and its potential outcomes would hardly be meaningful. Yet, in his exceptionally subtle work *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890 - 1990*, Aschheim takes on the bold enterprise to make sense of the hundred years of Nietzsche’s “fluid heritage”, of “the complex diffusion and uses of his ideas”. This is, in other words, to “furnish such a history”.\(^{324}\) Having trespassed the whole scenery, Aschheim concludes:

”No prior, singular (and, in any case, disputed) master interpretation has been able to do justice to the astonishing range of that influence and its pervasive penetration into the contradictory areas of political and cultural life. [...] Nietzsche has not been exhausted by any particular political system or cultural time frame. [...] While we cannot predict its future contours, the Nietzsche legacy will in all probability live on as a dynamic force and assume new forms, responding to the dilemmas and needs of changing times and be integrated into our own tentative self-definitions and cultural representations.”\(^{325}\)

This is very far indeed from, and superior to, virtually any of the efforts in trying to assess Nietzsche’s developing significance. One may consider two examples from the recent general historiography. J. M. Roberts writes about how “unfortunate” it was “that the language in which he couched many of his observations and his introductions of such notions as that of the superman and the “master and slave morality” invited misinterpretation”. The historian deplores the way Nietzsche’s creations “were torn from their context in his works to justify an unbridled individualism in rebellion against liberal civilization”.\(^{326}\) Eric Hobsbawm, in turn, defines Nietzsche’s “enthusiastic admirers” who “multiplied” from the 1890’s onwards to be “middle-class (male) youth”\(^{327}\).
Against the type of treatment manifest in Roberts, one could consult Aschheim who sets it as his
“conviction that, to understand the many influences, Nietzsche’s work cannot be reduced to an essence
nor can it be said to possess a single and clear authoritative meaning”. Against the sort of reading
exemplified by Hobsbawm, one had better to read Aschheim about how, from early on, “Nietzschean
thematics appealed to a remarkably wide range of political and cultural interests.” 328 It does not make
good sense either to insist on distortions of the authentic message or to single out a community of heirs.

To give an idea of his research strategy Aschheim makes a passing recourse to Jacques Derrida, but he
could have cited Michel Foucault for a more revealing comment. Foucault’s statement, I believe,
prefigures a lot of the type of reasoning that the critical historian came to rehearse on Nietzsche’s legacy:
"I do not believe there is a single Nietzscheanism. There are no grounds for believing that there is a true
Nietzscheanism, or that ours is any truer than others." 329

In the following account of the Nietzsche reception, I will not try to cut philosophical reactions off from
the rest. What I shall attempt to do is to shed light on the ways the contemporary images of Nietzsche
have been shaped and to make way for my contention that the variety of modes, in which his thinking
was received, has a bearing on the study of that very thinking. I shall begin from the first receiver,
Friedrich Nietzsche.

Chapter I displayed Nietzsche as almost constantly worrying about his own books. In a letter from
August 1885, he wrote to his sister about Schmeitzner, the no-good antisemitist publisher of his:

> Aber das Malheur, das dieser Verleger in Hinsicht auf die Wirkung Deines Bruders
angerichtet hat, ist ungeheuer: daß ich jetzt, im 41ten Lebensjahre isolirt bin, keinen
Schüler habe und es täglich empfinde, daß ich gerade in meiner besten Kraft stehe, um eine
große Schul-Tätigkeit als Philosoph auszuüben, stelle Dir das auch vor die Seele! Die
Bücher heraus aus diesem Winkel!!! Es sind meine Angelhaken; wenn sie mir keine
Menschen fangen, so haben sie keinen Sinn! -
(KGB III/3, August 1885, 82.)

Once this biblical imagery of fishing humans with a new teaching is, three years thereafter, incorporated
in *Ecce homo*, one can read that

> [v]on da [JGB] an sind alle meine Schriften Angelhaken: vielleicht verstehe ich mich so gut
als Jemand auf Angeln?... Wenn Nichts sich fieng, so liegt die Schuld nicht an mir. Die
Fische fehlten...
(EH “WisgBs”: JvGuB 1, KSA 6, 350.)
By setting lures and hooks a writer seeks to acquire disciples but the success is never guaranteed. Neither is mutual satisfaction. Referring to Zarathustra Nietzsche wrote as follows: it is “ganz notwendig, daß ich mißverstanden werde; mehr noch, ich muß es dahin bringen, schlimm verstanden und verachtet zu werden” (KGB III/1, August 1883, 439). Accordingly, he said later that, with this book, he has “das Verständniß fast noch mehr als das Mißverständniß zu fürchten” (KGB III/3, Januar 1886, 143).

There was also the worry about the book not selling enough: “Vom Zarathustra sind nicht hundert Exemplare verkauft (und diese fast nur an Wagnerianer und Antisemiten!!) Kurz, es gibt Gründe zu lachen und den Rücken zu kehren.” (KGB III/3, Dezember 1885, 118.) Decisive statistics came after the Leipziger Buchhändlermesse of 1887. It turned out that, despite 66 copies of Jenseits sent to editors, only 114 copies were sold at the fair: ”Lehrreich! Nämlich man will partout meine Litteratur nicht”. Nietzsche saw that it is “von der Geburt der Tragödie an bis jetzt, eine stetig wachsende Gleichgültigkeit gegen meine Schriften ziffernmäßig constatirt.” (KGB III/5, Juni 1887, 87 & 89.)

Moreover, he would complain that he has “noch nicht zu einer einzigen auch nur mäßig achtbaren Besprechung auch nur eines meiner Bücher gebracht”, instead “es herrscht ein zügellos feindseliger Ton in den Zeitschriften, gelehrten und ungelehrten” (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 249). To his mother, he wrote that what German papers told about Jenseits amounted to “ein haarsträubendes Kunterbunt von Unklarheit und Abneigung”. If anything matched it could already have been said about his first book but at that time “lebte ich unter einem hübschen Schleier und wurde vom deutschen Hornvieh verehrt, gleich als ob ich zu ihm gehörte”. “Unzweifelhaft”, he wrote, “werde ich immer noch einige Jahre früher in Frankreich “entdeckt” sein, als im Vaterlande.” (KGB III/5, Oktober 1887, 165.) Nietzsche saw that he was being handled “als ob ich etwas Absonderliches und Absurdes wäre, etwas, das man einstweilen nicht nöthig hat, ernst zu nehmen…” (KGB III/5, April 1888, 286).

Inattentive and disparaging reception surely contributed to Nietzsche’s intense pondering on readership, publicity and reputation. He could say that he prefers a “langsam und gleichsam unterirdische Weiterwirken meiner Schriften”, and yet that “ich sollte sogar jede andre plötzlichere Art von Wirkung mit meiner Denkungsweise finden”. Burkhardt and Taine he considered to be his only readers: ”ich mir [...] zum Troste sage: ”ich habe bis jetzt nur zwei Leser, aber solche Leser!”“ (KGB III/5, März & November 1887, 35 198.)

Observing both the disappointing reviews and his own strength, Nietzsche made different estimations as to the day when his underground influence will have to break through. The epigraph of this chapter is by no means the only example of these predictions. In May 1884, he said that “[w]er weiß wie viele Generationen erst vorüber gehen müssen, um einige Menschen hervorzubringen, die es in seiner ganzen
Much of these complaints and jokes can be seen as related to the many attempts Nietzsche made at fashioning his books into functioning wholes. He would write that “alle die Vorreden und Beigaben der neuen Auflagen meiner älteren Werke”, together with the fresh *Jenseits*, had the shared objective, “daß ich der schändlichen *Vermanschung* meines Namens und meiner Interessen ein Ende machen will, die sich in den letzten 10 Jahren gebildet hat” (KGB III/5, November 1887, 193). For this purpose, he even coached Carl Fuchs to write an essay on him with more care than what others had shown. His words to Fuchs can also further clarify his interest in “types”:

> haben Sie die Klugheit, die leider noch Niemand gehabt hat, mich zu charakterisiren, zu “beschreiben”, - nicht aber “abzuwerthen”. Es giebt dies eine angenehme Neutralität: es scheint mir, daß man sein Pathos dabei bei Seite lassen darf und die feinere Geistigkeit um so mehr in die Hände bekommt. Ich bin noch nie charakterisirt - weder als Psychologe, noch als Schriftsteller (“Dichter” eingerechnet), noch als Erfinder einer neuen Pessimismus (eines dionysischen, aus der Stärke geborenen, der sich das Vernügen macht, das Problem des Daseins an seinen Hörnen zu packen), noch als Immoralist ( - die bisher höchsterreichte Form der “intellektueller Redlichkeit”, welche die Moral als Illusion behandeln darf, nachdem sie selbst Instinkt und Unvermeidlichkeit geworden ist - ) Es ist durchaus nicht nöthig, nicht einmal erwünscht, Partei dabei für mich zu nehmen: im Gegentheil, eine Dosis Neugierde, wie vor einem fremden Gewächs, mit einem ironischen Widerstande, schiene mir eine unvergleichlich intelligentere Stellung zu mir. - Verzeihung! Ich schrieb eben einige Naivetäten - ein kleines Recept, sich glücklich aus etwas *Unmöglichchem* herausziehn...
> (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 375-6.)

The notion that a posthumous fame is the only available form of notoriety is one of the recurring points in Nietzsche, and it is not without an irony of its own. This is how Nietzsche, in a later letter to Fuchs, referred to his instructions just quoted: "Sie haben hoffentlich mein “litterarisches Recept” nicht ernst genommen?? - Ich mache in puncto “Publizität” und “Ruhm” nichts als Bosheiten. - Einigen werden posthum geboren. - “ (KGB III/5, August 1888, 403).

In Turin, the tragic experience developed toward some kind of relaxation. After hearing Rossaro’s music for the first time and being deeply moved by the art of the forgotten composer, Nietzsche wrote that “ich weiß nicht mehr, was “große Namen sind... Vielleicht bleibt das Beste unbekannt.” Rossaro’s case was
the opportunity for him to ask for the definition of perfectness: "Sollten die allerbesten Dinge unbekannt bleiben? die allerbeste Menschen eingerechnet! Gehört es zum Wesen des Vollkommenen nicht "berühmt” zu werden? - Ruhm - ich fürchte man muß ein wenig canaille sein, um berühmt zu werden.” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 409 & 507.) Moreover, Nietzsche said that:


The numero uno was not completely isolated. There was the promising contact with the Danish intellectual Georg Brandes from the late 1887 on. Nietzsche saw this “ausgezeichneten” man with the “ernsthaftesten Willen” to be one of the “geschicktesten Missionären neuer Ideen” and “wie geschaffen dafür, zwischen den Nationen zu vermitteln und neue Namen bekannt zu machen”. He thought of Brandes as “vielleicht der Einzige, der genug Übung in der Nachrechnung complicirterer Rechen-Exemplar der Psychologie hat, um über mich keine grobe Ungereimtheit zu sagen” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1887 6 Januar 1888, 207-8 & 226.)

In Ecce homo, there is a line that reads: "In Wien, in St. Petersburg, in Stockholm, in Kopenhagen, in Paris und New-York - überall bin ich entdeckt: ich bin es nicht in Europa’s Flachland Deutschland...” (EH “WisgBs”: 2, KSA 6, 301). When Brandes had given, in Copenhagen, the first public lectures on den tyske filosof Friedrich Nietzsche and reported Nietzsche about the auditorium bursting at seams and spectators giving long applauds, Nietzsche sent Deussen a postcard: ”- Sic incipit gloria mundi...” (KGB III/5, Mai 1888, 307).

In 1889, Brandes published an article on Nietzsche that emphasized the thinker’s “aristocratic spiritual orientation” and rebellious individualism against leveling systems of morality. The rising philosophical authority in Denmark, Harald Høffding, opposed this teaching of “aristocratic radicalism” with his preferred “democratic radicalism”.

Even before Brandes’s undertakings in lecturing and writing, there had been small and scattered circles of enthusiasts trying to make sense of Nietzsche. In Berlin, with Bernhard Förster and his acquaintances, there was some interest in Nietzsche and, in Vienna, a group of young artists and intellectuals, including the composer Gustav Mahler, was inspired by his early thoughts already in the mid-1870’s. Back in Berlin, about a decade later, a society grew around Paul Réé and Lou von Salomé, with such members as Brandes and Ferdinand Tönnies. For all these people, too, Nietzsche was a point of reference and a
frequent target of criticism.  

Nietzsche’s fourth *Unzeitgemäss* was translated in French in 1877, but the book circulated mainly among few Swiss Wagnerians. It wasn’t until 1890’s that Nietzsche became a topic of broader discussion in France and begun exerting “radical influence” on a number of intellectuals. This was mainly carried out by the periodicals *Le Banquet, La revue blanche* and, most important, *Mercure de France*. The activist behind *Mercure* was the Alsatian patriot Henri Albert who had translated, by the First World War, fifteen of Nietzsche’s books and called the philosopher “master” or “teacher” with a future religion to offer. Ironically, it was the Wagner vogue, in Paris, that paved the way for Nietzsche’s popularity: as Wagner’s prestige was diminishing, Nietzsche stepped in to occupy a central, albeit highly controversial role in the French intellectual scene. New translations and commentaries, such as Henri Lichtenberg’s *La philosophie de Nietzsche* (1898), began to appear, too.  

Lichtenberg was in general agreement with Brandes’s model of interpretation. He underlined individualistic and aristocratic features, in Nietzsche’s stance, calling the new view of morality “handsome and admirably logical.” By the first few years of this century, the Parisian Nietzscheans had acquired notable adversaries, such as Alfred Fouillé and Ernest Seillière.  

Meanwhile in the Eastern Central Europe, one thinker to have discovered Nietzsche was the democrat politician Tomáš Masaryk. There was, in the late 19th-century Czechoslovakia, “considerable attraction” to Nietzsche and “radical disillusionism” associated to him. Masaryk rejected all this and treated Nietzsche’s extreme individualism as but a warning sign, if not as a “fiasco”.  

In St. Petersburg, the first article on Nietzsche was published in 1892. Two years later, *Der Fall Wagner* appeared in Russian translation. It has been pointed out that Nietzsche was generally interpreted, in Russia, in terms of the world views embodied in Dostoevsky’s characters and in the light of the growing awareness of contemporary physiological and psychological theories. The names of Darwin and Spencer were commonly mentioned in appealing to his thought.  

In the German-speaking world, the reception may be said to have started, in 1872, from the article, in *Basler Zeitung*, where Nietzsche’s open lectures on education were approvingly covered. Yet, in general, his subsequent writings did not receive much attention from the press. Of the more well known writers, Karl Hillebrand and Bruno Bauer gave favorable estimations of the *Unzeitgemäss* volumes. As it already turned out above, the book reviews that appeared, irregularly, in such publications as *Literarische Centralblatt, Deutsche Rundschau* and *Der Bund* were mostly negative or ambivalent.
Here as elsewhere, it was in the early 1890's that works on Nietzsche began to appear increasingly bringing about a dramatic change in his reputation. In 1886, Helen Druscowitz, a critic to have made personal acquaintance with Nietzsche, could write, in her Modere Versuche eines Religionzersatzes, that Nietzsche’s remarkable, though perhaps, in its Darwinian emphases, overdone contribution to a problematic prepared by Comte, Mill and Feuerbach, was largely ignored.

Seven years later, Ludvig Stein wrote an article on the “dangers” of the Nietzschean Weltanschauung. Alfred Biese’s book, also from 1893, testifies to the sense of urgency. The author’s polemic was targeted against a Modephilosophenthum that had arisen in Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, and further against Büchner’s materialism. Yet, the real state of emergency was triggered by “a new idol [...] that is worshipped by the newest Stürmer und Dranger, the grinning avatars of décadence, fin de siècle, tomorrow’s Europeanism, master morality [...] This idol is Friedrich Nietzsche.” According to Biese, “innumerable young people are already praising” the “false prophet” and, thus, running a grave risk of “damaging our German Volksseele”. The task is to throw off such Tagesgrösse and teach pupils to take preventive measures.

An author much more sympathetic to Nietzsche’s work, Christian von Ehrenfels, spoke, in 1892, of him as “the currently so highly fashionable [so hoch in Mode stehenden] philosopher”. von Ehrenfels called him “the philosophical actor and poser with much repute”. Nietzsche, as the man of the moment, was widely taken to feed the self-interpretations of the younger generations, in a way similar to other writers with attractive characters to offer for identification. Indeed, another German commentator expressed his disapproval, in 1895, for the “current enthusiasm [Begeisterung] for Nietzsche and Ibsen”.

Among the first monographists, there was Lou von Salomé with her Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken (1894). She characterized Nietzsche’s path using the terms of the second Unzeitgemäss: the philologist had practiced antiquarian history, the follower of Schopenhauer and Wagner had made monumental historiography, and the positivist critic had mastered critical history. Once Nietzsche had conquered even this last stage, says von Salomé, all the three modes of inquiry melted into one and lead to a recognition of the unhistorical necessities of individual life. According to her, the later Nietzsche was more and more occupied with his inner world and drawn toward the mystical.

In 1895, Rudolf Steiner published his monograph Friedrich Nietzsche. Ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit. Steiner, who was, at the time, still in good relations with Elisabeth Förster, acknowledged her assistance. Perhaps independently of this connection but nicely in line with Förster’s valuations, Steiner wrote explicitly against von Salomé’s view: “nowhere, in Nietzsche’s ideas, is there a tiniest trace of mysticism”. In addition, and this time against Förster’s developing visions, Steiner emphasized the
critiques the dissident had given of German nationalism and of the philosophical and aesthetical main stream. Anticipating the medical interest in Nietzsche’s case, Steiner held that psycho-pathological study is called for, although specifying that this says nothing against the man’s genius.

The one to generalize the psycho-pathological perspective was the adversary of modernism Max Nordau who, in his book, Entartung (1892), identified Nietzsche with sadism and madness. Although Nordau’s considerations were widely disputed, he had his audience. Incidentally, his book had its important impact in Russia, too, as the translation appeared in 1894. In Britain, Nordau’s assault was also harmful to Nietzsche’s name.

A much more sober critic was Tönnies. His pamphlet Der Nietzsche-Kultus. Eine Kritik was issued in 1897 with its stance against the elitist loathing of democracy and morality. The same year, one of Brentano’s and Meinong’s students, attacked the Darwinian implications in Nietzsche’s thinking, yet undervaluing its importance, since the growing “success is almost exclusively reducible to an extraordinarily subtle capacity for sniffing journalist trails.” Still in 1897, Alois Riehl published a sympathetic study on Nietzsche as “the philosopher of culture” who had left the standpoint of science for a more artistic approach.

In Strasbourg, Theobald Ziegler had lectured on Nietzsche during the winter season 1897/8. The monograph he came to publish, in 1900, gave support for von Salomé’s book as well as critical comments on Förster’s practices. Ziegler was worried over the proliferating Übermenschenthum that was on the verge to invade theaters and all artistic circles and encouraging general attitudes toward a brutality of some kind. On the other hand, Ziegler welcomed the way the case for an integrated individual was strengthened because of Nietzsche.

Apart from these kinds of valuations, Ziegler also paid attention to the problem of a fashion being born. He spoke of amazingly short “incubation” that was needed, for Nietzsche’s In-die-Mode-kommen and Berühmt-werden. What was especially intriguing was Nietzsche’s posture as the “untimely” or “unpopular” thinker who, nonetheless, became so quickly zeitgemäß and populär, or even the “idol or prophet of the time”. Ziegler supplies the following grounds for this course of events: Nietzsche as a dazzling stylist with a power to entertain beside enlightening, aphorist to suit the modern abruptly alternating way of life, paradoxist to seduce the bold and the young, poet even while philosophizing, tough to stand apart from the all too meek general sensibility. According to Ziegler, it is utterly difficult to tell about the “uncritical Nietzsche enthusiasm”, with its “Nietzsche-preachers” or “Nietzsche-fans”, on the one hand, and those showing equally fervent condemnation, on the other.
Re-editions, translations and commentaries began to proliferate to such an extent that, already by 1902, one could feel obligated to justify one’s own contribution as follows: “Yet another book about Nietzsche?” - this is the question of all those who are aware of how numerous are the books that have been - in a truly impressive crescendo - published over the last years on this author.”\textsuperscript{359} Or, as in 1904: “A new book on Nietzsche seems to be extraneous, as one thinks of how many books about him, and not all of them bad, are written”\textsuperscript{360}. And still a year later: “Nietzsche without an end! [...] the Nietzsche literature grows like an avalanche”\textsuperscript{361}.

However, issuing of original texts, translations and interpretations is but a slice of the scope of the “Nietzsche reception”. Aschheim prefers to talk about a “battle over Nietzsche”, in which “Nietzschean concepts became increasingly incorporated into German and European political vocabulary, part of the available stockpile of slogans and catchwords.” As he says, many of Nietzsche’s “[g]raphic and elastically employable terms [...] were integrated into the language.”\textsuperscript{362} An account, from the 1920’s, also has it that around the turn of the century, “Nietzsche’s thoughts varyingly influenced the whole ethical view of life at the time, not only among his disciples but among his opponents, too.”\textsuperscript{363}

I give two examples. The philosophy professor Theodor L. Haering writes, in 1919, on the \textit{Zeitgeist}. He fails even to mention Nietzsche but insists on the need to effect “a true revaluation of all values” to fight materialism and save “a consciously idealistic world view of the leader”\textsuperscript{364}. Ten years later, Franz Kröner, in turn, came to put a stigma on “perspectivism” and the notion of “perspective”, since they involved, in his view, inefficient instruments in criticizing systematic philosophy. This time again, the most famous theorizer of the perspectival, Nietzsche, was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{365}

Aschheim’s invaluable perception about the popularity of recognizably Nietzschean \textit{Schlagwörter} is that an “indication of their growing familiarity is the fact that Nietzschean terminology was itself used to subvert Nietzschean values”. He could have referred, for instance, to von Salomé’s practice of critically analyzing Nietzsche in Nietzschean concepts but he chooses to introduce M. G. Conrad’s book \textit{Der Übermensch in der Politik} (1895). There, Nietzsche is defended against two groups of contemporary misusers of the ‘overhuman’, the power politicians and the intellectual-artistic bohemians.\textsuperscript{366}

This latter group, in Karl Kraus’s words, “superapes of the coffee-houses”, was widely seen as the inheritor of the Nietzschean danger of neocynical attitudes\textsuperscript{367}. When it comes to the political influence of Nietzsche, it has turned out that he was becoming a constant reference point for virtually any movement with social ambitions. Nietzsche himself had written to Köselitz in March 1887:

\begin{quote}
Anbei ein komisches Faktum, das mir mehr und mehr zum Bewußtsein gebracht wird. Ich
\end{quote}
The “underground influence” of Nietzsche came to be felt within the political left as well. Although Franz Mehring’s Kapital und Presse (1891) laid the groundwork for socialist condemnations of the philosopher of capitalism, the book itself was a reaction to certain radical social democrats attacking the increasingly authoritarian form of Marxism. Moreover, despite the dismissive attitudes of Bernstein and others, Nietzsche aroused interest in various revisionist socialist groups. From the early 1890's on, there appeared texts with the specific motive of absorbing his thought into socialist form of life. One curious piece of information is that, among Leipzig workers in 1897, Nietzsche’s books were far more widely read than those of Marx and other founders of socialism.368

Of the aforementioned German commentators, Ziegler presents a case in point here. He criticized Nietzsche’s “one-sided view of democracy, yet, in an open appeal for socialism, he said that the “new cultural ideal” was in need of a Nietzschean defence of the individual.369 It can be added that the early French and Russian reception reflects similar fuses. Georges Sorel and Maxim Gorki were among the most famous thinkers to extract different kinds of unities out of Marx and Nietzsche370. In Paris, according to a later judgment, even the majority of Nietzsche enthusiasts may have expected his thought to contribute to socialist ends371.

However, these tendencies must not be exaggerated. Georgi Plehanov, as an eminent early socialist theoretician, was clear in his negative view of Nietzsche. In his articles from the first decade of the 20th century, he set forth the view of the German philosopher as embodying the late modern bourgeois reaction against the members of the working class. Nietzsche-inspired neo-romantic currents were equally criticized by Plehanov.372

Among German sociologists, Georg Simmel defended Nietzsche against Tönnies. Simmel considered it to be Nietzsche’s decisive breakthrough to have made the modern identification between society and humankind. Despite Nietzsche’s celebration of the individual, Simmel saw that he overcame the isolated individual in favor of a more social conception.373

In retrospect, Alfredo Guzzoni describes the early stages of Nietzsche reception as dominated by “extraphilosophical influence”. Broad and diverse themes of cultural criticism, morality, anti-theism and overhumanity had the upper hand.374 From the midst of these early stages, one observer wrote as follows:
“Undoubtedly, Nietzsche’s thoughts have largely influenced the whole ethical attitude to life, not only among his disciples, but among his adversaries, too. The extent to which this has happened in literature, art, practical life, can no more be tracked down.”

It is important to underline that, all the while, there appeared books by such writers as Eisler, Rittelmeyer and Vaihinger where the more traditional philosophical concerns were prominent. These three scholars concentrated on epistemological and metaphysical questions. For a fourth example, the Austrian Jakob J. Hollitscher wrote a book, *Friedrich Nietzsche. Darstellung und Kritik* (1904), in a fairly disapproving tone, but addressed ethical and metaphysical dilemmas instead of social upheaval, political restlessness or cultural conflicts.

Of the well-known thinkers, in the German speaking world, Franz Brentano and Ernst Mach can be mentioned as two men who recognized Nietzsche’s rising notoriety and reacted, in the main, negatively. Mach rejected, in a passing remark, Nietzsche’s appeal to overhumanity. In 1907, one commentator specifically placed Mach in opposition to Nietzsche’s utterly unscientific subjectivism. Brentano, too, attacked what he termed as “Nietzsche’s unhuman suprahumanism”. Yet, he welcomed Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer and came up with a little more balanced overview of Nietzsche’s writings where, “beside all the lack of grounds and consistency, there are evermore happy insights”.

One more early description of the German Nietzsche craze, the one by Friedrich Paulsen, emphasizes the questionable way *Nietzscheanismus* arouses and intoxicates the youth. According to Paulsen’s judgment, “Nietzsche has become a steady item in newspapers and journals; Nietzsche is the most frequently mentioned name in the lists of desired books in our public libraries; indeed, I was told by a high school teacher that there are, in the essays of not that untalented pupils, occasional traces of Nietzsche’s spirit and writings”.

In the Anglo-Saxon world, the American philosopher William James was characteristically alert to continental developments. For instance, he reviewed the English edition of Nordau’s book and although he did not directly repudiate its treatment of Nietzsche and others, he was cautious enough to dismiss the work as “little more than a pathological ‘document’ on an enormous scale”. What is, probably, the most famous of James’s remarks on Nietzsche is the one in which he describes the teachings of the German, together with those of Schopenhauer, as “sick shriekings of two dying rats”. While featuring “ennobling sadness”, they nonetheless “lack the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives faith”. These formulations are taken from *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) where the “poor Nietzsche’s” criticisms are termed, in addition, “inimical” and “sickly”.
Nietzsche’s presence was, for some time, not very strongly felt in the English-speaking world. Edwin Emerson Jr. would claim that “Nietzsche’s death […] was all but ignored by his contemporaries.”\textsuperscript{384} To name a notable exception, it was George Bernard Shaw who aroused controversy with his play, \textit{Man and Philosophy. A Comedy and a Philosophy} (1903), filled with Nietzschen motives. In an extensive “epistle dedicatory” to this work, Shaw enumerated Bunyan, Blake, Hogarth, Turner, Goethe, Shelley, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Ibsen, Morris, Tolstoy and Nietzsche as his brothers and went on to describe Nietzsche’s philosophy as “post-Darwinist, post-Schopenhauerian”.\textsuperscript{385} In a recent reassessment, Shaw’s awareness of Nietzsche is deemed remarkable\textsuperscript{386}.

The first decade of the 20th century has been termed as “the great age of Nietzscheans in England”. It was, on the British Isles, not only Shaw, but also Havelock Ellis, H. G. Wells and W. B. Yeats who took a lively interest in Nietzsche\textsuperscript{387}. As in France with, say, André Gide and in Italy with especially Gabriel d’Annunzio, much of the early awareness of Nietzsche was due to creative artists\textsuperscript{388}. In its own way, this state of affairs is reflected in Paul Henry Lang’s pointed judgment that “at the beginning of the twentieth century, literature and the theater were abounding in demonic human beasts, supposedly above all moral precepts in the sense of Nietzsche’s superman”\textsuperscript{389}. Whereas Brentano had condemned Nietzsche, along with Wagner and Schopenhauer, for espousing metaphysical, “highly wondersome” and “pompous phrases” about music\textsuperscript{390}, Nietzsche seemed indispensable for a multitude of people interested in arts.

Oscar Levy who saw to the translation project and A. R. Orage, the Nietzsche monographist and the editor of the socialist weekly \textit{The New Age}, were perhaps the most influential importers of Nietzsche’s thinking across the Channel. Their work was decisive in preparing the British Nietzsche vogue dated between 1909 and 1913.\textsuperscript{391} From about this period, dates the remark by an American writer about “the increasing pressure of [Nietzsche’s] ideas”\textsuperscript{392}.

British developments had their analogous unfoldings everywhere in the Western world. The historian James Joll writes that “perhaps the most all-pervasive influence of all those who in 1914 were revolting against accepted ideas and current doctrines was Friedrich Nietzsche. […] In the years before 1914 no one with any intellectual pretensions was ignorant of his work.” Joll goes on to state that “Nietzsche’s writings had an explosive effect on a whole generation”.\textsuperscript{393}

Despite Otto Ernst’s consistently mocking tone, in his pamphlet \textit{Nietzsche der falsche Prophet} (1914), he came up with one of the most moderate works on Nietzsche from the period. In a way, it already features a thesis similar to Aschheim’s point on the linguistic shift occasioned by the new intellectual vogue. Writing mainly against Simmel and concentrating on axiological questions, Ernst says that “the general public relates Nietzsche’s name to the concepts of overhuman and herd human, master human
and slave human, master morality and slave morality, transvaluation of all values or the ways of speaking in terms of “beyond good and evil” and “the eternal return of the same”\textsuperscript{394}.

From 1914 on, Nietzsche was to stand, in the main, for the demoralised and cruel German nationalism. His proponents were put, ever since, on the defensive. It deserves to be underscored that it was only at this point that Nietzsche’s name was introduced to the larger Anglo-Saxon audiences.\textsuperscript{395} The unique “world-despising temper of our age”, the “general attitude for which life, tried by every test, seems equally condemned”, would be traced back to Nietzsche\textsuperscript{396}. In London, “Euro-Nietzschean war” soon became a conceivable and usable term\textsuperscript{397}. It has recently been confirmed that Nietzsche, along with von Treitschke and von Bernhardi, was most often considered, in public estimations, as the “blood-thirsty” trio behind German militarism\textsuperscript{398}.

Paralleling the growing distrust and ideological opposition in Britain, the German interest in Nietzsche was beginning to tend more strongly towards national questions. Part of this tendency was seen already in section I.c. Yet, the question merits more elucidation. National questions were part of the Nietzsche-inspired artistic regeneration lead by the poet Stefan George. George himself had taken an interest in Nietzsche, from 1890’s on, and he was, with Gottfried Benn, the most influential figure among young aesthetes and intellectuals in the early 20th century Germany. Although a recent reconsideration has emphasized George’s opposition to Nietzsche\textsuperscript{399}, he clearly spread the news. Of the writers close to George, Ernst Bertram published an extensive book, Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie (1918). Walter Kaufmann has called Bertram and Förster “the two fountainheads of the legend”, because their works were the most popular and most mystifying efforts in reappropriating Nietzsche’s legacy.\textsuperscript{400}.

Although Thomas Mann, for his part, held that the accusations made against the humanist Nietzsche as an initiator of the First World War were ridiculous, he was able to praise Bertram’s vision of Nietzsche as the late romantic German hero\textsuperscript{401}. Martin Havenstein, whose monograph Nietzsche als Erzieher was published in 1922, not only said that Nietzsche’s influence “has hardly begun” but insisted on the point that ”Nietzsche’s yea and amen rising triumphantly from the abyss of the last nay-saying to the cloudless sky is so German as is all his striving [Trachten] and writing [Dichten]”\textsuperscript{402}. Yet, it wasn’t only in Germany that Nietzsche was uncritically hailed as a mythic hero. The Bulgarian Nietzsche enthusiast and racist Y. Yanev, for instance, spoke of his master, in 1925, as “apostle of a new culture”, “new Prometheus”, “new Christ”\textsuperscript{403}.

Aschheim says that among the far right, Nietzsche’s individualism was dissolved and his dynamism regimented. He puts the issue like this: For those who needed it, Nietzsche supplied a vocabulary that rendered Weimar’s dehumanizing impulses respectable.\textsuperscript{404}
In 1929, *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* published a book by Fritz Krökel, *Europas Selbstbesinnung durch Nietzsche*. The author’s conviction is that Nietzsche was not “anti-German”. On the contrary, he was in blood-relation with whatever was German and, as a German, he “thought and hovered with his “blood”“. Yet, since Krökel’s objective is to study Nietzsche’s relationship with the French moralists, he admitted that “there lived, in him, something extra-German, too”. Ambivalently enough, the book is drawn to a close by celebrating the Nietzschean type of ‘good European’: “The continent wishes, for all the enthusiasm of nationalism, to become one, and the united Europe wishes to rule the world”405.

In 1930, after studying some time in *Nietzsche-Archiv*, a Finnish scholar uttered quite innocently that "Nietzsche has given a most beautiful model for solving national questions on a spiritual basis"406. In equally good faith, Emge, one of the editors of the *Historisches-kritische Ausgabe*, said that there is no other material so immediately actual and positively usable than Nietzsche’s literary estate407.

Aschheim is of the opinion that the archive led by Elisabeth Förster “never became a normative or authoritative center”408. This, I think, is a bit too strong a point. Admittedly, it is in line with Aschheim’s laudable strategy of showing that, from the start, “Nietzschean thematics appealed to a remarkably wide range of political and cultural interests” and that Nietzsche’s “initial and most explosive and enduring impact [...] was upon diverse circles of the intellectual, artistic and literary avant-garde”409.

Yet, if the archive was, for more than three decades, the sole instance guarding Nietzsche’s manuscripts and issuing “original” texts and, hence, the unavoidable channel through which his thinking and his vocabulary became available, then it surely had central normative and authoritative power for those who either needed or did not need any of the additional biographical or interpretative information it mastered.

I don’t think that there were so many who could do wholly without this additional material, if only to deviate as far as possible from its emphases. Even if it is accepted that “the Nietzschean” disseminated, first and foremost, through the transformation of notions and vocabularies due to forces hard to pin down and impossible to individuate, it was the archive that played a key role in institutionalizing new glossaries.

While I do think that it is a fair view Aschheim holds by saying that to make a paradigm out of Nietzsche has been the only constant property of the entire history of reception410, I would grant the archive, and the practice it fabricated out of Nietzsche’s legacy, a pretty stable status in this turmoil. Nietzsche was shaped into something of a product, a package that Förster was able to sell to the national socialists and other consumers. Moreover, Aschheim’s stress on the avant-garde is, unlike his otherwise subtle reading, fairly typical of the way Nietzsche’s influence has been assessed among historians. In the 50’s, Carlton J. H. Hayes, for one, held that “Nietzsche’s doctrine made its chief appeal to a coterie of young
intellectuals who wanted to be “revolutionary” or were enamored by the literary form of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as much as by its philosophical content.”

As for the most horrific side of the transvaluation, there were, in the 1920's, publicists using Nietzshean language to promote racist programmes. They would expound a “morality of force” with the explicit claim of the “extermination of the weakest”, insist on “handling the Jewish question” in terms of “master morality”, and support the idea of “destroying life unworthy of living”.

Among philosophers with more or less prominence, Karl Joel had underlined, already in 1904, that, for Nietzsche, wickedness is the best human quality; Ludwig Klages ventured to praise irrational powers of pure cosmic life; Ernst Jünger emphasized violence and obedience in creating new humanity, while Alfred Baeumler was to stress heroic realism. Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlands (1923) generalized “Nietzschean” concerns for culture into a disillusioned historical morphology on a grand scale.

According to Aschheim, “[w]hen the Nazis came to power, the building blocks of a Nietzsche-inspired vitalistic, renaturalized, elemental society had been implanted, in many cases by sources that remained outside or even opposed to national socialism.” He says that the First World War and the era of the Weimar republic “graphically illustrated that the Nietzsche heritage both molded and was molded by the dominant cultural, political, and ideological perceptions of the day.”

To mention an act of reception further removed from the European discussion, the Japanese scholar, Watsuji Tatsurō can be introduced. Tatsurō had studied in Germany during the 1920's, yet his interests included a “plea on behalf of Japanese creative past”, which has been seen as analogical to the way Nietzsche paid tribute to the Greeks. Tatsurō used Nietzsche in his socio-cultural campaigns for the “creative elite over the general populace” and against “labor movement and social mass parties of the late 1920's”.

As it has become clear by now, these examples should not be taken to mean that there were no philosophical, in some narrower sense of the term, readings offered. Sometimes, as in the case of Jonathan Kräutlein’s Friedrich Nietzsche’s Morallehre in ihrem begrifflichen Aufbau. Eine systematische Studie (1926), such a reading was specifically directed against the exhaustive claims of biographically and literarily informed explanations. The same year, August Vetter’s highly original book Nietzsche was released. Vetter begins from the situation where “Nietzsche’s philosophical significance is still being disputed” and ends in the “still multifacetedly present doubt as to the philosophical validity of Nietzsche”. In between, he turns down both artistic and systematic approaches to this philosopher and seeks to work out a novel interpretation that stresses the “direction” of Nietzsche’s thought. Vetter
manages to achieve a rare degree of close reading and a balanced stance toward Nietzsche’s place in the history of thought.\textsuperscript{417}

Contemporary Nietzsche experts are inclined to think that the first really weighty interpretations came no sooner than from the late 1930’s on, as Karl Löwith, Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger occupied themselves with Nietzsche’s texts. Their work could not have been carried out in isolation from the extraphilosophical situation in Germany, which is probably one of the reasons why the commentaries these philosophers produced appear to be, in a sense, the least immediately moved by contemporary concerns. As a kind of a link between these interpretations (especially Heidegger’s) and the Nazi propaganda, the work of Baeumler must be mentioned. His Nietzsche der Philosoph und Politiker appeared in 1931. Baeumler became a powerful educator, due to his position as both a professor and a government official, as well as a major remodeller of Nietzsche’s legacy, through both his monograph and his editorial efforts. The most crucial aspect of his analysis was the way he forcefully reestablished the idea of there being systematic philosophical unity of Nietzsche’s thought preserved in the posthumously published notes, whereas the books were merely so many clever masks.\textsuperscript{418}

National socialists did find use of Nietzsche. An article in a Nazi publication, appearing as early as in 1931, advised the readers to follow the well-read Mussolini and get more out of Nietzsche’s philosophy.\textsuperscript{419} The atmosphere that the national socialists came to strengthen was created effectively by absorbing certain Nietzschean manners of speech in their own elocution to be used in public addresses and bulletins. They also made special popular editions assembled from Nietzsche’s texts. A plurality of commentaries was written by party activists. Central Nazi ideologist, Alfred Rosenberg related Nietzsche, in his book Gestaltung der Idee (1938), to such racial theorists as Lagarde and Chamberlain.\textsuperscript{420} Rosenberg exploited the general sensibility comprehended as Nietzschean by focusing on an “apocalyptic struggle” and an “ability to think in radical terms, to philosophize in warlike and soldierly terms, and to conceive of ultimate scenarios like the present war.”\textsuperscript{421}

Gottlieb Scheuffleur published a book with the title Friedrich Nietzsche im Dritten Reich and Richard Oehler wrote another called Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Zukunft. What could be the most interesting work by a national socialist is Heinrich Härtle’s Nietzsche und der Nationalsozialismus. Härtle gave explicit instructions as how to go about selecting, from Nietzsche’s corpus, ideologically relevant material, on the one hand, and avoiding harmful material, on the other hand.\textsuperscript{422}

Apart from these relatively easily identifiable instances of appropriation, there is the more elusive dimension to be spelled out. In Aschheim’s words, in the Dritte Reich, there was a need to take notice of Nietzsche’s thought, “to confront its claims” and “to conduct arguments within its terms”.\textsuperscript{423} Across the
English Channel, in 1935, Sir Herbert Samuel made a speech, in the house of commons, in which he said that Nietzsche’s philosophy is the reason for the trouble in Europe. In 1937, the sinister planner and the dreadful accomplisher were conjoined in the heading of an article that appeared in *English Review*: “Hitler and Nietzsche”\(^{424}\) Bertrand Russell who could be seen to have entertained, at least for some time, more or less Nietzschean attitudes himself\(^{425}\), went on to give authoritative justification for Nietzsche’s alleged proto-Nazism. In an article that appeared in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, in 1940, Russell placed Nietzsche in front of Byron and Heine and behind the contemporary “nationalism, Satanism, and heroworship”. Ambiguously, he said that Nietzsche formed a “part of the complex soul of Germany”.\(^{426}\)

After Russell, Crane Brinton published an article, in the very next number of the same periodical, titled as “The National Socialists’ Use of Nietzsche”. He did not restrict himself to documenting Nazi’s exploitations, however, but made the analogy between 1940 and 1914, since in both occasions “Nietzsche’s name” was “in the news”. Brinton spoke of “the oddly-assorted group of Nietzscheans” always raving about “their master” who was really “a kindly soul, a real philosopher” and represented “the best of our Western tradition, humane, peaceful, liberal, even Christian (in the profound sense, of course)”. All this was, for Brinton, “the bowdlerizing, the sugaring and softening of Nietzsche’s doctrines”, of which he accused especially the French commentators.\(^{427}\)

In the Anglo-Saxony, Nietzsche was widely seen as the avatar of German neo-imperialism. It made sense to write about Nietzsche-inspired “*tour-de-force* application of Darwinism” including the biological imperative of expanding domination and the celebration of war\(^{428}\). Eric Bentley went on to extend the heroic interpretation offered by Russell and others and fused Herder’s historicism, Carlyle’s hero-worship, Bergson’s vitalism, the fantasies of “eugenically-bred elites” of Nietzsche, Shaw and Wells plus Spengler’s “historical Nietzscheanism”. Bentley was, however, cautious enough to state that “those who soften his teaching blunt its cutting edge and therefore defeat its purpose, while those who see nothing in Nietzsche but brutality are undone by their own indignation”.\(^{429}\)

In France, Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski contributed to a special number of the magazine *Acéphale*, in 1937, where Nietzsche was being reassessed and defended against fascist misuse. Bataille attacked Förster’s editorial abuse of the texts, made a recourse to Nietzsche’s hostility toward nationalism and racism and dissociated the vocabulary of “masters” from any community of them. It has been said that Bataille, Klossowski, Leiris and Caillous had the shared goal of maintaining Nietzsche readable, that is, sheltered from condemnation and neglect.\(^{430}\)

The *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* of the Frankfurt school was, for some time, published in Paris, too. In 1938, Max Horkheimer wrote an extensive article on Montaigne where the Frenchman is portrayed as
a model for the always ambivalent Nietzsche. It is, for Horkheimer, Nietzsche’s scepticism that reveals the contemporary *Führergestalten* to be but distortions of his overhuman utopias.431 In the same issue, Herbert Marcuse reviewed a bunch of Nazi German books related to Nietzsche and exposed, among other things, the utterly unreliable interpretation by Härtle432.

After the war, Theodor W. Adorno wrote, with respect to Ernst Newman’s massive Wagner biography, that “the Anglo-Saxon cultural climate [...] apparently makes it exceedingly difficult to grasp the historico-philosophical significance of so desperately German a figure as Nietzsche”433. On the face of an American wartime analysis, with its talk of Nietzsche’s paving way for Bismarck and Hitler, with his “perverse interpretations” of Darwinism, the climate was, indeed, anything but favorable434.

However, Adorno did not imply that the Germans had it easy to cope with Nietzsche’s postwar legacy. Barbro Eberan has investigated the quarrel over the *Schuldfrage* as it took place in the German press between 1945 and 1949. She says that Nietzsche was commonly seen by Marxists as reactionary racist, decadent aesthete, antihumanist despiser of the people, elitist propagandist of master humanity. Dogmatic catholics, in turn, saw him as unacceptable nihilist and irrationalist and his *Zarathustra* as the bible of the third Reich. Eberan describes Nietzsche as a passionately debated character with his double potential as a dangerous nihilist and a farsighted visionary.435

The rehabilitation of, and inventing of fresh approaches to, Nietzsche’s work had to be carried out abroad436. One might say that new interpretative situation developed through an initial establishing of ambiguity. Corliss Lamont wrote about Nietzsche’s “repellent” celebration of cruelty and his “wild and turbulent overflows” as marking the frightening culmination of German “colossal and perilous” egocentricity. Yet, the vision of the overhuman was, for Lamont, “invigorating”.437

H. A. Reyburn’s *Nietzsche. The Story of a Human Philosopher* (1948) was perhaps the first major work in the postwar reassessment. If the national socialists and their opponents had widely adopted Förster’s and Baeumler’s view of Nietzsche as a politically usable metaphysical systematian in the philosophy of power, Reyburn underlined the engagement in an anti-metaphysical outlook on life as Nietzsche’s priority.438

Yet, it wasn’t until Walter Kaufmann’s *Nietzsche. Philosopher Psychologist Antichrist*, published in 1950, that Nietzsche’s bad name was being elaborately disinfected from the contamination of the German right-wing radicals, antisemitism and the legend erected by Förster and others439. Kaufmann was followed by such notable Nietzsche scholars as R. J. Hollingdale and F. A. Lea440. To be sure, one has only to come across with, say, a remark made in a professional philosophical periodical, in 1971, about the need
to argue “with bad men, with Nazis or Nietzscheans”\textsuperscript{441}, to see that no amount of rehabilitative effort succeeds in dissociating Nietzsche from fascism. Unless, of course, even this utterance is to be taken as a careful differentiation between Nietzsche and his illegitimate exploiters, national socialists and other Nietzscheans.

It has been underlined that Kaufmann’s work was especially called for, since “the older translations of [Nietzsche] were trifly flawed, [...] ideological and cultural preconceptions foreign to Nietzsche himself regulated the translation policy”. The situation was such that “[t]he Nietzsche who emerged from these translations and from the studies built around them, was sometimes a mad and dreamy poet lacking in all intellectual discipline, sometimes the athletic cassier of the life force against bourgeois society and later on the patrician source for the racist and military fantasies of Nazism.”\textsuperscript{442} In short, Kaufmann’s work is, to a great extent, “responsible for rendering the intellectual climate in the English-speaking world receptive to the study of Nietzsche’s corpus”\textsuperscript{443}.

Interestingly, Kaufmann himself sharpened his policy by emphasizing Nietzsche’s distance to the questionable features of German philosophical tradition, such as the often preposterous, vague but burdensome language: “Nietzsche, who loved to crack conventions, exploded this tradition, too.” Quite specifically, he polemicized not only against the kind of irresponsible hero-worship that pro-Nazi Nietzsche readers like Bertram championed, but also against the eminent anti-Nazi Jaspers whose traditional ‘vagueness’ and more timely ‘ambiguity’ contributed, tragically, “to the muting of a message which was severely needed”. This is to say that, according to Kaufmann, all those who cherished Nietzsche’s absolute stylistic dissidence were doomed to ignore both his more acute philosophical achievements and his relentless political dissidence.\textsuperscript{444}

Recently, Richard Rorty offered a provocative thought experiment. He said that if “Nietzsche had been much more central to the rhetoric of Nazism than he actually was” and if “the Third Reich, after having conquered Britain and Russia, had lasted quite a while, breaking up only in 1989”, everybody having lived under its regime would be, nowadays, as sick of “the philosophy of Nietzscheanism-Hitlerism” as contemporary East and Central Europeans are with Marxism-Leninism.\textsuperscript{445} The analogy has not just imaginary repercussions, as this piece of Marxist-Leninist historiography illustrates:

"With the penetration of German capital into Bulgaria and the strengthening of Germany’s economic and political influence over the life of the country, her philosophy also gained more ground. Nietzscheanism, as one of the most modern manifestations of this philosophy began to penetrate into Bulgaria as early as about the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. But at that time its influence was restricted to the framework of individual literary and pedagogical circles. After the establishment of
fascism in Bulgaria (1923) it acquired a more political and ideological character inasmuch as Nietzsche’s views were used as a theoretical mainstay of fascist ideology.\textsuperscript{446}

In the early sixties, O. Hobart Mowrer expressed the idea the “Nietzsche’s “Superman” was [...] to live beyond good and evil, without guilt; and Adolf Hitler, World War II, and the mass extermination of Jews were some of the horrid manifestations of this dream.”\textsuperscript{447} Ten years later, Raymond B. Cattell reaffirmed the pairing of Nietzsche and Hitler with a reference to “racist caricatures of natural selection”\textsuperscript{448}. For such views, there have been correlative, and equally compact, comments made of Nietzsche as, say, “an oracle frequently misunderstood, as by Hitler”\textsuperscript{449}.

Anyone in need of more balanced and nuanced treatments can consult Stephan Körner who claims that much of what Nietzsche wrote could, after translation into a special idiom, be conceived as coming from a Nazi leader. Yet, says Körner, Nietzsche cannot be seen as an early national socialist, since he would, most likely, have been thrown in a concentration camp for his hatred of nationalism and his occasional praise of the Jewish prestige.\textsuperscript{450} Hans Sluga, in his recent book on the political case of Heidegger, has written about Nietzsche’s fascination with the Jewish as revealing “the true gulf that separated him from his later Nazi admirers”\textsuperscript{451}.

Another recent account is based on the view that Nietzsche did pave the way for Nazis by demolishing idols, wrecking rigid rules and affirming open agenda and life’s arbitrariness, yet he stood detached from their peculiar field of politics, the gutter\textsuperscript{452}. Thomas Jovanovski denies the idea of Nietzsche being a “proto-Nazi” as “egregiously erroneous”. Yet, there is, according to him, no way of denying either the “troubling and problematic” fact that Nietzsche offered, beside “a literary exercise meant to shock”, a more or less specific and fatal “recipe for practical action on a universal scale”.\textsuperscript{453}

Again more confidently, Oliver Reboul speaks of the Nazi utilization as but “crookery” where Nietzschean notions are vulgarized and twisted and utterly un-Nietzschean ones exalted\textsuperscript{454}. This brings in mind a 1951 commentator who resolutely rejected the proto-Nazi interpretation and held that “the totalitarian writers of Germany [...] perverted the essential spirit of Nietzsche who did not believe in nationalism or antisemitism” but exerted decisive “criticism of contemporary conditions and contemporary culture”\textsuperscript{455}. In the same vein, Vattimo underlines the need to see just how many deliberate “philological “errors”“ and “precise falsifications” there were in the Nazi line of exploitation\textsuperscript{456}.

One commentator goes as far as to state that Nietzsche (just as Voltaire, Marx or the early evangelists) would have withdrawn from all writing, should he have foreseen the harsh reappropriations\textsuperscript{457}. William van den Berchen, in turn, draws a parallel between the ways Nietzsche was misused by the Nazis,
Voltaire by the Jacobins and Feuerbach by the Marxists, so that the misusers fabricated, out of a critique of religion, “a new pseudo-religion”\textsuperscript{458}. However, Martin Jay, for his part, holds that whichever way the issue is, it remains true that it was possible to use Nietzsche’s texts as justification of Auschwitz, whereas it was impossible to do the same with the texts of Mill and de Tocqueville\textsuperscript{459}.

Finally, in his Nietzsche und der Faschismus (1989), Bernhard Taureck has attempted at a full scale analysis. He questions the borderlines between appropriation, need, exploitation and abuse. He concludes that the arguments made against the proto-fascist interpretation are too weak, since there are at least seven aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that relates it with that of the fascists: (i) demands of a Vernichtungskrieg; (ii) political ontology of race and demands of mass extermination; (iii) demands of the unity of perfectness and criminality; (iv) the transpolitical unities of Macht- und Zweckstaat and statesman and artist; (v) theory of the threat through an egalitarian totalitarianism to be prevented; (vi) caste system; (vii) breeding of a post-national global master race. For Taureck, Nietzsche’s political thinking can be viewed in terms of either presenting maximal demands to be realized or presenting them in order to neutralize them by their very impossibility. According to his conclusion reminding one of either Brinton or Horkheimer, this ambiguity can be traced back to Nietzsche’s two opposing voices, that of the humane Montaigne and that of the ruthless Machiavelli.\textsuperscript{460}

Obviously, Aschheim had to spell out his position on this issue, too. At its most concise, it reads as follows: ”Nietzscheanism was effective as a public force only when it was structured by mediating systems and ideologies. No naked or pure Nietzschean nihility existed. All the versions we have discussed in some way nationalized or socialized the Nietzschean thematic, placing it at the service of other goals. This had the effect of taming or limiting its dynamic or selectively controlling and deploying it. Such ideologies, far from dispensing with transcendence, simply redefined it, and stayed firmly within their self-created sacred boundaries. This process applied especially to the Nazi case.”\textsuperscript{461}

Although Aschheim is hardly consistent, when he denies the “pure Nietzschean” and, right after that, feels free to speak of “the Nietzschean thematic” being “placed” and “tamed” and so on, as if there really was a pure original to be moulded, I find his stance more promising than Taureck’s. Where Taureck is, rather schulmeisterisch indeed\textsuperscript{462}, yet with a praiseworthy attempt at a balanced analysis, trying to end on a settling judgment of Nietzsche’s stance toward fascism, Aschheim treats the issue as a multifaceted problematic that offers a unique “index to our perceptions of the modern world”\textsuperscript{463}.

In other words, the terms in which to assess a problematic ought to be problematized, too. Gary Shapiro has drawn his conclusion from all this as follows: “We cannot simply seek the “true” Nietzsche who did not mean what the Nazis had him say”\textsuperscript{464}. It appears that reading Nietzsche continues to be a matter of
dealing with, among other things, national socialism. The problematic has risen into new heights, since Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism has become under debate. For example, in Heidegger’s 1941/2 lectures, Nietzsche is characterized as “the name for a global era [Weltalter]: the epoch of the unfolding and empowering of the mastery of humans over the earth.”

Jacques Derrida has addressed the question of how to view Nietzsche in this light. He says that “at the time he was teaching his “Nietzsche”, Heidegger had begun to put some distance between himself and Nazism.” This had to do with the way Heidegger attacked Lebensphilosophie. Derrida insists that Heidegger’s attempt to rescue Nietzsche “from any biologicist, zoologicist, or vitalistic reappropriation” was a “strategy of interpretation” and “a politics”. In his view, Heidegger’s Nietzsche would intimate a philosophy “of spirit in the Hegelian sense”. In another context, Derrida writes how Nietzsche died “before his name and it is not about knowing what he had thought, wanted or done”. More relevant is to interrogate the way Nazism has been, or still is, “the only politics” that calls itself Nietzschean.

To come back to the immediate post-war situation, one has to say that the rehabilitative efforts by Bataille, Kaufmann or the editor Karl Schlechta, to name a few, could not remove the controversial label in Nietzsche. A major backlash came in 1952, when Georg Lukács published his thick volume on the Zerstörung der Vernunft, with Nietzsche starring as the founder of bourgeois irrationalism and capitalist imperialism, the arch enemy of the working class and the pioneer of Nazism. Lukács, who had experienced Nietzsche fever in his youth, had now matured to champion vulgar Marxist criticism where “all philosophy is, in its content and method, determined by the class struggle of its time”. His Nietzsche was, then, but the barbaric mouthpiece for the rising power of German militarist expansion. Lukács’s work has been tremendously influential. Its outlines were reproduced in the official Marxist-Leninist literature until 1990 and its effects can arguably be seen in many disapproving Western Nietzsche readings, as well. Recently, several Nietzsche scholars have shown that Lukács’s contribution is, in any case, worthy of a careful refutation.

In the 1960's, systematic treatments of Nietzsche’s thought began to appear often without explicit appeal to ideological tensions. Very many of the works published had the main goal of establishing Nietzsche as a thinker in his own right. In 1961, Martin Heidegger’s lectures were released in a somewhat curious compilation. It was accompanied by works with revealing titles, such as Eugen Fink’s Nietzsche Philosophie (1960), Eckhardt Heftrich’s Nietzsche Philosophie (1962), Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962) and Danto’s Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965).

I have already quoted a few comments from the earliest stages of reception saying that the flow of books on Nietzsche is overwhelming. In the 1970's, Vattimo described the Nietzsche literature as vastissima.
and Sarah Kofman situated her own volume of close reading as follows: “Yet again a book on Nietzsche! [...] the works on Nietzsche have not ceased to multiply. All the modern philosophy reclaims him. All our culture “lives” out of him.” Kofman referred to Nietzsche’s becoming ““popular”“ and “vulgarized by the mass media”, so that “everybody’s “talking” about him a little like they talk about a fashionable author without having read his texts”\textsuperscript{475}.

One may see how Kofman is hinting at the need to opt for the original. Vattimo, in turn, tries to find his solution to the reading problems by identifying key figures in the reception history. His overview, from 1974, operates with the following landmarks or searchlights: Bertram and the Nietzsche myth; Lukács and capitalist violence; Kaufmann and the tradition of European humanism; Jaspers and existence as transcendence; Löwith and the end of historicism; Heidegger and the completion of metaphysical nihilism; Bataille and the transhuman totality; Marcuse and the notion of total liberation.\textsuperscript{476}

Now and then, Nietzsche is seen as the herald of the most fashionable youth movements. In one view, his books “appear as a modern secular mysticism, ornaments of the age of drugs and advanced musical technology”. Zarathustra “will be remembered by some as a bible for hippies and flower children”\textsuperscript{477}. No doubt, one reason for the popularity is Nietzsche’s repute as “the least dull” of the philosophers\textsuperscript{478}.

In the 1970's and 1980's, there grew a renewed interest in Nietzsche in the West Germany. Some observers, at least, were worried about the new fashion’s being related either to right wing political aspirations or disconcerting confusion among the youth. A key aspect of the Nietzsche reception, during this period, was his use in the alternative cultural and political circles, such as among the greens.\textsuperscript{479} According to Stephen Aschheim, “the dominant perception of Nietzsche in German popular culture remains to this day closely and uncomfortably related to the National Socialist experience\textsuperscript{480}.

To address the developments from the fifties to the present day, it may be wise to try and identify some important facets of the Nietzsche reception. One of the notable works in the official Marxist-Leninist line of interpretation was S. F. Oduvev’s Tropami Zarathustra (1971), in which Lukács’s handling of Nietzsche was developed further to illustrate the author of Zarathustra as the height of the logic of capital reaching the stage of monopoly capitalism. The shift from politics to economy was one of the key trends. Even if Lukács remained important among East European socialists, Nietzsche was, by and large, treated in a less vulgar fashion as he was also increasingly seldom identified with Hitler.\textsuperscript{481}

The Marx connection itself is by no means exhausted. In the West, it was not only the members and inheritors of the Frankfurt school who were eager and capable of finding points of contact between Nietzsche and Marx and, often enough, Freud was mixed in, too. Vattimo in Italy, Gilles Deleuze,
Michel Foucault and Paul Ricoeur in France and Danko Grlić in Yugoslavia made influential syntheses out of the two thinkers. Deleuze and Vattimo also published monographs on Nietzsche, while Foucault, perhaps the best candidate for continuing Nietzsche’s study of modernity, never published more than two short papers on him. In an interview from 1983, Foucault says that he read Nietzsche “because of Bataille, and Bataille because of Blanchot”. He goes on to describe the situation as follows:

"But those who found in Nietzsche, more than thirty-five years ago, a means of displacing themselves in terms of a philosophical horizon dominated by phenomenology and Marxism have nothing to do with those who use Nietzsche nowadays. In any case, even if Deleuze has written a superb book about Nietzsche, and although the presence of Nietzsche in his other works is clearly apparent, there is no deafening reference to Nietzsche, nor any attempt to wave the nietzschean flag for rhetorical or political ends. It is striking that someone like Deleuze has simply taken nietzschean seriously, which indeed he has. That is what I wanted to do. What serious use can Nietzsche be put to? I have lectured on Nietzsche but written very little about him. The only rather extravagant homage I have rendered Nietzsche was to call the first volume of my History of Sexuality “The Will to Knowledge”.

As for the seemingly paradoxical approach to Nietzsche by way of Marx, and vice versa, the Italian Marxist Antonio Negri has tried to capture it as follows: "attention to power as the content of the will, and, consequently, as a productive matrix of the collective subjectivity, that is, the production of culture, that is, the becoming of subjects versus the state". Working in a context such as this, the eminent practitioner of critical theory and the leader of the second generation of Frankfurt school, Jürgen Habermas, has constantly found use for Nietzsche. Having once edited an anthology of Nietzsche’s epistemological writings, Habermas regards him as an important point of reference but always outlines him as a warning sign for destructive tendencies inherent in modernity.

Back in France, being able to exploit the works of Bataille, Klossowski and Blanchot, it was possible for Derrida, Kofman, Bernard Pautrat and Jean-Michel Rey to develop Nietzsche readings that concentrated on the signifying process in his texts, and to discard any conclusive crystallizations. Their works, often referred to as “deconstructive”, have had an extraordinary impact especially among American scholars sensitive to the so called continental thinking. Referring to what appears to many as “the French disease” of poststructuralism, Shapiro has compared the growing popularity of using Nietzsche to the position that Aristotle held in the Middle Ages, in as much as everybody works out his/her “thoughts in struggle with or commentary on [his/her] great predecessor”.

In America, the philosophical interest in Nietzsche began to intensify from the 1970’s on. Magnus and Schacht together with Joan Stambaugh, Robert C. Solomon and John T. Wilcox, to mention but a few,
have all published qualified Nietzsche literature to form what might be called the third wave of Nietzsche scholarship after Kaufmann’s and Danto’s monographic works. The scholar to be mentioned separately is Tracy B. Strong who was one of the first to address Nietzsche’s political philosophy. After Magnus, Harold Alderman and John Sallis, there have been others even more inspired by the “continental” approaches to Nietzsche, such as Shapiro, David Farrell Krell and Alan D. Schrift. Among British Nietzsche experts, there are, say, David S. Thatcher, Nicholas Davey, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Graham Parkes who have done a great deal to enhance Nietzsche studies in the Anglo-Saxony.

There seem to be two large strands of confronting Nietzsche that were both born in the 1960’s. On the one hand, there is the industry grown around the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, the *Nietzsche-Studien* yearbook and the *Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung* publication series. What is perhaps the most distinctive feature in the various efforts done in the confines of this official Nietzsche scholarship is the post-Försterian and post-rehabilitative sobriety, a sense of joint effort in clarifying a modern classic and in assuming a sophisticated policy of norm giving for academic quality research. To be sure, this has not prevented some critics in comparing Förster’s murderous actions with the equally violent academic customs where clarity and simplicity deaden Nietzschean pluralities487.

On the other hand, there is a variety of more or less independent attempts to search for alternative approaches to Nietzsche. The landmarks of this tradition include the international meetings in Royaumont (1964) and Cerisy (1972), as well as among the Yugoslavian Praxis group in Belgrad (1968). If the official scholarship has produced, in the main, works that deal with traditional academic questions and that tend to stabilize Nietzsche as one of the greatest thinkers of the West, the independents have created surprising combinations of, say, political and semiotical nature.

Yet, the edges of this distinction are easily blurred. For one thing, once it is remembered that the central figure of the official Nietzsche industry, Mazzino Montinari, was an Italian Marxist who took part in the independent sessions, or that probably the most independent of all independents, Deleuze, was a professor of philosophy not at all indifferent about the importance of the new critical edition, no utterly strict divisions hold anymore. For another, neither one of the baskets is suitable for the considerable amount of cogent Nietzsche experts in, for instance, the U.S.488. Thirdly, Nick Land has recently expressed the view that beyond Bataille’s book and, to a lesser degree, the work of Klossowski and Deleuze and, presumably, that of Land himself, all writing on Nietzsche is “pure pornography”.489.

The perception of an official Nietzsche headquarters is not entirely delusive. It has been a practical necessity to erect a counter-instance against the remarkably influential exploitation carried out by the late *Nietzsche-Archiv* and to refine its practice so competently that it no longer looks like a counter-instance.

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Derrida’s remarks on the policy of constructing the KGW volumes of posthumous material may well suffice to mark the thin borderline between those who reconstruct and those who don’t.⁴⁹⁰

I give three examples of assessing the contemporary scene. Vattimo, first of all, has attempted to depict the latest developments in receiving Nietzsche. His general estimation is that the political aspect so central to the post-Heideggerian Nietzsche interest, particularly among the Italian and French left, has given way to prominently aesthetical concerns.⁴⁹¹ Christoph Menke, in turn, writes as follows:

"In this historical process of self-correction of the modern, Nietzsche is one of the decisive and influential figures. Many of the revisions, in the self-understanding of the modern, can be understood as following from the answers given to the disputes finding their sharpest formulation in Nietzsche. In reflecting upon, say, aesthetics, rhetorics and the philosophy of language or in discussing concepts of history, subject and truth, a central place for Nietzsche is widely accepted and assured in the contemporary debates. In the field of the practical and political philosophy, just because it is about the practical and the political and has at least conceptual consequences for their shaping, things are different. Here it seems much less clear, if he has ever said anything that is still significant for our self-understanding."

Finally, Laurence Lampert could be the most ambitious in his judgment on the current situation. He suggests that instead of writing a history for Nietzsche, one should rewrite the entire history of philosophy on the basis of Nietzsche’s thought. It would be about “a defendable claim” to find an exit of the aged “labyrinth”. In Lampert’s estimation, this Nietzschean historiography of philosophy would no more be any “reorganized gaze to the past”, not any “hidden history of philosophy”, but an encompassive and overt “new understanding of humanity and nature”.⁴⁹³

The bewildering nature of 'Nietzsche’ has not been erased in the hundred years of his reception history. As he writes, in the epigraph of this section, his concerns have seemed increasingly self-evident for increasingly large amounts of people. It has been easy to receive and use Nietzsche. But the ways in which Nietzsche has been utilized have varied perplexingly.

In the next three sections, the concern for reception will be enlarged by differentiating it in varying ways. The first one deals with receiving Nietzsche in terms of installing him in the developments of philosophy and in the company of other thinkers. The second differentiation will go again through the reception history with an eye on the manner in which Nietzsche has been treated in philosophical schools and in the disciplines following the division of intellectual labor. Finally, the contemporary scene of the Nietzsche debate is illustrated by reviewing three interrelated spheres of discourse.
II.b Localization Varieties

I contend that it is worthwhile to have a look at the ways historiography has treated Nietzsche and, in addition, to assess the sorts of possibilities currently available in making comparisons between him and other thinkers. This should expose the variety of locating Nietzsche in different continuums or at divergent points of rupture. It ought to show aspects of the strategies through which he has been lined up with, or dissociated from, the others.

III.b.1 Histories of Philosophy

Probably the first extensive history of philosophy to have accommodated Nietzsche was Richard Falckenberg’s Geschichte der neueren Philosophie that appeared in 1886. The needed linkage between the grand tradition and the newcomer was established by making Nietzsche stand close to the Schopenhauerian pessimism. In addition, he was referred to as the one who admired Wagner with the most understanding. More philosophically estimated, Falckenberg detected, in Nietzsche, a turn from Voltaire to Rousseau.\(^494\) In later editions, Falckenberg emphasized how this “highly talented man” constantly leaned toward renaissance naturalism and resisted idealism\(^495\).

In 1898, Wilhelm Dilthey lectured on the Zeitgeist and discerned three basic features. These were secular realism, linkage of knowledge/domination and vanishing of the notion of an unchangeable social order. In Dilthey’s view, Fichtean or Schillerian pathos was no longer feasible in circumstances where new kinds of mixed techniques prevail. The hegemony of scientific spirit and the voidness of consciousness presented novel necessities. Even though he says that Spinoza, Hobbes, Feuerbach and Stirner had already played enough with limitless possibilities of the spirit so that “history did not need Nietzsche”, Dilthey places Nietzsche behind both the new philosophical attitude and the current artistic stance of gloomy and proud pessimism.\(^496\)

At the same time, Rudolf Eucken, who had held the chair of philosophy in Basel until the early 1870's
and was later awarded with Nobel Prize in literature, made room for Nietzsche in his overview of philosophical developments. Eucken depicts a situation where the enlightenment had split into rationalist and irrationalist romanticism, which, in turn, had given way to a new kind of realism. It is against this neorealism, extracted from Comtean positivism, modern theory of evolution and social democracy, that he puts Nietzsche’s new *Sturm und Drang*. According to Eucken, Nietzsche’s stance rose from “profound dissatisfaction” with everything petty bourgeois, only to declare “the self’s proud liberation from the domination of the non-self”. Eucken appreciates Nietzsche’s “free and sensitively moving spirit” that one should detriment by turning it into formulas but he deplores the one-sided cavilling and inability to find positive faith.497

Curt Friedlein’s *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1913) describes Nietzsche as the late romanticist meeting point of “the principle of life of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will, the not just philosophical representations of the ancient Greeks and the stimuli of scientific biology”. What worried Nietzsche, so Friedlein, was the decadent dissolution of the will to power within an individual or a collective.498

By 1915, Clement C. J. Webb had passed to print his account of the philosophical tradition. Webb says that Nietzsche deified Schopenhauer’s ‘will to live’. This will was transformed into a call for a “more robust affirmation”, where tenderness, pity and resignation were absent.499

A German textbook from this period located Nietzsche among “objectivists”. While there are the versions of “perfectionism” and “evolutionism”, Nietzsche is best seen in connection with the third one, “naturalism” with its background in Stoics and Rousseau. Together with this move, the book recognizes Nietzsche’s emphasis on the “joy that is rooted in activity”.500 It may be of interest to note that, in at least one German piece of philosophical historiography, Nietzsche does not appear at all, though for explicitly given editorial reasons.501

John Herman Randall Jr., in turn, wrote on *The Making of the Modern Mind* (1920). In this book, Nietzsche is placed at the junction where social Darwinism was given “an idealistic turn”. Randall acknowledges his “greatness” and writes that it was only in him that evolution was taken “seriously as furnishing a moral standard for life”, which made it necessary to “develop a whole new set of specific ideals and values”. Nietzsche’s message is said to be that it no longer was about adapting “to our present environment, but to the conditions of further success and power over nature”. On Randall’s reading, he was misperceived as justifying brutality or deifying the commercial greed, rather than comprehended as offering “prerequisite of future divinity”. Nietzsche’s was “a great romantic struggle for the better days to come”, for “a select band of heroes” representing “the true flower of humanity”.502

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In Will Durant’s *Story of Philosophy* (1926), Nietzsche is said to have meant for philosophy what Wagner had stood for music: the peak of romanticism. In flashier terms, he is reported to have been Darwin’s son and Bismarck’s brother. Nietzsche’s critical attacks were, in Durant’s opinion, just a way to pay back to those he owed the most. Durant describes Nietzsche as a boyishly insolent and girlishly mild nature, yet fit for preaching Germany’s rising power. He lacked, says the historian, humbleness but paid for his genius what could have been the highest price ever. Durant concludes by giving some credit to a thinker after whose sweep the philosophical atmosphere in Europe is cleaner and fresher.503

Ralph Barton Perry restates, in his history book, the Darwin connection but says that the Englishman’s influence on Nietzsche was limited. Although he introduces Nietzsche under the heading “Vitalism, voluntarism, pragmatism”, Perry finds his ultimate goal to be “a kind of intellectual aristocracy”. 504 In Sweden, Alf Ahlberg registered Nietzsche as a “romantic naturalist”, while in Finland, J. E. Salomaa let the “aristocratic individualist”, the problematizer of value and culture, enter the scene after the 19th century systems of philosophy.505 Shortly before Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, Egon Friedell, in his *Kulturgeschichte*, accommodated Nietzsche in the tradition of Christian thinking.506

Ernst von Aster’s history of philosophy, from 1932, locates Nietzsche, once again, among the reappropriators of Darwinism, this time with a stress on a pragmatic theory of truth. The latter was, so von Aster, not accomplished solely by the Anglo-Saxon thinkers, but by Nietzsche and Vaihinger, as well.507 Horace M. Kallen, in turn, speaks of Nietzsche in the context of “continental transformations of aesthetical Darwinism”. He sacrificed himself for the needed relief from cultural degeneration.508

* A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (1945) displays its author taking a few steps backwards from his previous formulations on Nietzsche. Bertrand Russell relates, in this book, Nietzsche to aristocratic anarchism, underlines his unacceptable aversion of love and says that it was partly his own fault that the world had turned into his nightmare. Yet, he underscores the fact that Nietzsche was no nationalist and no antisemtitist. According to Russell, Nietzsche’s importance lies primarily in ethics and, secondarily, in his historical criticisms.509

Hugh Miller reaffirms, in his 1947 historical treatise, the contact between Darwin and Nietzsche. The latter is to be counted among the very first to have grasped the “radical implications of the evolutionary science”. Nietzsche is probably better than what is told, says Miller, but his neurotic endorsement of an individual who could “ignore morality and sanctions” was evidently reminiscent of the unsound amoralism of both Hobbes and Rousseau, Fichte and Schopenhauer. As such, it is risky material for a “casual reader”. For Miller, Nietzsche’s greatest advantage is to have developed the early Greek thinking
into an “affirmation of radical discontinuity in nature”.  

At the same time, I. M. Bochenski’s overview of the current philosophical situation and its origins places Nietzsche in the irrationalist succession of Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. Nietzsche’s novelty is the Darwinian emphasis on vital instincts which merits the label of both “historicism” and “biologism”. Moreover, Bochenski is already in the position to say that Nietzsche has “supplied existentialism with many of its fundamental aims”.  

George Boas, for his part, denied Nietzsche’s being a “Neo-Darwinian, though his philosophy could be assimilated to that vague lyrical creed”. Nietzsche is to be seen as a successor of German voluntarism that had developed from Kant’s third critique through Fichte and Schelling to Schopenhauer.  

Crane Brinton’s overall presentation of Ideas and Men, from 1950, incorporates a picture of Nietzsche where the sincere and impassionate posture of a sensitive moralist is recognized only in order to be contrasted with a more sinister side of his work. According to Brinton, Nietzsche did, in fact, wrote the programme for the far right totalitarianism.

The next year, Frederick Mayer’s A History of Modern Philosophy was released. It contained a very different valuation: “What others saw in a superficial and inadequate way, he described in profound and comprehensive terms.” This praise did not prevent Mayer from questioning some of Nietzsche’s inventions or from ridiculing some features of his character. In general terms, Mayer sees Nietzsche, his Schopenhauerian, voluntaristic, emotionalistic, Darwinist and other “anti-intellectual strains” notwithstanding, as an adversary of romanticism and a follower of Voltaire. Moreover, he cannot be classed as an idealist any more than as a materialist. What is underscored the most, in this book, is Nietzsche’s foresight: “Our century is still trying to answer him. So far his insight has been uncanny. Science has not made a new utopia; peace has not been realized; the struggle for power has been intensified more than ever before, and Western culture seems to be disintegrating.”

Although Hans Joachim Störig addresses larger audiences than the academic world, in his Weltgeschichte der Philosophie (1950), the assessment of Nietzsche’s putatively questionable moral, social and political nature is silently abandoned for a more doxographic approach. Störig says that Nietzsche stood in a similar relation to Schopenhauer as Schopenhauer did to Kant: pupil, follower, adversary. In Störig’s view, Nietzsche is to be understood as anti-metaphysician, anti-moralist, anti-democrat, anti-feminist, anti-intellectualist, anti-pessimist and anti-Christ who took on the enterprise of forging new values after the old ones had collapsed. Störig’s general policy of pinpointing Nietzsche can be seen as shared in W. T. Jones’ A History of Western Philosophy (1952). Together with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche appears
there as the disobedient pupils in the school of Kant’s philosophy.516

Sterling P. Lamprecht’s history of philosophy was released in 1955. Nietzsche is now offered as a prophet who had most effectively revealed “the inadequacy of a morality of mediocrity”. Lamprecht claims that Nietzsche did not care about metaphysics and epistemology but championed Lebensphilosophie with “ejaculative” aphorisms that were sometimes witty, “trenchant and meaty”, sometimes deliberately provocative and contradictory but passionately honest. In this reading, Nietzsche’s criticisms of Kant, as well as his objections to Darwin and Huxley, are not to be overlooked. The more lasting impulses, in turn, are Schopenhauer, from whom Nietzsche is said to have deviated in not accepting will’s universal effectiveness, and, most of all, the Greeks.517

To check up on the field of general historiography, there are, in the 50's, R. R. Palmer’s and Joel Colton’s A History of the Modern World and Golo Mann’s Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts both taking note of Nietzsche. Palmer and Colton write about those who later developed totalitarian rules and drew from Nietzsche “who, safe and civilized, had declared that men should live dangerously, avoid the flabby weakness of too much thought, throw themselves with red-blooded vigor into a life of action”. The writers discover, in Nietzsche, “a new form of paganism” that could be seen as expressing “with unshrinking frankness many ideas implied in the outlook of his day”.518 By contrast, Mann’s Nietzsche is the exceptionally rebellious philosopher attacking the conservative, conventionalist and nationalist German empire from his lonesome, untimely standpoint519.

Something of Mann’s interpretation may be detected in Gordon A. Craig’s Europe Since 1815 (1961): “With the eloquence of an Old Testament prophet, Nietzsche excoriated what he considered to be the true characteristics of the age - mediocrity, vulgarity, materialism, love of power - and was unimpressed by Germany’s economic prosperity, which he felt sapped the people’s will, or by the achievement of its universities, where what he called “the de-spiritualizing influence of our current science-industry” prevailed.” According to Craig, Nietzsche’s criticisms may seem “unnecessary harsh” of the German situation in Bismarck’s time, but “less so of William II’s”.520

As for the outlines of the Palmer/Colton policy of locating Nietzsche, they are reaffirmed in, say, Carlton J. H. Hayes’s Contemporary Europe Since 1870. Hayes writes about “the significance of the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche development”, about a “‘realism’ based on appetite and passion”. He says that “it could be utilized to explain, even to excuse or extol, the behavior of “supermen” among nationalist statesmen and industrial capitalists, and so to justify assaults on supernatural religion and conventional morality. And it was so utilized by an increasing number of persons, especially after 1900. It became a factor in the “realism” that helped to pave the way to world war and dictatorship.”521 In the same
attunement, David Thomson’s *Europe Since Napoleon* (1957) depicts Nietzsche as providing with “an ethic that chimed well with the current rivalry between states for wealth and territory, and also with the impending notions of relativity”\[^{522}\].

H. Stuart Hughes, in his historical study on the European social thought, holds that it was, in the 1890's or early 1900's, the neo-romantic and neo-mystic writers who yearned for a “turn toward the subjective”, “who established the cult of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche as the literary heralds of the new era”. This generation experienced itself as “reaching back over a half-century gap to restore to honor those values of the imagination” that the previous generation “had scorned and neglected”. However, Hughes says that it is “surely misleading” to describe Nietzsche as a neo-romantic, since that would do “less than justice to the critical and Socratic elements in his thought”. For Hughes’ purposes, Nietzsche stands as the prime model for later thinkers, such as Bergson, Freud and James, “whose central concern was the problem of unconscious motivation”\[^{523}\].

Two broad Scandinavian idea historical works, from the same time, testify to the persistence of vitalistic lines of interpretation. In one, Nietzsche is subsumed under the heading “Scientific positivism” and portrayed as the philosopher of value who let biological concerns, the obsession of ‘life’, penetrate his thought\[^{524}\]. In the other, the inheritor of Schopenhauer is told of as having asserted “the given life in its clear and complete nakedness”\[^{525}\]. Nietzsche is subsumed under the rubric of “philosophy of life” in Johann Eduard Erdmann’s and Vergilius Ferm’s respective accounts of the philosophical tradition, too\[^{526}\].

Julián Marías brings the vitalistic emphases into the 1960’s and, unlike many of those previously stressing similar aspects, he wholeheartedly appreciates “the discovery of life” by Nietzsche, as by Kierkegaard, too. In his *Historia de la filosofía*, he writes: ”The most important elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy are his idea of life and his awareness of the existence of vital values, that is, values which pertain specifically to human life. The expression vital values contains two of the ideas which came to dominate later philosophy. Nietzsche is the source of the philosophy of value and the philosophy of life.”\[^{527}\]

Depending on the viewpoint, Johannes Hirschberger’s strategy of locating Nietzsche can be seen as anticipating Foucault, Grlić and others, or as reappropriating older, Jaspersian or otherwise, synthetic heresies. In any case, his *Kleine Philosophiegeschichte* (1961) presents Nietzsche, although with disapproval, as “the third subversive spirit of the 19th century” beside Marx and Kierkegaard\[^{528}\].

Frederick C. Copleston directs the scene as follows. There are the idealistic systems of Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel to be replaced by a reaction against all metaphysical idealism by Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. What is left after their critiques is a much more decomposite situation. There are, first
of all, Lange’s and Häckel’s non-dialectic materialism, secondly, Cassirer’s and Dilthey’s neo-Kantianism and, thirdly, the recovery of metaphysics embodied in Fechner, Lotze, Wundt, Driesch and Eucken. For Copleston, Nietzsche’s is a thought centered on a spiritual crisis and expressed in the disconcerting, non-academic way representing, in the main, anti-Darwinist pragmatism.529

John Passmore’s work A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1957/1966), situates Nietzsche under the rubric “Pragmatism and Its European Analogues”. In this setting, Nietzsche comes out as a radical exploiter and developer of the ideas that make up to a devastating critique of reason or intellectualism. Passmore mentions F. A. Lange as Nietzsches important predecessor. Most of all, however, he underlines Nietzsche’s commitments to cultural regeneration and criticism of lifestyles.530

In 1968, William S. Sahakian, for his part, reaffirms the interpretation of Nietzsche as a representative of “evolutionary naturalism” accompanied by Lamarck, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Bergson and Alexander. Nietzsche’s special bent is, according to Sahakian’s historiography, “rugged individualism” and a longing for a master race in the spirit of “might makes right”.531

Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the developments in moral theory has Nietzsche stand side by side with Kierkegaard. They were the ones to face the becoming implausible of Kant’s categorial imperative and Hegel’s free and rational individual. MacIntyre regards Nietzsche as trying to give historical and psychological grounds for the moral void, to expose false candidates for a new morality and to surmount the limitations of previous moral systems for a new mode of life.532 The linkage between Nietzsche and the question of morality is emphasized in Roger Scruton’s historiography, too. Scruton places him beside Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard marking the key reactions to Hegelian idealism.533

The official Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy attached great weight on the centrality of a “philosophy of life” for Nietzsche. This was identified with irrationalism, voluntarism and hostility toward the working class. A conception of Nietzsche was advocated where he was seen as drawing together all the subjective-idealistic tendencies of the late 19th century.534

Herbert Schnädelbach, in his book on German philosophy since Hegel, published in 1983, presents Nietzsche as a critic of historicism operating in the confines of Lebensphilosophie. He specifies that whereas Schopenhauer could oppose historicism as but idealistic speculation, Nietzsche had to face it as full blown school with scientific prestige.535

In Emanuele Severino’s historical analysis, Nietzsche has a key role in exemplifying the contemporary dissolution of “every definite truth” and “every permanent and unchangeable structure of reality”536.
Similarly enough, what is most strongly underlined in Volker Spierling’s historical work is Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{537}

Gunnar Skirbekk and Nils Gilje’s \textit{Filosofihistorie} (1987) depicts Nietzsche as practicing his own kind of pragmatism. The authors compare him to Kierkegaard, because these two despised the masses and the self-content bourgeois, and to Socrates, because they both cherish contradiction. Nietzsche’s moral philosophy is said to revolve around “a grand attempt at offering a psychological explanation for the moral phenomena”, while his epistemology is related to the notion of interpretation and the bond between knowledge and interest.\textsuperscript{538}

D. W. Hamlyn stresses “the emphasis on life and the role of art-forms in dealing with the problems to which life may give rise” as probably “the most prominent theme” in Nietzsche. Apart from “preaching a sermon”, Hamlyn’s Nietzsche develops a relativist epistemological view “emphasizing a radical subjectivity” reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s existentialism. Nevertheless, he allows considerable social significance for Nietzsche’s linguistic grip. All in all, Hamlyn says that Nietzsche’s was “a romanticism combined with a sort of irrationalism”: ”Many have been attracted by his views, but in their totality they perhaps reveal too much of a taste for romantic paradox. Certainly philosophy could go no further in this direction.”\textsuperscript{539}

To have a look on the recent accounts of general historians, one can see that the type of contrast between the readings of Palmer/Colton and Mann has been persistent, albeit liable to transformations. In his \textit{Europe Since 1870}, James Joll describes, in tune with Mann, Nietzsche’s increasing “alienation from Bismarck’s Germany”. He is also sensitive to the risks of a “short summary of Nietzsche’s views”. Joll observes both gentle and questionable aspects in Nietzsche. Rather than trying to settle, once and for all, on some particular interpretation, he concludes that “[i]t is in his writings that we must seek some of the keys to understanding not only the presuppositions of the Europe of 1914, but also what happened in Europe in the twentieth century.”\textsuperscript{540}

Eric Hobsbawm’s standpoint is closer to that of Palmer’s and Colton’s. His book \textit{The Age of Empire 1875-1914} has Nietzsche appear as “the great, but far from politically “progressive” genius” of modernity. In this view, “[f]ew thinkers were more sceptical of the mid-nineteenth-century verities, including science, than the philosopher Nietzsche. Yet his own writings [...] can be read as a variant of Social Darwinism” and as the part of the background for eugenic hygieny. Hobsbawm refers to Engels, on the one hand, who “analysed” the prospects of a world scale war and to Nietzsche, on the other, who “crazily, but prophetically, hailed the growing militarization of Europe and predicted a war” that would restore healthy barbarism. However, Hobsbawm leaves open the question of Nietzsche’s message and
goes on, curiously, to exploit what he terms as crazy prophecy in order to characterize the historian’s business to study, “how the era of peace, of confident bourgeois civilization, growing wealth and western empires inevitably carried within itself the embryo of the era of war, revolution and crisis which put an end to it”. 541

To come back to philosophical accounts, Ernst R. Sandvoss’s Geschichte der Philosophie (1988) describes Nietzsche as the individualistic, subjective, voluntarist avatar of “an irrationalist naturalism” and an “ideology of power”. Sandvoss joins Lukács in holding that Nietzsche was a “radical expression of the imperialistic era”. He adds the psychologist-cum-physiologist observation that Nietzsche’s views were due to a fear of freedom caused by overriding sense of guilt and weakness. 542

Finally, in Kurt Wuchterl’s locating policy, Nietzsche is pointed a place where “numerous critical currents are embodied as a universal cultural criticism” and “the destructive tendency of our Geistesgeschichte reached its absolute peak”543.

This is but a slice of the wealth of historiography covering developments that have been seen to intersect Nietzsche’s home ground. One can say that the locating options actualized, in the treatments introduced above, form not that great a variety. To be sure, many of them echo one or two Nietzsche interpretations struggling for preeminence on the level of monographic research, limited comparative studies and non-expert discourses. But the manifold of the ways of reappropriating Nietzsche that was met in reviewing the course of his reception is, somewhat surprisingly, nowhere near matched in the pictures offered in history writing.

Hence, main features are easily enunciated. The concentration on romanticism, life, vitalism, voluntarism, irrationalism, biology, evolution, Darwinism, naturalism, power, domination is, in great many chroniclers, sufficiently striking. The disposition to thematize an extremism of whatever sort, to operate with the utmost, the superlative, the ultimate is evident. To put it a bit more polemically, the urge to take sides and crystallize is stronger than the desire to expose and differentiate.

Now, I find that one should avoid hasty objections of the type that “these-and-these presentations distort Nietzsche’s notion of this-and-that”, since, very probably, just about any thinker is treated, in entire histories of thought, as drastically diminished. The way this philosopher comes out of the histories of philosophy tells mostly about the peculiar genre itself.

Yet, Nietzsche’s case seems to be particularly alarming one. There has been very little room, in broad overviews, for engaging with Nietzsche’s thinking, as they say, “in its own right”, or even room to

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incorporate something of what these kinds of engagements, carried out elsewhere, have produced. Arguably, more than the other singularities in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche has been used as an oddly stable sign of instability in the established games of expertise. Assessing the continuity or discontinuity in the Nietzsche phenomenon has resulted in more compelling sequences in the ways of assessment.

From early on, Nietzsche was integrated in the “story of philosophy”, if only, as it often was the case, by dismissing him. This regulative practice can be taken as a part of maintaining certain orderings between different traditions and as a part of coping with the tensions between, or within, them.

II.b.2 Comparative Efforts

While still studying, in Leipzig, Nietzsche closed a letter to a friend of his by the following postscript:

NB. Das bedeutendste philosophische Werk, was in den letzten Jahrzehnten erschienen ist, ist unzweifelhaft Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, über das ich eine bogenlange Lobrede schreiben könnte. Kant, Schopenhauer und dies Buch von Lange - mehr brauche ich nicht. (KGB I/2, Dezember 1866, 184.)

Kant’s, Schopenhauer’s and Lange’s texts are, undoubtedly, among the ones to be taken into consideration in reading Nietzsche, while there are good reasons to read him with an eye on certain clarifying texts written without his ever knowing them or those published after his death. The connection to immediate predecessors is important, most of all, because it helps to assess Nietzsche’s contributions in, and to, the intellectual milieu he had to confront. One may profit from a passage in Menschliches:

_ Irrthum der Philosophen._ - Der Philosoph glaubt, der Werth seiner Philosophie liege im Ganzen, im Bau: die Nachwelt findet ihn im Stein, mit dem er baute und mit dem, von da an, noch oft und besser gebaut wird: also darin, dass jener Bau zerstört werden kann und doch noch als Material Werth hat. (MA II/1, 201, KSA 2, 466.)

Whereas historiography presented not that wide a selection of Nietzsche readings, analogies between Nietzsche and other thinkers are drawn in literature, from passing juxtapositions to detailed studies, with a richness equivalent to the amount of interpretative options made available in the course of his reception. I shall make no attempt at exhausting the abundance, in the possibilities of thinking in terms of “Nietzsche and X”, or “X and Nietzsche”, but merely record some main lines and curiosities of this type of locating. I shall point at overrepresented and underrepresented pairings and groupings.
After finishing *Geburt der Tragödie* Nietzsche set out to investigate early Greek thinkers. He explains his strategy, to his friend Rohde, by describing “eine schöne Kategorientafel” of his own. According to this classification, Nietzsche differentiates between “Hauptkerl, Vorläufer und Nachläufer!” For instance, Parmenides is *Hauptkerl*, while Xenophanes is his *Vorläufer* and Zeno his *Nachläufer*. (KGB II/3, Juni 1872, 10.) In this respect, assessments of Nietzsche’s “predecessors” or “heirs” should not be dismissed as anything utterly un-Nietzschean.

The tendency to see Nietzsche predominantly among German “Schopenhauerians” was particularly persistent in the early phases of the reception. In 1888, Moritz Brasch integrated Nietzsche into his story of the contemporary philosophy by referring to him as “undoubtedly one of the most interesting and attracting physiognomists out of a whole group of Schopenhauerians”\(^5\). While Nietzsche and Eduard von Hartmann were seen as “the two great pioneers of the philosophy of life”\(^5\)\(^4\), von Hartmann himself listed Nietzsche, along with Frauenstädt, Bahnson, Peters and Hamerling, as Schopenhauer’s “readers and admirers”, before setting out to present his own synthesis of Hegel and Schopenhauer.\(^5\)\(^6\). Apart from direct attachment to Schopenhauer, early comparisons were eagerly made between Nietzsche and such characters as Darwin, Stirner and Bakunin.\(^5\)\(^7\).

In later times, Schopenhauer is almost always mentioned as the source back to which Nietzsche’s interest in volition, the unconscious and metaphysics of music are to be traced. Bryan Magee, for instance, says that Nietzsche cannot be understood unless by way of Schopenhauer. In his opinion, Nietzsche adopted Schopenhauer’s basic conviction of the being as energy but went on to tie this to a Darwinized struggle for survival.\(^5\)\(^8\) Nick Land writes about Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s “philosophical tap-root” in whom “the approach to the ’noumenon’ as an energetic unconscious begins to be assembled, and interpreting the noumenon as will generates a discourse that is not speculative, phenomenological, or meditative, but diagnostic. It is this type of thinking that resources Nietzsche’s genealogy of inhuman desire, which feeds in turn into Bataille’s base materialism, for which ’noumenon’ is addressed as impersonal death and an unconscious drive.”\(^5\)\(^4\)\(^9\)

Wagner’s share, in contrast, has typically been treated in biographical terms and it has seldom amounted beyond establishing obvious aesthetical influences and affinities. One could contend that whatever Wagner had to say on the things that interested Nietzsche was dramatized Schopenhauerianism. But Nietzsche did spend quite some time in digesting Wagner’s entire output, including the non-musical texts, and can be seen as exploiting many of the motives Wagner put forth whether in notes or letters.\(^5\)\(^0\) An early commentator found that Nietzsche always remained in the opera master’s spell and was driven, because of him, toward an artistically conceived transcendence.\(^5\)\(^1\). Elsewhere, Nietzsche is related to Wagner and Schopenhauer with the help of Jakob Burckhardt, in a sense that these four thinkers are
united in discovering the “dark, tragic, pessimistic” legacy of the ancients.\textsuperscript{552}

It seems that only after rising among the Western classics, Nietzsche became available as the other term in more flexible pairings. If Schopenhauer is widely seen as Nietzsche’s point of departure and Wagner, sometimes, as the important figure in redirecting and intensifying his interests, it is, say, Empedocle, Protagoras, Pyrrho, Callicles, Thrasymachus, Hume, Rousseau, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Marx, pragmatists, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Camus who feature as nominees for a philosophical brother he never had.

When it comes to the Greeks, Tracy B. Strong has said that Nietzsche did not long for a retreat to the ancient order but insisted on studying its formation, because of the structural lesson it might give for today.\textsuperscript{553} It is said that what he inherited from the pre-Socratic philosophers was a notion of the world as a problem, as a paradigm of contradiction and tension.\textsuperscript{554} Since Empedocle was so “radically undefinable and ubiquitous”, he became Nietzsche’s special favorite.\textsuperscript{555} Yet, apart from what may be the most commonly mentioned figure, Heracleitus, Nietzsche was also, early on, compared to, say, such ancient thinkers as Democrit, Xenophanes, Pyrrho, Hegesippus, Zenon of Elea and others.\textsuperscript{556} More rarely, Nietzsche’s stress on such things as ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’ cause interpreters to relate his ethical thought with that of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{557} Nietzsche has been depicted as standing beside Epicur, too. He welcomed the latter’s non-metaphysical interpretation of nature as a continuation of the pre-Socratic tradition.\textsuperscript{558}

One observer asserts that Nietzsche concurs with Protagoras in “that man is the measure of all things” and that “moral valuations remain matters of opinion”. Yet, his “deconstruction of the philosophical tradition entails that sophistry need not be saddled with the bad reputation it has acquired as a result of that tradition.”\textsuperscript{559} Another commentator speaks of Gorgias as Nietzsche’s forerunner.\textsuperscript{560} Yet, the “fundamental difference” between Nietzsche and the sophists has been seen in the way the former’s view of human action involves “the necessity of meaning” against “arbitrariness and capriciousness.”\textsuperscript{561}

Occasionally, Nietzsche has been likened to the other extremist thinkers Plato described, notably Callicles and Thrasymachus.\textsuperscript{562} Yet, it has been argued that while “Thrasymachus would have agreed with Nietzsche that only weaklings go in for justice”, “Nietzsche thinks that the so-called virtue of Justice [...] is a device of the weak for preventing the strong from getting too great an advantage over them” and “Thrasymachus, on the contrary, thinks that Justice is a device of the strong for keeping the weak in their place”\textsuperscript{563} According to a differing opinion, Nietzsche is more in agreement with Plato than with Thrasymachus or Callicles.\textsuperscript{564}

In Manfred Riedel’s opinion, Nietzsche’s fascination with the Greeks shows itself particularly strongly in the way he was caught by the reflection of the “birth of thinking”. It dealt with the \textit{Ur-Sprung} of reason
from its sensual basis. Logical thought has distanced itself so long that it denies its point of departure. The duality of intuitive and rational, or of the Heraclitian and Anaxagoric, elements is attached to language. Riedel says that as Nietzsche begins to comprehend words as phonetico-auditive signs, he is already probing a view that attempts to do justice to the power of translation, metaphor and allegory beside the communicative pressure of a conceptualized language. He is working towards an originary view of nous as listening to the symbolic structure of logos.565

To move back toward the modern times one can consult a commentator drawing an analogy between “[t]he aphoristic discourse of Pascal and Nietzsche” both “dissolving the philosophical seriousness.”566 Max Horkheimer preferred to emphasize more the similarity, especially in the early Nietzsche, with Montaigne567. And, in Gadamer’s view, Nietzsche joins Montaigne and Pascal in the group of “great moralists”568.

With Rousseau, Nietzsche is reported to have shared the quest for authenticity, despite his gradually evolved aversion towards Rousseau’s sentimentalism569. Stated otherwise, although he came to reject Rousseau, Nietzsche saw, very much like him, the barbaric thrust within culture itself570. Nietzsche’s basic difference from Rousseau is found to be in his being an “ontologist of life and nature” as opposed to being a moralist or a philosopher of right. It is said that Nietzsche’s lacking awareness of Rousseau’s ideas lead him, ultimately, to see the Frenchman as but a continuator of Christianity.571

Of other French philosophers, Nietzsche’s less known contemporary, Jean-Marie Guyau, was brought close to him in some interpretations. Sometimes, the link between the two was established by speaking about Guyau as “the French Nietzsche”572. In Franz Brentano’s opinion, Nietzsche’s self-analyses resembled the ones by La Rochefoucauld and de Mandeville573. Much later, Foucault has brought up Mallarmé’s name574.

As for the home ground, it has been said that Nietzsche is, along with Kant and Hegel, “the third member of the great triumvirate of German philosophy” and, for that matter, the most “modern and flamboyant” of the three575. For Kant experts, Nietzsche has sometimes presented a tedious case. S. I. M. Duplessis, for instance, speaks about Nietzsche’s “orgiastic intuitionism”, “intuitionistic dynamism”, “narcissism”, “dualism” and “irrationalism” as blinding, for Nietzsche himself and for his commentators, the essential indebtedness to Kant: ”It need not surprise us that he was also one of the few to take note of the realistic trend in Kant’s philosophy”. 576

On the other hand, Kant’s emphasis on the spontaneity of the act of cogito or ich-denke has been compared to Nietzsche’s anti-cogitational will to power577. One commentator has expressed the link by
saying that for Nietzsche it was mainly about self-critique of the Kantian critique and had more to do with grasping the consequences of Kant’s agnosticism than dwelling on the complexities of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Alternatively phrased, “Kant’s interpretation of the world, Nietzsche’s interpretation of the world and his critique of the former are all [...] possible perspectives, “language games” that the world plays with us and that we play with the world; experiments whose failure or success can never be guaranteed”.

Odo Marquard, for one, is of the opinion that Nietzsche followed Schopenhauer on the road from Kant’s transcendentalism toward a philosophy of the will, and came to attack the metaphysical remnants in both of his forerunners. What Heinz Röttges, in turn, has to say about the relationship between Kant and Nietzsche has direct bearing on the problematic of the present study. He thinks that where “Kant’s philosophy reaches its peak” in the battle against nihilism as the “falling apart of the moments of the dialectic of the enlightenment”, Nietzsche no longer believes in the possibility of reconciliation between science and ethics or necessity and freedom.

One of the most extensive studies on Nietzsche’s relationship with Kant is Olivier Reboul’s *Nietzsche critique de Kant* (1974). Coming up with a plurality of shared points of departure and similar trains of thought, Reboul’s main is that Nietzsche is to been as the continuator of Kant’s critical philosophy and, thereby, also a critic of that very philosophy. Reboul says that Nietzsche did not ignore Kant’s ideas but, on the contrary, took seriously his most profound aspirations. Similar idea of further enhancing the critical enterprise, is developed in Friedrich Kaulbach’s writings on the Kant inspiration in Nietzsche.

There are those, too, who emphasize more the ultra-idealist connection. Michael Allen Gillespie describes Nietzsche’s career as a shift from an essentially Fichtean position toward Schelling’s naturalizing and divinizing tendencies, yet remaining within the confines of the subjectivist voluntarism developed by these two predecessors. In fact, the historiographer Falckenberg took Nietzsche, in 1876, to be a renovator of Fichte as seen through “Schopenhauerian lenses”.

Schelling’s name points to the romantic controversy. Nietzsche’s confrontation with Goethe, Schiller, Schlegel and others raises the question of his relationship to German romanticism. In an anthology on relativism, Nietzsche is held responsible for its “romantic source”, since he “distilled” an atmosphere of counter-enlightenment and laid the groundwork for the idea that “reality is socially constructed”. Another recent account seeks to lay bare Nietzsche as “masked romantic” who failed to “purge himself of” the inevitable pressures of this cultural force. Nietzsche’s romanticism is, in this view, differentiated into the common features of transformation, linkage between the sublime and the frightening, life as vital forces, heroism, total revaluation, search for command and ambivalence toward femininity.
earlier, one critic wrote that Nietzsche stands for “[t]he answer to and the negation of the Idealistic and Romanticist philosophy of history in Germany”, yet that his “worship of the Great Man” was “one point in common with the Romanticists”.  

Studying Nietzsche’s commitment to romanticism has shown that the coat of a romanticist looks only as good on him as it fits badly. If his criticisms of romanticism merely strengthen his bonds to it, there is his peculiar “anti-romantic irony” that can be seen as effectively marking his distance. In his thorough study on the German tradition from Novalis onward, Michael Neumann writes that by his elucidations of both reason and “its other” Nietzsche “radicalizes the enlightened as well as the romanticist positions”. Schopenhauer mediated to Nietzsche the scenery of Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann. In Neumann’s careful differentiations, Nietzsche is treated as “the terminating metamorphosis of German romanticism”, in which this tradition meets “its translation in the horizon of the modern”.  

One way to place Nietzsche in the history of his tribe is to look at the developments of the German theory and practice of tragedy. Where Benno von Wiese once accommodated Nietzsche, in the epilogue of his story from Lessing onwards, as the one who draw the extreme conclusions from von Kleist’s, Hölderlin’s, Grillparzer’s, Grabbe’s, Büchner’s and Hebbel’s increasingly nihilistic understanding of the human condition, Massimo Cacciari has, more recently, spoken of how “the real problem of tragedy” had been discovered by Schiller and Goethe and further developed by Hölderlin, was, thereafter, “presented in all its negativity by Nietzsche”.  

The emphasis on the historical philosophizing was a dominating current in the mid-19th-century Germany. Schnädelbach has spoken about three kinds of Historismus: a positivism in human sciences accumulating facts; a relativist theorizing of historical variation; a view of history as a principle. According to Schnädelbach, the normative character of history was universally reproduced from Hegel to Marx, and it was only later that historical thinking was attached to the idea of loss of valid and obligating points of reference.  

The third kind of historicism, history as a principle, was critical of Hegel but remained close to him by affirming the developmental imperative and denying only the absolute synthesis of historicalness and systematicity. This “historical school” was led by Leopold von Ranke whose student Jakob Burckhardt was to be a major influence for Nietzsche. Burckhardt reaffirmed the school’s crucial claim of the preconceptions conditioning historical events. Yet, he differed from its main stream in questioning the centrality of political history and the existence of world historical ideas.  

In this light, Nietzsche’s ambivalent relation to Hegel should not be too surprising. Werner Stegmaier has
addressed this issue and he describes how Nietzsche became, “step by step”, closer to appreciating Hegel’s preparatory achievements. And even at the early stages, as Nietzsche was tackling with the problems of historicity and attacking Hegel, he was, in Volker Gerhardt’s phrase, “standing closer to him than what he knew”. For instance, Hegel’s concentration on a “single drive” as accountable for the varieties of human action has been seen as anticipating Nietzsche. Moreover, his handling of “the otherworldliness of Christianity both as a response to failure and an insurance against success” has been taken as “adumbrating” Nietzsche. Another way to approach the relationship, is offered by a critic who says that Nietzsche could move from Kant’s rigid rationalism toward a more dynamic conception of experience, while Hegel could not be similarly overcome, or bypassed, because Hegel’s, as also Nietzsche’s, concept of reason includes the unreason, or the prerational drives and impulses.

Elsewhere, Hegel’s picture of Christianity, in his Phänomenologie des Geistes, is described as similar to Nietzsche’s depiction, in Genealogie. This is because both thinkers are taken to have emphasized the notion of self-overcoming. Finally, Stephen Houlgate’s book, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics (1986), is a rare comparative effort. It seeks to demonstrate Hegel’s superiority in handling a number of issues that are, nowadays, often thought to be genuinely Nietzschen. Richard J. Bernstein has located Nietzsche in the aftermath of Hegel by comparing him to others deviating from the established custom: “If one takes a broader view of the development of philosophy, we can see that the cluster of issues concerning action has dominated philosophic concern since the demise of Hegel. Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Peirce all agree that Hegel fails to do justice to what is distinctive about human action, and each in his own way sought to provide a more adequate account.”

Anthony Quinton calls Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche “the great nineteenth century irrationalist anti-Hegelians” who had their effect on the fact that the whole century of continental thought consists of rejections of Hegel. Often enough, Nietzsche is named among other thinkers collectively labelled as “post-Hegelians”. In Karl Jasper’s view, from 1938, the utterly unclassifiable Nietzsche can only be coupled with Kierkegaard and Pascal. In the 50’s, Jaspers came to speak of the crucial triple of Nietzsche, Marx and Kierkegaard as the great critics of traditional philosophy. In about the same time, in a similar spirit, Hannah Arendt singled out Marx, Nietzsche and Bergson as the three critics of rationalist calculus, avatars of the homo faber and action-based philosophy of life. Later on, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky have been mentioned as the “great enemies of the enlightenment”. This has not prevented others from insisting on Nietzsche’s kinship with, and indebtedness to, the great luminaries, such as Voltaire.

Richard Rorty, being a “patriot pragmatist”, says that he would like to see Nietzsche as accompanying such American thinkers as Emerson, James and Dewey. Emerson was a major source for the young
Nietzsche\textsuperscript{611}, while his pragmatic anti-Cartesianism, anti-representationalism and anti-essentialism, according to Rorty, paved the way for Dewey\textsuperscript{612}. On the basis of James’s hostile remarks to Nietzsche, one might be lead to think that the thinkers were busy with something quite different from one another\textsuperscript{613}. For Dewey, it seemed to be easier to allow some degree of convincingness in the views of the German thinker\textsuperscript{614}. The connection to pragmatism, including affinities between James and Nietzsche, has been referred to in many other occasions, too\textsuperscript{615}. It is Klaus Oehler with his 1987 article who pointed the way toward a better understanding of Nietzsche, in this context, by referring to him as a “European pragmatist” whose “critique of apriorism”, as well as “an action-oriented conception of experience and knowledge” and a “theory of signs”, all make him stand “remarkably close to American pragmatism” of, especially, Peirce. Oehler puts it rather pointedly that Nietzsche’s pragmatic philosophy “failed to have an impact on the German philosophical tradition”, as his main concern is to criticize Apel and Habermas for misunderstanding Peirce.\textsuperscript{616}

Nicholas Rescher has also drawn Nietzsche into the history pragmatist thought. In his view, there is a line from the Kantian “primacy of practical considerations” that was, however, vitiated by the way Kant “expressly exempted theoretical reason itself from any impingement by” those considerations, via the Schopenhauerian identification of understanding with “potential uses by or implications for our agency”, to Nietzsche. It was the “evolutionary dimension” that, so Rescher, Nietzsche brought along, as well as the related distrust for “the quest for certainty”. Through Nietzsche, one can then grasp the specifically practical features in such thinkers as Lotze, Sigwart, Vaihinger, Simmel, James and others.\textsuperscript{617}

Since Emerson, as also Schopenhauer and the orientalist friend Paul Deussen, enlightened Nietzsche on eastern thinking, it may be noted that aspects related to this have resulted in attempts at analogies between Nietzsche’s thought and some ancient non-Occidental views. In comparing Nietzsche’s thought with Buddhistic traditions, Freny Mistry saw the crucial linkage in “the unrelenting effort to rise above selfhood”\textsuperscript{618}. Along with Emerson and Schopenhauer, there is F. A. Lange whose contribution to philosophy Nietzsche was, for some time at least, fervently fond of. Lange’s importance may well lie in the way that he made Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for Schopenhauer stay on, or return to, a critical and less romanticist basis, and his admiration of Kant on a counter-idealistic one. Nietzsche’s reflections on the theory of knowledge, in particular, were strongly affected by Lange, as well as by such men as Gustav Teichmüller and Afrikan Spir.\textsuperscript{619}

Nietzsche’s relationship to his contemporaries, most obviously to Dühring, Häckel, Avenarius and Mach, is poorly investigated. An East German Nietzsche monographist, Heinz Malorny, held that what Lenin wrote against Mach and others, in his Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908), is applicable to Nietzsche, too. Malorny claimed that Nietzsche already embodied a lot that was later to unfold as
contemporary bourgeois philosophy, that is, relativism, conventionalism, fictionalism, pragmatism, gnoseological pluralism. Apart from this, there is very little that is said about Nietzsche's relationship to the philosophy of nature of his time. In Johannes Volkelt's 1918 study on validation, Nietzsche represents, among other things, an analogical relativist current with empiriocritics, economists of thought and utilitarian-vitalist schools. Leszek Kolakowski makes a more contemporary exception by comparing Nietzsche's and Avenarius's respective epistemological views, while Alistair Moles's recent monography *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology* (1990) adds to the awareness of the general relationship between the philosopher and sciences of his day.

Karl Löwith was not the first to compare Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who heard about the Danish thinker from Brandes but never got to read him, yet his article, from 1931, is an important document for establishing this pair as conditioning contemporary thought. Later, it seemed quite possible to refer to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as the two "great exceptions" in the era of the dominating Hegelianism. Recently, it has even been argued that *Zarathustra* operates on a structure similar to Kierkegaard's famous stages of life. It is fairly common to attach Kierkegaard and Nietzsche together by a recourse to their shared focusing upon aesthetico-ethical problematic and the concreteness of individuality. In similar contexts, comparisons are made between Nietzsche and later existentialists such as Buber, Camus and Sartre. One does well to remember that there are those who underline Nietzsche's affinities with such spiritual and artistic radicals as Tolstoy.

The phenomenological connection is sometimes underlined, as in Gadamer's remark on Nietzsche's and Husserl's work on the concept of 'horizon'. Kolakowski, too, has found a point of contact between the respective criticisms of biological relativism in these two thinkers. In a larger setting, Nietzsche is brought close to such philosophers of experience as Husserl, Mach and Bergson. A parallel to Bergson is drawn by, for instance, Olivier Reboul.

A place beside Marx has been seen as earned by Nietzsche, as he joined his elder contemporary, whom he never knew, in a radical philosophical practice that makes them "the great destroyers of 19th-century certitude". In Foucault's and Deleuze's addresses, in the Nietzsche colloquy in Royaumont in 1967, Freud is mentioned as the third in this team, just as already in Paul Ricoeur's remark, two years earlier, just as already on the three masters of the "hermeneutics of suspicion". Stanley Cavell, in turn, has spoken of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as "our teachers of unmasking", while Francis Snare calls them "the three great modern debunkers of morality" and Merold Westphal the three most influential modern atheists. Yon Quiniou emphasizes that Nietzsche is to be seen as, on the one hand, standing behind Freud, and, on the other hand, behind Weber. The Weber connection has been advocated by others, too.
Yet, the linkage between Marx and Nietzsche is much more commonly referred to. One observer puts it this way: they are “inviting us to unite theory and practice in a permanent revolution”\textsuperscript{643}. Another feature that is seen to unite the two thinkers has been the way they both analyze the loss of meaning in modern times as either through alienation or through nihilism\textsuperscript{644}. These concerns help to understand how the pair of Marx and Nietzsche is sometimes extended with Kierkegaard to get three philosophers in favor of the “concrete individual” against any abstractions\textsuperscript{645}. As one can guess, some critics insist that Marx’s and Nietzsche’s respective criticisms cannot be combined. Nancy S. Love says that while Marx explains consumption as determined by production, Nietzsche does it the other way round. This is why, according to Love, they offer opposed scenarios of liberation.\textsuperscript{646} Nevertheless, even Love has spoken tentatively on the synthesis of Marxian ‘class’ and Nietzschean ‘mass’ analyses in interpreting and changing the world\textsuperscript{647}. Then there are those, like the Swedish author Melker Johnson who, having first attacked Nietzsche from a Marxist standpoint, became disillusioned by the fate of European radicalism and came to hold that both Marx and Nietzsche “start from the freedom of the individual but end in sacrificing it to power”\textsuperscript{648}.

The power political dimension has inspired some observers to underscore Nietzsche’s links with the classics and exploiters of politology. If not Thukydides, then surely Machiavelli and Hobbes are the most often identified allies of Nietzsche in developing realist views of power relations\textsuperscript{649}. More alarmingly, Nietzsche has been likened to such characters as Treitschke and Bernhardi to make a triple of “violent men free of morality [\textit{moralfreie Gewaltmenschen}]”\textsuperscript{650}. Hobbes and Nietzsche are seen to take part in other sorts of sequences as well. The Englishman is, namely, interpreted to have outlined for the German/ Swiss the crucial questions of movement, desire, happiness and self-preservation\textsuperscript{651}. In this tradition, Nietzsche’s relation to Spinoza, too, becomes an evident topic of discourse\textsuperscript{652}. Yirmiahu Yovel, for one, has composed a tradition of “immanence”, or a counter tradition to the extramundane, by drawing from Spinoza, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. He speaks of the “enemy-brother relationship between” Spinoza and Nietzsche and aims to use the former as a correction for the latter’s, ultimately, “oversimplified unmasking” of the reason.\textsuperscript{653}

Apart from Hobbes and Spinoza, the third great early modern classic of \textit{conatus}, Leibniz, has been compared to Nietzsche on the basis of the way the latter shared an interest in \textit{dynamis}, \textit{potentia} or \textit{Macht}\textsuperscript{654}. Monadology has been seen as anticipating Nietzsche’s experiments with the view of the world as interplay of ‘quantums of force’ or ‘centers of power’\textsuperscript{655}. George J. Stack underlines that Leibniz is important to Nietzsche through Boscovich’s deanthropomorphic theorizing over the reality as “extensionless points of force”\textsuperscript{656}. What is perhaps the most surprising connection, established between Leibniz and Nietzsche, is the one suggested by Gadamer, in an article from 1941, according to which there leads, from the late 17th century thinker, a discourse of the thinking subject that climaxes in the late
19th century thinker’s nihilistic subjectivism\textsuperscript{657}.

Yet, Nietzsche also been compared to Hume, if only to draw out a fierce opposition. Masaryk, for one, held that, compared to the serene Hume, Nietzsche is but a child “boiling over”. On this estimation, Schopenhauer, Stirner, Darwin and Dostoevsky left nothing unique to say for Nietzsche but only a chance to embody a “fiasco”.\textsuperscript{658} Since that, Nietzsche’s considerable affinities with Hume have been discussed with precision by, notably, Nicholas Davey\textsuperscript{659}. When it comes to the later thinkers compared to Nietzsche, one might as well continue with British philosophers and mention a rarer case that Michael Hinz has recently made. According to Hinz, it is beside R. C. Collingwood that Nietzsche ought to be situated, since both of these thinkers “foresaw and broached problems which were to confront philosophy after the decline of the great systems”. What is decisive is that Nietzsche and Collingwood mark the interest in the effects of the “revolution in historical methods which had developed in the nineteenth century”.\textsuperscript{660}

Rorty has placed Nietzsche beside later Wittgenstein, later Heidegger and Kierkegaard to form that wing of revolutionary philosophy, which rejects all efforts of institutionalizing new vocabularies incommensurable with the old ones\textsuperscript{661}. Wittgenstein and Nietzsche are sometimes presented as seeking to overcome the philosophical tradition “through the diagnosis and dissolution of problems rather than through their solution”. There can be seen an “overlap in project, method, and style” in these two thinkers in many ways so different from each other.\textsuperscript{662} According to Harry Redner, the similarity is mainly “a textual illusion” arising from Nietzsche’s “cryptic language”. He says that where Nietzsche attacks ordinary language and wants to renovate its fetishisms, Wittgenstein wishes to leave it as it is, while fetishizing it.\textsuperscript{663} However, other commentators have underscored, with a reference to a radical critique of the connection between thought and language, the kinship between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein\textsuperscript{664}. Probably the lengthiest attempt to compare the two philosophers has been made in Glen T. Martin’s book \textit{From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein} (1989). Martin emphasizes, in both thinkers, the painful awareness of the problems facing modern times, on the one hand, and the philosophical struggle with the metaphysics of language and the concept of truth, on the other hand\textsuperscript{665}.

Heidegger has been seen to exemplify many of Nietzsche’s concerns better than Nietzsche did himself, or worse, when it is thought that their criticisms of reason turn up against themselves\textsuperscript{666}. One commentator finds that “both Heidegger and Nietzsche were essentially moral philosophers, and yet it is precisely the morality of their philosophies - or at least the possible consequences of them - that trouble us now”\textsuperscript{667}. Be that as it may, Heidegger is, nowadays, a practically unavoidable reference point in making sense of Nietzsche\textsuperscript{668}. Documenting and assessing the “Heidegger controversy” or the relationship between Heidegger and national socialism, Richard Wolin writes that “Heidegger shares with Nietzsche a number
of essential value-premises”, “the Zeitdiagnose proffered by Nietzsche”, “Nietzsche’s characterization of “modern democracy””. Wolin draws the conclusion: "That Nietzsche’s critique, as well as Heidegger’s appropriation of it, is capable of sensitizing us to the “excruciations of modernity” - to the ways in which the rationality of “progress”, as buttressed by categories of formal and technical reason begins to take on an apparent life of its own, divorced from the needs of the historical actors who originally set it in motion - remains undeniable. Yet by highlighting the failings of modernity to the exclusion of its specific advances [...] this critique proves, in the last analysis, woefully imbalanced and myopic. It thereby seemingly invites the political extremism in point of fact.”

More favorably, Graham Parkes has said that what brings Nietzsche and Heidegger together is their attitude to nihilism. Where Nietzsche had “encouraged his readers to confront the abyss of meaninglessness with an unwavering gaze”, Heidegger came to endorse “resoluteness in the face of the void and courage in the engagement with the Angst that discloses the nothingness of death”670. Today, the Heidegger connection, in turn, is virtually indistinguishable from the Derrida connection. Although neither Heidegger nor Derrida is ordinarily compared to Nietzsche, the three are nearly identified in contemporary discussions. Gayatri Spivak likens Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s respective treatments of the traditional conceptual oppositions671, while Bernard D. Freydberg holds that Derrida’s readings do not even meet with Nietzsche672.

Sometimes, it is the triple of Heidegger, Derrida and Wittgenstein that is complemented by Nietzsche to get an effective group of philosophers busy analyzing the constraints of textuality673. Most often, however, it is the “anti-logocentrist paradigm of interpretation”, with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida in key roles, that is seen as the most pressing674.

Many of these comparisons were more like genetic hypotheses, some of them tentative proposals for atavistic links and anticipations. Robert Ackerman is one of those critics who question Nietzsche’s locating in the “abstract battle” with traditional philosophy and metaphysics. In so doing, the “polemical historical context”, where Nietzsche wrestled with himself and with his immediate opponents, gets lost.675 This point is well taken. Yet, the context in question is not readily discernible. As if corroborating the basic insights of modern hermeneutics, the historical and comparative strategies of locating Nietzsche appear to reveal much more about their own contexts than about any of Nietzsche’s. For all its potentially crippling effect on bold comparative discoveries, one ought not to neglect the very variety of proper names that comes out from the references in Nietzsche’s texts. There is the interesting index of KSA to be inspected676.

What emerges is that apart from family members, close acquaintances and mythical figures, the names of
the following people are particularly well represented: Aeschylus, Euripides, Hesiod, Homer, Horace, Pindar, Sophocle, Tacitus and Thukydides; Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Händel, Liszt, Mozart, Offenbach and Rossini; Raphael and Michelangelo; Balzac, Baudelaire, Byron, Cervantes, Dante, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, the brothers Goncourt, Heine, Hölderlin, Hugo, von Kleist, Leopardi, G. C. Lichtenberg, Mérimée, Racine, Sand, the brothers Schlegel, Scott and Shakespeare; Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, as well as Paul, Augustine and Luther; Pericles and Caesar with Bismarck, Frederick the Great, Louis XIV and Napoleon. Moreover, the pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Cicero, Epictet and Seneca, Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Lessing, Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, Emerson, Hume and, Mill, Darwin, Galiani and Spencer, Burckhardt, Goethe, Schiller, Wagner and Winckelmann, Voltaire, Rousseau and Stendhal stand out as frequently referred characters.

Of other philosophical figures accorded with a considerable amount of references, the following must be mentioned: Xenophon and Plutarch, Dühning, von Hartmann, Herder, Hillebrand, Spir, Strauss and Teichmüller, Comte, Diderot, Hélvetius, La Rochefoucauld, Renan, Sainte-Beuve and Taine.

What could be the most striking people mentioned? First of all, whereas Schopenhauer’s predominance amazes nobody, the high frequency of Leibniz, Kant and Hegel references may come to some readers as a surprise. Secondly, Goethe and Schiller references are probably as high as one is to expect from just about any German writer in the 19th century with some interest in poetry, drama and the Greeks, but the wealth of Frenchmen treated as parties of conversation is likely to bewilder the casual observer. Thirdly, the visibility of the pre-Socratics and certain Roman authors may be quite obviously due to the business of the philologist and the appearance of many religious names dictated by the needs of criticizing Christianity, but the part of politicians is astonishingly big. Fourthly, the special status of such characters as Byron and Leopardi and, perhaps in particular, Stendhal, as well as the more readily philosophical visibility of the pre-Socratics and point the way to the more individual concerns. Fifthly, the contemporary names - most eminently, Baudelaire, Dostoevsky, Taine, Burckhardt, von Hartmann, Strauss, Dühning, Spir and Teichmüller - indicate the parameters of the actual polemics.

What about the omissions? Marx and Kierkegaard may be the first to come to mind. Whereas their case is partly explained by the closeness in time (just as Brentano, Mach and Frege fall beyond even potential appreciation), the absence of Plotin, Ockham, Berkeley, Bodin, Vico, Cusanus, Wolff, Reid and Hamilton is harder to understand. Moreover, there are surprisingly few references to either Fichte, Schelling and Feuerbach, Jean Paul and Novalis, Condillac, d’Alembert and Montesquieu or Bacon, Hobbes and Locke. Eckhardt, Beneke and Tetens are wholly ignored, while Aquinas, Paracelsus, von Baader, Böhme, Herbart, Lotze, Jacobi, Büchner and Malthus are mentioned only rarely.
It deserves to be repeated that caution is called for in making sense of this review of the index to the main corpus of the Nietzschean texts. For instance, F. A. Lange’s influence on Nietzsche can hardly be doubted, yet there are, in KSA, but three instances where a recourse is made to this thinker. On the other hand, von Hartmann and Strauss were the objects of Nietzsche’s early polemics and the majority of the cases where either of the two writers is mentioned is connected to the close reading of their works for the purpose of a public diatribe; they do not, then, present any lasting points of reference. The lesson can be spelled out as follows. Although Nietzsche is hardly an authority on any of the individual thinkers or intellectual currents that keep recurring in his texts, he was a very alert and able student and critic of a host of thinkers and currents. Not only was he delving deep into the pre-Socratic philosophers and artists or Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s views, he had a lot to say on many thinkers that ought to interest, and have interested, experts, too. One could schematically characterize the situation by saying that Nietzsche’s texts contain rich discussion of the many dimensions of Greek and Roman antiquity, as well as the Judeo-Christian traditions, much that is valuable on the rationalism/empiricism debate, a multifarious account of the later materialist, idealist and positivist developments in a number of philosophical, scientific artistic and political groupings and a good deal of polemics of the situation in the late 19th century thought. However, in the references, there is next to nothing that would reveal a commitment to, notably, the medieval philosophical discourse.

Inspired by a multitude of forerunners Nietzsche polemized in a plurality of directions, with the help of numerous assistants, against a host of opponents. As he writes, in the epigraph of this section, he acknowledged his being influenced, his being made of influences, and yet, presenting the far edge of originality. Odd as it may be, a similar picture comes out of the efforts of locating his position, too.
II.c Interpretative Traditions

( - ein Ereigniß ohne Gleichen in der Litteratur und Philosophie und Poesie und Moral usw. usw.)
(KGB III/3, September 1886, 237.)

II.c.1 Metaphysical & Antimetaphysical Readings

To many observers, it is one of the most important reasons for Nietzsche’s current status as both an indispensable thinker and highly controversial figure that Martin Heidegger, an indispensable and controversial philosopher himself, should have spent an amazing amount of time and energy in coming to terms with his work. As one these observers writes, “Heidegger’s overall account of life in the present age depends essentially upon his reading of Nietzsche” 677.

In his student years until the first world war, Heidegger is known to have read the 1906 edition of “Wille zur Macht”. In 1915, giving his venia legendi lecture on the concept of time, he spoke of a “philosopher’s will to power” and pointed to the need to redirect thought from epistemology toward metaphysics where the goal of philosophy can be properly interrogated. Soon after this, Heidegger explicitly appreciated Nietzsche, while favorably using the concept of ‘life’. During the 1920’s, Heidegger distanced himself from these kinds of concerns expressing his opposition to the rise of philosophies of value and life. His Sein und Zeit and the other works from the Marburg period manifest little use of Nietzsche. Yet, it is said that even at this point, and quite evidently from the 1930’s to the early 1950’s, Nietzsche was Heidegger’s most important reference point. 678

Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche begin with the announcement that was, in the years to come, to be repeated over and over again. He says that Nietzsche stands on the path of the Western philosophy, not only with his basic question, but also with the answer he gave to it. The question concerns the Seiende. As Nietzsche adopts this problematic, he is, according to Heidegger, a part of the Western philosophy “thought of as metaphysics”. Yet, he marks a transition and deserves the highest merit a thinker can earn. In this context, Heidegger sharply opposes his reading to all lebensphilosophische treatments. 679

In the summer of 1937, Heidegger introduces Nietzsche’s “metaphysical principles”. He advances the thesis that Nietzsche signifies “the end of metaphysics”, since he illustrates its entire historical chain to the very first rings. Heidegger uses Parmenides and Heraclitus to make his case: the two pre-Socratics
left but two alternatives: either the Seiende, in its entirety, “is” or it “becomes”. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche seconds to Heraclitus’s insistence on the essentiality of becoming, incessant creation and destruction, yet in Nietzsche even that very becoming “is”. What is most crucial, in Nietzsche’s principle of the ‘eternal return’, in Heidegger’s view, is that it fuses being and becoming into one being-becoming. This is what amounts to the closing of Western metaphysics.680

In 1939, Heidegger contends that “all Western thinking from the Greeks to Nietzsche is metaphysical thinking”. Nietzsche is “the last metaphysical thinker”. Again, Heidegger attacks interpretations advocating a philosophy of life. This line of reading, in his opinion, “wretches” (is beelend to) Nietzsche’s thinking. He treats Lebensphilosophie as a device for certain Christian circles, to give false support to Nietzsche, while suppressing the dangerous acts of ’knowing’ and ’interrogating’.681

In his lecture course of 1940, “Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus”, Heidegger introduces Nietzsche’s “main rubrics” as internally interdependent building blocks of metaphysics. He says that nihilism is, for Nietzsche, “something more”, that is, the devaluation of the highest value and the subsequent sense of valuelessness. Heidegger speaks of nihilism, in a psychological sense, as “the metaphysics of the present day” and, conversely, metaphysics as “the proper [eigentlich] nihilism”. In these lectures, as in the others, Heidegger concentrates on the non-book “Wille zur Macht” holding it as “the metaphysical major work that Nietzsche planned”. This is also the occasion for him to refine his view of Nietzsche as marking both the end (Ende) and the final fulfilment (Vollendung) of metaphysics. What it boils down to is the “forgotten difference” between Seiende and Sein. This difference grounds all metaphysics, as Heidegger understands it, and he seeks to question that difference and that grounding. It is about posing the question about the verb “to be”, or more exactly, about the form “is” (ist). Heidegger says that Sein has been consistently ignored for more than two thousand years. As the most general and the most unique, Sein signifies being as separate from everything that “is”. It is the source from where all that “is”, in each and every form, is given.682

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche takes to the extreme metaphysical thinking where the meaning and essence of Seiende is tracked down. Nietzsche’s subjectivism involves the erecting of a peculiar world by a megalomaniac subject whose will to power, or creative shaping as mastery, goes wholly unconstrained. For this reason, Heidegger sees Nietzsche’s metaphysics as “but the extreme unfolding of that classical teaching of Descartes, according to which all truth comes down to the self-assurance of the human subject”. All this began in Protagoras’s doctrine of man as the measure of everything.683

During the third wartime winter, Heidegger teaches that Nietzsche is essentially a metaphysical thinker, just as every Western thinker has been, ever since Plato. Nietzsche’s metaphysics is one characteristic of
asserting values, of asking the question about the value of *Seiende*. Heidegger states that Nietzsche thinks from the standpoint of being human, “in the sense of subjectivity”, which leads him to induce the idea that all that “is” is brought before, and justified by, the subjectivity. In this way, Heidegger reasons, human subject becomes the basis for asserted truth and the measure over everything that “is” as such.684

Heidegger does give detailed accounts of many of Nietzsche’s problems and later on in this study I shall come back to some of them. It is important to acknowledge the richness of the treatment, since Heidegger is sometimes reported to have been putting forth something that is quite removed from Nietzsche’s texts. This is clearly erroneous. He carries out painstaking close readings of the Nietzschean texts. But even the basic tenet of his confrontation is very complex.685 Nietzsche is to be hailed as one of those glorious thinkers of the West and not to be reduced to a witty aphoristic observer of life. Yet, the very tradition amounts to, as Heidegger repeats, an essential and fatal disremembering. Despite being the most full blown representative of this ultimately detrimental tradition, Nietzsche is best understood as the one who singlehandedly puts it to an end.

After decades of trying to digest Heidegger’s lectures, Nietzsche readers can hardly agree on much more than that they have become a part of reading Nietzsche. Will McNeill wrote recently that Heidegger’s effort just has to be “something else”, since it is “just as much about Heidegger as it is about Nietzsche. And it is just as much about the tradition of philosophy as it is about either of these two figures. Or perhaps it is not really “about” any of these.”686 Nick Land is less tolerant: “One of Cioran’s casual jokes is of inestimably greater value in making contact with Nietzsche than the whole of Heidegger’s ponderously irrelevant *Nietzsche*.687 Elsewhere, it has been stressed that although Heidegger sentences Nietzsche for a life time in the prison of metaphysics, “he also feels that in Nietzsche’s works there are original and ontological insights which serve not only to isolate the notion of Being [*Sein*] but also to develop a methodology of how to think about what it means to be”.688

What counts the most, for the present purposes, is Heidegger’s nearly obsessive concentration on metaphysics. One must see how this obsessiveness does not vitiate sophisticated points. For instance, Heidegger once says that the metaphysics he is at pains to examine is one that “Nietzsche’s thought fulfills and supports, yet it does not ground it and never lays it down”.689 Heidegger is, thus, aware of how forcefully he has to reconstruct the problematic, from bits and pieces.

What is most important, Heidegger is not blind to Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics. It is more in order to say that he is not blinded by its shine. In 1940, he makes the following remark: "That Nietzsche is thinking about the highest values as categories shows him as remaining in the basic setting of metaphysics. That he describes himself as anti-metaphysician merely says that he needs metaphysics, in a
precise form, namely, to be against it.” To have to pose as the one who opposes and refutes metaphysics is to be in a desperate need of metaphysics. Heidegger’s compares Nietzsche to an ardent enemy of alcohol who, should the liqueur disappear, “loses his substance”. 690

One may say that Heidegger uses Nietzsche in the fear of losing his own substance but that would not help in grasping his point. Pierre Chassard says that, compared to Nietzsche, “Heidegger defined the essence of metaphysics quite differently”. The “two conceptions, that of Nietzsche and that of Heidegger, radically oppose each other. The position of the latter, determined by his project, exacts this opposition unto the former.”691 Yet, Heidegger writes, in an essay from 1943, that, “through Nietzsche, metaphysics is, in a certain way, robbed of its possibility of being [eigenen Wesensmöglichkeit]”. Restating the other half of his basic tenet, Heidegger goes on to explain how Nietzsche understands metaphysics as amounting to the dualism of the sensual and the supersensual and is unaware of the way his “counter-movement”, as all counter-movements, is held hostage by “that against which it goes”. 692

In any case, Heidegger is not alone in speaking about “Nietzsche’s metaphysics”. Danto’s key idea, in his Nietzsche as Philosopher, was that, in “Nietzsche’s metaphysics”, there is nothing in the world to which the units of our language correspond693. Moreover, there is the almost humorous view, presented in a recent Handbook of Metaphysics, that Nietzsche was never quite able enough to finish his metaphysics694. Among those who stress the novelties in Nietzsche’s stance, there are, say, Walter Schulz, Wilhelm Weischedel and Robert Legros offering ’life’ as the fundament of Nietzsche’s “new metaphysics”695. As such, this is close to Heidegger who says that “life”, in its deeper meaning, is just another word for Nietzsche’s metaphysical principle of the will to power696. What is a good deal further from him, yet still occupied by the metaphysical reading, is the way in which Jeffrey Minson speaks in favor of ’body’, or Mihailo Djerič in favor of ’text’, as the key to the Nietzschean metaphysics697.

To explain the complicated setting, Hannah Arendt has said that Nietzsche heightened his rebuttle of old values to the status of the new value. This is where he forgot, says Arendt, “that a reversed Plato is still Plato”. 698 Does Nietzsche’s case, then, corroborate the hypothesis that there is, among metaphysical systems, one that must be called, in Alfred Binet’s phrase, “metaphysics of those who refuse to be metaphysicians”699? Did Nietzsche hold on, as an early critic put it, “in this metaphysics-less time” to “a piece of metaphysics” in the form of an assent to the Heraclitian “flux of all things”?700 Is his, as F. L. Jackson calls it, “extrametaphysical critique of metaphysics” devised to accommodate “a metaphysics of the phenomenal world”?701 Can, as Wolfgang Stegmüller says, “metaphysics only be fought with another metaphysics”?702 Is, to quote Peter Heller, Nietzsche’s an “antimetaphysical metaphysics”?703?

Lars-Henrik Schmidt, has suppressed this problematic in two argumentative sequences. The first gives
the general structure of the critique of metaphysics: to remove metaphysics is to assert one; to criticize this procedure is to have to use the same instruments as metaphysicians; to assume the instrumentality, the mediateness, is to lose immediacy and construe the social reality as a surrogate one. The second sequence is specifically offered to articulate Nietzsche’s stance: positive, antimetaphysical science abandons ideals only to wind up asserting itself as ideal; the critique of the positive, antimetaphysical science is forced to use the instruments of metaphysics; the recognition of this produces the loss of immediacy and a perspective into its surmounting in the tragic reconciliation through suffering.⁷⁰⁴

To engage in the critique of metaphysics is to maintain, at least, the problematic of metaphysics. Yet, there are reasons to ask, whether one is doomed or not to stay in the confines of metaphysical thinking in every step of the way. August Vetter, for one, thought that (like Kant) Nietzsche first embraced metaphysical absolutes, then attacked them and, finally, sought for “reconciliation” in the “middle zone”⁷⁰⁵. Michael Fleiter, for another, interprets Nietzsche as trying to steer between scientific enlightenment and metaphysical remnants⁷⁰⁶. To Djurič, in turn, Nietzsche’s liberation from metaphysics seems “more essential”, more fundamental and more fatal” than his belonging to it⁷⁰⁷.

Eugen Fink’s treatment of Nietzsche is a fine example of the complexities in mediating between the metaphysical and the antimetaphysical. Fink’s question is, if Nietzsche is or if he is not “one thinker figure among others” in the “long succession of interpretation conceptualizing and explicating the being [seinsbegrifflicher und seinsdeutender Auslegung]”. In agreement with Heidegger, Fink holds that Nietzsche “stands on the basis of the tradition he wishes to overcome”, he “moves within the metaphysical “horizons of being””. Furthermore, Fink subscribes to the Heideggerian insistence on the point that it is thinking in terms of value that proves Nietzsche’s “captivity in metaphysics”.⁷⁰⁸

But Fink stresses, after all, Nietzsche’s success. He endorses the policy of open question against Heidegger’s reading of the will to power as marking the subjective metaphysics that has dominated the tradition since Descartes. Fink finds that it is the Heraclitian vision of a playing child that becomes Nietzsche’s “key concept for the universe” or his “cosmic metaphor”. He is cautious enough to remark that this is not an anthropomorphic gimmick. It is about a kind of proto-phenomenological “ecstatic openness” towards the world. To take part in the world is, in this setting, to accept a part in the play, to play one’s instrument with one’s Mitspieler. Fink concludes: what can be found in Nietzsche’s “thoughts concerning the play” is “[t]he non-metaphysical originality in the cosmological philosophy”.⁷⁰⁹

Charles E. Scott has recently proposed, in a Finkian tone, that there is, in Nietzsche, a complex play of the metaphysical and the antimetaphysical asserting, while the play itself remains non-metaphysical⁷¹⁰. Scott has also argued, against Heidegger, for the non-metaphysical freedom embodied in Nietzsche⁷¹¹.
The direction that Scott points to is the one important for all those who appreciate Nietzsche’s struggle with metaphysics “not only on the level of argument but on that of the text, writing”\textsuperscript{712}.

Jacques Derrida has been an unavoidable figure behind many contemporary antimetaphysical readings. In \textit{La voix et le phénomène}, he refers to Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics as reminiscent of phenomenology seeking to reduce naïve ontology to a “return to an active constitution of meaning and value, an activity of a life producing the truth and the value”. In \textit{De la grammatologie}, he writes that any effort to develop a less naïve metaphysics, however, is to misunderstand the “virulence” of Nietzsche’s thought. One can tactically subscribe to the Heideggerian reading and wait until the “naivety” of breakthrough” in utilizing metaphysics finally conveys its “absolute strangeness”. In \textit{Écriture et la différence}, Derrida says that both Nietzsche and Heidegger operate with metaphysical concepts, which makes their destruction of metaphysics an autodestructive enterprise. The lucidity of Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘last metaphysician’ coincides with its bad faith. What is more important than any of this is that, for Derrida, “Nietzsche has indicated a way” to an “interpretation of interpretation” that is active, affirmative and playful, non-structuralist and non-humanistic.\textsuperscript{713}

According to Gianni Vattimo, Heidegger’s “Nietzsche the metaphysician” interpretation is “much more convincing and philosophically much more lively” than Derrida’s “Nietzsche of the difference” reading. Heidegger’s perceptions cannot be “liquidated by a simple aesthetical reprise of the notion of play”. They should be seen “as a rigorous expression of the ultimate absence of the foundation”. In Vattimo’s view, it has to be admitted, however, that “Heidegger’s conclusions are baffling and unsatisfactory”.\textsuperscript{714}

Michel Haar, for his part, says that what Nietzsche does to the Platonic two-world metaphysics is that he “abolishes” it rather than to merely “turns it upside down”. Haar considers the more Heideggerian definition, where metaphysics is mainly about “discovering the unique and ultimate word assigning to everything present the trait of presence”. Is Nietzsche, with his “will to power”, a metaphysician in this sense? Haar’s answer is on the negative. Will to power, “as all the great Nietzschean themes”, sends one back “to the broken, disfigured identities forever dispersed and untraceable”.\textsuperscript{715}

Heidegger met resistance not only within the grand tradition of phenomenology, which could be seen to have expanded, transformed, divided and partly vanished in the course of his production and its reception up until Derrida. Yet, although many readers of Nietzsche have been inclined to agree with H. A. Reyburn’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the very thinker to have “abandoned the theory of metaphysics”\textsuperscript{716}, Heidegger’s insistence on the continued hold of a metaphysical way of thinking, even in this exceptional thinker, has not lost its force. It is safe to say that the axis of metaphysical / antimetaphysical is one of the most prominent ones in the contemporary discussion on Nietzsche.
II.c.2 Existential Readings

One camp of adversaries to the metaphysical line of reading was formed by existentialists. Richard Lowell Howey has compared Heidegger’s and Karl Jaspers’s “radically different” interpretations of Nietzsche and concluded that they arise from the correlative dualism of metaphysics and philosophical anthropology in Nietzsche.\(^{217}\)

Jaspers’s *Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens* (1936) is, however, not purged from the metaphysical/antimetaphysical problematic. On the contrary, Jaspers writes, in an astonishingly Heideggerian manner - or is Heidegger’s phrasing amazingly Jaspersian? -, that “Nietzsche stands in the line of those metaphysicians who assert the concept of being [...] and conceive, in it, the whole of universe.” His reservations for this statement include the entirely familiar one about Kant’s demolishing of the “naïve dogmatic metaphysics” and the more radical one about Nietzsche’s thisworldly “metaphysics grasping the being of the world as *pure immanence*”.\(^{218}\)

It is safe to say that these views, as such, do not amount to an antimetaphysical alternative to Heidegger’s reading. Perhaps Keiji Nishitani’s work that seeks to situate itself somewhere between the apparent extremes of Heidegger and Jaspers is potent to illustrate the difficulties in any clear-cut divisions. Nishitani speaks, with the reference to Nietzsche, of “existential historicity”, where observation is traded for the standpoint of passionate existence. This is where he sees metaphysical basis of history being exchanged for a view of the self as grounded in the entirety of history.\(^{219}\)

Though differently, both Heidegger and Jaspers stress metaphysical tradition. They both crave for another lineage of thought. They both problematize the metaphysical construal of selfhood. Both of them use Nietzsche in bringing all this to the fore. Yet, Jaspers’s distance from Heidegger is clearly marked when he states that “[t]he teaching of the will to power is not Nietzsche’s ultimate metaphysics, but a test [Versuch] in the entirety of his reflections on being”\(^{220}\).

To be sure, Jaspers’s very different grip on Nietzsche is visible beyond such propositional vindications. He insists, not on the Heideggerian idea of Nietzsche’s systematic thought available in the “Wille zur Macht”, but on the acts of “philosophizing”, on the crucial bondage between Nietzsche’s life and writings. Jaspers cherishes such terms as “concrete condition of existence”, “existential historicity” and “existential realization”. These refer to Nietzsche’s idea of the interpretative multifacetedness of the world and the openness of possibilities. They emphasize creation and human self-production, as well as unity of nature against moralistic dualities. Jaspers insists that when the individual is favored over the generic, it is not meant that some “isolated private person” is being exalted.\(^{221}\)
In France, Jacques Maritain could write, as early as in 1942, about the “fashionable atheism” among existentialist literature making much of Nietzsche’s tragic and heroic example. The most eminent existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre, did not write very much about Nietzsche, but the way Nietzsche is, at the very beginning of his *L’être et le néant*, referred to as the source of the destruction of the dualism between being and appearing, certainly suggests considerable recognition. Sartre is also known to have written in his twenties a more or less Nietzschean essay titled as “L’histoire de la vérité”. A key representative of the religious variety of existentialism, Gabriel Marcel, proposed a “psychoanalysis of the Nietzschean thought” to discover if Nietzsche was, along with Kierkegaard, “a philosopher of anxiety”. A German catholic existentialist, Wilhelm Michel, for his part, attacked both Nietzsche and the national socialist forces riding on his glory.

Roughly from the late 40's to the early 60's, existentialist Nietzsche interpretations were flourishing. E. L. Allen’s *Existentialism from Within* (1953), Colin Wilson’s *The Outsider* (1956), Karl Jaspers’ *Man in the Modern Age* (trans. 1957), William Barrett’s *Irrational Man. A Study in Existential Philosophy* (1958), H. J. Blackman’s *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (1959), Kurt F. Reinhardt’s *The Existentialist Revolt* (1960), Hans-Rudolf Müller-Schwefe’s *Existenzphilosophie* (1961), Ernst Breisach’s *Introduction to Modern Existentialism* (1962) and Emmanuel Mounier’s *Introduction aux existentialismes* (1962), to mention a few of the many works in this field, all portray Nietzsche as an existentialist, or a proto-existentialist, thinker.

Both Müller-Schwefe and Mounier compare Nietzsche to Kierkegaard as the two background figures for 20th century existentialist philosophies. Allen suggested that Nietzsche is after an affirmation of life, while Wilson regarded Nietzsche as the one to best understand the type of the ‘outsider’. Barrett, for his part, placed Nietzsche in the junction of the specifically modern loss of meanings and identities.

Nietzsche provides an answer, says Barrett, by pointing to the archaic past of the species, but what is more important, by living his tragic life. This is why he presents Nietzsche as primarily a pre-exemplification and forerunner of contemporary human condition. One of the laborious activists in the existential interpretation, Maurice Friedman, calls Nietzsche “the father of atheist existentialism” paving the way for Sartre. He stresses Nietzsche’s being “strongly critical of inauthentic existence” and finding valuation to be “neither pragmatic nor instrumental: it is the very center of human existence, what makes man a man.”

Although Walter Kaufmann criticizes Jaspers for sacrificing Nietzsche’s conceptual efforts to the all-consuming principle of existential meaningfulness, or even to the celebration of existential ambiguities, he does bring his own Nietzsche close to the existential concerns. Along with the very vocabulary of *Existenz*, in Nietzsche, Kaufmann stresses the ideas of authentic, individual and unconventional self-
creation as the basic issue shared by Nietzsche and the existentialists.  

Explicitly existentialist interpretations seem to be getting rarer and rarer, these days. Yet, a vaguely existential tone is perceptible in many other readings that emphasize Nietzsche’s apparent commitment to lively and literary approach to philosophical issues as opposed to any technically systematizing one. Of major Nietzsche experts, George J. Stack might be the key figure in trying to renew the existential perspective, while being able to move in other approaches as well. It must only be added that the alignment with existentialists has also been explicitly denied, as Robert John Ackermann does when he says that the far-reaching parallels with Kierkegaard are unwarranted and that Nietzsche’s distance from existentialism is also evident in his resistance to humanism.

**II.c.3 Analytical Readings**

Somewhere beyond the compelling metaphysical/antimetaphysical readings and the unfashionable existentialist ones, one can try to tell the unknown story of the relations between Nietzsche and the analytical tradition. It is no common knowledge that the leaders of the *Wiener Kreis* had a high regard of Nietzsche and even felt themselves to be post-Nietzschean in the sense of following many leads he had left behind. Moritz Schlick spoke approvingly of the thoughts expressed in *Zarathustra* about the thisworldliness of values and made striking use, in another occasion, of a “beautiful simile” by Nietzsche. He also rejected the erroneous caricature of Nietzsche who supposedly denied all claims to truth. What may be the most decisive, Schlick appealed to nobody but Nietzsche, as he stated as his conviction that “[t]he whole of philosophy is chiefly a matter of putting language in order”.

Otto Neurath, in turn, recognized Nietzsche’s impact on psychoanalysis and the modern behavioral sciences, while he also came to consider his contribution to “weakening the resistance force of the youth against […] Nazism”. More tellingly, Neurath welcomed Nietzsche’s critique of the speculative elements in Kant, as he also rejected Spengler’s reappropriation of Nietzsche. Furthermore, Neurath credited Nietzsche for having discovered such phenomena as ‘resentment’, in his boldly extra-academic and antisystematic studies designed to put metaphysics to an end. Resistance to metaphysics was the primary reason for Neurath to hail Nietzsche as “an immediate part of the blooming of the Vienna school”.

Neither is it generally known that what Nietzsche planned, “*zur Erholung!*” right after *Zarathustra*, was “ein großer *Front-Angriff* auf alle Arten des jetzigen deutschen Obscurantismus (unter dem Titel “Neue Obscuranten”)” (KGB III/1, Januar 1884, 467). He related this obscurantism to both antisemitism and unscientific stance: it can “jungen Leute [...] ruiniren”, because it “treibt sie zum “Mystischen” und läßt sie das wissenschaftliche Denken verachten” (KGB III/1, April 1884, 494). As it happens, among
Nietzsche’s early readers, Christian von Ehrenfels paid attention to the way the philosopher, “in the final phase [of his career], sought, with good justification, to rescue himself, from the vague dimness [verschwommenen Halbdunkel] of a subjectivist mysticism into which the Germans all too easily lose themselves, to the world of Romantic clarity and sharply defined realism”\textsuperscript{742}.

In other words, there is in Nietzsche, even after his so called “positivistic middle period”, a sufficiently strong inclination to the virtues of clarity and scientificness to make the seemingly surprising attitudes of Viennese logical empiricists easier to understand. If Nietzsche’s emphasis on ‘life’ is regarded as an antithesis to the suggested linkage, one might consult Neurath writing about “the scientific world conception” as “serving life”, while life, in turn, approvingly accommodates this kind of conception\textsuperscript{743}. All this may well be what is required to catch Rudolf Carnap’s point, in his famous article “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1934), where he makes a reference to Nietzsche. Carnap says that, in \textit{Also sprach Zarathustra}, Nietzsche “openly chose the form of art, of poetry \[Dichtung\]” to express more strongly what the others had done by “metaphysics or ethics”. Through this highly multivalent judgment, Carnap can be taken as, at the same time, according Nietzsche an equal status among the great ones, on the one hand, and closing him outside the arena of knowing and inside the field of sentiments, on the other.\textsuperscript{744}

Carnap could be read as indirectly acknowledging his indebtedness to Nietzsche by specifying the uniqueness of the author of \textit{Zarathustra} in an article with so “Nietzschean” title. The case for this interpretation can be strengthened by a recourse to Carnap’s other writings. In his most ambitious work, \textit{Der Logische Aufbau der Welt} (1928), Carnap makes two crucial references to Nietzsche. Criticizing the notion of subjectivity, he writes that neither “the relatedness of experience to the self”, the Ich-\textit{Bezogenheit}, nor the existence of this ‘self’ is any given fact. Here, he both quotes Nietzsche’s words on the self as a “grammatical habit” and relates, rather sensationally, Nietzsche’s and Russell’s annulling treatments of agency.\textsuperscript{745}

Of the less famous Viennese philosophers of science, Philipp Frank went so far as to compare Nietzsche with the thoughts of the more official inspiration of the logical empiricist movement, Ernst Mach. According to Frank’s estimation from 1917, Mach’s thoughts stand in a “striking agreement [...] with those of a thinker from whom he cannot have had great sympathy, Friedrich Nietzsche.” On the basis of especially epistemological affinities with the two thinkers, Frank calls Nietzsche “the other great enlightenment philosopher of the end of the nineteenth century”, as well as “that great master of language”, that is, with two descriptions more usually meant to refer to, first, Nietzsche’s opponents and, secondly, his more or less redeeming uniqueness. Frank has Nietzsche express “the positivistic world conception”. What it all boils down to is, in his view, the way Nietzsche came to fight “with cutting
sharpness the employment of very frequently misused concepts” of real and apparent.\footnote{746}

To introduce still one Viennese figure, one can turn to the mathematician Richard von Mises. Although he said, deploringly it seems, that “Nietzsche was not sufficiently interested in the theory of knowledge” to carry out the dismantling of Kantian Schulplosophie, he is ready to assert that “[i]n full agreement with Mach’s ideas, Nietzsche once said: “Originally it is language which builds concepts; later it is science.””\footnote{747} After this citation, and in accordance with it, von Mises goes on to develop a view of there being “no sharp division between pre-scientific and consciously scientific thought”, no “question in any field whatsoever of a final conclusion, of a definite form of knowledge”.\footnote{748}

Despite all this, it was only as late as in D. J. O’Connor’s anthology, A Critical History of Western Philosophy (1964), when Arthur C. Danto gave authoritative plausibility to the idea that Nietzsche could be counted among the forerunners of the analytical tradition. Even though Danto admitted Nietzsche’s distance from a “dispassionate, careful analytician”, he observed as well the rejection of irrationalism, and held that many of Nietzsche’s views coming close to logical empiricism. Moreover, the contacts between Nietzsche and the analytical tradition were even more profound than that. Danto refers to the Kantian categories being traded for a study of language and its power to produce entities.\footnote{748}

It is somewhat ironical that Danto should proceed to write a monograph where he made Nietzsche workable with analytical tools but spoke quite unproblematically about his “metaphysics”. While Heidegger, Jaspers and the Viennese scholars can be seen as embodying the crude currents of fundamental-ontological phenomenology, existentialism and analytical philosophy, respectively, what they all favor is the emphasis on the non-metaphysical.

In any case, neither Danto’s contributions nor any of the more immediate reactions discussed above have managed to enlighten the self-acclaimed neo-enlighteners or the broad school of analytical philosophy on the figure of Nietzsche. In point of fact, his role entirely escapes from three recent accounts of the making of analytical philosophy.\footnote{749} One might suspect that this is due to the persistent idea of Nietzsche as the very opposite of anything that the tradition stood for. In any case, a recent anthology edited by Klemens Szaniawski, contains Barry Smith’s article “Austrian Origins of Logical Positivism”, where Nietzsche gets mentioned only to be referred to, beside Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza and Plato, as a topic in the “rather old-fashioned sort” of historical philosophizing in Vienna, as opposed to the progressive “outsiders” of the Schlick and Mises Circles.\footnote{750}

Robert P. Pippin makes one the few references to the issue at hand, as he points out that “Nietzsche is sometimes said to be a precursor” of logical positivism. The context for this comment is Pippin’s
interpretation of Nietzsche in terms of “Anti-realism”. He unites this position with the “verificationism” of the early Viennese school. Yet, Pippin concludes: “There are as many differences as there are similarities between the two, but several members of the Vienna Circle did know of Nietzsche and occasionally referred to him.”

On the whole, Nietzsche has been a particularly irritating figure within the analytical tradition. O’Connor himself, for instance, had written in 1957 about a “born irrationalist” who degrades rationality, “shrinks from and distrusts any systematic use of reason”, who wants to “decry what he calls ’intelllect’ or ’logic’ and praise instead mysterious natural impulses and intuitions”. This attitude, O’Connor explained, is “very widespread” and it “characterizes the intellectually lazy, the woolly minded, the fanatical and the superstitious”. He concludes: ”And it is the more pernicious in having supporters who enjoy some reputation - philosophers such as Nietzsche and Bergson, theologians like Kierkegaard and a great many artists and writers, to say nothing of well-known pretentious mystagogues like Rudolf Steiner and Ouspensky. Two contemporary examples of the effect of this attitude can be seen in the psychological theories (if they can be so called) of Carl Jung and the existentialist movement in Europe.”

This was a time of the not just philosophical cold war. No wonder, then, if lazy and woolly opinions, albeit quite fanatical and superstitious, were advanced in the name of philosophical thinking. Perhaps it was no worse than nowadays but attacks were made, it seems, from clearer positions. Obviously, existentialism was one of the most beloved targets of the analytical outrage and Nietzsche’s being turned into an eminent figure in this camp made it hard to reassess his status.

Yet, embarrassingly, O’Connor and many others manifested plain ignorance of not only Nietzsche but of their own Viennese heroes, too. In this spirit, G. E. Anscombe did not fail to condemn Nietzsche when rehabilitating Schopenhauer as Wittgenstein’s “philosophical ancestor”: ”It is one of the oddities of the present day [1959] that Schopenhauer is often vaguely associated with Nietzsche and even with Nazism, and is thought to be some kind of immoralist, worshipper of power and praiser of suicide; it is not the mythical Schopenhauer of popular repute, but the actual Schopenhauer, that we should remember in connection with Wittgenstein.”

An unexpected defence of Nietzsche among the analytically mannered philosophers, albeit made in the passing, came from P. E. Strawson. Writing in 1961, Strawson touches upon the “region of the ethical” housed by “truths which are incompatible with each other”. He spells out the lesson: ”One cannot read Pascal or Flaubert, Nietzsche or Goethe, Shakespeare or Tolstoy, without encountering these profound truths. It is certainly possible, in a cool analytical frame of mind, to mock at the whole notion of the
profound truth; but we are guilty of mildly bad faith if we do."\textsuperscript{755}

A remark such as this can, however, be taken to marginalize by the very act of appreciation: merits in literary moralism by no means guarantee a position among competent philosophers. Yet, editing the papers of a symposium held in 1969, Frederick Suppe made what could be seen as one of the most daring deeds in the present context. He smuggled Nietzsche into the confines of analytical philosophy of science. The few who are aware of Carnap’s use of Nietzsche as a reference point are, of course, not too shocked. To be sure, Suppe’s remark was, too, merely a footnote but it amounts to one of the most serious observations on Nietzsche by a scholar ostensibly equipped with a “cool analytical frame of mind”. In the occasion that the ideas are presented about the scientific practice as proceeding from within a Weltanschauung and the task of a philosophy of science as analyzing linguistic-conceptual systems through a world view, Suppe notes that this neo-Kantian-\textit{cum}-pragmatic approach is an “inheritor to the philosophical tradition” of Nietzsche, C. S. Peirce, C. I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine. It is about abandoning the notion of a “unique set of categories determining the Weltanschauungen”.\textsuperscript{756}

Recently, both Nietzsche’s interest in the history and contemporary state of science, or in such figures as Drossbach or Boscovich, and his role as the not that grey eminence in the breakthrough of modern scientific world view, have been objects of increasing scholarly curiosity\textsuperscript{757}. In his book, Alistair Moles even wishes to focus on “Nietzsche’s admiration for science”. He notes that Nietzsche was “interested in scientific thinking of his day, and read much scientific literature.”\textsuperscript{758} By and large, however, Nietzsche’s repute, in those parts of the philosophical world where the analytical tradition has been dominating, cannot be said to have greatly improved even by the work of Strawson, Danto, Suppe or others. At best, Nietzsche is casted in a role where he can shed additional light to the discoveries made in the analysis. A good, and by no means common, example of this is the limited but bold use of Nietzsche made by Ingmar Pörn who, in the midst of examining the predictability of human agency, appeals to his notion of “the herd’s morality of truthfulness”.\textsuperscript{759}

Among contemporary Nietzsche experts, however, analytical approaches have been tested not by Danto alone\textsuperscript{760}. Richard Schacht’s thick monograph in the analytically modelled publishing series is certainly one of the most notable works in this field. Hesitantly, Schacht accepts the idea of Nietzsche as a pioneer in the “analytical movement” but stresses that Nietzsche also violently criticized, “\textit{ante rem}”, this movement. Schacht says that Nietzsche called for interpretative and evaluative measures to complete any analysis. Perhaps more strikingly than in his locating and characterizing Nietzsche’s work, Schacht’s analytically tempered (yet oddly Heideggerian) approach is visible in his strategy to ignore rhetorical moves and to go for “philosophical substance” instead.\textsuperscript{761}
In general, analytically trained philosophers have assessed the argumentative structures in Nietzsche’s works. After Danto, R. H., Grimm and John T. Wilcox, for instance, have written extensively on Nietzsche’s epistemological views. It should be noted, however, that not all commentators have welcomed Danto’s basic idea of Nietzsche as the predecessor to analytical philosophers. Maudemarie Clark’s *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (1990) could be the first comprehensive survey on Nietzsche’s contributions to the theory of knowledge with constant references to the contemporary analytical discussion and to such theorists as Putnam, Rorty, Dummett, McGinn and others. Clark’s conviction was that “one need not take the life out of his thought by concentrating on arguments, objections, and other truth-related matters”. After Clark, Peter Poellner has written a monograph that relies heavily on the analytical tradition, yet criticizes previous attempts in this tradition and, in addition, underlines the proto-phenomenological features in Nietzsche.

As the borderlines between the grand traditions of modern philosophy have become increasingly blurred, Nietzsche has acquired more attention among thinkers who have been schooled in the analytical fashion but whose interests and activities exceed the aged limits of the current once known as “analytical philosophy”. Particularly fruitful has been the convergence of pragmatic and analytical research. The works of Richard Rorty, Daniel C. Dennett and Hilary Putnam present cases in point. Since Rorty’s Nietzsche was already briefly introduced in section II.b, I shall be happy to say something about the other two.

Dennett’s special interest has been the philosophical questions of evolutionary theory. If it was, and undoubtedly still is, a general opinion of Nietzsche’s work that "the vitality and beauty of his poetry is undeniable, but, unfortunately, it embraces among other errors of scientific conceptions the notions (a) that the survival of the fitter is an affair of individuals, and (b) that competition and aggression are one", the boldness of Dennett’s reassessments can be appreciated. He has taken up Nietzsche to expand the otherwise rather thin discussion in its historical depth. Already in 1976, Dennett referred to Nietzsche and Marx as thinkers who paid attention to the development of human consciousness and language under social pressure and to the correlative interdependence of an access to oneself and an access to other people. In the early 80’s, he likened Julian Jayne’s freshly argued case for mind’s developmental discontinuity to Nietzsche’s “view of the relation of consciousness and social and linguistic practices”.

In his most recent works, Dennett has ventured to make more extensive use of Nietzsche. He takes him to be, after Hobbes, “the second great sociobiologist” painstakingly “imagining a premoral world of human life”. According to Dennett, “[t]he amazing and ingenious tale Nietzsche told about how the transvaluation of values happened defies fair summary and is often outrageously misrepresented.”

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says that Nietzsche’s “appreciation” of the import of Darwinism’s major directions is “remarkable”, when it is remembered that he never got to read Darwin. Further, Dennett writes, in his *Kinds of Minds* (1996), about the idea of the mind spreading from its original cerebral depository “to other parts of the body”. He says that “our control systems” containing the nervous systems are “noninsulated” and that “our bodies themselves” actually “harbor” much wisdom. In this context, Dennett is ready to quote a passage from Zarathustra, about the “great reason”, since “Nietzsche saw all this long ago and put the case with characteristic brio”.

Hilary Putnam, for his part, has found use for Nietzsche in his studies on realism. Whereas in *Realism and Reason* (1983) Nietzsche is merely mentioned as the representative of “a pessimistic wing” of modernism, *The Many Faces of Realism* (1987) has him appear as the announcer of the loss of foundations, the decisive theme for Putnam’s distinction between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘internal’ types of realism. Putnam’s *Realism with a Human Face* (1990) opens by a confession of debt to Kant and a quotation from *Geburt*, a move that is recognized by the author as “virtually blasphemous” for any “true Kant lover”. As Putnam specifies, he is not going to discuss Nietzsche, yet he describes him as “immensely interesting” and goes on to hint at the affinity between his rejection of the “God’s-Eye-View” and Nietzsche’s destruction of the ‘true world’.

**II.c.4 Aesthetical Readings**

One may refer to Nietzsche’s “own emotionally overpowering experience as an artist”. Yet, even though it isn’t always remembered that Nietzsche composed music, wrote poetry, employed all kinds of artistic structuring and imagery in his books and came to exert formidable influence on a host of creative artists, his aesthetic importance is undeniable: “Throughout his creative life, Nietzsche seems to have been preoccupied with the elusive task of achieving a balance between his competing impulses, the artistic and the philosophical”. It has been proposed that it was because, like Rousseau, Nietzsche did not find proper actualization for his musical aspirations, that these philosophers “expressed in the music of their prose what their music could not say”. Gadamer, for instance, has confessed that Nietzsche’s is the “most beautiful, mature, rich German prose that I know”.

Andrew Bowie has sought to sum up Nietzsche’s point of departure as follows: ”Art, in the form of music” is the incomparable force “because of its revelation of the divided nature of all phenomenal experience, which can only be overcome in art.” Music was, for Nietzsche, the irreducible and “wholly autonomous medium of aesthetic experience”. Its appreciation helped him, not only to think music as “the materiality of notes” and rhythmic sequences as the paradigm of “differentiality”, but as well to think language as having noncognitive “tonal basis”. Bowie says that Nietzsche came to question this
“romantic” and “vitalist” setting later but its importance lies in its “illustration of the extremes” to which aesthetical and metaphysical thinking can go.\textsuperscript{778}

Peter Bürger’s \textit{Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik} (1983) shows how strongly Nietzsche is integrated in aesthetical debates. Reviewing contemporary discussion, including opinions as to Nietzsche’s aestheticism and the Nietzschean inspiration of an avantgardist “aesthetics of “suddenness””; Bürger places Nietzsche’s \textit{Geburt} in the confines of an idealistic metaphysics of art.\textsuperscript{779} Eberhard Lämmert, for his part, calls Nietzsche as “the first to apply the modern aesthetic of genius also to philosophizing”\textsuperscript{780}. Edward Halper, in turn, underlines Nietzsche’s detrimental influence on the contemporary art scene. He says that Nietzsche’s excessive emphasis on creativity and experimenting as distinct from rationality is “directly responsible for a good deal of artistic anti-rationalism. The first paradox here lies, so Halper, in the way Nietzsche’s philosophy is accountable for “recent views of art”, while his conviction seems to be that no philosophy can determine art and no “art reflects views of art”. The other is that art does rely on “the results of reason”, where artists, following Nietzsche, continue to talk about its insignificance.\textsuperscript{781}

It is \textit{Geburt}’s phrase about the aesthetic as the sole option for justifying ‘being-there’ that has aroused much controversy. M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern see the issue as follows: "However we translate the phrase, the characteristic Nietzschean paradox remains. Nietzsche’s starting point is the aesthetic conceived as a sphere beyond all moral considerations, self-sufficient, an alternative form of existence. How is this to be brought into a meaningful relationship with the world in which we live? Evidently, only by some vindication or justification of this world which cannot itself be aesthetic - that is, by some kind of redemption. All his writings are marked by some attempt at an aesthetic re-casting of the world of human experience, yet any such attempt is foiled by the requirement that, if it is to be more than ‘a phantasmagoria’, it must be anchored to that activity of ours which endows the world with value. A redefinition of the word ‘aesthetic’ to bring it closer to this value-giving activity is implicit in BT [GT] - surely an admission of the dilemma.”\textsuperscript{782}

Similarly, Ralph Driever’s thesis is that it is the “\textit{culturalistic aestheticism} that is so extraordinarily important for Nietzsche’s writings”. What is at stake is the aestheticization of the Schopenhauerian notion of the will. Yet, Driever assures that it is not only the core of \textit{Geburt} but the “basis, on which his later theory of culture, too, is to be developed”. The basic insight is, as he writes, that \textit{Kultur}mensch is always an artist to whom \textit{Kultur} is always a work of art. Driever’s conclusion reads: "Nietzsche was never an aesthetician, that is, a theoretician who, in a coherent reflection, determines the productive [\textit{werkschaffende}] form of action according to its lawlikenesses and creative factors.”\textsuperscript{783}

One of the early assessments of Nietzsche from the point of view of the aesthetical and the artistic, is
included in Otto Kirn’s book *Sittliche Lebensanschauungen der Gegenwart* (1907). It speaks of his aesthetical *Lebensaufassung* and artistic *Lebensgestaltung*. In this way, Nietzsche stands close to Goethe, Schiller, Schlegel and Schopenhauer.\(^784\) More recently,

Nietzsche’s alleged aestheticism finds its most explicit and most forceful thematization in Alexander Nehamas’s *Nietzsche. Life as Literature* (1985): ”Nietzsche, I argue, looks at the world in general as if it was a literary text. And he arrives at many of his views of the world and the things within it, including his views of human beings, by generalizing to them ideas and principles that apply almost intuitively to the literary situation, to the creation and interpretation of literary texts and characters. Many of his very strange ideas appear significantly more plausible in this light. The most obvious connection, of course, is supplied by our common view that literary texts can be interpreted equally well in vastly different and deeply incompatible ways.” Nehamas adds that this “literary model” is the one motivating Nietzsche “to create what we may well call a literary product” and explains: ”Nietzsche’s positive thinking consists”, most importantly, “in the presentation, or exemplification, of a special character, recognizably literary” making philosophical views “a way of life that is uniquely his”.\(^785\)

Nehamas has been strongly criticized in a Nietzsche monograph written together by Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart and Jean-Pierre Mileur. They write as follows: ”In life, self-fashioning works sometimes against, sometimes in concert with, antecedent conditions of family, environment, personality, and so on. Writing involves antecedent conditions of its own, having to do with the nature of the activity, the experience, origins, and place in the world of the writer as writer. Nehamas’s understanding of Nietzsche’s “aestheticism” has the effect of making his writerliness transparent to the concerns of philosophy; but it might be more helpful to say that by taking Nietzsche’s writerliness fully into account we actually “clarify” the problems posed by his ideas by showing that they are more deeply problematic than philosophers have yet recognized.” For the critical trio, ”Nehamas’s rhetoric is the means by which the literary text is silently appropriated to aesthetics, the creation of a literary character is equated with the moral project of literal self-fashioning, and acts of interpretation are made to respond to the preoccupations of epistemology.”\(^786\)

Alan Megill, for his part, emphasizes Nietzsche’s aestheticism as the neglected key to his interpretative thinking. It is, for Megill, a counter-position against naturalistic thought.\(^787\) Another way to look at the matter can be found in Pauli Pylkkö’s article on the Nietzschean semantics. Pylkkö writes that it “may not be surprising” to hear that “Nietzsche’s philosophy of language and meaning is relativistic and that it conforms with the artistic theory” of naming and meaning, as distinct from logico-cognitivistic and eliminativist theories. Yet, as Pylkkö insists, “there is another line in Nietzsche’s thinking”, namely, that of a Humean “skepticism and naturalism” that sometimes comes close to “phenomenalism and even
behaviorism”. This calls for, so Pyllkö, an understanding of Nietzsche’s project, or at least of his so called middle period, as a complex combination of artistic and eliminative materialist views of signification.788

Haar is the most unequivocal opponent of any aestheticist reading of Nietzsche. He admits that some passages, in Nietzsche, may point to the possibility of art as a “refuge” but the “(future) primacy of art” itself have to “rest on a double necessity”. On the one hand, there is a “forgotten primitive artistic creation” inherent in taking cognizance of anything and using language. This is a desperately anthropomorphic procedure. On the other hand, art, in its utmost intensity, is the closest approximation of “the essence of the Will to Power as a permanent self-growth”. In both aspects, it is the servant of prior, nonaesthetical forces. This is why Haar concludes: ”There is no aestheticism in Nietzsche.” 789

II.c.5 Psychological Readings

In an article from 1914, Sigmund Freud writes about psychoanalytical research as capable of corroborating hypotheses that philosophers “intuitively accomplish”. This is the context where Freud assures his readers that he has come to his views of, say, repression, independently of Schopenhauer whose similar insights he came to know of only later. Moreover, Freud says that he freed himself from the bonds of established ideas by, for instance, deliberately resisting the “high enjoyment of Nietzsche’s work”. Returning to this issue in his self portrait, from 1925, Freud reaffirmed that he came to know Schopenhauer only at a late stage and that he had avoided Nietzsche - “another philosopher whose anticipations and insights cover, often in an amazing way, the laboriously gained results of psychoanalysis” - to maintain his independence.790

Be that as it may, Alfred Adler placed, in 1908, Nietzsche and Freud side by side when he referred to “drives” and their “cultural transformations, refinements and specializations (Nietzsche’s, Freud’s sublimation)”. Furthermore, Adler found from Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, or from the critique he made of it, something to develop Freudian psychoanalysis further from its “exclusively sexual” approach.791

C. G. Jung, as said in section I.a, invested in Nietzsche more than perhaps any other scholar. It is interesting that, in his marathon seminar on Nietzsche, he repeatedly criticizes Nietzsche’s “error” to think “that man has invented God and so can invent something else”. Jung says that “we constantly need Christian concepts in order to understand the collective unconscious”. He holds that “for thousands of years, the majority of people will not be able to get beyond the Christian conception; therefore it ought to exist, one cannot abolish it.” This is why it is, for Jung, so serious that “one misses in Zarathustra the
concept of the unconscious; there is only the conscious”. 792 The interest, though divergent and complex, in Nietzsche, shared by all the major psychoanalysts suffice to help understand why a critic wishes to conclude his study on the relationship between Nietzsche and the founders of depth psychology as follows: “Nietzsche’s psychological potential is undisputed” 793. On the other hand, Ian Hacking has pointed out that Nietzsche was aware of the psychological research of his time, as, for example, of the work of Ribot and Janet. Quoting a piece from Genealogie, Hacking says that one “can usually count on Nietzsche to be a prescient observer and analyst” 794.

Accordingly, psychological interpretations of Nietzsche are often inspired by his own engagement in psychological meditations. As Pierfranco Ventura says, “the figure and the work of Nietzsche” seems always relevant for psychological scrutiny, for one has only to think of “his personal malady, his tormented life, his introspective reflections, his tragic end” 795. Jean-François Meyer insists that the Delphic imperative of knowing yourself is “in the center of” Nietzsche’s thought 796. Christian Baumer, for his part, has claimed that Nietzsche’s most important contribution to psychology is a new view of humans where internal conflicts and their resolving in the act of self-overcoming is being highlighted 797. A step further, from this line of interpretation, is taken when Nietzsche’s internal tension between psychological needs and the imperative of sincerity, or even his split personal character, is taken to put a stigma on his thinking as a whole 798.

In the project for finding psychological, psychiatric or psychoanalytical explanations of Nietzsche’s thought, Jung and Alice Miller are accompanied by a host of others. Henri Guillemin emphasizes the varied forms of inhibition that characterize Nietzsche, the blinking, blushing, masturbating, eternal boy 799. Stressing the traits of femininity, Joachim Köhler is of the opinion that “without the inner experience of sexuality one does not understand Nietzsche’s intuitive philosophy. His concepts remain odd shells.” 800 Jörgen Kjaer, for his part, confesses how he came to terms with Nietzsche only by turning to the philosopher’s immature narcissism and misanthropy: ”The structure of Nietzsche’s personality, his relations to other people, his attitude towards life, world, human existence, resulted prominently from the interaction and communication with his mother” 801.

Whatever these indications manage to reveal of Nietzsche’s personality, there are those who focus more on the psychological insights he, presumably informed by many intimate torments, came up with and fused into his other thoughts. Carl D. Schneider, for instance, notes that Nietzsche makes much of the phenomenon of shame and develops a view stressing its sheltering function for the individual and its linkage to the more general discourse of the mask 802. Gary Shapiro, in turn, observes how “Nietzsche seems to be one of the few modern thinkers who have devoted much attention to envy” 803.
John H. Riker has recently tried to assess the larger significance of Nietzsche’s psychological criticisms: “Nietzsche is the philosopher of the Western psyche’s demise, Freud is its scientist”. Nietzsche is the key agent in preparing the ground for “an ecological model for organizing the psyche”, since he “unmasked reason from its manipulations and pretenses”. The way Riker goes may, however, strike one more anti/irrationalist than ecological reassessment: “He showed how reason, rather than controlling the psyche, was the pawn of a stronger impersonal force, the will to power. More importantly, he raised the question of whether a rationally directed psyche was capable of living as richly and deeply as a psyche not so organized. Reason was seen not only an impotent, but life negating.”

Henry Staten proposes a “psychodialectical reading” of Nietzsche, where what interests the reader is “the dialectic between logic and libido”, or “the interaction between the libidinal economy of a text and its logical and dialectical structures”. Other commentators have said that Nietzsche’s “psychosexual eroticism was channelled” into his philosophical creations.

II.c.6 Pedagogical Readings

Nietzsche not only acted as a teacher, but gave a series of public addresses on education, wrote about the state of Bildung and longed for private pupils of his own. Small wonder if that those interested in pedagogical matters have found his views worth studying. Or worth a warning: the fierce quotation from O’Connor given above was from a text book of educational philosophy. Torsten Schmidt-Millard’s dissertation deals with Nietzsche’s early pedagogical writings. He finds that Nietzsche started from the idea of creating a genius. Yet, the public speeches on the school system did not, strictly speaking, take this as their theme but “handled the conditions that had to be given in order for that which cannot be described to unfold”. According to Schmidt-Millard, Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemässe came to mark a transition, a decisive turn from the “metaphysics of the genius to free-spiritedness”.

In 1910, Achim von Winterfeld wrote an article on “Unser Erziehungswesen im Auffassung Nietzsche’s”. He places Nietzsche in the long line of thinkers - from Montaigne and Rousseau via Goethe, Herder, Jean Paul and Fichte, to Heine, Hebbel, Bismarck and Hauptmann - who attacked the existing schemes of schooling. He suggests that Nietzsche’s recognition of “the overriding importance of education” explains his general rebuttle of the systemic. His “testament for the humankind”, von Winterfeld concludes, is to offer up his own work: ”take what you can use and gradually shape up and heighten yourself [bildet euch empor] so spacious that you make everything yours!”

More than sixty years later, Eliyahu Rosenow is to give a similar view: ”Nietzsche’s statement that both traditional thinking and conventional education have not only failed to understand man’s nature but have
actually denied his true being, is not really new”. What is new, says Rosenow, is “the sharpness of his criticism and the extreme nature of his position”. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s “new conception of the nature and purpose of education” is “fully worked out” and can be summarized “as self-liberation, as man’s progression toward himself, toward a confrontation with that element in his soul which nobody can touch”. According to Rosenow, Nietzsche’s notion of education is “a preparatory instruction necessary for such a confrontation". 809

James W. Hillesheim has also emphasized “Nietzsche’s conception of self-surpassing as the ultimate educational aim”. This conception implies “contest and opposition”, the state of being “challenged and stimulated”. As for the potential beneficiaries of the desired situation, Hillesheim says that, for Nietzsche, what matters is cultural greatness which, in turn, “depends not on how well it educates its masses, but on how well it educates its intellectual-artistic elite”. Yet, he finds it possible “to maintain that it is Nietzsche’s view that in the long run the creators and the masses advance together”. 810

According to Nimrod Aloni, there are three central dimensions to be differentiated in the thought of this “philosopher-educator”. The first of these is that Nietzsche radically redefines “the aim of education - formulated in medical and cultural terms - as the recovery of health and worth.” Secondly, he contributes “to the philosophical and historical study of human nature, experience, and possibilities with a particular interest in the educative potentiality of man.” The last dimension Aloni offers is that Nietzsche’s works “are, in themselves, educative” 811

Particularly in the Anglo-American pedagogical readings, Nietzsche is being compared to John Dewey. It is said that while “Dewey speaks in the name of democratic society and the ideal of constructive activity within its framework”, Nietzsche “speaks in his own name only" 812. Elsewhere, Dewey is held to be the only one to come close to Nietzsche’s idea of the “extreme open-endedness” of “self-realization”. Yet, what Dewey’s notion of “education as “growth“ lack is “the dynamism, the tension, the enormous energy, excitement, and ecstasy, that is so characteristic of Nietzsche’s outlook”. 813

Nietzsche’s pedagogic potential seems undisputed but there are those who make nearly pedagogistic claims about his project. Michel Guérin, for instance, writes that Nietzsches, as Plato’s, philosophy is “wholly determined by a pedagogical paradigm”814. In tune, Aloni argues “that the guiding principle of his philosophy is the exploration of cultural conditions and ways of life that could lift man to higher modes of existence”815. And in the words of Peter Berkowitz: "Nietzsche’s thought [...] focuses with single-minded zeal on the education and happiness of the higher and highest men"816.

Commenting later on the more and more fashionable pedagogic writing on Nietzsche and the selective
use of his ideas, Rosenow states that “whoever wishes to adopt Nietzsche as an educational philosopher must stop midway and adopt him partially”. This is because otherwise the reconciliation of the educational practice and the philosophical ideal is impossible: ”our teachers and educators [...] are called upon to promote a rebellious individualism within the framework of an authoritative system, that is, they are expected to realize an educational goal that is a contradiction in terms”. 817

Yoshihiko Maikuma presents Nietzsche as a figure in German Bildungsgeschichte, and emphasizes, like Rosenow, critical reservedness. In particular, Maikuma refers to Nietzsche’s Darwin-inspired insight of “culture as breeding [Züchtung]”. For him, Nietzsche’s “poetic robinsonade leads unmistakably to egocentric-hyperbolical prophecy and apotheosis”, or “from the factual world to a utopian totality”. 818

II.c.7 Cultural & Anthropological Readings

Maikuma’s reading already moves in wide cultural scenery. As it was said in section II.a, Alois Riehl took Nietzsche for the very philosopher of culture. Among other monographists, August Vetter and Karl Ulmer, for example, think that the regeneration Nietzsche was after was not merely philosophical or artistic in nature. Instead, they see Nietzsche’s fundamental task to be cultural in nature819. Frederick C. Copleston, for his part, depicts, in his Friedrich Nietzsche. Philosopher of Culture (1942), Nietzsche as the genuine admirer of culture against any kind of barbarism. Respectable nobility aside, however, Copleston insists that Nietzsche did not understand that his attack on Christianity and the Catholic church was to harm his own aspirations of a cultural renaissance.820

It has been said that Nietzsche understands by Kultur, in different contexts, at least three things: Bildung, high culture or the totality of the spirit’s action. According to one view, Nietzsche started out as a true elitist but, already in studying the music drama, came to appreciate a strong sense of integration and a more collective sense of culture.821

Oswaldo Giacoia Jr. expressly criticizes Maikuma’s account. For Giacoia, Nietzsche was caught by the notion of culture as self-production (Selbsthervorbringung) of humanity. Giacoia maintains that this bringing forth and bringing about is supported by no “theory of culture” or an explanation of the birth of cultural institutions. What Nietzsche offers, instead, is a “symptomatology” of the ways culture appears as a whole and in its details. This is accompanied by an evaluative typology of the cultural formations and their potential in enhancing or denying life.822

Werner Stegmaier, in turn, refers to Nietzsche’s early book series where Cicero’s determination of philosophy as cultura animi becomes important. Herder’s notion of culture as Erziehung and Bildung of
the individual is preferred to Lessing’s and Schiller’s emphasis on the humankind. In Stegmaier’s view, Nietzsche underlines the “heightening”, “accelerating”, “enforcing”, “becoming more” of culture in a way similar as he underlines the Steigerung of life or potency (Macht). Another commentator claims that the old distinction and tension between the “spiritual” Kultur and the more “material” Zivilisation lives on in Nietzsche. He was, for instance, planning to articulate the ambivalence and ambiguity of modernity with the help of this opposition. More characteristically, perhaps, he is found seeking the shared borderlines of these “counter concepts”. And despite the considerable domination of culture in his writings, Nietzsche refers approvingly to Voltaire as the one capable of both defending and relating it to civilization.

Keith Ansell-Pearson has addressed this dynamics. He observes that Nietzsche’s “fixation” on the question of civilization amounts to asking “how to cultivate” optimal conditions for human development in the era of nihilism. Eric Blondel thinks, too, that “the question of culture, its birth, development, its illness and degeneration - or nihilism, to which is perhaps connected to the rebirth of culture” is what especially interests Nietzsche. For Blondel, Nietzsche’s project is “to reject (negieren) the de-negation (Verneinung) of the body and life in the discourse of culture”.

Gilles Deleuze writes that, for Nietzsche, “culture is generic human activity; but since this activity is selective, it produces as its result an individual in which the generic itself is repressed”. Nietzsche’s role beside Marx and Freud, in the Deleuzian version of this trio of the modern culture, is to stand for counter-culture. According to Deleuze, what is exceptional in Nietzsche is that he offers, after his “decoding” critiques, no new replacement system, no “recoding”.

A popular variant of the cultural readings is that of problematizing modernity. Already in 1975, Richard E. Palmer said that Nietzsche’s “self-reflective awareness” is probably the best “introduction to a “post-modern” philosophy of interpretation”. Since that, Nietzsche is regularly related to the discussion over the postmodern. Pippin finds that “Nietzsche, for all his elusiveness and difficulty, is a fruitful, paradigmatic ‘modernist’ to interrogate” the complex issue of modernism. Multiplying the quotation marks, David Michael Levin calls him “the first” of the “postmodern” thinkers.

The Norwegian critic, Trond Berg Eriksen has attempted at a typology of this problematic. What is modern, in Nietzsche, are, according to Eriksen, utopian fantasies, linkage between knowledge and power, pathos of sincerity, truthfulness and honesty. What is postmodern is the rejection of utopias as fantasies and a play with them, as well as resignation and paradox, masquerade, role play. Stephen A. Erickson asks if “post-modernism is fathomable without Nietzsche” and believes that this is “doubtful”. There are those who think that the whole question of the postmodern consists, to a large
extent, of a “vulgarization” of Nietzsche836. Gianni Vattimo says that the whole discourse of post-modernity can “acquire philosophical rigour and dignity” only with Nietzsche, just because his work is never reducible to Kulturkritik837. As such, “cultural” readings may involve interpretations hostile to excessive emphasis on the cultural, whenever this means denying philosophical relevance. Jürgen Habermas has been particularly active in linking Nietzsche with what he takes to be postmodern mythical irrationalism. Among Nietzsche scholars, Hans Zitko has rejected this idea, partly by calling attention to the enlightening elements in Nietzsche, partly by accepting “poststructuralist” appeals to his role as the one to have broken away from reifying reason.838

By “anthropological” readings, in my subtitle, I refer to the two basic meanings of this term. On the one hand, there is, say, Alan Megill arguing that Nietzsche did start by investigating Greek myths partly as a cultural anthropologist with a specific time and place to contextualize his findings but moved on to less ethnographic, more ahistorical and ultimately mythologizing practices839. On the other hand, there is, say, Liselotte Gorontzi characterizing Nietzsche’s preparation of an open, future oriented, unsystemic view of humanity as his general contribution to philosophical anthropology840.

If the former line of work produces, typically, assessments on Nietzsche’s handling of the ancient Greece and the insights about occidental culture acquired by this way, the latter is perhaps most closely related to pedagogical questions. There are those who claim that Nietzsche’s proclamation of “the death of god” means asserting antropos as both the basic and the highest structure to be investigated841. In contrast, Michel Foucault has underlined that the “death of god” necessitates writing of a necrology for the human as well. Hence, according to Foucault, Nietzsche marks the decisive eradication of the business of anthropology.842

II.c.8 Linguistic Readings

If it is, in Foucault’s view, anthropology that ceases to breathe in Nietzsche, it is “radical reflection upon language” that commences. With Nietzsche, so Foucault, philosophy is united with philology “as the analysis of what is said in the depths of discourse”. This is the modern form of criticism. Concisely, whereas Marx’s Das Kapital is an exegesis of value and Freud’s writings add up to an exegesis of what is not said, Nietzsche’s work embodies an exegesis of certain Greek words.843

Hannes Böhringer insists that the “metonymia of language” interested Nietzsche who wished to turn “all cosmology and theology to anthropology”. As he argues, “Nietzsche’s whole philosophy of value can be understood as philosophico-speculative etymology of the Sanskrit root ma / man”. This root is the source for a family of concepts, such as thought, remembrance, sensation, lie, cure, mind, man. It has its
correlative in the Greek root μνήμη / μνοῦ that, in turn, resources such notions as remembrance, learning, animation, inspiredness, manic rage, muse, music. Böhringer refers to the etymological studies of Georg Curtius, one of Nietzsche’s professors in Leipzig, who held that the root is “the last meaningful sound complex”. Böhringer goes through Nietzsche’s early notes and shows how the considerations of knowing as measuring and the music drama as animated measuredness figure prominently: etymology was seriously taken as the radical search of radixes. Böhringer concludes: “Not only his early philosophical work, but Nietzsche’s whole philosophy is an example of the philosophical potential of the nineteenth-century historico-philological science.”

Daniel Bell is interested in “Nietzsche’s theorizing as a philosophical philologist”. According to him, “the development of the Geisteswissenschaften, historical and hermeneutic, became the occasion and indeed condition for a rethinking by Nietzsche of the general forms of our knowing, and for a freeing of philosophy from the ecological constraints of classical epistemology”. Bell’s view could be seen as mediating between the readings of Foucault and Böhringer, since he takes Nietzsche’s epistemological insights and interpretative practice to be “more indebted to the historicist and hermeneutic traditions of the Geisteswissenschaften than to Darwinism despite his reservations about the former’s metaphysics of ‘man’.”

“Linguistic” readings may encompass very different approaches from the standpoint of, loosely termed, philosophy of language, hermeneutics, discourse analytics, semiology/semiotics, narratology, intertextual research, rhetoric, deconstruction and so on. A special case would be the study on the nature of Nietzsche’s philological work, a study that can be seen as feeding the other “linguistic” alternatives. One recent assessment tells that the interruption, in his philological career, was particularly dramatic, since Nietzsche’s methodological renewal in investigating Theognis can still be held as revolutionary and that many of his attributions of anonymous ancient texts have later been confirmed.

Nietzsche conducted philological investigations and lectured on rhetoric. It has been said that, as a philosopher, he continued to think that rhetoric is not at all about something “empty, hollow, phraseological”. Indeed, Hans Blumenberg has even said that “rhetoric is the essence of Nietzsche’s philosophy”. Be that as it may, a student of Isocrates said, recently, that even though Nietzsche was not very interested in this particular, it is “the Nietzschean mediation” that still appears as the “only access toward another reading” of his texts other than the platonicizing one.

As Josef Kopperschmidt writes, the new and original in Nietzsche is to be found in “the stringency with which he, as a classical philologist and especially as a connoisseur and translator of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that he highly valued, inherited its central categories” and “used them methodically” in a critique of
impure reason". With the shared emphasis on Nietzsche’s acquaintance of rhetorical theory and practice, Angèle Kremer-Marietti holds that “Nietzsche’s critical positions rest on his fundamental critique of language.”

This critique has been seen to involve sensitivity to the constraints of language on all thinking, the prison of the syntax. It involves recognizing “deep-rooted thinking habits” that, for instance, make one see “sentences [as] basically predications in which properties are attributed to some substances or the substances are related to one another.” Yet, Harry Redner has contested this opinion. According to him, Nietzsche’s understanding of language is “shallow” and “naive”, on the grounds that, as Redner sees it, he cannot appreciate the transformation process of language and thinks himself able to totally recode the obsolete, fetishist instrument. Another recent critical reaction amounts to the claim that Nietzsche embraces a paradox by striving for “post-linguistic perspective on the world”, after “casting off the spell of language”, while being doomed to use language to convey his points.

“Linguistic” readings can enter in an exchange with other kinds of readings. Staten’s “psychodiadic”, that was mentioned above, is based on the insight that “libidinal forces too are textual”. This might be related to the view that Claudia Crawford has distilled from Nietzsche’s early writings, to the effect that unconscious drives and urges have a language of their own. The prime example of applying a psychoanalytically inspired interpretation on Nietzsche’s writings is Luce Irigaray’s Amante marine. De Friedrich Nietzsche (1980) where the latter’s imagery of water, earth and sexuality is critically and creatively extended and countered. As for the alternative of opting for the “uniformity of forms of thought and language”, for the schemes that are both cognitive and linguistic, Stack has proposed a reading of Nietzsche as structuralist, while remarking that Nietzsche would probably not tolerate the scientistic aspects in the structuralist anthropology.

It was seen, in previous sections, that such makers of modern hermeneutics as Gadamer (see I.b) and Ricoeur (see II.b.2) have acknowledged Nietzsche’s importance. Surprisingly, in the light of these acknowledgements, Nietzsche was not often mentioned by hermeneuticians as their forerunner. However, Gadamer has said that “the career” of interpretation began with Nietzsche and the same thing has been the lead for a number of writers on philosophical hermeneutics. Among Nietzsche experts, it is Jean Granier who has forcefully endorsed the view of Nietzsche as the key figure in thought in terms of world as a text, or l’être-interprétré. He has been followed by, notably, Alan D. Schrift, who sees, in the Nietzschean perspectivism and the Nietzschean philology, “the horns” of modern hermeneutics. Both Granier and Schrift emphasize the attempt to steer between, or beyond, dogmatism and relativism. Yon Quiniou, for his part, argues that Nietzsche has two very different conceptions of interpretation. One is objectivistic sharing the explanatory ambitions of science and is used by Nietzsche
in coming to terms with factual “moral phenomena”. The other mode of interpretation is characterized by practical “prudence” towards, and against, science.\textsuperscript{865}

Hans Lenk, who refers to Dilthey’s recognition of Nietzsche’s work in hermeneutics, has recently discussed the latter’s views of the “interpretatitivity of all world constitution”. Lenk emphasizes that “it is not so much language” that is exalted in Nietzsche’s model but the more general and more comprehensive “perspectivist forms of interpretation”.\textsuperscript{866}

Along with those of Paul de Man, Derrida’s contributions have been especially significant in shaping the linguistically informed Nietzsche interpretation\textsuperscript{867}. Even the very notions of ‘reading’, ‘writing’ and ’text’ have a Derridean flavor to them\textsuperscript{868}. Saying that Heidegger shared the Nietzschean problem of liberating language from the metaphysical slavery and admits that Nietzsche leans on the tradition he is opposing, Derrida explains: ”This is not an inconsistency, for which one is to search a logical solution, but a textual strategy and stratification, which is to be analyzed in practice.”\textsuperscript{869} What counts the most is Nietzsche’s specific type of writing, since it remains that whatever he has written, he has done it by writing it. For Derrida, Nietzschean writing is the one not subjected to the truth and logos.\textsuperscript{870}

In his \textit{différerance} lecture of 1968 - about which Vattimo jokes that it might have seemed as the manifest of the philosophy of difference but became more like its epitaph or necrology\textsuperscript{871} - Derrida writes about the play of differences as the condition of all conceptuality. Nietzsche’s poison against the “system of metaphysical grammar” as ”guiding culture, philosophy and science” is the unstoppable and untamable activism of “forces and differences of force”.\textsuperscript{872} In \textit{Grammatologie}, Derrida had already written that Nietzsche radicalized “the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation and difference”\textsuperscript{873}.

\section*{II.c.9 Feminist Readings}

Derrida’s challenge is felt in gender criticisms of Nietzsche, too. The notion of ’sexual difference’ and the emphasis on ’writing’ bear testimony to this influence\textsuperscript{874}. In his \textit{Éperons. Les styles de Nietzsche} (1972/1978), Derrida reads Nietzsche’s texts concentrating on the “exchange between the style and the woman of Nietzsche”. He starts from \textit{Dis-tanz}, from Nietzsche’s distancing and dancing techniques of parody related to the woman’s power that she exerts by seducing from afar. On the double ground of sheltering oneself from fascination and remaining tempted by it, distance calls for distance from itself, that is, distance from distance. Derrida explains: ”There is not an essence of woman, because the woman distances and distances from herself. [...] Woman is a name for this non-truth of the truth.”\textsuperscript{875}

Derrida goes on to detect the “effects” of Nietzsche’s texts. He observes that “if style was (as the penis
would be, according to Freud, “the normal prototype of the fetish”) man, writing was woman”. The heterogeneity of Nietzsche’s texts and the variation of Nietzsche’s types of woman, however, necessitate that “[i]there is, then, no truth in itself of the sexual difference in itself, of the man or the woman in itself” but, instead, an “undecidability”. Derrida’s reading is being dealt with in, for instance, the anthology *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (1993), where Keith Ansell-Pearson criticizes the reduction of the issue to a metaphorical discourse or to a rhetorical trope. Kelly Ann Oliver, in turn, starts from Derrida, but develops a reading that emphasizes “Nietzsche’s woman fetishism” as but one version of the patriarchal construal of femininity. Oliver deprecates, in particular, what she takes to be Nietzsche’s stubborn insistence on the linkage between the female and the participatory and dialogic bent.

Irigaray has been the one to elaborate the most original (feminist) reading of Nietzsche. She is said to have accused Derrida for being blinded by the presuppositions of his own reading that still tends to treat woman as “the other of the same”. Yet, Irigaray joins Derrida in dissolving the specifically patriarchal violence of metaphysical thinking. In her *Amante marine*, Irigaray mimes Nietzschean imagery by appropriating his, and developing her own, insights of the question of the sexual difference. She writes mockingly about the forthcoming domination of “sublime discourses”, about “your only woman: the eternity”, about woman becoming an idea and idea becoming a woman. As Ellen Mortensen - who characterizes Irigaray’s project as “an attempt at invoking this dormant, silent but still fecund reservoir of profound difference, namely the dionysian woman, or *le féminin*” - writes, Nietzsche projected woman in so prettified image that he “is horrified when he fathoms what her *nature* might be”.

Irigaray also connects what she takes to be the crucial question of the era, precisely the one concerning the ‘sexual difference’, to destructive contemporary tendencies menacing “the living subject”. In Nietzschean terms, she writes about the advanced technological consumption society as characterized by its “nihilism without any affirmation other than the reversal of already existing values”.

This resembles Olivier Reboul. In his view, Nietzsche’s “scandalous” attacks against democracy and socialism contain, in any case, a remarkable insight. The process of leveling coincides with the production of “passive consumers” freed from all creativity. As Reboul sees it, the root of the matter lies in the effacement of “differences between cultures or between humans, between the child and the adult, between the pupil and the teacher, between man and woman”. He says that Nietzsche foresaw how the “asexual” human being and the loss of creativity will mark “a condition of inertia and death, a maximum of entropy for a minimum of information”.

Diane Behler, too, notes Derrida’s work and expresses her wonderment about the scanty research done in the field. Behler’s own contribution consists in arguing that Nietzsche “seeks to discover, in the Greek
state, positive analogies to his own time”. He is likening woman to the original, the primordial, the natural. Based on this, Behler writes: ”Nietzsche sees the modern attempts at liberating woman and making her like man as denaturalization and degradation of her unique capacity and ideality, just as Nietzsche saw the Dionysian vigor to perish with the degeneration of the Greek tragedy.”

It is to these modern movements that Nietzsche’s philosophy is, at times, contrasted. Ellen Kennedy, for one, has called Nietzsche “the founder of modern patriarchy”. She appeals to the early article by Hedwig Dohm, “Nietzsche und die Frauen” (1898), where Nietzsche’s hostility to women’s liberation movement was already denounced. Kennedy also mentions Elisabeth Förster’s pitiful rehabilitative effort, Nietzsche und die Frauen (1935). Yet, it has been shown that Nietzsche’s work functioned as a more positive stimulus to some early women’s rights activists. The case in point is Helene Stöcker whose career as a spokesperson for emancipatory commitment was, to a considerable degree, fueled by her awareness of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In organizations such as Bundes für Mutterschutz und Sexualreform and Internationalen Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit, in the periodical Die neue Generation, as well as in her novel Liebe, she promoted the creative individual and an ethics of reciprocal assistance. Stöcker did not see Nietzsche as a conservative chauvinist or as a social Darwinist, but as the one to have pointed the way toward the kind of agency that parts from the ideals of romantic interiority and recognizes its unconscious and material constraints in order to unite the productive powers of volition and cognition. Yet, Stöcker felt the need to move further, since Nietzsche’s philosophy could not possibly fill in the blank space that women had to take in their possession to actualize themselves.

Indeed, the question was urgent and Nietzsche was used in the quarrels. In his 1907 book on “sexual ethics”, Christian von Ehrenfels polemized against the radical women liberators. To back up his critique, the author quoted a few lines from Nietzsche and passed on to portray the essential threat of the militant movement. The key words included “denial of all moral responsibility”, “”Jacobinism” of sexual revolution”, “general fall back into pagancy”, “extinction of Western culture, as well as of the white race of humans”.

Kathleen Nutt, for her part, puts the issue as follows: ”Nietzsche’s views on women and politics are deeply troubling. Yet, perhaps more troubling still is the implicit acceptance and lack of criticism of these views by many on the left of centre philosophical community in the English-speaking world.” Shari Neller Starrett perceives that Nietzsche’s ponderous remarks on women have most often been diplomatically recognized only in order to minimize their import. Staten agrees that Nietzsche’s “misogyny or gynophobia” is, dubiously, seen as “peripheral” or “irrelevant to strictly philosophical questions”, even though “nothing is more deeply rooted in the totality of Nietzsche’s text than the
gynophobia." Carol Diethe stresses that Nietzsche’s utterances on women cannot be explained away as sexist jokes or slips of the tongue. His view of woman is a combination of extra-rational motherhood and sex. Nietzsche’s stance is, in Diethe’s view, either aggressive or defensive and he fails to solve this ambiguity in any other way than by constructing a noble man.

Ofelia Schutte has thematized the question of woman as a general tension in Nietzsche’s work. She says that there is, in Nietzsche and in the situation he termed as “the death of god”, two opposing thrusts. One points to a new patriarchy and increasing domination. The other is a liberating orientation towards post-dualistic and post-alienative existence. Whereas the latter is, for Schutte, the more fundamental, the former became, in her view, more prominent in Nietzsche. Gayle L. Ormiston says that “[a]t first blush, Nietzsche appears to be a raging misogynist in addition to being a raging madman. Such a reading of Nietzsche’s text cannot be ignored.” Recently, it has been proposed that Nietzsche did try to break through from all dualisms, including the one between man and woman, but grammatical constraints made it exceedingly difficult. According to this reading, Nietzsche’s misogynist enunciations were a part of the old language that he wished to abolish.

An early commentator said that it is no use to ask, with respect to this thinker, où est la femme?, since the “great, unhappy love” of his life “was no woman, but music […] that inflamed his hottest affects.” Another one ventured to analyze later that Nietzsche “was afraid of women, but he rationalized this fear by saying that man should have a whip in his relationship with the opposite sex”. Referring to the whip quotation, from a line of an elderly woman character in Zarathustra, as the inevitable Nietzsche anecdote to crop up in casual conversations, Wilhelm Weischedel sees it best to instruct how “entirely false” is the impression that it gives of Nietzsche’s utterly shy attitude to women.

Lawrence J. Hatab cannot help but boast when he is about to “even attempt the impossible: argue for Nietzsche’s “feminism”!” To bring about this, he makes the following observation: “Western culture values knowledge over mystery, reason over instinct, technology over nature. Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman present a defence of, and in some ways a preference for certain sub-cultural forces, the denial of which leads to alienation, weakness and sickness”. Hatab goes on to argue that Nietzsche takes “the creator-type” to be “an androgynous mix of masculine and feminine traits”.

II.c.10 Political & Social Readings

Kaufmann’s view of Nietzsche as an antipolitical existential thinker has been confirmed by those who feel that Nietzsche is, first and foremost, interested in heroic life and becoming an individual. On this reading, Nietzsche’s attacks on both state idolatry and liberalism are seen to stem from his antipolitical stance: his
Leitmotiv is identified as “anti-political individual seeking for self-perfection”\textsuperscript{899}. In the same vein, Tarmo Kunnas has said that to politicize Nietzsche is to do “violence to his essence”. His antipolitics is, says Kunnas, no escapist aestheticism but a philosophically grounded sceptical position.\textsuperscript{900}

However, Kaufmann’s influential reading has recently been described as “antiseptic”.\textsuperscript{901} Accordingly, his depoliticizing interpretation has been seen as “an attempt to sweeten and water down what Nietzsche thought” so that it amounts to both “prettification” and “trivialization”.\textsuperscript{902} Already in 1975, Tracy B. Strong was claiming that interpretation must deal with “inconveniences” and resist the temptation to explain them away as rhetorical moves.\textsuperscript{903} “Political” and “social” readings are typically both antimetaphysical and anti-aesthetical, yet Strong has recently thematized the aesthetical dimension of Nietzschean politics\textsuperscript{904}.

Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (1990), too, underscores the political implications of Nietzsche’s insights as aesthetical by nature. Although Nietzsche cannot be interpreted as wishing to restore some ancient form of master rule, neither can one ignore his commitment to social inequality. It is this commitment that also ties his thought, inescapably, to domination.\textsuperscript{905} Karl Brose’s book on Nietzsche’s social thought appeared the same year but with different emphases. Among other things, Brose sought to demonstrate how especially the younger Nietzsche’s work goes against aristocraticism, while retaining its radicalism\textsuperscript{906}.

The conflict between commentators is sometimes traced back to the original. Urs Marti crystallizes the principle difficulty like this: “Whoever attends Nietzsche’s political thought will see him/herself confronted with a contradiction that is hardly solvable; with the discrepancy between the necessarily cruel process of civilization, of raising [Züchtung] that degrades humans to objects, and the goal of that process, the emancipation of humans from the condescending morality of mores.”\textsuperscript{907} Alternatively, John Carroll’s reading could be seen as mediating between the social/political and the asocial/apolitical interpretations. His work concentrates on micropolitical “anarcho-psychology” that he sees as having grown from Nietzsche’s obsession with the concrete individual. The “anarcho-psychological” attitude became a socially and politically potent force.\textsuperscript{908} Yet, Mario Cassa has observed that it is very questionable to hold that Nietzsche’s political philosophy is induced from his putative psychological, metaphysical or ontological base structure. Cassa claims that “the politico-social thematic derives from that ontology and psychology no more than, conversely, that ontology and psychology derive from the politico-social”\textsuperscript{909}.

The fascist and national socialist use of Nietzsche may still have a role to play in this field. In William T. Bluhm’s Theories of the Political System (1978), Nietzsche is presented as the nihilistic progenitor of
both existentialism and Nazism. In the East German *Enzyklopädie zur bürgerlichen Philosophie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (1988), Heinz Holz writes, under the title “Signs of Counter-Enlightenment”, about “Nietzsche’s prefascist philosophy of life and power”. Holz claims that Nietzsche literature is tantamount to “modern counter-reason”, since “[c]ontemporary adepts are reading Nietzsche not historico-critically, but as a guide to their own understanding of the world.”

Marxist-Leninist interpretation sees, in Nietzsche, a combination of political naïveté and cunning. As Erhard Naake writes, in his dissertation *Friedrich Nietzsches Verhältnis zu wichtigen sozialen und politischen Bewegungen seiner Zeit* (1985), the knowledge Nietzsche operated with derived from “reactionary ideologues, that is, from other publicists”. Naake says that Nietzsche was terrified by the thrust of mediocrity inherent in socialism, as he (mis)perceived it but that he was most worried “about the safeguarding of the privileges that he and his kind possessed.” Nietzsche’s neglect of, in particular, the economic dimension in social and political life, has been mentioned by others, too.

Nietzsche’s political solutions seem not much happier to a number of commentators further from the bipolar tensions of the cold war. Johannes Weiß has tried to sum up Nietzsche’s vision of the ‘great politics’ and its challenge to European reorganization in a tripartite presentation. First, there are purely pragmatic, especially economic, reasons to put the national state system to an end. Secondly, there is a spiritual predisposition for this unification. Thirdly, the goal of the European unity can only be governing the world. This is, says Weiß, what Nietzsche sees as dictated by contemporary nihilism for the political life. He emphasizes that Nietzsche held the social sciences as capable of nothing else than exemplifying this nihilistic situation.

One way to absorb Nietzsche into political and social debates is to pay attention to his critique of ideology. Karl Barth wrote more than fifty years ago that Nietzsche’s “philosophical work is, to a considerable extent, criticism” that can be understood as “showing that Christian morality and religion, the reason and the Western concept of spirit and, finally, theories of state, society and justice have a character of ideology”. Barth sees, as does Monika Funke in her *Ideologiekritik und ihre Ideologie bei Nietzsche* (1974), that Nietzsche runs the risk of falling prey to the ideological features of his own critique.

As it was the case in some “feminist” interpretations, there are commentators who attach Nietzsche’s views on political issues to his acquaintance with the Greeks. His elitism and the idea of a “warlike man in a culture producing state” cannot be, it is judged, apprehended otherwise. Apart from them, it is Machiavelli who is often mentioned as Nietzsche’s point of departure: these two are said to have extracted the notion of human value from its dominating religious frame to be “redefined in historico-
political realm”919. This turn may also justify comparisons to Hegel and Burckhardt920.

Bernard Yack, for his part, says that, although they deny it, both Marx and Nietzsche start from the common 19th-century bias, the Kantian dilemma of an autonomous individual facing the natural necessity. As for Rousseau, the surmounting of the existing limits of social life was a key question for Marx and Nietzsche. According to Yack, this explains why their work, “the longing for the total revolution”, is spanned across the extremes of nostalgic and apocalyptic aspirations.921

Sometimes, Leo Strauss is seen as Nietzsche’s heir, because the two men seem to have shared similar estimations of modernity’s crisis and its political consequences922. Ansell-Pearson forcefully criticizes this pairing: ”Although Strauss could recognize the undoubted importance of Nietzsche’s diagnostic and prognostic statements and utterances, he could never fully come to grips with the challenge his thought poses to traditional conceptions of political philosophy.” Ansell-Pearson’s Nietzsche is “a critic of the type of political conservatism” that Strauss stands for and, moreover, “his own thinking represents an attempt to prepare the ground for a philosophical and political radicalism”.923

Ansell-Pearson has written perhaps more extensively than any other contemporary scholar on Nietzsche’s political philosophy, which, as he says, is for many others “a source of confusion and embarrassment”. According to him, Nietzsche’s “existential questions about human identity cannot be separated from an understanding of history (especially of morality), of culture, and of politics. Nietzsche’s key problem is “how to ground and justify a common political life in the absence of the support traditionally provided by absolute, transhistorical moral and religious values.”924 Ansell-Pearson is convinced that Nietzsche should not be mistaken to offer “little more than an antipolitical conception of life or an aestheticization of politics” but, rather, he ought to be understood as making a challenging inquiry into “the value-basis on which social relationships are to be established and a common ethical and political identity created and constituted”.925

Despite his enthusiastic reappropriations of Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson has expressed fundamental doubts concerning Nietzsche’s insights. He writes, for instance, that “[i]t is perhaps a great irony - and tragedy - of Nietzsche’s attempt to suppress history in the name of a higher justice (the panoramic will to power) that it commits the same errors and follies of a monumentalistic reading of history which he warned against in his untimely meditation on history. [...] His vision of great politics, and of the cultivation of the overman, inspired not simply gifted egoists and great visionaries, but also the impotent and the indolent.”926

Another way to sum up Nietzsche’s redefining of the nature of political philosophy is proposed by John
Rajchmann. He writes that whereas “classical political theory had asked how sovereignty is constituted from subjects”, Nietzsche “asks what the political consequences are of our being constituted as subjects.” Rajchmann is mainly interested in Nietzsche’s model for the Foucaultian critical enterprise. As another basic characteristic of this model, he supplies the shift from providing “a philosophical foundation for the political order” to analyzing “of those forms of self-government which have no foundation or are historically contingent”. Lastly, there is the transition from “a “scientific” analysis of political institutions” to an analysis of “the politics of true discourse about those institutions”.

Mark Warren is another major contributor to the contemporary Anglo-American research on the political impact of Nietzsche’s thought. In a paper from 1985, he outlined the typical image of the political Nietzsche as follows: "His experiment deepened rather than resolved the crisis because it glorified the powers of the individual qua individual, affirmed a creativity conceived without social and political limits, and thus produced politics without care.” In contrast, his own point of departure was to look for Nietzsche’s significance “not in his political explanations, speculations, or ideals but, rather, in the way his philosophy penetrates the way in which political philosophy traditionally has constituted these three conceptual domains.” In this respect, Nietzsche’s lack of understanding for markets and bureaucracies and his correlative stress on the cultural and the physiological did not water down his philosophy of power, although they prevented him from grasping the dynamics of modern society.

Later, in reacting to a polemical critique Warren gives his reply to the type of accusations I referred to as “sweetening” Nietzsche’s thought: "One of the hazards of the Nietzsche industry is that it attracts those who believe one has not really penetrated the authentic Nietzsche until he is made as terrifying as possible.” Warren holds that Nietzsche’s “philosophy of power is politically relevant, but also politically indeterminate”: the philosopher failed to give his thought plausible “political identity”. Yet, Warren insists that one should learn many lessons from Nietzsche, because his thinking involves profound insights and fresh initiatives in the direction of societal intersubjectivity and egalitarianism, in addition to those in the more familiarly “Nietzschean” direction of individuality and pluralism.

Nietzsche’s social philosophy has interested commentators from early on. Von Winterfeld’s assessment, from 1909, centers on Nietzsche’s standpoint of viewing humankind dualistically. This thinking in terms of “the higher” and “the lower”, as von Winterfeld writes, can “blind a little” or go “a little too far”. The worth of the mass goes unnoticed and Nietzsche is about to strive “for too pure a split” and, hence, open the possibility for “a certain injustice and cruelty.”

Tönnies and Simmel (the latter is von Winterfeld’s main inspiration) were not the only sociologists who paid attention to Nietzsche. It has been said that Max Weber formalized and solidified Nietzsche’s critical
insights concerning the Western secularization and specialization. In Weber’s own writings, one finds few but arguably crucial references to Nietzsche. In a letter from 1907, Weber says that what is most sustainable in Nietzsche is his differentiation of the noble morality, whereas the “biological ornaments” he adds “around the core of his thoroughly moralistic teaching” represent the worst. More importantly, Weber’s *Wahrheit und Demokratie in Deutschland* (1917) includes an open praise for Nietzsche’s *Genealogie* and his idea of religion’s basis in class relations. He sees in Nietzsche’s work the first thematization of the role of suffering in religious morality. Weber considers Nietzsche’s ‘resentment’ to be a “psychologically significant discovery” that has its applications in social ethics. Yet, he doubts the fruitfulness of a generalized notion of ‘ascetic’.

These observations can be heard as an echo in the criticisms V. J. McGill makes against Russell’s political philosophy: “Russell’s theory of social mechanics is obliged to explain why the same instinct impels some men and some societies to seek Power, and others, to escape from it.” McGill points to the “much more resourceful” Nietzsche whose “interpretation of the Christian stress on loving kindness and humility as a disguised and inverted striving for Power, although certainly one-sided, is at least an attempt to meet the difference.” In contemporary discussion, Georg Stauth and Bryan S. Turner has attended to Nietzsche’s contributions to a sociology of the ‘body’. Lars-Henrik Schmidt has also been interested in situating Nietzsche within the confines of sociology for the principle reason of acquiring a viable metacritical viewpoint to that field of study. Nietzsche’s crucial role in inspiring Foucault’s later philosophy of power draws him often to the focus in today’s social and political debates.

Recently, Martha Nussbaum has expressed the view that, “[i]n political thought, [...] let us simply forget about Nietzsche, except to argue against his baneful influence”. Her stance has direct bearings on the feminist readings, too, since Nussbaum holds that Nietzsche’s writing on “women and the family” amounts to nothing “more than the silly posturings of an inexperienced vain adolescent male”. The “liberal Enlightenment thinkers that Nietzsche found so boring” are the ones to whose arguments one ought to turn to, while letting Nietzsche’s contributions to moral psychology to save their grace.

**II.c.11 Legal Readings**

“Nietzsche is the thinker and prophet of legal positivism”. This is what Philippe Nonet writes and means that Nietzsche resources “the historic movement by which the power of command rises to the rank of a supreme source of law, thus inaugurating the reign of positive law”. In Nietzsche, higher law (*Recht*) gets degraded, while positive law (*Gesetz*), giving birth to justice (*Gerechtigkeit*), is heightened to a new potency. It is not about “legal enactment” nor about “legal system” or anything like that. Nonet explains that what is at stake is “that fundamental understanding of law which first opens the possibility of
positing laws and instituting arrangements for such positing”. In his opinion, Nietzsche is radicalizing Kant’s idea of autonomy so that what counts eventually is the will’s own unconditioned “power to command what it wills”. Nonet endorses Heidegger’s basic argument: “positive law blinds itself to its own destructiveness, and falls under the illusion that it will overcome all nihilism”.

In his “Response to Nonet”, Peter Berkowitz admits “that the highest - and lowest - points of Nietzsche’s philosophical investigations concern the nature of an unconditional and self-certifying command and the character of the human being who aspires to issue it”. Yet, Berkowitz refutes Nonet’s presentation of the Nietzschean subversion: it is justice that is, for Nietzsche, prior to both higher and positive law. Furthermore, Berkowitz argues that Nietzsche does long for “man’s self-deification” but, as a part of this problematic, his idea of achieving “pure or unconditioned mastery” is more like “a thought experiment, wish, or unreached goal” than “an accomplished fact”. Nevertheless, what Nonet stresses as Nietzsche’s radicalization, or even perverting, of Kant’s basic theme, was already identified, similarly evaluated and rebutted by Gillian Rose’s harsh critique of Nietzsche, Heidegger and French post/structuralists. Rose does not make the mistake about justice that Berkowitz observes as Nonet’s crucial failure. Nietzsche is depicted merely as the source for an unacceptable attempt at overcoming legality and commencing lawgiving to the future.

It certainly goes to show, among other things, the flexibility of Heidegger’s reading that while Nonet draws from him the basic line of reasoning, his opponent, though evidently unwittingly, counters this reading by the Heideggerian recourse to Nietzsche’s special understanding of justice. Heidegger writes, namely, that Gerechtigkeit is Nietzsche’s candidate for the truth of Seiende as such, since it is the core of his notion of the will to power. Nietzsche’s justice, says Heidegger, is the essence of becoming master over oneself. It is, along with will to power, nihilism, eternal return and overhuman, one of the “basic words” or “main rubrics” that make up to the “essence of metaphysics” in Nietzsche.

Apart from these considerations, Nietzsche’s “transvaluation of cruelty”, his participation in rehabilitating delinquency, criminality, sadism and violence have been seen as a highly disturbing, disquieting, troubling invitation to the “carnivals of atrocity”. On this reading, Nietzsche endorses “philosophical cruelty”, in the “quest for the truth”, as he also accepts “ascetic cruelty”, in welcoming “the harsh renunciations and sometimes brutal costs of relentlessly pursuing any vaulting ideal”. Moreover, he is seen as advocating “artistic cruelty”, in fashioning “the works of imagination”, as well as commending “the cruelty of Machiavelli’s prince”, in giving license “to institutions and political practices that foster brutality and public displays of suffering”, in praising “regimes and popular insurrections that do not flinch from execution, torture, terror, unleashing the lust for revenge”. All this is based on Genealogie’s “speculation” on the birth of “the spheres of legal obligation and morality”.
There are other considerations. André Mineau has discussed Nietzsche’s views as to the human rights. He says that, while Nietzsche seems to reject human being’s intrinsic value, as well as the idea of politics of promoting the common good, his emphasis on the individual coupled with his hostility toward the state warrants a comparison to human rights theorists. However, Mineau concludes that Nietzsche’s turning away from the notion of a universal humanity residing in each and every human being, his aspiration for a special subclass of the humankind and his vision of the overcoming of the human-ness set him apart from the 16th century classics and their later followers.\(^{945}\)

Henry Kerger’s book *Autorität und Recht im Denken Nietzsches* (1988) is a unique monograph on the legal import of Nietzsche’s thought. What is especially noteworthy in this work is that it situates his stance in today’s debate among institutional theories of law and documents the philosopher’s awareness of the judicial discussion of his time. Kerger holds it as the “essential advantage” of Nietzsche’s philosophy that it relates itself so “immediately to sociological and jurisprudential questions”. His “speculations” are contextualized when compared to the shift in legal theory, embodied in the work of Rudolf von Ihering, from conceptual paradigm to the questions of interest and value. According to Kerger, Nietzsche shared von Ihering’s view that law is to be judged by the way it asserts and assures the conditions of existence. Whereas von Ihering describes violence (*Gewalt*) as something that has produced law as its “accidence”, Nietzsche favors more the role of power (*Macht*). If this is “might makes right”\(^{946}\), it does not mean identifying power with law but disputing their essential difference.\(^{947}\)

Individual legal readings bear witness to the scattered contributions to this field and its distinctive incoherence and lacking sense of shared business. This is further illustrated by the case of Yves Leduc. He mentions, as a curiosity, an early German monograph by the title *Nietzsches Philosophie vom Standpunkt des modernen Rechtes* (1906), but, like Nonet and Miller, fails to appreciate Kerger’s research. Leduc, who stresses Nietzsche’s suspicion of the Christian notion of egality in the basis of law, writes as follows: "Evidently, Nietzsche’s relationship to the judicial world is not primary nor essential. Nietzschean corpus is situated in other level and is pursuing different finality. Its problematic develops in a space that is not the one of law. And yet, I think I can affirm that a jurist can hardly ignore this philosophy. [...] In many aspects, Nietzschean thought touches upon problems that very much concern the functioning of society and the inter-human relations."\(^{948}\)

**II.c.12 Ethical Readings**

The most readily available realm to address Nietzsche’s challenge in “inter-human relations” is, of course, that of moral philosophy. It is not unusual to find remarks about the self-proclaimed immoralist and the author of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* along the lines such as these: the fundamental defect in
Nietzsche’s thought is that it “fails to recognize the need for universal ethical principles by which to distinguish between good and evil”\textsuperscript{949}. Early on, Nietzsche was said to stand for “the philosophy of heartlessness”, “the power exertion of the individual” and “the master rights of the genius”\textsuperscript{950}.

This kind of atmosphere is probably a necessary condition for understanding what, for instance, A. Campbell Garnet have to say: ”Nietzsche and Marx, Schweitzer and Gandhi, as well as Robespierre, were thoroughly conscientious men”\textsuperscript{951}. It also explains the way Martha C. Nussbaum pronounces her conclusion after examining “the most widely known” aspect of Nietzsche’s “critique of morality”: ”I hope to have shown that Nietzsche’s presentation of pity [...] is very much subtler and not that much tied to heartlessness and hardness than has so far been believed”\textsuperscript{952}.

Nietzsche’s considerations of morality, too, have, sometimes, been contextualized in his acquaintance with the ancients. In a recent book, Francis Snare discusses Nietzsche’s notion of ’noble morality’ by comparing its ideals with both those of the Homeric heros and, thereby, of the Greeks, and those of modern athletes. Snare remarks, in the passing, the subtlety and complexity, in Nietzsche’s descriptions of this type of morality and of its counterpart, ’slave morality’, before ending on the ambiguous character of “debunking” morality by relating its unfolding. Snare also claims that Nietzsche does assume a moral position himself, as he opposes, say, egalitarianism or antisemitism.\textsuperscript{953} In fact, it has been a common technique of criticizing Nietzsche to try and show how he, first, asserts the overcoming of morality as the primary goal and, then, fails to avoid promoting a morality of his own\textsuperscript{954}.

Joel J. Kupperman, has attempted at an alternative analysis in his \textit{The Foundations of Morality} (1983). He identifies “two countenances” of morality, the one of “strict demands on oneself” and the other of “outward-directed censoriousness”. Whereas the former can be seen as leading to guilt, the latter engenders repression of the unconventional. Kupperman says that this latter “countenance” along with its complex problematic is Nietzsche’s home ground, since his “hostility to morality did not prevent him from having a vision of what kinds of life are worth leading and what kinds are contemptible”. For Kupperman, Nietzsche is not a “moral philosopher”, but an “ethical philosopher” who offers “an elaborate guide towards what he thinks would be a life of the highest quality”\textsuperscript{955}.

Bernard Williams tries to capture “a distinctively Nietzschean route towards the naturalization of moral psychology”. He says it is about layers of explications that begin from “a supposed psychological phenomenon”, such as willing. In examining action, this phenomenon is “tied to morality” by “a certain conception of blame”. According to Williams, it is a “fit between the special psychological conception and the demands of morality” that “enables us to see that this piece of psychology is itself a moral conception”. He says that the things Nietzsche describes as ’ressentiment’ “certainly lead out of the
ethical altogether, into the categories of anger and power, and it cannot be a matter simply for philosophy to decide how much those categories will explain.” 956

Yet, where Williams sees, cautiously, “some measure of agreement” or, ironically, a “happy and enduring consensus”957, Michael J. Matthis writes that “while there may well be a tendency in Nietzsche to express himself in terms that have traditionally come to be associated with ethical naturalism, this terminology and the phases that contain it, should not be confused with the conceptual basis of thinking about ethics and values”. More precisely, Matthis’s Nietzsche “is not naturalizing value by identifying it with becoming and the will to power, but is in fact showing how value is distinct from fact, as the active is from the passive, as the creative from that which merely is.” Based on this conviction, he feels himself free to compare Nietzsche to G. E. Moore who warned of the dangers of naturalistic fallacy. Matthis says that Nietzsche’s position in ethics is “so essentially new that understandably he would employ the words and concepts of the discarded traditions”958.

Although “ethical” readings are typically anti-aesthetic, often apolitical and nonmetaphysical, they sometimes mirror treatments of other sorts. Alasdair MacIntyre’s comment, in the “Postscript” to the second edition of his After Virtue, could be taken as molding Nietzsche in the Heideggerian way of reading. MacIntyre writes, namely, that Nietzsche’s critique of morality is to be seen as but another aspect of the “moral culture” he fought.959 It is due to MacIntyre, Williams and other theorists, that Nietzsche’s critique of morality is, recently, taken into consideration in making sense of contemporary Anglo-American ethical criticism960.

In Lester H. Hunt’s monograph, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (1991), Nietzsche is presented as the relativist avatar of modern ethics of virtue. Despite his critique of justice and his neglect of the role of community, his emphases on character and on the integration of the self, make his thought open for comparisons to Aristotle and for further refinements in this tradition.961 Hinrich Fink-Eitel claims that “Nietzsche accomplished in the field of the critique of morality what Marx did in the theory of society and Freud in the science of the sick soul. He demonstrated the all too simple, idealized self-understanding of moral philosophy”. Yet, just as contemporary social theory is, so Fink-Eitel, as if untouched by Marx, so is it with today’s moral criticism and Nietzsche. According to Fink-Eitel, there are six options: 1) ancient teleology of good life, 2) post-renaissance agreement theory, 3) Kantian deontology, 4) Benthamian utilitarianism, 5) Rousseau’s and Schopenhauer’s ethics of pity and 6) Nietzsche’s ethics of radical self-realization.962
II.c.13 Theological Readings

Marx and Freud accompany Nietzsche in yet another context, as Merold Westphal calls them “the three most widely influential atheists in the modern era”. What their works require is, among other things, a redefinition of atheism. As distinct from traditional evidential atheism, the three thinkers are, in Westphal’s view, to be counted as mastering a non-Cartesian “atheism of suspicion”. Maritain already defined Nietzsche’s position as “positive atheism” involving battle against anything reminiscent of God. James L. Muyskens, for his part, says that apart from many disbelievers who would consider god’s existence as good, Nietzsche does not find even this slim chance to be desirable.

Nevertheless, Jaspers was one of the early thematizers for the reading that Nietzsche’s atheism springs from his ultimate religiousness. In his Nietzsche und das Christentum (1938), Jaspers writes that Nietzsche’s hatred of Christian faith is attached to his “factual bondage to Christianity”. As a matter of fact, it was Lou Salomé who first espoused the stronger idea that Nietzsche’s “various philosophies were but replacements of god”.

There are others who also insist that, despite all his criticisms, Nietzsche entertained a notion of the divine and sacred. For example, Leszek Kolakowski says that religion was, for Nietzsche, a despicable “experience of human insufficiency”. Yet, Nietzsche was a “pious soul” who could find no comfort in the credo of consistent atheism. Another commentator puts the issue like this: “Nietzsche [...] cannot be regarded as a religious philosopher, even though he is an outspoken tychic thinker”. These views have become so common that one wonders if only the creationists subscribe anymore to the unequivocal description of Nietzsche as an atheist.

Elsewhere, it is said that “[n]ot only Kierkegaard” but Marx as well, in his “eschatological horizons and prophetical pathos” have to be seen as working in the shadows of the 19th-century crisis of religion. The passage goes on: ”And, most completely, Nietzsche!” Similarly, a recent statement has it that “Nietzsche found meaningfulness and purposefulness in a Joachimite, utopian eschatology”. Harry Redner, for his part, has also insisted on the essentially “eschatological scheme” in Nietzsche’s account of nihilism.

Nick Land writes that “the death of god” that Nietzsche and Bataille specify as a crime “is no less worthy of cathedrals than the tyrant it abolished, and whose grave it continues to desecrate. Indeed, such new cathedrals are inextricable from the unholy festivities of desecration which resound through them, as the texts of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bataille illustrate”. He adds that “[f]or Bataille - far more than for Nietzsche - the atheology thus generated is of a specifically Christian character”. Yet, Land notes that as “a replacement for God was sought in the years 1888-9 even Nietzsche - the manic of compassion - was
reluctant to accept the post. 975

Nietzsche’s relatedness to, as well as his distance from, theological debates is handled in Christoph Schulte’s book Radikal Böse. Die Karriere des Bösen von Kant bis Nietzsche (1991). Schulte sees an analogy between Kierkegaard’s appeal to the Johannite Christianity and Nietzsche’s criticisms of St. Paul as the malicious ideologue of the church. Yet, his main emphasis is on the way Nietzsche opted for the naturalization and aestheticization of the theologically conceived evil.976 Others hold that it is “hermeneutic theology” that characterizes Nietzsche’s (and Heidegger’s) style, not any properly religious speech: ”There is philosophical piety, but no philosophical religion”977. Since Nietzsche’s name will be associated with the notion of the ‘death of god’, one does well to remember the way the other ’death of god’ thinker, Hegel, determined the theologico-philosophical connection: “ […] philosophy, too, has no other object than god and, thus, it is, essentially, rational theology and god’s worship continuing in the service of truth”978.

II.c.14 Ecological Readings

Hans-Georg Betz writes about the rise of “the green project of the left” in Germany, after the criticisms of Marxism by such thinkers as Rudolf Bahro. Betz depicts an “atmosphere of cynicism and resignation” coupled with a “celebration of critical and creative irrationalism” and an “affirmation of life”. It is in this sort of scenery, so Betz, that the alternative and green movements began to take shape. In the essentially ambivalent attitude towards modernity that characterizes these developments, Nietzsche was an indispensable thinker.979

Max O. Hallman observes that not much has been done to “exonerate Nietzsche’s philosophizing from the accusation that it affirms the technological domination of the natural world”. On the contrary, as far as Hallman sees it, “Nietzsche’s thinking is still generally viewed as antithetical to ecologically oriented, environmentally concerned philosophizing”. By contrast, Hallman himself thinks that Nietzsche’s “thinking is, on the whole, compatible” with such an orientation. He differentiates four points of affinity between Nietzsche and contemporary ecophilosophers. The first and the second of these are rejections of any “otherwordly” or “anti-natural” and anthropocentric approach. The third point of contact is the recognition of the significance of environmental interrelatedness and immanent development. Lastly, there is the call for a “reimmersion” of humanity “into nature”. 980

It would be fair to say that the general interpretative policy that it is endorsed in the present study may be called “ecological”. Yet, it is best to immediately qualify such a declaration. First of all, by “ecological”, in this context, it is meant that Nietzsche’s philosophical project is fruitfully examined as
one that took place somewhere between Darwin and Dewey. It does not necessarily claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is ultimately “environmentally friendly”, nor does it state that his main concern can be comfortably characterized as ecological. Most importantly, it does not say that “ecological” dimension somehow replaces or even surpasses the other dimensions differentiated above in sections II.c1-13. “Ecological” viewpoint can be seen to have its effect on issues of, say, metaphysical, social or moral nature. Apart from the more or less evident ‘natural’ and ‘naturalist’ emphases in Nietzsche’s work and from the not that well acknowledged connections to both Darwin and Dewey, the main reason for approaching it in an “ecologically” oriented fashion is that Nietzsche pointed the way from rigid subject / object models toward reciprocal relations, complex interdependence, flexible networks, dynamic exchange and organic development.

In point of fact, Nietzsche’s putative ‘naturalism’ would be much less interesting without its specifically ecological dimension. While I insist on the need to study the Nietzschean conceptuality, I also try to argue that this is important for any area of his work and that it can, to an extent, be explained in terms of an ecological breakthrough in thinking. In naturalizing the event of conceptualization, Nietzsche did not lose sight to the way nature itself, even though its existence is prior to, and independent of, the existence of anything capable of conceiving it, is always already ‘nature’ conceived as such and such. The most decisive sense of philosophical ecology is to be found in concepts being molded by experience and experience being molded by concepts.
II.d Key Debates

The varieties of interpreting and locating that have actualized in the course of the Nietzsche-Rezeption are at work in certain persistent contemporary intellectual conflicts. In this section, questions currently haunting the Nietzsche research will be related to a more general philosophical discourse. By so doing, one can best appreciate the metaphilosophical potential inherent in Nietzsche’s work and the controversies it has provoked.

II.d.1 Quarrel over Philosophy

Bertrand Russell may be the decisive figure in questioning Nietzsche’s philosophical stature. He did discuss Nietzsche, in many occasions, and took him along in his reconstructions of the tradition. Yet, Russell was eager to point out that Nietzsche was no philosopher “in the ordinary” sense of the term, but more of a literary master who produced poetic prose and not academic philosophy. These reservations did not, however, prevent Russell from speaking about “Nietzsche’s philosophy” 981

Rudolf Carnap’s double blow on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as poetry and metaphysics - even if it did include, as was suggested above (II.c.3), a considerable appreciation and even an acknowledgement of indebtedness - could be seen to provide back up to Russell. In any case Russell’s influence can be detected from, say, Roger Scruton who calls Nietzsche a “moralist, but one capable of considerable metaphysical ingenuity”. No matter how considerable or ingenious his thought was, however, to Scruton it stood for an “obsessive” critique of Christianity and “passionate extension of [...] egotism”, where “rhetorical” or “literary gifts of a high order” could not help solve the self-created “confusion” 982.

In D. W. Hamlyn’s view, “[t]here are some who see Nietzsche as a moralist more than a philosopher”. His own estimation is somewhat more balanced: “Nietzsche’s style is as much that of the poet as that of the philosopher” 983 John Passmore exemplify another typical, yet a bit more favorable than the usual, view of Nietzsche among Anglo-Saxon philosophers. He says that Nietzsche was “a man of remarkable
insight and literary gifts, although not at all a systematic academic philosopher”. According to Passmore, Nietzsche advocates “the conception of the philosopher as a critic of ways of life”. He calls Nietzsche a moralist and writes that, as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche was no “systematic philosopher - they were indeed positively opposed to systematic philosophy”.

Commenting on Ernest Newman’s Wagner biography, in 1947, Theodor W. Adorno wrote that "Newman quotes with sympathy such writers as A. J. Knight, who ruminates the hackneyed commonsense thesis that Nietzsche was “not a logician at all”, that his “contribution to philosophy was negligible”, that he had no method, no system, and that he “never succeeded in providing any contention scientifically”. Even Knight’s fantastic statement that Nietzsche was “intellectually lazy” goes unchallenged.” Adorno’s criticism is targeted against Newman’s overlooking of “the fact that the criteria he accepts from official philosophy are precisely those which were subject, by Nietzsche, to the most penetrating critical analysis, that the latter’s failure to comply with the rules of the game of academic thinking is not due to a lack of strength and selfdiscipline but rather to a lack of naivety and conformism.

Adorno points the way to appreciating the metaphilosophical potential inherent in a thinker that only with a great difficulty fits in the received model of philosophy. After a discussion of Kierkegaard’s philosophical standing, Alastair Hannay writes as follows: “Although philosophy for Kierkegaard was a limited enterprise whose terms of reference did not extend to the solution of the ultimate questions which concerned him, we are, of course, nowadays, well prepared to accept that the view that philosophy is limited is a philosophical view. Or better, a metaphilosophical view. Unlike paraphilosophy which carries the connotation of a project ’beside’ or ’beyond’ philosophy, metaphilosophy takes philosophy itself as its province and has just as good reason to be called philosophy as has, say, philosophy of religion, politics, logic, or whatever.

The lesson here is that one ought to try and study the specific kind of philosophy that emerges from an unconventional (meta)philosophical effort. It has been said that there is “no longer any need […] to prove that Nietzsche’s philosophy is not quite like other philosophies” Some commentators have followed Adorno in thinking that Nietzsche deliberately embarked upon reconceiving philosophy. As K. Weisshaupt chooses to put it, Philosophy appears, in Nietzsche’s eyes, as both a “title for errors and misconceptions of millennia” and a "watchword”. It is Nietzsche’s “twofold basic word for a challenge and a programme to interpret the world’s basic text that, for him, consists in there being no such text.” Weisshaupt concludes: “In Nietzsche, the unmasking of philosophy does not entail its death, it deals, rather, with transformation into another shape [Gestalt] and - mask.”
It is safe to say that even though Nietzsche is, nowadays, being studied in the confines of a variety of philosophical currents, the common suspicion as to his very philosophicalness still persists, especially in the English-speaking world. In his book, *Nietzsche in 90 Minutes* (1996), Paul Strathern writes that “Nietzsche’s larger philosophical ideas are barely worthy of the name”, albeit his “actual *philosophizing* is a brilliant, persuasive and incisive as any before or since”\(^989\).

J. P. Stern says that what is often “intolerable to Anglo-Saxon readers” is that “Nietzsche is not interested in the technicalities of philosophy” but “endears himself to literary men” by coming up with “total statements of the human condition”. Stern goes on to add, however, that “Nietzsche also knew that men are inexorably, fatally committed to thought”.\(^990\) In another context, Stern says that Nietzsche neither advocates a view of philosophy as literature nor entertains a view of literature as philosophy. He is, rather, urging the readers to appreciate philosophy and literature as closely related “forms of life”.\(^991\) Julian Roberts writes about from the same problem: “The very fact that his books are well-written makes them stand apart as 'literary' for any reader accustomed to the severity of the analytical schools. The sheer extravagance of his ideas makes it hard to approach some of his work as philosophy in any accepted sense.”\(^992\)

It is best to add that not always, not automatically, is Nietzsche more readily admissible outside Anglo-Saxony. In France, Francis Guibal has criticized his work as containing more “intensity and *provocation*” or “aphoristic and poetic expression” than “coherent discourse” or “rigorous and positive *analyses*”\(^993\). As for the German discussion, one could refer back to Rudolf Steiner (cf. I.c). It was seen that Steiner was a key figure in questioning the reliability of Förster’s editorial work, as well as in rejecting messianistic instances of appropriation. Yet, the paradox lies in the way the mere mentioning of Steiner, as the one to have understood Nietzsche enough to observe fraud copies of his thought, is to evoke a partnership that threatens Nietzsche’s philosophical image more than almost anything else. Even though Steiner was not yet, at the time he finished his monograph, the influential theosoph he came to be, and even though that book does contain a fair amount of good scholarship, there are features that may well cause these kind of second thoughts. For instance, Nietzsche is not just described as an individualist or a realist but as a vitalist and a personalist, too. He is not only divorced from “professional philosophers” but his being a thinker (“in the conventional sense”, though) is also disputed in favor of “bold leaps of thought” and “deeper secrets of the human nature”.\(^994\)

It was a part of Walter Kaufmann’s rehabilitative efforts to criticize both the artistic type of exploitation, as among the members of the George circle and the existentialist preference on “philosophizing” over philosophy, as in Jaspers. Kaufmann blamed Jaspers for “discounting Nietzsche’s philosophy” and for refusing to “take seriously” Nietzsche’s concepts. He felt that interpreters read their own vagueness onto

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the Nietzschean text. The reason for this lay, so Kaufmann, in the way “the words and parables which had intoxicated Nietzsche soon intoxicated other, lesser writers as well”. 995

Nietzsche’s questionable philosophical status is often related to the putative hegemony, in his texts, of “metaphors” and “persuasions” over “arguments”996. At least, arguments are taken to be “seldom given in the text” but “latent within it and must be sought and found rather than passively received”997. Yet, as the case of another commentator shows, a view of Nietzsche as a “highly literary writer, the champion of brilliant isolated perceptions and colourful, arresting metaphors” need not entail the absence of argumentativity, since “through the frequent use of genuine metaphors and through the fusion of those metaphors with more straightforward use of words, Nietzsche demonstrates in his style the theoretical argument that all his linguistic characterisations of life are in fact metaphors”998.

Be that as it may, Richard Schacht had a demanding task in accommodating Nietzsche in the publication series “Arguments of the Philosophers”. Schacht begins the inevitable justification with a comparison to Wittgenstein’s impact on the received view of the nature of philosophy. He goes on to characterize Nietzsche’s philosophical activism that involves investigating, developing and defending interpretations. According to Schacht, the problem of the “philosophical argument” is transformed, in Nietzsche, into a problem of soundness and adequacy in the interpretative practice.999

Charlene Haddock Seigfried’s paper “Why Are Some Interpretations Better Than Others?” (1975) is one example of the efforts to attend to this problematic. The author argues that “it is a delusion to think that the standard for valuation and interpretation lies in some primitive spontaneity”, since “Nietzsche nowhere espouses absolute arbitrariness”. She stresses that the Nietzschean notion of interpretation involves “the introduction of meaning” and the idea of “a new interpretation” as “superimposed over an older one”. A crucial criterion is that to be better the new interpretation must “do justice to the greatest number of observations about what is being interpreted by opening up new, more comprehensive perspectives”. Wider perspectives “would cause what is interpreted to be observed in fresh, new ways.” On this reading, Nietzsche does not abandon truth altogether but merely recognizes the absence of “one total, correct view of the world” and refuses “to be deceived by any partial truths”.1000

It is the purpose of many analytically oriented Nietzsche scholars, provided that they are sufficiently favorable to his thought, to legitimate his philosophicality. Robert C. Solomon, for instance, has insisted on the necessity to investigate Nietzsche’s thought “within the philosophical tradition”. As he sees it, this is not a conspiracy of those who wish to lose the excitement of Nietzsche’s exceptionality and to opt for the neutral sobriety. What is at stake is to recognize, in this thinker, not only a “blustering “immoralist”“ but a “profound philosophical analytician” as well.1001
There are other routes to the problematic. Paul de Man has made much of the unavoidable “literariness” of Nietzsche’s texts, while referring to the high frequency of philosophical statements within them. His pointed conclusion is that Nietzsche realizes the removal of the question of the difference between literature and philosophy.\textsuperscript{1002} What fuels the current quarrel over philosophy and Nietzsche is both the closeness of philosophy and literature felt uneasy by commentators with analytical background and the attachment of the two disciplines felt productive by many other linguistically oriented commentators. Whereas Hamlyn concludes his discussion on Nietzsche by remarking that “philosophy could go no further in this direction”\textsuperscript{1003}, the editors of the anthology After Philosophy. End or Transformation? (1987) relate Nietzsche to the complex “self-delimitation” of philosophy from the theory and practice of rhetoric and poetics.\textsuperscript{1004}

Attempts at coping with the literariness of philosophy and philosophicalness of literature have produced various proposals. Lewis White Beck has offered the notion of “philosophical literature” to cover two cases: literary text quotes philosophical text or embodies philosophical problematic.\textsuperscript{1005} Yet, as Robert Gooding-Williams notes, more urgent than the issue of the philosophical momentum of literature is that of the philosophicality of philosophy. The specifically philosophical, in a given text of philosophy, may be pursued in its properties that have to do with themes, narrative techniques or structure. This involves supporting certain conception of philosophy expected to be expressed in the thematic, narrative or structural features of the text. However, it does not necessarily mean that philosophical texts should be seen as but a literary genre, as “deconstructivists” do. The scope of these texts is just expanded to accommodate at least some literary fiction. Gooding-Williams mentions, as one version of the potentially philosophical in Nietzsche, Richard Rorty’s distinction between philosophies that offer arguments for persistent problems in a fairly inert language and those supplying narratives and new vocabularies questioning the old problems and their aged answers.\textsuperscript{1006}

Gooding-Williams writes that in order to defend “narrative philosophy” arguments may be dispensable. A surrogate philosophical device could be ‘explanation’, in the spirit of Robert Nozick. Explanation appeals to hypothetic conjectures about the sufficient conditions of a phenomenon. A given narrative could be philosophical in the sense that it delineates potential explanations.\textsuperscript{1007} As Karsten Harries observes, Gooding-Williams’s treatment leaves open the ways in which the “integrity” of philosophical writings should be safeguarded, how the specifically philosophical in an explanation should be understood and how philosophy relates to poetry, on the one hand and to prose, on the other.\textsuperscript{1008}

The quarrel has broader dimensions. It is instructive to look at the manner in which Magnus, Stewart and Mileur argue their philosophico-literary joint effort, Nietzsche’s Case. Philosophy as/and Literature (1993): ”This difficulty of blending the voices of philosophy and literature mirrors the felt difficulty of
fruitful collaborative inquiry into root questions within one’s own discipline. [...] If the mutual shunning which has come to characterize philosophy in America has had undesirable consequences, the conflict in literary studies between those committed to traditional historico-critical methods and those pursuing recent developments in “theory” has been no less unfortunate. Indeed, the educational and political consequences of mutual shunning may have been and may continue to be as baleful in literary criticism as the analytic/continental split has been to philosophy.”

To widen the boundary dispute to bear on the level of commitments that surpass those boundaries would be well in line with Nietzsche’s sense of his own questionable accomplishment that, in the spirit of the epigraph of the previous section, questions traditional limits of scholarly expertise. Where Magnus, Stewart and Mileur see “undesirable”, “unfortunate” and “baleful” effects, Richard Rorty speaks of “the tiresome “analytical-continental split”“ that will, in the future, be seen “as an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of communication”

To be sure, the trouble is not exclusively American. Andreas Graeser wrote recently that the gap between Anglo-American analytical philosophy and continental hermeneutic philosophy “seems to constitute a threat far more devastating and annoying than anything that has been witnessed in the past”. Having picked up the names of Charles Taylor, Arthur Danto and Thomas Nagel, as exceptional free movers, Graeser discussed the chances of a reunion. This will have to take place on the basis that “philosophers, while clinging on to the tools and techniques developed by analytically minded thinkers and maintaining the ideal of clarity they inherited from Socrates, should not hesitate to cope with the wide range of interesting issues raised by hermeneutically oriented thinkers and try to develop them accordingly.” It is surely a fine thing to hope for a reunion. It is another thing to start the preparations with presuppositions such as these. In Graeser’s eyes, one camp is equipped with the instruments, the other with good questions. Only one camp is clear enough to qualify as the heir of Socrates. One camp is “minded”, the other is “oriented”. If it is meant that there are those capable of manufacturing devices for “coping with” whatever questions the others should “raise”, then what is proposed is not an agenda for further negotiations but a declaration of conquest.

I would hold that the “shunning split” is relevant in studying Nietzsche. It has to do with lacking self-awareness and shallow mutual acquaintance in the opposed interpretative camps. For instance, as I said above (II.c.3), there is ignorance about Nietzsche’s anti-obscurantist thrust and favorable reception among logical empiricists. Adorno is one of the very few to have caught something of this affair when he writes about the “irony” in the way Nietzsche “liked to identify himself passionately with Western soberness and positivist disillusionment” and is, however, doomed to become “a helpless victim as soon as faced with positivist criteria”.
As for the dispute between the philosophical and the literary, Derrida’s influence in intensifying this affair cannot be overlooked. According to Ernst Behler, Derrida considers Nietzsche’s philosophy to be “not so much an exercise in demonstrating that language turns back on itself, that Nietzsche’s philosophical rhetoric is untrustworthy, but that it constitutes a paradigm of overcoming philosophy in the traditional manner. Derrida does not, as does Heidegger, merely see Nietzsche as the last and most extreme philosopher of the tradition, but as the true end of traditional philosophy itself.” Christopher Norris underlines the more cautious features in the French thinker: ”Derrida is far from endorsing Richard Rorty’s proposal that we should drop the idea of 'philosophy' as a discipline with its own particular interests, modes of argument, conceptual prehistory etc., and henceforth treat it as just one 'kind of writing' among others, on a level with poetry, literary criticism and the human sciences at large. In fact his recent essays have laid increasing stress on this need to conserve what is specific to philosophy, namely its engagement with ethical, political and epistemological issues that cannot be reduced *tout court* to the level of an undifferentiated textual 'freeplay'.

In any case, Derrida has pronounced his objection to the notion of “the end of philosophy”: "I think that the conclusion that philosophy has reached its conclusion, come to its term, is a very dangerous thing and a thing which I would resist. I think that philosophy has, is, the future, but for the moment it has to give its consideration to that which has enclosed it, a set of finite possibilities. What does this finitude consist of? What is this finite element in philosophy? We have the feeling that philosophical discourse is exhausted, that it can only reproduce itself in different forms, in different combinations. What does this closure consist of? This is an opportunity for thought; it’s nothing like death, or the end, but an opportunity. And if this is called philosophy, then I think that philosophy not only has a future but that it is only if there is a future, if non-anticipatable events lie ahead. What interests me here is the event, and the event is such only insofar as it cannot be programmed and therefore anticipated. That’s what provokes thought. And that’s what provokes philosophy.”

Despite these reservations, Derrida has certainly contributed to the boundary disputes surrounding or permeating philosophy. The most important gesture, on his part, has probably been the way he once read Nietzsche as “parodying the language of the philosophers”. In this, he is accompanied by Jean-François Lyotard who has spoken of Nietzsche as “parodying prophecy”.

On the face of it, the traditional positivist or the modern analytical distrust for anything that looks even remotely like stylistic, poetic, aphoristic, satiric, playful, provocatory kind of expression produces, in assessing the dilemma “Nietzsche and philosophy”, an outcome not that different from the one caused by the textual readings corroding any principles to divide portions of writing. Inclusion of Nietzsche among philosophers requires changes, in the definition of philosophy, yet his work casts a shadow on any
attempt to provide these redefinitions.

Another intriguing debate that has more or less direct bearing on the notions of both 'philosophy' and 'Nietzsche' is the one between realism and anti-realism, especially in the way it is has been going on between such all-rounders as Putnam and Rorty. Rorty’s interest in Nietzsche might seem evident and even unproblematic for those, if there are any, who feel at home in the “anti-realist” position. In contrast, Putnam’s appreciation of Nietzsche that may well, as was suggested above (II.c.3), extend beyond his remark about Nietzsche’s being “immensely interesting” is surely more disquieting to many “realists”. To be sure, the conflict between Putnam and Rorty has not concentrated on Nietzsche. Yet, the questions that they deal with are relevant enough to merit a brief discussion here.

As Putnam sees it, Rorty thinks that “the failure of our philosophical “foundations”“ is apt to make “a difference as to whether and when we are allowed to use words like “know”, and “objective”, and “fact”, and “reason”“. Putnam denies that “our reaction to the failure of a philosophical project […] should be to abandon ways of talking and thinking which have practical and spiritual weight”. In addition to this, he criticizes Rorty for his Carnapian manner in rejecting philosophical controversies: “he scorns the controversy”. By contrast, Putnam sees himself as “examining the pictures involved“ in the “realist-anti-realist controversy”. Although both doctrines “misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts”, they are not “unimportant“.

Rorty’s reply is this. He denies Putnam’s first accusation but accepts the second one. When it comes to the idea of philosophy as a basis for culture Putnam is “just wrong about what I say”. Rorty claims that he has “complained over and over again about Martin Heidegger’s and Jacques Derrida’s overestimation of the cultural importance of philosophy”. What is more, he stresses the need to “continue to speak with the vulgar while offering a different philosophical gloss on this speech than that offered by the realist tradition”. He admits that there is a Carnapian tone in “some of my writings (particularly in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature), and there should not be”. He writes that “I should not have spoken of “unreal” or “confused” philosophical distinctions, but rather of distinctions whose employment has proved to lead nowhere, proved to be more trouble than they were worth.” Rorty deplores his being mistaken to endorse “the end of philosophy”: ”Perhaps it may clarify matters if I say that I hope that we never stop reading, e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Dewey, and Heidegger, but also hope that we may, sooner or later, stop trying to sucker the freshman into taking an interest in “the problem of the external world” and “the problem of other minds”“.

To sum up a little, there are, in my list, three instances of the quarrel over philosophy and Nietzsche. The first leads to either dismissing his philosophicalness in favor of, typically, poetry, rhetoric, moralist
teaching, or saving it by a recourse to Wittgenstein or other more respectable metaphilosophical radicals. The second instance leads to either equating his philosophy with literature/literary criticism, or attaching these in a way that precludes any purely philosophical account of their relations. The third one leads to asking, whether Nietzsche is modeling or taking part (if not in the classical realist-representationalist tradition, then) in the pragmatic alternatives of Putnamian minimalist realism or Rortyan (post)philosophical ethnocentrism.

These issues are clarified in the context where I shall try to make sense of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy (see section IV.c.3). As for now, it suffices to stress that while the three instances I just mentioned all oppose, avoid, resist metaphysics, the quarrel harks back to it all the time. The step forward may well be taken with Karl Ulmer who, despite his respect for the Heideggerian reading, says that “Nietzsche’s work is cut across by trains of thought that in no way belong to the sphere of received metaphysics” as the “speculative general determining of being”. This makes it urgent to study his striving for “a wholly new kind of philosophy”.\textsuperscript{1020}

II.d.2 Quarrel over Metaphysics & Subject

Putnam says that “I take it as a fact of life that there is a sense in which the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics and a sense in which its task is to continue metaphysical discussion”. What has been “disastrously failed” is, according to Putnam, the attempt at “providing a foundation for Being and Knowledge - a successful description of the Furniture of the World or a successful description of the Canons of Justification”. His project is to “lay out some principles that we should not abandon in our despair at the failure of something that was called metaphysics and something that was called epistemology”. Resistance to both nostalgia and panic is highlighted in Putnam’s rejection of Relativism and Realism as impossible attempts at a “View from “Nowhere” or a “God’s Eye View”. What remains is a realism that accepts “reality” as never “language independent”, while being happy to say about the world that “[i]t’s just the world.” But what remains as well is, for Putnam, metaphysics as “simply reflection at the most general and most abstract level”.\textsuperscript{1021}

Incidentally, Steven Rappaport unites Putnam’s “internalist perspective” and Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” under the common, and more or less confusing, rubric of “metaphysical relativism”. He defines it as being tantamount to “holding that there is no unique, objective world order”. According to Rappaport, this view is, in turn, “a deduction from the claim that the world or reality does not come presorted”, that is to say, “already arranged into a unique set of kinds”. He writes that “metaphysical relativists can be realists in the sense of believing that there are objects - rocks, stars, trees etc. - which exist independently of any knowledge or awareness of them”.\textsuperscript{1022}
With Rappaport, things might seem to get too entangled to fit in the frames of the present study. However, what is more important here than the specific way he establishes the connection between Putnam and Nietzsche (or Danto’s reading of the latter), is that he does it in the first place. Yet, Putnam’s context for his defence of renewed realism is a great deal more sizeable than Rappaport’s positional differentiation. While running the risk of distorting Putnam’s views, I would like to take a few steps forward from his basic setting.

There are two big questions. What is the import of the allegedly continuous need for metaphysics? What is the import of the loss of metaphysics, if metaphysics was the provider of ontologico-epistemological foundations? Interestingly enough, Christian von Ehrenfels was one of Nietzsche’s early readers to have paid attention to these sorts of questions. In a text from 1902, where Nietzsche does not appear, he contributed to the present problematic by calling for a choice between “metaphysical trust” and “metaphysical nihilism”. What was at stake was either an assent to an “imperishable metaphysical need”, and some kind of function of a “minimum of metaphysical convictions”, or the denial of these. It was von Ehrenfels’s view that the continuous faith in metaphysics is a much more meaningful world-view than nihilism requiring “peculiarly satanic refinement”, since “truth is the productive and error the destructive”. For example, Ptolemaic conception of the universe is to be regarded as being “closer to the truth” than an “astronomical nihilism” disputing all efforts to argue for a view on this issue. Thus, von Ehrenfels seeks to defend metaphysics, even if only in its “minimal” sense, as something close to making scientific hypotheses. 1023

Drawing an analogy between metaphysics, on the one hand, and hypothetico-experimental research, on the other, is one way of tackling the dilemma. Historically speaking, this sort of defence of metaphysics strikes odd, as one thinks of, say, d’Alembert’s vision of the “renaissance of philosophy” involving a denunciation of metaphysics and system-building in favor of “the spirit of hypothesis and conjecture”. 1024 Yet, after the initial enlightenment outrage against outmoded static conceptions of knowledge, many contemporary observers have been more concerned in reconciliating metaphysics with science, and that these reconciliations do sound like von Ehrenfels’s idiosyncratic utterances.

For example, in 1974, Erazim V. Kohak said that the most significant demarcation problem is no more the Popperian one about science and (metaphysics as) non-science. It is the question about good and bad metaphysics. Whereas all metaphysics is, for Kohak, lousy science, metaphysics is called for, because, unlike essentialists hold, experience is not “unequivocally self-interpreting”. According to Kohak, the reality needs, then, to be both described and interpreted. Science investigates the actual, metaphysics the potential. In Kohak’s view, metaphysics is the business of providing “rational “myths”“ or proposals for a “systematic and critical reality-matrix” that introduces meaning to the phenomenological descriptions of
the “incoercible” structure of reality.\textsuperscript{1025}

Klaus Hartmann’s recent contribution to the issue of metaphysics starts from the “main impulse” Kant has given to criticizing metaphysics. In classical terms, Kant thwarted the \textit{metaphysica specialis} as a bundle of so many pseudo-arguments, but held tight to a certain \textit{metaphysica generalis} understood as “a regional ontology restricted in the objects of experience”. Hartmann discusses Hegel’s attempts to reform metaphysics and proceeds to have a look at the modern developments. He recognizes, notably, Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s “hermeneutical” criticisms and the “avoidance of metaphysics” characteristic of the analytical tradition. His conclusion is that ontology and metaphysics cannot be abolished, since they take part in “making the world understandable”.\textsuperscript{1026}

Let Kohak and Hartmann represent here but two versions of the idea of the insufficiency of scientific explanation. They serve to exemplify solutions to the problematic of the survival of metaphysical thinking. Moreover, they are strikingly a kin to the way Gregory Schufreider tries to maintain “metaphysics” in the explicit vocabulary and tool case of Nietzsche research. Schufreider expresses the, by now, familiar point that antimetaphysical stance can only be grasped through metaphysics. His reading makes Nietzsche into a self-reflective metaphysician. Schufreider stresses that this kind of metaphysics participates in creating a world view, in providing the world with a meaning.\textsuperscript{1027}

What makes the question tricky is the way the words “metaphysics”, “critique of metaphysics” and “loss of metaphysics” are so tightly linked with automatic divisions in the current intellectual constellations. As the last case of the first big question identified, I would like to have a recourse to a text, from 1974, by the Italian critic Ugo Spirito. What makes Spirito’s approach surprising, from today’s perspective, is that he attacks the metaphysics of those who have claimed themselves the merit of abolishing metaphysics, that is, positivists. Spirito speaks of a “\textit{metaphysics of mass}” as the proper “metaphysics of positivism”. Since positivism is but a “new speculative dogmatism” no better than the old idealisms, what is called for is a “\textit{problematicism}” with its “programme of a more radical scientific antimetaphysics”.\textsuperscript{1028}

When it comes to the second big question, it is best to quote at once Karl-Otto Apel: ”A post-metaphysical philosophy is needed today for the very sake of an ultimate foundation of knowledge. The greatest single weakness of metaphysics (and of mythical thinking) is that metaphysics can only intimate, but never really prove, an ultimate foundation.” Apel’s stance may appear strange in the light of what has been said above. Yet, rather like Putnam, he endorses Peirce’s idea of metaphysics as a “speculative discipline of universal hypotheses”. As Apel goes on to clarify, however, he is striving for a differentiation of the varieties of metaphysics, on the one hand, and for a philosophical non-fundamentalism, on the other. Interestingly enough, he repudiates, along with “traditional ontological
metaphysics”, both “Popper’s followers” and “post-Nietzscheans”. Where the Popperians, in Apel’s view, “abandon all notion of an ultimate foundation”, the Nietzscheans commit themselves to the view that “the possibility of an overcoming or ‘getting over’ metaphysics depends on enduring the performative self-contradiction”. Since these alternatives are so unattractive to him, Apel would choose, should his programme fail, “to be called a metaphysical philosopher”.

Gianni Vattimo is the one to criticize Apel for deviating from the anti-Kantian path of Heideggerian hermeneutics. There are two directions in Heidegger. One seeks a place “beyond metaphysics” and looks for thinking that is “absolutely other”. This path may, as Vattimo insists, “lead to mystic conclusions”. The better, the Nietzschean direction requires “traversing” metaphysical errors and is accomplished in the act of “repeating” and “distorting” them. One suspects that this is precisely the “endurance” Apel is mocking: the only Überwindung of metaphysics is its Verwindung. Since it has to do with the dissolution of foundations, it is not surprising that Vattimo discusses Rorty’s hermeneutics more sympathetically than that of Apel. He sums up Rorty’s critique as follows: “epistemology is founded on the presupposition that all discourses are commensurable and intertranslatable, and that the foundation of their truth pertains precisely to their translation in one language basis that is the mirroring of facts; hermeneutics, for its part, affirm that such a unifying language cannot be given and it enforces itself to appropriate the language of the other sooner than to translate it into its own”.

To begin to move towards the debate about the subject, Michel Meyer can offer the first glimpse. He speaks about “the defoundationalization of the subject” that was “inaugurated by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud”. By 1986, says Meyer, “the death of the subject” and the domination of language have become “the two great characteristics of our epoch”. The demise of the Cartesian subject has left philosophy “without a foundation” and made it “more problematic than ever”. In Meyer’s estimation, now that a “certain “metaphysics of foundation” is dead, with Nietzsche and others”, philosophical thinking is threatened by neo-positivistic scientism and “simple play” both marking the “impossibility of discourse”. What he seeks is a “problematological” approach to philosophy that is, however, not to be mistaken for the problematicism Spirito proposed, since it includes the idea of “returning to philosophy its natural metaphysical function” that has been lost, since Kant identified rationality with the scientific.

It has been suggested that the subject’s becoming questionable, in Nietzsche’s writings, points the way to appreciating “the system of transformations of subject positions within the text signed “Nietzsche”“, and this “Nietzsche” as “the assemblage of these subject positions” . According to Hans Blumenberg, Nietzsche extended the transience of the object to include the one of the subject, too. As an organism may only live so long, “the unity of the subject” has not enough time to become actualized: there is no time “to unfold the different identities” at one’s disposal.
J. Hillis Miller finds, in Nietzsche’s unpublished writings, “the most systematic and cogent dismantlings of the concept” of the self “in its relation to the other metaphysical concepts with which it is necessarily connected”. Beside “dismantling”, Miller uses, quite generously, such terms as “disarticulation”, “deconstruction”, “decomposition”, “demolishing” and “disentangling” of the “concept”, “idea” or “entity” of the self or selfhood. What counts is “the idea that the fundamental activity of the mind is an activity of interpretation”. This involves, in turn, “simplifying, schematizing, omitting, and making equal of things which are not equal”. According to Miller, Nietzsche’s project has produced “undone” orders and priorities, as well as distinctions deprived of meaning, such as that between “inner” and “outer”. The act of disarticulation, however, comes to depend on the usage of “self”. Where Nietzsche’s deconstruction deconstructs itself, it is, for Miller, only “a version of the universal aporia of deconstruction”. 1034

'Deconstruction’ is not the only form of close reading to have brought to the fore Nietzsche’s critique of the self. In one of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s writings, Nietzsche is referred to as “the great fatal figure” whose critique touches upon “the most radical strangeness” inherent in the creature pretending to know itself. Gadamer writes about Nietzsche’s masquerade where mask after mask is undressed, but no self results from this unmasking. Where his critique ushers us, so Gadamer, is away from what is our own, our most unique, that is, from self-consciousness. 1035

Vattimo takes his lessons from Gadamer, and from Nietzsche, too. He starts by noting that the “notion of the subject is one of the most constant objects of the operation of unmasking that Nietzsche directs against the contentions of metaphysics and the Platonic-Christian morality”. Turning to Gadamer’s articulation of truth as experience - including the rejection of the empiristic imagery of seal and tabula for an understanding of a “modifying effect in the subject” - Vattimo says that this “dislocated” subject no longer “‘founds” in any sense this term has in the philosophical tradition”. For him, “the ”master” line of contemporary hermeneutics as it is defined in the work of Heidegger and Gadamer” is to be set against “the programme of neo-Kantian “refoundation” of Apel or Jürgen Habermas. 1036

Yet, as it was seen, Heidegger thought that Nietzsche could not take off from Western philosophy as subjectivism. This sort of critique can be found in other commentators, too. Glen T. Martin, for example, concludes that Nietzsche “retained the picture of human beings as isolated subjectivities over and against the world who had to somehow transcend that very subjectivity if they were ever to have genuine knowledge that was not merely one more subjective perspective”. 1037 Jacques Brafman, in turn, holds that both Nietzsche and Heidegger, in their respective criticisms of the Cartesian cogito, “ran the risk of proving against themselves”. In addition to the trap of the fallacies and superficialities of relativism and to Nietzsche’s ultimate refuge in “privileged one interpretation, his own” as truth, Brafman also points
to the way the properly Nietzschean and Heideggerian high regard of one’s own prestige goes back to German romanticism and its cult of the creative individual.1038

Michael Hinz, for his part, says that “Nietzsche takes as his starting point subjectivity, or the self, in order to provide a new way of understanding human nature as the ultimate ground of all value”. He goes on, however, to criticize Heidegger and to insist on such issues as “all the processes of subjectivity”, “self-creation process”, “whole subject”, “self as a unity of creative activity”, “self as an organized totality [in] an ongoing accomplishment” in order to differentiate between a “lame conception of subjectivity” and the Nietzschean “new conception of the self”.1039

Among Anglo-American hermeneuticians, Nicholas Davey has been particularly active in investigating Nietzsche’s view of the self, or his “‘no-self’ theory”. In comparing Nietzsche to Hume, he tries to show that the former’s denial of “the notion of actual self-identical things” is “distinctly metaphysical”, since it is based on “the actuality of continuous Becoming”. In Davey’s view, the commitment to this metaphysics makes it ultimately impossible to explain the origin of the belief in the self, seen as practical necessity, a surface fiction upon “the collectivity of drives” or “a temporary grouping of instincts out of which consciousness arises as a means of self-regulation and co-ordination as an effective unit”. In a later article, Davey attempts to combine this ontological “no-self”, or “subject-as-multiplicity”, theory with an only implicitly Nietzschean “hermeneutically oriented notion of the self as an interpretative nexus” that no longer relies on “substantive or transcendental identity”. In a still more recent text, he defends Nietzsche against charges of “wilful subjectivism”.1040

Christopher Janaway seeks to show how Schopenhauer paved the way for Nietzsche in undermining the “unitary self”. Janaway says that “[f]or Nietzsche, our being a ’subject-unity’ depends on our being primarily an organic plurality”. According to Janaway, this “multiplicity of subjectless (unowned) processes” derives from Schopenhauer’s notion of the “‘blind’, organic will”. As he argues, very much like Davey in the Hume-Nietzsche juxtaposition, Nietzsche faces the dilemma of the horrifically chaotic self completely dissolved in the flux and the unified self to “organize and harness” this flux. On Janaway’s reading, this is one of Schopenhauer’s “haunting echos” to be heard in Nietzsche.1041

Alongside Hume and Schopenhauer, one had better to remember the positivist attack on the substantial subject. A philosopher very important for Nietzsche, Hippolyte Taine, was particularly active in questioning the meaningfulness of the subject, soul or ego. For him, these were just so many metaphysical articles of faith or, ultimately, mere words. In more positive terms, the ego was to be conceived as “events and their combinations”. According to Taine, it was only “the concept of fact or of the event” that “corresponds the real things”.1042 Meanwhile, in the German speaking world, Ernst Mach
put it succinctly: “The ego [Das Ich] cannot be rescued”. The time has come to replace the “soul” or the “psychic unity” with the notion of psychic phenomena as somehow “hanging together”.\textsuperscript{1043}

Arthur C. Danto has been the key figure in bringing the question of the subject into the analytically oriented Nietzsche research. For instance, in reviewing Morgenröthe, he writes that the book introduces moral psychology that is “relentlessly anti-Cartesian”. Danto specifies that Nietzsche’s writing shows us unknowing about what we are, as lacking from the immediacy of our own consciousness.\textsuperscript{1044}

Rorty offers another account. Criticizing Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s metaphysics, Rorty claims that Nietzsche was the first to propose “that we drop the whole idea of “knowing the truth””. Rorty relates this suggestion to the need to abandon both representationalism and the “idea of finding a single context for all human lives”. Yet, he says that Nietzsche did not jeopardize “the idea of discovering the causes of our being what we are”, of being able to “track home the blind impression that all his [the individual’s] behavings bore”. What is at stake is, rather, the “contingency” of the self and of the faculty of reason. In making sense of the human nature, no one strategy is privileged over the others. Nietzsche’s pragmatism involves, so Rorty, the radicalized notion of self-knowledge as self-creation.\textsuperscript{1045}

The status of the subject has been crucial in the context of the social and political readings of Nietzsche, too. Mark Warren, for one, says that Marx and Nietzsche share the approach to their various problems starting from different practices, not from the standpoint of the cognizing subject. Nietzsche was busy studying the way a certain, paradigmatically modern subject has come to be what it is.\textsuperscript{1046}

A rarer way is taken by Alfred I. Tauber in his The Immune Self (1994). He seeks to show the deep affinities between Nietzsche’s critique of subjectivity and the immunological research by Elie Metchnikoff. Tauber regards Nietzsche’s “biologicism” or “organicism” to be “the clearest enunciation of what identity means in a post-Darwinian world”. Metchnikoff came up with his “phagocytosis theory” explaining the “active defensive mechanisms of the host” and introduced the “modern concept of the immune process as a special case of inflammation”, that is, as part of “the body’s effort to maintain its integrity”. Nietzsche, in turn, had an “enormous preoccupation with the body”, an “obsessive concern with disease” and preference for a “competitive motif”, all of which take part in his strive to develop, out of the actualization of the self in a “disharmonious […] internal struggle”, a view of the subject as a “dynamic construct”. As Tauber puts it, Nietzsche let the “active”, “ever-evolving”, “ever-changing and growing” and, hence, “elusive” ‘self’ surpass the more or less “punctual” alternatives of the ‘I’ and the ‘ego’.\textsuperscript{1047}

The subject debate is exceedingly multifaceted and very much entwined with metaphysical problematic.
In Charles Taylor’s broad study, *Sources of the Self* (1989), Nietzsche appears as “one of the main forerunners and inspirers” of the currently popularized view that “the self might not enjoy a guaranteed, a priori unity”. This is, in Taylor’s estimation, related to the post-Kantian awareness “of the historical and cultural variation in the forms whereby we structure experience.”

Roger Smith’s recent reconstruction of the history of the human sciences offers an opportunity to move from the quarrel over subject toward the one concerning the putative antagonisms and the reputed formlessness of Nietzsche’s output. He writes about “Nietzsche and his modern interpreters” as key players “in the demolition - or, to use jargon, the deconstruction - of the notion of the self”. Smith’s cautious handling of the issue can be seen both in the stress on the ways of conceiving selfhood and in his remark to the effect that “mainstream scientific psychology” was also soon to criticize “the notion of a coherent or unitary self”. Not only can one refer to Lacan and Foucault as those responsible of implicitly and explicitly following Nietzsche in making the self “the subject of history and language, rather than the subject of psychological science with universal pretensions”. One should also bear in mind the contemporary efforts by, for example, Minsky and Dennett, to radically redefine what may be taken as “an ordinary person’s sense of self”. The issue at stake can, then, be approached from the double perspective of the critique of science and the self-correcting development of science. Dennett’s name should suggest that Nietzsche is, despite his being, “[b]ly any conventional definition of psychology as an occupation or as a science”, neither a psychologist nor a scientist, equally important for both dimensions. Yet, his influence in the “Parisian intellectual hot-house” of the 60's and 70's is what counts most for Smith, which is why he contextualizes the properly Nietzschean demolition of the self within “the late twentieth-century preoccupation with the fragmented, ironic and contradictory character of the human condition”.

**II.d.3 Quarrel over Contradiction & Thematical Reading**

It is a common general complaint about Nietzsche that he seems more or less hopelessly contradictory. Even those who do not complain so much, are ready to say that “his work teems with contradictions both fruitful and frustrating”. Often enough, these divergences and discrepancies mirror his reception. In 1978, Bernd Magnus wrote that, in the Nietzsche scholarship, “nothing is settled”. Five years later, Magnus estimated that “Nietzsche commentators disagree about most aspects of his thinking”. Yet, he added, “crudely and even misleadingly”, that “there is considerably less disagreement concerning the negative, deconstructive side of Nietzsche’s thinking than there is about the positive, reconstructive side.”

However crude or misleading this may be, Yirmiyahu Yovel is happy to say that the sheer disparity, in
the Nietzsche reception, suits well the philosopher’s own emphasis on the concept of interpretation. By contrast, another commentator deplored, in 1990, the “situation within Nietzsche scholarship” as being “quite confusing” with its “fundamental differences” concerning both the philosopher’s peculiar techniques and the achievements he may have been able to come by. Already in 1918, Johannes Volkelt drew attention to the way Nietzsche’s texts contain incessant and “enspirited” mocking of truth, logic, thinking and knowledge. The problem in relativizing these concerns the status of one’s own utterances. Volkelt not only refers to the usual refutations of relativism on the basis of paradoxical self-reference, he also states that Nietzsche’s self-refuting denials conceal a “domineering, almost insultingly dogmatic kind” of attitude.

More recently, John M. Bernstein has made much of the contradictoriness in order to disqualify Nietzsche’s thought, although he says that it does not remove “the value of Nietzsche’s writing”. What makes Bernstein’s otherwise familiar observations - e.g., that Nietzsche scorns Englishmen here, appreciates there - compelling is that their critical edge is directed, most of all, against Nietzsche’s sympathetic readers. Bernstein says that where Kant scholars find it quite normal to think that Kant is frequently erring and see it as their equally normal job to be to criticize him, Nietzsche experts select and defend their master against misunderstandings, yet do not commit themselves to his issues or argue for his being right. Usually, Nietzsche’s ambiguities are simplified and his arbitrarities ignored. Yet, in his own monograph on Nietzsche, Bernstein formulates a thesis which just has to be deliberately self-refuting. He says, namely, that it is impossible to write precisely or sincerely about an author that spreads so many contradictions.

This is already tantamount to formulating the challenge for a “thematical” interpretation of Nietzsche’s work. But in order to move on toward such challenges, it must be said that there have been many attempts to come to terms with the conceptual family of contradiction (Widerspruch, Widerstreit, Gegensatz, Opposition, Antagonismus, Antinomie, Kontroverse, Spannung) that he raised. Karl Jaspers is, no doubt, to be counted as among the first to have thematized this issue. His pointed hypothesis was that for each of Nietzsche’s statements there is a counter-statement. All of the positions Nietzsche assumes he also abandons. In Jaspers’s view, there is no way of telling where this practice lead him. There is only the option of attending to Nietzsche’s experimental activity in each of its tensions.

There is a Jaspersian tone in Erich Heller’s writing about Nietzsche’s “existential contradictions” that “belong to the pattern of a most complex mind”. He stresses that these contradictions “are far too obvious to be called mistakes or oversights. They are the expression of Nietzsche’s fear of the curtailing of articulation”. Yet, Heller is perhaps a bit more optimistic than Jaspers, since he says that these contradictions “dissolve into meaninglessness when examined within a narrow section of the whole”. He
identifies the essential tension to be between Nietzsche’s “poetic prophecy” and his “suspicion that the poet is a liar”. 1058

Peter Heller’s different strategy is to relate Nietzsche in the German tradition where Lessing’s stance is already symptomatic of the diminishing uncertainty and the urge for the fierce movement of dialectic. Heller argues that dialectic became, for Nietzsche, a matter of “torture” that was at the same time irresistible and unbearable. Nietzsche is very rarely, says Heller, offering any mediation to tame the contradiction. On the contrary, it is heightened into cosmic principle (‘will to power’), description of the cycles of creation and destruction (‘eternal return’) and superior personal capacity (‘superman’). Heller takes into account Nietzsche’s early criticisms of dialectical thinking, but seeks to pinpoint the way his basic motivation of “reversal-addiction” remains the only thing unreversed in Nietzsche. 1059

For Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche is, with his pluralistic philosophy, specifically and “resolutely anti-dialectic”, even “the most outrageous, the only profound enemy” of dialectics. The “ensemble of Nietzsche’s philosophy” is missed, if it is not grasped that it was directed, in particular, against all sorts of Hegelianism. What is at stake is the notion of negativity, since for Nietzsche, “the essential relationship between a force and another force is never conceived as a negative element in the essence”. A force does not “deny the other force or that which it is not”, but instead “it affirms its own difference and rejoices of that difference”. Negativity engenders only in the prior activity of “the aggression of an affirmation”. In Deleuze’s terms, “dialectic”, along with negation, opposition and contradiction, mean “speculation” and “work”, but not necessarily “more thinking”. “Difference”, in turn, connotes “empiricism” and “fun”. Deleuze explains that, since Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave depends on the master’s will to represent itself, it is committed to portray the master as but an image of the slave. 1060

Deleuze has a developmental point to make, too. He is of the opinion that when Nietzsche was, at the time of his first book, under the heaviest influence of Schopenhauer, he nevertheless retained a more Hegelian mode of depicting the tragic dilemma and its reconciliation. Only after freeing himself from Schopenhauer, says Deleuze, he became more Schopenhauerian in his anti-dialectic stance. 1061

Stephen Houlgate has challenged the antidialectical reading of Nietzsche. Quite specifically, Houlgate argues that had Nietzsche known and understood Hegel’s dialectical logic and the all-important function of the Aufhebung as “the immanent transformation of one mode of thinking into a moment of a more complex mode”, his criticisms of conceptual oppositions would have been greatly improved. As it stands, Nietzsche’s attempt to promote “a mode of being which overcomes the simple dichotomy between the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical, a mode of being, though opposed to metaphysics in a sense almost incorporates it, because it has been interiorised and civilised by it”, falls short of achieving more than “that ‘almost’”. It remains, then, “too closely wedded to polemical antithesis”. 1062
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter’s *Nietzsche. Seiner Philosophie der Gegensatz und Gegensätze seiner Philosophie* (1974) concentrates on Nietzsche’s conception of all that happens as involving the imperative of “requiring opposition”. All oppositions are “immanent to life”. All that takes place are forces, or centers of the ‘will to power’, playing with and against each other. Oppositions are building blocks of a thisworldly philosophy where reality. Such a construction is an invitation to interpret, while what is constructed is taken to be a dynamic interpretative process itself. Nietzsche’s is, therefore, a philosophy of an interpretation of interpretation.1063

Peter Pütz is the last commentator of Nietzsche’s contradictoriness to be introduced. He approaches the issue from the viewpoint of reappropriations of Nietzsche’s texts, since what interests him is “the fundamental contradictoriness of Nietzsche’s philosophizing” that “intentionally guards itself against the possibility of usurpation”. Besides systematizers and those who try to explain contradictions away by, typically, adopting developmental and biographical viewpoints, there is the “possibility of bringing together the fundamental positions”, through an “argument that recognizes antinomical thinking itself as Nietzsche’s methodological principle”.1064 However, as Pütz goes on to remark, “even the principle of contradiction” is explicitly “contradicted” by Nietzsche (see MA I 1, KSA 2, 23). No “reconciliation” of oppositions is, then, to be sought, but “opposition to the principle of opposition”. The importance of ‘life’ for Nietzsche is, according to Pütz, explained by the perception that it “withstands its irregularity and contradictoriness”, tolerates them. Pütz concludes that “[t]he deeper and, ultimately, irresolvable contradiction, in Nietzsche’s work, is that contradictoriness and totality are hostile opposites that must, nonetheless, work together.”1065

The transition from the quarrel over contradiction to the one over the possibility of a thematical reading seems to me to be the shortest route. Yet, it could be argued that just about any debate, in the contemporary discussions on Nietzsche, tends to lead there. One of the easiest ways to understand it, is to recognize just how numerous “themes” are introduced and dealt with, in Nietzsche’s writings, and how difficult it is to discern their limits and decide their order of rank. This is how Karl Ulmer opens his monograph: "The unclarity about Nietzsche springs from the multifacetedness and extensiveness of his work. That work is transected by a plenteousness of themes which might be ordered into groups but seem to resist, as a whole, any combinations in terms of a necessary interconnection. Moreover, one finds, about these themes, most variegated insights that cannot to be united with one another [...].”1066

One of the classics of the thematical challenge is, again, Jaspers. His crucial role is best appreciated through the critical exchange between him and Kaufmann. In his polemics, Kaufmann says that Jaspers “values Nietzsche’s explosion of every finite position as the proper function of philosophical reason”. He is particularly irritated by Jaspers’ emphasis on Nietzsche’s destruction of secure foundations and on his
awareness of the absurd and the ambiguous. What is lost, by such an “inconclusive” reading, is both Nietzsche’s “acid clarity” and his painstaking attempts at working out his thoughts.  

To these accusations, Jaspers replies as follows. He holds on to the “self-contradictoriness” of Nietzsche and affirms its thoroughness. As for his self-understanding in studying Nietzsche, Jaspers writes that his task is to “make the contradictions meaningful”, not just to dwell on the oscillations. This is why he has chosen to underscore the “room-making, illuminating, dialectically daring, never fixating kind of thinking” exemplified in Nietzsche’s work. What Jaspers sees as getting lost, in the traditional approaches, such as the one Kaufmann represents, is the “immense spiritual energy” invested in that philosophical work. The decisive lesson is to resist “wanting to get positions from Nietzsche, either in order to make them one’s own or else in order to fight them”.  

One can turn to two Nietzsche books, from the 1990's, and detect points of view that differ from one another in lines largely continuous with those drawn by Kaufmann and Jaspers. While Gerhard Schmitt insists that Nietzsche is to be portrayed “in his contradictoriness”, Alistair Moles stresses that Nietzsche has “quite well articulated views on many different topics, from aesthetics to religion, from education to ethics, from epistemology to criticism of the mechanistic account of natural events and its replacement by what he calls a “dynamical” view of the world”.  

Since Moles does, in the same context, take his distance from readers who seem only to find “postmodern themes”, from Nietzsche, one is effectively transported to the realm where the thematical challenge is, nowadays, felt to be the most pressing. Julian Young’s case is instructive here. He suspects that Nietzsche may a philosopher with respect to whom it is especially hard to settle on a “single view” on anything, since the general nature of philosophy as having to do with the way “everything is connected with everything else” becomes intensified in his work. Moreover, he notes Nietzsche’s “fluctuating beliefs” and makes a distinction between what, of all the texts there is to his name, the philosopher might have “entertained” and what also “affirmed”. Yet, Young rejects any celebration of “self-contradictions” and strongly criticizes what he takes to be the two dominant varieties of approach today: either the Nietzschean text is entirely ignored and interpretation given freplay or the text is given a “quasi-biblical status”.  

The key figure in the becoming pervasive of the quarrel at hand is, yet again, Derrida. Writing in the early seventies, Derrida pointed out that the metaphysical oppositions are no face-to-face confrontations, but have to do with hierarchies and repression. In this context, he outlines “deconstruction” as an indirect destroyal of these oppositions. He does not mention Nietzsche here but writes, in another text from the same year, about “classical metaphysics of opposition” and about the need for a “new articulation”
that is being called for “in Nietzsche’s discourse”\textsuperscript{1073}.

One of Derrida’s challenges for thematic treatments is to problematize “the commerce between the said author and his proper name”. Derrida’s questions about the author are, “whether he signs what he signs when he signs, whether his proper name is truly his name and truly proper, before or after the signature, and how all this is affected by the logic of the unconscious, the structure of the language, the paradoxes of name and reference, of nomination and description, the links between common and proper names, names of things and personal names, the proper and the non-proper, no question is ever posed by any of the regional disciplines which are, as such, concerned with texts known as literary.”\textsuperscript{1074}

Ernst Behler has elucidated Derrida’s probing for a “new kind of communication, one that resists the temptation to posit fixed doctrines or ultimate meaning, but persists in the endless deciphering of its own terms”. Thus, says Behler, Derrida has taken the lead of “Nietzsche’s turn towards infinite interpretation” or “the activity of the sign without truth, without foundation, without beginning or end”. Henceforth, the point is “to explore his text”. Yet, Behler holds that one does not have to “abandon from the outset the project of knowing what the text says”.\textsuperscript{1075} Taking his bearings from Derrida, Staten writes that “I do not claim to be excavating what Nietzsche really thought underneath the ellipses, obscurities, ambiguities, confusions, and contradictions, but mapping the textual topography within which all these take place, or take their place.” Moreover, Staten divorces his treatment from the excavative ones by questioning any reading that discusses Nietzsche’s views “as though they were propositional entities inhabiting a consciousness that viewed them and was their owner, these entities then being re-viewable by us as the proper objects of our investigation within the overall field called “Nietzsche’s thought”.” In short, Staten warns of “normalizing” interpretations and holds that “there is nothing in the texture of the text that can be isolated as in principle inessential”.\textsuperscript{1076}

Also in the aftermath of Derrida’s contributions, Angèle Kremer-Marietti has ventured to say that Nietzsche’s transforming of the “dualisms of thought into relations of value” puts him beyond dualist implications of logic in a way reminiscent of Teilhard de Chardin’s and Einstein’s respective physical breakthroughs\textsuperscript{1077}. Alan D. Schrift, in turn, says that Nietzsche’s “rejection of oppositional thinking” is what most effectively brings him close to the “disassembling” practices of contemporary criticism\textsuperscript{1078}. Stephen D. Weiss, for his part, relates the “dismantling of the metaphysical doctrine of opposites” to the view that “Nietzsche’s contraries are sublimated and unsublimated versions of one another”\textsuperscript{1079}.

Then there are Foucault and Deleuze. Foucault says that “[t]he actual history of Nietzsche’s thought interests me less than the kind of challenge I felt one day, a long time ago, reading Nietzsche for the first time. When you open \textit{The Gay Science} after you have been trained in the great, time-honored university
traditions - Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl - and you come across these rather strange, witty, graceful
texts, you say: Well I won’t do what my contemporaries, colleagues or professors are doing; I won’t just
dismiss this. What is the maximum of philosophical effects to be found in these texts? That, for me, was
the challenge of Nietzsche.”

Deleuze, in turn, writes about his own books on the figures of the history of philosophy and about the
way Nietzsche “extricated me from all this”. This was due to the way, says Deleuze, “you just can’t deal
with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things behind your back. He gives you a
pervasive taste - certainly something neither Marx nor Freud ever gave anyone - for saying simple things
in your own way, in affects, intensities, experiences, experiments.”

The quarrel over thematical reading makes it extremely questionable to settle on any view as Nietzsche’s
last word about any single question. It ushers one to doubt any “solution” to whatever interpretative
problem there arises in attending to Nietzsche’s texts. In the words of Kathleen M. Higgins and Robert
C. Solomon, there is “nothing Nietzschean überhaupt”, that is, no single or privileged way of unifying
Nietzsche’s corpus. Or as Lars-Henrik Schmidt puts it, “one cannot write a book about Nietzsche
with chapters of the type “Nietzsche’s view on...” This is because Nietzsche offers no “secure reference”,
no “secure stepping stone”. Schmidt’s Nietzsche is “a stimulant”. Nietzsche’s challenge lies in the way he
invites one to his teaching that instructs how it is “precisely this underlying tendency to security” that is
itself to be recognized and studied.

Even Danto, the founder of the analytical Nietzsche interpretation, has come to question traditional
manners of scholarship in dealing with the German writer. It is about the fate of ‘propositionality’. Danto
remarks that Nietzsche “invented perhaps ten distinct philosophical genres, to the point where, I am told,
a practiced reader of his work can tell to which text a particular fragment must belong”. This
phenomenon of “stylistic affiliation to a parent text” is enough for him to become suspicious as to “the
degree to which we are justified in pulling out propositions out of Nietzsche [...] [that could] be detached
and asserted on their own.”

It is something of a paradox that the thematical problematic may have its most decisive, albeit not well
recognized, root in Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche. Where Heidegger, with his stress on the
“basic question” and the exhausting “main rubrics”, offers perhaps the most “thematical” of all of the
Nietzsche readings, he manages to mark its questionability, too. In the lectures of 1940, Heidegger says
that his objective is not to get a grasp of Nietzsche’s standpoint. It is something else. In his view,
“because Nietzsche was the first to try to think about “nihilism”, we have to think about his thoughts”.
Significantly, Heidegger lays great weight on the point that it isn’t so urgent to “know all the “places” of
the “theme” of nihilism”, but, instead, to be able to discover what they are saying.
It would be out of step to proceed without consulting Georges Bataille. He edited a collection of excerpts from Nietzsche and proposed them “for the long, for the slow meditations” to be “ruminated without end”. Bataille explains why he is not discussing such issues as will-to-power, eternal return and so on: "Essentially, Nietzsche’s thinking elevates on the ridge of the waves UP TO A POINT WHERE THE MOST TRAGIC IS RIDICULOUS. At this height, it is difficult (and perhaps impossible) to maintain oneself: Nietzsche’s thinking itself did not, for good reasons, maintain itself there but rarely. I have tried to indicate the path of these crests, not to dwell on the well-known themes [...]".\(^{1086}\)

Just what kind of a challenge it is to move away from thematic treatments is intimated by way of Sarah Kofman’s inquiry on the theme of culture in Nietzsche. Kofman writes about Nietzsche’s “aim of deconstructing the whole system of metaphysical oppositions”\(^{1087}\). Her contribution, to the important conference in Cerisy, was a paper on Unzeitgemäße. In her view, these books “allow a metaphysical reading, as well”. In spite of that, she accomplishes one that concentrates on “the indefinite metaphorical play” locating the texts “outside metaphysics”. What is important is that, in the book series, there is “a series of metaphors” for culture, of which “[n]one is privileged, none is proper”.\(^{1088}\)

Bernard Pautrat wants to suggest “that the thought of the eternal return is completely missing from Nietzsche’s system, even if its place is marked within it, that it is that which is absent, and that this absence activates, in a profound way, Nietzsche’s text”. He goes on to say that “what this thought says, what it “means”, is never directly, positively presented in the form of a philosophical thesis”. In other words, Pautrat’s Nietzsche’s Zarathustra “is never in the position to give an exoteric statement of it”.\(^{1089}\)

Yet, it is only with Jean-Michel Rey’s L’enjeu de signes. Lecture de Nietzsche (1971) that the Bataillean anti-thematical Nietzsche comes to the fore. On the first page, it reads: ”Not a commentary [...], but a curving and repetitive reading”. And in the first note, at the beginning of the first chapter, it is said: ”It is a question about a reading that ought to reflect itself at the same time it produces itself; the Nietzschean text requires such a text [...]; multivalent text that cannot be reduced to a thematical cutting (e.g., articulation of “will to power”, “eternal return”, “death of god” and “overhuman” that would, according to Fink, reproduce the quadruple articulation of the metaphysical question), nor to an entangled network of themes; a text that introduces a rupture in the philosophical discourse and that, as such, cannot be put under a classical commentary”.\(^{1090}\)

Taken together this is a strong case for Nietzsche’s exceptional stature and the special procedures it necessitates in interpretation. It spreads doubt concerning the concept of interpretation, confrontation, thematization. Says Gary John Percesepe, one of Derrida’s Anglo-American disciples, where Kafka’s writings cry out for interpreters to come, the Nietzschean text exclaims: ”Find the styles!”.\(^{1091}\)
Anti-thematic, non-thematic or a-thematic undertakings have had a decisive effect on the way that it is thought to be appropriate to write about Nietzsche. For many, an altogether too decisive. David E. Cooper, for one, has opposed “the ’new’ Nietzsche”, a notion that, for Cooper, covers the readings offered by Blanchot, Deleuze, Derrida, de Man and such anthologies as The New Nietzsche (1977) and Exceedingly Nietzsche (1988). What Cooper sees as the “prima facie doubtfulness” of this renewed figure is that it invites readers to believe that Nietzsche did not assert or affirm what he wrote in places in which it has been thought that he did, but that all pieces of writing should be understood as so many “ruses” or “jabs”. In his view, Nietzsche is not informing his readers about being in a “paradoxical position”. On the contrary, Cooper sees him as consistently developing his interpretations to fit his newly established criteria of correctness.1092

Peter Heller, for another critic, sees the readings that treat “Nietzsche’s texts (as preferably all texts) to be texts about texts” as just another “cop-out” that tries to make Nietzsche “malleable for a cult”. In this sense, he goes on, anti-thematical reading can be compared to Kaufmann’s strong rehabilitation programme. For Heller, the linguistic cop-out has “a function in creating an ideology of disengagement (a philistine contentment with sophisticated futility) in a context in which the humanities are meant to be reduced to the status of learned distractions or the innocuous foil for a cynical pragmatism”. He finds an antidote from Nietzsche’s critique of esoterism. Heller writes, in a way that is different from, but compatible with, Cooper, about “the very mode of exploratory, tentative radicalism, or experimental and provocative reversals, the dynamic intellectual games - which, to be sure, would not have been played with the engagement due to seriousness in playing if he had not meant what he said, or meant it only as flatus vocis, without bearing on the shaping of the game of life in all its aspects, including the verbal domain but hardly ever restricted to it.”1093

Similarly, Peter Poellner takes it as his “central hermeneutic hypothesis” that Nietzsche “does really wish to engage critically with those whom he persistently appears to criticize”. If it be thought otherwise, it becomes difficult to “convince us either that what Nietzsche is doing has any relevance to the more traditional concerns of philosophy, or that it can be seen as a critique of these concerns or of particular ways of pursuing them”. According to Poellner, “[i]t is surely possible, given [...] a sufficiently strong will to ignore many things he says, to read Nietzsche as being concerned exclusively with a certain thesis about the role of metaphors in language, or as not making any substantive claims at all, or as merely parodying and playing with various elements of available ‘discourses’, but such a reading would not only leave the specificities of very large areas of his writings unaccounted for or under-interpreted, it would also render him uninteresting to most of his readers, who felt that he has something to say on issues which are of importance to them.”1094
All the same, Poellner is sensitive to the challenge of thematical treatments. Namely, he makes the remark that “Nietzsche never commits himself to” the epistemological views appearing in his texts “with complete conviction”. Moreover, he holds that “it would be naïve to believe that [Nietzsche] himself actually subscribes to all the considerations and positions he presents or adumbrates”. Poellner insists on there being, for Nietzsche, “a number of reasons for his persistent prevarications and ambiguities”. All in all, what Nietzsche’s “almost obsessively critical” philosophy reveals is, at the minimum, that he is “by no means [...] simply unconcerned with and uninterested in rational argument”.

Sure enough, many Nietzsche scholars do not seem that troubled by the problematical nature of the thematic. Having noted the problem of themes, Karl Ulmer went on determining ‘philosophy’ as “a certain dimension of thought, a certain sphere of themes, as well as an inner unity of their unfolding”\(^{1096}\). Later on, Elisabeth Kuhn, for example, makes a very frequent and rigorous use of the notion of Themenkreis in her differentiation of Nietzsche’s discourse of nihilism\(^{1097}\).

It is best to say that the expression “thematical/anti-thematical” is not quite a happy one. For one thing, in Nietzsche’s own notes, the notion of “Themata vorschlagen” is seen to appear (N Herbst 1881 12 [219], KSA 9, 615). For another, Derrida, who is seen to be the sinister or redemptive figure behind the ‘new’, post-thematic Nietzsche, writes himself, for example, about “the entire thematic of active interpretation”\(^{1098}\).

Yet, the term has considerable summarizing power. Rudolf E. Kuenzli has intervened in the quarrel over thematical reading in an interesting way. He says that “[b]road thematic readings still dominate Nietzsche criticism to such an extent that analyses of individual works have been the exception.” He deprecates the common habit of favoring the Nachlass over the books Nietzsche finished and criticizes, among others, Bataille’s and Derrida’s strategies. Yet, it is clearly from them that Kuenzli draws, as he means to “focus on the overall signifying process” and make sense of “the sequential repetitive process of active forgetting and remembering, of seductive high seriousness, and of undercutting and mocking that seriousness”. These “movements of deconstruction” encourage Kuenzli to speak about Nietzsche’s “metalinguistic insights” that are “rhythmically inserted” to “put into question his own assertions”. For him, Nietzsche is “aware that writing in only rewriting, a repetition of socially agreed-upon signs”, hence his resorting “to parody, to self-parody, to play”.\(^{1099}\)

Another way to criticize the contemporary anti-thematical readings could be to argue that they do just what Bataille, the founder of this counter-tradition, saw as the most pernicious. Prefacing his collection of Nietzsche’s texts, Bataille writes as follows: ”Reading is, habitually, [...] the means to adjourn, to avoid the consequences. [...] I have assembled these texts for the use of those who WILL SEARCH FOR
THE CONSEQUENCES. [...] If, in the heights indicated, one does not discover new perspectives, a new world - rending the old one inhabitable - it is because one passes by, because one arranges a little betrayal. It is necessary to choose: comes a time of being FOR or AGAINST. Bypassing, avoiding the consequences - decisive not only for the destination of the individual but for the destination of humanity - signifies that one understands nothing, that one WANTS to be deaf.\footnote{1100}

As a matter of fact, some such critique is developed by Nick Land who admits that Derrida, at his best, “partially captures a shift from bilateral reflection to unilateral propulsion that is profoundly consonant with Nietzsche’s thinking”. Yet, he sees there “an immense gulf between Nietzsche’s aggressive genealogies that wreck unity on zero, and Derrida’s deconstructed phenomenology that interminably probes the border between presence and absence.” Instead of being reducible to deconstruction, Nietzsche’s unilateral thought and his hatred towards polar thinking feels, in Land’s view, better at home in Bataille’s no-study, no-commentary, no-exegesis, in his “space of community”, in his “pact against industry”. He writes that “I have no argument at all with Derrida as a reader of Heidegger, after all, deconstruction and reading Heidegger is one thing. It is when his academic textualism attempts to cope with \textit{writers} such as Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille, and Artaud that it definitively abandons its zone of relative utility and becomes an apparatus of domestication in the service of the state. [...] Anyone seeking to fortify a reconstructed reason against the sacred will find much of value in these writings.”\footnote{1101}

Moreover, for Land, the pressing issue is that “[a]cademic prose has the remarkable capacity to plunge one into a sublime dystopian nightmare: \textit{is anything this appalling really possible?} one asks. What happened to these people? Is it part of some elaborate joke perhaps? Or do they just hate books? There is a sense in which one can only admire their ability to make Nietzsche seem like a bank manager, Bataille like an occupational therapist, or Derrida world-historic, but in the end one just vomits.”\footnote{1102}

This could be compared to other comments made on the impossible mission of absorbing Nietzsche into the confines of the academy. I shall introduce only three. Stanley Rosen writes that “[o]ne of the most serious difficulties facing any student of Nietzsche is how to bring out his author’s teachings (or dreams) without distorting them by the exigencies of academic prose.” His own choice is to “be discursive”, yet “dare to dance and leap a bit, if only to come within hearing distance of the extraordinary thinker who is in the process of conquering late twentieth-century thought in a variety of disguises”.\footnote{1103}

Most likely, Land would remain hostile to Rosen’s talk of “bringing out” anything, as Rosen would probably see Land as “regaling the reader with parables and revelations”\footnote{1104}. Be that as it may, it is instructive to see how the two of them question both traditional manners of scrutiny and Derrida’s attempts at a new articulation. Rosen’s comment on Derrida is even more chilling than that of Land’s:
"This is Nietzsche with a vengeance [...] There is nothing playful about this, but neither is there anything serious here. Where there is différance, there is no difference".\textsuperscript{1105}

Elsewhere, Derrida, with his 'undecidability', is much more expectedly accused of "conscientious obscurity" and "pretend-philosophising" so "absurd" and so "pernicious" that it threatens the scientific "ideal of objectivity". These accusations by Brian Medlin take place in a context where rationality is being fortified against (Derrida’s view of) Nietzschean affirmation.\textsuperscript{1106} Likewise, Bernard Zelechow has attacked Derrida’s notion of 'undecidability', on the grounds that it threatens the possibility of communication and is about to lead to "despair or nihilism". He, too, makes his objection in discussing Derrida’s use of Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{1107}

In his article, "Upon Nothing", Roger Scruton has expanded this issue into a full-scale attack against what he identifies as "the new breed of scholar for whom the subject of study is not thought or knowledge but 'text'". To characterize the "deconstructive writing" that has taken over humanities departments, Scruton speaks of a "peculiar surface, in which technicalities float on the syntactic flood and vanish unexplained downstream". He mocks Derrida’s "childish word-play" and the way "each passage cancels in its second half what is promised in the first". Unwilling to call it meaningless, Scruton describes this sort of writing as "jargon-infested delirium". While mentioning "the favourite philosopher of the Nazis", Nietzsche, as "Baptist to Derrida’s Christ", Scruton endeavors to show that the current literary fashion related to the names of Derrida, Barthes, Bourdieu and Foucault, is reducible to "the annihilation of truth by power" characteristic of the 1968 rage against the bourgeoisie. Or better, of "cleverness actively deployed in the cause of Nothing".\textsuperscript{1108}

To be sure, some defenders of "deconstructive interrogation" have expressed that they find it regrettable that their moves have caused such counter-effects, while others have remained silent. Kevin Newmark, for one, wishes to convey that one ought to see how Nietzsche is not after an "annihilation of all values". While this would only be "as arbitrary and meaningless as their blind acceptance and propagation", one must attend to Nietzsche’s "transvaluation" or "revaluation". In doing this, Newmark says that the labels such as "nihilist", "irrationalist" or "meaningless" that are accorded to deconstruction are designed to stop "taking it seriously".\textsuperscript{1109}

To refer back to the quarrel over philosophy and to the "shunning split" that Magnus, Stewart and Mileur recognized on the American intellectual scene, I shall close this subsection and this chapter by consulting Rainer Nägele. He writes as follows: "But curiously, although not surprisingly, these deconstructions [those by Derrida, Kofman, Lacoue-Labarthe, de Man] of oppositional constellations have effected at the same time all the more rigid dichotomies on the institutional level. Even the simple
uttering of a term like “deconstruction” places us firmly and inescapably within an institutional machinery of exclusion and inclusion. Thus, in the search for an escape from the ontological and metaphysical dichotomies, we find ourselves in the concrete(ness) of institutional walls. If this seems to lead us farther and farther away from the philosopher [Nietzsche] who ultimately stepped outside the institution, it brings us at the same time to the core of a philosophy of conflict, opposition, exclusion and inclusion, radical no and jubilant yes.1110

As far as I can see, these sorts of quarrels are best approached by exploring Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. I have tried to show how that conception cannot be studied without a sense of the hundred years of critical coping with the philosopher’s legacy.
This chapter stands in the middle of the present book, between the first two and the last two chapters. The best way to begin here is to sum up what has been done so far and to point the way forward. I started out from the problems involved in Nietzsche’s life. My thesis was that the philosopher’s biography is not philosophically irrelevant, yet the drawbacks of biographisticist reasonings that have haunted much of the Nietzsche scholarship ought to be recognized and avoided. Through psychoanalytical considerations, for instance, one can draw a lot from the interplay of life and text but the latter cannot be explained by the former. In any case, critique of the ways that a thinker’s bios is told and written will remain urgent. I attempted to show that the issue of the various ‘philosophies of life’ is relevant to studying Nietzsche, yet one needs to admit how poorly investigated that tradition or type of thought still is, and how much careful reading its utilization requires. One either departs from Nietzsche and moves toward Lebensphilosophie or goes to the opposite direction, a thorough study and complete revaluation of the problematic is called for.

However, my most significant point, in section I.a, was none of these. It was to demonstrate that ‘life’ was a persistent philosophical object of inquiry for Nietzsche who seems to have continually problematized his own existence while interrogating the larger topic of living, health, sickness and decay.
I wanted to make clear that whatever one is to make out of Nietzsche’s life, one should pay attention to
his laborious elaborations of ‘life’, to the impact that these elaborations have had on later currents of
thought and to the hints they offer about the philosopher’s way of philosophizing and about his
conception of concepts in general. Concept of ‘life’ is liable to change. Its tight connection to the
concept of ‘concept’ makes it crucial not only from the point of view of the individual experience of
collapse toward the end of Nietzsche’s life but also from the viewpoint of the Zusammenbruch of
collective conceptions and the ensuing nihilistic sense of experience.

The basic message I tried to convey discussing Nietzsche’s works was a simple one. I wished to show
just how numerous his books are. I wanted to join those commentators who stress the distinctness of the
individual works in his corpus and usher readers to attend to their individual structuring and special
distinguishing features. A clear grasp of the variety of the philosopher’s output is the best antidote
available against the all too loose way of speaking about “his view” on this and that, “his characteristic
habit” of doing such and such or “his declarations” on who knows what. Just to play it safe, though, I
had another point to make that was of greater magnitude than this. It was to make visible and to
explicate the Nietzschean way of problematizing the notions of book, text, writing and producing. I also
suggested that the classic question of the successive phases of his career could be answered along the
to lines of a perpetual emancipation from emancipation.

In section I.c, the historical stages of editing Nietzsche’s writings were examined. I told about my view
that all of Nietzsche’s writings collected in the Colli-Montinari edition are to be taken in consideration in
studying his thought. While emphasizing the philosophical importance of many things often taken to be
of but a philological interest, I also endeavored to articulate a more specific point. The plurality of
Nietzsche’s utterances to the effect that his books form pairs, triples, sets and sequences and the fact that
he was practically forced to take care of the publishing, too, both prompted making sense of the notions
of publicity, readership, intersubjective exchange. It was not a long way from these reflections to
underscoring the significance of the questions related to reception. In a way similar to noting the
differentiated and multifaceted character of Nietzsche’s ‘life’ and his ‘work’, the sheer variation in the
acts of receiving and the plain abundance of the more or less eminent receivers deserved to be brought
to the fore. Covering the reception history of this philosopher means confronting exaggerations,
controversy, stupidity, enthusiasm, hype, erudition, all the while the flexibility of his works or his slogans
continue to take one by surprise. My proposal for coming to terms with Nietzsche’s legacy was extracted
from his volume on Wagner: what happened to the philosopher was very much like what happened to the
opera master of whom that book tells that he quickly transformed into a “concept” (Begriff) ‘Wagner’,
or a brand if you will, that people can consume or criticize but not quite digest or control.
Sections II.a.1-2 contained two concise probings into the ways in which Nietzsche has been located in the history of thought. They turned out to be interestingly disharmonious. Whereas the general philosophical historiography has treated Nietzsche in a quite one-sided fashion, the comparative studies on him and some other thinker(s) involve much more colorful coordinations. It was the occasion for me to state that I would like to see Nietzsche’s close surroundings (Teichmüller, Dühring, Spencer, Mach etc.) to be investigated in detail. My choice for the ideal interpretative frame of reference would include some combination of the post-enlightenment French thinkers from Comte to Taine, the Britons from Hume to Mill and the Germans from Kant to Hegel, while the crucial axis would be established between Darwin and the American pragmatism.

In an extensive exhibition of the interpretative traditions, the current favorites from Heidegger’s metaphysical emphases to Derrida’s linguistic ones kept company with the evergreen options of psychological, aesthetical and ethical readings, the classical alternatives of pedagogical and cultural interpretations as well as the notoriously sensitive ones of politico-social, feminist and theological variety. In addition, the rather outmoded existentialist type of reading was discussed along with the little known work in the fields of analytical philosophy and legal theory. Finally, the potential new rivals, ecological readings, were introduced and mentioned as the ones that situate close to at least some of the objectives in my exploration. Again, the aim was to illustrate the manifold of the options actualized in the course of the hundred years of reception. Right before the present chapter, I tried to separate between dominant concerns in today’s Nietzsche scholarship. The peculiar nature of the Nietzschean philosophy has contributed to the debate on ‘the philosophical’ in his thought. As for its basic philosophical choices, the questions of the fate of metaphysics and subject are the ones that have especially tempted the commentators. The famous contradictions and the difficulties in arranging Nietzsche’s views have been objects of intense quarreling. Discussion of these controversies completed my attempt to canvass the variety of approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy. The point was to have my own treatment converse with them, at least in principle, since the conceptual element belongs to any thinkable approach.

I dwelled a long time upon the varieties of critical assessment of Nietzsche. In a sense, it would have done just to quote, as I did, Steven E. Aschheim on the multifaceted and inexhaustible nature of the Nietzsche legacy. Yet, the mere saying it, even if backed up with the authority of such a learned and nuanced work as that of Aschheim’s, would hardly have been enough. For one thing, Aschheim concentrated on the general social and cultural scene in Germany, while I tried to cover an area that is wider in scope. For another, it would have meant taking an unproblematic stance towards the authority appealed to, that is, leaving Aschheim’s own act of receiving of Nietzsche unquestioned. Most important, it would have given the unnecessary support for the idea that only those works that specifically address reception history lend themselves to reception critical considerations. Being an outstanding work of
reception critical research does not entail being a work of reception critical interest only. In addition to laying bare lineages of appropriation and tensions between a number of actors and factors in the field, reception historical presentations can enhance the appreciation of the work being received and of the methodological problems in approaching it. One of the remarkable merits of Aschheim’s work is precisely that it is not made invalid by the requirements of its genre.

The chief import of the Nietzsche reception is that there is no ‘received view’ of Nietzsche. On the contrary, there is an ever-expanding variety of Nietzsches in the market. Consequently, reception critically cognizant interpreters cannot build upon the otherwise common, respectable and effective intellectual policy of outlining a generally accepted construal and move on to revise or refute it. In the absence of any clear-cut ‘received view’, next thing one could imagine would be to identify common shortcomings or instances of neglect, in the plurality of interpretations offered, and ground one’s own alternative in this lack of proper scholarly care. To be sure, my reading is motivated by a few things I see lacking in the Nietzsche scholarship and, as such, it, too, exploits this policy. In particular, crucial conceptual issues, in Nietzsche’s enterprise, have so far been largely unidentified. Likewise, the very common manner of perceiving various extremities, in his stance, leads to my outlining of a specifically Nietzschean radicalized balance.

Yet, I would not dare to say that the scarcity of conceptual considerations and the plentifullness of observations about immoderateness are enough to make up to anything like an established view to be criticized, or even that these features effectively describe the wealth of different readings. The ‘received view’ is always constructed by the one about to destruct it and, as such, it is not meant to faithfully portray the actual multifacetedness. Like any monographist, I think that it makes sense to “go back” from the contemporary theorists’ (more or less Nietzsche-laden) interpretations to the original interpretations (in Nietzsche’s texts). Yet, I do not take this option to be available or, in any case, desirable without studying just how the various reinterpretations have shaped the view of the initial mass of words and how they set the very parameters of the field where inter-preters transport their findings back and forth and, on occasion, meet their rivals.

Hence, I doubt orientations, such as the one adopted by Randall E. Havas, where Nietzsche’s texts are claimed to be treated “head-on”, while avoiding “detour through the secondary literature”. I do not mean to portray him as a believer in some firmly fixed unity of Nietzsche’s texts open for unbiased scholars. I am merely raising the question concerning reception. There is no other Nietzsche meaningfully readable than the one always already steeped in the waters of the collective interpretative laundry. Even the notion of some part of the relevant material being “secondary” is questionable. In any case, reading the “primary” literature is always conditioned by the ways it has been read before, and one would do well
to attend to these conditions.

An illustration is in order. It is said that, in *Dritte Reich*, there was a compulsion to assume a position toward Nietzsche, if only in the watered-down sense of treating it as a reservoir of flashy slogans. In any case, as the competent chronicler Aschheim says, there was a constant “need to confront its claims” and “to conduct arguments within its terms” to the effect that the “Nietzschean categories were fundamental axes around which grasping, defining, and critiquing the era revolved”.1112 One wonders, whether this is not, in its outline, a viable description of the present scene, too. To speak about “Nietzschean categories” as very intensely exploited means of thought is, in any case, to question their being uniquely Nietzsche’s products. Commentary and utilization reproduce the received pieces of a body of writing, while at the same time transforming it. Stated more strongly, it is only through ongoing commentary and utilization that a body of writing is emarginated for it to be able to stand as a point of reference for further commentary and utilization that, in turn, blur its edges and so on and so forth. In this sense, the problematic of reception is no merely additional hindrance that is there to disturb the interpretative sagacity by the difficulty of determining the decisive point in the initial design. Or again more forcibly, it is impossible to isolate the incipient acts from their prefigurations and reappropriations.

The abolition of ’the received view’ does not entail that there was nothing, in the manifold of the reception, that conditions new readings. The vastness of the options that has come available should make one suspicious of any autonomous or privileged line of interpretative descent. There is something else than just *Nietzsche-Studien* yearbooks, ’the new Nietzsche’, moral discourse, celebration of an exceptional individual, inconsistencies of arguments and coherences of styles, intellectual parasitisms of Heidegger and Derrida. There is always something else. Nietzsche’s inexhaustibility invites readers into an interpretative liberation from the absolute constraints of any compelling model, as much as it invites, entices and excites readers to situate themselves in relation to one or two or three or four of these models, now reassessed in their compellingness. Presumably, in a happy case, they are not just reassessed, but transformed anew.

A reading worth attempting could be one that sees, in the very broadness of the appropriations of Nietzsche, both possibilities for unexpected moves and dangers of ignorance. Such readings are not too numerous in the wealth of the Nietzsche literature. His texts and their reception could function, in the spirit of the epigraph of the present book, as a catalyst for interpretative emancipation and a stir for emancipation from this emancipation.

Whatever is the line of interpretation one is prepared to use, its strength is, to my mind, very much dependent on its ability to communicate with others and its sensitivity to its own character as an
interpretation. Even though there is no 'received view' of Nietzsche, there are aspects of his work that are both characteristic to it and more unacknowledged or more uncritically accepted than others.

The reading I endeavor to develop, in my exploration to Nietzsche’s texts, is a one that is interested in the richness of reception (as opposed to latching upon some authoritative lineage), varieties of localizing (as opposed to asserting some overriding comparative groups), interplay of the ways of reading (as opposed to concentrating on one or two philosophical schools, other disciplines, language areas, traditions) and actual disputes (as opposed to eternal or fictional debates, or some detached setting modeled by laboratory or asylum).

This chapter holds three sections. The first one continues the reflection upon the specific nature of Nietzsche’s work and the special difficulties it presents for research. While making sense of the meaningfulness of talking about any pattern or structure characteristic of Nietzsche’s output, I shall try to argue for the view that the problems of 'form' and 'whole', too, open themselves to the issues of conceptuality and nihilism. Whatever linguistic and stylistic or psychological and metaphysical or social and political lessons one could spell out about the peculiarly Nietzschean form of philosophy, there is the conceptual dimension to the formation and form-giving that needs to be articulated. In the second section, a case is made for the crucial methodological framework of the present study by arguing for the importance of the dilemma of concepts for philosophy and, in a preliminary fashion, for the study of Nietzsche. At first (III.b.1), the language of “con-ceiving” is studied in order to better appreciate the problem of conceptuality. Thereafter (III.b.2), a number of philosophical attempts to define or to conceptualize ‘concept’ are discussed. Since the philosophical problem with concepts is not exhausted by a concern for linguistic diversity or for technical questions of definition, the ultimately interesting and problematic issue is identified as bearing on the relations between 'the conceptual’ and 'the non-conceptual’ and the process of conceptualization. By so doing, however, the importance of the vocabularies of conception and the concepts of concept turn out to be more than merely “linguistic” or just “technical”.

Finally, section III.c presents my chosen approach, the one I call 'concept critical’, to Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise. It is a combination of the analytical concern for the way concept is conceived and used in a philosopher’s philosophy and the historical one for the way the philosopher confronts some concept, and the concept of concept, at some point of that concept’s career. The more critical the philosopher’s attitude toward concepts is, the more intense will be the conceptual problem for the conceptual approach to cope with.

What is the role and significance of concepts in philosophy or a more general sense? Which of the
specifically late modern problems of conceptuality are relevant in studying Nietzsche? How is the question of conceptualizing decisive in coming to terms with a philosopher’s philosophy?
Wilfrid Sellars says that it remains “the ’eye on the whole’ which distinguishes the philosophical enterprise”. His own preference, too, is for a strategy that seeks “to contest the analytical conception of philosophy as myopia with the synoptic vision of the true philosophy”. Accordingly, he says that philosophy aims “to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term”. What is particularly important is that Sellars advocates the view of ‘language’ as the decisive “conceptual frame” regulating all perception.\textsuperscript{1113}

Stanley Rosen writes that “[p]hilosophy begins in a dream of the whole. This dream is eventually transformed into a concept”. In Rosen’s vocabulary, “whole” is interchangeable with “context” or “world”. His grand \textit{Geistesgeschichte} of the Occidental thinking describes the Kantian-cum-Nietzschean legacy of contemporary times involving all major philosophical styles, deconstructionist and reconstructionist efforts alike. In this tradition, the whole has been completely conceptualized. Rosen’s contention is that, all its advantageous features aside, this heritage has had the insidious effect of doing away the difference between the pre-conceptual, pre-philosophical context of any conceptual and philosophical acts. Present-day humans are trapped and lost in their thought in a way, so Rosen, the Platonic dialogist was not.\textsuperscript{1114}

Significantly, Rosen manages to take Nietzsche along in his dexterous account, since “Nietzsche is himself a Kantian” in the sense that for him, too, “[a]ll theory, including the theory of nature, is a construction”.\textsuperscript{1115} By so doing, he emphasizes features that often escape from Nietzsche commentators. One of my aims, in this investigation, is to show that Nietzsche offers an account of his own that is sufficiently similar to that of Rosen’s, although it has its distinctiveness worth discussing apart from such comparisons. It is not only the idea that Greeks, albeit for Nietzsche the pre-Platonic ones, were in some sense freer in their thought, that makes Rosen’s depiction seem similar to Nietzsche’s.

One may at once consider a note by Nietzsche written sometime between the summer of 1872 and the early 1873. It deals with the issue of “Tautologie, als die einzig zugängliche Form der Wahrheit” (N 19 [258], KSA 7, 500). The fragment would be of even great significance regarding Nietzsche’s theoretical
confrontation with matters of truth and knowledge. I am thinking about the way he has recently been interpreted from the point of view of Tarski and the redundancy theory of truth.\textsuperscript{1116}

Yet, my interest in the present study is not so much in the alethiological or the epistemological as it is in the conceptual. There has already been, against the manner of analyzing Nietzsche’s utterances in the light of different theories of truth, criticism enough not to discard all undertakings in that field but to imply that these attempts have bypassed more fundamental questions.\textsuperscript{1117} I shall come back to this issue in the other sections of this chapter defending my chosen strategy of research.

What I find the most striking feature of the 1872/3 note is Nietzsche’s proto-Rosenian phrase about the “ganze Welt unter die richtigen Begriffe subsumiren”. The world conceptualized in its entirety means, so the note has it, that “die einzelnen Fälle unterordnen” with the help of a “vorhandenen Begriff”. Put otherwise, it means “die einzelnen Dinge einreihen” according to “die ursprünglich menschlichen allgemeinsten Formen der Relation”. To conceptualize correctly is to arrange the individual cases under given headlines, that is, “richtig rubrizieren”. The point about seeking something underneath concepts where one has first placed something is made in order to show how this conception of conception contributes to “die Begriffe nur bewahren”. (N 19 [258], KSA 7, 500.) This is a fragment with all the complexities awaiting the interpreter aware of the difficulties of, in particular, the thematization controversy. The question could be: are Nietzsche’s words here, is his philosophy in general, directed against concepts or the conceptual rubbing? While it is best to say that the view I shall argue for is that Nietzsche’s philosophy is most fruitfully interpreted as amounting to the need to reconceptualize conceptuality through a critique of concepts, I would not recommend acting in haste and drawing too many conclusions about Nietzsche’s theoretical commitments, early or later. One could, instead, use the fragment as a good introduction to the issue of form and conceptuality.

In his article of 1983, Robert P. Pippin cogently rebutted the claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy would give its support to “human subjects” whose primary task, or in fact a mixture of their fears and needs, is “to ‘impose’ an order on what is in itself an undifferentiated, purposeless ‘chaos’”. This “imposition metaphor”, as Pippin calls it, may get some support from Nietzsche’s writings, yet it suits badly to his so called perspectivism. Yet, he wishes not to “saddle Nietzsche with a metaphysics of nature” plus a belief in the human capacity to make sense of the world in itself. Pippin interprets Nietzsche’s references to “chaos beyond or behind perspective” as reinforcements of the “claim about the unintelligibility of the very notion of such a ’world in itself’”. What is “chaotic” is the notion of a ’perspective-independent world’.\textsuperscript{1118}

Although Pippin also succeeds in pointing out how Nietzsche really paid considerable attention to the
social and historical structure of perspectives so that the notion of anybody’s ‘imposing’ a perspective loses its “metaphorical force”¹¹¹⁹, his reflection falls short of interrogating, whether Nietzsche might still have retained some minimal assumption of a world independent of the evolving human conceptions¹¹²⁰. The word “notion” seems to say that even if one should assume the objective world - such as the world before humans ever appeared on the face of the earth, for the sake of a sufficiently Nietzschean attempt to transform philosophy along the lines of evolution - this world would be inconceivable in terms other than by human concepts.

What is left unexplained is how the misleading talk of imposing a form onto the chaos may conceal something that is of value in examining Nietzsche. Pippin’s article concentrates on making sense of the Nietzschean notion of ‘aesthetic justification’ initially related to “the absence of any possible transcendental or moral justification”, yet leading to the insight that “there is no neutral discourse within which the possibility of discourse of justification can be given”¹¹²¹. Yet, the text also refers to an utterance of Nietzsche echoing, as Pippin says, “a ’network’ theory of meaning”. Indeed, in Pippin’s ears, the paragraph 20 of Jenseits about “eingeborne Systematik und Verwandtschaft der Begriffe” (JGB, KSA 5, 34) “sounds as though it was written by a Lévy-Strauss eager to show that ’structure is prior to subject’”.¹¹²²

This is not the proper place to discuss the explicit claims, made by for example the eminent Nietzsche scholar George J. Stack, about Nietzsche as a kind of proto-structuralist¹¹²³. However, recognition of the structuralist aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking by Pippin and Stack provides the preliminary case for a study of Nietzsche’s thinking on form (form-giving, formation, formulation). It is a case that does not involve a view of him as the protagonist of either a metaphysics of the formless world or a subjectivism of imposition.

To begin with, I will call upon Rudolf Eucken to illustrate the concern for the question of form in the German-speaking philosophy of Nietzsche’s time. In his *Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie im Umriss* (1879), the problematic of conceptuality is wedded to the problematic of the whole. This comes out in an astonishing passage where general conditions for the emergence of Greek philosophy are summed up in a way that allows practically each and every member of what will be called, in the present section, “the family of the whole” to make their appearance. Namely, Eucken writes about the “unified character” of the Greek terminology, the masterly *Gestaltung* and *Gestalten* that the Greeks performed in combining pluralities into a *Ganze* and in collecting varieties into the *Gemeinsame*, so that it was possible to produce an encompassive *System* “of concepts and terms”, a sustainable *Gesammtbesitz* and a distinctive *Typus*¹¹²⁴.
The Gesammtbesitz is not the only Gesammt- term Eucken is fond of. There are the ones of -geschichte, -bestrebung, -bewegung, -aufgabe, -lage, -leben, -auffassung, -process, -gebilde, -zustand, -leistung, -wirkung, -literatur, -richtung, -strömung, -thätigkeit, -bild, -ergebniss, -inhalt, -arbeit, -geschehen, -macht. He is, obviously, attempting at a synthetic account of a synthetic practice. Apart from the Greeks, he refers to Romans as having been powerful in keeping things together and organizing specialties into a whole.1125

In particular, Eucken differentiates between alternative ways of synthesizing. According to him, there have been three grand attempts “to bring unity to the multifaceted without destroying it”. First, there is Aristotle providing with an aesthetic kind of unity in depicting a cosmos where individuals cling together and assume a secure place in a well-organized work of art. Secondly, there is Leibniz offering a step by step treatment of differences by lining them up successively on a physico-mathematical model. Kant supplies the third option: the act of consciousness binds multiplicities together in the human agency.1126 Most generally, it is Eucken’s priority to describe philosophical rationality as engaged in making sense of all there is in a human society. He says that “[e]very philosophical system, in as much as it asserts an original world conception, must define the perceived terms more accurately, distinguish side effects, elaborate more limited patterns [Gestalten]”. In this light, philosophy is “in the service of the whole”.1127

Much of this talk can be traced back to Hegel. For example, Hegel saw that the Greek polytheistic religiosity is characterized by its “lack of systematic partition” and “random determinacy”, to the extent that it cannot be said to make any “totality” to really speak of.1128 Analogically, he defined ’concept’ as a “unity of its determinations and, thus, a concrete totality” that results from the process where a representation or a percept unfolds its different sides and is finally unified.1129

It is clear that whatever else concepts may be said to deal with, Hegel and Eucken agree on the point that they are part of the general event of the wholes-producing formation. Criticizing Hegel, Bertrand Russell said that “everything short of the Whole is obviously fragmentary, and obviously incapable of existing without the complement supplied by the rest of the world”. Russell went on to suggest that the way out of this kind of thinking, and out of metaphysical systems, is the one of “the piecemeal investigation of the world […] in harmony with the inductive and scientific temper of our time”.1130 Yet, it has been insisted that Hegel is “neither freezing the forms nor dissolving all form.” In other words, he is “neither a Platonist or Cartesian […] nor yet a Nietzschean”. In Hegel’s philosophy, “[f]orm is in motion, fluid and dynamic, not just static form, nor sheer process, but the formation process itself”.1131

The above considerations give an idea of the way the ’question of form’ has philosophical significance. My plan here is to relate such considerations to the manifold of both Nietzsche’s output and its
reappropriations, handled in the two previous chapters, as well as to both the problematic of
conceptuality and the specifically concept critical treatment that are developed and experimented with in
the rest of the present study. In what follows, I shall show how the conceptual family of form - 'whole',
'totality', 'system', 'synthesis', 'unity', 'Gestalt', 'type' - is related to Nietzsche’s works by his readers
as well as by himself.

To begin with, Theobald Ziegler can be consulted. In his book of 1900, he wrote as follows: “One
understands Nietzsche only either wholly or not at all. Now, happily, not all is said by the words
‘wholly’ or ‘whole’. With so rich and multifaceted a writer and, especially, an aphorist who speaks of
everything, as Nietzsche does, it is inevitable that one bypasses many things and leaves a lot unsaid. For
the entire picture [Gesammtbild], this does no damage, as long as nothing essential is left out and the
features remain unspoiled.”1132 Thus, the early interpreter put forth the view that Nietzsche’s various
interventions reasonably discourage any attempt at a full scale commentary. Yet, Ziegler saw no
particular problem in reconciling between ‘the Nietzschean’ and the conventional task of reconstructing
the essential features of a body of thought.

It is safe to say that Ofelia Schutte expresses a widely held point of view when she remarks that
Nietzsche belongs to those thinkers who have more to give in countering or questioning systems than in
erecting them1133. Sometimes, the emphasis may be more on the incapacity of, or indifference toward,
 system building. In any case, it remains the usual conviction that “[o]ne might as well try to bring order
out of the mass of popular proverbs as to find a system in this writer”1134. Another thing is that
commentators often feel that there is something not only difficult but simply wrong in “[r]endering
Nietzsche more systematic than he initially appears”. The line is taken from Pippin who goes on to
legitimate his own attempt at such a rendering by saying that he is not “turning [Nietzsche] into a Hegel”.
He says that there is a considerable “systematic inter-connection among Nietzsche’s various texts”. Thus,
aware of how Nietzsche isn’t quite “as systematic as” the “broad reconstruction” of the Nietzschean
writings on a specific problem (i.e., modernism) “suggests”, Pippin wishes to justify what he is doing by
urging the reader “to notice that some of his claims depend on others”.1135

One can see how Hegel is here used as the systematic thinker par excellence. There is an easily
imaginable divergency between Hegel “as a systematic philosopher who places his faith in the rigorous
and methodical unfolding of dialectical reason” and Nietzsche as “an unsystematic, highly literary writer,
the champion of brilliant isolated perceptions and colourful, arresting metaphors”1136. Yet, quite like
Pippin who goes on to say that to systematize Nietzsche’s thinking (or to show the systematic
“connection” inherent in it) is to empower one to see better the extent to which Nietzsche was working
on “a Hegelian question” (i.e., “the ’world historical’ meaning of modernism”)1137, Stephen Houlgate
from whom the concise distinction was just quoted embarks upon what may the most ambitious comparative study of Hegel and Nietzsche. From the opposition between the two philosophers, Houlgate is ready to move toward showing how “they are both critics (at least in intent) of all conceptual oppositions or Gegensätze”. However, the crucial difference he finds lies in Nietzsche’s unjustified and uncritical surrender to one fatal opposition, as he believed, so Houlgate, “that life is becoming without logical form or identity, without ’being’”\textsuperscript{1138}.

In an early account, different aspects of Nietzsche’s lack of system were all expressed at once. The lack was seen as a defect, yet it was also taken as something to be considered in studying an unsystematic edifice. The deficiency of the systematic was even regarded as important in reassessing the overall nature of philosophical practices. The critic’s account contained, then, (i) complaint about Nietzsche’s lacking “ability to think in a unified and closing fashion […] to systematically work on something” and about the related absence of “the organizing discipline of a constructive plan, of a rigorous conceptual edifice”; (ii) warning of the risks of turning the aphorist writer into a systematician; and (iii) general remarks of the methodological advantages of systematic enterprise.\textsuperscript{1139}

A great stress was put on Nietzsche’s antisystematics by Theodor W. Adorno\textsuperscript{1140}. Curiously enough, the antipositivist Adorno joins, here, with the positivist Neurath whose conviction read: “’The’ system is the great scientific lie. It does not work as a guiding light, not even as a goal to be anticipated.” It was the “encyclopedia” that Neurath preferred as the proper model of the unified sciences.\textsuperscript{1141} He joined earlier encyclopedists who thought, in the words of d’Alembert, that “the appetite for systems” could no longer be accommodated in a decent philosophy and, a fortiori, that systems were not only something outmoded but, from a scientific point of view, “dangerous”\textsuperscript{1142}.

In Nietzsche’s posthumously published note books, one can find an entry echoing d’Alembert and anticipating Russell about the present “Zeitalter, wo man begreift, daß die Wissenschaft anfängt, Systeme bauen ist Kinderei” (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [135], KSA 11, 49). Götzen-Dämmerung, in turn, contains the compact utterance about distrusting each and every systematician (GD, “S&P” 26, KSA 6, 63). Another note supplies a description of certain philosophers dealing with “etwas Lebloses, etwas Hölzernes, eine viereckige Dürheit, ein “System”” (N Herbst 1887 9 [181], KSA 12, 445).

Hostility seems evident enough, but the quotation marks, in the last passage, should raise questions as to the selectivity of Nietzsche’s anger. This kind of open question is nicely mirrored in Karl Schlecha’s otherwise so blunt statement: ”Nietzsche has no “system””\textsuperscript{1143}. Another commentator has stressed the “latent” possibilities of Nietzsche’s thought that, as such, is anything but dogmas or a complete system, to the extent that “the systemlessness, too, has its system”\textsuperscript{1144}. An attempt to qualify the notion, and to
close the question, is Karl Löwith’s choice of speaking about the Nietzschean “system in aphorisms”\textsuperscript{1145}. Eric Blondel’s choice, in turn, is to propose that if there is not, in Nietzsche, “a systematic rationality of the discourse”, there might still be a “unity” of some other sort\textsuperscript{1146}.

Georges Montcriol, too, who takes what may be the longest way toward dissociating Nietzsche from any sense of form, insists that Nietzsche does not replace “the metaphysical unity” by “pure dispersion”. His objective, in the first place, is to characterize the particular pattern of the ’aphoristic discourse’. Yet, Montcriol’s emphasis on the de-formation is strong enough for many to cause doubt as to his backhanded concession to the chances of form. He attaches, namely, Nietzsche philosophy to the project of fighting “all ontological unity” and “the totalisation of the diverse in the architecture of a system”. Moreover, it involves “the deconstruction of a type of subject” that is purely theoretico-rational. Furthermore, the notions of ’synthesis’, ’identity’ and ’objective structures of Being’ are all discarded. According to Montcriol, however, Nietzsche’s “plural” and “dynamic” philosophy gives support for notions like ’unity-multiplicity’, ’vital unity’, ’organic unity’, ’functional unity’ or ’open unity’. It includes the opportunity for a typology and order of its own.\textsuperscript{1147}

What is troubling with this interpretation is the way Montcriol first says that Nietzsche’s “conception of Being excludes totalization, systematicity”, and then claims that the “Nietzschean discourse in no way excludes systematicity but only the metaphysician’s \textit{a priori} will of the system”\textsuperscript{1148}. Despite this obstacle for any helpful clarification in the midst of Montcriol’s equally annoying tendency to operate with clear-cut oppositions, his interpretation succeeds in highlighting the need to take the question of form seriously in reading Nietzsche.

These meditations point the way to fruitful and painstaking studies. Rather than to hasten to concur whole heartedly with the likes of a commentator saying that Nietzsche “builds no system, he even rejects all systematic form”\textsuperscript{1149}, one does well to map out Nietzsche’s routes within the problematic of system. Instead of using the available term of reproach or celebration for a thinker just like that, one ought to interrogate its use and problematization by the thinker in question. Consider the following quasi-Aristotelian passage from \textit{Menschliches}. It says that philosophers are mislead in thinking that “der Werth seiner Philosophie liege im Ganzen, im Bau”, since the latecomers will only appreciate the material, out of which the edifice had been constructed (MA II/1 201, KSA 2, 466). Nietzsche’s philosophy, too, has been approached with not that great concern for its peculiar form. In concentrating on elementary parts and details or the putatively philosophical raw stuff, interpreters have been in the position either to take for granted that there is no \textit{Systematik} emerging from the Nietzschean thought or to insist that it would be an utterly un-Nietzschean perception to see some systematic structure in his thinking. Yet, if there seems to be no building to really speak of there, the relation between the end product (fabrication) and
the stuff (fabric) is transformed. The most valuable Material might well lie in exactly the kind of metaphilosophical insights as the one just quoted from Menschliches, while it may also be that the very Bau of Nietzsche’s philosophy is to be understood in terms of a new architecture of metaphilosophy.

Elisabeth Kuhn is one of the few to have interrogated the Nietzschean sense of systems. She has tried to collect a number of Nietzsche’s utterances on the “system” and assess their significance. Her conclusion is that there is a sense of system that Nietzsche seems to accept. It can be characterized as “an incomplete system”, “an open system”, or “a hypothetical system” to offer models of interpretation. Granting the evident convincingness of this view that is rather close to Pippin’s moderate conception of the Nietzschean “inter-connection”, I would say that there is much more to be gained from Nietzsche’s writings on ‘the systematic’. They are worth checking out in order for one to relate them into the conceptual family of formation as it appears in the Nietzschean texts.

Right at the start, one may keep in mind that, in his letters, Nietzsche, continually under the pressure of being sick and feeling miserable, made use of the term “system” in relation to his psycho-physical condition. Arriving at Nice, his favorite winter residence, in early December 1883, he wrote about the “förmlich elektrisirenden Wirkung dieser Lichtfülle auf mein ganzes System” (KGB III/1, Dezember 1883, 458). Again, from his most beloved summer home, Sils-Maria, he communicated that “[d]as ganze System ist viel beruhigter und mehr in Gleichgewicht” (KGB III/5, August 1887, 120). In largely the same tenor, the speaker of Ecce homo refers, in listing the more and less vital and virile periods in his life, to the problem of “die tiefste Schwäche des gastrischen Systems” (EH “Wiswb” 1, KSA 6, 265).

The word “system” seems to work finely for Nietzsche as a synonym for the body as an organic structure taken as a whole. In this light, the line about the system as a lifeless construction might be read as saying that the edifice of the systematician is so breathless that it shouldn’t even be called a system, because of the vital connotations this term has (cf. GM II 3, KSA 6, 296). Thus, one may appreciate the way Robert John Ackermann seeks to justify his interpretative effort. While emphasizing Nietzsche’s criticism of systems, Ackermann wishes to “give Nietzsche back the body of his thought, body that unifies his work”.

One may be willing to draw a clearer distinction between a bodily system and a thought-ful system. Yet, those of the opinion that at least the latter suffers a terrible defeat Nietzsche’s would find themselves in a fairly uncomfortable position in having to face such countering examples as this piece of information Nietzsche mediated to his publisher:

- Ich brauche jetzt, für lange lange Jahre, tiefe Ruhe: denn es steht die Ausarbeitung meines
To be sure, one could insist on the context here and say that Nietzsche’s using of the conventional expression in a letter like this proves nothing of his actual thinking on the viability of the concept of ‘system’. Is here not a troubled author referring, rather pompously, to his future plans of publication and pronouncing the solemn word “system of thought” for solely strategic reasons? Contextual sensitivity is surely in order here, too. But this individual utterance is hardly exhausted by its nature as a piece of a certain correspondence, since it enters in connection with the other utterances on systems elsewhere in Nietzsche’s writings.

Admittedly, the majority of these utterances contains more or less open scorn for systems. What is important to see, however, is that apart from scorn they also exhibit philosophical working up on the concept of ‘system’. It is from both of these sources that the following note book entry derives its vigor:

Ich bin nicht bornirt genug zu einem System - und nicht einmal zu meinem System... [...] (N Herbst 1887 10 [146], KSA 12, 538).

It pays to read this sentence in the two ways implied by the above considerations: one is either claiming that no system of thought could accompany such a freewheeling thinker as one is or that one’s body as a system can hardly accommodate or sustain one’s thoughts. Another choice of interpretation would be this: one is either maintaining that one’s cognitive riches cannot be stored within but one framework of thought, since one’s thinking consists of a series of successive experiments with differently organized thought combinations or that one’s animal existence stretches out from anything comfortably described as one’s “own”. A possible tentative conclusion of Nietzsche’s point could be that just as surely as one has a system, the well being of which one may be willing to observe with great care, one may also perceive the risks in assimilating oneself to whatever construction one is ever able to work out from one’s resources.

To tolerate the simultaneously fleshy and thought-full connotations of the systematic, one does not need to dwell on the reputed master of paradoxes. One can, for a change, consult Ernst Mach who came to say that “[o]ur body, and especially our consciousness, is a relatively separated, isolated system of facts”\textsuperscript{1152}. If Mach was to be used, for the argument’s sake, to represent a positivist and scientist practice where the fragile human exceptionality is traded for systemist analogies, could one use Nietzsche to represent the diametrically opposite position?
It would seem, rather, that Nietzsche is prepared to take a few steps with positivism, even if these were best interpreted as flirtation or parody. That is: he appears to be ready to let any system of thoughts be studied from the point of view of the thinker’s bodily functions, too. Yet, this is only the other half of Nietzsche’s thought. The Jenseits passage, mentioned above with Pippin’s interpretations, starts from the other end of the issue by comparing the “sämtlichen Glieder der Fauna eines Erdtheils” to the way “einzelnen philosophischen Begriffe” grow “in Beziehung und Verwandschaft zu einander” and “einem Systeme gehören” (J 20, KSA 5, 34). In other words, conceptual systems can be approached from the perspective of the evolving coordinates of natural kinds, as well as natural systems may be studied from the point of view of conceptual orderings.

I am not, just yet, in the position to argue for what I take to be Nietzsche’s contribution to the recognition of the importance of concepts. What counts, for the present purposes, is that even in the face of the alluded (by the reference to Borniertheit) proximity of ‘the systematic’ with ‘the narrow-minded’ and ‘the cramped’, the whole notion of the system, in Nietzsche, hardly withers away just like that. Systems may deal with stupidity, but one does not live from sheer intelligence. The next step to be taken is the one further beyond the idea that Nietzsche’s is a thinking of dissonant and dispersed nature. While it may be wise to make clear that I am inclined to endorse some such overview myself, I want to move on to give an account of the more neglected, the harmonizing side of this thinking.

With Wagner’s idea of Gesamtkunst as the most obvious backdrop, Nietzsche came to appreciate the urge to the entire, the full, the aggregate throughout his writings. As I see it, there is no better evidence for this than the extraordinary richness of his peculiar glossary of completeness. In 1875, still celebrating Wagner, though only in public and with increasing ambivalence, Nietzsche wrote about Gesammtthaten, Gesammenteinrichtung and Gesammtleidenschaft of an All-Dramatiker capable of reconstructing the “Ein- und Gesammtheit des künstlerischen Vermögens” (UB IV 3, 7, 9, KSA 1, 445, 468-9, 494). Thirteen years later, in Nietzsche’s violent polemics, Wagner stood for nothing less than “Gesammtverwandlung der Kunst in’s Schauspielerische” or, in a word, Gesammtteinkrankung (W 7 & 5, KSA 6, 26-7 & 23). The judgment had turned from positive to negative, while its basic structure proved to be lasting.

Were these taken as but so many parodies of Wagner’s folly, something would be missed. In Nietzsche’s criticisms of Wagnerian aesthetics, a serious fault of his early idol was repeatedly to have let “the whole” suffer at the cost of partiality: ”das Ganze ist kein Ganzes mehr. […] Das Ganze lebt überhaupt nicht mehr: es ist zusammengesetzt, gerechnet, künstlich, ein Artefakt. - ” (W 7, KSA 6, 27; cf. “ZN”, 47.) It dealt with “[d]jeses Beseelen, Beleeben der kleinsten Redetheile der Musik” being “ein Beweis dafür, daß sich das Leben aus dem Ganzen zurückgezogen hat und im Kleinsten luxuriert”, in other words, “die Symptomatik eines Niedergangs der organischen Kraft” and “der Unfähigkeit, große Verhältnisse noch
rhythmisch zu überspannen”, “myops für die weiten, langen, großen Formen” (KGB III/5, August 1888, 401).

One may presume that the critique involves Wagner’s failure to live up to the zeal he shared with Nietzsche. Namely, to the way Schopenhauer preferred the exhaustiveness of one complete thought and the organic connectedness of its constituent parts over any architectonically pieced system of thoughts\(^\text{1154}\). That both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer cherished the notion of an organic whole is, I believe, largely due to the Goethean influence on the two philosophers\(^\text{1155}\). Another thing is that, despite Schopenhauer’s rage against Hegel, the latter’s insistence on the primacy of an “organic whole that divides itself into elements” and his correlative reproach for “a mere aggregate, [...] a whole set together out of parts” as well as for “abstract, empty and static construals”\(^\text{1156}\), does seem to lurk there in the background, if only in the sense of a particular sense of ‘the whole’ and the ‘the organic’ to be rejected.

In any case, Nietzsche’s book on Schopenhauer has it that the merit of the philosophical educator is that “er dem Bilde des Lebens als einem Ganzen sich gegenüberstelle, um es als Ganzes zu deuten”. That is, to keep an eye in “das allgemeine Gemüle des Lebens und Daseins” and to construct a “regulatives Gesammtbild”. (UB III 3, KSA 1, 356.) Yet, inasmuch as Schopenhauer was the only object of Nietzsche’s later criticisms comparable to Wagner, it seems reasonable not to make too much of this fascinating point. What is safe to say is that Schopenhauer and Wagner offered for Nietzsche two powerful models and intricate problems, or a joint model and a joint problem, of perfectness and perfectibility.

Nietzsche could wrote about Gesammt-Gesundheit (FW, “V” 2, KSA 3, 349), Gesammt-Fortleben (GD, “WidAv” 4, KSA 6, 159) and Gesammt-Geschick (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [136], KSA 11, 49), as well as Gesammt-Gefahr, Gesammt-Entartung (JGB 203, KSA 5, 127), Gesammterschöpfung (e.g. EH, “Wiswb” 1, KSA 6, 265), Gesammt-Abirrung (e.g. EH, “Ma” 3, KSA 6, 324), Gesammt-Abwerthung (GD, “SeU” 21, KSA 6, 125), Gesammt-Excitation (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [113], KSA 12, 118) and Gesammt-Décadence (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [227], KSA 13, 89). Characterizing his own condition - his Gesammtbefinden (e.g. KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 234) or Gesammtlage (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 347) - he told not only of his habitual cold water Gesammtabwaschung (KGB III/1, August 1881, 121) or the “große Gesammt-Consultation über meine Gesundheit” (KGB III/3, Juni 1885, 57), but also of his Gesammt-Depression (KGB III/1, September 1884, 530) and Gesammtverstärkung (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 240).

Above all these more or less common phrases, there are terms of this kind, in his vocabulary, suggesting a more immediate contact with totalizing thinking. To list some of them, Gesammtverband,
Gesammtabrechnung (MA I 208, 475, KSA 2, 171, 310), Gesammt-Absicht (GD, “SeU” 24, KSA 6, 127), Gesammt-Aspekt (e.g. AC 57, KSA 6, 243), Gesammtproblem (e.g. EH, “Wiswb” 1, KSA 6, 264), Gesammt-Anblick (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [31], KSA 13, 17), Gesammt-Charakter, Gesammtansicht (e.g. N Frühjahr 1888 14 [14], [133], KSA 13, 224, 316), Gesammtconnex, Gesammtanschauung (KGB I/2, April 1867, 206, 209; II/1, März 1870, 112), Gesammtdenken (KGB I/2, Februar 1868, 258), Gesammtbestimmung (KGB II/1, August 1869, 38), Gesammttempfindung (KGB II/3, Juli 1872, 25), Gesammt-Eindruck (KGB II/3, September 1879, 448), Gesammtabschätzung (e.g. KGB III/1, April 1883, 368), Gesammt-Tendenz (KGB III/5, September 1888, 437) and Gesammt-Bezeichnung (III/5, November 1888, 467).

As it happens, there is a fragment, by Nietzsche, where the talk of these end-to-end constellations comes together with the talk of the intellect’s central role in pre-regulating the economy of affects: ”Alle Lust- und Unlustgefühle setzen bereits ein Messen nach Gesammt-Nützlichkeit, Gesammt-Schädlichkeit voraus: [...] Lust- und Unlustgefühle sind Willens-Reaktionen (Affekte), in denen das intellektuelle Centrum den Werth gewisser eingetretener Veränderung zum Gesammt-Werthe fixirt, zugleich als Einleitung von Gegenaktionen.” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [71], KSA 13, 34).

In the light of this Gesammt glossary, one shouldn’t be that bewildered to find, in Nietzsche’s writings, fairly frequent acknowledgements of the advantages of synthetic thinking. In Jenseits von Gut und Böse, it is said that every profound and broad-minded human in the eighteenth century has marked a preparation of a new synthesis (JGB 256, KSA 5, 201). As for himself, he reports, in January 1888, how “diese ganze letzte Zeit für mich reich war an synthetischen Einsichten und Erleuchtungen” (KGB III/5, 226). Comparison could be made to Nietzsche’s praise of Wagner as “bei weitem der vollste Mensch” he knew (KGB III/1, Februar 1883, 337) or to the traits he picked out to be distinctive of his elder colleagues, the encyclopedic scholars Jacob Burckhardt and Hippolyte Taine, namely to have “geistige Umfänglichkeit” (KGB III/3, September 1886, 253), and to be “unabhängig und weitblickend” and “universal gebildet” (KGB III/3, Oktober 1886, 269, 272). Already in the late 1880, there is asked, in the note books, whether the great human is “ein Mensch, dessen Details hinweggedacht werden, vermöge der zwingenden vergötternden Gewalt seines Ganzen?” (N 7 [147], KSA 9, 347).

This last quotation, in particular, echoes Nietzsche’s comments on both the miserable days, as to how ”[i]ch leide immer am Ganzen und im Ganzen - “ (KGB III/1, Dezember 1882, 313), and joyful occasions, as in a temporary rediscovery of “die Stimmung und Kraft und Lust für das Ganze” (KGB III/1, Februar 1881, 66). Indeed, one commentator proposes that Nietzsche may have wished to abandon wholeness, in a sense that he was more interested in deconstructing received totalities, yet he was all the more interested in promoting the ideal of a whole self\(^{1157}\). I have shown, however, that it is by no means
evident that Nietzsche was eager to rid off wholeness in the first place. But the notion of a whole self could be an important interpretative key to both his famous resistance to systems and unities and his less known fondness for unified ensembles.

The most famous example Nietzsche ever gives of the synthetic, full, all-out kind of human excellence is Goethe. There is a passage, in Götzen-Dämmerung, where the Goethean greatness is contrasted with décadence, all the while the discourse of the whole is brilliantly exploited. Goethe comes out as a European “Ereigniss”, “grossartiger Versuch”, “Gesamt-Ergebniss” who willed “Totalität”, “bekämpfte das Auseinander von Vernunft, Sinnlichkeit, Gefühl, Wille”, “disciplinierte sich zur Ganzheit”, “concipirte einen starken hochgebildeten, in allen Leiblichkeiten geschickten, sich selbst im Zaume haben, vor sich selber erfürchtigen Menschen, der sich den ganzen Umfang und Reichtum der Natürlichkeit zu gönnen wagen darf”. Moreover, Goethe stood “mitten im All, im Glauben, dass nur das Einzelne verwirflich ist, dass im Ganzen sich Alles erlöst und bejaht” and strived for “eine Universalität im Verstehen, im Gutheissen, ein An-sich-heran-kommen-lassen von Jedwedem”. (GD “SeU” 49 & 50, KSA 6, 151-2.)

This description finds an echo in Emerson’s praise of Goethe. In his Representative Men, Emerson spoke of the German as “one great Exploring Expedition, accumulating a glut of facts and fruits, too fast for any hitherto existing savants to classify”. Moreover, Goethe’s mind is said to have “ample chambers for the distribution of all”. Emerson calls him the “philosopher of [...] multiplicity” who is “able and happy to cope with this rolling miscellany of facts and sciences, and by his own versatility to dispose of them with ease”. 1158

The American was another crucial figure in Nietzsche’s philosophical environment to have facilitated his recognition of the worth of the whole. In Nietzsche’s note books from roughly the same period as the depiction of Goethe, there is talk of the contemporary lack of both a great synthesis (N Frühjahr 1888 25 [445], KSA 11, 132) and a great synthetic human being (N Herbst 1887 9, 119, KSA 12, 404). Even previously, the following characterization had been given: “Ein Mensch in dem sich die geheimnißbreiche Vielheit und Fülle der Natur auswirkt, eine Synthesis des Furchtbaren und des Entzückenden, etwas Versprechendes, etwas Mehr-Wissendes, etwas Mehr-könnendes.” (N Sommer 1887 8 [3], KSA 12, 330.) A still earlier fragment is interesting in this light:

Der Verlust bei aller Spezialisierung: die synthetische Natur ist die höhere. Nun ist schon alles organische Leben eine Spezialisierung; die dahinterstehende unorganische Welt ist die größte Synthesis von Kräften und deshalb das Höchste und Verehrungswürdigste. [...] (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886, 1 [105], KSA 12, 35-6.)
At this point, the problematic is beginning to intensify. If it was the lack of vitality that undermined systematician’s and Gesamtkünstler’s enterprise, now it seems that what is most respectable is maximally dead. On alternative or complementary reading of this last passage, it could be concluded that in the sphere of the organic, differentiation is unavoidable but synthesizing still pays. Another posthumously published fragment, from Nietzsche’s note books, provides with additional clarification, as well as additional intensification, to the matter at hand: “Der Gedanke ist in der Gestalt, in welcher er kommt, ein vieldeutiges Zeichen, welches der Auslegung, genauer, einer willkürlichen Einengung und Begränzung bedarf, bis er endlich eindeutig wird.” Thinking emerges as a wild plurality to be domesticated, made into a unity by “Interpretation oder [...] willkürlichen Festsetzung”. In normal conditions, it is further inscribed in the note, we are “beim Denken nicht an’s Denken zu denken”. The passage continues as follows:

Der Ursprung des Gedanken bleibt verborgen; die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür ist groß, daß er nur das Symptom eines viel umfanglicheren Zustandes ist; darin daß gerade er kommt und kein anderer, daß er gerade mit dieser größeren oder minderen Helligkeit kommt, mitunter sicher und befehlerisch, mitunter schwach und einer Stütze bedürftig, im Ganzen immer aufregend, fragend - für das Bewußtsein wirkt nämlich jeder Gedanke wie ein Stimulans - : in dem allen drückt sich irgend etwas von unserem Gesammtzustande in Zeichen aus.

(N Juni-Juli 1885 38 [1], KSA 11, 595-6.)

In order to understand thinking, to think it, the insight into the amplified state of the thinking process is called for. To further illustrate Nietzsche’s appetite for the integral, for the large scale, it is instructive to note that, along with aesthetic, ideatic, psychological and biological (I am only trying to supply helpful, rough divisions) dispositions, there is, in his texts - books, notes, letters - a social one. In both Jenseits and Genealogie, the expression “das Ganze” appears in the sense of res publica (JGB 201 & GM II 19, KSA 5, 122 & 307). If it merely illustrates a recognition of the collective point of view, one can also bear in mind Nietzsche’s work on the notion of a supranational, European unity (EH, “W” 2, KSA 6, 360; N Frühjahr 1888 15 [68], KSA 13, 451; KGB III/5, Oktober 1888, 454).

As an extension of all that has been said, it is written, in Götzendämmerung, about the view that there is nothing to measure “das Ganze” with, indeed, there is nothing but “das Ganze”. Ecce homo, in turn, introduces the notion of the “große Oekonomie des Ganzen”. (GD, “Vgl” 8 & EH, “Wiswb” 4, KSA 6, 96 & 368).

Now, as it was implied above, the display of these undiminished, undivided and unimpaired wholes, in Nietzsche’s texts, seems to be at odds with the general nature of those texts. The Swedish historian of philosophy, Alf Ahlberg, once put it like this: “His work is a big fragment”1159. With a recklessly unhistorical reading, Ahlberg’s view could be seen as extended in Derrida’s later gaze into the difficulties.
in reading Nietzsche. These difficulties have to do, in Derrida’s words, with “suspending the hypothesis” that Nietzsche’s whole corpus is, in its welcoming to endless possibilities of interpretation, of the type of his seemingly casual jottings. As is it well known, Derrida’s pick is the umbrella line “ich habe meinem Regenschirm vergessen”. Yet, he goes on to question the meaningfulness of the concept of ‘fragment’, since it appeals to totalizing. What the hypothesis says, then, is that there may be no whole whatsoever in Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{1160}

While explicitly, although perhaps only occasionally, deploping fragmentariness, the Nietzschean text presents itself, at least to some readers, fragmentary or, even more strongly, devoid of any coordinating elements. One ought not, as one commentator advises, to look for any “unity” in Nietzsche\textsuperscript{1161}.

As a matter of fact, however, one could object to Derrida just by taking up another note where a reference is made to umbrellas in the funny sight of a “Laokoon-gruppe, von drei Clown’s und ebenso vielen Regenschirmen dargestellt” (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [306], KSA 11, 232). It certainly does not amount to establishing a whole, at least in any substantial sense of the notion, but may be enough to suggest that even for the seemingly isolated passages there is a nexus somewhere in the web. Among Nietzsche specialists, Gary Shapiro has been active in emphasizing intertextual concerns, such as sensitivity to “junctions in an indefinitely ramified network”\textsuperscript{1162}. This may be taken as a modification and reinterpretation of what Pippin called “inter-connection” of Nietzsche’s thoughts.

In another context, Derrida asks: "Next to Kierkegaard, was not Nietzsche one of the few great thinkers who multiplied his names and played with signatures, identities, and masks? Who named himself more than once, with several names?" These questions bear, Derrida’s view, on the problem of the totality and whole in Nietzsche or, indeed, in numerous Nietsches. In what he calls a “schematic”, “preliminary” and “sketchy” treatment that avoids “getting tangled up in the complexity of this whole question”, Derrida suggests that “Nietzsche by no means trusts any thought of totality”, nor subordinates his thoughts “to an unequivocal meaning of totality, of the relation between a whole and a non-whole”. He proposes that “Nietzsche thwarts all that governs the thought or even the anticipation of totality, namely the relationship of genus and species.”\textsuperscript{1163}

A slightly more serious case than the umbrella one can, I believe, be made of Nietzsche’s choice to speak of forming and shaping “out of the whole”. In a passage that can be taken to amount to a striking counter example against the Derridean hyperbola, Nietzsche magnifies the ability of his friend, the musician Heinrich Köselitz,

\begin{quote}
  aus dem Ganzen zu gestalten, fertig zu werden und nicht zu \textit{fragmentarisiren} (vorsichtiger
\end{quote}

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Euphemismus für “wagnerisiren”) (KGB III/5, August 1888, 384; cf. 401; see also N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [198], 521, on Wagner’s “nicht Gestalt gewordene, fertig gewordene Gestalt” as a sheer inability to give form.)

The published pamphlet on Wagner reaffirms this piece of criticism. Moreover, it detects an incapacity to create aus dem Ganzen not only in the grand opera master (W 10, KSA 6, 35). Despite his relative difference, Brahms, too, is characterized by the way “er schafft nicht aus der Fülle, er durstet nach der Fülle” (W “ZN”, KSA 6, 47). In Genealogie, the question is posed, whether it is possible to tell the story of Luther in terms other than what is done in a “über alle Begriffe viereckig und harmlos” contemporary biography. That is, to do it more in Taine’s fashion “aus einer Stärke der Seele und nicht aus einer klugen Indulgenz gegen die Stärke”. (GM III 19, KSA 5, 387.)

The recurring point might be paraphrased as follows. A supreme kind of thought (act or creation) is one that is willing to acknowledge just how much its thinking (acting or creating) is not made or produced but, rather, allowed to happen. It is about admitting how thought (act or creation) stems from all the resources that the thinker (actor or creator) possesses. In addition, these resources only make one the way one is. Any move toward constructing already marks a lack and deficiency, which could, ultimately, be taken to be the lack of comprehension of one’s constitutive, self-structuring powers. Again, one might see the notion of the material’s primacy at work here. To be sure, to create from what is full toward that which cannot be but partial is also to construct. The difference is, then, that such a method offers a heuristics preventing one from treating one’s constructions with redundant respect, as well as it helps one to be alert to the self-critical issue involved in an act that produces, or at least molds, both the actor and the outcome of the act.

Inevitably, one is lead to the problematic of Gestalten. To begin with, there are, in Nietzsche’s Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, a longer passage on the artist and the artist’s characters. These are not to be identified with one another but, so the text reads, “die Reihenfolge der Gestalten, an denen er ersichtlich mit innigster Liebe hängt, sagt allerdings Etwas über den Künstler selber aus”. With the help of “hundert Gestaltungen”, an artist can let “die eigenste Unerfahrung” speak out. (UB IV 2, KSA 1, 437-9.)

In Nietzsche’s notes from this time, Wagner’s transmutations are handled with markedly less reverence. A fragment says that it is dangerous “aus seinen Kunstwerken bestimmte Winke über die Gestaltung des Lebens entnehmen zu wollen” (N Sommer bis Ende September 1875 12 [26], KSA 8, 264). The context shows that what is at stake is Wagner’s questionable political potentiality. However, the notion of Gestaltung des Leben can have positive significance in, as in one of Nietzsche’s letters, organizing one’s
personal life “etwas erträglicher und ihrer Natur würdiger” (KGB III/1, September 1882, 259; cf. also M 18, KSA 3, 31). This formulation further speaks in favor of the need to have one’s ways converge the manner in which (natural) fullness articulates itself.

In a reference to the great Voltaire, one of Nietzsche’s books speaks of his vielgestaltig soul being balanced by a truly Greek sense of measure. In this context, even Goethe’s understanding of the “alte Vollkommenheit und Ganzheit” is said to fall short of the practical embodiment of fullness by the best of the Greeks and the French. (MA I 221, KSA 2, 182-4.) As it was noted with the discourse of Gesammttheit, the discourse of Gestaltung, too, follows Nietzsche throughout his writings, despite his violent breaks with numerous past beliefs. The breadth of this latter discourse comparable to the scope of the former can already be anticipated from the way Nietzsche described his studies to a fellow student. He spoke about “einen ethischen Einfluß” inherent in extensive projects. What is decisive is to concentrate on something which is, then, “harmonisch zu gestalten” (KGB I/2, April 1867, 206).

It is in this vocabulary that Nietzsche sought to make sense of other scholarly strivings, as well. This is how he wrote about investigating ancient historians of humanities:

[...] jetzt zieht mich das Allgemein-Menschliche an, wie das Bedürfniß einer literar-historischen Forschung sich bildet und wie es unter den formenden Händen der Philosophen Gestalt bekommt (KGB I/2, Februar 1868, 248).

His sensitivity to the problematic nature of this organizing, forming, shaping and creating is vividly present when he discusses his later plan to study the great Greek atomist: ”Mir persönlich gefällt die Gestalt des Democrit gewaltig, freilich habe ich sie mir ganz neu reconstruirt” (KGB I/2, Dezember 1868, 350). Two decades after this, Nietzsche was not only paying tribute to the musical Gestaltungen of Köselitz, as noted above, but boasting of his own parallel skills of writing books: ”Ich bin außerdem Artist genug, um einen Zustand festhalten zu können, bis er Form, bis er Gestalt wird” (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 363). As it was seen, in section I.b, this had to do with Nietzsche’s growing appreciation of his work.

But there are other dimensions in this form giving. In a note book entry from the late 1880, the idea of finding oneself is contrasted and undermined with the insight of “uns selber machen, aus allen Elementen eine Form gestalten” (N 7 [213], KSA 9, 361). And a few years later, Nietzsche sent his friend, the historian of religion, Franz Overbeck, the following words:

Mein Leben gestaltet sich allmählich und nicht ohne Krämpfe - aber es soll Gestalt
Echoing the remark about organic life as specialization, these last two passages seem to crave for an understanding of *Gestaltung* as both the artist’s activity on life and the life’s activity on the artist. In other words, it is to have the creation toward (*nach*) a willed goal converge the creation from (*aus*) one’s already existing, yet perhaps repressed resources. Some such emphasis may be the key to understanding Nietzsche’s place in the post-Darwinian scene of thought. Emerson saw nature as “the manifold” and the mind “as “a terrific unity, in which all things are absorbed”". Moreover, he spoke of the “Unity of Nature, - the Unity in Variety, - which meets us everywhere”. In this ecologism, any particular thing not only relates “to the whole, and partakes of the perfection of the whole”, but is also “a microcosm, and faithfully renders the likeness of the world”. For all his enthusiasm for natural history and natural science, Emerson maintains that scientific study may “cloud the sight” and hinder “the manly contemplation of the whole”.

In Emerson’s praise of the fellow naturalist Goethe, there was a double emphasis on the almost ecosystem-like diversity within one’s personality and one’s activities and the ability to “cope with” that. The complex interplay of elements was, in someone like Goethe, made possible, empowered and intensified, as well as recognized and made sense of. When it comes to Nietzsche, one can readily detect similar accentuations. Yet, the Emersonian (and Goethean) confidence was traded for a more reserved and critical stance, and the very terms of this kind of thinking, such as ‘whole’ and ‘unity’, were subjected to a more haunting interrogation. One might want to say that the immediate pre-Darwinian hope and the immediate post-Darwinian nostalgia for nature needed to be reappraised according to some more consistently naturalistic model.

To attain a wider perspective on the matter there is still one more sibling to be named in Nietzsche’s family of the whole. Beside *System, Ganzheit, Gesammttheit, Einheit, Gestalt* and *Synthesis*, one needs to place *Typus*. It was already referred to, in section I.a, yet only at this point, it can be related to the more general problems in reading Nietzsche. As was the case with its twin, *Gestalt*, it is best to start with artistic creation. A note book entry on the “Lust an Charakteristischem” includes the following idea: ”Die Vorstellung musterhaften Typen wäre ein Hauptverdienst der Künstler: den Sinn für das Einheitliche und Proportionirte zu entwickeln” (N Herbst 1880 6 [308], KSA 9, 277).

In the light of Nietzsche’s later criticisms of Wagner, one can justifiably argue that Nietzsche came to think that the opera genius failed to develop the “sense for the unified”. In *Der Fall Wagner*, there is talk of the Wagnerian heroes and heroines, “als physiologische Typen betrachtet”, as forming “eine Kranken-Galerie! - “ (W 5, KSA 6, 22). Yet, in a letter, Nietzsche signed the sentence: ”Wagner war mir als
Typus unschätzbar” (KGB III/5, Dezember 1888, 518). Nietzsche did not restrict “types” to artists’ arsenal. In the context of pre-Socratic philosophers, there is, in his notes, praise of “diese plötzliche Fruchtbarkeit an Typen, […] diese ungewollte Vollständigkeit in der Aufstellung der großen Möglichkeiten des philosophischen Ideals” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [100], KSA 13, 278). The emphasis on the pedagogic function of artistic and philosophical work is further illuminated when extended by another note about Nietzsche’s special favorite in historical and political wisdom. It is, namely, Thukydides who is “mir der Typus, der mir am nächsten steht: er hat die Freude an den Typen, findet, daß zu jedem Typus ein Quantum von guter Vernunft gehört, und sucht dies zu entdecken [...]” (N Herbst 1880 6 [383], KSA 9, 296).

*Typus* is also taken along in assessments of the development and shattering of customs and morals. One note reads: “Die Erhaltung des Typus bringt eine Moral hervor. Das Zu-Grunde-Gehende des Typus die Unmoralität.” (N November 1882 - Februar 1883 4 [217], KSA 10, 172.) This insight seems to get developed into a claim that “die Heerde sucht einen Typus aufrecht zu erhalten und wehrt sich nach beiden Seiten, ebenso gegen die davon Entartenden (Verbrecher usw.) als gegen die darüber Emporragenden” (N Sommer - Herbst 1884 27 [17], KSA 11, 279).

Hence, “type” looks like a means to maintain the *status quo* and to counteract dissolutions. The function of the dominating type, the successfully propagated and established “Normal-Typus” (N Frühjahr 14 [113], KSA 13, 291), is, it appears, analogical and interrelated with the function of the dominating whole, the dominating unity. This is why their crises take place simultaneously, and under the same heading, nihilism. Before turning to the explicit considerations as to that problematic, the question of types requires further clarification. With the problematic of the type, research is doomed to get entangled with those aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that many of his supporters wish to neglect or deny, as well as many of his opponents are eager to stress or use as excuses for not having to examine it more thoroughly. These aspects are, to typify, the biologically flavored social and political considerations and aspirations converging the psychologically informed cultural ones. To begin with, Nietzsche writes to Georg Brandes about his fictional Polish aristocrat family background and says that German influence has not been able to effect the way “der Typus gut erhalten ist” (KGB III/5, April 1888, 288). In *Jenseits*, one finds ideas pertaining to the type being solidified and strengthened, to the variation of the type and to the deliberate breeding of the type (JGB 262, KSA 5, 214). In *Antichrist*, there is expressed the contrast between “höherwerthigtere Typus” both as resulted incidentally and as produced on purpose. Moreover, in the same book, there is presented a division of the three types belonging to “jeder gesunden Gesellschaft”: those by whom the spirituality dominates, those who are distinctively strong in terms of fitness of muscle and temper and those who rank as mediocre. (AC 3 & 57, KSA 6, 170 & 242.)
While there is no short cut to determining the precise anatomy of these ideas, the alarming nature of, in particular, some of the note book entries, casts a shadow on the entire discourse of _Typus_. Or how to ignore, say, the points being made about the “amputalen Typen” in the body of society (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [13], KSA 13, 413)? One of the reasons for my concentration on the problematic of the whole covering its, arguably, separate but closely related discourses is to try and interrogate Nietzsche’s thinking in its very controversiality. It remains to be seen how this can be achieved without resorting to sheer exposition of a bourgeois bad conscience. In any case, rather than to just enumerate and compare his virtues and vices, which is useful in its own right and even, up to a point, necessary, I will make the effort of exploring Nietzsche’s thinking in its unique richness.

Quite obviously, Nietzsche’s writings abound in attempts at articulating a new type, the most famous, and perhaps the most complex, being the ones toward _Übermensch_. But at this point, it is important to note that what Nietzsche is happy to call “types” is, taken together, an astonishing plethora of characters. I quoted above, in the context of _Gestalt_, a piece of Nietzsche’s letter (in fact, a sketch), where yours truly bragged about his artistic ability to stand by a situation until it acquires a form of some kind. The passage goes on as follows:

_Ich habe, mit Willkür, mir jene Typen erfunden, die in ihrer Verwegenheit mir Vergnügen machen, z.B. den “Immoralisten” - einen bisher unerhörten Typus_ (KGB III/5, Juli 1888, 363).

In addition to the type of the immoralist, there are, in Nietzsche’s texts, only to pick out some of them, the types of the _Bildungspilister_ (UB I 2 ff., KSA 1, 165 ff.), the _Pöbel_ (JGB 219, KSA 5, 219), the _Raubthier_ (GM III 15, KSA 5, 373), the Wagnerian (W “ZN”, KSA 6, 48), the great wise (GD “DpdS” 2, KSA 6, 67), the Napoleon (GD “SeU” 44, KSA 6, 145), the preest (e.g. GD “SeU” 45, KSA 6, 147), the philosopher (e.g. AC 12, KSA 6, 178), the God (AC 18, KSA 6, 185), the Jesus and the redeemer (e.g. AC 29, KSA 6, 199), the fanatic (AC 54, KSA 6, 237), the sceptic (EH “Wiskb” 3, KSA 6, 284), the Caesar (EH “Wiskb” 4, KSA 6, 287), the sophist and the learned (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [42], KSA 7, 284), the free spirit (N Herbst 1877 25 [2], KSA 8, 483), the stoic (N Ende 1880 7 [275], KSA 9, 374), the Pharisee (N Juli - August 1882 1 [36], KSA 10, 19), the lawgiver (N Sommer - Herbst 1883 15 [10], KSA 10, 481), the Luther (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887, 7 [5], KSA 12, 271), the Zarathustra (EH “WigBs”: AsZ 1-2 & 6, KSA 6, 337 & 344) and the nihilist (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [229], KSA 13, 90).

For the record, all these are called “types” in their specified _loci_. The list suffices, I think, to show the extensiveness of Nietzsche’s discourse of _Typus_. Most of all, it cannot be done away as so many obscure
physiological speculations, clever characteriological groupings or tongue in cheek caricatures, although
these quick depictions may well grasp something of the problematic. My interest is in studying typicality
as a part of Nietzsche’s thinking that has a bearing on synthetisizing considerations.

In line with the appreciation expressed toward such all-rounders as Voltaire, Goethe, Burckhardt and
taine, there are, in Nietzsche’s notes, characterizations of the “higher” and “stronger” type with an
emphasis on richness and complexity (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [133], KSA 13, 317), on the possession of all
the forces “synthetisch gebunden” (N Herbst 1883 16 [5], KSA 10, 497). Here as elsewhere, Nietzsche’s
radicalism is not so much crystallized in showing off with ultimate positions but in endeavoring to
accommodate whole varieties of positions in order for them to mutually question one another.

It could be said that the discourse of the type would not be that Nietzschean, if there wasn’t grave, be
they serious or playful, objections made against the very idea of the type. To be sure, a realist thinking in
terms of types is favorably contrasted with the moralist discipline: ”Die Wirklichkeit zeigt uns einen
etzückenden Reichthum der Typen, die Üppigkeit eines verschwenderischen Formenspiels und -
Wechsels: und irgend ein armseliger Eckensteher von Moralist sagt dazu: “nein! der Mensch sollte
anders sein”?” (GD “MaW” 6, KSA 6, 86-7). Furthermore, types seem to embody the possibility of
creativity: ”Der schöpferische Kraft - nachbildend, bildend, formend, sich übend - der von uns
repräsentierte Typus ist eine unserer Möglichkeiten - wir könnten viele Personen noch darstellen - wir
haben das Material dazu in uns. - “ (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [362], KSA 11, 107). However, there is, in
Nietzsche’s texts, a dimension opening into the harmfulness and potential transiency of the types. A
key passage from the notes of May/June 1883 can be quoted here:

Man ehrt erst einen Einzelnen, insofern er einen Typus ausdrückt: z.B. “der Priester”, “der
Held” usw. - später erst, insofern er “er allein” ist.
Moral gibt es, welche Tugend dahin stellt, daß einer nicht Individuum, sondern Typus
werde! daß er schließlich für die Empfindung zusammenfällt mit einem verehrten Typus des
Volkes. (N 9 [12], KSA 10, 349; cf. KGW II/5, 239..)

This might be taken to strengthen the case that Julian Roberts, one of the very few to have paid attention
to this issue, is making for a Nietzschean theory of types. According to Roberts, “the archetype of
Nietzsche’s early symbolism is replaced by the simulacrum [...] The simulacrum is for the future what the
type was for the past. [...] while the type is, as the word indicates, a mould taken out of the eternal stock
of forms, the simulacrum is a kind of venture, an essay, an experiment. It does not represent anything,
and neither does it especially resemble anything, except those things which initiate itself. [...] Nietzsche’s
Platonistic suggestion of a cosmos of types prides one order within the chaos of Becoming.”}1167
Although my review of the discourse shows that Roberts’s point does not hold as a strict statement of there being a clear-cut shift in Nietzsche’s thinking, it is an effective reminder of there being quite sweeping doubts as to the merits of the types. It is my contention that Nietzsche’s discourse of type is part of his reconceptualization of conceptuality, in accordance with the classic connection between concepts and types, yet with modern reworkings and self-critical doubts in the picture.

Enough has been said, for the moment, about what I loosely termed as the harmonizing side of Nietzsche. The sustained efforts, on his part, to develop a discourse of Ganzheit, Gesamtheit, Einheit, Synthesis, Gestaltung and Typus are not to be ignored. I find it easy to agree with Martin Jay who has spoken of Nietzsche as a philosopher often used to counter the very “concept of totality”, while he often points beyond modern decadent disintegration. Where Jay was happy just to refer to Nietzsche’s conception of Goethe, I wanted to show above just how pervasive the Nietzschean appetite for wholeness is.

Without a recourse to Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre contributed to a similar problematic in his attempt to renovate the theoretical foundations of Marxism and the have them support his existentialism. The more general metaphilosophical concern of his was to defend “philosophies” against la Philosophie. Sartre wanted to oppose “knowledge already totalized”. Yet, he emphasized the crucial philosophical need to totalize and unify all contemporary knowledge. His strategy was to combine Hegel and Kierkegaard in Marxian terms. Hence, Sartre underscored “concrete syntheses” in the historical becoming wordly of philosophy and came up with the key notion of “detotalized totality”. The point was to say that no totality is fixed and complete, but evolving and in need of experiential check up and personal “elaboration of passion”. This was the only way to stop theoretical and practical stagnation and keep available “the keys, the interpretative schemes”.

Detotalized totalities might well be helpful in making sense of Nietzsche’s extensive use for the language of whole and for his reservations as to this very vocabulary. It is, namely, not only the Nietzschean texts, in their overall dissipated nature or in the untamable processes of signification within them, that tend to question his bent toward entirety. This inclination is also challenged by some specific features of wholeness detected by him. I shall now turn to these second thoughts.

First of all, the feature of Nietzsche’s texts that have to do with their density of images and thickness of texture, multilayered and multipolar structures, sheer overflow of details, aspects, nuances, subtleties, hints, sidesteps, byproducts, is coupled with a pronounced superiority of this kind of writing and thinking over the unified, the monolithic, the deficient, the insufficient, the barren. One finds, for instance, in the notebooks from between November 1887 and March 1888, paraphrases and quotations from the works.
of the French writer Benjamin Constant. Some of them are particularly interesting for the present purposes, such as the one about the “Regel der Einheiten”. The function of the unities is that they “zwingen den Dichter oft, in den Ereignissen und den Charakteren, die Wahrheit der Gradation, die Delikatesse der nuances zu vernachlässigen; es giebt Lücken, zu brüske Übergänge.” (N 11 [306], KSA 13, 130.)

It may be tempting to have it once and for all determined, whether Nietzsche, composing his own books and taking his lessons from Constant and others, attempted to master both the wholes and the holes or tried to get rid of any arrangements. My point, however, is rather to make it convincing that his texts contain material indicative of, or at least useful for, a heightened awareness of the problematic of unity. As one can guess by now, the aesthetic problem of the form is by no means the only direction taken in questioning the disadvantages of unifying efforts. In one of Nietzsche’s fragments, the Schopenhauerian change from the perspective of consciousness to the one of the body is performed to show the simplifying bias inherent in the former: ”Alles, was als “Einheit” ins Bewuβtsein tritt, ist bereits ungeheuer complizirt: wir haben immer nur einen Anschein von Einheit. Das Phänomen des Leibes ist das reichere, deutlichere, faβbare Phänomen: methodisch voranzustellen, ohne etwas auszumachen über seine letzte Bedeutung.” (N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [56], KSA 12, 205-6.)

Further from the perspective of the body, it appears that “[f]ortwährend arbeitet noch das Chaos in unserem Geiste: Begriffe Bilder Empfindungen werden zufällig neben einander gebracht, durch einander gewürfelt. ... Nachbarschaften... etwas Neues combiniert wird... eine neue allerfeinste chemische Combination sein, die wirklich im Werden der Welt noch nicht ihres Gleichen hat.” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [121], KSA 9, 484.) This is something that will acquire an important role, in Zarathustra, where emphasis is put on the “große Vernunft” and on the promise in people who still “noch Chaos in sich haben”. Zarathustra’s preferences are easily associated with what was said above about creating “out of” one’s proper resources: “Ich liebe Den, dessen Seele übervoll ist, so dass er sich selber vergisst, und alle Dinge in ihm sind”. The other side of such a capacity is that those whom the orator calls soul-full and soul-deep can also “an einem kleinen Erlebnisse zu Grunde gehen”. Or that, for such a character, “werden alle Dinge sein Untergang”. (Z “V” 4-5, KSA 4, 18-9.)

The tragic dimension to the economy of the spacious and embodied mentality aside, what may be the most dramatic demolition of the notion of unity, in Nietzsche’s writings, is this: “Das Schwächere drängt sich zum Stärkeren, aus Nahrungsnoth; es will unterschüpfen, mit ihm womöglich Eins werden. Der Stärkere wehrt umgekehrt ab von sich, er will nicht in dieser Weise zu Grunde gehen; vielmehr, im Wachsen, spaltet er sich zu Zweien und Mehreren. Je größer der drang ist zur Einheit, um so mehr darf man auf Schwäche schließen; je mehr der Drang nach Varietät, Differenz, innerlichem Zerfall, um so

Apart from being one of the many sketches for the notion of the ‘will to power’, the fragment contains rather straightforward endorsement of diversity as strength and equally straightforward discrediting of oneness as weakness. The evolutionary and ecological setting necessitates, however, that the stress is laid on the process where movements of variation and assimilation keep on recurring. It is best to look for further chances of shedding light on the issue. A telling instance of the counter-harmonizing thrust, in Nietzsche’s texts, is that his Gesammt glossary includes such terms as Gesammtbewußtsein, Gesammtsensorium and Gesammtgewalt. With these words, a reference is made to a Godlike Gestalt that should perish but dies hard as an ingredient of philosophical explanation. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [72], KSA 13, 34-5.) Moreover, in another posthumous note from the same period, it is said that there is no Gesammtprozeß, no such thing as “das Ganze” (N 11 [74], KSA 13, 37).

Are these denouncements of the systematic and synthetic sort of thinking or, rather, its qualifications? In the latter of the passages just quoted, there is, indeed, an explicit qualification of the deplorable notion of Gesammtprozeß reading “(diesen als System gedacht - )”. Sufficiently similar qualification of unifying thinking can also be found in a portion of Nietzsche’s earlier Nachlass where the appropriate, suitable or allowed sense of unity is specified:

Alle Einheit ist nur als Organisation und Zusammenspiel Einheit: nicht anders als wie ein menschliches Gemeinwesen eine Einheit ist: also Gegensatz der atomistischen Anarchie; somit ein Herrschafts-Gebilde, das Eins bedeutet, aber nicht eins ist.
(N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [87], KSA 12, 104.)

This utterance implies that what was just quoted about variety and difference as superior to the homogeneity should not be taken to mean surrendering to any anarchistic model. Still another kind of qualification is found, in an important note book entry from the early 1884, about the naïve and deceiving idea of “ein Ganzes von Erkenntnis, ein System”. The passage goes on with the juxtaposition and affirmation of “ein Ganzes von Voraussetzungen der Methode”. (N 25 [449], KSA 11, 132-3.) Is this not close to the interpretation I gave of the Material and Bau passage of Menschliches? That is, to the view that if Nietzsche’s philosophical construction cannot be conveniently seen as a systematic edifice, it can still be regarded as a carefully built ensemble of metasystematic, metaconstructionist, metaphilosophical insights. The whole can be reinterpreted as the entirety of the ways to go about reconstructing, deconstructing and reevaluating wholes.
In any case, Nietzsche’s writings suggest that there are better and worse ways of thinking in terms of wholeness. One note has it that the allegedly causal successions in representation bring about “fingirte Synthesen und Einheiten”. Clearly, there appears to be synthenses and unities of less questionable, less meddlesome nature. Interestingly, the root of the matter is said, in the same note, to be the notion of “Bewußtsein selbst als Gesammt-Sensorium und oberste Instanz”. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [145], KSA 13, 68.)

However, there are even more sweeping negations of the conceptual family of the whole. The most sweeping, and the most representative of the questions discussed so far, is very probably the group of enunciations best captured in yet another note book entry. In the critical edition of Nietzsche’s writings, it is classified as the fragment number 11 [99] and determined to date from between November 1887 and March 1888. A fair share of the note deals with the problem of asserting or postulating “eine Ganzheit, eine Systematisierung, selbst eine Organisierung in allem Geschehn und unter allem Geschehn”. The Gesammtvorstellung and Einheit acquired in this way, is “ein modus der Gottheit”. (KSA 13, 47.)

Significantly, this fragment carries the title line “Kritik des Nihilism”. Ascribing a unity to all-that- takes-place is identified as one of the causes of nihilism. The explanation reads as follows:

Im Grunde hat der Mensch den Glauben an seinen Werth verloren, wenn durch ihn nicht ein unendlich werthvolles Ganze wirkt: d.h. er hat ein solches Ganzes conceipirt, um an seinen Werth glauben zu können.
(KSA 13, 47.)

One may note here the difference between aus dem Ganze and nach dem Ganze being repeated and refined. It is refined in the sense that now it is explicitly said that some whole is active “through” somebody. The challenge seems to be to “conceive” a whole in a way that would not alienate the conceiver from that which is conceived. Or better, to conceive it so that the conception reproduces and renews the conceiver, while bringing about a meaningful and worthy concept of the whole. At the same, nihilism seems to call into question the whole business of conceiving and conceptualizing, since, in the aftermath of a collapsed order of conceiving, severe doubt can be cast on any concept as to its role as sheer make believe, an obsolete weapon or a fetish.

The problematic of the whole, then, leads to the problematic of nihilism. One may pay attention to the way the note speaks of a “such” whole and implies that there are vital conceptual differences between wholes. The other extreme of form-giving with a phony whole can be borrowed from Nietzsche’s second Unzeitgemäss where Schiller’s criticism of modern historiography is favorably cited. This is the Gestalt as Glaubensatz of the historian to the effect that there is, in history, “einem übereinstimmenden Ganzen -
Das freilich nur in seiner Vortellung vorhanden ist" in which the historian, all the same, wants to arrange oneself “als ein passendes Glied” (UB II 6, KSA 1, 291).

In as much as one of the famous insights in Nietzsche’s book on historiography was that of thematizing the function of “das Vergessen” with respect to the way “lebt das Thier unhistorisch” (UB II 1, KSA 1, 248-9), one can have a look at an earlier fragment on the impossibility of forgetting:

Vielleicht kann der Mensch nichts vergessen. Die Operationen des Sehens und des Erkennens ist viel zu complicirt, als daß es möglich wäre, sie völlig wieder zu verwischen, d. h. alle Formen, die einmal vom Gehirn und Nervensystem erzeugt sind, wiederholt es von jetzt ab so oft. Eine gleiche Nerventhätigkeit erzeugt das gleiche Bild wieder. (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [82], KSA 7, 447.)

To sum up, human physiology, according to this hypothesis, may make it a necessity to remember everything that one ever experiences. The complex form-giving process conducted by the brains and the nerves would be unstoppable. Now, even though the book on historiography starts from the apparently similar setting of the physiology of remembering is moves on to point out how the characteristically historical Zeitalter “eine Art von ironischem Selbsbewusstsein zuschreibe, ein darüberschwebendes Ahnen, dass hier nicht zu frohlocken sei, eine Furcht, dass es vielleicht bald mit aller Lustbarkeit der historischen Erkenntniss vorüber sein werde” (UB II 8, KSA 1, 302-3). That is, the fragment’s microlevel ecology of conceiving is transformed into the book’s macrolevel ecology: historical manner of conceptualizing has reached its highpoint as the ruling conceptual power, while it at the same time pre-conceives its loss of credibility.

One may compare this to the debate in today’s philosophy of science concerning the relationship between scientific and conceptual revolutions. Especially after Kuhn’s revisions of his own early idea of “a holistic Gestalt switch” and Donald Davidson’s critique of the notions of “massive conceptual change”, conceptual revolutions have been referred to as “upheavals, evolutions, small revolutions, saltations”. As Matti Sintonen argues, “the Copernican Revolution was not just a scientific revolution, but one which was accompanied by a conceptual evolution, the gradual emergence of a new way of seeing motion, and the gradual emergence of new methodological standards and new standards of intelligibility”. Since this slow unfolding of “ramifications […] on the career of the programme” was no one’s, not even Copernicus’s, “masterplan”, it serves to exemplify, in Sintonen’s delicate phrase, “revolutions that we do not make but revolutions which make us”.1171

I think it is instructive, at this point, to take a step backward to the Nietzschean discourse of Gestalt. There, one can meet another note where a similar sweeping doubt against form-giving and ensemble-
forming is expressed:

Wir können aus allen unseren Kräften viele Gestalten formen, oder auch die Absenz der Gestalt. Es gibt eine gewisse künstlerische Freiheit in der Vorstellung unserer Muster, die wir erreichen können.
(N Herbst 1880 6 [147], KSA 9, 234.)

In the light of this passage, one may escape the need to organize experience in terms of forms or types. One could imagine a situation where the modelling of experiential material is mostly dependent on the resources and capacities of the modeller. These could include the skill of suspending modelling or the ability to withdraw from the activity of shaping and organizing. Combined with the above passage on nihilism it would appear either that one may, after all, do without wholes, too, or that one does need a meaningful whole to be able to tolerate a lower level absence of order as Gestalt-lessness. Another note, seven years later, supplies more information. The entry is about the “Gesammt-Anblick des zukünftigen Europäers” and the “Affekt- und Intelligenzen-Chaos” of these future (contemporary?) creatures. In this reworking of the Zarathustrian notion, it is said that

[u]m sich aus jenem Chaos zu dieser Gestaltung emporzukämpfen - dazu bedarf es einer Nöthigung: man muß die Wahl haben, entweder zu Grunde gehen oder sich durchzusetzen.
(N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [31], KSA 13, 17-8.)

One might gather that what may have been a matter of free choice is predicted to become one of life and death. Either you perish or you force your Gestaltung through the chaos. In this way, nihilism would indeed entail the necessity of new formations and conceptions. In Zarathustra, there is a proper dramatic timing for the issue of the “alten und neuen Tafeln” (Z III/12, KSA 4, 246-69). Zarathustra meets a youngster moaning about his fatigue and nausea due to, as the orator assumes, his fervent zeal and tendency to “verwandel[e] mich zu schnell” and “überspringe[n] oft die Stufen, wenn ich steige, - das verzeiht mir keine Stufe”. His reply to the disencouraged man involves a restatement of the risk and weakness inherent in setting one’s goal beyond one’s self, to project something that does not stem from all there is within that self: “Noch bist du nicht frei, du suchst noch nach Freiheit. Übernächtig machte dich dein Suchen und überwacht./ In die frei Höhe willst du, nach Sternen dürstet deine Seele. Aber auch deine schlimmen Triebe dürstest nach Freiheit.” (Z I/8, 51-3.)

The episode illustrates how nihilism may result from an ideal that is unreasonably alienated from the very beginning. To put one’s faith in a purified concept is to leave a large portion of one’s resources intact while conceiving and to end up with worn out abstract concepts incapable of making sense of experience. Whatever emancipation this type of conceiving may have meant for the conceiver, from his or her condition, it is doomed to remain without the all important second order emancipation, emancipation
from emancipation. Perhaps an emancipation from emancipation is only possible after the trial and error of false ideals. What is needed is a step from the distance from one’s situation back to the situation with renewed resources of conceiving.

I find it useful to think that the ambivalence of Gestaltung and Ganzheit goes back to Nietzsche’s early ponderings on Greeks, art and knowledge. There are, in the notes between 1872 and 1873, remarks about, say, the nature having no Gestalt, about the impossibility of knowing the whole, about a need for developing a Gestalt, about the ability to perceive a Gestalt (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [133], [141-142], [153], KSA 7, 462, 464-5, 466). Without trying to systematize the givings of these early reflections, I wish to suggest that the peculiar dynamics of Nietzsche’s confrontation with the problematic is already recognizable.

Now, I said above that one of the candidates for being the allegedly impossible all-Nietzschean was hostility toward systems. Its corollary could be, and quite often in the reception it is, praising of the becoming, of the flux. As Kenneth Bruder proposes, with good grounds, Nietzsche “may become the first philosopher of a first philosophy of becoming”1172. If it is a commonplace to see, in Nietzsche, a defender of plurality and becoming against the menace of oneness and being, the thick discourse of unity being charted here might well be baffling. Unless, of course, it is thought that this sort of countering, complementing, balancing and transforming material proves best that Nietzsche is in a state of becoming and not being fixed as an avatar of becoming. Be that as it may, to shed light on this issue of becoming and, at the same time, to help link the conceptual problematic with the discourse of Gestalten, I recommend having a look at a fragment of an especially fragmentary fragment:

[...] daß ein Begriff angebliches Wissen an Stelle der Natur treten soll, als Bildner, gestalten, bauen will
der Haß gegen das Werden, gegen die sorgfältige Betrachtung des Werdens [...] (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [53], KSA 13, 444).

“The hatred of becoming” seems to be conjoined here with the imposition of “a concept of pseudo-knowing” on nature. This would be the common reading of Nietzsche as the herald of the flux. But isn’t there room for such a “painstaking study of becoming” that would exploit concepts of other sort? Can and should the whole of what is taking place be made into a Gestalt, can and should it be conceptualized? How to go about making it? Or is the flux, however it is conceived, to be left alone? And would that be possible or just inconceivable?

Ernst Cassirer has discussed the relations between Begriff and Gestalt. Forms or shapes are, as he explains it, at home within “the natural world-view [Weltbild]”. Yet, in molding the natural, they already
imply a “distancing” and a tendency toward “strict theoretical concepts”. If one has, at first, “intuitive forms [anschauliche Gebilden]”, the clarity about them is, little by little, “claimed by conscious exercise of thought”. According to Cassirer, it is the “primary achievement of the concept” to realize the anticipatory “differentiation and order” inherent in the “intuitive reality [anschauliche Wirklichkeit]” and to specify the meanings within. Furthermore, “all individual conceptual structures ought [...] to be incorporated with a unified all-encompassive context of thinking”. In this way, Gestalt is not so much an opposite of Begriff but, rather, its prefiguration.

One more note book entry, from Nietzsche, must suffice to give a preliminary idea of the connections between what I have pursued here and what will be taken up later on:

Die Sprache, eine Summe von Begriffen. / Der Begriff, im ersten Moment der Entstehung, ein künstlerisches Phänomen [...]. [...] Wie verhält sich der Begriff zur Erscheinungswelt? Er ist der Typus vieler Erscheinungen. Das Erkennungszeichen des gleichen Triebes. / Wenn der Intellekt rein Spiegel wäre? Aber die Begriffe sind mehr (N Winter 1870-71 - Herbst 1872 8 [41], KSA 7, 238-9.)

Conceptualizing is gathering together, summing up, signifying, typifying. It is something else than just mirroring the sensually given. This is how the problematic of the whole is linked with the problematic of conceptuality.

As will be shown later, nihilism is, apart from anything else that it may be, that which triggers the crisis of consistent conceptual orientation, of sufficiently one-piece conceptualization to make possible the making sense of experience. As the epigraph of this section has it, failure to grasp the presence of such a meaningful whole, to adapt oneself to it and to transform it, will result in falling prey to it. In this way, the viewpoint of conceptuality offers itself as something that brings order and solidity into Nietzsche’s writings, but only by introducing a more critical stance toward any totalizing moves in the interpretation, since these, just as the detotalizing ones, fail to appreciate the need to rehearse self-criticism. If, as it will be tried below, it can be shown that the concept critical reflections are at work in Nietzsche’s texts, and not merely in the apparatus being here somehow imposed onto it, there is all the less need to worry about the questionable aspects in this “bringing into”.

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Stanley Rosen speaks about philosophy as dreaming of the whole, of the ultimate context, of the world. In philosophical thinking, says Rosen, the whole is transformed into a concept. In his view, the deplorable aspect of this is the resulting incapability of reasonably accounting for the one who undertakes the conceptualization, that is, the conceiver. In more general terms, the context of conception grows hazy, dreamy, edgeless, undifferentiated. If conceiveers become dreamers, concepts become poems. It is Rosen’s contention that “the distinction between philosophy and poetry turns upon our ability to distinguish between conceptual construction and the natural or pre-analytical world of the conceiver”.

Rosen holds Kant responsible for the contemporary situation where this very ability of distinction does not fare well. The German philosopher carried out a suppression of dreams by his project of thorough rationalization. Yet, he inaugurated an irrationality of the essentially dreamy subject. This is so, in Rosen’s opinion, because “[i]n conceptualizing the world, Kant removes the conceiver from its structures, or from rational explanation”. As Rosen sees it, Hegel then “reconceptualizes the conceiver” and “attempts to carry through the definition of philosophy as conceptual analysis.” Since the fall of the Hegelian project, there have been two basic “attempts to do justice to the conceiver”. Rosen identifies them as those who seek for an “existential individual” and new “extra-rational modes of thinking”, as well as those who turn back to Kant and the Enlightenment.

Rosen’s analysis reads: “In the twentieth century, we therefore find ourselves in the following situation. On the one hand, there is a widespread conviction that philosophy begins from ordinary experience, everyday language, or the pre-philosophical [and pre-conceptual] world. On the other hand, the conviction is itself articulated in the language of concepts.” Rosen thinks that there is, in this respect, not that great a difference between phenomenological reconstructions and analytical treatments of concepts. What all philosophy shares is the dilemma that “the very attempt to understand the world leads to a conceptual reconstruction that separates us, by having acquired theoretical understanding, from the world we set out to understand”. Interestingly, Rosen claims that it is precisely the Kantian/Nietzschean legacy that the world - all the way to the ““natural” world of the pre-philosophical individual” - is, nowadays, taken to be a conceptual construct.
It should be noted that Rosen is, in the main, criticizing those not quite aware of their ultra-conceptual stance. Thus, it is worth asking what would be his comment on, for example, Nicholas Rescher’s defence of ‘conceptual idealism’. Rescher begins to argue his case for an idealism consonant with today’s “philosophical ethos” by stating that arguing is relying on “conceptual schemes and their linguistic manifestations”. Cognitive situations are such that one enters them as a conceiver with peculiar ways of conceptualizing the objects of knowledge. This is why, says Rescher, philosophical explanations require a special emphasis on the unique capacities and operations that the mind possesses and accomplishes in seeing, making differences and forming hypotheses.1177

Rosen would probably say that the risk here is to extend one’s explanations beyond the sphere of the ‘cognitive’ and, thus, move on to conceptualize the whole variety of being. In any case, Rosen stresses that he is neither condemning phenomenology nor rejecting formal logic, any more than he is thinking that it be “possible to give any reflective account of human experience without some kind of structural analysis”, or to get rid of concepts. Accordingly, as he consults Plato’s dialogues to find a suitable alternative, Rosen is careful to underline that the difference between the ancients and the moderns is not to be simplified. Soon as one perceives how “Greeks philosophized from the direct sources of everyday life”, one is also reminded of the way “[t]he problem of the conceptualization of the world is thus already implicit in the philosophizing of the natural consciousness.”1178

Rosen develops his alternative by, for instance, noting the way Hegel intended “to show that there is no conflict between human existence and conceptual knowledge”. This laudable objective of the “dialectical conception of experience” was, however, shattered by the fact that it was but a “stage of the logic or unfolding of the Concept”. According to Rosen, conceptualizing the world demands “our existence at a self-conscious but extra-conceptual level”. Hence, he proposes neither novel systems nor relapse into an irrational ignorance of the context of reasoning. Instead, the “deeper and more comprehensive grasp of the process” he strives for is such that “this “grasp” is not a concept or system of concepts, but a dream, albeit a reasonable and lucid dream”.1179

This is, I contend, an ingenious presentation of the contemporary philosophical situation and the crucial metaconceptual problem involved in it. It is sufficiently original, although it, no doubt, combines great many philosophical insights from a variety of sources. In point of fact, what it does bring to my mind, apart from Nietzsche and perhaps more forcefully than any other, is John Dewey’s naturalist, or better, ecological depiction of the circumstances of conceiving, and his related hopes for a philosophical regeneration. I am thinking, most of all, of Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philosophy where Kant is criticized for overdoing the point of experience “buttressed” with “pure concepts”: “When Kant taught that some conceptions, and these the important ones, are a priori, that they do not arise in experience

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and cannot be verified or tested in experience, that without such ready-made injections into experience the latter is anarchic and chaotic, he fostered the spirit of absolutism, even though technically he denied the possibility of absolutes.*1180

Later on, I will have more to say about the fruitful connections between Rosen’s account and other philosophical views. But right now it is my top priority to develop ideas such as these into a specific conceptual problematic relevant to the present study.

Since Kant, it has been a philosophical commonplace to treat concepts as a necessity, or to try and go about specifically avoiding that necessity. Yet, there is no consensus of what concepts are and how one is supposed to account for them. To be sure, such a lack of consensus is, if anything, the hallmark of philosophy. But the trouble with conceptuality is this. While philosophers of different persuasions in, say, ontological and ethical matters, all tend to agree that conceptualizing defines the very business of philosophy, concepts are, at the same time, that which philosophy shares with a handsome variety of non-philosophies ranging from special sciences via common sense to some forms of art. In addition, philosophical experiments of doing without concepts, or at any rate of radically reducing their significance, converge different scientific, artistic, religious and other non-philosophical forms of extra-conceptuality.

It is my purpose to bring Nietzsche in this setting. The project assumed in this study is about trying to spell out his presence, already felt but poorly acknowledged, in the modern problematic of conceptuality. Since that very problematic is so broad, I shall begin by asking just what kind of language does one use in talking about conceiving and conceptualizing (III.b.1). The more precise and more readily philosophical questions follow thereafter: which are the ways to make sense of the concept of concept (III.b.2), and how to reconstruct the issue of conceptuality for it to bear on both the nature of philosophy and Nietzsche’s thought (III.b.3).

To close this chapter, I shall outline my concept critical approach (III.c). It will become clear that this approach has already been put to play, in the present study, beginning from the way I discussed Nietzsche’s concept of ‘life’. A philosopher is studied concept critically, as it is examined how he or she conceptualizes ‘concept’ and what this conceptualization tells about his or her other conceptions. To study how philosophers understand the role and nature of concepts in philosophy is to become to comprehend their philosophical effort to conceive. Concept historical investigation complements this largely analytical and hermeneutic grasp by showing how the career of a concept and the one of a philosopher coincide.

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III.b.1 Vocabularies of Conceptuality

In Robert M. Martin’s book, *The Philosopher’s Dictionary* (1994), the entry “concept” is offered two explications. The second one of them describes philosophers’ use of the word as having sometimes to do with the skill of categorizing or, at other times, with the generalizing of “percepts” that are particular mental items “had while sensing” particular things. I shall handle these sorts of questions in the next subsection. For the moment, one may consider Martin’s first explication: “In ordinary talk, this word often has little meaning, and is best omitted when it’s just a pretentious synonym for ‘idea’.”

What Martin says has doubtless plausibility, yet it is surely not to be taken as all that there is to tell about “concept” and “ordinary talk”. This will be shown in the following excursion into the vocabulary of conceptuality. The more pressing thing to question and, if possible, to show is how the ordinary talk can have some significance for the word “concept” as used in philosophical contexts. I would venture to say that there is, in Martin’s proposition, a good deal of academic arrogance when he is ready to attribute a pretentious attitude to the unprofessional language users. After all, what may be the most presumptuous is the intellectual indoor gymnastics, in the universities, where the life of the language beyond campus is often regarded with contempt or indifference. Far as I can see, philosophy is not very philosophical if it is not interested in learning from the ways such words as “philosophy” and “concept” are used in non-expert circles, as well.

The professional resistance, among philosophers, to this kind of recognition has, probably, been grounded in the insight that without such self-delimitation philosophy becomes indistinguishable from anything surrounding it, be it religion, literature or whatever. One can think of Ernst Mach who held that “the nature of concepts ought to emerge much better from scientific concepts that are *consciously* formed and used than from the vulgar concepts. Due to their confusedness, the latter can hardly be counted as concepts proper.” In the Machian conception of philosophy, what counts is the way science is in need of philosophico-conceptual analysis. Hence, realms of, for example, the politics of conceptuality (the power relations guiding human practices with concepts) and the economy of conceptuality (the relations guiding the production, marketing and consuming of concepts), could not be more than distant satellites of the heartland of philosophical conceptualization.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that philosopher’s monopoly, in dealing with concepts, is being challenged by scientists, such as sociologists and, even more powerfully, by experts in commerce and marketing techniques of communication and information. This latter threat to philosophy consists, according to Deleuze and Guattari, in stealing all that is eventful in conceiving. They hold that it has to do with the way philosophers have mistaken “Universals” for concepts, and the way their newest rivals
mistake concepts as “merchandises” for concepts as “aerolites”. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari do not play down what Martin referred to as “pretentious” and Mach as “confused” word use. For them, the collision of philosophy and its contenders is the chance for philosophy to assume its proper task of creating concepts.\textsuperscript{1183}

For Richard Rorty, too, what matters more than the aged quandaries of defining concepts is the chance to turn tables for other questions. It is, indeed, Rorty who has strongly spoken for the philosophical need of new ways of speaking, new vocabularies, sentences, narratives.\textsuperscript{1184} According to him, as he writes in an article on the pragmatic consequences of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, “[e]ven in the sciences, metaphoric redescriptions are the mark of genius and of progress”\textsuperscript{1185}.

In all fairness, it should be added that Mach is by no means blind to the decisive role of language and society in conceptualization. On the contrary, he says that language skills and the related social and cultural activities make human conceptualizing stand out from its cruder forms in higher animals. Words “describe and embody” concepts. To utter a word is enough to ring the bell and make certain associated experiences come alive, even though they are not “clearly and explicitly represented”. To define concepts is to have the definition “concisely contain a sum of experiences”. A word unit is the basis of mutual understanding, as within a profession, because word is “a sensual generally conceivable label of the concept”. Eventually, science is but the highest stage in the progress from “a determined tendency toward conceptual schematization”, as in the brutes capable of differentiating between biologically vital natural colors, to the point of “the concept of the word-related or term-related consciousness of reactions that one expects from the described class of objects (facts)”.\textsuperscript{1186}

This is how Mach argues that something like conceiving or conceptualizing takes place even in the animal world, yet to begin to talk about humans is, at the same time, to start talking about conceptualization proper, that is, about using concepts to name (label, describe) things and to predict the consequences of an action. In a somewhat curious manner, Mach treats pre-scientific schemes as conceptually deficient, while he also writes about there being a kind of continuum from the primitive marking off to the sophisticated differentiations in science. In due course, I shall try and show that this problem was shared by Nietzsche who did not, however, have the sensualist bias in common with Mach. Nietzsche’s difference here is most obviously explainable in terms of his more serious, albeit highly provocative, paradoxical and playful, attention to the role of language in conceiving.

Now, philosophers have been traditionally occupied with concepts of such and such, more rarely with the concept of concept. When they begin to assess a concept of such and such, they do consider, every now and then, the ordinary talk about this such and such. These considerations can assume a form of
dismissal, a passing introductory remark or more or less ardent investigation into the many facets of natural languages, their respective etymologies and so on. However, the considerations are very rarely, even when the issue of the concept of concept is specifically under scrutiny, applied to the word “concept” itself.

As a notable exception, Stanley Rosen poses and answers the burning question as follows: ”What is a concept? The simplest reply to this question takes its cue from the etymology of the term. A concept is the result of our grasping something mentally. The comparison of the mind to the hand is at least as old as Aristotle, older, that is, than the technical terminology of concepts. Here, as in so many other cases, Aristotle begins with everyday language, the original manifestation of the phenomena in linguistic form.” Rosen goes on to say that, while “the grasp of thought” is, for Aristotle, “receptive but not fundamentally productive”, the modern view is characterized by the maxim “we know only what we make”. According to Rosen, “the Kantian revision of Aristotelian Platonism” can be taken to unite Husserl’s tradition of fundamental ontology and Frege’s tradition of analytical philosophy: ”A concept is a mental entity, intuited or constructed, expressing a determinate content of discursively accessible thought”.1187

In the context of modern philosophy, Rosen’s talk of the concept being an “entity”, or even of its being something “mental”, may be misleading. Nowadays, many philosophers would feel more comfortable with an explanation in terms of ”skills” related in a ‘public’ activity. Yet, I shall save the intricacies of the concept of concept to the next subsection, and keep on pursuing the verbal peculiarity of conceiving, beginning from what Rosen aptly terms “the paradigm of the hand”.

If the Latin conceptus goes back to, among other things, “taking” or “gripping” and, hence, to mental “grasping”, things are very much the same, not only in the evident cases such as the French concept and the Italian concetto, but in German or Swedish, too. Begriff / begrepp and Auffassung / uppfattning can be traced back to griffen / gripa and fassen / fatta as “taking hold of”. C. G. Jung, for instance, wrote once that ”[d]ie Auf”fassung” ermöglicht einen “Griff” an den Dingen, das heißt einen “Begriff” derselben, was eine Inbesitznahme ausdrückt”1188. This sentence could be translated in various ways, since Jung’s formulation invites one to rethink the word for conceiving or conceptualizing, fassen, as indistinguishable from griffen or “to grip” and, arguably, very close to angriffen or “to onslaught”. A further complication could be that fassen can also mean “framing” or “installing”.

Incidentally, Rosen’s stress on “the paradigm of the hand” is further corroborated by something he is probably not aware of. I do not mean the English colloquialisms like “catching what you mean” or “getting it”, which, in turn, continue the Latin linkage between taking in, holding, containing and
comprehending (*capere*). What I have in mind is that in Finnish, the connection is even more blatant. *Käsite* stands for “concept”, *käsi* for “hand”, while the verb *käsittää* has transformed from its early meaning of “to capture” to its modern one of “to conceive [understand]”.

Before Rosen, Martin Heidegger had much to say about the pragmatics of the hand. Heidegger’s task being to elaborate the etymology of *pragma* or action (*Handeln*), he suggests that things can be said to “act” (“*handeln*”) in so far as they refer that which is at hand (*Vorhandenen und Zuhandenen*) back “to the sphere of the ‘hand’”. He puts forth the thesis that, for human beings, hand is “the essential feature [*Wesensauszeichnung*]”, while “[n]o animal has got a hand”. In point of fact, nor do humans exactly “have” a hand, because, according to Heidegger, hand itself discloses the essence of humanity. He mentions, for example, prayer, oath, waving and shaking, before moving on to insist that hand emerges from “the word” which is “the essential sphere [*Wesensbereich*] of the hand”. Through these considerations, Heidegger is ready to say that along with the decline of handwritten form of writing, “the word is being degraded into a medium of exchange”.

As it happens, Nietzsche’s *Genealogie* had already contained an interesting reference to hand. Namely, in a passage where it is said that the procedure of a punishment is prior to the use of this procedure for carrying out the punishment or, more generally, that significance is less stable and always secondary to the acts to which it is attached, the following analogy is presented: “[...] unsre naiven Moral- und Rechtsgenealogen bisher annahmen, welche sich allesammt die Prozedur *erfunden* dachten zum Zweck der Strafe, so wie man sich ehemals die Hand erfunden zum Zweck des Greifens” (GM II 13, KSA 5, 316). The irony here is manifold, since part of the whole issue of genealogy is to investigate concepts and thoughts in a way analogical to the study of the evolution of species involving, among other things, complex series of bodily adaptation to the changing environment. One might infer that hand cannot be seen as having been imposed on the event or act of grabbing and grasping. Instead, it is something that evolves in the process where human beings seek to apprehend and appropriate their surroundings. And it is a classic philosophical problem, whether hand itself is already part of those surroundings. As Paul Valéry once put it, “[c]onsidering one’s own hand on the table always results in philosophical amazement. I am in that hand, and I am not there. It is *me* and *not-me*.”

Valéry’s words evoke Condillac and his *Traité des sensations* with its famous statue example. An immobile piece of carved marble is first given smell, hearing and sight. Only as the further sense of touch is given to it, it can understand its own bodily being. The statue puts its “hands upon itself” and recognizes itself in different parts of its own body, while placing them upon things where this recognition of the same sentient being (“This is myself, this is still myself”) does not occur, it knows it is touching other bodies: “the ‘I’ feels itself modified in the hand, does not feel itself modified in the foreign body:
The “I” does not receive the response from the foreign body which it receives from the hand.” Condillac’s point is that this is how the child learns to know its body, that is, by perceiving its “sensations not as modifications of its mind, but as modifications of the organs that are their occasioning causes”. Thus, says Condillac, “the ego, instead of being concentrated in the mind, becomes extended and somehow repeated in all parts of the body”.1191

One may as well observe how Condillac receives no minor valuation in a Nietzscbean fragment: “besten strengen Philosophen-Schule Europas, der der Condillac und Destutt de Tracy” (N 25 [8] Dezember 1888 - Anfang Januar 1889, KSA 13, 641). As for the importance of the ‘paradigm of the hand’ for Nietzsche’s view of concepts with respect for instance Condillac’s sensualism, these will be examined in the next chapter. To balance Condillac’s view, one more version of the philosophical hand will be taken up.

In his Nature (1836), Emerson has a fine passage on the evolution of conceptual practices: “What tedious training, day after day, year after year, never ending, to form the common sense; what continual reproduction of annoyances, inconveniences, dilemmas; what rejoicing over us of little men; what disputes of prices, what reckonings of interest, - and all to form the Hand of the mind; - to instruct us that “good thoughts are no better than good dreams, unless they be executed!”1192 Whatever the proto-vulgar-pragmatist tones of this formulation, on the one hand, or the emphasis on mental handling, on the other hand, there is hardly a more apt way to illustrate the way habits of conceiving go hand in hand with habits of action. It needs to be added that Emerson, for one, had a clear sense of the way the issue of conceiving and the one of the ‘whole’ went together: his chosen epithet for Goethe was “hundred-handed”1193.

Now, when it comes to Aristotle’s way of taking seriously the everyday discourse, Rosen is not the only one to have seen this as the grounding effort in all philosophical conceptualization. Rudolf Eucken wrote of the great Greek as follows: “Here extending, there contracting, here connecting, there disuniting, yet always with a fine touch and a secure step, the philosopher adjusted the existing language to his purposes. [...] what is once fixed is, however, kept, with unyielding energy, solid against the penetration of fanciful representations; no wonder that the language of science was, henceforth, determined for millennia.”1194 Eucken’s objective is to study the reverberations of Begriffswörter, or the expressions of concepts, in languages. This is why he mentions, as the background for his efforts, a couple of outstanding general dictionaries, a few philosophical monographs with a stress on terminological matters as well as some thinkers who have drawn attention to the importance of expressions. Over and above these things, Eucken calls for comparative linguistic research.1195
According to his view, the Greeks managed to develop their philosophical practice, to the effect that “language, really, becomes the proper incorporation of thought”. By contrast, he states that the contemporary situation - with its miserably corrupted Hegelianism: “abstractions revered as divinities” - is characterized by a “confusion of language”. In Eucken’s critical assessment of his day (1879), philosophical terminology no longer serves the purposes of making sense. Yet, he judges the poor conditions to be only transitional.\textsuperscript{1196}

Eucken’s book contains useful reflection upon the more general issue of verbalization. His way to tackle with the issue is to speak about the ‘term’ as “combining word and concept”. What is required from a term is, in his eyes, precisely the ability to provide a solid, tight connection between the two. Each term has its verbal as well as conceptual history. It takes time for some word to be conceptually fixed, some concept to be appropriately phrased or some term to be adopted in day by day speech, just as it takes time for utterances to wear out. Where, say, \textit{Aesthetik} was swiftly taken in general usage after Baumgarten had launched it, \textit{Psychologie} needed more than a hundred years to be made relevant and compelling by Wolff. The conceptual side, says Eucken, is more decisive, in the sense that changes occurring in it causes the term to change, while transforming discourse does not necessarily affect the concept. Another thing is that new concepts are created by major thinkers, while linguistic novelties are the products of gradual collective efforts. In any case, Eucken holds that “concept and description of concept ought not to be confused”.\textsuperscript{1197}

Yet, he does lay stress on the point that expression is not a “mere medium”. Besides “certain links, characteristics, colorings”, words bring into a concept “a value estimation of its content”. On the one hand, verbal polysemy is a constant threat of conceptual clarity. On the other hand, language is irreplaceable, because it accommodates a whole “world of the spirit” that turns sounds and letters into philosophical thoughts.\textsuperscript{1198} It would seem that the Aristotelian method of tracking the, as Rosen would have it, “original manifestation” of phenomena in daily language is not only applicable to concepts of this or that. It also pertains to the very concept of concept. In other words, its linguistic form - with the allusions to the “paradigm of the hand”, to handcraft and manufacture, to putting one’s finger on something and so on - is not to be disregarded.

Plato has been characterized as the first philosopher with a technical sense to ascribe to “idea” and the Stoics as the first to have fixed δύναμις as “concept”\textsuperscript{1199}. The word δύναμις is translated as the act of thinking, reflection, cogitation; or an object of thought. It can refer to a notion as well as to an intent or (good) sense (of a word)”. The verb δύναμις ἔχω means to have in one’s thoughts, to consider, to reflect; to take thought for, to take note of, to draw conclusions from. It may involve understanding something or intending to do something; thinking of something or inventing something; forming a notion of something
or supposing something. In the case of words, the verb implies that they signify something.\textsuperscript{1200}

What else does the language of conceptuality contain? I find it the most instructive to have a look at the ways the crucial inheritor of ἐννο-έω, the Latin concipire is, in turn, translated in German and, for the reasons dictated by the language of the present study, in English\textsuperscript{1201}. What I am striving for here is surely not the highest degree of philological sophistication, but a heightened philosophical sensitivity to the problematic of concepts. Many of the following points are well known. Yet, I do not believe that even trained philosophers are aware of all of them, at least not all of the time, and not even while using the vocabulary of concepts. In any case, it is my contention not so much to make them known but interdependent and problematical, and available for the coming studies on Nietzsche’s concepts. The present considerations prepare the way to them, while they also form a part of the defence for my choice of supplying the Nietzsche quotations in German (cf. I.c). This is to say that the one must pay attention to the Nietzschean text and its use of the peculiar language of be-greifen.

By all accounts, concipire is a multidimensional expression. To begin with, there is the case that can be rendered in German as zusammenfassen or abfassen, aussetzen having two related basic uses: to express something in a formula or to swear, as in taking an oath. Then there is einsaugen/ einziehen or fangen/empfangen meaning absorption, fecundation, impregnation. This could refer to all sorts of becoming fertile from terra concipit semen to a woman becoming gravid. To continue, there is the case of sich zuziehen or anhaften, pulling together or attaching. A special case is the one of becoming guilty of illegal action. In addition to all these, there is the most readily conceptual meaning of concipire finding its counterparts in auffassen, erfassen, erkennen, begreifen, verstehen, sich vorstellen, sich denken or empfinden, fühlen, fassen. The complicated passage from these activities as concipire to the other ones can be understood in the way such things as in sich aufkommen lassen and in sich nähren are mentioned, right after, fassen, as further equivalents to the Latin verb. Jung’s hinting at the intimate relationship between grasping, gripping and grabbing becomes all the more acute.

As it is to be expected, the specific relations between what I called the “most readily conceptual” key words vary according to the context. To take but one philosophical example here, and restricting to three such key terms, Adolf Stöhr’s Psychologie der Aussage contains the following distribution. Auffassung as the headword can be either perceptual Erfaßen or intellectual Begreifen, so that the former event is a one involved in Empfinden and the latter in Denken.\textsuperscript{1202}

Turning to the English expressions one can briefly enumerate those offered for concipire. To receive or draw into themselves, take in, absorb, catch; to catch fire, to be set alight, to be smitten with love/enthusiasm. To draw or derive. To receive in the womb; to be the mother of; to be fertilized; begin
to form fruit; to germinate; to cause to germinate the earth. To bring into existence, produce, form; to give rise to, to generate winds. To contain, hold. To detect a theft by a search. To contract, to catch a disease; to take upon oneself, to contract a moral stain. To undertake, assume. To pronounce solemnly; to fix by formal announcement, promulgate, declare. To express in formal language, draw up; to state expressly.

In addition to all these, there is, again, the most readily conceptual cases of “to perceive”, “to grasp by the means of the senses”, “to conceive or grasp in the mind”, “to form an idea of”, “to imagine”, “to device/conceive a plan”, “to adopt/form a particular mental attitude”, “to conceive a hope”. Now, dictionaries advise that “[n]early all the senses found in Fr. and Eng. were already developed in L., where the primary notion was app. ’to take effectively, take to oneself, take in and hold’”. The decisiveness of the ’paradigm of the hand’ is, thus, reaffirmed.

The vocabulary introduced so far may be enlarged by such expressions as “to comprise”, “to formulate, express in words or in other form, to couch”, “to apprehend, understand, comprehend”, “to take into one’s head, form an opinion, be of opinion” or “to fancy”, without much expansion of the dimensions or much alteration of the significations already noted. To refer to one special case, conceiving is sometimes used “as a modest way of expressing one’s opinion, or a depreciative way of characterizing the opinion of another”.

What about the German word where the Latin root is not visible? It is, namely, that there the modern talk of conceptuality is usually, as it were, couched in the talk in terms of begreifen. This is precisely the inheritor of ’the most readily conceptual’ dimension of concipire. It is defined as geistig erfassen or in seinen Zusammenhängen erkennen or verstehen. A related idiom is es begreift sich, daß, or “it is clear/evident that”. By extension, begreifen is explicated as Verständnis für jemanden oder etwas haben referring to being able or unable to understand somebody or something. Furthermore, it can be used to denote precision as in unter einer Sache etwas ganz Bestimmtes verstehen. Yet, as was seen in the Jungian phrasing, begreifen is not void of connotations. Apart from the idiom of comprising or etwas in sich begreifen, umfassen, it is, in general usage, related to be fühlen, betasten, greifend prüfen.

’The most readily conceptual’ dimension of concipire as “to conceive” or begreifen is, since it covers virtually every mode of activity that has been ascribed to human consciousness, something very spacious indeed. It is not altogether easy to say what it is, in this variety, that accounts for the significance usually attributed to conceiving in modern philosophical discussion. In disputes, at least, one might claim that what one’s opponent seems to understand by conceptuality has more to do with either fixing formulas or taking oaths than with anything else, even if it be admitted that these cases, too, involve some sort of

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grasping in the mind.

Dictionaries may lodge a lot of theories, including those of concepts, but one cannot expect to find them in any explicitly articulated form. At the minimum, however, what emerges from the basis of solely lexical presentations of conceiving is something along the following lines. Other people’s points, at least, are caught or left uncaught only from what they express, solemnly or otherwise, yet, as a rule, verbally, with together agreed upon signs, on the public arena, in conversation.

To move on to the noun conceptus, its Latin uses can be divided as follows. A solemn or formal utterance, formula. The action of conceiving in the womb, conception (from reproductive processes all the way to catching fire); embryo, foetus. The storing up of water; a basin, a reservoir.

Only the last of these uses is wholly absent from the modern English language family of conceptuality. The word for the reproductive case is usually “conception”. Indeed, the Latin conceptio is explained as “nativitas in utero”, yet “in animo et intellectus est apprehensio alicujus rei”. That is, the reproductive case - conceiving of babies - could be taken as the primary but the cognitive case - conceiving of things - is an equally clear one for relevant speakers and conceivers. By the word “conception”, then, it is, in English, further referred to the faculty/capacity, act/process or result/outcome of conceiving as related to originating in the mind, forming ideas, apprehending, imagining, designing, planning, and, thus, to concepts, ideas, notions, inventions.

The “concept” can mean “thought, idea”; “disposition, frame of mind”; “imagination, fancy”; “opinion”. The logical or philosophical usage can be designated by lexical means as amounting to the “product of the faculty of conception; an idea of a class of objects; a general notion or idea”. By extension, and “in weakened use”, the word “concept” denotes “in the context of marketing and design; a 'theme’, a set of matching or co-ordinated items, of e.g. furniture, designed to be sold together. Chiefly advertiser’s jargon.” In addition, there is the nonce-word use for “draft or rough copy”.

These last uses, the marketing case and the “rough copy” or plan, have survived in the German word Konzept. It is commonly used of a piece of paper, Konzeppapier, upon which to sketch and from which to read out sketches. The related idiom einen aus dem Konzept bringen or “to upset”, can perhaps be taken to refer to the confusing of both someone’s thoughts and plans or, super-literally, someone’s important papers. What is crucial is that, in the German Konzeption, the case of impregnation live on beside that of the creative act of outlining.

Although Konzept and Konzeption sometimes suit the technical use of concept as an item of philosophy
or logic, these cases are usually expressed with the word *Begriff*. In modern German, *Begriff* can mean *Gesamtheit wesentlicher Merkmale in einer gedanklichen Einheit*, or the unity of essential characteristics, and be more or less synonymous with *Vorstellung, Auffassung, Meinung* or the capacity of producing these.

There are the phrases of someone’s having and forming (*machen*) concepts, as well as giving a concept which refers to something’s being familiar to somebody who is, then, able to understand and express that something. A related idiom is *schwerleicht/kurz von Begriffe sein* that is used to describe the nature or the level of these abilities, of cleverity. Moreover, something’s being a *Begriff* usually means that it is famous enough to be self-evident for relevant speakers, while going *über meine Begriffe* means “incomprehensible for me”. Another idiom has it that something is *über alle Begriffe*, that is, extraordinary and/or unintelligible. To say for somebody that he/she is to have a *schönen Begriff* about something is usually taken as an ironic way to express that he/she is unlikely to get a good impression.

Yet another interesting idiom, *im Begriffe sein/stehen*, means that someone is about to do something. Related phrase is *in etwas begriffen sein* and says that someone is occupied with an undertaking or with a process of some kind. A more recently popularized way of speaking, *im Begriff des Begreifens sein*, is used in conveying the idea of just beginning to do something. It may not be all too far fetched to suggest that these sayings point to the role concepts have in guiding action: the Machian insight of the lower level, or animal, ‘tendency’ toward conceiving might be seen here as inscribed in the ordinary language.

One thing to remember is surely that whereas English (like French, Italian etc.) has the multivalent and common word “notion”, it is, to put it somewhat hyperbolically, hardly met in German outside Kant’s *Kritik*. The German word *Begriff* is translated in English as concept or notion, if not idea, opinion and so on. “Notion”, coming from the Latin *noscere*, “to know”, is used largely in the same way as “concept”: a general concept; a term expressive of such a concept; idea or concept; understanding, mind, intellect; view, opinion, theory. More special uses of “notion” include the ones designating inclination, disposition or fancy, not to speak of the plural “notions” meaning small wares.

While Boethius attributed *concipi* and *conceptio* to the metaphysical being, Cicero popularized the use of *notio*. It was Descartes who, in his fierce opposition to scholasticism, felt free to use interchangeably “expressions that had been invested with centuries of meticulous differentiation”. Thus, just as the physical, the corporeal and the material were practically one and the same for him, *notio, conceptus, idea* and *cogitatio* were virtually equivalent. After him, Locke held on to “notions” but Leibniz followed Descartes in speaking, alternatingly in similar contexts, of ideas, concepts and notions. Leibniz did, however, insist on the need of *analysis notionum* or “conceptual analysis”, that is, on the need to test
notions in order to see if they amount to a properly ‘clear and distinct’ (Descartes) idea or only to a chimera.  

A step from “concept” and *Begriff* to “conceptual” and *begriﬄich* is a step towards increasing abstractness. Although it can be taken to be only the neutral extension by a suﬃx, it usually entails, in the case of concepts, that the more imaginative elements of concept diminish or vanish, while the more systematic, schematic, hierarchic elements stand out. So, where *Begriff* can convey a great many things that stem from the still more multidimensional *begreifen, begriﬄich* tends to allow a much more limited use. A case in point is the English philosophical term “conceptual” when used synonymously with “analytic”: they describe the kind of statement that is true in virtue of its constituent concepts or words, as in the statement “all bachelors are unmarried”.  

The increasing abstractness pertains, a fortiori, to the English verb “conceptualize”, to form a concept of something, which is not easily rendered in German. The forming in question must be expressed more indirectly, as in *in Begriffe fassen*, unless, of course, *begreifen* is already understood as conceptualizing, as it, on occasion, might well be. What is still lacking, ﬁnally, are “conceptuality” and *Begriﬄichkeit*. In dictionaries, these words can be said to refer to the faculty of forming conceptions. The more philosophical (and less psychologizing) use would be the one where it is the whole, the realm, the field, the context, the network, the problematic of concepts that is appealed to with this word. This is the “conceptuality” that stands in the title of the present work.  

I take “conceptuality” to involve, in addition, the questions as to the verbalizing of concepts, to the very constitution of the vocabulary of conceiving. To map the language of conception is already to interrogate the nature of philosophical conceptuality. An important part of such a mapping are the considerations as to the evolution of the ways to speak about conceptualizations.  

Very interesting is the unfolding of the German vocabulary of conceiving which was one of Rudolf Eucken’s most central objects of inquiry. An individual thinker, Notker, would use, in the turn of the first millennia, both *begreifen* and *ervaren* for *comprehendere*, while *Begriff* and its derivatives stood, almost universally, for scope (*Umfang*) or inclusion (*Inbegriff*) all the way to the close of the 17th century. To be sure, it did not prevent Meister Eckhart from coming up with *unbegriﬄichkeit*, nor Luther from conjoining, on occasion, *Idea* and *Begriff*, nor Böhme from identifying *Begriff* and *Vorstellung*. Eventually, Christian Wolff stabilized the pairing of these last two words. What was left open, however, was the exact relationship between them. Wolff’s critic, C. A. Crusius, for instance, used them, as also “idea”, alternatingly in similar contexts. The situation did not improve in Johann Nikolaus who deﬁned ideas as *Vorstellungen mit Bewußtsein* and tried to reestablish, after Leibnitz, *Notio* as a word in German
philosophical language.\textsuperscript{1209}

Eucken estimates that there were, in any case, a general tendency to regard concepts as a larger set than representations. The needed clarity and the standard of priority were to be provided no sooner than in Kant’s critical enterprise. He specified the difference between \textit{begriffen} and \textit{vorstellen} and held the latter to be the more basic one: \textit{Begriffe} became a subset of \textit{Vorstellungen}. After Kant, conceiving was, increasingly, united with thinking as apart from mere imagining. Nevertheless, Herbart put forth the view that everything thought, everything processed in consciousness, be taken as a concept: representations are concepts by virtue of what is represented through them. Schelling, for his part, saw that the relation of \textit{Vorstellen} and \textit{Denken}/\textit{Begreifen} was analogous to the one between \textit{Existenz} and \textit{Wesen}.\textsuperscript{1210}

It would be a mistake, however, to think that Kant singlehandedly put all the terminological vagueness and all the related disputes to an end. A good example is the way in which Kant himself seems to have had a hard time resisting the temptation to restore, in \textit{Begriff}, the old sense of \textit{Inbegriff}: “The concept \textit{[Begriff]} of the world is the totality of existence \textit{[Inbegriff des Daseyns]} of all that is in space and in time, in so far as it is possible to gain empirical knowledge about it”\textsuperscript{1211}. This connection was further appropriated by, for example, Wilhelm Weischedel\textsuperscript{1212}, and was even reaffirmed by Heidegger\textsuperscript{1213}.

Again, ordinary language provides the key here, since, by the word \textit{con-cept}, English-speakers are constantly faced with concept’s relatedness to a sense of combination and completeness, to constructing totalities, while in order for the German-speakers to do the same they need specific philosophical reminders to awaken them from the linguistic slumber. On the other hand, a proper sensitivity to the closeness between \textit{zusammen-fassen} and \textit{begriffen} could as well do the trick.

All in all, I think it is unwise to follow Martin’s lead and neglect the philosophical significance of the reciprocity between expert and general usage of the vocabulary of conceiving. One can say that the concept of concept, just as any other concept, is more or less tightly linked to the many ways people talk about it. Yet, it is to the more narrowly philosophical talk of concepts that I shall turn to next.
III.b.2 Concept of Concept

A familiar way to tell the story of philosophical thinking about concepts starts from Plato’s “realism”\textsuperscript{1214}. It is thought to say that concepts subsist as abstract entities independent of whatever they stand for and whoever is thinking about them. Since these entities are called “ideas”, Platonic realism is also, confusingly, known as “idealism”. The next step is taken with Aristotle whose view is understood as more moderate and refined sort of “realism” amounting to the claim that these universal entities exist only as exemplified by particular objects, or as thought by thinkers. The ancient conflict was reformulated in the medieval debate over the nature of universals, where realisms were railed by nominalism and conceptualism. The former is taken to reject universals for the view that there are only individual things in the world, while the latter means that universals exist only as conceived in the mind.\textsuperscript{1215}

For all these ambitious efforts and grand epochs there are corresponding scholarly traditions within the confines of which specialized philosophers, philologists, theologians, ethnologists and cultural historians have worked and continue to work. The historical issue of universals is one of the few sites of contemporary philosophical discussion where concepts are more or less openly at stake. One might even say that the mediating position of conceptualism that emerged to revise both realism and nominalism was also the position from which concepts in their proto-modern sense first began to develop. Its fruits can be seen in, for example, Johannes Micraelius’s late 17th century \textit{Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum}, where the primary meaning of \textit{conceptus} is said to be “assimilation of things conceived in the intellect”\textsuperscript{1216}.

Apart from the story of idealism, realism, nominalism and conceptualism, there is another way to tell the story of philosophical conceptuality. It is to depict the grand tradition as dominated by various “entity theories” of concepts and as gradually turning towards the hegemony of various “disposition theories” of concepts. Regarded as entities, concepts are thought to exist in a way or another and expected to be studied by asking “what is a concept?”. Seen as dispositions, they are approached by, rather, posing the question “what it is to have a concept?”. Traditionally, it is thought that Plato established the entity theoretical tradition by his account of ideas, while it took a long time to introduce dispositional perspectives. Alternatively, it can be thought that late medieval conceptualism marked the birth of concepts and construed these as entities for centuries to come.

Some say that it was Rudolf Carnap’s investigations on definition that brought dispositional concepts to the fore\textsuperscript{1217}. Others hold that only Wittgenstein inaugurated their era. In any case, in 20th century philosophy, the entity theoretical part of concepts has still been emphasized by, say, Bertrand Russell,
while it was challenged by, notably, Gilbert Ryle’s and Peter Geach’s respective theories of dispositions. I’ll have Geach to present his findings.

Geach writes that to be able “to express a judgment in words” is to have “a number of capacities, previously acquired, for intelligently using the several words and phrases that make up the sentence”. He continues: “I shall apply the old term “concepts” to these special capacities - an application which I think lies fairly close to the historic use of the term.” His example is that “if somebody knows how to use the English word “red”, he has a concept of red”. Seen in this way, concept is indicative of or, indeed, identifiable with, acts of judgment as skills or dispositions. Two persons “having the same concept” is equivalent to their being able to “do essentially the same things”. Yet, as Geach insists, “to say that a man has a certain concept is to say that he can perform, because he sometimes does perform, mental exercises of a specifiable sort”. One should not speak about concept-formation beyond verbalizations, beyond human interchange. Moreover, Geach opposes the idea of abstraction. He finds that mind’s making of concepts is “a matter of fitting a concept to my experience, not of picking out the feature I am interested in from among other features given simultaneously”.

A correlate of the shift from entity theories to dispositional ones is the way in which the concentration moves from psychological speculation to bear on the linguistic performance. This comes clearly out of the Geachian formulations. As Richard Rorty puts it, with a rewarding reference to Wilfrid Sellars, it is about identifying “the possession of a concept with the mastery of the use of a word”.

Indeed, Rudolf Haller has spoken of the decisive shift or turn in the 19th century philosophy. After the speculative doctrines of concepts that characterized much of German idealism, two new interests in concept-formation began to develop. One had to do with fresh logical theories, the other with the thematization of verbal elements in conceptuality. While Leibniz, Lambert, Herbart and Bolzano belong to the group of outstanding logical innovators to have prefigured the former dimension of the shift, Vico, Hamann, Herder and Humboldt are mentioned as the ones foreshadowing the linguistic turn.

Sellars himself has put the necessity of concepts as follows: “Observing that the situation is thus-and-so already involves the use of a conceptual frame”, or “language” that accommodates “descriptive terms” with their respective “conceptual meanings”. It should be added, however, that Sellars also insists that “not all properly linguistic roles are conceptual”. He says that one may well accept the concepts of ’roundness’ as a property that the word “round” expresses, ’conjunction’ as an operation that the word “and” expresses as well as ’necessity’ as a modality that, say, the German word notwendig expresses. Yet, as his example goes, the French word hélas! cannot be said to express the concept ’alas’ but only a “sense”.

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In order to better understand these developments, one ought to first turn to the way the logician Gottlob Frege set out to solve the problem of concepts. It is said that Frege’s critique of psychologism is related to his “clear opposition against the verbalizing of the “logical laws”; and that means also a clear opposition against the verbalizing of concepts”. This, in turn, came to be the basic opposition between Frege and Wittgenstein.1223

Such an opposition, at least when stated in this fashion, might confuse the historical importance of Frege’s radicalness, that is, his resistance to the old speculation on the nature and role of concepts. As Raili Kauppi stresses, Frege distances himself from the old subject-object scheme. His concept is a function, a reference for an incomplete, unsaturated grammatical predicate of which a sentence, or Vollausdruck, is formed. What a sentence expresses is a “thought”, in the sense of the objective content of thinking. This complete thought forms the Sinn of the sentence. On the other hand, the Bedeutung of the sentence is its truth-value.1224

By these moves, Frege brought about a change that was widely welcomed. According to M. S. Gram, for instance, the new theory “escapes both of the defects besetting traditional accounts”. These are, first, that “few philosophers have undertaken to offer an analysis of “concept””, and secondly, that “virtually none of the participants in the discussion bother to offer demonstrations that there are really things which are denominated by the word “concept””. As Gram says, the mere supplying of synonyms will not do to account for concept’s being “a problematic entity” figuring “in philosophical arguments”.1225

At this point, it is important to note how Gram, too, insists on the scandalous philosophical practice of leaving concepts of concepts outside philosophical attention. Where Rosen was calling for an elucidation of the non-conceptual context of conceptualization, Gram concentrates on praising an eminent effort in eradicating contextual matters from the issue of concepts. Yet, they share an equally strong insistence on the need to study conceptuality. This is, I think, a fine instance of the shared conceptual concerns of two philosophical critics aiming at different goals.

Continuing with Gram’s explanatory effort one learns, how “Frege introduces concepts in two ways, and they must be strictly separate”. On the one hand, concept “is a kind of function” that, “when completed, yields the name of a truth-value”. In addition to being a function, concept is a predicate. On the other hand, it has to do with epistemic phenomena and the classificatory capacity. For Gram, Frege’s concepts are “neither things of the outer world nor ideas”, neither physical, nor mental. Concepts do not assume “the properties of things falling under” them, nor do they depend upon unsharable mental contents of those who conceive.1226
Interestingly enough, Irving M. Copi, for one, does not agree with Gram about the strict separateness of Frege’s different viewpoints. For Copi, Frege’s approach, in the classic essay “Über Begriff und Gegenstand” (1892), is partly psychological, partly logical, partly a mixture of both of these.1227 This disagreement between commentators serves to pinpoint the way Frege’s legacy was ambiguous. William Kneale’s remarks articulate this state of affairs more clearly.

Kneale quotes Frege’s words to Russell who had detected the famous deficiency in the former’s theory of classes. Frege writes that he fell for something he had specifically tried to establish as a risk: ”One ought to put up a warning sign that could be seen from afar: ”No one should let a concept be changed for an object [Gegenstand]!”“ Kneale says that Frege did a favor for philosophical thinking by insisting that “fundamental sign for universals must be predicative”. Yet, Frege’s “eccentric doctrine of the Bedeutung” prevented him from understanding that “what was signified in a fundamentally predicative way could also be later designated by a derivative sign and, then, be transformed into a subject of discourse, on the sole condition that we who fabricate language understand our own procedures of nominalizing and denormalizing”.1228

In terms of the great 20th century philosophical schools being born, there is probably nothing as instructive as to have a look at the way Edmund Husserl laid down the principles of conceptualization in his effort to establish the enterprise of phenomenology. Husserl emphasized the split between logical and psychological accounts of concepts. Since Frege was the one who had publicly attacked the alleged psychologism in his early work, Husserl could not possibly base his views on the Fregean considerations. Fortunately for him, Husserl was able to rely on Herbart’s and Lotze’s accounts of the function of concepts in logic and even have a recourse to another early master of modern formal logic, Bolzano.

Husserl admits the merit of Herbart’s “introduction of the concept of concept”, yet he deplores terminological confusions, as in the lacking differentiation between Inhalt, Vorgestelltes, Gedachtes. Moreover, he even claims that “Herbart did not pronounce the, as far as I see, one and only clarifying word on the determination of the concept of concept, namely, that concept or representation, in logical sense, is nothing other than the identical meaning of the corresponding expressions”. Lotze’s fault was, in turn, an “inharmonious crossbreed of psychologistic and pure logic”. Husserl picks Leibniz to be the closest of his predecessors in delineating the “expansion of logic toward a mathematical theory of probability” and “analysis of problems”.1229

He then insists upon “theoretical cohesion [Zusammenhang]” and “scientific clarification”. This involves the need to “determine [feststellen] the most important, and especially all the primitive concepts”. Thereafter, “second order concepts, namely, concepts of concepts and other ideal unities” become

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“constitutive”. Setting out to replace undetermined concepts, out of which sentences and theories are formed, “concepts of concepts and other ideas take the place of simple concepts”. The second order concepts, such as ‘concept’, ‘sentence’, ‘truth’, ‘are now to be fixed’. Immediately after this, the passage continues as follows: “their “origin” [‘Ursprung’] is to be studied separately”. Thus far, one might have imagined oneself to be ruminating the origins of the so called analytical school rather than the phenomenological, yet the more characteristic and explicitly renovating tone of voice is soon audible. The “origin” is, so Husserl, not to be confused with psychological emergence. It is about a “phenomenological origin” having to do with the “insight into the essence of the concepts in question”. According to Husserl, should one skip the clarification of concepts, or the “fixation of unequivocal, sharply differentiated word meanings”, it would be of no use to go on with the study.1230

Now, one had better to consult Morris Weitz’s avowedly unorthodox presentation of the entity/disposition controversy. He argues that Plato was, in fact, advocating a dispositional view, while the entity tradition is founded by Aristotle. Moreover, in his case studies of the Western thinkers, he frequently points out how difficult it is to determine whether some thinker advocated the one view or the other. Understandably, Weitz is not happy just to deal with the quarrel over universals and the dilemma of entities and dispositions. He looks for still another, and most decisive, narrative of the relationship between philosophy and conceptuality. This is discovered in the story of philosophy as caught by the conviction that “all concepts are and must be closed [governed by definitive sets of criteria] if philosophy is to secure a coherent and possibly true view of the world”. For Weitz, this pervasive view was not challenged “until perhaps” Sir Karl Popper’s or C. L. Stevenson’s criticisms, “to be followed by but not influencing the consummate demolition of it in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”.1231

From this perspective, Weitz holds that what is most distinctive in Frege’s theory is that it, “in its explicitness”, epitomizes the grand tradition: “Concepts are necessarily closed; their sense and the intelligibility of the questions and assertions in which they are expressed rest on absolutely determinate criteria”. This means that “[a]mbiguity, vagueness and indeterminacy are ruled out.” Weitz claims that even though the thesis about concepts as functions is very important, even more central is Frege’s “universal claim that all concepts, to be concepts, must be closed: composed of definitive sets of characteristics that determine exact classification of objects and correct use of language”. He thinks that Frege’s view, as such, is not that “revolutionary or even original”, but stands as “the consummation and culmination of the whole classical tradition, stemming from Plato and Aristotle, that concepts must be closed if the conceptual life is to be rendered intelligible”.1232

By now, the stage is set for Ludvig Wittgenstein. The crucial contribution is found crystallized in the concise account on the concept of ‘language game’ in the section 71 of his Philosophische
Untersuchungen. As Wittgenstein insists, explicitly against Frege, the imprecise and unfixed nature of the contours of this concept does not disqualify its conceptuality. The concept can be transmitted by playing the game which is - and this is the most decisive point - no shorthand for the list of properties or the common denominator. Instead, it is the whole story or, better still, the whole play, the whole drama.

The famous theme arising from this is the one of 'family resemblance’. Its basic lesson for concepts is the situation where there is “no single attribute that is shared by all members of a category, yet each member has at least one attribute in common with other members of the category”.

Tadeusz Pawlowski writes about the Wittgensteinian concepts with family meanings that “their extension does not consist of a set of objects characterized by a number of properties common to all elements of the extension and only to them; rather, it consists of a number of subsets which bear only partial similarity to each other”. In other words, “there is no set of properties common to all objects denoted by such a concept and only to them”. These sort of concepts “make up a family of subsets” and they are “open, i.e. there is no boundary separating objects which fall under a given concept from those which do not”. While their extensions evolve, as a result of psychological, social and praxiological changes, concepts can undergo either enrichment, by new subsets, or split. Beside 'game', Pawlowski lists “art, avantgarde, novel, tragedy, sculpture, sign, sentence, question, subjectivism, anarchy, mental illness, mental health, ideal, animal, plant, etc.” as examples of family concepts. He says that these kinds of concepts appear in ordinary language as well as in scientific jargon from humanities to mathematical research. Concepts with family meanings are sometimes hard to distinguish from “simply ambiguous” concepts, since it is custom and persuasive interests that determinate their usage more often than any definitory introduction. Pawlowski is inclined to doubt their scientific value and prefers to regard them as characteristic of short-lived periods.

His emphasis on the transitional notwithstanding, Pawlowski concludes his case study on 'kitsch’ as follows: “Growing interest in the concept of kitsch has been accompanied by an increase in the number of different meanings attached to this word. The question arises whether it will not be possible in the future to reduce the existing plurality of meanings to one concept with a universal extension. I do not think it plausible.” Even though definitions can be attempted, in terms of partiality at least, connotations live on in open concepts.

The novelties in Wittgenstein’s later writings can be judged in various ways. Weitz says that they undo the closedness of concepts. What Ross prefers to emphasize is this: “the use of words is not only important for presenting concepts, but it also belongs to the conception of what concepts - “according to their concept” - are.”
The historical accounts of both Weitz and Ross can be taken support the strategy adopted in the present study. Namely, the insistence on the humiliation of the closed concept of concept, the correlative emergence of open concepts and, most of all, the related insight into the verbalization of concepts all indicate that there is, indeed, a good reason to consult the vocabularies of conceptuality beyond the entries that begin with the abbreviation Phil., too. If one will, Frege’s, arguably, mixed techniques can be, too, used as an excuse for discussing the more encompassive cognitive role of concepts.

In any case, apart from everyday discourse, from coffee table conversations to the language of advertisements, several other fields of research, beyond traditional philosophy and including established academic disciplines, make much of conceptual language. One might begin to make sense of them with the help of Ernst Mach who, as was seen in the previous section, advocated the view that the concept of concept is, first and foremost, to be sought and used in science.

Mach’s overall polemics is targeted against nominalism. His main objection is that concepts cannot be mere words, as “very abstract sentences are understood and correctly used in concrete cases”. What is interesting is that Mach’s point, as such, anticipates Geach and others who emphasize the capability of verbalizing as an indicator of concept possession, while its principle intention is to make way for psychological and abstractionist not, as in Geach, for linguistic, semantic and anti-abstractionist inquiries. In Mach’s view, concept is no Augenblicksgebilde, that is, not like “a simple concrete sensual representation” capable of arising momentarily. Any concept involves an eventful “psychological formation history”. Yet, this is no commitment to some kind of subjectivism. Mach makes it clear that where representation involves “the individual’s needs”, concepts reflect the more collective necessities and carry, then, “the mark of the culture of their time”.1238

Machian kind of conceptualizing is about either giving “the words, through circumscribing delimitation (definition), a meaning different from, and narrower than, the vulgar language” or choosing “brand new words”. Thereafter, concept-words remind one of “the reactions of the defined objects as indicated by the definition” and draw these recollections to the mind. Concepts provide, then, with “the most convenient and the shortest route to sensual representations”. Mach’s sensualism is encapsulated in his view that “the last, the lowest conceptual building blocks can be analyzed into sensible reactions as their distinguishing marks”. This is how concepts “have their roots in the facts”. Concepts, as well as representations, are always poorer than the inexhaustible facts. As Mach goes on to say, concepts arise from need and they develop to serve specific purposes, while facts cannot be “made”. Hence, facts offer a constant “correction” to concepts.1239

For the present purposes, one can welcome Mach’s emphasis on the way each profession has its peculiar
conceptuality. Where *Berufsfremd* sees but empty signs, *Fachmann* grasps the precise meaning. What counts is “to have lived with in the profession”, on the one hand, and to value “testing of the received concepts for their correctness” more than mere reading or hearsay, on the other.\textsuperscript{1240}

Despite the fact that most of Mach’s own speculation on the problematic is about the process of cognition, he manages to wed these with general methodological considerations. Mach finds that “conceptual thought is an activity of reaction”. This is to say that it is about “using abstract concepts onto the facts” and, thereby, letting the facts “operate on us a simple impulse to sensual action, which creates new sensual elements to accordingly determine our further train of thought”.\textsuperscript{1241}

To move from general perspectives of the philosophy science to the practices of special disciplines, there is the case where the importance of daily language and the importance of novel breakthroughs in cognitive research meet, that is, linguistic studies. A key lesson can be spelled out, in an up to date way, like this: "Meaning is equated with conceptualization (in the broadest sense); semantic structures are thus conceptualizations shaped in accordance with linguistic convention. Semantic structures (of any size) are referred to as predications. They are characterized relative to cognitive domains, some of which are basic in the sense of being cognitively irreducible (e.g. our experience of time and space, or fields of perceptual potential such as the range of possible color sensations), while others involve cognitive structures of indefinite complexity. Any cognitive structure - a novel conceptualization, an established concept, a perceptual experience, or an entire knowledge system - can function as the domain for a predication."\textsuperscript{1242}

As for the general cognitive interest in concepts, there have been, in the 20th century, a number of more or less philosophically sophisticated psychologists who have studied developmental issues in terms of concept acquisition. Such eminent scholars as Vygotski, Werner, Piaget and Bruner all attempted to make sense of the way children’s growing up involves the gradual shift from concrete and instance-bound confrontation of individual objects of experience to more and more abstract levels of representation and apprehension. This shift was explained, in varying ways, in terms of the child’s emerging conceptual and verbal skills.\textsuperscript{1243}

Accordingly, in contemporary psychological research, concepts are discussed in topics such as “conceptual learning”, “conceptual development”, “concept attainment”, “concept achievement”. The issue involves the point that concepts refer to both “mental contents” and “socially accepted meanings”, although generally only the latter dimension attracts psychological interest. Concepts are typically about “organized information” helping an individual “to discriminate a particular thing or class of things from other things or classes of things”. As such, they are “mental constructs” with a “critical” role to play in “a maturing individual’s continuously changing, enlarging cognitive structure”. Concepts mark the key “way
of categorizing items and demonstrating which items are related to one another”. This is why developmental psychology usually concentrates on the ways people “solve the concept quickly and accurately, without straining their memories or reasoning skills”. 1244

Frank C. Keil brings contemporary philosophical debates to bear on the discussion in cognitive psychology. His main tenet is that “[c]oherent belief systems, or “theories”, are critical to understand the nature of concepts.” To this purpose, Keil not only tells about how Thomas S. Kuhn’s views about conceptual change has been reappropriated among psychologists to make sense of qualitative changes in cognitive development. He also shows that Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” has been important in revising psychological accounts of categorizing. 1245

Yet, Keil is of the opinion that it is Hilary Putnam’s and Saul Kripke’s philosophical criticisms that “have made perhaps the most concerted attack on traditional views of meaning by arguing that there may be no simple property or properties that language users always rely on to pick out the referents of a term”. He goes on to explain: ”Such necessary and sufficient features might in fact exist, but they are by this account rarely if ever part of an analytic meaning that is known to most users of the term in question, and they are not the criteria used to pick out the extension”. 1246

Since the received view of concepts as lists of necessary and sufficient properties has been subjected to systematic criticism, there have been various proposals for redefining concepts and their role in language acquisition and cognitive development in general. Perhaps the basic choice of replacement is to define concepts in terms of a model that consists of a typical example accompanied by some characteristics and exceptional cases. Some such view is further developed as the theory of ’prototype’ representation. 1247

Prototype is, by and large, the “best example” for a given category of things. It provides a reference point to which other items are compared. Not only is a robin prototypical of the category ’bird’, while a penguin is a non-prototype. 1248 One can also have a prototype of the category ’robin’.

Let us try to supply an obligatory and, inevitably, unsophisticated example. What is involved in perceiving, say, a bear, is not so much cerebral reruns of the properties of brownness, hairiness, massiveness and so on. What is involved is, rather, a prototype bear consisting of a bear once or thrice seen in a zoo or met in the woods or made friends in a kindergarten play or assumed in a masquerade or looked at on Jean-Jacques Annaud’s famous film or some documentary, or a combination of all previous perceptions such as these, worked out by additional information gained in other contexts. Prototypes such as these are taken to best illustrate what happens in a conception.
One of the points to be made about the history of the conceptual theorization is that where Wittgenstein and others implemented a “linguistic turn” after the long domination of the entity speculation hostile toward, or ignorant of, the role of language, the current “cognitive turn” is often enough allied to the view that concepts can be studied irrespective of language. In fact, much of the present-day cognitive research is fueled by the conviction that the 20th century attachment to the privilege of language has been detrimental to the development of the understanding of brain processes.

One camp is distinguished as “radical concept nativists” holding that all nontechnical concepts are innate, so that environmental factors merely serve to trigger them. In its refined versions, nativism does not claim that beliefs, thoughts or knowledge are to be taken as “internal” affairs, nor does it deny the role of learning. It holds that monomorphemic concepts, or the building blocks of mental objects, are innate. It is argued that the most serious problem with nativism is the act of “triggering” that is adopted from etology without seriously considering its applicability to mental objects. Moreover, it is said that the very idea of concept being triggered by a single impulse reveals that nativism is uncomfortably close to the rational-causal view of learning modelled by inductive logic. 1249

Another way of approaching the complexities of contemporary cognitive studies is to start from the attempts to establish “abstraction heuristics” to account for the choice that takes place in experience between different “networks”. It is even a mainstream, in contemporary psychological research on conceptual development, to think that concepts are best seen as nodes in a network of some kind. Moreover, it is, arguably, presupposed in a variety of theories about prototypes, ‘event-scripts’ and ’semantic markers’. Although the network theory of conceptual structure does not entail the network theory of conceptual development, it is often used in assessing the progressively maturing consciousness, too. It can be taken as developmentally antecedent to the concept being analyzed and, hence, its construction is the primary activity to make judgments about development. 1250

The problematic of conceptual networks has become an eminent field of research in artificial intelligence and, especially, computer science. Once in a while, studies assumed in this discipline, too, strive for wide perspectives over the whole scenery of the philosophico-psychological topics more or less loosely termed as cognitive research. One recent dissertation on interacting systems, or “autonomous agents”, extends to interrogating the nature of concepts. The author’s point of departure is that “concepts are independent of language, or at least they can be studied independently of language”. Accordingly, the emphasis is on the “conditions that should be satisfied in order to have the concept” and on the “functions that the concept can serve”. 1251

One may see how, in the history of concepts, the importance of language has been challenged not that
long after it was first promoted as the most crucial element in conceptualization. In his recent article, D. W. Hamlyn offers another historical description of the fate of conceiving. He says that the early Greek atomists, such as an unclassifiable pre-Socratic thinker as Empedocle as well as also Aristotle all seemed to have endorsed more or less causal theories of perception. In Hamlyn’s story, Descartes’s setting sails for modern philosophy involved precisely a take off from the tradition where the emphasis was put on the way objects cause sensual effects and a reorientation toward the view that “the immediate objects of perception are mental representations”. From Descartes on, various representationalist theories all the way to the ’sense-data’ speculation dominated philosophical discussion. As a crucial instance of opposition, Hamlyn considers the disagreement between Hume and Reid. The latter was, so Hamlyn, saved from Hume’s scepticism by his astute sense of the difference between sensations (having “no object other than themselves”) and perceptions (having “physical things as their objects” and involving “also concepts of those things and beliefs about them”).

However, Hamlyn’s primary concern is not historical. The historical introduction is there merely to show that the various emerging ’cognitive science’ or ’information-processing’ trends have their root in the ancient causal theories of perception and that one is best off in using someone like Reid to counter these trends. According to Hamlyn, it is a part of the “contemporary fashion” to think that “perceptual content either is or can be non-conceptual” and “belief-independent”, and this is the view that he seeks to rebut. He says that the notions of ’informational state’ and the related claims to do without concepts in accounting for perception sustain “at best the conclusion that perceptual experience is not always totally determined by what concepts one has”. It does not amount to a counter-argument to the view that Hamlyn subscribes to: “perception always involves concepts” and the nature and content of perception is, accordingly, transformed by any changes in the concepts one has.

Hamlyn says that perception is always concept-dependent, in the sense that “to see something as x” demands some understanding of “what being an x amounts to”. He calls “knowledge” “the context in which all concept-use is to be understood”, yet underlines that “belief has no special claim to be the place for concept-use”. In this way, Hamlyn gives support for the view that the question of concepts is prior to the question of knowledge. If perception and belief were strictly separated, and concepts were accorded to the realm of the latter only, this would be, so Hamlyn, be tantamount to failing “to take account of the richness of our experience”.

I find Hamlyn’s reasoning convincing. What it is thrilling about it is that in this openly conservative criticism rehearsed by the conservative critic of Nietzsche (see above sections II.b.1 & II.d.1) there are, to my mind, crucial Nietzschean considerations involved. Apart from the thrill, there is a fair dose of historical irony: is Nietzsche counted among those prefiguring the characteristically Wittgensteinian
insights of language and concepts or not, the thought that was radical and revolutionary a hundred years ago is now put on the defensive by the new wave of typically extra-linguistic and sometimes non-conceptual currents. Yet, as I shall try and show, Nietzsche was working on both sides of the controversy, that is, he was at pains to articulate the role of language in conceiving and perceiving, as he was also occupied with making sense of pre-conceptual processes.

I shall now let Tyler Burge summarize “what is widely thought of as the “the traditional view” of concepts”, or “the general conception of concepts”. It is Burge’s further objective to assess “how two important contemporary doctrines - holism about confirmation and anti-individualism about the individuation of mental states - affect our understanding of” the received view.1255

For Burge, traditional concept of concept involves four kinds of elements. There are those that have to do with thought contents and propositional attitudes, those concerning referentiality, those related to defining and those bearing on meaning and language. The tradition that goes back to Aristotle and culminates in Frege holds, first, that “[c]oncepts are sub-components of thought contents”. It claims, secondly, that they “are representational or intentional”. Thirdly, it says that “[d]efinitions associated with concepts fix necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept.” According to the traditional view, concepts are, fourthly, “commonly expressed in language. They constitute meanings of the speaker’s words.”1256

All this is nicely in line with Weitz’s insistence that the move from entities to dispositions is not as great event as the move from closed to open concepts. Less articulate is the issue of verbalization that was made prominent in Ross’s account of conceptual history.

Burge goes on to say that a threat to the traditional view is presented by holism, as developed by W. V. O. Quine and others, since it holds that no procedure “to determine whether something falls under the concept, or satisfies the meaning” is possibly “associated with any unit as “small” as a concept or a word meaning”. In Burge’s critical view, holism goes wrong at the start: ”concepts are not merely procedures for finding a referent”. Yet, he grants that holism succeeds in pointing out something that has been neglected: ”There is little reflection before this century on how what a thinker treats as his most fundamental means of applying a concept can be displaced by other means that are in fact more fruitful and accurate.” Moreover, holism contributes to revising the traditional view about meaning: ”Neither epistemic nor metaphysical definitions exhaust the significance of a word (the word’s translational meaning). Nor are they merely re-expressions of the concept that they provide a conception of.”1257

When it comes to anti-individualism, as developed by Kripke and Putnam and others, Burge takes it to
entail that “[w]hat the individual knows about the range of entities - and hence, [...] about the meanings or concepts - need not provide a definition that distinguishes them from all other (possible) meanings or concepts.” This is because semantic or conceptual “identities are fixed by environmental factors that are not entirely captured in the explicatory or even discriminatory abilities of the individual, unless those discriminatory abilities include application of the concept itself”. For Burge, the weakness of the anti-individualist critique resembles the one of holism, because it, too, misconstrues the tradition: ”concepts were not seen as entities whose identities are independent of their intentional function, independent of the sorts of things they represent.” Anti-individualism can, however, modify the traditional view by showing that having a concept “does not depend purely on associated discriminative procedures”. It also broadens the viewpoint of defining from “theoretical notions of science to an extremely wide range of notions in ordinary discourse”.1258

It is plain to see that starting from Burge’s account, too, one could arrive at the importance of the extended vocabularies of conceptuality. Yet, other notions than those of “notion” or “concept” continue to hold sway in conceptualizing efforts.

To close this subsection, it is best to go back to Stanley Rosen’s philosophical polemics. In sharpening his critical edge, Rosen makes clear that he is not calling for any sentimental, mystic or artistic dethroning of rationality, yet neither is he joining those who pay tribute to the panaceist scientific method. He claims to be working on a reconstruction of rationality by charting the proper context of reason, of conceptualization. His principal concern is to refute the view that philosophy is equated with conceptual analysis. For this purpose, he turns, among other things, to Casimir Lewy’s distinction between “having a concept” and “having a concept of a concept”. Rosen notes that “Lewy does not apply his analysis to the concept of a concept and the concept ‘concept of a concept’, just as he nowhere explains exactly what he means by ‘concept’”‘. According to Rosen, this is representative of the part of analytical philosophy “that defines itself as conceptual analysis without defining “concept”’.“ The problem with this “reflexive case” is that “[e]ven if there should be a range of senses to the ‘concept of a concept’, no single sense can be understood without understanding the concept ‘concept of a concept’. Therefore, so Rosen, we cannot distinguish conceptually the concept of a concept and the concept ‘concept of a concept’.”1259

What is needed, in his view, is the difficult distinction between a concept and “our conception of that concept, i.e., the psychological, linguistic, and historical circumstances of our thinking that concept”. In what he calls the self-reflexive case, or the one about “a self-having” or “the having of a having”, this distinction becomes impossible, since “[t]o have a concept of a concept is already to know what knowing is.” Rosen writes that, “whereas “knowing X” is arguably the having of a concept, whether in the sense
of an essence or a linguistic expression, it is also the case that knowing or having the concept 'knowing', or in effect having the concept 'concept of a concept', is the having of a universal which is an instance of itself. The universal *qua* universal must be a particular, whereas *qua* particular, it must be a universal.*1260

As Rosen shows, it is a tricky business to conceive a conception, to conceptualize a conceptualization. It was an attitude of much more confidence that John Dewey entertained, as he set forth “the operational conception of conceptions” to replace “the traditional orthodox”. In Dewey’s view, ‘conception of conception’ is deliberately “self-applying”. This is to say that “the conception advanced is also a designation of a method to be pursued”. To illustrate this, Dewey went on as follows: “One may lead a horse to water but cannot compel him to drink. If one is unable to perform an indicated operation or declines to do so, he will not of course get its meaning.” What Dewey criticized was the empiricist conception of concepts as “mere summaries of results” or “simply memoranda of identical features in objects already perceived”. Instead of anymore relying on this “essentially retrospective” view that is doomed to cherish “dead” concepts “incapable of performing a regulative office in new situations”, he called for a reconception that treated concepts as “anticipatory plans and designs”.1261

III.b.3 Philosophical Issue of Conceptuality

The most exciting question of the topic “philosophy and concepts” is not the one concerning the rich language of *concipire* or the other about the technical experiments with definitions of ’concept’. It is the set of issues consisting of the nature of concepts, their role in experience, thought and philosophical theory, the dynamics of conceptualization and the demarcation between the conceptual and the non-conceptual. Yet, in as much as the vocabularies of conceiving and the attempts to define ’concept’ bring this set of issues to the fore and how this set of issues, in turn, reactivates the significance of verbalization and delimitation, they, too, are of the first magnitude in making sense of philosophical conceptuality.

G. H. von Wright has defined philosophy as “explication of conceptual intuitions”1262. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, philosophy is “creating concepts”1263. Although manner in which these thinkers go on to characterize the philosopher’s business, or the actual way that they exemplify it, is very much different from one other, one does not have to be a doctor to see that both von Wright and Deleuze/Guattari let philosophy and conceptuality embrace.

Moreover, despite whatever objections they may have to the respective definitions by von Wright and Deleuze/Guattari, almost all philosophers, while philosophizing, can be seen as “explicating” some such items as “conceptual intuitions” and coming up, in an effort like this, with conceptual “creations”. They
may pursue better analyses, historical accounts or uses for certain familiar concepts, or they could be preparing new concepts to be launched or introduced to rival the former ones and to convey better results in some old problems or to indicate novel ones. The way they see their own work sums up their concept of 'philosophy'.

The most concise formula I know for the complex interlacing of philosophy and concepts is found in a forgotten book, written by Ludvig Freund and called Am Ende der Philosophie (1930): “Nothing in philosophy is more debated than its concept.” In as much as this a historical observation, Freund appropriately supplies some “leading concept determinations” for 'philosophizing’ from the Ancients to contemporary thinkers. Yet, instead of being a subject of history of ideas only, there is the more theoretical lesson that Freund wants to spell out. His conviction is, namely, that the concept of 'philosophy' is the most controversial concept in philosophy, since it is also “the most difficult” as well as “an unavoidable” one. In short, it is “the basic problem of philosophy”. Soon enough, the reader is told that, if 'definition' means “the delimitation of a concept as opposed to other concepts” for the sake of coming up with “peculiar distinguishing features constituting the concept”, then “[t]here is no fully valid definition of philosophy”. Where philosophy is thinking that takes place in concepts, it is problematical to the point of virtual inconceivability.¹²⁶⁴

To illustrate an important point, I shall, instead of thoroughly reviewing Freund’s book or challenging his basic tenets, compare it to the way a German textbook, from about the same period of time, is opened. The neorealist Oswald Külpe begins his Einleitung in die Philosophie by writing that “[u]nder the concept of philosophy, we understand the meaning of this expression as asserted for the scientific use of the word philosophy, and under the definition of the concept, the determination of the word’s meaning. The latter will, in the main, be accomplished by placing the nearest kind (genus proximum) under the kind of the concept to be defined and by supplying the species-forming peculiarity (differentia specifica) that distinguishes it from other concepts belonging to the same kind.” After that, Külpe, too, is ready to refer to “the many determinations of philosophy that really deviate from one another”.¹²⁶⁵

Both Freund and Külpe represent those philosophers who have been philosophical enough to pay attention to the proper conceptualization of this theory-practice so irreversibly entwined with concepts. Külpe emphasizes the “scientific” nature of conceptualization and, accordingly, appropriates Aristotle’s ancient technique in constructing conceptual dichotomies and hierarchies. Without utilizing the same expressions, Freund, too, has a recourse to the way the all important operation of defining is understood as marking off by identifying special characteristics. Both writers seek to demonstrate that the multifaceted and contradictory historical alternatives make it practically impossible to refer to any generally accepted or universally applicable concept of philosophy. It seems as if philosophy, the science
and art of concepts, is ultimately fatal for conceptualization.

The decisive difference between Freund and Külpe is this. Külpe’s text meets the expectations one may have for the first chapter of a traditional standard introductory work (Einleitung in): it seeks to specify the most basic and general terms in order to move on to the higher level of more special questions. Admittedly, the author’s treatment of the basics is recognizably philosophical, yet the policy of making clear the “word and concept” before attending to their applications and exemplifications is not likely to characterize anything specifically philosophical as distinct from other disciplines, arts, approaches, styles. By an exchange of certain key terms, one could turn Külpe’s work into a conventional text book in almost any subject.

By contrast, Freund’s publication sets up a different horizon. Its title already refers to situatedness around the edge/end/purpose of philosophy (Am Ende). In accordance with this, Freund aims to argue that the unique nature and role of philosophy as the study of conceptuality is to come back, all the time, to the question of its own philosophicality and conceptuality. Where Külpe’s text is, in the final analysis, indicative of an adjustment to the requirements of the textbook genre, Freund’s text exemplifies philosophical inquiry by having the beginning and end of philosophy meet each other on the limits of conceptuality.

Like I said, I had a point to be illustrated. That is why it may not be altogether crucial issue, whether I manage to do justice to either of these philosophical writers. What counts is the articulation of the self-critical, self-reflective kind of philosophy committed to watching the ways it is being deconceptualized and reconceptualized among philosophers and other conceptualizers. A basic distinction could be made clear. There are the practices of operating with some specific concepts and producing some specific concepts. This is one thing. The other is this: there are the practices that attach to the concept in general, or the concept of concept, or the philosophical conceptuality. The difference is a one between first order and second order moves. Stated in more continuous terms, one might say that philosophical practice is always at some point between the extremes of studying/discovering a concept ’x’ and studying/discovering the concept of concept that conditions the concept ’x’ and perhaps the concepts of ’y’ and ’z’, too. Philosophers differ to the extent to which they move from pursuing something to conceptualizing that ‘something’, from that to conceptualizing the ‘pursuit’ and the ‘pursuer’ and from that to conceptualizing the very ‘conceptualization’.

Out of these reflections, one could stipulate a definition of the substantive “philosophy” and the adjective “philosophical”: philosophy is study of concepts, yet it, or any other study pertaining to concepts, becomes really philosophical only as soon as it begins, simultaneously, to study the concept of concept.
Philosophy is stuck with conceptuality. But it becomes self-conscious or interested in and even capable of both self-delimitation and dialogue with other disciplines and arts, and thus “philosophical”, only as it commences to conceive and conceptualize the nature and role of concepts within itself. This is a matter of analytical and historical awareness equally.

In fact, one can gather some such argument for philosophical philosophy from Freund’s writing, too. He emphasizes that all human thinking is inextricably conceptual and that philosophy takes place in and with concepts. He stresses that any concept can be an object of philosophy and the task of philosophy is to clarify this unlimited field of potential conceptualizations. Yet, only as one begins to interrogate the very definability of a given concept, it becomes philosophical. There is, in this account, a nice philosophical shift from first order acts (defining concepts) to the second order act (defining and problematizing the definition), yet one is, I think, entitled to hope for some more elucidation of the conceptuality of concepts.

The history of philosophy consists of thinkers having achieved remarkable things in the fields that have come to be called ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic and so on. This historiography is about making sense, with the help of analytical and historical, textual and contextual reconstructions, of the concept of ‘good’, ‘being’, ‘truth’, ‘negation’ and others explicitly or implicitly entertained by these thinkers. Many of the renowned thinkers have had something to say about the concept of ‘philosophy’, too. Quite often, their philosophical stance is, however, read from their actual manner of discussing the more local questions of such and such important philosophical concept. Sometimes, the philosopher in question has had a word on the issue of ‘concept’, as well.

Viewed in the light of the definition postulated above, not that numerous philosophers are so very philosophical that they should get down to conceptualize ‘philosophy’ or ‘conceptuality’, even if the answer that they gave to a question about their work would include these very terms. This may not say so much against their worth as philosophers, but it certainly leaves them at the mercy of someone else’s definitions of the line of work they practice. Those who happen to get, all of a sudden, philosophical enough to venture to propose a fresh reconceptualization of ‘concepts’ and ‘philosophies’, tend to forget this self-reflective stance, soon as they address new topics.

The fact that the kind of philosophical philosophy - study of certain concepts with an eye on the more general question as to the ontology, character and use of concepts - is scarce indeed, may result from a plurality of sources. Philosophers could be afraid of their being labeled as even worse hairsplitters than what they are commonly held to be, should they begin an intensive self-questioning of their activities at hand. They may have accepted the vulgar pragmatic imperative, according to which some aspects of any
general policy are doomed to remain unspecified, and the word “concept” is unlikely to confuse relevant audiences, even if left without special problematization. They might think that the issue is sufficiently clear after, say, Kant, Frege, Husserl or Wittgenstein. Or, if they ever come to think of the whole problem, they probably conclude that it is a mess to be avoided.

I think that the basic problem here can be described along the lines offered by Stanley Rosen and briefly introduced in the beginning of the present chapter and utilized in subsequent sections. There is the belief in the pre-conceptual field of experience and there is the always already conceptual reconstruction of that field. Rosen wishes to make room for ‘the self-conscious but extra-conceptual’ condition of conceptualizing that could account for ‘the event of conception in the absence of a meaningful ‘concept of concept’. It is to be noted that Rosen directs his criticism against the more or less unwitting application of conceptual thinking where it can only fail. He makes it clear that he is neither condemning conceptual thought nor denying its necessity, he only wishes to explain it by contextualizing it with ways other than through the dreamlike conceptualizing of conceptualizing. What is not entirely clear, however, is how Rosen’s more “lucid dream” would relate to the modern conviction (articulated, in part, by Hamlyn in section III.b.2) that human perceptions as the lowest level of making sense are always already theory-laden and contaminated by conceptuality.

At this point, one can readily grasp the importance of what I have been calling the language of conceiving or the vocabularies of conception. Namely, Rosen has specifically differentiated uses for “concepts” and “notions”. He writes as follows: “It has already been suggested that vision is not the only possible or desirable paradigm for the capacity designated by intuition. The term is admittedly defective in that its etymology expresses a “looking at” or “into” some entity. Nevertheless, the term is part of tradition, has marked advantages of familiarity in everyday speech and, with appropriate qualifications at certain junctures, may usefully be employed as a portmanteau-word designating a variety of cognitive activities which cannot be rigorously specified. To employ an ad hoc technical distinction, “concept” refers to analytically defined construction of the discursive intellect. We have a notion, but not a concept, of intuition. “Notion” is an intentionally vague term selected to cover a wide range of mental contents incapable of rigorous definition. The fact that meaningful talk depends upon intuition does not mean that intuition is inaccessible to meaningful talk. Rather, it is true that “meaningful talk” is a wider term than “conceptual construction”. In my present terminology, concepts are constructive representations of notions. This is why we speak today of “theory-construction”. Some notions are amenable to conceptualization and others are not. But even in the case of the “sharply defined concepts”, there remains a non-conceptual residue (or substratum) of notions, such as that of intuition.”

This goes to show the value of attentiveness to the language of conceptuality. In order to argue for the
non-conceptual context of conception (and for what he takes to be the vital ability to distinguish between dreaming and being awake), Rosen’s needs to reconceive the key concepts of ‘concept’, ‘notion’ and ‘intuition’. Anyone interested in his controversial distrust to the power of concept does well to observe how he openly lays down his stakes.

It remains questionable, but still possible, that someone like von Wright would accept Rosen’s proposal as a proper account for ‘philosophy as explication of conceptual intuitions’, too. von Wright does not avoid the word “conceptual”, yet neither does he discard the word “intuition”. In the light of Rosen’s distinction, one can only guess whether the “conceptual” intuitions are, in von Wright’s sense, the ones, in the pre-conceptual reservoir, that are amenable to conceptualization, or whether the emphasis is on the point that all intuitions are always already conceptual and that explication serves to both unfold the conceptual essence and appropriate it for a specific use. Either way, von Wright’s definition of philosophy reignites the question of a genuinely philosophical philosophy.

One may speculate about the extent to which the word “explication” links von Wright’s view to the Vienna Circle. It was by that word that Carnap, who otherwise tried to reduce philosophy to an “analysis of concepts”, recognized the pre-scientific, pre-conceptual\textsuperscript{1268}. Yet, “intuitions” inspired little confidence among the Viennese. Moritz Schlick, for example, wrote expressly against intuition and for concepts, as he sought to identify Bergson’s misconception of knowledge: “Knowing is indeed an embracing, but an embracing or enclosure by means of concepts whereby the known is unambiguously assigned a place in the midst of them”\textsuperscript{1269}.

As it happens, the even the word “concept” suffered in Vienna. At any rate, Otto Neurath came to include it in his 1941 list of dangerous and “careless terms”. Neurath insisted that he was not enumerating these terms for the sake of pedantry, pseudo-clarity, evoking an oracle or a vain dream of getting rid of all vagueness. Instead, he wished to avoid the expression “concept”, as also “motive”, “soul”, “spirit”, “mattter (as a contrast to “spirit” or “form”), “economic”, “capital”, “abstract space”, “progress”, “pathological”, “normal” and “value”. As a self-critical positivist, he also named “definitively certain”, “meaning”, “verification”, “true” and “false”. Three years later, Neurath reaffirmed that “concept” is to be “eliminated” as harmful. To the black list, he now added “Volksgeist”, “ethos of a religion”, “ethical powers”, “existence”, “entity”, “reality”, “thing”, “spirit”, “spiritual world”, “physical world”, “meaning”, “progress”, “beauty” and “goodness”. As for the self-critical amendments, “fact”, “simple basis sentences”, “atomary ideas” and “sense data” appeared, too.\textsuperscript{1270}

I am not going to get involved in all the questions that these quotations suggest: ‘Is Schlick construing Bergson’s views correctly?’; ‘Can one apply Schlick’s criticism to Rosen’s ‘intuition’ (or ‘notion’),
too?”; “Can one apply Rosen’s criticisms to Schlick’s use of “unambiguous”?”; “Are the contexts of scientific theory-construction and conception of concepts incommensurable?”; “How is the development of the logical empiricist theory to be related to the changing Viennese views of concepts and how to do justice to the variety of opinion among the members of the Kreis?” And so on and so forth.

I wish only to use these examples as to indicate the different routes to the basic problem in discussing the limits of conceptuality. To make my point more explicit, I would like to refer to one more philosopher who is rejected by both Rosen and the faithful followers of Vienna Circle. It is, namely, Jacques Derrida who has also written about the condition of conceptual processes and systems, of the endless chain of concepts and introduced his différance as a non-concept and non-word to imply that very condition. It would not be entirely futile to examine, if Rosen’s ‘intuition’ and ‘notion’ and Derrida’s ‘différance’ cannot help but be function as concepts in their respective philosophical texts. In any case, Rosen’s and Derrida’s appeals to the conditions of conceptuality, just as von Wright’s, Schlick’s and Neurath’s comments on concepts, all point toward the need to philosophize over the defining element of philosophy.

In what follows, I shall go through a number of philosophical cases where the borderline between concept and “its other” has received special attention. This should make it clear that my concentration on the conceptual problem does not involve an automatic denial of, or indifference to, the ‘other’ of conceptuality as a key question in philosophy or in studying Nietzsche. On the contrary, I find the issues of, for instance, the detrimental nature of concepts or the context of conceptualization to be one of the most decisive aspects of the conceptual problematic. Thus, my choice of speaking, all the time in the present study, about concepts and conceptuality, ought not to be regarded as blind faith to conceptuality and sheer neglect of non-conceptuality. The way I see it, conceptual problems pertain as much to the potential insignificance, irrelevance, unintelligibility or inexistence of concepts as to their potential prominence.

In the early 20th-century philosophy, as Schlick’s critique intimated, it was Bergson’s thought that was most usually seen as the prime instance of increased distrust toward conceptuality. Connected to Bergson, William James’s anti-intellectualism was another philosophy under similar suspicions. I think it is fair to say that James’s Some Problems of Philosophy (1911) was the first book summing up the conceptual quandary in its most typical modern form. Right in the beginning of his discussion, James says that he is interested in not so much in the “origin of our concepts” but in their “functional use and value”. He introduces a “pragmatic rule” to be used in testing concepts. This is to say that of a given concept it should be asked “what sensible difference to anybody will its truth make?”. James affirms the customary view that “many disputes in philosophy hinge upon ill-defined words and ideas”, which is the very reason
for resorting to the method “handier” than any other in making concepts clear. He then offers a fine series of formulations in favor of concepts: concepts make up a “map of relations” capable of steering conduct, reanimating action, supplying new values and points of emphasis. Yet, after these remarks James goes on to cast doubt on concepts involving “translation of the perceptual flux” and “harnessing perceptual reality” in a way that fosters defects and shortcomings through falsification and inadequacy.1272

As it happens, Freud has a word on the detrimental or risky nature of concepts. He chooses merely to refer to the current vitalist doubts (“they say [...]”) concerning concepts as inflexible and tending to kill and separate and alienate. More on his own, Freud speaks of the dilemma of philosophy and science as bounded by concepts, while “conceptual abstractions involve sources of mistake and possibilities of error”. His special emphasis on the language, and, thereby, his almost proto-Geachian tenor, comes out as he makes the following claim: “Conceivably, the incapacity of the concept to represent the reality in its entire content, the object in its fullness of existence, hangs together with, above all, the incompleteness of our word formation. [...] Yet, the birth of the concept is not thinkable without the word that it clings to and that must support it. The practical usability of the concept, too, depends, before everything else, on the word.”1273

In section III.a, I mentioned and supported Robert P. Pippin’s view that Nietzsche ought not to be attached to the ‘imposition’ view of structuring. This does not mean, however, that Nietzsche’s “pragmatism” was worlds apart from that current’s Jamesian or Freundian varieties. I think it has already become conceivable that many of Nietzsche’s discussions find an echo in James, as well as many of the Nietzschean considerations could be taken to prefigure Rosen’s outlining of the context of conception. Instead of overdoing the anticipatory nature of Nietzsche’s reflections, I would like to, next, sketch the longer line of continuous problematization of conceptuality that I find relevant for at least Nietzsche, and probably for any philosopher tackling the problem of the conceptual.

In order to do this, one must talk about Lebensphilosophie. I have already (see section I.a) told how Heidegger’s studies on Nietzsche were, to a great extent, motivated by his resistance to this current. My opinion is that the way the ‘philosophies of life’ have usually been treated, in philosophical circles, has done anything but enhanced self-critical philosophy. The justified, albeit mostly retroactive, fury against the cults of life and power that found applications, through 1920's to 1940's, in the European totalitarian orders, has afflicted all orientation to the philosophically fruitful insights developed among those labeled as irrationalistic Lebensphilosophen.

What is needed, I think, is neither a rebirth nor even a rehabilitation of these philosophies but a review
from the point of view of philosophical self-conceptualization. This should indicate that I am not denying the need to study the politico-social aspects in the career of philosophical tendencies. In as much as this sort of review necessarily involves rehabilitative aspects, it could be taken as necessitating self-critical reflection upon the problematic of rehabilitation.

To make the beginning of such a review possible, I shall once again call upon Rudolf Eucken. The problematic of the opposition of life and concepts is indeed much older than the Bergsonian vitalist controversy. One might talk of a perennial tension between the rationalistic and other approaches to philosophical questions, yet the peculiarly modern variant of the problematic was there at least from the mid-19th century onward. It can be illuminated with the help of Eucken whose book on conceptual history, from 1879, I have been intensely exploiting in the course of this chapter.

Eucken made a case for the basic philosophical question posed by conceptuality. He spoke of a common charge leveled against philosophy that it makes reality is abstract and formal, paralyzed and shattered. To be sure, philosophy requires “a certain letting loose of the immediate world” to be able to specify conceptual relations and solidify them with appropriate language. In so doing, neutrality takes over the animated and the colorful. Yet, the example of Aristotle goes to show that not necessarily is philosophy a fiend of life. His virtuosity lay, in Eucken’s words, in his ability to “grasp [erfasst] the essence of a thing by concept as a living force”, to “understand the whole fullness of the given”, to opt for “a great concrete world view” and to “give a lively content [...] to all concepts”. Hence, it depends on the skills of a given philosopher, or on the resources of a given culture or epoch, whether philosophy has to turn into a formalism. In the happy case, its synthetic aspirations eventually overrule the analytical ones, to the extent that “in the place of the world, resolved by philosophical thinking, it assert[s] a wholly full and living world recomposed”.1274

One may note how Eucken was not as worried as Rosen came to be about the mediateness, alienation or otherworldliness. All the way through his historical case studies, Eucken is eager to point to the instances of successful conceptualization, which seems to involve large scale attempts escaping the vices of excessive or artificial distinctions, schematic or scholastic formalism, on the one hand, and vagueness or hidden fancifulness, on the other. Creative concepts can retain fresh and astute experiential sense, as they do even in Plato whose concepts otherwise, so Eucken, tend to grow out of proportion and rise above the world.1275

On occasion, however, Eucken’s text seems to move closer to the concerns of Rosen on the point of conceptual mediacy. The case of Augustine, for example, urges him to write at length about the desperate, yet productive efforts to reconcile a “glowing hatred against the purely formal and abstract”
and a “theoretical interest for a universal conception of the world”. Conceptual orientation appears to vitiate any attempt at preserving, or regaining, informal, immediate, concrete experience.

Moreover, Eucken, too, is careful enough not to idealize the Ancients in excess. He puts forth the view that “all of the difficulties brought along by the relations of thought and expression, the concept and the word” were already felt in Greece. One can speak of a Greek trilemma involving i) the early lack of “appropriate expressions”, ii) the later becoming abstract and artificial of terms along with the depression of the “creative force” and, finally, iii) the type of internalized intellectuality with no perceptive and creative sense of the “inherited vocabulary”.

Further, and perhaps most interestingly, Eucken describes, in a very ingenious way, I think, Leibniz’s peculiar strategy of conceptual improvement. It was not the habit of the German classic to do the usual crime of apprehension. That is, Leibniz did not seek to adjust everything strange to his own idiom. On the contrary, he would take what was his very own (das Eigne) and then mould (ergriﬀen, erörtert, umgestalten) it for it to become extensive enough for “that the new to be taken in”. In other words, conceptualizers can improve their conceptualizing facilities. Not everything needs to be conceived according to but a few rigid modes. Eucken says elsewhere that “what is most interesting is to detect, how philosophy grabs and reshapes [ergreift und umbildet] the expressions of the common life”. One may feel that this runs counter the Leibnizian imperative of refashioning the conceiever. On a more generous reading, however, Eucken’s point is to say that the reshaping process works both ways.

Some such reshaping came to be important for Ernst Mach, too. In his more positivist vocabulary, he spoke of the constant and urgent necessity to get acquainted with the passage “[f]rom facts to concepts and back”. He said that “[t]he same fact, or a group of facts, can lead the interest and attention to different reactions, different concepts”. Yet, Mach shared the anxiety over an excessively conceptual attitude. One’s “intercourse with concepts” should not disturb the more immediate “sensual representations” and the beneﬁcial “lively knowing”. In a crucial passage, he draws it all together like this: “Whoever has got an elaborately divided system of concepts that satisﬁes his interests and that he has made his own through language and education, enjoys great advantages as opposed to others at the mercy of mere perceptions. Should one lack, however, the ability to swiftly and ﬂuently translate the sensual representations into concepts and vice versa, one could occasionally be led astray by one’s concepts, too; they could become a sheer drag of prejudices for him.”

Mach is able to provide a good example, even if he calls it “trivial”. The concept of ‘the era of the pharaohs’, as a vague thing of the distant past, may well appear to be mere a flatus vocis, or just some people talking. Yet, should one think of a 60-year-old Egyptian who has a son who, in turn, has a son as
he reaches sixty, and the son, too, has a son at the same age and so on for 70 whole generations, one arrives quickly to this date, 3 600 years later, is less perplexed by the contemporary barbarism and represents the concept more vividly. To apply this reasoning to the future is to learn the illusory nature of the concept of ‘family’ or “own flesh and blood”. In the happy case, one adopts a new concern for the benefit of the humankind. The philosophical lesson remains the same, that is, the “translation of concepts into intuitions [Anschaungen] and the other way round”. 1282

Thus, the positivist scientific theorist Mach and the life philosopher Eucken both point to the need to maintain a regular two-way line between experience and concepts. Admittedly, this is a little too rewarding way to describe the two thinkers, since what is lacking from Eucken’s and Mach’s accounts is a conscious sense of conceptuality as always already moulding perceptions and conditioning facts.

Mach’s case can be further illuminated to bring out this point. Just as Hippolyte Taine had construed concepts as mental images or recurring sensations associated with a certain class of experiences1283, Mach, too, held on to the reducibility of concepts to the primitive sensual experience devoid of the conceptual. As Mach introduces to his European audience one of the most outstanding works of philosophy in the 19th century, the American J. B. Stallo’s The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1882), his sensualist bias becomes evident. Mach begins from Stallo’s point that “[t]hought deals not with things, as they are in themselves, but with our thoughtful representations (concepts) of these”. He continues by referring to such notions as the relativity of conceptual knowledge and the inexhaustible nature of the objects of thought.1284 What he does not emphasize is Stallo’s unique point about the metaphysical assumptions of words. This is to say that it is just where Mach fails to appreciate Stallo’s focusing on the lessons of linguistics for concepts, epistemology and scientific theory construction, that he also clings to the doctrine of immediacy and the non-conceptual access to reality.

However, I must step back from these debates. I am using Mach here only in order to sketch a continuous philosophical reflection on concepts from Eucken via James and the Viennese theorists all the way to Rosen. Vital differences between all these thinkers are less important, for the present purposes, than their similar interest in the limist of conceptuality. Next, I would like to discuss a further example of Lebensphilosophie, this time from the 1920’s.

I shall reintroduce Richard Müller-Freienfels. His picture of the philosophical situation of his day was already used in the series of attempts to identify Nietzsche’s proper location in the historical unfolding of Western thinking (see II.b.1). His book Irrationalismus (1922) offers a perspective into the post-Bergsonian kind of philosophical criticism that seeks to question the significance of the conceptual approach dominant in philosophy. It is best to say, with respect to what I proposed about reviewing the
‘philosophies of life’, that this is a book as informative and insightful as also representative of its Zeitgeist. It ends in the repellent view that whereas rationalism fails to make any sense of war, irrationalism may contribute to “quietly revering that for which our understanding remains helpless”.

As for the question of conceptuality, Müller-Freienfels has a lot to give. He cannot help but comment upon the Bergson controversy (he condemnsthe Frenchmen’s meditations on the instinctive as “rather nebulous and hardly conceivable”), yet his general point is to say that all great philosophers have been interested in the “cooperation of all kinds of knowledge”. There is then, not only the theoretical attempt to redefine philosophy as something that allies itself with “science as far as possible” and keeps “an eye on all extra-scientific possibilities of knowledge”. There is also the historical point that, say, Plato, Kant, Hegel, Locke, Schopenhauer and Dilthey, despite their varying focal points, were engaged in this sort of study of reciprocal forces.

Now, Müller-Freienfels reassures his readers that the “conceptually rationalizing” type of thinking or knowing (Erkennen) is “by no means to be completely thrown away”. Reason and understanding are not to be “devalued”. Even the critique itself, despite the irrationality of its “object”, relies on the “rationality of its concepts”. The real disease lies in the “onesided rationalism overpowering the theory of knowledge”. The needed therapy consists of the attention to the “entirety of activities” with their rational and super/sub-rational dimensions for the benefit of a “concept of knowledge more broadly conceived”.

Irrationalismus has it that rational concepts are unable to exhaust or fully accommodate the wealth of dynamic, multirelational, emotional, experiential, sensual, instinctive, intuitive and personal data received, meditated and transmitted in the human life. In the book, the scope of philosophical knowing is arranged so that the bottom level, in the system of ramifications, contains “spontaneous instinctual reactions”. One step higher, there are “intellectual knowing” and “emotional knowing”. The intellectual branches further into “rationalizing” and “singularizing” modes of knowing and forms the realm of exact sciences, while the emotional is divided into Einfühlung and “creative knowing” as the shared sphere of arts, religion and morality.

There is more to Müller-Freienfels’s challenging metaphilosophical setting than these conventional dichotomies. He says that “[w]ords and concepts of the language are surely no capsules, into which to purely pack the meaning and to pass it on from hand to hand”. Stated in the terminology of the previous subsection, the shift Müller-Freienfels is attempting to enact is the one from closed to open, from language-independent to language-based as well as from entity to disposition concepts. Namely, for him, “[c]oncept is a center of action [Aktionszentrum]”. Conceiving is more about “Einstellung” than about
“Vorstellung”, that is, it has more to do with attitude and orientation than with representation. Quite clearly, Müller-Freienfels states that concept is “an ability and disposition to deeds [Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft zu Handlungen]”. Furthermore, he describes concept as not so much an “intra-individual event” as, rather, a “social and vital function”.1291

This degree of explicitness in describing the novel concept of concept, in 1922, is admirable indeed. Müller-Freienfels’s depiction of the dispositional concept as Handlungsbereitschaft and Tätigkeitseinstellung is superior to just about any other piece of philosophical writing of his time. The further point about concepts involving specific Begriffsgfühl or Begriffserlebnis is still highly interesting. Even though Müller-Freienfels fails to relate his insights concerning the “mainly non-conscious, [...] motory, [...] physiological” to those concerning the linguistic and social aspects of concepts, his reference to the “pre-scientific” reality of concepts or to the primacy of the “natural life of thought” is, as Rosen would say, meaningful talk. Yet, his attempt to proceed is not that happy. He makes much of the essentially mystic origins of philosophy, of how there can be no philosophical pupils but only philosophical disciples, as in the arts and religion.1292

Although this last tends to water down the authors stress on the intimate relation between philosophy and science, the illustration Müller-Freienfels supplies of conceptualization is better in line with his more balanced notion of the broad cooperation of cultural forces. Suppose a Lutheran man visits a Catholic society in order to speak about his faith. The man rationalizes his concepts, draws back the onesidedly Lutheran colorings in them and strives for a mutual understanding and shared basis of thinking by working on his concepts. In the meeting, a kind of impersonal concord is sought by settling on a few important distinguishing features involving “as objective and abstract formation of concepts as possible”. Yet, as Müller-Freienfels says, “all this does not need to happen methodically”, since the parties can achieve the correct form of discussion through “sheer “tact”“. In his estimation, here is an instance of something “nowhere near rational”, yet indicative of “modified concepts” being “strongly internalized”. The conclusion reads that there is, in thinking that precedes scientific concept-formation, “tendency and possibility to rationalize in a multitude of ways”.1293

This ends my preliminary case for the need to review the ‘philosophies of life’. From these discussions, I shall move back toward Rosen’s reflections on the paradoxes of the concept of concept and on the need to reinterpret the context of conceiving. The next cases offered by Theodor W. Adorno and Gilles Deleuze / Félix Guattari exemplify what must perhaps be taken, along with Rosen’s case, as the boldest attempts to explore conceptuality versus “its other” as the dimension that is varyingly pre-conceptual, sub-conceptual, supra-conceptual, trans-conceptual, post-conceptual, extra-conceptual, anti-conceptual, un-conceptual, non-conceptual, dis-conceptual, a-conceptual1294.
Adorno’s *Negative Dialektik* (1966) could be the most sustained philosophical treatise of the question of non-conceptuality, although it is not entirely exhausted by this problematic. In fact, I think one could find many points of contact between Adorno’s book and Rosen’s critique of contemporary philosophy. I will, however, refrain from direct comparisons and seek to handle Adorno’s work on its own, yet only as a contribution to the problematic under discussion.

Adorno writes that the “true interest” of philosophy is “in the conceptless, the individual and the special” which is just what both Plato and Hegel disqualified. Yet, he attacks both Bergson’s “cult of the irrational immediacy” and Husserl’s attempt to arrive at essence only by reproducing the general concept. He says that it is a “utopia of knowledge” to think to be able to “undo the conceptless with concepts without identifying it with these”. By contrast, Adorno thinks that the “necessity for philosophy to operate with concepts” is not to be made into “the virtue of their priority”, nor is it enough to espouse “the summary verdict over philosophy”. Stated in utmost brevity, Adorno’s negative dialectics is about fighting the category of identity by “the de-magicalization [Entzauberung] of the concept”. It is about trading the absoluteness of philosophy for a view of “the constitutive character of the nonconceptual”.1295

Deleuze’s book, *Logique du sens* (1969), in turn, describes concepts as inhabiting “signification”, which is said to be, after “manifestation” and “designation”, “the third dimension of the proposition”. In this vocabulary, the fourth or “the ultimate dimension” is sens, or “the pure event insisting or subsisting in the proposition”. According to Deleuze, “sense” was first discovered by Stoics and later by, say, Ockham. In short, it is the always already presupposed sphere for manifesting self, designating speech and signifying thought. In a crucial way, the “logic of the sense” is an attempt to work out a “copresence” of, or “an intrinsic relation” between, “sense” and “non-sense”.1296

Despite working on a philosophical borderline case, Deleuze’s book seems to reserve for concepts a quite subdued role in philosophy. Undoubtedly, Deleuze was to amaze many of his readers, when he said in an interview, in 1988, - and restated it again in the book by him and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991) - that philosophy is nothing more and nothing less than “creating concepts”1297. I presume that many of his readers would have expected to hear him say that ’sense’, ’event’ and ’intensity’ remain more decisive than ’concept’. Ernst Behler, for one, had referred to Deleuze as attempting to replace “a topology of concepts” with “a topology of forces”1298.

To be sure, Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is no “simple art of forming, inventing or fabricating concepts” that is distinctive of philosophy, “because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries or products”. Creating concepts is creating philosophical novelties that are never given. The task of philosophy lies beyond “contemplation, reflection, communication”. Deleuze and Guatteri state that
“[p]hilosophers are not sufficiently occupied with the nature of concept as philosophical reality.” And when they have been, as with Hegel and Schelling, it has lead to questionable results. Deleuze and Guattari propose “a pedagogy of concept” to fight both the post-Kantian subjective and universalist encyclopedism and the current commercialism of concept.1299

For Deleuze and Guattari, concept is “a fragmentary whole”, a multiplicity, a “centre of vibration” posing itself and its object. It is created from, and haunted by, chaos, the “contours” of which are always "irregular" and, hence, an “affair of articulation”. Concept has its zigzag history and its bifurcative future. Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, contrary to Logique du sens, takes the concept of concept as explicitly non-propositional. Concept expresses now “the event, not the essence or the thing”. What is most important is that concepts are something strictly philosophical, while science has but functions, art, in turn, affects and percepts. These are “the three aspects under which the brain becomes subject”. Deleuze and Guattari conclude that it is only in constant relation to their respective “non”’s that philosophy can teach one to conceive, art to feel, science to know. All three touch upon undecidability and mutual indiscernibility involving, in part, non-philosophical comprehension of philosophy where conceptuality touches upon the non-conceptual.1300

It is in their peculiar morphology that Deleuze and Guattari also discuss the possibilities of ‘order’ in the face of chaos. As they see it, art supplies “varieties”, whereas science provides with “variables” and philosophy “variations”, all of which are needed in order for one to “plunge into” chaos and yet to be protected from it. Varieties leave “reproduction[s] of the sensible” for “a plane of inorganic composition”. Variables, in turn, trade the relations of ownership operating with “local probabilities” for the “finite coordinates” in a “global cosmology”. Variations, for their part, depart from “associations of distinct ideas” and opt for “re-enchainements through the zone of indistinction in a concept”. Taken together, the three planes meet not as “unity” but as the “junction” which is the brain.1301

Deleuze and Guattari, like Müller-Freienfels before them, make a case for a metaphilosophical problematic of conceptuality that has its bearings on an interplay between different walks of life and lines of work. In what follows, the perspective utilized so far in making sense of the interplay between the conceptual and the non-conceptual is reversed. If the relentless philosophical self-analysis leads to the demarcation questions of philosophy with respect to arts, religions and sciences, one does well to see how the issue of conceptuality may provoke more or less similar self-reflection in these other fields, too.

Let us start from religion. Conventionally speaking, in describing religious experience, the conceptual is clumsiness of superficial rationalization. However, there have always been theologians and pious people seeing little trouble in the thought of analyzing the constituents of belief in terms of concepts, or of
calling relevant religious words, terms and characters “concepts”.

The theology professor in Marburg, Rudolf Otto, wrote, in 1917, a book on the relations of divinity and the ir/rational. At the start, Otto maintained how utterly important it is for each “theistic conception of god [Gottesauffassung]” that the divine is “grasped [gefaßt] with sharp precision”. He went on to assert that the predicates needed to describe god, such as “spirit, reason, will”, were “clear and distinct concepts [...] accessible to thought, to thoughtful analysis, to definition”. All this makes god into something essentially “rational”. In Otto’s rationalist theology, therefore, it is “a distinguishing feature of the highness and superiority of a religion that it has ’concepts’ and knowledge, namely, knowledge of faith [Glaubenserkenntnis] of the supersensual in concepts”. The professor is ready to promote, for this very reason, Christianity as the supreme form of religiosity.1302

Admittedly, this example does not represent any common understanding of god and spiritual matters. Yet, my point was only to show that religious context is not, necessarily, a one of the non-conceptual. And even if Otto’s defence of a single school of theology merely reinforces the mainstream idea of religion as distinct from, or hostile to, conceptuality, I think that his approach effectively calls into question certain stubborn habits of thought in a way relevant for philosophical thinking, too. Further in his book, Otto makes a helpful reference to the aesthetic realm. After characterizing the “saint” as “a category of interpretation and evaluation” that escapes rationality to the degree that it is an ineffabile or “fully inaccessible for conceptual experience, (as is also, in a wholly other field, the ‘beautiful’)”1303.

By contrast, Hegel maintained that beauty “stands, thoroughly and from all sides, open for the conceiving thought”. It was his basic point that the challenge of approaching arts and the beautiful with conceptual means involves both a reconceptualization of the beautiful as “a determined way of expressing and displaying the true” and a reconceiving of the concept as a non-abstract totality. Hence, beauty could be viewed as “the in itself concrete absolute concept and, conceived in a more determined fashion, the absolute idea in the appearance that is appropriate for itself [in ihrer sich selbst gemäßen Erscheinung]”.1304

Hegel’s ultra-conceptual philosophy may not be the most compelling case for the conceptual in matters of beauty, aesthetics or art. One might move on to question the separation of art and conceptuality by referring to the recent rise of variegated (self-)acknowledged conceptual tendencies in, especially, visual arts. Especially from the 1960's to the 1990's, several movements following such renowned artists as Lawrence Weiner, Sol LeWitt, Joseph Kosuth and Bruce Nauman, were associated with Conceptual Art or Concept Art. In Edward Lucie-Smith’s helpful explanation, the key features were that artistic activities within many of these new currents i) did not expose their basic idea as a product of physical

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form, ii) used language (of, typically, art theory) as their fundamental material, and iii) approximated to an interrogation into the nature of art.\textsuperscript{1305}

The concept of ’concept art’ is notoriously difficult to outline for it be an effective instrument of distinction, mainly because its leaves room for articulating a “conceptual” element in any conceivable form of art. Inasmuch as the notion of ’conceptual art’ is apt to strengthen the case for separation, it unfortunately implies that only those forms of art that fall under that heading are to be understood as having something to do with conceptuality.\textsuperscript{1306}

That is why it may be, after all, best to detect the instances where precisely the traditional opposition of the experiential and the conceptual stirs creative artists to attain fruitful insights to their work. What the poet Allen Ginsberg says about the American Beat movement can be taken to dispute and renew the role of conceptuality in artistic (and, for that matter, spiritual) activity. It was one of Ginsberg’s aspirations to rehabilitate and refine the Whitmanian sense of personhood in his own and, to an extent, his fellow writers’ poetical and cultural projects. Many people, including a number of authors and literary critics, would, I guess, be inclined to say that the Beats were kissing goodbye anything as formal and boring as ’the conceptual’. Yet, here is Ginsberg speaking about “the concept of person”, revising it with the notions of “(affective) feeling” and “body” and mocking only the “purely conceptual” and the “fake conceptions”: ”But I was seeing the transmission, in America, as a transmission of person, of the concept of person, of the feeling of person, as a breakthrough, a reasonable breakthrough, beyond the purely conceptual mind that had gone mad with the fake conceptions of thinking head cut off from the body and cut off from affective feeling.”\textsuperscript{1307}

Running the risk of an altogether akward extension, I would like to briefly consider the issue of concetto in order to close this problematic of arts and conceptuality. By this Italian word, a reference is usually made to the late renaissance practice of producing artworks with one overriding idea as its source of meaning. The mannerist masters would have their commanding conceptions or concetti worked onto their sculptures that, hence, spoke volumes. According to a recent commentator, concetto stands close to disegno “but with the implication that the meaning is in some way suprising of paradoxical”.\textsuperscript{1308}

It seems, then, that conceptuality may even express the most inventive, the most stunningly effective dimension of artistic creation without depriving a work of art from its visible and tangible beauty. The highly selective cases of concetto and Otto’s theology would imply that not only is there something utterly wrong in automatically discarding concepts from creative and spiritual contexts, but also that there is the viable option of promoting concepts as the essential elements even in the least likely fields of artistic activity and religious experience.
To begin to move toward the case of scientific activity, Mach can be consulted again. This is because he can safely be said to be the most typical representative of the opinion that concepts are, by definition, scientific, yet he did ponder on the issue of hallucinations and dreamy phantasms and confessed a personal awareness of these phenomena. However, Mach sharply separates their potential for artistic use from their uselessness in science: “Art remains overwhelmingly sensual, and applies, in the main, to one sense. Any sense can hallucinate for itself. Science, however, is in need of concepts. Are there concept-hallucinations? How could they come about? What meaning could it have to expect the latest human intellectual achievement, the scientific concept that is born, according to its nature, through conscious purposeful work, to have happened by the unconscious organic?”

On the face of it, it might seem that Ludvig Klages, as probably the most notorious of all the ‘philosophers of life’, would reply in the affirmative to Mach’s first question. His idea of expanding “the psychological [seelenkundliche] research of [magical and religious] ecstasy” with “a science of narcotic substances” could be conceived as welcoming conceptual hallucinations. However, Klages expressly states that it “would be a fruitless undertaking to discern ecstatic experiences [Erlebnisse] in the language of concepts”. The curious outcome of this comparison between Mach and Klages is that while the Lebensphilosoph holds on to the conventional view of the inanenability of powerful experiences and emotions to conceptualization, the positivist theoretician comes up with the hypothesis of conceptual hallucination.

Mach’s remarks on the dangers of excessive conceptuality, coupled with Neurath’s distrust of the very word “concept”, have had their repercussions in later forms of rationalistic and scientific scepticism of concepts. In his review of the features of modern concept of concept, Tyler Burge does not ignore the contemporary perspective to the general harmfulness or redundancy of concepts. While he is himself not ready to concur wholeheartedly with those, “including Quine, [who] have taken” the holistic considerations “to undermine the belief that there are concepts at all”, Burge is generous enough not to prevent this radical line of thought from taking air. He refers to the “general forms of hostility to mentalistic notions” as characteristic of the followers of the logical empiricists (if not quite of themselves), such as behaviorism and the varieties of eliminationism. In classical terms, this hostility is a variant of the nominalistic position that, for instance, Copi related, already in 1958, to Goodman’s, Quine’s and White’s attempts to get rid of abstract terms.

In this light of what has been said, it is almost amusing to see how Quine’s scientism involves an attitude toward concepts that finds an echo in a great many aesthetic and spiritualist convictions. The evident difference between the parties in this unexpected reunion can, probably, be captured in saying that “concepts” are all too symbolical for holistic scientists and nowhere near symbolical enough for
conventional artists and believers; yet for both of them, concepts are too narrow items of discourse. What is decisive is that the challenge of concepts is multidimensional and the problem of the conceptual and the non-conceptual can grow out and intensify from a plurality of perspectives.

To close my discussion on the manifold of issues concerning the limits of concepts, I would like to have a recourse to a pioneering work in a positive recognition of concepts in scientific theory. Around the mid-19th century, William Whewell wrote against J. S. Mill that Kepler’s achievements should not be seen, as Mill had done, as restricted to the new observations of the motion of Mars. In Whewell’s eyes, Kepler “bound together” those observations with the help of “the notion, or, as I have called it, the Conception, of an ellipse, which was supplied by his own mind”. This “hitting upon the right Conception” involved “different step”, “special preparation”, “special activity in the mind of the discoverer”, “special mental operation”, “special endowments and habits of thought”. To complete his induction Kepler had to come up with the essential element, “superinduction”, that set the facts under “a different aspect”, caught them “in a new point of view”. According to Whewell, the conception’s key role “in all Inductive discoveries” was demonstrated “by there being some special new term or phrase introduced in every Induction”. 1313

I have already quoted Wilfrid Sellars’s formulation for the necessity of concepts and conceptual frames for any perceiving of something as something. It could now be added that Sellars, too, is writing specifically with scientific dynamics in mind. He insists on there being alternatives for all conceptual structurings. As if rephrasing the Wittgensteinian lesson of the concepts with family meanings, Sellars says that there is “no conceptual frame to which all others, to the extent that they are ‘coherent’, approximate”. What he calls the “essence of scientific wisdom” is “being uncertain about what is certain” and maintaining “readiness to move from one conceptual frame to another”. According to Sellars, there is an ongoing contest between conceptual frames competing “for adoption in the marketplace of experience”. 1314

I would be more inclined to speak of ‘philosophical wisdom’. Consider again what Whewell was doing. His hidden intentions aside, taking a look at his text one finds that he starts his critique of Mill by writing that “I conceive that Kepler […]”1315. Whewell is, quite obviously, introducing or superinducing or hitting upon a conception of his own to tie together his observations of Mill and Kepler. His conception is that of “Conception”. Hereby, a new point of view is reached, a different aspect shows itself. If it is not, in this case, “the facts” and “discoveries”, at least in any sense directly comparable to the situation of observing planetary orbits, it would surely be a matter of Whewell’s mind supplying something special to account for a particular case and, in all probability, to any case bearing sufficient resemblance to it. The conception of conception is an essential element of Whewell’s critique of Mill. There is no mistaking that
the new conception is to be recognized by the new term or phrase “Conception” - “as I have called it”.

Whether Whewell’s contribution is deemed revolutionary - in virtue of its anticipation of Peirce and of the work on the ‘theory-laden’ elemental observations carried out by Popper, Feyerabend, Kuhn and others - is another question that I cannot assess in detail here. It is more urgent is to grasp that he was engaged in a philosophical concept-formation and conceptual critique. The special capacities and actions, at work in his critique, might be best understood as nothing more or less than philosophical preparations, operations, endowments, habits. What makes it all philosophical is, in my view, that while reconceiving an individual scientific procedure, it also reconceives and reconceptualizes the acts of conceiving and conceptualizing.

The key points I have been trying to convey in the present section can be restated as follows. Philosophy and concepts are entangled with each other, no matter from where one observes them. Yet, philosophy has no privileged authority in determining concepts, in controlling their use, in fixing their meaning or significance. On the contrary, there is a plethora of players in the field: everyday speakers, researchers of virtually any science or any school, activists of the arts and religions, journalists, advertisers, dictionarists, marketing experts and so on. It follows that what is the most unique and most distinctive to philosophy is, at the same time, something that it shares with everybody else. At the minimum, philosophy does not own the word “concept” and in as much as it allows any function for language to execute in conceiving, philosophy is not self-sufficient but doomed to the complex interplay of cultural forces.

In my view, what marks ‘the philosophical’, in acts of conceptualization, is, first and trivially, a familiar philosophical topic under scrutiny; secondly and less trivially, a philosophical context; thirdly and the least trivially, a philosophical way to carry it out. “Philosophical”, in the term “philosophical topic”, means that a concept has been discussed by acknowledged philosophers. In the expression “philosophical context”, it means that a concept is discussed with a recourse to an acknowledged philosopher or philosophical topics or that it can be viewed in this light. What I mean by the “philosophical”, in the phrase “philosophical way”, is that a concept is treated so that attention is paid to its being a concept and, on occasion, to this conceptual attentiveness itself.
III.c  Concept Critical Approach

Wittgenstein says that “[c]oncepts lead us to investigations. They are the expression of our interest, and link our interest.”¹³¹⁶ In a book of “philosophical investigations”, this may well be taken as its height of self-reflectivity. At any rate, I take it as one of the leads to the exploration I am undertaking in the largely unknown world of Nietzschean concepts.

The multifaceted problem of conceptuality will constrain my efforts. Nietzsche’s thinking is investigated, in this study, by ways that are best described as amounting to a concept critical treatment. Conceptual problematic has been there, in the course of Nietzsche’s reception history, more or less recognized by many commentators, yet it has never been specifically developed as the frame of reference for an overall inquiry. In fact, cruder forms of applying some such problematic have, many times, been rejected as utterly inappropriate for the study of Nietzsche.

One might, indeed, want to ask what an earth is strived for with such a sterile notion as ’concept critical’. Is it perhaps a deliberate antithesis to the writer who once complained and boasted that no one has 1% of his passionateness, of vehement grief and zeal, to come to meet with him: “man kommt mir nicht mit dem Tausendstel von Leidenschaft und Leiden entgegen” (KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 229)?

In principle, ’concept critical’ pertains to the features of any activity from astrophysical research or automatic data processing to the most voluptuous debauchery or most violent anger. I do not mean to
say that it renders everything irreversibly homogenous. It is only that, whatever its stamp of cerebrality, it does not exclude passion. If this is just what it, nonetheless, suggests, for most of the language users, one can but conclude that the ruling concept of concept is fatally impervious.

My choice is to work out a novel way of coming to terms with Nietzsche’s philosophical contributions, while seeing to that this particular way maintains critical dialogue with other interpretative options. The concept critical approach is designed to function in reading so chameleon-like a figure as Nietzsche, as well as to enter in a productive, competent and competitive exchange with other interpretative strategies. More than a strict method it is, rather, a set if philosophical means to recognize and intensify problematization of concepts. Since the issue of conceptuality is discussed in a great many philosophical currents and recognized outside philosophy, too, there are a number of inspirations for this approach.

In what follows, the approach will be outlined with the principle help of Morris Weitz’s analytical philosophy of concepts and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy of conceptual history. To begin with, however, historical perspective to both dimensions is gained once again from Rudolf Eucken’s classic study, the pioneering importance of which I would thus like to reaffirm.

It is said, in his study, that neither the pre-Socratic philosophers nor Hippocrates and his companions produced much technical conceptual language, even if Democrit came close to sketching a systematic terminology and medical innovations were later taken to bear on logico-conceptual philosophy. Only with Plato, “concept begins to develop to full independence”. By the time Aristotle was ready with his work, a full-blown system had evolved from the process of reshaping the old and creating new.

According to Eucken, the Stoics tended to make the creations of the great classics more abstract, while Epicureans and Sceptics had little influence in the Greek conceptual heritage.\textsuperscript{1317}

Further, when it comes to Plotin, a certain “indifference” toward language can be detected that lead to a discrepancy characteristic of his neo-Platonism between the preserved vocabulary and yet thoroughly interpreted Platonic tenets. As for the Romans, Eucken says that they ran the risk of losing lively conceptual language altogether. The key individuals, in this situation, include Cicero with his vague eclecticism, and Augustine with his passionate and productive conceptual reworkings. The massive translation project in rendering Aristotle in Latin aroused interest in terminological matters, yet the excessive emphasis on them soon escalated in the often artificial and redundant scholastic differentiations.\textsuperscript{1318}

Scholastic habits lived on, through Leibniz and Wolff, to have their effect upon Kant, too. Eucken mentions Hobbes as having viewed thinking as “counting (adding and subtracting) with concepts” and
paid much attention to the “precise definition of words”. Descartes’s grip on language was of different nature: he deliberately brought the language of science close to the everyday discourse. As for the other great rationalists, Eucken estimates that whereas Leibniz studied terminological provenances, Spinoza suffered from an inability to match his far reaching thoughts with sufficient conceptual fluency.1319

Locke, Herder and Hegel are presented, by Eucken, as philosophers with an exceptional interest and proficiency in having language serve their needs in conceptualization. While Fichte strived to mark the philosophical usage of certain expressions off from their daily uses, Schopenhauer’s technical terminology was almost entirely built on everyday language. Compared to all these thinkers, the superior thinker and systematician Kant had not, says Eucken, a very creative sense of phrasing.1320

What the Euckenian approach shows (cf. also sections III.a-b), for all its aestheticizing accentuation of fluency and a kind of geistesgeschichtliche connoisseurship, is that the history of philosophy can be written from the perspective of the philosophers’ attitude toward conceptualization. It does not have to result in a doxographic succession of standpoints. Instead, it can be an illuminating narrative and a sweeping and critical account of the nature of philosophy.

In his posthumously published book, Theories of Concepts. A History of the Major Philosophical Tradition (1988), Morris Weitz writes as follows: “if it is true, as I am convinced it is, that philosophy is, whatever else it includes, conceptualization in language, and that philosophers employ concepts, expressed or conveyed by the words they use, in order to talk about the world - the non-existent as well as the existent, what ought to be as well as what is - then it is of the utmost importance to try to understand what individual philosophers take concepts to be, whether they philosophize about or only with them”1321.

To his “amazement and incredulity”, Weitz “could find no book on the history of philosophical theories of concept”. What is more he also discovered that “there is next to nothing on Plato’s theory of concepts” or that “there is not a single essay - at least that I have been able to find - on Descartes’ theory of concepts”.1322

Weitz was motivated enough to write his own history, where Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Frege, Russell, Moore, Ryle and Geach are discussed with respect to their peculiar concept of concept. For example, he introduces Aquinas as a “philosopher who not only employs certain concepts in his works and a vocabulary of conception, concept and conceiving”, but who “also states what concepts are, how they are formed, and what their role in knowledge and philosophy is.” Nonetheless, from his standpoint, Weitz is able to
criticize both Aquinas and his commentators for turning all too hastily to epistemological and other issues without raising “the more basic question”. That is to say: "I cannot ask, how do or can I know God? until I ask and answer, how do or can I form the concept of God?". 1323

Since Weitz’s fine book, Arno Ross has published a massive work, Begründung und Begriff. Wandlungen des Verständnisses begrifflicher Argumentationen I-III (1990), that, in part, traces the career of the concept of concept. As it happens, unlike Weitz who does not include Nietzsche in the “major tradition” he discusses, Ross writes like this: "Besides, these four authors - Frege, the young Wittgenstein, Russell and Moore - are by no means the only ones, in the years around the turn of the century, to assume a predominantly language critical attitude. One further example for such a stance is found in the writings of Nietzsche, as well.” He goes on to add: “there is an important difference between Nietzsche, on the one hand, and the four authors, on the other hand: the latter are - disregarding certain restrictions to be made with respect to Moore - characterized by their linking of their language critical intentions to a programme of constructing a critically elaborated language. In contrast, efforts like this played no role for Nietzsche.”1324

With respect to Ross’s term of “constructing”, it is surely the case that Nietzsche is absent from the way analytical philosophy of language took shape, whereas it is not even conceivable without the figures of Wittgenstein, Russell and Moore. Yet, his point about Nietzsche, the universally recognized master of writing, as failing to elaborate his language is a bit strange. Moreover, some commentators might well be more eager to couple Nietzsche and Wittgenstein apart from Moore and Russell, on the basis of the fragmented and elusive character of much of their output, or perhaps even Nietzsche and Russell, on the basis of their wide social and political interests, than to advocate Ross’s division. Further, recalling the significance of Nietzsche to the Vienna Circle, it is hard to dismiss him from the emergence of the 20th-century philosophical criticism of language. Now, what kinds of efforts do play a role in Nietzsche’s work? What is his view of concepts like? In what ways does it emerge from his conceptual criticisms and his own conceptual creations? How does it relate to his understanding of the philosophical enterprise? How to assess his significance in bringing about the modern concept of concept? What are Nietzsche’s contributions to rethinking conceptuality? Do these questions already distort his projects, do they fail to make sense?

Despite his omission of Nietzsche1325, Weitz offers a general itinerary for assuming a concept critical approach to his work, too, as well as to any other philosopher’s philosophy. Analyses of the views of concept, in individual thinkers, do appear every now and then. Gordon Leff, for instance, accords a considerable space for conceptual questions in his monograph on Ockham. In a way that could be seen as lending support to Weitz’s basic tenet, he makes the interesting claim that “[o]f itself the issue of the
status of concepts in the mind is secondary to their status, above all as universals, in relation to what exists outside it. But the matter has a direct bearing - one of the very few - upon the chronology of Ockham’s speculative and non-political writings.»\textsuperscript{1326}

Even though Leff’s point here was more or less exceptional within the Ockham scholarship (which is something that is not my purpose to assess), the very act of interrogating Ockham in the context of conceptuality is entirely conventional. One could draw a lot from Leff’s treatment of him that would be significant in investigating Nietzsche, too, but general problems remain. Is Nietzsche just too odd for all this? Whereas it is even rare to speak about Ockham without mentioning universals and, hence, at least indirectly, concepts, is it utterly out of place to speak of concepts together with Nietzsche, or in any case, to try and specify his concept of concept according to the Weitzian approach?

In brief, it is not at all inappropriate to relate Nietzsche to the issue of concepts, yet his strangeness requires modifications to Weitz’s analytical interrogation. It may be that, for Weitz, Nietzsche is too inconsistent, too untheoretical and even too unconceptual, if not just too exceptional from the rest of the tradition, to be approached by the method he is developing and applying with respect to the “major tradition”. Yet, at the minimum, the connection between Nietzsche and the founders of the analytical movement makes it more difficult to ignore his contribution. I think that Weitz’s approach should even be, in principle, more readily applicable to Nietzsche than to many of the thinkers Weitz discusses. Whereas, say, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Locke and Hume did not have a vocabulary of concept that would be much to speak of, that is, either their implicit theory of conceiving is to be read from the ways they handle their key questions or their elaborations of ideas and alike issues are to be arranged with conceptual questions, the situation is different in Nietzsche. As I shall demonstrate, in the next chapter, Begriff, its derivatives and other words close to it occur frequently in his texts and often with explicit concern for their very Begrifflichkeit. This is striking enough to include Nietzsche in the tradition depicted by Weitz.

Another things is that Weitz’s stance is almost untouched by the question of the limits of conceptuality. At any rate, there is little concern for the issues that were seen, in the previous section, to become underscored by Rosen, Adorno and Deleuze/Guattari, in particular. What seems to be a clear weakness in Weitz’s approach is that it tends to assume, in the philosophies to be investigated, a positive stance to concepts that verges on an unproblematic assent. His story is the one from closed concepts to the open ones and not from closed concepts to some sort of incessant becoming questionable of the very concept of concept.

To illustrate the situation here, I shall have a look at an interesting paper by Leon J. Goldstein who has a
tale to tell about Max Kadushin who set out to study rabbinic Judaism. As Goldstein writes, Kadushin soon discovered that, since “rabbinic concepts” are not specifiable as philosophers seem to require, “he could expect no help from the experts on concepts”. This did not discourage him, though. Goldstein argues that Kadushin’s discoveries of organic value-concepts and their divergent concreticizations anticipate “what is increasingly discovered about other kinds of concepts: that concepts can be open and that Frege [with his demand of the “sharply defined” closed concepts”] was mistaken”.

Goldstein explains that “rabbinic concepts are not the sort that could emerge from an analytical process of explication, and that to insist upon such a process and such an outcome can only result in the loss of the concepts of rabbinic Judaism altogether”. Precise delimitation is apt to destroy the meaning of these valuational concepts. What is implied, in Kadushin’s stance, is that there are “connotative indeterminants” to be determined by concreticizations in “the actual situations” and events of daily life. Even if concepts themselves are not sensory, their instantiation “requires the presence of what is experienced sensorially”.

All this is very instructive for any concept critical study. One finds a researcher in need of conceptual expertise to grapple with specific thoughts in the written form. Failing to find suitable guidance, or assistance, from philosophical theories of concepts, for the reason that these appear to require from concepts something that the ones in need of making sense do not possess, the researcher does not quit the conceptual effort, but seeks to modify the standard view of concepts. However, as Goldstein relates it, the story takes place within the Weitzian framework, as Kadushin deviates from Frege by only prefiguring or foreshadowing Wittgenstein.

What about Nietzsche? To refer back to the previous section, it can be added that Richard Müller-Freienfels treats Nietzsche, too, as one of those philosophers who studied all the opposing cultural forces and was, then, interested in both concepts and the inconceivable. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche could be seen as the key figure in offering back up for Müller-Freienfels’s project. The Nietzschean ‘ethics of immorality’ is mentioned, in the preface, as a model for positivizing the negative. In the context of the renovation of concepts, Nietzsche’s Nachlass is identified as a special source of inspiration.

While the case of Müller-Freienfels and his studies on irrationalism may only strengthen, despite my effort of reading carefully its manifold and more or less balanced views and preliminarily reviewing ‘the philosophy of life’ tradition that it relates to, the impression that Nietzsche does not belong to the story of philosophical conceptualization. On the other hand, Ludvig Freund and Oscar Külpe, the other two early German writers with much less to do with lebensphilosophische considerations, recognize Nietzsche in their respective accounts of the basic questions of philosophy. If only in the passing, Külpe
credits Nietzsche for “powerfully showing the activity-based pleasure as distinct from the quietist ideal”\textsuperscript{1330}. Freund even takes his initial encouragement from Nietzsche and praises his doubt concerning the claims to knowledge, yet he deems Nietzsche’s “uncompromising pragmatism” as too rigorous a position\textsuperscript{1331}.

These references are somewhat arbitrary and can, probably, be best explained by the kind of pervasive presence of the Nietzschean terminology in the European philosophical discussion of the period. Yet, the mere fact that Nietzsche appear in books that treat, in different ways, philosophy as an activity with concepts, is enough to make one interested in his role in the making of modern conceptuality of philosophy and concepts. Now, ironically or not, it is, in part, the fact that Wittgenstein is not his hero that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of conceptual history is of help in critically developing the analytical approach. This is not to say that Wittgenstein’s importance could be discarded, but only that there is another dimension to the story of philosophical conceptuality that cannot be exhausted by the Weitzian method.

Gadamer’s writings “Begriffsgeschichte und die Sprache der Philosophie” (1971) and “Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophie” (1970) are significant here. In them, he tries to argue that Begriffsgeschichte is to be understood, not as a supplement or as a useful instrument, but as the heart of philosophy. He contrasts Begriffsgeschichte to Problemgeschichte that sought to make philosophy address “basic problems of human thought that constantly renew themselves”. ‘History of problems’ was mastered by neo-Kantian thinkers from Cassirer and Hartmann to Windelband and Hönigswald. As the counter movement to this, Gadamer refers to Dilthey’s critique of apriorism and to Heidegger’s teachings that finally made possible the critical philosophical thinking about conceptuality. He specifies that Begriffsgeschichte is not about historicism, but about problematizing the historical legacy and interrogating its consequences for thinking.\textsuperscript{1332}

Gadamer appeals to Bacon’s critique of idols as exemplifying the critical attitude towards the prejudice of language. What is important to Gadamer is that, unlike in sciences with the numeral language of exact measurements, philosophy has to be satisfied with language that always says a lot. For begriffsgeschichtlich thinking, this means that philosophical terminology tends to hold on to its own historical unfolding. Where the “historical genesis of sense” is blurred, history of concepts has, as its enlightening task, to uncover repressed linkages. Yet, it only seeks to show the limits of such a task and cherishes no total enlightenment, no total ascendance from “self-oblivion of language to its full self-consciousness”. Moreover, Gadamer stresses the undogmatic stance and liberation from “conventional schematisms of experience that language serves and makes binding”\textsuperscript{1333}. 311
Since philosophical thoughts can only be expressed in necessarily fluctuating language, ambiguity cannot be dispensed with. Gadamer gives a series of intriguing examples from Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Plotin to make a case for open questions and for facing the need for, and the lack of, appropriate language. He speaks of the emergency of language (Sprachnot) characterizing, as well, the emergence of philosophical thinking. According to Gadamer, things get even trickier with the Greek thoughts being reproduced in the “so different” Latin. Yet, Augustine took care of the transformation and Nicholas of Cusa of the later renewal. Further, Hegel did what Aristotle had done. He took the vital word usage of his mother tongue as the point of departure for forming and determining concepts. As the last example, Gadamer refers to Heidegger’s Sprachnot, Sprachgewalt, Sprachgewaltsamkeit that, in his opinion, should not be dismissed as hopelessly contradictory or nonsensical, but seen as testifying to the philosophical quandary and the philosophical promise about language that is the unique accomplisher of thought.  

In a way similar to Weitz’s talk of the philosophers philosophizing “with” and/or “about” concepts, Gadamer makes the distinction between thematical and operative concepts that is based on the perception that some concepts are merely used. “Thematization always shadows what is not being thematized”. He mentions the example of Husserl’s crucial, yet unspecified concept of ’constitution’ and refers to Kant’s pairing of ’transcendental’ and ’transcendent’ that “was not followed and held tight by Kant himself nor by lively use of language - the neo-Kantian schoolmasters excluded”. 

Gadamer concludes that to rehearse ’conceptual history’ is “to walk back and forth the way from the word to the concept and to keep it walkable”. To illustrate the need to link concepts to their “concept historical provenance” Gadamer takes up the musical notion of an overtone and its belonging to a tone. He writes that “the conceptual language [Begriffsprache] of philosophy becomes competent for its utterances by the resonation of the overtones that relate concept’s delimited and specified field of meaning back to the underlying natural potency of all concept-formation in the life of language.”

As it can be expected, Gadamer emphasizes the connection to hermeneutics. That is why it is not so much individual concepts, but “the whole” of “conceptuality [Begrifflichkeit]” that is of special interest for Begriffsgeschichte. What it all boils down to is our “verbal world-orientation” put to action “as a communicative process”. He says that the “ideal of philosophical language” is not to be sought from unequivocal terminology and naming that depart as effectively as possible from “the life of language”. Rather, it requires one “to tie the conceptual thinking back to language and the whole of truth present there”. For Gadamer, this means that to confront philosophy one has to turn attention to the “actual speech and conversation”. 

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Gadamer and Weitz both contribute to the concept critical approach. Despite his aversion of Wittgenstein, Gadamer can even be taken to combine the later Wittgenstein’s insistence on the importance of ordinary discourse for conceptualizations and Heidegger’s underlining of the philosophical conceptuality as a matter of investigating fundamental provenances. As is typical of him, Gadamer stresses the merits of Heideggerian thought, for ’conceptual history’, too. Perhaps more strongly, on the very idea of Begriffsgeschichte, he relies on Eucken. Gadamer makes a passing reference to Eucken’s book, yet his debt is much greater than what he cares to acknowledge. In brief, he joins Eucken in the following points: he contextualizes concept historical studies with a recourse to dictionaries; he warns of historicism; he reviews the grand tradition through the same shifts and same thinkers and treats similarly their relationship to language, including, for instance, objections against scholasticism and Kant’s distinction of ’transcendent’ / ’transcendental’, as well as appraisals of Bacon, Herder and Hegel. What is most important, Eucken already formulated the Gadamerian insistence on the non-trivial nature of the begriffsgeschichtliche investigations by saying that he is after a genuinely philosophical work and no “ensemble of notes and curiosities”\(^{1339}\).

My reason for coming back to Eucken may be partly affected by the fact that his path crossed Nietzsche’s path in the late 19th century Switzerland. More significant is, however, that his book mediates something valuable of the intellectual climate in which any late 19th century thinker had to think his/her thoughts. And most decisively, Eucken contributes to the concept critical interrogation. It is his explicit conviction that such an examination can give fresh insights of the anatomy of a thinker’s bibliography, location and originality, as well as of the larger setting of competing currents and cultures.\(^{1340}\)

What is troubling here is this. Eucken’s implicit and Gadamer’s explicit withdrawal from accounting for the concept of concept and from reconceptualizing it\(^{1341}\) causes one to doubt the critical potential of Begriffsgeschichte. Should one consult Reinhard Koselleck, the leading theorist in concept historical research and the one who has most forcefully tried to make Begriffsgeschichte stand out from Wortgeschichte and Sach- und Ereignisgeschichte, a sufficiently similar limitation is met. Koselleck takes his bearings from Kurt Baldinger’s distinction between “semasiology” and “onomasiology” and goes on to outline the business of concept history as follows. Focusing on meaning, semasiological study explicates the relationships that a given word has with different concepts. Focusing on description, onomasiological study delineates the relationships that a given concept has with different words. These two examinations are extended by, first, a synchronical perspective that makes sense of the concept’s situatedness at a given time, and, secondly, a diachronical perspective that investigates the concept’s transformations in a number of successive situations.\(^{1342}\)
Avoiding at least some of Eucken’s and Gadamer’s respective idealistic tendencies, there is still the characteristic lacking of interest in the critical interrogation concerning the fate of the concept of concept itself. Similar defect comes through H. G. Meier’s way of specifying Begriffsgeschichte as a project of making sense of the Bedeutungshistorie of concepts “in the most encompassive possible way”. This involves “working on the historical efficacy” of a given concept in order to make it “systematicizeable in an unequivocally clarified context of meaning”.

This is the way in which Weitz’s analytical perspective could help to adjust the approach of ’conceptual history’. While being itself corrected for its little concern for the life of language or for the other forces affecting conceptualization, except for the mere succession of philosophical theories, the analytical approach can, in return, make urgent the need to specify the changing concepts of concept itself. It can be added that Gadamer, despite his genealogical stress on the Genesis of Sinn, fails to even mention Nietzsche who has otherwise been his important reference point. One may ask, whether both Weitz and Gadamer take it for granted that Nietzsche is not a conceptual theorist or, at any rate, the most reliable authority to be used in legitimizing new conceptual approaches.

By contrast, in his extensive 1971 encyclopedia article on Begriffsgeschichte, H. G. Maier refers to Nietzsche (or to his Jenseits and Genealogie) to account for the relations between conceptual history and philosophy. Maier says that “[i]ndependently of the general development of concept historical theory” Nietzsche came to hint at the promise of linguistic studies and etymology for an Entwicklungsgeschichte von Begriffen. Maier, who also relies heavily and explicitly on Eucken’s crucial contributions, goes on to add, also affirms that Nietzsche did expressly pay attention to the shared, non-arbitrary history of philosophical concepts.

Maier does not argue for his stress on the isolated character of Nietzsche’s undertaking but seems to take it for granted, in the manner reminiscent of Ross. This is a bit strange now, since Maier has a good deal to say about the way Nietzsche’s Basel colleague, Gustav Teichmüller theorized on Begriffsgeschichte (see IV.a.2 below). One might ask just how “independent” Nietzsche’s views on conceptual history were, if his ‘perspectivism’, in particular, can be said to have one of its roots in precisely Teichmüller’s teachings. In any case, what Maier specifically underscores as Nietzsche’s achievement should qualify any the freedom of the individual contributions to the shared or collective nature of philosophical conceptuality as apart from idiosyncracy or personal fancy.

At this point, one could try and sum up the analytical and hermeneutical ingredients of the concept critical approach. This approach suggests that it is of vital importance to investigate a philosopher’s peculiar conception of ’concept’ as it emerges from the philosopher’s writings. Without a sense of a
philosopher’s concept of concept, there is much less promise in making sense of the philosopher’s criticisms of received conceptuality and of his or her own creative formations. In short, the nature of the conceptual in a philosopher is a matter of priority before the reflections or solutions the philosopher may have to offer for issues in, say, epistemology and aesthetical or social theory.

On the other hand, words and meanings evolve and concepts are situated in specific times and places. A philosopher’s work on some concepts is a potential object of inquiry for not only determining the philosopher’s concept of concept but as well for assessing the stage of the career of those concepts he or she is working on. Each concept has a history and any philosopher addressing a concept confronts the concept at some point of its history. Another thing is, of course, that a philosopher’s conception of concepts tend to change in the course of the philosopher’s career.

Both the analytical dimension of conceptualizing and the historical dimension of conceptualization contribute to the understanding that there are different sorts of concepts of concepts with their peculiar implications and varying careers. In any confrontation between a philosopher and a concept, there are roles to play for the philosopher’s proper conception of concepts, the history of the concept and the history of the concept of concept.

To shed some more light in the issue here, I would like to have a recourse to three cases that, I think, will be of help in grasping the objectives of the concept critical approach, while at the same time they bring in new aspects of conceptuality to the benefit of this approach. In a quick look at the cases of Marxism, pragmatism and phenomenology, I am surely not trying to get at the position to judge the basic tenets of these variegated philosophical currents that all came to prominence in about the time Nietzsche’s work culminated and ended. I wish only to indicate how the analytical and historical dimensions of the concept critical approach can acquire additional significance by attending to the currents that Weitz and Gadamer bypassed.

To consider phenomenology first, one can at once say that where Husserl was not included in Weitz’s book of the “major tradition”, he is surely more strongly present in Gadamer than what it may seem on the face of his passing criticism of the insufficiently conceptualized ‘constitution’. My interest is, however, not in Gadamer’s exact relation to the founder of phenomenology but in the question of concepts within this broad philosophical school. Anyone reading a book by the name of Logische Untersuchungen is entitled to expect from it a specific care as to the defining of concept and the related terms. These expectations double, as the second chapter of the first part of Husserl’s work opens with the stress on the “securing and clarifying of concepts and laws that give all knowledge objective meaning and theoretical unity”. Moreover, there is an emphasis on the “great task of making the logical ideas, the
concepts and laws, *epistemologically clear and evident*. Disappointment is gripping, as one finds that there is, in the book, not much more to come on the subject. For instance, Husserl elaborates different views of ‘abstraction’ and ‘concept formation’, calls abstract concepts “the meanings of certain names”, likens conceptual representations with “attributive” ones, but makes all this mostly in the passing and does not dedicate any special analysis to the concept of concept.1345

Some later phenomenologists sought to correct this. An early description accounts for these efforts as follows. Whatever is taken as the object of phenomenological study it is required that “the reflection must arise from the concepts, with the mediation of which we think of the object, its properties and relations”. In philosophy, this is made urgent by “the almost Babylonian confusion of language”, and, of course, by the fact that concepts are understood as “meanings of words” or as the *Gedankliche* “that relates the words to their objects”. Words as such are “but acoustic or optic objects of perception”. That they should “‘mean’ ['bedeuten'] something” or “be “meaningful” ['sinvolle'] signs”, is up to the thought to link them. Yet, concepts remain “general and abstract”, while objects stay “individual and concrete”. What calls for the clarification of concepts, in the final analysis, is the fact that words are used, “in practical life as in science, “instinctively” or without any clear consciousness of concepts and their distinguishing marks”. Phenomenological progress would signify a verbalization that would be less bound in emotions and more committed to defining words with words and disqualifying wholly undefinable ones, such as ‘value’. By the means of “concrete examples”, one can, even in this last case, make objects “representable” and point to the importance of “general essence”. This is, however, not to say, that the phenomenological *Wesensschau* always hits the target.1346

Now, I think that it fair to suggest that Heidegger’s contribution to the later developments of phenomenology is more specifically conceptual, or concept critical, than what Gadamer’s general appreciation of the Heideggerian philosophy of being and language makes it seem. Writing on Heidegger’s concept of concept, Daniel O. Dahlström underlines that “[t]he methodological function ascribed by Heidegger to philosophical concepts as formal indications are [...] governed by his specific understanding of the aim and content of philosophy”. As Dahlström also states, the difficulty “about philosophical concepts - and the reason Heidegger stresses that they be regarded as formal indications - can be traced to philosophizing itself. Philosophizing is a way of being-in-the-world that at the same time aims at determining this way of being.”1347

It is a rewarding emphasis, on Dahlström’s part, to stress the interrelated significance of a philosopher’s concept of philosophy and the philosopher’s concept of concept. There is, however, more to the issue. I suggest that Heidegger’s writing, “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung” (1920), that appeared, in the *Gesamtausgabe*, only in 1993, is crucial
here. To look at this text is to see that Heidegger was occupied with the specific task of developing a something like concept critical approach.

Heidegger writes about the “certain stage of thematico-conceptual distinction and the systematic perfection” that a given philosophy is to have for an observer to discern “the structure of its concepts and the methods of concept-formation”. He takes it as his double goal to study how the phenomenological concepts and structures stem from “the fundamental stance of phenomenology” and to “conceptualize [zu Begriff’ zu bringen]” this stance. Moreover, Heidegger writes that phenomenology differs markedly from Reflexionsphilosophie, since it does not hold the concept-formation to be “the correlate of an externally imposed reflection on a ready-made philosophy”. The emphasis is, instead on “bringing about of the philosophy itself”, on its actual “accomplishing” (vollzugsgemässige). On the one hand, phenomenology is, for Heidegger, the business of destroying “ambiguities, contradictions, unclarities, confusions, lack of purity and sharpness in conceptual work”. On the other hand, it means the engagement with constructing philosophy radically anew.

Another distinction made by Heidegger is the one between philosophical and scientific/theoretical concept-formation. The former is, in its “meaning, character and function”, determined “in terms of origins”, the latter “classificatorily”. In a supplementary note to this text, Heidegger goes on to say, in a way reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language game’, that the concept of phenomenological philosophy “cannot be defined in a classificatory way, or in a way that different Sachgebiete are divided.

There are many comments to be made about these considerations. One could say that they only mirror Heidegger’s early views, even the ones significantly preceding Sein und Zeit (1927). One could say that Heidegger’s purpose is, in the main, to work against rival forms of phenomenology and that his observations should be accordingly contextualized. One could say that Heidegger’s view of classification as the distinctive feature of science was outdated even in 1920. And so on.

I must repeat that I do not think that these brief remark make up to anything like a reinterpretation of phenomenology. My point is to suggest that there is a specifically concept critical element in the way Husserl’s legacy was developed by Heidegger. In other words, Heidgger can be said to have taken the insufficiently conceptualized issue of concepts among the primary objects of reconceiving. In this way, at least, the concept critical approach not only profits from Heidegger’s views but can also make sense of their nature and development.

In the context at hand, it is worth noting that Ludvig Freund, whose work was discussed in the previous
section, says that the “definition is nothing but the unfolding of the concept. And the unfolding of the concept is nothing but making clear of its content.” What is special about this formulation is that the ultra-philosophical activity, the one of elucidating concepts and definitions and the practices of conceiving and defining, is described in a way that lends itself to both strictly analytical and strictly historical appropriations. *Ent-faltung* points toward analytical *ex-planation* as well as historical unfolding.

Freund was also seen to situate himself close to some forms of pragmatism, although he criticized what he took to be Nietzsche’s extreme variety of it. Next, I would like to indicate how the case of pragmatism, that both Weitz and Gadamer ignore, could both contribute to, and be reinterpreted by, the concept critical approach.

To get right to the point, doubts as to the merits of concepts remain, in my view, the factor that sets James, if not apart then, at a distance, from Peirce. The latter’s famous version of the pragmatic rule reads: “Consider what effects, which conceivably might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” Significantly, Peirce stresses the vocabulary of conceiving by adding a note on the Latin verb *concipire*. It has been underlined, correctly as far as I can tell, that Peirce attaches action and concepts to one another so that “concepts are no longer thought to be reflections of an external reality” but “instruments for the active exploration of a world which is to be known only through living”.

With an eye on the still almost automatic association between pragmatism and a vulgar stress on activity, it is important to note that Peirce was interested in the traditional and modern theories of concepts and he would express his opposition to common sense philosophy and nominalism with the unsustainable belief in “absolute individuals”. His own invention was to define ‘concept’ as “the living influence upon us of a *diagram*, or *icon*, with whose several parts are connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas”. Despite the nearly psychologizing flavor of this formulation, Peirce is resolutely leaving the crude psychological plane of concepts as “mere jumble[s] of particulars” for the one that is guided by a semiotic sensibility. Accordingly, Peirce held that “[a] concept determinate in all respects is as fictitious as a concept definite in all respects”.

From these considerations, it is easier to understand how Peirce himself denied that ever he identified “intellectual purport of symbols” with “our conduct”. He explained that the purport is, rather, “our *concept* of what our conduct *would* be upon *conceivable* occasions”.

What emerges from these reflections is that the Peircean pragmat(ci)sm involves a reconceptualization
of concepts. One might say that the great American philosopher took seriously the implication of Kant’s thought about the inevitability of concepts, and went on to do better justice and less violence to the richness of experience, the centrality of action and the fact that “[t]he mind delights in triads”\textsuperscript{1358}. It would be, I think, one of the most demanding tasks for contemporary research to establish the connections between different strands of American pragmatism and the post-Kantian currents in Europe. Among the astonishing results of such a study, I suspect that there would be an improved sense of the way it is almost particularly those currents that are usually seen as less interested in concepts that turn out to be the most fruitful in reconceiving conceptuality.

But in order to stick to the point here, one can consult John J. McDermott who sees the American (pragmatist) tradition of thought as one willing and able to “accept the pressure of experience without necessarily submitting such a transaction to the judgment of a conceptual framework”. Speaking about the insufficiency of “an epistemological critique”, McDermott points the way to the fact that American experience has always involved “an evershifting scene, characterized by widespread geographical, political and spiritual upheavals”. This is the reason for him to hold that, despite all the precious fruits of learning, American thought, in its “aversion to any separate mode of discourse”, constantly “forces theoretical statements to respond more to the language of events than to its own mode of discourse”\textsuperscript{1359}

One can only guess, if the reference to “the language of events” is closer in spirit to the (Tainean) notion of the reducibility of concepts to the primary sensual processes than to the (Deleuzian) notion of reconceptualizing the processes of happening and conceiving. In any case, McDermott’s use of the idea of American exceptionality to make room for a way of thinking liberated from concepts is probably reconcilable with some of James’s convictions but not with Peirce’s thought. As I just tried to show, Peirce may have contributed to criticizing ’conceptual frameworks’ for the benefit of ’the pressure of experience’ in ’an evershifting scene’, yet his emphasis stayed on concepts, conceptualities and conceivabilities.

One does well to hear John Dewey who was, after all, the one of the three great classic pragmatists to have most forcefully taken into consideration the kinds of ’upheavals’ that McDermott mentioned. Dewey certainly underscored “action” but said that it lies “at the heart of ideas”. He articulated the issue of conceptual dynamics as follows: “Conception and systems of conceptions, ends in view and plans, are constantly making and remaking as fast as those already in use reveal their weaknesses, defects and positive values. There is no predestined course they must follow.”\textsuperscript{1360} Thus, probably the most “American” of all major American philosophers did not use his experience and his environment to discard the significance of conceptual constructions, structures or frameworks, but was eager to make sense of their changes.
To conclude, the case of pragmatism further testifies to the way the concept critical approach may contribute to understanding individual philosophers’ efforts and crucial philosophical developments. An attentive study of the philosophical conceptualizations carried out by Peirce, James and Dewey could illustrate one of the most important sequences of modern attitudes to conceptuality. To put another point with a little more exaggeration, ‘conceptuality’ might unite the three thinkers even more intimately than ‘action’ or ‘practice’ ever can. On the other hand, if there is room for concept critical considerations in discussing pragmatism, there is one reason less to doubt their pertinence in Nietzsche.

The third case I promised to have a look at is that of Marxism. In fact, I shall raise the specific question, whether the concept critical viewpoint functions at all with Karl Marx, a thinker expressly opposed to concepts and with interests more pragmatic than just pragmatistic. It is to be expected that this question is not wholly detached from the more familiar questions of Marx’s dependence on Hegel’s logic, his studies on the ancient materialism, his engagement in the critique of political economy and so on. I would not be surprised, however, the concept critical concern was to transform these questions in a radical way.

As a matter of fact, Derek Sayer’s book *The Violence of Abstraction* (1987) is indicative of the potentiality of this type of reading. Sayer concentrates on the linkage that Marx sees between “abstractions”, “ideas”, “idealizations”, “categories” and the perversely alienating practices of capitalism. Even if this is somewhat too simplifying, at least in my concise rephrasing of the original text where the issue of concepts is but a part of a larger research, Sayer makes a persuasive case for further refinement and testing of a concept critical approach.\(^{1361}\)

Sayer is followed by Daniel Little who ascribes to Marx a separation between concepts that “serve only to identify the phenomenal features of the social system” and others that “identify its essential elements” or “atoms”. This was the basis of his critique of the “vulgar political economy” and its “concepts of simple observation”. As Little sees it, Marx’s criticism sets out not from “a preconceived set of analytical concepts” but from choosing “concepts that permit him to analyze” what he sees as the crucial economic and social questions. These concepts, in turn, “must be constructed in close connection with the empirical circumstances they are to describe”. Little goes on to clarify the point by saying that Marx sets out from “a historically and empirically concrete concept, and then constructs more abstract concepts in terms of which to look at and explain” the dilemmas.\(^{1362}\)

The crucial text, important for both Sayer and Little, is Marx’s *Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners “Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie”* (1879-80). In that piece of writing, Marx ridicules the habitual manner of “deriving the economic category of “value” from a “concept”“. The related tendency is, according to the text, to speak of the generic “man”, while meaning “*professorial men* who think that
they have conceived the world after having arranged it under abstract rubrics”. For Marx, this is “concept economy” or “hither and thither reasoning over the concepts or words “use value” and “value””. By contrast, he calls for “an analysis of the given economic formations [Gestaltungen]” or patterns. The concept of value is juxtaposed with the “social thing”, “the concrete social pattern [Gestalt]”, “the simplest social form, in which the product of work in the contemporary society presents itself”, that is, the “commodity”.1363

Little is, I think, quite right in pointing out that, his claims notwithstanding, Marx cannot help but start from concepts, namely, from “the concept of the commodity form”1364. Hence, it makes sense to try and articulate the difference between the traditional and the Marxian kinds of concepts. The obvious choice would be to reinterpret Marx’s distancing himself from the aprioristic type of concept formation as resulting in concepts reconceived through the concreteness of economical and social patterns.

Yet, this does not have to be carried out, as it were, against Marx’s text. The key can be found in Little’s reference to the essential elements or “atoms” of the social system. Consider Marx’s early remarks on concept as “the intermediate between form and content” and his observation about Epikur that “[t]he general form of the concept is, for him, the atom” being something concrete and, at the same time, a species for "higher specifications and concretizations of the concepts of his philosophy"1365.

One can see how Marx is not only discussing the early atomistic concept of ’atom’ but the atomistic concept of concept itself. Now, compare this to Marx’s economical manuscripts from roughly a quarter of a century later. By the 1860’s, namely, Marx was at pains to discuss “the conceptless form of capital” illustrated by money. This, in turn, while marking the hegemony of exchange value over user value, destroys the “conceptually differentiated concrete shapes [Gestalt] that capital assumed in the production process” and, hence, breaks down the meaningful differences between the sorts of goods.1366

It could be said that Marx’s early view of Greek atomists, as being engaged in both clarifying essentialities and launching conceptualities, is still philosophically operative in his approach to political economy. Although he refuses to admit that the ’commodity’ is a concept appearing in the economic debate, he uses it in a manner reminiscent of the way he himself had described as the early Greek way of conceptualization. At the very least, one may use the later Marx in trying to explain how concepts stem from the socio-economic forces always in the process of taking shape and creating form. A further step from Marx would be to speak of the reciprocal interplay of conceptualizations and concretizations.

Thus, Marx’s case is vital in coming to terms with the other of conceptuality and not only, more obviously, in virtue of its emphasis on the power-based and cooperation-related conceiving. The concept
critical approach seems to be fruitful in reading his texts, too, and these texts, in turn, redefine this approach by widening its scope of interest and demanding more intense self-reflection.

To close my attempt at illustrating the chosen approach for the present study, I want to draw attention to an interesting and, nowadays, neglected philosopher of concepts: R. G. Collingwood and his view that studying conceptual systems involves studying their history. Stephen Toulmin has tried to save Collingwood from both oblivion and the common accusations of relativism. He seeks to relate this modern classic to the pioneering work by Whewell and to the contemporary debate initiated by Kuhn. Collingwood would analyze the inner structure of conceptual systems where the more specific elements “rely for their meaning and relevance” upon the more general ones. General concepts must maintain their applicability in order for the narrower ones to preserve their validity. The analytical problem here is to establish the ultimate ending of relativity in a concept on the top of the system and to avoid the self-sufficiency of absolute presuppositions. Collingwood could not, in Toulmin’s opinion, decide whether to stress “rational reasons” or “compelling forces” as the ground for the switch of the “most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action”. Yet, he grants that Collingwood managed to raise the question as to the nature of the succession of “constellations”. Collingwood shifted the discussion from its traditional logical and psychological contexts to the field of the history of ideas and sketched a more “realistic” philosophy of socio-cultural dynamics. Quite explicitly, he held that “how we think” cannot be separated from “in what terms we think”, which is tantamount to justifying the practice of “conceptual history”.1367

What escapes Toulmin is the way Collingwood, much like Heidegger, distinguished scientific concepts that operate with mutually exclusive sub-classes in assorting the objects of research from philosophical ones where classes may overlap. As Louis Mink has said, what Collingwood called a ’scale of forms’ could be understood as a taxonomic system or a philosophico-conceptual system where differences of degree and of kind, as well as relations of opposition and distinction fuse with another. ’Constellations of absolute presuppositions’ were stages in the scale of forms.1368

In his own way, Collingwood outlined a pragmatic conception of concepts as changing ’habits’ and ’standards’ with great historical, social, cultural significance for collectives and individuals. As it happens, his general philosophical programme along these lines has recently been compared to Nietzsche’s thinking on similar issues.

In Michael Hinz’s book, Self-Creation and History. Collingwood and Nietzsche on Conceptual Change (1994), the work of these two thinkers is counted among “the most conscientious direct responses to the problem [of conceptual change]”. As Hinz sees it, Nietzsche and Collingwood resemble each other, yet
also differ as to their respective accounts of “the generation and corruption of systems of belief and systems of value associated with human practices and ways of life”. It was, he goes on to explain, Nietzsche’s view that, in particular, “the order rank of evaluations” that offers the clue to analyzing a given community’s systematic thought and activities, while he also emphasized the “artistic discharges of strength” underlying all change. Competition between ways of valuing and the resulting “fluctuations” in the rank order have their “instinctive” dimension as well as their political, moral and scientific manifestations. According to Hinz, Nietzsche and Collingwood meet in their insistence on the heightened cultural self-knowledge, or a new “way of conceiving itself”, as the most important outcome of rendering “crucial conceptions intelligible”. 1369

Later on in the present study, I shall come back to Hinz’s pathbreaking efforts. At this point, it suffices to say that they offer an interesting way to relate Nietzsche, via Collingwood, to the problematic of conceptuality and, more specifically, of conceptual dynamics. Yet, the onesided emphasis on the Collingwood connection may also be the weak point in Hinz’s view of Nietzsche.

What is most important, Collingwood’s teachings can be used in developing the concept critical approach. By combining the need to address the intra-systemic relations of a conceptual framework and the need to investigate the context and consequences of a change in such systems, he brings the analytical perspective and the historical perspective closer to one another. Moreover, his work could be seen as reconciling the ways to interpret, on the one hand, theoretical changes in science, and, on the other hand, the ways to interpret the more practical cultural changes in everyday life. Although one can scarcely be content with Collingwood’s level of explicitness about the very concept of concept he advocated, his contribution to the concept critical approach is remarkable: one might go about asking just how much there is, in a given philosopher’s work, that is of help in accounting for the changing concepts as “habits and standards of thought and action”. At the same, Marx and other thinkers critical or hostile to concepts and attentive to the forces that can not comfortably called “conceptual” are needed to correct the views put forth by Collingwood, Gadamer and Weitz.

The concept critical approach I am experimenting with is not to be equated with a research objective of determining, whether Nietzsche is in favor of conceptualism or nominalism, whether he advocates entity or dispositional concepts, or neither of them, or whether he is to be classed as the supporter of open or closed concepts. To be sure, these are too important questions to be completely ignored. It is only that there are concerns of a greater weight than those bearing on the way an individual thinker can be drawn to a philosophical debate as it is seen through the perspective of modern preferences.

My concept critical approach to Nietzsche’s work is designed to function, first and foremost, as a way to
make sense of the peculiar overall concept critical project embodied in that very work. What I said, in the
previous section, about the specifically philosophical in conceptualization is relevant here, too. In my
exploration, attention is, as is only to be expected, paid to the conventional concepts appearing in
Nietzsche’s texts; more important, to the particular textual settings where his use of the traditional
philosophical vocabulary takes place; and most decisively, to the way that the conceptualization itself is
being problematized in those texts. In other words, I shall interrogate Nietzsche not only as a potential
user of concepts, nor just as a potential concept theorist, but as a potential researcher of the possibilities
of concept theorization and concept use.

In this respect, while repeating the point that the present exploration is not developed in order to
suppress the different dimensions of conceptlessness but to take them into consideration as a part of the
problem of concepts, it is instructive to see how Adorno, Rosen and Deleuze express their indebtedness
to Nietzsche.

In discussing the issue of conceptuality and nonconceptuality, in his Negative Dialektik, Adorno does not
quote Nietzsche, although he refers to him in some other key passages of the book. The silence over the
Nietzschean concept criticism is something rather curious in a writer almost constantly having a dialogue
with the controversial classic. It is especially curious, since, only a year before, Adorno had opened his
essay, “Gesellschaft”, by a recourse to “Nietzsche’s insight” about concepts as having to do more with “a
whole semiotic process” than with “verbal definitions”. I think it is quite evident that Nietzsche was
not only among Adorno’s most important forerunners, he was, in particular, among Adorno’s most
important precursors in conceptual critique.

As for Rosen, the situation is different. Perhaps even more so than Adorno’s works, Rosen’s publications
abound in references to Nietzsche. Yet, he is very critical of Nietzsche. Typically, and in a spirit, though
not in a style, reminiscent of Heidegger, he is keen to show how Nietzsche’s ingenious insights tend to
turn back against themselves. The relationship finds its most telling and most problematic
crystallization, as Rosen, first, reappraises Platonic thinking, the one almost constantly standing for
Nietzsche’s favorite object of ridicule, as superior to the modern thought as exemplified by, notably,
Nietzsche, and as he, secondly, says that he is, however, after a Platonism where “there is room for the
best features of Nietzsche”, too.

When it comes to Deleuze, one can appreciate the way he writes, in Logique du sens, that “Nietzsche
disposes of the method he invents: one ought not to be satisfied with biography nor with bibliography,
one ought to reach a secret point where anecdote of life and aphorism of thought are one. It is like the
sense [sens] that, upon one facet, attributes itself to the stages of life and, upon another, insists in the
propositions of the thought. This could be compared to the opening sentence of Deleuze’s monograph, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962): ”Nietzsche’s most general project consists of this: to introduce to philosophy the concepts of sense and value.” One learns that even that which was to be thematized as the “ultimate dimension”, as that which comprises and surpasses the dimension of the concept, i.e. “sense”, was called a “concept” by Deleuze, and one introduced to philosophy by Nietzsche.

My suggestion is that Nietzsche is worth considering as an eminent background figure for a variety of concept critical studies. This is where I wish to recall the questions taken up, in chapter II, about his multivalent legacy, and to make those reflections bear on a more precise problematic.

If Wittgenstein’s language critical investigations were anticipated by Nietzsche, as Ross implies, there should be good reasons to be interested in Nietzsche’s investigations, in their built-in conceptual leads. Further, if Wittgenstein is the conclusive case fueling Weitz’s study on concepts, it means that Nietzsche is that, too, although Weitz does not know or say it. *A fortiori*, granted that Nietzsche was a major inspiration and an object of critical interest for the Vienna Circle and that he has resurged in the related debates by the way of, notably, Richard Rorty’s and Hilary Putnam’s contributions, he ought to be taken as someone exerting a considerable influence in the development of both analytical and pragmatic thinking on conceptuality.

Moreover, being an unavoidable reference point for Gadamer and, especially, for Heidegger, Nietzsche should be regarded as a classic in the phenomenologico-hermeneutical critique of concepts, as well. In the same vein, different sorts of semiological, grammatological, discourse analytical, rhetorical and deconstructive readings of concepts can claim his heritage. And when it comes to the many contacts established between the Marxian and the Nietzschean criticisms of the Western tradition, some of them may, surely, speak in favor of the specifically conceptual impulses shared by Nietzsche and Marxist thinkers.

In addition, there is Nietzsche’s role as the overriding character in modeling artistic and literary avantgarde (including that of the Beats), as well as spiritual struggle and reinvigoration, not to forget about the impulses he gave to the emerging generations of psychologists. In all of these fields, too, where there is talk of concepts, one had to be justified in asking, if there are Nietzschean repercussions audible in the discourse.

These are but vague and general remarks. No doubt, none of the aforementioned thinkers or schools unequivocally state that Nietzsche is obligatory reading in conceptual matters. In point of fact, what many of them are likely to dismiss, from his efforts, are precisely the conceptual ones. As far as I can see,
this is due to the way his work has been, to a great extent, seen as exemplifying poetical virtuosity, linguistic wit, moralist preoccupation, cultural degeneration and regeneration, social provocation, political recklessness and some such things, none of which are, traditionally, taken to be at close reach with concerns adequately labeled as “conceptual”. And indeed, very probably the greatest hindrance of Nietzsche’s concept critical repute has been that his concept critical elaborations have been overshadowed by the other aspects related to his work. Hence, I would say that his influence, in bringing about concept critical renovations, has gone largely unnoticed by even those who have profited a lot from him, while there are, undoubtedly, others who have deliberately taken what they have needed and kept quiet.

As should be evident from the material I have been using, in the course of this section, concept critical approach is designed to take its bearings from many sources, the authorized guardians of which are often more or less avowedly opposing each other. If the various considerations or theoretical traditions that I seek to draw from, contradict themselves, it should not, however, mean that only some of them have privileged access to Nietzsche’s thinking.

Contemporary positions, typically, lack concept historical self-awareness and concept critical motivation to change. The concept critical approach will be appropriating insights and techniques, in reading Nietzsche, that have been declared as private property by a tradition or another only after Nietzsche. In so doing, it aims to interrogate, if only indirectly, the development and relationship of these traditions. This is, I believe, the only way to remain concept critical toward the concept critical approach itself.

Moreover, the concept critical approach seeks to ally itself with a close reading of texts. One does well to note how Eucken aims “to present the multifaceted relations of word and concept and to track the varying fate [Geschicke] of the term, combining word and concept, from emergence to decline”. It is about asking “the When and Where of the origin” of a term. Eucken pronounces the idea of the descent, adaptation and existential struggle of concepts, yet he does not fail to supply a footnote on the only relative pertinence of these Darwinian notions to the issues of conceptuality. He gives his support to the view that the accumulating critical reason is constantly at work behind the seemingly independent terminological forces.¹³⁷⁵

Nonetheless, Eucken keeps writing about the Kampf der Begriffe, about “catastrophes”, “crises” and “small destructive powers” implementing “decline”, “dissolution” and “liberation” as necessary prerequisites for Neugestaltung. In other words, “confusion” ought not to be a mark of “simply a sinking force of the spirit”. Instead, it could be a sign of “an inner discrepancy of life, a breakthrough of multifaceted, not yet reconciliated forces, the beginning of great strivings expecting their fulfilment from
Translating these remarks into a more modern, less idealistic and at least a little more realistic, idiom, one may well take them as, not only manifesting the policies of a philosophy of life, pointing toward the discussions that have been characteristic to the contemporary philosophy of science and its concern for conceptual change\textsuperscript{1377}. One of the participants, in this debate, to have a rare but crucial recourse to Nietzsche was Paul Feyerabend.

In a text from 1965, Feyerabend takes it as his starting point that “only two or three per cent of the inbuilt circuits of the brain have been utilized”. He calls for a “new mode of education” that would “integrate theories into behaviour”, since this is the “way to see the world in terms of such theories”. An example could be the need for “a more detailed study of the central nervous system” that is, in Feyerabend’s view, “somewhat precarious and always threatened by a ‘revolution from below’”. By analogy, he writes that the Greeks most likely had a “perceptual world” very different from the one of modern westerners, which, at least in part, explains that the culture fostered “thinkers with a range of imagination quite inconceivable today”. He goes on to propose that, among other things, the Greek conception of the relationship between dream and wakefulness, a separation so vital for the modern world, was, to an extent, left open. It is this point that Feyerabend chooses to illustrate by referring to Nietzsche’s insight that being awake is ascertained by a web of concepts\textsuperscript{1378}.

It is not so important, whether this text displays a good reading of Nietzsche or whether it is or is not a central part of Feyerabend’s confrontation with scientific theory. What is decisive here is the very act of referring. It is, by that act, that Nietzsche’s works open themselves to yet another conceptual dimension, namely, to the one of conceptual revolutions at the level of the nerves as well as at the level of the full scale theories of the world. As I will try to show, in due course, this is one of the key dimensions.
Five ways to establish a connection between Nietzsche and the problematic of conceptuality were mentioned in the previous chapter. Arno Ross took Nietzsche’s work to anticipate the enterprise of those 20th-century philosophers who came to ponder on the concept of concept via a critique of language. H. G. Maier spoke of Nietzsche as contributing to the promotion of a specifically concept historical study. Paul Feyerabend implied that conceptual frameworks with their transformations and impact on experience, which is of vital importance in the modern philosophy of science, were already recognized by Nietzsche. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari proposed that it goes largely to Nietzsche’s credit that philosophy is to be understood as the practice of creating concepts. Stanley Rosen related Nietzsche to the modern dilemma beginning from Kant: where the world is totally conceptualized, there is no chance to make sense of (the conceiver’s act of) conception.

In what follows, it will be looked more closely at how Nietzsche’s interpreters appreciate the questions of conceptuality. Having discussed efforts along these lines, I shall sketchily reconstruct the historical background that Nietzsche had to face when developing his own views. The middle section of this chapter following thereafter consists of an attempt at an overlook of Nietzsche’s output from the concept critical viewpoint. Finally, the perspective of philosophical reconceptualization is examined.
IV.a Background

Von der Art, wie so ein Buch [GT] entsteht, von der Mühe und Qual, gegen die von allen Seiten andrängenden *anderen* Vorstellungen sich bis zu diesem Grade rein zu halten, von dem Muth der Conception und der Ehrlichkeit der Ausführung hat ja niemand einen Begriff [...]
(KGB II/1, Februar 1872, 288.)

IV.a.1 Previous Views

Nietzsche’s resistance to concepts is something that almost all those who care to address the issue “Nietzsche and concepts” concentrate upon. However, in this subsection, it will be seen that the debate is not at all one-sided, although the general opinion remains that Nietzsche was not a thinker of concepts and that there is a gap between ‘the Nietzschean’ and ‘the conceptual’.

J. P. Stern speaks about Nietzsche’s “creative impatience with abstraction and conceptual thinking removed from living experience”¹³⁷⁹. Others may emphasize more the philosophical reasons than any artistic eagerness, yet still affirm there being, in his thought, a clear preference for the unconceptual.

John Sallis, for one, says that “Zarathustra’s language” is other than the one of “conceptual reflection”. It is to be understood as “the immediate language of an overflowing creativity, which in its rootedness in the earth, in this world, expresses itself in concrete, sensible imagery and in so doing reaffirms in the midst of creativity its faithfulness to the earth”.¹³⁸⁰ Anke Bennhold-Thomsen, for another, argues for the view that “the philosopher Nietzsche does not abstractly elucidate his thoughts”. The character of Zarathustra is, so Bennhold-Thomsen, precisely created in order to take off from the convention of “arguing conceptually” for one’s key thoughts.¹³⁸¹ The one to emphasize Nietzsche’s “aestheticism”, Allan Megill, too, characterizes *Zarathustra* as embodying an “anticonceptual, antiscientific perspective”¹³⁸².

Giorgio Colli writes his “Afterword” to *Zarathustra* in this same attunement. He does not articulate the more or less conventional view that a book of poetic form is not aptly characterized as conceptual. Rather, Colli describes the book’s “forms of expression” as deviations from the practice that, “as a rule”, is dominant in both poetry and philosophy. *Zarathustra* steps beyond “expression” toward “life’s immediacy” and archaic layers of culture. Colli says that unlike the philosophical “manipulation of concepts that are the expression of sensually perceptible objects”, *Zarathustra*’s “concepts and images
express neither concepts nor concrete things”. They are faceless “symbols” or “germinating forms of expression”. According to him, this book, as “extraordinary” as it may seem, is “harmoniously bound up” with the other Nietzschean works. The apparent exceptionality of Zarathustra is qualified by the fact that Menschliches with its “concepts of science”, says Colli, “converges an extreme boundary” of the Zarathustrian “immediacy beyond representation [Vorstellung]”. 1383

These comments make it seem that Nietzsche’s philosophy, or at least his opus magnum, is not only devoid of conceptual language, it is also resolutely opposed to, or deliberately removed from, such a language. William Desmond explains the issue with a recourse to the “philosophical commonplace” of juxtaposing “logic and imagination, reason and sensibility, the concept and intuition, philosophy itself and arts”. It all goes back to the beginning of philosophy and finds its classic manifestation in “Plato’s exiling of the poets”. As Desmond sees it, in Nietzsche’s thinking this “ancient quarrel” is “renewed again, but this time reversed”. Homer is set over against Plato to mark “life’s basic antagonism”. 1384

Eugen Fink - whose mediating interpretation between metaphysical and antimetaphysical readings has already been considered (see II.c.1) - underscores Nietzsche’s takeoff from the traditional seinsbegrifflich philosophizing. His distance from the efforts to conceptualize the ’being’ is explicated by Fink as follows: Nietzsche “does not effect [bewegt sich nicht in] a conceptual destruction of metaphysics, he does not deconstruct it by the means of conceptual thought on being, but abandons [verwirft] concept, fights rationalism and the reflective abuse [gedankliche Vergewaltigung] of reality”. 1385

Critically building on this, Jacques Derrida writes that “there is no sense in giving away the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics; we’ve got no language - no syntax and no glossary - that would be foreign to this history [of metaphysics]; we cannot enunciate any destructive proposition that would not already be forced to sneak in the form, in the logic and implicit postulations of that which it would want to contest”. Nietzsche, too, “operated” with or within “the inherited concepts of metaphysics”. What Derrida calls Nietzsche’s “concepts of play, interpretation and sign” were there to “substitute” the ones of ’being’ and ’truth’, and, thus, caught in the tradition. Although Nietzsche also pointed away from the tradition, the alternative he proposed is, so Derrida, not ultimately a matter of choosing. What is at stake is something just being born, something “as yet unnameable that announces itself and cannot do that”. 1386 In this way, Derrida speaks of Nietzsche as replacing traditional (metaphysical) “concepts” by his own new “concepts” that, despite their unavoidable entrapment in the (metaphysical) tradition, paved the way to what Colli would surely call “germinating” forms.

Georges Montcriol, for his part, makes much of the allegedly Nietzschean throwing away of concepts.
He says that Nietzsche’s preference is for “an indefinite play of interpretations” which is an antidote for the homogenizing “subsumption” and the synthetic unity in concept. It involves a “rebellious profundity” against “the transparence of the concept”. Nietzsche’s task is, so Montcriol, to affirm “the differentiating dissemination” of the plural being. Difference cannot be reduced to a concept.1387

A similar stress is put on the proper method for a Nietzsche reading by Charles Murin who holds that “no concept [...] can shed a unifying ray of light on the thinking of our philosopher”1388. Sometimes the issue is spelled out in a way that emphasizes Nietzsche’s desperate need and unfortunate lack of concepts suitable for his ambitious projects. Colin Wilson, for instance, says that Nietzsche did not possess “concepts”, as that of ‘intentionality, with which he could have effectively carried out his project of undermining commonly accepted positions1389.

Condemning Nietzsche, Roger Scruton discusses his loathing for the “pernicious” practice of conceptualizing1390. Celebrating Nietzsche, David Wood discusses his choice of not offering a new concept (of time) but, instead, showing the impossibility of conceptualizing (time)1391. In between, there is Derrida who speaks of Nietzsche’s attack against “active indifference” toward the ‘difference’ that is characteristic of philosophical conceiving, yet he also points out that Nietzsche did make room for the ‘sameness’ as eternal recurrence or as différence1392.

With respect to the more traditional questions of concepts, others have proposed that Nietzsche’s work is best seen as part of the nominalist tradition. In this context, it is said that he shares the nominalist aporia of referring to equal and unequal particulars without being able to justifiably accommodate such universalist notions as ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’ within the nominalist view1393.

A subtler case is made by Friedel Weinert’s locating of Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism: “Again and again, the nominalist argument consists of setting the plurality and multifacetedness of human actions against an abstract concept. Historically, nominalism is an important precondition of the concept of individual as it developed in the Renaissance. With its emphasis on the individual, nominalism is related to the 17th-century empiristic way of thinking.” Nietzsche takes part to this tradition, yet, as Weinert says, he did not deny the role of general concepts. His view can be seen to mirror the 18th-century natural scholars’ categorizations of flora and fauna in a nominalistic way but with the help of generalities that were, only and simply, names. In addition to this, Nietzsche’s stance relates to the Machian instrumentalism and modern sociologists’ view of necessary, but simplifying schemes. Weinert concludes that from Nietzsche there leads a path to a conceptualist mediation between realist and nominalist ways to understand universals.1394
Mihailo Djurič, for his part, writes about Nietzsche’s critical “standpoint of the untimely”. This is to be understood as the key to his ”new concept of philosophy” intended to overcome the “received concept of philosophy as metaphysics”. As Djurič has it, Hegel took philosophy to be “the conceived [begriffene] knowing [Wissen] of the spirit”, the ultimate Gestalt of all Gestalten of the spirit. Thus, philosopher’s task is to always explain, in retrospect, what took place. By contrast, “the conceived” is for Nietzsche a thing of the past. He “brought philosophy into the wide and uncertain field of the incomplete being”. In short, he started out the interrogation of “new, unknown, so far not yet discovered possibilities of living and experiencing”.  

Interestingly enough, Djurič speaks about Nietzsche’s new Begriff or Auffassung of philosophy, about his “strategic” Idee and about his Konzeption “of the polemical use of reason”. Nevertheless, he sees it best to draw the conclusion that Nietzsche did exploit “concept of the untimely” in an intense way, yet he “never carefully differentiated” it “nor ever deeply thought it over”. To sum up, Nietzsche traded the Begriffene for a whole conceptual collection of his own (Begriff, Auffassung, Idee, Konzeption), yet failed to elaborate his peculiar critico-affirmative stance. This leaves obscure the interplay between conceptual critique and conceptual regeneration. One cannot decide, whether the stress on the conceptual is due to Nietzsche or commentator.

In another text, mostly opposing Heidegger’s analyses, Djurič analyzes Nietzsche’s “most personal idea”, namely, “philosophy as joyful science”. He argues that Nietzsche was constantly thinking about philosophy, constantly at pains “to define its concept, to clarify its uniqueness in relation to science and art”. This would now imply that, whereas the concept of ’the untimely’ remained purely operative in Nietzsche, he did manage to thematize the one of ’philosophy’ with more discernment. Djurič even makes the further claim that “the whole of Nietzsche’s philosophy is really a comprehensive and profound, yet scattered and incomplete attempt at a new concept of philosophy”. All the same, his strong accentuation of reconceptualization notwithstanding, Djurič insists that Fröhliche Wissenschaft reaches for no unity or whole, operates beyond “strict conceptual framework” and prefers “images and metaphors” rather than “discursive concepts and logical reasonings”.  

Either is to be accounted for by a recourse to Nietzsche’s or his interpreter’s inconsistency, or it is to be understood as saying that there could be concepts that escape the drawbacks of excessive “strictness” and “discursiveness”. The third option would presumably be think that while Nietzsche’s philosophy does not operate with concepts (at least not in the conventional sense) it nonetheless aims at, and winds up in, a new conception of philosophy. In this sense, seemingly non-conceptual (or non-philosophical) undertakings may have metaconceptual (or non-philosophical) importance. The problem is how far from philosophy can one exercise efficient metaphilosophy.
Be that as it may, Djurić’s handling of Nietzsche resembles Montcriol’s interpretative strategy. As I just told, he laid a great weight on Nietzsche’s non-conceptual and anti-conceptual kind of philosophizing. Yet, Montcriol uses distinctly conceptual vocabulary in making sense of Nietzsche’s achievements. The philosopher who is supposed to abandon conceptuality, is nonetheless reported to “invite one to conceive” a number of new “conceptions” and “concepts”.1398

Is one to recognize, in the talk of new concepts created by the anti-conceptual conceiver, Montcriol’s concession to the conventions of philosophical writing? Is Nietzsche or his interpreter just inconsiderate? Is the question of viable conceptuality after the demolition of conceptuality somehow too superficial or too artificial to be discussed? The reader is left without an explanation, except for maybe the implicit recommendation to hold on to the usual notions of ‘philosophy’ as something conceptual and ‘Nietzsche’ as something unconceptual.

For the present purposes, I wish only to continue my demonstration of how difficult it seems to be for Nietzsche’s readers to come to terms with his relation to concepts. Sometimes it involves the difficulty of speaking about his new conceptions after discussing his rejective attitude to concepts. More often, it is about taking for granted the separation between 'the Nietzschean’ and 'the conceptual’.

For all the force of his casting Nietzsche in the key role of the modern philosophico-conceptual quandary, Stanley Rosen, too, doubts the idea of the German philosopher as one of conceptuality. He says that “[t]he centrality of interpretation, and so of sense, in Nietzsche, shows that he too falls within the horizon of Kant, and is therefore related to Husserl and the contemporary analytical philosophers, as well as to Heidegger and his successors.” He goes on to add that Nietzsche’s “act of definition, of course, is not conceptual or discursive in the analytical sense”, but, rather, “an existential choice”.1399

It is the “in the X sense” part of Rosen’s judgment that, I think, should be appreciated and studied. It is the “of course” part, in turn, that deems less appreciation and more doubt, although just as much critical scrutiny. The existential dimension does not necessarily exclude concepts and could be taken to qualify the sense of the conceptual in a direction other than that of “analytical discursiveness”. One could read Rosen as saying that Nietzsche’s moves are “not conceptual in the analytical sense but they are conceptual anyway”, or that they are “not conceptual in any way and not in the least analytical”. Although the latter option seems to be closer to Rosen’s view1400, it is to be remembered that it was his specific objective to begin to find a way of making sense of conception in a manner conscious but not-yet-conceptual - that was what he called “lucid dream” - and that he used Nietzsche as a part of this project. Ironically or not, Nietzsche may have been, after all, more willing than that to adjust his thought according to the constraints of conceptuality.
What is clear is that one has to investigate Nietzsche’s connections with, and deviations from, the mainstream philosophical tradition of conceptualizing. The interplay of concepts and metaphors has been the most outstanding issue in tackling this question. Jean-Michel Rey discusses conceptuality in Nietzsche with constant references to a “level always metaphoric”. He writes that “[t]o us, the question about the grammar, about the articulation of the concepts seems more fundamental, in the Nietzschean text, than the question bearing on the provenance of concepts”. In Rey’s view, Nietzsche’s texts are “like a theater of metaphors” where “concept is discerned as becoming of metaphors, as metaphoric redoubling”. He chooses to speak about the “notions” of Nietzsche, such as those of interpreting and perspectivity, since “they are not, properly speaking, concepts, even less “techniques””.1401

Sarah Kofman, in turn, examines this issue in her contribution to the colloquium in Cerisy. She says that there is not just one concept of culture in Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemässe, but numerous concepts. Immediately to this, she adds that “there are no concepts of culture there: there is but a series of metaphors upon one another removing the habitual meaning from each other. No one of them is privileged, no one is proper. This indefinite metaphorical play situates the Unzeitgemässe beyond metaphysics, even if the text also permits a metaphysical reading”.1402

Later, turning to the non-item “Philosophenbuch”, Kofman addresses “the relationship which Nietzsche establishes in Das Philosophenbuch between concept and metaphor”. She says that Nietzsche’s fairly traditional description of the conceptual hierarchies by the means of architectural metaphors becomes original once it is noted that he is repeating familiar metaphors in order to juxtapose them with “a stereotyped image of a totally new figure, thereby inciting a reevaluation of traditional metaphors at the same time as he ridicules them”. Accumulating “the metaphors of metaphor” is revitalizing language and illustrating the “metaphoric instinct repressed in conceptual and scientific activity”. Kofman emphasizes that concept is, in Nietzsche’s view, necessary, because it enables one to “distinguish between being awake and dreaming”. Yet, while “concept can serve as a metaphor for intuition”, “intuition cannot double as a metaphor for the concept”.1403

Drawing from considerations such as these, there are those who wish to explicitly shift the focus from conceptuality to rhetoric. Peter Gasser is one of them. He says that “the concept of rhetoric” implies the hegemony “of metaphors over the conceptual language”. According to Gasser, Nietzsche sets himself free “from the conceptual thinking of the rationalist and enlightening tradition”. Nevertheless, Gasser is of the opinion that “Nietzsche uses concepts tropically, as he also uses tropes conceptually”. What is at stake, then, is an incessantly alternating and integrating play between concepts and images. For Gasser, Nietzsche’s subversiveness is to be found in the way he “liberates the metaphysical concepts from their inherited contents and fills them up with new, multiple possibilities of meaning”.1404
However, despite his insistence on an interplay - on “Nietzsche’s strategy to handle concepts as metaphors” - it is not hard to see that Gasser lays more weight on the anti-conceptual pole. He says, for instance, that Zarathustra’s opening cannot be “translated to conceptuality”. He opposed Nietzsche’s “‘new’ speech of metaphors” or his “language of the body” to the “metaphysical language of concepts”. The move toward the figurative means that the “rhetorical discourse puts conceptual thinking in question by disseminating its identity”. Nietzsche’s texts are, in Gasser’s conclusion, about “rhetorical deconstruction of the logical language of concepts”.

It appears, then, that the anti-conceptual or non-conceptual elements, in Nietzsche, are very much underscored, in the current discussion. What is important to note is that these features are not only seen as symptomatic of a triumph over aged manners of philosophizing. Quite simply, for some commentators, the step beyond conceptuality is a fatal philosophical flaw. Diané Collins, for one, formulates the basic aporia in Nietzsche’s stance as follows. She finds that the philosopher “condemns all conceptualisation and linguistic organisation of experience and yet uses that very language to articulate his condemnation and to imply that there is indeed a true state of affairs that would be, or is, discernible once we free ourselves from all the known modes of discernment”.

One cannot be quite sure as to how exactly Collins wants her words to be read. Is she only saying that Nietzsche mocks words and yet continues to write? Is she also saying that he despises the practice of producing literature and yet goes on finishing manuscripts to be published? Is she even saying that Nietzsche cannot stand the words like Begriff and Auffassung and yet keeps on utilizing them? Or is she making the more alethiologico-epistemological point that Nietzsche’s utterances run counter the chance of truthful description of the world, yet he carries on describing, if only implicitly, it himself?

Instead of guessing Collins’s answers to these questions, I would like to consult a critic who does not feel the inconvenience familiar to the previous cases of discussing the combination “Nietzsche and concepts”. I am thinking about the way Hans Lenk clarifies Nietzsche’s notion of interpretation with an admirable ease and accuracy. He manages to fight both those who praise Nietzsche’s putative dive into the non-conceptual and his reputed inability to conceive in a consistent fashion.

Lenk says, namely, that the Nietzschean interpretation entails that everything “as apprehended [als Erfaßtes] and experienceable [Erfahrbares] is interpretation-laden [interpretationsimprägnierte]”. He goes on to explain Nietzsche’s “insight that all that we can apprehend [erfassten] can be comprehended [auffassen] only as depending on the interpretative agency, on our concepts [Begriffen], on our language, on our act of understanding and on the embedding it in our system of action”. According to Lenk, Nietzsche takes every Be-greifen to be, necessarily, begrifflich, that is, “dependent on our
categories of thought, on forms, linguistic models, rasters etc.\textsuperscript{1407}

What may worry some readers - it worries me at least - is the complete lack of doubt, on the part of Lenk, as to the exhaustiveness of this interpretation. There are neither qualifying remarks nor counterexamples. One might expect that, on the face of what was quoted above from many authors, the view of Nietzsche as the avatar of a conceptual compulsion is specifically launched to revise the received view. Yet, there is no mention of the common pictures, be these condemning or celebrating, of the anti-conceptual Nietzsche. Most pointedly, is Lenk really describing Kant instead of Nietzsche?

Robert C. Solomon’s exhortation to find the “profound analytician” in the “blustering immoralist” without turning the juicy virtuoso into a tiresome twaddler (see II.d.1) is an example of the kind of interpretative awareness the lack of which weakens Lenk’s case. One way of trying to accept Solomon’s invitation is exemplified by Peter Poellner.

He has reassessed the idea of Nietzsche as insisting on the chasm between the flux of events, on the one hand, and conceptual means of accounting for them, on the other.\textsuperscript{1408} Poellner writes as follows: “Nietzsche’s apparent claim […] that the application of concepts and propositional knowledge are \textit{in principle} impossible if the object-domain is one of ’flux’, i.e. rapid change, is […] mistaken (although a conceptualization and knowledge of items in such a domain might be impossible for some knowers in practice, due to their contingent cognitive limitations).” Appealing to Donald Davidson, Poellner says that such claims presuppose the dichotomy of conceptual schemes and not-yet-conceptualized stuff in a way that only leads astray.\textsuperscript{1409}

However, Poellner is careful to point out that Nietzsche “never commits himself”, at least “with complete conviction”, to these sorts of views. He explains this by referring to Nietzsche’s “unusually modest sense that our intuitions on these matters are often too tenuous to allow us to embrace with what he would call intellectual cleanliness any particular position with a great degree of confidence”. To account for the ambiguous situation Poellner chooses to have a recourse to Nietzsche’s anticipating the phenomenological “emphasis on the primacy of affectivity”.\textsuperscript{1410} Although Poellner does end up with a view that is fairly close to the usual image of ’the Nietzschean’, his cautious interpretation allows a more differentiated sense of the issue.

Maudemarie Clark proposes an argument for what she takes to be Nietzsche’s fundamental change after \textit{Jenseits}. This turn went from assuming metaphysical truth (despite frequent attacks against it) and endorsing representationalism that insists on the necessarily falsifying character of all descriptions, to finally adopting the perspectivist view which no longer needs the falsification and, thus, does not treat
all concepts as distortions of reality. Clark lays weight on Nietzsche’s connection with the pragmatist tradition from James to Putnam and Rorty. She compares his denial of things-in-themselves because of their inconceivability to the way Putnam and Rorty came to demolish metaphysical realism.\textsuperscript{1411}

Another way to rethink the dilemma is to refer back to the nominalist problematic. It was associated with Nietzsche, for the first time, by Hans Vaihinger. For him, Nietzsche opened the path for the view of concepts as “practical fictions, or assumptions through which the \textit{praxis of thinking} becomes easier”. What the method of abstraction and generalization did not need to assume was, according to Vaihinger, the correspondence between these fictions and some, necessarily, metaphysical world. The necessity in question was due to the practical, vital needs prescribed by the continuing existence. Sensations (\textit{Empfindungen}) or intuitions (\textit{Anschauungen}) were essentially chaotic, while concepts were the result of active combining, elaboration and transforming the sensually given.\textsuperscript{1412} If Vaihinger depicted Nietzsche as a Kant pragmatized or a Kant deprived of the things in themselves, Lenk made Nietzsche into the philosopher who transformed Kantian categories into linguistic models and, in general, to a more dynamic sense of the constraints of experience. If basic conceptual forms are liable to change, concepts themselves ought to evolve, too.

It is to be noted that Derrida, too, having inspired many of the recent readings of Nietzsche that concentrate on the metaphoric, such as the ones of Rey, Kofman and Gasser, deplores the opposition erected between concept and metaphor. He sees the need for “a new articulation” of the matter to be so manifest in “Nietzsche’s discourse”. This rearticulation would make flexible the limits of the metaphoric. There might be no point, says Derrida, in letting concepts and metaphors collide, since there are concepts of metaphors, too.\textsuperscript{1413} Slobodan Zunjić further illuminates the situation. He says that whereas Nietzsche had no way out of the “conceptual structure of language”, he had many ways to fight this imprisonment. Zunjić writes as follows: ”To completely surmount the conceptual language would be [...] to exit philosophy, so that this surmounting would preserve no relation to philosophy. To completely forget the metaphoric, in turn, would be to detriment critique and reflection into a dogmatic and irreparable condition. Stated in Nietzsche’s words, conceptuality marks the perspectivity and dependence on schemes that our thinking cannot avoid. In contrast, metaphoricality refers to the possible, yet still perspectival, overcoming of what is at hand. This is the lesson that we can learn from Nietzsche’s thought experiment.”\textsuperscript{1414}

Jeanne Delhomme speaks of “Nietzsche’s originality” in the context of the attention to the “\textit{role of words}” or the “\textit{text itself}”. Schematisms or fixations are part of the life of language. Nietzsche is interested in the “process of concept” not just in order to expose the “rigidity of ideas” or inflexible habits of thought. As Delhomme sees it, Nietzsche opts for “another tentative” and “a new conception
of the conceived” involving the boundaries of thought and life always conditioned by deep-rooted structures of conceptuality and terminology.1415

Derrida says elsewhere that “Nietzsche radicalizes the *concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation and difference*”\(^{1416}\). One may observe that he is much more tolerant, or much less uneasy, in using the term “concept” in relation to Nietzsche than many of his followers. Yet, he does not say that the concept of concept is being radicalized, although this can be taken to be entailed by his view.\(^{1417}\) In any case, Derrida’s points are understood through one of his readings of Heidegger (cf. I.a). He says that Heidegger’s condemnation of the common interpretation of Nietzsche as “a life-philosopher without conceptual rigor”, the interpretation to which Nazis gave a special logistic bent, is problematic. This is because Heidegger “is pretending to rescue Nietzsche from this or that distortion” by using “categories which can themselves serve to distort”. It all boils down, in Derrida’s view, to the way Heidegger, in attacking biographical approach to Nietzsche, “simply lets stand the conventional concept of autobiography instead of reshaping it”.\(^{1418}\)

To understand Heidegger’s critique of various bio-approaches, it is, I believe, instructive to have a quick look at the way the perhaps most cerebral of all the so-called philosophers of life, Wilhelm Dilthey, announces his study programme: “I shall prove that the philosophical systems, as well as religions and works of art, contain a view of life and world, which is grounded, not in conceptual thinking, but in the livelihood of the persons that accomplished them”\(^{1419}\).

By contrast, Julian Roberts says that Nietzsche’s processual thinking entails that “even the conceptual activities of philosophers are in fact part of the struggle of life, the articulations of particular instinctual patterns”. Roberts goes on explaining that the defect in “most of the conventional repertoires of philosophical concepts is that they fail to understand their own role, and attempt to impose upon life a web of concepts which make fraudulent claims to permanence.” One might infer from this that the more self-reflective concepts are forcefully rehabilitated by Nietzsche. Yet, since it is, in Robert’s words, the “futurity” or “splendid thrust forwards” that is Nietzsche’s preoccupation, he is drawn to conclude “that ‘things’, the material of full-blooded life, are always superior to concepts”.\(^{1420}\) In this way, Roberts winds up, after all, to the position that is virtually identical with that of Dilthey.

Now, although Derrida’s reads Heidegger carefully, he fails to appreciate countering material, that is, Heidegger’s explicitly non-oppositional formulation of the problematic. In attacking the philosophy-of-life-interpretations of Nietzsche, Heidegger speaks about conceptualizing as the basic activity in life’s practice. This is where he differs markedly from Dilthey’s approach without supplyin a merely opposite view. Here, I think, Heidegger may well be reshaping the conventional concept of concept more
strongly than Derrida: "Concept is no formation hostile to life invented by those otherwordly and weak in life; concept is, rather, the innermost “work” of life itself." 1421

One should resist the temptation to read the controversy between (Heidegger’s) conceptual approach and (Lebensphilosophen’s) non-conceptual approach as an instance of a clear-cut opposition. This is proposed by Heidegger’s reconceiving of concept. A further example of the early German reception is in order to see just how complex the issue of ‘Nietzsche and concepts’ has been from the start. In his monograph of 1926, August Vetter refers to Nietzsche’s insistence on the historical formation of all concepts. This sets him further from Locke’s denial of native ideas, since the “objective being of concepts” is also repudiated by Nietzsche. Building upon Kant’s constructivism Nietzsche prepares the way to pragmatism. As Vetter construes it, Nietzsche rejects Kant’s distinction between empirically acquired concepts and apriori categories by identifying the latter with the former. Thus, he demolishes “the last remnant of dogmatic rationalism [...] [the] passive “givenness”“. Nietzsche’s critique of transcendentalism and philosophical conceptions of the subject does not, according to Vetter, entail “shallow sensualism”. Rather, it entails the conception of a “concrete” and “active [tätige]” self, of a “psycho-physical [...] unity” of some kind as opposed to an “abstract identity in the concept of ego [Ichbegriff] or in the idea of god [Gottidee]]”. 1422

This reconstruction of Nietzsche’s project is exceptional, especially as concerning what is nowadays called the myth of the given. Curiously, however, Vetter presents his outstanding reflections in a book that otherwise supports the conventional view of Nietzsche’s work as utterly unamenable to conceptual thought. By so doing, he prefigures the interpretative custom that was seen in many of the above critics. In any case, Vetter mentions “the purely conceptual” as something that would, along with “the innerly undisturbed” and “the purely enjoyable”, go against Nietzsche’s philosophical goals. Where this could be taken as but necessary qualifications of the Nietzschean project, there is more to come. Vetter holds, namely, that Nietzsche’s place in the tradition can be viewed as “no direct continuation of the theoretical movement of knowledge”, which makes “the conceptual evaluation and differentiation” inadequate in his case. What is at stake is a philosophy “more poetic and ephemeral than conceptual and fundamental”. Accordingly, Vetter calls some of Nietzsche’s inventions “ecstatic Sinnbilder that breathe “heightened passion” tending to “obscure conceptual obviousness”, while others are something “flowing” to the point of “resisting [...] conceptual and verbal fixation”. 1423

This is not all there is to it. Even if Vetter dissociates Nietzsche from the path of theoretico-conceptual epistemology leading from Descartes to Hegel, he places Nietzsche beside Kant. To be sure, Nietzsche is located in the dimension of the Schopenhauerian critical following in order to separate his thought
from the concept-centered dimension of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Yet, Vetter compares Kant’s critique of the metaphysics of reason to Nietzsche’s critique of the metaphysics of will. Still more interestingly, Vetter perceives an analogy between Hegel’s work on the “unified movement of concepts” coordinating the atomistic logical concepts and Nietzsche’s efforts with “ethical values”.

Vetter further qualifies his interpretation of Nietzsche’s distance to the “purely conceptual”. Quite simply, Vetter just has to do this, since he refers to Nietzsche’s Begriff or Konzeption of ‘eternal recurrence’. The conclusion reads: “Because Nietzsche’s philosophy is no restful system, but a living process and dramatic action, what rules in it is the attempt to unite intuition and concept in passionate striving”. Although his interpretative reconciliation between the anti-conceptual Nietzsche and the conceptual Nietzsche remains annoyingly half-finished, one might defend Vetter by underlining the almost unique way he manages to recognize Nietzsche’s conceptual strivings as well as his conceptual criticisms and to point toward studying this important tension between them.

I would argue that Vetter’s most valuable discovery is Nietzsche’s attack on the given. Even if this means merely that Nietzsche refused to take concepts as given - and not that Nietzsche also refused to take anything else as given but as always already molded by concepts that themselves are not given - this is a point that compensates Vetter’s less successful moves. The burning problem of conceptuality is this: does Nietzsche think that there is an access to reality beyond the mediation of concepts? A recent commentator to have underlined Nietzsche’s critique of concepts, Andrzej Warminski, insists that Nietzsche is not calling for any “return” to the “immediacy” of perceptions or metaphors. Similarly, an earlier critic specified that, for Nietzsche, there is no factum brutum.

Apart from prefiguring these denials of the given, Vetter’s notion of a Nietzschean “concept formation that hides itself [sichverhüllende Begriffsbildung]” is to be underscored. As a matter of fact, I contend that it should be equally celebrated and rejected. It is worth extolling, because it is not at all a bad way to make sense of the way Nietzsche’s philosophy is conceptually significant and productive, even though this philosophy is clearly something altogether different from the mainstream philosophy occupied (at least putatively) by conceptual concerns. It is to be cast off, however, since it hinders the recognition of the plethora of conceptual formations and the wealth of explicit reflections upon concept-formation and conceptuality in Nietzsche’s writings.

Gilles Deleuze’s treatment of Nietzsche is probably one of the most tolerant of conceptual language, while it also points to both the Nietzschean critique of concepts and the Nietzschean reinterpretation of concepts. Apart from the already mentioned (see previous section) introduction of the “concepts of sense and value” that Deleuze ascribed to Nietzsche, he mentions Nietzsche’s “new concept of
genealogy”, concepts of “force” and “difference”, conceptions of “tragedy” and “existence”, “conception of physics”, “concept of reaction”, “conceptions of differentiation and final state” and so on. He also speaks regularly of how Nietzsche “conceived” this and that.1430

Although he emphasizes Nietzsche’s project as seeking to liberate “thought” and to create “new ways of thinking” and “feeling”, Deleuze underscores the manner in which Nietzsche criticizes the concepts of, say, quantity and quality for their abstractness and others for their passivity. Moreover, Deleuze has Nietzsche to dissociate his concept of, say, affirmation and negation from the defective ones available, direct his “principle concepts against” his adversaries, and “propose a new conception” of great many things. Indeed, defending the rigor of Nietzsche’s thought against quick complaints over its deficiency in systematization, Deleuze even goes so far as to hold that “Nietzsche employs very precise new terms for very precise new concepts”. What is still more important, Deleuze finds in what he describes as Nietzsche’s pluralist and empiricist philosophy something “properly philosophical”. This is because the view that there are but polysemic events to be interpreted marks “the highest conquest of philosophy” or “the conquest of the true concept”. Accordingly, Deleuze speaks not only of the way Nietzsche “renews and subverses” the conceptual history of being and non-being “by his theory of their relations and their transformation”. He refers to Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole in terms of concepts: “the whole Nietzschean concept situates in the crossing of two unequal genetic lines”.1431

Compared to the conceptual thickness of his interpretative scheme, Deleuze has amazingly few quotations to offer where Nietzsche discusses conceptuality. Moreover, he does not explain the more general assaults, in Nietzsche’s writings, against concepts, no more than he explains prevailing critical agreement as to Nietzsche’s distance from conceptual manner of philosophizing. One could perhaps try and account for the ground of this strategy in terms of the Deleuzian insistence on the superiority of affirming one’s own difference with respect to negating one’s opponent. Yet, a better chance is illustrated by his view of the Nietzschean “total critique”. The key to understanding its “true realization” is found in Nietzsche’s upsetting and overturning of the “notion of value”. Values presuppose evaluations and not the other way round. Evaluation marks the “value of values”, the source of values and the “differentiating” or critico-creative “element” of values. In this sense, evaluations are “manners of being” or “modes of existence” or “life styles” that ground “beliefs, sentiments, thoughts”. And living is evaluating. This explains, so Deleuze, Nietzsche’s commitment to topology and typology.1432

It also exhibits how the issue of self-reflectivity is fundamental for Deleuze. Nietzsche’s “dramatic, typologic, differentiating method” transforms philosophy into an “art of interpreting and evaluating”. The crucial point here is that the “[d]ifference reflects itself and repeats itself or reproduces itself”.1433 So, even though Deleuze does not explicitly form the question of the concept of concept, as one would
be entitled to expect, he nonetheless moves in the scenery of ’the value of values’ and the difference-reproducing difference which imply the reflexive notions of both conceptuality and nihilism.

All in all, one could use Deleuze’s book in order to argue against the view that Nietzsche’s preoccupation was lifestyles rather than concepts. Types of living stand for complex networks of beliefs, feelings and thoughts. They embody conceptions and generate meaning and value. What is more important, one can see how Deleuze refuses the notion that Nietzsche’s peculiarity lies in his extra-philosophical imagery. He holds that whatever Nietzsche may have done with his aphoristic or poetic means, it all had “a determinable relation to philosophy”. Thus, “a play of images never replaced for Nietzsche a more profound play, that of concepts and philosophical thinking.”.1434

To close this inquiry into the previous conceptions of Nietzsche and concepts I would like to draw attention to another early account. Apart from what special insights it may offer, there is also the more general advantage of being able to better appreciate the whole range of interpretations that have come available during the century of Nietzsche reception.

Oscar Ewald referred to the idea of the lyrical Nietzsche taking off the “tight suit of armor of the logical concept development”. He craved for “new forms of expression and content”. What is instructive for today’s readers is the way Ewald was ready, already in 1903, to call this getting loose both “incomplete” and “customary”. He observed that there is a correlative concept for even such things seemingly non-conceptual phenomena as Stimmung. Ewald went on explaining that feeling and knowing do not have to be in dispute. This was motivation enough, for him, to begin to study “the concepts not the creator or the shaper of concepts”. Accordingly, he set out to examine Nietzsche’s “conceptions” of, in particular, the symbolical pair ’overhuman’ / ’eternal return’. The outcome of Ewald’s investigation is that Nietzsche himself had “unnerved the fundamental idea of his teaching” to the extent that, of all that is symbolic at first, there remains, in the end, but “crudely realistic shells of concepts”.1435

With some astonishment, one follows Ewald’s leap from criticizing the dominant interpretation that underscores non-conceptuality to the other extreme of interpreting himself Nietzsche as the ultra-conceptual thinker. However, in a later book, Ewald came to reaffirm his initial view of Nietzsche’s conceptions by specifying how he is to be credited for having, critically and radically, repudiated false claims to objectivity or to the suprasensual model of philosophy. Ewald even tried overtly Nietzschean aphorisms of his own containing such titles as “Magic of Concepts” and “Genealogy of Critique”.1436

On the one hand, Ewald’s case emphasizes the threat of one-sided interpretative traditions seeking to
legitimize and absolutize themselves. On the other hand, it bears testimony to how hard it is to leave the “philosophizing in and with Nietzsche” for “philosophizing over and beyond Nietzsche”\textsuperscript{1437} - and, one should add, \textit{vice versa}. In order to stay alert for both risks, the best one can do is to stay in contact with a plurality of alternative conceptions and to explore Nietzsche’s philosophy as always already conditioned by them. Next, his philosophical predecessors will be consulted in order to better understand Nietzsche’s contribution to the issue of concepts.

\textbf{V.a.2 Nietzsche’s Forerunners}

In the light of the interpretations of Nietzsche’s relationship to concepts, there would seem to be as wide a consensus about Nietzsche’s hostility and distance to conceptual thinking as there is to his self-awareness of its defects and necessity coupled with a set of indirect moves toward some kind of liberation. While the debate is more variegated than what is perhaps usually thought, it is safe to say that it tends to operate more with general views of Nietzsche’s philosophical characteristic than with the actual conceptual reflections in his texts.

It needs to be grasped that his position somewhere on the border between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, if not clearly on the side of one or the other, cannot be reduced to his absolute uniqueness. In what follows, Goethe, Kant, Schopenhauer, Lange, Spir, Hegel and Teichmüller will be consulted in order to outline the general philosophical context of the Nietzschean interrogation of conceptuality.

J. P. Eckermann’s \textit{Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens} is a book frequently appealed to, in Nietzsche’s writings, and once even hailed as the “besten deutschen Buche, das es giebt” (MA II/2 109, KSA 2, 599). It is from this work that one may begin to outline the philosophical context of Nietzsche’s confrontation with conceptuality. To Eckermann, Goethe asserts his conviction that philosophy is detrimental. He says, for example, that Schiller’s poetry suffered from the author’s philosophizing and his speculative tendency to heighten ideas over and above nature. More generally, he claims that it is precisely philosophy that causes Germans to write so badly, whereas the practically disposed Englishmen or the socially-minded French are not similarly impeded. Goethe says that he has always kept himself free from philosophy and preferred the healthy basis of human understanding. He says that Germans should be taught, in the English manner, ”less philosophy and more strength of action \textit{[Tatkraft]}, less theory and more praxis”.\textsuperscript{1438}

However, Goethe praises Cuvier as “the great natural scholar” but blames him because he “has no philosophy whatsoever”. For this very reason, Goethe suspects that Cuvier’s education may result in students that are “well-trained but not very profound”.\textsuperscript{1439} For all his scorn for philosophical

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speculation, then, Goethe aspired for better philosophy. Extraneous philosophicalness may be a weakness, but lacking philosophicality makes all exchange shallow. Apart from this sort of balancing, Goethe cherishes tension, in the spirit of his credo that “contradiction is what makes us productive.”

Paul Hübscher’s recent book on Goethe’s influence on Wittgenstein is interesting for the present purposes. Among other things, Hübscher thematizes Goethe’s emphasis on Bildung and Umbildung. It involves stressing the organic and processual Gestalt over the abstract and closed Form. Hübscher is, however, careful enough to remark that even the form is potentially alive and that Goethe uses the terms “form”, “shape” and “concept”, for all their peculiar nuances, as largely synonymous. Earlier, Werner Lambrecht had argued that Goethe is in favor of intuitive or anschauende type of thinking as very different from, and indeed, opposed to conceptual or begrifflich type of thinking. Lambrecht tried to pin this difference down to the divergent ways of understanding generality. On the one hand, there is an ontologically real and essential generality in images. On the other hand, there is an instrumental generality that is thought of in concepts. According to Lambrecht, Goethe opts for ideas or primordial images and calls them Urphänomene.

Although Lambrecht did a good job in elucidating Goethe’s stance, I think that the opposition he erected between conceptuality and its other is questionable both “as such” and with respect to the Goethean organicism. To be sure, Goethe expresses his amusement to Eckermann about aestheticians “who torture themselves in trying, with some abstract words, to conceptualize [in einen Begriff zu bringen] that inexpressible, for which we use the expression beautiful.” Quite like Lambrecht indicated, he goes on to exploit the language of primordiality: “The beautiful is a primordial phenomenon that never itself appears. But its reflection becomes visible in the thousand different expressions of the creative spirit and it is so multifaceted and so variegated as the nature itself.”

Nonetheless, Goethe feels himself free to refer to his Urphänomenon as “[t]his concept, this emotion [Gefühl]”. This indirect conjunction between concept and emotion may well disconcert anyone expecting conceptions to be cognitive by nature. What counts here is that even though Goethe rejects the abstract concept of ’the beautiful’, his construal of beauty with the help of his “concept” of Urphänomen is enough to imply that he is leaving room for less abstract ways of conceiving. Small wonder if there are other instances suggesting that he was not committed to aversion to concepts. Eckermann reports about his and Goethe’s shared efforts of trying to come up with a name for a short story the old master had just finished. They made proposals but were unable to settle on any title that would capture the whole text. Finally, Goethe decided to baptize it with the common name made into a proper noun: ”we shall call it ’A Short Story’ [‘Novelle’]; since what is a short story [eine Novelle] other than an unheard incident that happened [eine sich ereignete, unerhörte Begebenheit]. This is the
proper concept \textit{[eigentliche Begriff]}, whereas many of the writings circulating in Germany under the title of short story are no short stories at all, but tales or whatever.”\textsuperscript{1445}

This is hardly the highpoint of Goethe’s reflection upon conceptuality. All the same, it shows him engaged in restoring an original meaning, an original concept. A context more readily significant is that where Goethe sets kind of Kantian limits to understanding. He speaks, namely, about the “boundary” of the “primordial phenomenon”. This borderline is, in his view, the far edge that must do for humans.\textsuperscript{1446}

Quoted in Eckermann’s book, there is a letter written by Goethe in this same attunement. Referring to the new edition of his botanical treatise \textit{Versuch über die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären} (1790) he touches upon the larger issue of conceptuality: “These now more than forty years old maxims still hold; one is happily led through them round the whole labyrinthine circle of the conceivable and brought all the way to the boundary of the inconceivable. It is there one can, after gaining a great deal, well feel satisfied. All the philosophers from the old and the new world could not strive for any longer than that.”\textsuperscript{1447}

Encouraged by Goethe, one ought to enter the labyrinth, in the sphere of conceptuality, and search it through. My final quotation from him should speak for the view that this is just what is expected from philosophers. Goethe regards Kant as the finest of modern philosophers, “without a doubt”. He tells the funny story about how Schiller used to put Kant down and usher Goethe to ignore him, while at the same time keeping on, just like Goethe, studying Kant carefully. In the key passage, Goethe puts forth the view that “Kant wrote the ’Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, whereby indefinitely many things were accomplished, yet the circle is not closed. Someone with distinction and capacity \textit{[ein Fähiger, ein Bedeutender]} would now have to write the critique of the \textit{senses} and of the human understanding, and should this happen impressively, we would have nothing more to wish from German philosophy.”\textsuperscript{1448}

All in all, Goethe would entertain a notion of the harmfulness of excessive philosophizing, yet having, at the same, a high regard for the best philosophical efforts and even high expectations for philosophical progression. His special double emphasis lay on the concept of ’primordial phenomenon’ involving the limit of understanding and on the notion of extended critical philosophy of the human sensory performance. On the way to Kant, it is best to consult two Nietzsche authorities, although neither of them pays attention to Goethe.

Gilles Deleuze writes, however, as if he was saying to Goethe that Nietzsche came to carry out the requested additional critique. Deleuze claims that whereas “Kant did nothing but pushed to the limit a very old conception of the critique”, Nietzsche embarked upon a more ambitious undertaking. Two of
the points he offers, in summarizing “the Nietzschean conception of the critique”, are particularly intriguing in this context. “Transcendental principles” are replaced by “genetic and plastic principles that account for the meaning and the value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations”. The justification of the human condition is abandoned for the goal of “sensing differently”, for “another sensibility”.1449

Friedrich Kaulbach joins, albeit implicitly, Deleuze in pronouncing that Nietzsche saw Kant’s critical practice as continuation of the defective tradition where the primacy of reason plus moral consciousness is asserted. This prevents one from recognizing the greater bodily rationality as motivating a meaningful perspective on the world. There is a Goethean tone, in Kaulbach’s voice, as he says that Nietzsche called for “not a denouncement but a Dionysian extension of the critique of pure reason”.1450

I attempt at no reconstruction of Kant’s basic tenets in his critical enterprise. I will only try to pursue some key aspects of his view of the nature of concepts as it shows itself in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and the Kritik der Urtheilskraft. What counts is Kant’s potential foreshadowing and prefiguring of Nietzsche’s thought.

Kant guides the reader into his vocabulary by organizing his word use with a great care. He starts from Gattung or Vorstellung überhaupt or representatio. Other types of representation are ordered underneath this most general type, the genus. Conscious general Vorstellung is tantamount to perceptor. When Perzeption is, in turn, related to nothing else than to the subject which it modifies one has Empfindung or sensatio. As the confines of the subjective are overcome, the objective type of perceptor at hand is Erkenntnis or cognitio. This stage of representation - knowledge - is further divided into immediate and singular Anschauung or intuitus and Begriff or conceptus that is mediate and common to numerous things. Concept is empirical, if it is not reiner Begriff. This pure concept, in turn, is Notio that originates in the understanding beyond sensibility. Finally, it is from notions that the Idee or the Vernunftbegriff is formed.1451 Right after introducing these distinctions, Kant makes the somewhat enigmatically psychologizing point that once they have been internalized it is unacceptable to use these terms in a deviant manner. To sum up, there is an impressive hierarchy of the ways of representation:
The connection to the verb *noscere* or “to know” is, I believe, the reason for Kant’s attaching to his *Notio* a sense that is, as it were, “conceptually” stronger or higher than that of his *Begriff*. The fact that the word “notion” has a wide daily application in English and French may explain Rey’s treatment of it as less technical than concept (see previous subsection). Correspondingly, Kant’s contrary choice is related to the fact that *Notio* is a much more uncommon word in German than *Begriff*.

Apart from the terminological hierarchy, Kant is accounting for the way knowledge is engendered. All knowing derives from the senses and passes through the understanding in order to reach the reason. Rational thinking is tantamount to the working out of the sensual intuitions into conceptual unities. For Kant, it is this activity of the reason that “(pro)creates [erzeugt] concepts”.\(^{1452}\) What is needed in the complex interplay of sensual, senso-conceptual and conceptual processes that make possible not the knowledge of the things-in-themselves but the “true grip of the nature” is, in Kant’s vocabulary, the synthetic and regulative “general procedure”, “hidden art in the depths of the human soul”, “productive force of imagination”, or in his most compact and least eloquent formula, “scheme”\(^{1453}\).

Now, compare this to the way he describes his own effort in general. In the introductory part of the *Kritik*, Kant insists on the interdependence of intuitive receptivity/sensibility and conceptual understanding/spontaneity. It is nothing other but this linkage that enables the subject to both represent and know its objects as they appear. Kant coaches the readers to combine their concepts with the sensible or the intuitive and ally their intuitions with the conceptual, because, as his famous thesis reads, “[t]houghts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”\(^{1454}\).

This is in line with Kant’s overall project of unifying the grand traditions of rationalism and empiricism.
At its clearest, this programme appears in the passage where Kant criticizes Leibniz for intellectualizing phenomenality and Locke for sensualizing conceptuality. Both of “these great men” failed to see the essential difference and the essential connection of the two dimensions of representation.

Apart from the consistent emphasis on the necessary linkage between reason and experience, Kant’s own (re)presentations are entirely dominated by conceptual forms. In other words, he is hardly engaging in filling his concepts with intuitive content. He is, rather, introducing more and more concepts to be elucidated. This is understandable on the grounds that it is the profound conviction of his that the categories, the *a priori* concepts of reason, both contain the possibility, and shape the form, of all experience.

The conceptual predominance is perhaps best illustrated by the astonishing frequency of the word *Begriff* in Kant’s book. As Morris Weitz says, “Kant recognizes the concept of concept and concepts of much, perhaps everything, else. Whatever their nature may be, they are as populous as anything else in his world.”. Weitz writes that “[a]ll the certainty regarding the place and centrality of concepts in Kant’s philosophy vanishes as we turn to Kant’s theory of the nature of concepts. Kant is not as explicit about their nature as he is about their roles; and his statements about concepts retain an ambivalence about their nature throughout the *Critique*. The textual and doctrinal evidence - at times the same piece of evidence - yields both that concepts are entities and that they are rules. Precisely which they are has become a focal problem in the exegesis of and commentary on the Kantian philosophy, especially since concepts are so clearly central to Kant.” Despite Kant’s references to rules, and in discrepancy with those who hold that he advocates a pre-Wittgensteinian dispositional theory of concepts, Weitz says that it is more plausible to speak about the post-cartesian view, where having of concepts “may yield abilities but are not the same as abilities”.

Yet, thinking about how an entity called concept can be accommodated in Kant’s world is so difficult that it makes Weitz conclude: “I find no answer in Kant to my question: What kind of object or entity is a concept, granted that it is an entity or object of the mind? Only two, equally unattractive, inferences from this impasse seem possible: either my question about Kant is illegitimate or Kant has no answer in and, within his system, can give none. If the latter is correct, Kant’s Copernican Revolution in philosophy is what is always was, a utopian dream.”

Be that as it may, Kant’s excuse might be that he is chiefly occupied with a conceptual analytics that is not to be understood as the traditional philosophical practice of decomposing and clarifying the employed concepts, but as the one that takes as its object the very capacity for conceptual thinking, the faculty of the understanding. Although this project empowers the kind of research conducted by
Weitz, the excuse would surely not do to make up the inconvenient silence, on Kant’s part, about the nature of these all important products of the all important faculty. At any rate, Kant manages to come up with a wealth of insights concerning the use of concepts. These spring from incessant distinctions that Kant himself finds “dry and boring”. His text gets particularly intriguing when it is read with keeping an eye on the changes that he made to the first edition of the *Kritik*. So, for instance, the passage that was originally about *Betrauchung* of space, was later corrected by Kant to be about *Erörterung* of the *Begriff* of space. Immediately after this, there is the supplementary specification of *Erörterung* as the exposition of “what belongs to a concept”. 1460

I shall call attention to but one more aspect of the rich discussions in Kant’s first critique. It bears on the nature of philosophy. In the part of the book that is titled as “The Architectonic of the Pure Reason”, Kant writes that philosophy is knowledge that comes out of concepts. He goes on to characterize the *Schulbegriff* of philosophy that amounts to logically systematizing the unity of knowledge. By contrast and extension, the *Weltbegriff* of philosophy has to do with “the science of the relationship of all knowledge to the essential purposes of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae)”’. Where philosophy as a school concept deals with arbitrary goals, philosophy as “conceptus cosmicus” is about “what necessarily interests everybody”. Based on this distinction, Kant is ready to hold that philosophers are no *Vernunftkünstlern*, but instead the philosopher is “the law-giver of human reason”. He is, however, not prepared to claim for himself the role of the judge, since “that would be very boastful”. 1461

Goethe’s insistence on the philosophical need to explore the boundaries of the conceivable and inconceivable - and, for that matter, the artistic need to explore the boundaries of the expressible and inexpressible - is not quite foreign to Kant. His third and last critique, the one of judgment, places him even more clearly to these surroundings. It the objective of *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* to canvass the aesthetical sphere both as distinct from theoretical and practical regions and as capable of combining them to achieve a sense of philosophy “as a whole” 1462. What interests me the most is not his overall theorizing on the beautiful and the sublime. It is the fate of concepts.

Kant says that there are “only two kinds of concepts”: natural concepts for the purposes of theoretical comprehension and moral concepts for the purposes of practical action. In terms of the “capacities of the soul” (*Seelenvermögen*) that Kant emphasizes throughout his work, the former dimension is anchored in the ability of knowing and the latter in the one of willing. There is, however, a third capacity: the capability of feeling pleasure and pain, convenience and inconvenience. As one can infer, there are no concepts for this last dimension. What is common to all the three capacities is that they are based on the lawgiving powers of the human apparatus. The aesthetical judgment differs from the other two precisely because it does not involve concepts but is a matter of taste, feeling, albeit a rule-like
feeling. Judgment of taste is, then, according to Kant, unconceptual or independent of concepts, since it is neither directed toward concepts nor springing from concepts or based on concepts. It is also illogical, since there is, from concepts, “no transition” to feelings. If this is what separates the aesthetical judgments from the theoretical ones, the needed difference from the practical judgments is due to the aesthetical ones being, in Kant’s view, void of interest.1463

Another thing is that there can be aesthetical “ideals” in the sense of “fixed” concepts involving objective purposes. Yet, Kant ushers his readers that there is no way of removing the expressive multifacetedness in terming these ideals, since the relevant language is always about “thinking into a concept much that is unnameable”, “animating the capacity of knowing” and “uniting the spirit”.1464

In Kant’s vocabulary, concepts situate on a field (*Feld*) of which they occupy the ground or plane (*Boden, territorium*) of possible knowledge. This is further divided into a dwelling (*Aufenthalt, domicilium*) and a realm or area (*Gebiet, ditio*). To locate the human powers Kant writes about the “unlimited, yet also inaccessible field for our entire capacity of knowing, namely, the field of the supersensual where we find no ground for ourselves” and fail to exploit it as the area of theoretical knowledge. This is tantamount to restating the central message of the critique of pure reason. In addition, it amounts to making way for the critique of practical reason as committed to working out a view of the autonomous moral subject that declares its supernatural liberation from the confines of natural concepts. Finally, it presents the critique of judgment as rising from the need to interrogate the evident cleft and the potential mediation, transition, influence between the sensual and supersensual.1465

Before moving on to Schopenhauer, it might be instructive to hear what Stanley Rosen has to say about “the (essentially Kantian) basis of the intrinsic unity between the ostensibly opposed poles of contemporary philosophy, existential or fundamental ontology, and analysis”. For Rosen, Kant’s legacy is that “we grasp something by our various cognitive faculties, but we cannot see it as it is in itself. Grasping is no longer merely touching, but constructing the structure that permits us to know what we grasp”. In this respect, concept’s function is to give “us security over what we think in a way analogous to the security we derive from the object that is gripped by the hand.”1466

Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant is, to a certain extent, analogous to Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche. He hails Kant as the initiator of true philosophical enterprise, while condemning his fatal confusions due to the blindness towards his very own constructions. As it was the case with Kant, I shall not pursue any accurate reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s thinking. I won’t even try to condense Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s critical enterprise. What is important, for the present purposes, is to take up some of the key points Schopenhauer makes, in his *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, as to
the nature of concepts and their role in general and their participance in philosophy, in particular.

Schopenhauer’s depiction of Kant’s essential ambivalence finds a particularly juicy expression as he characterizes the latter’s style (that is prefigured, he says, in Aristotle) by speaking of the “dazzling dryness with which he very carefully conceives and grasps the concepts as solid [die Begriffe fest zu fassen und herauszuziehen] and then, to the reader’s amazement, is able to spread them hither and thither with greatest freedom”. The advantage/disadvantage of this arid lustrousness, in the Kantian concept-formation and concept-use, is one thing. But according to Schopenhauer, there is another thing that is much more important than the annoying oscillations in the employment of individual concepts once defined. Namely, Kant’s basic flaw is to rush on to solicitously specify concepts that belong to either reason or understanding and to “make them into the material of his philosophy”, before investigating “what concept is in the first place”.

This is astonishingly similar to the analytical criticism that Weitz directs against Kant’s philosophy or, for that matter, to the critique Rosen directs against the post-Kantian, especially analytical, philosophy as a whole. Yet, Schopenhauer goes on to develop his opposition to a direction that would, presumably, be uncomfortable to Weitz and Rosen. This is hard to ascertain, though, because, for all their dissidence, in their respective intellectual environments, Weitz and Rosen seem to share the common practice of neglecting Schopenhauer. Unless, perhaps, it is more about the preference for suspending judgments about him. Anyway, it is enough to make the tentative conclusion that the conceptual approach could be an effective way to reassess and spell out Schopenhauer’s relevance, much more promising, at least, than the usual procedure of ruminating his voluntarism.

What Schopenhauer sees as the most ruinous consequence of Kant’s failure to expose the concept of concept is the confusing entwinement of “the intuitive and the abstract knowledge”. Worse yet, Kant seems to mix intuitions and concepts only in order to, notwithstanding his longing toward equilibrium, to restore the primacy of the conceptual. Where Kant’s starting point is, says Schopenhauer, the mediate, the reflected, “the forms of abstract thinking”. Schopenhauer declares himself to be setting out from the immediate, the intuitive, “the sole source of all evidence”. In his view, for Kant, “philosophy is a science from concepts”, for himself, “a science in concepts”. Concepts are gained by conceiving and fixing the “whole environing, intuitive, multifarious, meaningful world”.

Schopenhauer insists that Kant’s position chimes well with the practice of the sciences. These seek to conceptualize, systematize and overpower what is “endlessly multifaceted in the intuitive phenomena”. Since the concepts are few in number as compared to the vastness of individual intuitions, it is indeed reasonable to suppose that concepts have an independent status of their own. Schopenhauer has nothing
to object to the way Kant attempts to differentiate intuitions and concepts separately, but he complains about Kant’s withdrawal from investigation of the relation between the sensual and the reflective. This relation, he says, is only presupposed by Kant.¹⁴⁷⁰

Schopenhauer cannot but lament Kant’s “monstrous view that there is no knowledge of an object at all without thinking, without abstract concept, and that the intuition, since it is not thinking, is no knowledge and, as a whole, nothing but a mere affection of sensuality, a mere sensation!”’. Kant’s putatively moderate balance entails the intolerable view that “intuitions without concept are wholly empty; yet concepts without intuition are still something”. It is, says Schopenhauer, the other way round.¹⁴⁷¹

This much must do about Schopenhauer’s direct criticisms of Kant. At this point, it could be noted that the Kantian and the Schopenhauerian Anschauung or intuitus or das Intuitive/das Anschauliche, are introduced as strictly based on sensory experience. However, Schopenhauer’s notorious effort is to view the world from both sides, that is, as represented and as not-yet-represented. The latter viewpoint is that of the ’will’, of the immediate awareness of the non-reflective, bodily existence that is similar to the mode of being of the non-human world as a whole. This is Schopenhauer’s answer to Kant’s division between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Where Kant sees that the latter, the realm of the things-in-themselves, is inaccessible to the human subject, Schopenhauer’s peculiar Ding an sich, the Wille, is not entirely out of reach. There is hilarious modesty in the way Schopenhauer announces his renewal of the philosophical scene, his redefinition of the common vocabulary: “the concept of will gets a greater extension than what it has had so far”.¹⁴⁷²

Instead of trying to make clear how Schopenhauer goes about arguing his case for the double aspect world¹⁴⁷³, I shall introduce some of his meditations on concepts. He refers to the alliance of language and reason in the Greek logos. Language is what reason has to use in its various efforts covering “the mediation of truth” as well as “the spreading of error”, and the “collecting [Zusammenfassen] of the common in a concept [Begriff]”. This last function of the reason - concept-formation - is, in Schopenhauer’s view, the most important and, in the final analysis, the one and only.¹⁴⁷⁴

According to Schopenhauer, thinking or reflecting is an essentially retrospective business - Nachbildung, Wiederholung - where the intuitive primordial images of the world are tracked down. The world/will presents itself, the intuition represents the world, the concept represents the intuition. For Schopenhauer, then, “it is wholly fitting to call concepts the representations of representations”. This view involves the idea of a chain that links a concept to other concepts and, eventually, to an intuition. Schopenhauer notes that it may be that there is but one object that falls under a concept. His example of
this special case is the acquaintance of some town through geography alone. That sort of concept orients only towards a single object, yet it might fit for some other cities, too. This allows Schopenhauer to conclude that it is not abstraction that is distinctive of conceptual generality, but that generality is presupposed in concept.\textsuperscript{1475}

He offers two different ways to expose concepts. There is the logical analysis of the scope and sphere of a concept as connected to other concepts. This is closely related to syllogisms and judgments and it is not distinctly practical. Yet, it had been originally introduced, so Schopenhauer, to devise a method for resolving conflicts by pointing out the shared presuppositions of opposing parties. Then there is the sophistic “art of persuasion” that could be a mere technique of speech or a form of informal reasoning. Schopenhauer claims that it is the latter mode of conceptual thinking that best characterizes most scientific and philosophical arguments, since otherwise it would be hard to understand the revolutionary overturns of the established doctrines.\textsuperscript{1475} Beside this, Schopenhauer comes up with many other illustrations of the nature of conceptual thinking. To close this inquiry into Schopenhauer’s view of conceptuality, I would like to draw attention to his insights concerning art. He says that concept is not fruitful in the arts, because, in this realm, it is only capable of producing something “lifeless, inert, mannered”.\textsuperscript{1477} This view is extended when Schopenhauer provides his view of the genius. Whereas concepts give rise to talented and rational people, artists or thinkers who serve the daily needs of their contemporaries, the genius is fed by intuitions.\textsuperscript{1478}

Schopenhauer both accepts Kant’s challenge of investigating concepts and recognizes Kant’s failure to conceptualize concept. At the same time, if more indirectly, he receives Goethe’s challenge of doubting concepts’ power and seeking the boundaries of inconceivability. At this point it ought to be added, however, that Kant was by no means inattentive to this very boundary. The way he closes his book Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, shows that it was Kant’s, as well as Goethe’s and Schopenhauer’s, self-understanding of his work to pay tribute to what cannot be conceived or conceptualized: “And thus we do not conceive the practical necessity of the moral imperative but we do conceive its inconceivability, which is all that can reasonably be required from a philosophy that strives, as a matter of principal, to the boundary of human reason.”\textsuperscript{1479}

It is time to move on to F. A. Lange. Nietzsche had enjoyed his Geschichte der Materialismus soon after it had appeared in 1866 (KGB I/2, August 1866, 160). Instead of trying to articulate the endurance of the enthusiasm for Lange, I shall trace the key conceptual issues in the latter’s work. A very important point is presented almost right at the beginning of the book. Lange writes that the Greek atomists were the first to come up with a “fully clear concept” of matter. The “assertion [Aufstellung] of this concept” meant establishing full-blown materialism “as the first fully clear and consequent theory
of all phenomena”. Lange’s insight into the scientific and intellectual progress through conceptual innovation is evidently inspired by William Whewell.\textsuperscript{1480}

It is somewhat strange that Lange goes on to develop this insight in a way that implies an anti-conceptual stance. This is due to his polemics against the thing-it-self and his critique of the notion of definition. In any case, Lange says that it is a commonplace that one can well fix words by definitions, but that a fixed star stands still or moves irrespective of the ways it is defined. Progress in research compels the definitions to be made anew, since “the individual things orientate not according to our concepts, but our concepts must orientate according to the individual things confronted in perception”. In Lange’s words, definitions apply only to the “abstract self-created concepts”.\textsuperscript{1481}

Beginning from these kinds of concerns, Lange offers a reassessment of the major Greek classics. He sees in Socrates the initiator of “the phantom of the definitions” and the related belief in the inherent “congruity of word and thing”. In addition to this, he sees in Plato the father of “the treacherous method of supporting a hypothesis by a still more general hypothesis” and the related habit of “finding in the most abstract the greatest certainty”. Finally, Lange sees in Aristotle the trickster of the potential and the actual who established an all-embracing closed system of true knowledge.\textsuperscript{1482}

All this is not sheer devaluation, since Lange is not at all denying the achievements of the Ancient philosophical giants. What he is saying is that “philosophy stands never isolated from the spiritual life [\textit{Geistesleben}] of a given people”. This is why it is important to assess its broader cultural aspects, to regard the different philosophical world views (\textit{Weltanschauungen, Gesamtbild}) and their role in the big picture (\textit{Gesammtentwicklung der Menschheit}). From this perspective, one can criticize Socrates’s “main significance for the history of philosophy” as “his belief in knowing [\textit{Wissen}]”, in “the general essence [\textit{Wesen}] of things” and in cherishing “\textit{concepts} as opposed to mere perception [\textit{Wahrnehmung}]”. Plato, in turn, is scorned for paving the way for “that hierarchy of concepts where the emptiest in content is always accorded the highest place”. And Aristotle, for his part, was not really a great researcher of the natural world but, rather, the one who “made the wealth and the dispersion of the real universe into \textit{slaves of concepts}”.\textsuperscript{1483}

As does Schopenhauer, Lange emphasizes the role of language. He picks Locke to exemplify the critique of reason that is motivated, activated and realized through “a \textit{critique of language}”. This is, in Lange’s view, the most valuable part of Locke’s philosophy and marks “the important distinction between the purely logical and the psycho-historical elements in language”. It is only too bad that this distinction has not been recognized properly. Lange says that, “in the philosophical sciences”, it is the case that “concept and word are continually confused”.\textsuperscript{1484}
The theme of language is, however, not the one that is most developed in Lange’s book. It is, rather, the conviction extracted, in the main, from Holbach and Voltaire, that “[n]ature is the great whole” and the sole context for human aspirations and actions. What is at stake is the interplay of inner drives and the surrounding natural reality. According to Lange, whatever defective or unsatisfactory concepts we may have is due to the lacking experience. Nature itself is “the conception [Zusammenfassung] of divergent matter in all individual things at large” and the nature of a thing is “the conception [Zusammenfassung] of its properties and forms of efficacy [Wirkungsformen]”.1485

In this setting, “metaphysical concepts” such as ‘order’, ‘disorder’, ‘purpose’, not to speak about ‘miracle’, “belong only to our understanding”. Lange insists on the deep-rooted thinking habit that “[w]e conceive [fassen auf] those causes as intelligent that are effective [wirken], according to our kind, and regard other modes of efficacy as the play of blind hazard”. Yet, human beings are blinded by their ignorance of “the forces and laws of nature”. Metaphysical concepts arise from our organization and they have no real validity for the objective world.1486

Lange sees in Holbach’s system “the completion” and the far edge of materialism that, “after destroying all religions […] becomes itself a religion”. Quite like Schopenhauer, he praises Kant for reversing the order of consciousness, but sees the major flaw, in his philosophical practice, to be the “pedantry” of “endless defining of concepts”. Like Goethe, Lange holds that the Germans are “gradually liberated - the process is not complete - from the net of formulas of the metaphysical bandits”. This liberation has come about with “the recovery of our poetry, positive sciences and practical strivings”. And indeed, some pages further in the text, Lange is ready to favorably cite Goethe’s views. Significantly, he does this with a hint of the kind of caution that I recommended above in coming to terms with the Goethean view of conceptuality. Lange refers, not only to the Goethean call for an immanent, Spinozist nature/god but, as well, to the harmfulness of “philosophy, yet especially metaphysics” and to the advantages of “lively knowing [Wissen], experiencing, acting and poeticizing [Dichten]”.1487

At this point, the post-Kantian philosopher Afrikan Spir should be mentioned. His book Denken und Wirklichkeit (1873) was, in addition to Schopenhauer’s and Lange’s masterpieces, probably the most important philosophical book for Nietzsche. Spir dealt with not only Kant’s, Schopenhauer’s and Lange’s respective works but discussed also, say, the philosophies of Herbart, Taine, Bain, Mill and Spencer. The book opens by a metaphilosophical foreword: “To bring thought to clarity about itself is surely the nearest and the principal goal of philosophy”. In the subsequent introduction, Spir specifies the basic philosophical situation after the Kantian refutation of “metaphysical” or “dogmatic” thought: “Metaphysics wishes to be the teaching of the unconditioned itself”, while critical philosophy, “in as much as it also rises above experience”, is “the teaching of the concept of the unconditioned, of the
origin, meaning \[\text{Bedeutung}\] and the objective validity of this concept".\textsuperscript{1488}

This goes to show how crucial it was, after Kant, to philosophize about and with concepts. Spir not only writes, extensively, about the concepts (\textit{Begriff}) of the unconditioned, the real, unity, causality and substance. He also accords a whole chapter on the question of \textit{Vorstellung} in which he argues for the separation of the ‘belief-related representation’ (or idea) from ‘belief-independent’ image and sensation. For example, Spir criticizes Taine’s sensualism, although he accepts many of the insights provided by him, and praises Reid for differentiating between “suffering pain” and “thinking of pain”. He further criticizes Hume’s, Spencer’s, Bain’s and Herbart’s empirisms, has a more favorable view of its Millian variant, and mentions von Hartmann’s position as but a “curiosum” that deems “no refutation”.\textsuperscript{1489}

Despite all this, Spir does not define the concept of concept itself. If it was for no other reason, Spir’s and Kant’s respective failures to conceptualize concept would call for a look at the case of Hegel. Although it was precisely the dominance of Hegelian philosophy\textsuperscript{1490} that can be seen to have motivated Schopenhauer, Lange and Spir to go, by a backroad via Kant, further into the artistic or scientific other of abstract concepts, the young Hegel has been taken to have worked on the problem of reducing the barriers between life and concept\textsuperscript{1491}.

Hegel is the modern philosopher to have most forcefully advanced the notion of “conceiving \textit{concept as concept}”\textsuperscript{1492}. If it was the notorious context of “immanent rhythm of concepts”\textsuperscript{1493} in which this advancing took place, it must be seen that this is not all there is to Hegel’s philosophy of concepts. Even the seemingly trivial, in the sense of conventional, remark that is made, in the preface to the second edition of \textit{Enzyklopädie}, about the attempt, on the part of the author, to lighten up “the formal” and to “bring the abstract concepts closer to the common understanding, and the concrete representations, of them”\textsuperscript{1494} is an important indication of the resistance to abstractness for abstractness’s sake.

More important, however, Hegel offers “the philosophy of philosophy a secure place not beside philosophy but within it; and not in a special discipline, but in the unfolding of the whole”. This formulation is taken from Nicolai Hartmann who spoke of his temptation “to see Hegel himself” as a stage “on the way of philosophy”. According to Hartmann, Hegel’s uniqueness consisted in the vision where philosophical knowing is always knowing of something and, at the same time, knowing of itself. And, more specifically, to conceive this as a process of “advancing conceiving” where “the conceived is always followed by a conceiving of the concept”\textsuperscript{1495}.

In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel says as follows: “In contemporary times, there is surely \textit{no concept...}
that has done worse than the concept as such; the concept in and for itself [...]”. The reason for this is, so Hegel, that concept has been viewed as an “abstraction of the understanding”. Its concreteness has gone unnoticed, although concept is, precisely, “the unity of different determinations [Bestimmtheiten] and, thus, a concrete totality”. What needs to be grasped is the “reality of the concept” through its “ideal unity” of “all particular moments”. In short, Hegel underlines the “power of the concept”.  

Hegel is assumed to be the first philosopher to have used the term Begriffsgeschichte. Nietzsche’s colleague in the University of Basel, the philosophy professor Gustav Teichmüller, was, in turn, the one to combine the emphases of power-related conceiving and conceptual history in an explicit theory.

For Teichmüller, Geschichte der Begriffe is the effective weapon for philosophy to regain its ruling position and a secure place amongst the special sciences. It involves studying the “mastery [Herrschaft]” of by concepts, their “collisions” and “claims to power”. True philosophy deals with concepts, not with opinions or convictions, to the extent that it excludes not only religious but psychological and biographical, social and political data from philosophical developments. Individual concepts are ordered into a “system of coordinates”. Teichmüller expressly constructs his view against historicist and relativist ones, because the latter imply a standpoint-based subjectivism quite foreign to the interest of the Ganze constitutive for the conceptual history. Indeed, history of concepts is a specific way to preserve the Ancient conceptual treasures, to protect the Platonic and Aristotelian sources of philosophical wisdom, and to help understand the still “remaining and lively forms of thought”. Teichmüller also separates it from the much more extended ‘history of ideas’ that could not contribute to philosophical theory formation or philosophical self-knowledge but only to tell general cultural histories or give accounts of mythology.

If readers can agree on the importance of Schopenhauer for Nietzsche, they are immediately involved in making sense of both Kant and Goethe as well as of the immediate reactions to Kant in the different directions of Hegel and Lange, Spir and Teichmüller. Sure enough, brief illustrations on the respective thoughts of these thinkers do not exhaust that environment consisting of uncountable other contributions. I would hope, however, that they shed light on the initially multifaceted and contradictory situation in the late 19th century philosophy of concepts and, for that matter, the late 19th century concept of philosophy. The circumstances in which Nietzsche had to philosophize were confused, demanding and alluring.
IV.b  Critique of Concepts

Metaphysik gehört also bei einigen Menschen ins Gebiet der Gemüthsbedürfnisse, ist wesentlich Erbauung; andernseits ist sie Kunst, nämlich die der Begriffsdichtung; festzuhalten aber ist, daß Metaphysik weder als Religion noch als Kunst etwas mit dem sogenannten „An Sich Wahren oder Seienden“ zu thun hat. (KGB I/2, April-Mai 1868, 269).

IV.b.1 Early Criticisms

There is no ready-made framework for assessing Nietzsche’s conceptual potential. He never wrote a book called Einführung in der Begriffsbildung or Zur Philosophie der Begrifflichkeit, not even one by the name Der Begriff der Tragödie or Willen und Begreifen. Neither are there, for that matter, titles that would contain words like “metaphor”, “symbol”, “intuition” or some other conceivable substitute for concepts. Similar lack of conceptual language can be detected from the bibliography of Wittgenstein and yet this philosopher’s conceptual potential should be incontestable.

What may come as a surprise, however, is the way Nietzsche once spoke of his plans for a philosophical study: “Mein Thema ist “der Begriff des Organischen seit Kant” halb philosophisch, halb naturwissenschaftlich. Meine Vorarbeiten sind ziemlich fertig.” (KGB I/2, April-Mai 1868, 269).

Moreover, after his first book, Nietzsche would tell about his preparations for a new work to be titled as “Cicero und der romanische Begriff der Cultur” (KGB II/3, Februar 1874, 200). Since these citations may be taken to reflect the, perhaps no less surprising, consent to academic conventions, let them stand as little more than vague indications of conceptual concern.

However, the posthumously published essay “Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne” (1873) is a clear candidate for the work where Nietzsche’s engaging in the problematic of conceptuality is at its most forceful. In this piece of writing, philological sensitivity is invested in the study of the relationship of metaphor and concept, on the one hand, and between language and reality, on the other. Jean-Michel Rey speaks of a “fundamental text” for “a problematization of the sign”1599. By contrast, it is in this same text that Friedrich Weinert anchors his thematicization of Nietzsche’s nominalism that tended toward conceptualism1500. Further, Manfred Riedel discovers, in the text, the outset of “Nietzsche’s radical scepsis towards the “reason” in philosophy”1501, while Gianni Vattimo traces “the
beginning of a development of Nietzsche’s conception of decadence". In fact, the importance of this text has been stressed to the extent that Maudemarie Clark has to use a rather strong expression to convey her opposing view that it “belongs, according to my interpretation, to Nietzsche’s juvenilia”. In what follows, I shall go through the course of “Wahrheit und Lüge” and then interrogate its significance with the help of more commentary.

The essay opens with a concise story about a star, on which “kluge Thiere das Erkennen erfanden” only to die along with their planet shortly thereafter. It is said that this “Fabel” is a possible, yet insufficient illustration of the “Pathos” in the “Besitzer und Erzeuger” of reason. Reason is then depicted “als ein Mittel zur Erhaltung des Individuums” that operates chiefly by creating “Täuschung”. The text has it that “fast nichts unbegreiflicher ist, als wie unter den Menschen ein ehrlicher und reiner Trieb zur Wahrheit aufkommen konnte”. (N “UWLiaS” 1, KSA 1, 874-6).

There follows the remark that it was the need to “gesellschaftlich und heerdenweise existiren” that brought about the distinction between truth and falsity. Shared conventions were established in language to secure societal order and predictability. This involved the moral discrimination of liars from those who told the truth and acted accordingly. The question is posed, whether language is “der adäquate Ausdruck aller Realitäten?” The answer is in the negative, unless it be that something crucial is omitted. (N 1, KSA 1, 877-8.)

Language is arbitrary, since it does not touch the reality as it is, but only, with “die kühnsten Metaphern”, relations between things and humans. Ding an sich is “dem Sprachbildner ganz unfasslich und ganz und gar nicht erstrebenswerth”; in any case, it remains unknown. The primary metaphoric operation is the transposing of “Nervenreiz” to “Bild”. The secondary metaphor occurs when the image thus acquired is further transposed into “Laut”. These basic and ordinary moves are characterized as unwarranted and illogical reasonings between incommensurable spheres. (N 1, KSA 1, 878-9.)

It is from these considerations that “die Bildung der Begriffe” is approached in the text: ”jedes Wort wird sofort dadurch Begriff, dass er eben nicht für das einmalige ganz und gar individualisirte Urerlebniss, dem er sein Enstehen verdankt, etwas an Erinnerung dienen soll, sondern zugleich für zahllose, mehr oder weniger ähnliche, d.h. streng genommen niemals gleiche, also auf lauter ungleiche Fälle passen muss.” Words become concepts through generalization, “Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen”. What is deliberately forgotten, in this, is the individual and the efficacious (Wirklichen) in the primordial form (“Urform”). (N 1, KSA 1, 879-80.)

Yet, it is said that even the distinction between the individual and the general is but an
anthropomorphism. Truth is said to be a “bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauche einem Volke fest, canonisch und verbindlich denken”. Moreover, truths are but “Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen in Betracht kommen.” (N 1, KSA 1, 880-1.)

After this, it is observed that if it had, initially, been a social necessity to strive for truthfulness, now the customary, conventional forgetfulness goes for truth. In order to rise above the animals the human being subjects itself to abstractions: ”er leidet es nicht mehr, durch die plötzlichen Eindrücke, durch die Anschauungen fortgerissen zu werden, er verallgemeinert alle diese Eindrücke erst zu entfärbteren, kühleren Begriffen, um an sie das Fahrzeug seines Lebens und Handelns anzuknüpfen.” Vivid sensual metaphors or “anchauliche erste Eindrücke” give way to conceptual schemes with

eine pyramidal Ordnung nach Kasten und Graden aufzubauen, eine neue Welt von Gesetzen, Privilegien, Unterordnungen, Gränzbestimmungen zu schaffen, die nun der anderen anschaulichen Welt der ersten Eindrücke gegenübertritt, als das Festere, Allgemeinere, Bekanntere, Menschlichere und daher als das Regulirende und Imperativische. (N 1, KSA 1, 881-2.)

The “grosse Bau der Begriffe” conceals the way concept is but “das Residuum einer Metapher”, because the metaphor, “Grossmutter eines jeden Begriffs”, is itself effectively effaced. Every nation is said to have a “mathematisch zerteilten Begriffshimmel” with a “Begriffsgott” for each of its spheres. The human “Baugenie” can boast of building more ingeniously than the bees, because ”er aus dem weit zarteren Stoffe der Begriffe, die er erst aus sich fabriciren muss”. In this process, it is the “primitiven Metapherwelt” and the “originalen Anschauungsmetapher” that are forgotten. This goes together with a human self-oblivion or the forgetting of the “künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt”. (N 1, KSA 1, 882-3.)

Oblivion aside, the aesthetical dimension in experience is stressed. Related to this, the notion of “richtigen Perception” is denied, as long as it evokes the illegitimate notion of adequacy between subject and object. Even the first metaphoric relation, the one between nerves and images, is indicative of no necessary causality. It can be accounted for by a recourse to long traditions of collective interpretation, of being conditioned to same impulses. What is known to humans are not laws of nature as such, but their relational effects, in so far as these confirm to human form-giving or “Spinne spinnend” contribution, to the human way of conceiving in terms of time, space and number. At this point, it is said that even the aesthetical and metaphoric operations “bereits jene Formen voraussetzt,
also in ihnen vollzogen wird”. (N 1, KSA 1, 884-6.) If it was language born out of societal necessities that was the first instance of conceptualization, science has later been appointed to carry out this task:

The conceptual gives shelter from the “furchtbare Mächte” menacing scientists. It is said, namely, that the “Trieb zur Metapherbildung” is a “Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen” that is “nicht bezwungen und kaum gebändiget” by what gets constructed of the “verflüchtigen Erzeugnissen, den Begriffen”. The free metaphoric powers are at work “im Mythus und überhaupt in der Kunst”. These occasion confusion in the “Rubriken und Zellen der Begriffe”, since they bring in “neue Uebertragungen, Metaphern, Metonymien”. In other words, metaphoric, mythic, artistic activity is the one that “das starre und regelmässige Begriffsgespinnst” or “die vorhandene Welt des wachen Menschen so bunt unregelmässig folgenlos unzusammenhängend, reizvoll und ewig neu zu gestalten, wie es die Welt des Traumes ist.”

A reference is made to Pascal’s remark: ”Wenn ein Handwerker gewiss wäre jede Nacht zu träumen volle zwölf Stunden hindurch, dass er König sei, so glaube ich, sagt Pascal, dass er eben so glücklich wäre, als ein König welcher aller Nächte während zwölf Stunden träumte er sei Handwerker.” This gives the opportunity to say that the early Greeks were “durch das fortwährend wirkende Wunder, wie es der Mythus annimmt, in der That dem Träume ähnlicher als dem Tag des wissenschaftlich ernüchterten Denkers”. An observation is made of the human “unbesiegbaren Hang, sich täuschen zu lassen”. Free, no longer enslaved intellect is said to enjoy its ability to cheat “ohne zu schaden” and to celebrate its “Saturnalia”:

Jenes ungeheure Gebälk und Bretterwerk der Begriffe, an das sich klammernd der bedürftige Mensch sich durch das Leben rettet, ist dem freigewordenen Intellekt nur ein Gerüst und ein Spielzeug für seine verwegensten Kunststücke: und wenn er es zerschlägt, durcheinanderwirft, ironisch wieder zusammensetzt, das Fremdeste paarend und das Nächste trennend, so offenbart er, dass er jene Nothbehelfe der Bedürftigkeit nicht braucht, und dass er jetzt nicht von Begriffen sondern von Intuitionen geleitet wird. Von diesen Intuitionen aus führt kein regelmässiger Weg in das Land der gespenstischen Schemata, der Abstraktionen: für sie ist das Wort nicht gemacht, der Mensch verstummt, wenn er sie sieht, oder redet in lauter verbotenen Metaphern und unerhördten Begriffsfügungen, um wenigstens durch das Zertrümmern und Verhöhnen der alten Begriffsschranken dem Eindrucke der mächtigen gegenwärtigen Intuition schöpferisch zu
The essay is drawn to a close by a gaze into the “Zeitalter, in denen der vernünftige Mensch und der intuitive Mensch neben einander stehen” and, both of them in their respective ways, “begehren über das Leben zu herrschen”. The latter type of humanity is exemplified by the early Greeks who were able “eine Kultur gestalten, und die Herrschaft der Kunst über das Leben sich gründen”. Moreover, “es scheint so als ob in ihnen allen ein erhabenes Glück und eine olympische Wolkenlosigkeit und gleichsam ein Spielen mit dem Ernst ausgesprochen werden sollte”. The former type of humanity, in turn, is embodied by the Stoics who enjoyed less and suffered less, as any reasonable, “durch Begriffe sich beherrschende” people do. (N 2, KSA 1, 889-90.) What is one to make of all this?

There is the option of latching on the anti-conceptual passage about the questionable practice of making identical what is not identical. In the light that this interpretative option sheds on the issue, Nietzsche’s position would find its clear opposition in Karl Marbe’s book Die Gleichförmigkeit in der Welt (1916) where it is precisely the notion of things being similar or equal, or even ‘the same’ in respect of their ‘form’, that is defended in order to argue for proper logical, philosophical and scientific conceptualization. Individualbegriffen aside, all concepts assume “the uniformity of objects” falling under them. According to Marbe, this sort of consideration pertains to the cases of “similar phenomena” or “consonant traits” in the sphere of culture - for example, “the concept of the Renaissance” as the Gleichförmigkeit of “action [Verhalten]” in “a great plurality of cultural appearances and human aspirations” - as well as to geographical or mathematical or, ultimately, to cases of the objects of “each and every thing that can be described or meant”. He also mentions the ‘concept of concept’ as grounding itself to the very assumption of evenness.1504

Nietzsche, too, would seem to think that conceptualization involves the postulation of equable objects, yet unlike Marbe, he deplores this. According to Roger Scruton, Nietzsche, indeed, “accepted the doctrine that all description, being conceptual, abstracts from the individuality of what it describes” and “regarded the description of classification of the individual as peculiarly pernicious, in that it attributed to each individual only that ‘common nature’ which it was his duty to ‘overcome’.1505 As it happens, Nietzsche appears in Marbe’s book as well. His role is merely to exemplify a thinker whose most personal thought (that of the eternal recurrence of the same) was prefigured by ancient orientals, Pythagoreans, Blanqui and Le Bon, while it is Bergson who serves as the example of someone who tried to escape the essential sameness or invariance with his “unfruitful, unclear, metaphysical hypotheses [...] removed from positive science”.1506 Although Marbe does not explicitly put it forth, one might gather that he is, more or less sensationally, having Nietzsche to support the very idea of his
book, that is, to offer backup for the counter-Bergsonian notion of uniformity.

I do not wish to appeal to Marbe’s ontological speculation to make my point, yet I doubt that the main outcome of “Wahrheit und Lüge” is the attempt to rebut conceptualization on the grounds of the illegitimate equalization. All the more doubtful is to say that such a rebuttle would be the principal result of Nietzsche’s philosophical project as a whole. “Wahrheit und Lüge” is a text that is hard to pin down in terms of what in it is actually accepted, endorsed or subscribed to and what is repudiated or disqualified. What is much easier to say, albeit difficult to see for anyone interested in solely the positional strategies of defence and offence that philosophers follow in their works, is that conceiving is described and, possibly, reconceptualized. Next, a plurality of commentators will be consulted.

Clark opts for an epistemological reading. She says that it is a “very weak” position on the issue of truth that “Wahrheit und Lüge” proposes, and that this was rejected by the later Nietzsche. The position amounts to exhausting the concept of truth by linking it to confirmation to linguistic conventions. However, Clark says that, in this essay, not language but representation or perception is the key. It seems that there are “two incompatible denials of transcendent truth”. Most of the time, Nietzsche can be taken to follow Kant and state that the unknown X of things is invaluable, conceivable but unattainable. Yet, occasionally, he clearly assumes the position that denies the very possibility of something’s corresponding to things-in-themselves. The latter, “neo-Kantian or Nietzschean”, position is, so Clark, what Nietzsche was unable to advocate consistently, until he rid himself of the representationalist remnants from 1886 on.

Volker Gerhardt, in turn, says that Nietzsche held it to be “beyond doubt that human being overestimates its conceptual competence” and found even possible that “the humanity may be destroyed by its knowledge”. Peter Gasser claims that Nietzsche “articulates in a new way the classical relationship between concept and metaphor”. Jean-Michel Rey states that what is involved is a “new metaphoric take off” and a “certain conceptual using up” that has hardly been detected in the “philosophical discourse”. According to Alessandra Tanesini’s reading, “Nietzsche thinks metaphors as the stuff, which we have to manufacture ourselves, that constitutes the delicate conceptual material by means of which we constitute our knowledge”. She discovers, in Nietzsche, the “claim that language is something we produce for no unique purpose.” Tanesini concludes: ”Like spiders which spin their webs, we produce the conceptual material that makes up the world we know. It is only after our world has been produced that those purposes that a given linguistic usage might serve emerge as needs or drives.”

Slobodan Zunjić, for his part, finds that Nietzsche is attempting at a kind of balance between metaphors
and concepts. According to Zunjić, Nietzsche wishes to retain both the contact with philosophy and an undogmatic critical stance. Hence, he is not striving for a complete surmounting of conceptuality, nor a complete repression of the metaphorical, but a scheme-dependent view over any scheme at hand. In Sarah Kofman’s view, Nietzsche repeats, with his sequence of the various conceptual constructions, traditional metaphors of metaphor. Yet, Nietzsche’s juxtapositions are path breaking, because his “new use of metaphor revitalizes language by engaging in the work of the poet: he effects a transmutation of the norms of thought and action; he transforms the slave into a free man, “reality” into a dream.” She sees that Pascal’s “aphorism [...] metaphorically resumes and states en abîme the relationship which Nietzsche establishes [...] between concept and metaphor”. This is because Pascal’s words “undermined the opposition between dreaming and being awake by distinguishing them only according to their duration”. Opposition may be done away, but, as Kofman writes, “[t]he concept can serve as a metaphor for intuition, but intuition cannot double as a metaphor for the concept: whence the necessity, if one must give it verbal expression, of multiplying metaphors”.

At last, Andrzei Warminski is the one to offer two alternative readings. His first choice, the more traditional close reading of the text, winds up in an aporia: criticizing concepts can be no campaign for a “return” to immediacy, since metaphors, for all their richness, are without contact to the so-called real things in themselves, nor can the critique be a call to an artistic freeplay with metaphors that have already become concepts. Since this reading is a failure, Warminski opts for a “fabulatory” one. It finds its justification of the opening scene in Nietzsche’s essay. Seen in this light, the text becomes a fable where “literary reflexivity” rules over the argumentative structure.

Now, I find much that is instructive in these interpretations. “Wahrheit und Lüge” is a text that welcomes numerous readings. As for the traditional and novel features in it, one might say that Kant’s agnosticism, Schopenhauer’s representationalism and anti-representationalism, Goethe’s Urfähnomen and Lange’s insight into scientific concept formation as fabrication of fictions, are all mixed in. Kant’s view of aesthetics is, with the help of Schopenhauer and Goethe, brought to bear on Kant’s and Lange’s view of theoretical and scientific procedures. Apart from these, however, J. G. Herder’s work cannot be ignored. Herder writes, in his classic Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772), about the human inclination to self-expression: “Hence, the strong, bold metaphors in the roots of the words, transpositions from the sentiment to another such that the sense of the headword and, in particular, its derivatives, form a most colorful picture.” One learns that not only the idea of metaphors as the basis of language, or their multicolored aspect, but the very expression “bold metaphors” recur in Nietzsche.

Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to Herder when he says that “the generally metaphoric in language is recognized ever more thoroughly”. Gadamer’s own explication for the metaphor’s function is twofold:
metaphors abstract from the conditions of veritable language use; metaphors evoke the original field of sense. One can see this double function being emphasized in Nietzsche’s essay, too. One of the most important features of “Wahrheit und Lüge” is, I believe, that it includes so very many points about concepts that were to be incorporated, often enough in a remodeled fashion, in Nietzsche’s later books. These include, for example, the image of the spider’s web, the view of shared linguistic-conceptual order as a social necessity, the insight into the power-related use of the conceptual discriminations and the point about artists as following anti-conceptual strategies.

Another feature, related to this last point, deserves separate attention. The Greek free spirit is depicted as capable of playing with the concepts, decomposing and ironically recomposing them. It is claimed that, in this play involving strange conceptual connections and violations of the established barriers between concepts, the free spirit is being led by intuitions. Some such ability was needed to bring about the flourishing of the Greek culture. Much of the opposition between the conceptual and the metaphoric is undone, the end of the essay carefully left open and the Stoic position described without direct reproach. Yet, the exalted picture of the ability to exploit concepts without subjecting oneself to them strongly suggests that the “intuitive” type of human being is the one being advocated.

Crudely stated, there are three interrelated discussions: the one of the limits of conceptuality, the one of the nature of conceptuality and the one of the acting upon the received conceptuality. Discussion of the limits of conceptuality is related to the way the emergence of the human race and the cultural evolution is thematized. It is also related to the manner in which the text, in its appeal to fable or to interrupted historical developments, reflects the difficulties in conceiving concepts, in writing about writing. This discussion is also connected to the way the things-in-themselves are said to be inaccessible, incomprehensible, inconceivable, worthless. Humans are described as beings enjoying illusion and betrayal. In this respect, the “honest and pure drive to truth” is certainly something “inconceivable”.

As for the discussion of the nature of conceptuality, a view is put forth that word involves two metaphors: first, excitation in a nerve-end is translated into an image, second, the image is translated into a sound. This is said to be the illogical, illegitimate, forbidden, artistic procedure. Nevertheless, here comes, for the present purposes, the most important point of the essay: even the initial metaphoric process of perceiving and, a fortiori, the second metaphoric process of verbalizing, are seen as confirming to the structures of the human organization as moulded by the specific socio-historical environment. In other words, they are always already processes with at least proto-conceptual elements.

What might be termed the conceptualization proper is the process of the metaphor’s, the word’s becoming generalized for it to fit in numerous cases. Depending on its stage of development, in this
process, metaphors are shining, fresh, brisk, or worn out, ragged, beat. Somewhere along the line, original, primitive, primordial processes are forgotten and conventional agreements begin to seem natural and truthful. This is where the discussion of the practical challenge of conceptuality takes place. Differently stated, it is here that the unlikeness of the metaphoric, the intuitive, the perceptual, the artistic, all on the one hand, and the conceptual, on the other, makes better sense. Namely, what is being discriminated are the two basic collective and individual stances: re-enforcement and de-enforcement of the received conceptualizations. The crucial aspect of this distinction is, in my view, not the difference of being led by either intuitions or concepts. Despite the stress it can be taken to get in the text, it is not crucial for the reason that the difference between intuitions and concepts already was, more in keeping with Kant than with Schopenhauer, played down.

It is crucial because it features two disproportionate attitudes towards the metaphoric process of conceptualization. The supporters of the established concepts cling, on conceivable and rational grounds, to the sheltering powers of wakeful, yet dreamlike habits. By contrast, destroyers of convention, misusers of language, dissolvers of concepts, reactivate the metaphoric activity that is typical of dreams and make, reasonably indeed, novel conceptualizations possible. “Wahrheit und Lüge” is about the dynamics of conceptualization, about the rule, transformation and replacement of leading conceptions. What is original is that artistic activity and non-conventional use of language may shake the scientific conceptions that depend on orderly linguistic means. Next, Nietzsche’s lectures on rhetoric and Greek literature are discussed.

Henk Manschot says that Nietzsche’s contribution to rhetoric is not, as such, any major novelty. Gustav Gerber, for one, had already put forward the view Nietzsche was to cherish, namely, that “[a]ll words are, from the beginning, ’tropes’”. According to Manschot, what makes Nietzsche stand out is the way he “gives a philosophical dimension” to what was hitherto taken to have “only linguistic significance”. In Nietzsche’s lecture notes on rhetoric, the point is made that “[I]anguage does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance”. The distinction between the rhetorical and the unrhetorical is forcefully put in question. Each word being a trope and no proper meanings being available, all language is “figuration”. That is to say that language “never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic” that is the most prominent or the most outstanding. (N “LNoR” 106-7 & 125.)

For all the force of this relaxed way to declare the illogical elements of language, the undoing of the distinction between the literal and the figural is hardly the chief import of Nietzsche’s notes. To be sure, there is a sense in which all words are tropes so that there is no use for a recourse to proper significations somewhere beyond the figularity of speech. Yet, granted that the absolute opposition
between the literal and the figural is abolished, nothing is said against the usefulness and meaningfulness of these concepts in a more relative usage. In my view, the absoluteness is abolished just to make possible the investigation of the relationship between the putatively opposing sides. The first lengthy section of these notes is rubricated as “The concept of Rhetoric”. It is about that concept’s “extraordinary development”. For example, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is characterized as “purely philosophical and most influential for all later conceptual determinations of the concept”. With respect to Stoics, it is said that the relationship between the rhetorical and the dialectical came close to “an extended eristic”, but that this “conception is too narrow”. (N “LNoR” 96 & 100-1.) This is why it should not be that hard to see that the lecture notes themselves are occupied with conceptual matters. They are about rethinking the concept of rhetoric, of language, of meaning.

The situation is similar in Nietzsche’s lecture notes on ancient literature. The very first paragraph has the title “Vorbegriffe”. As far as I see, this is not only an indication of a traditional academic procedure, but a symptom of renovative aspirations. The text opens, namely, like this: ”Das Wort “Litteratur” ist bedenklich und unterhält ein Vorurtheil.” As it happens, the customary way to concentrate on the literary, at the cost of the oral, inheritance is questioned in the conceptual vocabulary:

   Der Unterschied ist außerordentlich, ob etwas zB. ein Drama für Leser oder für Hö rer und Schauer bestimmt ist und ob die gesammten Künstler der Sprache, wie im älteren Griechenland, eben nur an Hö rer und Schauer bei der Conception des Kunstwerks denken; ebenso wie auch dir Aufnahme des Kunstwerks beim Lesen oder durch Hö ren eine ganz verschiedene ist. (N “V” 1874/1875, KGB II/5, 7.)

Likewise, a later lecture course starts from the section boldly titled as “Die klassische Litteratur der Gr. als Erzeugniss einer unlitterar. Bildung”. The very first lines read: ”Hier sind mehrere Begriffe zu bestimmen: klass. Litt. der Griech. im Gegensatz zu einer unklassischen, unlitterar. Bildung im Gegensatz zu einer litterar. Bildung.” (N “V” 1875/1876, KGB II/5, 275.) Other lecture material is equally interesting from the concept critical viewpoint.

Nietzsche’s notes for the course on the “Gottesdienst der Griechen” begin with a remark of the overriding “Schönheit Pracht Mannigfaltigkeit Zusammenhang” of the Greek way to worship. It is said to be the “höchsten Erzeugnisse ihres Geistes”. A specific kind of thinking is read out from this instance of religiousness. It is said that, strictly logically, this type of thinking is best characterized as an “unreine Denken”. The thinking in question is not restricted to Greeks, but can be applied to all cases of “Denken der magie- und wundergläubigen Menschen”. Its characteristics are offered as follows:
These are fascinating elaborations. Unfortunately, they cannot be studied at length here. Something of the problematic will be reconsidered with respect to Dionysus (see IV.c.2), but now I merely identify the decisive point. The second one of the named and numbered features is alternatively phrased as the lack of “überhaupt jeder Begriff der natürlichen Causalität”. What is favored, in the kind of thought described, are the magic effects. On the other hand, it is said that a novel way of thinking is already anticipated: ” - sie dämmert bei den älteren Griechen allmählich in der Conception der über den Göttern thronenden ‘Ανάγκη, Μορφή”. (N “V” 1875/1876 & 1877/1878, KGB II/5, 366-7.)

Even more important than to appreciate the way the distinction between the conceptual and non-conceptual is relativized is to recognize the self-reflective stance of this undertaking. Before turning to the issues of “Ahnengrab”, “Unterpfund”, “Reinigung” and “nachahmende Handlung”, the initial points of the lecture notes, summed up above, are referred to as follows:

Bis jetzt haben wir nur das allgemeine Verhalten von Menschen gegen die Natur betrachtet, auf Grund dessen sie einen Cultus erzeugen. Nun wollen wir einige speziellere Ansätze zu einer solchen Erzeugung, die Conception bestimmterer Begriffsgruppen u. den von ihnen erregten Keim zu einer gottesdienstlichen Handlung erwägen. (N “V” 1875/1876 & 1877/1878, KGB II/5, 370.)

The key to understanding ancient actions and creations lies in better reconceptualizations. It seems that Nietzsche came to attend to the specifically conceptual in this type of interrogation. To be able to elucidate the received metaphysical, moral, psychological and social concepts, as he did from Menschliches onwards, Nietzsche could not do without the complex critical interplay of the historical and the conceptual. The following conclusion is at hand. Whatever Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Wahrheit und Lüge” may be taken to have entailed for concept acquisition, concept formation, conceptual reflections or concept of concept, it does not seem to have invalidated the conceptual strivings of Friedrich Nietzsche.
As it was hinted, the case for such a view may be weakened by saying that the radical implications of Nietzsche’s early essay are to be traced from anywhere else than his transactions as a university professor. Yet, if one appreciates, in “Wahrheit und Lüge”, the problematization of the relationship between metaphors and concepts, the glorious depictions of conceptual mastery, and the stress on the dynamics of deconceptualization and reconceptualization, one does not have to resort to explaining away Nietzsche’s continued use of the concept of concept as but academic conventionalism. In his early extra-academic strivings, as well, Nietzsche used conceptual language. One might note, how, in the “Fünf Vorreden” he gave to Cosima Wagner for Christmas present in 1872, conceptual language plays a significant role. There is talk of “den Begriff “Mensch” schöner fortzupflanzen, scorn for the “weichlichen Begriff der modernen Humanität”, as well as polemical meditation on “zwei Begriffen”: ”Würde des Menschen” and “Würde der Arbeit” (N “FV”, KSA 1, 756 & 783 & 763 & 775-6 & 767).

Furthermore, although the cycle of public speeches under that Nietzsche gave under the title “Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten” is scanty in explicit conceptual reflections, one can observe a disposition in the note books where the item number one reads: ”Bildung als exceptio. Über den Begriff einer Bildungsanstalt” (N 1871 9 [63], KSA 7, 298).

It seems clear that conceptuality is taken by Nietzsche as a problem to be investigated and as something to be developed. An early note points the way for reconceptualizing, not only some specific obsolete conceptions, but the concept of concept as well. There is, at least, an echo of dispositional determination, as it is said that a “genäcktes Symbol ist immer ein Begriff: man begreift, was man bezeichnen und unterscheiden kann” (N 3 [15] Winter 1869-70 - Frühjahr 1870, KSA 7, 64). In other words, any meaningful symbol is always already conceptual and concepts mark the ability to distinguish. It was seen how one of the key questions of the essay was whether its author somehow advocates the primacy of the non-conceptual over the conceptual. My preference for the reverse option is further corroborated by a short fragment from the winter 1872-73:

Unsre Anschauungen bereits durch Begriffe modifizirt.
Begriffe sind Relationen, nicht Abstraktionen.
(N 23 [43], KSA 7, 558.)

In the “Wahrheit und Lüge” essay, Anschauungen featured as “grandmothers” for concepts. Here, the modifying force of the grandchildren is said to reach back through two generations all the way to the grandma’s birth. Even if it was the case that “concepts” in their worn-out sense of aged and obsolete building blocks of reality are always embarrassed by fresh sensual experience, that experience is no pure, immediate, preconceptual contact. Sense-perception is always already conceptual. Thus, concepts present a necessity that is involved, among other things, in any attempt at making sense of the pre-
conceptual. Here, Nietzsche seems to follow the Kant of the first critique, rather than the Kant of the third critique or Schopenhauer or Goethe. Yet, Kant’s third critique, as well as Schopenhauer and Goethe, can be taken to have urged him to account for the unconceptual.

It was his radically new invention to use what he had adopted from different sources to come up with an ecological model of conception. From the negative point of view, it meant that, contrary to what positivist science claims, one cannot get rid of the “Netz von Illusionen” or the “Spinnengewebe”. From the more affirmative viewpoint, there is the hypothesis concerning the way “zwischen dem Begriiffe und Vorstellungen erzeugenden Intellekt und der anschaulichen Welt ein untrennbares Band ist”. (N September 1870 - Januar 1871 5 [33] & [99], KSA 7, 101-2 & 120.)

The “unsichere Stellung” or the “noch unentschiedenen Kampf” between “Begriiff und Anschauung” is the key (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [126], KSA 7, 184). It prompts the inquiry into the way “Begriiffe sind mehr” than pure intellectual reflection or “rein Spiegel” (N Winter 1870-71 - Herbst 1872 8 [41], KSA 7, 239), or into the human “Perceptionsapparat” and “Perceptionskräfte”. There is a chance for constantly improving “Wiederspiegelung” of the world, but there is more to it than that: “Der Spiegel selbst ist aber nichts ganz Fremdes und dem Wesen der Dinge Ungehöriges, sondem selbst langsam entstanden als Wesen der Dinge.” (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [157] & [158], KSA 7, 468-9.)

Things are apprehended by humans according to their perceptual capacititis that themselves are part of the so called reality. Simultaneous imperative of reflection and self-reflection point away from the notion of the isolated conceptualizer conceptualizing the not-yet-conceptualized. It points toward the process of conceptualization where conceptualizing develops from “Bildung der Gestalt” in the event of crystallization (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [142], KSA 7, 465) all the way to human concepts, while this process is also conceptualized and, as such, under the constraints of the human perceptual-conceptual powers.

IV.b.2 Later Criticisms

The critical attitude toward concepts that was met in Nietzsche’s “Wahrheit und Lüge”, proves to be persistent and characteristic. In a note from 1885, it is said that “Begriiff ist eine Erfindung, der nichts ganz entspricht, aber Vieles ein Wenig”. While these common denominators make up an “erfundenen starren Begriifls- und Zahlenwelt”, they nonetheless, simultaneously, equip humans with “ein Mittel, sich ungeheuerer Mengen von Thatsachen wie mit Zeichen zu bemächtigen und seinem Gedächtnisse einzuschreiben”. The “Zeichen-Apparat” that effects the “Reduktion der Erfahrungen auf Zeichen” is “höchste Kraft” at the disposal of human agency. (N April-Juni 1885 34 [131], KSA 11, 464.)
Again, conceptual mastery is hailed, while the defects in the machinery are also implied. One can hardly begin to draw conclusions for Nietzsche’s subscribing to pro-conceptual or anti-conceptual positions. What is at stake is an attempt to critically conceptualize conceptualization. In what follows, other notes on concepts from the 1880’s will be considered. In one fragment, Plato and Aristotle appear as sharing the “Mißverständniß” of starting “energisch […] das Reich der Begriffe festzustellen”. The misunderstanding may be taken to lie in i) the imagining of a specific sphere of existence for concepts, ii) the excessively rigorous defining of concepts so that nothing quite matches these definitions or iii) both. Either way, a further fragment, from the same period, says bluntly: “Kampf gegen Plato und Aristoteles.” (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [171] & [387], KSA 11, 194 & 253.) By calling it “blunt”, I am not saying that the note simply expresses Nietzsche’s intentions. It could as well be an analysis of later, perhaps especially modern philosophical, developments or whatever.

Nonetheless, it is said, in another fragment, that “Plato und alle Philosophie” have “keinen Begriff” of the “historische Sinn” (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [393], KSA 11, 254). Later, Plato is related to Kant and Leibniz as ignoring ’the becoming’ “auch im Geistigen”, whereas “der große Umschwung” of “Lamarck und Hegel” meant conceiving everything “historisch durch und durch”. Elsewhere, Plato is called dogmatic. Still later, it is implied that it was not ignorance but tactics that lead him to present the “angelernten begriffe als göttlichen Ursprungs” as well as the “volkstümlichen Werthschätzungen als die ewigen und unvergänglichen”, yet only after an attempt to “neu aufzuputzen” them for “dialektischen Freude”. So, “Plato war gewiß nicht so beschränkt, als er die Begriffe als fest und ewig lehrte: aber er wollte, daß dies geglaubt werde.” (N April-Juni 1885 34 [73], [25], [136] & [179], KSA 11, 442, 429, 466 & 481.)

So, as it is only to be expected, Plato’s conceptualizations are not simply attacked. One note reads as follows:

NB. Was Plato und im Grunde alle Nach-Sokratiker thaten: das war eine gewisse Gesetzgebung der Begriffe: - sie stellten für sich und ihre Jünger fest “das und das soll unter uns bei diesem Worte gedacht und gefühlt werden”: - damit lösten sie sich am bestimmtesten aus ihrer Zeit und Umgebung los. Es ist dies eine der Arten feinen Ekels, mit dem sich höhere, anspruchsvollere Naturen gegen die unklare Menge und ihren Begriffs-Wirrwarr empören. (N April-Juni 1885 34 [84], KSA 11, 446.)

Were Plato and Aristotle - their difference does not come out of these meditations, while the emphasis is constantly on the former - misguided or not, at least the philosophical tradition has misunderstood them. It has not been seen that they had reasons for their fixations that, in turn, ought not to be taken as recommendations for the kind of philosophical practices that systematically devalue experience and
succumb to received conceptions. The argument is encapsulated in another note from between April and June 1885:

Die Philosophen 1) hatten von jeher das wunderbare Vermögen zur contradiction in adjecto. 2) sie trauten den Begriffen ebenso unbedingt als sie den Sinnen mißtrauten: sie erwogen nicht, daß Begriffe und Worte unser Erbgut aus Zeiten sind, wo es in den Köpfen sehr dunkel und anspruchlos zugieng. NB. Was am letzten den Philosophen aufdämmert: sie müssen die Begriffe nicht mehr sich nur schenken lassen, nicht nur sie reinigen und auffühlen, sondern sie allererst machen, schaffen, hinstellen und zu ihnen überreden. Bisher vertraute man im Ganzen seinen begriffen, wie als einer wunderbaren Mitgift aus irgendwelcher Wunder-Welt: aber es waren zuletzt die Erbschaften unserer fernsten, ebenso dümmssten als gescheitesten Vorfahren. Es gehör diese Pietät gegen das, was sich in uns vorfindet, vielleicht zu dem absolute Scepsis gegen alle überlieferten Begriffe noth (wie sie vielleicht schon einmal Ein Philosoph besessen hat - Plato: natürlich hat er das Gegenheil gelehrt - - ) (N April-Juni 1885 34 [195], KSA 11, 486-7.)

Received and more or less internalized conceptions are to be criticized by making them “purer” and “clearer”, while this criticism is also apt to enhance novel conceptualizations. It is not a very bold claim to say that Nietzsche’s own philosophical efforts are attempts to intimate and initiate conceptual critique and critical conceptual history. Accordingly, there is a considerable temptation to find something very confessional, if not programmatic, in the following fragment: ”Wir haben fast alle psychologische Begriffe, an denen die bisherige Geschichte der Psychologie - was heißt der Philosophie! - hing, annullirt”. Immediately after these words, a numer of denials are mentioned, including those of existence of will, consciousness “als Einheit und Vermögen”, thinking and causality. (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [13], KSA 13, 414.)

Yet, whether the concepts of the philosophical tradition become annulled or nullified in Nietzsche’s work is a question worth asking. What is easier to say is that Nietzsche’s writings contain a specifically conceptual critique on all of his main objects of criticism. Already in a note from 1885, Wagner’s rise to fame is described by characterizing the master’s young fans in terms of “Sumpf: Anmaßung, Deutschthümelei und Begriffswirrwarr im trübsten Durcheinander”. Moreover, a specific “Begriff “Künstler”“ is criticized, too. (N August-September 1885 41 [2], KSA 11, 675-7.) Later on, it was an aesthetic current associated with Wagner, Baudelaire and Poe that came to be attacked for its “heilige Begriffs-Dunst von Ideal, von Drei-Achtel-Katholicismus” (N Oktober 1888 23 [2], KSA 13, 600-1.)

The function of concept criticism may perhaps be best appreciated if this scorn for conceptual confusion is compared to the way Plato is said to have gone so far in polishing his conceptions that he “maß den Grad Realität nach dem Werthgrade ab und sagte: je mehr “Idee”, desto mehr Sein. Er drehte den Begriff “Wirklichkeit” herum und sagte: “was ihr für wirklich haltet, ist ein Irrthum, und wir kommen, je
näher wir der ‘Idee’ kommen, um so näher der Wahrheit’” (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [2], KSA 12, 253). Lange’s voice is clearly audible here. Where Plato is connected with the perennial “abschreckliche und pedantische Begriffskauberei” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [375], KSA 13, 169), Kant, for his part, is varyingly called “Phantast des Pflichtbegriffs” (N Herbst 1887 9 [178], KSA 12, 442), “Fanatiker des Formalbegriffs “du sollst”“ (N Herbst 1887 10 [11], KSA 12, 460) and “eine Begriffsmaschine” (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [50], KSA 13, 442).

This goes to imply that concept critical approach may be directed to both the instances of lacking conceptual rigor and the instances of excessive faith in conceptual rigor. In some of the note book assaults, the two cases seem to merge with one another, as in a fragment about “edle Müßiggänger, Tugendhafte, Träumerische, Mystiker, Künstler, Dreiviertel-Christen, politische Dunkelmänner und metaphysische Begriffs-Spinnen” (N Juni-Juli 1885 38 [7], KSA 11, 605).

This last lead to metaphysics supplies enough motivation to differentiating the scope of Nietzsche’s criticisms, since metaphysical conceptions are subjected to almost constant ridicule: "Gerade die Philosophen wissen sich am schwersten vom Glauben frei zu machen, daß die Grundbegriffe und Kategorien der Vernunft ohne Weiteres schon ins Reich der metaphysischen Gewißheiten gehören: von Alters her glauben sie eben an die Vernunft als an ein Stück metaphysischer Welt selbst” (N Frühjahr 1888 6 [13], KSA 12, 237).

The point here is that philosophers suffer from the shadow of theology: “Das ganze absurde Rest von christlicher Fabel, Begriffs-Spinneweberei und Theologie geht uns nichts an” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [55], KSA 13, 27). The needed improvement from the part of scientific concepts was also questionable, because the sheer oppositionalism drove them to the extreme that was, after all, hardly distinguishable from the religious model. Scientists, “[u]m ihre Gegnerschaft zu Ehren zu bringen, brauchten sie im Übrigen einen Apparat nach Art derer, die sie angriffen: - sie affichirten den Begriff “Wahrheit” ganz so unbedingt, wie ihre Gegner, - sie würden Fanatiker, zum Mindesten in der Attitüde, weil keine andere Attitüde ernst genommen wurde. (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [52], KSA 13, 443.)

Moral considerations are another source of conceptual confusion. In the early 1888, a note book entry has the following passage: ”Es kommt in der ganzen Entwicklung der Moral keine Wahrheit vor: alle Begriffs-Elemente, mit denen gearbeitet wird, sind Fiktionen, alle Psychologica, an die man sich hält, sind Fälschungen; alle Formen der Logik, welche man in dies Reich der Lüge einschleppt, sind Sophismen. Was die Moral-Philosophen selbst auszeichnet: das ist die vollkommene Absenz jeder Sauberkeit, jeder Selbst-Zucht des Intellekts: sie halten “schöne Gefühle” für Argumente: ihr “geschwellter Busen” dünt ihnen der Blasebalg der Gottheit…” Another note says, with respect to the

Moral thinking can become an object of conceptual criticism by virtue of its general form: ”Daß das moralische Urtheil, sofern es sich im Begriffen darstellt, sich eng, plump, armselig, beinahe lächerlich ausnimmt, gemessen an der Feinheit desselben Urtheils, sofern es sich in Handlungen, im Auswählen, Abweisen, Schaudern, Lieben, Zögern, Anzweifeln, in jeder Berührung von Mensch und Mensch darstellt” (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 1 [157], KSA 12, 46). On the other hand, individual moralist conceptions are no less harshly criticized: ”Laster ist eine ziemlich willkürliche Begriffs-Abgrenzung, um gewisse Folgen der physiologischen Entartung zusammenzufassen” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [113], KSA 13, 290).

There is a crucial note from the autumn of 1887 that is worth citing at length, since it best captures the sense of Nietzsche’s concept critical studies of the ruling cultural force in the West:

NB Verstecktere Formen des Cultus des christlichen Moral-Ideals - Der weichliche und feige Begriff “Natur”, der von den Naturschwärern aufgebracht ist (abseits von allen Instinkten für das Furchtbare, Unerbittliche und Cynische auch der “schönsten” Aspekte) eine Art Versuch, jene moralisch-christliche “Menschlichkeit” aus der Natur herauszulesen, - der Rousseausche Naturbegriff, wie als ob “Natur” Freiheit, Güte Unschuld, Billigkeit, Gerechtigkeit Idyll sei... immer Cultus der christlichen Moral im Grunde... 
[...] der weichliche und feige Begriff “Mensch” à la Comte und nach Stuart Mill womöglich gar Cultus-Gegenstand... Es ist immer wieder Cultus der christlichen Moral unter einem neuen Namen...
[...] der weichliche und feige Begriff “Kunst” als Mitgefühl für alles Leidende, Schlechtweggekommene [...] immer wieder der Cultus des christlichen Moral-Ideals (N 10 [170], KSA 12, 558.)

Christian morality continues to influence all conceptualization and, hence, all perceiving, all experience. Everything tends to be interpreted in accordance with the fundamentals of this tradition. This is even worse that it may seem, since it is said, under the title “Zur Geschichte des Gottesbegriffs”, that “der christliche Gottesbegriff - Gott als Krankengott, Gott als Spinne, Gott als Geist” is “der niedrigste Gottesbegriff, der auf Erden erreicht wurde: er stellt den Höhepunkt der décadence in der absteigenden Entwicklung der Gottesidee dar.” (N Mai-Juni 1888 17 [4], KSA 13, 523-5.)

It follows that the more targeted blows on specific notions of Christianity, as introduced by especially St. Paul, are less decisive (see N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [275] & [281] & [281] & [295], KSA 13, 104 & 107-9 & 115; September-Oktober 22 [4], KSA 13, 585). What counts are the implications of the hierarchy and the structure in this successful reconceptualization: ”Die Heiligkeit, leer, antithetisch,

Nietzsche’s criticisms of god deserve special attention here. One will see, namely, that they are distinctively conceptual. The one about the spiders that was quoted above is, then, no exception. In a note that may be surprising to find in the papers of one of the most famous misogynists in the world history, the following point is pronounced: ” - die Auslegung unserer Erlebnisse als providentieller Winke einer gütilgen, erziehenden Gottheit, auch unserer Unglücksfälle: - Entwicklung des väterlichen Gottesbegriffs, von der patriarchalischen Familie aus” (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 1 [5], KSA 12, 11). To complement this, it may not be altogether futile to quote a later fragment about “”Sohn” in den semitischen Sprachen” that is said to be “ein äußerst vager, freier Begriff” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [389], KSA 13, 183).

A nominalist type of criticism is rehearsed in the notes from the fall of 1887: ”( - was geht uns Gott, der Glaube an Gott noch an! “Gott” heute bloß ein verbliches Wort, nicht einmal mehr ein Begriff!). In another one from the same period, it is said that “[e]ntfernen wir die höchste Güte aus dem Begriff Gottes: sie ist eines Gottes unwürdigt. Entfernen wir insgleichen die höchste Weisheit”. (N 9 [18] & 10 [90], KSA 12, 346 & 507.)

Both fragments leave open the possibility of reconceiving ‘god’. Soon, the chance is taken up as follows: ”Die einzige Möglichkeit, einen Sinn für den Begriff “Gott” aufrecht zu erhalten, wäre: Gott, nicht als treibende Kraft, sondern Gott als Maximal-Zustand, als eine Epoche…” (N 10 [138], KSA 12, 535.) Later, it is explicated that “[d]er klassische Geschmack und der christliche Geschmack setzen den Begriff “göttlich” grundverschieden an; und wer den ersteren im Leibe hat, der kann nicht anderes als das Christenthum als foeda superstition und das christliche Ideal als eine Carikatur und Herabwürdigung des Göttlichen zu empfinden” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [95], KSA 13, 44).

On the basis of this, it should not be so bewildering to meet, in Nietzsche’s texts, both harsh scorn and fresh intimations for the concept of god. A conceptual critique has its affirmative dimension even in the context of the most devastatingly attacked conceptions. For example, it is said that “[i]n praxi hat sich derselbe Gott der höchsten Kurzichtigkeit, Teufelei und Ohnmacht erwiesen: woraus sich ergiebt, wie viel Werth seine Conception hat” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [122], KSA 13, 58-9). Still more crudely, it is inscribed that “der Begriff “Gott” stellt eine Abkehr vom Leben, eine Kritik, eine Verachtung selbst des Lebens dar...” (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [42], KSA 13, 436).
The note "Zur Geschichte des Gottesbegriffs" has additional points to be considered. It is exclaimed that “[w]ie kann man, mit der Einfalt des geistreichen Renan, die Fortentwicklung des Gottesbegriffs vom Gott Israels zum Israel zum Inbegriffs-Gott alles guten einen Fortschritt nennen!” Further exclamations read: "Zwei Jahrtausende beinahe: und nicht ein einziger neuer Gott! Sondern immer noch und wie zu Recht bestehend, wie win ultimatum und maximum der gottbildenden Kraft, des creator spiritus im Menschen, dieser erbarzungswürdige Gott des europäischen Monoto-theismus! dies hybride Verfallsgebilde aus Null, Begriff und Großpapa, in dem alle Décadence-Instinkte ihre Sanktion erlangt haben!...” All this is contrasted, through a reference to Zarathustra, to an alternative insight about a dancing god: "Die leichten Füße gehören vielleicht sogar zum Begriffe “Gott”“ (N Mai-Juni 1888 17 [4], KSA 13, 524-6; cf. Frühjahr 1888 15 [5], 403.)

In the light of this, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity and religion in general is even distinctly conceptual. This seems to come down to the way ‘god’ has been the regierende or the ruling, reigning, directing, guiding and prevailing concept of practically each and every culture or society. It is by way of god that people have conceived themselves, their thoughts and actions. It is only on the basis of what Nietzsche assesses as the harmful turn in the very business of conceptualization that his critique of individual religious concepts make sense: “Man verdankt dem Christenthum: / die Einmischung des Schuld- und Strafbegriffs in alle Begriffe” (N Herbst 1887 10 [7], KSA 12, 458); “die ganze Welt-Conception ist beschmutzt mit der Straf-Idee...” (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [42], KSA 13, 436.)

So, under the rubric "Meine fünf „Neins”, the very first item is “[m]ein Kampf gegen das Schuldgefühl und die Einmischung des Strafbegriffs in die psychische und metaphysische Welt, insgleichen in die Psychologie, in die Geschichts-Ausdeutung. Einsicht in die Vermoralisierung aller bisherigen Philosophie und Werthschätzung”. The item number two includes the point of the “Gefährlichkeit des christlichen Ideals“ as hiding “in seinen Werthgefühlen, in dem, was des begrifflichen Ausdrucks entbehren kann: mein Kampf gegen das latente Christenthum (z.B. in der Musik, im Socialismus)”. (N Herbst 1887 10 [2], KSA 12, 453.)

An earlier fragment already has it that “[w]elches Freiheitsgefühl liegt darin, zu empfinden, wie wir befreiten Geister empfinden, daß wir nicht in ein System von “Zwecken” eingespannt sind! Insgleichen, daß die Begriffe “Lohn” und “Strafe” nicht im Wesen des Daseins ihren Sitz haben!” (N Herbst 1886 - Herbst 1887 2 [206], KSA 12, 167-8). Still another fragment says that the “Begriff Schuld als nicht bis auf die letzten Gründe des Daseins zurückreichend, und der Begriff Strafe als eine erzieherische Wohltat, folglich als Akt eines guten Gottes” (N Herbst 1887 10 [151], KSA 12, 541).

Christian way of conceiving has, thus, profound consequences for any act of conceiving anything in its
sphere of influence. In one of Nietzsche’s thought-experiments, there is a combined historical and analytical hypothesis for the conceptual malaise. The analytical aspect of the issue comes out from the way “die Entsninnlichung” is handled together with Wagnerian resignation. One may perhaps take this comparison to amount to the view that both optimist philosophers excessively faithful to conceptual fixations and pessimist artists opting for a release from the sensual affectivity are to be subjected to conceptual criticism. As for the historical dimension, it is said that the tradition of taking-away-the-sensual goes from Buddhism through Egyptians and Pythagoreans to the Jewish religion and Platonic philosophy. (N April-Juni 1885 34 [90], KSA 11, 449-50.)

This is the basis for the genealogical investigations that may utilize, for example, a legal viewpoint instead of the ethical in order to go about making sense of some fundamental concepts. Hence, the eradication of punishment as a universal way to conceptualize can be related to the more local issue of reshaping the very concept of punishment. One of Nietzsche’s fragments says that the “Verbrechen gehört unter den Begriff: “Aufstand wider die gesellschaftliche Ordnung”, Man “bestraft” einen Aufständigen nicht: man unterdrückt ihn. [...] Man soll den Begriff der Strafe reduzieren auf den Begriff: Niederwerfung eines Aufstandes, Sicherheitsmaßregeln gegen den Niedergeworfenen (ganze oder halbe Gefangenschaft) Aber man soll nicht Verachtung durch die Strafe ausdrücken: ein Verbrecher ist jedenfalls ein Mensch, der sein Leben, seine Ehre, seine Freiheit risquiert - ein Mann des Muths.” (N Herbst 1887 10 [50], KSA 12, 478-9.)

Now, apart from the process of conceptualization, the concept of the conceiver is criticized, too. In the fall of 1887, there is a reference, in Nietzsche’s note books, to the “fader und leerer Begriff der christlichen „Seligkeit”” (N 9 [28], KSA 12, 349). Later that fall, an account for the provenance of this conception is sketched as follows: ”Die Leidenden, Verzweifelten, An-sich-Mißtraurischen, die Kranken mit Einem Wort, haben zu alle Zeiten die entzückenden Visionen nöthig gehabt, um es auszuhalten (der Begriff “Seligkeit” ist dieses Ursprung)” (N 10 [168], KSA 12, 557).

Another note supplies further articulation: ”NB. NB. “der Mensch, unschuldig, müßig, unsterblich, glücklich” - diese Conception der “höchsten Wünschbarkeit” ist vor allem zu kritisiren. / Warum ist die Schuld, die Arbeit, der Tod (und, christlich geredet, die Erkenntniß…) wider die höchste Wünschbarkeit? / Die faulen christlichen Begriffe “Seligkeit” “Unschuld”, “Unsterblichkeit”“. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [267], KSA 13, 100.)

The question is still pressing in the early 1888. In a note that consists of a series of diatribes against Christian conceptions, including the concepts of punishment and guilt and the “verrückter Begriff” of the “Gleichheit der Seelen vor Gott”, it is said as follows: ”Vom Christenthum her sind wir an den
abergläubischen Begriff der “Seele” gewöhnt, an die “unsterbliche Seele”, an die Seelen-Monade, die eigentlich ganz wo anders zu Hause ist und nur zufällig in diese oder jene Umstände, ins “Irdische” gleichsam hineingefallen ist, “Fleisch” geworden ist” (N 15 [30], KSA 13, 424-5; cf. November 1887 - März 1888 11 [153], KSA 13, 72 for the equality before god.)

As this last quotation makes clear, the reason for the decisiveness of Nietzsche’s conceptual criticisms of the soulfulness is their linkage with his all-important critique of the subject. Another fragment reads: ”- “Seele” zuletzt als “Subjektbegriff”“ (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 1 [11], KSA 12, 13). As early as in August/September 1885, there is a note with an appeal to Kant’s critique of subject. The opening passage goes like this: "Was thut denn im Grunde die ganze neuere Philosophie? sie macht, versteckt oder offen, ein Attentat auf den alten Seelenbegriff - das heißt auf die Grundlage des Christenthums, auf das “Ich”: sie ist antichristlich im feinsten Sinne” (N 40 [16], KSA 11, 635).

This is not to say that the philosophical conception of self would be unproblematical. This is how the opposition to the Cartesian model is expressed in one of Nietzsche’s notes. The stress on the specifically conceptual root of the matter is plainly visible:

> (N August-September 1885 40 [24], KSA 11, 640-1.)

I take this passage to be very helpful in trying to figure out Nietzsche’s affirmative contribution to conceptualizing. At this stage, however, its critical edge is the more urgent thing to appreciate. The rejection of simplistic transparence and the defence of greater complexity is in line with what will be an increasingly dominant feature in Nietzsche’s criticisms of the subject, namely, the resistance to, and the study of, thing-like unities and illegitimate ontological assumptions. One fragment from the fall of 1885 goes against mechanist explanations of all kind, “[g]egen Kant-Laplace” and “[a]lso gegen den absoluten Begriff “Atom” und “Individuum”!” (N 43 [2], KSA 11, 701).

From between the fall of 1885 and the early 1886, there originates a note that illustrates the route from the ’soul’ to the ’subject’, and from the ’subject’ to substantial atomistic unities: ”die Annahme von Atomen ist nur eine Consequenz vom Subjekts- und Substanz-Begriff: irgend wo muß es “ein Ding”
geben, von wo die Thätigkeit ausgeht. Das Atom ist der letzte Abkömmling des Seelenbegriffs (N 1 [32], KSA 12, 18; cf. [43], 20).


What it all boils down to, what is “unbedingt zu bekämpfen”, is the “elenden Seelen-Metaphysik”. The “falsche Begriff “Individuum”“ reveals the defective theory-practice that ushers the “Umstände, aus denen ein Mensch wächst, von ihm zu isolieren und ihn, wie eine “seelische Monade”, gleichsam bloß hineinsetzen oder fallen lassen”. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [156], KSA 13, 74.)

This is a strong case for an ecological conception of conception. It has serious consequences for a plethora of philosophical concepts: ”das “Ding an sich” […] im Grunde die Conception eines “Subjekts an sich” ist. Aber wir begriffen, daß das Subjekt fingirt ist. Der Gegensatz “Ding an sich” und “Erscheinung” ist unhaltbar; damit aber fällt auch der Begriff “Erscheinung” dahin.” As if this was not enough, the note goes on to say that “[e]s giebt keine Gegensätze: nur von denen der Logik her haben wir den Begriff des Gegensatzes - und von denen aus fälschlich in die Dinge übertragen.” Moreover, “[g]egen wir den Begriff “Subjekt” und “Objekt” auf, dann auch den Begriff “Substanz” - und folglich auch dessen verschiedene Modificationen z.B. “Materie” “Geist” und andere hypothetische Wesen “Ewigkeit und Unveränderlichkeit des Stoffes” usw.” (N Herbst 1887 9 [91], KSA 12, 383-4.)

All this is intimately related to the critique of causality. Two respective fragments from the note books of the fall 1885/the early 1886 say that “- die Bewegungen sind nicht “bewirkt” von einer “Ursache”: das wäre wieder der alte Seelen-Begriff! - sie sind der Wille selber, aber nicht ganz und völlig!”; “NB. Der Glaube an Causalität geht zurück auf den Glauben, daß ich es bin, der wirkt, auf die Scheidung der “Seele” von ihrer Thätigkeit. Also ein uralter Aberglaube!” (1 [37] & [38], KSA 12, 19.)

A later fragment provides further elaboration: “Thatsächlich stammt der Begriff “Ursache und Wirkung”, psychologisch nachgerechnet, nur aus einer Denkweise, die immer und überall Wille auf Wille wirkend glaubt, - die nur an Lebendiges glaubt und im Grunde nur an “Seelen” (und nicht an Dinge)” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [139], KSA 12, 135).

In the same attunement, another note on the concept of ’cause’ says that “psychologisch kommt uns der ganze Begriff aus der subjektiven Überzeugung, daß wir Ursache sind”. Explanation reads that “[W]ir
haben unser Willens-Gefühl, unser “Freiheits-Gefühl”, unser Verantwortlichkeits-Gefühl und unsere Absicht von einem Thun in den Begriff “Ursache” zusammengefaßt: / : causa efficiens und finalis in der Grundconception Eins.” Accordingly, “[d]as Ding, das Subjekt, der Willem, die Absicht - alles inhärit der Conception “Ursache”:- An atom is said to be a “hinzugedachtes “Ding” und “Ursubjekt”“: Here, the enlightening tone takes the upper hand: “Endlich begreifen wir, daß Dinge, folglich auch Atome nichts wirken: weil sie gar nicht da sind... daß der Begriff Causality vollkommen unbrauchbar ist.” The point being made is that “ein “Ding” ist eine Summe seiner Wirkungen, synthetisch gebunden durch einen Begriff, Bild... Es gibt weder Ursachen, noch Wirkungen. Sprachlich wissen wir davon nicht loszukommen.” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [98], KSA 13, 274-5.)

Small wonder, then, if it is precisely the “Geschichte des Begriffs “Subject”“ that features prominently in these critical texts. The “[p]sychologische” history has to do with a specific conceptual maneuver: "Der Leib, das Ding, das vom Auge construirte “Ganze” erweckt die Unterscheidung von einem Thun und einem Thuenden; der Thuende, die Ursache des Thuns immer feiner gefaßt, hat zuletzt das “Subjekt” übrig gelassen.” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [158], KSA 12, 143.)

Later, an alternative formulation is offered: ”Daß man den Thäter wieder in das Thun hineinnimmt, nachdem man ihn begrifflich aus ihm herausgezogen und damit das Thun entleert” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [96], KSA 13, 44). The critical concept historical interest remains: ””Ursache und Wirkung” geht zurück auf den Begriff “Thun und Thäter”. Diese Scheidung woher?” (N Frühjahr 1888 7 [34], KSA 12, 306).

It may be that the critique of the concept of causality is the most sustained problematization in Nietzsche’s later notes. This critique is closely attached to the criticisms of subject, soul, Christianity, morality, philosophy. In short, it is a part of the critique of the received conceptuality and of the established concept of concept. A note captures the polemics against causality: ”Das Prädikat drückt eine Wirkung aus, die auf uns hervorgebracht ist (oder werden könnte) nicht das Wirken an sich; die Summe der Prädikate wird in Ein Wort zusammengefaßt. Irrthum, daß das Subjekt causa sei. - Mythologie des Subjekt-Begriffs (der “Blitz” leuchtet - Verdoppelung - die Wirkung verdölllicht. / Mythologie des Causalität-Begriffs. Trennung von “Wirken” und “Wirkendem” gründfalsch.” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [78], KSA 12, 98-9; cf., e.g., 2 [84], 103.)

It is no exaggeration to say that Nietzsche is practically obsessed with conceptual criticism. If the early writings testified to the deep roots of Nietzsche’s conceptual considerations, one might as well note that the reflections are still actual, between December 1888 and the early 1889, as a note on the defective “Begriff “freier Wille”“: implies (N 25 [1], KSA 13, 637)
My contention is that his concept critical philosophy criticizes, among other concepts and as the most
decisive, the very conception of philosophical conceptuality. There is a note, from August-September
1885, where the point is made as follows:

Noch jetzt ist die eigentliche Kritik der Begriffe oder (wie ich es einst bezeichnete) eine
wirkliche “Entstehungsgeschichte des Denkens” von den meisten Philosophen nicht einmal
geahnt. Man sollte die Werthschätzungen aufdecken und neu abschätzen, welche um die
Logik herum liegen: z.B. “das Gewisse ist mehr werth als das Ungewisse” “das Denken ist
unsre höchste Funktion”; ebenso den Optimismus im Logischen, das Siegessbewußtsein in
einem Schlusse, das Imperativische im Urtheil, die Unschuld im Glauben an die
Begreifbarkeit im Begriff.
(N 40 [27], KSA 11, 643.)

One has to criticize the “belief in the conceivability in concept”. This kind of criticism does not pursue
the total demolition of the “Ausdrucksmittel” peculiar to human beings, that is, conceptuality as the
“Zeichensprache von Auge und Gestas”. Yet, it seeks to make it possible “zu begreifen, in wiefern es
bloße Semiotik ist.” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [122], KSA 13, 301-2.)

IV.b.3 Books Reconsidered

Having shown that Nietzsche is attentive to the problematic of conceptuality, I shall now have a look at
his publications to find out the extent to which they accommodate any of that attentiveness. In section
I.b, I already went through Nietzsche’s bibliography. At this point, a second round is called for to test
the viability of my concept critical approach. Simultaneously, I hope, more differentiated and more
synthetic view of Nietzsche’s works is attained.

Since Geburt der Tragödie will be handled later, in its most meaningful context of examining Dionysus
(see section IV.c.2), the conceptual point of view is first brought to bear on the four Unzeitiggemässe
Betrachtungen. In Nietzsche’s second publication, his book on David Strauss, the stakes are very much
different from those of the defiant Erstlingswerk. Praising articulation of beloved material, Wagner’s
art, is replaced by the mocking close reading of a revolting text. Worship has transformed into a
warship. Yet, the zeitkritisch stance seems to be of a largely continuous nature. Criticism is called for
again, since “in Deutschland der reine Begriff der Kultur verloren gegangen ist” (UB I 1, KSA 1, 163).

It has been dethroned by the “Begriff des Epigonen-Zeitalters”, by those who “alles historisch zu
begreifen suchen”. These ill-conceivers are “Bildungspilister [...]”, der auch krause Schnörkeleien liebt,
vor allem aber sich allein als wirklich begreif und seine Wirklichkeit als das Maass der Vernunft in der
Welt behandelt”. (UB I 2, KSA 1, 169-70.) Clearly, the book’s point of departure is a particularly
scandalous instance of an intolerable way of conceiving that, nonetheless, enjoys common support and respect. The attack against it commences by reconceptualizing it in terms of epigones.

In Nietzsche’s polemics, Strauss is being criticized for, among other things, his negative judgment on Schopenhauer (UB I 2, KSA 1, 170). There is, however, more to it than that. In the seventh paragraph of the book, Strauss is cited as saying that “[a]ll moral action is self-determination of the individual, according to the idea of the human kind [Gattung].” Comments on this questionable “Sprung in’s Imperatvische” follow:

In’s Deutliche und Greifbare übertragen heisst das nur: Lebe als Mensch und nicht als Affe oder Seehund. Dieser Imperativ ist leider nur durchaus unbrauchbar und kraftlos, weil unter dem Begriff Mensch das Mannigfaltigste zusammen im Joch geht, zum Beispiel der Patagonier und der Magister Strauss, und weil Niemand wagen wird, mit gleichem Rechte zu sagen: lebe als Patagonier! und: lebe als Strauss! [...] Strauss hat noch nicht einmal gelernt, dass nie ein Begriff die Menschen sittlicher und besser machen kann, und dass Moral predigen eben so leicht als Moral begründen schwer ist [...] (UB I 7, KSA 1, 195.)

In one and the same blow, Strauss is accused of both failing to provide with concepts of sufficient clarity and flexibility and putting his faith on overestimated conceptual powers. The critical momentum is condensed again as Strauss’s four basic questions are assessed. These are: “Are we still Christians? Have we still got a religion? How do we conceive the world? How do we organize our life?” The critical treatment of these questions is, in the main, based on the view that they are not logically interrelated, that they suggest false entailments. The third one, for instance, is seen as independent of the second and only blurred by the fourth. Yet, already the first question is said to be detrimental to free philosophical thinking, as much as it is to be doubted as ethnocentric and ignorant in its neglect of the non-Christian majority of the world’s population. (UB I 9, KSA 1, 210.)

What makes Strauss’s case particularly alarming is further articulated, in Nietzsche’s book, with a reference to the purer concept of culture as stylistic unification (see I.b): “Es ist nun höchst bezeichnend für jene Pseudo-Kultur des Bildungs-Philisters, wie er sich gar noch den Begriff des Klassikers und Musterschriftstellers gewinnt - er der nur im Abwehren zu einer Gleichartigkeit der Aeusserungen kommt, die fast wieder wie eine Einheit des Stiles aussieht” (UB I 11, KSA 1, 221).

To sum a little, I find it fruitful to emphasize that Nietzsche’s criticisms of Strauss are conceptual. Perhaps the most evident issue is contained in the way Strauss is approached as representing a typical figure of something conceptualized as Bildungspilz. This, in turn, stands for the loss of proper way of conceiving ‘culture’. Moreover, Strauss’s work is attacked, because it involves unwarranted claims
to speak in the name of all humans generally conceptualized. Furthermore, critical attention is paid to the way Strauss himself employs the concept of conceiving.

As for the second *Unzeitgemäss*, it seeks to differentiate between modes of historiography and utilizes conceptual insights to carry this out. The monumental mode of writing history attempts, for instance, “den Begriff “Mensch” weiter auszuspannen und schöner zu erfüllen”, while the antiquarian historian is described like this: "Der Besitz von Urväter-Hausrath verändert in einer solchen Seele seinen Begriff: denn sie wird vielmehr von ihm besessen” (UB II 2 & 3, KSA 1, 259 & 265).

When it comes to the diatribes made, in the book, against historicism, one can see that they are everything but indifferent to the issue of conceptuality. The danger in the “Ideen-Mythologie” of Hegelism is said to be that it “hat die Geschichte an Stelle der anderen geistigen Mächte, Kunst und Religion, als einzig souverän gesetzt, insofern sie “der sich selbst realisirende Begriff”, insofern sie “die Dialektik der Völkergeister” und das “Weltgericht” ist”. It is pronounced that “[a]lles objectiv nehmen, über nichts zürnen, nichts lieben, alles begreifen, wie macht das sanft und schmiegsam”. (UB II 8, KSA 1, 308-9.)

Thus, Hegelians are blamed for excessive conceptualizations. Later on in the text, a characterization of education is offered, according to which, young people’s “Kopf wird mit einer ungeheuren Anzahl von Begriffen angefüllt, die aus der höchst mittelbaren Kenntniss vergangener Zeiten und Völker, nicht aus der unmittelbaren Anschauung des Lebens abgezogen sind” (UB II 10, KSA 1, 327). In other words, not only are redundant concepts criticized as means of indoctrination. It is further implied that retrospective conceiving is a harmfully mediated business. This criticism is further developed into what is termed the call of the “erste Generation”:


(UB II 10, KSA 1, 329.)
One might see in this the most perfect disapproval of the conceptual in favor for the living, the not-yet-conceptual. Such an impression becomes heightened by the references to the “Begriffsbeben, das die Wissenschaft erregt” and to the youth whose “Mission aber ist, die Begriffe, die jene Gegenwart von “Gesundheit” und “Bildung” hat, zu erschüttern und Hohn und Hass gegen so hybride Begriffs- Ungeheuer zu erzeugen”. Still stronger, it is said that “diese Jugend [...] selbst keinen Begriff, kein Parteiwort aus den umlaufenden Wort- und Begriffsmünzen der Gegenwart zur Bezeichnung ihres Wesens gebrauchen kann, sondern nur von einer in ihr thätigen kämpfenden, ausscheidenden, zertheilenden Macht und von einem immer erhöhten Lebensgefühle in jeder guten Stunde überzeugt wird”. (UB II 11, KSA 1, 330-3.)

However, it would be inconsiderate to take these points, for all their persuasiveness, to mean that the conceptual is to be abolished in order for one to be liberated from the deadlock of objectivist historicism, one-sided educational principles, current banalities or ideological nomenclature. That is, to drop conceptions and to embrace emotions.

Inconsiderate, I say. Am I seriously calling for considerateness in witnessing one of most sensational and devastating assaults on the aged conceptions always reproducing the status quo and hindering vital novelties? Is not “inconsiderate” a Parteiwort of today’s establishment? My point is this. What was radical and, indeed, explosive, in the immediate polemical context of the book, has still a good deal potency in criticizing conservative thinking. Yet, it seems to me that more radical is the way Nietzsche’s text is not nailed to this. It is capable, not only of mocking the obedience to ruling conceptions but, of unmasking any claims to unconceptual salvation, too.

The quoted paragraph continues by a reference to the ancients. The early Greeks struggled to retain their integrity against “ein Chaos von ausländischen, semitischen, babylonischen, lydischen [und] aegyptischen Formen und Begriffen”. One might propose that this but the final element lacking in the variety of attacks against concepts. Yet, it merely points to the chaotic political and cultural pressures from without. Since the context is precisely that of the supreme Greek capacity “das Chaos zu organisieren” or the gradual process of learning (“lernten allmählich”) to become who they really are: “So ergriffen sie wieder von sich Besitz”. In order not to make too much of the nationalist and alien-prejudiced implication of the reference to foreign influences, one may observe how the case of Greek is offered as Gleichniss supposed to work “für jeden Einzelnen von uns” in the sense that everybody “muss das Chaoes in sich organisieren, dadurch dass er sich auf seine ächten Bedürfnisse zurückbesinnt”. What is at stake, then, is a refinement of the Delphic call: “Erkenne dich selbst.” Neither aggressive foreign policy nor aggressive individual behavior is implicated by the passage. And, to conclude, life is not there to abolish either thought or concept: ‘culture’ as physis is something that is grasped as one
“beginnt [...] zu begreifen” the decorative hype and trades it for “Cultur als einer Einhelligkeit zwischen Leben, Denken, Scheinen und Wollen”. (UB II 10, KSA 1, 333-4.)

Thus, Nietzsche’s book counsels the reader, rather patiently, toward a kind of interpretation that leaves room for appreciating the more affirmative role of concepts. A hint was already given in the above quoted comparison where both “life” and “being” were written in quotation marks. For all their evident antimony, these were, then, presented as, in one sense or another, equal. And the particular sense I would advocate is the conceptual one: the similarity between the two is that they are conceptualizations of experiences (of previous conceptualizations), the difference between the emptiness of Sein and the fullness of Leben is that they are products (constructs) of discrepant ways of conceptualizing. (Cf. EH “WisgBs”: DgdT 3, KSA 6, 313.)

There are other considerations. The pedagogic points of the Delphic application are prepared by the remark that the “deutsche Jugenderziehung geht aber gerade von diesem falschen und unfruchtbaren Begriffe der Cultur aus”. The task is to conceptualize more aptly, more fruitfully: "Wer aber diese Erziehung wiederum brechen will, der muss der Jugend zum Worte verhelfen, der muss ihrem unbewussten Widerstreben mit der Helligkeit der Begriffe voranleuchten und es zu einem bewussten und laut redenden Bewusstsein machen.” (UB II 10, KSA 1, 326.)

What is needed, in the place of Begriffsbeben and Parteiwörter is, precisely, conscious refinement of the skills of conceptualization and verbalization. Sure enough, this requires renewed emotional commitment, yet it is not enough to feel good. Rather, in the co-existence of Leben, Denken, Scheinen, Wollen, reconceptualization is concomitant with reanimated sentiments. When it comes to the, arguably, most decisive concern in the book, the role of history in the general economy of life, the problematic of conceptuality is far from being absent in articulating it:

Dass das Leben aber den Dienst der Historie brauche, muss eben so deutlich begriffen werden als der Satz, der später zu beweisen sein wird - dass ein Uebermaass der Historie dem Lebendigen schade
(UB II 2, KSA 1, 258).

The view to be defended is a balanced one and it is this balance that the reader is advised to conceive as clearly as possible. I think it can be gathered, from all this, that the lack of good concepts available or the predominance of the historico-conceptual objectivism is no reason just to welcome a return to sub-conceptual sensualism. Rather, this is balance reconceptualized, considerateness radicalized.

The outstanding import, for the present purposes, of the second Unzeitgemäss, is that the reassessment
of the advantages and disadvantages of historical thinking is, at the same time, a reassessment of the virtues and vices of conceptual thinking. A major flaw of historicism is that it, despite its conviction of everything being in time, eternalizes its own concepts into mummies. In a passage masterly ironical of the current historicist atmosphere, it is said that the “Erweckung eines Wortes zum Leben” is time consuming, “denn wenn schon, wie Gibbon sagt, nichts als Zeit, aber viel Zeit dazu gehört, dass eine Welt untergeht, so gehört auch nichts als Zeit, aber noch viel mehr Zeit dazu, dass in Deutschland, dem “Lande der Allmählichkeit”, ein falscher Begriff zu Grunde geht” (UB II 10, KSA 1, 325).

Nietzsche’s volume on Schopenhauer may be somewhat more scanty with respect to the conceptual problematic. There are, however, important points spelled out, in the book, even more forcefully than before. First of all, Schopenhauer is praised for striving for a Ganze, a Gesammtbild “ohne sich abziehen zu lassen, wie Gelehrte thun, oder durch begriffliche Scholastik abgesponnen zu werden, wie es das Loos der ungebändigten Dialektiker ist” (UB III 3, KSA 1, 356-7). Again, it appears that the troubling point is to get carried away by one’s own conceptual efforts, not the conceptuality as such.

Secondly, one finds the “Verschrobenheit der jetzigen Menschennatur” being deplored, since it presents a major obstacle for the Schopenhauerian model to be realized in education. This hindrance is explained as having to do with the way the world is “mit Flausen eingehüllt”. These include “religiöse Dogmen” as well as “solche flausenhafte Begriffe wie “Fortschritt”, “allgemeine Bildung”, “National”, “moderner Staat”, “Culturkampf“: The passage is extended to a more global view: ”ja man kann sagen, dass alle allgemeinen Worte jetzt einen künstlichen und unnatürlichen Aufputz an sich tragen, weshalb eine hellere Nachwelt unserer Zeit im höchsten Maasse den Vorwurf des Verdrehten und Verwachsenen machen wird”. (UB III 7, KSA 407.)

The air is so thick with hollow concepts that one can hardly find one’s way through them. Such a disorientation due to available conceptuality reactivates the question of the local and global aspects of Nietzsche’s conceptual criticism. Along with the harshness of the critique, one can well appreciate the way it is the fabulous concepts, right beside religious dogmas, that are attacked, not conceptuality in general. The further specification is no less noteworthy: it is held that current generalities are virtually void of the natural, while not all generic expressions everywhere need to be so.

In the book, the question about the animality and supra-animality in humans is taken up. This is the occasion to say that the usual situation for the human being is to live as if it was an animal:

wir kommen für gewöhnlich aus der Thierheit nicht heraus, wir selbst sind die Thiere, die sinnlos zu leiden scheinen.

This “sudden clarity”, or the momentary coming to conceive, is brought about with the help of “jene wahrhaften *Menschen, jene Nicht-mehr-Thiere, die Philosophen, Künstler und Heiligen.*** They mark the moment when “die Natur, die nie springt, ihren einzigen Sprung und zwar einen Freudesprung, denn sie fühlt sich zum ersten Male am Ziele, dort nämlich, wo sie begreift, dass sie verlernen müsse, Ziele zu haben und dass sie das Spiel des Lebens und Werdens zu hoch gespielt habe.” Accordingly, the task that culture presents to each of us is to complete nature’s project by preparing “*die Erzeugung des Philosophen, des Künstlers und des Heiligen in uns und ausser uns*”. (UB III 5, KSA 1, 380 & 382.)

A setting familiar from many 20th-century philosophical discussions is thus sketched. There is the less than reflective level of living, on the one hand, and there is the level of meditating this first level, on the other hand. Philosophical - as well as artistic and religious - capacity and attitude ignite the human self-reflection that bears on the very limits of the human. In depicting the (to borrow the later phenomenological language) pre-conceptual *Lebenswelt* and the reflective conceiving of its sigificances related to the upper level, Nietzsche is in fact exemplifying the second order philosophical questions proper. This is because there is, in the passage, not only the pre-reflective and the reflective, but the further reflection on them.

Another thing is that, in the exploited imagery, the basic duality in conceiving is being bridged. Even nature can *begreifen*, just as humans intellects can conceive, procreate and bring forth. This indicates that concepts are not necessarily artificial or antithetic to natural activities. In tune with this, it is said, in Nietzsche’s book on Schopenhauer, right after a distinction is made between properties that belong to a period of time and those that don’t, that this difference is “wesentlich, um das Vorbildliche und Erzieherische in Schopenhauers Natur zu begreifen” (UB III 3, KSA 1, 360). This formulation exhibits one of the main objectives of the publication: to conceive or to conceptualize the educational model that the name of Schopenhauer is standing for.

Before trying to sum up the conceptual potential, in the whole series of *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, the book about Wagner will be investigated. Compared to the volume on Schopenhauer, *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* is again more evidently an untimely book about the problematic of conceptuality. This is implied in the way “die wichtigste Frage aller Philosophie” is formulated: ”wie weit die Dinge eine unabänderliche Artung und Gestalt haben”? This question, in turn, has a direct bearing on the more
practical philosophical task to “mit der rücksichtslosesten Tapferkeit auf die *Verbesserung der als veränderlich erkannten Seite der Welt* loszugehen.” (UB IV 3, KSA 1, 445.)

Conceptual questions become more explicit in other junctures of the text. In a later context, the special constraints exerted on thinking by language and concepts are recognized. Language is said to be “überall eine Gewalt für sich”, while a reference is made to “der Wahnsinn der allgemeinen Begriffe”. There is talk of the “Hohlheit jener gewalttherrischen Worte und Begriffe”, as well as of the “Leiden der *Convention*” meaning the “Uebereinkommens in Worten und Handlungen ohne ein Uebereinkommen des Gefühls”. Right after these considerations, the following explication is offered:

> Wie in dem abwärts laufenden Gange jeder Kunst ein Punct erreicht wird, wo ihre krankhaft wuchernden Mittel und Formen ein tyrannisches Uebergewicht über die jungen Seelen der Künstler erlangen und sie zu ihren Slaven machen, so ist man jetzt, im Niedergange der Sprachen, der Slave der Worte; unter diesem Zwange vermag Niemand mehr sich selbst zu zeigen, naiv zu sprechen, und Wenige überhaupt vermögen sich ihre Individualität zu wahren, im Kampf mit einer Bildung, welche ihr Gelingen nicht damit zu beweisen glaubt, dass sie deutlichen Empfindungen und Bedürfnissen bildend entgegenkomme, sondern damit, dass sie das Individuum in das Netz der “deutlichen Begriffe” einspinne und richtig denken lehre: als ob es irgend einen Werth hätte, Jemanden zu einem richtig denkenden und schliessenden Wesen zu machen, wenn es nicht gelungen ist, ihn vorher zu einem richtig empfindenden zu machen. (UB IV 5, KSA 1, 455-6.)

Now, this is, indeed, forcible criticism. The question is, what is being criticized? If even the conceptual clarity, and not only the exceedingly hollow, generic or conventionalist concepts, is being disapproved, what else is this but the final repudiation of conceptuality? As is only too easy to guess, by now, I think it is something else. The obviousness of concepts is put in the quotation marks to indicate that their justification is far from being evident. Most important, I take the closing of the passage to signify that fresh perceptual resources and skills are necessary to prevent one from getting trapped in the network of concepts. In as much as word and concept are virtually identified here, it would seem that new coinages to substitute the likes of “clear concepts” (“*deutlichen Begriffe*”) are needed.

To get a better grasp of the issue, one must go on with the text. Still within the same paragraph, the notion of *richtig Empfindung* as “die Feindin aller Convention, aller künstlichen Entfremdung und Unverständlichkeit zwischen Mensch und Mensch” is seen operative in Wagner’s music. Music’s significance is closely connected to the issue of language/conceptuality. Music means a “Rückkehr zur Natur”, yet in a quite special way, namely, as “zugleich Reinigung und Umwandlung der Natur”. This is a crucial point in the argument. If conventions are to be diluted to the natural, it does not entail a view of the unspoiled, raw nature, since, in the process, the natural will be reshaped. The point amounts
to a claim very close to the one that just as perceptions mould concepts, concepts mould perceptions. The challenge is that “in der Seele der liebevollsten Menschen ist die Nöthigung zu jener Rückkehr entstanden, und in ihrer Kunst ertönt die in Liebe verwandelte Natur”. (UB IV 5, KSA 1, 456.)

The way out of the conceptual impasse seems to be that concepts have to be naturalized in a way that allows experience to fashion them anew, while they themselves remake the experience, the nature. This involves the transformative power of love. At this point, one may wonder, whether the account is beginning to sound totally irrational, mystical, utopian, romantic. Does it any longer retain a meaningful relation to more traditional conceptual concerns? I think that most of the difficulty in facing Nietzsche’s transactions is explainable by a recourse to the intense context of articulating Wagner’s position against his opponents, while being unable to concur wholeheartedly with neither party. Another, equally important aspect is that the job is about making sense of music, while being busy introducing new ways of making sense.

The critique of inert conventionalism can hardly be convincing without unconventional flexibility of expression. In any case, the insight into the mutual transformation of thinking and acting, or into the way concept and experience reciprocally mold one another, need not be anything mystical even if coupled with love as the key. Among other things, the intense attachment residing in love involves dispositions that elsewhere appear contradictory: a sense of immediacy and a sense of heightened capacities for discerning meaningful elements in experience.

Generally speaking, the tribute paid to sensation (Empfindung), in Nietzsche’s text, is done in a very Schopenhauerian manner. If concepts are made of sensations and if concepts seem crippled, they have to be reshaped by tracing them back to the peculiar sensations to which each of them is related. This is also an educational imperative, since the linguistic and conceptual conventionalism has its friends, allies and exploiters, among the social forces that reproduce alienation and misunderstanding in human relations. Admittedly, the tone of this type of criticism sounds either religious or political or, in any case, agitational and persuasive, and, hence, not very argumentative. One recalls the aforementioned declaration of the goal of philosophy as ‘improvement of the world’. As the practical task of philosophy was to be to demarcate the changeable from the unchangeable, the reflections on conventionality are quite consistent with the expressed guidelines of the book. There is also antidote to messianism in a critical reference to contemporary historiography and philosophy as disguised theology or, indeed, “als Opiat gegen alles Umwälzende und Erneuernde” (UB IV 3, KSA 1, 445).

On these grounds, I would say that the book on Wagner can be seen, even more clearly than its predecessors, as Nietzsche’s attempt at a subversion of the ruling concept of concept. My thesis is in
painful need of more support. That can, I think, be drawn from the following remarks:

Ueberall, wo man jetzt “Form” verlangt, in der Gesellschaft und der Unterhaltung, in schriftstellerischen Ausdruck, im Verkehr der Staaten mit einander, versteht man darunter unwillkürlich einen gefälligen Anschein, den Gegensatz des wahren Begriffs von Form als von einer nothwendigen Gestaltung, die mit “gefällig” und “ungefällig” nichts zu thun hat, weil sie eben nothwendig und nicht beliebig ist (UB IV 5, KSA 1, 457).

This is a way to discuss the interplay between the terms of form, *Gestalt* and concept. Few philosophers or aestheticians or politologists would venture to speak so very generally about a concept, be it that of the “form” or anything other. But philologists need not to experience any major inconvenience in investigating the use of some term, word or concept in a variety of fields. I think that this is one of the things that are best kept in mind in reading Nietzsche. On the other hand, the point, in the quoted passage, is to criticize the excessive expansion of the scope of the concept that is, in turn, contrasted with its more limited, “true” sense.

One may take notice of another passage, nicely utilizing the vocabulary of conceptuality. It says that there is “zwischen Kant und den Eleaten, zwischen Schopenhauer und Empedokles, zwischen Aeschylus und Richard Wagner solche Nähen und Verwandtschaften, dass man fast handgreiflich an das sehr relative Wesen aller Zeitbegriffe gemahnt wird: beinahe scheint es, als ob manche Dinge zusammen gehören und die Zeit nur eine Wolke sei, welche es unseren Augen schwer macht, diese Zusammengehörigkeit zu sehen” (UB IV 4, KSA 1, 446). This would serve to balance the point about the one and only decent concept of form.

Other significant points ought to be made. One of them concerns Wagner’s crisis, depicted in the book, out of which the opera master is told to have emerged into his creative triumphs. This has to do with the reception of Wagner’s writings, since these were commonly held to be confusing: “neue Verwirrung, neues Gesumme - ein Musiker, der schreibt und denkt, war aller Welt damals ein Unding; nun schrie man, es ist ein Theoretiker, welcher aus erklärten Begriffen die Kunst umgestalten will, steinigt ihn! - ” (UB IV 8, KSA 1, 478).

This critique of critique could be taken to reflect the insights Nietzsche gained from the reception of his own *Geburt*. It had been, after all, because of its artistic ambitions that the book’s theories suffered. On the other hand, something of Nietzsche’s drastically diminished loyalty towards Wagner may also be detectible in the way the latter’s early writings are elaborated. Their unliterary accessibility is praised, while there are also some more critical remarks, as the following one:
Die Dialektik in ihnen ist vielfältig gebrochen, der Gang durch Sprünge des Gefühls mehr
gehemmt, als beschleunigt; eine Art von Widerwilligkeit des Schreibenden liegt wie ein
Schatten auf ihnen, gleich als ob der Künstler des begrifflichen Demonstrirens sich
schämte (UB IV 10, KSA 1, 502).

One might paraphrase the sentence like this: conceptual reflections should regain their confidence, yet
not in terms of emotional leaps in the course of argument. The conclusion is at hand that it is the
prejudiced reception, on the part both Wagner and his readers, of the radical notion of an artistically
inspired conceptualization that is illustrated in these passages. However, when it comes to Wagner’s
actual artworks, it is held that “er in sichtbaren und fühlbaren Vorgängen, nicht in Begriffen denkt, dass
heisst, dass er in mythisch denkt, so wie immer das Volk gedacht hat”. What Wagner does is that he
forces “die Sprache in einen Urzustand zurück, wo sie fast noch Nichts in Begriffen denkt, wo sie noch
selber Dichtung, Bild und Gefühl ist”. Hence, “Der Ring des Nibelungen ist ein ein ungeheures
Gedankensystem ohne die begriffliche Form des Gedankens.” (UB IV 9, KSA 1, 485-6.)

This is a strong case against conceptuality and for pre-conceptuality. It combines Goethean
Urphänomene, Schopenhauerian anti-conceptuality, Kantian aesthetics and Nietzschean radical
philology. It could hardly be more at odds with promoting conceptuality. In fact, concept is the only
casualty in this critical warfare, since what survives from its rejection are many things: the primordial,
the mythic, the folkloristic, the imaginary, the poetic, the eventful, the vivid, the tangible, the thoughtful.

What is, anymore, the point of advocating an interpretation seeking to retain a commending stance
towards concepts? I can only propose a closer look at the book. The quoted reference to Wagner’s re-
shaping of the concepts of art would speak in favor or reconceptualization. In characterizing Wagner’s
thoughtful but conceptless grip, the process of thinking of renewed. It is at least a little strange that
even the notion of ’system’ passes for a decent expression of the renovated thought, whereas ’the
conceptual’ is discarded. It could be said that it is only the case of artistic creation that is being
characterized here, while other realms remain intact. But this remark goes only so far. The distinction
between art and philosophy is being done in a way that is, for philosophers, hard to digest.

The artist of the future ”nicht, gleich dem Philosophen, in einen dunklen Winkel für sich der Erkenntniss
nachjagen kann [...]. Seine Kunst ist auf dem Kahre der schriftlichen Aufzeichnung nicht einzuschaffen,
wie diess der Philosoph vermag: die Kunst will Könende als Ueberlieferer, nicht Buchstaben und
Noten.” (UB IV 10, KSA 1, 500-1.) This appears to reaffirm the Goethean emphasis on action, while
being still more radical in disqualifying the chances of verbalization. Yet, the question can be posed as
to which of the tasks is assumed, in the book: that of the artist or that of the philosopher? At the very
least, the author is painstakingly trying to verbalize a multitude of things.

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Once the non-conceptual, yet cognitive, reflective or *denkerisch* nature of Wagner’s *Nibelungen* opera is identified, it is said that “[v]ielleicht könnte ein Philosoph etwas ganz entsprechendes ihm zur Seite stellen, das ganz ohne Bild und Handlung wäre und blos in Begriffen zu uns spräche: dann hätte man das Gleiche in zwei disparaten Sphären dargestellt: einmal für das Volk und einmal für den Gegensatz des Volkes, den theoretischen Menschen.” The spheres of the “popular” and the “theoretical” do not converse with each other, since the first one uses “Verknüpfungen der Vorgänge” or “thatsächliche Causalitäten”, while the other one employs logical entailments. (UB IV 9, KSA 1, 485-6.)

On this account, the philosophers are doomed to theoretical conceptuality. On the other hand, they stand the chance of achieving “something congruent” with their unattainable artistic counterpart. One must ask just how neat this version of the Kantian dichotomy is after all?

It can be seen that Wagner’s importance is explained in terms of the difficulty, “ob er Dichter oder Bildner oder Musiker zu nennen sei, jedes Wort in einer ausserordentlichen Erweiterung eines Begriffs genommen, oder ob erst ein neues Wort für ihn geschaffen werden müsse” (UB IV 9, KSA 1, 485). Wagner may operate with non-concepts, yet his operations are readily conceptualized. It seems that the opera master’s most significant influence is as much actualized in the experience of his audience as they are realized in the transformed, or even subverted, basic concepts of art.

First of all, that extraordinary, extraconceptual activities taking place in a realm distinct from, and hostile to, concepts can have an effect on, or even shake, conceptual conventions. Secondly, there is a chance of producing new concepts for these activities. Conceptuality remains something with the help of which to account for the activities occurring in, or even beyond, the reach of its limits. Novel conceptions require novel perspectives on the familiarities of experience: ”Schon um zu begreifen, inwiefern die Stellung unserer Künste zum Leben ein Symbol der Entartung dieses Leben ist, […] muss man völlig umlernen und das Gewöhnte und Alltägliche einmal als etwas sehr Ungewöhnliches und Verwickeltes ansehen können” (UB IV 4, KSA 1, 448). This formulation bears a striking resemblance to the aforementioned case of the educational view about reconceiving as something in need of fresh perceptions. And it is, I believe, precisely this effort of reconceptualizing present familiarities in order to conceive contemporary developments that is eminently at work in the book on Wagner.

This ends my analysis of Nietzsche’s *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* from the concept critical point of view. Is Sarah Kofman right in saying that they offer no concept of culture, but several concepts, and, more rigorously, no concepts at all, but a series of metaphors? Depending on the ways to specify the respective imports for “concept” and “metaphor”, this interpretation is varyingly warranted. On the grounds of the common use of “concept” as cognitively and formally more demanding a product than
“metaphor”, Kofman’s no-concept view is possible and even evident.

But to say such a thing is, I think, to ignore the plurality of points about conceptuality, made in Nietzsche’s four books, or to reduce them to a play with the language of conceiving. To be sure, there is an incessant play going on with the vocabulary of conceptuality. I would only argue that it is much more plausible to say that it is the renovation of conceptuality through its probing, correcting, ridiculing, denunciation or suppression that takes place in the texts. In each book, there are claims to the effect that some definite concepts need to be abolished and that concepts, in general, lead astray. Yet, likewise, in each of them, the reader is ushered to conceive some particular viewpoint in order to better understand the subsequent considerations. Their point is surely missed if the attention is, exclusively, paid to the “positions”, “propositions”, “themes”, “problems” or “arguments” that are handled in them. But the point is, just as effectively, missed if the attention is, exclusively, paid to the metaphoric processes of writing.

I would find that the book series allows a fruitful interpretation as a series of problematics bearing on the issue of conceptuality. If Kofman is right at all, she is right in the sense that the concept of culture is not, at least in any readily coherent way, determined by establishing sufficient and necessary criteria for candidates to fall under it. This amounts to saying that Nietzsche’s books ought not to be taken as traditional philosophical treatises on some well defined subject matters. In emphasizing, indirectly, the becoming questionable of conceptuality, Kofman may be seen to come closer to the opposing view that underlines the loss of proper conceptualization, the otherness it has caused and the need for reconstruction and heightening of the powers of conceptualizing. Unless her reading is taken to point to this direction, I suppose it is not much different from the stance of some analytical critics who find that Nietzsche’s writings are at best unconceptual, at worst inconceivable.

In my view, only on a sadly distorting interpretation could one state there is no conceptually relevant or conceptually sustained thematization about conceptuality to be found in the Unzeitgemässe. I think there is such a thematization and it is not exhausted by the self-ironical or self-reflective playing down the significance of concepts. In the highly ironical Ecce homo, it is said that the book on Strauss was designed to show that the Franco-Prussian war “nicht ein Cultur-Ereigniss sei, sondern vielleicht, vielleicht etwas ganz Anderes…” Where this implicitly reaffirms the reconceiving of ‘culture’, the book on historiography is expressly linked to the “verloren gegangnen Begriff “Cultur”“. Finally, the books on Schopenhauer and Wagner are described as offering “Fingerzeige zu einem höheren Begriff der Cultur, zur Wiederherstellung des Begriffs “Cultur”“. (EH “WissBs”: DU 1, KSA 6, 316-8.)

It is worth recalling (see section IV.a.1) that right after Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche was planning to
write a book about Cicero and the “concept of culture”. It is, then, not only the Nietzschean retrospect that presents the untimely book in the conceptual light. Next, it is Menschliches, Allzumenschliches that will be approached concept critically. By so doing, if also from other viewpoints, the book stands out from the earlier publications.

The very first paragraph carries the title “Chemie der Begriffe und Empfindungen.” It might not be, however, an altogether futile speculation to ponder, whether a similar heading would fit in in some of the Unzeitgemässe, if the numbered sections in them were rubricated. In any case, I have been trying to show that some kind of ’conceptual chemistry’ was characteristic of Nietzsche’s work even before he comes up with this specific concept. As it happens, the situation seems to be curiously overturned now. Namely, the books on historiography and Wagner are filled with explicit conceptual language without no indication of this in their titles, whereas the text under the title “Chemistry of concepts and sensations” is empty of the words Begriff and begreifen.

I think that the conceptual points, in the opening section of Menschliches, can be summarized as follows. In philosophy, the emergence of something from its opposition is a persistent problem. Whereas metaphysical way of doing philosophy denies that the highest things evolve from the lower ones and depicts the former as some sort of miracles, philosophers of historical and scientific persuasion reject all such contradictions as caused by the “gewohnten Übertreibung der populären oder metaphysischen Auffassung”. This latter kind of philosophy holds that, “streng gefasst”, there are but “Sublimirungen” or, more generally, “eine Chemie” of moral, aesthetical, cultural, social, psychological “Vorstellungen und Empfindungen”. From such chemistry, the dirty work of interrogating “Herkunft und Anfänge” acquires its motivation. (MA I 1, KSA 2, 23-4.)

From this setting, there are many directions to opt for. What may be the most important one will be discussed in the section on conceptual regeneration below (see IV.c.1). For the present purposes, it is interesting to see how concepts stand by sensations on, basically, the same level. Replacing the word Begriff, in the title line, for the word Vorstellung, in the text, is not being strictly faithful to Kant’s nor to Schopenhauer’s distinctions, since it might imply that sensation - the unchanging part of the two pairings - is not a representation. Yet, this is quibbling. The paragraph offers, clearly, no developed differentiation of the terminology of perceiving and conceiving. It seems, rather, to be a reformulation of the problem of the relationship between concepts and the raw material they are made of. It proposes to study the emergence of sensations and representations (concepts).

That the historical manner of practicing philosophy is to be advocated is explicitly said in the very next section (MA I 2, KSA 2, 24-5) and the notion of the “Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen und
Begriffe” is introduced later (MA I 10, KSA 2, 30), as is also the “Enstehungsgeschichte des Denkens” and the scientific criticism of the “irrthümlichen Grundaufffassungen” (MA I 16, KSA 2, 37). Critique of metaphysics is tightly linked to the issue of conceptuality: “man könnte von der metaphysischen Welt gar Nichts aussagen, als ein Anderssein, ein uns unzugängliches, unbegreifliches Anderssein; es wäre ein Ding mit negativen Eigenschaften” (MA I 9, KSA 2, 29).

But Nietzsche’s strategy underlines modesty (see MA I 2, KSA 2, 25) and caution. Obsolete concepts are not to be thrown away without seeing to that their significance and former viability is conceived. In a passage that nicely, if only implicitly, appropriates the principle of ’emancipation from emancipation’, the point is made as follows:

Die eine, gewiss sehr hohe Stufe der Bildung ist erreicht, wenn der Mensch über abergläübische und religiöse Begriffe und Aengste hinauskommt [...] ist er auf dieser Stufe der Befreiung, so hat er auch noch mit höchster Anspannung seiner Besonnenheit die Metaphysik zu überwinden. Dann aber ist eine rückläufige Bewegung nöthig: er muss die historische Berechtigung, ebenso die psychologische in solchen Vorstellungen begreifen, er muss erkennen, wie die grösste Förderung der Menschheit von dorther gekommen sei und wie man sich, ohne eine solche rückläufige Bewegung, der besten Ergebnisse der bisherigen Menschheit berauben würde.

(MA I 20, KSA 2, 41-2.)

Where Menschliches criticizes the kind of artistic, anticonceptualist and more or less metaphysical stance described in the book on Wagner, it does not fail to recognize the need to criticize this criticism itself. If the Unzeitgemässe were read without addressing their significant pro-conceptual features and if Menschliches is read without an eye on its counter-conceptual features, the step from the series to the new book would seem to be tantamount to turning the tables. Conditions are, indeed, changed but, at least on the point of conceptuality, they are not completely reversed. In the spirit of the ’chemistry of concepts’, complex transformations are preferred to marvellous conversions.

Conceptualization is a matter of thought and experience checking each other. A tentative conclusion could be that where Nietzsche’s earlier books stressed the need to dilute petrified concepts into the wealth of organic sensualities, the first overtly antimetaphysical volume makes more explicit the need to take seriously the conceptual end of this process. The conceptual problematic proves to be continuous.

To go on with Menschliches, its second chapter is called “Zur Geschichte der moralischen Empfindungen”. Rest assured, I won’t try to argue that it could as well be “Zur Geschichte der moralischen Begriffe”. I merely mention how, in that chapter, there is talk of the “jetzigen Begriff der Moralität”. In addition, there is a paragraph worth closer observation. Three stages in the development
of morality are discerned. The first step is the emergence of rational planning of action in order to achieve a goal. The second stage is to conceive the social aspect of respectable deeds. The highest rung in the ladder is to behave “als Collectiv-Individuum”. That means acting “nach seinem Maastab über die Dinge und Menschen”. By this point, minds are made up “für sich und Andere, was ehrenvoll, was nützlich ist”. Here, one “ist zum Gesetzgeber der Meinungen geworden, gemäss dem immer höher entwickelten Begriff des Nützlichen und Ehrenhaften”. (MA I 95 & 94, KSA 2, 92 & 91.)

Moral development is, then, indistinguishable from the development of conceptual skills. The character, or the type, of the lawgiver already depicted in Kant’s conceptus cosmicus of philosophy, appears here as the master of the prudential and ethical conceptuality in shaping the public opinion. The notion of conceptual unfolding is further illustrated like this:


It can be seen how the notion of historicist objectivism that was described, in the second Unzeitgemäss, as the lack of both love and anger is recycled to designate conceiving as indifference. What is striking is that this apathetic stance is now hailed as the possible source of the badly needed human power, although there is also a hint of its double edge. Something like an antonym is presented for conceiving, namely, “erroneous estimation”, while the emphasis stays on the power of conceiving.

The third chapter enters the realm of religion, the origins of which are, positivistically enough, traced back to, among other things, the lack of “jeder Begriff der natürlichen Causalität”. This notion was already met (section IV.b.1) in Nietzsche’s lectures on the Greek religiosity. As if modifying the inherent positivism, the need to study religious matters is explained to arise from the way the liberation from its grip has not yet been complete. On the contrary, people still wish to “religiösen Empfindungen und Stimmungen ohne begrifflichen Inhalt zu begegnen, zum Beispiel in der Musik”. (MA I 111 & 131, KSA 2, 112 & 124.) The notion of conceptlessness was, in turn, used to denote the great opera master’s art in the book on Wagner. Although I tried to show how the conceptless was initially linked with conceptuality, it is clearly revalorized in this new context. Conceptual considerations are needed to account for both the primitive lack of valid conceptions and the evolved stage of sophistication where
the content of a concept can be bypassed in exploiting the mood surrounding it. The first point bears on
the birth of religions, the second one on, for instance, the late modern appreciation of the ritual.

In the chapter on politics, one can find that social relations of all levels are described as taking shape
“unter dem Einflusse der herrschenden constitutionellen Regierungsform”. The “allerneueste Begriff” of
’government as compromise’ is something that “überall sich der Köpfe bemeistert hat!” (MA I 450,
KSA 2, 292-3.) One is reminded of the lawgiver who is capable of exerting conceptions in generalized
usage. In this context, then, it is not only the question of different political rules, but also of the rule of
concept. Conversely, the powers of concept are not divorced from social significance.

These examples of the conceptual concerns in the first part of Menschliches must suffice. In Vermischte
Meinungen und Sprüche, intense conceptual considerations continue. The second paragraph about the
spoiling effect of conceptual clarity is instructive to be quoted here. In a certain sense, it makes explicit
the book’s cautious way of moving ahead from the seemingly anti-conceptual style of the
Unzeitgemässe toward a directly conceptual manner of philosophizing:

Verwöhnt. - Man kann auch in Bezug auf die Helligkeit der Begriffe verwöhnen: wie
ekelhaft wird da der Verkehr mit den Halblklaren, Dunstigen, Strebenden, Ahnenden! Wie
lächerlich und doch nicht erheiternd wirkt ihr ewiges Flattern und Haschen und doch nicht
Fliegen- und Fangenkönnen.
(MA II/1 2, KSA 2, 381.)

At the same time, this points to the need to articulate the close relationship that conceivers have with
their concepts. The following passage, in turn, takes this thought further:

Darin dass wir uns vor unsern eigenen Gedanken, Begriffen, Worten fürchten, dass wir
aber auch in ihnen uns selber ehren, ihnen unstreitig die Kraft zuschreiben, uns
beohnen, verachten, loben und tadeln zu können, darin dass wir also mit ihnen wie mit
freien geistigen Personen, mit unabhängigen Mächten verkehren, als Gleiche mit Gleichen
- darin hat das seltsame Phänomen seine Wurzel, welches ich „intellectuales Gewissen”
genannt habe (MA II/1 26, KSA 2, 391).

This is a nuanced account of the root of the matter: conceptualizer (thinker, verbalizer) is extending
her/himself by her/his concepts (thoughts, words). The interchange between the creator and the
creature, gradually developed into an equal power with a creative force of its own, is the internal
dialogue, personal encounter, private conference or “intellectual conscience”. Although there is a tone
of a self-sufficient ego controlling the allocation of cognitive resources, the weight put on the exchange
and on the idea of the products of the self gaining independence seems to balance the situation.
The passage may be taken to develop what I have been calling an ecological model of conceptualization where experience corrects concepts and concepts condition experience. It can now be thought that one’s concepts are part of one’s proper environment. This makes it all the more understandable that they need not be seen as furthering human alienation from nature. The book features, as well, an instance of one of the very frequent images, in the context of Nietzsche’s thematizations of concepts, that is, the web. A concise reutilization of this image is offered as follows:

Am Webstuhl. - Den Wenigen, welche eine Freude daran haben, den Knoten der Dinge zu lösen und sein Gewebe aufzutreten, arbeiten Viele entgegen (zum Beispiel alle Künstler und Frauen), ihn immer wieder neu zu knüpfen und zu verwickeln und so das Begriffene in’s Unbegriffene, womöglich Unbegreifliche umzubilden. Was dabei auch sonst herauskomme, - das Gewebte und Verknottete wird immer etwas unreinlich aussehen müssen, weil zu viele Hände daran arbeiten und ziehen.

(MA II/1 30, KSA 2, 393.)

Apart from being, in the business of conceiving, another sample of the “paradigm of the hand”, the passage has women join the artistic process of returning concepts into the inconceivable. Apart from thus expressing respect for the female creativity, the parallel certainly reproduces patriarchal prejudice-cum-provocation of the 19th-century bourgeois (sexual) political socialization, in the way it excludes women from one camp and includes them in another. The image of the web lives on, further in the book, this time with the reproductive conceiving in the key role:

Drei Denker gleich einer Spinne. - In jeder philosophischen Secte folgen drei Denker in diesem Verhältnisse auf einander: der Erste erzeugt aus sich den Saft und Samen, der zweite zieht ihn zu Fäden aus und spinnnt ein künstliches Netz, der Dritte lauert in diesem Netz auf Opfer, die sich hier verfangen – und sucht von der Philosophie zu leben.

(MA II/1 194, KSA 2, 464.)

One meets here the central actor of the “Wahrheit und Lüge” essay, the spider. Apart from that connection, the passage is as closely related, as it is also situated close, to what I referred to, in an earlier chapter, about the material being more valuable than the edifice that a philosopher comes to erect (see III.a). It also resembles the description of the three stages in moral development. However, here the point is said to bear on any philosophical current.

To articulate the point here, it seems clear that, in the third phase, philosophers are doomed to get choked in their excessive conceptualizations, whereas those representing the first one have the honor of supplying raw material. More puzzling is the middle period: what makes the construction out of the natural stuff so “artificial”? In reading the word künstlich, one can only put the emphasis on the senses
of “worked up” and “manufactured”, rather than the pejorative “factitious”. Seen in this way, it is only the last group that exemplifies something readily embarrassing, if not something genuinely tragic.

The conceptual problematic goes on, in the last part of the trilogy, Der Wanderer und sein Schatten, too. This book contains, for instance, such witty observations about the spheres of the conceivable and the inconceivable as the one about the criminal who “den ganzen Fluss der Umstände kennt, findet seine That nicht so ausser der Ordnung und Begreiflichkeit, wie seine Richter und Tadler”, while his punishment “wird ihm gerade nach dem Grade von Erstaunen zugemessen, welches jene beim Anblick der That als einer Unbegreiflichkeit befällt” (MA II/2 24, KSA 2, 559).

Of the, by now, familiar issues, the one of love and conceptuality is, sarcastically, re-elaborated. A reference is made to the end of the kingdom in ancient Greek *polis*. This is explained in terms of the transformation of the love of kings into the love of the state, because “ein Begriff mehr Liebe erträgt, als eine Person, und namentlich dem Liebenden nicht so oft vor den Kopf stösst, wie geliebte Menschen es thun”. (MA II/2 232, KSA 2, 658)

On the other hand, the book provides at least, one conceptual elucidation that approximates a definition. Incidentally, it still has exceptional currency: ”Hier, wo die Begriffe “modern” und “europäisch” fast gleich gesetzt sind, wird unter Europa viel mehr an Länderstrecken verstanden, als das geographische Europa, die kleine Halbinsel Asien’s, umfasst: namentlich gehört Amerika hinzu, soweit es eben das Tochterland unserer Cultur ist. Andererseits fällt nicht einmal ganz Europa unter den Cultur-Begriff “Europa”; sondern nur alle jene Völker und Völkertheile, welche im Griechen-, Römer-, Juden- und Christenthum ihre gemeinsame Vergangenheit haben.” (MA II/2 216, KSA 2, 650.)

Apart from these important features of the book, there are remarks of more general nature about conceptuality. In this sense, the following passage is hard to neglect:

> Das Wort und der Begriff sind der sichtbarste Grund, weshalb wir in diese Isolation von Handlungen-Gruppen glauben: mit ihnen *bezeichnen* wir nicht nur die Dinge, wir meinen ursprünglich durch sie das *Wesen* derselben zu erfassen. Durch Worte und Begriffe werden wir jetzt noch fort während verführt, die Dinge uns einfacher zu denken, als sie sind, getrennt von einander, untheilbar, jedes an und für sich seient. Es liegt eine philosophische Mythologie in der *Sprache* versteckt, welche alle Augenblicke wieder herausbricht, so vorsichtig man sonst auch sein mag.
> (MA II/2 11, KSA 2, 547.)

This passage reactivates some of the typical concerns of “Wahrheit und Lüge” and the *Unzeitgemässe.* For example, whereas in Wagner’s thinking of the primordial language, the mythical dimension was said
to be untouched by concepts, here the mythic resides in the conceptuality of the ordinary language. Certainly, the turn is, in the main, due to the shift from making sense of art’s mythical dimensions to unmasking myths in their more unexpected sites. Yet, as well as art, critical thinking and daily discourse have their peculiar mythical structures, in a much as a thinker and a speaker / writer cannot thematize all the concepts and words with which he or she operates.

This aspect is later restated as “eine sehr wunderliche Begriffs-Mythologie” (MA II/2 23, KSA 2, 558). It has to do with the way conceptual abilities seduce the conceiver to believe in the omnipotence of differentiation and in the universal discernibleness of things. To be good at grasping and speaking is, paradoxically, to be liable to the temptations of misperceiving. Hence, the unity of language and conceptuality in controlling human perceptions of the world is again, and more tightly than ever before, affirmed. In keeping with the antimetaphysical style of the book, words and concepts are said to execute not the task of apprehending essences but of describing and fashioning the experiential reality.

Once, the mythology of the concept is referred to in the following phrase: “die eingewobenen zarten Begriffs-Täuschungen und die von Alters her vererbten, langsam gesteigerten Einzel- und Gruppen-Empfindungen” (MA II/2 20, KSA 2, 554). One might begin to suspect that the last part of *Menschliches* is again moving closer to the spirit of the *Unzeitgemässe* with their frequent attacks on concepts. Yet, this passage can be taken as the chemistry of concepts and sensations revisited. The nature of the relationship between the conceptual and the sensual is left open, except that they are analogous in their tendency to carry in them whole contexts from the past and to evolve toward increasing homogeneity. Their double effect is to make one take cognizance of the environment according to already established ways. One can appreciate the concept and sensation are, a little later, made to look like interchangeable terms:


(MA II/2 33, KSA 2, 564.)

One might call this paragraph Nietzsche’s first elaborated view on concepts. Yet, it should not be regarded cut off from the less evident instances discussed above. Reading Nietzsche is not catching sentences that promise statements and to exclude utterances of a less propositional nature. It is, rather,
to attend to the discourses that engender and dissolve. While the former kind of reading is doomed to lose any understanding of the context and the process of signification, the latter strategy has no difficulties in dealing with either these or the formal assertions in them.

The word “root” intimates the way concepts and emotions are discussed in terms of language studies, in particular, of etymology. The word was met above, in speaking about the “intellectual conscience”, yet its linguistic or philological sense was not so much emphasized there. More indicative of this sense would be another case, from the first part of the book, under the title “Freigeist ein relativer Begriff” and with an appeal to the different “Ableitungen der Freigeisterei” (MA I 225, KSA 2, 189).

Critical historical philology is, quite clearly, the irreplaceable part of Nietzsche’s conceptual interests. One should not look for a lost conceptual unity, since there never was one. Concepts are enveloped not in sacred repositories but in the much more vulgar “pockets” containing a varying number of variable items with variant interconnections. The reason for this is that concepts are at the mercy of speech that, for all its conventions, is liable to transformation, disagreement and misunderstanding.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Menschliches is Nietzsche’s entrée as a self-reliant thinker whose peculiar speciality lies in the verbalization of concepts, on the one hand and in the open nature of concepts, on the other. It is here that the philosophical and psychological potentiality of the historically and culturally oriented critical philology becomes manifest. To put it in more anticipatory terms, the Wittgensteinian sense of language games and conceptual openness is being foreshadowed, albeit with differences. One formulation reads: “Der Cultus wird wie ein fester Wort-Text immer neu ausgedeutet: die Begriffe und Empfindungen sind das Flüssige, die Sitten das Harte” (MA II/2 77, KSA 2, 587).

Yet, quite in keeping with the insight into the need to retreat after the victorious liberation from choking conceptualizations, there is a constraint recognized for the fluctuating concepts:


To rephrase the epigraph of the present study: as important as it is to be liberated from one’s chains, be they conceptual or otherwise, it is even more important to be liberated from this liberation. This is the
radical balance what I am ready to regard as Nietzsche’s most ingenious contribution, particularly so, since it is, apart from being a masterly aphorism, an intimation of the philosophical pursuit that describes his own efforts, at their best.

As well as the previously discussed books, Morgenröthe is best seen as a critical work about conceptuality. Yet, the case must be made for it independently of the others. This is not to say that one should ignore the insights that have come up and are reworked in the new book along with fresh viewpoints. Rather, its peculiar characteristics ought to be fleshed out and not subsumed under the shield of sameness.

To take an example of the familiar questions, Morgenröthe continues to speak in terms of webs and spiders: “Wir sind in unserem Netze, wir Spinnen, und was wir auch darin fangen, wir können gar Nichts fangen, als was sich eben in unserem Netze fangen lässt”. The viww into the inevitable participance of concepts in each and every act of conceiving seems to involve consequences for both the structure of human organization in general and for the situation of the individual. That much is also implied by the notion of the other people as “Satilliten unseres eigenen Systems”, in the very next section with more explicit conceptual language: “Was begreifen wir denn von unserem Nächsten, als seine Gränzen, ich meine, Das, womit er sich auf und an uns gleichsam einzeichnet und eindrückt? Wir begreifen Nichts von ihm, als die Veränderungen an uns, deren Ursache er ist, - unser Wissen von ihm gleicht einem hohlen geformten Raume.” (M 117 & 118, KSA 3, 110 & 111.)

To criticize conceiving and its proper limits is to behave like a good Kantian. To problematize the terms of the critique and the criticizer in order to criticize the critique is to act as a disobedient or reckless, if not just a particularly consistent, Kantian: “Wir können viel, viel mehr Dinge denken, als thun und erleben, - das heisst, unser Denken ist oberflächlich und zufrieden mit der Oberfläche, ja, es merkt sie nicht. Wäre unser Intellekt streng nach dem Maasse unserer Kraft und unserer Übung der Kraft entwickelt, so würden wir den Grundsatz zu oberst in unserem Denken haben, dass wir nur begreifen können, was wir thun können, - wenn es überhaupt ein Begreifen giebt.” (M 125, KSA 3, 116.)

The faculty of conceiving has grown out of its proper proportions. Presumably, this is the reason for countering it with equally sweeping objections and doubts. In any case, questions are posed, towards the end of the book, as to “[w]ie kommt es, dass, je begreiflicher die Welt geworden ist, um so mehr die Feierlichkeit jeder Art abgenommen ist? Ist es, dass die Furcht so sehr das Grundelement jener Ehrfurcht war, welche uns bei allem Unbekannten, Geheimnissvollen überfiel und uns vor dem Unbegreiflichen niedersinken und um Gnade bitten lehrte?” (M 551, KSA 3, 321.) The skills of conceptualization might be taken, in this light, to have evolved in fighting the fear of the inconceivable.
That these questions stand for a genuine problem for contemporary times is most clearly illustrated with a recourse to Rousseau. Two alternatives for explaining the lousy civilization are presented: the pro-Rousseau one says that the bad morality is to blame, the contra-Rousseau one accuses the good morality. The title line ("Gegen Rousseau") and the lengthier articulation of the latter alternative as having to do with the predominance of the "schwachen, unmännlichen gesellschaftlichen Begriffe" over "Leib und Seele" strongly suggest which one is to be understood as the correct choice. The paragraph has, however, a less evident ending. Instead of declaring the victory of either option, two paradoxic alternatives are affirmed, both of which may well be false. (M 163, KSA 3, 146.)

Neither is it quite clear, whether the weak concepts are to be countered with more masculine ones or with unconceptual forces. In any case, concept is accorded social significance. The relevance of these considerations for the philosophical tradition is put to relief by critical remarks about Schopenhauer’s:

(Worüber eigentlich fühlte sich Schopenhauer gegen Kant so dankbar gestimmt, so tief verpflichtet? Es verrät sich einmal ganz unzweideutig: Jemand hatte davon gesprochen, wie dem kategorischen Imperative Kant’s die qualitas occulta genommen und er begreiflich gemacht werden könne. Darüber bricht Schopenhauer in diese Worte aus: "Begreiflichkeit des kategorischen Imperatifs! Grundverkehrter Gedanke! Ägyptische Finsterniss! Das verhüte Himmel, dass der nicht noch begreiflich werde! Eben dass es ein Unbegreifliches giebt, dass dieser Jammer des Verstandes und seine Begriffe begränzt, bedingt, endlich, trüglich ist; diese Gewissheit ist Kant’s grosses Geschenk." - Man erwäge, ob Jemand einen guten Willen zur Erkenntnis der moralischen Dinge hat, der von vornherein durch den Glauben an die Unbegreiflichkeit dieser Dinge sich beselet fühl! Einer, der noch ehrlich an Erluchtungen von Oben, an Magie und Geistererscheinungen und die metaphysische Hässlichkeit der Kröte glaubt!)

(M 142, KSA 3, 135.)

In Nietzsche’s text, there is an even more direct critique of both Kant and Schopenhauer, and of modern thinking at large, where the concept of concept figures prominently. In addition, the insight, formulated in Menschliches, into loving a concept rather than a person is further developed:

Persönliche Auszeichnung, - das ist die antike Tugend. Sich unterwerfen, folgen, öffentlich oder in der Verborgenheit, - das ist deutsche Tugend. Lange vor Kant und seinem kategorischen Imperativ hatte Luther aus der selben Empfindung gesagt: es müsse ein Wesen geben, dem der Mensch unbedingt vertrauen könne, - es war sein Gottesbeweis, er wollte, grüber und volkthümlicher als Kant, dass man nicht einem Begriff, sondern einer Person unbedingt gehorche und schliesslich hat auch Kant seinen Umweg um die Moral nur desshalb genommen, um zum Gehorsam gegen die Person zu gelangen: das ist eben der Cultus des Deutschen, je weniger ihm gerade vom Cultus in der Religion übrig geblieben ist. Griechen und Römer empfanden anders und würden über ein solches "es muss ein Wesen geben" - gespottet haben: es gehörte zu ihrer südländischen Freiheit des Gefühls, sich des "unbedingten Vertrauens" zu erwehren und im letzten Verschluss des Herzens eine kleine Skepsis gegen Alles und Jedes, sei es Gott oder Mensch oder Begriff, zurückzubehalten. Gar der antike Philosoph! Nil admirari - in
The wealth of the conceptual criticisms of god that was confronted in Nietzsche’s Nachlass (see IV.b.2) is reflected in this paragraph. God’s status has been inherited by concept, in the sense that both involve, in their German variety at least, unconditional obedience. This is because god can be conceived as the grandest of concepts, as the embodiment of the highest skills, gravest fears, wildest dreams of a society. Scepticism with respect to god is scepticism against all the conceptually absolute claims to validity.

By now, it is safe to say that this kind of scepticism toward concepts is characteristic of virtually all of Nietzsche’s writings. Early on in Morgenröthe, one can find critical remarks on “dieser verruchten Interpretations-Kunst des Straf-Begriffs”. It is said that the “Begriff der Strafe” has “die ganze Welt überwuchert”. (M 13, KSA 3, 26.) One must observe, however, that here, again, the emphasis is on the excessive conceptualization, not on conceptuality as a whole. In addition, this quotation reaffirms the way this book accommodates much of the Nachlass criticism of religious concepts.

Further in Morgenröthe, there is an important paragraph about dividing concepts from non-concepts. About the specifically moral concepts, it is said that they make up to “ganz andere” history than the one to be written about moral sentiments (Gefühle). Explanation reads that moral sentiments “sind mächtig vor der Handlung”, while moral concepts are put in play “nach der Handlung, angesichts Nöthigung”. Conceptualization, in the moral realm, is retrospective legitimation having “weder mit der Herkunft, noch dem Grade des Gefühls bei inhen Etwas zu thun”. (M 34, KSA 3, 43.)

This criticisms can be said to utilize two strands of Nietzsche’s earlier work. There is an echo from the critique of ‘convention’, presented in the Wagner book, as the condition where words and actions match but no feeling is involved. There is another one from the way Menschliches criticized the modern enjoyment of religious “sensations and feelings”, as long as they can be had in the form of art without the corresponding conceptual content. More specifically, the Schopenhauerian method of tracing the sensual background of concepts is taken to lead to a kind of self-denial. In morality, at least, concepts do not spring from the sensations or, so to speak, from the original connections. They are rationalizations without necessary links to the actions being rationalized. Is this to be taken to mean that all concepts are only contingent latecomers? Or, is it so that the ruling concepts have lost their linkages with sensory experience? In other words, is conceptuality to be destroyed or renewed?

Perhaps it is easier to assess the issue here by considering two other cases that include more general
points about concepts. In a paragraph “Die Feindschaft der Deutschen gegen die Aufklärung”, it is said, among other things, that German philosophers of the 19th century “sind auf die erste und älterste Stufe der Speculation zurückgegangen, denn sie fanden in Begriffen ihr Genüge, anstatt in Erklärungen, gleich den Denkern träumerischer Zeitalter” (M 197, KSA 3, 171). In another paragraph, it is stated that it should not confuse the moderns as they see that the ancients had “ähnliche Worte und Begriffe” as they do. It is, namely, the case that “hinter ihnen liegt immer eine Empfindung versteckt, welche dem modernen Empfinden fremd, unverständlich oder peinlich sein müsste.” (M 195, KSA 3, 170.)

In the first case, then, concepts are compared to dreams and primitive speculations and set against enlightening explanations or clarifications. This may seem to be very hard to connect with the view, put forth above, that concepts as the key instruments in implementing objectivity have done much harm to imaginative abilities and emotional dispositions. In the second case, it is said that concepts and words remain, where sensations and percepts change. This, in turn, might appear to be difficult to combine with the insight, introduced earlier, that concepts fluctuate, but customs resist time.

Contexts are, however, different, and so are the juxtapositions. One might well explain the possible oddities away. Compared to feelings, concepts are pale, but compared to clarifying elucidations, they are speculative items in a dreamlike vision; compared to the customs of positive morality, concepts are not that solid, but in comparison to the ways of perceiving, they are more inert. Although it could be said that Nietzsche’s writings on conceptual issues are not tightly interwoven - which is precisely the starting point of the present study - their very broad scope calls for caution in assessing individual obscurities. It calls for further investigation, while discouraging once and for all explanations.

There is, in the book, a tentative characterization of the philosopher’s enterprise as reconciliation and mediation between the learning child and the knowledgeable adult. This sort of self-awareness would suit philosophers, since the time of the philosophical Conception is when “es zum Glauben zu spät und zum Wissen noch zu früh ist.” (M 504, KSA 3, 296.) Philosophers have a youthful mind with no way of knowing or believing. This is what commits them to conceptuality, to creating and criticizing concepts, rather than to occupying doxastic or epistemic positions.

I wish to end my reconsideration of Morgenröthe with a remark that can be found near the closing of the book. Despite numerous attacks on concepts, the volume does not amount to a depreciation of conceptuality altogether. On the contrary, it is said that the modern way of philosophizing is but disguised religion and artistic megalomania, as it exalts the “nun zum Beispiel “intuitive Wesen”, [...] ”inneren Sinn” oder [...] “intellectualen Anschauung”,“ and the “Götter-Vorrecht, unbegreiflich zu sein”. By contrast, the initial Greek conception of philosophy had to do with fulfilling
die Seelen mit Trunkenheit, wenn das strenge und nüchterne Spiel der Begriffe, der Verallgemeinerung, Widerlegung, Engführung [...] - mit jener Trunkenheit, welche vielleicht auch die alten grossen strengen und nüchternen Contrapunctiker der Musik gekannt haben. (M 544, KSA 3, 314.)

This is a very important passage indeed. It makes clear that the many assaults, by Nietzsche, against concepts are carried out in order to make room for a non-conceptual immediate access to the world. If one of the repeated lessons, in Nietzsche’s first books, has been that concepts may threaten perceptual powers and emotional capacities and hinder explanation and thinking, one must conclude that the equally recurring call to abandon inappropriate concepts and to conceive better is to be understood as an intimation of conceptual regeneration. What is revolutionary is that the needed change is to affect the very conceptuality of concept.

This point may also be part of the reason for the fact that after Morgenröthe, explicit conceptual language in Nietzsche’s books greatly diminishes, until it intensifies again in Jenseits. As one might propose, avoidance of concepts is one of the strategies that Nietzsche experimented with in his confrontation with conceptuality. At any rate, Fröhliche Wissenschaft is not permeated by explicit conceptual discussions in the way both Menschliches and Morgenröthe have been seen to be. Yet, I think that the case can be made for its being an attempt at realizing the notion of ‘drunken sobriety of concepts’, in which one avoids automatic reductions of pluralities to concepts as well as of concepts to pluralities. The novelty of this effort may be the most vividly illustrated by the following passage taken from the critical assessment of the use and abuse of consciousness:

Es ist immer noch eine ganz neu und eben erst dem menschlichen Auge aufdämmmernde, kaum noch deutlich erkennbare Aufgabe, das Wissen sich einzuviehöfeln und instinctiv zu machen, - eine Aufgabe, welche nur von Denen gesehen wird, die begriffen haben, dass bisher nur unsere Irrthümer uns einverleibt waren und dass alle unsere Bewusstheit sich auf Irrthümer bezieht! (FW 11, KSA 3, 383.)

Heed is to be taken, then, of the necessity of incorporating or embodying the proper process of knowing. It is important to see how this enterprise itself is said to be scarcely within the reach of knowledge and how it requires a prior conception of a failure. In other words, cognitive reconceptualization is called for to assume a new, more bodily sense to cognition.

Of related interest is a paragraph with the heading “Unser Erstaunen”. It can be taken to remodel the point about fixed ideas: ”wir sind so sehr von all der Unsicherheit und Phantasterei unserer Urtheile und von dem ewigen Wandel aller menschlichen Gesetze und Begriffe überzeugt, dass es uns eigentlich ein
Erstaunen macht, *wie sehr* die Ergebnisse der Wissenschaft Stand halten!” Change was the voluptuous amazement of the ancients, stability is the pleasant astonishment of the moderns. (FW 46, KSA 3, 411.)

Here, the strategy is different from many of Nietzsche’s writings. If they, usually, attack persistent fixations, now it is “us” firmly believing in constant change. Yet, a similar effect was made by one of the above mentioned *Vermischte Meinungen* that spoke of the spoiling influence of conceptual clarity. Convictions concerning conceptual change are not to be overdone. When and where everybody tends to opt for the equally questionable extremes, moderation is radicalism.

Moreover, *gaya scienza* reaffirms the moral function of conceptuality as the dress for the naked human animal. If there no longer is any need to tame this animal, there is still a need to disguise the creature, since the European has become “ein krankes, kränkliches, krüppelhaftes Thier”. The question is posed, whether this dressing up “der “moralischen Menschen”, ihre Verhüllung unter moralische Formeln und Anstands begriffe, das ganze wohlwollende Verstecken unserer Handlungen unter die Begriffe Pflicht, Tugend, Gemeinsinn, Ehrenhaftigkeit, Selbstverleugnung nicht ebenso guten Gründe haben” as does dressing up in general? (FW 352, KSA 3, 588.)

Another paragraph contains a comment upon scientific activity: “”Erklärung” nennen wir’s: aber “Beschreibung” ist es”. Description involves correct inductions, “- aber *begriffen* haben wir damit Nichts.” This is because the picture has been complemented, but it is still the picture that hinders us to see behind or over it. (FW 112, KSA 3, 472.)

These quotations deviate from the two distinctions made in *Morgenröthe*. Where the earlier book had regarded conceptual considerations to be but retrospective rationalizations, now the eloquent open question is suggests that there might not be anything obviously wrong about this practice. Wearing clothes and concepts tells about the outfit needed by the human being. Just as garments, concepts differ as to their texture, raw materials, process of manufacturing, strength of the seams, adaptation to the shape of their bearer, congruity with the social and cultural codes and so on. Humans could be clothed with concepts other than the moral ones intended to hide their animality.

Where *Morgenröthe* had spoken of explanations as superior to concepts as engaged in mere description, now the two are likened with one another as opposed to the inferior operations of describing and logical reasoning. One might do away with the obscurity by proposing that, quite simply, concepts are not identical with explanations but, in comparison with descriptions and formalizations, they situate on the higher level with explanations.
What remains ambiguous are the related ontological commitments. Is there, as some of Nietzsche’s utterances imply, a way to see beyond or behind ‘the picture’? Can one get at the naked animal or is the human being’s grasp of itself and of everything else necessarily indirect, deluding, distortingly visual and ultimately antropomorphic? There might be, implied by the passage in *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, a further distinction between concepts combined with mere description and formal argumentation and concepts combined with explanatory power. The point in the underlined passage of conceiving nothing is there to imply this more demanding type of concept. While the question of the ontologico-epistemological implications cannot be reliably answered on the basis of the quoted passages, what is clear is that they search for a better sense of the concept of conceiving.

In the book, concepts seem to serve other, at least superficially, unworthy purposes, too. In the context of a paragraph where all sorts of literary *Geschwäztigkeit* (or the highly ambivalent notion of more or less redundant fluency or gossip), are differentiated. Luther and Schopenhauer, for instance, stand for “Geschwäztigkeit des Zornes”, Montaigne for one “aus einem Lust an immer neuen Wendungen der selben Sache”, Goethe “aus Lust an guten Worten und Sprachformen”, Carlyle “aus inneren Wohlgefallen an Lärm und Wirrwarr der Empfindungen”. It is Kant who represents the one “aus einem zu grossen Vorrathe von Begriffsformeln”. (FW 97, KSA 3, 451.) An indulgent philosopher is also an indulgent conceptualizer. Or perhaps it is, rather, that an indulgent conceptualizer is an indulgent formalist. What is implied, again, is the radicalized balance.

In the fifth part of the book, incorporated in the second edition of 1886, the achievements of Kant are referred to in a much more favorable way. Hegel, too, is given credit in a way that is worth observing. After a tribute paid to Leibniz’s critique of consciousness, the passage goes like this:

"Erinnern wir uns zweitens an Kant’s ungeheures Fragezeichen, welches er an den Begriff “Causalität” schrieb, - nicht dass er wie Hume dessen Recht überhaupt bezweifelt hätte: er begann vielmehr vorsichtig das Reich abzugrenzen, innerhalb dessen dieser Begriff überhaupt Sinn hat (man ist auch jetzt noch nicht mit dieser Grenzabsteckung fertig geworden). Nehmen wir drittens den erstaunlichen Griff Hegel’s, der damit durch alle logischen Gewohnheiten und Verwöhnungen durchgriff, als er zu lehren wagte, dass die Artbegriffe sich aus einander entwickeln: mit welchem Satze die Geister der Europa zur letzten grossen wissenschaftlichen Bewegung präformirt wurden, zum Darwinismus - denn ohne Hegel kein Darwin. Ist an dieser Hégelschen Neuerung, die erst den entscheidenden Begriff “Entwicklung” in die Wissenschaft gebracht hat, etwas Deutsches? (FW 357, KSA 3, 598.)"

The answer given to the last question is in the affirmative, which makes the passage to be one of the very few acknowledgements of German achievements in Nietzsche’s texts. Yet, the paragraph ends in drastically denouncing everything presently German and praising the all-European stance (FW 357,
KSA 3, 602). What is the more pressing point here is that Kant’s concept of causality and Hegel’s concept of development are depicted as less important than their respective manners of rehearsing a philosophical critique of concepts. In Kant’s case, what counts the most is the activity of delimitating of the meaningful scope of a concept. In Hegel, it is the insight into the conceptual development.

In this way, one can appreciate how a kind of concept critical approach to philosophy was outlined by Nietzsche. What is more, his triple stress on Leibniz’s elaborations of consciousness, on Kant’s studies of the limits of conceptualization and on Hegel’s work on the dynamics of conceptuality aptly characterizes the classic prefigurations of the late modern Nietzscheran variety of concept critical philosophizing.

As for other conceptual concerns, in gaya scienza, I’d merely like to point out that the concepts of, say, ‘female’, ‘substance’, ‘cause and effect’, ‘strong and weak’, ‘normality’, ‘mechanics’, ‘knowledge’, ‘church’, ‘artist’ and ‘possession’ are recognized and/or criticized and elucidated in the course of the book. (FW 70 & 111-2 & 118 & 120 & 127 & 355 & 358 & 361 & 363, KSA 3, 428 & 472-3 & 476 & 477 & 482 & 593-5 & 603 & 608 & 611.) When I said that this work is not so thoroughly involved in conceptual issues as Nietzsche’s two earlier publications I meant it. This is not to say, however, that the concept critical potential of the joyful science is negligible. For instance, the section number 360 has a symptomatic ending: “Man bedarf noch einer Kritik des Begriffs “Zweck”” (FW, KSA 3, 608).

It is time to move on to Also sprach Zarathustra. Can I go on the policy of claiming that this book, as well as the others, is a book about conceptuality? I hardly can. In the other publications, there is plenty of use for the word Begriff and the key questions are how much?, what kinds of? and in which sense? As for this work, there is virtually no use for it.

This means no total discouragement to the concept critical approach, though. It merely says that the very exceptionality of Zarathustra comes, effectively, to the fore by approaching it concept critically. Indeed, the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s major creation is, in my view, best captured by saying that it does not employ the terminology of concepts as it is so characteristically employed in the other Nietzscheran writings preceding it. From the point of view of the earlier works, the big question is nothing other than this: what is all this scarcity of concepts? Whatever it signifies, then, that Nietzsche’s magnum opus avoids conceptual terminology, it prompts the inquiry into the limits of conceptuality.

Yet, one does not need to find the warranty for the approach in purely negative terms. It has to be remembered that, in Nietzsche’s bibliography, Idyllen aus Messina and Dionysos-Dithyramben are, more completely still, void of conceptual terminology. A simple inference would be that “concept”,
even according to Nietzsche, is to be excluded from poetry. But what is one to say about the fact that whereas the other two books are thoroughly stripped off of Begriff and entirely untouched by its derivatives, Also sprach Zarathustra is not? Perhaps that Zarathustra is, both formally speaking and in line with great many commentaries, philosophical poetry and poetical philosophy.

It is best to begin the examination of the conceptual dimension of Zarathustra from the way it carries further issues that are familiar from Nietzsche’s previous publications. Thus, although Zarathustra does not use the language of Begriffen as it employs the image of web, it is recognizably dealing with what many other Nietzschean books expressly relate to the question of concepts. In the third part, Zarathustra’s plea to the sky reads: ”Oh Himmel über mir, du Reiner! Hoher! Das ist mir nun deine Reinheit, dass es keine ewige Vernunft-Spinne und -Spinnennetze gibt” (Z III “VS-A”, KSA 4, 209).

Despite the single-minded tone of this condemnation, Zarathustra qualifies his aversion to the “eternal spiders and spider webs of reason” in two ways. First, while “Vernünftigkeit” is an impossibility for everyone, there is “[e]in Wenig Vernunft, ein Same der Weisheit zerstreut von Stern zu Stern, - dieser Sauerteig ist allen Dingen eingemischt”. Secondly, and more generally, Zarathustra emphasizes in this context the way he is not one to stop in negation but “ein Ja-sager” for whom the sky is a “Tanzboden [...] für göttliche Zufälle”. (Z III “VS-A”, KSA 4, 208-9.)

Apart from the image of web, there is also the one of chaos that was used in the second Unzeitgemäss as the depiction of conceptualization as organizing of chaos. Zarathustra’s initial speech, where he tried to speak of the overhuman but changed the subject into that of the last human being, contained the following expression of hope: “Ich sage euch: man muss noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden Stern gebären zu können. Ich sage euch: ihr habt noch Chaos in euch.” (Z “V” 5, KSA 4, 19.)

Zarathustra implies elsewhere that conceiving is something deeply human, necessary for life: “Weder in’s Unbegreifliche dürfet ihr eingeboren sein, noch in’s Unvernünftige”. This is the connection where he discusses god as “eine Muthmaassung” that goes beyond the human creative capacity or, because “Muthmaassen begrenzt sei in der Denkbarkeit”, beyond the human power of thought. The thought of “Einen und Vollen und Unbewegten und Satten und Unvergänglichen” is downright “menschenfeindlich”. Zarathustra urges that everything has to be transformed along the human conditions: “Menschen - Denkbares, Menschen - Sichtbares, Menschen - Fühlbares!” This challenge is at the same about the need to think through the senses (“Eure eignen Sinnen sollt ihr zu Ende denken!”)

As in the appeal to the humans with chaos in them, this speech also likens the thought-ful creativity to the procreative power: “Dass der Schaffende selber das Kind sei, das neu geboren werde, dazu muss er auch die Gebärerin sein wollen und der Schmerz der Gebärerin.” (Z II “Adgl”, KSA 4, 110-1.)
In two crucial occasions, Zarathustra himself is also positively described as hitting upon a successful conception. In the speech “Der Wahrsager”, Zarathustra’s recovery from sorrow and boredom is described by the words “da verwandelte sich mit Einem Male sein Auge; er begriff Alles, was geschehen war” (Z II “DW”, KSA 4, 175). Again, in the last act of the fourth and last part of the book, Zarathustra is “betäubt und fremd”, until the event of conception releases him in the following way: “Und schon kam ihm die Erinnerung, und er begriff mit Einem Blicke Alles, was zwischen Gestern und Heute sich begeben hatte” (Z IV “Z”, KSA 4, 407).

This double reference strongly suggests that Zarathustra is a character striving for conceptions, character capable of both producing and enjoying them. As important as his winding path through his varying states of mind, his varyingly receptive audiences and varyingly happy ventures, or through the course of the book, is for the structure and symbolism of the work, one must see how Zarathustra’s own conception of what happens is also emphasized. It may be added that the latter reference to his sudden coming to conceive also suggests a crucial continuation of the book’s key questions in the fourth part, too, thus speaking in favor of it as the legitimate final of the book.

Despite what commentators say about Zarathustra’s anticonceptual structure, the act of conceiving is not being, once and for all, depreciated in the book. It is being heightened and renewed. This can be further comprehended by reading the speech that is titled “Vom bleichen Verbrecher”. Alan White, for instance, takes this address to be a discussion of interpreting passions, of the pale criminal’s body being “the victim of his soul” and of his inability to see that the past is “transformed with every moment”\(^\text{1519}\). Without trying to either refute, or entirely subscribe to, this helpful interpretation, I would point out that the main character’s inabilities are of conceptual nature, too:

Immer sah er sich nun als Einer That Thäter. Wahnsinn heisse ich diess: die Ausnahme  verkehrte sich ihm zum Wesen.  
Der Strich bannt die Henne; der Streich, den er führte, bannte seine arme Vernunft - den Wahnsinn nach der That heisse ich diess.  
Hört, ihr Richter! Einen anderen Wahnsinn giebt es noch: und der ist vor der That. Ach, ihr krocht mir nicht tief genug in diese Seele!  
Und nun wieder liegt das Blei seiner Schuld auf ihm, und wieder ist seine arme Vernunft so steif, so gelähmt, so schwer.  
(Z I “VbV”, KSA 4, 46.)
The pale criminal is someone who “litt und begehrt” and “deutete es als mörderische Lust und Gier nach dem Glück des Messers”, as if he had internalized the retrospective moral concepts that were introduced in *Morgenröthe*. He is unable to interpret his sufferings and desires otherwise. This is why his reason/folly is essentially retro-active and not pre-active. It is the latter type of reason or folly that the pale criminal cannot conceive with his “poor reason”. (Z I “VbV”, KSA 4, 46-7.)


It seems that the *Ich* cannot help but make concepts, but they are animated and directed by the whole of the human organization. The same goes, of course, for Zarathustra’s *Ich* and, for that matter, for Nietzsche’s *Ich*. By the same token, this goes for Zarathustra’s and Nietzsche’s concepts, too. To be aware of the nature of conceptualization, which is where the pale criminal failed, is to grasp something of the bodily wisdom regulating the rational operations and, possibly, to produce better concepts.

The speech on the pale criminal ends in Zarathustra’s self-description: “Ich bin ein Geländer am Strome: fasse mich, wer mich fassen kann!” (Z I “VbV”, 47). To be able to figure out this image, one must take a look at one of those rare uses of *Begriff* in the enigmatic work:


“Über dem Flusse ist Alles fest, alle die Werthe der Dinge, die Brücken, Begriffe, alles “Gut” und “Böse”: das ist Alles fest!” -

Kommt gar der harte Winter, der Fluss-Thierbändiger: dann lernen auch die Witzigsten Misstrauen; und, wahrlich, nicht nur die Tölpel sprechen dann: “Sollte nicht Alles - stille stehen?”

“Im Grunde steht Alles stille” - , das ist eine rechte Winter-Lehre, ein gut Ding für unfruchtbare Zeit, ein guter Trost für Winterschlüfer und Ofenhocker.

“Im Grund steht Alles still” - : *dagegen* aber predigt der Thauwind!

Der Thauwind, ein Stier, der kein pflügender Stier ist, - ein wüthender Stier, ein Zerstörer, der mit zornigen Hörnern Eis bricht! Eis aber - - *bricht Stege*!

Oh meine Brüder, ist jetzt nicht Alles im Flusse? Sind nicht alle Geländer und Stege in’s Wasser gefallen? Wer hielte sich noch an “Gut” und “Böse”?

“Wehe uns! Heil uns! Der Thauwind weht!” - Also predigt mir, oh meine Brüder, durch alle Gassen!

(Z III “VaunT” 8, KSA 4, 252.)
For all its temporary impotency, the flowing flux is eventually the supreme master over anything seemingly solid and stable. Values and concepts are like bridges: more or less well established communicative devices that even tend themselves to pose as they were all there was to be communicated. They absolutize themselves to do away their fragility, their ultimate subjection to change, evolving, decay. This line of interpretation is further corroborated by the context of the speech. The crucial stress is, namely, on the breaking down, on the dissolution of old tables. Yet, I think it is a mistake to believe that this is the whole story.

In referring to himself as “Geländer am Strome” and in urging that “fasse mich, wer fassen kann”, the main speaker of this book of speeches speaks out his double message. He may be hard to get a hold of and he may indeed be useless, as long as the bridge rests on its pillars. Yet, soon as the bridge crumbles down and everything solid sinks in the running water and hands grip for support, then Zarathustra is the last refuge, the stronghold or the handrail and parapet. He is is a concept to be conceived, he is the condition of conceiving.

On the basis of these considerations, I cannot agree with those who hold that Zarathustra is essentially anticonceptual. More to the point, albeit freely avoiding the confrontation with pro-conceptual and anti-conceptual features in Nietzsche’s book and heavily exaggerating its systematic construction, is Pierre Héber-Suffrin’s view, as he writes about the prologue that it “constitutes a well constructed systematic introduction to the ensemble of Zarathustra, an inventory of the problems and an assertion of all the concepts”¹⁵²⁰.

Following the shared view of the importance of Zarathustra, I have tried to show how this book is also the touchstone for these conceptual reflections. Where many interpreters find the work and its central character to be digressing from conceptuality, my reading of it seeks to prove that there is nothing wrong in attaching it to a perspective of conceptual regeneration. The critique of those longing for other worlds and those despising the body is not rehearsed in the name of a totally anticonceptual attitude. It is, rather, performed to make room for reconceptualizing conceptuality in a way that no longer entails the old dualisms. An instructive fragment reads:

So gewiß auch dies “Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft” keinen Commentar zu den Reden Zarathustra’s abgiebt und abgeben soll, so vielleicht doch eine Art vorläufiges Glossarium, in dem die wichtigsten Begriffs- und Werth-Neuerungen jenes Buchs - eines Ereignisses ohne Vorbild, Beispiel, Gleichniß in aller Litteratur - irgendwo einmal vorkommen und mit Namen genannt sind
(N Sommer 1886 - Anfang 1887 6 [4], KSA 12 234).
Zarathustra contains, thus, novelties that can be said to be conceptual. Nietzsche’s comment of Jenseits as the “Index” of the preceding book is no hyperbola. It may be as accurate as a very late fragment on Zarathustra that reads like a compact account for the conceptual renewal carried out in the book: “Dies Mosaik von Worten, wo jedes Wort, als Klang, als Ort, als Begriff, nach rechts links und über das Ganze hin seine Kraft ausströmt, dies maximum von Umfang der Zeichen, dies damit erreichte maximum von Energie des Zeichens - das Alles ist römisch und, wenn man mir gleiben will, vornehm par excellence: der ganze Rest von Poesie wird dagegen eine Gefühls-Geschwätzigkeit” (N Oktober-November 1888 24 [1], KSA 13, 624).

Where concept-novelties or the conceptual renewal may point to the idea of old concepts being merely replaced by new ones, these two fragments appear to say a little more than that. The emphases on “event without prefiguration”, ‘the whole’ with its force and energy, the mosaic and the transient flux of words, sounds and coordinates - all these make Zarathustra look like an attempt to sketch the larger issue of reconstructing the very concept of concept, of regenerating conceptuality on a grand scale.

It is time to move on to the post-Zarathustrian books. If Nietzsche’s views of concepts were to be explained by restricting oneself to but one publication, the most obvious choice would, no doubt, be Jenseits von Gut und Böse. It contains more explications of the nature and role of concepts than the other books do. Yet, it hardly encompasses or consummates the manifold that is gained by consulting each work on its own.

To begin with, Jenseits features a handsome selection of hostile criticisms of concepts. There is contemptuous irony offered for positivist “bric-à-brac von Begriffen verschiedenster Abkunft” (JGB 10, KSA 5, 23), romanticist “graeue und grausenhafte Begriffe” (JGB 11, KSA 5, 25), platonist “blasser kalter grauer Begriffs-Netze” (JGB 14, KSA 5, 28), Northern “sonnenlosen Begriffs-Gespensterei und Blutarmuth” (JGB 254, KSA 5, 200), universal “Unbegriff “freier Wille”” (JGB 21, KSA 5, 35) or the “gutes Gewissen” as the “ehrwürdige langschwätzige Begriffs-Zopf, den sich unsre Grossväter hinter ihren Kopf, oft genug auch hinter ihren Verstand hängten” (JGB 214, KSA 5, 151).

On the other hand, there is much more propitious talk of, say, “das Begriffs-Raffinement in der Freundschaft” (JGB 260, KSA 5, 211). Neither are concepts necessarily there to cause suspicion and confusion, but they can themselves be hid under prejudices: ”die Schuldigkeit, ein altes dummes Vorurtheil und Missverständniss von uns gemeinsam fortzublasen, welches allzulange wie ein Nebel den Begriff “freier Geist” undurchsichtig gemacht hat” (JGB 44, KSA 5, 60). And the rottenness of some concepts is apt to imply more proper conceptualizations: ”die “allgemeine Wohlfahrt” kein Ideal, kein Ziel, kein irgendwie fassbarer Begriff, sondern nur ein Brechmittel ist” (JGB 228, KSA 5, 165).
One can readily see how conceptual criticism is exerted on a wide variety of issues. Apart from the hinted *raffinement* of concepts, the most important point balancing or contextualizing, but not taming, the ruthless critique of concepts is the same thing already asserted in *Morgenröthe*. The abolitions and demolitions of concepts are not carried out in favor of some unconceptual awareness, since this, too, is something conceptualized.

Dank einem unbezwinglichen Misstrauen gegen die *Möglichkeit* der Selbst-Erkenntniss, das mich so weit geführt hat, selbst am Begriff “unmittelbare Erkenntniss”, welchen sich die Theoretiker erlauben, eine *contradictio* in *adjecto* zu empfinden: - diese ganze Thatsache ist beinahe das Sicherste, was ich über mich weiss (JGB 281, KSA 5, 230).

In other words, conceptual criticism is not the servant of pre-conceptual immediacy or extra-conceptual intimacy. One may note how the critique of concept involves, in a recognizably Kantian fashion, the limits of the “possibility” of experience and the scope of knowledge.

There are, in the book, many references to individual concepts. For example, there is a passage that reminds the reader of the structurally similar one, in *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*. In both cases, Germans are appreciated only to be scorned: “‘Entwicklung’ ist deshalb der eigentlich deutsche Fund und Wurf im grossen Reich philosophischen Formeln: - ein regierender Begriff, der, im Bunde mit deutschen Bier und deutscher Musik, daran arbeitet, ganz Europa zu verdeutschen” (JGB 244, KSA 5, 185). This way of talking also resembles the insight into the manner that the concept of punishment had, so *Morgenröthe*, conquered the world. The notion of a “directing concept”, in turn, was met in the previous subsection in the critical reference to the ’sanctity’.

For another example, the joint effort of the German philologists and historians is deemed, because it “stellte sich allmählich und trotz aller Romantik in Musik und Philosophie ein *neuer* Begriff vom deutschen Geiste fest, in dem der Zug zur männlichen Skepsis entscheidend hervortrat” (JGB 209, KSA 5, 141). Not long after this, the philosopher’s lot is said to be misunderstood as but a matter of vivisecting present virtues, even though the untimely philosophical mission is to work out “eine *neue* Grösse des Menschen”, to assert “den Begriff “Grösse” gerade in seine Umfänglichkeit und Vielfältigkeit, in seine Ganzheit im Vielen” (JGB 212, KSA 5, 145-6).

These references indicate, in a new way, that Nietzsche’s books can openly launch new concepts. Related to the issue of greatness, it is also said that the “grössten Ereignisse und Gedanken - aber die grössten Gedanken sind die grössten Ereignisse - werden am spätesten begriffen”. Words that following familiar from Nietzsche’s letters of the late 1880’s: “‘Wie viel Jahrhunderte braucht ein Geist, um

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The reference to the Stern refers back to Zarathustra’s aforementioned hope that his listeners’ chaos within may be pressed into a new born star. Another reactivated piece of previous text is the passage in the second Unzeitgemäss where it was said that it takes time for concepts to be deconceived, while now it is estimated that it takes time to conceive new things, or to reconceptualize old things. What is alluded is conceptual renovation, not an aconceptual backlash. Preferably, the renovation brings forth conceptual novelties as well as new conceptions of concept.

In the book, the concepts of philosophy and philosopher are recognized, too, and, at least, indirectly explicated almost throughout the book. I shall only mention two cases. The possibility is appealed to that “man den „Philosoph“ nicht auf den Philosophen einengt, der Bücher schreibt - oder gar seine Philosophie im Bücher bringt!” (JGB 39, KSA 5, 57). Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume are mentioned as marking “eine Erniedrigung und Werth-Minderung des Begriffs “Philosoph”“ (JGB 252, KSA 5, 195). Conceiving is, then, restricting or enlarging, lowering or heightening. Whichever it may be in a given instance, philosophical conceptualizing is a matter of delimitation.

More critically, it is a matter of problematizing conceptuality itself. Of the many observations of the nature of concepts, one might start from this: ”man soll sich der “Ursache” und “Wirkung” nur als reiner Begriffe bedienen, das heisst als conventioneller Fiktionen zum Zweck der Bezeichnung, der Verständigung, nicht der Erklärung”. The negative side of this passage is, by now, familiar.

Conceiving, at least, with these kinds of “pure” concepts, is not explanation. But to say that it has to do with supplying “conventional fictions” leaves it open, whether one can come up with something that is no more fictitious, or only with, at best, unconventional fictions. In the light of what is immediately added, the latter alternative seems the more promising: ”Wir sind es, die allein die Ursachen, das Nacheinander, das Für-einander, die Relativität, den Zwang, die Zahl, das Gesetz, die Freiheit, den Grund, den Zweck erdicht haben”. (JGB 25, KSA 5, 36.)

Instead of getting entangled with the problematic of pure concepts as conventional fictions, I would like to quote a passage that, in all probability, amounts to the clearest intimation of the concept of concept in Nietzsche’s publications. At the same time, the psychological explication that is offered combines the problematic of conceptuality with that of the reciprocal dealings, shared practices, social wholes:

Was ist zuletzt die Gemeinheit? - Worte sind Tonzeichen für Begriffe: Begriffe aber sind mehr oder weniger bestimmte Bildzeichen für oft wiederkehrende und zusammen
The point about *sich verstehen* shows that attention is paid to the vocabulary of concept: “having a shared concept of something”, “understanding each other about something” and “something’s being evident” are conveyed by one and the same expression. The most useful differentiation could be that between sensations and concepts, as concept is presented to be the synthesis of a plurality of sensations.

It would be simplifying matters, however, to say that Nietzsche’s view of conceptuality, as it comes out of *Jenseits*, is exhausted by creative combinations of the insights gathered from evolutionary biology and developmental psychology. For example, the practical use of concepts for scientific and philosophical purposes would have to be remembered, too. Moreover, the *ideologiekritische* aspect or the insight into the power-based conceptuality cannot be neglected: it is said that it makes a difference, whether the “Herrschenden es sind, die den Begriff “gut” bestimmen” or the “Beherrschten” (JGB 260, KSA 5, 209).

The most important dimension seems to be the connection of language and conceptuality. Descriptions of concepts can be comprehended via an analogy to words, as in the example reminding one of the earlier insight of words as pockets: “auch der festeste Begriff hat [...] etwas Schwimmendes, Vielfaches, Vieldeutiges - “ (JGB 188, KSA 5, 108). *Jenseits* proves the philosophical potential of philology in the famous passage that was also cited by Arno Ross, in his study on the history of concept of concept and by myself already in the introductory essay. What is crucial is that where the above quoted passage with the notion of ‘concept’ as an “image-sign for a group of the oft-recurring and uniting sensations” sounds almost naively empiristic, the following account is expressly set against Locke’s superficial
theory of the emergence of ideas:


(JGB 20, KSA 5, 34-5.)

There are great many points condensed in this key passage. Roughly: attention is drawn to the coherence of concepts; this is accounted for by a recourse to the family resemblances in philosophical positions; this is accounted for by a recourse to similarities in languages; this is accounted for by a recourse to the physical conditions of societies or communities. Is this reductionism par excellence? Potentially so, but the integrity of the separate levels of analysis is not denied.

Two things seem particularly important. First, what is explicitly offered, in the passage, is an explanation. That is, it should be something more than just a description, and either more than a conception or precisely an explanatory concept or conceptualizing explanation. Secondly, in the spirit of the remark on Hegel’s achievements, the history of thought and the conceptual evolution is likened to natural history and the evolution of the species. That is, concepts turn out to be, in certain aspects at least, something other than inanimate opponents of living creatures or shallow markers of a deluded little reason. This natural historical view becomes emphasized in the chapter “zur Naturgeschichte der Moral”. It is said, right at the beginning of i, that, instead of moral science, one should have the modesty of speaking about “Sammlung des Materials, begriffliche Fassung und Zusammenordnung
It is striking that “value sentiments” and “value differences” are likened to animals as capable of growth, procreation and disaster. Conceptual activity is that of grasping, organizing and shaping these organic items. It is to be noted that there is no more talk of explanations, but conceptualizations, visualizations and preparations of typologies. The caution is even enhanced by the very title word “zur”. To move toward Zur Genealogie der Moral, one can have a look at the last quotation from Jenseits:

Es steht auch heute noch so, wie es immer stand: ich sehe Niemanden in Europa, der einen Begriff davon hätte (oder gübe), dass das Nachdenken über Moral gefährlich, verfänglich, verführerisch getrieben werden könnte, - dass Verhängniss darin liegen könnte! (JGB 228, KSA 5, 163-4).

Having and giving of the concept of moral studies, of “die moralische Begriffswelt” (GM II 6, KSA 5, 300) is what Genealogie can be seen as focusing upon. Crucial question in this research is formulated as follows: "Welche Fingerzeige gibt die Sprachwissenschaft, insbesondere die etymologische Forschung, für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der moralischen Begriffe ab?" (GM I “A”, KSA 5, 289).

Sensitivity to conceptual language is plain to see: "Hat man in aller Tiefe begriffen - und ich verlange, dass man hier gerade tief greift, tief begreif - inwiefern es schlechterdings nicht die Aufgabe der Gesunden sein kann, Kranke zu warten, Kranke gesund zu machen, so ist damit auch eine Nothwendigkeit mehr begriffen, - die Nothwendigkeit von Ärzten und Krankenwärtern, die selber krank sind: und nunmehr haben und halten wir den Sinn des asketischen Priesters mit beiden Händen" (GM III 15, KSA 5, 372). In this reappropriation of “the paradigm of the hand”, asceticism is one of the principal phenomena being conceived:


Ascetism allows no natural rivalry of ideas, but asserts “die ganze sinnenfeindliche, faul- und raffinirtmachende Metaphysik der Priester, ihre Selbst-Hypnotisierung nach Art des Fakirs und
Brahmanen - Brahman als gläserner Knopf und fixe Idee benutzt” (GM I 6, KSA 5, 265-6). One can see how the refined sense of conceptuality that *Jenseits* linked with friendship finds here its opposition in the re-finement that proceeds through excessive purification and clarification to metaphysical putting on airs. *Genealogie* presents fixed ideas as pathologic:

Dies ist eine Art Willens-Wahnsinn in der seelischen Grausamkeit, der schlechterdings nicht seines Gleiches hat: der Wille des Menschen, sich schuldig und verwerflich zu finden bis zur Unsühnbarkeit, sein Wille, sich bestraft zu denken, ohne dass die Strafe je der Schuld äquivalent werden könne, sein Wille, den untersten Grund der Dinge mit dem Problem von Strafe und Schuld zu infizieren und giftig zu machen, um sich aus diesem Labyrinth von “fixen Ideen” ein für alle Mal den Ausweg abzuschneiden, sein Wille, ein Ideal aufzurichten - das des “heiligen Gottes” - , um Angesichts desselben seiner absoluten Unwürdigkeit handgreiflich gewiss zu sein (GM III 23, KSA 5, 332).

Talking about “ideas”, rather than concepts, is, I think, due to the phraseology of the *idée fixe*. However, the points being articulated bear on conceptuality. And, indeed, an insight is expressed to the “zeitweilige Tyrannie solcher paradoxe und paralogischer Begriffe wie “Schuld”, “Sünde”, “Sündhaftigkeit”, “Verderbniss”, “Verdammniss”“ (GM III 16, KSA 5, 375).

Genealogie is about unfoldings that are captured in linguistic history. It is claimed that etymological studies corroborate the view that all languages “auf die gleiche Begriffs-Verwandlung zurückleiten”. This conceptual transformation concerns the way ““vornehm”, “edel” im ständischen Sinne der Grundbegriff ist, aus dem sich “gut im Sinne von “seelisch-vornehm”, “edel”, von “seelisch-hochgeartet”, “seelisch-privilegirt” mit Nothwendigkeit heraus entwickelt”. In other words, philologico-philosophical critique pays, since there is discovered a “Regel, dass der politische Vorrangs-Begriff sich immer in einen seelischen Vorrangs-Begriff auslöst”, not the other way round. (GM I 4 & 6, KSA 5, 261 & 264.)

Yet, it makes little sense to say that earlier conceptions are to be taken as superior ones. It makes more sense to try and articulate forgotten ways of conceiving, since “alle Begriffe der älteren Menschheit sind vielmehr anfänglich in einem uns kaum unendlichen Maasse grob, äusserlich, eng, geradezu und insbesondere unsymbolisch verstanden worden” (GM I 6, KSA 5, 264-5).

On the more readily philosophical level, the book aims to show that there is a crucial “Band zwischen asketischem Ideal und Philosophie”. This has to do with the Kantian ““’interesselose Anschauung”‘ as “ein Unbegriff und Widersinn”. What is at stake is the “gefährlichen alten Begriffs-Faberei, welche ein “reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt der Erkenntniss” angesetzt hat”, accompanied by
“contradiktorischen Begriffe wie “reine Vernunft”, “absolute Geistigkeit”, “Erkenntnis an sich””. (GM III 9 & 12, KSA 356 & 364-5.)

All this speaks in favor of the view that only defective concepts or corrupt ways of conceiving are attacked, not any concepts and conceptualizations whatsoever. A key aspect is the “Moralisierung der Begriffe”, that is, “ihrer Zurückschiebung in’s schlechte Gewissen”. More generally, it is the “Sklavenaufstand der Moral” that stems from negativity toward anything different. The notorious slave morality is expressly described as a specific way of conceiving, since it “hat “den bösen Feind” concipirt, “den Bösen”, und zwar als Grundbegriff, von dem aus er sich als Nachbild und Gegenstück nun auch noch einen “Guten” ausdenkt - sich selbst!...” By contrast, “vornehm Werthungsweise” starts from “einem triumphirenden Ja-sagen”: ” - ihr negativer Begriff “niedrig” “gemein” “schlecht” ist nur ein nachgeborenes blasses Contrastbild im Verhältniss zu ihrem positiven, durch und durch mit Leben und Leidenschaft durchtränkten Grundbegriff “wir vornehmen, wir Guten, wir Schönen, wir Glücklichen!”” (GM II 21 & I 10, KSA 5, 330 & 270-4.)

Here, it is made clear that both the good guys and the bad guys conceive something fundamental, on the basis of which they think and act. Transposition from base conditions to noble circumstances is not a transposition from conceptuality to the unconceptual. At the same time, the point about concepts as retrograde rationalizations is no longer affirmed. Instead, concepts appear to be pre-active.

The two cases of conceptual refinement, the one that takes place among friends, as was referred to in Jenseits, and the one that happens in ascetic isolation, can be seen as both sharing something and deviating far from one another. Negativist asceticism produces concepts that are highly refined but gained from resentful relation to other conceptions and conceivers, detached from ideational concurrence and pathologically fixed into absolutes. Active sociability manufactures concepts whose refinement is free from ressentiment, overtly enjoyable, enjoying and open to change.

This difference is especially relevant for the methodological and ideologiekritische thrust of genealogy. A critique of functionalism is offered as it is said that “[w]enn man die Nützlichkeit von irgend welchem physiologischen Organ (oder auch einer Rechts-Institution, einer gesellschaftlichen Sitte, eines politischen Brauchs, einer Form in den Künstern oder im religiösen Cultus) noch so gut begriffen hat, so hat man damit noch nichts in Betreff seiner Entstehung begriffen”. It is, rather, that “die ganze Geschichte eines “Dings”, eines Organs, eines Brauchs kann dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen-Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und Zurechtmachungen sein, deren Ursachen selbst unter sich nicht im Zusammenhange zu sein brauchen, vielmehr unter Umständen sich bloss zufällig hinter einander folgen und ablösen.” Hence, the “Form ist flüssig, der “Sinn” ist aber noch mehr...” (GM II 12, KSA 5,
Punishment is a case in point. It is said that there is something that is “relativ Dauerhafte an ihr, ihr Brauch, den Akt, das “Drama”, eine gewisse strenge Abfolge von Prozeduren”. The other side of punishment has to do with “den Sinn, den Zweck, die Erwartung, welche sich an die Ausführung solcher Prozeduren knüpft”. The form of punishment is subject to change, while the meaning, or “sense”, of punishment nothing but change: a sequence of interpretations. The following description of “das Flüssige” in punishments is strongly reminiscent of the way words and concepts were, in Morgenröthe, described as pocket-like flexible depositories of meaning. At the same time, it contributes to the problematic of the whole:

in einem sehr späten Zustande der Cultur (zum Beispiel im heutigen Europa) der Begriff “Strafe” in der That gar nicht mehr Einen Sinn vor, sondern eine ganze Synthesis von “Sinnen”: die bisherige Geschichte der Strafe überhaupt, die Geschichte ihrer Ausnützung zu den verschiedensten Zwecken, krystallisirt sich zuletzt in eine Art von Einheit, welche schwer löslicher, schwer zu analysiren und, was man hervorheben muss, ganz und gar undefinirbar ist. (Es ist heute unmöglich, bestimmt zu sagen, warum eigentlich gestraft wird: alle Begriffe, in denen sich ein ganzer Prozess semiotisch zusammenfasst, entziehen sich der Definition; definirbar ist nur Das, was keine Geschichte hat.) In einem früheren Stadium erscheint dagegen jene Synthesis von “Sinnen” noch löslicher, auch noch verschiebbarer; man kann noch wahrnehmen, wie für jeden einzelnen Fall die Elemente der Synthesis ihre Werthigkeit verändern und sich demgemäß umordnen, so bald dies, bald jenes Element auf Kosten der übrigen hervortritt und dominirt, ja unter Umständen Ein Element (etwa der Zweck der Abschreckung) den ganzen Rest von Elementen aufzuheben scheint.

(GM II 13, KSA 5, 316-7.)

What is being recommended is not the past way of treating concepts in an unsymbolical fashion, nor the current manner of seeking unequivocal formal distinctness and closedness. Yet, there is a “unity” and a “synthesis” that is gained and met in concepts. At least some of them comprise a processual whole, an ongoing “crystallization”, of which Jenseits already spoke of and ushered it to be conceptualized. Concepts themselves are destined to undergo incessant reappropriations, reorderings of the constituents, attempts at fixing of a single aspect, or of numerous properties, over the others. A specific point in cultural development has been reached where any non-technical concept is difficult to analyze and impossible to strictly define once and for all.

Jenseits and Genealogie accommodate Nietzsche’s most fully articulated views on conceptuality. Nevertheless, the first seven and the last four books find use for conceptual vocabulary and cannot be overlooked in investigating his philosophical interrogation of concepts.
Der Fall Wagner is not just a case study of Richard Wagner’s art, personality and influence. Wagner presents a philosophical and a specifically conceptual case. This is carefully expressed both in the beginning and in the end of the book:

Ich bin so gut wie Wagner das kind dieser Zeit, will sagen ein décadent: nur dass ich das begreife, nur dass ich mich dagegen wehrte. Der Philosoph in mir wehrte sich dagegen. [...] Wenn ich mit dieser Schrift den Satz aufrecht halte, dass Wagner schädlich ist, so will ich nicht weniger aufrecht halten, wem er trotzem unentbehrlich ist - dem Philosophen.

(W “V”, KSA 6, 11-12.)

Ein Philosoph hat das Bedürfniss, sich die Hände zu waschen, nachdem er sich so lange mit dem “Fall Wagner” befasst hat. - Ich gebe meinen Begriff des Modernen. - [...] Ich bewundere, anbei gesagt, die Bescheidenheit der Christen, die nach Bayreuth gehn. Ich selbst würde gewisse Worte nicht aus dem Munde eines Wagner aushalten. Es gibt Begriffe, die nicht nach Bayreuth gehören... [...] - Aber eine solche Falschheit, wie die der Bayreuther, ist heute keine Ausnahme. Wir kennen alle den unästhetischen Begriff des christlichen Junkers. [...] - Aber wir Alle haben, wider Wissen, wider Willen, Werthe, Worte, Formeln, Moralen entgegengesetzter Abkunft im Leibe, - wir sind, physiologisch betrachtet, falsch... Der Fall Wagner ist für den Philosophen ein Glücksfall, - diese Schrift ist, man hört es, von der Dankbarkeit inspirirt...

(W “E”, KSA 6, 50-3.)

Wagner can safely be said about the concept of 'Wagner': "Will man mir glauben, so hat man den höchsten Begriff Wagner nicht aus dem zu entnehmen, was heute von ihm gefällt”. Wagner’s thinking is amenable to conceptual critique, since "er errieth, [...] er mit Händen griff, was allein der Deutsche ernst nimmt - "die Idee”“. The same goes for his tastelessness: "Ein Geschmack, den Wagner begriff!” (W 7 & 10, KSA 6, 28 & 36.)

Naturally, Wagner’s works, too, present conceptual problems: "Der Lohengrin enthält eine feierliche In-Acht-Erklärung des Forschens und Fragens. Wagner vertritt damit den christlichen Begriff “du sollst und musst glauben”“. Further, Wagner’s alternatives can be articulated by conceptual means.

Compared to him, Bizet’s “Auffassung der Liebe” is “die einzige, die des Philosophen würdig ist -”, while “[m]an kann einen guten Theil der andren Musiker in den Begriff Brahms subsumiren”. (W 3 & 2 & “ZN”, KSA 6, 17 & 15 & 48.)

The influence of Wagner is, in turn, to be studied, because “unsre Schauspieler verehrungswürdiger als je sind”. That Wagner is, most of all, an actor does not mean that “ist ihre Gefährlichkeit nicht als geringer begriffen...” In other words, it is the question of conceiving the proper proportions of a detrimental phenomenon. As for the many effects of Wagnerism, more dangerous than the “Entartung des rhythmischen Gefühls” is the “Verderbniss der Begriffe”. (W 12 & “N”, KSA 6, 39 & 44.)
Seen in this light, *Der Fall Wagner* appears to be Nietzsche’s most representative and most sustained conceptual study. It remains to be said, however, that its sole concern is by no means to criticize concepts. It offers another intimation of the more positive conception of conceptuality, as it construes “unser Begriff “Stil”“ to bear on the pre-thought-ful hunch or pre-figured chaos (W 6, KSA 6, 24.)

As well as Wagner, though differently, the next publication introduces itself as a book about conceptuality: ”Götzen-Dämmerung: ah wer begriffe es heute, von was für einem Ernste sich hier ein Einsiedler erholt! - Die Heiterkeit ist an uns [Germans] das Unverständlichste...” (GD “WdDa” 3, 105-6.) Some aspects, at least, of the title are explicated as follows:

> Sie fragen mich, was Alles Idiosynkrasie bei den Philosophen ist?... Zum Beispiel ihr Mangel an historischen Sinn, ihr Hass gegen die Vorstellung selbst des Werdens, ihr Ägypticismus. Sie glauben eine Ehre anzuthun, wenn die dieselbe enthistorisieren, sub specie aeterni, - wenn sie aus ihr eine Mumie machen. Alles, was Philosophen seit Jahrtausenden gehandhabt haben, waren Begriffs-Mumien; es kam nichts Wirkliches lebendig aus ihren Händen. Sie tödten, sie stopfen aus, diese Herren Begriffs-Götzen diener, wenn sie anbeten, - sie werden Allem lebensgefährlich, wenn sie anbeten. Der Tod, der Wandel, das Alter ebensogut als Zeugung und Wachsthum sind für sie Einwände, - Widerlegungen sogar. Was ist, wird nicht; was wird, ist nicht... (GD “D”V”idP” 1, KSA 6, 74.)

Forming a part of the critique of a completely ahistorical thinking, concepts as mummies and objects of worship are being ridiculed. “Philosoph sein, Mumie sein” reads the revindication of the defenders of the stable being, and they are said to add: ”weg vor Allem mit dem Leibe, dieser erbarmungswürdigen idée fixe der Sinne!” (GD “D”V”idP” 1, KSA 6, 75).

What follows is a very Langean passage about another philosophical idiosyncrasy. It is the one of placing “Das, was am Ende kommt, - leider! denn es sollte gar nicht kommen! - die “höchsten Begriffe”, das heisst die allgemeinsten, die leersten Begriffe, den letzten Rauch der verdunstenden Realität an den Anfang als Anfang”. What are, conventionally, taken to be the highest of concepts, “das Seiende, das Unbedingte, das Gute, das Wahre, das Vollkommne - das Alles kann nicht geworden sein, muss folglich causa sui sein”. Highest concepts must, furthermore, be consistent and coherent; hence the “stupenden Begriff “Gott”...” In so far as this is what philosophy has given, it is but “die Gehirnleiden kranker Spinnerei”. By contrast, it is said, later, that “[n]ichts ist weniger griechisch als die Begriffs- Spinnerei eines Einsiedlers” (GD “D”V”idP” 4 & “SeU” 23, KSA 6, 76 & 126.)

Despite the strong flavor of, and clear paraphrases from, Lange’s *Geschichte des Materialismus*, these insights are developed into a genuine account of conceptuality. Once again, it is done with a stress on the interdependence of words and concepts:
Die Sprache gehört ihrer Entstehung nach in die Zeit der rudimentärsten Form von Psychologie: wir kommen in ein grobes Fetischwesen hinein, wenn wir uns die Grundvoraussetzungen der Sprach-Metaphysik, auf deutsch: der Vernunft, zum Bewusstsein bringen. Das sieht überall Thäter und Thun: das glaubt an Willen als Ursache überhaupt; das glaubt an’s ‘Ich’, an’s Ich als Sein, an’s Ich als Substanz und projicirt den Glauben an die Ich-Substanz auf alle Dinge - es schafft erst damit den Begriff “Ding”... Das Sein wird überall als Ursache hineingedacht, untergeschoben; aus der Conception “Ich” folgt erst, als abgeleitet, der Begriff “Sein”... (GD “D’V”idP” 5, KSA 6, 77.)

It is good to take notice of the way Conception and Begriff stand, at last, side by side. Language as a fetish substantiates the subject, which is said to be the very first thing conceived. The role of language becomes utterly emphasized by the verb abgeleiten: the concept ‘thing’ or ‘being’ is inducible from the grammatical ‘I’. The aspect that has to do with developmental psychology is, in turn, that the child’s initial post-symbiotic differentiation from the mother may be accountable for much of the subsequent ways to conceive substantial wholes, substantial differences. In any case, language tends to maintain habitual ways of conceiving and direct the discriminative abilities.

Later on in the book, the problematic is taken up again: ”die Conception eines Bewusstseins (“Geistes”) als Ursache und später noch die des Ich (des “Subjekts”) als Ursache sind bloss nachgeboren, nachdem vom Willen die Ursächlichkeit als gegeben feststand, als Empirie...” Explication is this: “Der Mensch hat seine drei “innere Thatssachen”, Das, woran er am festesten glaubte, den Willen, den Geist, das Ich, aus sich herausprojicirt, - er nahm erst den Begriff Sein aus dem Begriff Ich heraus, er hat die “Dinge” als seier gesetzt nach seinem Bilde, nach seinem Begriff des Ichs als Ursache.” It is added that the “Ding selbst, nochmals gesagt, der Begriff Ding, ein Reflex bloss vom Glauben an’s Ich als Ursache.” (GD “DvgI” 3, 90-1.)

It has to be noted, too, how the fictitious nature of substantializing conceptions is heavily underlined in both contexts. Such concepts are created to be projected-onto, thought-into, woven-under the things that, in turn, only begin to exist, as it were, quite naturally, at the moment of the conception. In a way that is most likely informed by the Schopenhauerian chauvinism against the femininity of reason, it is said, with a reference to Greeks, that “Die “Vernunft” in der Sprache: oh was für eine alte betrügerische Weibsperson!” (GD “D”VidP” 5, KSA 6, 78).

The combined critique of the grammatical subject, the psychological ego, the theological god, the spiritual soul and the metaphysical substance was discussed in the previous subsection. It can now be seen that Götzen-Dämmerung is the book able to accommodate these intense criticisms.
But what is perhaps the most important point, in all the book’s considerations, is that they themselves are recognized as conceptual ones. In critically interrogating conceptions that involve questionable substantializations reducible to “rudimentäre Psychologie”, as in the metaphysical Ding an sich, the theological Gott or the physical Atom, a specific conceptual novelty is also introduced: “diesen Begriff der imaginären Ursachen”. (GD “DvgI” 6, KSA 94; see also 3, 91.) Differently stated, corrupt concepts are traced back to corrupt ways of conceptualization.

One can read the other chapters of the book, too, through concept critical lenses. “Das Problem des Sokrates”, for instance, has it that Socrates was a decadent. Yet, it is worth asking, whether he had “das selbst noch begriffen, dieser Klügste aller Selbst-Überlister?” Socrates could conceive and conceptualize anything, but he may not have had a good grasp of his own conceptual make up. Be that as it may, the question about Socrates is a conceptual one: “Ich suche zu begreifen, aus welcher Idiosynkrasie jene sokratische Gleichsetzung von Vernunft = Tugend = Glück stammt”. (GD “DpdS” 11-2 & 4, KSA 6, 73 & 69.)

The chapter “Moral als Widersinnatur”, in turn, includes the insight that “[m]it einiger Billigkeit werde anderseits zugestanden, dass auf dem Boden, aus dem das Christenthum gewachsen ist, der Begriff “Vergeistigung der Passion” gar nicht concipirt werden konnte”). The chapter also deals with problems of spiritualizing sensuality into loving or having enemies, both of which involve conceiving of the value of sublimation. (GD “MaW” 1 & 3, KSA 6, 82 & 84.)

“Die “Verbesserer” der Menschheit”, in turn, features the point that morality is but “eine Ausdeutung gewisser Phänomene, bestimmter geredet, eine Missdeutung. Das moralische Urtheil gehört, wie das religiöse, einer Stufe der Unwissenheit zu, auf der selbst der Begriff des Realen, die Unterscheidung des Realen und Imaginären noch fehlt”. (GD “D”V”dM” 1, KSA 6, 98.)

Elsewhere in the book, it is said, for example, that “die Bestie”, against which the moral campaign was originally targeted, has its “Gegensatz-Begriff” in the “Nicht-Zucht-Menschen” or the “Mischmasch-Menschen” or the “Tsandala” (GD “D”V”dM” 3, KSA 6, 100). Moreover, the point is expressed that Russia is “der Gegensatz-Begriff zu der erbärmlichen europäischen Kleinstaaterei und Nervosität”.

Furthermore, it is written that “unser moderner Begriff “Freiheit” ist ein Beweis von Instinkt-Entartung mehr”. (GD “SeU” 39 & 41, KSA 6, 141 & 143.) And about the connection of philosophy and religion the following remark is made: "Und wie viel Plato ist noch im Begriff “Kirche”, in Bau, System, Praxis der Kirche!” (GD “WidAv” 2, KSA 6, 156).

Now, that the conceptual problematic is recognized, in Nietzsche’s texts, is one thing, and one that
should no more come as a surprise. That it is articulated in various ways is another thing, no more astonishing anymore. Still another issue is, however, the question about Nietzsche’s own creations and their potential conceptual nature. Two of the paragraphs, in one and the same chapter of Götzen-Dämmerung, have headings that are apt to stir such questioning: ”Mein Begriff von Freiheit.” and ”Mein Begriff vom Genie.” Moreover, there is a reference to ”meinen Begriff “jenseits von Gut und Böse”. (GD “SeU” 38 & 44 & 37, KSA 6, 136-45.)

This is important to bear in mind when reading the harsh criticisms of concepts or of the concepts of concept. The criticisms seem to be such that they leave room for other kinds of concepts, other conceptions of conceptuality. This point is not merely hinted at but specifically elucidated in the last section of the chapter “Was den deutschen angeht”. This piece of writing is not only rich in its conceptual vocabulary, in the appropriation of the “paradigm of the hand”. It is one of the most forceful cases made for the need to develop new kinds of concepts to replace obsolete ones.


(GD “WdDa” 7, KSA 6, 109-10.)

Turning to Ecce homo, one cannot help but see this kind of conceptual concerns to rise into prominence: ”Selbst jene Filigran-Kunst des Greifens und Begreifens überhaupt, jene Finger für nuances, jene Psychologie des “Um-die-Ecke-sehns” und was sonst mir eignet, ward damals erst erlernt, ist das eigentliche Geschenk jener Zeit, in der Alles sich bei mir verfeinerte, die Beobachtung selbst wie alle Organe der Beobachtung” (EH “Wiswb” 1, KSA 6, 265-6).

As if commenting on the riddle-like challenge of the dance with concepts, there is a reference to
Zarathustra, that until “es Solche giebt, die eines gleichen Pathos fähig und würdig sind [...] wird es Niemanden geben, der die Kunst, die hier verschwendet worden ist, begreift”. Moreover, it is said that “[m]ein alter Lehrer Ritschl behauptete sogar, ich concipirte selbst noch meine philologischen Abhandlungen wie ein Pariser romantier - absurd spannend”. Elsewhere, a quotation from Jenseits is prefaced by the phrase: ”Um einen Begriff von mir als Psychologen zu geben”. (EH “WisgBs” 4 & 2 & 6, KSA 6, 304 & 301 & 307.)

Apart from these remarks, the book supplies other conceptualities, too: “Den höchsten Begriff vom Lyriker hat mir Heinrich Heine gegeben”; ”Die Deutschen sind unfähig jedes Begriffs von Grösse” (EH “Wiskb” 4, KSA 6, 286). It is common knowledge that Ecce homo involves an exceptional series of self-criticisms or one of the most generous expositions of self-review in the history of writing. It is becoming more and more common to treat these efforts as, in an important sense, questioning the very business of self-critique and self-review, since, in the first place, the book hardly confirms to any received notion of selfhood.

What is not commonly underlined is that Ecce homo provides descriptions of the earlier publications that, quite specifically, recognize and emphasize their conceptual aspirations. The remarks on the Unzeitgemässe, were already quoted above. In addition, the books on Schopenhauer and Wagner are characterized in terms of “ein Problem der Erziehung ohne Gleichen, ein neuer Begriff der Selbst-Zucht, Selbst-Vertheidigung bis zur Härte, ein Weg zur Grösse und zu welthistorischen Aufgaben”.

Schopenhauer als Erzieher is also depicted as elucidating the way “ich den Philosophen verstehe, als einen furchtbaren Explosionsstoff, vor dem Allen in Gefahr ist” or “wie ich meinen Begriff “Philosoph” meilenweit abtrenne von einem Begriff, der sogar noch einen Kant in sich schliesst, nicht zu reden von den akademischen “Wiederkäuen” und andren Professoren der Philosophie”. (EH “WisgBs”: DU: 3, KSA 6, 319-20.)

Moreover, Ecce homo sheds light on the background of Menschliches. The making of the early work is connected to the first Bayreuth festivals. More crucial than the biographical data is, however, the conceptual dimension of the setting: “Wer einen Begriff davon hat, was für Visionen mir schon damals über den Weg gelaufen waren, kann errathen, wie mir zu Muthe war, als ich eines Tags in Bayreuth aufwachte. Ganz als ob ich träumte...” If this was how the trilogy was set in motion, it was finished the same time as the first issue of Bayreuther Blätter: ”ich begriff, wozu es höchste Zeit gewesen war.” All in all, the last part of the trilogy is referred to as the chance to “begreifen, was diese “Rückkehr zu mir” war: eine höchste Art von Genesung selbst!” (EH “WisgBs”: MA 2 & 4 & 5, KSA 6, 323 & 326 & 327.)
Morgenröthe, for its part, is reviewed as posing and answering the question “Welchen Sinn haben jene Lügenbegriffe, die Hülfsbegriffe der Moral, “Seele”, “Geist”, “freier Wille”, “Gott”, wenn nicht den, die Menschheit physiologisch zu ruiniren?...” And about Fröhliche Wissenschaft, it is said that the closing of the third part “ein Schicksal für alle Zeiten zum ersten Male in Formeln fasst”. This aside, attention is paid to the “provençalischen Begriff “gaya scienza” and to “diesen Begriff” of “die grosse Gesundheit”. (EH “WisgBs”: M 2 & DFW, KSA 6, 331 6 333; “AsZ” 2, 337.)

To continue, bringing about Zarathustra is described by the means of asking, if anybody has, “Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, einen deutlichen Begriff davon, was Dichter starker Zeitalter Inspiration nannten?” Explication is offered in terms of the “Begriff Offenbarung, in dem Sinn, dass plötzlich, mit unsäglicher Sicherheit und Feinheit, etwas sichtbar, hörbar wird”, “man hat keinen Begriff mehr, was Bild, was Gleichniss ist, Alles bietet sich als der nächste, der richtigste, der einfachste Ausdruck”. After this exhausting process, the story goes on, there came sickness and plans for a stay in Aquila, the “Gegenbegriff von Rom”. Eventually, it in was Nice where the speaker says that he was seen “ohne einen Begriff von Ermüdung”. The passage goes on with the statement that there is no way of telling how to give a “Begriff von der Distanz, von der azurnen Einsamkeit, in der dies Werk lebt”. (EH “WisgBs”: AsZ 3 & 4 & 6, KSA 6, 339-41& 343.)

Jenseits, in turn, is appealed to as “eine Schule des gentilhomme, der Begriffgeistiger und radikalener genommen als er je genommen worden ist”. When it comes to Genealogie, a reference is especially made to the way asceticism asserted itself as the ideal “weil es keinen Concurrenten hatte”. (EH “WisgBs”: JvGuB 2 & GdM, KSA 6, 350 & 353.)

Götzen-Dämmerung is recommended for anyone wishing to “sich kurz einen Begriff davon geben, wie vor mir Alles auf dem Kopfe stand”. Finally, Wagner occasions scorn for Germans: ”Selbst der Begriff dafür, was tief an einem Buch ist, geht ihnen ab”; “[...] so gutmütigen Begriff der canaille [...] die Deutschen sind canaille - ach! sie sind so gutmütig...”; “Den Deutschen geht jeder Begriff davon ab, wie gemein sie sind, aber das ist der Superlativ der Gemeinheit, - sie schämen sich nicht einmal, blass Deutsche zu sein...” (EH “WisgBs”: G 1 & DFW 3 & 4, KSA 6, 354 & 361-2.)

To conclude, the retrospective Nietzsche exhibition held in the pages of Ecce homo maintains a steady conceptual interest throughout its reconsideration of the publications. Concept critical approach can, then, hardly be said to be an anti-Nietzschean or non-Nietzschean way to come to terms with Nietzsche’s bibliography. In fact, Nietzsche was the first concept critical Nietzsche scholar.

To be sure, Ecce homo is not just a selection and collection of reviews. Its main conceptual interest is
the ich that is telling all that is told about itself:


Indispensable concepts have been lacking and subversions are bound to destroy all previous conceptions. If this is the general judgment of the situation, it is no wonder that the book is drawn to a close by a series of conceptual reverberations:


The concepts mentioned here are said to have been “invented” and maintained for a specific purpose. A specific operation has been done in the name of these concepts. A certain taking sides has been carried out under their flag. The purpose / operation / taking sides has been presented in order for it to be “believed” to be morality. As such, here is a piece of clear cut conceptual criticism as a critique of ideology.
But is it also a negative way to picture a more trustworthy morality? Is it a revindication of another ideology? Having a look at what has been neglected, blurred, confused, hindered, choked or strangled by the so-called morality is having a look at such concepts as 'life', 'the only world' or 'the reality of the Earth', 'body', 'instinct', 'self' and 'self-assertion', or the 'pride' and the 'yea-saying' of those who have done well and are prepared to do well in the future.

One can scarcely pretend to be able to answer the questions about the status of the concepts being allegedly repressed by the force of the moral conceptuality, unless one continues further the investigation of Nietzsche’s thinking. The last book to be reread before the attempt to articulate Nietzsche’s view of conceptuality is Der Antichrist.

It is tempting to interpret this work as the consummation of the problematic developed in the earlier publications. In a sense, that would be perfectly justified. Its contributions to this problematic are, however, best summed up without this kind of objectives. What I find quite evident is that, among Nietzsche’s books, Antichrist is, to a great extent and in a way comparable perhaps only to Wagner, a study on conceptuality. Its special property lies in its enforced ideologiekritische thrust.

The book ends in a rather similar position as did Ecce homo: “Die “Gleichheit der Seelen vor Gott”, diese Falschheit, dieser Vorwand für die rancunes aller Niedriggesinnten, dieser Sprengstoff von Begriff, der endlich Revolution, moderne Idee und Niedergangs-Princip der ganzen Gesellschafts-Ordnung geworden ist - ist christlicher Dynamit...” (AC 62, KSA 6, 252). Not necessarily are concepts, then, pale and powerless. They can be revolutionary forces.

Of course, this recognition is not tantamount to acceptance of the rule of Christian concepts. Yet, there is much to be learned from the subversion it effected. The point is made that Christianity “hatte barbarische Begriffe und Werthe nöthig, um über Barbaren Herr zu werden” and that it “auf dem Boden Herr werden will, wo aphrodisische oder Adonis-Culte den Begriff des Cultus bereits bestimmt haben”. Furthermore, “die Begriffe “Jenseits”, “jüngstes Gericht”, “Unsterblichkeit der Seele”, die “Seele” selbst; es sind Folter-Instrumente, es sind Systeme von Grausamkeit, vermöge deren der Priester Herr wurde, Herr blieb...” (AC 22-3 & 38, KSA 6, 189-90 & 210.)

Not only religion but philosophy as well is criticized for its conceptions. The concepts of “wahre Welt” and of “der Moral als Essenz der Welt” are said to be “zwei bösartigsten Irrthümer, die es gibt!” Kant’s moralistic philosophy, with its “Pflichtbegriff überhaupt”, belongs to the “Hirngespinnste”, to the procedure of “Opferung vor dem Moloch der Abstraktion.” (AC 10-1, KSA 6, 176-7.)
Complementing the problematic of the base and the noble, illustrated in Genealogie, the book has it that the very discerning of the two ways of valuing is a specifically conceptual undertaking. It boils down to the “Gegensatz-Begriff einer vornehmen Moral und einer ressentiment-Moral”. Yet, the principle reference point of the book is the type of the priest. What is decisive, from the concept critical point of view, is that the priest is said to be the one who “bestimmte den Begriff “wahr” und “unwahr”! (AC 24 & 12, KSA 6, 192 & 179.)

Reinvoking Nietzsche’s early notion of the deficient concept of causality, in religious thinking, priestly concepts are now said to constitute an “Attentat gegen den Begriff Ursache und Wirkung!” The point is that the priest knows “nur Eine grosse Gefahr: das ist die Wissenschaft - der gesunde Begriff von Ursache und Wirkung.” Conversely, the “Schuld- und Strafbegriff, die ganze “sittliche Weltordnung” ist erfunden gegen die Wissenschaft, - gegen die Ablösung des Menschen vom Priester...”. This is no minor conflict, since “[w]enn die natürlichen Folgen einer That nicht mehr “natürlich” sind, sondern durch Begriffs-Gespenster des Aberglaubens, durch “Gott”, durch “Geister”, durch “Seelen” bewirkt gedacht werden, als bloss “moralische” Consequenten, als Lohn, Strafe, Wink, Erziehungsmittel, so ist die Voraussetzung zur Erkenntniss zerstört, - so hat man das grösste Verbrechen an der Menschheit begangen. - “ (AC 49, KSA 6, 228-9.)

Sceptics, including Zarathustra, are set against priests and priestliness. From their point of view, believers and fanatics are “Epilektiker des Begriffs”. The difficulty is that the latter “wirkt auf die grosse Masse, - die Fanatiker sind pittoresk, die Menschheit sieht Gebärden lieber als dass sie Gründe hört...” (AC 54, KSA 6, 237.) It must be admitted that the point is well taken, since Antichrist itself is most conveniently read as a book of fanaticism, if not of showing off, in any case without a claim to grounds.

The Christian teachings are studied in two steps. First, the conceptual space of the Gospels is articulated. Thereafter, the focus is on “eine “schlimme Botschaft”, ein Dysangelium of the Pauline practice. An analogue is found in the history of Judaism. The cause for the degeneration of the popular religion of Israel is said to be the change in the concept of God: "man veränderte seinen Begriff, - man entnatürlichte seinen Begriff [...] Sein Begriff wird ein Werkzeug in den Händen priesterlicher Agitatoren. [...] Die Gottesbegriff gefälscht; der Moralbegriff gefälscht”. (AC 39 & 25 & 26, KSA 6, 211 & 193-4.)

While reaffirming the usefulness of the ’paradigm of the hand’, the basic model of conceiving proves to be indispensable in the critique of religion. Where perceptions are always in danger of becoming suffocated by conceptions, religious perceptions are also liable to transform into churchly conceptions. In other words, in the course of time, concepts are no longer checked with percepts but, instead, all
perceiving tend to confirm to the ruling conceptuality.

If this is the grand setting of conceptual criticism, in Antichrist, it by no means exhausts the whole problematic. A number of individual points is made in terms of concept critique. Against Renan, it is held that “wenn irgend Etwas unevangelisch, so ist es der Begriff Held”. Renan is seen as committing another error in calling Jesus a genius: “Unser ganzer Begriff, unser Cultur-Begriff “Geist” hat in der Welt, in der Jesus lebt, gar keinen Sinn.” These concepts are not valid, since there is seen, in Jesus, no heroic resistance. What is more important is that the evanglic logic is best seen as

Instinkt-Hass gegen jede Realität, als Flucht in’s “Unfassliche”, in’s “Unbegreifliche”, als Widerwille gegen jede Formel, jeden Zeit- und Raumbegriff, gegen alles, was fest, Sitte, Institution, Kirche ist, als Zu-Hause-sein in der Welt, an die keine Art Realität mehr rührt, einer blass noch “inneren” Welt, einer “wahren” Welt, einer “ewigen” Welt... “Das Reich Gottes ist in euch”...
(AC 29, KSA 6, 200.)

Now, the concepts of “Wiederkunft” and “jüngstes Gericht” are said to be “völlig unevangelischen Begriffe” fabricated by theologians for the purposes of their specific type of divinity. It is not, however, claimed that the resistance to formulas would mean the complete absence of concepts in the Gospels: “Freilich bestimmt der Zufall der Umgebung, der Sprache, der Vorbildung einen gewissen Kreis von Begriffen: das erste Christenthum handhabt nur jüdische-semitische Begriffe” amounting to nothing more than a semiotic interconnectedness of signs. (AC 31-32, KSA 6, 203).

It is curious that the semiotic processes guiding the signification of a concept are played down, whereas Genealogie said that definitions are to be replaced by a synthesis of forces and by a semiosis of interpretations. Even more, the opposite view is stressed: the circle of concepts is only a contingent factor supplying inevitable background and adding flavor to any actions. Nonetheless, the passage, in Antichrist, seems to go on reaffirming the point that there cannot be much else than a semiotical interplay of signs for each concept. Having a recourse to it is, then, far from revindicating definitions and closed set of criteria for formal distinctness. The fact that Jesus was forced to act within the conceptuality of his people is, after all, not an altogether trivial feature of the evangelic situation. But what is more, there is not alone the conceptuality of the tradition that comes out from the evangelium but, as well, a conceptuality peculiar to Jesus’s original thinking.

Jesus einen “freien Geist” nennen - er macht sich aus allem Festen nichts: das Wort tödtet, alles was fest ist, tödelt. Der Begriff, die Erfahrung “Leben”, wie er sie allein kennt, widerstrebt bei ihm jeder Art Wort, Formel, Gesetz, Glaube, Dogma. Er redet bloss vom Innersten: “Leben” oder “Wahrheit” oder “Licht” ist sein Wort für das Innerste, - alles Übrige, die ganze Realität, die ganze Natur, die Sprache selbst, hat für ihn bloss den

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Werth eines Zeichens, eines Gleichnisses. - Man darf sich an dieser Stelle durchaus nicht vergreifen, so gross auch die Verführung ist, welche im christlichen, will sagen kirchlichen Vorurtheil liegt: Eine solche Symbolik par excellence steht ausserhalb aller Religion, aller Cult-Begriffe, aller Historie, aller Naturwissenschaft, aller Welt-Erfahrung, aller Kenntnisse, aller Politik, aller Psychologie, aller Bücher, aller Kunst - sein “Wissen” ist eben die reine Thorheit darüber, dass es Etwas dergleichen gibt.

(AC 32, KSA 6, 204.)

Concept critically, the passage is crucial, because it has concepts to stand beside, and united with, experience against words, formulas, rules, beliefs, dogmas. For once, concepts do not connote withdrawal from, and the distortion of, the experiential, the lived, but, instead, participate in fighting such detachments and writhings. Or better, there are concepts that alienate and twist and those that do neither.

The criticism goes on as follows. What lacks from Jesus is “der Begriff Schuld und Strafe; insgleichen der Begriff Lohn.” By the same token, ““Sünde”, jedwedes Distanz-Verhältniss zwischen Gott und Mensch ist abgeschafft”. In other words, “[w]as mit dem Evangelium abgethan war, das war das Judenthum der Begriffe “Sünde”, “Vergebung der Sünde”, “Glaube”, “Erlösung durch den Glauben” - die ganze jüdische Kirchen-Lehre war in der “frohen Botschaft” verneint.” Moreover, the concept of “Himmelreich” being ein Zustand des Herzens” serves to underline that the “gänze Begriff des natürlichen Todes fehlt im Evangelium”. Since ““Todesstunde” ist kein christlicher Begriff”, “die “Stunde”, die Zeit, das physische Leben und seine Krisen sind gar nicht vorhanden für den Lehrer der “frohen Botschaft”...” (AC 33-4, KSA 6, 205-7.)


As it was said, in Genealogie, the past way of treating concepts was highly unsymbolical and, hence, crude, it is now held that the churchly interpretation of the highly symbolical conceptuality in the Gospels has been either crude or cruel. In any case, everything was different after Jesus: ”Dass die Menschheit vor dem Gegensatz dessen auf den Knien liegt, was der Ursprung, der Sinn, das Recht des
Evangeliums war, dass sie in dem Begriff “Kirche” gerade das heilig gesprochen hat, was der “frohe Botschaft” als unter sich, als hinter sich empfand - man sucht vergebens nach einer grösseren Form welthistorischer Ironie - -” (AC 36, KSA 6, 208).

Whereas “Jesus hatte ja den “Schuld” selbst abgeschaffen”, St. Paul came to stress the notion of sacrifice. Moreover,

Von nun an tritt schrittweise in den Typus des Erlösers hinein: die Lehre vom Gericht und von der Wiederkunft, die Lehre vom Tod als einem Opfertode, die Lehre von der Auferstehung, mit der der ganze Begriff “Seligkeit”, die ganze und einzige Realität des Evangeliums, eskamotiert ist - zu Gunsten eines Zustandes nach dem Tode! ... Paulus hat diese Auffassung, diese Unzucht von Auffassung mit jener rabbinischen Furcht, die ihn in allen Stücken auszeichnet, dahin logisiert:”wenn Christus nicht auferstanden ist von den Todten, so ist unser Glaube eitel.” - Und mit Einem Male wurde aus dem Evangelium die verächtlichste aller unerfüllbaren Versprechungen, die unverschämte Lehre von der Personal-Unsterblichkeit... Paulus selbst lehrte sie noch als Lohn!...

(AC 41, KSA 6, 215.)

It is said that Paul’s “Bedürfniss war die Macht, - er konnte nur Begriffe, Lehren, Symbole brauchen, mit denen man Massen tyrannisirt, Heerden bildet”. He “begriff, dass die Lüge - dass “der Glaube” noth that; die Kirche begriff später wieder Paulus”. (AC 42 & 47, KSA 6, 216 & 225.)

The point about concept as power finds its more general application in the following formulation: "Das “Gesetz”, der “Wille Gottes”, das “heilige Buch”, die “Inspiration” - Alles nur Worte für die Bedingungen, unter denen der Priester zur Macht, mit denen er seine Macht aufrecht erhält, - diese Begriffe finden sich auf dem Grunde aller Priester-Organisationen, aller priesterlichen oder philosophisch-priesterlichen Herrschafts-Gebilde”. The priest embraces the philosophical idealist who has “alle grossen Begriffe in der Hand ( - und nicht nur in der Hand!), er spielt sie mit einer wohlwollenden Verachtung gegen den “Verstand”, die “Sinne”, die “Ehren”, das “Wohlleben”, die “Wissenschaft” aus [...] “. (AC 55 & 8, KSA 6, 239 & 174-5.)

The zeitkritisch outcome of the double critique of the religious and philosophical tradition is, as is expressed in the very first paragraph of the book, that the modern “Toleranz und largeur des Herzens, die Alles “verzeiht”, weil sie Alles “begreift”, ist Scirocco für uns” (AC 1, KSA 6, 169).

It is utterly important, and not too hard, to see that Antichrist criticizes all that it criticizes from a pre-eminently conceptual viewpoint. One might reckon that this illustrates a considerable trust in the powers of conceptual critique, in the decisiveness of conceptions. On occasion, it is even said that “strenger
geredet, der ganze Begriff geistiger Ursächlichkeit ist falsch. Das Christ-sein, die Christlichkeit auf ein Für-wahr-halten, auf eine blosse Bewusstseins-Phänomenalität reduziren heisst die Christlichkeit negiren.” (AC 39, KSA 6, 212.)

The books that Nietzsche finished for publication have now been reassessed from the concept critical point of view. I shall try to gather the key points found in this inquiry. My concept critical reading of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen show them as books about the task of philosophy and the concept of culture. This task is accomplished from the point of view of the conflicts and the interplay between concept and life, concept and change, concept and event. They can be read as books about conceiving these relations and, by extension, about the cultural importance of this very conceiving. In particular, the books on historiography and on Wagner are rich in their conceptual problematic.

The way I see Menschliches stresses its overt strategy of taking conceptuality into consideration and, especially, interrogating its evolution. In the book, a great many concepts are recognized, while thinking is characterized as solving or confusing conceptual problems. Significantly, philosophy is viewed as production of concepts. Furthermore, drawing from the insights of historical philology, concepts are held to be open and fluctuating. The important remark is also made that any concentrative attention to a single conceptualization is, nowadays, likely to be seen as a psychiatric case of fixed idea.

Morgenröthe can be taken to present conceiving from an even stronger evolutionary point of view. Yet, this viewpoint is reconceptualized. Conceptual abilities are described as disproportionate to human agency. They are offered a tentative psychological motivation bearing on the fear of the inconceivable. At the same time, the ideological and power-related use of concepts is critically assessed. There is, as well, the insight into the intoxicating joy of concepts. Fröhliche Wissenschaft, in turn, may be illustrated by the two references to an indispensable predecessor. First, Kant is said to have established, more or less fortunately, the ongoing philosophical delimitation of the sense of concepts. Secondly, Kant is also the one who had, more or less unfortunately, an excessive arsenal of conceptual formulas.

As well as in any other respect, Also sprach Zarathustra is an exceptional work with regard to the issues of conceptuality. It contains very little that is explicitly about conceptions. Yet, what is said about them is, in my view, of great significance. There are the thoughts of concepts as needing bodily animation and of a possibility to better conceive the pre-conceptual desires. What is more, Zarathustra himself is depicted as conceiving decisive happenings. Still more tellingly, his task is likened to the function of the concepts: to stand in the stream, to bridge.

Jenseits and Genealogie include explicit characterizations of the nature of concepts and the ways to
investigate their role in human transactions. Language, agency, community, unconscious drives and power are perhaps the most crucial reference points in these two books coping with conceptuality. The complexity of concepts and their multidimensionality, their openness to interpretation, play and exploitation are all discussed. As already in Menschliches, Morgenröthe and gaya scienza, numerous concepts are harshly criticized, while the reader is also constantly urged to conceive this and that.

In Der Fall Wagner, one can observe a variant of the concept critical approach at work. The specifically conceptual, in Wagner’s art and in its impact on the contemporary cultural and society, is critically conceptualized. More strikingly, the main concept of the book is the concept of 'Wagner'.

Viewed from the concept critical angle, Götzen-Dämmerung can be seen to be occupied with the effort to work out a double perspective to the harmfulness of certain kinds of concepts and to the fruitfulness of other kinds of concepts. Ecce homo, in turn, the one of Nietzsche’s works that is by far the most sympathetic toward conceptuality, could be taken as a continuation and refining of this attempt. The overt sympathy may be understood on the grounds that the book deals, in the main, with Nietzsche’s own achievements, his peculiar conceptual creations, including his 'Ich'. As such, it can even be said that Ecce homo provides with an interpretative key, already hinted at in the earlier books, to a study of Nietzsche that is distinctly concept critical. It must be remembered, however, that, in this volume, the conceiver or the subject, is as strongly as enigmatically problematized.

In Antichrist, the question of conceptuality intersects the whole text. Major qualitative changes in the nature of religion are accounted for in terms of conceptual subversions and shifts. Evangelic Christianity is depicted as embodying a nearly pre-conceptual discourse, while the priestly Christianity is seen as an ideology of power-related concept employment. From the scientific point of view, says Antichrist, religion celebrates inconceivabilities.

Let it be stressed that these characterizations are not meant to exhaust all that is going on in Nietzsche’s books. They serve to illustrate how these works are readable, in a meaningful and interpretatively forceful way, as texts deeply involved in the problematic of philosophical conceptuality. Whatever else there is to the books, they are concept critically representative and challenging.

If I were to organize Nietzsche’s publications according to the level of conceptuality or to the intensity of conceptual discourse inherent in them, I would go about as follows. The height of conceptuality is reached in Antichrist. From this book, one can construe a gradual diminishing of explicitly conceptual concerns in a sequence such as this: Wagner, Jenseits, Genealogie, Ecce homo, Götzen-Dämmerung, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Über die Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben,
Menschliches, Morgenröthe, Geburt, David Strauss, Schopenhauer als Erzieher, Fröhliche Wissenschaft and Zarathustra.

Another way to organize the books is to say that Geburt, Unzeitgemässe I, II and IV, Genealogie, Wagner and Antichrist are Nietzsche’s most elaborate inquiries into relatively restricted conceptual questions, while Menschliches, Morgenröthe, Götzen-Dämmerung and Ecce homo exhibit his multifaceted interest in conceptuality. The third Unzeitgemäss, Fröhliche Wissenschaft and Zarathustra suggest various concept critical concerns, but find limited use for explicit conceptual language.

Let these groupings be but gymnastics on the possibilities of the chosen approach. If there is greater relevance to this speculation, it may be that the concept critical reading finds the last books indispensable and tightly related to the earlier works and that they help understand Zarathustra’s double nature as an extraordinary book that has, nonetheless, much in common with the other works.

The most important outcome of the concept critical reading is that all of Nietzsche’s books turn out to be attentive to the ways of speaking about conceptual matters, the automatic and complex nature of conceiving, the advantages and disadvantages as well as the habituality and activism of conceptualizing, the purposive use of conceptions, the limits of conceptuality, the necessity and freedom of concepts. All this can be said without holding that they are works that can comfortably be rubricated as studies on concepts. Here is the decisive metaphilosophical force of Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise.
I have tried to show how Nietzsche’s writings retain the language of conceptuality. This implies the further task of interpreting the role of concepts in these texts so very critical of concepts. While Nietzsche’s books may contain support for positivist criticism of bric-à-brac von Begriffen, his thoughts on concepts are not reducible to positivist or romanticist sensualism, or any other position, such as Lebensphilosophie, hostile to concepts. Concepts are criticized in order to show the defects in the kinds of concepts involved. When the critique reaches conceptuality in general, it can be taken to outline a better sense of the process of conceiving, the act of conceptualizing and the dynamics of conceptualization.

As Kant’s “theologische Begriffs-Dogmatik“ is criticized, it is specified that Kant’s failure to rid himself from it was due to his captivity in what is called “asketische Ideale” (GM III 25, KSA 5, 405). When Kant is further reproached as the “verwachsensten Begriffs-Krüppel”, it is said that the flaw is to be found, not in concepts or conceptualization as such but, in the “plumpe Hand beim Fassen” and “keine Finger für nuances”, in short, in the lacking “Begriff”. It is urged that thinking is to be learned anew, “als Praktik, als Handwerk“of thinking and as “Tanzen-können mit den Füssen, mit den Begriffen, mit den Worten”. (GD “WdDa” 7, KSA 6, 109-10.)

An approach more promising than the one stressing the unqualified anti-conceptual is to see that there is, beside intense Nietzschean criticisms of concepts, room for a Nietzschean conceptual regeneration as well. Or better, his critique of concepts is a part of his reconceptualization of conceptuality. This rethinking and redirecting of philosophy is a complex endeavor. It is best appreciated through case studies, such as the one on Dionysus that will be the topic in section IV.c.2. Before that, I try to make the more general case for reading of Nietzsche’s confrontation with conceptuality. My point is that this confrontation turns out to be fatal for the opposition between natural occurrences and conceptual
IV.c.1 Conceptual Regeneration

Hamlet posed a question to Polonius: “Have you a daughter?” After the affirmative answer, he went on: “Let her not walk i’ the sun; conception is a blessing; but not as your daughter may conceive.” Polonius uttered aside: “How pregnant sometimes his replies are! a happiness that often madness hits on, which reason and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of.”

There is, in the verbal world of conceiving, an easily discernible basic duality/unity (III.b.1). The language of conceptuality can be used to account for the acts of impregnation and cognition. Ordinarily, the meanings of conceiving are most sharply divided along the line that separates the context of sexual reproduction from the one of thinking. Yet, a philosophical case can be made for the view that the verbal connection helps one to apprehend the ways in which “conception” is a pregnant expression, on the one hand, while impregnation is, philosophically too, a portentous set of phenomena, on the other. The lesson of concipire is that what may seem to be the most mental and what might appear to be the most bodily are not self-evidently detached from one another. In order to understand the concept critic’s project of conceptual regeneration, a further look is had at the basic duality/unity in conceiving. Broadly speaking, Nietzsche’s regeneration of conceptuality is to be understood as denying the duality and reclaiming the unity of conception and conception.

In an interview where he expresses his unwillingness to define the essence of poetry, the poet and one the tireless exploiters of the French language, Jacques Prévert, says: ’Everybody has his ideas - there is even a more ridiculous name for it: concept! Conception is always immaculate, often inoculate. There are things that are better done than said.’ Prévert is toying with the Catholic notion 'The Immaculate Conception'. This is the article of faith, according to which, the Virgin Mary was conceived and born free from original sin. The effect, in the pun, is achieved by the way Prévert juxtaposes the two alike sounding “i-culate” words that suddenly appear as close in meaning, too.

It is probably in Spanish that the basic duality/unity of conception finds its most outstanding manifestations. Apart from the acts of understanding or representation and impregnation or reproduction, the word concepción connotes the festivities where the immaculate conception is celebrated with the picture of the Madonna in a key role. Accordingly, in Spanish-speaking Catholic countries there are towns that carry the name Concepción. The pregnancy of the word could hardly grow any more from this.
This goes to show the efficacy of Prévert’s pun. Small wonder that he speaks of his love for women and his incomprehension of the ’woman’. With the pun, the poet succeeds in not only bringing disgrace to clerical traditions but in discrediting the philosophical and scientific parts of the Occidental cultural legacy as well. By one and the same move, he blemishes the spotlessly clean spiritual inheritance. In consequence, both the churchly notion of “conception” and the cognitive notion of “conception” appear as immaculate attempts to inoculate the minds of men and women with something that their bodies could never sustain. One might say that in its double denial of the body, the concept of ’immaculate conception’ stands for a height of defective re-producing.

Prévert is surely not the only sinister utilizer of the basic duality/unity of “conception”. Here is how Gilles Deleuze explains, in retrospect, his own efforts in the history of philosophy: ”But I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.” 152 For Deleuze, ’immaculate conception’ provides an opportunity to ridicule the fruitless (interpretative) tradition and to have, through mutative re-readings, his philosophical harvest feast in the barren land. The faultless immaculacy is blotted most forcibly by trading the holy virginity for the sodomitic.

Prévert’s and Deleuze’s excursions in blasphemous bad talking can be related to Nietzsche’s criticisms of Christianity. In Antichrist, it is written that “darf man Christ sein, so lange mit dem Begriff der immaculata conceptio die Entstehung des Menschen verchristlicht, das heisst beschmutzt ist? (AC 56, KSA 6, 240). As it is very typical of his writing, this former philologist grabs the literal sense of the words used: what the concept of immaculate conception does is that it maculates the event of birth.

Now, the question as to the theological aptness of Nietzsche’s, Prévert’s and Deleuze’s respective uses of ’immaculate conception’ is of little importance here. What is decisive is Nietzsche’s concept of concept. The passage quoted from Antichrist contains the notion of ’the concept of the immaculata conceptio’. In a book permeated by explicit conceptual considerations such a coinciding of Begriff and conceptio is hardly any coincidence. One gathers that there is a ’concept of concept’ that does not render the human origination dirty. In point of fact, the first indication of the properties for a better concept of conception is that it no longer demands absolute purity. It becomes irresistible to quote Nietzsche’s reply, twenty years earlier, to a letter he got from Deussen. The Deleuzian profane is foreshadowed in redefining the scholastic idea of philosophy as a servant of theology:

Deine mythologische Auffassung der Philologie als Tochter (sage Tochter! heu heu!) der Philosophie, die als solche jeder Controle und Gerichtbarkeit entzogen sei, enthält doch
One might treat such quotations as but sad instances of the sexual rhetoric of an inexperienced boy, and as Nietzsche’s own aphorism reads, “Grad und Art der Geschlechtlichkeit eines Menschen reicht bis in den letzten Gipfel seines Geistes hinauf” (JGB 75, KSA 5, 87). Yet, and this is sad indeed, Nietzsche’s language follows the sexual rhetoric of other inexperienced or experienced boys. The aforementioned (see IV.b.3) Morgenröthe phrase of “unmanly concepts” evokes Emerson’s Nature. This book aspires a “high and divine beauty which can be lived without effeminacy”. It endeavors to read nature and “her text” to the degree that “[s]he pardons no mistakes. Her yea is yea, and her nay, nay.” All of this can be gained from “the manly contemplation of the whole”.

For the purposes of reading Nietzsche and investigating his concept of concept, it is best to see the connection of the 1868 letter to other venereal passages in his texts. Twenty years later again, a note about modern aesthetics as “eine “Weibs-Aesthetik”“ explains how “nur die Empfänglichen für Kunst ihre Erfahrungen “was ist schön?” formulirt haben”. The trouble with this “receptive” philosophy is the lacking perspective of the active part, giver, maker, creator, artist. It is said that this failure is unavoidable, since the condition of the artist is void of criticism, “denn der Künstler, der anfangen würde sich zu begreifen, würde sich damit vergreifen”. (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [170], KSA 13, 357.)

Differently phrased, the creator, or the progenitor, is not a creature that conceives, but one that produces and donates. I withdraw from analyzing this as an instance of Nietzsche’s endorsement for a specific view of art and. Although I do this in order to stick to the conceptual problematic, I also find such an analysis unpromising. Apart from being hindered by the problem of establishing Nietzsche’s opinions, I would argue that what is found in the fragment is a rehearsal of perspectivist analysis and not an argument for one aesthetic position to be defended or another one to be discarded. The most important is to appreciate Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the conceptual language. In a note from the same period, the point is made that a Begriff can be a Fehlgriff (N 14 [119], KSA 13, 296). Ver-greifen and Felh-griff both refer to misconceiving and can mean the more or less literal mis-taking or the erroneous way of using one’s hands. One may describe with these words the inaccurate playing of the pianist. In the hands of a philosopher like Nietzsche, the philology of be-greifen is endlessly resourceful.

As for the sexual imagery in philosophical contexts, Schopenhauer is crucial (cf. MA II/2, KSA 2, 551-3). It was this philosopher who carried the sexual bias of Western philosophy to an extreme both in his
male chauvinism and in his insistence on the need to subject the condition of the disengaged subject for
the blindly desiring universal will. Yet, whereas both of these new emphases that Schopenhauer
introduced or aggravated are, nowadays, rather familiar issues, it is not as well known that he made
these philosophical moves in close contact to the conceptual problematic. The reason for this may well
be that Schopenhauer’s unconcerned way of presenting the sexual elements of thought made it look like
someone was attaching to thinking something that was quite foreign to it, and not like someone was
frankly accentuating features that had always been part of thinking, albeit in more or less discrete way.
The all too overt vulnerability of his gender-hyper-specific language to feminist criticisms can give
enough motivation for anyone interested in studying the complexities of his philosophy.

In his major work, Schopenhauer writes that a given “intuitive conception [anschauliche Auffassung]
has always been the process of procreation [Zeugungsproceß], in which every authentic art work, every
immortal thought, maintains the spark of life.” This is Schopenhauer’s manner of promoting the sensual,
the intuitive, the experiential over the conceptual. Hence, my translation of the anschauliche
Auffassung is, strictly speaking, contradiction in terms. Conceptual grasp is clearly subordinated to
perceptual grip. Yet, Schopenhauer would also write as follows: ”Reason is of female [weiblicher]
nature: it can only give, after it has first received [empfangen]. By itself alone, it possesses nothing but
the contentless forms of its operating.” The passage seems to underscore the abstract nature of
rationality, when at the same time it likens reason’s productivity to natural reproductivity. The activity
of reason is further described by saying that what it “deals and conceives [empfängt] are abstract
concepts, non-intuitive representations that, formed once and for all and comparatively few in number,
grasp [befassen], contain and stand for [vertreten] all the uncountable objects of the real world.”1526

In other words, even if reason was incapable of bearing fruit alone, its activity is depicted by the
analogy of sexual bringing forth. From these considerations, one might begin to question
Schopenhauer’s repeated insistence on the clear difference between the conceptual and the perceptual.
Against his explicit hopes for the contrary, the energetic Schopenhauerian will appears to inform the
insight into a kind of conceptuality that is not opposed to non-conceptuality. That is, even though
Schopenhauer thought it possible for one to have an extra-conceptual access to the world or to grasp
the reality without, or before, the conceptualizing process, his philosophy is useful for anyone trying to
hold on to the unavoidability of concepts and yet seeking to explore the limits of conceiving.

Gary Shapiro has paid attention to Nietzsche’s vocabulary of conception. He observes the way Ecce
homo refers to Zarathustra’s Grund-Conception. Shapiro’s comment reads: “Here, in a very writerly
fashion, Nietzsche refers to eternal recurrence as the Grund-conception of his literary masterpiece. The
German Concept is more like a sketch, outline, or draft (a notebook can be called a Konzeptbuch). So
Nietzsche can be read here as saying something about the genesis of his philosophical style by indicating how he came across what a novelist like Henry James would call “the germ of a story”.

I think that Shapiro has a valuable point here. Yet, the way he goes on to defend his own interpretation of the Nietzschean narratives is apt to exclude the important philosophical dimension that I would find worth preserving and accentuating. Shapiro proceeds, namely, by juxtaposing the “literary surface” characteristic of Nietzsche and the “labor of the concept” characteristic of Hegel. As such, this is surely legitimate. For one thing, Shapiro is not hindered by his nearly all too neat distinction to come up with the delicately balanced insight that Zarathustra “demands to be read as one of the more self-conscious reconsiderations” of the ancient struggle between philosophy and poetry. For another thing, I am not that fascinated by my concept critical approach that I would demand Nietzsche to be fully Hegelianized (even if this involved a reasonable reinterpretation of Hegel that would save him at least from the most simplistic accusations of rationalist abstractionism).

However, Shapiro’s stress on the “writerly” is expressly linked with his playing down of the “conceptual” dimension in a way I can only disagree with. Shapiro comes back to the issue of Grund-Conception and describes the passage in Ecce homo as a “discussion devoted to explaining the personal circumstances and surmounting that led to the conception and composition of the book”. What is at stake are “stylistic reminiscences of an author relating “Why I write such Good Books””. Again, Shapiro’s fine taste of the context is clear, even though his emphasis on “explanation” and “reminiscing” may well cause one to suspect, whether writerliness is being traded for a record realism of the chronicler. He goes on as follows: “In that context it may be significant that Nietzsche speaks not of a Begriff or Idee, the usual German philosophical terms for a comprehensive thought or idea; instead he refers to a Grundconception.” And as Shapiro says, “a Konzept may be a sketch or plan and is frequently used to describe a preliminary outline by a visual artist or draftsman”. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s use of Conception does not suggest any philosophical explanation of “the interconnection of [the] major thoughts”. The conclusion reads: “In any case Nietzsche’s expression is hardly unambiguous.”

This is laudable interpretative craftsmanship in more ways than one. Shapiro is cautious enough to detect Nietzsche’s exact use of words, as well as to stay alert to the dangers of oversimplification within his own peculiar line of reading. Yet, his insistence on the way the issue of “conception” is “guided by the language and the presence of the text”, is unhappily running counter to the conceptual thrust of Nietzsche’s text. In other words, I am inclined to exploit the ambiguity that Shapiro detected in the context in order to get at an interpretation that is almost opposite to the one he proposed. Even if the account of Zarathustra presented in Ecce homo would speak in favor of Nietzsche’s implying the
genesis of his style, at the cost of his clarifying the conceptual make up of his thinking, it should not fade out Nietzsche’s philosophical confrontation with concepts. Since this confrontation involves bringing conception as ‘interconnection of thoughts’, on the one hand, and conception as ‘personal circumstances’, ‘germ of a story’, ‘artist’s or draftman’s preliminary outline’ and ‘writerliness’, all on the other hand, so close to each other as to make a unity of them, one ought to be careful in describing Nietzschean textuality as though it was opposed to Nietzschean conceptuality.

I would venture to hope that one finds in Nietzsche a philosopher whose writerly sensitivity and awareness of the processes of his personal creative activities do not entail an opposition to, or takeoff from, the philosophical conceptuality. Or perhaps one needs to speak of the threat that the Nietzschean conceptuality is being checked in its growth. Rather than to argue that Nietzsche the philosopher is, in Ecce homo or anywhere else, giving an account of the successive stages in his efforts of conceptualization, I have been trying to reconstruct a context where it is not (solely) the traditional quarrel of literature and philosophy but the basic unity of conceiving that constrains interpreting.

One can turn to Nietzsche’s writings for other utterances that are relevant here. In Götzen-Dämmerung, there is also talk of “meinen Begriff “jenseits von Gut und Böse” (GD “SeU” 37, KSA 6, 136). Following Shapiro’s reasoning, one might expect to read about the “conception” of ‘beyond good and evil’, yet the text supplies the word Begriff.

To be sure, in the notes preceding Jenseits, “meine Conception des “freien Geistes”” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [180], KSA 12, 156) is mentioned. A casual reader would perhaps draw the conclusion that the conception (Conception, Konzept) talk does involve plans and notebooks, while the concept (Begriff) talk is reserved for finished books. However, other notes from the same period discuss the need “die zusammengehörigen Begriffe “freier Geist” und “Gesundheit” ganz zu Ende denken” and the challenge to conceive “eines neuen Begriffs der Größe des Menschen” (N August-September 1885 40 [59] & 35 [25], KSA 11, 658 & 519-20). Furthermore, Nietzsche’s fragments contain the cases of, say, the “Begriff des höheren Menschen” (N Herbst 1884 - Anfang 1885 29 [8], KSA 11, 338-9), the “Begriff” of the “höchste Mensch” (N Herbst 1887 10 [111], KSA 12, 519-20), as well as the “Wiederherstellung des Begriffs “tragisch”” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [50], KSA 13, 243).

The conclusion is at hand that Nietzsche’s writings make Begriff and Conception coalesce. Probably the most forceful example of this fusion is the “Begriff der “Vervollkommnung”” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [76], KSA 12, 96). The concept of perfection and perfectibility is referred to as both “Conception einer neuen Vollkommenheit” and “unser Begriff von “Vollkommenheit”” (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [36] & [62], KSA 12, 307 & 317).
Now, Shapiro was happy to close his case with the view that Nietzsche’s use of *Conception*, in the junction where *Ecce homo* refers back to *Zarathustra*, is ambiguous. He meant that it remains unsettled, whether the word designates something like a preliminary outline or something like an encompassive idea. The ambiguity, it seems, allowed Shapiro to underline the former dimension, since he apparently took it to be closer to his chosen textual approach and more in line with his description of, in particular, Nietzsche’s relation to Hegel. While profiting from Shapiro’s working on the “sketch” dimension of ’conception’, there are, with an eye on the general situation in the present Nietzsche scholarship, too, reasons for emphasizing the other dimension of “conception”. Nietzsche’s textual innovations or his literary virtuosity are not objects of much dispute, although there is no agreement as to how to articulate his mastering of language. By contrast, his conceptual skills remain less than well acknowledged.

To be sure, I would not want to use the further textual evidence just gathered on the *Conception / Begriff* issue to say that the “interconnection of thoughts” side of conception completely exhausts its “draft” side. Instead, the way that the words seem, at least to a degree, to be interchangeable in Nietzsche, allows me to convey another point. Apart from testifying to Nietzsche’s not that pedantic distinctions - which in their un-Kantian spirit may resemble Descartes’s self-liberation from scholasticism - the mutual convergence of the “rough copy” and the “polished notion”, as well as their share of the issue of impregnation and reproduction, is in line with his overall project of renewing philosophical conceptuality.

At its most direct and most forceful, the problematic comes out from the philosopher’s writing on his planned journey to Corsica. This is one of those examples where Nietzsche’s letters can serve as the key source to important philosophical points. What may at first glance seem like so much small talk or vain caprice turns out to be a perspective into the most vital aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In the mid-1880’s, Nietzsche would tell his correspondents about his plans for the Corsica trip. He underscored that it was for his own conceptions that he wished to visit Corte or the town where Napoleon had been conceived. The notion was introduced as follows:

Ich selber möchte am liebsten nach Corsica: und zwar nach Corte [...] dort ist die Stelle für ganz große Conceptionen (Napoleon wurde dort, 1768, concipirt: in Ajaccio ist er nur geboren!)
(KGB III/3, August 1885, 86.)

A year after this first reference (see, however, N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [463], KSA 11, 273, for a favorable description of the islanders), Nietzsche writes to Köselitz that “Corte ist die Stadt der
Empfängnis Napoleon’s: wie ich ausgerechnet habe. Scheint es nicht, daß eine Wallfahrt dorthin eine geziemende Vorbereitung für den “Willen zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe” ist? - “ (KGB III/3, August 1886, 231.) Based on this, Nietzsche’s use of ‘conception’ is close to the modern case of Konzeption standing for both impregnation and outlining. A letter to Seydlitz from the same time, offers additional support for this view:

Wahrscheinlich mache ich eine Wallfahrt nach Corte auf Corsica (woselbst Napoleon zwar nicht geboren, aber - was vielleicht sehr viel mehr ist, concipirt worden ist).
(KGB III/3, August 1886, 234-5.)

However, the planned journey is not to be attached too tightly to the Konzept as a plan for the book “Wille zur Macht” (or for the eventual Umwerthung aller Werthe). This becomes clear when Nietzsche writes to Köselitz, in February 1888, about the potentially favorable effects of the “große Bescheidenheit der corsischen Lebensweise” and of the “Simplicität der Sitte”. To travel there would be to get “weit weg von der “Modernität”!” It could cure the soul and make one “stolzer... ( - ich mache mir nämlich klar, daß man jetzt weniger leiden würde, wenn man stolzer wäre: Sie und ich, wir sind nicht stolz genug...”) Nietzsche says that, in comparison to Köselitz’s staying in Venice, the time in Corsica would amount to “ein grandioser Contrast”, indeed, “eine Cultur...” (KGB III/5, 241.)

Still later, in a letter to Emily Fynn, he writes as follows: "Für den nächsten Winter will der Eremit nach Corsika, nicht gerade nach Ajaccio, sondern in eine unentdeckte Welt. Ich habe eine so tiefe Selbstbesinnung nöthig, daß mir es nirgends still, nirgends antimodern genug ist.” (KGB III/5, August 1888, 387.) This is enough to suggest that Nietzsche’s striving exceeds the limits of individual book plans and opts for a wholly different way of conceiving from all that he felt was dominating the thought of his cultural peers and his own thinking, too. For a philologist and language game player like Nietzsche, the vocabulary of conceiving did not cease to provoke philosophical insights.

The Corsica case is reflected by a note book entry on the “Logik meiner Conception”. The fragment indicates that the “Wille zur Macht” plan includes a new “Conception der Welt”. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [415], KSA 13, 193; Frühjahr 1888 14 [135], 319.) Quite clearly, Conception means here not the plan for the book but the conception to be fleshed out in the book. The book was never finished so that it could qualify as a book by Nietzsche among his other books. It remained a series of plans, outlines and sketches. It remained a concept never realized. The term “notion” is equally fitting here, since “Wille zur Macht” can well be called both Nietzsche’s “whim” and Nietzsche’s “scheme”.
My point is that creativity and innovation, philosophizing with notebook *ébauches*, does not necessarily mean leaving conceptuality for less-than-conceptual or more-than-conceptual flights of imagination and invention. As it happens, in the Spanish-speaking world, one can earn the epithet *conceptuoso* for being clever, skilful, ingenious, intelligent, imaginative, inventive, innovative. Also: in the Greek vocabulary so fundamental for European conceptuality, the crucial verb anticipating the Latin *concipire*, that is ἔννο-έο, has derivatives as interesting as ἔννο-ητικός for “thoughtful” and ἔννο-ημετικός for “inventive, subjective, notional”\textsuperscript{1531}. One could say that the varieties, the promises and the risks of conceptual experiencing are all appropriately captured in the vocabularies of conceiving.

Nietzsche’s talk of concepts - as involving the aspects of bodily interaction, fruitfulness, preliminarity, being always in the making and preceding action - reveals something about the way concepts need no longer be automatically disqualified as the very instruments of alienation. Some concepts, some ways of conceiving or some interpretations of conceptuality succeed better than others in making and keeping possible the reproductive elements in human thought and action.

Before articulating further this Nietzschean oneness, I would like to spell out the way my commentary differs here from the one proposed by Walter Kaufmann. Starting from the notion of ‘overcoming’ (*Überwindung*) as that which Nietzsche “considered the common essence of all morality”, Kaufmann explains that for him “general concepts” are part of the human being’s attempt to “impose restraints” upon itself in order to surmount the level of the “merely given” and, by extension, not to yield unreflectively “to impulses”. While Nietzsche also “proposed to explain all human behavior in terms of the will to power”, he could not describe the overcoming through an appeal to “the traditional dualism of reason and impulse”. According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche went for “self-overcoming” where the will to power overcomes itself. That is, he developed a variety of Hegel’s metaphysics of dialectical monism with “a single basic force” plus its diverse manifestations. The key is a process of *Aufhebung* as “a simultaneous preserving, canceling, and lifting up”. Where this is the “conceptual” side of Nietzsche’s over-coming, the more characteristically psychological side of it consists of the process of “sublimation” where the same basic drive is not “abnegated”, “repudiated” or “extirpated” but controled and mastered. As Kaufmann sees it, rationality and sex drive are but “forms of the will to power”, yet the latter means slavery to unsublimated impulses, while the latter means “power over” oneself and “over nature”. This is how reason is the highest manifestation of the will to power.\textsuperscript{1532}

Kaufmann does a good job in emphasizing the conceptual features in Nietzsche’s thoughts, as well as in stressing the broken dualism of reason and passions. Yet, he assumes the notions of “the given” and “imposition” and, thus, reaffirms the idea of an immediate access to reality, upon which it is the reason’s duty to display its mastery: “Reason is extolled not because it is the faculty which abstracts from the
given, forms universal concepts, and draws inferences, but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony - and thus to give man power: power over himself and over nature."\textsuperscript{1533}

Rather than making the dualism of human reason and nature seem unconvincing, Kaufmann’s words strengthen the old notion of consciousness with a variety of impositions at its disposal. His rehabilitative campaign probably made him emphasize more than what is reasonable the Nietzsche as endorsing sublimation, harmony and rationality. I think that the crucial drawback in Kaufmann’s handling of Nietzsche’s work is due to the way he starts from what he takes to be definite and committed “metaphysics” and proceeds to discuss its implications for the individual problems. More promisingly, one could start from the problem of \textit{Zeugung} and see how it relates to Nietzsche’s hypothesis of will to power (see JGB 36, KSA 5, 55).

While some of the aspects of harmonizing and form-giving were dealt with in an earlier occasion (III.a), the directly relevant part of Kaufmann’s view of ‘sublimation’ is that of its conceptual history. He refers to Goethe (on dramatic sublimating of “original naturalness”), Novalis (on more or less sublimated visions of heaven) and Schopenhauer (on “‘representations’ as sublimated into abstract concepts”) as precursors in determining this concept. He says that only Nietzsche “first gave it that special connotation which is has today”. In a laudable manner, Kaufmann generalizes this to illustrate how “characteristic” it is “of Nietzsche’s ‘coinages’” to work on terms “known before, though not prominently”. In his view, \textit{Menschliches} is a case in point, since its first paragraph uses ‘sublimation’ in the traditional sense, while section 95 of the second part, already announces the new meaning of (love as) “sublimated sexuality”. It is a pity that what Kaufmann gains by his brief reconstruction of the new conception, he almost throws away by playing down the importance of “who uses what word when and how” and underscoring “what Nietzsche had in mind”. Accordingly, Kaufmann is less interested in Nietzsche’s use of “the mere word “sublimation” but rather” in “the conception which he sometimes - though by no means always - designated in this way.”\textsuperscript{1534}

In this way, Kaufmann legitimates his distance to the Nietzschean text and his emphasis on the fundamental metaphysical theories. Running the risk of twisting the notion of sublimation, one could claim that he is too anxious to organize the chaos of utterances into a controlled and harmonious conception. I would try to show how Nietzsche was criticizing both the all-too-sublimated and the all-too-unsublimated in order to come up with an ecological model of conception. As the opening of \textit{Menschliches} has it, much more decisively than what Kaufmann implies, “ein völlig interesseloses Anschauen” is but one of those “Sublimirungen” that attempt to create false oppositions - and “es keine Gegensätze sind” - and explain away the processual. As for the book’s other section on sublimation, it
expressly shows the affirmative function of “sublimation”: to dissolve metaphysical or moral oppositions and to re-fasten genealogical connections. (MA I 1 & II/1 95, KSA 2, 23-4 & 414-5.)

With respect to the concept of ‘sublimation’, one ought not to rush in to sublimate it. The same goes for any other concepts, too, and, a fortiori, for the one of concept(ion). The classic case to be revived here is Socrates’s midwife analogy as it is told in Plato’s Theaitetus. In that dialogue, Socrates introduces himself as both midwife’s son and practitioner of midwifery. He refers to the custom, according to which “[n]o woman […] who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing”. Similarly, says Socrates, his “art of midwifery” is something that an old man does in order to help young “souls when they are in labour” and assist in “the thought which mind of the young man brings forth”. The comparison is justified by the argument to the effect that what is of the essence in midwifery is not “cutting the umbilical cord” but executing the task of “most cunning matchmakers” or judging “what unions are likely to produce a brave blood”. This is also the ground for extending the analogy to farmers who know “in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited”. Yet, Socrates wishes to draw a crucial distinction between his profession and all these other walks of life. He says that whereas “women do not bring into world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits”, he must be on guard for fake ideas. Accordingly, he says to Theaitetus: “let us examine together this conception of yours [that knowledge be equated with perception], and see whether it is fertile or a mere windegg.”

Plato’s dialogues make much of this imagery. In Menexenus, it is said that “the woman in her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth”1536. In Symposium, “conception and generation” are hailed to be the “immortal” within “the mortal creature”: their divinity is explained by the way the harmonious “union of man and woman” directs itself toward “procreation […] in beauty and not in deformity”. The procreative moment is celebrated as the hour when “the teeming nature is full” to the point of “flutter and ecstasy about beauty”. Beauty makes “the procreating power” what it is, that is, “propitious, and expansive, and benign”. In the presence of “ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from procreation”, yet beauty causes it to “bear and produce fruit”. Mortals tend to procreate, since “generation is a sort of eternity and immortality” and love is “love of generation and of birth in beauty”.1537

From all this, Socrates’s likening of philosophical elaboration with labor in childbirth acquires its full weight. As he shifts the focus from bodies to souls and claims for philosophy “the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery” in the “discernment of the true and false birth”, he is demanding for the profession all the magic and simplicity of the artists and artisans of the bringing-forth-of-new-life. At the same time, he is implying that the philosophical practice is re-production in its highest form.
One could propose that Nietzsche finds a new application for the Socratic analogue, except that he wants to restore the bodily or the vegetative dimension to the lifeless conceptions of philosophy. Discerning the true and false birth has become a matter of deciding whether a given conception is disposed to disclose the process of its development or destined to be a windegg.

At this point, it may be said that both Shapiro’s reference to the ‘germ’ of a story and Colli’s insistence on ‘germinating’ forms of expression suit Nietzsche’s handling of the basic unity of conceiving. I would only hold that these are better understood as germs and germinations of new conceptuality.

It can be recalled how Zarathustra describes creativity in very much sexual terms (see IV.b.3). Who creates, he says, must be both the child about to be reborn and the one giving birth, without forgetting the “Schmerz der Gebärerin” or the “Geburtswehen”. In the same context, Zarathustra condemns the “grosse Müdigkeit” of “Nicht-mehr-wollen und Nicht-mehr-schätzen und Nicht-mehr-schaffen”, and praises the “Wille zur Zeugung” or the “Schaffens-Wille”. In a Platonic manner, yet specifically insisting on the necessity to use but better or worse “Gleichnisse”, he speaks of creation as the “Rechtfertigung aller Vergänglichkeit”. (Z II “Adgl”, KSA 4, 110-1.)

Derrida was also seen above (IV.a.1) to pay attention to the way Nietzsche points toward a new interpretation in the making. He says that historical type of questions allow one to see but “the conception, formation, gestation, labor”. These words refer to the “operations” of enfentement, or of having children, yet they also refer to “the yet unnameable that announces itself and cannot do that, as it is only necessary each time that a birth is taking place, in a kind other than the non-kind, in the shapeless, mute, infant and terrifying shape of monstruosity”.

Nietzsche’s elaborations of conceptuality can indeed be viewed as constant reminders of the way available concepts cannot be fully criticized and replaced by new ones. I have been trying to show the extent to which his texts already problematize this issue. I have also attempted to argue for the view that even if Nietzsche’s philosophy would be seen as chiefly an effort to make room for “the other” of concepts, it is carried out in an intimate contact with concepts. In fact, Nietzsche’s came to use, with increasing consistency, the word Begriff of whatever he may have hypothetically assumed about the non-conceptual. In the following passage from Wagner, where the notion of something busy being born is again exploited, the pre-reflective condition is described with a concept and in combining the elements of pre-sentiment or fore-boding with the re-crudescence of chaos:

Was den Ahnen-machen betrifft: so nimmt hier unser Begriff “Stil” seinen Ausgangspunkt. Vor Allem keinen Gedanke! Nichts ist compromettirender als ein Gedanke! Sondern der
In other words, this is the basic duality and unity in conceiving revisited. *Begriff* opens up to the dimension of procreation. It is, namely, not just Nietzsche’s *Conception* that denotes both intellectual/imaginative productions and reproduction. *Begriff* appears to do the same, while it also points towards *Concept* as plan, disposition, pre-activity, anticipation. In this sense, concept is something unfinished, in the state of becoming, in the process of crystallization. It is “about to go about” or, better yet, about to break out again. In short, the Nietzschean concept of concept always reflects its own provenance from the pre-conceptual chaos. This chaos may be unthinkable, but even as such, as only anticipated, it is already conceptualized. There is no imposition upon the chaos, not really any organizing of chaos either, there is the interplay between natural crystallizations.

At this point, I would like to have a recourse to a paragraph called “Zur Vernunft des Lebens” that Nietzsche was to drop from the final version of his *Götzen-Dämmerung*. In this portion of writing, sensuality and sexuality are being discussed and a view is approvingly presented that a “relative Keuschheit, eine grundsätzlichliche und kluge Vorsicht vor Erotis selbist in Gedanken, kann zur großen Vernunft des Lebens auch bei reich ausgestatteten und ganzen Naturen gehören”. What is most important here is the passage that reads:

> Es ist ein und dieselbe Kraft, die man in der Kunst-Conception und die man im geschlechtlichen Actus ausgiebt: es gibt nur Eine Art Kraft.  
> (N Oktober 1888 23 [2], KSA 13, 600; cf. KSA 14, 772-3.)

Although I do not think that this point can be exhaustively contextualized, one may readily place it on a par with Zarathustra’s talk of the *große Vernunft* or rationality, prudence and wisdom of the body that grounds the more limited uses of one’s intelligence. The fragment becomes all the more telling when it is compared to the one about Schopenhauer in Nietzsche’s *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. At home among other genealogical discussions, one can meet the observation about “Schopenhauer’schen Philosophie” as “die Conception eines sechsundzwanzigjährigen Jünglings’s”. This is related to the hypothesis “ob nicht seine Grundconception von “Willen und Vorstellung”, der Gedanke, dass es eine Erlösung vom “willen” einzig durch “Vorstellung” geben könne, aus einer Verallgemeinerung jener Sexual-Erfahrung ihren Ursprung genommen habe”. (GM III 6, KSA 5, 348.)

Admittedly, this criticism verges on a rather cheap sort of biographicism. In the unfriendly tone of the
sexual reproach, Schopenhauer’s pivotal “interconnection of thoughts” is presented as the outcome of the adolescent boy’s power of conceiving. Yet, there is more to it than just mocking.

As one can see, the very expression Grundconception is used in the sense that Shapiro wished to play down. I would read the passage, as I read the one in Ecce homo, as indicating that concepts retain the aspects of impregnating, outlining and thinking. As it is said in Nietzsche’s early notes, “Erkenntnisstrieb” and “Geschlechtstrieb” would share “Zeichen der Gemeinheit” (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873). What Nietzsche had first learned from Schopenhauer, and from the case of Schopenhauer, he was later ready to put to play as an ironical critique of Schopenhauer.

The Nietzschean continuation of, and disruption with, the Socratic tradition of philosophical conceiving can be seen in Zarathustra’s speech “Von der unbefleckten Erkenntniss”. The speaker addresses the audience of “empfindsam Heuchlern, euch den ”Rein-Erkennenden“: He appreciates not only their perceptiveness but also their loyalty to the earthly plane, which is one of the most precious things for him. Yet, Zarathustra does not want to praise these purists of knowing but to reveal their betrayal. These shameful people are said to have adopted it as their primary objective to abandon their desire:

auf das Leben ohne Begierde zu schaun und nicht gleich dem Hunde mit hängender Zunge:
Glücklich zu sein im Schauen, mit erstorbenen Willen, ohne Griff und Gier der Selbtsucht - kalt und aschgrau am ganzen Leibe, aber mit trunkenen Mondesaugen!
(Z II/15, KSA 4, 156-7.)

The reason for Zarathustra’s drawing a parallel between such disinterestedness and the moon, “dieser schüchterne Nachtschwärmer”, lies in the way the latter loves the earth from afar and fails to realize its ultimately dishonest aspirations. Of course, the moon cannot but be distant and feed wrongful human projections and inferences, whereas the desire-less and will-less attitude of the self-proclaimed knowers is simply phony and perverse. For Zarathustra, anyone committing oneself to pure knowledge becomes “all eye” devoid of contact with the Schaffende, the Zeugende, the Werdelustige. Light from an improved perspective on the business of taking cognizance is what discloses the fakery of disinterestedness, as the first rays of sunlight reveal the truth about the cold love of the moon. While the sun is thirsty for the sea and wants “seine Tiefe zu sich in die Höhe trinken”, Zarathustra’s counter-objective against purism is to love and want “Leben und alle tiefen Meere”. (Ibid. 156-9.)

One might say that this crucial passage of Nietzsche’s masterpiece deals with theories of knowledge. This is justified, I think, but only in so far as epistemology can be said to provide the proper context for
philosophical reflections on perception. I would hold, however, that this very speech of Zarathustra is apt to strengthen the view - most clearly pronounced by Morris Weitz and developed into a specific concept critical reading for the present study in chapter III - according to which the conceptual discourse is prior to the epistemological one.

Nietzsche’s text insinuates the conceptual problematic in the work least amenable to the technical vocabulary of conceptualization. The decisive attribute of the type of knowledge criticized - *unbefleckt* - is both taken to the title of the speech and written in italics during the exposition of its fraudulent nature. In other words, there is no doubt that the “spotless” purity is the main target of Zarathustra’s scorn. Apart from the tacit reference to the *interesselose Betrachtung* of Kant’s aesthetics, he also alludes to the notion of ‘immaculate conception’. One cannot fail to see that both of these key allusions point away from epistemological questions proper toward the ones about perceiving and conceiving.

Zarathustra’s moon parable, and the whole speech, begins with a scene directly highlighting the case of conception. The rising moon, “breit und trächtig”, wishes to give birth to a sun: “er eine Sonne gebären wolle”. It is precisely this false *Schwangerschaft*, inconsequential pregnancy, light-weight effort, that provokes Zarathustra to attack all the lunatics of immaculacy. Giving credit to feminist readings critical of Nietzsche’s male chauvinist stance, the passage also contains a quite unwarranted inference from the spurious pregnancy of the moon to the unreliability of women. Seldom is a Nietzschean blow on the female more out of place as it is in this context, even though its structural significance may be found in the way the bad joke accompanies Zarathustra’s getting really irritated. (Ibid.)

The philosophico-cultural background of the speech, in addition to the dimension of Kant’s critique of judgment and the one of the cult of the Virgin Mary, is enriched by the allusions to Schopenhauer’s misogynism and Socrates’s art of midwifery. On the basis of this last dimension opened, one may state that Zarathustra is at pains to differentiate between real and unreal cases of fertility. It was seen how the type devoid of creativity and pro-creativity is what particularly alarms Zarathustra about the moon and the *Rein-Erkennenden*. Quite clearly, Zarathustra is making room for a better sense of apprehension.

My reading of the “unbefleckten Erkenntniss” speech treats it as a critique of a certain way of conceiving and a sketch for a new approach. Creation and procreation involve contact and intense interaction. They require one to touch, and be touched by, one’s environment. To the extent that this necessity is denied as long as the model of contact remains the moon’s cool gaze, one can legitimately describe, as Zarathustra does, the received view of perceiving and conceiving as the business suitable for “Beschmutzer edler Namen”. The pun is on the claim to immaculacy on the part of those who refuse to admit their unavoidable maculation through living in the world of the nitty gritty. (Ibid.)
Thus, Zaratustra contains an idea similar to the above passage of Antichrist about ‘immaculate conception’ as making the event of birth unclean. Where Zaratustra unMASKs the reputed neutrality of the world’s spectators, he calls them the Lüsterne or the lustful par excellence. What lacks from them is the “Unschuld in der Begierde”. Watchers betray their desire to both see and feel. They keep their tongues in their mouths and go on staring without the procreator’s love and will, without handgripping what is around them and finding themselves as part of it. This is the position hostile to the interactive process where the creature of words and bodily linkages to the world becomes aware of itself. I would hold that this depiction is best read in terms of radically regenerating one’s conceptual powers.

At this point, before I am ready to close my discussion on the speech, a brief extension of the problem at stake is called for. From the wealth of interpretative literature on Nietzsche’s place in theories of cognition (from perception to knowledge), I shall single out here two little known contributions with significant points to offer for the present purposes.

In his 1982 article, Georges Montcriol suggested that Nietzsche’s aphoristic discourse reorders the relations among the senses. Nietzsche’s dynamic model of bodily encounters, of a series of meetings (reachings-touchings-unitings), emphasizes the importance of the faculty of touch. Accordingly, the discourse casts doubt on the primacy of vision. Montcriol observed how already the latter’s “localization on the body defines it as the sense of height” and distance. As one sees something, the body may easily forget its “proper activity in the exercise of vision”, whereas in the “act of touching” the body is reminded of itself. To avoid becoming detached and insensible one must drop the purely rational or theoretical notion of thinking as the “light” cast by the subject on the surrounding world. Instead, one needs to adopt a view about “the action of the exterior world upon the subject”. Montcriol was not speaking in favor of simplistic empiricism, since he, nonetheless, underscores the active role of the subject. The point is to understand the selective subject in its Nietzschean terms of “warmth of contact” where it passes through transformative “amorous encounters”. In its very form, Nietzsche’s thought belongs to those philosophies that do not “leave us pathetically neuters” but that “seduce us”.1539

As I have mentioned earlier (see IV.a.1), Montcriol explicitly seconds to the common estimation of Nietzsche as a thinker opposed to conceptual thinking. In as much as he accentuates Nietzsche’s contribution to the bodily understanding of cognition, he does this by playing down the specifically conceptual elements in Nietzsche’s project. Still, Montcriol uses heavily the vocabulary of conceiving in order to convey his point. He speaks about “concept(ion)s” of being, consciousness, reading, thinking, thinker, natural light, cosmos, subject. He also speaks about “conceiving” a number of things as the particular challenge and invitation of Nietzsche’s thought. The difficulty with this strategy is as striking
as it is also common. Except for his remark that the “conception” of the relations of analysis and synthesis ought to be “modified” (so that analysis is the “affirmative” and “productive” force different from the “poor identity” supplied by synthesis), Montcriol does not imply that his is a business of reconceiving received conceptions. There remains a gap between the anti-conceptual stance attributed to Nietzsche and the conventional philosophical language of concepts applied to him, too.\footnote{1540}

It is a great advantage of Montcriol’s article that he moves on from Nietzsche’s criticisms of concepts toward both the general rethinking of cognition in terms of the complex bodily processes and the specific issue of the differences among sensory faculties. Yet, his interpretation suffers from the allegiance to the anti-conceptual as well as from the lacking reflection upon the task of reconceiving conception. Montcriol’s contribution may be compared to the one by Edith Wyschogrod.

In her fine article of 1981 on the topic of tactility, Wyschogrod offered a concise critique of Nietzsche. She construed him as maintaining that “I know how the other feels by imitation”. Although this view on the problem of foreign souls brings Nietzsche close to respectable psychology such as that of William James, it distances both of these philosophers from the opinion defended by Wyschogrod that “empathy and sympathy are primordial modes of access to the other” taking “place without first having recourse to myself”. In fact, her interpretation takes Nietzsche even further away from defendable positions not so much because of his inefficient antidotes to solipsism but because of his erroneous ways to surmount it. Wyschogrod explains, namely, that “Nietzschean vitalism” ignores the living “body’s vulnerability”. His mistake is to equate life with “perpetual self-overcoming” and to treat “phenomena of vulnerability - sensitivity to temperature, fatigue, exhaustion, sleep etc.” In other words, he only recognizes the body narrowly interpreted as “the body awake”. Thus, so Wyschogrod, Nietzsche’s philosophy fails “to relinquish visual consciousness” and falls short of providing the necessary notion of a “tactile encounter [...] at a pre-reflective level [as] vulnerability to the other”.\footnote{1541}

Despite her critical attitude Wyschogrod manages to bring Nietzsche close to the modern developments of phenomenological theories of the role of the body in cognition. Yet, I think that she is simply wrong in her claim about Nietzsche’s denying the vulnerability of the body. There might be room for speculation over the possibility that Nietzsche went on heightening the status of ascending bodily powers because of his own fragility, to which his letters may be said to bear witness. Yet, it makes better sense to interpret his letters on a par with his other discussions on the human capability of being wounded, on the all too human liability to injury. This does not mean, as Wyschogrod would have it in her quick conclusion, that Nietzsche opts for a “metaphysical” treatment of life’s ups and downs.

It needs to be noted how Zarathustra presents its central character as a highly vulnerable and sensitive...
person with his notoriously changing moods. Kathleen Marie Higgins, in particular, regards Zarathustra’s “varying states of mind” as “integral to the book’s structure”. In Higgins’s view, the basic message here is that “meaning in life” (as a “volatile commodity” rather than a “secure possession”) is to be found in “loving life for its own sake”. Indeed, this “position” or “stance of vulnerability” involves loving or “[e]mbracing life in all its details”. Apart from making sense of the structure and message of Zarathustra, Higgins links this ‘fragile but always reattainable balance’ to the general topic of nihilism. As she explains it, “the illusion of attainable safety abets the nihilistic perspective that life has no value”. The illusion of safety as strong and common as it is “disastrously self-defeating”. Its counterpart is the “tragic insight” that “the individual is radically vulnerable”. According to Higgins, the attempt to seek “safety is both strongly motivated by the painfulness of life’s insecurity and dominant in Nietzsche’s culture. He therefore sees it as singularly worthy of attack in all its manifestations.”\[1542\]

Undoubtedly, the central character of Also sprach Zarathustra is a speaker who does not hold his tongue inside his mouth. Nor does he close his eyes (or ears) and hold back his arms. He uses his ganzen Leibe to actualize his own lover’s contact with the earth. Hence, his vulnerability and his varying moods. In Zarathustra’s speech of immaculacy, the point about touching and becoming touched (nur mit dem Auge betasten or was mit feigen Auge tasten lässt) as well as the one about hands (ohne Griff) are eminently displayed in it. While moonlight can only be seen, the experience of sunshine is fulfilled only as it is both seen and felt. What is of great importance here is that touch is allowed to prefigure the project of senses in general, including the allegedly primary one of seeing: one should not (think that it is possible to) touch with one’s eyes only. This means that the rehabilitation of tactility is not made in order to belittle the role of vision but to rethink it by sensing it in terms of the reputedly lower sense. This is already the task of reconceptualizing the process of perceiving and conceiving.

The speech on “unbefleckten Erkenntniss” finds an interesting development in the one on “Menschen-Klugheit”. Zarathustra begins this latter address by describing the moment of being thrown down, as “der Blick hinunter stürzt und die Hand hinauf greift”. He goes on to say that his own particular risk is, rather, that of falling for the opposite temptation. His Abhang and Gefahr is the double desire of his heart: “meines Herzens doppelten Willen [...] dass mein Blick in die Höhe stürzt, und meine Hand sich halten und stützen möchte - an der Tiefe!” While Zarathustra’s eyes are fixed into the blinding vision of the Übermensch, his hands still believe in the solid and the palpable (“an Festes”) and continue to grip and grab, to grope and grapple the tactual human reality. As if to complete its connection to the earlier speech on immaculacy, the one on “Menschen-Klugheit” has it that “wer unter Menschen rein bleiben will, muss verstehn, sich auch mit schmutzigem Wasser zu waschen”. (Z II/21, KSA 4, 183-4.)

In conceiving, one gets one’s hands dirty. Zarathustra’s task as a philosophical visionary would be
impossible without his commitment as a philosophical handicraftsman. Tactility, in turn, involves the full bodily sense of situatedness forming the basis of all sensory experience and all conceiving. Zarathustra’s becoming “ein Ja-sager” also coincides with his release from the status of “ein Ringer” and his getting “die Hände frei” in order not to wring them and wrestle but to be “ein Segner”. In as much as Zarathustra’s blessing is to liberate things from the ready-made world of dogmatic rationality and to plant little reason in the form of “ein Same der Weisheit”, he exemplifies both the germinating new conceptuality and the principle of emancipation from emancipation. (Z III “VS-A”, KSA 4, 208-9.)

Nietzsche’s anticipation of the phenomenology of the body à la Merleau-Ponty and his foreshadowing of the ecology of perception à la Dewey are well enough there in Zarathustra. Wyschogrod may be right in her claim that Nietzsche fails to get rid of the primacy of vision. I would only hold that in as much as vision retains the quality of mediacy, it continues to be an effective corrective of all the claims to “direct access” to reality. Nietzsche’s philosophy can be taken to attempt to restore the ‘paradigm of the hand’ back into the conception of conception, after it had lost its connection to the bodily situatedness. This does not entail celebrating the bodily as anything that would do away the conceptual mediation of all experience. For a conceptual animal, the body, too, is conceptualized.

In its most general sense, the dimension of fruitful re-production points toward a reconceptualization of the conceptualizer in terms of ecological interplay. If the words of a Nietzschean fragment: “was um mich wohnt, das wohnt sich bald auch ein” (N Herbst 1884 - Anfang 1885 29 [56], KSA 11, 349). The pressure of the so called external world can provoke the hypothesis that the “Central-Gewalt - darf nicht wesentlich verschieden sein von dem, was sie beherrscht” (N April-Juni 1885 34 [55], KSA 11, 438). The paradox is that the height of one’s becoming aware of the power of the environment is the height of one’s own powers. Where the concept of “one’s own” is about to lose its meaningfulness, it also reaches its fulfilment.

In this section, I have tried to show that Nietzsche’s thought was committed to reconceiving conceptuality. It would be a shallow interpretation of his philosophy to insist on his unmasking of the pretensions of concepts. It would be an equally shallow line of reading to treat his more positive utterances of concepts as but instances of his contradoritoriness due to a heightened stylistic and ironic awareness of reflexive quandaries, to a proud affirmation of elemental difference, to a sadly unfinished theory, or to sheer sloppiness.

It would be more to the point to grasp the extent to, and the manner in, which Nietzsche’s philosophy is a sustained effort at criticizing and reconceptualizing conceptuality. Nietzsche did not stop at the common view that concepts hinder, falsify and debase life. He went all the way to rethinking them as
formations that exemplify life at its most vivid, most animate, most living:

Die Begriffe sind etwas Lebendiges, folglich auch etwas bald Waschsendes, bald Schwimmendes: auch Begriffe sind einen Tod gestorben. Sie wären im Gleichnisse erst als Zellen zu bezeichnen, mit einem Zellen-Kern und einem Leibe herum, der nicht fest und - -

(N August-September 1885 40 [51], KSA 11, 654.)

The unfinished form of the note might be interpreted in the form of a reminder. Conceiving concepts in this way is inevitably inconclusive, since the analogy of cells and concepts can only be sustained for so long. It might be impossible to leave the plane of the analogy for the establishment of a plane of true oneness.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of this kind of reconceptualization is, after all, that it runs counter the positivist and romanticist hostility toward concepts. One can learn from Nietzsche that the living concept’s counterpart is the “Begriff des Lebendigen” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [192], KSA 13, 378). The reconceptualized concept of concept as something living finds it echo in the need to conceive of a “[v]ollerer Begriff des Lebens” (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [27], KSA 12, 305). If these are samples of the late 1880's philosopher’s jottings, one may note how already the younger Nietzsche insisted on the challenge to “begreifen, was Leben ist” (N März 1875 3 [59], KSA 8, 30).

Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise may be described as the attempt to break the duality of life and concept. It must only be remembered that he sought to do this by working on the double necessity of criticizing concepts for their claims to a supra-natural status and of affirming the always already conceptual mode of apprehending naturality.

As it has been outlined in the present subsection, this ecological model of conception seems to have little to do with social or historical constraints of conception. Nietzsche’s reconceptualization of concepts with his ecological conception, however, meant precisely that concepts are rendered both natural and socio-historical, as it is clarified in the first paragraph of Menschliches and reaffirmed in the section number 20 of Jenseits. Here, the stress has been on the naturalization part of the reconceptualization. After the case of Dionysus has been dealt with in the next subsection, this section and the whole chapter will be closed in an examination of Nietzsche’s philosophical reconceptualization of conceptuality that emphasizes the role of the changing collective habits of conceiving.
IV.c.2 Crucial Conceptions - The Case of Dionysus

In all probability, candidates for Nietzsche’s most original or most peculiar notions include perspectivism, genealogy, will to power, eternal return and overhuman. Concept critical approach to perspectivism would mean that prior to the epistemological, hermeneutical, metaphysical, or aesthetical dimensions there would have to be asked which kind of concept it is and how its conceptual character comes out of Nietzsche’s writings. The notions of, say, ‘eye’, ‘optics’, ‘sight’, ‘myops’, ‘horizon’, ‘viewpoint’, ‘angle’, ‘panorama’, ‘vista’, ‘foreground/background’ and ‘prospect’ would be taken into consideration. The concept critical treatment might begin from utterances such as these: ‘”Alles begreifen” - das hieße alle perspektivischen Verhältnisse aufheben das hieße nichts begreifen, das Wesen des Erkennenden verkennen” (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 1 [114], KSA 12, 37); “Es gibt nur ein perspektivistisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivistisches “Erkennen”; und je mehr Augen, verschiedene Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser “Begriff” dieser Sache, unsre “Objektivität” sein” (GM III 12, KSA 5 365).

Similar treatment of genealogy would entail that moral philosophical or historiographical aspects were taken to be secondary, while the primacy would be on the conceptual. The notions of ‘family’, ‘pedigree’, ‘kind’, ‘descent’, ‘origin’ and ‘delination’ would be interrogated. The investigation could start from a reference to “übernatürliche Quelle der Vernunft” and the more promising alternative of “der praktischen Sphäre” would be examined from the point of “die wahre Genesis der Begriffe” (N Sommer 1887 8 [2], KSA 12, 327).

Schematically speaking, perspectivism and genealogy can be conceived as the main deconceptualizing forces in Nietzsche’s philosophy. As for the key reconceptualizations, will to power ought to be considered as a concept in a concept critical undertaking before it is interpreted in metaphysical, political, physical, physiological or psychological ways. Eternal return deserves similar caution before subjected to physical, logical, existential, mythical or religious ponderings. This goes for overhuman, too, until its evolutionary, social and ethical aspects are scrutinized.

Considerations of the will to power, in particular, are permeated with conceptual points (see e.g. N Frühjahr 1888 14[79]-[81], KSA 13, 257-62). The eternal return as the “Gedanken der Gedanken” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 188111 [143], KSA 11, 496) provokes reflection of the concept of concept. As for the overhuman, one needs only to read about the need to “begreifen” that Zarathustra “concipiirt” it as the model of abolished alienation, that he “mit zarten Händen anfasst” his adversaries and thereby exemplifies “Mensch überwunden” or “der Begriff Übermensch”“ (EH “WieSb” 5 & “WissBs”: AsZ 6, KSA 6, 370 & 344), to be able to appreciate the conceptual thrust involved in it.
All these five constructions can be taken as concepts. They can be taken as concepts that involve a change in the concept of concept. Concepts no longer imply an unproblematic separation from either metaphors, symbols, words, meanings and values or facts. Concepts are naturalized, socialized, historicized, textualized and turned from the direction of entities to the one of dispositions, as well as from the direction of closedness to openness. Yet, the most important feature of Nietzschean concepts is, according to my view, that they self-reflectively turn back on themselves, ask for their own conceptual provenance, structure and function and enhance problematization of the concept of concept.

I shall try and illustrate this by examining one of Nietzsche’s key conceptions more closely. Dionysus is chosen for the reason that it is the least likely to be called a concept or to be taken to strengthen the case for a concept critical reading. Dionysus is a divinity of mixed origins that occupies Nietzsche’s attention throughout his writings like nothing else. It is not that much the question of the divine that it is entangled with, but, rather, with entanglements of all kind and with what it is to be entangled. My proposal is to appreciate, in this problematic, a concept critical concern.

The classic accounts of the ancient mythological Dionysus relate its many forms and names. Dionysus the god could take the shape of girl, lion, bull or panther. One of its most common embodiments is the joyful drunkard known by its Latin name Bacchus. Dionysus was taken to be the son of Zeus and Semele. There are many versions of him being torn to pieces and renewed again. When Dionysus grew up, he made his ingenious invention: the vine. But soon Hera lashed an attack on him and made him mad. Dionysus was destined to wander around with much wine, short-lived love affairs and a variety of forms to go berserk. His usual companions were Silenus and colleagues of this satyr with female maenads. Dionysus helped Ammon to reestablish his power in Egypt. In his heroic victories of war, that reached out all the way to India, he acquired a worldwide notoriety. Dionysus married Ariadne in the island of Naxos. He paid a visit in the underworld to seek for his mother. He died and ascended.

Two overlapping practices of worship grew around this mythological heritage. On the one hand, there were the orgies of women drinking wine and eating goats alive by tearing them apart with bare hands. In 186 B.C. the Roman senate banned these bacchanals, but they were rehabilitated by Caesar. On the other hand, there were the ecstatic-orgiastic masquerades and parades lead by phallic carriers, all of which prepared the way to both various rites of fertility and to the theater. The Greek cult of Dionysus was more or less closely related to the earlier beer festivals of Thrace and Phrygia and to the worship of the Cretan deity, Zagreus, that was also told of being torn to pieces.

Yet, this is but one possible compilation of the phenomena related to Dionysus. As one critic holds,
“classical scholars disagree over the most fundamental facts about Dionysiac religion”. This conflict, in turn, can be accounted for in more ways than one. There is more or less contradictory evidence available but the explanations of this “controversial figure” seem to reveal “as much execration as sympathetic interest”.\footnote{1544}

In John Burnet’s description, the cult of Dionysus was one of the ecstatic forms of worship related to Orphism, which stood in opposition to “all earlier Greek religion” and especially to “Ionian pessimism”. Burnet recommends viewing the mythical Dionysus in terms of the post-Homeric need for unhumanized divinity that was felt in Ionia in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. After “the light-hearted polytheism of Homer” people longed for another form of worship and Dionysus with Demeter, as “the two agricultural gods”, fulfilled this need.\footnote{1545} This account differs significantly from the one Sir James Frazer presents in his classic \textit{The Golden Bough} (1890-1915). Frazer’s general methodology of reducing myths to pre-scientific explanations leads him to conclude that Dionysus with its many animal figures should not prevent us from seeing its ultimately anthropomorphic nature.\footnote{1546} However, Jane Harrison who worked under the immediate influence of Frazer, was to stress Dionysus as a prominent chthonic deity, that is, a deity of the earth as opposed to Olympic, human-like divinities.\footnote{1547}

To draw from more recent research on the worship of Dionysus, it is Walter Burkert’s advice not to focus so much on the visible role of sexuality or wine, but instead on the more profound constituents of “core of the myth”. According to him, the phallus in the Dionysian parades “was as such hardly any more secretive” than the symbols of agriculture. The doubtless centrality of sex is balanced by the probable connection between the festivals and the initiation of adolescents. Moreover, there is some evidence that only married women could become true worshippers of Dionysus. What Burkert explicitly emphasizes as the key to the bacchanals, is “the transformation of consciousness” in ’madness’, ‘enthusiasmos’ or ’mania’. But, as he insists, “anyone can become a drunkard, but not a backchos.”\footnote{1548}

To be sure, Nietzsche knew Dionysus from his schooling in classical philology, but his use of it as a contemporary marker for his own purposes was prefigured by closer forerunners. Dionysus along with its counterpart Apollo was first “brought to philosophy” by Schelling\footnote{1549}. In addition, the name of the deity is to be found, for instance, in the writings of the brothers Schlegel. More strikingly, Dionysus is mentioned both in the works of one of Nietzsche’s colleagues in Basel, J.J. Bachhofen, and in a text by Wagner from 1849 where Dionysus features in the context of tragic poetry. All this does not prevent commentators from maintaining that Nietzsche’s contribution to the history of Dionysus is crucial.\footnote{1550}

Park McGinty expresses this impact in no uncertain terms. In his comparative study of Dionysus interpretation, he said that Nietzsche’s was “the first major revalorization of Dionysos, and still the most
fertile”. He even stated that whereas Dionysus had been considered “[f]or centuries a minor symbol of luxurious ease and hedonistic fertility”, through Nietzsche’s contribution it “re-entered the Western consciousness with an intensity unparalleled since the Hellenistic era.”

After Nietzsche, Max Scheler was the one to take the challenge of Dionysus most seriously. He is said to have made his stand in opposition to the “Nietzschean naturalism” where the Apollinian and Dionysian strands remain unresolved. Scheler conceived this pairing as representing the bondage between relations of value and relations of causality.

The post-Nietzschean use of Dionysus has been fairly large even outside the immediate Nietzschean problematic. I will briefly mention a few representative cases of utilization. First, it is worth noting that Dionysus has been a key figure in the production of many literal works. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s Dionysian is to be met most often in aesthetic or art philosophical debates.

Secondly, when it comes to classicists, the debate used to boil down to, whether Dionysus represented an integral part of Greek culture or an essentially alien intruder. It was Nietzsche’s friend Erwin Rohde whose work Psyche (1894) set sails for a new frontier in the Dionysus scholarship. He is “still revered by many modern classicists as the giant on whose shoulders we stand for our present view of Hellenism”. Although Rohde distanced himself considerably from the common ground upon which he once stood with Nietzsche, it is via Rohde that the Nietzschean ideas lived on in the field. Rohde studied Dionysus’s links with antecedent Thracian culture and with subsequent Orphic religion.

Later, Frazer came to emphasize the connection of “the rude tribes of Thrace, who were notoriously addicted to drunkenness”. According to him, the Greeks were heavily influenced by Egyptians so that Dionysus “was merely a disguised Osiris”. This point can be seen to be corroborated by an eminent contemporary classicist who draws a parallel between Dionysus/Demeter and Osiris/Isis. It ought to be remembered, too, that within the “massive œuvre” of “this century’s leading scholar on Greek religion”, Martin P. Nilsson, “Dionysos occupied a central place”. In particular, Nilsson traced the Phrygian background of the Greek deity.

In the 1930's, W. F. Otto not only resisted the evolutionary and essentially denigrating stance toward myths championed by Frazer, but also tried to recover the Nietzschean view of Dionysus as expressing something truly Greek. With E. R. Dodds and W. K. C. Guthrie the quarrel began to move to a direction of synthetic moderation: they granted the Dionysiac faith its independent status, while attempting to address the related philosophical questions.

Thirdly, a somewhat bolder extension of Nietzsche’s work was carried out by Ruth Benedict. In her anthropological work, she depicted Pueblos as Apollinian, apart from all other American Indians who
“including those of Mexico, were passionately Dionysian”. Benedict was, however, cautious in her applications: “Not all of Nietzsche’s discussions of the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus apply to the contrast between Pueblos and the surrounding peoples.” Despite this, she held that the terms defining Greek culture “bring clearly to the fore the major qualities that differentiate” other anthropological complexes as well.  

Now, in Nietzsche’s texts, Dionysus appears to be the most long lasting major point of reference. It stretches from the first book to the last, from the philosopher’s early notes to the signatures of his last letters or the so-called Wahnsinnszettel. Next, this discourse of Dionysus will be concisely presented.

Geburt der Tragödie introduces two deities, Apollo and Dionysus, and places them in the context of the birth, decline and the possibility of a rebirth of tragedy. The thesis is put forward that Dionysus is the real hero on the stage, the one behind every mask offered by Aeschylus or Sophocles. Dionysus is taken to be the womb out of which both music and the tragic myth were born. Tragedy is said to have been, in its original form, a choir without drama. Its later developments coincide with the decay of music’s imageless power, which was to give way for the evident in epic. It is held that tragedy passed away tragically. Euripides is said to be the first author who no longer produced anything Dionysian, but surrendered to the unmythical Socratic imperative of intelligibility. (GT 8 & 24 & 8 & 11 & 12, KSA 1, 63 & 152 & 57-64 & 75 6 83-88.)

Dionysus is crystallized in the book as intoxication (Rausch), Apollo as dream (Traum). Dionysus possesses the powers of fusion and abolition of opposition among human beings and between humans and the rest of the nature, while Apollo is attached to the orderly world of appearance. The Apollinian signifies self-consciousness, discipline, delimitation, amount, number. The Dionysian marks the forgetting of oneself and the excesses of desire, suffering, knowledge. The nicht-apollinische in Dionysus refers both to the vor-apollinische Titans and to the ausser-apollinische barbarians, while the Greek Dionysian is also clearly separated from the “dionysischen Barbaren”. Out of this setting, three types of art are seen to have arisen. Apollinian art is visual and pictorial, the art of painters and sculptors, while Dionysian art is music. The composite form of bildlich-unbildlich or Apollinian-Dionysian art is tragedy, in which the existential unity with the world is put into images. Dionysus is said to be “Untergrund der Welt”, “Fundament aller Existenz” calling “die ganze Welt der Erscheinung in’s Dasein”. (GT 1-2 & 4 & 25, KSA 1, 26-31 & 38-42 & 31 & 155.)

Nietzsche’s Nachlass shows that Dionysus had been there in the making for a long time. A fragment on Greek drama from the fall of 1869 involves “jenen orgiastischen Festfeiern des Dionysos” and the related experience of “Ausser-sich-sein” or ecstasy (N 1 [1], KSA 7, 10), which was to be one of the
key problems discussed in *Geburt*. Some months later, there is what may be the first naming of Apollo and Dionysus together (N Winter 1869-70 - Frühjahr 1870 3 [53], KSA 7, 75).

Should one wish to reconstruct this problematic with an eye on Nietzsche’s developing interests in a more exegetic manner, one might try something along the following lines. He had practiced theater way before his teens. He dramatized, for instance, a piece called *Die Götter auf den Olymp*. The cast was tantamount to the neighborhood kids, Nietzsche himself assuming the double role of Mars and Thalius. He also worked on a piece with the title *Untergang Troja’s*. As for the more general sense of the tragic, it may be of interest to point out that there is, in one of these adolescent plays, a scene where the hero, Sirenius, follows the call of the nymphs and leaves humanity in order to turn into a god through drowning. The next scene has “Vater, Mutter, Elisabeth” all lamenting on the grave of the “Sohn”. (N 1854- , KGW I/1, 110 & 238 & 105-10.)

As a pupil at the Pforta school, Nietzsche still had his own drama projects. For Christmas in 1860, he wished to have Shakespeare, and for his nineteenth birthday, he was hoping for a volume on Aeschylus and Sophocles. (KGB I/1, April & Dezember 1860 & September 1863, 102 & 133 & 257). Later, in Bonn, Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff that his professor Ritschl was leaving for Leipzig to lecture on the history of Greek tragedy (KGB I/2, August 1865, 75).

Let this only indicate the way the tragic and the Dionysian deal with something highly intimate to Nietzsche. The long process of preparation continued in the writings immediately preceding *Geburt der Tragödie* and directly relating to Dionysus. In “Das griechische Musikdrama” (1870), one finds the distinction between dilettantes and the genuine servants of Dionysus or the bacchants. The idea is expressed that he choir of tragedy referred to the “Kampf- und Leidensgeschichte des Dionysus” (N, “DgM”, KSA 1, 522 & 527). “Die dionysische Weltanschauung” (1870) opens with a presentation of the two deities, Apollo and Dionysus, as “repräsentieren im Bereich der Kunst Stilgegensätze”. In its arrangement of the myth, Apollo is the one renewing Dionysus after his being torn apart. (N, “DdW”, KSA 1, 553 & 559.) In “Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankes” (1870), these points are repeated (N, “DgdG”, KSA 1, 581 & 587). And the latest attempt, “Sokrates und die griechische Tragödie” from 1871, was to be transferred into *Geburt* almost exactly as it is.

After the first book, Dionysus gave way for other concerns in Nietzsche’s books. As such, there is nothing puzzling about this. Studies on Dionysus had taken years and the results Nietzsche was able to come up with were anything but universally welcomed. Moreover, the basic setting that the original Dionysus seemed to require was radically transformed by Nietzsche so that Dionysus’s absence from his next publications is almost tantamount to their changed atmosphere. Apart from a casual remark in
Menschliches Nietzsche’s works remain, for years, silent about the initial main topic.

In the notebooks, however, Dionysus lives on, although what it amounts to is nowhere near the intense discourse of 1869-1872. The following fragments date from the summer of 1878:

Drei Typen der göttlichen Jugend […] Apollo Hermes Dionysos - erstaunlich das auszubilden, welcher Muth!
 […]
Dionysos erster Gott der Thraker, ihr Zeus, wie Wotan.
(N 29 [42] & 30 [132], KSA 8, 519 & 545.)

Five years later, from around the time of the third part of Zarathustra, one can find two notes amounting to essentially the same, that is, describing the Dionysian as an access to the Greeks or “als die mir zugänglichste Seite des Altherthums”. Another remark is about the basic characteristic property of the Dionysian: “§ Rausch. Seine gemeine Form im Busskampf. Warnen vor Dionysos!” (N Mai - Juni 1883 9 [27] & [50], KSA 10, 354 & 363.) And even though Dionysus was invisible in Nietzsche’s published work during this period, it appeared in his book plans. In any case, there is a fragment of sketched titles from the early 1884 with the line on the top: “Meine nächsten Aufgaben”. The last of the rubrics reads: ”Die ewige Wiederkunft. Dionysische Tänze und Fest-Lieder”. (N 25 [2], KSA 11, 9.) Another book plan carries a set of headings: ”Dionysos. Dionysos als Erzieher. Dionysos als Betrüger. Dionysos als Vernichter. Dionysos als Schöpfer” (N Herbst 1885 34 [248], KSA 11, 504).

It is Jenseits von Gut und Böse that, finally, has Dionysus reenter the stage in the second last section. Dionysus is called “Versucher-Gott”, “jener grosse Zweideutiger”. The speaker of the book refers to himself Dionysus’s disciple, the one who knows this deity and is in the position to let him philosophize. (JGB 295, KSA 5, 237-9.) This talk of Dionysus as a philosopher begins in the notes from April/June 1885: “Dionysos. Versuch einer göttlichen Art, zu philosophiren”. This way of doing philosophy involves realizing the nature of religion and morals as means to a given end in reshaping of both human beings and things. (N 34 [184] & [176] & [181] & 41 [9], KSA 11, 483 & 478-80 & 482 & 685.)

From the mid-1880's on, a frequent issue in Nietzsche’s notebooks is the reassessment of the youthful book. As one can guess, this material contains references to Dionysus. Actually, as early as in the beginning of 1884, there is a fragment in which Schopenhauer is cited on the topic of tragedy. After the quotation marks, between which Schopenhauer stresses the orientation of the tragic spirit toward resignation, one can read: ” - Oh wie anders redet Dionysos zu mir ! - “ (N 25 [86], KSA 11, 31.) This very sigh - or cry - is reproduced in Nietzsche’s “Versuch einer Selbstkritik” opening the second edition of the Geburt der Tragödie published in 1887 (GT, “VeS” 6, KSA 1, 20). Two of the questions the
book once posed are now spelled out as follows:

Was bedeutet, gerade bei den Griechen der besten, tapfersten Zeit, der tragische Mythus? Und das ungeheure Phänomen des Dionysischen?

(GT, “VeS” 1, KSA 1, 12.)

The Dionysian is, in retrospect, depicted as an intended anti-doctrine against morality, Christianity, romanticism and anything German. The voice that speaks in the book is said to belong to the “Jünger eines noch “unbekannten Gottes”“. The novelty of all this may have been obscured by an “Artisten-Metaphysik im Hintergrunde”, yet the “Name des Dionysos” was written down “wie ein Fragezeichen”. (GT, “VeS” 2-6, KSA 1, 13-20.)

In the new edition of the Geburt der Tragödie, the original subtitle aus dem Geiste der Musik was replaced by Griechenthum und Pessimismus. It is in this same attunement, that one is encouraged to read the expanded edition of the Fröhliche Wissenschaft dating from 1887, too. In one of its new sections, “Pessimismus der Zukunft” or ”dionysische Pessimismus” is set against “romantische Pessimismus”. The word Dionysian is identified as “mein terminus”. (FW 370, KSA 3, 621-2.)

Götzen-Dämmerung presents once again Apollo beside Dionysus. This time around, they are both considered as qualifications of the aesthetic Rausch. In the same book, Dionysus is used to embody the Goethean emancipated mind that “verneint nicht mehr...” (GD, “SeU” 10 & 49, KSA 6, 117-8 & 151-2.) Later on in the book, Jacob Burckhardt’s pioneering work is acknowledged, yet there is no question about the one to have discovered the Dionysian:


(GD, “WidAv” 4, KSA 6, 158.)

The book reaffirms the picture of “ich, der letzte Jünger des Philosophen Dionysos” (GD, “WidAv” 5, KSA 6, 160). Since it has both the subtitle Oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt and the epilogue “Der Hammer redet”, it is instructive to note that already in a disposition from April/June 1885 one chapter was sketched as: ”der Hammer (oder Dionysos)” (N 34 [191], KSA 11, 485). In this sense, Götzen-Dämmerung is a very Dionysian book indeed.

In the preface for Ecce homo, the speaker claims, in a way familiar by now, to be a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus, the one who “eher noch ein Satyr zu sein als ein Heiliger” (EH, “V” 2, KSA 6, 467).
258). Some pages deeper in the text, one discovers the lines:

Die *grossen* Individuen sind die ältesten: ich verstehe es nicht, aber Julius Cäsar könnte mein Vater sein - *oder* Alexander, dieser leibhafte Dionysos... In diesem Augenblick, wo ich dies schreibe, bringt die Post mir einen Dionysos-Kopf...
(EH, “Wiswb”, KSA 6, 269.)

Whatever one wishes to make out of the numerous book plans and headlines in Nietzsche’s notebooks, the ones accommodating Dionysus in their disposition stand out from some others for the simple reason that the last book Nietzsche was able to finish he did name as *Dionysus-Dithyramben*. In its famous poem, “Klage der Ariadne”, the lamenting goddess is calling after “mein einziger Genoss”: “mein unbekannter Gott! mein *Schmerz*/ mein letztes Glück!...” The poem closes dramatically:

Ein Blitz. Dionysos wird in smaragdener Schönheit sichtbar.

*Dionysos*:

Sei klug, Ariadne!...
Du hast kleine Ohren, du hast meine Ohren:
steck ein kluges Wort hinein! -
Muss man sich nicht erst hassen, wenn man sich lieben soll?...

*Ich bin dein Labyrinth*...

(DD, “KdA”, KSA 6, 401.)

It is worth noting that one finds, already from the fall of 1887, a sketch for a *Satyrspiel* including a part by the name of “Klage der Ariadne”. In the last act, Dionysus weds Ariadne and calls her a labyrinth. Another fragment from the same time says this: “Oh Ariadne, du selbst bist das Labyrinth: man kommt nicht aus dir wieder heraus”... “Dionysos, du schmeichelst mir, du bist göttlich”... (N 9 [115] & 10 [95], KSA 12, 400-2 & 510.)

To close the Nietzschean dossier of Dionysus, there are the *Wahnsinnszettel*. From the critical edition of Nietzsche’s correspondence, one finds a sketched dedication to Catulle Mendès. It is dated on January 1, 1889, and signed as “Nietzsche Dionysos”. The letter actually sent to Mendès with the *Dithyramben*, has the signature “Dionysos”. There are seven other letters from the first four days of the year 1889 signed by the name “Dionysos” and eight letters with the signature “The Crucified”. (KGB III/5, 570-7.) To exclude at least the crudest readings, one should see that just like many of the above-mentioned Nietzschean uses of “Dionysus” these signatures of the “crazy papers” refer back to previous utterances (and, then, not automatically to the writer’s going mad). One could pay attention to a sketched chapter title in a book plan: “Christ und Dionysos” already from the fall of 1885 (N 42 [1], KSA 11, 691). From the early 1888, months before the *Wahnsinnszettel*, there is, in the notebooks, a fragment: “Die zwei Typen: *Dionysos* und *der Gekreuzigte*” as well as another one with the remark

Now, the interpretation of Nietzsche’s Dionysus can be begun from the very end of what was just reviewed. Says Werner Ross: ”In the last wisdom of his madness, the god of life, Dionysus, and the god of all heaven, the crucified, grow together again.”1565 The apparent strength of this sort of commentary is considerably diminished by the fact just presented that Dionysus and the crucified stood side by side even many years before the final letters. Yet, the very idea of the cross-identification of Dionysus and Christ has proved irresistible for commentators. Whereas Reinhold Grimm considers this convergence to testify to the fact that it is impossible to maintain an exterior stance to an object of one’s most relentless critique, Jörg Salauqarda focuses on establishing that it is Saint Paul, not Christ, that serves as the exemplification for the Christianity Nietzsche attacked1566.

To begin to differentiate between various critical controversies that Nietzsche’s Dionysus has provoked, it is best to start with Rohde who addressed the adequacy of the claim that the Dionysian would stand for the essential in the early Greek life. Rohde had shared Nietzsche’s enthusiasm to the degree that he wrote from Göttingen university in 1871 about his classicist colleagues’ depressing lack of attentiveness to Dionysus. However, by the 1890's, he was ready to depict Dionysus as a harmful alien in Greece. What he had first felt as having “just as deep an influence as the ‘Göttingen-enlightened’ Apollo”, was converted by his later work into a historical threat to an already flourishing culture. This positivist turn made him think of Dionysus as dangerously enforcing the Orphic other-worldliness.1567

What is interesting in Rohde’s mature academic stance is the way he sought to keep the genuine Greek experience disinfected by the Dionysian. As for the original Nietzschean project of reinterpretation, it is often understood in the way that, in the words of August Buck, Nietzsche’s Dionysus exposed a “new dimension in the Greeks” that had escaped from the humanistic idealizations of Goethe and Winckelmann1568.

Some commentators have criticized Nietzsche’s apparent attempt to define the non-national or the supra-national by the Dionysian. Wole Soyinka, for one, condemns Nietzsche distortion of the national or ethnic distinctiveness of Dionysus. As he sees it, Nietzsche’s insistence on his own intuitive “depth-illumination” of the “basic impulses” inherent in the two deities is the sustainable part of his analysis. What is extraneous, and readily dangerous, are “the distorted dances to which Nietzsche’s Dionysiac frenzy led him in his search for a selective ‘Aryan’ soul”.1569

An early Nietzschean note implies that Geburt might have been substituted by another book: “Die Tragödie und die Freigeister. Betrachtungen über die ethisch-politische Bedeutung des musikalischen
Drama’s.” (N September 1870 - Januar 1871 5 [42] & [43], KSA 7, 103-4). At any rate, there was, early on, a political dimension to the Dionysian. One may have a look at another note beginning with the words “Was ich von Richard Wagner gelernt haben”. What follows is an enumeration that not only suggests the continuum from the early Greeks to Shakespeare and German music but the larger sociocultural significance of the philologist’s task:

Künstlerische Erfüllung der germanischen Begabung.
Einheit von Dichter und Musiker. Man muss die Weltgeschichte erleben, um sie zu verstehen.
Das Shakespeare’sche Drama als Consequent der griechischen Tragödie.
Der griechische Dithyrambus.
Das Dionysische erstirbt in der Tragödie (Aristotes).
Die griechische Tragödie als apollinische ist kalt, wegen des schwächeren dionysischen Untergrundes.
Shakespeare als höchste dionysische Potenz verbürgt die herrliche deutsche Musikentwicklung.
Der Mythus der Germanen ist dionysisch.
Appell an die Deutschen.
(N Winter 1870-71 - Herbst 1872 8 [48], KSA 7, 241-2.)

While another fragment balances these nationalist tendencies and idea of music as potential salvation for nations by making it clear that music is precisely “unnationale Kunst” (N 1871 9 [59], KSA 7, 297), it remains open for the kind of criticism offered by Soyinka. In Geburt, it is explained that, unlike the ancient female worshippers of Apollo, the devotees of Dionysus were “Verwandelten” in the specific sense that “ihre bürgerliche Vergangenheit, ihre sociale Stellung völlig vergessen ist”. These women were “zeitlose, ausserhalb aller Gesellschaftssphären lebenden Diener ihres Gottes”. (GT 8, KSA 1, 61.)

This perspective shows, first, how Geburt itself is not exhausted by “other-wordly” concern, at least not in a way that would exclude more sociological reflections, and, secondly, how not all of its descriptions serve the purpose of erasing the local distinctiveness of the Dionysian. What Soyinka felt as alarming can be assumed to begin with the way Geburt is interested in not only things of the distant past but in “analogen Erscheinung der Gegenwart” as well. Indeed, the book speaks of the rebirth of tragedy “für den deutschen Geist” as “nur eine Rückkehr zu sich selbst, ein seliges Sichwiederfinden” that may only end the “Barbarei der Form” as a force of “ungeheure von aussen her eindringende Mächte”. (GT 16 & 19, KSA 1, 102 & 128.)

In the context of the notion of ‘learning from the Greeks’, the Dionysian is related to a “bis zur Gleichgültigkeit, ja Feindseligkeit gesteigerten Beeinträchtigung der politischen Instincte”, while the Apollinian stand for “staatenbildende” activity. The function of tragedy is to “das ganze Volksleben erregenden, reinigenden und entladenden” and to mediate between “den stärksten und an sich
verhängnissvollen Eigenschaften des Volkes”. The “Einsein von Volk und Cultur” that had been the special advantage of France is now within reach for the Germans with their “so fragwürdige Cultur”, yet all the more “edeln” core of the “Volkscharakter” or the “reinen und kräftigen Kerne des deutschen Wesens”. The passage goes on to express the requirement (“erwarten wagen”) that the German essence is need of “Ausscheidung gewaltsam eingeplantzter fremder Elemente” that “[vielleicht [...] Mancher”, with the background of the “siegreichen Tapferkeit und blutigen Glorie des letzten Kriege”, associate Romanic influences. The text has it that Germans - “der Deutsche zagend sich nach einem Führen umblicken sollte, der ihn wieder in die längst verlorne Heimat zurückbringe” - should listen to their Dionysiac calling. (GT 19 & 21 & 23, KSA 1, 129 & 132-4 & 145-9.)

Further, in its recognizably Goethean sweep of Zeitkritik, or critique of the Jetztzeit, Nietzsche’s book attacks contemporary press, institutions of journalism and (art) criticism, prevailing form of historiography, aesthetics that turn art into pastime entertainment. The assault could perhaps be outlined as having a double target, as it directs itself against the miserable passivity or the “Wildniss unserer ermüdeten Cultur” and against the miserable activity or the “unheimliche Sichregen dieser Cultur [...] gierige Zugreifen & Nach-Nahrung-Haschen des Hungernden”. (GT 18 & 20 & 22-3, KSA 1, 119-20 & 130-1 & 143-6.)

Thus, the distinctly national emphases are accompanied by more general concerns. The foreword to Richard Wagner instructs the reader to not to get stuck with the book’s apparent Gegensatz between “aesthetischer Schwelgerei” and “heiterem Spiel”, on the one hand, and “patriotischer Erregung” and “tapferen Ernst”, on the other hand. Anyone able to perceive in arts something more earnest than “lustiges Nebenbei” will also understand the need to take aesthetics seriously and to see its connectedness to the “ernsthaft deutschen Problem”. This problem is even taken by the book, it is claimed in the “Vorwort”, “recht eigentlich in die Mitte deutscher Hoffnungen, als Wirbel und Wendepunkt”. (GT “V”, KSA 1, 24.) Without their Hausgötter, mythische Heimat or “ein Wiederbringung” aller deutschen Dinge”, the Germans are lost. What is at stake is the “dionysischen Befähigung eines Volkes” through the double power of music and myth. The comforting hope stems from “Anzeigen” to the effect that the deutsche Geist embodied as the deutsche Ritter is “in herrlicher Gesundheit, Tiefe und dionysischer Kraft unzerstört”. (GT 23-4, KSA 1, 49 & 153-4.)

While one does well to observe that the “German knight” riding high in Geburt is first identified as the character horseback in Albrecht Dürer’s famous engraving and then personified by the philosopher Schopenhauer who strived for the truth in the absence of hope (GT 20, KSA 1, 131), this non-military and non-jingoist setting does not silence the militant tone in the book. It is all the more important, then, that the specific line of criticism directed against its nationalist considerations was introduced by
Nietzsche himself. In the “Versuch einer Selbstkritik”, it is written that the Geburt may well have been, to an excessive extent, “selbst ein Stück Antigriechenthum und Romantik, selbst etwas “ebenso Berauschendes als Benebelndes”, ein Narkotikum jedenfalls, ein Stück Musik sogar, deutsche Musik” (GT “VeS” 7, KSA 1, 21).

Nevertheless, commenting, in the late 1930’s, on “the pagan tendencies of modern Germany” with instances where young people would sacrifice sheep, and on the general amazement they had aroused, Jung suggested that “Nietzsche’s Dionysian experience” would be of help. In this context, he referred to Wotan as Dionysus’s “Teutonic cousin”. According to his testimony, “[i]n the dreams of the Germans whom I treated then [during the Great War] I could clearly see the Wotanistic revolution coming on”. Jung states that “Nietzsche’s biography” contains “irrefutable proof that the god he originally meant was really Wotan, but, being a philologist and living in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century, he called him Dionysus”.

In the light of what has been told above, Jung’s claim and proof are anything but convincing. Dionysus had been there in Nietzsche’s writings long enough to rival the Wagnerian enthusiasm over Teutonic mythology, and it certainly survived the wasting away of that enthusiasm. Differently, but as though reappropriating Jung’s interpretative policy, it has been claimed that even Zarathustra was just a mask of Nietzsche’s “real hero who reveals himself in the madness: Dionysus, a god and a jester”.

The biographer Janz writes about “the personal symbolic” of Nietzsche’s Dionysian, about “personification” and “identification” between Nietzsche and his Dionysus. More philosophically, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari treat Nietzsche’s Dionysus as one of his “conceptual personae”. They wish to make clear that the relationship between a philosopher and his conceptual persona/e is such that “the name of the philosopher” is “the simple pseudonym of his personae”. For them, Nietzsche’s Dionysus is a prime example of the way in which “the destination of the philosopher is to become his conceptual persona/e, at the same time as these personae become themselves other than they are historically, mythologically or currently”. Nietzsche’s Dionysus, they claim, is not “the Dionysus of the myths”. It is, with Zarathustra, a sympathetic conceptual persona of Nietzsche to be differentiated from his many antipathetic ones.

Peter Bergman, in turn, claims that Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus originally stood expressly for opposing political forces. In Bergman’s view, the very contemporaneity of his own account made Nietzsche shiver and lead him to depoliticize the Dionysian. The emancipatory potential of the opposition was moulded into an elitist cult of divine brotherhood. In Karl Brose’s view, the Dionysian consists of various threats and pressures that an Apollinian civilisation, such as Nietzsche’s
Europe, had to face in the form of subversive movements of, say, extremist socialists, anarchists and nihilists. Thus, Brose’s view comes close to the ones, mentioned in section I.b, according to which Nietzsche’s twin deities modeled socio-political regulation instead of announcing anarchy. According to Georg Stauth and Bryan S. Turner, the Nietzschean question for modernity is not so much the tension between Dionysian desire and Apollinian discipline, but the conflict between the Dionysian-Apollinian tragic stance and the Euripidean-Socratic optimistic rationalism.

Bergman’s interpretation shows a proposal to come to terms with the problem of Dionysus’s continuity in Nietzsche’s works. Usually, the debate has concentrated on the way the early Dionysus is in need of Apollo, while the later Dionysus stands alone. Walter Kaufmann holds that Nietzsche’s early thoughts differ remarkably from those of his later times. His thesis is that Nietzsche rejects his former, dualistic interpretation as inadequate and develops a practice in which the later Dionysus carries within itself oppositional elements integrated into one reality. While, for example, Salaquarda shares Kaufmann’s position, Bruce Detwiler sees the early and the later Dionysian as contrary, but compatible.

Deleuze is more interested in the emergence of Ariadne by the side of Dionysus. His interest is, again, not biographical but theoretical. He holds that Dionysus needs Ariadne, because Dionysus needs “the affirmation of affirmation”. In Deleuze’s reading “Dionysus is the affirmation of being, but Ariadne is the affirmation of affirmation, another affirmation or the becoming-active”. Deleuze cites the following stanza from a Dionysos-Dithyramb: “ewiges Ja des Sein’s/ ewig bin ich dein Ja” (DD, “Ruhm und Ewigkeit”, KSA 6, 405.) These perspectives bear on the way Nietzsche’s Dionysus is not at all exhausted by the aesthetical problematic.

Probably the most pressing controversy surrounding Nietzsche’s Dionysus is not so tightly linked to its psycho-biographical or political implications or its consistency as a part of the development of Nietzsche’s thought. Instead, it is intimately related to the quarrel concerning metaphysics that was outlined above, in section II.d.2. According to Margot Fleischer, Geburt’s Dionysus is the ‘thing in itself’ hiding behind the shine of phenomena and the counterpart of the Schopenhauerian world as will. In her view, Nietzsche’s stance is at the same time aesthetical and metaphysical. Dionysus is the unchanging, the undivided, whereas Apollo is the apparent, the individuated. Art that is at once Dionysian and Apollinian has the capacity to unite that which represents and that which is represented. Its superiority lies in the unification of the opposites. It no longer merely smoothens the pain of individuation, which is the function of the Apollinian, nor does it abolish the principle of individuation, which is the function of the Dionysian. The highest, tragic form of art relates the pain of individuation to the pleasure of being one with the reality.
Fleischer is not alone in her emphasis on the metaphysical. Other commentators have seen Nietzsche’s Dionysus similarly, that is, along the Kantian lines of *Erscheinung / Ding an sich* with its Schopenhauerian reworkings.\(^{1583}\)

The invitation to a metaphysical reading of *Geburt* is obvious. In the “Vorwort”, there is already talk of “Kunst als der höchsten Aufgabe und der eigentlich metaphysischen Thätigkeit dieses Lebens” (GT “V”, KSA 1, 24). In the first paragraph, “metaphysischen Wunderakt” of the Greeks is mentioned. Further, not only can one find a remark on Schopenhauer’s profound metaphysics of music and the view of tragedy’s importance as metaphysical comfort. There is also a reference to “der wahren, d.h. der metaphysischen Bedeutung des Lebens” as well as to the need “uns mit einem kühnen Anlauf in eine Metaphysik der Kunst hinein zu schwingen”. (GT 1 & 5 & 17 & 23 & 24, KSA 1, 15 & 46 & 114 & 148 & 152.)

On the other hand, it is as evident that such a reading cannot be very illuminating at the face of the favorable references to metaphysics made explicitly in the Nietzschean text. When Nietzsche’s later critical preface permits the description of the book as *Artisten-Metaphysik*, it is certainly faithful, but tautological to call, as some commentators do, his early period as one of “artist metaphysics”\(^{1584}\). Any anti-metaphysical reading, in turn, faces difficulties in pinpointing the crucial locations in the text where the metaphysical setting is about to shatter. Typically, it is drawn to use other material beside *Geburt*, if not Nietzsche’s subsequent self-criticism, then his dissonant utterances in the unpublished material\(^{1585}\).

John Sallis will have the opportunity to counter the received interpretation. Sallis insists that the Dionysus of Nietzsche’s first book is not the thing-in-itself, the metaphysical ground of all phenomena, at least not in any straightforward or definite sense. In Sallis’s reading, the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics is already there, evidently enough. What is lacking is the appropriate vocabulary to express it. Sallis focuses on Dionysus’s attributes of “limit”, “amount”, “rupture” and “excess”. If the Dionysian means the state of *ekstasis*, being outside one’s self, as Nietzsche insists, it not only transgresses the limits and boundaries of the self, the inner and the outer, it abolishes the ideas of limit and boundary. Sallis says that it could be termed “excess-in-itself”, had not the “in-itself” itself become obsolete by the excess. He goes on to state that Dionysus would not be much of a ground for phenomena, since it breaks down the very “ordering” and the very “determinance” inherent in the concept of ground. What is at stake in Dionysus is the gaze into the abyss. Sallis concludes that the remnants of metaphysical discourse in Nietzsche are outweighed by his fragmented discourse of *ekstasis*.\(^{1586}\)

One may note how this interpretation exploits Nietzsche’s insistence on both the Dionysian dimension of *Ausser-sich-sein* in the Dionysian fist and the literally “fragmented” mythic Dionysus. Another
commentator formulates this double import of the Dionysus myth as follows: “Ripped in pieces at the hands of the titans for the (by him) unwilled acts of hubris, a divine birth, Dionysus-Zagreus commences divine existence by this experience of the destruction of the self, the transitional horror.”

There are a number of interpreters sharing Sallis’s basic view. The conflict between the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical options is no simple confrontation. Charles Senn Taylor offers an intermediate position between Fleischer and Sallis by first saying that Nietzsche copies in his twin deities the Kantian and the Schopenhauerian dichotomies and then adding that the Nietzschean Dionysus cannot be understood in dualistic terms. In Taylor’s view, Nietzsche uses Schopenhauerian tools, gets further away from his mentor in every step of the way, but is not alert enough to realize the distance.

Another creative solution to the quarrel over metaphysics (and to the problem of continuity), is offered by Alan White. He picks up the character of Silen featuring in Geburt along with Dionysus and Apollo. White’s advice is to give the name “Silenian” to that metaphysical part of the original Dionysus that Nietzsche later rejected, whereas Dionysus “in my narrower sense, points in the direction of what Nietzsche continues to affirm”. White explains this by suggesting, in tune with Sallis and Taylor, that “Nietzsche’s descriptions, in 1872, are richer than his terminology”.

I do not think the quarrel over metaphysics can be settled once and for all. What is important is that it has made possible a powerful perspective in Nietzsche, and more generally, new ways of thinking about metaphysics. But it has also effectively hindered other kinds of approach. It was, in part, for this reason that I chose to make explicit the political dimension to Nietzsche’s discussion of the Dionysian. It is best to say that my support is more for the anti-metaphysical reading, yet, and this is what I mean by the effective hindering, the issue is not as clear as that. Although the “concept critical” Dionysus that I wish to argue for might, in principle, be more or less “metaphysical”, in some sense of the word, it is certainly incompatible with the peculiarly essentialist character that is seen to be ascribed to it in Nietzsche’s (early) work. And even though “anti-metaphysical” readings deny the essentialism in his Dionysian, they do it in the way that cast doubt on “conceptual”, too.

I would hold, then, that the question of conceptuality is prior to the one of metaphysics or to any other targeted question about the nature of Nietzsche’s Dionysus. Since I shall follow the non-metaphysical line of reading in thinking that Nietzsche would have needed, as the later self-criticism has it, “in jedem Betrachte für so eigne Anschauungen und Wagnisse auch eine eigene Sprache” (GT “VeS” 6, KSA 1, 19), it is best to start from the very vocabulary created by him for his specific needs. I would hold, namely, that Nietzsche’s terminology may not have entirely suited to his virtually impossible mission, yet it is more resourceful than what White’s estimation might imply.
Geburt seeks to illuminate the Greek Kunstschauung (GT 1, KSA 1, 25), while making its simultaneous intervention in the contemporary philosophical Kunstbetrachtung (GT 5, KSA 1, 46), aesthetical Kunstdörste (GT 3, KSA 1, 37) and Kunstredensarten (GT 7, KSA 1, 52). Dionysus and Apollo feature as the two Kunstgottheiten (GT 1 & 22, KSA 1, 25 & 141), künstlerische Mächte (GT 2, KSA 1, 30), Kunstgewalten (GT 25, KSA 1, 155), Kunstzustände (GT 2, KSA 1, 30), to be accommodated in two Kunstwelten (GT 1 & 16, KSA 1, 26 & 103), Kunstreichen (GT 23, KSA 1, 147), Kunstbereiche (GT 25, KSA 1, 154), Kunstgebiete (GT 12, KSA 1, 83) or Kunstspäre (GT 24, KSA 1, 151). For these, the corresponding Kunstriebse (GT 2, KSA 1, 30-1 etc.), Kunstabsichten (GT 24 & 25, KSA 1, 150-5), Kunstvermögen (GT 16, KSA 1, 107) and Kunstwirkungen (GT 21 & 22 & 24, KSA 1, 139-40 & 149) are introduced. This serves as the basis for assessing different Kunstperiode (GT 20, KSA 1, 130), Kunststufe (GT 4, KSA 1, 42), Kunstgattungen (GT 7, KSA 1, 54 etc.), Kunstformen (GT 14, KSA 1, 93-4 etc.), Kunstmitteln (GT 12 & 22, KSA 1, 86, 141) and Kunstwerk (GT 1, KSA 1, 26 etc.). More generally, it deals with Kunstrarbin (GT 7, KSA 1, 52) and Kunswissen (GT 5, KSA 1, 47).

The minimal outcome of this enumeration would be that there is a peculiar consistency in this book where the verbal possibilities of the term “art” are experimented with. As Geburt speaks of the eternal Wesen der Kunst (GT 5, KSA 1, 48), of the Kunstgewalt of all nature (GT 1, KSA 30), of the struggle between optimistic knowledge and tragic Kunstbedürftigkeit (GT 16, KSA 1, 102-3), of the alienation from the real purpose of art (GT 22, KSA 1, 143-4), and of Dionysus as the eternal and original Kunstgewalt (GT 25, KSA 1, 154-5), it does this with an intense effort of creating an extensive glossary of art terms1591.

Compared to this vocabulary of arts, Geburt does not contain a vocabulary of conceptuality to match either its intensity or extensiveness. The very beginning of the book makes it clear that the mere “logische” Einsicht is insufficient in “die aesthetische Wissenschaft”. A recommendation is made for the “unmittelbaren Sicherheit” of Anschauung. Right after introducing Dionysus and Apollo the text reads:

Diese Namen entlehnen wir von den Griechen, welche die tiefeninnigen Geheimlehren ihrer Kunstanschauung zwar nicht in Begriffen, aber in den eindringlich deutlichen Gestalten ihrer Götterwelt dem Einsichtigen vernehmbar machen (GT 1, KSA 1, 25).

Thus, the book is concerned with clear, lucid, penetrating obviousness of divine figures that conceal the deepest magic of the ancient views of art but that may still remain open for the immediacy and certainty of intuition. Logical insight, at least left alone, does not help, since the object of inquiry is not conceptual. This should discourage any conceptual undertaking. In so far as Geburt is favorable to
Greek mythology and to Schopenhauer's philosophy of music, it seems to be favorable to the non-conceptual and extra-conceptual. Indeed, the question about the relation of music to image and concept is explicitly posed and answered. The book’s lengthy quotation from Welt als Wille und Vorstellung contains the Schopenhauerian basic tenet about music as representation of the will, concept as representation of representation. (GT 16, KSA 1, 104-7.)

When it comes to what was already discussed as the politico-cultural problem of the fate of the “deutsche Wesen”, there is explicit anti-conceptuality involved. Symptoms of a weakening of both music and myth are to be found in “dem abstracten Character unseres mythenlosen Daseins” and in “einem vom Begriff geleiteten Leben”. The pre-conceptual and the anti-conceptual are, thus, neatly tight together in a phrase about “dieser engsten Verwandtschaft zwischen Musik und Mythus”. (GT 24, KSA 1, 153).

The modern situation where concept rules over myth was prefigured by Socrates. Although Geburt’s critique of Socratism is mainly about the extreme idea of science as panacea (Universalmedizin) characterized by its “Glauben an die Ergründlichkeit der Natur der Dinge dem Wissen”, the issue of concepts is explicitly involved in it. Optimistic scientism is described as a tendency to conceive (begreifen) “Irrtum” as “das Uebel an sich” and to value accordingly: “In jene Gründe einzudringen und die wahre Erkenntniss vom Schein und vom Irrthum zu sondern, dünkte dem sokratischen Menschen der edelste, selbst der einzige wahrhaft menschliche Beruf zu sein: so wie jener Mechanismus der Begriffe, Urtheile und Schlüsse von Sokrates ab als höchste Bethätigung und bewunderungswürdigste Gabe der Natur über alle anderen Fähigkeiten geschätzt wurde.” (GT 15, KSA 1, 100-1).

The Socratic imperative of total clarification ousted die tragische Erkenntniss and the concession to the points of the Unauffellbare surrounding the sphere of knowing. Tragedy, too, degenerated from direct expression of the will itself to “in einer durch Begriffe vermittelten Nachahmung”. As for the contemporary situation, “[u]nsere ganze moderne Welt ist in dem Netz der alexandrinischen Cultur befangen und kennt als Ideal den mit höchsten Erkenntnisskräften ausgerüsteten, im Dienste der Wissenschaft arbeitenden theoretischen Menschen, dessen Urbild und Stammvater Sokrates ist.” (GT 15 & 17 & 18, KSA 1, 101-2 & 112 & 116.)

Thus, Socrates’s conceptual thought brought down the ancient myth (and authentic music and authentic tragedy) and the modern Socratism with concepts in the lead rules sovereignly over the mythical (and authentic music and authentic tragedy). What one learns from this concise exposition, as differentiated with respect to three apparent main concerns of the book, is that (i) the Greek view of arts is not to be found in concepts and not to be approached by anything like conceptual means; (ii) that the essence of
music is a question of a higher order than the one about concepts; and (iii) that the conceptual or concept-guided way of life is directly responsible for killing off the tragic culture based on the intimate relationship with conceptually unintelligible primal forces.

Commentators affirm this. Sarah Kofman, for one, emphasizes Nietzsche’s conviction that “with Socrates and the post-Socratics, philosophy becomes conceptual”. She explains the way Geburt unmasks the arrogant pretensions of conceptual thinking: “With Socrates, there begins the serenity of the theoretical man relying on the illusion of being able to, by consciousness, close the entire becoming in the net of concepts and, in so doing, acquire administration over it.” Giorgio Colli, in turn, underlines the positive counterpart of such a critical effort. He draws the conclusion that the book on tragedy, and indeed all of Nietzsche’s work, is involved with “a specific immediacy of life [...] beyond representation and consciousness”. It is about the vision of a “primordial knowledge” that can be mediated only by “symbols” or in “germinating forms of expression” and not at all by “concepts”.

Colli and Kofman both read Nietzsche as committed to the project of non-conceptuality. Likewise, two other representative interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought that reserve for Dionysus a central role accentuate its “symbolic” nature. First, Rose Pfeffer’s treatment of Nietzsche as “the disciple of Dionysus” relies heavily on the explanatory or metaphoric force of this divine construction. She regards Dionysus as embodying several Nietzschean characters, such as: sceptic, critic, destroyer, creator, constructor, ground of being, contradiction, flux, will. But more than anything, it is a “symbol” of modern human being in a state of both despair in the face of lost traditions and heroic strength to overcome nihilism and to discover a new meaning of life, one that is “Dionysian, tragic”.

Secondly, Jendris Alwast advises Nietzsche’s readers not to be perplexed by the “plurality of philosophical motives” in the books following Zaratustra. Unbothered by Dionysus’s transformations or its varying degrees of presence and absence in Nietzsche’s œuvre, Alwast recommends the deity as the very source of unity: "The fundamental thing engendering unity in the philosophical theory of Nietzsche consists [...] of no primum that could be sharply defined in thought. The integrating factor, through which the apparently heterogenous complex of thoughts is allowed to have its grounding context, is a symbol. Only in the mythical figure [Gestalt] of Dionysus, the whole of being as potency [Mächtigkeit] of life is brought together and given linguistic expression in Nietzsche’s thought."

Now, Dionysus certainly does not make things too easy for a conceptual reading to justify itself as an approach to Nietzsche. On the contrary, Dionysus appears to reject the very conditions of such a reading. What I try to argue is that there is, nevertheless, a dimension in Dionysus representative of Nietzsche’s peculiar sense of philosophical conceptuality.
If the concept critical reading fails to make a convincing case about the decisive figure claimed to unify Nietzsche’s divergent aspirations and foreshadow all his writings, there is not much hope to treat conceptuality as the key to his philosophy. It has been my strategy to show that there is, in Nietzsche, maybe the most vehement criticism of concepts in all philosophy, and - I would say “despite this”, if it was not more like “through this” - one of the most haunting attempts to conceptualize more, better, differently. Here, I try to demonstrate how this sort of characterization works in making sense of one of Nietzsche’s most crucial concepts.

The “other” of conceptuality is powerfully present in Geburt der Tragödie. Not only does it explicitly slight concepts and favor the appeal to immediate apprehension of vivid patterns. It is a stylish book on the roots of art, inspired book on the deeper meaning of music, enthusiastic book on myths, tiefpsychologische book on unconscious drives, soulful book on religious experience, symbolical book on spiritual sentiments and imaginative book on supra-sensual reality. Moreover, it speaks approvingly of the mysterious, the magical and the miraculous (GT 17 & 8 & 23, KSA 1, 111 & 64 & 145).

Following its initial distinction, Geburt may be taken as an attempt to provide not the logische Einsicht but the unmittelbar Anschauung of its topic, that is, of the (re)birth of tragedy. This is a matter of initiation, inspiration, encouragement, stimulation, excitation (anregen, erregen), all coming down to ‘emotion’ as the condition of being moved (regen). Thus, Nietzsche’s first book on the dithyrambische primitive choir is not that much removed from his last book reintroducing Dionysus in the dithyrambic poems. Both works utilize dramatic or even ceremonial means of presentation owing to Goethe’s Faust where Dionysus makes one of its most glamorous entrances: the choir sings about clashing cymbals, “Dionysus reveals itself from mysteries” accompanied by satyrs and the whole scene ends in the resulting dizziness, confusion, drunkenness.1596

What I am trying to convey is that Geburt der Tragödie is a book ambitious enough to endeavor to awaken the vision of the ancient Greek culture by stimulatingly depicting the power inherent in the tragic experience grounding that culture. Arguably, much of this ambition derives from the Goethean critique of merely “aestheticizing” and “negatively criticizing” tendency in the emerging business of art criticism, which Geburt also faithfully repeats. Thus, in practically each and every thinkable way, it resists anything like conceptual considerations. The resistance is not entirely explainable by its genre, its conventionally extra-conceptual interests or its openly declared objectives to pay tribute to Wagner and to the German cultural cause. Geburt seems to be committed to showing that humans can do without concepts, whereas they are in urgent and constant need of the whole variety of non-conceptualities.

As such, the book would surely be of interest for conceptual reflections. It would be a philosophical
challenge to study how far one can go with avoiding concepts. Yet, I aim to show that the variety of non-conceptualities in Geburt take part in reconceiving conceptuality. My first effort to clarify the conceptual problem is to briefly illustrate the book’s attitude to the philosophical tradition. This may begin from the way Geburt praises Kant and Schopenhauer for dissociating their thought from the ultra-optimistic epistemology of ancient and modern Socratism. That decisive philosophical turn meant the rejection of the “Erkenntbarkeit und Ergründlichkeit aller Welträtsel” or the cognitive unattainability of the “innersten und wahren Wesen der Dinge”. (GT 18, KSA 1, 118.) By this move, the book can be said to announce that granting the impossibility of making good conceptual sense of things beyond the limits of theoretical reason, those realms can only be spoken of in non-conceptual terms.

Since Schopenhauer is mentioned as Kant’s partner, it might be more instructive to go on with Goethe’s insistence on the Urphänomen. In Goethean vocabulary, Geburt speaks, on one and the same KSA page, about Urtragödie, Uterscheinung and Urphänomen. It would seem that these primordialities necessitate an extra-conceptual approach. A similar effect is made with the other key word, besides the prefix Ur-, that is repeated three times on the page, that is, Vision. In any case, it is explicitly presumed that “bei unserer gelehrtenhaften Anschauung über die elementaren künstlerischen Prozesse” such a vocabulary and such approach are intolerable. (GT 8, KSA 1, 60.) What one needs is a visionary kind of Anschauung able to reach the primordialities. The most important of them is, as Fleischer said, the Ur-Eine or the “Wahrhaft-Seiende” (GT 4, KSA 1, 38-9).

In what follows, it will be seen that, in addition to the vocabulary of Kunst, there is an extensive and intense terminology of primordiality more or less consistently developed in Geburt. The primordial oneness is also termed Ursein and Urgrund (GT 8, KSA 1, 62). It is emotionalized as Urschmerz, Urleiden, Urlust, Urfreude and Urwiderspruch (GT 4-5 & 21-22, KSA 1, 39 & 44 & 137 & 141) and personified as either Urmutter or Urkünstler (GT 16 & 5, KSA 1, 106 & 48). While this setting makes it possible to refer to the Aryan Urfrevel and Semitic Urstunde (GT 9, KSA 1, 70), the focus stays on artistic coping with primordial contradiction. Accordingly, Apollo and Dionysus are called Utriebe (GT 23, KSA 1, 147), yet the former as such conveys but “Gleichnissbild” compared to the latter as involved with the underlying Urbild (GT 24, KSA 1, 150). Music with its Dionysian Urelement (GT 21, KSA 1, 139) is Urwiederklang (GT 5, KSA 1, 44). Conventional German nicely supports this special vocabulary, as the Apollinian-Dionysian tragic hero is called Urheber (GT 22, KSA 1, 141).

As for the modern culture, its malaise lies in the fact that it knows no Urheimat (GT 21-2, KSA 1, 136 & 141) or “keinen festen und heligen” Ursitz (GT 23, KSA 1, 146). Socrates, the Urbild of a theoretician, with a “grosse Cyclopennaue”, cannot “in die dionysischen Abgründe mit Wohlgefallen zu schauen” and, hence, regards tragedy as but Ursachen “ohne” Wirkungen” and “Wirkungen ohne”
Ursachen (GT 14-6, KSA 1, 92 & 100 & 116). Instead of the mechanistic and static Urtheile (GT 15, KSA 1, 100) as the Socratic Urbedingungen (GT 19, KSA 1, 127), one has to make sense of the organic and dynamic Urbegierde and Urprozess (GT 4, KSA 1, 39), of the Ursprung of art and, especially, Ursprung of the Greek tragedy (GT 5 & 7, KSA 1, 47 & 54).

One can see how the conventional words Urbild, Ursach, Urteil and Ursprung fit in among the new coinages. It is as though the fresh Ur-words activated the forgotten primordiality of the old ones. In any case, this would be in line with the task assumed in the book. The process traced by Geburt opens the opportunity to differentiate between the early tragedy with its Urscene of humanity and the later quattrocento opera that tried to evoke the “homerischen Welt als der Urwelt”. The problem with the rudimentary Renaissance opera has to do with its idealistically superficial faith in the good Urmensch having lived during the Urzeit (GT 19, KSA 1, 122-5).

Likewise, of the Urproblem of tragedy, modern aesthetics has so far had but a shallow understanding (GT 16, KSA 1, 104). Reassessment has to start from the Greek Urbild of human being as a satyr, “begeisterner Schwärmer, den die Nähe des Gottes entzückt”. However, since individuation is the Urgrund of suffering and evil (GT 10, KSA 1, 72-3), the key is to be found in the collective Urerscheinung or Urphänomen of the “schwärrende Schaara der Dionysusdiener”. This rapturous mass, in turn, was the model of the dityrambic choir as the ursprünglich tragedy, Urdrama or Urtragödie. (GT 7 & 8, KSA 1, 52 & 58-61).

“Logical insight” and “concepts” cannot, it seems, get at this primordial level which is left for Gestalten and Anschauungen. There are further qualifications, since it was seen how gelehrten A anschauungen will not do. The obvious implication would be that one’s A nschauungen need to be less “learned” or “erudite” and more “artistic” or “creative”. In a faithfully Schopenhauerian passage, there is relevant clarification of the “ächten Dichter”. The true poet is said to have a “Metapher” before him “an Stelle eines Begriffes”. Quite specifically, the metaphor is “nicht eine rhetorische Figur, sondern ein stellvertretendes Bild”. When it comes to the dramatic handling of personae, it is said how Character is, for such a poet, “vor seinen Augen aufdringlich lebendige Person”. This is because the poet “von Gestalten sich umringt sieht” and has, then, no need for a “zusammengesuchten Einzelzügen componirtes Ganzes”. Homer’s poetry, in particular, was so anschauliche, because he “so viel mehr anschaut”. Stated otherwise, poetry is about the ability “fortwährend ein lebendiges Spiel zu sehen und immerfort von Geisterschaaren umringt zu leben”, while drama is about the capacity “sich selbst zu verwandeln und aus anderen Leibern und Seelen herauszureden”. (GT 8, KSA 1, 60-1.)

Except for maybe the reference to the “groups of spirits”, this kind of articulation of anschauen would
be in line with a neutral notion of poetry as an activity that prefers affection and perceptiveness to the conceptual. In other words, the emphasis is on the sensory and the sensuous, as the specified notion of ‘metaphor’ clearly indicates. If the book’s initial favoring of Anschauung and Gestalt over Begriff and Einsicht was evaluated on the basis of but this passage, it could be said that Geburt merely reaffirms the familiar thesis that the vivid and colorful sense of the empirical diversity is the poet’s unmistakable advantage to the inevitably more abstruse philosopher.

As much as this sort of view may belong to the tenets of Nietzsche’s first book, the mere rehabilitation of the sensual would be hard to reconcile with the appeal to the primordial. Fortunately, the passage under discussion contains the seeds of a more demanding meditation. As the text speaks of Gestalten and “spirits” surrounding the poet, or of the dramatist’s imperative to transform oneself, it points back to the Urphänomen of the collective ecstasy experienced in the Dionysian revelry. As it was seen, this is where tragedy developed from. Accordingly, the book has it that Musikdrama furthers “innerliche Erweiterung der schaubaren Bühnenwelt und ihre innere Erleuchtung”. This means that “Musik zwingt” one to see “mehr und innerlicher als sonst zu sehen”. The “Vorgang der Scene” is made by music into what is “wie ein zartes Gespinst” preparing “unser vergeistigtes, in’s Innere blickendes Auge die Welt der Bühne eben so unendlich erweitert als von innen heraus erleuchtet”. (GT 21, KSA 1, 138.)

By these moves, the sensual Anschauen (by the eye) is described as but a secondary path to the extra-sensual Anschauen (by the mind’s eye). Moreover, the last paragraph speaks of Apollinian “Schönheitswirkungen” that “wohl eine nächste Generation schauen wird”. Whereas this refers to future visibilities, the very next sentence is about their underlying necessity which is not so much seen, as it is a matter of dream-like nachempfinden “am sichersten, durch Intuition”. This intuition involves a kind of self-transformation into “althellenische Existenz”. Thus empowered, one sees one’s own “verklärten Gestalt” in the midst of beauty and harmony all emanating from the way Apollo and Dionysus teach people to cope with suffering and insanity and to turn these into artistic culture. (GT 25, KSA 1, 155.)

Putting the details aside, the situation here would seem to be quite simple. Geburt der Tragödie is a book about things that escape concepts as well as a book that entertains the view that conceiving is an inferior way of apprehension compared to either direct sense-perception or immediate intuition. Although it celebrates Kant’s repudiation of an uncritically limitless reasoning, its own post-critical enthusiasm only starts from where Kant’s pre-critical efforts ended. It joins Schopenhauer in tracing the extra-conceptual (conative, energetic, libidinal, metaphysical, musical, unconscious) spheres.

In order to qualify Geburt’s emphasis on the non-conceptual, the first thing to say is that many of its passages draw the reader’s attention to the deliberate choice of this particular emphasis. This is to say

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that *Geburt* is at least not non-conceptual without appreciating this feature itself. On the contrary, it boasts of its non-conceptuality, as already the above reference to the “courageous charge into the metaphysics of art” implies. With less bragging, yet with a similar double effect of self-reflectivity and affectedness, an earlier passage of the book shows the speaker of the text saying that due to pondering on Apollo “fühle ich mich zu der metaphysischen Annahme gedrängt, dass das Wahrhaft-Seiende und Ur-Eine, als das ewig Leidende und Widerspruchsvolle, zugleich die entzückende Vision, den lustvollen Schein, zu seiner steten Erlösung braucht” (GT 4, KSA 1, 38).

In the light of this quotation, the seeming metaphysical convictions of the book turn out to be but metaphysical assumptions made for the reason of being pushed by one’s need to explain. Moreover, such assumptions may be expressed in the appropriately hypothetical or conditional language: “als ob der innerste Abgrund der Dinge zu ihm [spectator of tragedy] vernehmlich spräche”. Indeed, *Geburt* comes very near to addressing an imagined positivist reader expected to reject its strange speculation on issues out of reach: “Das Ungewöhnliche dieser Behauptung [that tragedy depends upon the spirit of music] zu mildern und andererseits den Ursprung dieser Erkenntniss aufzuzeigen, müssen wir uns jetzt freien Blicks den analogen Erscheinungen der Gegenwart gegenüber stellen”. Differently stated, Nietzsche’s book is alert to its probably extraordinary nature and also concerned to tone down such an effect. This watchfulness also comes out from the passages where will is written in quotation marks or equipped with the explication: “das Wort im Schopenhauerischen Sinne genommen”. (GT 21 & 16 & 1 & 3 & 6, KSA 1, 135 & 102 & 25 & 36-8 & 50.)

Further in this direction, the book’s explanation of the primitive choir must be discussed. It reports how “die Scene sammt der Action im Grunde und ursprünglich nur als Vision gedacht wurde, dass die einzige “Realität” eben der Chor ist, der die Vision aus sich erzeugt und von ihr mit der ganzen Symbolik des Tanzes, des Tones und des Wortes redet”. The vision takes place as the choir schaut and sieht Dionysus as its “Herrn und Meister”. Thus, tragedy develops from being an esoteric *Visionsgestalt* (of the choir) to becoming *jedem Auge sichtbar* (that is, drama). Whereas Dionysus as the “eigentliche Bühnenheld und Mittelpunkt der Vision” was at the primitive stage “nicht wahrhaft vorhanden, sondern wird nur als vorhanden vorgestellt”, its later destiny was to become an object of increasing visualization. The choir assumed the task of stimulating (anzuregen) the audience so that the spectators did not see “maskirte Gestalt” but translated “das ganze magisch vor seiner Seele zitternde Bild des Gottes” into to masked actor. (GT 8, KSA 1, 62-4.)

It is to this crucial, I think, that Henry Staten’s words apply the best. Critically building upon Paul de Man’s and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s readings, Staten writes about Nietzsche’s work on Dionysus as prefiguring the deconstructionist issue of what it is to make present a transcendent reality. He wishes to
do justice to “the notorious complexity” of Geburt, to “the labyrinthine crossings and returns of its argument that baffle any summary that tries to be faithful to the nuance and apparent contradiction on major points that we find there”. This leads Staten to propose that the book is “concerned with the problem of giving a face and a voice, or faces and voices, to an absent, deceased, or voiceless entity, an entity called Dionysus, who is a figure not of any particular deceased being but of decease in general, of all that is already dead or all that lives as already affected by its future death, and thus a sort of transcendental elegy [...]”.1597

Whatever one is to make of Staten’s terms “entity”, “figure” and “transcendental elegy”, his is a fine rendering of the self-reflective power of Nietzsche’s Dionysus. My aim to show how Nietzsche sought to reconceive, through the concept of Dionysus, the conceptual as well as the nonconceptual elements by ruminating tragedy may seem like going past the very problem of reconceiving (or of giving a voice and making present) something that has been, or at any rate has become, conceptless (or voiceless or absent). I contend, however, that to study Nietzsche’s Dionysus is to study the very problematic of conceptuality from the non-conceptual to the fully conceptualized and back again.

One learns from the passage about the choir’s vision that, at the beginning, Dionysus was there in no way other than as brought before the mind (vorgestellt). The actual place or plane of Dionysus was not yet enacted on the stage but represented in the mind. What the choir first envisaged was likened in the mental images of the spectator, while the masked hero made no attempt to really look like a divinity. Here, it seems like Gestalten have to give way to something very much like Begriffe. In any case, the emphasis on the original necessity to think in terms of Vision involves, roughly, as strong an invitation to the non-conceptual elements (all the way from the magic before one’s soul via milder forms of imaginative fancy up to the immediate sensory experience) as to the conceptual ones (the initial imperative of Vorstellung and the reconstructive nature of perception).

The outcome of all these qualifications can now be spelled out. Even if the book is filled with material apt to disconcert the rationally disposed reader, it shows its self-awareness of this and underscores either the need to make sense of these oddities or their vital function. Another thing, which is also best to say at once here, is that Geburt is nowhere near exhausted by its conceptualizing counter-thrust, which can be taken to strengthen its credibility as a book with comprehension and appetite for the non-conceptual. It would seem that modern aesthetics, from the point of view of Nietzsche’s polemics, has not been able to do justice to either the intelligible or the unintelligible. So the way to continue goes through his criticism of aesthetical concepts in the immediate context of Dionysus. Compare the opening of Geburt to the following note: “Die Griechen helfen uns mehr als unsre Aesthetiker in ihrer Hauptunterscheidung des Dionysischen und Apollinischen” (N 1871 9 [34], KSA 7, 284). Just as the
opening of the book, this fragment says that the contemporary accounts of both the Greeks and the nature of art are to be criticized through reinterpreting the business of philology and aesthetics.

William Desmond has suggested that Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus approximate Schiller’s *Formtrieb* and *Stofftrieb*. The reference to Schiller is important, yet Nietzsche’s texts show that it is, more specifically, Schiller’s concepts of ‘ naïve’ and ‘sentimental’ art, rather than any other conceptual pair, that is important for the new aesthetical account.


(N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [126], KSA 7, 184.)

It seems warranted to see in Nietzsche’s introduction of Dionysus an effort to replace a certain previous conception. In its alleged field of application, Schiller’s ‘sentimental’ fails to account for important things, for which Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian’ offers itself as a tailor-made improvement. One may note how the vocabulary of art terms is, again, the key to a comprehensive reinterpretation. At the same time, however, the note restates the basics of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and, thus, plays down the importance of concepts. In due course, I will come back to the Schopenhauer connection as well as to the distinction made in text just quoted between *Schein des Scheins* and *Schein des Seins*. Before that, it pays to see how *Geburt* lets Schiller and his fellow German classics enter in passages delivered by interesting exercises in conceptual language. I shall discuss Nietzsche’s polite use of these forerunners in order to get a better idea of the not altogether condemned or depreciated conceptuality of the book.

First, the opinion is put forth that since the “edelsten Bildungskampf Goethe’s, Schiller’s und Winckelmann’s” and its “nächsten Einwirkungen”, things have been bad. In particular, “das Streben auf einer gleichen Bahn zur Bildung und zu den Griechen zu kommen, in unbegreiflicher Weise schwächer und schwächer geworden ist”. This would amount to saying that not the bridge to the Greeks and its falling down are things “beyond conceiving”. Or, as I would rather read it, there was a relatively viable
approach to the ancients available, in the time of the great German classics, although it fell short of arriving home and remained in the level of a “sehnsüchtigen Blick [...] nach der Heimat”. (GT 20, KSA 1, 129 & 131.) The implication would seem to be that now one ought to, no matter how it strains one’s conceptual capacity, grasp the almost incomprehensible becoming ruined of this approach.

In any case, Goethe is elsewhere expressly credited for his wisdom of being able to recognize, in the midst of theoretical culture, “eine so befremdende Existenzform” as that of “Productivität der Thaten”. According to the immediate continuation of the passage, Goethe was provoked by Napoleon and managed to make begreiflich an untheoretical “form of existence”. One could conclude that, the reputed nature and the self-declared task of Geburt notwithstanding, there seems, after all, to be nothing wrong in finding in a Gestalt or in a living human being a proper arena for conceptual apprehension. The nicht-theoretische-Mensch may well involve “etwas Unglaubwürdiges und Staunenerregendes”, while still being, for appropriately equipped observer, “conceivable”. In tune with this, Goethe’s and Schiller’s current labeling with the pejorative Pseudoidealismus is countered by a rebuttle of crude naturalism: “wir sind dagegen mit unserer jetzigen Verehrung des Natürlichen und Wirklichen am Gegenpol alles Idealismus angelangt, nämlich in der Region der Wachfigurencabinette”. (GT 18 & 7, KSA 1, 116-7 & 55.)

While merely mentioning that Goethe’s groundwork is also recognized elsewhere in the book - when it comes to countering the vulgar and mainstream aesthetic notion of sacrificing tragic heros to “sittlichen Weltordnung” and to advancing work on the tragic with “ein lebhafter pathologische Interesse” along the lines of the special Greek invention of “das höchste Pathetische” as “aesthetisches Spiel” - the case of Schiller is in need of further articulation. It is his contribution to the “Tendenz, das Theater als Veranstaltung zur moralischen Volksbildung zu verwenden” that Geburt favorably recognizes (GT 22, KSA 1, 142-144.)

More decisively, for the present problematic, Schiller is also the one to have fought “gegen den gemeinen Begriff des Natürlichen, gegen die bei der dramatischen Poesie gemeinhin geheischte Illusion”. The natural in tragedy was, rather, a matter of “fingirten Naturzustand” and “fingirte Naturwesen”. Schiller is equally credited for offering a better explication of the choir than what was concealed in Schlegel’s “Begriff des schauspielslosen Zuschauers”. While this latter is but “ein widersinniger Begriff”, Schiller’s alternative, “Chor als eine lebendige Mauer [...], die die Tragödie um sich herum zieht, um sich von der wirklichen Welt rein abzuschliessen und sich ihren idealen Boden und ihre poetische Freiheit zu bewahren”, is deemed much more promising. (GT 7, KSA 1, 54-5.)

The text does not say, whether Schiller’s substitutions of the concepts of ’choir’ and ’the natural’ are
themselves to be understood as falling within or beyond conceptuality. Yet, his contribution is twice referred to as “unendlich wertvolle” and “richtige” Einsicht, albeit one opening into the choir as tragedy in its “primitive” Gestalt (ibid.). Keeping in mind the distinctions made in the opening of the book, this would intimate that Schiller’s insight is “logical” and expressed in “concepts”, yet it concerns an “evident” Gestalt that was supposed be a matter of “immediate” and “certain” Anschauung.

I shall come back to the difficulties in these separations. One last point needs to be spelled out about Schiller. In its concise story of the evolution of the opera, Geburt makes use of the Schillerian “Ausdrucksweise und Erklärung” in differentiating between “Idylle” and “Elegie”. The former involves the sorry condition of Trauer referring to lost nature or unattained ideal, while the latter points to “Freude, indem sie als wirklich vorgestellt werden”. The reason for the recourse to Schiller’s aesthetics and the use of his Idyllischen is described as follows: “Sollten wir wünschen, die […] bei der Entstehung der Oper wirksamen Vorstellungen unter einen Begriff zu vereinigen […]” (GT 19, KSA 1, 124.)

In other words, even if conceptualizing - unifying subsumption of individual representations under a more general class according to a common denominator - is an extraneous or optional operation (“should we wish...”), it can, all the same, be accommodated in Geburt. Schiller’s concept of ’idyll’ is feasible in explaining the quattrocento erudite Florentines’ less successful attempt to imitate Greek tragedy by the means of stilo rappresentivo and recitative (ibid. 120-6). But which concept could make sense of that early tragedy? Schiller’s concepts were deemed insufficient for Nietzsche’s purposes, and it still remains questionable if his goals could ever be attained by conceptual means.

Nonetheless, I have now demonstrated that Geburt is not obviously anti-conceptual or non-conceptual. At this point, it will be seen just how Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will is appropriated in the book’s confrontation with concepts. The first reference to Schopenhauer concerns his discerning of “das ungeheure Grausen” that is actualized, as the human being “plötzlich an den Erkenntnissformen der Erscheinung irre wird”. Another one cites him on the issue of will as Wollen, Affect, Leidenschaft, bewegter Gemüthzustand of the singer. It is about the mixture of will as das persönliche Interesse des Zwecks and the purely aesthetical or will-less Anschauung. This is further developed by appealing to Schopenhauer’s view that music is not will, “denn der Wille ist das an sich Unaesthetische”, yet it “erscheint als Wille” or “als Gegensatz der aesthetischen, rein beschaulichen willenlosen Stimmung”. (GT 1 & 5 & 6, KSA 1, 28 & 46-7 & 50-1.)

Finally, there is the long quotation from Schopenhauer presented as the answer to the Urproblem: “wie verhält sich die Musik zu Bild und Begriff?”. Schopenhauer’s quoted points can be summed up as follows (cf. IV.a.2). Music and concept involve two sorts of generality, two sorts of abstraction, two
sorts of languages. They seem to stand to the world of particular things, or to reality, in a parallel way. As if by the appointment of the majesties of music and concept, the reality produces for them the divergently anschauliche, besondere, individuelle, einzelne things. Despite this similarity, music and concept differ markedly from each other. Compared to concepts as Abstracta proper, the generality of music is fuller and more concrete, thoroughly evident and precise to the point of geometric or mathematical exactness, loaded with overriding expressive power. (GT 16, KSA 1, 105-7.)

In Schopenhauer’s famous terms, music represents will in its varying Bestrebungen, Erregungen und Aeusserungen, while (reason with its) concepts (like that of Gefühl) represent these representations. Schopenhauer is generous enough to rephrase this in a variety of ways. In scholastic terms, music supplies universalia ante rem, the reality universalia in re and concepts universalia post rem. In proto-psychoanalytic terms, music is the unconscious, concept the conscious. In metaphysical terms, music is connected to the core or the heart of things and to the essence of the world, where concept has to do with superficial mediation and imitation. In terms of the perceptual process, music precedes all Gestaltung, while concept is form abstracted from sensual experience. (Ibid.)

Before the Schopenhauer quotation, a reference is made to Wagner’s view that music is not suitable for the applications of the “Kategorie” or “Begriff der Schönheit” that rules in the form-centered visual arts (ibid. 104; cf. ibid. 108). However, right after the Schopenhauer quotation, putatively “an sich verständlichen und keiner tieferen Beobachtung unzugänglichen Tatsachen” are spelled out. It is said that the unique immediacy of music excites “unsere Phantasie” that begins “jene zu uns redende, unsichtbare und doch so lebhaft bewegte Geisterwelt zu gestalten und sie in einem analogen Beispiel uns zu verkörpern”. That is, imagination cannot but commence the form-giving process provoked by music’s invisible power and directed to the “world of spirits” to which music gives voice. (Ibid. 108.)

Nietzsche’s interpretation has it that the musical accompaniment of “Bild und Begriff” affects the two by lifting them “zu einer erhöhten Bedeutsamkeit”. This is not a negligible deviation from the Schopenhauerian text. Schopenhauer speaks of Gemälde, Scene, Handlung, Vorgang and Umgebung being intensified and acquiring heightened significance from music or a melody that is sufficiently analogical to the “inner spirit of the given appearance”. He does not mention Begriff. The Nietzschean reading, in turn, specifically accentuates music’s function in a way that does not play down concepts. Music furthers “gleichnissartigen Anschauen der dionysischen Allgemeinheit” and the culminating of that “gleichnissartige Bild in höchster Bedeutsamkeit”. (Ibid. 105-8.)

In an earlier section of the book, there is the outspoken and stressed notion of “Schein des Scheins” or of “Deponziren des Scheins zum Schein”. This is supposed to account for the property of certain
masterpieces of art (Rafael’s *Transfiguration* is mentioned) to expose themselves as what they seem to be and at the same time to disclose their deeper meaning. Whoever is “im ersten Schein Befangenem” fails to see (*nichst sehen*) the emerging “visionsgleiche neue Scheinwelt”. Others may be able to appreciate the symbolism of the second order shine with “leuchtendes Schweben in reinster Wonne und schmerzlosem, aus weiten Augen strahlenden Anschauen”. Art can communicate the beauty with its primordial ground so that it is “vor unseren Blicken” so that “wir [...] begreifen, durch Intuition, ihre gegenseitige Nothwendigkeit”. What is at stake is the “erlösenden Vision” created by Apollo for humans to “ins Anschauen derselben versunken”. (GT 4, KSA 1, 39-40.)

Whatever the higher rank of *Schein des Seins* (as this notion was introduced in a fragment quoted above) may signify, the *Schein des Scheins* is described as necessary. Any “Blick in das Wesen des *Dionysischen*” has to be gained through less essential things than that (GT 1, KSA 1, 28). While the exact relation of Nietzsche’s *Geburt* to Schopenhauer appears to be impossible to articulate without ambiguity, it is reasonably clear that it never aligns itself completely with the anti-conceptual tendencies in the latter’s philosophy. Later on, I will have more to say about *Geburt*’s location in the philosophical tradition. Next, it must be shown that the book in fact displays a considerable hermeneutic awareness of the problems it seeks to address and of its chosen approach. The first indication of this was received from what Staten called the problem of giving a voice to the voiceless. My point was that *Geburt* is not trying to reproduce the Dionysian magic in the spirit of stage-effects, although it shows a taste for these too, but it seeks to elucidate its own scenography.

In one passage of the book quoted above, there appeared the expression that the spectator may feel “as if” the abyss of things spoke to him or her in a “conceivable [vernehmbar]” way. In the book’s initial arrangement, there is a similar emphasis is on the way the early Greeks made their doctrines sensible or conceivable. The phrase is *vernehmbar machen* and presumably chosen, in this book about the *Geist der Musik*, for its common usage as primarily related to the sense of hearing. Even if the ancients did not possess their teaching, and their lesson for the moderns, in *Begriffe* but in divinities, and if it, thus is, wrong to expect conceptualities from a pre-conceptual culture, the challenge for that culture was already the one of making itself conceivable.

In any case, this is how one can read that quoted 1871 fragment’s reference to Greeks and “their main distinction between Dionysus and Apollo”. The distinction was already made by the Greeks depending on that very distinction or on their capacity to distinguish. As for a later culture trying to understand this, there is the double challenge of grasping the conditions of conceiving that apparently had regulated the old culture and the conditions of conceiving that regulate the effort of communicating this to its distant follower.
This sort of hermeneutics is central to Nietzsche’s first book. In an exciting passage, it is said that the “tragischen Mythus” never became “in begrifflicher Deutlichkeit durchsichtig” for the Greek poets, “geschweige den griechischen Philosophen”. One may readily note how “obviousness” that was supposed to accompany the divine Gestalt is now related to concepts. In this light, the opening passage can be read as saying that the needed conceivability of the tragic remained at the level of Gestalten, whereas the inherent conceptuality escaped from both those who created them and those who criticized them. As for the discussion at hand, it claims now to have presented and assessed the significance of this very myth (“die vorhin aufgestellte Bedeutung des tragischen Mythus [...]”. (GT 17, KSA 1, 109.)

This passage strongly suggests that Geburt itself now assumes the task of providing “conceptual clarification” of the tragic myth. It goes on to describe how tragic “Helden sprechen gewissermaassen oberflächlicher als sie handeln” and the tragic “Mythus findet in dem gesprochen Wort durchaus nicht seine adäquat Objectivation”. The text has it that, in early Greek plays as in Shakespeare’s tragedies, it is the scene and the “anschaulichen Bilder” that “offenbaren eine tiefere Weisheit, als der Dichter selbst in Worte und Begriffe fassen kann”. (GT 17, KSA 1, 109-10.)

To be sure, the subordinate role of words and concepts, these two seen as largely co-extensive, is clear. Yet, if Sophocles and Aeschylus only could exemplify (or implement concretely) but not to verbally conceptualize that which also remained inconceivable for the Greek philosophers, their late modern explorer seems to claim to be in the position to carry out the conceptualization. One may wish to draw the conclusion that not only the early tragic texts of the “poet himself” but Nietzsche’s words, too, fall short of capturing the “deeper wisdom” of the myth. As it can be recalled, this conclusion would also match Nietzsche’s later self-critique as to Geburt’s lack of new language to express its new Anschauungen and “ventures”.

Yet, another passage does not sustain such modesty on Nietzsche’s part. What I mean is the context of establishing “das Gemeinsame zwischen dem Promotheischen und dem Dionysischen” in the “titanische Drang, gleichsam der Atlas aller Einzeln zu werden und sie mit breitem Rücken höher und höher, weiter und weiter zu tragen”. This discovery is coupled with the other one about “aeschyleischen Prometheus”, namely, the Apollinian element related to “tiefen Zuge nach Gerechtigkeit”, which is said to be within the reach of Einsichtigen. On the “zugleich dionysische und apollinische Natur” of Aeschylus’s Prometheus, Nietzsche’s text reads as follows: “so möchte das Doppelwesen [...] in begrifflicher Formel so ausgedrückt werden können: “Alles Vorhandene ist gerecht und ungerecht und in beidem gleich berechtigt.”” (GT 9, KSA 1, 71.)
Thus, the modern conceptualizer can, after all, get at the root of what remained unsaid by the early tragic poet and not conceived by the early rationalist philosopher. Back in the context where *Geburt* claimed to have set forth the meaning of the tragic myth, the book’s self-confidence coincides with its hermeneutical self-awareness. It is said that the ancient tragedy has survived for the modern world “nur als Wortdrama”. Yet, references are made both to the “Zeugnissen der Alten” and to the “Wirkung” of the actual plays. The two objects of inquiry are thus identified. The view is expressed that one should not infer any flat superficiality or insignificance of tragedy from what the book calls its characteristic “Incongruenz zwischen Mythus und Wort”. Indeed, the book concentrates on arguing for the force of the word-resistant myth and the “Uebermacht der musikalischen Wirkung”. The crucial point here is that in order to sense and feel (*empfinden*) the power and the comfort inherent in this, one would have to be an ancient Greek. What remains for the interpreter is the task of “auf gelehrtem Wege reconstruiren” the lost experience. (GT 17, KSA 1, 110.)

Thus, *Geburt* turns out to be a book with a more or less delicate sense of the interpretative challenge. One could say that whatever it seeks to say about the Greeks is a matter of “reconstruction”. Its appeals to immediacy are, thus, strongly modified. In what follows, I shall show how the book’s most important aspects are nowhere near being simply hostile to, or removed from, conceptuality. Back in the time the book was under preparation, a notebook fragment was written that can shed light on the present problem. The note covers more than six KSA pages under the heading “Vorwort an Richard Wagner” and above the date “Lugano am 22 Februar 1871, am Geburtstage Schopenhauers”. It begins like this:

> Von Ihnen weiss ich es, mein verehrter Freund, von Ihnen allein, dass Sie mit mir einen wahren und einen falschen Begriff der “griechischen Heiterkeit” unterscheiden [...] Deshalb gebührt Ihnen die nachfolgende Erörterung über Ursprung und Ziel des tragischen Kunstwerks, in der der schwierige Versuch gemacht worden ist, unsere in diesem ernsten Probleme so wunderbar consonierende Empfindung in Begriffe zu übertragen. (N 11 [1], KSA 7, 351.)

The idea of a conceptual replacement and improvement inherent in the project of studying the Greek tragedy and Dionysus could not be more forcefully pronounced. The concept of ‘Greek serenity’ is, so the passage states, in need of further differentiation. Moreover, the problem related to the fate of tragedy requires conceptualizing what already is shared between the old composer and the young scholar. The verb *con-sonieren* strongly suggests the task of translating harmonious perceptions of sounds into a linguistic agreement.

Building on this, the ninth paragraph of the book speaks about the way in which one can “glauben, den ernsthaften und bedeutenden Begriff der “griechische Heiterkeit” richtig zu fassen”. This specific
manner takes it example from an optical phenomenon: anyone ever blinded by the sunlight and perceiving “dunkle farbige Flecken” can think of Sophocles’s heros as those eye-protecting phenomena on the surface of what is but “grausige Nacht” underneath. The situation is, then, reversed, since the Greeks sheltered themselves by dramatic Lichtbilderscheinungen from the ultimate darkness of the abyss or the “Innere und Schreckliche der Natur”. Serenity is their wisdom of coping with their basic insecurity, whereas “wir allerdings den falsch verstandenen Begriff dieser Heiterkeit im Zustande ungefährdeten Behagens auf allen Wegen und Stegen der Gegenwart antreffen”. Further in the text, the degenerate form of serenity is described as the un-Dionysian or Alexandrian “Heiterkeit des theoretischen Menschen”. Moreover, there is scorn for “eine gänzlich wirkungslose Schönrednerei mit der “grieschischen Harmonie”, der “grieschischen Schönheit”, der “grieschischen Heiterkeit”.

Although these references already testify to the great significance of the concept of ‘Greek serenity’ for Geburt, one can note, in addition, how an earlier Nachlass note spoke expressly about Dionysus’s rebirth as the joy of Demeter (also mentioned in GT 10, KSA 1, 72) and recognized this very joy as the hellenische Heiterkeit. (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [55], KSA 7, 151.)

The outcome of the issue of serenity for the case of conceptuality can be summed up as follows. It is the first clear instance of there being, in Geburt, an expressly reconceptualizing effort going on. One can well appreciate the cautious and self-critical way that the reconception is introduced (“Nur in diesem Sinne dürfen wir glauben [...]”). All the same, it is introduced. A false concept of ‘serenity’ is replaced by a true one and special instructions are offered for conceiving it. By all accounts, this concept is even one of the defining concepts in the whole book, indeed, one expressing just what had been seen lacking in the available conception of ancient Greece.

What is more, the Greek serenity is not only “difficult” to conceive. Geburt’s first reference (except for the above mentioned “Vorwort” passage where it occurred as to indicate the book’s seemingly playful aesthetical indulgence) to serenity speaks of it as “so unerklärlicher Heiterkeit”. The context here is the story of Dionysus’s companion Silen. It is told how the old satyr was captured by the king Midas who was anxious to consult him on the question of the supreme human advantageousness. Forced to reply, Silen burst into “gelmel Lachen” and said: ““[…] Das Allerbeste ist für dich ganz unerreichbar: nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zu sein, nichts zu sein. Das Zweitbeste aber ist für dich - bald zu sterben.”“

Instead of being happy with this piece of Volksweisheit, Nietzsche’s book seeks to examine its relation to the “olympische Götterwelt”. Its outcome is that the latter was vitally important for the Greeks as a “künstlerische Mittelwelt” between human existence and the “titanischen Mächte der Natur” or the “ursprünglichen titanischen Götterordnung des Schreckens”. (GT 3, KSA 1, 35-7.)
The passage speaks of serenity as “inexplainable” and yet goes on to explain it. Against this background, it should not be that bewildering to confront the talk of the “concept” of Heiterkeit. If one generalized the lesson of the case of serenity, it could be proposed that Geburt is a book committed to conceiving what has been taken to be inconceivable, to conceptualizing what has been taken to lie beyond conceptualizing. It shows how concepts, the modern variety of a Mittelwelt between human agents and their environment, are foreshadowed by divinities that provided the Greeks with a condition of making sense and living.

Comparing the discarded foreword to the meager piece of the actually published as Geburt’s “Vorwort and Richard Wagner”, one learns that the latter is completely devoid of the vocabulary of begreifen. As decisive as the concept of ‘Greek serenity’ came to be in the book, it was announced as such in the opening pages. It becomes all too alluring to speculate on the grounds for this reduction of conceptual language. In July 1871, Nietzsche received a letter from his philosopher friend Heinrich Romundt. He told news about Nietzsche’s essay “Sokrates und die griechische Tragödie” being received among the philological circles in Leipzig. He spoke of its having caused “great sensation” and lively demand. Yet, Romundt underscored how “everybody”, including the professor Ritschl, had expressed it as their wish to see “the concepts of the Apollonian and the Dionysian” to be developed in a way “more perspicuous” and “more diligent”. Quite specifically, Romundt communicated how “the world is still somewhat unaccustomed” to his friend’s style of moving from “aesthetic concepts” all the way to “the innermost depths of the essence of things”.

In the absence of Nietzsche’s reply to his friend, there is room for surmise. Was Nietzsche himself pondering on the likely reception of his Dionysus or not, the philosopher Romundt made it clear just how far the problematic had slipped from the path of academic conventions. Still wanting to publish his salute to Wagner, though, or to opt for the promised sensation, Nietzsche may have reasoned as follows. By not tightening and heightening but, on the contrary, by further reducing the conceptual in his discussion he could save the book from unnecessary criticism. There would be no point of accusing the book for its insufficiently developed conceptuality or unwarranted flights from concepts to essentialities, if it was expressly about musical affectivity, religious emotions, politico-cultural ideals and unconscious psychodynamics.

Yet, one does need to step out of line here. The actual process of making Geburt does not have to an object of conjectures, even if one wishes to take into consideration what either Nietzsche’s notes or Romundt’s commentary on the preliminary essay add up to the book’s problem of conceptuality. Whatever Romundt’s influence was, in Nietzsche’s later self-reviews of the 1880’s, there is a recognizably Romundtian ring to his criticisms of the weaknesses in Geburt. What is scorned are the
book’s lacking will to logical cleanliness and the absent effort to prove one’s self-assured points (GT “V” 3, KSA 1, 14; already cited in section I.b above). What is ridiculed are its Hegelian-Schopenhauerian quick translations from aesthetics to metaphysics (“Eine “Idee” ins Metaphysische übersetzt”) and abrupt analogies intended to fulfill the need to clarify and conceptualize (“Dinge, die noch nie einander ins Gesicht gesehen hatten, plötzlich gegenüber gestellt, aus einander beleuchtet und begriffen”) (EH “WisgBs”: GT, KSA 6, 310).

One may note how the critique is directed to an unacceptable conception of conceiving. It is a fair conclusion to say that Nietzsche’s self-reviewing attempts with Geburt involve, to a remarkable extent, reassessing what in his early conceptions was conceptually valuable. What I am trying to show here is that these reviews cannot be reduced to a distorting retrospective gaze, since the issue of conceptuality, in fact, receives a multifaceted treatment in Nietzsche’s first book.

The very first characterization of the ancient Dionysian festivities as the root from which the Greek art forms of dance, music and drama gradually grew speaks of a “Gesammtentfesselung aller symbolischen Kräfte”. This integrated emancipation of the symbolic forces is urged to be grasped (“Um [...] zu fassen”). The condition of its becoming comprehensible (“wird [...] verstanden”) is said to have been the attained “Höhe der Selbstantäusserung”, which is to say that it takes a Dionysosdiener to understand a Dionysosdiener. Yet, even if the primal symbolic powers put to play by (or through) the servants of Dionysus remained strange to the Apollinian Greeks, their bewilderment contained a preconception of how their Apollinian “Bewusstsein” was but “wie ein Schleier” there to cover “diese dionysische Welt”. As for the contemporary observer, there is a similar challenge to conceive the issue (“Um dies zu begreifen [...]”). The condition of this conception lies in a successful attempt to deconstruct the Apollinian edifice erected on the Dionysian (“jenes kunstvolle Gebäude der apollinischen Cultur gleichsam Stein um Stein abtragen”). (GT 2-3, KSA 1, 33-4.)

The task bears on the “Wiedergeburt des Dionyson” “als das Ende der Individuation”. Again, this is something to be conceived (“zu begreifen”). Shortly after declaring this conceptual requirement, it is said that the “angeführten Anschauungen” contain “Bestandteile” for both “einer tiefssinnigen und pessimistischen Weltbetrachtung” and “die Mysterienlehre der Tragödie”. This would imply that Anschauungen point simultaneously to the book’s conceptual and non-conceptual objectives mediated by the faculty of vision. Be that as it may, the language of conceiving continues in the context where the popularity of Euripides is described as “begreiflich”. (GT 10 & 11, KSA 1, 72-3 & 76.)

Further, the critical point about scholars who have been pushed to attain the “‘leichter Eleganz’” of the press is made in the vocabulary of conceiving as follows: “in welcher peinlichen Verwirrung müssen die
derartig Gebildeten einer solchen Gegenwart jenes Phänomen anstarren, das nur etwa aus dem tiefsten Grunde des bisher unbegriffnen hellenischen Genius analogisch zu begreifen wäre, das Wiedererwachen des dionysischen Geistes und die Wiedergeburt der Tragödie?” (GT 20, KSA 1, 130). What has so far escaped conceiving or been misconceived is now to be conceived along the lines offered by the book.

The chosen “Vorwort” did not announce (this) reconceptualizing to be the key to the book, unlike what the unpublished sketch had done and contrary to what the quoted passages suggest. Not wanting to make any (further) assumptions about his intent, I should modify my suggestion that Nietzsche had a reason to leave out conceptual emphases from Geburt. I supply three ways to comprehend the relative absence of conceptual language in the book, none of which entails any intentional fallacy. Geburt is a book that seeks to reconceptualize the question of arts, yet it avoids, to an extent, conceptual language (i) because it at the same pays tribute to an opera master whose business and preference are not on the side of the concepts; (ii) because it at the same reads closely the semiotic textures of phenomena arising from aesthetic, religious, psychological and social fields neither of which is, at least conventionally, the proper arena for concepts; (iii) because conceptual language, such as it is, is its second order target of criticism.

One must read the beginning of Geburt more carefully. It is best begun from the apparent distinctions between logische Einsicht and unmittelbare Anschauung, Begriff and Gestalt. For one thing, it ought to be seen that the first paragraph speaks against the scholarly satisfaction due to solely (nur) logical insight. It could, then, be read as a direct justification of the almost embarrassing dedication to Wagner just closed on the previous page, and as a legitimation of the following concentration on mythological figures and on the experiential and spiritual dimension of arts. Logical insight, which is what the reader is entitled to expect, would, thus, be accompanied by an attention to emotional responses to powerful and memorable experiences.

At first, a word on the attribute of insight, “logical”, is in order. Socrates is called, in Geburt, the “despotischer Logiker” whose “ganz neue” teaching of serenity was characterized by the “im Wesen der Logik verborgener Optimismus”. As optimism, having acquired the status of the foundation of culture, begins to crumble, the optimist feels as if that culture “anfängt, unlogisch zu werden d.h. vor ihren Consequenzen zurück zu fliehen”. It can be seen that logic is not repudiated as such. The critique is directed against its one-sided favoring and against one’s being carried away by them. Exclusive logical insight is a bad autocrat. Socrates who was described in terms of “apollinische Einsicht” is also said to have conceived (begriffen) no other form of poetry except aepopische Fabel. (GT 14-5 & 18, KSA 96 & 101 & 119 & 92.)
The case of Einsicht is discussed in a context important for the tragic turn in the story of tragedy. Where Sophocles criticized Aeschylus for doing the right thing unwittingly, Euripides (who conceived (begriffen) himself as the first one sober among drunkards) opted for a more Platonic criticism. Aeschylus necessarily fails, because of his unconscious way of creating. It was precisely Plato who disparaged any poetic capacities other than that of “bewusste” Einsicht. Euripides’s wish to put an end to the “‘unverständigen” Dichters der Welt“ took its motivation from the Socratic dictum of Verständigkeit: “Sokrates [...] die ältere Tragödie nicht begriff, und deshalb nicht achtete”. (GT 12, KSA 1, 87.)

This last comment amounts to saying either that respect for tragedy requires a concept of it or that it is precisely wrong to try and conceive tragedy in order to respect it. Needless to say, I would bet on the former option. In the above discussed context of Aeschylus’s Prometheus, Einsicht was rehabilitated as not only a logical virtue, in the narrow sense, but one allied to perceptive interpretative ability. Although the passage spoke of insight with respect to the Apollinian in Prometheus and did not quite explain the interplay, suggested by the book’s opening, between Einsicht and its counterpart of more immediate and certain nature, it climaxed on an explicit conceptualization. Perhaps this is to be understood as follows. Familiarizing oneself with all that can be conceived about how the ancient tragedy looked like needs to be complemented by insightfully conceptualizing the Gemeinsame and the Formulierbar in the spectacle.

In any case, it was also seen above how Schiller’s paving the way for a better assessment of the function of the (pre)tragic choir was described in terms of Einsicht. What is more, the juncture where the visionary choir was distinguished as the ground for the vision-generating drama is as well described in the vocabulary of insight: “wir jetzt zu der Einsicht gekommen”. Insight won’t do alone, yet it is not, as such, out of place. One may compare this to still another use of the key word. The context of criticizing the “Typus des theoretischen Menschen” features a highly self-critical grip. It is urged, namely, that this type of Daseinsform is to be taken as the task (unsere nächste Aufgabe) of investigation aiming at “über dessen Bedeutung und Ziel zur Einsicht zu kommen”. (GT 8 & 15, KSA 1, 62 & 98.)

Geburt takes its readers to the insight of the insight’s limits. It is an effort to produce insights. It also indicates that the book attempts at an insight about the insight-producing practice. Would it be out of place to call it a theorization of theorization? No, it would not. Even if das theoretische Mensch is the object of scornful criticism in Nietzsche’s book, it appears that the book does not claim to be able to escape the theoretical in order to achieve its own goals.

This can be clarified with a help of an early self-analysis by its author. As Geburt was enjoying its first
weeks out on the market, Nietzsche sent a copy to the composer Franz Liszt. The crucial passage of the enclosed letter is quoted as the epigraph of the present chapter. In a courteous exercise of eloquence, Nietzsche describes Liszt as “one of the most remarkable exemplifications” of “the Dionysian”, one to “have grasped it truly instinctively”. As for himself, Nietzsche reserved the role of that who “described” the “phenomenon”, “named” it, and “studied it with the highest theoretical interest”. (KGB II/1, Januar 1872, 327.)

Interestingly, this is a passage empty of the language of Begreifen and it is not explicitly in favor or against concepts. The points about the “instinctive” and, to a lesser degree, “exemplification”, would seem to give some support for the view that Dionysus is a matter of intuition. By contrast, the points about description, naming, studying and theorizing appear to strengthen the case for the phenomenon of the Dionysian being conceptualized.

More can be said about the hermeneutics of Geburt. Namely, it seems to be well aware that in telling about the pre-conceptual divinities or anti-conceptual music, it is itself forced to express whatever it is expressing in a non-divine and non-musical manner. That is, it cannot but stay as a matter of writing, verbalizing, conceptualizing in language. Yet, Geburt seems to hold that a credible account of tragedy and the tragic experience must disclose a full sense of, and taste for, the tragic in arts and life. From the point of view of conceptuality, the most pertinent question concerns immediacy. According to Giorgio Colli, emphasis on Unmittelbarkeit and striving for expressiveness beyond the mediation of concept and representation belong to the most central Nietzschean novelties.

Analytically speaking, it may be hard to understand why Anschauung would be, as Geburt claims in its opening, immediate, if it also relates it to evident/obvious/lucid patterns mediated in perception. Logical Einsicht, coming closer to geometrical and mathematical precision, sounds much more immediate than that. At any rate, its attribute logische would seem to preserve the element of Sicherheit more effectively than what is possible in the fragile and vague experience of Anschauung to which “certainty” is ascribed.

In fact, this is not just “analytical” reasoning but one that pertains to the local and special problems of Geburt der Tragödie. The paragraph number 21 offers the best illustration of the problematic of immediacy. It appeals to someone “unmittelbar verwandt mit der Musik”, to someone whose only Verbindung to things is “durch unbewusste Musikrelation”. This thoroughly musical person is urged to think, whether he or she could survive “percipiren” the third act of Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde “ohne alle Beihilfe von Wort und Bild rein als ungeheuren symphonischen Satz”. To save the ächten Musiker from disaster, there is an intervening factor “zwischen unsre höchste Musikregung und jene Musik” so
threatening in its directness. Namely, the tragic myth and the hero, the “Gedanke” and the “Wort” make their intervention in order to offer “das Gleichnissbild” powerful enough to save the listener from the fatal exposure to the “unmittelbaren Anschauen der höchsten Weltidee”. (GT 21, KSA 1, 135-7.)

Further in the book, it is explained that the function of the Apollo is to save people from the Dionysian “orgiastischen Selbstvernichtung” and to do this with the help of Bild and Begriff. Shortly thereafter, the weaker position of the art of words compared to the art of the Musikdrama is described. While the latter is dealing with the becoming conceivable (vernehmbar) of “die Relationen der Dinge in sinnlich wahrnehmbarer, keinesfalls abstrakter Weise” but, instead, “unmittelbar”, the Wortdichter is forced to take the indirect road, the “viel unvollkommener Mechanismus” of Wort and Begriff. The overriding capacity of the music drama resides in the “Identität zwischen der Melodienlinie und der lebendigen Gestalt, zwischen der Harmonie und den Characterrelationen jener Gestalt” that can be apprehended “beim Anschauen der musikalischen Tragödie”. (GT 21, KSA 1, 137-8.)

Poetry involves conceptual mediacy and indirectness of abstract linguistic presentation, while musical drama makes use of the ‘sensually perceptible’ in the living Gestalt. Despite its Schopenhauerian tone, this is but a very conventional way of distinguishing between forms of art. In addition, one might propose that what is at stake in defining Musikdrama is that the combination of Begriff and Wort is subordinated to the combination of Begriff and Bild. Begriff joins Bild in countering the mergering and self-murderous Dionysian thrust and their role in this is not underestimated (as by the phrase “much more imperfect” related to Wortdrama) but accentuated (“ungeheuren Wucht”). In as much as Dionysus “schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert wieder ihr Versöhnungsfest mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen” (GT 1, KSA 1, 29), Apollo balances this extreme utopia of reconciliation by pointing to the necessity of concept and image.

In this respect, the immediate Anschauung is at least a psychological impossibility and Geburt tends toward expounding its philosophical impossibility. In the first section of the book, Unmittelbarkeit is articulated. The text has it that in a dream and, by extension, in the Apollinian dream-world created by an artist, “[w]ir geniessen im unmittelbaren Verständnisse der Gestalt, alle Formen sprechen zu uns, es giebt nichts Gleichgültiges und Unnöthiges”. Yet, there is the “durchschimmernde Empfindung”, the “Vorgefühl” or the special philosophical “Gabe” to suspect that these forms are Schein, Phantome or Traumbilder. The specific nature of the gift required from a philosopher (“sensation”, “presentiment”) is not further articulated, yet the apparent forms are taken to be necessary. What is more, the “Nothwendigkeit der Traumerfahrung” is, fortunately, a “freudige” one. (GT 1, KSA 1, 26-7).
One learns that immediacy here concerns the patterns and the forms and not the formlessness beyond them. And, to repeat it, these *Gestalten* and *Formen* are unavoidable. Where *Geburt* speaks of the myth and appears to evoke non-conceptuality, it does in fact say that the early Greeks were “unwillkürlich genöthigt, alles Erlebte sofort an ihre Mythen anzuknüpfen, ja es nur durch diese Anknüpfungen zu begreifen” (GT 23, KSA 1, 147). Making sense of experience was a matter of conceptualizing, even if this happened with the help of a mythical frame of reference.

It is important to see that the development of *Anschauung* as visual sense-perception into *Anschauung* as contemplative survey of essentialities is self-reflective, too, and, as it were, tragic. *Geburt* has it that the *Sehkfraft* of the spectator’s *Augen* is *Flächenkraft* of sensory nature, yet it reaches “in’s Innere” “als ob” s/he would “vor sich sehe” the will “sinnlich sichtbar”. Before too long, however, this drive toward a heightened, yet merely ’als ob’ *Sichtbarkeit* is canceled. There is no “beglückte Verharren in willenlosem Anschauen” in tragedy, since the spectator is not rewarded by “die in jenem Anschauen erreichte Rechtfertigung der Welt der individuatio”, since s/he can but *schauen* and *sehen* and yet to deny that s/he sees. (GT 22, KSA 1, 140.)

The simultaneous experience of seeing and of a wish not to see is explained later with the help of musical *Dissonanz* (”wir hören wollen und über das Hören uns zugleich hinaussehnen”). The condition of “deutlich perzipierten Wirklichkeit” coincides with the condition of “Streben in’s Unendliche”. As *Geburt* explains this, what is at stake is the Dionysian process where “das uns immer von Neuem wieder das spielende Aufbauen und Zertrümmern der Individualwelt als den Ausfluss einer Urlust offenbart” (GT 24, KSA 1, 153).

This is how the Dionysian experience disturbs the Apollinian order. It may not be said that this kind of *Anschauung* is self-refuting, since the book supplies the means for mediation. There is at least one use of *Anschauung* the sense of which neither comes close to sensation nor tends toward inner intuition. The mythic story of Dionysus, who went through *Zerstückelung* and whose laughter gave birth to the Olympic gods and out of whose tears humans were born, is concisely summed up in section 10. What follows is a reference, already met above, to the “angeführten Anschauungen”. These *Anschauungen* - “die Grunderkenntnis von der Einheit alles Vorhandenen, die Betrachtung der Individuation als des Urgrundes des Uebels, die Kunst als die freudige Hoffnung, dass der Bann der Individuation zu zerbrechen sei, als die Ahnung einer wiederhergestellten Einheit” - are said to include “alle Bestandtheile” for not only a *Mysterien-lehre* but also for a *Welt-betrachtung*. (GT 10, KSA 1, 72-3.)

*Anschauungen* that capture the tumultuous adventures of Dionysus as well as contain the elements or structural factors of teaching, doctrine, standpoint, view or survey are not formations exhausted by
either their sensuality or their intuitiveness. The term *Anschauung* enjoys anything but rigorous and onesided use in the book and comes, at times, pretty close to the conventional usage of *Begriff*.

The seeming opposition between *logische Einsicht* plus *Begriffe* and *unmittelbare Anschauung* plus *deutliche Gestalten* is, at any rate, off balance. What one has to see is that the text is not that oppositional at all. Yet, the most strikingly strange feature of the opening passage of *Geburt* is that, for all its preference of *Gestalt*, it does not first introduce the *Gestalten* Apollo and Dionysus. Instead, the italicized *das Apollinische* and *das Dionysische* are introduced before them. By all accounts, these are much less *Gestalt*-like constructions, divinities adjectified and substantified. In the light of the later interpretation of Schopenhauer and the concept of ’the tragic’ gained from it, ’the Dionysian’ and ’the Apollinian’ are more like *Begriffe* than *Gestalten*.

In a passage that comes closest to any definition, Apollo and Dionysus are referred to as “künstlerischen Gottheiten der Griechen”, on the one hand, and as “lebendigen und anschaulichen Repräsentanten” of their respective realms of the artistic (GT 16, KSA 1, 103). One could take this to say that they were “divinities” for the ancients but they are “representatives” for the moderns. In both cases, they stand for something, although the nature of the old and new kinds of representing as well as the past and the present conditions of livelihood and perceptibility may differ from another.

What I want to suggest here is that *Geburt*’s announcement of the inappropriateness of concepts is anything but unequivocal. More to the point would be to say that the opening passage amounts to saying (i) that research on aesthetics does not, as yet, possess sufficiently effective or creative means to come to terms with the Greek art developments and their implications for the contemporary situation; (ii) that the peculiar conditions of *Vernehmbarkeit* or conceivability of the Greek artistic sensibility resist the tools of modern aesthetics as one knew it at the beginning of the year 1872; (iii) that the introduction of the new instruments of the Apollinian and the Dionysian is an attempt to stop the impasse of research by getting at the process of conceiving embraced by the Greeks with its lessons for modern conceptualizations governing, in turn, all conception of the ancients.

Thus, the initial setting may well lead the interpretation of the entire book astray. It is best to say that there would surely be something rather awkward in the attempt to look for extremely polished terminological divisions from Nietzsche, even though extremist is what he is claimed to have been. On the other hand, however, it pays to read his language with great care. Close reading bears out the vital feature of the book as an “Untersuchung, die auf die Erkenntniss des dionysisch-apollinischen Genius und seines Kunstwerkes, wenigstens auf das ahnungsvolle Verständniss jenes Einheitsmysteriums gerichtet ist”. It is a “research” with cognitive goals even at those points where the only form of
understanding available is that of a foreboding or presentiment. What is also termed ahnungsvoll is the question as to the potential understanding of art as Correlativum and Supplement of science. (GT 5 & 14-5, KSA 1, 42 & 96-7.) For better or worse, the task is to reconstruct.

The case of choir can now be discussed once more. If the groundwork laid by Schiller was treated in terms of an Einsicht substituting Schlegel’s “senseless concept”, one may press the question as to how Geburt understands its own steps from Schlegel to Schiller and forward. It can be seen that Nietzsche’s criticism of Schlegel’s ‘choir’ as a “senseless concept” is made in favor of the view that grants the necessity to restore the “Begriff des Zuschauers” (GT 7, KSA 1, 54). This is precisely the reason for the book’s intense dwelling on the spectator’s experience of tragedy. Geburt understands itself as a book creating new concepts to aid comprehension of things, events, relations, processes. The weightiest object to be comprehended with its help is, I would hold, that of the incomprehensible or the function and nature of the inconceivable, or the relationship between conceptuality and non-conceptuality (in the sense of the pre/extra/supra/anti conceptual), or the process of conceptualization.

For all this, there is the Dionysian-Apollinian relationship to be investigated. The book speaks of how the choir is “zu verstehen” in terms of the Dionysian. The tragic choir as “das Symbol der gesammten dionysisch erregten Masse” is what the book calls “unserer Auffassung” containing its “volle Erklärung”. (GT 8, KSA 1, 62.) Even if Auffassung and Erklärung are not quite the same as Begriff and Einsicht, they are surely closer to these than to the immediacy of (at least ultra-sensual or ultra-intuitive) Anschauung and Gestalt. The text goes on to legitimate its account of the choir. It speaks of having “zu der Einsicht gekommen”. It says that its emphasis on the choir may be hard to accept regarding the trivial role of the choir in contemporary theater or even opera. The point that the choir ever was “älter, ursprünglicher, ja wichtiger [...] als die eigentliche “Action”“ is likely to be so bewildering for today’s people that it is beyond conceiving (“wir [...] gar nicht begreifen konnten”). Noting how the text once again takes into consideration the conditions of its own conceivability, one can spell the obvious implication of this last point. The reinterpretation of the choir is made to function as an Auffassung empowering anyone grasping it to conceive the development of tragedy. (Ibid.)

It is only now, after a lengthy and intricate discussion of a variety of major and minor points about conceptuality, that I shall arrive at Geburt’s climax of conceptuality in the paragraph number 16. It is the same section where Schopenhauer is favorably cited for his theory of will and music. This would be enough for one to suspect that non-conceptuality is strongly affirmed. On the contrary, however, conceptuality is fortified.

The figuration or simulation (Gleichniss) is the means of “dionysischen Erkenntniss” endeavoring to
express the “tragischen Mythus” born out of music. Music strives toward figure and image. It strives toward symbolical, figurative or simulacrum-like (gleichnissartige) Bild and Begriff. The top of this striving (“höchsten Steigerung”, “höchsten Verbildlichung”), or the “symbolischen Ausdruck” that music finds for its “eigentliche dionysische Weisheit” is to be found in “Tragödie und überhaupt im Begriff des Tragischen”. (GT 16, KSA 1, 107-8.)

To wit, the book about the birth of tragedy recommends that to search for the expression of the Dionysian wisdom, one has to look for the “concept of ’the tragic’”. Although restating more or less faithfully the Schopenhauerian theory of will and representation, the characteristically anti-conceptual tenor of Schopenhauer’s treatment of music is hardly audible in the passage. On the contrary, concepts are hailed in two crucial senses. First, they are, after all, depicted on a par with tragedy, and even more, since the implication of the “überhaupt im Begriff” would seem to be that there is no tragedy, at least for anyone (re)searching it, divorced from the concept of the tragic. Secondly, concepts are not depicted as the remotest alienation from music, but as its “highest elevation”, as the climax of music.

Now, it has become clear that those who see Nietzsche’s Dionysus as “Symbol”, as Pfeffer and Alwast were seen to do, run the risk of blurring its conceptual dimension. This is the situation with Jung’s Psychologische Typen (1920), too. Jung’s case is important for the issue at hand. Deleuze, whose work on the Nietzschean concepts I have been trying to acknowledge, clarify and use, was seen above to describe Nietzsche’s Dionysus in terms of the “conceptual”. He is also one of the few commentators to have paid serious attention to the Nietzschean discourse of “types”, and he did this with a favorable reference to Jung’s appreciation of Nietzsche’s typologies. The trouble here is that where Deleuze writes about how Jung “admired Nietzsche for being the first to install psychology on the plane of the subject, that is, for having conceived it as a true typology”¹⁶⁰¹, Jung’s own texts express this admiration for non-objectivism in a way hostile to concepts.

In the book, with its numerous references to Nietzsche, there is even a chapter on the double notion of Apollinian-Dionysian. Jung writes about Nietzsche’s pointing to “the principles” of the specific psychological types “that could be described as aesthetical types in opposition to the rational types”. Nietzsche is credited for discovering the profound function of the intuitive. He is criticized for excessive aestheticization. Jung himself defines type as “characteristically recurring example or model image for a character of a kind or generality”."¹⁶⁰²

Jung’s failure to acknowledge his true indebtedness to Nietzsche’s thematizations of Typus is one thing (see section III.a). His choice of using Nietzsche’s work as an exemplification of aesthetic, intuitive and anti-rational emphases is another and, for the present purposes, the more important thing. Elaborations
on Dionysus and Apollo are irreparably directed by Jung into the ’other’ of concepts.

Elsewhere, in the context of different ways of making sense of psychic reality, Jung would criticize concepts that combined nominalist objections and quasi-pragmatist doubts as to the worth of concepts\textsuperscript{1603}. Thus, coming from someone like Jung, the point about the unconceptual or the irrational is no reproach. As it was seen (sections I.a & I.b), his main criticism against Nietzsche was the way the philosopher was unable to accept the irrational drives within him and to do justice to such drives in Zarathustra’s character. In short, Nietzsche was too conceptual for Jung, if not for anyone else. Yet, Jung is also the very psychoanalyst to have penned down the “possibility”, that “in the unconscious, emotions and concepts are not that purely differentiated, but are even ultimately united”\textsuperscript{1604}.

This is a hypothesis that he did not develop further. Instead, he seems to have turned toward more conventional opposition between conceptuality and the realm of drives, feelings, aesthetic enjoyments, spiritual experiences and so on. By so doing, he came to place Nietzsche’s work on the side of the non-conceptual and was unable to appreciate Nietzsche’s painstaking philosophical mediations between the conceptual and the non-conceptual or his outlining of a process of conceptualization.

Now, in beginning to check out Nietzsche’s later writings on the Dionysian, one can see how Ecce homo refers to Dionysos as both Symbol and Begriff (EH “WispBs”: DgdT 1 & AsZ 6, KSA 6, 310 & 344-5). It is not happy just to refer to the novelty of the “Verständniss des dionysischen Phänomens bei den Griechen”. It also contains the speaker’s expressly conceptual self-reference about this discovery: “Ich hatte zu meiner innersten Erfahrung das einzige Gleichniss und Seitenstück, das die Geschichte hat, entdeckt, - ich hatte ebendamit das wundervolle Phänomen des Dionysischen als der Erste begriffen.” Similarly, just to make it sure, the speaker reaffirms the invention of the concept of ’tragic’: “[...] ich [...] den Begriff “tragisch” [...] gefunden hatte”. (EH “WisBs”: GdT 1-3, KSA 6, 311-312.)

It is in the self-review of Zarathustra that Ecce homo speaks of Dionysus itself as “concept”. This text strengthens the view (held by Colli) of the Dionysian as stretching its influence to the other books by Nietzsche, yet rejects the view of Dionysus’s unconceptuality. The review has it, namely, that in the opus magnum, “[m]ein Begriff “dionysisch” wurde [...] höchste That.” As if this was not enough, there is an additional point that is incompatible with Jung’s unconceptual treatment of both the Nietzschean typology and the Nietzschean Dionysus. Namely, a description of what is “typisch” for the Typus Zarathustra or Typus des Zarathustra is twice summed up as follows: “Aber das ist der Begriff des Dionysos selbst.” (EH “WispBs”: AsZ 6, KSA 6, 343-5.)

Before that, the above-mentioned passage of Götzen-Dämmerung, had already described Dionysus in
terms of conceptuality: “Was bedeutet der von mir in die Aesthetik eingeführte Gegensatz-Begriff *apollinisch* und *dionysisch*, beide als Arten des Rausches begriffen?” (GD “SeU” 10, KSA 6, 117). The view that the Dionysian was introduced by *Geburt* to aesthetics is hereby corroborated. What is more, Dionysus is, after all, treated as a concept conceived in a specific way.

How badly is Nietzsche reading his own writing? How is one to relate this reassured talk of concepts to the implicit and explicit non-conceptualities in *Geburt*? If one should do away with the discrepancy by a recourse to Nietzsche’s development from his “early” to his “mature” stage, one would still have to examine whether there is any sense in the claims made by late self-reviews that the original achievements deserve the status of conceptualization, even though that was supposed to be an expressly excluded option at the time they were realized.

What I have been trying to show about *Geburt* entitles one to answer that the conceptual interpretation of Dionysus is astute. In the additional light of *Götzen-Dämmerung* and *Ecce homo*, Dionysus becomes more clearly a conceptual construction Nietzsche once introduced to aesthetics and went on applying to further uses. ‘Dionysus’ is Nietzsche’s conception, a concept that he claims to have found, invented, discovered, coined. It stands for the phenomenon perceived and conceived in the midst of early Greek culture and early Greek way of thinking, while it is also the modern philosopher’s specific way of approaching the ancients.

There is a late note by Nietzsche worth discussing here, since it sheds light on the almost carefree ascriptions, in Nietzsche’s last books, of conceptuality to Dionysus. It describes the youthful project as specifically pertaining to the concept that defines the very business of classical scholarship: “Man möchte sagen, daß der Begriff “klassisch” - , wie ihn Winckelmann und Goethe gebildet haben, jenes dionysische Element nicht nur nicht erklärte, sondern von sich ausschloß” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [35], KSA 13, 235). As I read it, the fragment says that the “Dionysian element” not explained by, but excluded from, the classical concept of ’classical’ is not something that necessarily escapes all conceptual explications. On the contrary, that element is in need of explanation, for which there would have to be better, more appropriate concept of ’klassisch’. Bearing in mind that *classicus* and *classis* come from the Roman military vocabulary, one may gain an additional viewpoint to Nietzsche’s militant ways in classifying. Be that as it may, the quarrel over the proper class of ’classic’, or the proper “elements” to be assigned to it, offers a highly Nietzschean case of self-critical philosophizing.

As it was told in introducing Nietzsche’s books, *Geburt* was related in the immediate critical reception to something like *Kunstmysterienreligionsschwärmerei*. I have been at pains to show to that the dimensions of art, mystery, religion and fanaticism retain a distinctively conceptual connection. In the
remainder of this subsection, it will be examined more closely how the border incidents taking place between conceptuality and non-conceptuality are handled in Nietzsche’s first book.

To begin with, one can have a look at a much earlier letter of Nietzsche where he summed up the points made in F. A. Lange’s *Geschichte des Materialismus*. In this 1866 letter to Carl von Gersdorff, Nietzsche wrote as follows: “das wahre Wesen der Dinge, das Ding an sich, ist uns nicht bur unbekannt, sondern es ist auch der Begriff desselben nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die letzte Ausgeburt eines von unsrer Organisation bedingten Gegensatizes, von dem wir nicht wissen, ob er außerhalb unsrer Erfahrung irgend eine Bedeutung hat.” On the basis of this, it is easy to say that Nietzsche was early on informed of the constraints of knowing or the limits of experience, yet also familiar with the post-Kantian critique of the ‘thing-in-itself’. He went on to explain Lange’s view on the ensuing philosophical liberty: “lasse man die Philosophen frei, vorausgesetzt, daß sie uns hinfüro erbauen.” Moreover, “Kunst ist frei, auch auf dem Gebiet der Begriffe”, which is to say that, for example, a given *Satz* of Beethoven is hardly anything to be refuted. (KGB I/2, August 1866, 160.)

This is quite removed from anything like either good criticism or cogent refining of Kant’s philosophy, yet it is also only an early letter by Nietzsche and not the final word of his philosophy. Its importance for the present problem lies in the way it is capable of providing some background to the use of Kant in *Geburt*. In a highly interesting passage, the choir of satyrs is said to prefigure Kant’s distinction, or better, to already imply this primordial distinction. As the Greeks who worshipped Dionysus transformed themselves into satyrs, they reaffirmed the natural basis of their humanity. After that, the choir assumed the similar task by emphasizing how the “fortwährenden Untergang der Erscheinungen” leave the “ewige Leben des Daseinskernes” untouched. And finally, the modern *Culturmensch* is in desperate need of telling the difference between nature and the “als Natur geltenden Summe von Bildungsillusionen”. *Satyrchor* and the fully developed tragedy already express the *Urverhältniss“* zwischen Ding an sich und Erscheinung”, between the “ewigen Kern der Dinge” and the “gesammten Erscheinungswelt”. (GT 8, KSA 1, 58-9.)

This strong assertion notwithstanding, and more in line with the 1866 letter, the “Gegensatz der Erscheinung und des Dinges an sich” is, later in the book, rejected as unusable (GT 21, KSA 1, 139). Still, it seems, it can be exploited to make sense of the “primordial relation” between what changes and what does not change. One might guess that while the distinction has become doubtful, it has most certainly had all the force of both historical convention and intellectual convincingness on its side.

Be that as it may, Nietzsche’s book indicates that Kant’s assumption of the thing in itself does not damage his philosophy of the limits. It is said that it has become possible to counter “die zufriedene
Daseinslust der wissenschaftlichen Sokratik” by way of Kant and Schopenhauer, since these two thinkers demonstrated the limits of intellectual optimism. Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s respective philosophical demonstrations have prepared the way to “eine unendlich tiefere und ernstere Betrachtung der ethischen Fragen und der Kunst”. This new chance for reflection, the passage continues, “wir geradezu als die in Begriffe gefasste dionysische Weisheit bezeichnen können”. (GT 19, KSA 1, 128.)

In as much as both Kantian and Schopenhauerian philosophies or art are characterized by their non-conceptual emphases, this passage presents verges on a more or less fortunate misconception. Be that as it may, the important implication is that the Dionysian can be “conceptualized”. Moreover, I don’t know how else to read the passage if not implying that the new (“indefinitely more profound and more earnest”) kind of reflection is being exemplified while pronouncing the need for it.

Significantly, the passage qualifies Geburt’s anti-philosophical and extra-conceptual features. Or better, it obliges the reader to study more carefully those of its properties that run counter the possibilities of philosophy and conceptualization. For example, where the book explains the history of tragedy by appealing to the event where “überwächst der philosophischen Gedanke die Kunst”, it does not repudiate philosophy or the thoughtful but points to its excrescence and to its unnecessary and unfortunate conquering of arts. It is more like the “logischen Schematismus” having triumphed over the more profoundly organic sense of generality. (GT 14, KSA 1, 94.)

In this light, Nietzsche’s book is not a rejection of philosophy and concepts, but a reinterpretation of them. Kant and Schopenhauer are credited for their breaking free from the confines of Socratism, yet not for escaping conceptuality. Even though Geburt favorably cites the Schopenhauer, it is not exhausted by Schopenhauerian philosophy. One needs to appreciate its more Kantian traits, too. As it happens, applauding the critical tradition of Kant Geburt calls its own treatment of the art principles by the very same name (Erörterung) that Kant uses when handling the conceptuality in Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GT 7, KSA 1, 52)\textsuperscript{1605}. In the sketched foreword to Geburt quoted above, the talk of Erörterung was explicitly related to the talk of Begriffe. Moreover, the very word Kunstprincip is the one that Kant uses in his Kritik der Urteilskraft to identify the only place within aesthetics where concepts play a legitimate role (see section IV.a.2).

I would not go on making too much of these points. By now, it must have become clear that, to put it somewhat pointedly, Geburt’s terminology is a mess. I do not think that one can have anything like a precise sense of its relations to the philosophical tradition, in terms of, say, ascertaining its ontological solutions. There is much better interpretative opportunity to study the way Nietzsche’s first book is interested in the relational itself, in the philosophical question of, to evoke Sellars’s definition (see III.a),
“how things in the broadest possible sense hang together in the broadest possible sense”. What is the key here is the point just met, according to which Dionysian wisdom is about defining the boundaries, about demarcation and transgression, about conceptualizing the far edge of conceptuality.

Geburt has it that, as the condition of conceivability, the myth enabled the Greeks to see even their immediate and well-known surroundings sub specie aeterni. Accordingly, it speaks of the high esteem of the ideatic and the at least relatively timeless as characterizing the position of the Greeks. Small wonder, then, if Geburt allows considerable explanatory power for the “platonische Unterscheidung und Werthabschätzung der “Idee” im Gegensatze zum “Idol““. There is even a specific application of this Platonic setting that the book is ready to accept as its own. That is, Geburt instructs the reader by having a recourse to the “Vielheit der Gestalten” in which “der eine wahrhaft reale Dionysos erscheint”. (GT 23 & 10, KSA 1, 147 & 72.)

If the above Urverhältniss seemed like an affirmation of Kant’s Ding an sich / Erscheinung, this would seem like a clear-cut instance of (Platonic) idealism or (Platonic) concept realism. One might think that this is good news for anyone seeking to defend a conceptual reading. I, for one, am trying to argue for the conceptual elements of Geburt but not in order to show Nietzsche’s commitment to (Platonic) idealism or (Platonic) concept realism. While this passage speaks strongly in favor of the conceptual (keeping in mind, however, the way Morris Weitz rejected the received view that Plato’s concept of concept would be found in his doctrine of ideas), it also seems to attach Geburt to an all too rigid position in the theory of concepts. I could perhaps try to press my interpretative skills and attempt to claim that the Idee is qualified by the “manifold of patterns” in a quasi-Aristotelian manner, so that the Dionysian exists only as represented in the so many actual particularities.

More promisingly, one can read (ibid.) how the Dionysian appearance is connected with the function of the “Traumdeuter Apollo” that seeks to mediate the choir’s interpretation of its Dionysian condition. In this way, the allusion to Plato is clearly instrumental in clarifying the interplay between the two Kunstgottheiten and, by extension, the power of tragedy. Attention must be paid to the textual structure of the allusion: “Um uns aber der Terminologie Plato’s zu bedienen, so wäre von den tragischen Gestalten der hellenischen Bühne etwa so zu reden [...]). With respect to the way Plato’s misunderstanding of tragedy is one of the basic tenets of the book, the use of his ontological distinction seems all the more like transient, experimental, illustrative and arguably also provocative and ironic, rather than developed, sustained and committed.

The significance of the Plato reference - and of the reference to the Urverhältniss of thing in itself and the appearance, too - is, I think, chiefly related to the more general thought that there is a path from 

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conceptual considerations to those pertaining to the Dionysian and back again. For this reason, it should be seen that the book’s criticism of Plato and Socrates - and its criticism of Kant’s distinction - is combined with respect. One should take note not only of the way the Platonic hero is chosen as the principal target of Geburt’s polemics, because his being “der erlauchtesten Gegnerschaft der tragischen Weltbetrachtung”, but also of the specifically conceptual admonition: “wir doch nicht im Stande sind, angesichts der platonischen Dialoge, [Socrates] als eine nur auflösende negative Macht zu begreifen”. (GT 16 & 14, KSA 1, 95-6.)

These points are best remembered when confronting what is probably, at least for the present problematic, the most outstanding example of the “notorious complexity” (Staten’s phrase) of Geburt der Tragödie. According to the book, Socratic, or even pre-Socratic, philosophizing took part in the “mächtiger Sieg des undionysischen Geistes”. With Euripides, the authentic Dionysian tragic inspiration deceased. This had to do with the music’s self-alienation (“Musik sich selbst entfremdet”) into a “durch Begriffe vermittelten Nachahmung”, on the other hand, and the degenerating dramatic ability of Charakterdarstellung, on the other hand. The latter means that the genre changes at the cost of the “ewigen Typus” culminating in the “Sieg der Erscheinung über das Allgemeine und die Lust an dem einzelnen gleichsam anatomischen Präparat”. (GT 17, KSA 1, 112-3.)

Philosophy partakes in spoiling the general in arts. At least for today’s readers, it would be easier to understand an opposing claim to the effect that philosophical thinking renders art excessively generalized. Yet, the point is to say that certain aspects of the new methods of analyzing and new ideals of naturalist (anatomical) description had a bad influence on the integrity of tragedy as the Apollinian-Dionysian art form par excellence. Tragedy was overthrown, as the typical and the general suffered a terrible defeat. The tricky part of this account is the simultaneous and equally unfortunate victory of concepts. The Schopenhauerian explanation for this would go, roughly, as follows. The omnipresent, unaesthetic will can be represented by the supremely general, resourceful and flexible means of music, whereas concepts are doomed to be the secondary representations of this primary representation. When music begins to function as part of the “äusserliche Analogien zwischen einem Vorgange des Lebens und der Natur und gewissen rhythmischen Figuren und charakteristischen Klängen”, it has alienated from itself to the direction of re-representation. In other words, it is no longer the “künstlerische Wiederspiegelung einer Weltregel”. (GT 17, KSA 112-3.)

Yet, as it was seen above, concepts carried, in the sense of the passage that Geburt cites from Schopenhauer, the mark of generality. Even though they were merely universalia ante rem, they were universal all the same. One would have to infer that the defeat of music means downgrading from universalia ante rem into universalia post rem, while the defeat of Typus means downgrading from universalia ante rem.
universalia in re into particularizing the last remnants of universality. However, the book says that, in the context of Schopenhauer’s basic teaching, “unterscheide man nun so scharf als möglich den Begriff des Wesens von dem der Erscheinung” (GT 6, KSA 1, 50). In this distinction, the essence stands for the thing in itself or the idea and appearance stands for its opposition, while they are both called concepts.

In as much as Nietzsche’s book is at least as much about ‘the tragic’ and ‘the Dionysian’ as it is about tragedy and Dionysus, it is a book about conceptuality. Since these two concepts stand for something more or less non-conceptual, it follows that Geburt conceives ‘conceptuality’ as the borderline between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, as the border from where all concepts come and toward which they also tend to go. Perhaps it would not be all too deluding to speak of Geburt as a study of Urbegrifflichkeit or the primordial conceptuality.

The dynamics of conceptuality has, in the book, both local analysis of the microlevel and global analysis of the macrolevel. The former case consists of discerning the spectator’s experience of tragedy. It was already seen above, how an art form removed from the “concept” of spectator does not make sense. The Wirkung of tragedy to the conceivable spectator is described as follows:

Er [der aufmerksame Freund or the perceptive reader wishing to update the presented theory with his or her own experiences as the spectator] schaut die verklärte Welt der Bühne und verneint sie doch. Er sieht den tragischen Helden vor sich in epischer Deutlichkeit und Schönheit und erfreut sich doch an seiner Vernichtung. Er begreift bis in’s Innerste den Vorgang der Scene und flüchtet sich gern in’s Unbegreifliche. Er fühlt die Handlungen des Helden als gerechtfertigt und ist doch noch mehr erhoben, wenn diese Handlungen der Urheber vernichten. Er schaudert vor den Leiden, die den Helden treffen werden und ahnt doch bei ihnen eine höhere, viel übermächtigere Lust. Er schaut mehr und tiefer als je und wünscht sich doch erblindet.

(GT 22, KSA 1, 140-1.)

These kinds of tensions were already discussed above with the help of musical dissonance. It can now be added that the point was, in that context, made that without one’s own experience (“Wer dies nicht erlebt hat, [...]” of the spectator’s dissonance (“[...] zugleich schauen zu müssen und zugleich über das Schauen hinaus sich zu sehn, [...]”), one may not be able to bring before one’s mind a representation of this simultaneity (“[...] wird sich schwerlich vorstellen, wie bestimmt und klar diese beiden Prozesse bei der Betrachtung des tragischen Mythus nebeneinander bestehen und nebeneinander empfunden wären: während die wahrhaft aesthetischen Zuschauer mir bestätigen werden, dass unter den eigentümlichen Wirkungen der Tragödie jenes Nebeneinander die merkwürdigste sei.”) (GT 24, KSA 1, 150-1.)

Even though this is not explicitly conceptual language, the indications - the verb vorstellen coupled with the adjectives bestimmt and klar - are clear enough to appreciate the conceptual dimension in the
description. Not surprisingly, then, I would pick out from the listed features the one that concerns the way tragedy empowers the spectator with intensified conceptual skills, while it also invites him or her to an escape to inconceivability. This feature seems to be powerful enough to account for the others, too. In any case, all the properties of the experience are further condensed in the formula utilizing the peculiar vocabulary of the book: “Der tragische Mythus ist nur zu verstehen als eine Verbildlichung dionysischer Weisheit durch apollinische Kunstmittel”. And the immediate continuation of this definition speaks about the function of the myth: “er führt die Welt der Erscheinung an die Grenzen, wo sie sich selbst verneint und wieder in den Schooss der wahren und einzigen Realität zurückzuflüchten sucht”. (GT 22, KSA 1, 141.)

The notion of ‘Dionysian wisdom’ is reaffirmed as a matter of limits. Where it was, in Kant and Schopenhauer, “conceptualized”, tragedy puts it into images. As the later critique of unwarranted intellectual optimism (or scientism), the mythic art exemplifies the tragic sense of the “the world of appearances” bound to collapse. The local case of Dionysian wisdom concentrates on the experience of simultaneously heightened states of conceptual empowerment and resistance to conceptuality.

However, Geburt provides a thought experiment on a much more global level, too. It is about generalizing the historical dispossession of tragedy by Socratic alexandrianism into “einen ewigen Kampf zwischen der theoretischen und der tragischen Weltbetrachtung”. In this context, there is talk, in the spirit of Dionysian wisdom, about “der Geiste der Wissenschaft” as driven “bis an seine Grenze” in order to destroy “sein Anspruch an universelle Gültigkeit”. (GT 17, KSA 1, 110-1.)

In the paragraph following thereafter, the point is developed into a notion of “drei Illusionsstufen” as the “ewiges Phänomen”. The first or the Socratic phase is said to consist of “shackling” (fesselt) the illusion-mongering “gierige Wille” with the “Lust des Erkennens”. The next or the artistic phase, in turn, consists of “clutching” (umstrickt) this fallacy of epistemologico-scientific panacea and of wrapping the things in “Schönheitsschleier der Kunst”. The third or the tragic phase consists of reaffirming “das ewige Leben” right there “unter dem Wirbel der Erscheinungen”. While the text has a recourse to there being still “gemeineren und fast noch kräftigeren Illusionen” ready to take over, it goes on to say that culture comes down to using these illusions as Reizmittel in order to cope with the Unlust due to the perceived Last und Schwere des Daseins. The Socratic or Alexandrine, artistic or hellenic, tragic or buddhist Exemplificationen are respective cultural options according to the “Proportion der Mischungen”. (GT 18, KSA 1, 115-6.)

In global terms, then, Geburt describes the successive paradigms and their changes as well as cultural variation. There is no cultural construction that would explain everything but the claim to such
encompassive explanatory force or the illusion of such power is there with each effort to drive the prevailing paradigm to its limits where it begins to seem unbelievable and impotent.

With the risk of twisting Geburt’s account more or less immanently depicted above, a brief comparison to Comte may clarify the matters at hand. It was Comte’s famous mid-19th century vision to divide the course of history into three successive stages of theological, metaphysical and positivist (or scientific) attempts to explain things. His own sociology was to embody this last stage in the sense that it both saw the preceding stages as anticipating itself and felt that, say, economics and psychology, are too onesided to account for things on the grand scale. 1606

The dynamics pictured is Geburt differs significantly from that of Comte’s vision. Nietzsche’s book deviates from its linear model, since it does not construe the new stage as an ultimate victor over the older one. It is more interested in showing how each type of explanation moves in its peculiar sphere and faces parallel problems when confronting the limits of its application. I would not be prepared to say that Geburt sticks to metaphysical phase in Comte’s sense. Nor would I affirm that is committed to the actual historical viewpoint that tragic, artistic and scientific phases have followed and deposed each other and will continue to do so. There is the obscure reference to the fourth stage or to the always ensuing new strategy of showing the incredibility or the illusoriness involved in the ruling way to cope with reality. It seems that the most important feature of Nietzsche’s depiction is the stress on the dynamics itself, on the way the humans’ relationship with their environment changes according to their capacity to incessantly “shackle” and “unshackle” their desire to conceive more.

The discourse of Ent-fesselung points to the Nietzschean principle of ’emancipation from emancipation’. If one was to propose that it was Geburt’s all too metaphysical or all too romanticist or all too idealistic engagements that Nietzsche later repudiated and abandoned, one would do well to add that the problematic of engagement that remained crucial for him was there already spectacularly presented in the Erstlingswerk. Above, reference has been made to Aeschylus Apollinian-Dionysian Prometheus. It was precisely the figure of Prometheus that Nietzsche wished to be printed in the vignette on the title page of Geburt der Tragödie. He wrote to his publisher as follows: “hier empfangen Sie für unsre Schrift eine Titelvignette, welche ein trefflicher Künstler gearbeitet und mir heute zugeschickt hat. Es ist der von seine Fesseln befreite Prometheus.” (KGB II/1, November 1871, 249.) Prometheus, the defiant and cunning creator and benefactor of mankind, and the father of all the arts and sciences, had a life full of suffering as he was, as the tradition has it, seized and bound with indestructible chains to one the crests of Mount Caucasus” to be freed only by gods and with Zeus’s permission1607.
It has been seen that Nietzsche’s book uses the notion of *Ent-fesselung* in a specific sense. It speaks of the “dionysischen Dithyrambus” as the point of “höchsten Steigerung” of the human “symbolischen Fähigkeiten”. It is about the not-yet-apprehended as reaching its expression (“etwas Nieempfundenes drängt sich zur Aeusserung”), as nature finds its symbolic exhibition (“das Wesen der Natur symbolisch ausdrücken”). The dancing and singing dithyrambic choir embodies and carries “eine neue Welt der Symbole”, indeed, “die ganze leibliche Symbolik, nicht nur die Symbolik des Mundes, des Gesichts, des Wortes, sondern die volle, alle Glieder rhythmisch bewegende Tanzgebärde”. Thereafter, music was born, as the “anderen symbolischen Kräfte” *Rhythmik, Dynamik, Harmonie* were developed. This whole chain of events is called *Gesammtentfesselung* of the full symbolic potential. (GT 2, KSA 1, 34.)

When this passage was first met as a part my evidence in defending the concept critical reading, I was able show that the un-shackling and its conditions of grasping were described in the explicit language of conceiving. The necessity of mediation between non-conceptual and conceptual is thus expressed and the particular form of culture that *Geburt* outlines for such a mediation is the one embodied by the character of the “künstlerischen Sokrates”‘. It is to be asked, whether Socrates with his unartistic imperative of intelligibility stand in “nur ein antipodisches Verhältniss” to art. And the book has, finally, the “Symbol des musiktreibenden Sokrates” to stand for the chance of the “Wiedergeburt der Tragödie”. (GT 14 & 17, KSA 1, 96 & 111.)

Yet, it must be seen that practically the whole of *Geburt*, from its initial opposition to the opposition ‘lightness of arts’ / ‘seriousness of (cultural) politics’ to the last four words *im Tempel beider Gottheiten* (GT 25, KSA 1, 156), is about working on the issue of mediation and relationality. Referring back to what I have been calling the book’s ‘peculiar consistency’, as it came out in the context of the glossaries of art and primordiality, I would now like to draw attention to a further instance of pervasiveness in Nietzsche’s redefining confrontation with his problematic. The present situation, as the puzzling combination of music and (the extremely un-musical) Socrates has just been introduced, calls for further examination of the book’s most meticulous elaborations.

What is needed is a closer look at the way the precise relationship between Dionysus and Apollo is discerned. Only after such an inspection can one begin to fully appreciate the hints at a *musiktreibenden* Socrates and the way in which Nietzsche’s first book is committed to philosophizing over conceptuality on the borderline of non-conceptuality. Analogically to the local and global cases of conceptual dynamics, the following discussion of Dionysus and Apollo provides the “analytical” study of conceptualization, while it is thereafter complemented by the more “historical” inquiry.

The schwierige *Verhältniss* (GT 22, KSA 1, 139) between Dionysus and Apollo is verbalized, in
To expand this, one may note how the essay “Die dionysische Weltanschauung” (1870) presents the two deities as “immer im Kampf mit einander neben einander einhergehen”, but in the highpoint of tragedy a state is achieved where they “verschmolzen erheinen” (N “DdW” 1, KSA 1, 553). This is explained later in the text by a recourse to ‘the sublime’ and ‘the ridiculous’ as phenomena housing “eine Mittelwelt zwischen Schönheit und Wahrheit: in ihr ist eine Vereinigung von Dionysus und Apollo möglich” (N “DdW” 3, KSA 1, 567). In the other essay from the same year, Apollo’s ethical principle is described as “hineingeflochten in die dionysische Weltanschauung” (N ”DgdtG”, KSA 1, 598).

Moreover, a fragment from the late 1870 speaks about “ein neuer Contrast des Apollinischen und des Dionysischen” and in the same sentence about “[d]as wissenschaftliche Weltbild und das religiöse Weltbild im Kampf” (N 6 [9], KSA 7, 131-2). Another fragment compares the divinities in terms of a Nebeneinander about to change when both drives begin to intensify (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [72], KSA 7, 154). It is clear that the project related to the study of tragedy was not finished with introducing and describing the two new principles. The decisive problem was how to go about making sense of their relationship. In a sketch for a book preface, this task is presented as follows:

Hauptunterscheidung der dionysischen und der apollinischen Kunst: jede mit verschiedener Metaphysik.
Hauptfrage: welches ist das Verhältnis beider Kunsttriebe zu einander?
Dies erklärt die Geburt der Tragödie; hier nimmt die apollinische Welt die dionysische Metaphysik in sich auf.
(N 1871 9 [36], KSA 7, 284-5.)

Even if it remains questionable, whether one can settle on one, or perhaps on a few formulations for the relationship between Dionysus and Apollo, it is undoubtable that Nietzsche did work on this relationship in many ways. Put in technical terms, the relationship of Dionysus and Apollo seem to be much more about interactionism than about dualism. According to Joan Linares Chover, Geburt may be taken to operate with several opposing terms: melos vs. logos, sound vs. word, song vs. speech, mysticism vs. logic, music vs. dialectics, ineffable vs. fit for formulation, enthusiasm / instinct vs.
consciousness, ecstasy vs. thought, pessimism vs. optimism, tragedy / arts / mime vs. science / theory / idea. She estimates that, taken together, these oppositions would seem to justify an opinion of Nietzsche as but an “epigone” and “good disciple” of Schopenhauer. Yet, Nietzsche’s self-critical words in the second edition of the book, his “lucid rereading”, point the way to appreciating the philosopher’s actual takeoff from the dualistic type of thinking. Indeed, Geburt contains more general meditation of the relational than what is exhausted by the immediate problem of the Apollinian-Dionysian. In its critique of recitative, for example, the point is made to the effect that the “Vermischung des epischen und des lyrischen Vortrags” is “keinesfalls die innerlich beständige Mischung”. The failure of the mixture involves the effort to mix up “so gänzlich disparate Dingen”. It could only lead into “die äusserlichste mosaikartige Conglutination, wie etwas Derartiges im Bereich der Natur und Erfahrung gänzlich vorbildlos ist”. (GT 19, KSA 1, 121.) It may be asked just how the book can exert criticism on something’s being unnatural, if it is committed to speaking in favor of fingirte naturalness designed to evoke the primordially natural and to oppose the scientific or common sense naturalness. Or how it is supposed to criticize something’s being contrary to experience, if it is interested in appealing to the moments that transcend the experiential reality. While I would say that the answer to these questions is to be looked for by problematizing the book’s commitment to, and interest in, the things that appear to be its basic tenets, there is more to it than that.

I have already argued above for the view that Geburt actually emphasizes how concepts are heightened through the effect of music and, by extension, the effect of the Dionysian. The Dionysian, in turn, is about “Natur, an der noch keine Erkenntniss gearbeitet”. For the natural, the Greeks invented the “Naturgenien” or the satyrs that came to prefigure the primitive choir. The choir of tragedy is, thus, “der höchste, nämlich dionysische Ausdruck der Natur”. (GT 8, KSA 1, 58-63.) As one can see, although Geburt supports the Schillerian reflections on the original fabricated or feigned naturality in tragedy, it nonetheless wishes to hold on to the connection between tragedy and nature. Here again, one can see how the “highest expression” of naturality coincides with the highly anti-naturalistic symbolism and fictionality of the stage. ‘The natural’ is conceivable only as discerned from what is conceived as ‘the not-yet-natural’ and ‘the no-longer-natural’. Intensified conceptual inquiry pertains to the limits of conceptions and to the limits of experience.

The more important thing, for the present purposes, is to see that the book favors mixtures as compounds with natural duration over the ones with externally glued together. Accordingly, Geburt directly repudiates the “populären und gänzlich falschen Gegensatz von Seele und Körper”. This incredible “Glaubensartikel” of “unseren Aesthetikern” cannot account for the “schwierige Verhältniss von Musik und Drama”, not to explain but to confuse everything (“nichts zu erklären und alles zu verwirren). This is not so, because it is, say, unartistic, but because of “die unphilosophische Rohheit
jenes Gegensatzes”. Those holding on to it only show how they “über einen Gegensatz der Erscheinung
und des Dinges an sich nichts gelernt haben oder, aus ebenfalls unbekannten Gründen, nichts lernen
mochten”. (GT 21, KSA 1, 139.)

The upshot of this criticism is that Geburt claims to have itself learned a lot from the notorious
contradiction of appearance and thing-in-itself. As it happens, this is also the context for speaking about
the “difficult relation” between the Apollinian and the Dionysian. Where the quoted fragment involving
the plan of a book on the “main distinction” of Apollo / Dionysus, with the “main question” of their
“relation”, spoke of Apollo as taking up the Dionysus in itself (in sich aufnehmen), Geburt wishes to
develop this event further.

In an interesting self-reference, “unserer Analysis” is said to give the impression of the full victory of
Apollo over Dionysus. Such an impression is corrected by subsequent analysis of the Dionysian primacy
and Uebergewicht in tragedy due to the way Dionysus drives Apollo to “eine Sphäre [...] wo es mit
dionysischer Weisheit zu reden beginnt und wo es sich selbst und seine apollinische Sichtbarkeit
verneint”. Yet, this is said only in order to end in the fraternity of both divinities. This is only in line with
the notion that the “Untergang” of tragedy results from the Auseinanderressen of Dionysus and Apollo
that had come in contact and gone through reciprocal “Steigerung”. (GT 21 & 23, KSA 1, 139 & 147.)

Despite the hints at the processual, my above construal of the mediation between Dionysus and Apollo
was mostly analytical and static. In what follows, the dynamic account, more characteristic to
Nietzsche’s first book, of conceptualization is illustrated. Utilizing the Schopenhauerian philosophical
language, the book speaks of how “[i]n den Griechen wollte der “Wille” sich selbst, in der Verklärung
des Genius und der Kunstwelt, anschauen”. Further, and in a bit more Hegelian fashion, Die Geburt der
Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik makes the claim about the spirit of the music as striving “nach
bildlicher und mythischer Offenbarung”. This forms the basis of the “dionysischen Weltbetrachtung” and
all those mythico-religious practices that lead to the invention of tragedy. (GT 3 6 17, KSA 1, 110-1.)

For all its emphasis on music (and dance), being a philologist’s book, Geburt is, however, a book on
language, too. It interrogates, in particular, the way the “Dichtung des Volksliedes” can be seen “die
Musik nachzuahmen”. Indeed, in this context, it is said that “das Wort, das Bild, der Begriff sucht einen
der Musik analogen Ausdruck und erleidet jetzt die Gewalt der Musik an sich”. Whereas this is called
the “einzig mögliche Verhältniss zwischen Poesie und Musik, Wort und Ton”, there is also a reference
to the two-sided Sprachgeschichte of Greek. Language would imitate either “Erscheinungs- und
Bilderwelt” or “Musikwelt”. Once again, this Gegensatz is urged to be conceived (“zu begreifen”):
ja es wird Einem dabei handgreiflich deutlich, dass zwischen Homer und Pindar die orgiastischen Flötenweisen des Olympus erklungen sein müssen, die noch im Zeitalter des Aristoteles, inmitten einer undendlchn entwickelteren Musik, zu trunkner Begeisterung hinrissen und gewiss ihrer ursprünglichen Wirkung alle dichterischen Ausdrucksmitdel der gleichzeitigen Menschen zur Nachahmung aufgereizt haben.

(GT 6, 49-50.)

The heavily conceptual language of this passage is interestingly related to the seemingly anti-conceptual context. Although the subordinate role of poetry as "shining forth" of music in "images and concepts" is granted ("nachahmende Effulguration der Musik in Bildern und Begriffen"; "Entladung der Musik im Bildern"), the emphasis stays on the way "das ganze Sprachvermögen durch das neue Princip der Nachahmung der Musik aufgeregt wird". (Ibid.) Indeed, in as much as musical tragedy exploits words, it can "den Untergrund und die Geburtsstätte des Wortes danebenstellen und uns das Werden des Wortes, von innen heraus, verdeutlichen" This is to say that the research offered to make sense of the supreme form of Greek communication, tragedy, can also shed light on the emergence of other forms of communication, including language. And if language, then conceptuality. This is how the book restates the importance of dissonance: "Dieses schwer zu fassende Urphänomen der dionysischen Kunst wird aber auf directem Wege einzig verständlich und unmittelbar erfasst in der wunderbaren Bedeutung der musikalischen Dissonanz: wie überhaupt die Musik, neben die Welt hingestellt, allein einen Begriff davon geben kann, was unter der Rechtfertigung der Welt als eines aesthetischen Phänomens zu verstehen ist. (GT 21 & 24, KSA 1, 138 & 152.)

Compare Nietzsche’s early account to Soyinka’s explanation of Yoruba music. Soyinka underlines the intimate mutual connection of music, ritual, drama and poetry. According to Soyinka, “[l]anguage […] is not a barrier to the profound universality of music but a cohesive dimension and clarification of that wilfully independent art-form which we label music. Language reverts in religious rites to its pristine existence, eschewing the sterile limits of particularization. […] Language is still the embryo of thought and music where myth is a daily companion, for their language is constantly mythopoetic.”

While Geburt does things differently by stressing music’s higher status, dictated by Schopenhauer’s philosophy, its distance to Soyinka’s account is not as great as it seems. For one thing, it was Nietzsche’s open aim to promote Wagner’s music and opera, while it is certainly one of the Nobel Prize winning author Soyinka’s goals to argue for the importance of language. For another thing, Nietzsche’s book is implying that it has, at its possession, the language and the concepts with which to make sense of both music and what it represents. Geburt’s decisive project is to make sense of both the analytical interrelatedness of different art forms and of how tragedy came to bring them all together. The maximum of music’s expressive power is met in the concept of 'the tragic' gained through conceiving
the ‘Dionysian condition’ leading to the desireous *Gesammt-ent-fesselung* of human capacities.

This ends my case for Nietzsche’s *Geburt* as a sustained, even if also confusing, effort of making sense of concepts in the far edge of conceptualuality. After all that has been said, it must be asked, whether there is still something very awkward in treating Dionysus as a “concept”. If Nietzsche came to speak in this way, it does not mean that it has any connection to what is usually, and even with a heightened level of philosophical tolerance, meant by concepts. Is not Dionysus the utter embodiment of non-conceptuality as extra-conceptuality and pre-conceptuality? Is not *Geburt* chiefly about the detrimental effects of a conceptual turn in the Western history at the price of the tragic death of the profound pre-conceptuality? Does it not endorse the view that there is a way of apprehension that is superior to conceptual conceiving? Does its ending not reaffirm what its beginning announces, that *Anschauung* as *Intuition* is the most secure, and ultimately the only, way to get at the root of western culture and to comprehend the pre-conceptual Greeks? Does this not prove that for all its favorable talk about concepts or its hermeneutical self-awareness of the business of reconstruction, the book is dedicated to justifying and exemplifying extra-conceptuality? How can one possibly defend the conceptuality of either the book or the deity?

Such questions take their strongest motivation from the attribute *Rausch* given to Dionysus in Nietzsche’s first work. No matter how convincing the argument for Dionysus’s conceptual dimension may be, there would probably remain strong disbelief or reluctance to accept the argument, because of this mythopoeic word meaning anything except “conceptual”, that is, intoxication, frenzy, drunkenness, flowing. Even if one stated, as I would, that Dionysus’s being a concept transforms the concept of concept, it could be thought that anything worthy of the epithet *Rausch* will forever resist conceptualization. What I am saying is that even if my reading was competent and persuasive, it could remain uninviting, because it runs counter to shared intuitions or expectations as to what is Nietzschean and what is conceptual. Those in favor of Nietzsche may doubt the correctness of the exposition if it seems to make of this great adventurer look like just one of those sterile, impotent and scary men of concepts. Those against Nietzsche may doubt the correctness if it appears to Shanghai this illogical and hyperbolic rhetor to the crew of reasonable concept analysts.

I feel no compulsion to meet all the collectively entertained intuitions or expectations about the Nietzschean in Nietzsche. Yet, it is simply a flaw in my reading if it stays too far removed from the attitudes or the emotional setting that was ascribed to Dionysus by Nietzsche and reproduced to a varying degree by his commentators. Therefore, further remarks on *Rausch* are in order here to adjust my reading to the symbolic of Dionysus as expressed by this crucial attribute. Perhaps it needs to be added that I will not seek to tame this freely bursting energy by a cool flick of the wrist, at least not
more than what is unavoidable in a context such as this. I want, rather, to show that a key dimension of this energy is nothing other than the one of conceptuality.

The English renderings of Rausch focus on an atmosphere that is varyingly termed as frenzy, fervour and ecstasy. Let this be placed at any point between what one classicist of the old school called “noisy enthusiasm”\textsuperscript{1611} or what another characterized as “tumultuous excitement”\textsuperscript{1612}. It is my claim that Nietzsche’s relentless criticisms of a plurality of subjects, be they flaming or icy, are often, implicitly or explicitly, seen in the light of this sort of Dionysian Rausch. One does not necessarily have to appeal, as Soyinka does, to Nietzsche’s own “Dionysiac frenzy”. But stating, as I do, that Nietzsche’s Dionysus is, in an important sense, “a sustained effort at developing a discourse of conceptuality”, could be seen to be tantamount to not appreciating its frantic excitement or not discovering its radical potential but to flattening it drastically.

Nevertheless, there is more to Nietzsche’s Dionysus than the sense of febrility, as there was more to the mythical Dionysus than its being driven crazy or to the worship of Dionysus than massacring goats or parading with giant phalli. Emphasizing frenzy makes the conceptual dimension needless, emphasizing the conceptual dimension, as opened by Nietzsche, merely contextualizes the frenzy. The context of Rausch is, indeed, more differentiated than what is assumed. It is hard to imagine the raging “Nietzschean” connotations, when listening to Fischer-Dieskau delivering the Schubertian lied, in Wilhelm Müller’s lyrics, about a young man desperately in love with the schöne Müllerin by the little stream that is there to - rausch. Admittedly, this seems as far-fetched as can be. Whatever Nietzsche’s style is, it can hardly be more remote from anything than the flowing of a gentle mill-tail in a piece of Romantic music. Yet, one can have a look at a letter that the fourteen-year-old Nietzsche sent to a friend of his enclosing a poem titled as “Mailied”. In this piece of Müllarian enough writing, one finds stanzas such as these:

\[
\text{[...]} \\
\text{Die Bächlein rauschen milde} \\
\text{Durch blühende Gefilde} \\
\text{[...]} \\
\text{Lass schwinden und vergehen} \\
\text{Was nicht wie Frühlingswehen} \\
\text{Dir rauscht in’s Herz hinein.} \\
\text{O kann’s was schöneres geben} \\
\text{Als den Mai, als den Mai allein!} \\
\text{[...]} \\
\text{(KGB I/1, Februar 1859, 55, 48-9.)}
\]

Instead of describing the scary and destructive unleashing of power, Rausch, in this poem, is the mild
movement of water. Nonetheless, it flows right to the heart. From this youthful lyricism, one could draw sensational implications for Nietzsche’s later moves. Is this here a pretty piece of evidence of Nietzsche’s socialization in the Romantic idiom? Is the imagery of deliverance, the praise of “blooming fields”, of spring “flowing into the heart” an anticipation of Dionysus, the cult of the spring deity of fertility? In Geburt, the first description of Rausch reads like this: “Entweder durch den Einfluss des narkotischen Getränkes, von dem alle ursprünglichen Menschen und Völker im Hymnen sprechen, oder bei dem gewaltigen, die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Frühlings erwachen jene dionysischen Regungen, in deren Steigerung das Subjective zu völliger Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet” (GT 1, KSA 1, 28-9).

To be sure, I do not want to overstate this connection, unless it already is an overstatement to call it a “connection”. But the teenager Nietzsche specifically asked, in his letter, for comments underlining that it would bring him “sehr viel Spaß”. Let my minimal point be that the attribute Nietzsche chose for his Dionysus carried within it a far wider frame of reference than those related to ancient bacchanals or to the mature philosopher’s hostile polemics, or either to Dionysus’s or Nietzsche’s going mad.

Geburt presents Rausch and its Apollinian counterpart Traum as “physiologischen Erscheinungen” (GT 1, KSA 1, 26). Both escape from conscious thinking that is, by implication, sober and awake, not confused nor dreamy. Yet, Rausch is also the state where the visionary, that is characteristic of the Apollinian dream, loses its power for the more holistically effective force of the body to the effect that the subjective ingredient in the experience melts in to the sense of belonging to society and, by extension, to the whole of nature. It is a “physiological appearance” that constrains the other of dream and all the psychological appearances and, thus, reinterprets the oppositions of ’physiological/psychological’ and ’appearance/essence’.

This not the opportunity to make sense of the rich discourse of narcotic substances in Nietzsche’s works. A few relevant aspects will have to do. In an early fragment, the defects of Socrates are once again discussed. This time, there is a reference to the philosopher’s inability to match the Stoics’ and Epicureans’ respective efforts of the “magische Heiterkeitszauber [...] durch Begriffe zu erreichen”. Apart from, thus, rehabilitating concepts in making sense of utterly unconceptual issues, the fragment attaches to Plato’s dialogues the further “defectus” of “[k]ein Rausch der Abstinenz”. (N Winter 1870-71 - Herbst 1872 8 [13], KSA 7, 224.) The notion of getting drunk from abstaining proves to be precious for Nietzsche (cf. N April-Juni 1885 34 [83], KSA 11, 445-6). From the springtime of 1885, a fragment was written that reads:

Die abstrakte Denken ist für Viele eine Mühsal, - für mich, an guten Tagen, ein Fest und
To conclude, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, *Rausch* and conceptuality are not mutually exclusive. One might consult Paul Valéry who, in his novel *Monsieur Teste*, set forth not consciousness as sobriety but “consciousness as intoxication” and not ideas as intellectual entities but “ideas as monstrous hallucinations”¹⁶¹³. By contrast, Ernst Mach took up “conceptual hallucinations” only in order to denounce them¹⁶¹⁴. And further, Ludvig Klages rejected the possibility of conceptually accounting for phenomena of intoxication¹⁶¹⁵. Roland Barthes has spoken of the “second order marginality” of Valéry’s novel. The book is, so Barthes, marginal because it discusses intoxication and insanity and other twists of consciousness that continue to symbolize marginality. Yet, it is also marginal for the sake of being written, unlike the texts of Artaud or Bataille, in the classical narrative convention.¹⁶¹⁶

With the help of these views, one might propose the following summary of Nietzsche’s concept ‘Dionysus’. Dionysus is proper noun, persona, god, an item in religion and mythology that suggests magic, marvel, passion, indulgence, energy, unconsciousness, self-destruction. As I have shown, Nietzsche is nonetheless holding on to conceptualizing it and using it, further, in order to conceptualize that which is not conceptual. The conceptuality of the by all accounts manifoldly non-conceptual figure is ultimately brought to the fore by the conceptuality of its by all accounts manifoldly non-conceptual attribute, *Rausch*. The crucial question, in Nietzsche’s first book, bears on the way “concept”, the means to conceive and conceptualize, has become obsolete and is in desperate need of regeneration for it work again in making sense of experience, of past memories and present perceptions.

One must not forget that the book itself is about the “birth” (and “rebirth”) of something “out of” something else. To have one last look at the opening of *Geburt*, one can see how the *Fortentwicklung der Kunst* is compared to reproduction: “in ähnlicher Weise, wie die Generation von der Zweigkeit der Geschlechter, bei fortwährendem Kampfe und nur periodisch eintretender Versöhnung, abhängt”.

Moreover, the interplay of Apollo and Dionysus is said to lead “zu immer neuen kräftigeren Geburten”. (GT 1, KSA 1, 25.)

Nietzsche had written to Rohde about his pre-*Geburt* studies as follows: “Wissenschaft Kunst und Philosophie wachsen jetzt so sehr in mir zusammen, dass ich jedenfalls einmal Centauren gebären wäre”. This approximates a self-fulfilling prognosis. Later, referring to the preliminary essay on Socrates, he asked Rohde to, for the time being, “Dich mit dem mystischen Dampfe der ersten Conzeption zu begnügen”. And after the publication of *Geburt*, ‘e told Rohde that “[v]on der Art, wie ein so Buch entsteht, von der Mühe und Qual, gegen die von allen Seiten andringenden anderen Vorstellungen sich
From the point of view of conceptuality, all this emphasizes the interplay between natural and socially conventional, between timeless and historically changing. What emerges from Nietzsche’s inquiry of the concept of ‘the tragic’ and his conception of ‘the Dionysian’ is an ecological model for a theory of conceptualization where experience and concepts mould each other in a mutually conditioned process.

Now, in order to understand Nietzsche’s later self-criticism of Geburt one does not need to stick to his alleged turn from a pro-metaphysical stance to an anti-metaphysical one. I find the specifically conceptual considerations to be more important, yet there is connection between the two problems. The section of Menschliches where Dionysus makes its only public appearance in the thirteen years following the Geburt der Tragödie, marks not only the distance to the atmosphere in Nietzsche’s early writings, but as well the continuation of its conceptual interest. The Menschliches passage says that religious sentiments, such as those involved in Dionysian festivities, can only be conceived historically, that is, without the sense of all the connections that ‘the religious’ had at that time (‘the obscene’ is no more thinkable as a companion to religious sentiment, because “die Empfindung für die Möglichkeit dieser Mischung schwindet”, and “wir begreifen es nur historisch, dass sie existirte, bei den Demeter- und Dionysosfesten, bei den christlichen Osterspielen und Mysterien”). Thus, Geburt’s problematic of conceiving powerful experiential interdependencies is reaffirmed. Menschliches also adds that the present combinations (like that of the moving and the ridiculous) may well be incomprehensible for future observers. (MA I, 112, KSA 2, 116.)

Although Nietzsche’s favorable stance toward the metaphysical is by 1880 transformed into a hostile critique of metaphysics, he still discusses Dionysus and conceptualizing. It seems, then, only natural to meet in his notebooks and in Jenseits the figure of Dionysus as philosopher. One might also say that after Jenseits the philosopher Dionysus tends increasingly toward the actor Dionysus, so that Nietzsche’s later philosophy acquires again the peculiarly dramatic tension that was there in the time of
his early Dionysus. Nietzsche came to drop the *aus dem Geiste der Musik* part from the original title. He repudiated what had even from the beginning been but dishonest talk of resignation. He took back the question of *Heiterkeit* in the preface. He rejected German nationalism. He emphasized the *Optik des Künstlers* and no longer the visionary intuition. He spoke of Dionysian *Phänomen* and not anymore of Dionysian *Urphänomen*. And he was also more at ease with calling his discovery of Dionysus in conceptual terms. In the language of generation, while Nietzsche abandoned his hopes “zur Regeneration des deutschen Geistes”, he did not let go the attention to the regeneration of concepts, or the way his thinking “wird Tag für Tag “organisirt” und “regenerirt”, allerdings zunächst nur im Kopfe” (KGB II/1, Januar & Februar 1872, 293-5).

Nietzsche’s new attitude to conceptuality is, I think, best described by his changed opinion of the perceptual process. Both *Ein-sicht* and *An-schauung* (appearing in *Geburt’s* opening) evoke vision. For that matter, so do *betrachten* and *theoretische* (appearing in the letter to Liszt). Being essentially imageless, the Dionysian should remain out of reach for all these activities, except of course for the mind’s eye. *Geburt* is filled with variations of *sehen* and *schauen* ranging from the more perceptual cases to the more contemplative ones of *Vision* and *Blick* used to imply the more profoundly intuitive survey of the world’s essential elements. And of course, contemplation, survey and intuition all derive from visual language.

The Apollinian “anschauende Auge” with “hellste Deutlichkeit des Bildes” and “durchleuchtende Allsichtbarkeit” was not enough but only demanded intensification of the vision. Yet, Apollinian language controls the attempt to make sense of Dionysus, as the phrases like the following show: “Blick in das Wesen des *Dionysischen*”. To be sure, there is the all important *Musikperception*, as one places one’s “Ohr gleichsam an die Herzkammer des Weltwillens”. But more than working on their difference, *Geburt* treats hearing and seeing relatively similarly. Each “Augenblick” of the “höchste Musikerregung” may be about the myth that “unser Ohr dem Wiederklang der universalia ante rem zu bieten”. Yet, the condition of “krampfartigen Sichausrecksen aller Gefühle” involves merely “hören und sehen”. (GT 24 & 1 & 21, KSA 1, 150 & 28 & 135-6.)

Soon after *Geburt*, the difference between eye and ear is accentuated and yet again faded in a fragment that reads as follows:

> [...] Bilder in menschlichen Augen! Das beherrscht alles menschliche Wesen: vom *Auge* aus! Subjekt! das *Ohr* hört den Klang! Eine ganz andere wunderbare Conception derselben Welt. / Auf der Ungenauigkeit des *Sehens* beruht die *Kunst*. Auch beim Ohr Ungenauigkeit in Rhythmus, Temperatur usw. darauf beruht wiederum die *Kunst*. (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [66], KSA 7, 440.)

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Three things become clear. Perception and conception are intimately related to one another. The aesthetical pertains to the elementary stage of sensual apprehension. Hearing and seeing are equally distant ways to perceive and conceive the inexact. It is safe to say that despite its references to Klang the early philosophy of Nietzsche is controlled by the paradigmatic sense of philosophy. It is the rule of the visible that Nietzsche’s later writings more successfully undermine. In Götzen-Dämmerung’s answer to its own question about the significance of the Apollinian and Dionysian kinds of intoxication, the role of the senses is articulated. The passage deserves to be fully quoted:


(GD “SeU” 10, KSA 6, 117-8.)

This can be taken to reinterpret the initial setting of Geburt. There is not just talk of the fading power of music through its loss of rhythmic force. The unbildlich nature of the Dionysian is not explained as referring to the imageless and the invisible, but to the totally sensorial, the all-at-once-sensible, the wholly affective. The passage speaks about the Apollinian as principally (vor Allem) concentrated on vision. The Apollinian variety of experience refers to one-sided operations guided by the model taken from the faculty of sight, whereas the Dionysian experience has to do with encompassive co-operations of all the senses. One learns that the difference between the two is not (anymore, at least) explicable in terms of the other being either invisible or completely out of reach for sensibility.
In the light of the quotation, one might also conclude that the interplay between Dionysus and Apollo is not the one between “precept” and “concept” but between two concepts of concepts. *Geburt* makes much of itself as stepping or diving (*treten, hineinstürzen*) “mitten hinein in” scholarly controversies (GT 16, KSA 1, 102-3), as much as it also painstakingly clarifies interactivity and fusions. However, its attitude toward taking cognizance verges on aloofness. The anxious and ambitious, tense and eager atmosphere of the book almost conceal the way its own conception of conceiving is remote and sterile.

From at least *Zarathustra* onward, Nietzsche’s writings tend to replace the distance of seeing and hearing to the more comprehensive bodily sense of partaking. The paradigm of the eye gives way to the paradigm of the hand. Something of this changed attitude is contained in the way the later Dionysus makes references to his own or to his female partner’s ears, while also underlining the grip of these sense-organs. (See GD “SeU” 19, KSA 6, 123-4; cf. N 16 [40], KSA 13, 498).

Conceiving no longer follows the lines of isolated consciousness but shifts to the interactive, gripping and grappling organism using all senses and combining the experiential with the intelligible. Only in his later philosophy, Nietzsche came close to what his early book had described as the “Zauber des Dionysischen”. After abandoning the forced stress on magic, and the correlative respect for intuition, it became possible to do justice to the ecological Dionysus that “schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert wieder ihr Versöhnungsfest mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen” (GT 1, KSA 1, 29).

**IV.c.3 Nietzsche, Concepts, Philosophy**

In the present chapter, it has been shown how Nietzsche’s writings are filled with conceptual considerations. His books can be read as a series of attempts at a sustained critical confrontation of conceptuality, and some of them are almost wholly committed to expressly conceptual reflection. His notes contain a wealth of intense conceptual criticism of an extensive variety of topics.

In section IV.b, it was argued further that Nietzsche did have a strong concept-regenerative project of his own to couple his critique of concepts. An embodiment of this critico-reconstructive philosophical enterprise is, as I demonstrated, to be found in Nietzsche’s Dionysus.

In as much as these interpretative tasks have forced me to dwell on what is most idiosyncratic in Nietzsche’s philosophy - perhaps most evidently: his almost obsessive attack on Christianity and his interest in the sexual economy of language and his enthusiasm about the early Greek tragedy - I shall now try and make it clearer how his conceptual considerations relate to the more readily philosophical
questions.

This is not to say that I wished to play down the characteristically Nietzschean considerations of, in particular, the interplay of the cognitive and non-cognitive and its implications for conceptuality. One ought to appreciate, on the contrary, how these considerations stem from the notion of philosophy as emerging from non-philosophy.

In Nietzsche’s posthumously published, unfinished essay “Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen”, philosophy is said to have awakened with Thales on the borderline between the empirical and the metaphysical, or between the mythical and the unmythical. Whereas the moderns “auch das persönlichste sich zu Abstraktionen sublimirt”, in the ancients “rann [...] das Abstrakteste immer wieder zu einer Person zusammen”. As this is alternatively explained in the way that Greeks had a hard time “die Begriffe als Begriffe zu fassen”, one might infer that contemporary people face the same difficulty, albeit from the opposite direction. Be that as it may, the text has it that Thales was “typisches” philosopher or even “der allgemeine Typus des Philosophen”. This is because he “die Wissenschaft und das Beweisbare zwar benutzte, aber bald übersprang” in the philosophical struggle to “den Gesammtklag der Welt in sich nachtönen zu lassen und ihn aus sich herauszustellen in Begriffen”. (N “DpitZdG” 3-4, KSA 1, 813-7.)

This would seem to say that philosophy is necessarily entwined with concepts. Yet, Heracleitus is introduced, in the same essay, as the one to have traded the “Vorstellungsart, die in Begriffen und logischen Combinationen vollzogen wird” for the “intuitiven Vorstellung”. Intuition is explained as having a double significance. On the one hand, it refers to “die gegenwärtige, in allen Erfahrungen an uns heran sich drängende bunte und wechselnde Welt”. On the other hand, it refers to “die Bedingungen, durch die jede Erfahrung von dieser Welt erst möglich wird, Zeit und Raum”. The conditions of perception must be “unabhängig von Erfahrung und rein an sich intuitiv percipirt”. Things like the ‘present moment’ are matters of “unmittelbaren, jedermann zugänglichen Anschaulichkeit und eben darum begrifflich und vernünftig sehr schwer zu erreichen”. Despite the depiction of Heracleitus in terms of the non-conceptual and the pro-intuitive, and despite the later talk of that philosopher’s appetite for the incredible and the cosmically metaphoric, the essay goes on, nonetheless, to describe his achievement in the language of conceptuality, as he “den eigentlichen Hergang jedes Werdens und Vergehens [...] unter der Form der Polarität begriff”. (Ibid. 5-6, 822-8.)

In the rest of the essay, concepts like “Sein” and “Unendlichen”, as introduced by Parmenides, are criticized, yet on the general basis of the unfortunate “absoluten Trennung von Sinnenwelt und Begriffswelt”. More specifically, it is even proposed that the “Bewegung von Begriff zu Begriff” implies
the unsustainability of the notion of “das Denken als ein starres Verharren, als ein ewig unbewegtes Sich-selbst-Denken der Einheit”. Both the Parmenidean identity of “Denken und Sein” and the Parmenidean conviction of the “Trug”, “Schein” and “Täuschung” of the senses are rejected. It becomes clear that it is the “Allgültigkeit der Begriffe” that is being criticized, in the sense that there is but onesided relation where “Begriffe” do not admit their provenance and their limited ability “Wirklichkeit messen und richten” but seek “Wirklichkeit bewähren und corrigen”. (Ibid. 11-3 & 16, 844-50.)

These meditations - representative of what I have been calling Nietzsche’s ecological model of conception - bear on the notion of philosophy as emerging from the not-yet-philosophical forms of thought. One can easily infer that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra offers another example of a similar situation, particularly so, since it emphasizes even more strongly the idea of philosophy in a state of emergency. I have been at pains to show how this extraordinary book, too, can be read as part of the reconceptualization of philosophical conceptuality. My discussion of Dionysus hopefully also strengthened the case for Zarathustra’s conceptual potential. In what follows, I shall say a few words more on the way Nietzsche’s opus magnum relates to the tradition of concept-centered philosophy.

In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel portrays “the religion of the ancient people of Zend-Avesta” as the most perfect case of what he terms “immediate unity of Bedeutung and Gestalt”. It was a cultural stage where there was still lacking the “difference between mind and body, concept and reality”. He explains how the fundamental phenomenon of light was, for Zoroastrians, at once the good, the right, the mighty, the preserving, the life-enhancing. In the personified form, yet personified like God in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the divinity of light, Ormudz is opposed by the divinity of obscurity, Ahriman. The superior duty of a believer is to love light, to advance the victory of Ormudz. Hegel insists that this particular religiosity remained unsymbolical and unartistic, to the extent that “all actions are transactions [Geschäftigkeiten]”. One must not, then, separate the natural or real existence of light from all that it signifies or stands for. Since, in Zoroastrianism, one can found a rare “unity of spiritual generality and sensual reality”, it provides, so Hegel, a basis for understanding the aesthetically meaningful symbolism that has developed through differentiation and struggle.1619

When it comes to Kant, his opus postumum contains many references to Zoroaster. To put it cautiously, the divinity seems to be related to the challenge of seeing “philosophy in all of its content [Inbegriff]” as a unified system. In other words, it has to do with the task of “conceiving” all philosophy “together under one principle”. With respect to Zoroaster, Kant speaks about a “faculty of interpreting” that found its source in “apprehending all things in God”.1620 Even though Kant does not explicitly discuss Zoroaster’s conceptuality, he is clearly looking at it from the point of view of conceptuality, as the
Kantian association of *Begriff* and *Inbegriff* intimates (see III.b.1).

Following Hegel, one might describe Nietzsche’s *Also sprach Zarathustra* as an attempt to get behind the modern distinction between concept and reality. Following Kant, one might say that Nietzsche’s *Also sprach Zarathustra* is an attempt to restore the original concept of philosophy as the unifying art of thinking *par excellence*.

Be that as it may, two things are clear. First, Nietzsche’s diving into the Zoroastrian imagery was not, even in the light of the grand tradition of western philosophy as it goes via the two great German classics, evidently non-philosophical and non-conceptual but even readily metaphilosophical and metaconceptual. Secondly, the ecological model of conception where experience and concepts reciprocally condition one another is also met in the grand scale where non-philosophy and philosophy place mutual checks on each other.

In this subsection, these two dimensions will be clarified. I will start from the latter and begin to outline the ecological current in Nietzsche’s thought. A note from the period of exceptionally intense inquiry into conceptuality reads: “Der Unfug Kant’s mit “Erscheinung”. Und wo er keine Erklärung findet, ein *Vermögen* anzusetzen! Dieser Vorgang war’s, worauf hin der große Schelling-Schwindel losging.” (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [461], KSA 11, 273.)

This line of criticism strikingly anticipates Husserl who came to attack Kant for entertaining “confusingly mythical concepts” of *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. According to Husserl, these concepts cannot be “accepted in the actual sense of faculties of the soul”. This is because they already presuppose logical moves they ought to account for. The redundancy of the concepts of reason and understanding, in explaining thinking, is analogical to the case where dancing (*Tanzkunst*) is explained by a recourse to the faculty of dancing (*Tanzvermögen*). This example could make one ponder, whether Husserl is indirectly admitting his indebtedness to Nietzsche. Be that as it may, what remains of Kant’s concepts, in Husserl’s hands, is that they point to the direction of formal and ideal operations of thought.1621

Like Husserl, Nietzsche points the way to the process of perception and cognition. Nietzsche’s originality lies in the attempt to do this with explicit reflections on the conceptual and with an emphasis on the potentially conceptual nature of pre-conceptual operations. One fragment, where the underlying “Werthschätzungen” are described as laying deep below “unsre sogenannten “Instinkte”“ and coming “unbegreiflich”, the difference between experiencing and conceiving is radically diminished:

> Über das Gedächtniß muß man umlernen: es ist die Menge aller Erlebnisse alles

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organischen Lebens, lebendig, sich ordnend, gegenseitig formend, ringend mit einander, vereinflachend, zusammendrängend und in viele Einheiten verwandelnd. Es muß einen inneren Prozeß geben, der sich erhält wie die Begriffsbildung aus vielen Einzelfällen: das Herausheben und immer neu Unterstreichen des Grundschemas und Weglassen der Neben-Züge. (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [94], KSA 11, 175.)

Whatever may be taken to be instinctual is always already conceptual in the sense that there is a complex interplay, order and selection going on:

Der erste Sinnen-Eindruck wird bearbeitet vom Intellekt, vereinfacht, nach früheren Schematen zurechtgemacht, die Vorstellung der Erscheinungswelt ist als Kunstwerk unser Werk”. Aber das Material nicht - Kunst ist eben das, was die Hauptlinien unterstreicht, die entscheidenden Züge übrig behält, Vieles wegläßt. Dies absichtliche Umgestalten in etwas Bekanntes, dies Fälschen - (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [424], KSA 11, 264.)

Nietzsche’s reflections aim at exposing the contamination of perception with conceptuality: “das, was Empfindung ist, projicirt zugleich Formen, die dann wieder neue Empfindungen erzeugen” (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [84], KSA 7, 448). In conceiving this, the understanding of conceptuality undergoes a change. The kind of “living” or “animated” concepts that are called for, in the Zarathustra period, relate to the viewing the human being as “ein formen- und rhythmensbildendes Geschöpf” that “will alles Geschehen sich als ein Geschehen für Auge und Getast zurechtlegen” to the extent that the “menschliche Auge und Begriffsvermögen” is the “ewige Zeuge aller Dinge”. (N Winter 1883-1884 24 [14] & [17], KSA 10, 651 & 656). Conceptuality is, then, the specifically human form of interacting with, and resisting, the other organic forces taking shape.

As for the “”Denken” im primitiven Zustande (vor-organisch)”, it can be termed as “Gestalten-Durchsetzen, wie beim Crystalle”. Compared to the human thinking, it remains that “[i]n unserem Denken ist das Wesentliche das Einordnen des neuen Materials in die alten Schemas” (N August-September 1885, 41 [11], KSA 11, 687-8).

These sorts of considerations point away from “idealistic” postulates of categories that are meant to secure rationality and toward the “realist” or “naturalist” account of the relationship between experience and conception. Yet, what is probably the most important single aspect of Nietzsche’s reflections, from the point of view of mainstream historical development of philosophical theories of perception, is that, for all their anti-Kantian thrust, they do not play in the hands of pre-conceptual sensualism. Although he did use positivist criticism against Kant, Nietzsche was not committed to the view of 'positive facts’ and came to use criticism against positivists that was sufficiently Kantian. Yet, Nietzsche’s Kantian and
positivist traits are Kantianism and positivism reconceived and recombined.

The crucial cases of Comte and Taine can be briefly discussed to appreciate this. First of all, Nietzsche wrote on both thinkers lines that were exceptionally revering in tone. Taine is referred to, in Jenseits, as “der ersten lebenden Historiker” (JGB 254, KSA 5, 198; cf. also GM III 19, 387), while Comte is mentioned in a note of his as one of the “großen Methodologen” (beside Aristotle, Bacon and Descartes) (N Herbst 1887 9 [68], KSA 12, 368). Both philosophers appear in another fragment as “braven Positivisten” (N Mai-Juli 1885 35 [38], KSA 11, 527).

On the other hand, Nietzsche’s texts contain forceful criticism of Comte and Taine. Instead of exemplifying the positive post-metaphysical stage of progress he described, Comte is said to have remained within the confines of Christian thinking, as his stress on brotherly love and altruism suggest (N Frühjahr 1880 8 [71], KSA 9, 398). Taine, for his part, is said to have suffered from the influence of German philosophy (EH “Wiskb” 3, KSA 6, 285).

For the present purposes, the most important dimension is this. Comte is related to the old-fashioned and unwarranted “Sensualism in der Erkenntnßtheorie” (N Herbst 1887 9 [178], KSA 12, 449) and Taine to the “Niederwerfung vor den ‘Facten’“ as “eine Art Cultus” (N Mai-Juli 1885, KSA 11, 531). This is to say that their positivist claims of a direct access to reality are repudiated. At its most explicit, the Nietzschean line of criticism reads as follows:

Die Schule der “Objektiven” und “Positivisten” zu verspotten. Sie wollen um die Werthschätzungen herum kommen, und nur die facta entdecken und präsentiren. Aber man sehe zu z.B. bei Taine: im Hintergrunde hat er Vorlieben: für die starken expressiven Typen z.B., auch für die Genießenden mehr als für die Puritaner.
(N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [348], KSA 11, 241.)

The 'objective', the 'positive' or the 'factual' could not convince Nietzsche in their self-acclaimed neutrality. This is the theoretical basis for his coarse criticisms of Comte’s vision of the rule of the intellectuals as but the triumph of “die Halb-Weiber, die Priester” over “die männlichsten Männer” (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [270], KSA 11, 82). There is a connection between Übermensch and the opposing Comtean trust on the development of humanity (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [232], KSA 11, 210 & N Herbst 1887 9 [44], KSA 12, 357). Once, Comte’s dream of a “Duckmäuserei (mit Mandarinen an der Spitze […]” is even set against the joyous hopes of the “militärischen Entwicklung Europas” and of the “inneren anarchistischen Zustände”. There is the correlative rehabilitation of “männliche Tüchtigkeit, Leibes-Tüchtigkeit” all the way to the “Barbar” and the “wilde Thier” being “in Jedem von uns bejaht”.

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Although this last note ends in an appeal to philosophy, rather than to the army, one cannot explain away this most pitiful dimension of Nietzsche’s criticism of positivists. His public praise to Comte, in *Morgenröthe*, is directed to the “grosen rechtschaffenen Franzosen, dem die Deutschen und die Engländer dieses Jahrhunderts, als einem Umschlinger und Bändiger der strengen Wissenschaften, Keinen an die Seite zu stellen vermögen” only in order to say that Comte, too, became old and let “Schwärmereien, Süssigkeiten, Würzen, dichterische Nebel und mystische Lichter” ruin his thought. In the same book, it is specified that, along with Voltaire, Comte represents “französisiche Freidenkern” who have freed themselves from Christian moral dogmatism (“von den Dogmen loslöste”) in order to justify this liberation (“Rechtfertigung dieser Loslösung”) through “einem Cultus der Menschenliebe”. Comte did not, the text has it, go beyond Christian theology, he “in der That das Christenthum überchristlicht”. (M 542 & 132, KSA 3, 311 & 123.)

Yet, neither can one explain away the theoretically crucial aspect in all this talking big. In *Götzen-Dämmerung*, the issue at stake is explained like this: “In England muss man sich für jede kleine Emancipation von der Theologie in furchteinflössender Weise als Moral-Fanatiker wieder zu Ehren bringen.” Although people “sind den christlichen Gott los”, they “glauben nun um so mehr die christliche Moral festhalten zu müssen”. (GD “SeU” 5, KSA 6, 113.)

In the light of the Nietzschean principle of the ‘emancipation from emancipation’, one could propose that what is called for is a further liberation from the mere loss of the Christian God, so that one could be free of Christianity as a whole. Yet, on the very same KSA page, there is criticism of Sainte-Beuve as a “Historiker ohne Philosophie, ohne die Macht des philosophischen Blicks” with “die “Objektivität” als Maske vorhaltend” (GD “SeU” 3, KSA 6, 113). The emancipation from emancipation would, thus, seem to reaffirm the notion that there cannot be such things as mere facts, naked positivities or pure sensations. After the Christian way of conceiving things, there may be a confused sense of no way of conceiving, yet there is always something that guides and shapes perception.

This is why Nietzsche’s notes expressly attack “der weichliche und feige Begriff “Mensch” à la Comte” (N Herbst 1887 10 [170], KSA 12, 558). It is significant to observe that the aforementioned Nachlass passage on the necessary conceptual element of perception was quoted from a fragment that continues to refer to the parallel situation with Taine’s “‘[h]istorischer Sinn’“ as involving the credo “die Hauptthatsachen voran” (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [424], KSA 11, 264). Among the so called facts, there are distinctions always already drawn.
While Taine is indirectly criticized for his sensualist setting of the passive ego under the total on-way influence of the external world (“sehen nur der Außen-Welt wirken und das ego geformt”) (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [182], KSA 11, 63), he is expressly praised for his conceptualizations. This note captures very well both the constraint and the creativity of concepts: “Taine, der die Kühnheit der Erfindung hatte, zwischen Hegel und Henry Beyle das Typische zu finden, seine Methode, welche wesentlich heißt: die Geschichte kann nur durch Begriffe begriffen werden, die Begriffe aber muß der historische Mensch schaffen: und die Geschichte, wo es nur 4, 5 Faktoren gibt, ist am begreiflichsten” (N April-Juni 1885 34 [22], KSA 11, 428).

Now, Hans Lenk was seen to present it as Nietzsche’s conviction that any conceiving is conceptual and that perception is theory-laden (IV.a.1). John E. Atwell has also underlined Nietzsche’s “attack on what may be called “purenesses” - on “pure facts”, “pure objects (or things)”, and “pure subjects””. According to Atwell, this antipositivist stance runs counter the notion of “simply given states of affairs which resist all “interpretation” (conceptualization, organization, adaptation)”. His ‘perspectivism’ is “contextualism” accepts only “theory-bound or “interpreted” facts”. All this is enough for Atwell to relate Nietzsche’s philosophy to the critical work of Sellars, Quine, Popper and Goodman.1622

Atwell’s insistence on “various stances we take toward things” that depend upon (i) conceptual schemes and language, (ii) purposes and interests as well as (iii) physiology and senses, can be seen prefigured in Edward Andrew’s account. In Andrew’s view, Nietzsche took a thinker’s existence to be “conditioned by the social circumstances in which he is active”. This is to say that “concepts” with “which he understands his experience are social products”. On the other hand, the thinker does “not passively reflect the social circumstances which condition” thinking, instead, the thinker must “creatively reinterpret” the inherited “conceptual tools” in order to make sense of experience.1623

In as much as the issue concepts intervening in perception embodies the other main aspect of Nietzsche’s reconceptualizing efforts, the other one concerning the role of language is already implied by this last reference to Taine. The cases of the words and concepts “Rache”, “Werth” and “Straf”, as they are presented in Menschliches and Genealogie, respectively (see IV.b.3), form an effective reminder of the way Nietzschean concept criticism is alert to the way language is tightly linked with conceptual studies.

The belief in Vernunft is itself said to be due to the way “die Sprache ist auf die aller naivsten Vorurtheile hin gebaut”. Problems arise from the necessity that “wir nur in der sprachlichen Form denken” which means that thinking is regulated by the subject/predicate structure and the tendency to assume unities and contradictions. Reappropriating the idea of Dionysian wisdom, the passage goes to
say that this rethinking of thinking is a matter of “eine Grenze als Grenze zu sehn”. Despite the sense of a “Philosophie der grauen Begriffe”, it remains that the “vernünftige Denken ist ein Interventire nach einem Schema, welches wir nicht abwerfen können”. (N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [22], KSA 12, 193-4.)

No wonder, then, that one of the requirements of a new concept of concept would be that it ought to be somehow relational (see N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 1 [99], KSA 12, 34; N Frühjahr 1888 14 [103], KSA 13, 280). For all the critical function of the physiological speculations, the role of language cannot be dodged. On the contrary, it must be examined:

Ein noch so complicirter Trieb, wenn er einen Namen hat, gilt als Einheit und tyrannisirt alle Denkenden, die nach seiner Definition suchen (N Frühjahr 1888 11 [115], KSA 9, 482).

Concepts and words usurp thinking and try to rule over fresh, corrective experience. Yet, acquisition of more experience is inseparable from acquisition or more concepts, albeit this latter “more” may be understood as a sign of obsolete conceptions being replaced: “Menschen, welche sehr viel innerhalb eines bestimmten Berufes arbeiten, behalten ihre allgemeinen Ansichten über die Dinge der Welt fast unverändert bei: diese werden in ihren Köpfen immer härter, immer tyrannischer. Deshalb sind jene Zeiten, in welchen der Mensch genöthigt ist seine Arbeit zu verlassen, so wichtig, weil da erst neue Begriffe und Empfindungen sich wieder einmal herandrängen dürfen, und seine Kraft nicht schon durch die täglichen Ansprüche von Pflicht und Gewohnheit verbraucht ist.” (N Ende 1876 - Sommer 1877, 23 [196], KSA 8, 473.)

The double social perspective into the production of new concepts is thus clarified. Concepts are formed in certain societal relations based on the division of labor, and they also exert power themselves. Small wonder if the vision of novel “Begriffe und Empfindungen” was described, in the opening section of Menschliches, in terms of the “Gross- und Kleinverkehr der Cultur und Gesellschaft”. In the same book, the first Greek philosophers are described as “Tyranne des Geistes” that violently broke with their tradition and their environment. Presocratics as well as Plato are depicted as embodying a “Gesetzgeber” or a “sublimirtere Form des Tyrannenthums”. The ancient state of affairs is, then, contrasted to the modern case of “Oligarchie des Geistes” or a group opposing both ochlocracy and tyranny. (MA I 1 & 261, KSA 2, 23-4 & 214-8.)

The sketched essay “Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen” already locates the beginning of philosophy with “einer Gesetzgebung der Größe” that consists of asserting “der Begriff der Größe”
which, in turn, involves “ein Namengebung”. It is about an “Einheit” that “wir erzeugen” in order to produce the “Eindruck der Größe”, because “der Begriff der Größe” is “wandelbar, sowohl im moralischen als ästhetischen Bereiche” and, thus, needs to be created through “sehr viele Wirkungen zusammenaddiren”. (N “DpitZdG” 3, KSA 1, 816-7; N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [80] & [81] & [83], KSA 7, 446-8).

One can observe how a fragment from as late as October 1888 contains four words “Dionysos” and “Typus des Gesetzgebers” (N 23 [8], KSA 13, 610). Yet, no doubt the most famous use for this persistent imagery, in Nietzsche, is the description of philosophers as it is given in Jenseits. At first, in the context of mocking the Stoic putatively unconceptual conception of nature, philosophy is said to be “dieser tyrannische Trieb selbst, der geistigste Wille zur Macht, zur “Schaffung der Welt”, zur causa prima” (JGB 9, KSA 5, 21-2). Later on, in the book, there follows the well known determination for a philosopher proper:


This passage reaffirms the notion of philosophy as lawgiving and lawgiving as creative assertiveness. The word “concept” does not appear, yet the way the paradigm of the hand is exploited offers a clue to the conceptual problematic. Nietzsche’s notes for Jenseits contain material that indicates the concept critical thrust in the notion of lawgiving. One of them reads:

Nb. Was Plato und im Grunde alle Nach-Sokratiker thaten: das war eine gewisse Gesetzgebung der Begriffe: - sie stellten für sich und ihre Jünger fest “das und das soll unter uns bei diesem Worte gedacht und gefühlt werden”: - damit lösten sie sich am bestimmtesten aus ihrer Zeit und Umgebung los. Es ist dies eine der Arten feinen Ekels, mit dem sich höhere, anspruchsvollere Naturen gegen die unklare Menge und ihren Begriffs-Wirrwarr empören. (N April-Juni 34 [84], KSA 11, 446; cf. Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [18], KSA 12, 191.)

This formulation restates the connection between lawgiving and conceptualization. Thus, it is not the case, as Stanley Rosen would have it, that the Nietzschean lawgiver trades the “transcendental ego” for a unconceptual poetics. Nor is it the case, as Edward Halper says, that Nietzsche dissociates creativity from conceptual constraints.
Conceptualizing is “transcendent” in the sense that it unfastens meanings from the familiar spatio-temporal setting. To appreciate the more social aspect in this, one may refer back to the above quoted note from 1870's where new concepts were said to be the result of people being forced to change their profession and to let loose from their adopted habits and environments. The early notes had speculated on the way the unified *Größe* were to be respected for their being *Seltenen* and *Unnormale* (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [80], KSA 7, 446). A further fragment from the mid-1880's reinforces the way lawgiving as conceptualization was a matter of establishing certain specific ways of perceiving and conceiving:

(N April-Juni 1885 34 [88], KSA 11, 449.)

Hence, it is clear that the “commanding” and the “lawgiving” kind of philosophers are those most successful in their conceptualizations. It must be seen that this description does not automatically support the view of Nietzsche as the spokesman of any might makes right type of ideology: in a fragment, from roughly the same time, there is scorn for the way Wagner is popular for “das Befehlerische, die Fähigkeit, lärrend zu kommandiren, auf sich allein zu stehen, auf sich allein zurückzuweisen, hartnäckig zu sich selber Ja zu sagen, und immer im Namen des “auserwählten Volks”, der Deutschen! - kurz, das Volkstribunenhafte und Demagogische” (N August-September 1885 41 [2], KSA 11, 675.)

One can also remember how *Menschliches* defined the tyrannical *idée fixe* as “*ein* einzelner Begriff, der Herr sein *wollte*“ (MA II/2 230, KSA 2, 657) and how *Genealogie* referred to the “zeitweilige Tyrannei solcher paradoxoner und paralogischer Begriffe wie “Schuld”, “Sünde”, “Sündhaftigkeit”, “Verderbniss”, “Verdammnis”“ (GM III 16, KSA 5, 375). At any rate, the lawgiving is about conceiving differently, even in the downright strange ways, which makes it the opposite of ruling ways of conceiving. Defining philosophy with the help of this notion means paying attention to the way concept is a matter of power and that power is, to a great extent, a matter of affecting the ways of conceiving.

Furthermore, the “lawgiving” merely determines the other side of philosophical practice, as still another fragment intimates:
Emancipation also distinctly mächtigste Tugendhafter escape this and appreciate inevitability art, the "Philosoph" concepts ensuing religiös-gehobenen concepts. Instead of positivistically becoming Tyrannei of Enthaltsamkeit - abtrennt, was bedeutet deshalb noch nicht vom abzweigen. Am Gründlichsten nicht falschesten, sondern Gründlichsten Begriffe abzweigen, wie die Begriffe als Versuche zu betrachten, mit Hilfe deren bestimmte Arten des Menschen gezüchtet und auf ihre Enthaltsamkeit und Dauer - - -
(N Mai-Juli 1885 35 [36], KSA 11, 526.)

Emancipation from "eternal concepts" calls for an emancipation from this emancipation, which means that the ensuing conceptless condition is reconceived in terms of "concepts as experiments". One can also note how Nietzsche's so called dream of a new human being or a post-human being seems to be distinctly conceptual.

To appreciate the reconceptualization here one can have a look at a fragment, in which the possibility of "der "Philosoph" heute" is pondered. The passage climaxes like this: "wir glauben, daß Einer ganz und gar "unphilosophisch", nach den bisherigen Begriffen, gelebt haben muß, vor allem nicht als scheuer und Tugendhafter - um über die großen Probleme aus Erlebnissen heraus zu urteilen. Der Mensch der umfänglichsten Erlebnisse, der sie zu allgemeinen Schlüssen zusammendrückt: mußte er nicht der mächtigste Mensch sein? - Man hat den Weisen zu lange mit dem wissenschaftlichen, und noch länger mit dem religiöses-gehobenen Menschen verwechselt." (N Mai-Juli 1885 35 [24], KSA 11, 518-9.)

Neither concepts nor philosophy, according to this reconceptualization, are any longer opposed to Erlebnisse. The positivistically scientific and the religiously or artistically ecstatic are the ones who escape conceptuality. By contrast, the kind of philosophy that takes its bearings from science, religion and art, by examining the peculiar relations to conceiving in each of them, reconceives conceptuality. At this point, it should be noted that, as the case of Dionysus intimated, Nietzsche seems to be extending the inevitability of concepts to the realm of the arts, too. This comes through from his opposition both
to the Kantian aesthetics of disinterestedness and the Schopenhauerian (and Wagnerian) one of absolute creativity (see esp. GM III 4-6, KSA 5, 343-9).

There is, in Nietzsche’s texts, explicit references to "höherer Begriff der Kunst", “mein höherer Begriff “Künstler”“, (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [66] & [184], KSA 12, 89 & 158), as well as to “der Begriff großer Stil” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [61], KSA 13, 247-8). Further, there is a reference to “meinen Begriff, meinen Geschmack “Goethe”“ and to “dieses Begriffs “Goethe”“ (N Oktober-November 1888 24 [10], KSA 13, 634-5.) As one of his early texts had contained the notion that, even in Homer, art is about “[i]n Ketten tanzen” in so far as one is compelled to confirm to some formulas “innerhalb deren er tanzen musste: und er selber schuf neue Conventionen für die Kommenden hinzu” (MA II/2 140, KSA 2, 612), a much later fragment reaffirms the insight: “Jede reife Kunst hat eine Fülle Convention zur Grundlage: insofern sie Sprache ist. Die Convention ist die Bedingung der großen Kunst, nicht deren Verhinderung” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [119], KSA 13, 296).

It is, according to my interpretation, characteristic of Nietzsche’s philosophical stance that, despite the utterly mocking and harsh tone of much his writing, virtually nothing, not even conventionality, is being repudiated once and for all. Instead, the conceptuality of the conventional is being checked up from different sides. A note from 1873, reads: "In Deutschland ist die Furcht vor der Convention epidemisch. Aber bevor es zu einem nationalen Stile kommt, ist eine Convention nöthig. Dazu lebt man doch in einerbummelig-inkorrektren Convention, wie all unser Gehen Stehen Unterhalten anzeigt. Es scheint, man will die Convention, die am wenigsten Selbstüberwindung kostet, bei der jeder recht schlampen kann. Die Historie ist freilich sehr gefährlich, indem sie alle Conventionen neben einander zur Vergleichung stellt und damit das Urtheil dort aufruft, wo die δόνομας alles entscheidet.” (N Sommer-Herbst 1873 29 [121], KSA 7, 686.)

What counts is the dynamics. What I wish to convey here is that this linkage between conceptual and zeitkritische concerns is something characteristic of Nietzsche’s way of thinking. His is a problematic of the dynamics of conceptualizing. To get a better idea of this one might as well consider the way it is said, in one of his fragments, that “das Neue macht Furcht: anderseits muß Furcht schon da sein, um Neues als neu zu fassen” and that “das Furcht lehrt Unterscheiden, Vergleichen” (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [3], KSA 12, 255). In other words, fear is conceptually relevant in three senses: one is scared to conceive novelties; one is scared of conceived novelties; one is prompted to conceive by being scared.

The new, the unexpected, the frightening is apt to intensify conceptualizing: "Gegensatz der Convention und der Mode. Gerade die letztere wird von dem historischen Sinne befruchtet: sie erwächst aus
Luxusbedürfnissen, sucht das Neue seiner selbst wegen, vor allem das Auffallende, ist solange “Mode” als es “neu” ist. Die Deutschen sind fast gewillt, eine französische Convention, rein aus Bequemlichkeit und Sinn für das Gewohnte, zur Convention zu machen.” (N Sommer-Herbst 1873 29 [122], KSA 7, 687.)

One conceptualizes, that is, makes comparisons and distinctions, either by a recourse to familiarity and conventionality, or by resisting this temptation. This difference is formulated in another fragment from the same period, this time in a more collective setting:


(N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [17], KSA 12, 191.)

This brings one to the problematic of conceptual change. As the fragment shows, Nietzsche’s contribution to the issue of concepts is no (pseudo-)psychological or (proto-)psychoanalytical letting loose from the level of concepts to the primal processes in the isolated consciousness. It is, rather, a philosophical interrogation of the ways in which outstanding general beliefs or organizing conceptions always constrain individual conceiving and outstanding individual conceptions, in turn, effect the common ways to conceptualize.

The aesthetical is subjected to the conceptual, as can be gathered from a note dating from between the fall of 1885 and the next fall. It has the old deities contrasted again, this time on the grounds of the “Ewigkeit der schönen Form” related to Apollo and the “beständige Schöpfung” connected to Dionysus (N 2 [106], KSA 12, 113).

One of the paradigmatic paradigm changes that is discussed in Nietzsche’s writings is the step from renaissance to reformation. As the next quotation indicates, it was the conceptual changes that were the keys to understanding it: “Wir haben in der Reformation ein wüstes und pöbelhaftes Gegenstück zur Renaissance Italiens, verwandten Antrieben entsprungen, nur daß diese im zurückgebliebenen, gemeingeblienen Norden sich religiös verkleiden mußten, - dort hatte sich der Begriff des höheren Lebens von dem des religiösen Lebens noch nicht abgelöst” (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [23], KSA 13, 419).
This is already the problematic of nihilism. In the next chapter, that concept will be studied as that concept of Nietzsche which best conveys the multifaceted conceptual problematic that makes his philosophical project still vital.
In one of his most famous *mises-en-scène*, Nietzsche staged nihilism as the “unheimlichste aller Gäste” about to enter (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [127], KSA 12, 125) the nice and cozy living room of modern westerners. What had seemed like a sheltered home (*Heim*) was suddenly turning to the uncanny (*unheimlich*)\(^{1626}\). Among the suggested synonyms for nihilism, there is one particularly apt for this context: “homelessness”\(^{1627}\). In about the same time as Nietzsche wrote down his note, an American explorer named J. M. Buckley was able to finish the preface of his journey report from the Northern Europe: “My chief reason for travelling in Russia was to study the “burning question” NIHILISM”\(^{1628}\).

Nowadays, there are still dictionaries that, under the entry “nihilism”, supply information only on the situation in the pre-revolutionary Russia\(^{1629}\) and, thus, fail to mention Nietzsche. Great many others that offer more varied accounts, nonetheless, claim that the term is of Russian origin coined by the novelist Ivan Turgenev\(^{1630}\). With Turgenev and his novel *Fathers and Sons* of 1862 as reference points, still other encyclopedias tell that this was the occasion for the notion to be popularized\(^{1631}\), actualized\(^{1632}\), activated\(^{1633}\), politicized\(^{1634}\) or “truly launched”\(^{1635}\) or given its “present significance”\(^{1636}\).

While the Russian case has been in the process of becoming but one, albeit crucial, instance in the unfolding of the idea and social history of nihilism, the sense of urgency and fear has, rather persistently, accompanied the use of the term. But where there ever was a chance to get excited about the restlessness in the Czarist Euro-Asian empire, after Hermann Rauschning’s 1938 account of the German Nazi triumph, in his *Die Revolution des Nihilismus*,\(^{1637}\) there was scarcely any reason for a meliorative sense of “nihilism”. This is not to say that general dictionaries mention the totalitarian usage, since they rarely do so\(^{1638}\), nor do they usually refer to an instance where nihilism was, in 1870 Germany, used to refer to the radicalism tending toward the proletarian revolution\(^{1639}\). But as the title of Alfred Kopf’s recent book, *Der Weg des Nihilismus von Friedrich Nietzsche bis zur Atombombe* (1988), so well testifies, what nihilism might have lost on the side of the thrilling, it has gained on the horrific\(^{1640}\).

In point of fact, as Günther Anders spoke, in 1956, of the nihilism of “the masters of the bomb”\(^{1641}\), his depressed atomic age stance was quite removed from the ironic and daring way the young journalist
Dimitri Pisarev said, in 1865, that the term belongs to the rhetoric arsenal of the conservatives always alert to detect and ban “the bomb of negation”\textsuperscript{1642}. In any case, one observer said, in 1892, as follows: “The spirit of nihilism preceded the activity of nihilism; the destructive thinking prepared the dagger, the revolver and the dynamite bomb.”\textsuperscript{1643} One hundred years after Pisarev’s remark, a German observer said that there can be no discussion on the current situation, or on the Zeitgeist, without the concept of nihilism\textsuperscript{1644}. This was after so much writing, in the preceding decades, on the alarming or dejected “affective tonality”\textsuperscript{1645} of western culture, and after a Scandinavian literary contest, in 1936, on the theme of nihilism\textsuperscript{1646}. The central failure of contemporary philosophy would be identified as the incapability of “adequately” responding to nihilism which results in a generalizing experience of meaninglessness\textsuperscript{1647}.

Yet, while Hannah Arendt still characterized nihilism as a “danger”, although one residing in the thinking process\textsuperscript{1648}, Theodor W. Adorno saw that it had taken the form of “mere method”, the rehearsal of which was a “farce” à la Cartesian doubt\textsuperscript{1649}. Similarly, according to Emmanuel Diet’s 1972 estimation, “[n]othing is more foreign to the modern nihilism” than the Nietzschean notion of living through the great problems with one’s body and soul\textsuperscript{1650}. In the aftermath of the cold war, nihilism is said to have undergone a further process of flattening. As Karen L. Carr's The Banalization of Nihilism (1992) has it, the old burning question is described as having lost its “crisis value” and become “impotent”\textsuperscript{1651}. One may also consult Mortimer J. Adler on the issue: “Heidegger looked into the abyss of philosophy and saw the beasts of Nazism - became, in fact, a Nazi. Rorty looks into the abyss of Heidegger - coolly, curiously, tolerantly - and sees not Heidegger as he saw himself, indeed as he was, but an “original and interesting writer”\textsuperscript{1652}.

In other words, where it was Ernst Jünger’s worry, in 1950, that nihilism is crossing a line into where it is no longer intelligible or conceivable\textsuperscript{1653}, it may appear, today, as something all too evident, albeit, as such, again nearly inconceivable. Those who still care to attack it, may formulate the career of the ism follows: “Nihilism may have served a harmless and pleasant luxury for the intellectuals of advanced societies in the 1920’s, but it is surely folly today”\textsuperscript{1654}. One way of sketching the shift is to refer to two recent American uses of the term. In Allan Bloom’s Closing of the American Mind (1987), nihilism is depicted as the status quo of the egocentric mentality. For Bloom, this normalized nihilism, endemic among the U.S. students, is a one without any sense of threat or emergency, without the abyss.\textsuperscript{1655} While Bloom laments on the situation, Harry Neumann declares himself as “a nihilist professor of philosophy” and urges his fellow liberal academics to admit their own nihilism and the “necessarily bigoted character of one’s most passionately held convictions”. More important than to cling to the word, which is but “pretentious way of saying something simple”, is to affirm that “nothing really exists”, or that “nothing […] endows anything with a non-arbitrary being, an identity not subject to
radical change at any moment”. If there is, in Neumann’s vision, “an abyss in which nothing is forbidden or commanded, good or bad, true or false”, it is covered by the “abysmal superficiality of pseudo-liberal academic philosophers”. 1656

Either way, Umberto Eco’s view is perceptive, as he says that, in meditating on nihilism, there is always the comfort of feeling noble1657. Now, if it had been the crucial issue how to surmount or overcome nihilism, how to get rid of this unwelcomed visitor, as great many contributors to the issue have seemed to take for granted1658, it hardly is anymore. According to one critic, writing in 1983, the historical forms of nihilism have been but foreplay for the “nihilism proper” ruling in the contemporary situation1659.

Jacques Ellul speaks of the ultimate success of nihilistic revolution, in which nothing is put in the place of what is denied, since the philosophical attack on the notion of critical and responsible self and the Western values surrounding it have lead to the situation where collective objectivity rules in the form of technical advance1660. So, even if nihilism has been banalized, it is still a candidate for the “one common set of governing assumptions which would provide a foundation for the varied contemporary intellectual expressions” in the present time. Thus, George M. Kren holds that “the concept of nihilism provides a unifying principle which connects many - though by no means all - of the manifestation of twentieth-century culture” 1661.

Most commonly, the problem of nihilism is seen as coextensive with the problem of modernity1662. Subscribing to this view, Simon Critchley proposes five ways to respond to nihilism. First, not admitting it and escaping the confrontation by opting for metaphysical (and religious) fundamentalism or for anti-metaphysical quietism. Secondly, not accepting it as a genuine question for anything other than erroneous historiographies of philosophy and overwrought continental criticism. Thirdly, taking it for granted and as entailing the impossibility of resistance. Fourthly, longing for total revolution. Fifthly, and this is what Critchley recommends, delineating nihilism while experiencing and deconstructing it.1663

There can be conceived, in the readings of Nietzsche and his considerations on nihilism as the uncanny guest, a fairly similar line of descent from urgency to banalization. Where, say, the early reception spoke of the philosopher as “false prophet” and the anti-Hitler propaganda as the proto-Nazi (see II.a above), Adorno chose to emphasize the less frenzied and more ironical move, on the part of Nietzsche, as what was termed “nihilism” was no longer an aberration from the Western bourgeois standard way of life but the very backbone of the Occident eager to repress of all kinds of “nihilists”. In the same context, Adorno said that all acts of overcoming are far more detrimental than that which is to be overcome1664.
Peter Sloterdijk, in turn, followed Nietzsche and Adorno in claiming that anti-nihilism, be it communist or fascist, is to be taken as the nihilism proper\textsuperscript{1665}. Yet, he has gone on to describe Nietzsche’s view of nihilism as already “well known” and “too harmless”, as nihilism had long, since, stepped in and acted, more than any guest, as the host\textsuperscript{1666}. As if to complete this banalization, Michael Allen Gillespie claims that as for “our understanding of nihilism, we are almost all Nietzscheans”\textsuperscript{1667}.

By contrast, I think that there is a lot, in Nietzsche’s confrontation with nihilism, that is nowhere near consentient acceptance, not to speak exhaustion. The problematic is not reducible to the message of urgency and its subsequent becoming an item of daily boredom. If Buckley had to leave his continent and travel over to a foreign land in order to inquire into the nature of the new and perplexing range of phenomena, one can try and abandon the doubtful familiarity and the phony ineffectuality attached to Nietzsche’s thinking on nihilism and set out for an exploration. Naïve enthusiasm may not be the most appropriate stance in thoroughly researching the affair and probing the wound that has caused the interpretative stiffness, but it may be just what it takes to recover from at least this version of nihilism.

In what follows, the history of the concept of nihilism is briefly related (V.a.1) and its analytical issues differentiated (V.a.2). Turning to Nietzsche’s writings and their commentaries, thereafter, the adoption and the outlines for the later use of \textit{Nihilismus} are examined (V.a.3). The latter half of the present chapter will be engaged in explaining the meaning of nihilism as it comes out of Nietzsche’s texts. Previous interpretations are critically assessed (V.b.1), before it makes better sense to expound the concept critical reading advocated in the present study (V.b.2). In conclusion, nihilism is compared to the other Nietzschean construals and described as embodying the problematic and crisis involving all conceptuality (V.b.3). What follows thereafter is a longer set of examinations, in which the interrelations between nihilism, conceptualizing, the issue of Nietzsche’s contexts and the question concerning his interpretation are clarified (V.c).

It was seen (see IV.c.1) how Nietzsche could speak about the project of new conceptions, in a relative distance from ‘modernity’, as involving a peculiar “culture”. In the epigraph of this section, what deems the characterization \textit{Kultur} is precisely the ability to problematize and reconceptualize the fundamentals of the European culture. I dare to remind, once again, of the notion of ‘emancipation from emancipation’. It is not enough, nor is it wise, to do away with “culture”. After the effort of liberating one’s thought from \textit{Kultur}, one had better to grasp just how much this liberation itself lends itself to be viewed under the aspect of culture.
V.a. Reconstruction & Differentiation of Nihilism

According to Alan White, “the history of how the term “nihilism” has been used” is “of negligible importance both for Nietzsche and for philosophy”. He goes on as follows: “What makes the term “nihilism” philosophically vital is not its history, but rather its use by Nietzsche. Nihilism becomes philosophically vital when it is presented not as one position among many, a doctrine some may chance to espouse, but rather as the necessary consequence of the Western philosophical tradition.”

I am inclined to think, too, that nihilism is best seen as something other than just an optional philosophical position. However, caution is called for, since the view of nihilism as quite removed from espousing doctrines and defending opinions may easily lead to disregarding the analytical, or more or less unhistorical, dimension of nihilism. What is more important is White’s questionable inference from the vain business of historical reconstruction to the need to stick to Nietzsche and his authentic message for the profession of philosophy. If it is the tradition that one is asked to understand as bringing about nihilism, why would one not profit from attending to the way nihilism has been treated in that tradition? Should the answer to this question be that these treatments, with the exception of Nietzsche, are “negligible”, to refute the thesis one needs only to demonstrate that they were a part of Nietzsche’s own hypotheses and, moreover, part of the make-up of Western philosophy.

It is perhaps possible to develop sophisticated views overlooking the problematic of nihilism without being fully enlightened of the details in its conceptual history. But failing to see that, for Nietzsche, the philologico-philosophical sensitivity to words as cultural items, in general, and the awareness of the
multifaceted dossier of nihilism, in particular, was of chief importance, is not vital but fatal both for him and for philosophy.

Gianni Vattimo forewarns of viewing history in a massive sense of reconstructing the origin of something by making it present. That would be history as sickness of metaphysics. By contrast, Vattimo praises the way Heidegger, in his account of nihilism, concentrates on tracing the fate of being in bits and pieces of Hölderlin’s and others’ writing. In Vattimo’s view, nihilism is “a geschichtlich problem in the sense of the connection Heidegger established between Geschichte and Geschick”. On this reading, nihilism is the only, the unique chance. Vattimo says that, just because he is not willing to fall back in any history of being, “with foundations lost, I can only relate the history of nihilism”.1669

Of the historians of nihilism, Dieter Arendt has said that the motivation for historical research is the fact there is no good definition available for this pejorative or honorable parole1670. Hans-Jürgen Gawoll, in turn, criticizes the “philologico-positivist […] pure historiography” of the encyclopedia articles that seek to “name the most important phases of nihilism” and end up in drowning the problematic issue in the collection of piecemeal material. In his view, even if nihilism cannot be identified with any concept that would be the concept of nihilism, all its “conceptual modifications”, at least the philosophical ones, can be written into a single history1671.

In pondering on the beginnings of nihilism, the ultra-philological stance may be conceived as concerning itself with the possibility of ascertaining the first documentable instance of uttering the word in any language1672 and the ultra-philosophical stance, in turn, as reflecting on the first instances of any act of thinking that may have resulted in nihilistic views1673. Such a setting is rather comic, until it advances at the level of some kind of interaction. While there are still critics who imply that philological aspects, of Nietzsche and nihilism, are not philosophically significant1674, the philosopher’s philological training and persistent attachment to the issue of language as an embodiment of cultural convictions and practices ought to make any clear cut division between the two spheres highly questionable.

The historical nihilism expertise has been, in the recent years, primarily in the hands of a few German speaking experts, most remarkably, Otto Pöggeler, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Martin Riedel, W. Goerdt and Hans-Jürgen Gawoll. To this group can be added Federico Vercellino and Stephen Wagner Cho.1675 My interest, in the following sketch of the history of nihilism, is not in the intricacies of this special discipline. All is done to serve the ends of making sense of Nietzsche’s reconceptualizing this concept.
Prehistory

The place to begin might well be the scholastic debate over Christ’s humanity. In the latter half of the 12th century, certain writers, inspired by Peter Lombardian’s work, attempted to argue against the incarnation of Christ. Inasmuch as Christ is human, his divinity is nihil, nothing, since what is earthly and time-bound cannot be identified with what is heavenly and eternal. This heretical trend in Christology, banned in 1163 by Pope Alexander II, was termed ’nihilianism’.1676

It seems that the connection of nihilianism and nihilism is merely accidental, since virtually none of the discussions about the latter draw anything from the former. Moreover, nihilianism has all but been forgotten: few professional (philosophical, theological) dictionaries even care to mention it1677. Yet, one may regard it as an effective reminder of the classical theological question, whether reason or logic is the most appropriate support of belief or the most suspect destroyer of faith.

There is an additional reason for mentioning ’nihilianism’. The case being that the word soon stood for all sorts of heresy1678, as well as for certain mystic trends1679, one can appreciate the conflictive, oddly confluent nature of this Begriffsgeschichte. When, for instance, Ockham came, in this century, to be called a “nihilist” for his “thoroughly subjectivist theory of knowledge” with its “enormous implications” for the universal existence of God and for theology as a whole1680, one may begin to grasp the extent to which this judgment and many other instances of name calling in terms of nihilism are combinations of anachronisms.

Sometimes, St. Augustine is credited for coining the term “nihilist” and using it against heretics1681. This connection, however, has been disputed1682. Yet, the misunderstanding dies hard and Augustine’s name keeps on recurring in the historical accounts of nihilism1683.

Another medieval quarrel leads more directly to a series of modern thematicizations of nihilism. The idea of destructio rei in nihilum, or more compactly, that of annihilatio, had its hold on practically all of the participants in the most fundamental questions of the era. Aquinas made the distinction between actual and possible destruction and Ockham sought to prove that there is, in the idea of a creator capable of destroying, a contradiction in terms. Annihilatio called into question the continuity of being by revealing the perspective of a world created from nihil sinking back into the nihil. Later on, the theological model of annihilatio was transformed by Hobbes and Bacon into the basis of secular physics.1684

As a philosophical problematic annihilatio has converged the discussion of nihilism in recent times -
with, say, Bergson, and Don Cupitt\textsuperscript{1685} - and by the time passed, it has become a devastatingly real option in international power politics\textsuperscript{1686}. Nowadays, nihilism is more often related to an environmental catastrophe than to nuclear war\textsuperscript{1687}.

To close this perspective to the pre-history of nihilism, one may consider George Berkeley as an example of the flexibility of the vocabulary of negation. In the early 18th century, this philosophical bishop worried over a particular variety of materialist mathematicians whom he called “meer triflers, meer Nihilarians”. Where Newton would represent to Berkeley the witty, the more acceptable materialists, the “wit and industry” of nihilarians, by contrast, did nothing to improve the conditions of humanity.\textsuperscript{1688}

**Late 18th & Early 19th Century**

*France*

It is widely agreed upon that the term “nihilism” first gained currency in the pre-revolutionary France. The priority speaks in favor of Paris as the womb for yet another new way to direct intellectual dispositions. Yet, very little has been said to clarify the background of this first, more or less generalized usage. There are a few writings, first known from the year 1733, in which the term occurs, but they have been labeled as “relatively obscure”\textsuperscript{1689} or, in any case, “relatively unknown” and, thus, with “no role in the later reappearance and development of the concept”\textsuperscript{1690}. There seems to be some kind of a connection with the early scholastic debate over ‘nihilanism’ with evident extensions, transformations and reapplications\textsuperscript{1691}. Be that as it may, Donald A. Crosby feels free to maintain that before 1870’s there were merely “scattered” uses of the term\textsuperscript{1692}.

According to Frederick C. Beiser’s recent judgment, the increasing pressure of nihilism, from the late 1780’s onward, was due to the degradation of the kind of rationalist metaphysics construed by Wolff and Leibniz\textsuperscript{1693}. Hans-Georg Gadamer has also said that Leibniz already anticipated the course of nihilistic and subjectivist idealism that came to reach its peak in Nietzsche\textsuperscript{1694}. Beiser and Gadamer are, however, making general points in terms of the history of ideas. They are not reconstructing the conceptual history of nihilism.

The first text book recognition nihilism ever deserved came in L.-S. Mercier’s *Néologie ou Vocabulaire des mots nouveaux II* (1801). Mercier loads the term with a strong pejorative sense and attributes it to people entertaining an indifferent stance toward the crucial social questions of the day. He makes it clear that nihiliste or rienniste is a vicious product of the Enlightenment, a person believing in nothing. Ironically, this lexicographer, a recorder of nomenclatural facts, accuses, in particular, the encyclopedic
project of Diderot and d’Alembert for arousing nihilism.\textsuperscript{1695}

Of the better known French thinkers, Maine de Biran soon adopted the word in his vocabulary. In a journal inscription of his, dating from 1824, there is talk of the speaker’s “spiritual condition” as “nihilistic and incredulous”.\textsuperscript{1696}

\textit{Germany}

i) Kant’s Legacy

Those with the unerring sense of discriminating philosophical questions from the wealth of unphilosophical ones, locate the emergence of a specifically philosophical interrogation over nihilism in the late 18th century German critique of Kant. The two crucial men, absent from nearly all of the discussions on nihilism, are Jacob Hermann Obereit and Daniel Jenisch.

In Obereit’s \textit{Die wiederkommende Lebensgeist} (1787) “Nihilisme” (thus written in its capitalized French form) features as one of the \textit{dramatis personae} in a philosophical dialogue concerning the basis of knowledge and existence in the aftermath of Kant’s critical work. It is the chief occupation of this character to undermine the trustworthiness of a given belief. Though it has not been possible to trace Obereit’s specific sources, it has been shown that his presentation draws heavily from the French theosoph Louis Claude de Saint-Martin. Saint-Martin, for his part, did not use the word “nihilisme” in his writings, but spoke frequently of “man’s will to annihilate” God. What is more, he defined atheism as the will to annihilate and as the belief “in demonstrating nothingness”.\textsuperscript{1697}

There seems to be, therefore, good grounds to make a case for an idea historical continuity not only from theology to philosophy but from the French discussions to the German vocabulary as well. However, this is not to say that the links were always known to people uttering the word, nor that the apparent thematical tightening of the discussion is necessarily due to any real transformation from looser to more rigorous speech, and not more to the growth of the present awareness of the discourse of the era.

Daniel Jenisch comments directly his former teacher Kant in a very harsh tone of voice. Writing in 1796 on Kant and his influence, Jenisch attacks the transcendental self depicted by Kant as a solipsistic construction, and the Kantian knowledge, therefore, as mere illusion. It has been pointed, on the basis of a contemporary review, that the use of the word by Jenisch did not seem to have provoked any bewilderment. Nevertheless, Jenisch himself can be seen to be offering a neologism. He writes that Kant’s philosophy ends up in atheism or, as he adds, in nihilism which “is the right word for it”.\textsuperscript{1698}
It has been said that many people felt as if Kantian philosophy left them stranded in nihilism. This general claim can be supported by combining the testimonies of Jenisch and Jacobi with the remarks by Herder and von Kleist. These men wrote of their fear of an abyss been opened by Kant.\textsuperscript{1699} As it happens, the young Kant himself had spoken of the chance of a meaningless existence by referring to a “black abyss”\textsuperscript{1700}. Was he trying to close or explain the abyss with his philosophy or not, a plurality of his peers and followers saw an intimate relatedness between his project and the threat of nihilism.

One way of condensing the issue by way of Kant is given by Walter Bröcker. According to him, there was, first, the demolition of subjective metaphysics with the invalidation of the arguments for God’s existence. Secondly, there was the installment of the postulates of practical reason. Thirdly, there was the developing of transcendental position. This is the three-sided legacy of nihilism that Kant passed on to the coming generations. In Bröcker’s words, while the first dimension meant the loss of higher reality and the second for the attempts to save it by a search for certainty and new absolutes, the third one gave way for the divinization of human beings.\textsuperscript{1701}

ii) Jacobi & Fichte

Only at this point it is F. H. Jacobi’s turn to make his entrée, although he is most often described as the first thinker with philosophical sense attached to the word nihilism\textsuperscript{1702}. Jacobi wrote against Fichte and idealism and drew support from common sense realism à la Thomas Reid, first in 1799 and another time in 1815.

Jacobi’s sources for the word could be Obereit or Jenisch, but the medieval debates as well, since Jacobi was well aware of the Christological controversies. Another thing is that a year before Jacobi’s blow on Fichte, the latter had been accused of “annihilating” the work of a colleague by inappropriate manners. Furthermore, it is probable that even as early as in the last years of 18th century nihilism was to some degree popularized.\textsuperscript{1703}

Jacobi’s critique stresses the untenable self-sufficiency of discursive reason disclosed in isolation from the rest of the reality. Jacobi considers Fichte’s absolutization of reason as fully fledged Kantianism. For Jacobi idealism simply is nihilism, because its very reliance on apriori Heiligenschein. It makes it all too evident that philosophy must be empiricism. Jacobi sees in the development of nihilism a major destructive power.\textsuperscript{1704}

Fichte became provoked and reacted repeatedly to Jacobi by stressing the misunderstandings of his thought. In the 1812 edition of his Wissenschaftslehre, he raises the question as to how “to avoid this
collapse of reality, this nihilism?" His answer is a thinking “to the end”, by which alone human existence can be grounded “in pure reality”. 1705

iii) Schelling & Hegel

In 1803, Schelling was twice charged of nihilism by Jacobi’s fellow Christian empiricists. Schelling did not welcome the phrase as an adequate description of his own philosophy. 1706

In Hegel, one has perhaps the first thinker who developed a positive attitude to nihilism. Hegel saw it as the task of philosophy “to recognize the absolute nothing”. His early essay “Glauben und Wissen” (1802) makes reference not only to Jacobi and nihilism, but also to the death of God. The thesis has been put forward, according to which it is from Hegel that the history of nihilism, as it is known, - in connection with the end of metaphysics - begins. 1707

Another way to link Hegel with the nihilist debate is to draw from his analysis of the “unhappy consciousness”. This issue has been put as follows: “the suppression of Nihilism is equivalent to the suppression of man’s merely historical individualism or uniqueness. The discontinuity of temporality is healed only by completeness in the sense of rational knowledge.” 1708

As Hegel went on to develop his ideas, he was accused of advancing a nihilistic conception of God. In 1835, Ch. Weisse wrote of Hegel as a thoroughgoing nihilist with a purely logical view of God as a category. With Hegel, Weisse stated, personal God gets trapped in “coincidence, or non-being”. 1709

iv) Jean Paul

The ground for an aesthetic discourse on nihilism was prepared by Jean Paul. In his Vorschule der Ästhetik (1804), he identified nihilism with the hostility to experienced reality and the correlative limitless self-respect. Jean Paul attacked nihilism as a popular tendency of free-play in nothingness at the price of being. According to him, the purely formal tendency embodied in nihilism, especially in Novalis’s work, just as its apparent opposite, materialism, could only produce poetry that is no poetry. 1710

v) Fr. Schlegel

The most isolated figure in this narrative, and hence, helpful in questioning its odd coherence, is Friedrich Schlegel. Nihilism is mentioned a few times in his texts from 1797 onwards, but this
fragmentary contribution has been left with quite scarce specification.  

I would suggest that Schlegel’s role is more important than what is assumed, whether it is judged by his writing as such or by its influence. The more obvious case of Jacobi should not neutralize Schlegel's contribution. Quite simply, Schlegel wrote of nihilism more extensively than anybody before Nietzsche. He connected it, in an interesting way, with many problems and he made himself heard. As Gawoll says, Schlegel connected the old issue of *annihilatio* to the more general and more modern problematic of nihilism.  

It was said above that the case of ‘nihilanism’ has all but been forgotten after the medieval debates and bears hardly any relation with the modern case of nihilism. However, Schlegel came to combine, some time between 1810 and 1828, the quarrel of nihilanism with contemporary debate over divinity. More specifically, he pondered on modern idealism (from Leibniz to Fichte) and the realistic thought of a German mystic of the Middle Ages, Jacob Böhme, especially his construction of the devil within the deity. The mystic dimension, indeed, was important for Schlegel, and that is where he anchored his thematization of nihilism. He held that the ‘[m]ystic’s antithesis is Nothing or All; Empiricist’s - Something or More’. Accordingly, he wrote that “[t]he religious ideas of metaphysics are *Nothing and All, creation and infinity, spirit and word*.  

In Schlegel’s view, it is not only sin that drives humans away from God, it is, rather, the “worldly nothingness”. Closely related to this, there are his remarks against the ancient idea of creation out of nothing. This testifies, in Schlegel’s mind, “‘the possible necessity or the necessary possibility” of the existence of evil. Evil emerges from the freedom of the spirit to direct itself to nothingness.” Schlegel adopts the view that the real way to God is to be found through living in love and quest, “but still (captured in nothingness) sensually confused and sensually dependent”.  

If the mystic is Schlegel’s most peculiar field, it by no means excludes other kinds of approach. He wrote of Jacobi as an “empirical mystic” whose “philosophical service” was to make a case about Fichte. Schlegel’s own critical remarks about Fichte are directed to the conceptuality of nothingness, and seem to reach their peak in the insight that Fichte failed to account for the activity of the asserting Ego. Moreover, Schlegel thought that the isolated faculty of reason is the product of “a breaking into pieces of the original human powers”. Reason thus understood, had as its object “the nihility, the nothingness, the nirvana of India”. Schlegel may well be the first one in the long succession of writers relating nihilism with oriental pantheistic mysticism.  

He wrote that the negative just as the positive can form a system of its own. Schlegel asked: “Should
nihilism not form its own definitive system?” He located nihilism in its modern form, as did Jacobi, in the quarrel between idealism and realism (or empiricism). Unlike Jacobi, he wanted to defend neither of the participants in this debate, but held instead that both tend toward nihilism. This would be original enough, but what is, I think, Schlegel’s most important extension of the nihilistic problematic is the way he drew parallels between contemporary and earlier debates, that is, put nihilism in a historical setting. He writes of Spinoza and Leibniz as “simultaneous idealists and realists. Spinoza realizes an ideal; Leibniz idealizes the real. Spinoza’s principle is All. Leibniz’s Nothing.” It appears that Schlegel is interested in both the “analytical” side and the “historical” side of nihilism. The analytical dimension, description of nihilism as a permanent possibility, is clearly actualized in his fragment: ”All wit tends toward nihilism (Voltaire, Swift)” 1716

Schlegel started out from the critique of German idealism with a moderate attitude: “The insight into the nihility of the sensual world - into the nihility of the external phenomenon, is what one gains from realism and idealism”. Looking into this Nichtigkeit opened for him a wide field of thought. Schlegel writes about Platonic treatments of being and non-being, the nothingness being to chaos what chaos is to the world, the relation of conceptuality and the a-conceptual nothingness and the notion of the borderline as a kind of Nothing. To be sure, these questions are no isolated scholastic dilemmas. Schlegel is able to write that the determining of positivity, negativity, neutrality and nullity involves the foreplay “of the philosophy of war. Should one neutralize or annihilate the negative?”. He says elsewhere that “[w]ar is music and algebra of political life, Nothing and All, the inner dualism, the beginning and end of justice”. 1717

vi) von Baader

In theology, the polemic of nihilism proper came to the fore with an acquaintance of Schlegel, Franz von Baader, who was even once hailed as the very first philosopher of nihilism1718. His key treatises from 1824-1826 showed nihilism as the breakdown of the original unity of faith and reason. In von Baader’s opinion, scientific fervor no longer respected the integrity of religion. The bitter fruit of the Enlightenment was a crisis of nihilism. His handling of nihilism was by no means scholastic. More than the theoretical twists, he emphasized the practical cultural effects of such decay.1719

von Baader knew Jacobi and discussed Kant and Hegel in his writings. In his text Über die Freiheit der Intelligenz (1826), von Baader made clear his position as to the “great problem of our times”. He spoke in favor of the “reunion”, or “restoration”, of “science through religion”. And he disapproved both the “misuse of intelligence destructive for religion” and the “inhibition” (shunning or despising) of reason. von Baader called the latter kind of bad tendency “Obscurantismus” and the destructive one
vii) Others

There is some indication that the use of Nihilismus was beginning to be fairly frequent already during the first half of the 19th century. In 1822, for instance, J. Görres spoke of nihilism as fugitive indifference and self-enamored stupidity. The word was also used to convey either wavering opportunism or desperate clinging to what is at hand or the case. All these instances have been referred back to the pejorative model of Mercier.

A fairly similar case is Berthold Auerbach’s 1846 call for a more vigorous Christianity to fight the growing loss of faith. He spoke of religion as the only power capable of leading “new humanity to peace and beauty of existence”. According to Auerbach, the devilishness of humans could be perceived everywhere so that it was necessary to counter both the modern secular state system and the humble kind of religious quietism.

Elsewhere

The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard must be mentioned here. Although he did not use the word “nihilism”, his work is often seen in terms of nihilistic problem and vocabulary. Quite specifically, his philosophical project has been interpreted as an attempt to counter nihilism. What is important, for the present chronicle, is that his teacher Poul Martin Møller, not only had outlined the scenery in which Kierkegaard was to engage himself, but also characterized it with the help of the notion of ‘nihilism’.

Apart from these concerns, in the medical circles of Vienna, a policy of “therapeutic nihilism” made its breakthrough during the early 19th century. With its linkages to the French “therapeutic scepticism”, it was based on the conviction that, in order to make the most reliable diagnosis and to discard inefficient treatments, patients should be given no medication. The autonomous course of disease was to be observed. Therapeutic nihilism lead to serious neglect of pain and suffering, as it also prevented inventions of medical improvement that could not be accommodated in the rigorously positivist frame of reference.

Late 19th century

British Isles

It is from Jacobi that Sir William Hamilton, the assistant and expositor of the Scotch philosopher,
Thomas Reid, got the word in his own and, at the same time, in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical vocabulary. Hamilton shared Jacobi’s view of Fichte as "the most consistent scheme of idealism" deserving the name nihilism. For Hamilton the hallmark of nihilism was not only the destruction of the outer world, but also, and more critically, the denial of the inner one. This denial of “the reality of consciousness” was, according to Hamilton, present not only in Fichte, but in Hume as well.1728 Of the other British philosophers, J. S. Mill came in touch with nihilism for the obvious reason that he had assumed the task of refuting Hamilton’s entire philosophical teaching1729. Thomas Huxley seems to have developed the usage of the term in his own direction, when he, in 1871, termed Spencer’s politology as “Administrative Nihilism”. In Huxley’s sense, nihilism meant the state's unjustified withdrawal from the maintenance of public welfare.1730

In 1889, the young Bertrand Russell, explicitly advocated “Nihilism” as a necessary step on the way toward revising intellectual and social institutions. To exemplify these revolutionary shifts, he referred to the Copernican as well as to the French revolution. He held that it makes little sense to deplore nihilism as unsystematic, since “in a time of its success” it will develop into a system that is “better and more effective” than the one it has dethroned.1731

*America*

Starting to employ the neologism in the American soil, William James and Charles S. Peirce most likely adopted Hamilton’s definition. In any case, James calls, in a note from around 1880, the Humean kind of “classificatory” idealism - stating that “a certain thing is objectively real because I find it classing itself with the group I have learned to call the group of objective realities” - “Nihilism”, and applies it to describe Alexander Bain’s thought1732. More important, James felt himself forced to label, by that word, the radical Pyrrhonist position of the legendary Harvard evolutionist, Chauncey Wright. Wright accepted the description as adequate.1733

In fact, James had considerable use for the word. What appears to be his first sketch, precisely in connection with Wright, has it that “Nihilism after all amounts to this: [...] [it] denies this to be a Universe, and makes it out a “Nulliverse””. James presents it as Wright’s conviction that “[b]ehind the bare fact of resemblance is nothing” and, therefore, only the “plenary existence” counts. He says that this is tantamount to denying there being any “Nature in things”, that is, no potentiality, effectiveness or continuity. The disagreement is crucial for James’s own common sense processualism, which insists on the continual character of happening with “one thing run[ning] into another”, instead of requiring, nihilistically, that “[o]f the two elements of a change [...] one does not exist at all till the other has ceased entirely”. In this light, James relates Wright’s nihilism to nominalism that falls short of
understanding the “duplication of the phenomenon”.\textsuperscript{1734} In another note, James separates between, on the one hand, realist and idealist substantialists allowing the existence of outward entities, and, on the other hand, nihilists holding on to the exclusive being of thoughts.\textsuperscript{1735} Later on, James came to combine these critical remarks to further clarify the Pyrrhonist and phenomenalist stance of nihilism. As he saw it, restricting one’s claims to the “instant consciousness” is remaining inescapably with metaphysical thinking, while the claim that “the substance adds nothing to the phenomenon” fails to make much sense.\textsuperscript{1736}

Peirce, on his part, went on to include nihilism as a component in his systematizing of the conceptual space of knowledge. More consistently than James, he tried, in other words, to come to terms with nihilism by placing it among other epistemic standpoints. The linkage to the contemporary European debate was clear and explicitly critical of Hamilton. Peirce set out to defend Kantian philosophy by trying to complete it. In his mind, as it is revealed in a text from around 1890, nihilism was to be likened with idealistic sensualism, where doubt extends from external perception to adherence of processes inside. This was a possibility that, according to Peirce, was foreign to Kant.\textsuperscript{1737}

\textit{Russia}

In the course of the 19th century, the use of “nihilism” grew increasingly frequent, but instead of becoming one global issue it turned out to be a swarm of local meanings. Yet if one should try to estimate the most common referent to the word toward the end of the century, there would, despite the variety, be no real challenge. The overwhelming majority of the utterances of “nihilism”, in different languages, took place in the confines of Russian radicalism.

Before Turgenev, the word nihilism had been sporadically used in Russia during the first half of the 19th century, for instance in relation to Jean Paul’s aesthetic.\textsuperscript{1738} Writing in 1829, the critic N. I. Nadeždin polemicated against Puškin’s Byronian romanticism and used the pejorative \textit{nihilizm} to describe a peculiar fascination with 'non-being' and 'nothingness' as well as 'self-hatred’ and 'disliking of anything existing”.\textsuperscript{1739} By 1840, nihilism was attached to an attitude of lost faith in anything else but science\textsuperscript{1740} and, later on, scientism was to be one of the attributes of nihilist conviction\textsuperscript{1741}.

Turgenev’s main character, Bazarov, is a determined and devoted student, a young man who wanted to “deny everything”, to bow before no authority or principle except utility\textsuperscript{1742}. Bazarov’s convictions were taken to fit well in the radical young generation who made demands for social and cultural reform in the autocratic empire. As the novelist himself reports, restless streets of St. Petersburg, soon after the release of his book, were instantly associated with the stance depicted in his book\textsuperscript{1743}.
Most often the names of Pisarev, Dobroljubov and Chernychevsky are mentioned as the eminent representatives of the new way of thinking\textsuperscript{1744}. Dobroljubov had, in 1859, attacked the nonsense of “high ideals” and the inability to reach the “practical level” as typical of the literature of his time\textsuperscript{1745}.

While aesthetics was also Chernychevsky’s point of departure, \textit{nihilism} became a political topic as he was arrested in 1862. A year later, as a prisoner, he had his programmatic novel \textit{What Is To Be Done?} published. In the book, “nihilism” does not appear. Instead, there are the “new people”. It is highly misleading to render this expression as “new men”, since the novel’s central character is an outstanding heroine who forcefully asserts and defends the cause of women’s liberation\textsuperscript{1746}. Soon thereafter, Pisarev praised the novel as presenting “the new thinking proletariat” with a novel kind of realism likely to be banned as “nihilism”. It was, indeed, banned, and Turgenev, too, moaned over the way people were using his term as an invective\textsuperscript{1747}. It is said that Chernychevski always thought that Turgenev’s book had been an attack against him\textsuperscript{1748}.

The immigrant Alexander Herzen, another key figure of Turgenev’s generation immediately preceding the radicals of the 60’s, clarified, in 1869, the situation in Russia. He wrote that the word is part of the conservative slang seeking to do erase the essentially affirmative radical movement by an etymological gimmick to the extent that it would be better to speak of the latter as \textit{hommes nouveaux}: “this manner of frankly posing questions without polishing, without wariness, without respect, [...] - but with a forceful conviction and an enormous logical audacity [...]”\textsuperscript{1749}.

In the last decades of 19th century there was, indeed, an intense rumour mongering about an Eastern threat to all humanity. It had a bad name: nihilism.\textsuperscript{1750} Foreign observers, who wrote about the instability in Russian cities and on trials of conspirators, produced the thrillers of the time. Books by Dostoevsky and other Russian writers were written and read in this atmosphere\textsuperscript{1751} and Western authors, such as Oscar Wilde\textsuperscript{1752}, contributed to the sense of a specifically Russian chaos and terror. The situation of the terrible Czar against the terrible plotters was sealed by the name of nihilism in the murder of Alexander II, in 1881, and in the legal processes following the assassination.

D.-K. Schédo-Ferroti was one of the first to attempt to give an account of the unstable society in terms of nihilism. From 1860's on, he published several texts to that purpose. He gradually adopted the view that nihilism is “no political sect, it is not even a doctrine”. It is “a moral infirmity” grown out of youthful self-content and tending toward rejection “of the basis of the social contract: religion, family, established government”. As such, nihilism can be met at different times in different places.\textsuperscript{1753}

Schédo-Ferroti further described nihilism as “nothing but a morbid excrescence upon the surface of the
tree of science”, “virus”, symptom of “moral malady”, “foreign sickness”. He said that political nihilism was “rather rare” in the West, but nevertheless, “the horror for all authority” was present among Occidental “ultra-liberals and socialists”. In Russia, it had its background in the Decembrist movement, but, as Schédo-Ferroti insists, at that stage the utopian inclination and constructive stance among the radicals justifies no label of nihilism. He felt necessary to impose a reform in bureaucratic-autocratic system and to erase ancient customs by establishing a new educational system.  

The American Buckley witnessed, in the expedition mentioned, a trial of 14 conspirators, among them several army officials and noblewomen, including “the beautiful Nihilist” Vera Figner “who had been suspected and tracked since 1875”. The process resulted in eight death penalties, two of which were implemented. Buckley wanted to find out what nihilism was and what was the scope of its activity. He tells that it is extremely difficult to study the subject, since the press gives little information on anything, public meetings are forbidden and people remain reserved when in conversation.

Moreover, Buckley writes that he found about the ways of “furnishing recruits to Nihilism”, and that it was from the noblemen, army, students and Jews that the movement got their activists and supporters. The number of nihilists may seem great, because of the terror their acts have excited. Actually, in a country where only 10% of the people lived in towns or cities, it must, as Buckley reasoned, be small, “at no time amounting to more than a few hundreds”. He did not advocate the applying of the term “nihilist” to all revolutionists, but recommended its use for the ones “who would overthrow the existing state by violence”. Outlined this way, nihilists fall into two main categories, “those who would promote open revolt” as distinguished from “those who will resort to the assassination of obstructive officers of the Emperor”. 

Buckley’s conclusion is that the extreme reactionary and oppressive government - arbitrary censorship, postponement of civil rights, Russification of conquered races, suppression of liberal ideas, hasty punishments, rejection of Western influences - the nihilists seek to fight, is very much “occasioned by their own conduct”. He sees in a gradual evolution the only way out, whereas nihilist activity “can only increase the burdens of the people”. 

A bit more systematic presentation of the emergence and nature of Russian nihilism can be found in Ernest Lavigne’s Introduction à l’histoire du nihilisme russe from 1880. One can easily hear the voice of Schédo-Ferroti or the general 19th century pathologizing tone, as Lavigne compares the current “contagious malady” among “certain classes of the Russian nation” to the hysterical, demonomanic and epileptic diseases met in some strata in the societies of the middle ages. According to a further analogy, there is also “a German nihilism (Schopenhauer and Hartmann); there is a French nihilism: the spirit of
negation has always existed; Pyrrho was a nihilist. Variety has concerned the forms of nihilism.”

However, Lavigne’s objective is not a philosophical essay on nihilism but an exercise in documentary. Right at the start, he has a helpful, albeit brief recourse to other sources by identifying a 1879 book on nihilism by a young Italian Arnaudo as well as to Leroy-Beaulieu’s equally recent article on this topic in the journal *Revue des Deux-Mondes*. He then offers his own text just published in *Liberté* in order for it to serve as the preface of the book. Lavigne’s approach resembles Buckley’s account in the way it treats nihilism as a “party”, links it to instances of the criminal law enforcement and emphasizes the question of “complete revolution” or “a sort of total subversion”. Yet, Lavigne entertains a more sympathetic attitude to the legitimate demands of the Russian people, attaches “nihilism” to the grand narrative of the development from servitude to liberation and thus transforms its pejorative sense. Nihilism, for him, is “a generic term applied to all those who aspire toward a social metamorphosis”. As Lavigne sees it, the “basis of nihilism” in Russia is the “agrarian revolution”.1759

According to Lavigne, one may distinguish between scientific, doctrinal and militant types of nihilism. Scientific nihilism indicates those who study and criticize the actual economic relations. Chernychevsky, whose *What Is to Be Done?* is mentioned as having already been published in France, is picked out as the champion of this variety of nihilism. It is out of the theoretical efforts of Stankevich, Herzen, Bakunin, Pissemly and Belinsky that the nihilistic analysis of the Czarist Russia emerged. Apart from Chernychevsky’s economic studies, his novel is, so Lavigne, to be seen as a serious projection of nihilist ideals against the caricatures of Turgenev.1760

In Lavigne’s vocabulary, “doctrinal nihilism”, in turn, refers to immigrant rebels whose dearest forum was Pierre Lavrov’s *En Avant*. Radical views - such as primacy of the socio-economic problem, absolute anti-statim, resolute anti-nationalism and intermediary stage of a democratic republic on the way to emancipation of labour and free associations - were advanced among the Lavrovists. According to Lavigne, there is a decisive step from the prudent and tempered “philosophical spirit” of the doctrinal nihilists of the *En Avant* to the agitational and inviting propaganda of the underground publications like *Land and Liberty*, *Popular Will* and *Tocsin*. “Militant nihilism” signifies the obscure activists in Moscow and St. Petersburg along with their collaborators in Switzerland and England. It is Lavigne’s estimation that, despite the potentially strong popular support for anti-Czarist action, there is not really an organized conspirational body in terms of “general centralization”. Nihilism in action is tantamount to isolated deeds, small disaggregated groups and loose affiliations. Lavigne thinks that the armed activists have caused themselves a great deal of harm and “retarded the revolution”.1761

Lavigne’s endorsement of the improving of the condition of the Russian peasants does not prevent him
from closing his book with the words of caution. He condemns the “series of nihilist crimes” and expresses his hope for a “strong” and “intelligent power” capable of “preventing and disarming” the revolution. Yet, Lavigne explains the extralegal actions by the absence of the freedom of speech and other basic rights, that is, by the absence of lawful means of communication. The situation is such that individuals resort to deeds that “everybody condemns but nobody can stop”.1762 As one can readily see, Lavigne’s reconstruction ends in treating nihilism quite narrowly as the Russian critical movement gone out of hand in the rigid authoritarian circumstances and perverted to hopeless instances of terrorism.

Karl Oldenberg is another invaluable source for these contemporary accounts of the Russian situation. His Der russische Nihilimus (1888) contains not only a balanced account of the development of recent Russian social history, but also a whole section on bibliographical matters. Oldenberg speaks about nihilism having three stages: the original ideology of 1858-1867, the phase of popular propaganda between 1868-1877, and the period of terrorism until 1887. Oldenberg comments on the nomenclatural transformation of the ism since Turgenev, by remarking how, in Russia, the term soon became obsolete, whereas abroad it stands for all of the different fractions of “the party”. He chooses to use the term in a wide sense contextually specified.1763

Oldenberg states that the original nihilism was at the same time analogical to the “general trend of the Enlightenment and progress” and a reaction against it. The new thinking soon turned into a “cramp-like drive to deny what has been taken valid” in whatever sphere of life. Oldenberg notes that the earliest version of nihilism died, as did the fictional Bazarov, young. The hope for a social reform, which was constitutive of it, was replaced by the inclination toward chaos. Oldenberg describes the division of nihilists, after the assassination of the Czar, into groups of terrorists on one hand, and populist agitators or narodniki, on the other. He states that there are expectations among nihilists not only for more assassinations, but also for the war in Europe.1764

Oldenberg separates the scholarly uses of “nihilism” from the catchword instances. He records Schédo-Ferroti’s, “the well known political writer and author”, text of 1867 as a point of departure in assessing Russian nihilism. In contrast he writes about an article in Deutsche Rundschau, “Der Nihilimus in Russland”, in 1878, as of little value and clearly erroneous in its stress on the negative character of nihilism. Another example of good research after Schédo-Ferroti is to be found in Arnaudo’s Il nichilismo. Oldenberg goes on to record how Alexander’s murder was followed by “an entire flood of literary products, most of which are quite worthless for a historiography of nihilism”. As a curious genre in itself, he introduces the often fake memoirs of nihilists claiming to have been sentenced to Siberia.1765

Indeed, nihilism was an irresistible topic for great many literary works during the last decades of the
19th century. Apart from what Turgenev and Dostoyevsky wrote, there is, for example, Oscar Wilde’s 1880 play *Vera, or the Nihilists* where the heroine activist pronounces: “The hour is now come to annihilate and to revenge”\(^{1766}\). Fritz Horn’s novel *Nihilist Woman* (1882) begins with the sentence “It was a wild, unpleasant night” and ends with the sentence “Will it [the protagonist’s dead heart] wake up one day to a new and better life, or is the human existence but a dream, a phantom, a nothingness?” In between, the author relates how the Russian Nahida von Brandt, “the most erudite and the most beautiful” of the students in the University of Zürich, exerts questionable influence upon her young and dazzled male acquaintances. Her credo reads: “I am a nihilist. This is to say that I believe nothing and hope nothing other than what I conceive and can achieve through my soul. I am the enemy of the so-called culture, in so far as it does not make people happy […] My god is my own self and its interest, my religion is the naked, cold egoism”. Moreover, in a dialogue between other characters, the point is expressed that nihilism is something deeply Russian, on the basis that *nitschewo*, or “no matter”, is the most frequent word to “come from a Russian mouth”\(^{1767}\).

One can also mention Johannes Alfthan’s little novel *The Suspected Nihilist*, published in 1882 in Stockholm, where the protagonist, lieutenant Danilo Wielsky is trying to decide between his loyalty to the Czar and his love of freedom and happiness of the people. There is no choice, however, as a corrupt general sets him up to establish a financially profitable “nihilist capture”. Wielsky is on the way train to Siberia, as his fiancé, the Polish Olga, comes to rescue, and the lovers escape to Finland and to “the free Sweden”\(^{1768}\). S. Kravchinsky, in turn, wrote his memoirs with the pseudonym Sergei Stepniak. In his book, there is as much romance as in Alfthan’s story, yet lengthy dialogues on Russian fate, Russian mentality, Russian generations and Russo-Western relations to merit more “realistic” an outcome. To be sure, it was Kravchinsky’s fame as the assassinator of the St. Petersburg chief of police and his colourful life as an autobiographical lecturer, with journeys reaching all the way to America, that brought him probably the widest audience that any writer on nihilism could hope\(^{1769}\).

While Dobroljubov, Chernychevsky and Pisarev remained little known figures in European consciousness, Mihail Bakunin was one of the much more notorious characters to be viewed under the aspect of nihilism. In France, Jean Bourdeau published a book in 1892 by the title *Le socialisme allemand et le nihilisme russe*. He depicted nihilism through the work of Bakunin and saw its development as quite continuous\(^{1770}\). The anarchist activist Bakunin is still the key figure in the attempts to make sense of the career, or of the distortion, of nihilism. In Aileen Kelly’s analysis, Bakunin’s stance is described as wavering. He had been acquainted with, and attracted to, the emerging pre-industrial non-class of *raznochintsy*\(^{1771}\), or the young intelligentsia of “unwashed seminarians and nihilists”. Of this type, Kelly introduces, instead of the already mentioned triple, such “extreme examples” as Nikolai Utin, Nikolai Zhukovsky, Aleksandr Serno-Solovevich and Mikhail Elpidin. Yet, as Bakunin came in
touch with the activist Sergei Nechaev and his, in Kelly’s words, “brutally consistent nihilism which rejected the virtues of the old world along with is vices”, he drew back. Bakunin criticized Nechaev for his “lack of knowledge of men, [...] of the social conditions, habits, customs, thoughts and common feelings prevalent in the so-called educated world” and accused him for longing after “absurd, impossible things, the total negation of man’s individual and social nature”. This is not to say that he did not hold on to his own cult of violence.1772

Marx and Engels publicly rid themselves, and the true radical workers’ movement, of the anarchist and terrorist inclinations of Nechaev. As Nechaev, in 1871, was arrested for having had a member of his own activist group murdered, the considerable European publicity for the affair did not escape from Marx and Engels. They condemned the terrorist and “arch-anarchistic” ideology of a “pan-destruction” and used the opportunity to accuse such immigrants, as Bakunin, for jeopardizing the safety of Russian activists by sending them mail that would only be seized by the police.1773 As is only evident from these aspects only, the question of the place of nihilism from the viewpoint of marxism and the bolshevist revolution is a complex one. Following the lead of Lenin, Tibor Szamuely, in particular, has underlined the essentially revolutionary thrust in the emerging intelligentsia1774. The official marxist-leninist opinion has been described as quite favorable to nihilism1775 and, indeed, Great Soviet Encyclopedia spoke of the importance of this “progressive” movement for revolution, albeit dissociating it from bolshevism1776. As late as in 1988, Chernychevski was hailed to have “developed and concreticized the idea of social change” by stressing, say, collective ownership1777.

Few commentators, however, have gone so far as to say that it was precisely the anti-humanistically nihilist or terrorist element that lived on, albeit in constant tension with humanism, in the early Russian socialism1778. To be sure, there have been others speaking of nihilistic elements in the still later stages of Soviet communism1779. In any case, nihilizm has retained its usability, as, for instance, the poet Yevtushenko was counted among the later nihilists campaigning for aesthetico-political regeneration1780. The word has also been used, in a strongly pejorative sense, by the marxist-leninists to refer to the Western neo-Marxists, such as Adorno1781.

But the linkage of nihilism to terrorism that was often alleged or affirmed1782 is being increasingly denied1783. William van den Berchen says that “Nihilists were not [...] political ideologists but poets, literary critics and general publicists”1784. Other Western observers, too, tend to underline that, at least for such people as Pisarev, the reformist and the legal aspirations had the upper hand of the revolutionary ones1785. And further, the Herzenian stress on the affirmative spirit of the movement blamed as “nihilists” has been recently repeated1786, as commentators specifically say that nihilists “did hold beliefs”1787. As a kind of a consummation of these revisions, it is emphasized that Russian nihilism
was not a terrorist ideology, not any revolutionary force, not even a social movement, and no negative stance. Instead, “it was an ethos”\textsuperscript{1788}. This view is taken from Richard Stites who has underscored, most of all, the feminist aspects of nihilism. Similar emphasis on women liberation had been put even earlier\textsuperscript{1789}. According to the timely testimony of one of the actors on the Russian ideatic scene of the mid-19th century, Nikolai Strakhov, “Nihilism itself hardly exists, although there is no denying the fact that Nihilists do”\textsuperscript{1790}.

The shift, in assessing Russian nihilists, from the overestimation of activist revolt on the social field has had its repercussion on the interpretation of Turgenev, too. The focus seems to have changed from Bazarov’s nihilism to Turgenev’s own nihilism as illustrated in his letting the main character finally shatter in an unhappy romance and forced into a state of resignation. The plot can be grounded in Turgenev’s Schopenhauerian inspirations\textsuperscript{1791}. Was Turgenev inspired by Schopenhauer, the philosophical mixture that is usually brought to bear on Russian nihilism, first depicted in his Bazarov, can be differentiated as follows. I. M. Bochenski characterized, in 1950, Dobroljubov, Chernychevsky and Pisarev “crude” and “primitive” utilitarians and materialists with still strong connections to Christian religiosity\textsuperscript{1792}. Such materialist writers as Vogt, Büchner and Moleschott, on the one hand, and Feuerbach, on the other, are among the incontestable inspirers\textsuperscript{1793}. Apart from them, the older generation of enlighteners from Diderot and Hévelius to Lessing, are mentioned as important\textsuperscript{1794}. Liberalists, as Buckle and Mill, can be underscored, too\textsuperscript{1795}, yet Rousseau figures as well\textsuperscript{1796}. The importance of Comte may be underlined\textsuperscript{1797}.

As for the stress on women rights, Mill is sometimes replaced by focusing on George Sand\textsuperscript{1798}. The more readily revolutionary setting is gained by having a recourse to Heine, Proudhon, Blanc and Lassalle\textsuperscript{1799}. At other times, the explanatory basis is structured by coupling Feuerbach with Kierkegaard to achieve the suitable sort of anti-Hegelianism, as well as opposition toward such positivism and university philosophy as that of the encyclopedists, or of Comte, Buckle and Mill\textsuperscript{1800}.

\textit{France & Germany}

In his book of 1885, \textit{Essai de la psychologie contemporaine}, the conservative Catholic thinker Paul Bourget diagnosed the psycho-cultural state of Europe in terms of nihilism. He saw the developments in German pessimism, Slavic nihilism and the Latin “curious neuroses” exemplified in French novelists and philosophers as strongly analogical. The sense of melancholy and disharmony was present everywhere in European thought. Apart from the Europeans’ “fear of Being and the furious taste for Nothingness”, there was “the Nirvâna of the Hindus”\textsuperscript{1801}.  

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Thus echoing Lavigne’s tendency to generalize, Bourget further spoke of the way “the same spirit of negation” is “day by day obscuring more the occidental civilization”. According to his estimation, the “suicide of the planet” might not yet be that close but this vision was surely “the supreme desire of the theoreticians of the unhappiness”. Bourget’s case studies of nihilism were accorded to “analytic libertinage” of Baudelaire, indifference of Renan, nausea of Flaubert, resignation of Taine and rebellion of Stendhal. Despite his being concerned, worried and earnest, Bourget also showed a remarkable understanding, sharing and admiration for the thoughts and works of his fellow intellectuals.1802 Bourget’s conception was taken up by, for example, Émile Zola, albeit without much of Bourget’s sympathies. Zola came to describe Flaubert’s position as nihilistic. Later on, Marcel Barrès said the same about Taine: “There is nothing. The world is an immense aurora borealis. This absolute nihilism makes him sad but he defends himself against all consoling ideas; he has an intense urge to deny, to destroy.”1803

In Germany, the use and the meanings of the word nihilism proliferated around the midway of the century. One special discourse concerned the oriental, mainly buddhist, kind of religiosity. It was Eugène Burnouf who, in 1844, questionably but with lasting effects associated Buddhism with negativity and nihilism1804. His student Max Müller gave further currency for the term “nihilism” as a synonym for the characteristically eastern way to stress the environing reality as merely apparent1805. Such thinkers as Feuerbach, Stirner, Schopenhauer and Proudhon were called nihilists in the course of the century. The novelist Karl Gutzkow published a story by the name Die Nihilisten.1806 Despite their interest in the Nechaev affair, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were anything but eager to use the word. A few years after the controversy, Engels was, however, ready to make fun of Eugen Dühring’s fear of nihilism. He ridicules the pompousness and cowardness of this university professor before the horror of (in Dühring’s own words) “a doubt worst than nihilism” and (in Engels’s words) “other lovely things such as this”.1807

By the time Nietzsche began his confrontation with nihilism it was already a fairly well established buzzword. Proudhon, Strauss, Feuerbach and Stirner were commonly related to nihilism. Moreover, Schopenhauer and Wagner were labeled as nihilists for their “nirwanist” and “resignationist” emphases.1808

V.a.2 Analytical Uses of Nihilism

As it was seen, the later historian of nihilism, Hans-Jürgen Gawoll refuses the idea of a single concept of nihilism capable of accommodating all of the relevant modifications. He is, however, generous enough to supply an “operative” concept of nihilism: “Its thesis reads: under 'nihilism' it is discussed, from the
late 18th century on, the problem of how to conceive the relationship between the humans and the world either with or without the mediation of an absolute or God. Nihilism is under discussion, as the received interpretation of metaphysical reality is driven to a crisis, or as the end of metaphysics is being explained, so that it seems necessary to reflect upon the ontological status of the world forming the place for the meaningful relationships of human life.\textsuperscript{1809}

In his book, Der Nihilismus im Lichte einer kritischen Philosophie (1941), H. Levin-Goldschmidt defines nihilism as follows: “Nihilism is the belief and the knowledge that, behind all contents of belief or knowledge and behind values, there lies nothing [nichts]. And it is the will to reduce all the contents of belief or knowledge and all the values to this nothing [Nichts]\textsuperscript{1810}.

It is David Farrel Krell’s opinion that “nihilism” is currently used in journalistic and academic debates as a “shibboleth” with which to point to the drastic extremes that the views of one’s proper opponents are claimed to lead to. Apart from such a use of the word, Krell says that the “most original, thought-provoking, and influential” elaborations of the issue of nihilism have come from Nietzsche and Heidegger. Yet, he adds to both these philosophical projects have an underlying connection to Jacobi’s conception of nihilism. What unites the three “philosophically serious” analyses of nihilism is the idea that not the crumbling down of “philosophical idealisms” but their instauration is what lies at the root of nihilism.\textsuperscript{1811}

As if still further reflecting the development of banalization, an up-to-date text book supplies a definition for “nihilism” that is very loose indeed: “any view which contains a significant denial”. To this, it is added, however, that “when the term is used there is often a suggestion of loss or despair”.\textsuperscript{1812} Another way to put it is to call nihilism a “philosophy of negation, rejection, or denial of some or all aspects of thought or life”.\textsuperscript{1813} Whatever the merits of these definitions, they convey the point that the notion of nihilism presents a peculiarly extensive issue that is only to be expected to lend itself to different uses in a variety of fields. It is this differentiation that will be considered next.

**Philosophy**

Hannah Arendt once said that nihilism is inherent in thinking, in so far as each any critical effort presupposes the act of, at least hypothetically, rejecting received views\textsuperscript{1814}. More commonly, however, nihilism is used to account for the most extreme positions on ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics or social critique. If this involves the need to exemplify, modern commentators select some thinkers whose attitude can, in one way or another, represent a nihilistic stance. For instance, such pre-Socratics as Metodorus and Xeniades of Corinth have been said to have entertained ontological and
epistemological nihilism that denies the possibility of being and knowledge. Similarly, sophists, cynics and skeptics have been pointed out as so extreme in their opinions on, in the main, epistemic matters that they are thought to deserve the name of nihilists. Even Epicureans have been related to nihilism because of their affirmation of the world devoid of gods.

One might say that, with an eye on the way such characters in Plato’s dialogues as Callicles and Thrasymachus are also called nihilists, the discourse is, then, a way of demarcating the mainstream of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle off from the seemingly more questionable, obscure or biased convictions among the Ancients.

More originally, John Foster has, in his defence of the Cartesian dualism, spoken of mental nihilism “which denies the existence of a mental realm altogether” and on corresponding physical nihilism. In the contemporary discussion, nihilism has also been ascribed to the ’computational model of mind’ as presented by some cognitive scientists. Alvin I. Goldman, in turn, has spoken of nihilism as a form of scepticism that is captured in the view denying there being, for beliefs or doxastic attitudes, one real system for the rules of justification.

But as the case of Peter Unger shows, however, nihilism does not always stand as the danger to be avoided. Piecing together an argument for ignorance and against absolute certainty, Unger finds support from the “normative nihilism” saying that ’no normative statements are true’. In a later context, Unger went on to develop the ancient sorites argument into a defence of “radical nihilism” that denies the existence of everything.

These examples indicate that nihilism analytically conceived does not have to be merely a way of organizing past philosophical postures. It can take part in modern argumentation. Despite the common charge of nihilism as hopelessly self-refuting position, or despite the view that, in Quine’s words, “[a]nomalies of nothingness […] let themselves readily to tired humor” , many logicians have found much to study in the questions of non-being, non-existence and the total negation of truth or knowledge.

Whereas nihilism rarely appears in these contexts by its name, it could, according to Charles F. Kielkopf, be taken as an object of logical determination. He defines it, at first, as saying that “everything is permissible”. Yet, this would merely be metaethical, while what is needed, in Kielkopf’s view, is to account for the intuitive dimensions related to the term is the metaphysical view of the unintelligibility of reality. Hence, nihilism is best determined as amounting to the modal sentence that “everything is possibly possible” or that “for any p, it is possible that it is possible that p.”
Nihilism may be described as a “coherent”, yet “doomday position”. This is how Onora O’Neill criticizes the practically “non-universalizable” nihilism: “Most supposed nihilists embrace nihilism for themselves but assume life as usual for others, whose habits and virtues their own indifference and neglect is to exploit”. O’Neill goes on to say that nihilism conceived and rehearsed thus in terms of a ‘free ride’ is indeed “often sustainable, since others will be good-natured or unsuspecting”. However, the notions of “connected lives” and “world where action is to continue” are enough to reveal the impossibility to universalize nihilism.1828

Other logical philosophers have insisted on the “interesting and unique” nature of nihilism to the extent that it may “raise no problems about vagueness”1829. John O’Leary-Hawthorne and Andrew Cartens have recently proposed a “metaphysical picture” of “ontological nihilism”. This “attractive” position amounts to treating, say, the utterance “It is snowing” as “a paradigm instance of a perspicuous characterisation of reality just as it stands”1830. One variant of analytical nihilism is “semantic” nihilism associated with the works of Fodor, Churchlands, Stich and Quine and involving doubts concerning the scientific purpose of semantic properties1831. Nihilism may also be identified as one of the many challenges to realism1832.

Of all philosophical contexts, morality may be the most common one for nihilism to appear by its own name. To take one example, David Pace once wrote about the problems in the great structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s work. According to the critic, “Lévi-Strauss has criticized Western values and preached a kind of inter-cultural relativism. But he has almost never actually affirmed any ethical stand.” This prompts Pace to judge his moral philosophy desperate enough to verge on nihilism: “He has denied the universality of norms in his writings on history and value while in his structuralist theory he has insisted that it is absolutely necessary for each society to have such norms. [...] Thus there is something fundamentally nihilistic about Lévi-Strauss’s world-view. [...] There is neither a serious effort to protect the things he sees as threatened nor an attempt to abandon his attachment to them.” Indeed, Pace extends the structuralist’s self-description as a “serene pessimist” with “an element of Nietzschean ‘ressentiment’”, which makes the position one of not “good affirmation” but, instead, of “evil rejection”.1833

André Glucksmann has written that the modern nihilism is essentially the attempt to deny “the experience of evil” by seeking to “elide suffering”1834. Usually, nihilism is depicted in moral philosophy as the extreme to be avoided, yet also as something in relation to which theory construction often takes place1835. Gilbert Harman holds that “ethics is problematic and nihilism must be taken seriously”. Nihilism means that “there are no moral facts, no moral truths, and no moral knowledge”.1836 More specifically, L. W. Sumner uses nihilism as the extreme form of cynicism toward the existence or
binding of true moral rights\textsuperscript{1837} and Thomas L. Carson as the corrupt form of relativism in metaethics\textsuperscript{1838}. Despite these views, there is, for example, Robert Wright saying that “[i]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that the prevailing moral philosophy within many philosophy departments is nihilism”\textsuperscript{1839}.

Combining the broader and the more restricted considerations, Ottfried Höffe defines nihilism as the “negation of morality altogether” and goes on to discuss three types of it. In its naïve sense, nihilism induces from the actual lack of confirmedness to a norm the ultimate invalidity of the norm, and proceeds to generalize this. The second version, cosmopolitan nihilism, makes the case about multifarious and contradictory rival forms of morality in different cultural settings. Third kind of nihilism is the one of Enlightenment, extremist critique of ideology. Finally, Höffe advances to spell out the paradox facing nihilist endeavors: “reversal of a moral [...] order is done in the name of morality”\textsuperscript{1840}.

One more philosopher to be mentioned here who has occupied herself with the issue of moral nihilism is Simone de Beauvoir. It was her express goal to develop an ethics for the existentialist position. She defined nihilism as the “attitude” of someone who, “instead of realizing his negativity as a living movement, he conceives his nihilation \textit{[anéantissement]} in a substantial manner”. Nihilism involves what de Beauvoir terms “the serious disappointed and turned back on itself”. Its merit is to point to “the ambiguity of the human condition”, to recognize that “the world has no justification and is itself nothing”. Its mistake is to appreciate the human liberty and participation is justifying the world. Nihilism is, thus, central for de Beauvoir’s defence of “a morality of ambiguity”: “One may not confuse the notion of ambiguity with that of absurdity. To declare existence absurd is to deny that it could provide with a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assume that the meaning is never fixed, that it must always be conquered.”\textsuperscript{1841}

It could be proposed that, especially among the English-speaking philosophers, nihilism is to be met, after the becoming outdated of the presentations of existentialism, such as those by William Barrett and Hazel E. Barnes\textsuperscript{1842}, in discussions concerning the fate of rationality and realism in different philosophical dimensions\textsuperscript{1843}. The general nature of the discussion is also part of the ground for using nihilism as a pejorative for anyone verging on the position of seemingly irrationalist or anti-realist persuasion\textsuperscript{1844}. More particularly, the heirs and critics of French structuralism, such as Michel Foucault, on the one hand, and the post-analytic thinkers, such as Richard Rorty, are among the major philosophers to be commonly associated with nihilistic positions\textsuperscript{1845}. What may be surprising, however, is that it was Sigmund Freud who was among the first ones to relate nihilism in an attitude that attacked scientific rationality\textsuperscript{1846}. 
Unlike on the historical side of nihilism, analytical experts on the issue are hard to pinpoint. The Swedish *Uppsalaskolan*, however, can be mentioned as a group of philosophers and legal and social theorists who set out, building on Kant but in the spirit of the logical empiricists, to study values from an explicitly *värdenihilistisk* viewpoint. Whereas, in 1937, a German critic accused one of these thinkers for, not only ignorance, but for absurd and inconsistent “value nihilism” or “value insanity”1847, a later Uppsala philosopher sees it best to explain that *värdenihilism* is no nihilism, but a way of accounting, in a realistic and scientific manner, for the notorious items of discourse.1848

Apart from Unger, Sir Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam and Thomas Nagel may represent those analytically oriented major philosophers who have found some use for the term1849.

**Theology**

The classical religious case of nihilism was the attitude toward oriental faith, of which there is still an ongoing debate1850. Some Western authors link modern phenomenalism, or any view in which only the immediately apprehended is real, to the negative techniques of Eastern religions1851. Many experts have found much that is philosophically significant in the variety of Eastern religious cases with emphases on the more or less total negation1852. Within Christianity, nihilism was taken up by Hans Jonas who thought that a “disruption between man and total reality is at the bottom of nihilism”. He drew parallels between the antagonistic nature of gnosticism and the indifferent nature of modern philosophy: the Gnostic “God has more of the *nihil* than the *ens* in his concept”.1853 Recently, this insight has been further developed in theology to defend a distinction between metaphysical (gnostic) nihilism and anti-metaphysical (modern) nihilism.1854

Some theologists have insisted on the connection between *creatio ex nilhil* and the modern nihilistic dream of returning to nothingness1855. Others have attempted to delineate the basic features of *Zeitgeist* in terms of nihilism. Helmut Thielicke may well be the thinker who went most rigorously in that direction.1856 Reinhold Niebuhr is another notable theologian who has been associated with nihilism1857. Otherwise it could be, perhaps, said that nihilism in theology is either seen as the downright opposite of any religious belief1858 or as indicating a struggle to attain a true relation to religion1859. As an attempt to construct nihilism as the horizon for all (philosophical) theology, the massive undertaking by Wilhelm Weischedel has to be mentioned.1860

**Aesthetics & Art Criticism**

Nowadays, it is in art criticism, and *a fortiori*, in literary criticism that nihilism seems to enjoy the
greatest currency. Almost daily, it gets ostensibly defined in reviews and it has become hard to point one single artist since, say, Baudelaire, who is not absorbed into the spectre of nihilism.\textsuperscript{1861} As for the discussion on more distant issues, debate is still going on about the proper way to estimate the nihilistic in German romanticism, as, for example, in novels such as \textit{Nachtwachen von Bonaventura}\textsuperscript{1862}.

As the archetypal cases of nihilist artists, dadaists, surrealists or expressionists\textsuperscript{1863} have often been mentioned. Most commonly named candidates, for the nihilist practitioner of a profession in arts or the one offering the most nihilistic characters, include at least Gottfried Benn\textsuperscript{1864}, the young Brecht\textsuperscript{1865} and Samuel Beckett\textsuperscript{1866}. The list could be expanded by evoking, say, Leopardi, Byron, de Sade, Wagner, Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, Strindberg, Kafka, Ionesco, Cocteau, Lorca, Camus, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Malraux, de Montherlant, Kazantzakis, Broch, Musil, Flaubert, Céline, Cioran, Jarry, Baroja, Dubuffet, Mann, Sylvia Plath, Woody Allen or Bret Easton Ellis.\textsuperscript{1867}

Yet nihilism is not just a label for certain kind of aesthetics. The general and basic nature of creative work has been termed as “nihilistic”\textsuperscript{1868}. Accordingly, the status of fiction has been characterized as “ontological stress between nostalgia and nihilism”. Closely related to this, there is the question of the fictionalization of reality.\textsuperscript{1869}

\textbf{Psychiatry}

In psychiatry, the term nihilism is linked with a kind of delusion, in which the patient either feels him/herself to be as in a dream or experiences the mind, body or some particular part of it, or finds the doctor, as nonexistent\textsuperscript{1870}. Karl Jaspers was the one who gave the decisive impulse for such psychopathological use\textsuperscript{1871}. Placing the psychological state in the more general context of psychic negativity, Hermann Drüe has written what is one the few elaborate presentations on the subject.\textsuperscript{1872}

It can also be remembered that Jung had an explanation for psychic nihilism. In his view, “instincts are part of the living whole”. To liberate them “as individual entities” is to take steps into “chaos and the related nihilism” as the state when “the unity and wholeness of the individual is cancelled and thereby destroyed”. Indeed, psychotherapeutics is, so Jung, the business of “maintaining or reconstructing” this psychic unity.\textsuperscript{1873} Elsewhere, he said that “the human \textit{Durchschnittskomödie}, the cold shadowy side of being-there, the desolate greyness of the psychic nihilism are my daily bread, continuous melody, unstimulating matter.”\textsuperscript{1874}
There can be talk of nihilism as the general view into the questionability of the role of law in stabilizing social life. More differentiated is the question of nihilism as debated among the members of the American Critical Legal Studies school. Its radical wing has enhanced the view that the theoretical and practical system of law is ultimately unjustified.

The political potency of nihilism stems from its being attached to the making of both Russian revolution and the rise of national socialism in Weimar Germany. Yet, discussions over liberalism may contain the view that liberalism is itself “diluted nihilism” in the sense that it accepts power and consumption and seeks to find the proper constraints for them in order for the community to continue its social life.

Every once in a while nihilism is associated with anarchism. This is the reason for George Woodcock to specify, in his fine monograph, that anarchism is not to be confused either with Russian nihilists and their terrorist means plus unanarchist ends or with nihilism “in a general sense”. What this latter alternative means is “negative philosophy”, “philosophy of destruction simply” or the belief in “no moral principle and no natural law”. As Woodcock has it, anarchism rests on a faith “in a moral urge powerful enough to survive the destruction of authority and still to hold society together in the free and natural bonds of fraternity”.

As one can readily see, the defence of anarchism may operate with not that much sympathy for the many defences of nihilism that, with respect to the Russian situation, were seen to involve a repudiation of violence and a revision of destructiveness. Straightforward practical applications aside, nihilism has been linked with other “detotalizing forces” that, alongside with egocentricity, loosens the social ties between people. Nihilism can be associated in social affairs with theories of alienation. It has been argued that the state is dependent upon an atomistic individuality, i.e., nihilism. Emancipatory education can, then, have the unwanted effect of declining individual authority and strengthening the power of the state to impose its own.

Most generally, there has been a tendency to sum up everything from the youth’s disillusionment to the withering away of old customs, as implying a profoundly nihilistic cultural setting. In empirical research, it has been attempted to map out the background for what seems “inexplicable wickedness”, such as vandalism, among the young delinquents.
The new critical edition of Nietzsche’s texts, with the quellenkritisch research it has enabled and inspired, enables an improved judgment of Nietzsche’s contributions to the historical and analytical discourse of nihilism. In what follows, the historical dimension will be elucidated by dwelling on the way Nietzsche adopted the term in his vocabulary and by briefly summarizing the import of his work for the subsequent reverberations in the concept’s career. Thereafter, the scope of Nietzsche’s confrontation with nihilism will be subjected to a brief analytical differentiation.

The first instance of the term, in Nietzsche’s papers, dates from the year 1865. Still a student in Bonn, Nietzsche had written, attending a lecture course by Carl Schaarshmidt, the remark about buddhism as “pantheist nihilism” 1886. Burnouf’s and Müller’s influence on the European, or at least German, academic opinion on Eastern religiosity is clearly seen here.

After this jotting, Nietzsche’s first references, enclosed in two fragments, to nihilism are from the summer of 1880. During the subsequent six years, before nihilism becomes, in the summer of 1886, Nietzsche’s lasting reference point, there are, in his texts, twelve instances of the term. 1887 The first two fragments, as well as the majority of their immediate successors, were unknown up to the Colli-Montinari edition. The case of nihilism being applied by the young Nietzsche to buddhistic conception of the world and divinity, too, remained unknown until 1989. Quite evidently, commentators have not long been in the position to judge the philosopher’s adoption of the term.

Recently, Elisabeth Kuhn demonstrated how the two fragments of 1880 have their joint root in Turgenev’s Fathers and Children and in a text by Prosper Mérimée attached to the French edition of the novel. As Kuhn carefully formulates, whereas the “receiving” Nietzsche might have read or heard about nihilism from just about anywhere, the “producing” Nietzsche was lead by one of these potential inspirations, viz. the Turgenev / Mérimée one, to the first sketches. 1888 Next, the two fragments will be read closely before turning to the other sources.

Mérimée, best known for his book Carmen, was a man exceptionally highly respected by Nietzsche (see esp. M 92, KSA 3, 448, W 2, KSA 6, 15, EH “WiSkb” 3, KSA 6, 286; cf. already MA I 50 & 453, KSA 2, 71 & 294). Nietzsche came in touch with the work of the French writer in the late 1870’s (see N Juli 1879 41 [73], KSA 9, 594). In the context at hand, Mérimée wrote of the situation in Russia and reported that Hegel was being replaced by Schopenhauer as the current idol for activists “proposing to sweep off all existing institutions”. 1889

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The first of Nietzsche’s nihilism notes from 1880 reads as follows:

Der Trost Luthers als die Sache nicht vorwärts gieng, “Untergang der Welt”. Die Nihilisten hatten Schopenhauer als Philosophen. Alle die extrem Aktiven wollen die Welt in Stücke gehen lassen, wenn sie ihren Willen als unmöglich erkennen (Wotan) (N Sommer 1880 4 [103], KSA 9, 125.)

Now, this goes to show how quickly nihilism assumed a key place in Nietzsche’s thought and acquired the ability to both distinguish and combine a variety of issues. Four items are listed. Mérimée’s unwarranted belief in Schopenhauer’s role in the Russian subversion (it was, rather, Turgenev himself who took an interest in the German philosopher) is mentioned in the past tense. This is said beside the remark on Luther’s fascination with the decline of the world. After these aspects, a reference is made to the frustrated extremist activists wishing to break the world in pieces. Fourthly, the supreme Germanic divinity and the principal dramatis persona of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung is written in the parenthesis.

It appears, then, that these considerations pertain to the dynamics of nihilism in a more general fashion than solely with respect to the Russian case. Nietzsche’s being familiar with the popularizing tendency to describe buddhism as a form of nihilism may have helped him to combine the term with both protestant reformation and Wagnerian neo-religiosity. In any case, nihilism seems to be most intimately attached to the notion of the global Untergang, since in addition to Luther’s and the activists’ explicit linkage to it, Wotan is known to be the strongest god that comes, in the final end, to die with all the other divinities in the world scale destruction1890.

As for Schopenhauer being associated with nihilism, one does not have to rely on the Mérimée connection alone. For one thing, Wagner’s overtly Schopenhauerian emphases were known to Nietzsche from early on, and if the closing of his Götterdämmerung could be linked with nihilism, the ground for this linkage might well be Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For another thing, calling Schopenhauer nihilistic was, as suggested in the section V.a.1, increasingly common in the latter part of the 19th century. Indeed, in a letter received by Nietzsche, in January 1873, a poem was described as nihilistic that was written by a certain young writer “with undoubtedly no knowledge of Schopenhauer”1891. This is enough to intimate that the Schopenhauerian was, in Nietzsche’s circles, readily interpretable as nihilistic.

Presumably, the sense of resignation and the denial of the striving force of will were the keys here. As Schopenhauer himself had argued, shutting out the will would seem, for all those still switched on, as but nichts, yet, conversely, the concrete reality to which all the willing grabbed for support amounted,
from the point of view of the already will-less, to nothing. One of Nietzsche’s early notes is specifically on the Schopenhauerian notion of “die Sehnsucht in’s Nichts” (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [174], KSA 7, 207).

One could think that Nietzsche was, with this utterance, making a comment on the nihilistic way Schopenhauer ends his masterpiece, just as he was later to comment on Wagner’s opera ending. Anyway, there seems to be little need for him to get puzzled by Mérimée’s awkward estimation of the idols of Russian radicals. After all, Schopenhauer’s writing already conceals the deeper insight into the business of naming and mocking. His words, just mentioned, referred to the way people’s lives and thoughts may seem to other people with their peculiar perspectives.

Far as I can see, what is most important, in Nietzsche’s first note on nihilism from the summer of 1880, is the way the obvious or the generally discussed instances of nihilism is linked with a not that obvious instance of nihilism. There is the combination of the active nihilism among the revolutionists and the passive nihilism in Schopenhauer’s voluntarism, on the one hand, as well as the one of Luther’s activism and Wagner’s resignationism, both susceptible of nihilistic tendencies, on the other hand. These associations bring the relations between evident and less evident cases of nihilism to the fore.

Shortly afterwards, there came the second note, this time explicitly, on the Russian nihilists. The issue of activism is articulated as follows:

(N Sommer 1880 4 [108], KSA 9, 127-8.)

The middle part of the fragment has it that general opinion on Russian nihilists has turned towards increasing understanding and acceptance. As a whole, the note contains yet another piece of action theoretical reflection, frequent in Nietzsche’s writings during the period, with an actual example considered. Nihilism reignites certain habits of thought for the philosophical observer to reveal. The jotting may be said about questioning the tendency to condemn wrongdoers’ humanity by casting light
on the contradictions in this nearly automatic instance of moralism. Moreover, it testifies to the way Nietzsche’s texts engender in polemical situations. The connection to Mérimée does not restrict the issue to literary influences or to subversive inspirations. Rather, nihilism is, again, combined with properly Nietzschean problems.

The two fragments - coupled with other sufficiently similar notes in the following few years (see N Frühjahr 1884 25 [264] & [281], KSA 11, 80 & 83) - indicate that the Russian case is crucial for interpreting Nietzsche’s thought on nihilism. Yet, they should not be taken to determine that this was even the primary aspect of the matter. At the minimum, one may recognize how it was specific acts of thinking - Luther’s handling of hope and despair, Mérimée’s attempt to explain the Russian situation, nihilists’ drawing theoretical back up from philosophy, Wagner’s construal of the mythic catastrophe, all in the first fragment, and the public view being formed, in the second fragment - that are taken up in Nietzsche’s notes.

This is not to say that the Russian case was unimportant for Nietzsche. On the contrary, I find it just as significant to argue for its broad and decisive importance for him as to avoid declaring it as the prior case. There were a number of personal reasons for the Russian connection. Nietzsche knew many Russian immigrants, the most outstanding of them being Lou von Salomé. She came across Nietzsche through Malwyda von Meysenbug who happened to have translated Herzen’s memoirs.

Nietzsche read Herzen in the summer of 1872. It is clear, then, that he was informed of Russian nihilism early on. He even recommended Herzen to Rohde and wrote to von Meysenbug as follows: “Ich war erstaunt über sie Geschichtlichkeit und Kraft des Ausdrucks […] ich habe aus ihm gelernt, über eine Menge negativer Tendenzen viel sympathischer zu denken als ich bis jetzt vermochte: und selbst negativ sollte ich sie nicht nennen. Denn eine so edel-feurige und ausharrende Seele hätte sich nicht allein vom Verneinen und Hassen ernähren können.” (KGB II/3, August 1872, 43 & 49.)

It appears that Herzen’s stress on the affirmative aspiration of the Russian radicals has been successfully mediated. A “negative tendency” might not entail pure denial and hatred. Yet, Nietzsche had nothing like the Herzenian urgent motivation to try and rehabilitate the young radicals. The language of negation suited for his purposes. In an earlier letter, immediately before the first reference to Herzen’s writing, Nietzsche proposes von Meysenbug a journey together. As it is only typical of him, he adds that should the correspondent refuse his offer, “mein Vorschlag […] ins Nichts verschwendet” (KGB II/3, August 1872, 40).

Most of his Russian acquaintances were the result of Nietzsche’s gaining access to the society of
Wagner. The opera master, in turn, had been allied with Bakunin in the Dresden uprising 1849. Bakunin appears, in Nietzsche’s notes, from the early 1873, although the term “nihilism” still doesn’t. Nonetheless, Bakunin has the distinct characteristics of a nihilist: “Bakunin, der im Haß gegen die Gegenwart, die Geschichte und die Vergangenheit vernichten will. Nun wäre um alle Vergangenheit zu tilgen freilich nöthig, die Menschen zu vertilgen: aber er will nur die bisherige Bildung, das ganze geistige Weiterleben, vernichten. Die neue Generation soll ihre neue Kultur finden”. Despite the emphasis on hatred, there is a revisionary aspect in the description that echoes Herzen’s influence. The total nature of the negation is qualified, when the possibility to “tilgen”, “vernichten” or “ruiniren” is granted, yet the perspective of “verbessern” is also opened. (N Frühjahr 1873 26 [14], KSA 7, 580.) One may note just how much this view of Bakunin resembles the way Woodcock came to emphasize the linkage between destruction and creation in Proudhon and Bakunin in order to save them “nihilism” as a one-sidedly negative philosophy^{1893}.

It is in largely the same tenor that Wagner’s youthful actions, his times as a “polittische Flüchtling [...] im Elend”, are elucidated in the fourth Unzeitgemässe: “Die Möglichkeit eines völligen Umsturzes aller Dinge taucht vor seinen Blicken auf, er erschrickt nicht mehr über diese Möglichkeit: vielleicht ist jenseits der Umwälzung und Verwüstung eine neue Hoffnung aufzurichten, vielleicht auch nicht - und jedenfalls ist das Nichts besser, als das widerliche Etwas.” (UB IV 8, KSA 1, 477-8.) This passage is open for an interpretation guided by the first nihilist note from 1880. In both contexts, the emphasis is on the dynamics of extreme activism and extreme passivism. Although nihilism is not mentioned here, the preference that the ex-revolutionary sets for the “nothing” as opposed to “repellent something” justifies a reading in its terms. Where Luther, Schopenhauer, Wotan and a Russian activist might seem as figures far apart from each other, Wagner can be taken to embody the unifying element of extremist attachment to nihilism to be met in all the four characters.

Hence, one can find, already in Nietzsche’s early writings, an attempt to capture the two sides of nihilism. There is the destructive or utopian nihilism of demolishing the present for the unknown new. There is the escapist and nostalgic nihilism of forgetting the present for a dislocated realm of existence. This is why it was not, for him, any “lapse”^{1894}, on Mérimée’s part, to combine Schopenhauer’s philosophy with the radical social activities. For all its historical inaccuracy, it was a view that chimed well with Nietzsche’s own analyses of the kind of predicament that he, too, was to describe as nihilistic.

Nietzsche exploited, from the beginning, nihilism as a notion that could make sense of both the Christian tradition widely seen as the most grandiose reconstructive effort of the Westerners and the contemporary destructive threats to this tradition. His distinctive manner of doing this was to pay attention how the case of Luther was apt to show the presence of a destructive tendency within the
putatively reconstructive tradition and how the Russian radicals helped to see an instance of the positive within the allegedly destructive counter-tradition. The fact that nihilism was also applied to Buddhism further intensified the self-critical reflection on Graeco-Judeo-Christian cultural heritage. In short, nihilism provided, for Nietzsche, an opportunity to account for the crucial dynamics in occidental civilization.

If one was to specify, on the basis of what has been said so far, Nietzsche’s location on the map of nihilism, the answer would include references to Russia and Germany as well as to arts and literature, politics and religion. Moreover, one might go on underscoring the seemingly psychologizing manner in which Nietzsche pays attention to the zeal, disappointment and comfort of the activist. A philosophical commentator of the narrower persuasion could well be irritated, if the only instance of something with his line of work highlighted really is the erroneous assumption of Schopenhauer’s importance for the anarchist activity in St. Petersburg. Happily, for such a commentator as well as for anybody interested in the larger relevance of both nihilism and philosophy, there is more to it than that. In what follows, I shall outline the overall context of Nietzsche’s contact with nihilism to extend the perspective opened by the first fragments.

In terms of the mainstream philosophical tradition, at least, the most significant issue of nihilism before Nietzsche, was the attempt to cope with Kant’s legacy. This problematic is as well being recognized in Nietzsche’s writings. In the third Unzeitgemäss, a reference is made to a “Gefahr” that Schopenhauer had to face, just as “jeden Denker, welcher von Kantischer Philosophie aus seinen Weg nimmt”. The danger involves, namely, Kant’s growing popular influence that assumes the “Form eines zernagenden und zerbrockelnden Skeptizismus und Relativismus” causing “Erschütterung und Verzweiflung an aller Wahrheit.” As an example of one such thinker in trouble with the harsh Kantian implications, von Kleist is mentioned. (UB III 3, KSA 1, 353-4.)

As for Nietzsche’s possible knowledge of the conceptual history of nihilism, it can be said that he read, say, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schlegel, Feuerbach, Jean Paul, Müller, Bourget, Gutzkow, Dühring, Huxley, all of whom had used the term. It is no surprise that he was to be the chief initiator in the philosophical study of nihilism. When it comes to the philosophical issues of non-being or nothingness or the ancient proto-nihilisms of especially Greek and Oriental origin, they belonged to the persistent reference points of his and, thus, capable of being absorbed to the nihilist problematic.

Nietzsche was, then, particularly well entrusted to investigate nihilism. Was one of his descriptions for nihilism “uncanny”, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one may as well hear one description of himself: “ [...] he had an almost morbid ability to sense a false tone, an insincerity. Such
uncanny clairvoyance is the characteristic of those fanatics of truth who educate themselves by vanquishing the many evil inclinations and passions seething in themselves.”

By this quotation, one may be reminded of the issue of combining “Nietzschean” and “nihilistic” to the point of cross-identification (see section I.a).

There is no denying that nihilism was a personal matter for Nietzsche. Speaking of probably the best candidate for the ultimate inspiration, one does well to observe Nietzsche’s coming across with a text written in the time of publication of his second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung by a disciple of Baader. The text in question was a review of Nietzsche’s book in which the writer Hoffmann expressed his worries about the Schopenhauerian pessimistic crusade deepening into a full-blown nihilism. This reaction is later mentioned in one of Nietzsche’s books. (EH “WisgBs”; DU 2, KSA 6, 318).

When this is related to the event of his way of thinking being called, by a French acquaintance of Wagner, Edouard Schuré, nihilisme écæré meaning a revolting sceptic atheism and Nietzsche’s being amused by the word game of the “herzbrecherisch” (see KGB III/1, März 1881, 68), it is clear that elaborating nihilism was to be a very intimate matter having to do with the growing distance from Schopenhauer and Wagner. Indeed, Cosima Wagner’s diary contains an interesting entry from the early 1882. As the composer’s disillusionment about Nietzsche is described, the philologist philosopher comes out as “absolutely” nichtig serving as “a true example of the not-understanding [Nicht-sehen]”. Moreover, Wagner is reported to say as his view that “Nietzsche has had no thoughts of his own, no blood that would be his own”, but instead “it all is foreign blood that has been mixed within him”.

Later, Nietzsche heard news from Tübingen as to how “ich gelte dort als einer der “negativsten Geister”” (KGB III/5, März 1887, 41). Fifteen years earlier, he had, as was seen above with respect to Herzen, he had spoken of his new ability to sympathize more with the various “negative” currents. Now he was himself aligned with at least some of them.

No wonder, then, that Nietzsche was fond of expressing his hope amidst of psychophysical sufferings by saying how “das Leben” is “immer noch schätzenswerther [...] als das Nichtsein” (KGB III/1, Juni 1882, 204). No wonder, either, that he would parody his freethinking character in a way that echoes Berkeley’s terms ‘nihilarian’ or ‘trifler’: “In der That ist es äußerst zweifelhaft, ob ich jetztz ein “nützlicher” Mensch bin; wer mich nicht als einen höchst überflüssigen Nichsthuer” (KGB III/1, April 1883, 360); “philosophisch-nihilistischen Nichtsnutz” (KGB III/5, März 1888, 281). Further, still, as Nietzsche had once rendered his name as “Pacific Nil” (N Frühjahr 1873, 26 [24], KSA 7, 586), he later made fun of “Nietzsche” meaning “Nihilist” in Polish (KGB III/5, Juni-Juli 1888, 346).
Another thing is the astute sense of the social and cultural climate in the West. There is an ironical tone audible, as Nietzsche refers to the many movements of his day and his being associates with a number of these: “Bei allen radikalen Parteien (Socialisten, Nihilisten, Antisemiten, christlichen Orthodoxen, Wagnerianern) genieße ich eines wunderlichen und fast mysteriösen Ansehens” (KGB III/5, März 1887, 48). One is reminded of the way William James came to piece together the multifaceted currents of the fin de siècle: “The anarchists, nihilists, and free-lovers; the free-silverites, socialists, and single-tax men; the free-traders and civil-service reformers; the prohibitionists and anti-vivisectionists; the radical darwinians with their idea of the suppression of the weak - these and all the conservative sentiments of society arrayed against them, are simply deciding through actual experiment by what sort of conduct the maximum amount of good can be gained and kept in this world.”


Taine was, however, somewhat of an exception in this list of thinkers. In any case, Nietzsche counted him and Jakob Burckhardt, along with himself, “als drei gründliche Nihilisten”. Yet, he added, in a letter to Rohde, that “obschon ich selbst, wie Du vielleicht spürst, immer noch nicht daran verzweifle, den Ausweg und das Loch zu finden, durch das man in’s “Etwas” kommt.” (KGB III/5, Mai 1887, 81.)

This last reference was made beside a self-description as “unterirdisch”, which was one of Nietzsche’s favorite notions during the period (cf. M “V” 1, KSA 3, 11). In all probability, it was taken from Dostoevsky to whom Nietzsche found time to attend and even admit his indebtedness in the matters of psychological wit (GD “SeU” 45, KSA 6, 147). This is not to imply that Nietzsche grasped the bigger picture of Dostoevsky’s Russophilic and Westphobic type of anti-nihilism. Be that as it may, Dostoevsky’s novels, with their persistent emphasis on extremist characters, problems and actions, shaped, more than anything, the cultural representations of nihilism, even for Nietzsche.

Now, the Baader connection, no matter how indirect, can be the key to what is perhaps most peculiar in Nietzsche’s adoption of nihilism, namely, the issue of religion. In the summer of 1880, that is, during the time of the first nihilism references, there are, in Nietzsche’s notes, remarks on the Salomo passages of “Alles ist eitel” (N 4 [228], KSA 11, 158) which are, then, incorporated in Zaratustra as the clause of the “grossen Müdigkeit” reading: “Alles ist gleich, es lohnt sich Nichts, Welt is ohne Sinn, Wissen...
Moreover, in an earlier note, it is said the Jewish people of the Old Testament had no fear greater than the one of “völlige Vernichtung” or the “Nichtsein” (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [19], KSA 7, 140-1). From these considerations, there is not long to the considerations of world destruction with the help of Luther, Schopenhauer, Wagner or contemporary assassins. It must be seen, however, that the verbalism of Vernichtung seems to suit the reflections concerning the ability to comprehend, too. In a letter on the last stages of the Franco-Prussian war, Nietzsche wrote to a friend that having heard from the damages in Paris “war ich für einige Tage völlig vernichtet” to the extent that “die ganze wissenschaftliche und philosophisch-künstlerische Existenz erschien mir als eine Absurdität, wenn ein einzelner Tag die herrlichen Kunstwerke, ja ganze Perioden der Kunst austilgen konnte” (KGB II/1, Juni 1871, 204). In other words, the state of being totally denied, destroyed, broken down, powerless was something with which to refer both to the threats caused by some menacing force and to the specific threat it causes for conceiving it or, after it has asserted itself, anything anymore.

In a sense, this would already be enough for appreciating the analytical dimension in Nietzsche’s confrontation with nihilism. But it is to be argued for separately. Before that, Nietzsche’s place in the history of nihilism ought to be outlined. In addition to what was said about his relationship to earlier or contemporary uses of the word - resulting in the insight that he drew from a great variety of sources and combined the givings with his other concerns - his decisiveness for the later thinking on nihilism ought to be assessed. In simple terms, Nietzsche’s works present a unique watershed in the conceptual history of nihilism. Levin-Goldschmidt says that its is only from Nietzsche onwards that one can speak of “authentic [echte] nihilism”, where the mere word is turned to a Sache, while the former uses were individual instances of mocking one’s opponents, the Russian case, despite its being among the symptoms of the nihilism proper, standing out as the most glaring example.

The notion of the watershed is conceived, even better, from the way all major 20th century theorists on nihilism have had to go through his considerations. Another thing is the extent to which indebtedness is admitted. In what follows, I shall name a variety of thinkers who have built on Nietzsche in order to come up with novel reappropriations of the concept of nihilism.

Karl Jaspers’s work was already mentioned as the impulse for psychological and psychiatric discussions of nihilism. In all fairness, it must be said that this meditation, on the world views and the fundamental question “is one to say, to life as a whole, yes or no”, is filled with references to, and paraphrases from, Nietzsche. As Jaspers says, the nihilistic problematic was already recognized by Hegel but it was Nietzsche who came to “lively experience and express it, in a consistent way, factually and
As for Martin Heidegger, it has been said that, although his ontological conception of nihilism is not to be confused with Nietzsche’s ontic interpretation, his stance has its distinctively Nietzschean characteristics: metaphysics identified as Platonism, Platonism identified as nihilism, privileged position of pre-Socratic thinking. Heidegger went on to develop a view that was directed against the conventional treatment of nihilism as “an interesting cultural psychology”, or as (its correlative) willingness to rediscover goals and happiness. He thought that this was apt to blur the view to the unavoidable goallessness of humans, to the opening of the sphere of deciding between being and non-being. In his reading of Hegel, Heidegger points to “negativity” as “the name for a sphere of questioning” that covers the whole family of Neinsagen, Verneinung, Verneinheit, Nicht, Nichts, Nichtigkeit. He speaks of nothingness as “the abyss, the being itself”.

From the many forms of nihilism, it is Heidegger’s programme to locate the “full weight” of the word. The accurate place to look for it is “the history of Western metaphysics as the basis for our own history and, then, for future decisions”. Heidegger redefines the problematic of nihilism as the situation in which “beings in their entirety must be set differently or in wholly different terms”. In Heidegger’s thought, nihilism is a problematic, the proper arena of which is not only the forgotten ontological difference between beings and the being of beings, but also the controversy between being and nothingness at the very midst of being.

There is a sensationalist ring to it, when a periodical introduces one eminent philosopher as accepting the description “nihilist” for his way of thinking. That philosopher is Gianni Vattimo. Vattimo has been studying the conditions nihilism sets for ontological hermeneutics. His multifaceted work in this area may be seen as having to do with finding in Nietzsche and Heidegger the corrective for Gadamer, and for one another. Vattimo speaks of his “affirming the coincidence” of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s definitions of nihilism. This is carried out, when nihilism is regarded as “the absorption of value by exchange value”, the process Marx was able only to deplore as an instance of a “generalized prostitution”.

Drawing from these lessons, Vattimo has developed an original stance to both hermeneutics and nihilism, one which enters in discussion with, among others, Habermas and Rorty. Vattimo insists that radical hermeneutical ontology must get rid of the metaphysical notion of the subject, and develop a theory of being along the lines of Nietzschean-Heideggerian nihilism toward the ontology of decline. In Vattimo’s opinion, the guidelines Heidegger gave to the project of ontological hermeneutics are the hermeneutic constitution of Dasein and the extra-metaphysical thinking as An-denken. These should
guard against lapsing into neo-Kantian apriorism. The former is nihilistic in its absence of a grounding foundation, the latter is nihilistic in virtue of its recalling the being as always already absent.  

The chance inherent in nihilism, Vattimo explains, depends upon the way we can live, individually and collectively. Its promise is the possibility of liberation. Vattimo says that nihilism involves the strength to live without foundations. Unlike resorting to restauraion of metaphysics or to the relativistic vanity of a philosophy of culture, radical hermeneutical ontology is, as the ethics of interpretation with nihilistic vocation, a properly ethical way to live.

Stanley Rosen has been writing on nihilism from 1968 onwards. He says that Nietzsche, “at his best”, not only “exemplify contemporary Nihilism, but he understands or transcends it”. This is a difference that Nietzsche himself, on Rosen’s judgment, did not understand clearly.

According to Rosen, nihilism “arises, not from the absence of truth (or what some philosophers call ‘Being’), but from its tediousness [...] it is boredom rather than falsehood that destroys meaning”. If rational speech is reduced to mathematics, says Rosen, the result is a kind of silence, nihilism. So, nihilism starts in rationalism and ends in irrationalism.

The way out of nihilism - “the loss of interest in reason” - can be found in tracing back the desireful sources of reason: reason as desire to perfection, or Eros. Says Rosen, “[t]he only sense in which one may 'escape' from Nihilism is by frankly recognizing its permanent location in the geography of human nature. The danger of Nihilism is inseparable from the nature of speech, because speech is a mark of imperfection.”

Rosen stresses that he does not think of nihilism as a result from “degenerate styles in art, the brutalization of man by his science and technology, or the rise of totalitarian political ideologies”. For Rosen, the question of nihilism is essentially the question of historicity and the possibility of doing philosophy. Rosen credits Jacobi as the first to use the word in a philosophical sense, but draws the general features of the issue from Hegel’s conception of ’unhappy consciousness’.

In his book Nihilism. A Philosophical Essay (1969), Rosen developed the problematic of nihilism as a critique of the ethico-political implications of the work of Wittgenstein, the ordinary language school, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Jünger. One of his many formulations for nihilism reads: “Nihilism as a political and moral problem of our epoch has its roots in the epistemological and ontological teaching of the day. This means not that nihilism is a “theoretical” problem in the sense of being an object for scientific investigation, but rather that the need to investigate it objectively springs from the nature of
man.” Rosen goes on to add that nihilism emerges, principally, from the changing relation between reason and the good.1928

In concentrating on the unity of the reasonable and the good, Rosen stresses the importance to investigate the ancient roots of modern nihilism. For example, he sees in Aristophanes’s condemnation of pre-Socratic thinking an anticipation of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s assault on Plato. The curious difference being that, in Rosen’s mind, Aristophanes’s diatribe against the reduction of reason to mathematical physics fits best to Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s ontology1929.

Rosen has later declared himself “a partisan of the thesis that we understand Being and nothing, but that we cannot explain them in a rigorous, consistent, noncircular manner”1930. Rosen has been virtually unique in his way of discussing the question of nihilism both in its analytical and historical dimensions and, more correctly, in so-called analytical philosophy as well as in the contexts of hermeneutics and fundamental ontology - with an eye on the ethical and political aspects.

As to Heidegger, Rosen asks, “why Heidegger’s resolution of the problem of nihilism is not itself nihilism on the grand scale”.1931 Rosen holds that “Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzschean nihilism is unsound. If Nietzsche, as a political thinker, forgot about the absence of Being, he was well advised to do so. As a matter of fact, the nihilism of the nineteenth century and by extension of the twentieth century had and has nothing to do with either the forgetting or the remembering of the absence of Being.”1932 But there are lessons to be learned from the “fundamental danger in Nietzsche’s experiment” in the realm of political creation.1933

To account for the other important authors, on the issue of nihilism, I will merely mention, somewhat arbitrarily, a few names beginning from Gottfried Benn1934 and Leo Strauss1935 through Kenji Nishitani1936 and Albert Camus1937 to Alberto Caracciolo1938 and Emanuele Severino1939. All of these thinkers, make their case with the crucial help of Nietzsche, even if they also criticize his thought.

The same goes for Winfried Weier with whom the step is taken from summing up Nietzsche’s historical place to commenting on his analytical location. According to Weier, nihilism results from three kinds of philosophical practices which he identifies as follows. First, there is the positivist dogma saying that one can make meaningful claims of facts only, which leads to the privileging of the first order of givenness and neglecting the second order with values and meanings. Secondly, there is the rationalist requirement of reality urging to conceptually fix and define everything, which turns to the underestimation of the unfixed. Thirdly, there is the autonomist subjectivism denying all transcendence. In conclusion, Weier holds that the uncanny guest Nietzsche spoke about has come in these disguises and is to be recognized
“as the necessary result of the fundamental currents in modern thought”.\textsuperscript{1940}

Nietzsche’s works contain rich material for analytical discussions of nihilism, too. In a sense, this was already proven by Arthur C. Danto’s monograph on Nietzsche that specifically began by a discussion of nihilism as a denial of the correspondence theory of truth\textsuperscript{1941}. Later, Danto went on to make sense of “semantic nihilism” with the help of Nietzsche’s views\textsuperscript{1942}. To illustrate this kind of analytical availability of Nietzsche’s writings, one example must suffice. “Die extreme Form des Nihilism wäre: daß jeder Glaube, jedes Für-wahr-halten nothwendig falsch ist” (N Herbst 1887 9 [41], KSA 12, 354). This is quite like, say, Peter Unger or Alvin I. Goldman, without a recourse to Nietzsche, propose as the determination of nihilistic view of justifying beliefs.

Without going into the details of Danto’s interpretative caution, it can, in its tendency to use Nietzsche to exemplify certain extreme theoretical positions, be contrasted with the text critically sharp orientation of Elisabeth Kuhn. Kuhn goes through all of Nietzsche’s more or less scattered remarks on nihilism and differentiates the discourse into its epistemological, religious, metaphysical, scientific, aesthetical, moral, political and economical dimensions\textsuperscript{1943}.

Hence, it is a fair hypothesis that virtually all of the relatively independent fields of applied nihilism draw from, or could be clarified by, Nietzsche’s reflections. Kielkopf, for one, did set out from Nietzsche in sketching the logic of nihilism. Elsewhere, Massimo Cacciari delineates a problematic of “architecture and nihilism” by relying on Nietzsche\textsuperscript{1944}.

As I proposed, the most general contemporary analytical concern and use for nihilism may be the debate over rationalism and realism as opposed to irrationalism and anti-realism. In less oppositional terms, it has been said that Western progress is inseparable from Western nihilism: progress always believes that it will erase alienation and devastation and all the other negativities, while it is only the idealized side of nihilism\textsuperscript{1945}. It goes to the credit of, for instance, Georg Lukács\textsuperscript{1946} and Jürgen Habermas\textsuperscript{1947}, that Nietzsche and nihilism are commonly associated with these vital and fatal questions bearing on a variety of disciplines\textsuperscript{1948}. 
V.b Interpreting Nietzsche & Nihilism

V.b.1 Previous Views

In his dissertation of 1969, James E. Parejko made much of the need to see that “Nietzsche must not be confused with the thing he analysed”. And it was precisely nihilism that was to be grasped as “his topic of philosophical analysis”. Beside this invaluable point, Parejko made another one about the need to withdraw from “arbitrarily assign[ing] one, or a few, meanings to that term”.1949

His own interpretative caution notwithstanding, Parejko went on to schematically divide the kinds of nihilisms that Nietzsche rejected (“Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Buddhism, Christianity, Pyrrho’s nihilistic indifference, the contradiction of the essence of life - the will to peace, the belief that everything should be destroyed, Hartmann’s call for the mass suicide of all humanity, that paralyzing attitude which sees nothing as worthwhile, the belief in not believing anything, and any form of Nihilism which, lacking an affirmative side, can only negate”) and the ones he defended (“implicit in and resulting from the will to truth, the overthrow of Christianity and everything connected with it, including the destructive epoch which must accompany the death of this major myth, the retaining of the conviction of the paradoxical absurdity of human existence, and this in its worst form, that is, eternally recurring […] favors suicide, and lastly, he favors annihilation, in whatever form, as the privilege of creators”). Ultimately, says Parejko following the Jaspersian interpretation, Nietzsche sought “to overcome all Nihilism”.1950

One can understand such a forcefully rehabilitative approach soon as one encounters a view, expressed as late as in the 1980’s, that the “most nihilistic forms of philosophy” related to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Fichte, were to be seen as directly associated with the Nazi mythology and violence1951. And if the Nazi connection of Nietzsche’s putative nihilism is not a mere relic of the past, nor did the Lukács-inspired interpretation of his alleged nihilism wither away with Realsozialismus: one critic related, in 1994, the “imperialist era” of ruthless Realpolitik of deeds to Nietzsche’s “ideology” of
Quite like Parejko, Robert C. Solomon describes nihilism as Nietzsche’s “problem”, to which he tried to answer. Yet, he goes on to add that Nietzsche was surely a nihilist in his claim that the breakdown of old values must be actively enhanced.\textsuperscript{1953}

The tendency to rehabilitate Nietzsche from the mark of nihilism can be seen in many commentators. One comes easily across his readers insisting that “Nietzsche does not embrace nihilism” and what is the most crucial thing in his work is “his frontal attack on nihilism”\textsuperscript{1954}. In the same vein, one observer holds that “Nietzsche proclaims no nihilism, instead he diagnoses it as a given fact. [...] Hence, Nietzsche’s thought is no philosophy of nihilism. Nihilism is interpreted, rather, as the necessary and unavoidable result of the historical development of occidental culture.”\textsuperscript{1955} Richard Schacht may have gone furthest into this direction in his detailed attempt to rescue Nietzsche from the “nihilist”’s label\textsuperscript{1956}.

I showed above how Nietzsche was related to nihilism, to negative inclinations and certain negativist tendencies already during his lifetime, and that he would also call himself nihilistic and a nihilist. The name calling could be of interest for any philosophical study on Nietzsche and nihilism for the principal reason that the philosopher was philosophically interested in naming and polemics and that “nihilism” had become a supreme instance of reproach and controversy. It is not that interesting, should one only seek to find out whether or not it is warranted to describe him as nihilistic in some sense of the term. The identification of the investigator and his case should be taken as a problem that Nietzsche recognized and ruminated.

Be that as it may, answers to the question whether Nietzsche either entertains or counters nihilism divides rather effectively those who can be taken as his supporters and admirers from those who can be taken as his opponents and mockers. When, for example, a biographer says of him that he opted for providing “an alternative to nihilism”\textsuperscript{1957}, it is reasonably clear that Nietzsche is being depicted in a more or less favorable way. On the other hand, as another text presents him as marking the “fixation or prophecy of a nihilism of thought”\textsuperscript{1958}, it is almost as evident that Nietzsche is being aligned with more or less condemnable thinkers.

This point is not to be overdone, though. Danto, for one, takes it merely for granted that Nietzsche’s position is (metaphysical, epistemological, alethiological) nihilism. It is, according to Danto, Nietzsche’s conviction that there is nothing to which truth claims could correspond and, hence, no adequacy between beliefs and that which they are about.\textsuperscript{1959}
To be sure, someone else can utilize this, as such, neutral interpretation of at least potentially plausible view in order to present much more evaluative accounts. Saying that he accepts Danto’s basic tenet, David Ohane goes on to speak of a modern “syndrome” of nihilism and totalitarianism going back to Nietzsche’s “absolute position” of denial (of values) that was pushed further by Ernst Jünger and his visions of technology and the *totale Mobilmachung*\(^\text{1960}\). On the other hand, it has been said that, from Nietzsche’s point of view, nihilism involved the Kantian commitments to things-in-themselves and, hence, to nothingness; in other words, it was Nietzsche’s project not to entertain but to unmask “*philosophical nihilism*” at the heart of Western thinking\(^\text{1961}\).

One may consider such readers as Deleuze who says that Nietzsche’s objective was to destroy all forms of nihilism\(^\text{1962}\) or Heidegger who claims that Nietzsche did not espouse nihilism as any “doctrine” of everything’s being nothing or every fact and act being useless\(^\text{1963}\). Although both of them point, as will be seen below, to treating Nietzsche’s relationship with nihilism as a more complex issue than simply a matter of his assent or dissent to it, it is evident just how hard it is for anybody to resist the temptation to see the issue in terms of Nietzsche’s putative subscribing to some forms of nihilism. In this light, it is only to be expected that many critics prefer to speak of him as both identifying with and reacting against nihilism\(^\text{1964}\).

Indeed, “Nietzsche’s name” is equated with nihilism as the loss of all absolutes as well as with the Dionysian as creation of values\(^\text{1965}\). As it was seen at an early stage of the present study (I.a), Nietzsche’s character, career, personality, biography, fate or whatever connected to him has been seen as strongly analogical to various grand historical processes termed as nihilistic in some sense of the word. In particular, the philosopher’s ultimate *Zusammenbruch* came to be an almost irresistible event for commentators eager to explain the religious, scientific, artistic, political, social, economic and philosophical revolutions and tragedies of the 20th century. To refer back to that discussion, one can turn to Ross Poole who holds that Nietzsche’s philosophical project is not so much any “diagnosis” of ‘modern nihilism’ as it its “symptom”. According to Poole’s specific emphasis, Nietzsche was well aware of the “vulnerability of the individual”, yet he held on to the individual to the degree that verged on ’hysteria’, ’megalomania’, ’insanity’ and (*Zusammenbruch* or) ’disintegration’.\(^\text{1966}\)

Some commentators draw from biographical evidence and psychologizing considerations in their approach to the issue. F. D. Luke, for instance, regards Nietzsche’s “positive” or “affirmative” philosophy as but the “superstructure” of his essentially negative and nihilist position. Indeed, the philosopher’s campaign for the overcoming of denial is not only unconvincing, in the sense that his assertions turn out to be dogmatically assertive, but also “tense” and “hysterical”.\(^\text{1967}\) In a sufficiently similar fashion, Jørgen Kjaer has said that Nietzsche’s fight against nihilism should not blur one to see
Nietzsche’s “own nihilism” as it expressed itself in a morbid dislike of his fellowmen\textsuperscript{1968}. One is reminded of Jung’s interpretation, according to which Nietzsche’s problem was that his teaching (of healthy instinctual life) was not matched by his way of living (in the “lofty heights” of a heroic detachment) and that this tension finally crushed him.

I would be inclined to claim that this sort of psychologism functions, quite often, as an ingredient in the explanations of much more philosophical nature. Mihailo Djurič, for one, holds nihilism to be Nietzsche’s most enigmatic and ambivalent field of thought, one that is “everything but easy to understand”. Nonetheless, he treats it as the \textit{Hauptpunkt} of Nietzsche’s philosophy which is taken to result from an “experience” of nihilism.\textsuperscript{1969} Another thing is what to emphasize in that ‘experience’. While Hermann Rauschning saw in Nietzsche “not only the prophet but also the \textit{revolutionary of nihilism}” with “evident influences from Russian nihilism”\textsuperscript{1970}, Georg Lukács identified Nietzsche’s nihilistic thought with the historical stage of totalitarian irrationalism\textsuperscript{1971}.

Rauschning’s and Lukács’s specific emphases aside, it has become more and more familiar to approach Nietzsche through the notion of the “era of nihilism”\textsuperscript{1972}. Theodor W. Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s famous depiction of the dialectic of enlightenment is crucial here. It was precisely the Nietzschean ambivalence concerning the enlightenment that they took as their point of departure. Adorno and Horkheimer distinguished between the movement of the sovereign spirit that Nietzsche seemed to have felt himself to be completing and the other, the nihilistic force of demystifying enlightenment. It was this latter dimension that, according to the critical theorists, was taken as a subject of later prefascist ideology.\textsuperscript{1973} From these ideas, Heinz Röttges went on to develop a reading of Nietzsche. Nihilism, “stemming from the rejection of the dialectic of enlightenment”, is, so Röttges, something that Nietzsche’s work is “circling round”\textsuperscript{1974}.

At this point, Heidegger’s account of Nietzsche and nihilism will be taken into consideration\textsuperscript{1975}. Bernd Magnus says that “[w]hether nihilism is a “good” or “bad” thing is a pointless question for Heidegger and, it should be added, for Nietzsche too”\textsuperscript{1976}. Most usually, the connection and the difference between the two philosophical analyses of nihilism is located in the issue of ‘overcoming’ nihilism: the ways that Nietzsche saw as crucial in surmounting the nihilistic condition were, in Heidegger’s view, themselves indicative of nihilism. Indeed, from Heidegger’s perspective, the very notion of \textit{Überwindung} is to be doubted.\textsuperscript{1977}

Having referred to the history and pejorative use of the concept, Heidegger proceeds to distinguish the buzzword (\textit{Lärm- und Schlagwort}) from the “full weight” of the term, “in Nietzsche’s sense”, as “thinking of the history of western metaphysics as the ground for our history and, thus, for future
decisions”. Paying tribute to his forerunner’s ability to identify what is crucial in nihilism, Heidegger says that Nietzsche was close to recognize nihilism even in his 1880 considerations on machines. Yet, the full conception came only later and amounted to the view that nihilism is, in Heidegger’s phrase, “the name for the truth of beings as a whole”. At this point, he makes the remark that, while thinking of nihilism, Nietzsche could not help but think of it in a nihilistic fashion. Hence, with all due respect, it is to be doubted, whether Nietzsche, struggling in nihilism, succeeded in grasping the “hidden essence of nihilism”.1978

According to Heidegger, it is Nietzsche’s commitment to valuative thought that keeps him stuck with nihilism. Nietzsche’s campaign for a revaluation of all values finds its motivation from the devaluation of received values understood as nihilism1979. From a broader perspective, Heidegger views Nietzsche as participating in the calculating kind of thinking, typical of his late modern contemporaries, on the one hand, and continuing the subjectivist and anthropomorphist metaphysics where being is justified before the megalomaniac human subject1980.

Heidegger characterizes Nietzsche’s “interpretation of nihilism, despite its essentiality, transient”. Yet, the more “fundamental” alternative he offers may well seem, in more ways than one, the less grounding after all. What I mean is that although Heidegger shifts the focus from such notions as ‘value’ or ‘goal’ to the more elementary and more grandiose vision into the essential human Ziel-losigkeit, he, nonetheless, also resorts to banalities that go pass anything that Nietzsche had to provide. Namely, Heidegger not only refers to bolshevism as “crude nihilism”, but he also mentions “cinemas” and “spa holidays” as the popularized forms of “cultural commodities”, of pursuing happiness, that has to be understood in terms of a “raving intoxication with “affections” [lärmenden “Erlebnis”-Trunkenboldigkeit]”. This enthusiasm is, according to Heidegger, “the greatest of nihilisms, the organized closing of one’s eyes before the goal-lessness of human beings, the “prepared” shunning from the decision that sets goals, the fear before any sphere of decision and its opening” 1981

In any case, Heidegger’s analysis of nihilism as the epochal determination for western thinking is widely followed1982. Ivo Frenzel, for one, explains that nihilism is an inevitable process, not bad or good, and that Nietzsche is its “greatest diagnostician”1983. Michael Gelven, in turn, reappropriates the line of criticism about values and stresses the need look for “existential” values instead of “moral” ones, since only the former ones can affirm the meaning of being in a way that continues to makes sense, rather than only enforce domination1984. While these two reappropriations are Heideggerian only in spirit, or implicitly, Tran Van Doan’s dissertation, Nihilisme de Nietzsche. Essai sur la métagraphique nietzschéenne (1975), is explicitly faithful to Heidegger’s notions and reasonings1985.
An interesting critique of Nietzsche comes from David Loy who speaks in the name of Buddhism but exploits many more or less Heideggerian considerations. As Loy sees it, “nihilism is not the debacle of all meaning but our dread of that debacle and what we do to avoid it”. Indeed, “[t]he dread of nihilism […] is the true nihilism” and “nihilism is not our lack but the fear and denial of that lack”. Nietzsche is to be credited, so Loy, for his seeing nihilism “as our collective shadow, the ghost that haunts Western civilization”, for his “sensitive nose [that] detected its stink almost everywhere”. Yet, since he fails to see the true nihilism and takes his “flight from lack” to the ’will to power’ as capable of filling the void, Nietzsche does not “vanquish nihilism” but exercises “pure nihilism”. One is advised by Loy to accept “meaninglessness”, to let “it devour the meanings that we use to defend ourselves against our no-thing-ness”. In his view, this is the only way to “realise a meaning-free-ness open to the possibilities that arise in our world”. Loy’s “Buddhist perspective” has it that “the problem is not our nothingness, but the ways we try to evade it”. What it boils down to is the need to see that “we are manifestations of the world, not subjects confronting it as an other”.  

Winfried Weier points to the view that already the exclusive asking for the Sinn is nihilism as Heidegger’s proper extension of Nietzsche’s analysis. It is also Weier’s own contention that Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism is essentially “incomplete” to the effect that his Vorgefaßtheit or pre-conceptions were lacking in self-reflection upon one’s commitment to the things one has set out to criticize. He regards it as Nietzsche’s chief failure not to have recognized just how much it was the very “manner of asking”, fashion of interrogating or way of posing questions that was the key to the Frage nach den Sinn. Nietzsche accentuates the questioner questioning about meaning, on the one hand, and the nihilistic condition where no further questions are possible, on the other hand. Instead of this, one ought to turn the attention to the specific art of questioning that necessarily leads to frustration. According to Weier, Nietzsche remained a “prisoner” of the double conception of “unreflected rationalism” and “questionless positivism” in so far as he accepted only the “reality of the countable, definable and, hence, of the timely concrete”.  

Gilles Deleuze’s analysis, too, has its affinities with Heidegger’s grand vision, although he also succintly rejects the latter’s analysis along the lines of the forgotten ontological difference of beings and the being of beings. In any case, Heidegger belongs to the few Nietzsche critics ever mentioned, and sometimes favorably cited, in Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la philosophie. Echoing Heidegger, Deleuze’s Nietzsche is treating nihilism as the presupposition of all metaphysics, since any metaphysics leads to the supersensual defaming. Nihilism is no historical phenomenon but an a priori element of history and, moreover, its motor and sense.  

I mentioned above that Deleuze, unlike Heidegger, takes it to be Nietzsche’s more or less successful
campaign to destroy nihilism. Somewhat like Solomon, however, he grants that Nietzsche’s *Umwertung aller Werte* or “transmutation” involves “many things being denied or abolished”. Indeed, Nietzsche’s “general formula” for this reads: “May everything be denied that *can* be denied”. Yet, Deleuze adds that the denial concerns solely the things that are, as such, negative: “this is to say: the negative itself, nihilism and its expressions”.\textsuperscript{1991}

Deleuze has a multiple sense to offer for nihilism as it figures in Nietzsche’s thought. He does mention the common meaning to the effect that “[n]othing is true, nothing is good”. This sort of nihilism is close to the ancient issue of *taedium vitae*. Interestingly, Deleuze does not move on to dissociate Nietzsche’s view of nihilism of this common sense conception. As far as one can tell, he accepts it as one place to start thinking about nihilism as the “denial of life” or as the event when life assumes the value of nothingness. Christianity is a case in point in its tendencies of general culpability (life accused, judged, condemned) and equation of suffering and punishment.\textsuperscript{1992}

Apart from these characterizations, Deleuze may be said to put forth three fairly independent, yet intimately related dimensions of interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophizing of nihilism. First of all, to begin from the most theoretical end, most of his efforts of explication concern the event of transmutation. This is the process in which nihilism as the “power of negating” aids the “reactive forces to triumph”. Nihilism is destroyed, as negation “breaks its alliance with reactive forces and becomes an affirmative power”. In other words, nihilism is exhausted as the negation loses its autonomous power and is taken in the service of affirmation. As Deleuze insists, Nietzsche’s philosophy, in particular the fourth part of *Zarathustra*, is committed to differentiating the false concept of affirmation from the real affirmation.\textsuperscript{1993}

Secondly, this interpretation of transmutation is part of Deleuze’s attack against dialectics (see section II.d.3). He presents Nietzsche’s discoveries of “the negativity of the positive” and “affirmation of affirmation” as drastically deviating from the dialectic notion of “the positivity of the negative” and “negation of negation”. In more historical terms, Deleuze underscores the role of Stirner as the philosopher to have exposed the impossibility of the thought in terms of ’contradiction’ / ’resolution’ and ’alienation’ / ’reappropriation’. Stirner’s extreme dialectics posited the unique *Ich* as the instance of reappropriation that ultimately destroys everything surrounding it. Yet, the only manner for this instance to realize itself is through self-decomposing. Where Feuerbach’s anthropology remained within the nihilism of the divine, Stirner’s egoism of an ego that reduces everything to its own nothingness “exposes nihilism as the truth of dialectics”.\textsuperscript{1994}

Thirdly, Deleuze finds a more flexible historical lineage for Nietzsche’s contributions. The question of
the reactive forces seeking to gain a victory makes him think of Lucrece and Spinoza. The former directed his thought against the troublesome mind or, in particular, those in need of this trouble to erect their power upon it, the latter fought against sadness and all those who found their power in the midst of it. In a similar manner, Nietzsche’s philosophy counters ressentiment, bad conscience, powers of the negative and anyone seeking to enslave humans with their assistance.1995

One could certainly hope for more precise indication of these last negativists than what is concealed in Deleuze’s talk of “Churches and States”. Presumably, one could seek for slave owners in the contemporary “amalgams” and “bizarre mixtures” of philosophies with nietzschéisme as an ingredient together with Hegelianism and Husserlianism. In any case, Deleuze’s words on these “strange combinations” and “dangerous alliances” suggest that freeing Nietzsche from the role he is currently playing in the festivities of the end of metaphysics and the death of philosophy is a challenge analagical to the one Nietzsche proposed in his own time. As Deleuze sees it, “Nietzsche presents the goal of his philosophy” as follows: “to liberate thinking from nihilism and its forms”.1996

Jean-Luc Nancy, for his part, starts from the notion that “Heidegger’s analysis” cannot be omitted and that Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation’ is tied to the realm of values. Yet, it is Nancy’s contention that this is not done for the benefit of the evaluator. To promote, as he does, ’probity’ as the mark of a moral kind of truth is, so Nancy, to imply a being that is self-evaluating. (This much already indicates that Deleuze’s analysis cannot be omitted either.) Ontological probity is simultaneously an ultimate metaphysical truth and a voyage that takes this truth beyond itself. Physis that itself valuates itself is what is always superior to anyone creating values. Comparing the situation to Kant’s categorial imperative which is, in Nancy’s view, assuming a judgment as a universal law but, “on the contrary”, accepting as a judgment only that which can present itself as a universal law, he says that Nietzsche’s valuative imperative is about identifying the law with the valuating itself.1997

Concentrating on the issue morality of truthfulness has been one of the most popular ways to deal with Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism. Tracy B. Strong, for one, speaks of the “epistemology of nihilism”. He explains nihilism, in Nietzsche, as the gradual undermining of all the potential bases of truth by the will to base knowledge in truth. Although truth seems to be unattainable, it remains to be an object for the attempt of attaining. It is, according to Strong, the forms of living and reasoning that make impossible to get at, in life and in reason, what they want.1998

John T. Wilcox reconstructs the issue as follows. If it is thought that only truth counts and, further, that only the non-human (or transcendent, absolute or non-perspectival) can be true, and, finally, that nothing that we believe is non-human, then nothing that we believe counts. The first two premisses
claim too much from the human intellect. 1999

Johan Goudsblom has expanded all this into a “culturological” account of the imperative of knowing. To know what acts are right one has to know what is right. Inability to gain reliable data about this latter question may lead to an endless suspension of judgment and, ultimately, to the denial of all certainties. Nihilism is, in the final analysis, a feeling of valuelessness with an interpretation of that feeling, and it is the coupling interpretation that is subject to learning and, thus, cultural constraints. 2000

The meaning of nihilism that may be said to be the most eagerly supported, among commentators, is the one related to the ‘death of God’ (FW 125, KSA 3, 480-2; Z “V” 2, KSA 4, 14) 2001. Because of the alleged centrality of this notion, there have been commentators who interpret Nietzsche’s vision of nihilism and its overcoming to be an essentially eschatological one 2002. Harry J. Asmus, for example, holds that “Nietzsche found meaningfulness and purposefulness in a Joachimite utopian eschatology” in the way “he hoped to overcome the nihilism of life […] just as every major religion hopes to do” 2003.

Settling on the ‘death of God’, in his book, Nihilism Before Nietzsche (1995), Michael Allen Gillespie not only interprets Nietzsche in a one-sided fashion but suppresses the whole interpretative tradition, too. He says that the shared understanding of nihilism as “the consequence of the fact that God and all eternal truths and standards become unbelievable” is to be replaced by a view of it as “the consequence of the assertion of an absolute human will that renders God superfluous and thus for all intents and purposes dead” 2004. While it was Fichte, in particular, who is to be seen as responsible for enhancing this latter kind of thinking, there is a need to go, as the title of Gillespie’s book implies, to the unacknowledged background of Nietzsche.

As Simon Critchley rightly remarks, in his Very Little... Almost Nothing (1997), there is, Gillespie’s reservations notwithstanding, a clear Heideggerian resonance in this argument 2005. Now, Heidegger based his reading of Nietzsche to the latter’s ultimate commitment of thinking in terms of values. As it happens, Critchley, too, quotes the following note, from “Nietzsche’s posthumously assembled miscellany The Will to Power”, and says that this is where nihilism acquires “its full philosophical statement and definitive articulation”. In other words, this is what, “[f]or Nietzsche, nihilism means” 2006:

- daß die obersten Werthen sich entwerthen
(N Herbst 1887 9 [34], KSA 12, 350).

In as much as this is the definition of nihilism that nearly all of the commentaries manage to supply, Heidegger’s insistence on values 2007 can be taken as both synthesizing various former readings of
Nietzsche and guiding much of the later Nietzsche reception.

There are, then, two meanings in nihilism onto which commentators had been inclined to latch: the one related to the death of god and the other to the devaluation of received values. Taken together these seem to speak in favor of the interpretation that it was the ultra-subjectivist (in the tradition of Protagoras through Descartes and onwards, as Heidegger says) or ultra-voluntarist (in the sense of Fichte, as Gillespie says) nihilism, inherent in his own analysis of nihilism and of other notions, that escaped from Nietzsche’s otherwise so pertinent observation.

For example, Kathleen Marie Higgins treats nihilism as defined by Nietzsche as the self-devaluation of values and as “descended upon modern culture as a consequence of God’s death”. Yet, she emphasizes neither godlessness nor values. Her point is, rather, that nihilism is a matter of meaning. The search for an “otherworldly ground for meaning”, for a ground “outside this life”, is tightly related to the nihilistic “conviction that one cannot find meaning in life”. Thus, as Higgins explains, there is an interdependence between nihilism as life’s utter worthlessness and the illusion of safety “solidly lodged in the everyday thinking of most members of the Western world”.  

Although Higgins’s interpretation is tight to the double issue of ‘god is dead’ / ‘devaluation’, it is this only, as it were, by convention. Busy arguing for her more specific views on Also sprach Zarathustra, she uses the most concise form to evoke the problem of nihilism and then turns it toward her discussion of life’s meaningfulness. Much like, say, Deleuze who regards Nietzsche as “the first” not to believe in there being just one sense in the ‘death of god’ and the one to believe that it takes time for it to “become a joyous event”2010, Higgins holds that “God’s death” is no “real threat” compared to the “tendency” immediately following it “to persist in demanding an otherworldly ground for meaning”2011.

Yet, despite her references to the dimension of ‘culture’, Higgins’s reading of Zarathustra focuses decidedly on the individual2012. If nothing else, this leaves room for assuming that her treatment of nihilism might be excessively concerned with personal “convictions” and not sufficiently interested in the public interchange of meanings. In this sense, it could illustrate Heidegger’s and Gillespie’s worries about megalomanian subjectivism.

Even if these two sides of nihilism can, thus, be taken to merge with one another2013, it pays to regard them separately. As for the death of god, it would do to say that it is a notion that is highly multifaceted and amenable to great many interpretations. At the minimum, the ‘death of god’ interpretation can hardly be taken as capable of representing any sort of one-sidedness in Nietzsche’s thought or consensus among his critics. For example, and especially in the light of Nietzsche’s first 1880 fragment
on nihilism, it would be interesting to ponder on his early note on the Germanic myth of the death of all gods (N September 1870 - Januar 1871 5 [115], KSA 7, 124-5)\textsuperscript{2014}.

One might be prepared to go on linking this with the later combination of (Wagner’s) Wotan, Luther, Schopenhauer and the so called Russian nihilists and argue that dying gods truly stand at the heart of Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism. A further explication could be that the extreme activist and the Schopenhauerian denial of his/her proper will could be interpreted in terms of the fate of Christian tradition of thinking so that, at least from Luther on, there has been a steady decline in the westerners’ general faith in divine powers, of which Wagnerian neo-religiosity is but a recent, perverted outcome. In this way, Nietzsche’s early notes on nihilism might be saved back within the interpretation in terms of the ’death of god’. But it is best to add that the weakest part of Gillespie’s argument is that it seeks to take the credit from what it is criticizing. If the concept of ’god’ stands for the absolute basis of truth, it is not only its fall but already its instauration that is subject to an analysis in terms of nihilism. This is something that Gillespie presents as his own reinterpretation without saying that he, thereby, appropriates Nietzsche’s account of nihilism as the rise and fall of a “\textit{ganz bestimmten Ausdeutung}”, namely, an interpretation that is peculiar to Christian morality (See N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [127], KSA 12, 125). If the early fragment on Luther, Schopenhauer, anarchists and the supreme Germanic deity does have something to do with Nietzsche’s later theorization on nihilism, this linkage is, in my view, best seen in the continual emphasis on the dynamic process of nihilism with its psychological and social manifestations.

More convincing is Deleuze’s interpretation of the powerful “reign of nihilism” as described by Nietzsche. Nihilism is lurking in the “supreme values of life” as well as in the “reactive values taking their place, and still in the valueless world of the last humans”. In each phase, it is the element of “depreciation”, the negative element that rules. Only a transmutation of values can turn the element into positive and affirmative. Affirmation operates beyond opposition and has no need to “charge” or “assume” but only to “deliver” or to “discharge what lives” and to “alleviate” by creating “new values that are those of life”.\textsuperscript{2015} As Deleuze sees it, Nietzsche’s work on nihilism involves an important differentiation between its successive stages. “Negative nihilism” is already included in the notion of (Christian) god as a conclusion divorced from its premisses. An attempt to correct it leads to “reactive nihilism” of god’s murderers who continue to retain godly values. Gradually, if not alternatively with reaction, “passive nihilism” emerges as the ideology proper for the last humans making themselves comfortable in waiting for extinction. Nihilism is overtake only in the phase of “perfect nihilism” that actively destroys the human on its way beyond it.\textsuperscript{2016}

In a fragment of Nietzsche from 1884, the issue of “vom Glauben an Gott sich rein zu erhalten” is dealt
with. In this context, doing without god is related to “Ehrlichkeit” and “kräftigen Manneskoppe und Mannesherzen”, whereas, it is said, in Pascal’s time, faith in the divinity was “eine Forderung des intellektuellen Gewissens”. The note links the current succumbing to received views and established authorities with a fear of the consequences of Gottlosigkeit: “gedankenlose Art, ohne Prüfung überlieferte Meinungen anzulernen und verehren zu lernen, ebenso die Verehrung für das, was unsere Väter geglaubt haben”. (N Sommer - Herbst 26 [175], KSA 11, 195.) Here, too, one may see how the stress is on the way both god-related and god-less situations are studied in terms of their effects on thought. Perhaps Gillespie is trying to raise the question of the specific ways of conceiving the ‘god’ that remained unclear for Nietzsche. Yet, the fatal fault, in Heidegger’s, and hence, in Gillespie’s, ways of reading is that they ignore the wealth of Nietzsche’s criticisms of subjectivity that ought to put into question the charge of subjectivism.

If this charge would merely be psychological, it would be enough to refer to, say, a note where it is said that a passionate attitude to independence may well be a sign of an appreciation of subtle dependencies (N Ende 1880 7 [91], KSA 9, 335; see also M 299, KSA 3, 222). As it happens, the chronological closeness of this fragment with the two notes on nihilism might offer an initial motivation for arguing that the economy between factors hemming action and factors stirring action is to be understood as further articulation of nihilism with its passive and active actualizations. More generally speaking, nihilism would seem to take part in Nietzsche’s nowadays so commonly recognized campaign against oppositional settings in Western thought.

Yet, one does well to look at another note where the external and internalized social constraints of any thinking are recognized in the context of articulating the self as plurality. Everything from gods to stock exchange becomes part of the conceiver or the dreamer. (N Herbst 1880 6 [80], KSA 9, 215-6.) It is Nietzsche’s insight, before Heidegger or Gillespie, that a subjectivity declaring itself as the only measure or the one embodying a total will power, is to be problematized (see also N Sommer 1880 4 [144], KSA 9, 137-8). Once again, one can see that these are writings written during the time of Nietzsche’s first two notebook entries on nihilism. The conclusion is at hand that Nietzsche could find room, in one and the same train of thought, for both articulating the significance of nihilism and criticizing the philosophical concept of the subject. Heidegger and Gillespie are right in trading the question of whether Nietzsche attacks or declares nihilism for the more complicated confrontation with the whole problem. Yet, they go wrong in latching on a single definition of nihilism (‘devaluation of values’ or ‘death of god’) and in claiming for themselves the glory of seeing the bigger picture more clearly than Nietzsche ever could.

William Desmond, in turn, holds that it is precisely “the self of the modern subjectivism” that suffers,
according to Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism, the worst defeat. Desmond’s special emphasis is in the way Nietzsche’s struggle with nihilism can be compared to Hegel’s attempt at “rising above nihilism”. The way he goes on with his interpretation suggests, however, a quite one-sided view of the problem reminiscent of Gillespie’s account. Desmond writes, namely, about how “Nietzsche’s aesthetics might be seen as a heroic effort to resacralize a world devoid of the divine, so to rescue it from its valueless thereness, its indifferent nihilist being.”

Desmond’s formulation brings one to the third decisive point, alongside ’valuelessness’ and ’death of god’, about what commentators take as Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism. The key fragment from the fall of 1887 about nihilism as a “normaler Zustand” that is “zweideutig” reads:

[...]
A)) Nihilism als Zeichen der gesteigerten Macht des Geistes: als aktiver Nihilism. Er kann ein Zeichen von Stärke sein: die Kraft des Geistes kann so angewachsen sein, daß ihr die bisherigen Ziele (“Überzeugungen”, Glaubensartikel) unangemessen sind - ein Glaube nämlich drückt im Allgemeinen den Zwang von Existenzbedingungen aus, eine Unterwerfung unter die Autorität von Verhältnissen, unter denen ein Wesen gedeiht, wächst, Macht gewinnt...
Andrerseits ein Zeichen von nicht genügender Stärke, um produktiv sich nun auch wieder ein Ziel, ein Warum? einen Glauben zu setzen.
Der Nihilism stellt einen pathologischen Zwischenzustand dar (pathologisch ist die ungeheure Verallgemeinerung, der Schluß auf gar keinen Sinn): sei es, daß die produktiven Kräfte noch nicht stark genug sind: sei es, daß die decadence noch zögert und ihre Hülfsmittel noch nicht erfunden hat.
B)) Nihilism als Niedergang und Rückgang der Macht des Geistes: der passive Nihilism: als ein Zeichen von Schwäche: die Kraft des Geistes kann ermußt, erschöpft sein, so daß die bisherigen Ziele und Werthe unangemessen sind und keinen Glauben mehr finden - daß die Synthesis der Werthe und Ziele (auf der jede starke Cultur beruht) sich löst, so daß die einzelnen Werthe sich Krieg machen: Zersetzung daß Alles, was erquickt, heilt, beruhigt, betäubt, in den Vordergrund tritt, unter verschiedenen Verkleidungen, religiös, oder moralisch oder politisch oder ästhetisch usw.
[...]
(N 9 [35], KSA 12, 350-1.)

Discussing this very fragment, Jean-Luc Nancy describes nihilism as “a matter of force” or strength, as an “energetic condition” with a “double intensity”, as a normalized “counter-pathology” of the absence of meaning that has come to the fore as a “backlash of the belief in the true meaning”. Its ambiguity involves being in the tense “in-between” of destruction and languishment. Nancy calls the nihilistic process one of “diffracted character” in the sense that it involves both the never-ending striving and the notion of the end as attainment or final destruction. He introduces “ex-termination” as the “key word of the era of nihilism”, because of its referring to a terminaison sans terme: the “interminable
extermination” is the “normal state” of nihilism. The double extreme of active/passive nihilism is surmounted once the nihilistic belief in no meaning is not healed with a variety of returns to the pre-nihilistic beliefs. Nancy urges one to grasp meaning itself, and existence as such, as “force”, and to apprehend the operation of ’subsuming a meaning’ as not one of an operative subject creating or destructing his/her world but as a “singularity of existence” that does not have a meaning but exists as a meaning.2018

As it happens, August Vetter wrote, in 1926, about nihilism in Nietzsche as a “question of force”. Nihilism or the “general fatigue” is something of which “the concept of decadence” as the “individual conceiving [Fassung] of the “impoverished” life” offers a preliminary understanding. The generality of nihilism, as well as the way Vetter emphasizes its late stages and its Christian nature, becomes clear, as he speaks about it as “the end product of the religious development, on the one hand, and of the scientific, political and artistic processes entailed by it, on the other hand”.2019

As far as I see it, Nietzsche’s fragment presents the extremes of nihilism in order to discuss their very extremity. One can see how within the active nihilism, there can be a question of the goal-setting-powers being fully or only partly developed, so that there is clearly a continuum from the most extreme form of passivism to the equally extreme form of activism. Yet, these extremes seem to be closer to each other than some not quite extremely active nihilism is from the height of activism or some not altogether extremely passive nihilism from the abyss of passivism. What makes the extremes intimate with one another is that they both involve the “tremendous generalization” from the incredibility of received beliefs as conditions of existence to the absence of all belief, all conviction, all meaning, all value, all existence.

What is probably the interesting point about the fragment is the way in which nihilism is related to the shared beliefs becoming unangemessen with the capacity of those who have to make sense and guide their own action with and through these beliefs. At the place of the measured syntheses, both the spirit that is far too powerless and the spirit that is far too mighty tend to set those “tremendous generalizations” that lead, according to the socially constrained (“relations in which one prospers” or suffers) but individually actualized dispositions, into shutting down or blowing up. All this has a direct bearing on the question of form to which I accorded a whole section of my study (III.a).

One gathers just how questionable it is as Gillespie claims to be “revising” Nietzsche’s one-sided analysis of nihilism as the loss of “gods” by “redefining” nihilism as the instauration of (men as) “gods”. Similarly, one can see how Heidegger’s attempt at “pushing further” the impartial analysis, i.e. his project of moving from the crisis in human goals to analyzing the systematic refusal of accepting the
essential goal-lessness of human, becomes questionable in the face of the fragment just quoted. Nietzsche’s note expressly points (contrary to Loy’s claims, too) to the issue of various forms of compensation stepping in (in the \textit{Vordergrund}) to blur the perspective into the naked nihilism that one endeavors to hide under different (spiritual, ethical, social, artistic) “\textit{clothings}”. What remains to be noted, at this point, is that the dynamics of “active” and “passive” forms of nihilism was already there in Nietzsche’s first fragment on nihilism from the summer of 1880. It may have seemed strange to see Schopenhauer associated with the Russian assassins, or Luther with the pagan Teutonic \textit{theo-cide} and world destruction along the lines of Wagner’s \textit{Wotanistic} artistic experiments. From the present context, one is in a better position to appreciate the overall problematic of nihilism capable of combining crucial political, religious, aesthetic and philosophical considerations.

It is my contention that ‘nihilism’ was already for Nietzsche a problematic requiring the most comprehensive, the most variegated and the most self-critical philosophical investigation. It was neither just a position or a view he may or may not have called his own nor anything he hoped to crystallize in some handy formula, at least other than the suitably compact and self-reflective one of ‘nihilism’. I have already shown that Nietzsche was very much aware of the historical reverberations of this evergreen concept and that he also experimented with its analytical efficacy and flexibility. His use of nihilism has very little that can be conveniently described as accidental or innocent. Rather, it is indicative of a certain vital function that this very concept has in Nietzsche’s philosophical project.

‘Nihilism’ is, in my view, the concept with which Nietzsche made sense of the problematic of the evolution of concepts according to the needs of a community (and the evolution of the needs according to the concepts), of the evolved conceptuality becoming every once in a while less successful in guiding the life of the community, of the dramatic disruptions caused by the lacking capacity of received conceptions, of the subsequent sense of concept-lessness and the attempt at a variety of conceptual replacements as well as the exploitation of the confused situation by those strong enough to produce functioning syntheses, of the question of the current conceptual crisis as putatively the most devastating and allegedly an irrevocable one. Whatever else one is to make out of it, ‘nihilism’ is Nietzsche’s conceptual synthesis of the situation of seemingly no synthetic conceptions.

\textbf{V.b.2 Concept Critical Treatment}

The first task of a concept critical reading was to reconstruct the analytical context of discussing Nietzsche and nihilism. I would now like to continue my attempt at a reinterpretation by outlining the early reception of Nietzsche in terms of nihilism and by relating this to the general debate on nihilism
that was going on during the philosopher’s lifetime. In this way, I hope to fulfill the second task of reconstructing the relevant concept historical context. After that, to close this subsection, I shall try and specify how Nietzsche’s handling of nihilism was distinctly conceptual. The next subsection, in turn, contains an attempt to show that nihilism was not only one of the key concepts in Nietzsche’s philosophy but even the very framework for a conceptual problematic decisive for all philosophizing. Finally, in section V.c, nihilism will be related to the issues discussed in the present work: Nietzsche’s life, works, reception and, once again, to that of concepts.

Otto Plümacher’s book on old and new pessimism reached its second edition in 1888. Plümacher defined pessimism as the conviction that “non-being of the world is better than its being”. He went on to discuss a number of cases, ranging from the Greek philosophers and buddhism to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, from gnosticism to later scientism and to poets such as Leopardi, Byron and Heine. The specifically Christian form of pessimism, the discussion of which may be the most polemical part of the book, was related to the contemptus mundi including the despising of the bodily. Plümacher spoke of an ambivalent move by the protestant reformation to attack the worldly tendencies of catholicism and, thus, to heighten the old Weltverachtung. The ambivalence lies in the way protestantism was, of course, acting with the specific objective to expound life-enjoying struggle against both old religiosity and new quietism. Significantly, Plümacher managed to accommodate Nietzsche in his discussion, even though this was done indirectly and only in the passing.2020

I call it significant, because it was precisely the general question of pessimism that fed many of the early debates about Nietzsche that, in turn, established or at least reinforced Nietzsche’s association with fin de siècle nihilism. In 1891, the French critic Téodor de Wyzewd described Nietzsche explicitly as a nihiliste. The reason for this reads: “Nothing, there is nothing, ever will there be nothing, and nothing has ever been there: such is, in a sentence, Nietzsche’s philosophy.”2021

Let this be taken as one of the more analytical judgments of Nietzsche’s position. In addition, the philosopher’s work was, at these very first stages of his reception, associated with certain historical examples of nihilism in a pejorative sense. Alfred Biese, for one, spoke of the “nihilistic scepsis” among sophists and generalized it as the threat to “solid knowledge, the basis of all spiritual being”. Nietzsche, in turn, is described by Biese as a one who offers but “warmed up old sophist wisdom” and preaches that “nothing is true, everything is permitted”. Alongside Nietzsche, the detrimental kind of philosophical pedagogy is identified in von Hartmann’s work.2022

von Hartmann, in turn, had been attached, already in 1880, to pessimism as the “widely expanded current of contemporary times”. Salomo as the back drop, Schopenhauer as the major modern
inspiration and growing suicide rates as timely manifestations were all considered as belonging to the issue of pessimism.²²³ von Hartmann himself reacted to the accusations and shook off all the labels from “atheist” and “pantheist” to “nihilist”: his notion of the “eventual destruction [Vernichtung] of the phenomenal world” was to be understood, as he insisted, as compatible with Christian eschatology.²²⁴

As one partaker in the pessimist controversy, Friedrich Paulsen wrote of the “practical consequences of materialism”, about its “dangerous effects” felt in the realm of “religion, morality and the belief in ideals”. It was the “nihilistic conception of life” that was said to be entailed by the materialist world view containing the notion of the reality as but “play of meaningless coincidence”. Idealist metaphysics was what Paulsen recommended as an antidote.²²⁵ In his lengthy account of the history of moral philosophy and of the contemporary situation, Paulsen came to relate Nietzsche’s increasing influence to the “lack of an ideal” and “moral nihilism”.²²⁶

In 1904, Jakob J. Hollitscher was ready, in an otherwise fairly balanced piece of research, to ban Nietzsche’s “ethical” and “subjectivist” nihilism.²²⁷ Ever since, one of the questions pondered in the Nietzsche research has been the one concerning the philosopher’s own nihilism,²²⁸ unless, of course, his nihilism is merely taken for granted.²²⁹

In as much as the concept critical approach involves rehabilitation, it would not so much enhance the presentation of some more “positive” features in Nietzsche or of his expressly anti-nihilistic utterances as it would, first of all, try and relate Nietzsche’s peculiar rehearsals with this concept to the other ways it was conceptualized before and around him. An important thing to realize is that the above references to Nietzsche as a nihilist were not only attempts at describing his philosophy with what the describers saw as a fitting word. They were also instances of the continuation of the problematic and language of nihilism, just as Nietzsche’s writings on nihilism are.

To clarify this point I would like to introduce Karl Grün’s book Die Philosophie in der Gegenwart from 1876. There is no indication that Nietzsche was familiar with this work but being about Schopenhauer and released by a publishing company in Leipzig in the time of his decisive taking off from the Schopenhauerian thought (as well as from Wagner and from Basel) it is quite possible that he had read it. Nietzsche might have known Grün but Grün almost certainly did not know him, so that all too tight a connection between the two critics cannot be established in historico-critical terms. However, there is room for comparing their respective ways of dealing with nihilism.

Rather than to insist on an actual historico-critical connection, I shall use Grün’s work here only as an effective way to shed light on the nihilistic problematic looming large in Nietzsche’s immediate
environment. In particular, as one of the most interesting thinkers to have emerged from the Hegelian left and to have had a part to play in the politicization of anarchist thought, Grün contributes to understanding the Nietzschean interest in the dynamics of nihilism between extreme activism and utter passivism.

Grün opens his work with a helpful specification of what he means by “contemporary” philosophy. He identifies Feuerbach as the “highpoint” of current philosophical thinking that has emerged from “scholastic Hegelianism” and opted for a “thinking of reality”. The situation is outlined with additional references to Schopenhauer, on the one hand, and the “extra-Kantians partly in opposition to, partly in consonance with” natural sciences. Endeavoring to write critically and accessibly (gemeinfaßlich) Grün’s pointed thesis reads: “Basically, all world-views are good, in so far as they are not boring, just as it is with poetic genres.”

Without making too much of the viability of this approach and this depiction of the philosophical circumstances, I would like to move on to the way Grün describes Schopenhauer’s position. Among Schopenhauer’s “sources”, Buddhism is listed beside Kant, Fichte and Schelling. The usual “antipode”, Hegel, is also seen as close to him, in the way that they both started from Schelling’s Weltseele in order to wind up in Weltwissen (Hegel) or Weltwillen (Schopenhauer), that is, in “conceiving mutually opposing concepts as similarly absolute”. Grün mentions Herbart as one who had understood Schopenhauer and Noack as one to have attacked him. Of Schopenhauer’s followers, von Hartmann is heavily ridiculed and all of his opinions contested. In particular, the idea of drawing Goethe and Herder into the discourse of “nirvanism” and Weltjammer is rejected.

Accordingly, Grün focuses on Schopenhauer’s attachment to the notion of nothingness. He asks what one is to draw from it: “Is it the bright Nothing that shines in Lessing’s crystal forms, the Nothing that glows in Lichtenberg’s sharp prose?” The idea of Schopenhauer as “seducing us to nirvana” is mentioned as is also the philosopher’s low evaluation of the humans. The idea of “turning away” (entziehen) from the ‘will of life’ is identified with “negating” (negiren) the ‘will to life’. To will no more would be, so Grün, “to give away one’s substance”. Moreover, he says that there is “not a one religion” that would teach the meaninglessness of “life”. Seeing Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity or Islam in these terms is failing to appreciate their insistence on life as “field of battles”, “place of trials” or, in any case, as a “passage” to some paradisiac realm.

For the present purposes, the most important slice of Grün’s text goes as follows: “What does Schopenhauer want? To torture [kasteien] himself and to have his gain therein. No gain? As if the piece of mind in will-lessness [die Seelenruhe der Willenlosigkeit] was no prize! As if the nihilism of
nirvana was not moving around the old “atonement”! Nor did Kant claim any gain, and should one count this [instance of] self-disinterestedness as [part of] his self-interest, one is only applying the same procedure to the case of the abandonment of the world [Weltentsagung]! The Kantian moral law is just as well equal with, and parallel to, the true [richtigen] self-denial of the will."\textsuperscript{2034}

First of all, this is an important early philosophical use of nihilism. Schopenhauer’s being more or less generally labeled by this very word is something that is significant in coming to terms with Nietzsche’s understanding of both Schopenhauer and nihilism. Secondly, the handsome comparison between Schopenhauer’s Verleugnung or Verneinung of the will and Kant’s rejection of the self(ishness) is a significant attempt to extend the problem of nihilism from the confines of the commentary on some relatively obscure figure (Schopenhauer before his ever controversial fame) to the much respected master of modern mainstream philosophy (Kant having already achieved his standing as the lasting classic). Thirdly, Grün’s handling of the contemporary varieties of pessimism with an emphasis on the overtly misguided perceptions (of, in particular, religion) and the potentially dishonest stance (as to, in the main, the disinterested approach) among their protagonists, is to be recognized. His case goes to show that nihilism could, early on, be received in a way that was not that alarmed or confused or enraged or fervently enthusiastic, but, rather, critical and ironical.

As a final reference to Grün, I would like to quote his view of the post-Kantian philosophical situation where no apriori concepts are accepted and metaphysics is reduced to a critique of knowledge. There is, however, the remaining opportunity to “conceive metaphysics” in a way that “this conceiving is a course on metaphors”.\textsuperscript{2035}

This much would have to do about the early debate on pessimism and nihilism. Grün’s final point takes one back to the basics of the conceptual problematic. Now, I do not mean to say that there has not been, in the Nietzsche scholarship, any sensitivity to the concept critical dimension of nihilism. On the contrary, there is much that ought to be taken in consideration when attempting at a reassessment.

In the words of George Desilet, “Nietzsche finds no particular word or concept “villainous” or offensive in itself”. This is why “nihilism” do “have favorable uses in his writings”. In Desilet’s view, Nietzsche begins “with a concern with language” and “arrives at an understanding of the workings of the negative”. The key is that “discrimination” can only proceed through negation.\textsuperscript{2036}

Gilles Deleuze, in turn, describes the way Nietzsche set out to “elaborate the concept of the will to power” and to “give it its full signification” (in a way that conserved the affective sense of ‘power’). Will to power, in turn, has “the quality of the negative” as its ratio cognoscendi. In other words,
nihilism is required in order for will to power to be known. Moreover, the *ratio essendi* of the will to power lies in the “contrary quality, affirmation”. That is, the destruction of nihilism is about “expulsion of the negative from this will”.  

Although Deleuze’s work inspires a study on the way ‘nihilism’ assumes the role of a (or the) key concept in Nietzsche’s philosophy, he does not explicitly combine his many points about the importance of nihilism for Nietzsche, on the one hand, and about the importance of conceptuality for Nietzsche, on the other hand.

Heinz Röttges’s book, *Nietzsche und die Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1972) was probably the first work to pose the question of interrelations between Nietzsche, nihilism and the concept of concept. Yet, having referred to the issue of the “dialectical concept of concept”, Röttges steps back to remark that “purely logical” handling does not suit Nietzsche who, as is said a little later, turned away from the conceptual toward the therapeutic and metaphorical.  

A sufficiently similar outcome results from a different interpretation offered in Damion Buterin’s recent article “Nietzsche: The Philosophical Nihilist and Overcoming Nihilism”. Buterin speaks of “Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism” as amounting to, among other things, “liberation from truth”. But he does not raise the question of the concept of concept. His concluding formulation, however, reveals that he takes for granted a certain conception of concept: “Nietzsche wants to change philosophy from within. He endeavours to expand not only the linguistic and conceptual embodiments of our ideas but also the ideas themselves.” One might want to see how this concept of concept - that seems to be married to words but not necessarily to the “ideas” it comes to “embody” - relates to the concept of nihilism, but Buterin remains silent on this question.

There are other commentators to have taken up the issue. Thomas Busch, in his *Die Affirmation des Chaos. Zur Überwindung des Nihilismus in der Metaphysik Friedrich Nietzsche* (1989), notes the conceptual dimension, too. Nietzsche’s critique of the knowing subject and of the notion of reality as rationally conceived leads to a critique of concepts and language. In metaphysical terms, the identity between words and concepts is being attacked because it involves making similar of what is dissimilar. In existential terms, concepts are polemicized for being hostile to all that lives. Busch says that the “critique of the philosophical concept” is to be seen as “one of the last consequences of the antimetaphysical impulses of the entire epistemological programme”. The more affirmative function Nietzsche reserves for concepts is omitted from Busch’s study.

In Robert C. Solomon’s view, Nietzsche’s concern is precisely the “new conception of values”. He
writes as follows: “The concept of “value” is the key to Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is the value of values that he seeks to understand, the revaluation of values that he undertakes as the goal of his philosophizing, the transvaluation of values that he seeks to unmask as the origin of “morality”, the nihilistic devaluation of the highest values that he diagnoses as the consequence of Christian morality. “Value” is the general conception of which “morality” is a special instance.” The moral psychological context of Solomon’s discussion prevents him from spelling out the more generally philosophical relevance of Nietzsche’s move. Yet, he acutely identifies this as one “from a demand for new values to a demand for a new conception of values, from the attack on morality to an attack on certain conceptions of morality.”  

Bernhard Taureck discusses, in his Nietzsche’s Alternativen zum Nihilismus (1991), the way nominalist criticisms do not exhaust Nietzsche’s conceptual considerations. It is, Taureck argues, better to speak of a quasi-conceptualism, where the quasi stands for Nietzsche’s doubts concerning any way to depict the mental realm. Although Taureck does not specify the connection between quasi-conceptualism and nihilism, it can be seen that where nominalism is not, in his view, the appropriate ground on which to erect Nietzsche’s work, nihilism can serve as such a “unifying basis”, as long as it is understood as both something that Nietzsche’s thinking exemplifies and something that it critically clarifies.

Elisabeth Kuhn’s monograph, Friedrich Nietzsche’s Philosophie des europäischen Nihilismus (1992), not only corrected the older reviews of the discourse of nihilism in Nietzsche’s texts by relying on the new critical edition of the philosopher’s work, but appreciated the inherent conceptual problematic as well. In this inquiry, nihilism is taken to be “the mid” framed by such key “philosopheme” as will to power, eternal return and over human. Yet, Kuhn took the question of the concept of concept only as the unquestioned point of departure for her study. She said that Nietzsche marks a shift from the Cartesian tradition of clare and distincte ideas to historically understood “concept of concept” that entails the impossibility of definition.

Instead of, thereafter, explicating further the reconceptualization or its entailments to the concept of nihilism, Kuhn speaks only of such things as negation of “the traditional conceptions of adequate conceivability of reality and truth by the means of conceptuality and faculty of reason”, affirmation of “dynamic” concepts that are created rather than discovered, Revidierung, Neubesetzung and Neufassung of epistemology, Umdeutung of received conceptions of knowledge and Umbesetzung of the concept of truth.

To look for the crucial connection between Kuhn’s persistent use of the term “Nihilismus-Begriff” or “Nihilismus-Konzeption” (beside the terms “philosopheme” or “vocable” of nihilism) and the new
concept of concept that is hinted at, one is left with empty hands. To be sure, Kuhn sketches a promising view of Nietzsche as taking his distance from both rationalism and irrationalism in favor of the “trans-rational”.

Yet, these potentially workable insights aside, it is, especially for a study that rigorously applies concept historical method, a considerable flaw to fail to relate the givings of the reconceptualization of conceptuality to the key concept under discussion is a considerable flaw. It is to be underscored that the defect in question is one menacing the begriffsgeschichtlich programme itself. It is the strict method whose successful execution prevents Kuhn from moving from making sense of the “semasiological” (the relations of the word Nihilism(us) with a variety of concepts) and “onomasiological” (the relations of such words as Pessimismus, Nirvana, Nichts and Nichtsein with the concept of nihilism) dimensions to problematizing the concept of concept along with such helpful divisions.

In some aspects, Kuhn’s work is related to the way Herbert Frey, in his dissertation, described nihilism as “the phenomenon [that] assumes middle position in Nietzsche’s philosophy”. Frey held that Nietzsche studied “not the immanent lawfulness of logic itself, but the conditions, under which logic springs forth, the genesis of concepts and their significance for the human existence”. In a book called Zur Genesis des Nihilismus bei Fr. Nietzsche (1975) one might expect to find much that would link the project of investigating the genealogy of concepts to the one of investigating the genealogy of nihilism. Yet, there is no discussion on the way the interest in the conditions for producing concepts affects the concept of nihilism. It has to be admitted, though, that Frey does a good job by developing his insights to the direction where the simultaneous closeness and distance to Kant, as well as Lange’s impact, are appreciated and the problematic approached as a one pertaining to the need to make basic questions of knowing communicate with the basic questions of living.

Joan Aucejo Javaloyas bases her interpretation, in the main, on Heidegger’s insights. Seen from the point of view of conceptuality, there are similar problems as with the above commentators. Aucejo stresses that “Nietzsche’s texts are prominently aphoristic, filled and loaded with images, unconventional symbols, through which they are set apart from the habitual conceptual explication of the classic philosophical texts, or at least from the majority of philosophers”. She also cites favorably Fink’s view of the anti-conceptual stance of Nietzsche (see III.a.1). Nonetheless, Nietzsche is said to be aware of the exceptionality of his approach and even willing to “clarify the way and the concepts in which his aphorisms are to be read”. After these remarks, Aucejo feels free to speak about “central concepts [Begriffe] in Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the modern conditio”, about “Nietzsche’s conception [Konzeption]” in general and about the “concept of nihilism” as the Leitfaden of his philosophy. Moreover, she criticizes the way Nietzsche’s elaborations of Sein and Werden fall short of “developing
these concepts in a satisfactory way” and remain at the level of “lexical contrast”. Indeed, Aucejo Javaloyas’s main objection to Nietzsche is that the “shift in conceptuality [Wechsel der Begrifflichkeit]”, that is, the rejection of ’being’ and the “return to the concept of becoming” is “crude” and simplistic and is only with considerable trouble compensated by genealogical and life-philosophical considerations.

This criticism finds an echo in Harry Redner’s reading of Nietzsche. Most concisely, Redner says that Nietzsche had a belief in overcoming nihilism through a change of the prefix. A whole historical riddle could be solved by one word: one has only to trade the Entwertung or devaluation for the Umwertung or revaluation. As Redner sees it, the root of the matter, or the reason for entertaining such a crude conviction, is to be found in Nietzsche’s heroic individualism, on the one hand, and in his naive understanding of language, on the other hand. The foolish individualism leads him to think that nihilism was “brought on” by a few outstanding authorities in ideatic matters and that it can be surmounted by a few other lawgiving philosophical heros. The silly philologism leads him to assume that language is handed over to contemporary people by their ancestors. Taken together, these defects in Nietzsche’s thought prevent him from appreciating incessant linguistic transformations, perpetual conceptual changes and unarrested historical developments.

Where Aucejo Javaloyas starts from the familiar doubts as to Nietzsche’s conceptual capacities and proceeds, via an unproblematized use of the vocabulary of concepts, to criticizing his too facile conceptual subversions, Redner reaches the same conclusion by emphasizing the a-social and quasi-historical nature of Nietzsche’s genealogy. Both critics underline the philosopher’s commitment to values and to the view of nihilism as loss of values. Yet, neither of them takes seriously the ongoing conceptual considerations in Nietzsche’s texts but, instead, apply conventional conceptual criticisms to this philosopher of conceptuality.

The book by Randall Havas, *Nietzsche’s Genealogy. Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge* (1995), contains much more original argumentation on nihilism and conceptuality. It marks a significant improvement in the line of interpretation that underscores the issue of truthfulness. For one thing, Havas feels free to refer to a number of Nietzsche’s “concepts” or “conceptions”, such as the ones of reading, culture, obedience, individuality, knowledge, will to knowledge, life in the present age, role of the philosopher, Greek tragedy, psychology, scientific discipline. More important, he argues that Nietzsche’s view of nihilism involves a critique of indifference toward “the ordinary conditions that govern the employment of any concepts” or toward the fact that “an external standpoint on life” no longer makes sense. In Havas’s view, Nietzsche’s attack on Socratism is an attack against the demand for reasons for one’s interpretations and definitions for one’s concepts in order to advance from

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instinctivity to intelligibility, since this demand “denigrates one’s practices with those concepts”. To use concepts is to live with them, not adopting “conceptual residence” or “having a conceptually independent standpoint on one’s historical situation”. As Havas insists, this conception is not “giving up life of reason” but “reconceiving [...] its character”. ²⁰⁵²

All this is readily helpful for any concept critical reading of Nietzsche. Yet, the specifically concept critical approach that involves attending to the way the concept of nihilism is used in Nietzsche and to the way this teaches one about the Nietzschean concept of concept is not rehearsed by Havas. Moreover, his discussion is anything but extensive and it rests on questionable oppositions between philosophy and life and philosophy and psychology that are attributed to Nietzsche²⁰⁵³. Nihilism and the issue of concepts are not clearly combined, although the book supplies many insights for any such attempt.

It is Keith Ansell-Pearson’s *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker. The Perfect Nihilist* (1994) that manages to discuss the dynamics of the reconceptualization together with nihilism. As an expert in political philosophy, Ansell-Pearson is, unlike Buterin, Busch, Kuhn, Frey or even Havas, less eager to rush from the interplay of life²⁰⁵⁴ and conceptuality to the further issues in epistemology.

He writes that Nietzsche “sees Western civilization caught in the grip of debilitating and demoralising nihilism in which our most fundamental conceptions of the world are no longer tenable and believable”. From this perspective, nihilism is “a cultural revolution [...] in which our appreciation of language and our conceptions of truth and knowledge would undergo a fundamental transformation”. The material and social nature of language, as conceived by Nietzsche, prevents this view to be taken as idealism. Humans are “symbolic animals” whose experience is always mediated by language and concepts to the extent that a “change in concepts means a change in our conceptual understanding of the world”. According to Ansell-Pearson, a nihilistic situation is such that there is “a disjunction between our experience of the world and the conceptual apparatus we have at our disposal, which we have inherited, to interpret it.”²⁰⁵⁵

Ansell-Pearson admits that he is building on the work of another political philosopher to have investigated Nietzsche, Mark Warren. For Warren, nihilism, in Nietzsche, involves there being no more resources, in the material and symbolic practices, for the “human agency” to reflect and interpret itself. It is this crisis of agency that covers, in Warren’s opinion, the whole range of nihilism, from its historical unfolding to the structures of self-interpretation on epistemological, moral, psychological, social and cultural level. Elsewhere, Warren specifically says that nihilism is about the “loss of conceptual orientation”. Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ is not a metaphysical concept that stipulates the “essential
content” of power. Instead, it “serves to frame an approach to power”, to constitute “a conceptual domain [...] adequate to the problem of nihilism”.2056

Even before, nihilism has been associated with the virtual impossibility of orientation2057, yet, as another recent reading implies, this is a peculiarly contemporary interpretation. According to Francis Guibal, nihilism becomes compelling, “in an era that has collided with its past [...] in an unclear and non-creative way”. For him, nihilism is, first and foremost, “anguished disorientation”.2058

It is only fitting that one of Heidegger’s basic arguments for the need to refine what he saw as Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism was that one should take, as the nihilism proper, not the suddenly revealed or felt absence of goals but the more or less systematic denial of the essential goal-lessness of human existence. The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset insisted, too, that ‘life’ ought to be understood as utter directionlessness2059.

I think that Peter Beier can be credited for issuing one of the first interpretations of nihilism as a crisis in conceptualization. As he saw it, the process in which the weakening of the self leads to the cancelling of the not-self can be characterized as “conceptualized history of nihilation”. In this view, Nietzsche’s struggle is a one with the kinds of moralities that seek to erase the self (Entselbstungsmoral). When it comes to describing nihilism, Beier says that it undermines the possibilities of interpretation and the whole notion of a “theoretical relationship with the world”.2060

Günter Abel’s painstaking elaborations of the Nietzschean kind of ‘interpretation’ find their most fruitful context near the above-mentioned readings. Although he does not explicitly discuss conceptuality, Abel’s concentration on nihilism as Sinnlosigkeit requiring sinn-logische reflections is immediately relevant to conceptual concerns. Indeed, he holds that the famous question of overcoming nihilism - “the motif at the nucleus of Nietzsche’s philosophy” - bears on the strength or capacity “at hand” to continue to interpret, since it is not a matter of coming up with novel myths or rebirth of the old ones but of new thoughts. Further, nihilism is not a psychological or ‘intra-conscious’ problem but a one of a community of interpreters. As Abel sees it, it necessitates a shift from “the highest, ever solid truths” to “interpreatively asserted and, thus, ‘leading’ thoughts that are not extra-temporal but ‘have their time’”. In order to surmount nihilism a living creature ought to appreciate anything existing as similar to itself, to “make all one’s actions, thoughts and experiences noble with eternity” and to grasp how “your own eternal recurrence depends on everybody else just like theirs depend on you”.2061

The concept critical reading of Nietzsche and nihilism can be articulated in connection with these previous interpretations. In addition, it seeks to attain a contact to the kind of reading that Heidegger or
Gillespie proposed, and to show that a crucial part of Nietzsche’s conceptual criticisms was exactly the critique of conceptualization as a business of megalomaniac subjectivity or of an unconstrained will. It is best to proceed by way of an apparently opposing line of reading.

According to John Sallis’s important article of 1969, the becoming questionable of the value of truth is “apprehended by Nietzsche as the most extreme and shattering event in the history of nihilism”. What is at stake is the possibility that “truth itself”, “the essence of truth” proves to “be a lie” or that “intelligibility itself” turns out to be “radically unintelligible”. Moreover, Sallis holds that “Nietzsche’s philosophy” requires one to trade the notion of a “theoretical first principle” for “a profound experience of nihilism” so radical that it excludes the very possibility of articulating its own essential structure as nihilism”. Nihilism cannot be “an item of knowledge”, a matter of “evidence and confirmation”. This is because, so Sallis, conceptualizations carried out along these lines of the nihilistic meaninglessness would be contradicted by their results soon as they ascribe some meaning to nihilism: they “irrevocably deny precisely what [they] would conceptualize (meaninglessness)”.

This would seem to be the most resolute discouragement to any reading that wishes to emphasize Nietzsche’s work with, and on, conceptuality. Yet, I have tried to make clear that the ‘conceptual’ in my concept critical approach does not imply an exclusive interest in concepts, any more than the ‘critical’ in it points to mere conceptlessness. The approach is designed to explicate the view on conceptuality in a given thinker and even if it was a different procedure to test in on Leibniz and Locke than to carry it out on Marx, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, James, Bergson and Adorno, this would say nothing against its viability on thinkers with substantial criticisms of concepts. Bergson’s or James’s respective assaults on (excessive, misguided) conceptualization do not prevent either of the two critics from belonging to the most interesting philosophers of concepts. By the ‘concept critical’ I mean ‘critical enough to interrogate not only the individual concepts within a corpus but also the nature, role, limits and possibility of conceptuality’.

But if Sallis is right in saying that the “meaninglessness” of nihilism precludes any conceptualization of it, what could be the point of holding on to concept critical strategy? Nothing, I guess. Yet, what if Nietzsche can be shown to be expressly conceptualizing nihilism? From Sallis’s perspective, it would only mean that Nietzsche succumbs to the same error that will be there to face anyone trying to capture the ‘essential structure’ of meaninglessness. My contention is, however, that already the fact that he came up with “nihilism” as the name for his ‘profound experience’ of meaninglessness suggests that Nietzsche had preserved a capacity to conceptualize his situation. Or better, he could not help but perceive his condition and his circumstances through some conceptual structure that evolved, in a mutual relation, with his experiences and that his philosophical shrewdness consisted in grasping that
very structure in its development, in its personal roots and its connections to the tradition and to the contemporary world.

I agree with Sallis that nihilism is no ’first principle’. Because of the intensely self-reflective and self-critical nature of this Nietzschean concept (as of the others, too), such a notion does not make good sense. Moreover, I second to Sallis’s opinion that ’knowledge’, ’confirmation’ and ’evidence’ are not suited to making sense of nihilism. Although I think that it is not entirely out of place to ask about the ’correctness’ of Nietzsche’s perceptions - i.e., about the extent to which his contemporaries may be taken to have suffered from the diminishing resources of meaning - I take nihilism as, first and foremost, pointing to the prior questions of how to conceive things before they can be construed as potential objects of epistemological considerations or scientific operations, how to tackle with conceptions regulating all perception to the point of tyranny and how to account for major changes in the conceptual regulation.

In this sense, I do not think that my strategy is completely alien to the one adopted by Sallis. It is probably the specific context of his article, that of “Zarathustra’s going down, his going under”, that prompts Sallis to emphasize the experiential over the theoretical and immediacy over conceptuality (see above IV.a.1) in a way that suggests a strict dichotomy and hierarchy between these spheres. In any case, I would rather underscore how the theoretical and the experiential are being renewed by reaffirming and reinterpreting their reciprocity. My concept critical reconsiderations of Also sprach Zarathustra (IV.b.3) and of Dionysus (IV.c.2) made up preliminary cases for a reading that assesses the conceptual problematic in a book and in a symbol usually viewed as quite removed from anything conceptual.

I would venture to say that for all of its interpretative sagacity and insightfulness, the philosophical backbone of Sallis’s phenomenological reading is a combination of an essentially conventional notion of poetry and an equally conventional notion of experience. It has been my contention that Nietzsche’s work provides good reasons for rethinking both of these conventions through the reconception of conceptuality in them. Concepts can be construed as not agents in theories or vehicles of alienation but as partakers in creative poems and profound experiences, too.

Indeed, as Sallis is fond of characterizing Nietzsche’s contributions in terms of their radicalness, extremism and revolutionarity, one further comment is needed to express my agreements and disagreements with him. To wit, Sallis speaks of “Nietzsche’s radical transformation of the tradition” related to his experience of the becoming questionable of the value of truth as the “most extreme” part of the most “radical” nihilism one can think of (just because one can hardly think of it) 2063. As I see it,
his point is a double one. First, he explicitly says that the articulation of his peculiar determining experience is to be set against the notion of Nietzsche’s “superficial whims” or “romantic yearning for the remote and the unattainable”. Secondly, he seems to imply that a mere destruction of received values and truths would certainly be devastating but it would not be radical, would not go to the root of the matter and to the rootedness of humans, as does the destruction of truth (value, meaning, intelligibility and conceptuality) itself.

My full support is for the view that there are better interpretations for Nietzsche’s thoughts and actions than a recourse to his twists of mind or utopian aspirations, although there is hardly any warrant for repressing these factors beyond necessity. Likewise, I am also endorsing a view of Nietzsche as a radical and revolutionary thinker. Yet, this is where I feel the longest distance to Sallis.

It may be that it is somehow “less radical” to deny everything from a to z than it is to deny the very ordering of the alphabet, no matter how vague the distinction here is. Yet, I find that in the actual debates of the 19th century philosophy, including the rage against Hegel and the rise of positivism, a denial of the viability of all conceptuality was not somehow “more radical” than a reconception of it. To reject the point or the possibility of concepts is “merely” to extend Kant’s aesthetics, whereas to rethink concepts - as always already regulating perceptions, as exerting tyrannical influence upon thinking and acting, as taking part in scientific, artistic, religious practices, too, as well as in those of the daily life, as tied to language and public interchange of meanings, and as involving subtle constellations with one another and with values that evolve in time and undergo gradual but dramatically revealed changes - is to strike at the common root of theoretical philosophy and practical experience.

Another contrast may be of help here. Since although I think that Lawrence M. Hinman’s reading of Nietzsche and nihilism is - for the reason that it emphasizes i) the instauration of a dominant conceptualization, ii) its destruction, iii) the subsequent disbelief in any conceptualization and iv) nihilism as Nietzsche’s key conceptualization for this process - , as such, superior to many other alternatives, including the one offered by Sallis, its facile and unproblematic recourse to individualist or subjectivist creativity of the will to power is inferior to the self-reflective stance rehearsed by Sallis.

Hinman expresses the sufficiently Sallisian point that nihilism should be taken as “first of all, an experience for Nietzsche”. His reason for urging this aspect is that nihilism “is not, at least in its initial stage, a proposition about the world which can be proved or disproved” but “something which we live […] a lived experience”. The meaninglessness, valuelessness and purposelessness as nihilism derive from “the inadequacy of particular sets of categories in terms of which the world has previously been interpreted” as well as from a “misunderstanding of the relation between categories and “the world””. It
is not only the breakdown of such a setting but already “the belief in any set of categories which are
classed as absolute” that is the problem here. In an interesting manner, Hinman compares the
Nietzschean case of nihilism to the Marxian one of alienation. They are described as the “two
fundamental categories” that “have come into prominence in attempts to deal with the malaise which
confronts contemporary man”. Despite the intimate relations between these “analyses of the 19th
century discontent”, Marxists have tended, so Hinman, to view “nihilism [as] a bourgeois luxury in
which the individual wallows in the enjoyment of his ennui and thereby avoids confronting the real,
social nature of the discontent he experiences”. Where Marx concentrated on the “inapplicability” or
harmfulness of categories for crucial collective ventures, Nietzsche insisted on the individual “exercise
of the will to power” as the instance of creating the categories.2064

Comparing Sallis and Hinman one may be tempted to resort to the distinction between passive and
active nihilism, as Sallis emphasizes the debilitating effect of nihilism for conceiving and Hinman the
creative opportunities it opens. Yet, Sallis does refer to the creative immediacy suggested by
Zarathustra’s teachings in a way analogous to Hinman’s policy of interpretation, while Hinman, for his
part, is not at all blind to the shattering event of meaninglessness preceding the potential resurgence of
creative forces. My foremost criticism of Hinman is that while he succeeds in defining (the acute)
nihilism to consist in the revelation of the defects of interpretative categories, on the one hand, and
nihilism as Nietzsche’s “category in terms of which he analyzes his age”2065, on the other hand, he does
not move on to problematize the evident self-reflective quandary. ’Nihilism’ is thus simplified as a
seemingly post-nihilistic non-absolute ‘category’ derived from the pre-conceptual ‘lived experience’ of
it and asserted by a creative individual in the full authority of his proper will to power as standing for
the detrimental nature of nihilistic or absolute ‘categories’.

The problem with Hinman is, as it was with Sallis, the overdone point about ‘experience’. As I see it,
whatever Nietzsche’s ‘experience’ was, it was strongly influenced by the issues of his proper
surroundings including, among other things, an almost full blown controversy over political, artistic,
religious and philosophical forms of nihilism. What Nietzsche experienced and perceived, he
experienced and perceived through concepts such as nihilism. Having the required level of self-criticism
as well as an intense interest in a great variety of contemporary topics and problems, Nietzsche was able
to try and articulate ‘nihilism’ as the key concept for the many alarming and fascinating concerns of the
people of his day. The common denominator for these concerns was the sense of urgency and of an out-
and-out change menacing the body of the most cherished convictions and institutions. It was his
personal experiences and preferences that guided his conceptualization of the situation in terms of
nihilism, yet it was the concept of nihilism that permeated his most intimate self-dialogue.
I shall now try and illustrate the very connection, in Nietzsche, of conceptual problematic and nihilism. Three instances suffice to show that whatever Nietzsche is experimenting with his thinking on nihilism, he articulates the conceptual nature of this very undertaking. In a fragment from 1888, Nietzsche writes about the contemporary misused of a “zufälligen und in jedem Betracht unzutreffenden Wort”, *Pessimismus*. The explanation follows:

> Man hat nicht begriffen, was doch mit Händen zu greifen: daß Pessimismus kein Problem, sondern ein Symptom ist, - daß der Name ersetzt werden müsse durch *Nihilismus*, - daß der Frage, ob Nicht-sein besser ist als Sein, selbst schon eine Krankheit, ein Niedergang, eine Idiosynkrasie ist...
> (N Mai-Juni 1888 17 [8], KSA 13, 529.)

Apart from bearing testimony to the need to examine the vocabulary of conceiving, or Nietzsche’s peculiar versions of the ’paradigm of the hand’ and the ’hand of the mind’, it is clear that, along the lines of Whewell’s philosophy of science, a new conception is taking place and the new name is a signal from this reconceptualization. The reconceptualization shakes the parameters of discussion by shifting the focus from competing answers to the way the question is posed.

Another fragment of Nietzsche has the heading ”*Gesammt-Einsicht*” and the concluding line “*Dies habe ich begriffen*”. It is written about how “jedes große fruchtbare und mächtige Bewegung der Menschheit hat zugleich eine nihilistische Bewegung *mitgeschaffen*“. Hence, the passage goes on, “die extremste Form des Pessimismus, der eigentliche *Nihilismus*” might be a sign of growth or of the “Übergang in neue Daseinsbedingungen”. (N Herbst 1887 10 [22], KSA 12, 468.) Here again, the conceptualization of nihilism and the conceiving of vital transformations are likened.

The third point I would like to make in favor of the concept critical reading is this. When there is, in Nietzsche’s notes, talk of the process where the morality of truthfulness intensifies questioning as to everything that morality envisages, and gradually, as to that morality and to the truthfulness itself, there is talk of the “Frage des Nihilism “wozu?”“. The collapse of a unified system of interpretation and the subsequent “[a]bsolutes Mißtrauen gegen die organisatorische Kraft des Willens fürs Ganze” cause panic and engender the misguided notion of “*Direkten bekommen*” from “*intuitiven Werthschätzungen*”. As the refuges that one is inclined to cling to, there is listed “Gewissen”, “Trieb zum Glück”, “*socialen Instinkt*”, “Vernunft” and the “*Fatalismus*” of either “*Ergebung*” or “*Revolte*”. After all these, there is still one more option: “*Verneinung als Wozu des Lebens; Leben als etwas, das sich als unwerth begreift und endlich aufhebt*”. (N Herbst 1887 9 [43], KSA 12, 356-7.)

Nihilism, it seems, is not only the crumbling down of a dominant, unified conceptual frame, within a
culture or society. Nor is it just the resulting confusion, boredom, frenzy or some other reaction to the sudden failure of conceiving. It is, rather, the whole process where, first, some way of conceptualizing acquires a ruling position, absorbs all the spheres of experience into it and exerts power on all perceptions, until, secondly, it fosters some conceptual imperatives that tend to turn upon itself causing doubts as to its power to guide and regulate experience and, thirdly, its shattering affects the capacity to reconceptualize in a meaningful way until, fourthly, a new way of conceptualizing has established itself. Quite fittingly, then, one fragment speaks of the “Begriff der nihilistischen Bewegung” (N Mai-Juni 1888 17 [1], KSA 13, 519).

The self-reflective force of nihilism, as the conceptualization capable of making sense of conceptualization, comes out in one of the few instances of the word in Nietzsche’s published works. What I have in mind is the paragraph number 346, titled as “Unser Fragezeichen”, in Fröhliche Wissenschaft.

It can be noticed how the beginning of the section speaks of the need to conceive: “als dass man begriffe, als dass ihr begreifen könntet, meine Herren Neugierigen”. Conceiving the world is related to interpreting it with a sense of respect, since “der Mensch ist ein verehrendes Thier!” Yet, “[s]o viel Misstrauen, so viel Philosophie.” That is to say, rather than to go to the opposite extreme and declare, in the manner of buddhist, Christian or contemporary pessimist “’Welt-vernehnendes’ Princip”, that the world is less valuable than what has been thought, it is required that the whole setting of human being as the “Werthmaass der Dinge” is questioned. This, in turn, is admitted to be close to the still harsher denial, as well as close to erecting an even worse opposition of the old world “mit unsren Verehrungen” and the world of ourselves. To get rid of ourselves would be “der Nihilismus”. But, it is asked about the other side of this modern either-or, about the getting rid of the respect, of the way of conceptualization that has provided the world with meaning, “wäre nicht auch das Erstere - der Nihilismus? - Dies ist unser Fragezeichen.” (FW 346, KSA 3, 579-81.)

Philosophy is a practice of conceiving that doubts its very manner of conceiving (N April-Juni 1885 34 [196], KSA 11, 487). What is at stake is the problem of reacting to the inevitable becoming suspicious of the received way of making sense of experience. As it is the “Sinnlosigkeit des Leidens, nicht das Leiden” that is the worst, according to the closing passage in Genealogie, anything that effectively provides with meaning is also an antidote for “selbstmörderischen Nihilismus”. In this passage, too, it is urged “dies zu begreifen”, namely, that “Willen zum Nichts” is better than “nicht wollen” at all. (GM III 28, KSA 5, 411-2).2066

The remedy that had been given for the disease of nihilism was itself nihilistic: “der Nihilismus als die
nothwendige Folge von Christenthum, Moral und Wahrheitsbegriff der Philosophie” (N September-Oktober 1888 22 [24], KSA 13, 594). Instead of regaining a foothold Diesseits the humans were cast further beyond by the “Jenseits-Lehrer und die mit ihnen verwachsene, die christliche Gesellschaft übertragen, hinzugenommen, was gleichen Ursprungs ist, die Pessimisten, Nihilisten, Mitleids-Romantiker, Verbrecher, Lasterhaften, - die gesamte Sphäre, wo der Begriff “Gott” als Heiland imaginirt wird...” (N Frühjahr 1888 15 [44], KSA 13, 438-9).

In Götzen-Dämmerung, Christianity is described as “eine zusammengedachte und ganze Ansicht der Dinge”. The passage goes on as follows:

Bricht man aus ihm einen Hauptbegriff, den Glauben an Gott, heraus, so zerbricht man damit auch das Ganze: man hat nichts Nothwendiges mehr zwischen den Fingern. (GD “SeU” 5, KSA 6, 114.)

The stress on concept and on the hand is exactly similar as in the book’s passage on the need for reconceiving concept (GD “WdDa” 7, KSA 6, 109-10; see section IV.b.3 & IV.c.3). Emancipation from theology is not an emancipation from philosophical conceptualization.

Accordingly, the further chance of affirming is likewise formulated in a note from this period. Under the rubric ““Mein neuer Weg zum “Ja”’“ there is subsumed “Meine neue Fassung des Pessimismus” and “Conception einer höheren Art Wesen als eine “unmoralische” nach den bisherigen Begriffen” (N Frühjahr 1888 10 [3], KSA 12, 455). Thus, the “Jasagen zu der Welt” means yea-saying “zur Conception dieser Welt als des thatsächlich erreichten höchstmöglichen Ideals...” (N Herbst 1887 10 [21], KSA 12, 468). In other words, the post nihilistic situation is not a postconceptual one.

V.b.3 Nihilism as Conceptual Problematic

Frederick C. Beiser praises Jacobi for bringing nihilism to bear on the very business of philosophy. Beiser writes as follows: “What is indeed remarkable about Jacobi’s use of this term, which has all the weight of precedence in its favor, is that it makes nihilism into the fundamental problem of all philosophy. If ‘nihilism’ is an appropriate word to denote the sceptical consequences of all philosophical inquiry, and if philosophy is trying to shave off the consequences of skepticism, then philosophy is indeed a desperate struggle against nihilism.”

I think that this point ought not to be overdone. The critical historical question of who it was that came
up with philosophical concept of nihilism remains contested. To underscore Jacobi’s manner of linking
the term to the threat of total skepticism is to evoke Schlegel, Jenisch, or even Mercier and von Baader.
As for the nihilistic challenge in any philosophical undertaking, Beiser’s point is well taken but he tends
to reduce nihilism to an extremist position that results from critical thinking. It could be more fruitful to
treat it as something that always already conditions thought as the need for, as well as the pressure,
threat and defeat of general conceptualizations.

As it happens, one of Jacobi’s later expositors, Theobald Süß, expressly stated that nihilism is to be
equated with excessive conceptuality. It was Jacobi’s general zeal, says Süß, to rehearse his reason
beyond “external authorities” and their misguided “concepts”. In this way, the German common sense
philosopher is said to follow Socrates and to anticipate Husserl. On the other hand, Süß presents it as
Jacobi’s view that phenomena having been “conceptually dissected” were also “alienated from their true
givenness”. For this very reason, Jacobi’s critical rage was directed to Fichte’s Begriffsidealismus as the
“pure subjectivity of the world as” but Vorstellung. A spirit that encompasses everything is “nothing but
a concept” and stands for the abstraction as “nihilization”. It is the contradiction of the ‘outer world’
and the ‘pure subjectivity in concepts’ that encapsulates the nihilistic condition: “nihilism emerges from
abstractive and concept-forming thinking”. Yet, Süß concludes that, while Jacobi tried not only to
attack the speculative philosophies but to promote his own “religious existentialism” as well, his
“concept of nihilism” turned against himself. According to him, Jacobi’s ‘abstraction’ has its affinities
with Husserl’s ‘reduction’. Both claim the reality of the experience held hostage by nihilistic versions of
Schein, yet both corroborate the more tragic hypothesis that “nihilism is created by the effort to assert a
continuum where there is none.”

Süß’s account reminds one about Rosen’s depiction of the peculiarly modern problematic of concepts
(see III.b.). In Rosen’s eyes, modern philosophies agree upon the pre-philosophical world as the point
of departure of philosophical concept-formation, yet their construal of that world is already and
inescapably conceptual. Whereas the opting for the immediacy of the Lebenswelt rests on the heavily
conceptualized ‘pre-conceptual’, the talk of the ‘concept of concept’ begs the question of conceptuality.
Rosen thinks that the only way to preserve the vital capacity to differentiate between concepts and the
context of conception and to divide between philosophy and dream is the one that goes through
philosophical dreams as marking the mode of being that is conscious but extra-conceptual.

In Rosen’s inquiry, it was the Kant’s and Nietzsche’s insistence on construction that foreshadowed the
20th century philosophical quandary with concepts. These two thinkers pushed the Aristotelian notion
of knowing and seeing as handling to its extreme. The late modern ’paradigm of the hand’ means that
one conceptualizes the world in its entirety but is unable to tell one’s products from one’s materials, or
one’s proper environment and the sphere of one’s own activity from the total conceptualization set in motion. His inclusion of Nietzsche among the makers of the constructionist conceptual tradition notwithstanding, Rosen says that Nietzsche did not operate with concepts. This would imply that Rosen’s own strategy of ‘lucid dreams’ is at least as Nietzschean as the tradition to which it is served as an alternative.

In my exploration into Nietzsche’s philosophy, I have tried to indicate that Nietzsche was already working on the issue of concepts and experiences mutually checking each other. It was his commitment to this complex interplay that helped him conceptualize the widespread threat to all conceiving. It also aided in the effort to conceive the force of conceptions and the interests in the use of conceptions, as well as of the tragic promise of new concepts. Even though Nietzsche’s philosophical texts retain their utter difference from those by Hegel, Nietzsche can be seen working close not to the “hatred of concepts” that Hegel suspected and criticized in Jacobi2069 but to the dynamics of concepts that was Hegel’s peculiar invention in the situation of the post-Kantian conceptual necessity.

As if to pay tribute to both Rosen’s view of concepts as matters of ‘grasping as gripping’ and to Nietzsche’s stubborn insistence of the very forming of words, it is my contention that nihilism ought to be taken literally, that is, as pointing to the situation of nihil-ism. Among the contemporary students of nihilism, Bernard Saint-Sernin makes a rare exception by paying attention to the structure of the concept. Saint-Sernin decomposes nihilism to its Latin elements of ne, for the denial, and hilum, for fibre, string or filament. As he proposes, nihilism may be taken to capture the notion of a disrupting connection, of an undoing attachment. Saint-Sernin refers to the related Latin word vinculum, a “tie” or a “bind”, and calls nihilism a condition of being “free or astray”.2070

The English idioms “on a string” and “no strings attached” may help to appreciate the point here. Nihilism involves the issue of liberation and the question as to the possibility, virtue, gain or meaningfulness of being liberated. If nihilism is taken as the Leitfaden of Nietzsche’s philosophy, as Aucejo Javaloyas suggested, this makes the best sense when it is remembered that nihilism is precisely about the emergence and disappearance of binding ties, about the dynamics of attachment and detachment, about the nostalgia of the not-yet-strung-up and the utopia of the no-more-on-a-string and about the necessity of being somehow constrained and restricted.

In this way, nihilism chimes well with Nietzsche’s insight about the emancipation from emancipation. Where an East German critic of his once spoke about the nihilistic and irrationalist “emancipation into nothingness”2071, and the Frenchman Saint-Sernin more recently about the need “to revindicate liberty without placing it upon the reason”2072, I would speak about emancipation of emancipation. Nihilism, as
Nietzsche construes it, is a problematic including the challenge of liberation as well as the promise and the threat of total independence. What is more, it also contains the need to interrogate and to put in proportion the potential or actualized state of emancipation.

At this point, it is most clarifying to consult one of Jean-François Lyotard’s many readings of Nietzsche. It is a comment that takes one back to the quarrel over metaphysics that has been a dominant issue in Nietzsche reception at least from the 1960’s onwards. In his work, *L’inhuman*, Lyotard writes about how “Nietzsche tries to emancipate thought, the way of thinking, from what he calls metaphysics, i.e. from that principle, prevalent from Plato to Schopenhauer, which states that the only thing is for humans to discover the ground which will allow tem to speak in accordance with the true and to act in accordance with the good or the just.” Nietzsche’s campaign for such an emancipation involves, so Lyotard, “the central theme [...] that there is no ‘accordance with’, because there is nothing that is a primary or originary principle, a *Grund*, as the Idea of the Good was for Plato, or for Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason. Every discourse, including that of science or philosophy, is only a perspective, a *Weltanschauung*.” Although Lyotard points to the possibility of “a rewriting” that may escape “the repetition of what it rewrites”, he speaks of Nietzsche as succumbing “to the temptation to designate what grounds the perspectivizations, and calls it the will to power”.

Should this reading be twisted according to the notion of the emancipation of emancipation, it would say that liberation from metaphysics (of the True and the Good) is followed by a liberation from this liberation and a further step from acknowledging the end of metaphysics to an inauguration of a new metaphysics (of Will to Power). I have included, in the present work, nothing near to a sustained analysis of the will to power or perspectivism. Consequently, it would make little sense, if I began to argue here for my view of them against the one that Lyotard seems to entertain. Yet, I have made the preliminary case for all of Nietzsche’s key concepts. What emerges from the concept critical approach to them is that one ought to appreciate their function and their mutual relations in Nietzsche’s philosophy. If the question of conceptuality is recognized as its crucial problematic, perspectivism is no less constrained by the will to power than the will to power by perspectivism or both of them by Nietzsche’s conception of concepts and conceptual dynamics that nihilism, more effectively than the other main concepts, embodies.

In trying to support this reading, I begin from a passage that probably most compellingly encapsulates the notion of the vital fibres being destroyed, of the threads being lost or broken, of the human wiring being out of condition. In *Genealogie*, namely, the idea of the hanging together of individual perceptions as in the process of dissolution, is expressed like this: “Seit Kopernikus scheint der Mensch auf eine schiefe Ebene gerathen, - er rollt immer schneller nunmehr aus dem Mittelpunkte weg - wohin?
References to the Copernican are, since Kant, strongly flavored with conceptual problematic. This is why I am happy to be able to take up again the debate about scientific and conceptual revolutions (IV.b.3). In an article that appeared in 1949, in the Library of Living Philosophers series volume on Einstein, Gaston Bachelard writes as follows: “A systematic revolution of basic concepts begins with Einsteinian science. In the very detail of its concepts a relativism of the rational and the empirical is established. Science then undergoes what Nietzsche called “an upheaval of concepts”, as if the earth, the universe, things, possessed a different structure from the fact that their explanation rests upon new foundations. All rational organization is “shaken” when the fundamental concepts undergo dialectical transformation.” As Bachelard explains, Einstein’s concept of simultaneity, among others, “collides with common sense” and necessitates “a Nietzschean transmutation of rational values”, “decisive intellectual mutation which must reverberate among the most fundamental philosophical values”. 2074

What is not so decisive is Bachelard’s success in either interpreting Einstein and Nietzsche or describing the event of conceptual revolution. Much more significant is that he did refer to Nietzsche as an authority in the issue. One thing to appreciate is that Bachelard simply couldn’t refer, even if he had thought about it, to, for instance, Ernst Mach, who would otherwise have been a much more reliable figure in scrutinizing scientific progress around the turn of the century. What he called interdisciplinary “metamorphosis of concepts”, or the “fermentation of concepts”, he felt to be something essentially detrimental. It provoked the urgent need of “more precise determination of concepts, more exact delimitation of their scope of application, clearer representation of the difference and similarity of the methods of [...] disciplines”.2075. It did not provoke, then, as Nietzsche would have it, the need to reconceptualize conceptualization, to revolutionize philosophy.

This way of conceiving nihilism is to point to the predicament where no entire and well established conceptual frames are available to guide action and where there is also a suspicion for any conceivable new frame to be other than a worse copy of the last one, the breakdown of which has exposed the confusion. In as much as this state involves the discourse of décadence, one does well to see that it, too, is viewed as a conceptualization: “Begriff “décadence”“, “Zum Begriff “Décadence”“,”Der Begriff und Umfang der décadence” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [75] & [86] & 15 [54], KSA 13, 255 & 264 & 444; cf. 14 [68], 252, on the Begriff der Erschöpfung).

This is also the way to understand the characterizations of nihilism, in Nietzsche’s notes, that vary from Wertlosigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit to Zwecklosigkeit and Ziellosigkeit. All of these are, quite explicitly, related to the becoming questionable of the received “Sinnzusammenhang, [...] das Nicht-Zufällige, -
Beliebige, Causale” capable of distinguishing what is real from what is unreal or dreamy. (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [54] & [61]; Herbst 1887 9 [73], KSA 12, 312 & 316; 374). Although Nietzsche may scorn the fear as to the consequences of Gottlosigkeit, he can deplore the “alle Brücken abgebrochen” relation(lessness) to the Greeks and the resulting Heimlosigkeit of the Moderns (cf. N August-September 1885 41 [4], KSA 11, 678-9) as well as to refer to Begierdenlosigkeit as a likely, or even necessary, outcome of the growth of knowledge as “Befreiung von schmerzbringenden überheftigen pöbelhaften Begierden” (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [216], KSA 11, 70-1.) Nihilism as Richtungslosigkeit necessitated that human agency be reconceived and the chance and danger of values, significances, orientation, objectives and preferences be reconsidered.

Just as value-lessness, the other intimations of nihilism, worth-lessness, meaning-lessness, purpose-lessness, goal-lessness and god-lessness, home-lessness, desire-lessness and direction-lessness, are instances of the no conceptual means to make sense. One of the coincidences related to Nietzsche’s explicit reflections on nihilism beginning in the summer of 1880 is that, at the same time, there was also an intense reflection upon conceptuality going on. A note from this period reads as follows:

Ein Zeitalter des Überganges: so heißt unsere Zeit bei Jedermann und jedermann hat damit Recht. Indessen nicht in dem Sinne als ob unserem Zeitalter dies Wort mehr zukomme als irgend einem anderen. Wo wir auch in der Geschichte Fuß fassen, überall finden wir die Gährung, die alten Begriffe im Kampf mit den Neuen; und die Menschen der feinen Witterung, die man ehemals als Propheten nannte, die aber nur empfanden und sahen, was an ihnen geschah - wußten es und fürchteten sich gewöhnlich sehr. Geht es so fort, fällt alles in Stücke, nun so muß die Welt untergehen. Aber sie ist nicht untergegangen, die alten Stämme des Waldes zerbrachen, aber immer wuchs ein neuer Wald wieder und zu jeder Zeit gab es eine verwesende und eine werdende Welt.
(N Sommer 1880 4 [212], KSA 9, 153.)

The connections with the first fragment on nihilism are not restricted to the temporal closeness. They are also evident in the problematic of the ’world destruction’. The ironical critique of the notion of a transitional period has been neglected by the scholars repeating it as what is characteristic of modern nihilism. The dynamics of conceptions knows no end, since in the words of a note from the late Zarathustra phase there has been “keinen Untergang, der nicht Zeugung und Empfängniss war” (N Sommer 1883 13 [1], KSA 10, 424). Zarathustra’s speech “Von alten und neuen Tafeln” is probably the one most directly involved with this dynamics.

What is most important, in the 1880 passage, is that the problematic of nihilism is brought together with the problematic of conceptual dynamics, of fermentation and conflict between the world as conceived with the receding conceptuality and the one as conceived with the one taking effect. “The thoughts during the revolutionary fermentation existing in the Russian society” disclose their more profound
sense as part of nihilism as conceptlessness, while nihilism is not exhausted by them. It was Nietzsche’s preoccupation to use the case of Russia, along with other cases of nihilism, to work out a philosophical view of conceptual dynamics.

As one can see from Nietzsche’s note on fermentation and transition, the individualist emphasis in conceptual change is checked and problematized, not celebrated in the way Redner and Hinman, among others, have suggested. Prophets of destruction, including Luther, have had a key role in understanding conceptual changes from their peculiar perspectives, yet the socio-historical process of reconceptualization and deconceptualization has not been a matter of heroic individuals effecting paradigm shifts on a grand scale.

It is here that Jung’s rather sensational claim about the hidden true identity of Nietzsche’s Dionysus is best countered, since what one has here is also the context where the claim makes best sense. According to the controversial classic of psychoanalysis and one of the most laborious Nietzsche scholars, what is termed “Dionysus” in the philosopher’s works can and must be read as “Wotan” (see section IV.b.2). If one was to accept this as a justified interpretation, the first nihilism fragment from the summer of 1880 would instantly acquire more significance than what it already has. Apart from the burning question of nihilism in Russia and in international relations, nihilism would be related by Nietzsche not only to his intimate quarrels with Luther (and Christianity), Schopenhauer and Wagner but with the Dionysus as well.

I have already said that Jung’s claim is less than warranted. Even if the Dionysus of Geburt was expressly related to national zeal, not only the later discrepancy between Nietzsche’s Dionysus and anything German but also the murderous reception of his early work by the German academic community speaks against the identification thesis.

Yet, I think that there is a chance of preserving something of Jung’s point. The early 1880’s could be characterized as a period of relative normalization of Nietzsche’s post-Wagnerian and post-Schopenhauerian thought. What I mean is that he was about to move from criticizing the metaphysical assumptions of the tradition that his two inspirators had also cherished toward the idea that he could make use and fun of all that and not be restricted to mere criticism. The fact that Wotan stands in the parenthesis of Nietzsche’s first fragment of nihilism dating from this time could be interpreted as marking the way that divinity was tied to the obsession of a total destruction characteristic of terrorists, religious reformers, resignationist philosophers and megalomaniac artists with little ability to handle their frustrations. In less psychologizing terms, Wotan was, at least from the perspective of Wagner that points back to Schopenhauer and Luther as well as to nihilist activists (and to Wagner’s past as
Bakunin’s comrade), one-sided concept belonging to the ideas of irreversibility and linear eschatology.

The fragment on “transition” as the normal state, on incessant “fermentation” and “battle of concepts”, is strictly non-Wotanistic, non-Schopenhauerian, non-Lutheran and non-Wagnerian. It is, rather, Dionysian. This divinity, as one of Nietzsche’s 1888 notes has it, stands for the primary “Lust” or the will to “Werden, Wachsen, Gestalten, das heißt zum Schaffen”, yet in a way that “Schmerz” is “nicht abgerechnet”. The notion of beständige Schöpfung, in which one “concipirt” it the conjunction of joy and pain as the “höchster Zustand von Bejahung des Daseins”, is expressly developed in the face of “der Pessimismus, sagen wir deutlicher der Nihilismus”. (N Mai-Juni 1888, 17 [3], KSA 13, 522.)

It was the problem of accounting for change that Nietzsche’s Menschliches had opened itself. In natural processes, transformations could be increasingly explained without a recourse to inessential or redundant entities. By contrast, metaphysical philosophy had been unable to supply any interpretation of something’s turning into its opposite, other than the denial of such a revolution and the reaffirmation of the “Wunder-Ursprung [...] unmittelbar aus dem Kern und Wesen des “Dinges an sich” heraus”. What was called for, in the book, was a Chemie der Begriffe that would involve movements that we “im Gross- und Kleinverkehr der Cultur und Gesellschaft, ja in der Einsamkeit an uns erleben”. (MA I 1, KSA 2, 24.)

Again, one finds the allegedly ultra-individualist philosopher emphasizing the mutual and reciprocal social relations as the territory of conceptual changes. Moreover, the point is that not even a hermit is safe or detached from what goes on in the economy of conceiving. The point of view of conceptuality seems to be precisely the one that takes observers from the situation where isolated brains (or hearts) process (or intuit) the facts of the world (or the secrets of the universe) to the situation where collectively developing ways of conceiving regulate individual perceptions that, in turn, incessantly modify conceptions.

Further in Menschliches, Byron’s words on the “false revolution” are quoted. The citation is followed by a characterization of Goethe as a poetic revolutionary. What is at stake is the “Abbruch der Traditionen” and the “Kraft des neuen Zeitalters” with the “neuen Funden, Aussichten, Hülfsmitteln” in a personal “Umwandlung und Bekehrung”. All this comes together in a vision of “Kunst” that “interpretirt, im Zu-Grunde-gehen, ihre Entstehung, ihr Werden”. (MA I 4, KSA 2, 183-4.)

The association of revolution and self-interpretivity suggests that of all the meanings of the “to revolve”, Nietzsche is emphasizing the one of “to ponder over and over”. At any rate, revolutions are treated as ways to illustrate how new things are conceived as old conceptions lose their compelling
force.

Christoph Cox’s point is well taken, as he underscores the Nietzschean insistence on “truths” as moments of “fleeting calm between battles within a war that has no preordained or final victor”. As a “matter of struggle and power”, the process or becoming of “competing interpretations” is not exhausted by the reference to individual might or to a mighty individual. In Cox’s words, the Nietzschean question of domination concerns the problem “of what rules of formation and criteria of justification prevail or hold sway in a particular discourse at a specific cultural and historical moment”. Who is the world’s philosophical legislators? Additional points about the paragraph 211 can now be made. With a reference to Kant (and Hegel), the text has it that great many philosophers have been at pains to formulate and formalize the theoretical, practical and aesthetic discourses. This operation has involved working on a great reservoir of factual value estimations, received positings and creations of values, that have become herrschend and acquired the status of “truths”. What is emphasized, then, is the way conformist social acceptance has produced and maintained a number of master concepts conditioning all individual efforts. As the paragraph moves on to characterize the task of the authentic or legislative philosophers, what does not change is the notion of working on inheritance. Indeed, one notices how the text speaks of “greifen mit schöpferischer Hand”. The paradigm of the hand is utilized in order to describe the philosophical battle between the aging conception and the evolving conception of the very business of philosophical conceiving.

If it is one of the problems with conceiving that it tends to suppress singularities and postulate entities thus reifying or denying or destroying that which is conceived and alienating or denying or destroying the conceiver, the attempt to conceptualize the process of nihilism is always an attempt to reconceptualize conceptuality. In one of Nietzsche’s notes, “Weltverneinung und Nihilisierung” is said to follow “daraus, daß wir Sein dem Nichtsein entgegensetzen müssen, und daß der Begriff “Werden” gelegnet wird (“etwas wird”)” (N Herbst 1887 9 [62], KSA 12, 369).

The world’s becoming fabulous (GD “WdwWezFw”, KSA 6, 80-1) by the “Begriff” of “wahre Welt” is explained by the “dreifache Weise” that “wir haben ein X zur Kritik der “bekannten Welt” gemacht”. The concept evokes, namely, i) “eine unbekannte Welt: - wir sind Abenteurer, neugierig, - das Bekannte scheint uns müde zu machen”, ii) “eine andere Welt, wo es anders ist” and “wir selbst - wer weiß? anders sind”, iii) “eine wahrhaftige” world that “uns nicht betrügt, nicht zu Narren hat”. What is the
In this way, nihilism is attached to a particular way of conceiving and conceptualizing that can only be grasped through deconceptualization. The fragment “Kritik des Nihilism” says that “[i]m Grunde hat der Mensch den Glauben an seinen Werth verloren, wenn durch ihn nicht ein unendlich werthvolles Ganzes wirkt: d.h. er hat ein solches Ganzes concipirt, um an seinen Werth glauben zu können.” And the “Gefühl der Werthlosigkeit wurde erzielt, als man begriff, daß weder mit dem Begriff “Zweck”, noch mit dem Begriff “Einheit”, noch mit dem Begriff “Wahrheit” der Gesammtcharakter des Daseins interpretirt werden darf. Es wird nichts damit erzielt und erreicht; es fehlt die übergreifende Einheit in der Vielheit des Geschehens” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [98], KSA 13, 46-8.)

Nihilism results from the failure to satisfactorily continue to conceptualize the multifaceted event of all things happening. The needed manner of conceptualizing would preserve the sense of unity while securing distinctions and differentiations that make the basis of conceiving and acting. Soon as one loses or lets go the regulating interpretation or a conception with enough power to integrate and distinguish, one is faced with the haunting sense of liberation into a chaotic realm of existence where there are no longer any meaningful differences or similarities.

Now, nihilism of the most famous, that is, of the late 19th-century Russian variety, was expressly a matter of emancipation. The developments and events that often misleadingly came to be discussed under the title of nihilism had a key point of reference in the 1861 emancipation of serfs. It was an incident with broad international significance that found its echo in a wide range of phenomena ranging from the notorious slave question in America to the women’s movement and to such minor anarchist sects in Europe as the British Labour Emancipation League. The issue of being set free from restraint was a genuinely 19th century type of a grand social problematic with a variety of applications. Here is what Alexander Herzen had to say about the Russian situation:

“The emancipated Russian is the most independent man on earth. Who could stop him? Respect for his past perhaps... But does not the history of the new Russia begin by the absolute negation of nationality and tradition? Well then, maybe it is another indefinite past, let us say the Petersburg period?
Ah, but that presents no obligation to us; this fiftieth act of a bloody tragedy played in a whorehouse does indeed emancipate us, yet imposes upon us no belief. On the other hand, your occidental past is nothing but instruction for us. In no way can we consider ourselves as the executives of your historical testament. We accept your doubts. As for your faith, it does not excite us. You are excessively religious for us. We take part in your hatred; as for your attachment to the legacy of your ancestors, we fail to comprehend it. We are too unhappy, too oppressed to welcome a semi-liberty. [...] Why should we, inferior and disinherited, argue with your traditional duties? And how could we frankly accept a faded morality, one that is neither Christian nor human, existing only in rhetoric exercises and procurators’ requisite. With what veneration would one wish to inspire us for this praetor of your barbarico-Roman justice, for these hard and crushing arches preventing all air and all light, rebuilt in the middle ages and replastered by the affranchised of the tiers état? It may not be about the brutal entrapments of the Russian tribunals, but who could prove to us that this is justice!"^2079

For Nietzsche, emancipation was an expressly philosophical question. As it was typical of his way of doing philosophy, his confrontation with this concept began from inspecting the very texture of the term. In the epigraph of the present book that I have cited many times during the exploration into the Nietzschean thinking, there is a reference to the need to emancipate from one’s chains or bonds and, further, from the eventual emancipation as well. Broken fetters tend to leave one with Ketten-Krankheit or the continuous suffering from the variegated forms of a post-liberation disease, unless one succeeds in the second order emancipation and overcomes the severe complications of freedom. With these remarks, Nietzsche points to the etymology of emancipation as the process where one comes out (ex) of somebody else’s hands (manus) that have taken (capere) one and used one as an item of transfer in reorganizing property (mancipare) with all the power of the buyer or manager (manceps).

Significantly, the same passage contains the famous Nietzschean slogan of becoming who or what one is. Emancipation in its classic enlightenment sense means that one breaks free from exterior checks, stops being a herb regulated by forces other than itself or an animal directed by species higher than itself or a machine controlled by others and, instead, assumes the kind of life, conduct and thought worthy of a self-governing authority and an autonomous adult agent. Emancipation in the further Nietzschean sense means that after breaking free from all kinds of bondage one does not turn the achieved emancipation into a new restraint that would prevent one from appreciating one’s proper constraints or the interdependence with one’s environment. The ‘last human’ introduced by Zarathustra is the perfect type of a total emancipation. Last humans have nothing to resist, nothing to overcome and nothing to emancipate themselves from. Or again, they are the content slaves of their own shackles.

Historical nihilism as the embodiment of the vision of a total emancipation was instrumental in
conceiving the philosophical problematic of nihilism. As Herzen’s interpretation of the young Russian rebel goes, the disinherited and dispossessed radicals experienced an emancipation to nothingness - that is to say, to the state of no way of thinking about things, of no way of perceiving things as such and such, of no way of guiding one’s action in the midst of things. Whatever the overall combination of Nietzsche’s “interest” in Russian radicalism, he had good philosophical grounds to think through its peculiar promise and its desolate quandary. To articulate both the need for a strong conceptualizer (efficient thinker, capable perceiver, potent actor) and the need for a reconception of conceptualization as an event that transcends individual conceivers who regard themselves as the self-sufficient architects of the world, Nietzsche had to come up with an ecological model where conceptions take place in the constant interchange between organic constellations as well as within them. Successful emancipation from emancipation and the overcoming of Ketten-Krankheit would require that one does not feel the need to resent the first order acts of emancipation or their results, even though these be checked by the second order emancipation.

The talk of “shackles” appears in an interesting context in Nietzsche’s masterpiece. In the latter of the two speeches discussed, in section IV.c.1, with an eye on the regenerative features of Nietzsche’s conceptual undertakings, Zarathustra says that “mit Ketten binde ich mich an den Menschen” (Z II/21, KSA 4, 183). Here, in “Von der Menschen-Klugheit”, the orator was making the point about his double will: while his visionary will opts for the over-human, his other will, that of the hand, is directed to the human. In “Von der unbefleckten Erkenntniss”, it was told that the neutral gaze into life was (if only seemingly) one without Wille, Begierde, Gier, Sucht, Lust. What was, in turn, the purest of wills as opposed to the indecent mockery of immaculacy was, so Zarathustra, Wille zur Zeugung as the will toward something above and beyond oneself: “wer über sich hinaus schaffen will, der hat mir den reinsten Willen”. (Z II/15, KSA 4, 157.)

The proper sort of conceiving that is at the same time purer and dirtier than the treacherous ‘immaculate conception’ (purer because no longer dishonest or self-important); dirtier because no longer detached or neutral) is a matter of desire and procreation. To deny these aspects of the conceptual is to play in the hands of will-less nihilism (in the sense of the closing paragraph of Genealogie mentioned at the end of the last section). Zarathustra’s words suggest that will is like a (ball and) chain linking one to what is at hand. Even though one may be ushered to free oneself from different linkages restricting one’s full potential, one is also reminded of the risk of (or of the illusion of) the condition of no chains and no restrictions. Zarathustra himself needs the linkage to the human reality, because it is constitutive of his task of envisaging the overhuman.

Again, the setting here is only apparently individualistic. In the ensemble of speeches in Also sprach
Zarathustra, one of the peculiarly sustained addresses is “Von alten und neuen Tafeln”. Among other things, it contains references to the types of Welt-Verleumder and Welt-Müde as well as to both the Hand and the otherwise mostly implicit issue of Begriiffe (Z. III/14, KSA 4, 246-69). The issue of old and new Tafeln, of tables turning for everything upon and below them and for everybody sitting around them, can be taken to ignite the double problematic of nihilism and conceptual dynamics.

One may note how the question of emancipation relates to the better known Nietzschean questions of perspectivism and truth. The existence of the world independent of humans can be assumed without this entailing the possibility of ever conceiving it in some other way than always already arranged according to human concepts. Similarly, the ecological exchange bringing about humans and other things can be assumed without this entailing the possibility of ever conceiving it in terms other than human.

What is the key here, is that human hands and human concepts are just as natural instances of the ecological exchange than are other forms of adaptation and transformation. Organic intercourse is about there being simultaneous processes of unified interpretations (concepts) being checked and moulded by ever increasing information and ever increasing information being checked and moulded by unified interpretations. Humans may be more “advanced” in their abilities to communicate about their communication, which is also the reason for many of their problems related to alienation from one’s environment and from the fruits of one’s proper strivings, yet whatever the ways to describe and analyze the drawbacks and disruptions in that communication, they arise in the course of the communication. For Nietzsche, the second order phenomena of conversing about conversing and thinking of thinking seem to have been sometimes excessively irritating and other times most exhilarating, yet in both moods, they were philosophically vital in reconceiving the event of conceiving.

The extremism inherent in nihilism helped Nietzsche work out this new conception of conceptualization in the era between Darwin and Dewey. His philosophical revolution was to let his thought and his texts revolve around the very concept of philosophical revolution as a conceptual change. Nihilism, like Dionysus, perspectivism, genealogy, will to power, eternal return and overhuman, is a self-reflective concept in the sense that it, too, poses the question of its own conceptual nature and, thus, of the nature of concepts, of their role in philosophy, of their critical and affirmative functions, of their necessity and of the necessity to attempt to articulate the limits and to appreciate the outside of conceptuality.

Nietzsche conceptualized nihilism, because nihilism is the event most effectively revealing the problematical nature of conceptualizing. To explore nihilism is to help to critically understand, how Nietzsche conceptualized what it is to philosophically conceptualize. To understand how he did philosophy is to understand what he did to philosophy.
Nihilism presented the challenge of a total loss of all concepts with which one could assort and arrange one’s perceptions and guide one’s actions. It pointed to the one extreme of a complete servitude to phony and illegitimate conceptions invented by forces foreign and strange to oneself, secured by power and regulated by pain and pleasure. It also pointed to the other extreme of a megalomaniac belief in one’s own omnipotence and power over others.

The good thing about nihilism was that it openly promoted the courage to break free from the bonds of one’s family or class, while even emphasizing the partly illusory (because automatic in the sense that new generations actually have different circumstances than what their parents had) and incomplete (in the sense that new generations cannot help but continue some of the basic habits of their predecessors) and essentially tragicomic nature of such an endeavor. Most of the enterprises that claimed to act in resistance to nihilism or that felt threatened by its growing impact on the late modern occidental culture and society, on thoughts and practices, were as eager to camouflage their transient nature as they were sensitive about their fatal exposure to irony and criticism.

By contrast, nihilism virtually declared its plain impossibility and gained success. Nietzsche was the philosopher to exploit the resources of a multifaceted historical phenomenon, of swiftly popularized sensibility, turn of mind and way of behaving. He recognized its hold on his own existence. He developed a theoretical and practical way of dealing with it that was ingenious, powerful and disturbing enough to make it a lasting enjoyment, lesson and warning for posterity.
By Nietzsche’s interpreters, nihilism is distinguished as the *Mitte* (Kuhn), *Hauptsstück* (Djuric), *Leitfaden* (Aucejo Javaloyas), *gemeinsame Basis* (Taureck) of Nietzsche’s philosophy, since it occupies the *Mitte-Stellung* (Frey) in an *um den Nihilismus kreisende* (Röttges) enterprise with the task of overcoming nihilism as its *zentrale Anliegen* (Busch). In a basic agreement with this shared insistence on the decisiveness of nihilism for Nietzsche, I have argued that his philosophical project is best seen as one interrogating the crisis of conceptuality and the related need of reconceptualization, both of which revolve around his conception of nihilism as the concept most effectively challenging all conceiving.

This means that nihilism is Nietzsche’s central concept, “the middle of his conceptual creating”\(^2\text{080}\), also in the second order sense. It prompts questioning on its own centrality\(^2\text{081}\), on its own conceptual nature and on the nature of conceptualizing. This may well be the juncture where philosophical conceptualization of nihilism meets the reputedly nihilistic attitude of the most famous historical representatives of “nihilism”, that is, the young Russian radicals of the 1860’s. Their nihilism, according to one of the many definitions, came down to the uncompromising spirit that “knows no middle position”\(^2\text{082}\). In more general terms, it is about a condition depicted in these poetic lines: “things fall apart; the centre cannot hold/ mere anarchy is loosed upon the world” (Yeats). Words that once conveyed the threat of a generalized societal disorder serve as well to depict the state of no informing concept, expect for perhaps ‘nihilism’.

In fact, Elisabeth Kuhn’s description of nihilism as Nietzsche’s “center” or “mid” is not just an economic way to pronounce its supreme philosophical significance. It is, rather, a precise choice of a term for her personal interpretation of “Nietzsche’s thought and method”. Kuhn says, namely, that these deviate from what she calls the formal logical model of “the closed circle” as well as from the dialectico-speculative model of “the open spiral”. This is due to the perspectivist nature of the Nietzschean kind of thinking, as it exploits “varying standpoints”, “different aspects” and opts for “ever widening horizons”. Accordingly, and in the spirit of Röttges’s characterization, Kuhn holds that
“Nietzsche’s movement of confrontation with the problematic of nihilism is perspectivist circling, in the course of which the concept of nihilism shifts, while it is being fluttered, differentiated and enriched.”

I have been critical to the way Kuhn and the others have neglected the concept critical potential in Nietzsche’s considerations on nihilism. In all fairness, however, Kuhn’s analysis is not only philologically accurate but tremendously insightful in its elucidations of Nietzsche’s thought. Hence, although I hold that she failed to provide the crucial linkage between the reconceiving of philosophical conceptuality and the discourse of nihilism, both issues that she nonetheless took up, I wish to express my indebtedness by thus beginning this concluding section from her excellent rendering of the way nihilism is handled by Nietzsche.

To repeat, my argument was for the view that ‘nihilism’ can be taken as Nietzsche’s most central conceptual creation in the following sense. It intensifies interrogation as to the concept-ness of this concept of concept-less-ness that, in turn, ignites the more general questions concerning the possibility, nature and role of philosophical conceptuality and the dynamics of deconceptualizations and reconceptualizations. Since nihilism involves the state of no central conception to make sense of experience and to guide action, it puts in question the very idea of centrality, too. In this concluding essay, I endeavor to show that ‘center’ and ‘circle’ can shed light on Nietzsche’s philosophical project with respect the *Problemkreise* of conceptuality and nihilism.

By so doing, I hope I can reinvigorate the issues dealt with in chapter I through chapter IV. There are the circles where Nietzsche lived his life, the cycle of books that he produced, the centers that saw to the editing of his writings, the circles in which his intellectual estate was distributed, the ring of interpretative problems, the sphere of conceptual questions and its circumference touching on the non-conceptual in its philosophical, scientific, aesthetic and religious aspects. One needs to interrogate what it could mean, if nihilism is accepted as the ‘center’ for Nietzsche and, hence, the ‘center’ for the circles of problems about life, writings, reception and concepts.

My basic tenet in the present investigation has been that Nietzsche’s texts are even more resourceful than has usually been seen. In particular, they accommodate an ensemble of elaborations on concepts more abundant than has been recognized. However, these texts cannot be read in any other way than through the ways of reading actualized in the course of his reception. Stated differently, many debates about Nietzsche’s writings are already accommodated within those writings, yet there is no interpretation of them independent of others.

In what follows, I shall discuss the manner in which Nietzsche’s ‘center’, or the ‘core’ of his
philosophy, has been problematized, and how the different opinions rely on the philosopher’s work. Thereafter, four successive, yet tightly interrelated inquiries are made to the Nietzschean writings to demonstrate just how forcibly they already deal with the conceptual question of ‘center’ with its bearings on nihilism and on the dynamic character of philosophical conceptuality.

**For & Against the Very Idea of a Nietzschean ‘Center’**

It might be proposed that the interpreters explicitly arguing for the centrality of ‘nihilism’ in Nietzsche’s thought come close to those who hold that there is no ‘center’ there in the first place. If ‘nihilism’ is not a center to really speak of, why not admit the centerlessness of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

It is now well over thirty years ago that Jacques Derrida discovered the Nietzschean ‘interpretation of interpretation’ that affirms joy and play, exiled and vagrant significations. The context for such a discovery was that of deconstructing the concept of ‘structure’ in structuralism. It was Derrida’s point that structuralist structure depends on positing a ‘center’ or on self-relating “to a point of presence, to a fixed origin”. Center functions as the force that orients, balances and organizes the structure and restricts the inorganizing force of play. The paradox is, so Derrida, that the “concept of the centered structure”, as the defining item of structuralism, itself escapes the transformations and permutations belonging to the very idea of structurality. Generalizing the outcome of his discussion, Derrida wrote that the history of metaphysics as “the determination of the being as presence” has concentrated on rephrasing the center (or the fundament, the principle, the originary or transcendental signified). *Eidos, energeia*, substance, God and man belong to the names for such a center. In the course of this history, Nietzsche figures as an eminent thinker of the structurality of the structure taking part in a process of “decentering”. As Derrida insisted, the Nietzschean “affirmation determines, then, the non-center in a way other than as loss of center.”

Would Derrida accept some form of ‘nihilism’ as to define this non-center is hard to guess. It could be asked, whether his notion of ‘non-center’ is, after all, likely to reinforce the oppositional setting he is at pains to upset. On a favorable reading, it can be said that it only exploits it in order to question it. If the non-center did not at all draw from the received polarity of center and its “loss”, the new post-nostalgic and post-utopian approach would be incommensurable with, and irrelevant for, the one it seeks to shake, embarrass or escape.

Relying on Derrida, Arkady Plotnitsky speaks of Nietzsche as “the central decentering figure who, with extraordinary power and insight, subjected both the logocentrist interpretation of interpretation and the logocentrist interpretation of value and evaluation to a radical scrutiny”. It is Plotnitsky’s explicit...
purpose to steer away from Heidegger’s idea that Nietzsche might come to occupy the “true center of philosophy”.

Plotnitsky’s phrase ’central decentering’ testifies to the amusing, or perhaps just annoying, practice of referring to Nietzsche’s non-centrality as belonging to the central problems of coming to terms with his work. Wayne Klein, for his part, says as follows: “One of the central obstacles confronting the reader of Nietzsche is the apparent lack of any single work or problematic which could serve as an organizing principle for what is, by any standard, an exceptionally variegated body of writing”.

One commentator explains the matter as follows: “Nietzsche’s thought is hardly possible to render in a coherent whole [...] The philosophy of Nietzsche [...] knows no thoughtful [gedankliches] center”. It is no use trying to establish a central interpretative field for rolling all of Nietzsche’s dubious utterances into one.

These kinds of views have been absorbed into general discussions concerning postmodernity where Nietzsche is often met but rarely confronted. Linda Hutcheon, for one, makes much of the paradoxical tension between “centralized sameness” or “centralized, totalized, hierarchized, closed systems”, on the one hand, and “decentered perspective”, “decentralized community”, “ex-centric”, “off-center”, on the other hand. In her critical view, the postmodern situation is such that the latter condition is “ineluctably identified with the center it desires but is denied”, that is, “the ex-centric relies on the center for its definition”. As for Nietzsche, Hutcheon has a passing recourse to his meditations on historiography related, she says, to a double move toward rethinking “margins and borders” and “away from centralization”.

Whatever in the Nietzschean textus circumtextus appears as a rounded and steadily rotating center is, by closer look, something elliptic hurled into a process of constant turbulence where a multitude of irregularities freely fluctuate. There is no kernel, nucleus, core, heart, bull’s-eye, midst, middlemost, innermost, focus, fulcrum, pith, gist, periplast, endoplasm, encephalon of ‘Nietzsche’ readily available for inspection.

What in Nietzsche’s scriptio circumfluens looks like a potential mid turns out, the next moment, to be only a part of the endless cycle of circlets having no prominently protruding part to take hold of, concealing nothing inner than themselves, leading to no sanctuary of thought. There are but endless questions of reading. How is one to hollow out a series of excavations? How is one to get straight something forever convex? How is one to encapsulate restless meanings? How is one to observe anything in incessant eddies, whirlwinds, twisters and cyclones? How is one to establish the axle for this
movement? How is one to exploit it with one’s explanatory millstones, churns and turbines? How is one to go on with serious research, while having to play an asymmetrical whirligig, to bet on a loose roulette? How is one to preserve one’s scholarly backbone to ride the sideslipping roller-coaster, the impromptu switchback, the freewheeling merry-go-round, the off-the-cuff carousel?

It must be said that an interpreter seem to be able to emphasize the Nietzscian deconstructions of central concepts, while not regarding his writings as completely void of features that could be said to be central to them. For example, Randall E. Havas stresses that for Nietzsche “the assumption that consciousness was centered on a single sovereign ‘I’ was untenable,”2090, while he still continue the more or less carefree use of the word “central” as an indication of importance. He does not problematize the issue further and finds it easy to refer to the “distinction between individual and herd” as being, among other things, “central to Nietzsche’s thought early and late.”2091.

Apart from reaffirming how it is Nietzsche’s handling of the philosophical ‘subject’ that most clearly attaches him to the anti-center view, this goes to show how one may assume that the usual practice of distinguishing between more and less significant features in a given philosophy seems to apply to Nietzsche’s exceptional corpus as well. At any rate, some critics just take it for granted that Nietzsche, too, had his central concerns. For example, an early commentator would speak about “the tangible and sustainable core of Nietzsche’s doctrine [Lehre]” and modify this notion by casting doubt on the idea of Nietzsche having a ’doctrine’, but not on the very idea of a ’core’2092.

Now, the aforementioned commentators do not underline Nietzsche’s explicit rejections of the notion of ’centrality’. At least the Derridean case for the Nietzscian ’non-center’ could even suffer from some anti-center utterances by the philosopher that would imply a commitment to a kind of thinking in terms of centrality.

Yet, other forms of counter-center emphases can certainly gain from Nietzsche’s attacks that include something like the following aspects. David Strauss is ridiculed, in Nietzsche’s early pamphlet, for his putative view that the universe should “um die Centralmonade Strauss schwingen” (UB I 6, KSA 1, 188). Where Centrum is allowed to stand as a title in a Nietzscian work, it is above an aphorism about the intense experience of shame. It is said that only the blush, as if caused by a giant eye and its penetrating and burning gaze, can make one feel that “‘ich bin der Mittelpunct der Welt!’” (M 352, KSA 3, 239.)

One may also consider Nietzsche’s assault on the “Maschinen-Cultur”, which is what Heidegger saw as a preliminary confrontation with nihilism. In its tendency toward “Centralisation”, this type of “culture”
resembles “Partei-Organisation und […] Kriegsführung”, as it seeks to violently unify everything singular and to make one dull (MA II/2, 218 & 220, KSA 2, 653). Nietzsche’s resistance to ‘centrality’ would seem to be affirmed and even intensified by an additional heroic message for any individual to appreciate.

But it is precisely against the background of this quotation that one can consult those of Nietzsche’s commentators who are not willing to accept ‘the non-central’ as the defining feature of his *œuvre*. Benjamin Pautrat, for one, regards Nietzsche as being ultimately engaged with centers, his contrary efforts notwithstanding. According to Pautrat, who otherwise shares Derrida’s emphasis on the semantic vagrancy in the textual signification process, Nietzsche’s thinking is musical thinking. It merely marks a shift, from the traditional logocentrism in philosophy, to a kind of melocentrism. As such, says Pautrat, it may be a good antidote to perennial philosophical thought but, because it does reproduce the notion of center, it is no real alternative. Michael Allen Gillespie agrees on this point and goes a step further by claiming that Nietzsche’s insistence on center is attached to his insistence on domination.2093

To support these views one could turn to a fragment, from the time well after the ironical blow on Strauss’s claim to centrality, that contains the notion of the “rechte Mann” as “der Mittelpunkt der Dinge” (N Anfang 1882 17 [32], KSA 9, 670). As for the case for a pro-center and pro-control interpretation, one could try to strengthen it with the following fragment from Nietzsche’s notes: “Eine Verbindung eines grossen Centrums von Menschen zur Erzeugung von besseren Menschen ist die Aufgabe der Zukunft. Der Einzelne muss an solche Ansprüche gewöhnt werden, dass, indem er sich selbst bejaht, er den Willen jenes Centrums bejaht, z.B. in Bezug auf die Wahl, die er unter den Weibern trifft, über die Art, wie er sein Kind erzieht.” (N März 1875 3 [75], KSA 8, 36.)

Further, Nietzsche’s public addresses on the educational system of his day could be read in this hideous light, as well. For one thing, they include the idea of “Concentration der Bildung auf Wenige”. For another, they give voice to the importance of “Gehorsam”, “Unterordnung”, “Zucht” and “Dienstbarkeit” as opposed to the so called “akademische Freiheit” and, inevitably, to the need of a “Führer” to safeguard culture against “störend und vernichtend” impulses. (N “UdZuB”: “E” & V, KSA 1, 647 & 750.)

Even if such a manifoldly dystopian atmosphere is removed, as in the talk of the need for “Centra der Cultur” (N Ende 1876 - Sommer 1877 21 [56], KSA 8, 375) or in the recurring notion of the whole Europe conceived as “Cultur-Centrum” based on mutual interdependence rather than national aggression (N Frühjahr 1888 25 [112], KSA 11, 42; cf. already KGB I/2, Juli 1866, 144 & N Oktober-Dezember 1876 19 [60], KSA 8, 344), the emphasis on centrality remains.

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Now, suppose one read, in *Menschliches*, the piece of sociocritique of the contemporary state characterized by a diminishing “Leistungsfähigkeit zu Werken, welche grosse Concentration und Einseitigkeit verlangen”, and would be lead to think of *Endlösung* through concentration camps\textsuperscript{2094}. I think that Nietzsche specialists ought not to stand right up for the clean cut kid and explain away the reckless anachronisms nor even to insist on the primacy of a related paragraph on the enlightening *Ring der Cultur*. Just because that kind of criticism and these sorts of words are, after Auschwitz, tangled up in the course that Western powers came to adopt, it is so important to read carefully the title “*Grosse Politik und ihre Einbussen*” and see how the paragraph characterizes both the current warry megalomania and the different costs, material as well as the ones of “geistige Verarmung und Ermattung”, due to “all diese Blüthe und Pracht des Ganzen”. (MA I 475 & 481, KSA 2, 310 & 315.)

This would amount to the point that the vital sort of “great concentration” is not the result but the casualty of great offensives. In other words, there is centralization that only suffers from the urge to centralize in the sense of domination. One of the general merits of this insight, too, is that puts into question Nietzsche’s often alleged extremism and helps to understand the kind of radicalized balance that can be seen developed in his work.

Basic social problems of the individual and the collective are treated, in Nietzsche’s early notes, in terms of harmonization. Where the Spartans sought for *Harmonie* out of unified educatory procedures, the Athenians allowed competing powers to subsist but tempered them by introducing uniting goals. Analogically, the contemporary European situation is characterized by its lack of common cause and shared purpose and, hence, by a Spartan kind of warry and anti-individualistic thinking. It is from these considerations that the philosopher’s task emerges, namely, to “ein Bündniss der bindenden Kraft sein”. Thus, harmony is not weakness, since it occurs “wenn alles auf einen Mittelpunct, auf eine Cardinalkraft bezogen ist, nicht wenn zahlreiche schwache Kräfte zugleich spielen”. (N Herbst 1873 - Winter 1873-74 30 [7] - [9], KSA 7, 732-4.)

One gathers that ’midpoint’ and ’cardinal force’ are presented as philosophico-political requirements for a pluralistically conceived communal life. At any rate, Nietzsche’s philosophy seems to have had a tight connection to the notion of center as a necessary criterion of thought and action.

In commenting upon Nietzsche’s initial philosophical objectives and achievements, Joan Llinares Chover mentions the option of traditional “logocentrism”. The young Nietzsche’s contribution to the tradition could be taken as a Schopenhauerian “eccentric variation” resulting in something like “melocentrism”. Yet, Nietzsche’s thesis was that the “conception of Greece as a culture”of *medida* and *bellezza*, along the lines of Goethe and Winckelmann, rested on a “superficial and partial, and hence,
false image”. Hence, it cannot be claimed that he was committed to treating music as the culmen and the cima of the arts. It is the direction of problematizing the centrality or recognizing its full complexity that Nietzsche is, according to Llinares Chover, pointing to.2095

Now, I think that one ought to gather from these points that Nietzsche’s texts contain sustained philosophical interrogation of the concept of ‘center’. In the following four examinations, I shall try to flesh out the overall Nietzschean discourse of ‘centers’ and ‘circles’ in order to show the extent to which these concepts illustrate the issue of nihilism and conceptuality.

Nietzschean ‘Centrality’ - Dionysus & Labyrinth

James R. Watson reaffirms the view that there is no “unifying center” for Nietzsche’s texts. The homeless Dionysian wanderings, and not any metaphysical centering, are what define the Nietzschean texts. There is no center in his work, Watson concludes, unless it is thought that “Nietzsche’s non-proprietary center” is the “Dionysian play of Nietzsche’s”.2096

Now, Nietzsche’s Ecce homo has it that the book on Dionysus, Geburt der Tragödie, could only recognize aesthetic values, yet it tended to deny these too:

Tiefes feindseliges Schweigen über das Christenthum im ganzen Buche. Es ist weder apollinisch noch dionysisch; es negirt alle ästhetischen Werthe - die einzigen Werthe, die die “Geburt der Tragödie” anerkennt: es ist im tiefsten Sinne nihilistisch, während im dionysischen Symbol die äusserste Grenze der Bejahung erreicht ist.
(EH “WigBs”: DgdT 1, KSA 6, 310.)

I have attempted to show that Nietzsche did move from his earlier standpoint toward new perspectives in a way that is best described as a change from an essentially detached setting of conceptualization, even when used to depict the utter Dionysian absence of distance, to a kind of ecology of conception. Since Geburt asserted aesthetic values as the only ones assertible, as Nietzsche’s later self-reflection (at least a little inaccurately, because thus toning down the metaphysical elements in the book,) claims, and then negated them, it embraced nihilism. This move may have had its advantages, and it may have been necessary, yet it was nihilism, whereas (während) the Dionysus wisdom, as awareness and study of the limits of conceiving, was the affirmative invention that was the greatest redeeming feature of Geburt. Is ‘Dionysus’ then Nietzsche’s philosophical ‘center’?

Right away, it can be noted how, in Nietzsche’s texts, vocabulary of center is indeed attached to
Dionysus. For the author of the book on the Dionysian, a certain vision had been of central significance. Writing to Rohde, in July 1872, Nietzsche makes the remark that “Du weißt daß ich bei den “Musen mit Dionysos in der Mitte” an das bei Wagner in Triebischen hängende Aquarell Genelli’s gedacht habe” (KGB II/3, 25).

Some commentators have paid attention to this affair. Michael Allen Gillespie goes so far as to say that Genelli’s work is, “probably” and “apparently”, to be taken as the “initial source of Nietzsche’s fascination with the Dionysian”. His balanced reservations notwithstanding, Gillespie goes on to suggest that the fact that Genelli had been inspired by the “Sturm und Drang poet Maler Müller” and focused on the sense of intoxication embodied by the deity and his revenue “reveals Nietzsche’s great debt to the early German Romantics”.2097 Saying that the painting depicts Dionysus “among” the Muses and failing to repeat Nietzsche’s phrase about its standing “in the middle”, Gillespie misses a good opportunity to vindicate his preference for the centrality’s overweight of decentrality in the philosopher’s work.

Fortunately, at least for anyone really wishing to attain such a vindication, there is no need to rely on solely biographical speculation. Dionysus’s contact with centrality can be argued otherwise. In an unpublished essay of Nietzsche, a reference is made to the ancient barbaric “Dionysosfeier”. Judgment follows: “das Centrum lag in der geschlechtlichen Zuchtlosigkeit, in der Vernichtung jedes Familienthums durch das unumschränkte Hetärenthum”. (N “DdW” 1, KSA 1, 558.) This is not a random jotting in a notebook but the point is also made in Geburt (GT 2, KSA 1, 32).

Moreover, the reference to Centrum is not quite casual either. In the book, not only is there “sokratische Tendenz” criticized for its intellectualist “Herz und Mittelpunkt” (GT 13, KSA 1, 89) or the “aeschyleische Weltbetrachtung” praised for its tragic Mittelpunkt (GT 9, KSA 1, 68). In addition, “Bilder der Lyriker” are elucidated as being “nur verschiedene Objectivationen von ihm, weshalb er als bewegender Mittelpunkt jener Welt “ich” sagen darf” (GT 5, KSA 1, 45). Most of all, Dionysus itself is called “der eigentliche Bühnenheld und Mittelpunkt der Vision”, just as the “herumschwärmenden Bacchen” are termed “die herrliche Umrahmung, in deren Mitte ihnen das Bild des Dionysus offenbar wird” (GT 8, KSA 1, 63, 60)2098.

One can see how it does make sense to talk about centrality even with respect to, culturedly put, the most whimsical conduct, the most rapturous happening one can think. This last of the four Geburt quotations is, indeed, a good antidote for biographical speculation. Even if Genelli’s painting never was crucial for Nietzsche the thinker, it is clear that the concepts of the frame and mid are here used in a sense that needs no back up from the conceiver’s life.
Now, the book on tragedy, with its talk of “Mitte der Hellene” (GT 23, KSA 1, 148), “innersten Kern der Dinge” (GT 16, KSA 1, 103), Lebenskern and “Herz der Welt” (GT 21, KSA 1, 137-8), is very much different from Nietzsche’s subsequent style of criticizing “religiösen, moralischen und ästhetischen” claims to the “Wesen und Herz der Welt” (MA I 4, KSA 2, 27). Yet, written in 1886, from the distance of fourteen years, after the youthful translations of Kantian agnosticism and Schopenhauerian voluntarism into the language of Wagnerian aesthetics were left behind, Nietzsche’s self-criticism of the early work still emphasized the “Gedanken über die Griechen” as the “Kern” of the book (GT “V” 1, KSA 1, 11).

Apart from Dionysus, but sufficiently analogically and still more tellingly perhaps, one ought to consider the following. While Nietzsche’s 1871 notes on the Greek mythology speak of Pythia as the “gemeinsame Centrum” for the Greek artistic aspirations (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [122], KSA 7, 174), his 1887 notes on the Jewish religious history speaks of “Opferkult als Centrum des nationalen Bewußtseins” (N Herbst 1887 10 [79], KSA 12, 500). What may have been changed, during the period of over 16 years, in the epistemological view or cultural expectations, it never shattered the explanatory technique of making sense of complex issues in terms of centrality.

There is an additional point to be made. In contradiction to the worship of Apollo being centered in Delfoi and Parnassus, or to those of Demeter being centered in Eleusis, “[t]here is, for the mysteries of Dionysus, no fixed centre”. This point is taken from a contemporary authority in Greek mythology, Walter Burkert, who also maintains that “[w]ithout a doubt, sexuality had a central function is the mysteries”. As I see it, Burkert’s testimony corroborates Nietzsche’s insistence on the curious centrality of the Dionysian. In any case, it was his project to reconceive the received view of the Greeks with its stress on the moderate, the well-balanced, the concerted. Dionysus’s introduction into the center of the Greek life and thought was simultaneously a reconceiving of centrality.

This gives enough motivation to search, in the conceptual family of ’center’, for a less metaphysical, mystical or abstract significance. It is of chief importance that this can be done already within the context of Geburt. In the book, it is said, namely, that the early Greek drama did not presuppose nor entail the separation of spectators and players. In securing the unity of the audience and the actors, the representative and mediating role of the choir as, in Schlegel’s words, “der idealische Zuschauer”, was decisive. The part of the “tanzenden und singenden Satyren” was already grounded in the specific art of constructing: “Ein Publicum von Zuschauern, wie wir es kennen, war den Griechen unbekannt: in ihren Theatern war es Jedem, bei dem in concentrischen Bogen sich erhebenden Terassenbau des Zuschauerraumes, möglich, die gesamte Culturwelt um sich herum ganz eigentlich zu übersehen und in gesättigtem Hinschauen selbst Choreut sich zu wähnen.” (GT 8, KSA 1, 59.)
One might propose that this stress on über-sehen implies Nietzsche’s spectatorial commitment that certainly made it possible him to write the book in the first place, but hindered him from spelling out the more participatory implication of his concept of ‘the tragic’ and of ‘the Dionysian’ for the event of conceptualization. Yet, the description of the theater also shows how Nietzsche’s viewpoint into the Dionysian is a one focusing on collective concerns. In addition to its force in making sense of experiences in arts, it might as well empower one to assess the athletic forms of gyromancy in track and field events where long-distance runners carry out the divination performance for the audience lined up on the concentric rows of the stadium.

Be that as it may, I would spell out the double lesson of the case of Dionysus for the issue of centrality as follows. On the one hand, the rigid position of holding on to the anti-center elements in Nietzsche is severed by the fact that there seems to be nothing anti-Nietzschean in speaking about centrality even in the case of the rambling and roaming multiformity. At the very least, one must grant that as eager as Nietzsche seems to have been in disintegrating received totalities or decentering accepted middle points, he was eager to centralize what may usually be taken as but a mess or chaos.

On the other hand, the rigid position of holding on to the pro-center elements in Nietzsche is frustrated by the fact that once the notion of center is identified - the central dramatic and conceptual space filled - with versatility, unlimitedness, desire and destruction, it takes on a sense different from anything previously or customarily attached to centrality.

This is to say that what has been taken to be the spinal cord, kelson or keel of the body of Western thought, is abruptly diagnosed as anomalous and erratic, as departing from the center. After that, there is, for philosophical tradition, cultural and social progress or personal development, no single effluence. No single efflorescence, no unique unfolding of the petals, no one and only cycle from a single root. Neither is there any unique established periclinal stratum of meaningfulness emanating and symmetrically radiating. Hence, eccentricity is not an aberration from a unique center. Being out of bounds is not failing to stay within the confines of one and only central sphere. Being out of curve is not falling short of sticking to the sole central circuit. Exorbitant behaviour is no converse and perverse reaffirmation of the sole or privileged order, pattern, course. The notion of center begins to circumvolve, to revolve.2100

This conceptual revolution is at work in Nietzsche’s use of the related concept ‘labyrinth’, too. One may remember how, in Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics, labyrinthine constructions were compared to dancing, on the grounds that these were the two arts that involved the notion of “symbolically imitating the movement of the great elementary bodies” or the “revolution [Kreislauf] of the planets”. In the
same lectures, Hegel has a recourse to the midsummer feast as well as to the Greek forms of celebration referring, in the passing, to the ancient “mysteries of Demeter and Bacchus”.2101

Nietzsche’s early book on Bacchus declares its own subject matter to be a kind of labyrinth (GT 7, KSA 1, 52). My suggestion is that one ought to be careful enough to appreciate, in this declaration, not just an expression of a critical stance appropriate for research. I would recommend that it is taken, in addition, as an invitation to cope with the Nietzschean reworkings of the conceptuality of the labyrinthine. Even if this involves the threat and promise of the unconceptual “Gleichniss” or “Chaos und Labyrinth des Daseins”, these are, for their conceivability, in need of the notion of the orderly “kyklischen Bahnen” (FW 322, KSA 3, 552).

In Nietzsche’s references to the labyrinth, the double edge of the concept pointing to life in the ancient past, on the one hand, and to the economy of the modern soul, on the other, comes most powerfully through in the poem “Klage der Ariadne” from one of the author’s very last volumes, Dionysos-Dithyramben. In the setting of a divine drama, Dionysus enters to answer his lamenting fiancée: “Sei klug, Ariadne! .../ Du hast kleine Ohren, du hast meine Ohren:/ steck ein kluges Wort hinein! - / Muss man sich nicht erst hassen, wenn man sich lieben soll? .../ Ich bin dein Labyrinth ...” (DD, “KdA”, KSA 6, 401.)

Dionysus’s activism seems to be one of archetypal masculine penetration and impatient resistance to unreasonable emotions. But it is also participation, approximation and identification. It is the imperative of listening that I find crucial in this robust and delicate rendering of the affectionate entwinement.

Architectonically speaking, the ear is a convex moulding, a volute. Moreover, it has an internal portion that is beautifully called a labyrinth.2102 (Cf. also GM II 18, KSA 5, 325-6, on the Goethean “Labyrinth der Brust”.)

Rethinking his field of research Northrop Frye once concluded that unless there was “a center of the order of words”, that is, unless “literature is a total form, and not simply the name given to the aggregate of existing literary works”, critical practice would have to confront “endless series of free associations” or “an endless labyrinth”2103. However, Frye’s point has later been reexpressed by his followers with explicitly removing “the pejorative implication” involved in the notion: “the labyrinth of language - of forms, structures, terms, and subjects - make up both the central preoccupation of contemporary critical writing, and its dispersal”2104.

Which one of the flavors attached to this sufficiently Nietzschean image is in, and which one out, of place? How does the structure of intricate winding and turning passages help to understand the nature
and implications of the philosopher’s output?

Pejoratively or not, “labyrinthine” is about to become a universal synonym for “Nietzschean”. In fact, the point was made very early on. In 1905, one commentator spoke of “Nietzsche’s labyrinth of thoughts”, or of “hundreds and hundreds of aphorisms, sea of insights, herd of building blocks, enormous fermenting mass of thoughts”.

It is in these sorts of terms, too, that Alin Christian recently identified the fundamental difficulty in the Nietzsche research. Speaking about the perplexing “labyrinth of Nietzschean metaphors” with its “thick of symbols” and “vast gamut of [...] possible nexuses” as being “by now a philosophical commonplace”, Christian holds that “a demand for even a selective form of completeness would sound preposterous”. To try to come up with a “key reference” and to “defend its centrality with textual evidence” is to have one’s presentation, “in the best of cases, encounter an apathetic approval”.

One could criticize this gloomy description for being, after all, a prescription and even one extremely hard to abide. In problematizing dance, as Christian does, one can hardly help not to promote it as a central theme in Nietzsche, even if one expressly tried to avoid any such practice. Or, at least, it would seem unavoidable that the incompleteness and the decentrality are affirmed as the central reference points in the absence of any compelling positivities (only Klein, in his seeming carelessness, seems to be alert to this). In spite of these objections, it cannot be denied that Christian manages to articulate well the essentially hopeless task of a totalizing Nietzsche commentary. Where is the thread of Ariadne, in Nietzsche’s texts, and how to coil it together - and round what?

My point is not to argue for the labyrinth’s centrality in Nietzsche’s work. Nor is it merely to note the questionable nature of such a task and to try and leave it for other concerns. It is, instead, to argue that labyrinth is one of the concepts through which the issue of centrality, and by extension the issues of nihilism and conceptuality, are elaborated in that work. It would be foolish not to look for those very elaborations.

Georges Montcriol’s interpretation is the best introduction to them, since he tries to show Nietzsche as the master of mobile nomadism who attacked systems and unities and fought against the power of concepts. I have discussed his views earlier (see sections III.a & IV.a.1), yet saving his emphases on decentering and labyrinths for this occasion.

Montcriol refers to Pascal’s view of the infinite space that decenters humanity, because it dispenses with all centers. However, he speaks of the “Pascalian center” as made up of “unheard attributes” into sheer
“ubiquity and mobility”. In the absence of “authentic, fixed center”, Pascal’s is a “false center, an inassignable center, always fleeing”. Nietzsche joins Pascal in ridding himself from the “three modes of totalizing the real”. Both thinkers negate i) the ancient scheme of one key principle at the top of the pyramid, ii) the Cartesian deductive organization of the chains of reasoning, and iii) the “Hegelian center” or “encyclopedia as the circle of circles”. What they favor is “the dislocated sphere where the center is everywhere and the circumference nowhere, the labyrinth that is to be imagined without closure and decentered”. 2107

According to Montcriol, Pascal foreshadows Nietzsche’s philosophy in still another way. Pascal’s paradoxes act as incitations and invitations to a dynamism of reading. What is at stake is the “cycle of thought in its relation to the reader (reception, conservation, reproduction)”. Even if Pascal’s objective is the un-Nietzschean reader tending to “circulate all the way to the discovery of God”, he offers the basic event of “disequilibrium” that Nietzsche, too, utilizes in his efforts in “circulating through vital perspectives”. Nietzsche experiments with the “identification with all the “egos” of history” in order to “introduce new ways of thinking and acting”. Thought is basically a series of vivid and energetic contacts and assemblages or “circulations without assignable beginning or end”. What the Nietzschean discourse evokes is not a straight line or a circle but “the open and decentered labyrinth”, not the “monocentered coherence of systematic discourses” but the “chao-erence of the aphoristic discourse”. In short, “Dionysian circulation through the sprinkled fragments”. 2108

In an earlier occasion (section III.a), I criticized Montcriol for his less than successful attempt at mediation between de-formation and re-formation. Here again, he seems to be trying to leave some room for reconceiving the notion of ‘center’, yet with his rendering of (Pascal’s and) Nietzsche’s all out attack against anything centered such a chance appears to be gone for good. I have also criticized Montcriol for his one-sided, inconsistent and insufficiently developed handling of Nietzsche’s relation to conceptuality (section IV.a.1). It is difficult to tell why he speaks of Nietzsche as decomposing the traditional subject of philosophy into its constitutive forces as “centers of interpretation, punctual subjectivities”. That is to say, why continue the language of centers and subjects, if one wants to abandon the language of concepts? 2109

My fundamental contention is present study has been that the most decisive of all the Nietzschean reconceptualizations involves the concept of concept itself. It is about the opening, the animating of ‘concept’ through its subjection to an ecology of experience, to a politics of power-related conceivings, to socio-historical revolutions of conceptions. I hold that one needs to study the Nietzschean concept of ‘labyrinth’ in order to see the extent to which it confirms to, or refines, the Nietzschean concept of ‘concept’.
One may consider the way Max Black closes his book, *The Labyrinth of Language*. He concludes, namely, that what the wandering through the linguistic landscape teaches is “that any simple theory about language must be over-simple”. There is “no Ariadne’s thread” there. Yet, Black maintains that “this is no reason for lachrymose complaints about the sophistry of language”. I think one is justified in inferring from this and from his introductory remarks - about the “purpose of this work” being “to extract [...] some productive concepts and controversial issues” and “to develop a tentative linguistic perspective” - that ‘labyrinth’ is Black’s fundamental conceptual model for attempting at explications instead of lamentations. 2110

Now, in a rather desperate letter, Nietzsche makes use of the double sense of the term “labyrinthisch”. By saying that there might be no way out of his misery, reference is made to the specific form construction is and, by saying of his being confused, to the state of amazement. (See KGB III/1, August 1883, 435; cf. GM II 22, KSA 5, 332.) The productive outcome of the complexity appears to be an awareness of essentially tragic kind. One gathers that it would not be quite so apt to say that Nietzsche celebrates labyrinthine thought, at least in the sense external to the tragic. Julian Roberts, for one, points out that “reactionary individualism”, with its “small-minded” cherishing of the “petty advantage”, as Nietzsche’s “principal target” of criticism, is illustrated by “the maze”. 2111

Nietzsche’s book on Schopenhauer makes a case is for the harmfulness of the labyrinthine. It is said that if one comes short of offering a guiding synthesis of experience “sind die Stricke, die nirgends ans’s Ende führen und unsern Lebenslauf nur noch verwirrter und labyrinthischer machen”. (UB III 3, KSA 1, 356; cf. GD “SeU” 32, KSA 6, 131.) One may note the imagery of vital fibres at stake here suggesting the connection to the problem of nihilism as a situation of *ne hilum*, or ‘no strings’.

In *Morgenröthe*, the notion of the labyrinthine is used in a comparison between the types of consciousness in the ancients and the moderns. Again, the dimension of architecture is exploited, too. (M 169, KSA 3, 151-2.) What this already implies is confirmed by a later book, namely, that it is a matter of the whole constitution, of the embodied connection of the moderns with pre-cultural barbarians (JGB 224, KSA 6, 158). Part of the irony seems to be that, despite labyrinth’s being a mythical, pre-classical and unphilosophical construction, it still stands for the modern ultra-rational condition.

Alan White says that Nietzsche’s reappropriations of certain recurring patterns conceal a view that “meanings are putative and orders ostensible”, yet, instead of entailing the imperative to destroy them, the view stirs the maxim that “meanings and orders should be examined”. As for the one examining Nietzsche, there are, according to White, ways only “within” Nietzsche’s labyrinth. 2112 Thus, he can be
taken to reaffirm Wilfrid Sellars’s criticism of those philosophers who try “to break out of discourse to an arché beyond discourse”\textsuperscript{2113}.

White, like Christian, has underscored the significance of dance, in Nietzsche’s work, as the issue of the total incorporation: “dance [is] inseparable from its dancing”. With the help of Milan Kundera, and not without repercussions from Hegel’s aesthetics, White suggests that “circle dance” is connected with the magical, the dreamy, the longing, the communal, the unified and, for the ones fallen from the circle and hurled away from it by centrifugal forces, with the nostalgic. The import of circle dances is that “they transform fortuitous occurrences into motifs that then assume permanent places in the compositions of our lives”.\textsuperscript{2114}

Dance is brought to the fore in both Nietzsche’s early book on tragedy and the later masterpiece, Also sprach Zarathustra. But Nietzsche’s Menschliches speaks of it too. The book has it that Homer was already forced, for all his originality, to accept the constraints of convention, “innerhalb deren er tanzen musste”. The section titled as “In Ketten tanzen” could hardly be a better reminder of Nietzsche’s insistence on the emancipation from emancipation: “Diess war die Erziehungs-Schule der griechischen Dichter: zuerst also einen vielfältigen Zwang sich auferlegen lassen, durch die früheren Dichter; sodann einen neuen Zwang hinzuerfinden, ihn sich auferlegen und ihn anmuthig besiegen: sodass Zwang und Sieg bemerkt und bewundert werden.” (MA II/2 140, KSA 2, 612.)

That is, dance is to be equated with freedom from conventional structures and forms and orders, but with freedom with and within transforming conventions. This is also the way to best capture Nietzsche’s analogies between dance and style (KGB III/1, Februar 1884, 478-9), dance and logic (W 10, KSA 6, 37), dancing and thinking (JGB 213, KSA 5, 148) and dancing and conceptualizing (GD “WdDa” 7, KSA 6, 109-10).

I think that the specifically conceptual dimension of the labyrinth is to be appreciated here\textsuperscript{2115}. Antichrist is Nietzsche’s most sustained single effort of conceptual criticism and it still attacks the modern consciousness that “Alles “verzeiht”, weil sie Alles “begreift”“ (AC 1, KSA 6, 169). Accordingly, it uses ‘labyrinth’ as the concept for both the necessary getting lost - “Eine Vorliebe der Stärke für Fragen, zu denen Niemand heute den Muth hat; der Muth zum Verbotenen; die Vorherbestimmung zum Labyrinth.” (AC “V”, KSA 6, 167) - and as the concept for the equally necessary getting out - “Wir haben das Glück entdeckt, wir wissen den Weg, wir fanden den Ausgang aus ganzen Jahrtausenden des Labyrinths” (AC 1, KSA 6, 169).

Labyrinth takes part in Nietzsche’s discourse of nihilism. In as much as the use of “kühlen Vernunft”
may be taken as the “Labsal für Menschen des Labyrinths” (N April-Juni 1885 34 [212], KSA 11, 493), the one who has “den Nihilismus selbst schon in sich zu Ende gelebt hat” is also the one who has already anticipated “jedes Labyrinth der Zukunft” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [411], KSA 13, 190).

In Nietzsche’s texts, labyrinth is a concept that opens centrality and the limits of conceptuality to questions. It intensifies the study of the incessant revolutions of centers and of the dynamics of conceptualization.

**Nietzsche’s Circles - The Issue of Eccentricity**

In a letter to a friend, Nietzsche complained on his being labeled, in German criticism, as “eccentric”. The unhappy but thought provoking description seemed to provide the Swiss citizen with a chance to discuss his own development and difficulties in assessing it:


(KGB III/5, Dezember 1887, 209-10.)

Whoever claims that another person has become “eccentric”, presupposes that the coordinates of the allegedly changed person’s proper center are established. A couple of weeks later, Nietzsche took the issue up again in another letter:

Diese Herren, die keinen Begriff von meinem centrum, von der großen Leidenschaft haben, in deren Diensten ich lebe, werden schwerlich einen Blick dafür haben, wo ich bisher außerhalb meines centrums gewesen bin, wo ich wirklich “excentrisch” war

(KGB III/5, Januar 1888, 221.)

The first thing to pick out from these quotations, from this philosopher’s critique of critique, is their political context of philosophizing. Nietzsche’s reaction to the review shows him rehearsing conceptual criticism in the midst of an actual polemical situation. He questions the parameters used in localizing his work. One does not have to fall back on biographistic explanations or vulgar (marxist or some other kind of) determinism, if one grants that Nietzsche’s writings are inextricably linked to the times and
places where the author was active, to his proper circles.

At the minimum, one could keep in mind how Nietzsche, the inter-railer, frequented the Centralbahnhof of his home polis, Basel (see KGB II/5, Mai-Juni 1875, 60) and knew many other traffic centres in central parts of this continent. Recognition of this minimal indication of coordinates contributes to understanding his intellectual wanderings, the meandering of his texts.

Undoubtedly with more sophistication than what is contained in my railroad station example, Gary Shapiro has paid attention to this issue. Despite his solitude, Nietzsche was, in Shapiro’s words, “hooked in to the universal systems of transportation and communication”. Coming from Shapiro, the point about the “material foundations” of “the philosopher of the postal age” is all the more happy one, since he says it not in order to discard but to heighten the other point about Nietzsche’s text as an “indefinitely ramified network”. According to him, Nietzsche’s “praxis of writing” was “directed toward shaking and centering the traditional fixed points - notably, God, substance, and soul - of the philosophical and religious tradition”. This is something that, says Shapiro, escapes from Heidegger who “still reads Nietzsche logocentrically”. 2116

This is already to say that the task of determining Nietzsche’s proper circles depends on one’s position in one or two of the circles that distributed the philosopher’s intellectual estate. Is Nietzsche to be met in the ‘history of metaphysics’ or in the ‘history of communication’? In the present study, I have drawn a lot, especially in questions pertaining to Nietzsche’s style and the writerly practices featured in his texts, from Heidegger’s critics. Yet, I have defended Heidegger’s insistence on the conceptual in studying Nietzsche, even though my opinion has been that Heidegger tended to take the credit of conceptual considerations for himself and not to articulate his full indebtedness to Nietzsche.

A brief illustration of the conceptual question with respect to the ’center’ is in order here. Richard Müller-Freienfels, an interpreter rather sympathetic to Nietzsche, sought to introduce him as the father of the ’philosophers of life’. Lebensphilosophen, it is told in Müller-Freienfels’s book, are “not clear as to their central concept”. This is because Leben is, in their view, a matter of endeavoring toward a goal. Some of the ’philosophers of life’ even deny, in principle, life’s “conceivability and the conceptuality”. According to Müller-Freienfels, “’life’ means the great X asserted as the core of the world”. As such, the concept of life is likened with the Fluchtpunkt “to which all the very different lines strive together”. 2117

This last analogy is tediously close to identifying anything invisible and inexpressible with ’the central’. For all its admirable gesture toward problematizing Nietzsche’s center is, Müller-Freienfels anchors him
all the more tightly to the center of a temporary cultural current - Lebenphilosophie - flourishing in Central Europe through the first few decades of the 20th century. Contrary to Müller-Freienfels and more in line with Heidegger, I would endorse the view of Nietzsche’s conceptual potential.

To continue with the review of Jenseits von Gut und Böse containing the judgment of “eccentricity”, the dimension laudably underscored by Shapiro can be better appreciated. The review had appeared in 17 September, 1887, in a periodical all too properly called Literarische Centralblatt. This Leipzig publication seems to have been among the few ones that Nietzsche kept on reading and one of the rare papers to somewhat regularly review his work. During the time of the Geburt controversy, Nietzsche even planned to publish an all-out attack against the editor who had refused to print a defence of his book tailor-made by Rohde (see N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [259], KSA 7, 500-1).2118

Centralblatt’s critique of Jenseits was in fact more or less favorable. Yet, it did contain the notorious point about the bigger picture tending to grow, in the course of the book, “completely dim through eccentricities”. Moreover, the word “eccentric” was colored through its being conjoined with certain other mocking words, such as “fundamentally false utterances”, “baroque and bizarre aphorisms” and “sickly elevated self-conscience”. This sort of depreciation reflected the general tone of the earliest Nietzsche reception. While some approving estimations of his works were given in public, it remained that even the “artiges Circular”, coupled with a Gesammt-Exemplar of books sent by his publisher to a number of editors, resulted in no qualified, propitious overall analyses. Nietzsche generalized the situation by telling a friend about how “[m]an hilft sich mit den Worten: “excentrisch”, “pathologisch”, “psychiatsritsch”“ (KGB III/5, Februar 1888, 265 & 248.)2119

The pejorative “eccentric” was still considered, by the one to have been labeled with it, as worth repeating five months after its public use and two months after the first letter I quoted above. To imply the larger significance of this affair, one may bear in mind how Nietzsche had once made the general claim that there is “in Deutschland nichts Ähnliches” as the English Mind or the French Revue philosophique (KGB II/5, August 1877, 266). Much later, in Ecce homo, there is open complaint about the German publicity as a whole (EH “Wigbs” 1, KSA 6, 300-1).

From the perspective of nihilism, Nietzsche’s notes also include an interesting restatement of the misunderstandings in the Centralblatt critique. After quoting the reviewer’s complaint of having “„den Faden” für mich verloren”, it is asked “wann hat es ihn gehabt?” (N September 1888 19 [1], KSA 13, 541). Just as the claim about eccentricity had presupposed a grasp of center from which Nietzsche had been assumed to make his exit, the claim about a lost connection now presupposes the prior situation of pulling the wires. In the light of the ne hilum discourse of nihilism, Nietzsche could be taken to say that
his alleged plunge into a nihilistic state of no strings attached is due to false assumptions about his previous standpoint, about the conventional understanding of dependencies and liberations and about the reviewer’s own abilities to assess meaningful transformations.

Nietzsche’s being committed to philosophical practice in his proper historico-social environment is something he himself also recognized and tirelessly problematized. In Ecce homo, Zarathustra’s gaze into the future is contrasted with the way Jenseits, the very book to have occasioned the criticism of eccentricity, was occupied with “das Nächste, die Zeit, das Um-uns scharf zu fassen” (EH “WisgBs”: JvGuB 2, KSA 6, 351; cf. M 44, KSA 3, 52 on the “Um-uns”). In other words, Jenseits, for all its marginality and eccentricity, consists of an effort to conceptualize the “around-us”, the immediately central plane of the day by day European modernity. Even though its reception made the volume into a book for nobody, rather than a book for everyone, Jenseits was trying to make sense of that which could be construed as the central experiential circumstances for anyone inhabiting and observing the rapidly industrialized occidental world.

The second thing that I would like to underline in the issue of Excentricitätäten is the surprising way Nietzsche seems to be ready to second to the pejorative sense of ’eccentricity’. As if offering premature counseling for him, Ralph Waldo Emerson says that “men of large calibre” may have “some eccentricity or madness” in their personality, yet they “help us more [...] than balanced mediocre minds”\textsuperscript{2120}.

In the same vein, John Stuart Mill announced, in his classic On Liberty (1859), a rehabilitation of exceptionality and nonconformity: ”Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.”\textsuperscript{2121}

Compared to Emerson’s and Mill’s respective defences of eccentricity in the face of the mean and the medial, Nietzsche’s remarks portray it as something much more ordinarily negative. There is, for example, an early fragment containing the point that Plato was, apart from his steady course of thought, fond of paradoxes to the point of twisting “seine Lehre recht exzentrisch” (N Ende 1870 - April 1871 7 [122], KSA 7, 170). Later on, there is scorn for Carlyle as “ein Mann der starken Worte und der exzentrischen Attitüden” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [45], KSA 13, 21). Elsewhere, Christianity is said to have been something altogether different from the church St. Paul came to establish, since it was devoid of the “exzentrische Begriff der “Heiligkeit’” (N November 1887 - März
There is more from where these came from. A psycho-aesthetical line of *Nachlass* criticism reads: “die extreme Erschlauffung aller morbiden Naturen nach ihren Nerven-Excentricitäten hat nichts mit den Zuständen des Künstlers gemein”. As for more targeted assaults, Wagner’s *décadence* is associated with *extreme Erschöpfung, beständige Überreibung* and “Reizung der morbiden Nerven und Centren durch terroristische Mittei”, while its Socratic variety is linked with *Exceß, Ausschweifung, Anarchie, Abnormität, Fanatismus, Pathologie des Untergrundes* and with being “übertrieben, excentrisch, [...] Carikatur, [...] buffo”. (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [119] & 15 [12] & 14 [92], KSA 13, 298 & 411-2 & 268-70; cf. also 14 [68], 252.)

Curiously, then, Nietzsche’s use of the word seems to confirm, unerringly, to the norm. Apart from deciding exactly which of the ancient or modern phenomena are to be seen as eccentric, the allegedly eccentric writer himself did not depart, in any unusual way, from the ordinary practice of referring, with this term, to despicable irregularities and inconsiderate sidetracks.

A seemingly programmatic note puts this conclusion into question. It contains, namely, the task of differentiating “Zukunftsmenschen, excentrisch, energisch, warm, unermüdlich, künstlerisch, Bücherfeind” (N 1871 9 [24], KSA 7, 280). The list would suggest that, after all, eccentricity might be a praiseworthy trait. To account for the obvious contradiction, between this and the former depictions, one could propose that it is explainable in terms of different stages in the thinker’s career. Admittedly, in the other early fragment already cited, Plato’s occasional eccentricity is not directly condemned. In developmental terms, the shift in the value estimation of eccentricity would have to be located between 1871 and 1874, since the notes for the 1876 monograph which was to praise Wagner’s *Mittelpunct* of force (UB IV 7, KSA 1, 466), contain criticism of the opera master’s tendency to act, in circumstances unfavorable to his need for domination, “unmässig, excentrisch, widerhaarig” (N Anfang 1874 - Frühjahr 1874 32 [20], KSA 7, 761).

Yet, the Wagnerian eccentricity and overindulgence may not be simply disapproved here. The “future human beings” could be imagined as having regardless, resistant and rebellious qualities overdrawn, overstrung and overwrought in a Wagnerian manner. Although I am of the opinion that it is the Wagnerian sort of eccentricity that Nietzsche comes to disapprove, while seeking a way to maintain some of its characteristics in his own preferred version of eccentricity, I think that it would be more to the point to suggest that there is an ambivalence here typical of Nietzsche.

It has been my interpretative policy to read Nietzsche’s texts in order to see the extent to which they
already contain problematization of the notions that are customarily imposed onto them. Eccentricity could be a case in point. In *Menschliches*, the contemporary culture with its high respect for knowledge is said to be in need of “eine grosse Ernüchterung des Gefühls und ein starke Concentration aller Worte”. Whereas emotional sobriety and verbal concentration were the distinguishing features in the Greek form of life, modern texts are characterized by the “Ueberspannte”. The passage goes on like this: “und selbst wenn sie einfach geschrieben sind, so werden die Worte in denselben noch zu excentrisch *gefühlht*”. Despite the fairly evident taking sides, the antidote of sharp and “kalte Schreib- und Gefühlssart” is not prescribed without pointing to its risks. (MA I 195, KSA 2, 165-6.)

In other words, Nietzsche’s book portrays eccentricity as a modern problem of communication. It is not a matter of simple endorsing or resisting. It is something to be conceptualized, while at the same time it conditions conceptualization. Admittedly, Nietzsche’s writings accommodate some more or less Emersonian and Millian instances of standing up for the rights of the deviant and the crazy, or of the suspected “nothing-ists”. Yet, what may be the more characteristic trait of his texts is the constant awareness of words, linguistic practices, writing and reading, that have a crucial role to play in perceiving some things or persons as aberrations and others as normal.

At this point, one ought to note how Nietzsche would use *Kreise* in its sociological sense to account for the individual’s difficulties in forming opinions as a part of “Völker Städte Familien”, where a given “Ideal entwickelt sich” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [96], KSA 9, 476). He seems to have had a clear sense of the way views are a matter of collective give and take, as well as of the way a group’s views can exert tyranny over its individual members. According to one fragment, one has to fight the intoxicating “sich-Opfern als Werkzeug einer Wissenschaft oder politischen oder geldmachenden Partei”, the intoxication of “irgend ein kleiner dummer Fanatismus, irgend ein unvermeidliches Sichherumdrehen im kleinsten Kreise” (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [13], KSA 11, 14).

I have tried not to continue certain habits of calling names or celebrating so persistent in much writing on Nietzsche. Indeed, a fresh book of photography on the philosopher and his milieu is promoted with a line about “the vagabond and increasingly eccentric Friedrich Nietzsche”2122. As for Nietzsche’s friend, Lou von Salomé, she was recently characterized as “eccentric”, too2123. Furthermore, their older contemporary Michael Bakunin has been depicted, as compared to the other anarchists Godwin and Proudhon who in “their unconventionality rarely exceeded the milder degrees of eccentricity”, as a man “monumentally eccentric”; yet Bakunin “remains too solid a figure to be dismissed as a mere eccentric” 2124.

I see little point in disputing any of these labels, even though I think that the last use of the word (by
George Woodcock) is the best supported by what follows the characterization. Nor do I see any urgency in comparing the relative ‘eccentricity’ of Nietzsche, von Salomé and the mentioned anarchists. There would be more promise in trying to articulate the way the late 19th century people appear to the late 20th century people. Yet, the most important dimension to the issue is, in my view, that Nietzsche’s texts provide with a whole discourse of eccentricity and related topics plus metalinguistic, metaconceptual and metaphilosophical considerations of its significance. It is for this reason that the options of further name calling and rehabilitation seem not that attractive. In any case, there is a more attractive and more philosophical alternative available.

It can be appreciated by taking the implied comparisons a bit further. It is no secret that practically all of Nietzsche’s scattered remarks on Mill are hostile in tenor\(^{2125}\), whereas the majority of his utterances on Emerson are even exceptionally positive\(^{2126}\). However, there are observers ready to see all the three thinkers as contributing, by and large similarly, to the late modern exaltation of the individual. One way to ground this perception is to sketch a tradition of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘aversion to conformity’ and to locate its root in Emerson. Thus, Mill’s words about the depressingly dominating inclination to insist upon people’s “position”, “station” and “pecuniary circumstances”, the related “deficiency of personal impulses and preferences” and the needed chance for “the best and the highest in me to have fair play” are cited as having “a strikingly Nietzschean moment” or “Nietzschean overtones”. The common denominator is, as one of these observers says, to be “infinitely galled by the mediocrity of modern life”.\(^{2127}\)

One is easily persuaded to believe in this. There is a Millian dimension in the way Nietzsche’s texts present it as the “Herd”’s tendency to see “die Mitte und das Mittlere als das Höchste und Werthvollste” and to reject exceptions (N Herbst 1887 10 [39], KSA 12, 474). Further in this direction, it is said that “[w]essen Instinkt auf Rangordnung aus ist, der haßt die Zwischengebilde und Zwischenbildner: aller Mittlere ist sein Feind” (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [38], KSA 13, 20; cf. Frühjahr 1888 14 [123], 304; see also UB II 9, KSA 1 315 & FW 32, KSA 4, 403).

Yet, there is much in Nietzsche’s writings that runs counter to the anti-mediocrity trend. In the notes concerning Europe’s future, “eine art Mitte” is said to be needed to socially regulate anything overheated (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [112], KSA 11, 42). The “Mediokren” are accorded the task to resist “die Herrschaft des Pöbels und der Excentrischen (beide meist verbündet)”. More specifically, the “liberal” Mittelmäßigkeit and the conservative anti-extremism, as represented by the Jewish, will exert a forceful “Macht der Mitte”, which might even become tempting and seducing for the Ausnahme-Menschen, too. (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [182], KSA 13, 368-9; cf. N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [19], KSA 12, 302.)
To be sure, there is a considerable dose of irony involved in this justification of the middle. Such an impression is even more palpable in another, sufficiently similar and, this time, public defence of the medial (see JGB 262, KSA 5, 216-7). This is why it would be silly to infer that the speaker, not to say the author, is simply expressing his support during these considerations. They are there, however, and they are there in a way that would be almost unthinkable for Emerson or Mill.

For Nietzsche, the 'middle' just is conceptually interesting in many ways. In *Menschliches*, it is proposed that “[d]ie Menschheit kommt vielleicht auf der Mitte ihres Weges, in der mittleren Zeit ihres Existenz, ihrem eigentlichen Ziele näher, als am Ende” (MA I 234, KSA 2, 196; cf. also N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 1 [238], KSA 12, 63). It is proposed, in *Morgenröthe*, that philosophers ought to reconcile between the childish and the mature. As such, the youthful practice of philosophy would involve standing “in der Mitte” with “das mittlere Bedürfniss”. And, it is added, many philosophers do come to their “Conception” in this mediating period of life. (M 504, KSA 3, 295-6.)

Zarathustra himself says that “[e]ine Mitte bin ich noch den Menschen zwischen einem Narren und einem Leichnam” (Z “V” 7, KSA 4, 23). In a later book, it is written that “[...] als “Volk der Mitte” in jedem Verstande, sind die Deutschen unfassbarer, umfänglicher, widerspruchsvoller, unbekannter, unberechenbarer, überraschender, selbst erschrecklicher, als es andere Völker sich selber sind: - sie entschlüpfen der *Definition* und sind damit schon die Verzweiflung der Franzosen” (JGB 244, KSA 5, 184).

Reporting to his friend of the new preface to his first book, Nietzsche wondered, if it “hat hoffentlich eine erträgliche Mitte zwischen Allzusubjektiven und Allzuobjektiven, - jene Mitte, die den guten *Geschmack* einer Vorrede ausmacht?” (KGB III/3, September 1886, 242). On the face of it, this is petty bourgeois taste at its most petrified. As a part of the discourse of borderline cases, it is more like a radicalized balance with its available contacts to all the dimensions of the extreme.

What has been my special concern, throughout the present study, is that the Nietzschean conceptual considerations turn back on the very issue of conceptuality. This holds for the *Mitte*, too. One of Nietzsche’s notes has it that consciousness is “ein *Mittel der Mittheilbarkeit*”. In this way, the apparatus of conceptualization is, as for its centrality, rearticulated in terms of the middle and, as for its unity, in terms of participation. (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [145], KSA 13, 68.) It could be proposed that this an instance that at the same time brings Nietzsche close to Heidegger’s self-reflectivities and sets him apart from the latter’s analyses of *Ereignis* as the *sich selbst ermittlende und vermittelnde Mitte*\(^{2128}\).

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Comparisons to Emerson and Mill are easier to make. Emerson’s praise of “great men” and “greater men”, as well as of the way nature exists “for the excellent” and reserves “more splendid endowments for those whom she elects to a superior office”\textsuperscript{2129} is, because of the unconditionally un-ironic stance, removed from Nietzsche’s seemingly similar emphases. Neither can the Nietzschean rehabilitation of the mediocre nor the Nietzschean separation of eccentricity from exceptionality be reconciled with Mill’s views. Unless, of course, it is thought that such moves themselves were something that the great individualist would have welcomed as eccentrically beneficial. Yet, the kind of metacritique required for this latter chance is precisely something that is characteristic of Nietzsche and not typical of Mill, or, for that matter, of Emerson.

Let me spell out the bottom line here. Nietzsche the philologist was sensitive to the way the bad word was compounded, the concept put together. Eccentricity is not dealt with properly, unless one pays attention to the way the Greek notions of\textit{ ek} and\textit{ kentron} were used in the cradle of Western civilization, adopted by the Romans and reassessed by civilizations that followed. Trying to pin down a basic difference in doing philosophy between the two eloquent thinkers is noting that where Mill sets himself to argue for the primacy of the individual’s rights, Nietzsche is more interested in rehearsing linguistically informed\textit{ Ideologiekritik}. More exactly, Mill operates on a socio-moral field, the conceptual and verbal structuring of which is, in turn, Nietzsche’s preoccupation.

The distinction is not made in order to depoliticize Nietzsche. I already suggested that where a concern for words might seem asocial and apolitical, the cases of exclusion and inclusion by the means of naming and mocking - as in using the label “eccentric” - imply the specifically politico-social nature of this concern. This is a point that ought perhaps to be pushed to the limit for the sake of doing away with certain automatic interpretations that offer themselves as aids to perceiving the differences between Nietzsche and Mill and Emerson.

To the extent that Mill spent quite a lot of his powers in promoting not only the individual’s rights and the interests of merchants, but the national interest of Britain, too, he can be said to have actively contributed to writing a programme for the violent globalization in a one-sided sense of this term. The most powerful and aggressively expanding economic and military center did not care for, say, the rights of individual Chinese citizens but used opium and gun powder in the ruthless integrational warfare.\textsuperscript{2130} His much worse political reputation notwithstanding, Nietzsche did stay alert to the way the Western power circles were ready to use narcotic and ideological pressure in conquering the rest of the world (see\textit{ FW} 147,\textit{ KSA} 3, 492).

When it comes to Emerson, his appellations for the great man with “vaster mind and will” who “inhabit
a higher sphere of thought, into which other men rise with labor and difficulty” were checked with ethical considerations. Despite these, they did not lose their more or less straightforward sense of fascination and had little political sensitivity built in them. 211 Again, his much worse political reputation notwithstanding, Nietzsche did warn, early on, for the Heroen-Cultus and Genie and Ideal fanaticism so characteristic of his century (and, through Carlyle, of Emerson, too) (M 298, KSA 3, 221-2). And for all his alleged turn, after this critical phase of the late 1870's, toward some form of mythologico-political prophesy, Nietzsche’s texts continued, nonetheless, to link décadence with the need of “großen Narcotica, - wie “das Ideal”, der “große Mann”, der “Held”“ (N Oktober 1888 23 [4], KSA 13, 606) and urged that one is not justified in making, “aus meinem Begriff “Übermenschi”“, something along the lines of “einen “höheren Schwindel”“ or of “Sybilen und Propheten”, all of which would contradict the concept’s anti-idealistic import (KGB Oktober 1888, III/5, 458).

This is not the proper place for a comprehensive comparative study of the Millian/Emersonian and the Nietzschean political philosophy. As I said, I wanted only to point out Nietzsche’s difference from Emerson and Mill in what concerns the awareness of verbalization is not simplistically dictated either by his less developed sense for the political or by his more alarmingly reckless political preferences. Even if one could not feel free to go with Nietzsche to the destinations that many of his expressly political considerations seemed to take him, whereas many of Mill’s or Emerson’s reflections may not present similar difficulties, there is no automatically available and reasonably reliable procedure in rejecting Nietzsche and embracing Mill and Emerson. It could be that Nietzsche’s fundamental “eccentricity” sets him apart from the other two thinkers. I would only insist that it is more his stubborn concept critical way of doing philosophy that is seen in the issue of ’eccentricity’, too.

Similarities with Mill aside, what handgrips Nietzsche are the insights gained through an attentiveness to the specifics of word use. To be sensitive to this sensitivity, attentive to this attentiveness, has been among the guiding lights in my exploration into the Nietzschean thinking.

For the controversial late Basel professor of classical philology, Friedrich Nietzsche, polished and sharpened use of language was as important as absurd and superabundant word games. These two aspects were so important and so interlaced that it appears to have been both too difficult and useless to keep them apart: “Durch die Worte, die uns umschweben, kommen wir auf Gedanken”; “Ein zufälliges Zusammentreffen zweier Worte oder eines Wortes und eines Schauspiels ist der Ursprung eines neuen Gedankens” (N Frühjahr 1880 2 [31], KSA 9, 39; Anfang 1880 1 [51], 17).

Although Nietzsche “could do incredible things with language” 2132, one can observe how his two utterings, in the letters on the Centralblatt review, of “eccentricity” failed to agree upon the way to
commence the word “c/Centrum”. This resembles the alternating forms of *Nihilismus* and *Nihilism* that were met in Nietzsche’s notes. Later, it will be seen how the plural form of center is rendered by him either as *Centren* or as *Centra*. The difference may be explained away by a recourse to the Latin term being, here, reproduced as such and, there, as a canonized item in the vernacular. Incidentally, another controversial Basel professor, Paracelsus, had introduced, nearly four centuries earlier, *Centrum* into the German tongue. One has only to decide, whether Paracelsus was doing something more bombastic, far-fetched and eccentric, when he adopted his name instead of the Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, than Friedrich “Fritz” Nietzsche who once translated his name as Pacific Nil and later enjoyed the idea that its root would lie in the Polish Niëtzky with its Slavic connotations to negating.

Be that as it may, the view is expressed, in one of Nietzsche’s early notes, according to which language is the “feste Punkt, um den sich das griechische Volk krystallisirt” and Homer the “feste Punkt, an dem seine Kultur sich krystallisirt” (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [278], KSA 7, 506). Although he may have later thought that language is not anything comfortably called stable or fixed, the notion of words and word-users as points around which customs and cultures are concentrated seems to fare well in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In his philological orientation, all kinds of transformations or crystallizations continued to present persistent problems. Critical reading is an inquiry into the changing biological, social and cultural phenomena.

If it is a tricky thing to claim centrality for any given notion in a textual edifice, one could scarcely do wiser than to investigate what it is said, in that edifice, about centrality. My goal is to follow the way Nietzsche’s texts exploit and embody the resources of language in tentatives of concepts. It is not for venerating his formidable skills of writing but for exploring his philosophical craftsmanship that it is so significant to keep a close eye on the way words are used in his texts.

Locating eccentricity at a received central place is a question elucidated by Jeffrey Minson in his book *Genealogies of Morals*. Minson says that ethical ‘eccentricity’ ought to be seen as “not merely a function of a particular eccentric content”. In this way, one may step beyond comparing the “generally agreed” cases of eccentricity (such as the soapbox politician’s oratory) and the not so evidently eccentric or “‘old-fashioned’, unfashionable” approaches (such as personalist ethics). Minson is pointing to the way a “wild extension of commonsense ethical categories” and, further, a certain “pattern of reasoning”, of relating a moral content to other things, would be the place to look for a mark of eccentricity. According to him, this shift in the interpretation helps one to detect eccentricity “in less marginal settings” and to question antinomical orders. A conventional case of ethical eccentricity “merely ’acts out’ an eccentricity inherent in the regime of contemporary personalist morality itself”.2134
In this way, the case of “center” and “eccentricity” becomes another instance of the ’emancipation from emancipation’. I have been trying to show just how important it was for Nietzsche’s philosophy to appreciate the way any liberation from the confines of some repressive setting is further conditioned by a liberation from that liberation. Since it was Emerson who held that “[n]ature is made to conspire with spirit to emancipate us”\textsuperscript{2135}, it is best to go back to the American philosopher and investigate his crucial role in the Nietzscbean discourse of centers and circles.

In the chapter on “Language” in his first book, Nature (1836), Emerson writes that “man is an analogist, and studies relations in all objects”. He goes on to add that the human being “is placed in the centre of beings, and a ray of relation passes from every other being to him”. It is in this interconnection of the human linguistic and cognitive capacities and the natural processes that Emerson makes his appeal to the wedding of natural history with human history.\textsuperscript{2136}

The book contains a wealth of formulations that draw from the vocabulary of centers and circles. The melting away of individuality is described as becoming “a transparent eye-ball” who is simultaneously “nothing” and “all” in the sense that “currents of the Universal Being circulate through me”. Apart from these sorts of points related to the allegedly pantheist dimension of transcendentalism, there is the constant ecological emphasis on “the totality of nature” as “the entire circuit of natural forms”. Moreover, truth is depicted with the help of the notion of “a great circle on a sphere, comprising all possible circles” and thought is explained by a recourse to the act of “making [things] revolve around [its] axis”, while human action is crystallized by speaking of the “wheels and springs of man”.\textsuperscript{2137}

In Nietzsche’s third Unzeitgemäss, the one about Schopenhauer as philosophical role model, there is the following passage:

\begin{quote}
(UB III 2, KSA 1, 342-3.)
\end{quote}

Much of this imagery is Emersonian. Another passage, further in the book, reads as follows: ”Ein
Emerson praised deeper direction. In supposedly and until the circle was drawn, the speaker finds its way, revolutionizing its significance and width, while the humans, too, had “no circumstance to” them. Yet, Emerson’s emphasis is not so much on the universal phenomena of circles as on the “generation of circles, wheel without wheel”, in thought. It is repeated how “around every circle another can be drawn”, no matter if it involves the arts destroying the previous ones, the supposedly ultimate facts falling before new ones as making up “a bolder generalization”, the parties of conversation surrounding each other with novel symbols, the psyche “rushing to the verge of [its] orbit” and making “the verge of to-day the new centre”. The dynamics of revolutionizing is about “strangely changed proportions”, the settled getting shaky and rattled, the institutions leaving “their foundations”, until the “dance” is itself (grasped as always already) conditioned: “And yet here again see the swift circumscription!”

Emerson’s most recent expositor, Robert D. Richardson Jr., claims that the “essay itself spins outward in sweeping centrifugal circles of excitement and acceptance. The central energizing spirit he now praised as a wild spirit.” In addition, the biographer relates that, “in the center of the room” where Emerson worked, there was a round writing table. But where Richardson detects the text bursting out of boundaries, one might also appreciate self-reflection quite appropriate for the subject under discussion. The speaker of Emerson’s essay, namely, lets an imagined reader deploringly exclaim “O
circular philosopher”, before the speaker declares to be doing nothing other than to “obey my whims”, “unsettle all things”, “simply experiment”. 2141

Nietzsche who was to develop his own Experimentalphilosophie had read a German edition of Emerson’s essays already in his later teens. He quickly made friends with insights concerning great men as self-evolving inner circles of the more encompassive ones in reality and the whole “circular wave of circumstances”. Nietzsche’s two unpublished essays from the year 1862 bear witness to the fruitfulness of this confrontation. The idea of philosopher and historian or, for that matter, prophet as the one who abstracts “von inneren Kreisen auf äußere” is put forth, while it is also claimed, in discrepancy with Emerson, that natural sciences hold the key position in disentangling the universal riddle and locating “das gemeinsame Zentrum aller Schwingungen” 2142

Emersonian emphasis on circles and centers had long lasting effects in Nietzsche’s texts. In Morgenröthe, for instance, one can read: ”Mein Auge, wie stark oder schwach es nun ist, sieht nur ein Stück weit, und in diesem Stück webe und lebe ich, diese Horizont-Linie ist mein nächstes grosses und kleines Verhängniss, dem ich nicht entlaufen kann.” At first blush, one is reminded of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s remark that the notion of ’horizon’ has had philosophical significance from Nietzsche onwards2143, but the continuation of the passage is, just now, more intriguing: ”Um jedes Wesen legt sich derart ein concentrischer Kreis, der einen Mittelpunct hat und der ihm eigenthümlich ist.” (M 117, KSA 3, 110; cf. N Sommer 1878 30 [94], KSA 8, 538.)

According to Richard Poirier, Nietzsche was most inspired by the essay ”Circles”. As Poirier sees it, the piece of writing amounted to the point that “liberation from one enclosing cultural discourse is to be achieved only by drawing another “circle” around it, all the while knowing that eventually it, too, will become an inhibition”. Any circle broken announces a “new circle which will ultimately hem life”. In his eyes, Emerson and Nietzsche were aware of their own utterances being circled by their respective cultural discourses: “To the very degree that what they want to say can be said, their language carries some degree of endorsement from the culture they live in, the culture they also resent”. In other words, their writing is “ephemeral”, because “the historical condition of language cannot without contradiction sustain what needs to be said”. 2144

This is a strong case made for the interconnection of Emerson and Nietzsche that, in addition to whatever other merits it has, succeeds in carrying it out without the usual stress on aesthetic kinship or shared tendency to poeticize what is natural. Yet, I would not stress so much the sense of inadequacy of language in, at least, Nietzsche’s case. Neither does one have to be happy about the way Poirier speaks about new circles of discourse as hemming life. Language and conceptuality may turn against vital
practices, but they can also share and improve living. However, Poirier points to the important issue of the dynamics of perspectives and their constraints, of which Emerson uses the notion of 'swift circumscription'.

I would like to call attention to a passage in a certain Nachlass note from the mid-1880's: “Das ganze europäische System der menschlichen Bestrebungen fühlt sich theils sinnlos, theils bereits “unmoralisch”’. Shortly afterwards, this much is added: “Die Anzeichen / Der europäische Nihilismus / Seine Ursache: die Entwerthung der bisherigen Werthe.” (N Herbst 1885 - Herbst 1886 2 [131], KSA 12, 131.) One can see that the first sentence contains a piece from Emerson I already cited from Nietzsche’s early book on Schopenhauer. “The system of human strivings” that the Emersonian great thinker was to subject to a subversion is now described as undergoing a nihilistic devaluation of values. As I read it, the great thinker can only be the one who strives to examine the process, even if, unavoidably, as a partaker to its acceleration. The great thinker cannot be the godsend one to singlehandedly bring about the devastating change, unless it is that the devastating change is conceived as a capacity to continue to conceptualize the turmoil, to see some sort of sense in all the more desperate and confused variety of struggling. On the other hand, if it is that it is more or less the very forms of seeing and establishing a meaning that have contributed to the strengthening of the nihilistic tendency, the conceptualizing can only happen in an intensely self-reflective manner, in a project of emancipation from emancipation.

In March 1887, Nietzsche wrote to his friend Franz Overbeck about his plans for the immediate future:

(KGB III/5, 49.)

One centner equals 50 kg. The pressure lay, then, with the weight of five tons on the speaker. (It was a misperception, taking Centner for Center, that lead me to stop at this passage, yet it taught me more of the wariness that can lead, in turn, to see how both of the notions are not that rare items in Nietzsche’s vocabulary.) In his late notes, both the “Wirkung der Wagnerschen Kunst” and “Wagner”, in general, are criticized for being centnerschwer (N Frühjahr-Sommer 1888 16 [37], KSA 13, 496-7) with its evident echo in the Zarathustrian stress on the weight and the camel (Z I “VddV”, KSA 4, 28-9) and the hostility toward the “Geist der Schwere” (Z III “GdS”, KSA 4, 241-5).
When Nietzsche discovered Turin, in the spring of 1888, he told of feeling himself more comfortable and more relaxed than perhaps ever before. The decreasing inner tension went together with the change of the environment. As he wrote, he was particularly glad over the large but quiet and shadowy heart of the city with its myriad of arcades allowing one to walk in peace and sheltered from the direct sunlight: "Gesammtausdehnung von 10 020 Meter (d.h. zwei Stunden gut zu marschiren)" (KGB III/5, April 1888, 301).

At this point, I would like to present my final criticism of Montcriol’s reading of Nietzsche. In his phrase, (Pascal’s and) Nietzsche’s aphoristic discourse is “a kingdom without the capital”. As a nomadic thinker, he disliked the “sedentarity of the city”. Where Socrates (who refused to quit the polis), Descartes (who preferred new towns), Leibniz (who recentered his monads along the lines of an urban planner) and Hegel (who placed the event of the spirit’s becoming self-conscious in the modern city) all reinforced the figure of the city, (Pascal and) Nietzsche was to “dissolve” it.  

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There is a point in this interpretation, yet it is fatally close to blurring the perspective into the Nietzschen rethinking of the city center as the heart of life in contemporary society. To be sure, Nietzsche spent much time in solitude beyond large centers and wrote a number of sentences expressing doubt and frustration over the phenomenon of the modern city. Yet, the philosophical significance of his Turin experience gets lost, if one views Nietzsche solely through his distance to cities. It is, namely, one of the best opportunities to appreciate his reconceiving of centrality.

Some eight months after the joyous report of the fine walking conditions, Nietzsche’s sanity, his “whole system”, crumbled down in Turin. Was his problem of an edifice where everything hangs together ever resolved or not, the pressure caused by the very idea of such a construction seemed to ease up right before the collapse. It is as though he stopped forcing his will through and, instead, let the weight attract his body toward the center of the earth.

In any case, Pier Paolo Pasolini once said that, in his beloved Italy, the realtä is “always eccentric” and “never centralist”2146. It may be that this is why Nietzsche fell in love with Turin, even though his observations on Europe’s future had been inclined to favor centralization. As it happens, in his notes from the mid-1870's, there are cautious remarks on the “centralisirenden Tendenzen” and “Centralisationsidee” in the “panhellenisch” Greece occasioned by the Persian military threat, and on the possibility of a centralization produced by more reflective and spiritual means (N Sommer 1875 6 [30], KSA 8, 110). May these ponderings be, as has proved to be typical of Nietzsche, ambivalent in their valuations, the Kulturbedeutung of the pre-centralized Greek polis is described, in the notes, as a happy combination of “Centrum und Peripherie” (N Frühling-Sommer 1875 5 [70], KSA 8, 60).
Thus, just perhaps, Nietzsche let Turin become his eccentric center with the long porticos forming continuous and concentrically vaulted arches overhead^2147^. Architecture had been, since the Romans, conceived as the art of constructing archs. While in building, these typically bow-bent, albeit diversely shaped and moulded, constructions were temporarily supported by what was called a “centering” or “centre”. It was usually a frame of woodwork, on which stones or bricks were arranged to, ultimately, support one another by mutual pressure and to sustain load and, thus, to make the support obsolete.^2148^  

As the construction of, say, an arcade advanced, centers were all the while deconstructed. One may remember Zarathustra speaking of the breaking “Gewölbe und Bogen” in a “Ringkämpfe”, as he expresses it as his “Brücke zur höchsten Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen nach langen Unwettern” that humans be “erlöst [...] von der Rache” as their *Tyrannen-Wahnsinn* (Z II “VdT”, KSA 4, 127-31.)

Similar interplay of constituents had been crucial for Nietzsche. He was extremely critical of any notion of ’oneness’, yet he was unable to endorse the nihilistic Wagnerian Wotan for its “Schwäche des deutschen Charakters” - “[...] er will zu vielerlei und nichts völlig bestimmt” - and endorsed Michelangelo’s “zürnenden Gott” with but “Einen Gedanken im Kopf” (N Winter 1880-1 8 [110], KSA 9, 406; cf. Ende 1880, 7 [11], 318). It was one of the innumerable *nota benes* of Nietzsche’s notebooks to pay attention to Hippolyte Taine’s praise for the “übermenschliche Größe” of Michelangelo’s “Conception” (N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [91], KSA 12, 223-4).

As far as I can see, it was Nietzsche’s mastery of the revolutionary reconception of philosophical conceptuality that made him alert to Michelangelo who once had written: “An excellent artist has no concept/ That could not be circumscribed on a single marble.”^2149^ For an eccentrically capable philosopher, too, there is no *concetto*, not even the one of ’nihilism’ signifying conceptlessness, that could not be circumscribed on a single *Lebenswerk*.

Gegen Turin ist Nichts einzuwenden: es ist eine herrliche und seltsam wohltuende Stadt. Das Problem, innerhalb der *besten* Quartiere einer Stadt, nahe, ganz nahe ihrem Centrum, eine Einsiedler-Ruhe, in ungeweih schönen und weiten Straßen zu finden - dies für Großstädte anscheinend unlösbare Problem ist hier gelöst. (KGB III/5, October 1888, 451.)

**Ecology of Conception**

According to Georges Poulet, circle is “the most constant” form of situating the self. Poulet, who has made an ambitious attempt to canvass the historical reverberations of this notion, asserts that its persistence is due to such things as “simplicity”, “perfection” and “ceaseless universal application”.

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What is important, in the unfolding of the discourse, is that one of its most powerful early exploiters and presumably Emerson’s main inspiration, Plato, already depicted the issue in a complex manner. In human being’s constitution, the soul for sure is the center, yet it is one that is spread out and put in a circular motion.\textsuperscript{2150}

Herder, for one, says that human being is “the central point of the circle [...] where all rays seem to converge”\textsuperscript{2151}. Emerson’s friend Coleridge, for another, claims that “man’s mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature”\textsuperscript{2152}.

Yet, Emerson himself already held that “[e]verything is medial. Moons are no more bounds to spiritual power than bat-balls”\textsuperscript{2153} and that nature “may be conceived of as a system of concentric circles”, yet with “dislocations”, a “sliding” surface to stand upon and “fugitive” words to detect\textsuperscript{2154}.

According to Gerhard Schmitt, the ’center’ may be taken to stand for the ego, the subject, the static being, whereas the ’periphery’ represents the deed, the predicate, the dynamic becoming. As Schmitt construes it, Nietzsche recognized it as a risk in one’s “contraction into an extensionless point” through a “dissimilating loss of the self to the outer world”.\textsuperscript{2155}

This is the question of \textit{Zusammenbruch} that was dealt with in chapter one (I.a). It can now be further clarified with the help of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari who illustrate what they call the ’desiring-machine’ as follows: “subject spreads itself out along the entire circumference of the circle, the center of which has been abandoned by the ego.”\textsuperscript{2156} To support this stance, Deleuze and Guattari quote the following passage from Pierre Klossowski’s \textit{Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux}: “The centrifugal forces do not flee the center forever, but approach it once again, only to retreat it yet again: such is the nature of the violent oscillations that overwhelm an individual so long as he seeks only his own center and is incapable of seeing the circle of which he himself is a part; for if these oscillations overwhelm him, it is because each of them corresponds to an individual other than the one he believes himself to be, from the point of view of the unlocatable center. As a result, an identity is essentially fortuitous, and a series of individualities must be undergone by each of these oscillations, so that as a consequence the fortuitousness of this or that particular individuality will render all of them necessary.”\textsuperscript{2157}

One is reminded of James Joyce’s conception of the mythico-literary Odysseus as embodying the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies illustrating the home-abandoning and home-seeking dimensions in the great voyager’s character\textsuperscript{2158}. What might be interesting to interrogate, in these cases, is whether the notion of ’abandonment’ is or is not at odds with Derrida’s dictum against the idea of a loss of center. Be that as it may, it seems that Klossowski’s and Deleuze/Guattari’s strategy, at least, is to get rid of the
haunting oppositionality of center and non-center by holding on to the oscillation and the thought of circles wider than the eventually unintelligible circuit of the self-conscious ego.\textsuperscript{2159}

As it happens, the notions of the ‘centripetal’ and the ‘centrifugal’ formed, early on, a part of the attempts at making sense of cognition, or the process of perceiving and the general economy of the (embodied) mind. In his 1903 account of the situation in the field, the Kant and Nietzsche scholar Rudolf Eisler referred to the perennial psychological explanation in terms of

i) sensory or centripetal event leading to the ii) emotional or intracentral event which, in turn, causes the iii) volitional or the centrifugal event. It was through such critics as William James that the scheme was reconceived as follows: i) centripetal sensory event, ii) centrifugal innervation and iii) centripetal secondary sensory event. Still another modification was necessitated, so Eisler, by the need to question the presupposition of immediacy: “it is dealt, here, not with "immediate experience" but "conceiving" [\textit{Auffassung}], not, as the philologists would say, with "text" but "interpretation"”.\textsuperscript{2160} In a book where, shortly hereafter, Nietzsche’s conceptual elaborations are favorably treated\textsuperscript{2161}, one is sufficiently warranted to assume that it is precisely to him that the philologist reference is pointed.

Eisler’s overview of the contemporary psycho-physiological discussion could perhaps be interpreted in terms of a Kant scholar paying serious attention to both the “realistic” dimension in the great critical philosopher and the later philosophico-experimental studies. Although he did not explicitly introduce Nietzsche with any such emphasis, Eisler makes it easier for today’s observers to appreciate Nietzsche’s connection with the post-Kantian situation.

In any case, it is important to see that Nietzsche’s speciality, in these questions, consisted of two rather different emphases. His stress on language was one thing. His interest in the physiological thought experiments was another. Both of them were part of a series of tentatives in which the philosophical and the common sense conception of the self or the intellectual powers were reconsidered.

Charles E. Scott has done much to chart the peculiarly Nietzschean dynamics. The key notion is ‘self-overcoming’ as ‘movements of recoil’, including the instances of “\textit{rebound, falling back under the impact of a force}”, “\textit{quail and wince}” and “\textit{coiling again}”. The clue, in turn, is to study how a given thought “\textit{functions} in Nietzsche’s writing”. According to Scott, one learns, from such a study, about the “oscillating rhythm”, in which “centers fade out, lose their magnetism” only in order to recover the identity again. This “movement without center” is to say that “[t]here is no center, no anchoring ballast”, but “the generative process” of decenterings and recenterings.\textsuperscript{2162}

One might propose that con-centration is needed to make different and even diametrically opposing
forces hang together and contribute to a common goal. Ex-centration, in turn, is needed to allow and foster multiplicity, variance and even incessant oscillation of these forces and their amenability to strivings to a number of different goals. As such, the dynamics of decentralization and recentralization is another indication of what I have been calling Nietzsche’s radicalized balance.

It seems to be this very dynamics that his writings seek to chart in the constant remarks of something’s centralizing that which tends to decentralize. It is, varyingy, arts (N Winter 1872-73 23 [14], KSA 7, 545; Anfang-Frühjahr 1874 32 [45], 768; N Frühjahr 1884 25 [409], KSA 11, 119), philosophy (N Sommer-Herbst 1873 29 [211], KSA 7, 714), faith (N Sommer 1880 4 [261], KSA 9, 165), affects (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [73], KSA 9, 469), pain (N Frühjahr-Sommer 1883 7 [239], KSA 10, 315; N Frühjahr 1884 25 [391], KSA 11, 114), ascetism (N Frühjahr 1884, KSA 11, 18), role (N Frühjahr 1884 25 [374], KSA 11, 110), nationalism (N Herbst 1887 9 [165], KSA 12, 433), classicism (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [46], KSA 13, 240) that are said to concentrate or centralize the culture or its member and to maintain the power or potency in tension.

One of Nietzsche’s notes has it that “[d]as höchste Todesziel der Menschheit auszudenken” would be “die Aufgabe” on which to “concentrirren” instead of the alternative of “leben, um zu leben” (N Herbst 1880 6 [281], KSA 9, 270). Later, Nietzsche referred to his own “Zukunftssorge (nämlich um die Ermöglichung meines Hauptwerks, in dem sich das Problem und die Aufgabe meines Lebens concentrirt)” (KGB III/5, Oktober 1887, 167-8). He would also write to his sister: ”Nur brauche ich eine Art von Besinnung und Concentration, die nicht ihres Gleichen hat - von wegen der berühmten “Lebensaufgabe”, zu der ich bisher, wie ich fürchte, gar nicht gepaßt habe” (KGB III/5, März 1888, 282).

Already in August 1883, Nietzsche had said that “ich bin eine so concentrirte Natur, daß es jetzt der äußersten und extremsten Mittel bedarf, um mich abzuziehn” (KGB III/1, 426). Written shortly afterwards, there is a note by him that carries the title “Meine Erneuerungen.” and, underneath it, several things are enlisted. The item number one reads: ”Mein Anstreben gegen den Verfall und die zunehmende Schwäche der Persönlichkeit. Ich duchte ein neues Centrum.” (N Winter 1883-84 24 [28], KSA 11, 661.)

At this point, it is evident that there is something about the incident of Nietzsche’s being labeled as “eccentric” that requires further articulation. He appears to have entertained a notion of one’s proper center out of which certain misguided steps, in life, might lead. Such an impression is supported by one of his earlier notes where the question is posed, whether it is that Denkfreiegeisterei and artistic creativity, both encouraging “Sich-verhehlen, Sich-vergessen, Sich-verleugnen”, tend to take one out
over the line and throw one “aus Centrum” (N Frühjahr 1880 3 [140], KSA 9, 93).

Should one be interested in an exegesis of his utterances or not, one may still note how he had, already much earlier, spoken of his immediate circle of friends as “Verführten, die in Schopenhauer ihr geistiges Centrum gefunden haben” (KGB I/2, Juni 1868, 285). In the light of this, the later conversation between Rohde and Nietzsche shows something of a continuity of the discourse of centers.

As it happens, the notion of center once appears in Nietzsche’s early writings with an exciting linkage to the issue of “strings attached”. Rephrasing the point about Schopenhauer’s centrality, Nietzsche writes as follows: ”Ich stehe jetzt wirklich in einem Centrum von Schopenhauerischen Fäden, in alle Welt ausgespannt” (KGB II/1, September 1869, 60). The sentence could be read as expressly anti-nihilistic in the sense that it states how, at least for his young admirers, Schopenhauer’s philosophy provides the crucial strings and fibres that tie one to the reality and prevent the condition of ne hilum.

In Der Fall Wagner, Brahms is mentioned as the composer for “die Sehnsüchtigen, die Unbefriedigten”. Those who tend to long, long for him because “[e]r ist zu wenig Person, zu wenig Mittelpunkt...” The point is that such as he is, the longing or the dissatisfied can understand him: ”Das verstehen die “Unpersönlichen”, die Peripherischen, - sie lieben ihn dafür.” (W “ZN”, KSA 6, 47-8.)

Before concluding that here is a neat piece of a Nietzschean text relying on the opposition between center and periphery, one may observe the way the question seems to be about somebody’s possessing “too little” of that which makes a midpoint. In this respect, the relationship between periphery and center could be construed not as a contradiction but as a continuum. For another thing, in the highly polemical context, Brahms stands for an attractive figure with some power to win friends in music circles. It appears to be a part of the book’s strategy to go along with this counter-movement against the Wagner vogue. Ultimately, however, doubt is casted on the promoted rival center, too. More important, the stress is on one’s being more or less Mittelpunkt.

One is taken back to the dynamics of conceptual change and nihilism. In Nietzsche’s lengthiest sketch for one of the projected “Wille zur Macht” books, there is talk of the “allgemeinsten Zeichen der modernen Zeit”. This most general sign of the times is said to be the belief in the “Würde des Menschen” and in the “moralischen Werthe” as “cardinale Werthe”. The point is, however, to say that these beliefs are becoming increasingly unbelievable, matters of a deliberate attempt at having faith. What is at stake is the situation after human beings have for a long time felt themselves “als Mittelpunkt und Tragödien-Held des Daseins überhaupt”. (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [3], KSA 12, 254-5.)
All in all, it would seem that modern people are forced to concentrate on themselves. Ironically, Nietzsche’s bad health promoted such interrogation: the philosopher felt free to refer to his severe headache, or “Gehirnleiden”, as a *Centralwirkung* capable of torturing the whole body (KGB II/1, Januar 1876, 133). A notebook fragment reads as follows:

NB. Wenn das *Centrum des ‘Bewußtseins’* auch nicht mit dem *physiologischen Centrum* zusammenfällt, so wäre doch möglich, daß dennoch das *physiologische Centrum* auch das *psychische* Centrum ist.

Die *Intellektualität des Gefühls* (Lust und Schmerz) d.h. es ist *beherrscht* von jenem Centrum aus.

(N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [56], KSA 12, 205-6.)

There is a double point to be appreciated here. Just as the allegedly spiritual or mental ‘consciousness’ may be amenable to physiological analysis, the allegedly bodily or irrational sphere of sensations may be taken to already involve cognitive processes. Of course, this means that the mental is physiologically reassessed and vice versa.

It seems, then, that, in a sense, the psychological and the physiological are one, yet they also seem to preserve their integrity (see GM II 3, KSA 5, 296; AC14, KSA 6, 181). Anything consciously conceived “ist das letzte Glied einer Kette” (N Herbst 1885 - Frühjahr 1886 I [61], KSA 12, 26), yet even the feeling of pain is said to be “ein *Erzeugniß* des Intellektes”, in the sense that “das Central-Organ das Verhältniß des reizes zum gesamten Organismus constatirt” and makes it known as pain (N Sommer-Herbst 1884 27 [7], KSA 11, 276).

The dynamics of the physiological (or the biological) and the psychological counts more than either of them does separately. A characteristically ecological model is at work here. What could be the most instructive formulation for this reciprocal enlightenment is the one, according to which the consciousness is separated from the “biologischen Centrum des Individuums”. Yet, as it coordinates more and more “‘Eindrücke’“; it takes part in “ein Prozeß, der sich vertieft, verinnerlicht” and “beständig nähert jenem Centrum”. (N Ende 1886 - Frühjahr 1887 7 [9], KSA 12, 295.) In other words, whatever is conceived as the *Bewußtsein* does not necessarily have to be thrown overboard. It needs to be reconceived in a dynamic relationship between the unconscious forces it tends to repress. In the happy case, given a sufficient exposure to variation, the conscious ‘center’ of the human system may coalesce with its dynamically changing biological ‘center’.

At this point, it is instructive to consult Nietzsche’s younger contemporary, the philosophizing physicist Ernst Mach, who expressed his frustration on the lively post-Cartesian speculation of the location of
personal identity. He spoke of the “custom to handle the unanalyzed self-complex as an undivided unity” by proposing, first, the nervous system, secondly, the brain, and thirdly some “point [in the brain]” as the “seat of the soul”. From Mach’s perspective, opinions so “crude” as these were but a part of the pitiful attempt to preserve or “rescue the psychic unity” and to refuse to work out a more promising view of the mental phenomena as somehow “hanging together”.

Nietzsche, too, was interested in getting rid of the aged conceptions of soul and seeking to picture organisms in an incessantly transforming state of complicated interdependence. He might have been more tolerant of different attempts at relocating. But the more crucial difference is that, unlike Nietzsche, Mach, in his sensualist bias, did not think that observation of the bodily functions was constrained, as any observations, by conceptual restrictions. Mach’s position is clearer and internally more consistent, but Nietzsche’s insistence on the always already conceptual nature of perceptions is more in accord with the late modern notion of the theory-laden.

Nietzsche’s ecological emphasis was placed on the way the forces in the environment must constrain the human organism, too, since “was um mich wohnt, das wohnt sich bald auch ein” (N Herbst 1884 - Anfang 1885 29 [56], KSA 11, 349). Moreover, en environing forces were to be seen as equal to internal forces, Blutumlauf finding its correlate in Erd- und Sonnenlauf (N Frühjahr 1881 - Herbst 1881 11 [184], KSA 9, 513). The ecological model also pertains to the analysis of nihilism in terms of a reciprocity between personal choices and the fact that “das gegenwärtige Europa hat noch keine Ahnung davon, um welche furchtbaren Entscheidungen mein ganzes Wesen sich dreht, und an welches Rad von Problemen ich gebunden bin” (KGB III/5, April 1887, 57-8).

Yet, just as these forces were capable of constraining and revising all conceptualizations, the perception of them was always already conceptual, since the “Empfindung unter Beihülfe des Intellects zu Stande kommt” (N Frühling-Sommer 1877 22 [58], KSA 8, 389). Rather than to cherish the make believe of reaching any meaningful contact with the objects of observation that would be purged of conceptual elements, it is the Nietzschean choice to opt for the chance of viewing the interaction itself, the event as somehow conceptual and, thus, inseparable from the human mode of interpreting it.

The critical implication of all this is that, on the one hand, any explanations claiming the ultra-conceptual nature of all interaction can be attacked for ignoring the way experience regulates and tests conceptualizing, while, on the other hand, any explanations claiming the non-conceptual opportunity can be fought because they neglect the way conceptions accompany experience.

This is not only so many things reconceptualized. Since the things in question are the ones supporting
the event of conceptualization, this is more like conceptuality reconceptualized.

In a way, Nietzsche emphasized Verkörperung des Geistes (MA I 543, KSA 2, 328) only as much as the “Reichtum an seelischen Erfahrungen […] vom Größten bis zum Kleinsten und Raffinirtesten” (N Sommer 1886 - Herbst 1887 5 [79], KSA 12, 219), and both of them only in order to surmount their separation. In a sense Nietzsche’s project was a combination of going along with Schopenhauer against Kant’s excessive faith in immutable categories, going along with Kant against Schopenhauer’s hopes for a direct access to reality and taking more seriously (and more humorously) than either Kant or Schopenhauer the role of language in conceiving.

Randall E. Havas passes on the sharp remark that, from Nietzsche’s standpoint, “no philosophical sense can be made of the idea or something lying outside the bounds of language”. Hence, “philosophical insistence on a thing-in-itself gives voice to fear of confinement - confinement to the circle of our representations, to our opinions, our judgments, our interpretations”. What it all boils down to is, in Havas’s view, that in the representationalist stance grounded in the inaccessible Ding an sich, our linkage to the world depends on “something completely independent of us”, which results in a situation where neither the world nor the perceiver make sense.2164

In interrogating the central powers of thinking, Nietzsche came up with results that may be said to be revolutionary. The paradox is that it is he, probably more than any other, who prepared the view of consciousness as more circumstantial than central, more a spin-off than any original center of authority. His thoughts seemed to kiss goodbye thinking and discursive acts and welcome accidental and casual forces. Yet, as I have been busy elucidating, Nietzsche’s thinking rotates round the axis of the concept of centrality and, in so doing, is capable of renewing this concept. And, since it is so central a concept, what is renewed through it is the philosophical concept of conceptuality.

All in all, Nietzsche’s criticism of the intellectual centralization may be divided into an internal and an external criticism, if it be remembered that both of these were instrumental in doing away any such divisions and in developing the more ecological model of an organism’s life. One of Nietzsche’s ways to explore self-consciousness was to take the lead from Schopenhauer’s insistence on the importance of the blind instincts and bodily drives and to investigate the way reason could be explained by a multi-center interplay or conflict of forces. Hence, the thought and writing experiments for an overall account of what is taking place in terms of such concepts as Kraftcentren (e.g. N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [311], KSA 9, 560), Macht-Centren (N Herbst 1885 43 [2], KSA 11, 701), herrschaftliche Centren (N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [73], KSA 13, 36) and “Bewegungsansätze und -Centren, von wo aus der Wille um sich greift” (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [98], KSA 13, 274; cf. 14 [29], 232).
Another way was to start from the way the circulation of blood and nutrition was important for the considerations of, say, the relationship between sleep and wakefulness (see MA I 13, 32-5), it only speaks in favor of the need to deconstruct the dichotomy. Whereas the nervous system was the crucial lead to the internal dimension, natural cycles were predominant in the external one.

Natural cycles were important in naturalizing religious and ideological patterns. The point is made, in one of Nietzsche’s books, that the systematization of holy ceremonies was needed to organize the worship so that “man den günstigen Verlauf des gesamten Ganges der Natur, namentlich des grossen Jahreskreislaufs, sich durch einen entsprechenden Verlauf eines Proceduren-Systems zu verbürgen meint” (MA I 111, KSA 2, 115). One could say that here is the so-called positivist Nietzsche of the second phase attacking the so-called mythologist Nietzsche of the first stage. Yet, Dionysus’s being (as Schmitt insisted) something “cyclical” does not necessarily mean its being stuck with a body of legend only. As a divinity of the earth, its initial recourse is to natural cycles, recurring series of successive events related to the changes in the constellations of heavenly bodies running their pattern, all of which was appropriated by people adapting to their physical and social environments.

Incidentally, the quarrel about centrality is effectively dealt with by having a look at Nietzsche’s early writing on the pre-Socratic philosophers. In Geburt, namely, sense is made of music “inmitten aller unserer Cultur” with the help of Heracleitus. The key passage has it that, in terms of Cultur, Bildung, Civilisation “sich alle Dinge in doppelter Kreisbahn bewegen”, that is, from the Dionysian to the Dionysian. (GT 19, KSA 1, 127-8.) The Dionysian centrality and circularity is thus proposed as the concept capable of accounting for the cultural dynamics of the Greeks.

Nietzsche was to study carefully the early Greek philosophers’ conceptions of nature and the world. In his invitation to Anaxagoras’s Vorstellungsbezirk, it is related how the Greek conceptualized the “Kosmos des Werdens” by starting from “bewegten Kreis”. This approach is preferred to the Parmenidian alternative of depicting “das wahrhaft Seiende wie eine ruhende todte Kugel”. Anaxagoras succeeds in putting the “Nous in’s Rollen”, in “Schwingung”, which results in bringing about natural, unmythical and unreligious, developments. (N “DpitZdG” 16-9, KSA 1, 864-72.)

One may also think of Thales who held that water is the basis of all nature. According to Nietzsche’s early text, this putatively first philosopher sought to “den Gesammtklang der Welt in sich nachtönen zu lassen und ihn aus sich herauszustellen in Begriffen”. Nowadays, it could be said that ‘hydrological cycle’ or the “continuous circulation of water through evaporation and condensation” has been one of the first examples of the type of explanation that appeal to a “series of physical or chemical changes which return to a starting point” and serve to attack the “mysterious transmutation postulated by
alchemy”. Analogically, there has been talk of the ‘oxygen cycle’ or ‘carbondioxide cycle’ in the context of photosynthesis, ‘nitrogen cycle’ in agriculture and ‘citric acid cycle’ in biochemistry.\(^{2166}\) (N “DpitZdG” 3, KSA 1, 813-7.)

Before moving to my last case of centrality and circularity that can shed more light on this question of the scientific and the mythical, I shall offer one more illustration of Nietzsche’s reconceiving of the event of conception.

Erwin Rohde praised, in a letter to Nietzsche, \textit{Fröhliche Wissenschaft} as exemplifying what is really real in its author. However, he says that “at first” the “new way of apprehension enthusiastically drowning in sobriety” had seemed to him “willed” as if acquired with biting the lip and pushed through by an “eccentric decision”. As for himself, Rohde told about having, “at last”, started his own major research project, which was to counteract the lousy academic splitting work by focusing on a \textit{Mittelpunct} “of thoughts magnetically attracting everything individual”. Despite his critique of academic convention, Rohde could not help but add that “this happy science does not always seem to \textit{me} as science, yet it becomes ever freer and happier”.\(^{2167}\)

Writing back to him, Nietzsche expresses his joy over Rohde’s engagement in “einer concentriereinden \textit{Haupt-Arbeit}”. He seems not appalled by the point about the scientific: he says that the title of the book is meant to denote “nur […] die gaya scienza der Troubadours”. Nor does he simply reject the “eccentricity” in a way that one would expect by the \textit{Centralblatt} affair. He admits that the reference to his eccentric decision was “vollkommen \textit{wahr}”. But he goes on to add: ”Aber - \textit{wer} war es doch, der sich da \textit{entschloß}? - Gewiß, liebster Freund, es war die \textit{erste} Natur: \textit{sie wollte} “leben”. - “Nietzsche explains that his “\textit{zweite Natur}” is there not to destroy (\textit{vernichten}) but to tolerate, endure or sustain (\textit{ertragen}) the fatal, lethal “first nature”. (KGB III/1, Dezember 1882, 291-2.)

What had seemed less rational, or even off-balance and weird, from the point of view of serious, sane and stable efforts, had all the while had a rationality of its own. Seeming lack in one’s balance of mind was needed to secure one’s capacity for later, more serious and more sensible efforts. While Rohde also suggested that his friend be a \textit{Tausendkünstler der Überwindungen}\(^{2168}\) (see also KGB III/1, Dezember 1882, 285), he could be taken to have meant something along the lines of ’swingometrics’ or ’brinkmanship’. In any case, Nietzsche had a highly personal sense of the way health and condition involve enduring and overcoming hardship and reaching ever new standpoints. It was his lifetime philosophical task to study this.
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What one commentator admires as a movement of thought is for another commentator just plain inconsistency. Where someone would propose that Nietzsche’s ingeniously dialectical or admirably freewheeling or relentlessly critical philosophizing deserves all appreciation, somebody else would speak of his sheer incapability of defending any position and the resulting vacillation between different extremes. Thus, there is a critic saying that Nietzsche’s thought incessantly “fluctuates” between “the rhetorical registers of optimism and pessimism”, between the “healthy” scenery of Caspar Friedrich and the “pathological” visions of Delacroix.\(^{2169}\)

In order to convincingly argue for Nietzsche’s perspectivist circling, one has to take into consideration the more traditional problems involved and the readily available suspicions toward any new treatments. In particular, the point about the philosophical concept of ’circle’ needs to be related to the philosophical malaise of ’circular reasoning’. Aristotle maintained that, while everything is well and fine with cosmic circularity and geometrical circularity, one has to disapprove circular thought or circular mode of justification. Despite this initial support for the linear alternatives, circular reasoning has continued to develop in Western thinking, through the contributions of, say, skeptics, St. Thomas and Vico. Later, it was Fichte who held that “knowledge is an essentially circular process”. Indeed, it is said that circularity was “widespread in the entire nineteenth-century German philosophical tradition”. Most famously, Hegel came to think that “knowledge in the full sense can be attained through a system which is circular”.\(^{2170}\)

I am not trying to nail Nietzsche into this tradition. Nor do I want to discuss at length, whether Nietzsche and Hegel are to be combined for having “conceive[d] of being in terms of circular movement”, or to be separated because the former’s “individualised, multi-faceted, perspectival view of events” differs from the latter’s “rounded, total view of history”\(^{2171}\). While my preference is more on the latter option, I have been trying to show how the kind of oppositional setting is a weak tool in coming to terms with Nietzsche’s (as it is also with Hegel’s) philosophy.

What the history of circularity may yield is the idea that reading Nietzsche’s utterances on circles, one does well to remember the largely unfamiliar dimension of the philosophical tradition and of Nietzsche’s immediate philosophical environment. Reading him, one might consider joining Sartre and state that “it is the very nature of consciousness to exist “in a circle””, that “[e]very conscious existence exists as consciousness of existing”\(^{2172}\). But one would still have to ponder, which forms of circular reasoning are acceptable, which circles less than vicious, which cycles wide enough to avoid assuming the soundness of the defended claims.
Indeed, at the face of a fragment of Nietzsche praising the logically consequential argumentation (N Frühjahr 1888 14 [183], KSA 13, 370), one could not go on asserting that there is, in his opinion, nothing wrong with sloppy inferences. Moreover, there is a note about Cirkelschluß having to do with anthropomorphist aspects in the Kantian constructionism (N Sommer 1872 - Anfang 1873 19 [125], KSA 7, 459; cf. also N Sommer-Herbst 1884 26 [309], KSA 11, 232). My proposal is that his texts encourage reasoning on reasoning and for this specific reason they are interesting from the point of view of circularity. It is, in particular, Günter Abel’s work on Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘circle of interpretation’, as well as Hans Lenk’s criticism of Abel, that have, in my view, greatly enhanced the understanding of the issue at hand.\textsuperscript{2173}

In his recent book, Gerhard Schmitt writes on Zyklus as a persistent “figure of thought” in both Nietzsche and Jung. He mentions Lou von Salomé as the one who first paid attention to Nietzsche’s fondness of that figure. Klages and Jaspers, too, have spoken of circles with respect to Nietzsche’s exceptionality. And in 1968, Manfred Ackermann’s dissertation concentrated on Das Kreissymbol im Werk Nietzsches. Schmitt now affirms that “the symbol of the circle can be counted as a steady, even a fundamental element of his thought”. Moreover, “Nietzsche’s writing”, in all of its forms, “can always be conceived, at the level of the symbolic, as a struggle for the integrity [Unversehrtheit] of the circle”. “Nietzsche’s achievement” is, for Schmitt, to be seen in the way he detected the danger of the circle being broken “in socio-cultural as well as in psychic dimensions”.\textsuperscript{2174}

In the words of Julian Young, “Nietzsche is, of course, the famous philosopher of the circle”. Without going to the details of interpreting Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘eternal recurrence’ he claims that, at least from the viewpoint of aesthetics, Nietzsche’s philosophy, “in the end, return[s] to its starting point”. Young comes, right after these words, to second thoughts and writes as follows: “It may be felt, however, that this foisting of a circular philosophy upon the philosopher of the circle is altogether too neat.”\textsuperscript{2175}

Granting the delicate piece of self-criticism, I would still say that the “of course” part of Young’s judgment remains questionable. Perhaps it could be thought that the epithet “philosopher of the circle” refers to a sustained philosophical effort to study circularity from a plurality of angles.

The most decisive event preceding Nietzsche’s efforts was the Copernican revolution carried out in Kant’s critical philosophy. The American philosopher, Ralph Barton Parry, once put the point about the novel necessity of all thinking - that whatever is known is related to the consciousness of some knower - in terms that are now be connected with a specific moral vice. He spoke of the “Ego-Centric Predicament”.\textsuperscript{2176}
Kant’s own definitions concerning self-consciousness, or Apperzeption, focused on the synthetic nature of the cogito, or Ich-denke. By these terms, it is meant that, in each and every cognitive act, there occurs a reaffirmation of self-sameness and identity in the face of representational plurality.2177. Schopenhauer, on his part, came to rephrase the, for him, questionable point of his predecessor as follows: "In drawing together [zusammenfassen] Kant’s utterances, we will find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is also the extensionless center of the spheres of all our representations, the lines of which converge to it”. Schopenhauer spoke also of “the subject of knowing”, “the correlate of all representations”, “the focal point” of all “cerebral activity”.2178

One may remember how one of Schopenhauer’s disciples, Ludvig Wittgenstein came to speak of solipsism as involving a conception of a self that “shrinks to a point without extension” and has “the reality coordinated with it”2179. As for Nietzsche, he was worried about his philosophical friend Heinrich Romundt’s becoming a mystic: "Klarheit was nie seine Sache, Welterfahrung auch nicht”. In Nietzsche’s words, what was troubling, in Romundt’s case, was the way he “grübelt in unheimlicher Weise über den Anfang der Empfindung, synthetische Einheit der Apperception - dafür behüte uns unser Heiland Jesus Christ.” (KGB II/3, März 1874, 211.)

Despite this caution, however, self-consciousness and centralization are, unwearyingly, either in the sense of “bringing to” and “proceeding from” or of “condensing by concentrating” and “disintegrating by disseminating”, conceptually worked up in Nietzsche’s texts. In a sense, the problematic echoes the way Louis Althusser described the basics of the Hegelian phenomenology, where consciousness is a “circle of circles” with “but one center” that solely determines it” and in a desperate need of “circles other than itself, decentered circles”.2180

In fact, Althusser came to work more on the problematic later on, as he specified his critique of the “juridico-ideological notion of the subject” made into the prime concept of “bourgeois philosophy” all the way from Descartes via Kant to Husserl. In particular, Althusser condemns “the idealist category of the “Subject”, as Origin, Essence and Cause, responsible in its interiority of all the determinations of the exterior “Object””. As he sees it, there cannot be, for dialectic materialism, for Marxism, any subject “as absolute Center”. Moreover, to speak with Lucien Sève about an “ex-Centration of the Essence” is, according to Althusser, only to assume a center: with no Center in the first place, there can be no “ex-centration”.2181

Nietzsche was not to be saved from considerations concerning self-consciousness or whatever alternatives there were for the central processing unit. How could he ever had, since, in the words of a fragment, “[d]em ganzen Umkreis der modernen Seele umlaufen, in jedem ihrer Winkel gesessen zu
haben - mein Ehrgeiz, meine Tortur und mein Glück” (N Herbst 1887 9 [177], KSA 12, 440). And it was only about the philosopher’s torturous runaround with the subject, it was just as much about the elusive subject running away from philosophy: “Subjekt springt herum” (N Herbst 1880 6 [70], KSA 9, 212). Finally, there is the decisive point about decentering the philosophical 'subject'. Nietzsche’s notes contain the insight to the effect that the “Sphäre eines Subjektes” is “beständig wachsend oder sich vermindern - der Mittelpunkt des Systems sich beständig verschiebend” (N Herbst 1887, 9 [98], KSA 12, 391).

Even though Nietzsche regarded Romundt’s speculations on the Kantian 'synthetic unity of apperception’ as “uncanny” - the very word for the arrival of nihilism - , he was himself to attempt at some clarity on these points. He did this by casting doubt on the philosophical reason as involving an “Einbildung der Vernunft”, a center whose “Centralisation ist gar keine so vollkommene” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [132], KSA 9, 490). In other words, reason that was supposed to fully conceptualize the world was itself to be taken under conceptual criticism.

It is in this context that one may again consider John Sallis’s (see I.a, IV.a.1 & V.b.2) doubts as to the point of speaking about conceptualizing with respect to Nietzsche. As Sallis sees it, Zarathustra is deliberately non-conceptual and in consonance with Nietzsche’s experience of nihilism as the 'destruction of logos’ or the shattering of concepts. Quite distinctly, Sallis speaks about “the breakdown of the circuit of reflective thought which philosophy strives to establish in the midst of human existence”. The end of “philosophical idealism” is the end of the “thought thinking itself”. This is, according to Sallis, the crucial import of Nietzsche’s philosophy stemming from “the nihilistic situation” the experience of which “determined the entire course which his life and thought were to take”.

I have already specified my view of Sallis’s basic tenets. Having been critical to his resistance to the notion of conceptualization, I may as well repeat here that I see his elucidations as very skilful indeed. It is the practice of “thinking the thinking” that I am here, contrary to Sallis’s opinion, at pains to ascribe to Nietzsche. Even if it be concluded that Nietzsche’s philosophy comes close to destroying the chance of “conceiving the conceiving”, one ought to appreciate the extent to which it is dedicated to these very attempts.

Now, Zarathustra likens child’s innocence to “ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine erste Bewegung” (Z “VddV”, KSA 4, 31). A notebook entry, from the same period, applies the image of a wheel for a human being as “eine neue Kraft” (N November 1882 - Februar 1883 5 [1], KSA 10, 207).

The notion of ‘force’ implies that cycles have their bearings on physical hypotheses and thought.
experiments, too. A notable case is Nietzsche’s reading of the materialist Vogt. In his notes of 1881, there are reflections on, say, the nature of time in terms of movement and rest, successions, juxtapositions, continuums and geometry of circles. Moreover, there are meditations on the nature of ‘force’ and the relationship between mechanism and hazard. These relate to the “gleichförmigen Kugelwesen” as well as Kreis, Kreisform, Kreisförmigkeit, Kreislauf or Kreisprozeß of all things (alles Bestehende, das All) and deviations from the uniformity in terms of difference, plurality, disorder, exceptions. (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881, esp. 11 [281] & [305] & [308] & [311]-[313], KSA 9, 549 & 559-62.)

These concerns did not vanish. Nietzsche’s criticisms of the “Tyrannie des Auges und Getastes” with respect to the illegitimately “absoluten Begriff “Atom” und “Individuum” were a part of an attempt to do away with atomary thinking and to mock all kinds of efforts to substantially visualize matter. (N Herbst 1885 43 [2], KSA 11, 701.)

As is obvious, the problematic of the center and circle is by no means open for solely psychocritical, aesthetical or ethnological debates. Already the notion of centripetal/fugal reminds one of a mechanic device known as the whirling-table. A modern extension of this machine is best approached by consulting Nigel Calder who recapitulates an important instance of the Einsteinian relativism as follows: “Another way of imitating gravity is by rotation, which is a special form of acceleration. Even at a constant speed, the rim of a rotating object is continuously accelerating towards the hub, while going sideways quickly enough to remain at a fixed distance from it.”

Calder goes on: “The ability of potential astronauts to withstand the g-forces of their profession is tested by putting them in a centrifuge - a fearsome merry-go-round in which they whirl at a high rate and feel the g-forces acting outwards. This ‘centrifugal force’ is indistinguishable from strong gravity, except in so far as the passenger may feel giddy. And scientists who propose building giant settlements in orbit around the Earth promise to provide one g at the perimeter; instead of being weightless, objects will seem to behave ‘normally’. In the spacetime diagram, the world-line of a person in a centrifuge travels in a helix around the world-line of the hub of the centrifuge. Because the direction of his world-line is continually changing, he feels the continuous acceleration.”

With the help of examples such as this, Calder endeavors to clarify modern physics of four dimensions and black holes, all of which opposes visualization. A crucial one, for the present purposes, is the “spaceship with beacons arranged to give off light in every direction”. Suppose that such a vehicle travels somewhere beyond the gravitation of greater heavenly bodies: “its light-bubble will surround it equally” and, being unable to beat the speed of light, it “lies dead-centre in the midst of the light-
bubble” with its future contained in it. Suppose then the spacecraft entering under the gravity of a massive body. What happens is that the force “displaces the light-bubble off-centre” and affects the possible futures of the travelers. If the gravitation was caused by a black hole from which no light ever escapes, spaceship “just crossing the dire perimeter at the surface” of the hole would be “trapped for ever”. Light from the beacons would “travel rapidly towards the center of the black hole” leaving the vehicle “completely off-centre with respect to the light-bubble”. What was time (potential future), becomes space (inevitable direction).\textsuperscript{2184}

The author moves on to picture a black hole “spinning on its axis” with a “nightmarish carousel”, or the “ergosphere”, as a “buffer zone” on its surface. In this “eddying of space”, all things “whirl around the black hole at high speed” and “revolutions are obligatory”. Any light takes on the direction of rotation. On the level of the Earth’s gravitation, one can, as Calder explains, try and detect some such effect “with a high-quality gyroscope spinning in a spacecraft that is orbiting the Earth. The axis of the gyroscope ought to swivel at a very slow rate, corresponding to one full turn in twenty-five million years.” Needless to say, research on all this requires highly sophisticated arrangements, such as virtually perfectly round balls or gyros, in satellites, with suitable techniques to set them spinning as well as controlling measures to correct any deviations from faultless orbits.\textsuperscript{2185}

These fascinating post-Einsteinian macro physical challenges could be compared to related developments and tests in micro physics. What I have in mind is gyrotrone research. A common problem in experimenting with such high tech equipment is that of misalignment. The hollow electron beams, in a cavity, ought to be placed concentrically around the resonator axis but deviations from symmetry occur. Eccentric electron beams present difficulties for estimating the performance of a gyrotrone.\textsuperscript{2186}

I am not reviewing these things for the sole purpose that Nietzsche was, generally, interested in the physical research of his time\textsuperscript{2187} and, especially, in the lessons that they might give to an inquiry to the human understanding. Not that this was unimportant, though. Nietzsche’s emphasis was on the way human reality was constrained by proportions and measures. This is to say that, since “[w]ir sind irgendwie in der Mitte”, between the “Größe” of the solar systems and the “Kleinheit” of atoms, the human capacity to understand involves “ein Zusammenfassen von Relationen unter einem Maße” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [33] & [36], KSA 9, 454).

What is at least equally important as this is that the scientific vocabulary has poured from the more or less popularized details of physical theories and practices to the modern general descriptions of “the present condition”. Hutccheon’s stress, mentioned above, on the notion of ’off-center’ could be a case in
point. In general, physics and astronomy, folk and scientific, are to be appreciated for spreading the notions of gravitation, sphere, orbit, revolution and the like to the daily discourse, to the ways people think and speak about forms, movements, attractions and sequences. Analogically, meteorology and biology, folk as well as scientific, have installed the ideas of series, cycles and variation to guide human perceptions of any meaningful pattern and phenomenon. Conversely, however, any attempt to make sense, beyond the strictest specialist communication, of scientific objectives and findings has to be made by exploiting natural language and concepts that tend to have wide application in everyday life.

In his classic novel, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, Robert M. Pirsig had his speaker analyze the structure and the functioning of the cycle in order (not only to give the credentials of a serious cyclist but) to illustrate thinking in terms of hierarchical systems. As “I look at the shapes of the steel now”, “I see ideas”. Where other cyclists or engineers may look at a troubled bike and think in terms of malfunctioning “parts”, the speaker is “working on concepts”.2188

From this perspective, motorcycle is “a system of concepts worked out in steel”. In a suitable way, many of the cycle’s concepts do cycle. As for its components, cycle can be divided into power assembly and running assembly. Even if one restricted the attention to the former, one would have the two distinct subclasses of engine and power-delivery system. Again, even if one was restricted to the former, one would have power train divided into cylinders, pistons, connecting rods, crankshaft and flywheel; fuel-air system divided into gas tank plus filter, air cleaner, carburetor, valves and exhaust pipes; ignition system divided into alternator, rectifier, battery, high-voltage coil and spark plugs; feedback system divided into cam chain, camshaft, tappets and distributor; lubrication system divided into oil pump and channels. And according to its function, cycle is divided into normal running functions and special operator-controlled functions; the former being further divided into intake cycle, compression cycle, power cycle and exhaust cycle etc. etc. 2189

Making a case about “[t]he true system, the real system” being “our present construction of systematic thought itself, rationality itself”, the speaker calls revolutions ineffective for their failure to come to grips with the underlying “systematic patterns of thought”. The cycle is “primarily a mental phenomenon” of “structural conceptual relations”, since its analysis reveals the inexistence of “given, fixed, inviolable shapes”. From this, the speaker is ready to induce that motorcycle, as well as its “raw” material steel and even the nature’s “potential” for steel, are all something “out of someone’s mind”.2190

This is, I believe, a fine piece of philosophical pedagogy. It is also a practice that I hope I have shown as belonging, in its own way, to the advantages of Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise. Pirsig’s storytelling main character does make an admirable move as he calls his vehicle a conceptual
construction and even demonstrates this by (de)conceptualizing it. At the same time, even more
admirably, he draws attention to the very practice of conceptualization in order both to celebrate, or
even boast about, this peculiar approach to cycles and to cast serious doubt on its potentially
conservative and harmful aspects. To put this the other way round, the undermining of the hierarchical
thinking does not make the speaker give up his insight of the bike as a sum of concepts. He is ready to
acknowledge better and worse conceptual efforts.

In point of fact, the speaker’s reasoning from conceptuality to the mental and to everything’s being out
of one’s head sounds more or less Emersonian. I would hold that this ultimate emphasis on the mental
at the expense of the physical is what separates Nietzsche’s ecological model from the one of Emerson.
Perhaps it separates it from Pirsig too, yet what is important is that Pirsig succeeds, with his
presentation of so many “wheels within wheels”, in both exemplifying and questioning the structures of
knowledge that pertain to all disciplines of thought. The extreme case of biology is pointed out, since
there “the hierarchy of phylum-order-class-genus-species is almost an icon”2191.

This is the place to pay tribute to Julian Roberts’s skilfully worked out conclusions. According to him,
the Nietzschean question of representation vs. simulacrum bears on the tensions between “an abstract
ordering, which somehow intervenes from outside in the processes of the world” and something that is
“itself part of the process”. Roberts reformulates Nietzsche’s contention by saying that “even the
conceptual activities of philosophers are in fact part of the struggle of life, the articulations of particular
instinctual patterns”. What is crucial is that the “conventional […] philosophical concepts […] fail to
understand their own role, and attempt to impose upon life a web of concepts which makes fraudulent
claims to permanence.”2192

All this is superbly rendered. The way Roberts goes on with his interpretation is, to my mind, less
successful. He says that “futurity”, or that “splendid thrust forwards”, and nothing but futurity, is what
affords permanence in the Nietzschean view. Compared to this approximation of “eternity”,
philosophical values are “tiresome” and “merely the baggage of the past”. Roberts concludes: “It is in
this sense that ’things’, the material of full-blooded life, are always superior to concepts.”2193

Since I have been trying to say that, for Nietzsche, there is no way of making sense of the extra-
conceptual ’things’ that would not itself be conceptual, because there is no way of perceiving anything
without concepts, I am afraid that Roberts is reintroducing, much like the early lebensphilosophische
interpreters once did, the dichotomy of unconceptualized reality and the philosophical conceptuality as
Nietzsche’s peculiar achievement. Indeed, Roberts says that the Nietzschean dancing body “does not
communicate with Being with the aid of the mind, but directly”. Although I think that there is a specific
sense to this formulation that would not contradict all construals of the Nietzschean reconceptualization
I have endeavored to articulate, Roberts’s additional tenets - that in the ecstatic “immediacy of Being
[...] [w]e understand without having to resort to mediating concepts because things, as symbols, speak
to us directly”, and that “speech and conceptual activity are secondary” - make such a reconciliation
impossible.2194

Although Roberts offers a fine depiction of the dynamics of Nietzsche’s thought, his interpretation of
conceptuality turns out to be little more than a very conventional reading of the issue of Ur-Eine and
phenomena as it was dealt with in Geburt der Tragödie.

I told early on in this study how Nietzsche’s thought was embraced by Otto Neurath, the leading figure
in the 19th encyclopedism. Neurath’s view of scientific practice underscored participatory action where
no Extraterritorialität or detached position is available for scholars. In his well known, yet hardly
exhausted, illustration, Neurath draws out sailors busy reconstructing their ship out on the ocean. In the
course of continuous sailing, the new vessel emerges, piece by piece, from the old construction, while
there is neither any viewpoint from beyond the seafare nor any telling of the precise end result.2195 Even
if Neurath’s famous marine parable was not expressly built upon Nietzsche’s extensive discourse of
oceans and sailing and exploratory adventure2196, his point is sufficiently Nietzschean.

What I want to suggest here is that not only is there a need to revise some conceptions of Nietzsche
with the help of the Neurath connection, there is also a need to revise the common conception of
Neurath with the help of Nietzsche. As it is well known, Neurath belonged to the eminent Viennese
who came to establish, in the early 20th century, one of the most famous “circles of science”. In my
view, this very circle has been sadly flattened into a caricature by the means of both respect and
reproach.

As Neurath himself wished to put it, “[i]n the course of years, a circle [Kreis] gathered round Schlick
that unified the different strivings in the direction of a scientific conception of the world. There
emerged, out of this concentration, fruitful mutual impulses. [...] The Vienna Circle [Kreis] was not
happy just to work collectively as a closed circle [Zirkel]. It also sought contact with the lively
contemporary movements, in as much as these had a friendly attitude toward scientific conception of
the world and rejected metaphysics and theology.”2197

Nowadays, it is commonly thought that the Viennese neo-positivists sought for an altogether too rigid
mode of rationality and a naïvely empiricist sense of science. Where Richard Rorty, holding that
“rationality is a matter not of obedience to standards (which epistemologists might hope to codify), but
rather of give-and-take participation in a cooperative social project\textsuperscript{2198}, may represent the critical post-analytic thinkers, it is best to remember that for all their questionable convictions, the pre-analytical empiricists were not so one-sided as one would like to believe.

At least, the point captured in Neurath’s ship parable testifies to a sensibility at least as self-critical as the one inherent in Rorty’s stance. Moreover, building upon the notion of multifaceted contacts, Neurath was to devote the later part of his career to the neo-encyclopedist project with the double objective to pay tribute to the spirit of d’Alembert and Diderot and bring together, in dynamic, open ended and non-pyramidal form, contemporary scientific efforts\textsuperscript{2199}.

The word “encyclopedia” goes back to the Greek enukklios paideia or “general education” and contains the notion of ring or cycle, kuklos. Nietzsche’s book on tragedy, too, has something to say about the “circle of science”:

Nun aber eilt die Wissenschaft, von ihrem kräftigen Wahne angespornt, unaufhaltsam bis zu ihren Grenzen, an denen ihr in Wesen der Logik verborgener Optimismus scheitert. Denn die Peripherie des Kreises der Wissenschaft hat unendlich viele Punkte, und während noch gar nicht abzusehen ist, wie jemals der Kreis völlig ausgemessen werden könnte, so trifft doch der edle und begabte Mensch, noch vor der Mitte seines Daseins und unvermeidlich, auf solche Grenzpunkte der Peripherie, wo er in das Unauflösliche starrt. Wenn er hier zu seinem Schrecken sieht, wie die Logik sich an diesen Grenzen um sich selbst ringelt und endlich sich in den Schwanz beisst - da bricht die neue Form der Erkenntniss durch, die tragische Erkenntniss, die, um nur ertragen zu werden, als Schutz und Heilmittel die Kunst braucht. (GT 15, KSA 1, 101.)

Again, one is reminded of the way Geburt is a book about the “limits”. Indeed, the limit of conceiving and the limit of affirming was what Nietzsche came to hold as the lasting strength of his first book.

In the 1920's, being accused of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, the German philosopher Richard Müller-Freienfels replied that, to his knowledge, that was the only choice for a human being, yet the redeeming feature of his particular version of this was to effect a “cosmomorphization of the ego”\textsuperscript{2200}. Quite like the positivist Neurath, the anti-positivist Müller-Freienfels opposed “the image of the rational pyramid of concepts”. In his view of philosophy, there was no “lineary progress” but “an encirclement of the same goal”. That is to say, philosophical systems do not lend themselves to lining up one after the other: instead, they “circle in a ring”\textsuperscript{2201}.

More surprisingly, the Viennese philosopher Philipp Frank hailed Nietzsche as the one who “comes out in defence of the case of enlightenment against the self-satisfied possessor of an enduring truth”. In
Nietzschean terms, Frank spoke of the “tragic feature” of the enlightenment: “It destroys the old systems of concepts, but while it is constructing a new system, it is already laying the foundations for a new misuse. For there is no theory without auxiliary concepts, and every such concept is necessarily misused in the course of time.” Frank concludes by characterizing the “restless spirit of enlightenment” as an antidote for any scholasticism: “The progress of science takes place in eternal circles”.

Hilary Putnam, a philosopher working near the outer spheres of the Wiener Kreis tradition, has paid attention to Nietzsche’s “wonderful aphorism” about “how the world can become more paradoxical as the circle of scientific knowledge enlarges”. By his judgment, “Nietzsche’s remark could be illustrated with material from just about any scientific field”. After referring to quantum mechanics and the liar’s paradox, Putnam moves on to debunk the notion of a “God’s-Eye-View” related to metaphysical thinking. What is at stake is “the entire enterprise of dividing mundane “reality” into the Furniture of the Universe and our “projections””. Putnam’s critical renovation of the realist philosophy is interlocked with the sense of liberation from metaphysics understood as “the search for a “true world” (Nietzsche’s phrase!)”.

One may note how flexibly Nietzsche’s writings allow themselves to be read by thinkers of radically divergent persuasions. For any attentive Nietzsche reader, I think, there is nothing “blasphemous” in drawing from a variety of intellectual circles, from Deleuze, Neurath, Putnam and others.

Among the more general objectives of my study, I have sought to deal with the question of the contacts between different philosophical currents. As I have tried to show, Nietzsche’s work is apt to stimulate this sort of questioning, too. My emphasis on conceptuality is, in an important sense, a way not only to come to turns with Nietzsche’s thinking, but as well to seek a dialogue between philosophical traditions, on the one hand, and between philosophy and related disciplines, on the other. The conception of philosophers running the same track, appearing on the same stadium, moving on the same curved path, circling the same orbit - all of which is best understood as the course of conceptuality - intimates, how Nietzsche the troublemaker is one of the key figures orchestrating shared intellectual practices.

The reason for this is that Nietzsche’s most outstanding achievement in questioning the basics of consciousness, and of the philosophies busy laying it bare, is his emphasis on the verbal constitution of conceptuality, the linguistic predicament. One implication of this is that any usage of a given word is, in principal, relevant for the fate of the word and the concept. There is a related section, in his Jenseits, that merits quoting, since it casts light on the sense of a shared problematic, as well as on the way the issue of conceptuality is open to the problematic of centers and circles.

(JGB 20, KSA 6, 34; cf. already N Frühjahr-Sommer 1874 34 [39], KSA 7, 805, on the “Thätigkeit des Philosophen” as not isolated but belonging “in ein Cyclus”.)

Without a direct reference to this passage, Jacques Derrida has written that the Nietzschean “destructive discourse” involving critique of metaphysical concepts and substituting of them with other concepts only goes to indicate how such projects “are captured [pris] in a kind of circle”. This “unique” circle, Derrida went on to explain, “describes the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics”. One cannot step out of the metaphysical tradition, since any proposition about it, no matter how destructive, is doomed to use what it is meant to contest. Derrida’s analysis is not, however, all that gloomy: “But there are many way of being engaged [pris] in this circle. They are all more or less naïve, more or less empirical, more or less systematic, more or less close to the formulation or the formalization of this circle. These differences explain the multiplicity of destructive discourses and the disaccordance among them.”

Although Derrida’s text is as clarifying regarding the general issue at stake as it is fitting for the spirit of the Jenseits passage just quoted, he does not move on to discuss the extent to which Nietzsche’s texts are already interlocked with not only the tradition of thought they criticize but with the problematic of this engagement. During the present exploration I have tried to show just how much Nietzsche’s philosophy displays a number of quandaries, on the one hand, and a lot of reflection on the coming to be of these quandaries. In other words, my goal has been to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s writings, as a rule, contain a variety problems with problematization of their formation (or, in Derrida’s language, formulation and formalization). This final essay deals with the Nietzschean manner of seizing ‘centrality’ and taking it into consideration as well as of being taken and seized by that concept.

Julian Roberts is one of the few to have been alert to the significance of both the Jenseits passage and Nietzsche’s discourse of circles in general. He speaks of the “wheel-like ring” as “the moment of centred power, the principle of change” as follows: “The still point at the centre of the rolling globe, or wheel, controls the power that surges around it, even to the extent of reaching into the movement of the
past [...] [...] the decisive moment knows, grasps, that part of the past which is encompassed by the same ring as itself”. Yet, as Roberts goes on to say, “the true interest of the ring, or wheel, is still more closely associated with the future” as exemplified in a child. The wheel is “the model for a reconstructed continuum, a circle which is not dependent on a mechanical other, but is self-generating and self-centring”. What counts is the “dance” of “outward” and “inward” movements, the dynamics of “centrifugal venture into change and becoming” and “centripetal principle of return”, or the Heraclitian “harmonious going-out and coming-back”. It is about abandoning, as well as about recovery, reassembling, recollection.2207

Says Baudelaire, “[i]n philosophical studies, the human spirit imitates the course of the stars and follows an orbit that returns to the start. Concluding is drawing a circle.”2208 In 1900, the question was posed, whether Nietzsche “was a meteor [...] rapidly rushing by or a star that will shine on and lead to new paths”2209.

Among Nietzsche’s philosophical predecessors, Kant was the one to have studied astronomy the most. In his book of 1755, Kant spoke of nature’s strategy to operate with “unobservable exceptions” comprising “all the stages of changes” and “a chain of intermediary parts” so that “the remotest features hang together with the closest ones”. Planetary movements provided but one example of this general state of affairs: “Eccentricity is, in planets, a result of the lack in nature’s strive to make all planetary movements circular, which she, however, can never fully achieve, due to various intervening circumstances [...]”. Kant’s special case is the one of comets, since these are situated at the top of “a regular ladder” of “all possible stages of eccentricity”. As he says, the “unlawful freedom” involved in comets tends to “grow with the distance from the midpoint of the system”.2210

This description by the pre-critical Kant is like a depiction of Nietzsche’s critique of concepts in the aftermath of Kant’s critical philosophy. In Nietzsche’s unfinished essay on the earliest Greek philosophy, astronomical language is used to spell out the changing conditions of the concept of the conceptualizer, the philosopher. There is a distinction made between philosophers within “eine wahre Kultur” and philosopher in circumstances where “diese Kultur nicht vorhanden ist”. The Greek speciality was to discover and maintain the cultural importance of philosophy, which makes a Greek philosopher into a shining “Hauptgestirn im Sonnensysteme der Kultur”. By contrast, the modern philosopher is not similarly attached (fesselt) to anything but embodies “ein zufälliger beliebiger bald hier- und bald dorthin versprengter Wanderer”. In short, the modern philosopher is “Komet”. (N “DpitZdG” 1, KSA 1, 809.)2211

In Stanley Rosen’s estimation, Nietzsche is “today the most influential philosopher in the” West with a
scope of this influence cutting “across the traditional lines of theory and practice by which intellectuals and political activists are usually divided”. As Rosen says further, Nietzsche’s thoughts “have been disseminated throughout the general public, and not the least among people who have never heard his name or read a page of his voluminous writings”. According to Rosen, Nietzsche is not a conservative but a revolutionary. He takes “modern scientific Enlightenment” to its extreme in the nihilism that corrodes theology, metaphysics, science and philosophy. The political consequences of Nietzsche’s views makes him “a revolutionary of the right” in the direction of “radical aristocracy and antiegalitarianism”, yet his status as a loner “isolates rather than unites him with his fellow higher men and modern revolutionaries”. 2212

Edward Andrew, too, emphasizes Nietzsche’s revolution, yet in a way different than Rosen. According to him, Nietzsche joined Marx in attacking science as “disinterested observation and cognition of data” for a view of science as active “molding [of] data conceptually for practical purposes”. As Andrew sees it, Nietzsche “may be inviting us to unite theory and practice in a permanent revolution”. 2213

Somewhere between the meanings of “forcible overthrow” and “regular recurrence” there is the sense of ’revolving’ that means intense “pondering over and over”. It is some such view that Werner Hamacher, too, shares, as he thinks that if there is a center for Nietzsche’s work, it is precisely ‘interpretation’ which, in turn, is a “monstrous” kind of center. According to Hamacher, Nietzsche’s version of the “Copernican revolution” is such that it is nothing more or less than “the revolving”or “the alteration and the decentering” that occupy “the center of the world”. 2214

Mine has been an exploration into the revolutionary reconceptualizing of philosophical conceptuality inscribed in Nietzsche’s texts. To assess what is new in his thinking about centrality, is, according to the general strategy of the present study, to start from and to return to the ways concepts, including the one of centrality, are elucidated and renewed. Far as I can see, it is for this reason, i.e. because his concepts revolved round the event of conceiving, that his work is revolutionary.
CONCLUDING REMARK

More or less surprisingly, Nietzsche turns out to be a philosopher of concepts *par excellence*. His texts are filled with inquiries concerning, and criticisms of, individual conceptions, and proposals for new ones. It emerges from these interrogations and creations that there is also, in his writings, continuous elaboration of the nature and role of conceptuality in philosophy and in general.

In the present study, the case has been made for recognizing Nietzsche’s conceptual undertakings. Whatever one is to say about his putative views of metaphysical, epistemological, religious, moral, aesthetical, political, educational, psychological or other sorts of matters, one ought to see that these depend on a prior issue, that is, on Nietzsche’s sense of the conceptual. The way the philosopher conceived concepts is the key to the way he conceptualized the rest of the things within the circle of his philosophical activities. Alternatively put, all the thrilling and threatening aspects of Nietzsche’s thought can be discussed without having to flatten them by a recourse to their reputedly obvious extra-conceptuality. To recognize Nietzsche’s conceptual potential is to constrain and to liberate his other potentialities.

I have not sought to ascertain the exact position, or series of positions, that he could be seen to have assumed and defended in the philosophical theory of conceptualizing. I take the special interpretative difficulties of reading Nietzsche, due to both the exceptionality of his *œuvre* and the extraordinary divergence in its reception, to entail that such an ascertainment is highly questionable. Another thing is that one cannot be too sure about, say, Kant’s ultimate conception of concept, even though his work is usually taken to exemplify the very project of concept-centered philosophy from the hold of which Nietzsche seemingly unfastened himself.

All the same, if one was to account for the Nietzschean conceptual meditations and experiments in terms of these theories, yet in a manner suitably provisory, local and self-reflective, I would suggest something along the following lines. The historical significance of Nietzsche’s deconceptualizations and reconceptualizations coupled with his metaconceptual investigations lies in the direction of open (versus closed) and dispositional (versus entity-like) concepts.

The intervention of language in conceiving is an equally important new emphasis in Nietzsche’s work. He was one of the first to have appreciated the decisiveness of vocabularies, linguistic structures and
grammar in guiding perception, thought and action of the human beings. Yet, language can be emphasized only in a tight connection with the apparently opposing tendency in Nietzsche’s philosophy of concepts, that is, his re-naturalization of all human capacities. This philosophy highlights the importance of the socially and historically conditioned, and conditioning, force that (conceptualizing in) language exerts on experience, only as much as it also underscores the significance of natural proto-linguistic (and proto-conceptual) processes that humans share with the rest of the reality from crystal(izations) onward.

Nietzsche can be said to have outlined an ecological model of conception where interpretation is necessary in apprehending one’s surroundings, yet the interpretative apparatus is really a product of those surroundings. This ecology of conception makes experience and concept depend on each other to the degree that conceptualizer reaches the height of self-consciousness at the point where the self is one with its environment.

In the western thought after Kant, there were a number of philosophical currents that sought to get rid of concepts and re-establish the lost immediacy of experience. I have tried to demonstrate that it is a mistake to attach Nietzsche to these currents. To be sure, Nietzsche worked in the context of Goethean-Schopenhauerian attempts to rehabilitate extra-conceptual contact with what is primordially real and came to even further develop these first moves.

Yet, Nietzsche did not eventually steer his philosophy away from the indispensability of concepts. One of the more philosophically vital explanations for both his verbose articulations of things of allegedly minor magnitude and his impudently succinct paradoxes over things that obviously require laborous analyses, is that they bear testimony to the inevitable mediatedness of making sense. What Nietzsche did was to point the way toward exploring the meaning, value and power of concepts, the process of conceiving and the dynamics of conceptualizations.

Nihilism is one of Nietzsche’s concepts. It has been formed, under the constraints of its peculiar conceptual history and of the international economic, socio-political and cultural situation of the late 19th century occidental world, to assume certain critical and affirmative functions in his philosophy.

Analytically speaking, ‘nihilism’ as Nietzsche’s concept comes down to the notion of conceptlessness. Historically speaking, it displays his conception of the late modern world with its problematic legacy of the two thousand years of Christianity. Analytico-historically, ‘nihilism’, as Nietzsche conceptualized it, pertains to processes where a unified conceptuality gradually evolve, where it then establishes its power so that anyone within its sphere of influence cannot help but conceive in its terms, where it further loses
its credibility and where it finally leaves the conceivers with the sense of conceptlessness, until a new sufficiently strong conception takes over.

The late modern situation where nihilism comes to a head prompts the question of, whether there can be ever again any conceptuality powerful enough to guide the thought and action of all the people within it. Is one, then, doomed to, and blessed with, the total emancipation from conceptuality? Another question arises, whether the self-reflective attitude to concepts that Nietzsche entertains and, at least to an extent, suggest as the appropriate one, can ever be anything like a ruling conception. If concepts need to be this and that and only this and that, if they are in need of strict unification and eternalization, the view that concepts are something to be pondered over and over again, and something that are liable to revolutions out of any one individual’s control, can hardly establish its power.

Nietzsche’s relentlessly self-ironical and self-critical stance toward concepts was probably fatal for himself and, as some might add, for the nihilistic 20th century people as well. Perhaps the totalitarianisms with their Endlösungen and the universalized happy indifference of ‘the last humans’, as the horrific distinguishing marks of the first hundred years after Nietzsche’s death, embody the need for an emancipation from emancipation, for an ecological model of conception following the exile from, and the brutal return to, the ’nature’.
NOTES

1. This term has been used for decades. In an essay of 1913, von Ehrenfels 1988, 395, spoke of the “eventual complete Zusammenbruch” and of the “final spiritual Zusammenbruch”. See Kräutlein 1926, 54; Vetter 1926, 39-40, for other early examples. The custom was institutionalized by Ernst Podach whose books *Nietzsches Zusammenbruch* (Heidelberg 1930) and *Friedrich Nietzsche’s Werk des Zusammenbruchs* (Heidelberg 1961) documented the last years of Nietzsche’s life. See also Janz 1978, III 9, on Nietzsche’s *Auflösung, Zerrüttung and Zusammenbruch*. Cf. also Wolff 1956, 299; Frenzel 1966, 116; Nolte 1990, 1.

2. For a philosopher’s remark, see Scheler 1915/1919, 9.

3. For an instance of this usage within the Nietzsche literature, see Hoffmann 1993, 9, on the Zusammenbruch “of GDR in November 1889”.

4. See Watson 1992, for a paper on Nietzsche’s “transnational thinking”, presented at a Leuven congress on European nationalism, September 1990. Cf. Stegmaier 1990, 23, on Nietzsche’s vision of the Weltgesellschaft. As Stegmaier says, Nietzsche’s notion of culture can “hardly” be identified with the way current powers seek to expand their economic and military might.

5. See Wuchterl 1990, 183-4 & 194.


7. See Salin 1959, 7, 152, 153.

8. Rauschning 1954, 23 & 27-31 & 18. Rauschning refers, p. 24, to the French critic, Julien Benda, as he develops the idea of a spiritual or mental Zusammenbruch as preceding the outer collapses.


12. See, for instance, Mayer 1951, 501, on Nietzsche being, in an “age of progress”, “conscious of inevitable disintegration”, as well as foreseeing, in an “era of peace and universal prosperity”, “a war which would shatter the very foundations of European culture”.


15. See Fischer 1982, 269. See also Weischedel 1971 II, 437, on the ’death of god’ meaning a great Zusammenbruch.

16. See Sallis 1969, for relating this interpretation of “the death of God” to “Nietzsche’s radical transformation of the tradition”.


19. See Verrecchia 1978, 257-61 retelling the article in *Nuova antologia*, September the 16th 1900.


21. See, for example, Mencken 1908/1913, who, despite the bibliographical caution, p. 294, of referring to other biographies, too, relies heavily on, and cites extensively of, Förster’s works.


23. For Janz’s part, cf. Ewald 1992, 47: "biography that may appear practically definitive". As for Verrecchia, the sheer ignorance among Nietzsche scholars - it is not even mentioned in the bibliography of the “Chronik”, KSA 15, 211-2, while Janz’s “ausgezeichnete” book is used as its main source - may be taken as a sign of unreliability. Yet, since this could, of course, testify for the contrary, I shall address the question of the value of his work further in the text.

24. Janz 1992, 48-9; Verrecchia 1978, 10, 16, 55, 129-131, 136, 149, 160, 227. I refer, here, to Janz’s recent comments in an interview where he assesses his own life time achievement in researching Nietzsche. On the basic point about Nietzsche’s tragic life cf. Janz 1978, 1433. Note that Montinari 1975, 95, can be taken to support Verrecchia’s point about the “monad”: there was, according to Montinari, not a one important outer event in Nietzsche’s life between winter 1882/3 and spring 1888.

25. See, e.g., Janz 1978, I 14, for the cautious remark on impossible exhaustiveness in writing about “so complex a phenomenon as Nietzsche”. Cf. Verrecchia 1978, 7, on his intentions of writing “neither exegesis nor interpretation but, rather, simply a biographical book”; p. 9, on his method of “destroying many legends”; and on such statements as, p. 10, about the complete lack of irony and humor in Nietzsche, and, p. 11-2, “Nietzsche is a sickness. [...] [...] It is known [...] that the admirers of Nietzsche generally have psychological problem [...].” About Verrecchia’s self awareness, see p. 13: “Along with the precision of presentation, it was my main interest not to annoy the reader.”


28. Gilman 1985, vii. Gilman’s anthology includes a rich variety of texts by some of Nietzsche’s closest acquaintances.

29. Windelband 1914, 6, goes on to remark that “the boundary between the special sciences and philosophy is not unequivocal”


31. See, Ernst 1914, 40-1, on the “weak, sickly” philosopher’s “understandable longing for health”, as well as on the modest small town priest’s son “equally great longing for aristocracy”; Bunge 1989, 22: “Only very sick people, like Nietzsche, would claim that health alone counts and would consequently propose a biologic value theory - one in which even truth would be reduced to survival value. Normal people know that there are nonbiological (e.g. cultural) values [...]”


33. See, for example, Saitschick 1906, vi: “Nietzsche is a symptomatic phenomenon: his thought is the passionate expression of our limitless individualism [...]”


37. Steiner 1895, 20-32; Steiner 1900, 181. It might be construed that Steiner reversed his interpretation of the issue, since where the 1895 monograph emphasizes Nietzsche’s contact with the deeper wells of life, the 1900 essay has the philosopher’s very latest thoughts rise over and beyond life.

38. Simmel 1907, 43-6. Simmel describes Nietzsche’s insight as a “poetico-philosophical absolutization of the Darwinian idea of evolution”. He says that while Schopenhauer holds on to the view that there is no purpose in life, and that it be construed as a meaningless striving to be denied, Nietzsche’s fundamental position is that “the life itself can become the goal of life”.


40. See, for example, Derrida 1967c, 26-7 & note 1; Taureck 1991, 8 et passim.

41. Heidegger 1936-7, 6-10 & 176-7; Margreiter 1978, 89.

42. See, for example, Strenski 1987, 19.

43. See, for example, Liebert 1935, 179.

44. See, for example, Moog 1922; Müller-Freienfels 1923.


46. Dühring 1865/1891, esp. 1-86, or the first three chapters. The remaining chapters 4 to 10 deal with, respectively, the course of human life, love and sexuality, death, physical and moral evil, women’s condition, knowledge and thought, world order.


48. See Hedrick 1982, 159, for a quotation from London’s letter, and a comment: “The striking discrepancy between what London thought he wrote and what readers understand him to write remains today.”

49. London 1903, 56.


52. See Paulsen 1892, 72.


54. For Burckhardt’s favorable reply to the very point of the “vermutliche Entstehungs- und Lebensbedingungen”, see KGB III/4, 222.


56. Cf. von Brandenstein 1947, 425, on Nietzsche’s “mystical metaphysics of life”.

57. Heidegger 1919/21, 14-5 & 18, who is here linking his considerations to Jaspers’s book Psychologie der Weltanschauungen that he is busy confronting.
58. It is to be remembered that Heidegger’s philosophical teacher, Heinrich Rickert, had written a polemical book, *Die Philosophie des Lebens. Darstellung und Kritik der philosophischen Modestürmung unserer Zeit*, which reached its second edition in 1922.

59. Heidegger 1939, 68 & 74-5.

60. Heidegger 1936-8, 139.


62. Windelband 1914, 22.

63. See, for example, Hof 1974, on the connection between the ideal of a “healthy” human being and the “cheap, positivist Nazi nihilism”.

64. See Frey 1975, 2.


66. Arendt 1958, 172 & 313 note 76.


71. See, for example, Schüssler 1983, 261-5 & 269; Holz 1988, 44-8; Busch 1989, 49-51 & 63 & 170; Bowie 1990, 206-52; Riker 1991, esp. 8; Halper 1993, 8 *et passim*. See also Rosen 1987, 126, where the idea that “Nietzsche subordinates *theory* to life” is related to a peculiar Kantianism, in which “nature understood as the Greek *physis* is not accessible to us and hence there is no independent standard for scientific “theories” All theory, including the theory of nature, is a construction: the value or sense of the theoretical entities comes from the will.”

72. See Kräutlein 1926, 67 note 75.

73. Djurič 1990, 39.


77. Ledure 1993, 259-60.

78. Schmidt 1985b, 10 & 12.

79. Schmidt 1985c, 90. See also Kristensen 1985, 65, on Nietzsche’s “rational critique” of modern rationalism that is “on the way to irrationalities”. For the ‘value of values’, see Solomon 1980.

80. Habermas 1968, 353-64.

82. Figl 1995, V.
84. Weischedel 1975, 259.
87. Deleuze 1965, 18.
90. Derrida 1984c, 40-3.
93. See, for instance, Kräutlein 1926, 54, for an early use of this term.
96. Deleuze & Guattari 1972, 21.
100. Möbius 1902, 1-2, 9-11, 194.
102. See Brusq 1933, esp. 102.
103. See Hirschberger 1976, 505, for a later view that the mental illness had been there “already long” before the *Zusammenbruch*.
106. See Miller 1988, chapter 1. Using the Finnish edition I withdraw from exact notation and from assessing the details of Miller’s reading. Cf. Prêtre 1990, 93, for a fictional diary entry by Nietzsche in
1890: “euphoric Nietzsche, desperate Nietzsche, you have never known how to live as most people do”. Let this quotation not be taken as the only way to support Miller’s case. Interestingly, it can be counted as an advantage of her stance that in the diametrically opposite biographical reading, the idolizing work by Nietzsche’s sister, there is not only a passing remark on the beloved mother’s intolerance toward sensitive religious discussions between her children, Förster-Nietzsche 1912, 156, but what is more revelative, an image of the boy successfully holding his tears when setting out to leave home for the school in another town, p. 78: ”Is not this tender, good natured kid, who knows so well how to master himself, with all his talents and bents for art, science and philosophy, who values friendship higher than anything and serves as the leader for his mates, is he not the representation of the future Nietzsche, if only in the child’s gestalt.”

107. See Ahlberg 1923, 12.


109. Bentley 1944/1957, 111. For another commentary that could corroborate Miller’s view, see Montinari 1975, 4: Nietzsche cut himself off of life, internalized events and spiritualized his philosophy of life.

110. Verrecchia 1978, 9-10. What remains of the “legendary” man is, for Verrecchia, p. 13, that he was a great master of style.

111. See Moles 1990, ix. Cf. also Würzbach 1942, 10: “His life, seen from within, is, however, the most adventurous we have ever known.”

112. See Kaufmann 1950, 30.


116. For early uses of this conventional term, the third member, along with Zusammenbruch and Wahnsinnsszettel, in the vocabulary of describing Nietzsche’s last years, see Saitschick 1906, 136; Würzbach 1942, 10.

117. See Onfray 1992, 75. Klossowski “became silent” himself, too, as he abandoned writing for painting. Cf. Reboul 1974, 44, who opposes his reading precisely to Klossowski’s ideas that “fecundity” is but a matter of utility, while delirium may stand for “superior lucidity”.

118. Prêtre 1990, 211.

119. Reboul 1974, 44. Cf. Ziegler 1900, 202, on the much more thrilled attitude to the “Fall Nietzsche” as an outstanding and intriguing example of the problematic of genius and madness.

120. Cf. von Ehrenfels 1888 (1913), 399: “Nietzsche’s madness has cost a lot for the German nation, for the cultivated humanity.”

121. Mayer 1951, 503.

122. Volkelt 1896/1917, 144.


124. See Dingler 1926, 10 & 400. Cf. Müller 1926, on the Zusammenbruch of science, of its value becoming questionable, of its a mere practical instrument, all of which this author conceives as “anti-
intellectual”.

125. For this distinction, see Magnus & Stewart & Mileur 1993, 5.

126. See Thatcher 1972b, 30, who judges, p. 42, Geburt to be necessary for Nietzsche in order to gain self confidence as independent thinker.


128. See Weischedel 1975, 258.

129. KSA 14, Chronik, 46.


131. See McGinty 1978, 39, who underlines, among other things, the book’s “powerful acknowledgements of the power of ideology over the development of culture”.


133. Megill 1985, 39-40. See also Durant 1926 & Verrecchia 1978, 238, for the more psychologizing views that Nietzsche’s character or habitus was much more Apollinian than Dionysian.


135. Desmond 1986, 163.


139. See, for instance, von Wiese 1948, 657-663; Frey 1975, 15.

140. See Heller 1988a, 1.

141. See Jodl 1917, 3. The article first appeared in 1891.

142. Spengler 1921, 11 & 15.


146. Lepens 1984, 141.


151. Bann 1995, 198. Cf. Dürr 1988, 35-9, for a critique of the specific “weakness” in Nietzsche’s work, that is, the notion of ‘critical history’.

152. See Ziegler 1900, 74-5.


155. Danto 1985a, 190.

156. Ibid. 187-8.


162. See Stern 1979, 158.


164. Pippin 1988, 45.

165. Bentley 1944/1957, 133.


167. Megill 1985, 88 & 357 note 23. While a whole anthology on the book has been published (The Great Year of Zarathustra (1881–1881), ed. D. Goicoechea. University Press of America, Lanham 1983), one might still argue that the work is usually taken into consideration almost only in the specific contexts of making sense of its peculiarity, not so much in order to use it, along with other texts of Nietzsche, to clarify a problematic issue in the philosopher’s thought.

168. Higgins 1987, xii-xiv, praises the rare cases of Alderman (as does Megill 1985, 357 note 253) and Bennholdt-Thomsen for confronting Zarathustra’s challenge. See also Wilson 1972, 13, on Zarathustra as a “lyrically repeating” work where the speaker’s views are not argued for.

169. See Lampert 1980, 141.

170. See Emerson 1902, [p.] 1901.

171. Jung 1934-9, 3.


177. I shall save what I have to say about Heidegger’s reply to the more sustained reviews of his interpretative policy in sections II.c.1 and II.d.1.

178. Jung 1934-9, 3-4, 12, 218, 396. See Djurić 1979 for a corroboration of Nietzsche’s lacking knowledge on the Orient.


180. See Zaehner 1961, 19. Cf. Boyce 1979/1987, xiii, on Zoroastrianism as the most complex existing religion to be investigated (see Zaehner, p. 15, on similar point), because of the scarcity in textual sources. Boyce, p. 1 & 99, considers it the oldest world religion that may have influenced humanity more than any of its rivals. While Boyce does not even hint at Nietzsche, she questions the scholarly value of Zaehner’s work.

181. See Maikuma 1985, 66.

182. Kuhn 1992, 236-7 note 850; more extensively ibid. 198-259.

183. Cf. also Whitlock 1990, 57 & 103 note 2, for references to the Zoroastrian cosmology and to further reading on the linkage between Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and the Persian Zoroaster.

184. See Mencken 1908/1913, 44, who stresses, however, that “there was no further resemblance between” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and the Persian Zoroaster, nor “likenesses whatever between Nietzsche’s philosophy and that of the Persians”.


186. See ibid. 340.


188. See Ziegler 1900, 125.

189. For a description of it as “Nietzsche’s mock-biblical literary masterpiece”, see Solomon 1988, 11.

190. See Volkelt 1896/1917, 382.


193. Héber-Suffrin 1988, 23-4, goes on to add, p. 46-8, that the essential point in Nietzsche is nomore negative refusing, but affirmation of life and creativity.


195. Lampert 1986, 258, 272, 278, as his colleagues, does not refer to any research on Zoroastrianism.

196. See Frischeisen-Köhler 1907, 16.

197. See Verrecchia 1978 & Köhler 1989. Note that Verrecchia’s original title line was La catastrofe di Nietzsche in Torino; he was, however, active in the project of the German edition (see his preface).
Jung 1934-9, 1061.

Bentley 1944/1957, 137.

Magnus & Stewart & Mileur 1993, 184, write that “Nietzsche creates the character Zarathustra not just to express himself but also in order to put parts of himself off on him, just as Zarathustra puts parts of himself off on the higher men. [...] Thus Spoke Zarathustra “consumes” the traditional discourse of gospeling and the roles roles of prophet, teacher, and pastor only in the sense of assimilating them to writing and the situation of Nietzsche, who strives to find some way to believe in his own creation.”

Gerhardt 1992a, 50.

Sallis 1969, 108.

Gadamer 1986.

Staten 1990, 3-5.


See Pütz 1978, 7-8.

Heller, E. 1988a, 70.

Weischedel 1975, 260.

Perkins 1986.

Schacht 1995, 231 & 223.

Nehamas 1985b, 46, 51.

See KGB III/6, Oktober 1887, 96.


Jodl 1917, 28 & 36-7.


Nehamas 1989, esp. 240, 244-5 & 252.

See Thatcher 1989, 589.

Danto 1985b, 22-3.

Danto 1985b, 19-20. Cf. Pasley 1978, 157, on the medical analogies Nietzsche is exploiting in the contexts of the middle ground between bodily functions and mental states and of the juxtapositions of body and culture.

Blondel 1986, 33.

Hayman 1980, 316.

See KGB III/6, September 1888, 309-10.
226. Danto 1965, 82.
228. See Lauster 1995, 185 & 199 on the unexplored thematic connection between Baudelaire’s Les phares and Nietzsche’s fifth dithyramb, “Das Feuerzeichen”.
230. See Kräutlein 1926, 75 note 106.
234. Gasché 1981, 274, 287. Cf. Gasché 1976, 119, on Ecce homo as the writer’s attempt at writing a corpus for himself, monumentalize himself, while Nietzsche as a body remains only momentary. See also Naas 1991, 289: “Writing himself out through flesh and blood, spreading out, a corpus almost finished, only the end remains, the body already written.”
236. Altieri 1985, 403.
240. See KGB III/6, August 1888, 275-94.
241. See KGB III/6, Oktober 1888, 330-1.
245. Kaufmann 1950, 19, still thinks, erroneously, that Antichrist is the legitimate “Part I” of “the major work”. Cf. on this issue section 1c below.
247. Heller 1980, 2. An identical triple is already offered by, for instance, Ulmer 1962, 83-84 note 6. For his view of the distinguishing features of the three stages see Ulmer 1962, 18-61. This same sort of periodization was already envisioned by Ziegler 1900, viii & 24-192, who considered, p. 114, Morgenröthe and Fröhliche Wissenschaft as “books of transition” from the second to the last phase.
254.See Giorgio Colli’s “Nachwort” in KSA 6, 449.
256.Cf. Bachelard 1943, 164-6 & 175, for Nietzsche as presenting the type of poetry and thinking that has essentially to do with the “vertical”, the “summit”, the “ascentional”, the “air”, not with the “earth” or the “water”. See, however, Deleuze 1969, 154 note 1, for the critical remarks on Bachelard’s neglect of the “earth” and for the view that affirms Nietzsche’s “verticality” as one of “profundity and descent”. Moreover, Deleuze writes that “the profundity serves, for Nietzsche, to denounce the idea of height and the ideal of ascention; the height is but a mystification, an effect of the surface [...]”.
258.Deleuze 1962, 201.
259.See Deleuze & Guattari 1991, 63.
260.Cf. a rare article on this issue by Andrew 1975.
265.Ibid. 30; KSA 14, 461-2 (Colli’s & Montinari’s commentary on Ecce homo’s textual history).
268. See KSA 14, “Kommentar”, 459-60.


274. Ibid. 42. Another exposition, beside the one of Basel archives, organized in the building of the late Weimar Nietzsche-Archiv made into a museum (the archive itself is nowadays situated within the Goethe-Schiller-Archiv) lays bare the connections between Förter’s enterprise, German cultural elite and national socialist government. Cf. section II.a for more on Baeumler, II.c.1 on Heidegger.

275. See de Launay 1992; Hoffmann 1993, 30. Cf. Janz 1992, 48: “I had the opportunity to work with Montinari: we would help each other; I’d give him musical indications he needed; he helped me to read the manuscripts that I couldn’t decipher.”

276. Förster-Nietzsche 1912, 120.

277. Cf. Hoffmann 1993, 24, on Carmen Kahn-Wallerstein (1903-88), Elisabeth Förster’s Jewish friend who was to defend Förster, toward the end of her life, against the accusations of antisemitism.

278. Ibid. 9.


281. Ibid. 22-3 & 91-2.

282. Ibid. 16-18 & 9.

283. Ibid. 50.


290. Deleuze 1962, 189.


297. See, for instance, Bentley 1944/1957, 135.
298. See Riva 1988, 980.
300. See Ulmer 1962, 62, on this issue.
301. Cf. Kaufmann 1957, 431, for a critique of Jaspers’s work where, so Kaufmann, the crucial distinction between books and other material is not made.
309. Ibid. 9.
310. See, for instance, Kuhn 1982. Quellenkritik could be seen as one of the main fields of contemporary Nietzsche research, results of which are regularly and prominently displayed in monographs, articles and, especially, in the year book Nietzsche-Studien.
313. See ibid. xi & 41.
314. See Dürr & Grimm & Harms 1988, viii.
315. Reed 1978, 179.
318. See Mayer 1951, 501.
320. See Wuchterl 1990, 205.


325. Ibid. 309 & 313-4.


328. Aschheim 1992, 3 & 6, gives his own example of the latter case by a recourse to Arno J. Mayer’s book *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War*, Pantheon, New York 1981. Where Mayer holds that Nietzsche was especially suitable for the purposes of aristocracy, Aschheim states that “[B]y and large, traditional elites continued to regard the philosopher as a dangerous and insane subversive”, which is not at all to be taken to say that he had no points of contacts with aristocratic interests. But, as Aschheim adds, nor does it mean that Nietzsche’s work could be absorbed in some emancipatory framework as R. Hinton Thomas (1983; see bibliography) tends to think.

329. See Foucault 1988, 31. The words are taken from an interview that was first published in 1983.


333. See Krummel 1974, 48.


335. Lichtenberg 1898, 181, refers to the natural inequality of humans as Nietzsche’s basic thematic.


339. See Clowes 1986, 316. Cf. also Zeitlin 1994, 165, on Dostoevsky as having “placed proto-Nietzschean ideas in the mouths of his characters. This reflects the fact that such ideas were in the air.”

340. See Krummel 1974, 4-73.


342. See Krummel 1974, 56; cf. also p. 71, for Druscowitz’s later, increasingly critical opinion of what she saw as Nietzsche’s exaggerations, as presented in her 1888 book on Dühring.

343. Biese 1893, 213-6. The article by Stein is, p. 214 note 1, mentioned and appreciated, in Biese’s book, yet Stein’s notion of “neo-cynicism” is disputed, since, unlike Nietzsche, the ancient cynic philosophers did accept at least some virtues as their ideal.
344. von Ehrenfels 1888 (1892), 190.
345. Jodl 1895.
346. Salomé 1894, 45 & 33-5.
347. Steiner 1895, 10.
348. Ibid. 18 & 69 & 85.
349. Ibid. 149.
351. One of the most cogent instances of Nordau’s dismissal was supplied by Eisler 1902, 76-7.
355. See von Ehrenfels 1897, viii-ix.
356. Richl 1897, 55 & 129.
358. Ibid. 2-4 & 202.
361. See Jodl 1905, 391.
362. Aschheim 1992, 31, refers, in a note, to Otto Ladendorf’s work *Historisches Schlagwörterbuch. Ein Versuch*, Stuttgart & Berlin 1906. Cf. von Salis 1960, 254, on the young Mussolini’s “Nietzsche for political daily needs” which is tantamount to “the ”will to power” and the “overhuman” as slogans”.
363. See Moog 1922, 92.
364. Haering 1919, 335-6 & 307. Cf, also Vetter 1923, 165, for a reference to “aesthetic revaluations” without the name of Nietzsche mentioned. Vetter was, however, soon to publish a monograph on Nietzsche (see Vetter 1926).
366. Aschheim 1992, 31
367. Ibid 36-8.
369. Ziegler 1900, 5-6.


373. Simmel 1907, 275-7.


375. See Moog 1922, 92.

376. See Vaihinger 1920, 584 & 771-90, who refers to R. Eisler’s *Nietzsches Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik* (1902) and F. Rittelmeyer’s *Friedrich Nietzsche und das Erkenntnisproblem* (1903); Hollitscher 1904, esp. 221-34.


378. See Frischeisen-Köhler 1907, 15-6.


381. Paulsen 1913, 152 & 155.


385. Shaw 1903, 519-20 & 524.

386. See Grimm 1988, esp. 96.


391. See Björkén 1996, 55-60.

392. See Mencken 1908/1913, vii.


394. Ernst 1914, 75.


398. See Bailey 1988, 799.


403. See Stoev 1973, 100.
406. Sandelin 1930, 137.
409. Ibid. 15 & 6 & 51.
410. Ibid. 313.
413. Ibid. 79 & 126-7 & 157-8 & 199-201.
414. Ibid. 163.
416. Kräutlein 1926, esp. 7-11.
417. Vetter 1926, esp. 7-9 & 304.
419. See Pütz 1988, 15.
420. See Kuenzli 1983, 429-34.
422. See Woodcock 1972, 76; Aschheim 1992, 252; Pütz 1988, 17.
423. Aschheim 1992, 271. Cf. Zapata Galindo 1995, for an extensive account of the Nietzsche reception in the Weimar Republic. This work suffers, I think, a lot from failing to take Aschheim’s studies into consideration and, thus, to sharpen the edge of its problematic.
424. See Woodcock 1972, 68-70.
425. See Wilson 1972, 53, for such a judgment.


428. See Bratton 1943, 234-5.

429. Bentley 1944, 9 & 35 & 134.


434. See Bratton 1943, 234-6.


438. Reyburn 1948, esp. 385-7. Cf. Lang 1941, 875 & 880, for Nietzsche, “the fanatist of truth” with “uncanny clairvoyance” having been “grossly misunderstood”.

439. See Kaufmann 1950, esp. Prologue and Epilogue.

440. See Woodcock 1972, 71.

441. See Lucas 1971, 10.

442. See Collins 1972, 124.


446. See Stoev 1973, 100.


449. See Berndtson 1950, 377.


455. See Mayer 1951, 518.
457. See Lonsbach 1985, 76-7, who considers, p. 72-4, Nietzsche as close to eugenicists, yet opposed to nationalists. He takes the goal of Nietzsche’s “cultural biology” to have been a “creative European master race”.
458. van den Berchen 1989, 77.
462. See Hoffmann 1993, 51, for this judgment.
466. Heidegger 1941/2, 84.
467. Derrida 1984a, esp. 6-7.
469. Derrida 1984b, 93 & 98.
470. See Kadarkay 1991, 56-7, on Lukács’s early view of Ibsen and Nietzsche as the greatest prophets of the times. His work on modern drama, from 1919, was heavily inspired by Nietzsche.
472. Ibid. 170-350.
473. See Naake 1985; Malorny 1989; Gedö 1990; Sziklai 1990 for some of the last East German accounts. Such Western critics as Bernstein 1987 and Detwiler 1990 stress, to a considerable extent, similar passages from Nietzsche as Lukács had done, and their general interpretative stance is fairly close to his, although Berstein and Detwiler do not endorse, say, historical determinism or Marxist vocabulary. See Ottmann 1983; Jung 1990 for detailed criticisms of Lukács’s work.
477. See Roberts 1988, 211.
482. See Revel 1992; Pütz 1988, 17.
488. Cf. Van der Will 1989, for a critical article on the American reception. See also Behler 1988, 133-77, for an account of the American developments from Kaufmann onwards.
489. Land 1992, xii. See also Hirschberger 1976, 521, on “the fair amount of Nietzsche literature” as but *gebranntes Wasser, Artistik und Interessant-macherei*. What sets Hirschberger apart from Land is that, for him, the redeeming thing about this is that the said features make the commentaries similar to the original texts.
493. Lampert 1993, 125 & 441.
494. See Krummel 1974, 59.
495. See Falckenberg 1912, 6 & 496-8.
496. Dilthey 1898, 109-12 & 117, mentions Schopenhauer and Mommsen as Nietzsche’s companions in the philosophical change. When it comes to the artistic pessimism, Dilthey relates Nietzsche to Byron and Leopardi.
497. Eucken 1898, 788 & 792 & 796.
499. Webb 1915, 186.
501. See Busse 1917, “Vorwort”, mentions Nietzsche, as well as, Fechner, Mach, Dühring, Haeckel and Wundt as philosophers that are reviewed in other books by the same publisher.
502. Randall 1920, 507 & 607-8 & 610-1. For a Nietzsche experts view on Durant, see Shapiro 1987, 31, saying that "Randall should be celebrated simply for the several ways in which he succeeded in shaking and displacing this "German" model of the history of philosophy [as the "handmaiden of academic advancement" (Randall)], although there is, of course, much more to his work."

503. Durant 1926. I am using a Finnish translation from 1956, so I withdraw from supplying direct quotations and page numbers.


505. Alhberg 1927, 159 & 178; Salomaa 1935-6, 170 & 252-4.

506. Friedell 1927-32. I am using a Finnish translation from 1955, so I withdraw from supplying direct quotations and page numbers.

507. von Aster 1932, 357.


511. Bochenski 1947, 9 & 122 & 158.


513. Brinton 1950. I am using a Finnish translation from 1964, so I withdraw from supplying direct quotations and page numbers.


517. Lamprecht 1955, 397-401.


524. See Schjelderup & Winsnes 1959, esp. 167.


526. Erdmann 1930, 663, speaks about, p. 683, "dithyrambic idolatry of life". See also Berndson 1950, 375, for an article on Nietzsche in Ferm's anthology.
534. See Iovtshuk & Oizerman & Shtshipanov 1982. I am using a Finnish translation, so I withdraw from supplying direct quotations and page numbers.
544. See Krummel 1974, 67. Brasch’s work was *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart*.
545. See Müller-Freienfels 1913, 68-9, who goes on to oppose Nietzsche’s poetic and von Hartmann’s scientific approach.
546. von Hartmann 1901, xiv.
548. Magee 1983, 264 & 270-1. See also Young 1992, 3: “Schopenhauer [...] remains the crucial figure to an understanding of Nietzsche.”
549. Land 1992, 8.
550. See Hollinrake 1982 for a rare study on Wagner’s substantial impact on Nietzsche’s work and, in particular, on *Zarathustra*. Cf. Fischer-Dieskau 1974. Magee 1968, 75-8, makes it clear that Schopenhauer was indispensable for Wagner, too.
552. See Meyer 1950, 493.
554. See Lesser 1987, 36.
555. See Krell 1991, 37.
556. See Mencken 1908/1913, 256.
557. See, for example, Scruton 1981, 192.
558. See Barkuras 1962, esp. 53. Cf. also Braun 1912, 103.
560. See Porter 1993, 41.
561. See Kaulbach 1990, 9.
564. See Kloch-Kornitz 1963, esp. 586.
570. See Wuthenow 1989, 64 & 74-7.
577. See Dickopp 1972, 259-61.


588. See Barnes 1937, 197.


595. Ibid. 40-3.

596. Stegmaier 1990, esp. 99


598. See Soll 1969, 12 & 41-2, for both points of contact.


600. See Westphal 1979, 206-7.


603. Quinton 1982, 44.

604. See, e.g., Fuller 1938, 441.


606. See Behler 1988, 184.

607. Arendt 1958, 172 & 313 note 76.

608. See Kolakowski 1982, 135.

609. See, for example, Mayer 1951, 509.
See, in particular, Stack 1993, 163-7. Cf. Mencken 1908/1913, 51, for an early recognition. Thatcher 1972b, 32 note 6, mentions Schopenhauer, Lichtenberg, Emerson and Thoreau as the philosophers to be remembered for their anti-academic stance.


See, for example, James 1902, 39 & 295-7.

See, for instance, Dewey 1939, 250, where Nietzsche’s “ethics of power” is explicitly rescued from “the crude from often alleged”.

See, e.g., Berndtson 1950, 376: “His instrumental theory of knowledge presages recent pragmatism.” See also Volkelt 1918, 302 note 1; Moog 1922, 43; Müller-Freienfels 1923, 71-2; Bloch 1977, 330. Cf. Habermas 1969, 234-5. Cf. also Mardersteig 1988, 332, on the Italian pragmatists Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezolini who drew from both Nietzsche’s perspectivism and its “secret ally”, its “obvious counterpart”, William James’s pragmatism. A case of its own is F.C.S. Schiller who developed a kind of pragmatism with an eye on James, Bergson, Mach, Ostwald, Jerusalem, Schultz and Eucken. See Schiller 1907, x-xv, for his view on the situation where “[i]n Germany alone the movement seems slow to take root eo nomine”; this preface is dated as follows: “Sils Maria, September 1906”.

Oehler 1987, 58.

Rescher 1977, 303-4.

Mistry 1981, 197.


Malorny 1989, 188.

Volkelt 1918, 365.


See Moles 1990, e.g. 61, on Boscovich. Moles does not even mention, say, Dühring or Spencer, and is not striving for any comprehensive historical reconstruction of the issue. The importance of his book lies, in the main, in its argument for Nietzsche’s having been, p. x, highly “interested in scientific thinking of his day” and having “read much scientific literature”. One might say that Moles manages to make a case for the urgency of the kind of reconstruction needed to balance onesided interpretations of Nietzsche’s work.

Löwith 1933.


See Collins 1972, 72; Susser 1981, 8-11.

See, for example, Seiler 1974; Duvall 1989.

See, for example, Phillips 1987.
637. See Revel 1992; Deleuze 1967; Ricoeur 1965; Behler 1988, 184-5.
642. See, for example, Eden 1983, xix.
647. Love 1987, 55.
649. See, for instance, Lessing 1908/1914, 84; Behn 1927, 142 & 147.
650. See Franz 1917, 1. For other examples, in Britain and France, of this persistent triple, see Bailey 1989. Cf. Cattell 1972, 201, on the connection between Fichte, Nietzsche, Gumplowicz and Treitschke; Bloch 1977, 282, on the one between Hobbes, Machiavelli, Nietzsche and the fascists.
651. See, for instance, Müller 1984, esp. 49-51 & 102.
653. Yovel 1989 II, 104-35, esp. 134; cf. I, 164-5. For a review of Yovel’s book, see Schacht 1992, who welcomes the philosophico-historical “revaluation and rewriting”, yet remarks that, since Hegel and Marx were teleologists, while Spinoza and Nietzsche weren’t, it may not be possible to tie the group together all too neatly.
656. Stack 1981, esp. 72 & 84.
657. Gadamer 1941.


662. See Williams 1988, 403, who speaks of both “[t]he Wittgensteinian criticisms of Nietzsche”, and “the Nietzschean criticisms of Wittgenstein” as, ultimately, “sound”, since they “hit home” in unmasking the impossible ideal of “complete mastery” presupposed by both thinkers.


664. See, for example, Strong 1975; Zitko 1991, 5; Parkes 1991, 455.


666. See Brafman 1994, 53.

667. See Han 1984, 290.


674. See Fekete 1987, xvi.


676. See “Gesamtregister” in KSA 15, 273-367.


678. See Krell 1983, 272.

679. Heidegger 1936/7, 4-6 & 278.


683. Ibid. 162 & 251.
Heidegger 1940, 85.

691. Chassard 1988, 16-24; cf. also David 1992, for a detailed differentiation of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s concepts of metaphysics.


694. See Landolt & Simmonds 1991.


696. Heidegger 1941/2, 71; cf. Heidegger 1939, 164, where it is said that, in Nietzsche, “life” refers, at times, to the whole of Seiende and, at other times, to the distinction between organic and inorganic, and, at still other times, to human life.


699. See Grogin 1989, 3. Binet’s description was reserved to materialists and mechanists.

700. See Ziegler 1900, 102.

701. Jackson 1991, 113-7, is making an analogy between Nietzsche’s and Marx’ critiques.


704. Schmidt 1984, 13 & 137. Cf. Schmidt 1985b, 18: “In short, Nietzsche is not a metaphysician: he tries to criticize metaphysics with the language of metaphysics” and employs paradoxes to convey both the inadequacy and the usefulness of metaphysical construals.

705. Vetter 1926, 159. Vetter holds, p. 310, that there is an affinity between Kant’s critique of “the metaphysics of reason” and Nietzsche’s critique of “the metaphysics of will”.


709. Ibid. 187-8.
710. Scott 1990, 32.
721. Ibid. 147-55 & 451.
723. Sartre 1943, 4.
724. See Foucault 1983, 32.
725. Marcel 1955, 137.
726. See Zapata Galindo 1995, 124. See also Michel 1939, 111 (cf. 113-5), on the prophetic skills of Nietzsche who “previewed that one must soon think about “governing the earth”“ and “sensed the necessity to think in terms of greater spheres of power”.
728. Allen 1953, 49.
729. Wilson 1958. I am using a Finnish translation, from 1958, and withdraw from supplying the relevant page numbers.
732. Friedman 1967, 244-5.
735. For such interpretations, after the 50's and 60's peak years, see, for instance, Murchland 1977. See also Crowell 1987, 12: “The focal point of Nietzsche’s reflection is human existence as such [...]”. Cf. Martin 1989, 10, on nihilism as “Nietzsche’s fundamental existential experience” calling for (p. 329) “a visionary philosophy which intuited a mode of human existence that engaged the phenomenal world, for the first time in history, as an end-in-itself, and with a creative fullness and meaningfulness in which these highest human potentials were at last realized”. Cf. also Riker 1991, 12.

736. I am thinking of books such as Strathern 1996, 10, where the Jaspersian credo is reformulated like this: ”Nietzsche’s actual philosophizing is brilliant, persuasive and incisive as any before or since”.


739. For an extremely rare overview, see Fischer 1982, esp. 259-60.

740. Schlick 1927, 113; 1928, 131; 1910, 141; 1933/4, 196.

741. Neurath 1981 (1938), 826; (1945), 995; (1938), 882; (1921), 182; (1933), 598; (1936), 692 & 697; (1938), 887.

742. von Ehrenfels 1990 (1922), 273-4, says this to balance what he feels as troublesome in Nietzsche’s “thinking excess [gedankliche Exeeß]” or his “reception of the senseless doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all events”.


745. Carnap 1928, 88-9 (§ 65) & 226 (§ 163), other thinkers mentioned to represent the modern founders of the problem of the self include Avenarius, Natorp, Driesch and Schlick.

746. Frank 1917, 230-3, credits Kleinpeter for the establishment of the Mach/Nietzsche linkage.


748. Danto 1964, 387.

749. The fresh anthology, on the Origins of Logical Empiricism (eds. Ronald N. Giere and Alan W. Richardson. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis & London 1996), remains quiet over Nietzsche. The same goes for Michael Dummett’s Origins of Analytical Philosophy (Duckworth, London 1993), where there is nothing on Mach, Neurath or Frank either. Michael Corrado’s book, The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. Background and Issues (American Library Association, Chicago 1975) fails as well to mention Nietzsche. In other words, these three works putatively concentrating on the ‘origins’ and ‘background’ of a philosophical current that ran from certain 19th-century philosophers through Schlick and Carnap to Austin and other famous analyticians, could well be attested for their neglect of a significant element of that which they attempt to reconstruct.

750. Smith 1989, 30-1.


754.Anscome 1959, 12.
757.See Stack 1981, on Nietzsche and Roger Boscovich; Weinert 1986, for the analogy between Boyle’s stance and Nietzsche’s nominalistic criticisms; Bearn 1987, 63, for the possible Faraday connection; Schmidt 1988, on Nietzsche and Maximilian Drossbach; Seigfried 1990, on the relationship between Nietzsche (and Heidegger) and Heisenberg. Cf. Schacht 1983, 19-20, for a view of Nietzsche’s attitude towards science.
758.Moles 1990, xi.
759.Pörn 1977, 82. Cf. also Bennett 1985, 90-1, who quotes Nietzsche on the “corruption of reason” before attacking Davidson’s “rationalist interpretation of the practical syllogism” and offering his own, action-based account.
760.One of the first contributors to this problematic was Robert C. Solomon with his article “Nietzsche as Analytic Philosopher”, Modern Schoolman, Vol. 48, 1971, 263-6. Cf. Wilcox 1987, for an overview of the American discussion on Nietzsche’s epistemology.
763.See van der Will 1989, 1018; Ackermann 1990, 10.
764.Clark 1990, x. Cf. West 1985 (originally 1981), for an article where Nietzsche is compared to Quine, Davidson, Goodman, Rorty, Kuhn and Sellars.
766.See Cattell 1972, 75. For similar views in the earlier reception, see Vygotski 1930, 180; Bratton 1943, 234-6.
775.See Makell 1993.
776.See Reboul 1974, 15.
780. Lämmert 1988, 60.
782. Silk & Stern 1981, 346-7. Cf. Newman 1983, 32-3: “Nietzsche’s fundamental insight is that truth - or rather meta-truth - is inseparable from art. And the artist is, paradoxically, the most truthful of human beings - for the very reason that he does nothing but lie innocently. [...] Artistic creation, because it is true to itself - its own true conditions - is the truest kind of truth.”; Brogan 1984, 356: “For Nietzsche, art and truth also exist in an essential unity. But in their divergence, the priority of art is affirmed.”
784. Kirn 1907, 57 & 61-70.
785. Nehamas 1985a, 3-4.
787. Megill 1985, 2-9 & 33-4 & 64 & 84.
788. Pylkkö 1993, 189-90. Cf. Losev 1975, 206, on Nietzsche as both a contributor to the absolutization of the aesthetic sphere and as a critic of aestheticism.
790. Freud 1914, 53 & 1925, 86.
791. Adler 1908 & 1926, 24 & 130.
792. Jung 1934/1939 I, 97-8 & 335 & 391.
793. See Wehr 1982, 21.
795. Ventura 1975, 142.
806. See Mandel 1988, xxvi.
808. von Winterfel 1910, 1 & 15.
815. Aloni 1989, 301.
819. Vetter 1926, 8; Ulmer 1962, 12. See also Tanner 1986.
828. Deleuze 1962, 158.
830. Palmer 1975, 326.
831. See, for instance, Fairlamb 1994, 1: “[...] a postmodern crescendo of skepticism that began with Nietzsche, if not with Romantic challenges to the Enlightenment.” An anthology edited by Clayton Koelb, *Nietzsche as Postmodernist* (State University of New York 1990), contains contributions for and against the linkage between Nietzsche and the postmodern.


839. Megill 1985, 100-1.


842. Foucault 1966, 342. See also Volkelt 1918, 295, for an early comment on Nietzsche’s critique of “anthropologism in the concept of truth”. Cf., however, Schacht 1989, 885-91, for the view that Nietzsche is to be seen as standing for the “anthropological turn in philosophy”. According to Schacht, his works require “the context of philosophical anthropology”, he is to be seen as marking not the death of humans but the “rebirth” of them and, thus, the “awakening of anthropology”. Cf. also Reboul 1974, 161-2, who quotes Foucault and comments: “The death of God signifies the death of man, of man as subject and as person. With Marx and Freud, Nietzsche denounces bourgeois humanism that proclaims egality, individual liberty, human dignity, in order to mask the most hypocritical and inhuman oppression. [...] However, bourgeois humanism is superior to the contemporary antihumanism, since its practice can be condemned on its proper criteria. Repress criteria, reject human dignity, and everything is allowed. [...] Undoubtedly, Nietzsche’s antihumanism is more complex than the one of his modern admirers. [...] The whole of Nietzsche is a pathetic waiting for the human being, for the superior individual who embodies everything that is happy in humanity and all of its promises. [...] one could turn his own criticisms against him

843. Ibid. 305 & 298.


845. Bell 1984, 189 & 193.


849. See Dixsaut 1986, 83.


852. See, for example, Reboul 1974, 24-5.


854. Redner 1986, 159-60.

855. See Moles 1990, 57.


860. See Figl 1980.

861. Gadamer 1983, 339; Gadamer 1941, 357.

862. See, for example, Sondag 1971, 349; Palmer 1975, 323-6; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 86-7.


866. Lenk 1993, 77 & 100.

867. Cf. Palmer 1982, for an overview of hermeneutics with a recourse to Nietzsche’s reassessments in France; Palmer 1989, for a discussion of Nietzsche’s availability in post-structuralism, with a special emphasis on De Man.

868. Cf., however, LaCapra 1983, 164 & 318, on Foucault and Bakhtin.


874. See Thomsen 1985, for a critical article on Nietzsche’s role within the modern feminist literary theory.


876. Ibid. 44 & 84.

877. See Nutt 1995, 204.

See Whitford 1991, 123 & 133.

Irigaray 1980, 24 & 29 & 118.

Mortensen 1994, 135 & 141.

Irigaray 1984, 13.


Kennedy 1987, 181-2 & 198. See also Schlüpman 1984, 129-33, for a reference to Dohm’s book *Die Antifeministen* (1902), where Nietzsche is being condemned.

See Schlüpman 1984, 134-7 & 151. Cf. Zapata Galindo 1995, 53, for a different piece of information: Stöcker’s interest is said to have been in the Nietzschean social darwinism of eugenics and breeding.


Nutt 1995, 205.


Staten 1990, 1 & 178.

Diethe 1988, 865 & 869 & 871.

Schutte 1984, 3-4.

Ormiston 1984, 179.

Burney-Davis & Krebbs 1988, 869-71.

See von Ehrenfels 1990 (1913), 411.

See Mayer 1951, 505.

Weischedel 1975, 256.


Sokel 1980, 442.


Strong 1975, ix.

906. Brose 1990, esp. 7-29.
909. Cassa 1979, 304.
913. See, for instance, Houlgate 1986, ix. Cf., however, Böhringer 1982, 54-5, for a view that Nietzsche had a considerable use for political economy.
915. Barth 1945, 262.
916. Ibid. 278-82; Funke 1974. Cf. also Gadamer 1980, for a reference to Ideologiekritik.
917. See, for example, Brose 1990, 81, for a reference to Heidegger as the one who already appreciated the connection between Nietzsche and, in particular, Thukydides.
919. See Stell 1987, 256.
920. See, for example, Houlgate 1986, 10 & 29-30; Hunt 1991, 26-31.
923. Ansell-Pearson 1986, 502 & 497. Cf., however, Rosen 1987, 125 & 137, for a comparison that turns for Strauss’s favor.
931. von Winterfeld 1909, 2 & 7.
932. See Fistetti 1981, 10 & 38-9; Weiß 1993, 17.
935. McGill 1944, 587.
937. Schmidt 1985c, esp. 71-3.
938. See, for example, Sax 1989.
942. Rose 1984, 1 & 89-90.
943. Heidegger 1939, 312; 1940, 69-71; 1941/2, 77ff.
944. See Miller 1990, esp. 474-8 & 484-5. See also Jodl 1882/1906/1920, 53, for an early account of Nietzsche’s “ethics of power and cruelty”.
946. Cf. Pojman 1994, 335, for such a view, even if hesitantly expressed.
950. See Jodl 1918, 113 & 403.
951. Garnet 1969, 82.
954. See, for instance, Midgley 1972, esp. 206 & 227.
957. Ibid. 5.
959. MacIntyre 1985, 259.
960. See Leiter 1997 for a comparison between Nietzsche and recent Anglo-American moral philosophers.
964. Maritain 1953 (1942), 104.
967. Salomé 1894, 88.
968. See Diet 1972, esp. 118-42; Small 1982, 41. Cf. also Deleuze 1962, 163.
969. Kolakowski 1982, 199 & 211.
970. See Bochenski 1947, 198.
971. Cf. Kitcher 1982, 186-7 & 195, for a critical account of the creationist Henry M. Morris’s views on, among others, Nietzsche’s sins as a “dedicated evolutionist” and “anti-Christian” “forerunner of Hitler”.
973. See Asmus 1992, 15.
992. Roberts 1988, 211.
994. Steiner 1895, 20-32 & 54.
996. See Haaparanta 1988, 490; cf. Poellner 1995, 1: “There is, in the works he published himself, relatively little that would qualify as a respectable argument of one of the sorts standardly recognized as such by most philosophers.” See also Rosen 1989, 226: “Nietzsche does not argue; he sings and dances.”
1002. de Man 1979, 153-4.
1004. See Baynes & Bohman & McCarthy 1987, 5.


1017. Lyotard 1974, 308.


1020. Ulmer 1962, 9 & notes 2 and 3.


1022. Rappaport 1993, 75-6 & 83 & 83-4 notes 1 & 2. Rappaport’s main point, argued independently of Putnam or Nietzsche, is that “metaphysical relativist need not be a relativist about truth”.


1033. Blumenberg 1986, 259-64.


1035. Gadamer 1965, 10-1. See also Gadamer 1975, 499, on Nietzsche’s “critique of the illusions of self-consciousness”.


1042. See Benrubi 1928, 22-3.
1044. Danto 1985a, 190.
1047. Tauber 1994, esp. 12-23 & 230-61. Note, however, that Tauber is not emphasizing the antimetaphysical: on the contrary, he describes, p. 232, Nietzsche as “the consummate metaphysician of the active self”. Tauber’s general aim is to show that, p. 201, “[t]here is an extraordinary parallelism in fin-de-siécle concepts of the self in psychology, art, philosophy, and our subject, immunology”.
1052. Magnus 1983a, 304.
1054. See Moles 1990, x.
1055. Volkelt 1918, 288-92 with notes.
1062. Houlgate 1986, 80. For a critique of Deleuze, see ibid. 1-8.
1065. Ibid. 24-5 & 28.
1066. Ulmer 1962, 7. Cf., for example, Houlgate 1986, 3, on Nietzsche as “extremely wideranging” thinker, on the “notorious complexity” of his thought and on the way it has inspired “many varied and often contradictory interpretations”.


1070. Moles 1990, x.


1073. Derrida 1971c, 263.


1080. Foucault 1988, 33. The words are taken from an interview published in 1983.


1083. Schmidt 1985a, 6.

1084. Danto 1985a, 386. Danto also discusses the similar difficulty with Chuang Tzu.

1085. Heidegger 1940, 18 & 22.


1088. Kofman 1973, 146. Cf., further, Kofman 1979, 10-12: “My project is polemical. [...] It continues to irritate all those who love settled [tranchées] categories, who would wish to arrange them in determined places, in [...] the history of philosophy conceived as linear, rational and necessary development. [...] This book would like to underline the essential affinity that Nietzsche perceived between the theater and the theoretical [...]”

1089. Pautrat 1972, 162.


1095. Ibid. 107 & 137 & 299-301.
1096. Ulmer 1962, 8.
1098. Derrida 1968a, 17-8. Cf. Derrida 1967a, 411: “[...] to arrive sooner to my principal theme - the determination of being as presence in each and every sense of this word.”; Derrida 1983, 9-10: “[...] That will be my theme. More than a theme, a task [...]”.
1099. Ibid. 43 & 45 & 48.
1100. Bataille 1945, 7-8.
1104. Ibid.
1105. Rosen 1987, 73.
1115. Rosen 1987, 126.
1116. See, in particular, Hugly 1987; Tanesini 1995a.
1117. For a good example, see Wilcox 1986, on the problems of discussing Nietzsche’s potential assent or dissent to the correspondence theory of truth.
1119.Ibid. 162.

1120.To be sure, Pippin straightforwardly speaks (ibid. 160) of Nietzsche as “maintaining an anti-realist position”, although he does not commit him to the no-truth postion or to the “Protagorean view” that “the predicate ’true’ could never be ascribed to any individual’s assertion without the qualification ’true-for-him-at-that-time’”. However, the attempt to immerse Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge deeper in the contemporary quarrel between realisms and anti-realisms had to wait until Clark 1990, in which the possibilities of a minimal realist assumptions acceptable for Nietzsche were experimented with. Like Pippin, Clark was very critical to the notion of ‘imposition’ or ‘falsification’.

1122.Ibid. 162.
1123.See Stack 1983, 31-2, on the structurally conceived “uniformity in forms of thought and language that [Nietzsche] believes has determined what he considers Western man’s cognitive-linguistic scheme”. Yet, as Stack concludes, Nietzsche would probably have attacked the scientism in structuralism.

1124.Eucken 1879, 10-1.
1125.Ibid. 48 on the Romans.
1126.Ibid. 143-4.
1127.Ibid. 219.
1129.Ibid. II, 147.
1130.Russell 1912, 82-4.
1131.See Desmond 1986, 100.
1132.Ziegler 1900, 194.
1133.Schutte 1984, 203 note 5.
1134.See Boas 1957, 552.
1136.See Houlgate 1986, 1.
1139.See Jodl 1916 (1905), 391 & 393 & 404-5.
1140.Adorno 1956, 18-9, 28, 178.
Kuhn 1992, 71-9 & 266-7. Cf. Sarup 1989, 17, for a view that Nietzsche had philosophical reasons for not claiming to be in possession of a system.

Acknowledgement 1990, ix & 7.

Mach 1905, 137.

See Silk & Stern 1981, esp 54, for Wagner’s art theories as Nietzsche’s background. Cf. Rosenstein 1970 for a comparison of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s views on tragedy and metaphysics. Rosenstein says that while Hegel is about to accord art and aesthetics a crucial role in the Gesamtwissenschaft of being, Nietzsche can accept no such comprehensive science.

See Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859, “Vorrede zur ersten Auflage”, 7-8, for the undermined status of system. Despite his cautious words, Schopenhauer 1850, “Vorwort”, 7, feels free to call his masterpiece “systematic”. - F.A. Lange may count, in this issue, as even more important impulse for Nietzsche. It was in 1866 that he discovered Lange’s book on the history of materialism, the “beutendste philosophische Werk, was in den letzten Jahrzehnten erschienen ist” (KGB I/2, August 1866, 159-60 & November 1866, 184). What is said in the last chapter of the part two - although it appeared not until 1875, it is referred to in Nietzsche’s notes (N esp. Frühjahr 1884 25 [318], KSA 9, 94) - captures a good deal of Nietzsche’s interest in the matter: “The universe [Weltall] as conceived [begreifen] merely in terms of natural science can inspirit us as little as Ilias spelled out. But when we grasp [erfassen] the whole as unity, we bring, in the act of synthesis, ourselves within the object, as when harmoniously shaping [gestalten] the scenery, in the act of Anschauung, no matter how much disharmony it may conceal in its details. All combining [Zusammenfassung] follows aesthetical principals, and each step toward the whole is a step toward the ideal.” (Lange 1875, 986).

Cf. Eckermann 1835, 131-2 & 536.

See Volkelt 1918, 516-22.


See Pelikan 1985, 58.

Ahlberg 1927, 178.


See Schmidt 1985a, 6.

Shapiro 1989, 2.

Derrida 1984a, 12 & 14-6.
1164. Cf. Eckermann 1835, 655, for Goethe’s attack on the notion of composing.

1165. See Pelikan 1985, 36.

1166. Emerson 1836, 53-6 & 82.


1168. See Micraelius 1662, for the entry “conceptus”.


1170. Sartre 1957, esp. 10-7 & 30-3 & 74.


1175. Ibid. 226 & 219.

1176. Ibid. 219 & 222.


1178. Ibid. 220 & 222.

1179. Ibid. 236-7 & 244 & 252 & 256-7.


1188. Jung 1912, 180, goes on to claim, let us say, in a Nietzschean way, that “[F]unctionally, the concept corresponds to the magical names that take the object under their power. In this, object is not only made harmless, but taken as a part of the psychical system. The meaning and power of human spirit is, thereby,


1192. Emerson 1836, 47.

1193. See Pelikan 1985, 58.


1195. Ibid. 1-6 & 191.

1196. Ibid. 11 & 162-4.

1197. Ibid. 166-7 & 170 & 176-7 & 184-95 & 217.

1198. Ibid. 181-3 & 220.

1199. Ibid. 198 & 31.


1201. In what follows, I will be relying on Menge-Güthling and *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (see Bibliography).

1202. Stöhr 1911, 13.

1203. The Oxford English Dictionary: “conceive”. The passage goes on:”The development is thus partly parallel to that of CATCH--, which word may be substituted for *conceive* in some uses.” In what follows, I will be relying on this dictionary.

1204. See Micraelius 1662, entry “conceptus”.

1205. See Walch 1775, for *conceptus* as a Begriff “of something [einer Sache]” or as “what the more recent philosophy has named” Idee.

1206. Eucken 1879, 57-8 & 52.

1207. Ibid. 88 & 98 & 104.


1210. Ibid. 1879, 208-9. Cf. also Haller 1971, on Kant’s crucial contribution.


1212. Windelband 1914, 420, on the Begriff “of being” as the Inbegriff alles Wirklichen.


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See, for instance, Haller 1971, on concept as the “hardly overestimable achievement of Socratic thinking”.

See Copi 1958, 42-44. Cf. Haller 1971, on, in particular, the scholastic separation between, *terminus conceptus*, *terminus prolatus* and *terminus scriptus*.

Micraelius 1662, entry “conceptus”.

See Pawlowski 1980, 23.

See Weitz 1988, 232-55. Ryle’s most important work is *Concept of Mind* (1949); Weitz’s comment, p. 238, reads: “Even the title of the book indicates that Ryle’s primary concern is with the concept, not the nature of mind. Philosophy as analysis shifts to philosophy as elucidation of concepts. (Contrast, for example, Russell’s title, *The Analysis of Mind*, with Ryle’s.)” Cf. Gram 1968, 194-9, for an “alternative approach” to concepts as “rules”: “Two people discover that they possess the same concept when they discover that the descriptions they give are exactly similar. And finding this out does not demand that one person compare his act of awareness with that of another. It requires only a knowledge of the rules and conventions of language - all of which are public. This “regulist solution” is an improvement, says Gram, because it does not endorse the Fregean idea of perceiving concepts as a simple apprehension, that is, it “does not duplicate the problem it was supposed to solve. We are not given a relation to concepts that is just a repetition of the relation in which we stand to perceptual objects.”

Geach 1957, 12-7 & 40 & 44.


Haller 1971.

Sellars 1963, 313-7 & 115.

Ross 1990, 3.

Kauppi 1967, 9-10.


Ibid. 179-89.

Copi 1958, 40.


Husserl 1913 I, 215-25.

Ibid. 243-5.

Weitz 1988, esp. 264-5.


Wittgenstein 1960, § 71.

See Matlin 1984.

1236. Ibid. 109.
1238. Mach 1905, 126-7 & 141.
1239. Ibid. 129 & 133-4 & 141-4.
1241. Mach 1885, 264-5.
1242. See Langacker 1990, 61.
1243. See Keil 1989, 5-23, for a brief summary of the traditional developmental view and critical assessments by contemporary cognitive theorists.
1244. See Klausmeir 1984; Matlin 1984.
1246. Ibid. 27.
1250. See Gauker 1993, 105-10.
1253. Ibid. 140-8.
1254. Ibid., esp. 152-3.
1256. Ibid. 309-11. Note that each of these principles include, in Burge’s presentation, one to three substantial corollaries.
1257. Ibid. 312-8.
1258. Ibid. 318-25.
1260. Ibid. 48-51.
1261. Dewey 1930, 141 with note 1 & 159-60.
1264.Freund 1930, 10-13 & 59.
1265.Külpe 1923, 7.
1268.See Pawlowski 1980, 102-3 & 111 note 16, on Carnap as the initiator of 'explication'. In his article of 1980, von Wright already modifies his position in relation to Carnap. It is perhaps best to say that von Wright's extensive output is not reducible to the analytical idiom in the narrow sense. In 1995, he gave an interview (niin&näin 2/1995), in which he told about his coming gradually to think that not only his well known publications - such as The Logical Problem of Induction (1941), Über Wahrscheinlichkeit (1945), Deontic Logic (1951), The Varieties of Goodness (1963), Explanation and Understanding (1971) and Freedom and Determination (1980) - but his extensive writing on a variety of literary, historical, cultural and ecological issues, almost solely available in Swedish and Finnish, are to be counted as philosophy.
1269.Schlick 1913, 149.
1273.Freund 1930, 20-1 & 103. The one doubting concepts, named in Freund’s text, is not Bergson but the German Hans Driesch.
1274.Eucken 1879, 24-5.
1275.Ibid., e.g., 16-8 & 41 & 49 & 72-75 & 89 & 131 & 136-7.
1276.Ibid. 58.
1277.Ibid. 11.
1278.Ibid. 100.
1279.Ibid. 178.
1281.Ibid. 144 & 163.
1282.Ibid. 162-3.
1283.See Benrubi 1928, 23.
1284.Mach 1905, 142-3.
1285.Müller-Freienfels 1922, 297.
1286.Ibid. 184-5.
1287.Ibid. esp. 269 & 277.
1288.Ibid. III-IV.
1289.Ibid. esp. 10.

1290.Ibid. 186.

1291.Ibid. 11 & 87-8. Cf. Müller-Freienfels 1927, 24 on “concrete concepts” as “schemes [that are] conceptions [Zusammenfassungen] of the sensually given” and, further, 245 on “the real, lively concepts” residing in “real thought as instruments” as opposed to the “artificial abstractions exempt from any life that the school logic speaks about”.


1293.Ibid. 94-5.

1294.Cf. ibid. 219-20 for types of Wirklichkeit that do not come down to Unwirklichkeit: there are the Sonderwirklichkeit or Nebenwirklichkeit of the arts, the Überwirklichkeit of religion and the Innenwirklichkeit of the solitary person.


1300.Ibid. esp. 21-9 & 36-7 & 198 & 205-6.

1301.Ibid. 190 & 196.


1303.Ibid. 4.


1306.See Funch 1997, 65, for the “newer arts of conceptual character”. Funch discusses both the recent theorists, such as Paul C. Vitz and earlier ones, such as Rudolf Arnheim. It is, p. 100 & 133-4, Arnheim’s idea of “visual forces” as “a precondition for concept formation” that Funch goes on to problematize, since it seeks to preserve the integrity of “sensitivity” by affirming its “spontaneous” character. Funch says that, on the basis of this, the emergence of concept formation and knowledge this are apt to “repress or inhibit” sensitivity and “not facilitate” it.


1308.See Lucies-Smith 1984.


1310.Klages 1930, 72 & 76 & 79.


1312.Copi 1958, 43.
1313. Whewell 1856, 253-6 (§ 24-29). I have come to think Whewell as an indispensable figure in the philosophy of science through the work of my professor Ilkka Niiniluoto.


1315. Whewell 1856, 253 (§ 24).


1317. Eucken 1879, 11-32.

1318. Ibid. 38 & 49-73.

1319. Ibid. 86-97 & 5.

1320. Ibid. 96 & 138-162.


1322. Ibid. xiii & 1 & 60.

1323. Ibid. 42 & 52.


1325. Cf., however, Weitz 1988, xvi-xvii: "Indeed, this query about the history of philosophical theories of concepts as a single subject much resembles similar worries expressed by those who question the very possibility of a history of (philosophical) theories of tragedy [...]. Here, too, the argument has been that there can be no such history because there is no single subject. Tragedies differ and moralities are too diverse to yield any univocal meaning of 'tragedy' or 'morality'. All the historian can do is to trace the diversity. It is therefore a conceptual illusion to suppose, for example, that Greek tragedy or Aristotle’s theory of tragedy and, say, modern tragedy or Schopenhauer’s or Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy, are historical points in the same continuum, that can serve as a single subject for the philosophical elucidation of tragedy. [...] Like all writers on the history of tragedy or theories of tragedy [...], I do not find this scepticism persuasive. For the multiplicity of use of [...] 'tragedy', or, in my case, 'concept', need not capitulate to the despair of ambiguity. Instead, this multiplicity itself offers a single subject of the unfolding of a concept in all its challenging disparateness of conflicting criteria for its correct use, whether that concept be that of tragedy, [...] or concept itself."

1326. Leff 1977, 78.


1329. Ibid. IV & 44. Cf. Müller-Freienfels 1921, 139; Müller-Freienfels 1927, 419.


1331. Freund 1930, 148 & 139.


1333. Ibid. 81-4.

1334. Ibid. 84-8.
1335.Ibid. 89.

1336.Ibid. 90.

1337.Ibid.


1339.Eucken 1879, 7.

1340.Ibid. 8.

1341.Gadamer 1971, 94.


1345.Husserl 1913 II/1, 3-5 & 211-23.

1346.See Messer 1926, 225-8.


1349.Ibid. 7-8 & 30-1 & 35.

1350.Ibid. 8.

1351.Ibid. 175.

1352.Freund 1930, 40.

1353.See Muelder & Sears 1940, 312.

1354.Ibid.


1356.Peirce 1905/1958, 166.


1363. Marx 1879-80, 362-75.
1364. Little 1986, 110.
1365. Marx 1837, 11 & 1839/1842, on Epikur.
1366. Marx 1863/1867, 142-3.
1367. Toulmin 1972, 201-12.
1368. See Mink 1972, 170-2.
1373. Ibid. 153.
1374. Deleuze 1962, 1.
1375. Eucken 1897, 7 & 167 & 190-1.
1376. Ibid. 214 & 165.
1377. See Hacker 1996, for a very critical account of, not only Kuhn, Feyerabend and Davidson but, the possibilities of doing philosophy with the help of such notion as conceptual scheme.
1378. Feyerabend 1965, 130-1 plus note 57.
1383. KSA 4, 412-3.
1385. Fink 1960, 7-8.
1387. Montcriol 1982, 4-6 & 23.
1396. Ibid., esp. 9 & 27.
1405. Ibid. 24 & 53 & 60 & 169 & 209.
1406. Collins 1987, 120.
1410. Ibid. 91-111.
1414. Zunjić 1987, 162.
1417. See Derrida 1968, 9, on *différance* as the condition of conceptuality and, p. 18, as Nietzsche’s principal way of fighting grammatical metaphysics. Cf. Rosen 1987, 7: “Restricting ourselves here to *différance*, we could say as an introductory approach that Derrida radicalizes Kantian spontaneity and
entirely detaches it from concepts or rules.” See also Derrida 1974, 6-10, for notes on Hegel’s efforts to separate concepts from words (p. 9): ”Language would not be what it is in (it)self, conformably to its concept (Begriff), to what in it conceives itself, grasps, takes possession of itself, catches and comprehends itself, elevates itself, leaves with one wing stroke [d’un coup d’aile] the natural ground and carries off its natural body.”

1420.Roberts 1988, 224.
1421.Heidegger 1939, 187. Cf., however, Müller-Freienfels 1922, esp. 11-2, 86-109, for an explicitly lebensphilosophisch, and even irrationalist, account of thinking that, nonetheless, seeks to determine the concept of concepts anew, as a kind of dispositional Aktionzentrum no longer opposed to life.
1422.Vetter 1926, 244-52.
1423.Ibid. 10 & 304 & 43 & 196-8 & 236.
1424.Ibid. 304.
1425.Ibid. 218.
1426.Ibid. 9.
1428.See Frey 1975, 63.
1429.Ibid. 7.
1432.Ibid. 1-2 & 38 & 129 & 211.
1433.Ibid 225; cf. also p. 217
1434.Ibid. 35.
1435.Ewald 1903, 12, 70-81 & 122.
1437.Ewald 1903, 8.
1439.Ibid. 614.
1440.Ibid. 516.
1441.Hübscher 1985, 200-1, says that Wittgenstein employs Goethe’s concepts without subscribing to their organic connotations.
1443. See Eckermann 1835, 531.
1444. Ibid. 373.
1445. Ibid. 194-5.
1446. Ibid. 275.
1447. Ibid. 374.
1448. See Eckermann 1835, 214-5 & 274.
1451. Kant 1781, A 320/B 377; cf. Weitz 1988, 147, who starts, too, from this “crucial terminological passage in The Critique of Pure Reason”.
1453. Ibid. A 138-42/B 177-81.
1454. Ibid. A 50-1/B 74-6.
1456. Ibid., e.g., B 165-8.
1458. Ibid. 181-2.
1459. Kant 1781, A 66/B 91.
1462. Kant 1790/1793, 12.
1463. Ibid. 6-7 & 13 & 41 & 49 & 51 & 55 & 60-1.
1464. Ibid. 78 & 188.
1465. Ibid. 9-12.
1466. Rosen 1980, 44.
1467. Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859 I/2, 527 & 533 (Anhang).
1468. See Rosen 1969, 72: “The modern project to master nature begins in Cartesian pride and ends in the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the nihilism of Nietzsche.” As for Weitz, cf. chapter IV.
1469. Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859 I/2, 555 (Anhang).
1470. Ibid. 556 (Anhang).
1471. Ibid. I/2, 580 (Anhang).
1472. Ibid. I/1, § 21-2, 154-5.
1473. See Jacquette 1996, 2-7, for a fresh summary of what is commonly seen as the core of Schopenhauer’s teaching: “the metaphysics of appearance and will”.
1475. Ibid. I/1, § 9, 72-5.
1476. Ibid. I/1, § 9, 75-86.
1477. Ibid. I/1, § 13, 98.
1478. Ibid. II/2, § 31 (Vom Genie), 448.
1479. Kant 1786, 324.
1480. Lange 1866 I, 12, is not referring to Whewell at this point. However, a little earlier in the text, p. 10, he criticizes Whewell for doing less than justice to deduction in general and to the Aristotelian school in particular. Whewell is Lange’s constant reference point and, in a crucial passage, II, 467-8, he explicitly praises the merits of Whewell in assessing induction and criticizing Mill in the case of conceiving planetary motion.
1481. Lange 1866 I, 59.
1482. Ibid. I, 43.
1483. Ibid. I, 43 & 56-7 & 59 & 65.
1485. Ibid. I, 382-3.
1487. Ibid. I, 396 & 404 & 412 & 423-5. Lange’s quotation is from Goethe’s *Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit* (1811-1814, 1833). There is the thick volume number two in Lange’s *Geschichte*, but since it appeared only later (1875), I shall not try to draw out its implications for the issue of conceptuality.
1488. Spir 1873, v & 3-4.
1489. Ibid. 33-79.
1490. See on the German philosophical situation Engels 1888; Schnädelbach 1983.
1491. See Pöggeler 1970.
1493. Ibid. 56.
1494. Hegel 1827, 5.
1495. Hartmann 1923-9, 570-2.
1497. See Maier 1971.
1498. Ibid.
1499. Rey 1971, 100.
1502. Vattimo 1974, 44.
1507. Ibid. 66-9.
1508. Ibid. 90-4.
1509. Gerhardt 1992a, 75.
1511. Rey 1971, 100.
1513. Zunjić 1987, 162.
1515. Warminski 1991, 104 & 111-4. Cf. Heckman 1991, 318: “the text enacts precisely the predicament it describes”, since it “argues for the anthropomorphic status of all knowledge even as it shows this in its rhetorical strategy”.
1516. Herder 1772, 46; cf. also p. 117, for the fragment on the excuberantly metaphorical nature of the “first languages”.
1520. Héber-Suffrin 1988, 6. Cf. p. 100 on “all the fundamental concepts of Zarathustra: / - TRANSMUTATION (§ 1), that is, Death of God (§ 2), Destruction of the ancient values (§ 3) +
Creation of the new values or the creative Nihilism (§ 4 and § 9). / - WILL TO POWER (§ 4); / - ETERNAL RETURN (§ 10); - NIHILISM (§ 5) of the Last Human, Nihilism of the higher human (§ 6) and Nihilism of the human (§ 8)."


1522. Cf. Gopnik 1998, 102: “explanation is to cognition as orgasm is to reproduction”.


1524. Deleuze 1990, 6. This text was originally published in 1973.

1525. Emerson 1836, 24-5 & 44 & 49 & 82.

1526. Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859, I/1, § 31, 448 & I/1, § 10 & 9, 86 & 72.

1527. Shapiro 1989, 35.

1528. Ibid. 36 & 41.

1529. Ibid. 70, where the points about germs, genesis and notebook are also repeated.

1530. Ibid.


1533. Kaufmann 1950, 199.

1534. Ibid. 189.

1535. Theaitetus 148d-151e (Plato, The Dialogues of Plato 1871).

1536. Menexenus 237e-238 (ibid.).

1537. Symposium 206c-207 (ibid.).


1540. Ibid., esp. 22.


1543. In depicting the mythological Dionysus I have relied here, in this and the following two columns, on the contradictory and complementary accounts by Guthrie 1950, 145-82; Grimal 1951, 138-40; Graves 1955, 103-10; Guirand 1959, 155-63.


1546. Frazer 1890/1915, 391.
1547. See McGinty 1978, 82.
1552. See Reifenrath 1976, 277-85.
1553. See Foster Jr. 1981 for an extensive treatment of the Nietzsche inspired role of Dionysus in Lawrence, Malraux and Mann.
1554. Cf. Bürger 1983, 72-77, 143-4. A passing but all the more interesting remark about Nietzsche’s Dionysos is made by Maud Bodkin in a treatise on the psychology of poetry. Before quoting Geburt on the issue of dance and rhythm, Bodkin 1934, 21 (cf. also p. 83), characterizes, in the way I can only appreciate as supporting the basic orientation advocated in the present study, Nietzsche as the one “who knew at once the intoxication of the artist and the analytic urge of the philosopher”.
1555. See McGinty 1978, 34.
1557. Frazer 1890/1915, 386.
1558. Frazer 1890/1915, 387.
1562. See McGinty 1978, 181-95, the notable difference between Dodds and Guthrie being that the latter accepted the metaphysical enterprise involved in the Dionysiac religion as legitimate, while the former sought in the verifiable phenomena of Dionysianism the locus of the peculiarly Greek sense of the irrational.
1563. Benedict 1934, 78-80. For the subsequent discussion among anthropologists, including divergent views to the effect of what is to count as distinctively Dionysian character of a people, see McGinty 1978, 2-3.
1564. Cf. Ballarini 1975, 100-1, on the metaphysical-cum-existential significance of the tragedy for Nietzsche.
1565. Ross 1980, 783. Cf. the more considerate judgment of Janz 1978 III, 32: “In any case it [identification with Dionysus] is not to be carelessly excluded from “madness”. With it Nietzsche set a symbol for a fact that dominated his life and thought, about which we lack clear awareness.”
1566. See Grimm 1985 throughout; Salaquarda 1974, 296.
1569.Soyinka 1972, 142.
1571.See Ross 1980, 687.
1575.Brose 1990, 13. Cf. Janz 1978 I, 368, on Dionysus’s political dimension as related to discussions with Jacob Burckhardt on the Franco-Prussian war. It is here, Janz maintains, that Nietzsche’s later “tragic prophesies of forthcoming wars between nations and ideologies” find their origin, “not as his wish, but as tragic insight”. According to Janz, Dionysus has “the fearsome double essence that, on the one hand, provides happy fervor of life [Lebensrausch], while on the other hand it draws with itself as its consequence the guaranteed destruction [Vernichtung]”.
1576.Stauth & Turner 1988, 149.
1579.See Janz 1978 I, 390, on the reading Nietzsche’s early drama synopsis on Empedocles and Corinna as preceding the later Dionysus/Ariadne texts. Janz confirms the idea of Ariadne as Cosima Wagner, Theseus as Richard Wagner and Nietzsche himself as Dionysus.
1581.See, however, a different viewpoint expressed by Bürger 1983, 74, for whom Nietzsche still remains close to idealistic metaphysics of art “that Schiller had formulated as “ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst”“.
1583.See Barrack 1974, 115-6, on Apollo as merely “the appearance of the Dionysian Ding an sich”, and Dionysos as the symbol of the Schopenhauerian Will. Cf. Decher 1985, 111, note 3, on this long line of interpretation.
1584.See Fink 1960, 7-35; Giacoia 1987, 29-89. See Schulte 1991, 315-36, for an account of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole in terms of artist metaphysics.
1585.See Staten 1990, 188, on the importance of the Nachlass for Paul de Man’s and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s deconstructive readings.
1587.See Soyinka 1972, 158.
1588. See Ansell-Pearson 1987, 325, 335, on Dionysus as “radically” this-worldly. According to Ansell-Pearson it is most destructive for the understanding of Dionysus to treat it as analogical to Kantian and Schopenhauerian constructions. Cf. also Allison 1985; Brogan 1991; Havas 1995, 57-9.


1590. White 1990, 33; for the whole argument see 26-38.


1593. KSA 14, 412-3.

1594. Pfeffer 1972, 35-6. Cf. McGinty 1978, 1, for a congruent formulation of Dionysus “as a central focus on modern man’s attempt to define his own authentic humanity.”


1596. Goethe 1833, 563.


1598. Desmond 1985, 246. Concerning the general background of Nietzsche’s first book, Desmond’s reference is surely invaluable. More recently, Richard Schacht 1995 has also emphasized Schiller’s role in making sense of Nietzsche’s (‘s Zarathustra). For my part, I would like to make the following points about the overall Schillerian impact on Nietzsche’s initial problematic of Dionysos. In his “Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen”, Schiller discusses the notion of Naturstaat and the related idea of political bodies as being “originally lead by forces, not by laws”. He thematizes the unfortunate event of bifurcation of the human capacities, the “harmonic powers” of “intuitive and speculative understanding”. Moreover, he speaks about the “antagonism of forces” as “the greatest instrument” in the disposal of a culture. Schiller goes on to say that reason itself should “become a force”, “a drive”. There is no third concept, says Schiller, that grounds both the sensual drive and the drive to form, but, nonetheless, their interplay does reveal a Spieltrieb connecting the object of the former (“life”) to the object of the latter (“Gestalt”) in the object of lebende Gestalt. (Schiller 567, 574-6, 580, 592, 597-8.) The stress on the forces, powers and drives, on the release and taming, on the tension and interchange and on the rethinking of rationality - all this clearly has a great relevance for Nietzsche’s undertaking.

1599. This is observed by Staten 1990, 187: “the structure of its [GT] fundamental distinctions is deeply influenced by Schiller’s definition of the “naive” and “sentimental”, concepts which, Nietzsche declares in a manuscript note, he means to “heighten” (steigern) so as to correspond to the metaphysics of will and illusion”. Staten uses the old Musarionausgabe. It is useful to quote the entire passage from the KSA to test Staten’s paraphrase: "Begriff des Naiven und Sentimentalischen ist zu steigern. Völlige Verschleierung durch Trugmechanismen ist “naiv”, die Zerreissung derselben, die den Willen zu einem Nothgespinst nöthigt, ist “sentimentalisch”. (N 7 [173], KSA 7, 206.) Staten’s reference is rare and invaluable. I would only doubt the idea of “heightening” Schiller’s concepts. In an important sense, what is at stake is not only the question of matching the grandeur of a superior metaphysics, but also the question of intensifying conceptual grip on the problematic to the point where the other half of Schiller’s distinction loses its credibility. I think this aspect emerges from the more direct reference to Schiller in a notebook passage which is unrecorded by Staten and given by myself in the text below.
1600. See KSA 14, 31.


1602. Jung 1920, 154 & 524, specifies, p. 154, that Nietzsche can be used to bring about the distinction between rational *Denk- und Fühltypen* or *Sinnes- oder Empfindungstypen* and the aesthetical *intuitive* type.

1603. Jung 1951, 41-44.

1604. Jung 1902, 97.

1605. See Kant 1781.

1606. See, for instance, Hamlyn 1989, 275. Needless to say, the “risk” mentioned has more to do with “twisting”, or at least crudely simplifying, Comte’s philosophical methodology. All the same, I assume that the comparison results in an improved understanding of Nietzsche’s first book.

1607. See *New Larousse* 1959, 93-5.

1608. In his account of the Greek mythology Graves 1955, 103-10, even goes on to state that Dionysus was a half-god, in a sense that Apollo never really ceased to be a part of him. This Nietzschean remark stands out from the rest of the literature as a relatively daring one.


1610. Soyinka 1972, 147.

1611. Hope Moncroft 1907, 49.

1612. This is an expression that McGinty 1978, 55, obtains from Erwin Rohde.


1614. Mach 1905, 161. See section III.c above.

1615. Klages 1921, 79.


1617. See West 1981, 250.


1621. Husserl 1913, 214 § 58.


1626. Not only is das Unheimliche Freud’s famous term for a crucial literary aspect. It is also the word associated with Nazism, as in Karl Jesko von Puttkamer’s study Die unheimliche Seele. Hitler und die Kriegsmarie, Wien 1952. In Nietzsche’s time, ‘the uncanny’ as the opposite of being at home was a familiar notion, as the title Friedrich Gerstäcker’s book testifies, Heimliche und unheimliche Geschichten I-II, Leipzig 1862.


1628. Buckley 1885, iii.


1635. See Saint-Sernin 1996.


1637. Rauschning 1938.

1638. See, however, Bonniers konversations lexikon 1951; Der grosse Brockhaus 1955; Collier’s Encyclopedia 1984.


1640. Kopf 1988, 12, for the specification that Nietzsche was not the archfather of nihilism but a thinker who was to recognize it first and who “tried to find a way to bring it to its overcoming”.


1643. See Bourdeau 1892, 287-8.

1644. See Blaser 1965, 1.

1645. See Flam 1959/60, 228.

1646. See Grue-Sörensen 1937.

1647. See Phillips 1987, 76.


1657. Eco 1964, 361.

1658. See, for instance, Brandell 1943, 19, on the useful side in the compellingness of nihilism forcing one back to basics; Thielicke 1951, 195, on the impossibility of viewing nihilism that he, esp. 77-100, likens with atheism and objectifying humanity; Rauschning 1954, 7, on the Überwindung of nihilism that, p. 14, he conceives as a modern Verfallserscheinung to be met in a plurality of fields; Mayer 1958, esp. 5 & 472, on the transitory character of nihilism that he, p. 436, traces in scientism; Arendt 1969, 353, on the chance for overcoming as the simultaneous chance to overcome idealism; Levin 1988, on the opening of vision made possible by nihilism.

1659. See Kraus 1983, 159.
1672. See Wein 1963 & Thom 1964 on determining the inauguration of nihilism.
1673. See Jaspers 1976, on nihilism “as old as philosophy”.
1674. See Gillespie 1995, 289 note 18, on dodging Elisabeth Kuhn’s work.


1680. See Dittrich 1926, 175 & 274.


1682. See Pöggeler 1970.

1683. See Kraus 1983, 81.


1687. See Kraus 1983, 161; Skolimowski 1984, 133-41.

1688. Berkeley 1948, 44, 47, 59 & 77.


1694. Gadamer 1941, 357-60.


1696. See Trésor de la langue française 1986.

1697. See esp Wagner Cho 1995, 206-211.


1700. See Beiser 1987, 30.


1702. See Levin-Goldschmidt 1941, 10; Van Doan 1975, 9; for the erroneous assumption that Jacobi was the first one to use the term. See Beiser 1987, 81; Wagner Cho 1995, 213; Critchley 1993, 3; Gillespie 1995, 65, for the view that Jacobi came up with philosophical use of the concept.


1704. Jacobi 1799, 44; 1801, 174-5; 1815, 15.

1705. See Wagner Cho 1995, 16.


1708. See Rosen 1968, 94.

1709. Weisse 1835, 462-3 note.


1711. Wagner Cho 1989, 217, 219, uses a couple of Schlegel’s remarks, but does not try to locate his contribution outside the critique of Hegel or the alleged confusion between nihilism and nihilianism. Gawoll 1989, 15-18, uses Schlegel as a link between scholastic debate on annihilatio and modern discussion on nihilism emphasizing the shared ”horror before nothingness” (Schreck vor dem Nichts). Both commentators stress Schlegel’s identification of nihilism with oriental pantheism.


1716. Ibid. Bd. XIX 77 & 310 & 50 & Bd. XVIII, 27.

1717. Ibid. Bd. XIX, 314 & 533 & 77-8 & 84 & 93 & 78 & 134. Cf. Bd. XIX, 147, on the ancient German Ritterkrieg as “a very laudable and wise preliminary exercise for the first Vernichtungskrieg”.

1718. See Lexikon der Pädagogik 1954.


1720. von Baader 1826, 21.


1723. Auerbach 1846, 184-91.
1724. See, e.g., Stack 1977, who begins his book from Kierkegaard’s treatment of irony and sees in this (esp. p. 43) the problem of nihilism in Kierkegaardian terms; Dreyfus & Rubin 1987, 33-75, who concentrate on the Kierkegaardian question as to how an individual can have commitments in a nihilistic culture.

1725. See, for example, Trojansky 1990, 114.


1728. See Hamilton 1846. See also Rothenstreich 1980, 46-57. For a rare reference, in a general encyclopedic work, to Hamilton, see Dizionario enciclopedico italiano 1958.

1729. Mill 1979, 134 & 151.

1730. See Wiltshire 1975, 183-185. “Administrative Nihilism” was the title of an article by Huxley in 1871.

1731. See Russell 1889, 36-38.

1732. James 1879-1880, 171.


1735. James 1876-1877, 129.


1737. See Peirce ca 1890, 17, on the denial of reality and on Hamilton’s “stupid” words about Reid’s conception of memory. See also Peirce 1903, 52-3 note 1, for a systematizing of various standpoints.


1740. See Moser 1964, 18; Stief 1969, 139; Treadgold 1973, 184-5.


1742. See Turgenev 1862, 47 & 84.


1744. See, for example, Lovell 1998.

1745. See Goerdt 1984b, 257.


1748. See Frank 1986, 52.
1749. See Kuhn 1992, 24 note 25. See also Herzen 1962, 445, for his later, still pro-”nihilist” but anti-labelist, estimation.

1750. See, for instance, Bauer 1890, 306-8, on nihilism as a peculiarly Russian threat to Germany.

1751. See, esp., Tyras 1986, on Dostoevsky reception; McLean 1977, esp. 210-9, on Leskov. Cf. Moser, 1964, 68, on Dostoevsky as the principal Russian antinihilist author; Hingley 1978, 97-8, on Dostoevsky’s almost unqualified hatred for leftism; Fuchs 1987, 17-8, on Dostoevsky’s Christian alternative to nihilism.

1752. Wilde 1880, esp. 144, on the way the main character underlines the need to “annihilate”.

1753. See Schédo-Ferroti 1880, 2.

1754. Ibid. 5 & 12 & 268 & 332 & 6 & 13-4 & ch. XI.


1757. Ibid. 368-370.


1759. Ibid. 2-6.

1760. Ibid. 6-7 & 157-206.

1761. Ibid. 7-8 & 207-301.

1762. Ibid. 399-401.

1763. Oldenberg 1888, 43-44 note 2.

1764. Ibid. 44-9 & 177 6 183-184.

1765. Ibid. 189-199.

1766. Wilde 1880, 640.

1767. Horn 1882, 3 & 482 & 67 & 477.

1768. Althan 1882.


1771. See for this term Schaeder 1946/7; Moser 1964, 16-7; Hingley 1967, 255; Stief 1969, 62-136; Szamuely 1974, 180 & 210; Freeborn 1982, 7.


1773. Marx & Engels 1873, 227-9 & 242; Marx 1871, 420.


1775. See Edie & Scanlan & Zeldin 1965, 10.


1781. See, for example, Batalov 1977 & the Progress anthology on Frankfurt School Philosophy 1978. I am using Finnish translations and so I withdraw from exact notation.

1782. See Bourdeau 1892, 297-308; Cobham Brewer 1894; Hingley 1967, 256-9; Christensen 1969.

1783. See Treadgold 1973, 185; Edie & Scanlan & Zeldin 1965, 6-7.

1784. van den Berchen 1989, 75.

1785. See Copleston 1986, 117.

1786. See Pipes 1990, 139.


1789. See Stief 1969, 147.


1791. See Woodward 1986, 161-188.


1794. See Anikin 1988, 178; Copleston 1986, 103-5.

1795. Coquart 1946, 11.

1796. See Miller 1947, 326.

1797. See Pipes 1990, 139.

1798. See Anikin 1988, 183.

1799. See Utechin 1963, 113.


1803. See *Trésor de la langue française* 1986.
1804. See Tuck 1990, 34.


1806. See about this, and generally, the most reliable encyclopedia entries: Riedel 1978; Müller-Lauter 1984.


1810. Levin-Goldschmidt 1941, 45.


1812. See A Dictionary of Philosophy 1996.


1815. See Freeman 1946, 328 & 353.


1817. See Barkuras 1962, 137.

1818. See Popper 1945, 72, 116-8 & 184.


1821. Goldman 1986, 70.


1824. See Belliotti 1987, 151-2; Deschamps 1990. Cf. Comte-Sponville 1990, on the one and only consistent form of nihilism, that is, the extreme scepticism concerning the worth, not the existence, of anything.

1825. See Quine 1987, 239, who says this (cf., however, Quine 1960, 133: “An indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has especially invited confusion, real and feigned, is ’nothing’, or ’nobody’. As tired humor [...]”) under the entry “zero”. The inviting nature of negation and nil may stem from the fact that all numbers are ciphers. Where Horace said “nos numerus sumus”, Luther added that the Pope is turning the bishops into “Ziffern”. The later Roman zero is allied to the Arabian çifr and, further back, to the Sanscrit çûṇja-s, or emptiness, nil. Arabs filled in the Indian symbol of the little circle and made into a point, which still has negative force in, for example, the French idiom point du tout, “nothing at all”. For these issues,
see Kleinpaul 1888, 439-40.

1826.See, for instance, Wolenski 1995, on the relationship between the model-theoretic existential assumption and non-existence; Martin 1995, on the neoplatonic contribution to the logic of existence and negation; Antonopoulos 1993, on the relationship between the law of the excluded middle, on the one hand, and the 'neither-nor' statements and states, on the other; Charron & Doyle 1993, on the medieval debate on self-refutation and truth.


1829.See van Inwagen 1990, 72-4 & 236, on nihilism as the position denying all “composite material objects”.

1830.See O’Leary-Hawthorne & Cortens 1995, 145-5, who start from Quine’s notion of “ontological innocence” to develop a stance that “repudiates ontology altogether”.


1832.See Butler 1988, 17-8.


1835.See, already, Cohen 1904, 42.


1839.Wright 1994, 328.

1840.See Höffe 1979, 288-293.

1841.de Beauvoir 1974, 75-90 & 186. Cf. McInerney 1982 on “Sartre’s basic ontology of the nihilating of the In-itself.”


1849. See Popper 1976, 194-195, on “five philosophical theories”: determinism, idealism, irrationalism, voluntarism, nihilism; Goodman 1984, 30-3, on the strange interdependence of monism, pluralism and nihilism; Putnam 1983, 298-300, on the nihilism inherent in positivism & Putnam 1987, 29-30 on the destruction of metaphysical foundations; Nagel 1986, 146, on objective nihilism.


1856. See Thi elicke 1951, on atheistic and politically dangerous nihilism with essentially existentialist characteristics.

1857. See Asmus 1990.


1859. See Welch 1985, 207-228.

1860. See Weischedel 1971 I, xix.


1862. See, for instance, Brinkmann 1967, esp. 156.

1863. See, e.g., Sedlmayr 1955, 56; Short 1976, 295; Kraus 1983, 47-78.

1864. See, for instance, Balser 1965; Hamburger 1983; Wolf 1988; Mertens 1990.


1871. See Jaspers 1922, 284-348.


1874. Jung 1932, 128.


1877. See Rauschning 1938.

1878. See Poole 1991, 89.


1881. See Dembo 1989, 4-6, 207.


1885. See Leyton 1979.

1886. See Figl 1989, 466.


1888. Ibid., 21-37.

1889. Ibid. 22-3.

1890. See, for instance, Lurker 1984, 262-4.

1891. KGB II/4, 175. The letter is from Carl Fuchs and the poet referred to is J.N. Vogl.

1892. Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859 I, 408-12 § 71. This is the last passage of the basic text in Schopenhauer’s Hauptwerk.


1895. See Lang 1963, 880.
1896. See Bergman 1987, 146, as the only commentator to my knowledge who has checked the von Baader/Hoffmann connection.

1897. See Kuhn 1992, 39-40 with notes.

1898. See Buterin 1996, 134, on nihilism being, for Nietzsche, a “highly personal affair”.

1899. Wagner 1881-3, 1106.


1901. See Ray 1986, for an estimation of the typicality of Nietzsche’s views on Russia and the Russians as well as for an account of his contacts with them.

1902. See Jacobsen 1956, 17, 21-5, 30-7 & 37-43, on the lasting issue of nihilism in Dostoevsky; cf. Dawydow 1982, esp. 502, 509, 600, 609-12, for a defence of Dostoevsky as feeding a resolutely anti-Nietzschean and anti-nihilistic thought. For an account of Nietzsche’s coming across Dostoevsky, see Miller 1973.

1903. Cf. Rosen 1968, 65, on nihilism as boredom or “world-weariness or the loss of interest which comes from unending repetition”.

1904. See Pöggeler 1975, 198.


1906. Jaspers 1922, 304, more extensively 284-348. Cf. Jaspers 1976, 173, on nihilism as the necessary “form of thought and experience, the test of truth”.

1907. See Boutot 1987, 290-291.

1908. Heidegger 1936-1938, 139.


1911. See Heidegger 1941-1942, 25.


1913. See Vattimo 1990.


1920. See Rosen 1968, 86.
1921. Ibid. 64-65.
1922. Ibid. 66-67.
1923. Ibid. 69-70.
1924. Ibid. 73.
1925. Ibid. 81.
1926. Ibid. 78-79 & 90.
1927. Ibid. 84-85 & 94.
1929. Ibid. 146.
1932. Ibid. 288.
1933. Ibid. 290.
1934. See Wolf 1988, esp. 84, on Benn’s understanding of nihilism as the normal condition of the moderns, as a result from rationalism, and as an object of study more along the lines of tentation than of a systematic inquiry. Cf. Hamburger 1983, 207 & 242; Mertens 1990; Balser 1965.
1935. See Strauss 1953, 419-457, on nihilism as entailed by Weber’s idea of social science free of values.
1936. See Nishitani 1949, on rescuing Nietzschean analysis from Heidegger’s reading by centering on the what turns out to be a Buddhist insight into the original, embodied form of life after the self-canceling acts of negation and affirmation have been played out.
1937. See Camus 1951, on nihilism (p. 273) as the non-belief in what is, and the correlative tendency in negating the present in favor of an unknown future.
1938. See the texts spanning from 1947 to 1987 in Caracciolo 1994, on nihilism as (p. 75; 1976) marking the contemporary situation “in its profundity and in its superficiality”. Caracciolo considers Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought, and sees (e.g. p. 25) in Giacomo Leopardi’s work the fundamental thought of nihilism, which makes nihilism an indispensable concept in assessing modernity.
1939. See Severino 1988, 169-170, on nihilism as “the unconscious of Occident”. Severino names five cases: idealism as nihilism (seen by Jacobi), Christianity as nihilism (Nietzsche), science as nihilism (Heidegger), abstract intellectualism as nihilism (Hegel) and capitalism as nihilism (Marx). Severino goes on to say (p. 184) that “[t]he conviction that beings are nothing is madness in the extreme. The Occident is the history of nihilism, because it is the story of the belief that being oscillates between being and nothing.” It may be that Severino has written more extensively on nihilism than anyone else (in, e.g., Essenza del nichilismo; La filosofia futura; Téche. Le Radici della violenza). One of his special contributions have been to draw nihilism closer to Marxist analysis of alienation; see Severino 1992, 156: “The thinking of nihilism. The extreme alienation.”

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1946. Lukács 1952.
1948. See Graham 1992 & Halper 1993, for recent discussions on Nietzsche’s relationship with ’the rational’ and ’the reasonable’.
1950. Parejko 1969, 93-6, does not, however, mention Jaspers.
1951. See Amato 1982, 104-5.
1955. See Busch 1989, 27
1957. See Elsner 1992, 144.
1967. Luke 1978, 120. For the diametrically opposite view, see Allen 1953, 49, on Nietzsche’s alleged nihilism as a commitment to seeking for an affirmation.

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1972. See, for example, Ansell-Pearson 1991a, 201.
1975. For a good overview of the development of Heidegger’s attitude to the problematic, see Müller-Lauter 1996.
1977. See, for example, Bales 1986, 146.
1980. Ibid. 103; Heidegger 1941/2, 25 & 67; Heidegger 1954, 123.
1985. See Van Doan 1975, esp. 1-8. This is not to say that Van Doan's conclusive definition of nihilism would be in accord with Heidegger’s analysis: “Nihilism is the proof of insufficiency of existence in a double perspective: man can never arrive at perfection, - man feels himself disappointed before the perfect, infinite, absolute and that is nihilism”. It is not.
1993. Ibid., esp. 204-5 & 213; cf. p. 144-5.
1994. Ibid. 207-12.
1995. Ibid. 144-5.
2006. Ibid. 6-7.
2007. I think that an important part of the issue is that value theories were so fashionable during the first decades of the century. See Lessing 1914, vii, 54, 83-94 & 111, for one work, in that genre, that appreciates Nietzsche’s contributions. Cf. Jannoud 1989, 19, for an example of the way nihilism is still associated with the “dysfunctioning” values of modernity.
2009. One might as well observe how Deleuze 1962, 170, refers, on one and the same page, to god’s death and devaluation in order to briefly describe nihilism.
2010. Ibid. 180 & 218.
2012. Ibid. 241: “Thus Spoke Zarathustra is largely concerned with the question of what constitutes a satisfying condition of balance in an individual’s life.”
2013. See Aucejo Javaloyas 1995, esp. 44-48, for an interpretation of nihilism as having to do with the ‘death of god’ and the loss of values (Wertverlust).
2014. For an early appreciation of this connection, see Jaspers 1936, 246-7.

2021. See Forth 1993, 103-4. de Wyzewd’s article appeared in the conservative *Le revue blanche* in 1891.

2022. Biese 1893, 146 & 214-6


2024. von Hartmann 1901, xviii-xix.


2026. Paulsen 1913 I, esp. 152-6, 376-84, 426 & 462.


2028. See, however, Gebhard 1984, claiming that the “interest in ’nihilistic’ Nietzsche has disappeared” since the existentialist discussion in the 1950’s.

2029. See, for instance, Obenauer 1924, 22, on Nietzsche’s active, as opposed to passive, nihilism.


2031. Grün 1876, iii-iv & 1.

2032. Ibid. 37 & 54 & 61.

2033. Ibid. 38-9 & 53 & 55 & 91-2.

2034. Ibid. 55.

2035. Ibid. 367 & 371.

2036. Desilet 1989, 75.

2037. Deleuze 1962, 70-1 & 199.


2044. Ibid. 96-7, 121 & 263.

2045. Ibid. 9 & 268.

2046. See ibid., 2-9, for the preliminary methodological considerations.

2048. Ibid., esp. 56-73.


2050. Redner 1986, 159-60 & 182.

2051. Cf., however, Edwards 1990, 2, for a rather similar view of nihilism. Edwards relates nihilism to the situation where “we” and “our normal action” are separated by a “certain philosophical representation” that construes ‘social practices’ as ‘rules’ or ‘structures’ for “self-conscious” practisants. His principal goal is to study Heidegger and Wittgenstein from the point of view of conceiving language as a representation of rules to be followed by the language-users.


2053. Ibid., esp. 25-6.

2054. See Ansell-Pearson 1994, 1.

2055. Ibid., 7 & 34-5.


2057. See Skirbekk 1959.


2065. Ibid. 95.

2066. See Bloom 1978, 5, on the distinction of being “void of meaning” and taking “the void as meaning”.


2070. Saint-Sernin 1996.


2072. Saint-Sernin 1996.

2073. Lyotard 1988, 28-9. Cf. also Heftrich 1962, 247 & 264-9, for a view of the Nietzschean ‘phenomenology of nothingness’. The belief in a divinity that has created the world and somehow subsists
“outside” the world is nihilism because there is nothing that would not be a part of the world. The world, in turn, is construed as a perpetual becoming of no-things (in themselves). Yet, Nietzsche presents his will to power as the “being of becoming”, as the world of nothingness surrounded by nothing other than itself.

2076.See Aucejo Javaloyas 1995, 49.
2077.See Lavigne 1880, 107.

2080.Eucken 1879, 8, refers, to be sure, not to Nietzsche but to the possibilities he sees in identifying a thinker’s central interest and achievement by the means of concept historical research. I shall come back, in chapter III, to Eucken in an attempt to make sense of my chosen approach.

2081.Cf. Aucejo Javaloyas 1995, 44, on the “concept of nihilism” and the situation where “a central question imposes itself upon us”, namely, the “question of meaning [Frage nach dem Sinn]”.

2082.See Frank 1926, 29, on the Russian either-or of unbiased God fearing and relentless denial.


2084.See Aucejo Javaloyas 1995, 44-5, on the “circle of problems” of nihilism, death of god, genealogy, becoming and the overturning of Platonism, as well as on “nihilism in its entire problematic”.

2085.Derrida 1967a, 427. For the continuance of the problematization of centrality, in Derrida’s texts, see Derrida 1987, 70.

2086.Plotnitsky 1987, 139, goes on to add: “Perhaps Heidegger is right, and Nietzsche is as yet too close to us, too close to “attain the true center of philosophy” [An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim. Yale University Press, New Haven 1979, 199.] envisioned by Heidegger’s hope or despair. But then again, from Nietzsche’s prelude, the “Prelude to the Philosophy of the Future” (Nietzsche’s subtitle to Beyond Good and Evil), we might want to move in a different direction.”


2089.Hutcheon 1988, 12 & 16 & 41 & 58 & 60 & 73. Having very little use for textual support from Nietzsche’s writings, Hutcheon’s book is characteristic of the works tracing “Nietzschean” currents looming large in contemporary thought.


2091.Havas 1995, 24-5. Cf. other things referred to as central in Nietzsche’s work, 21 note 35 (distinction active/reactive) & 44 (membership in a culture making one immune to the Socratic demand for reasons) & 235 (response to the death of God; meaning of human life in the present age) & 238 (character of our commitment to truthfulness). See also Nehamas 1985a, 168: “The paradoxical interplay between creation and discovery, knowledge and action, literature and life is at the center of Nietzsche’s conception of the self”, and Higgins 1987, 241, about “[t]he central, “tragic” message of Zarathustra”. Even Derrida has once, in the context of the “epoch of presence [...] and its central vein from Descartes to Hegel”, referred
to his own deconstructive practice as involving the “central concepts [...] of presence and architrace” (Derrida 1967a, 293-4).

2092. See von Ehrenfels 1897, VIII, who is proposing, for the center, “[t]he availability of Darwinism in the field of ethics”. Cf. also Ziegler 1900, 200, on “the nucleus [Kernpunkt] of the Nietzschean philosophizing and moralizing”, that is, on his emphasis on being tough or brutal.


2094. This is not an entirely imaginary induction. I came to think of it, seriously, as I read Günter Grass’s book on his fears of the German reunification and his hopes for the decentralization. Although Grass does not discuss Nietzsche, he has a good deal of relevant points to make. Recollecting his younger days between the wavering “certainty of this Hitler Youth” and “other kinds of egocentric certainties - the unthinking, unfocused, yet intense desire to be an artist”, Grass 1990, 96-7, reallocates Adorno’s classic dictum about the barbarism in the idea of writing after the concentration camps as follows: “Auschwitz speaks against all this [purchasing power of the West German economy], because one of the preconditions for the terrible thing that happened was a strong, unified Germany. [...] We have every reason to fear ourselves as a unit. Nothing, no sense of nationhood, however idyllically colored, and no assurance of late-born benevolence can modify or dispel the experience that we the criminals, with our victims, had as a unified Germany. We cannot get around Auschwitz.” Or, in other words, p. 96: “Even if surrounded with explanations, Auschwitz can never be grasped.” Grass 1990, 66-8, had written, already in the mid-sixties, about the perspective of reunification and the ruling “policy of ‘all or nothing’” or the “schizoid nature of the policy”, in the Federal Republic, claiming the full representation of the German people while it “in reality pursues separateness”. Interestingly enough, he chose to describe the related ritualism of expressing the guilt of the Nazi empire by saying that: “We have lost the bigger picture.” Here, at least, is a writer who seems to think that giant monsters can only be fought by still more sizeable thoughts and emotions.


2098. Cf. GT 11, KSA 1, 76, on the “Mittelpunkt des dramatischen Interesse’s” & N “SudT”, KSA 1, 534 on the “Mittelpunkt des ganzen Dramas”.


2102. See Deleuze 1962, 214-6, for an interpretation of Nietzsche’s references to ears and labyrinths in terms of “the maze of affirmation”.

2103. Frye 1957, 118. Frye’s book contains a number of references to Nietzsche, neither of which is, however, developed into more substantive criticisms. Then again, for the present concerns, it is nice to see how Nietzsche is attached, p. 346, to “an all-round revolutionary philosophy”.


2105. See Jodl 1916 (1905), 391-2.

2107. Montcriol 1982, 5 note 3; 7 & 12.
2108. Ibid. 13 note 24; 14 & 16-23.
2109. Ibid. 10-1.
2110. Black 1968, 168 & 18-9. In this book, Black does not mention Nietzsche and the way he thematizes the need to avoid becoming discouraged by the labyrinthine is rather inconsistent. If language is presented as a labyrinth to wander through, it is, at the very least, a little inconvenient to talk about it, the next moment, as an “incomparable instrument” invented by our forefathers for us “to master its proper uses”. On a generous reading, Black can be said to pay attention to the linguistic realities as both ends in themselves and instrumentalist constructions, and if the latter aspect is more stressed, it is because he is interested in emphasizing “the profusion and variety of resources” in coming to terms with the haunting multidimensionality.
2111. Ibid. 215.
2113. Sellars 1956, sec. 63.
2115. For a different view, see Rosen 1989, 209-31, who emphasizes the loss of conceptualization, the victory of feeling over cognition and the sense of desperation in the Nietzschean labyrinth, all of which leads “to the unraveling of the text into an unending Ariadne-thread, or to an unending unraveling Ariadne-thread, which leads deeper into the labyrinth.”
2117. See Müller-Freienfels 1923, 66-7.
2118. See Krummel 1974, 7 for the fate of Rohde’s paper, 64 for the critic A.K.’s view of eccentricity & 37 & 45 & 54 for other Nietzsche reviews in Centralblatt.
2119. See ibid. 64 for eccentricity; ibid. 58 & 64 & 62 for J.V. Widemann’s, G. von Gizycki’s and J. Schlaf’s reviews in Der Bund, Deutsche Rundschau and Allgemeine Deutsche Universitätszeitung, respectively. For other instances of the early reception see above section II.a.
2120. See Pelikan 1985, 41.
2121. Mill 1859, 269.
2122. The fine book is David Farrell Krell’s and Donald L. Bates’s The Good European. Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image (University of Chicago Press 1998), the description is by Alain de Botton (“Books of the Year” feature, Sunday Telegraph), and the ad I saw stood in New York Times Book Review.
2123. The description is from Peter Gay’s book Freud. A Life for Our Time (1988), chapter 4. Since I have read only the Finnish translation, I withdraw from exact notation.
2124. See Woodcock 1962/1986, 121-2. One is clearly dealing with Woodcock’s favorite expression, since elsewhere in the book, p. 94, he refers to Charles Fourier as “the eccentric socialist”.

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2125. *Flachkopf* is the reproach reserved for Mill in Nietzsche’s texts (N Herbst 1887 9 [55], KSA 12, 362; N November 1887 - März 1888 11 [148], KSA 13, 70). Even in his earlier work, *Morgenröthe*, Mill’s views are ridiculed in the passing (M 51, KSA 3, 50). Interestingly enough, however, Nietzsche’s notebook sketches suggest that while he was working on the famous construction of will-to-power, Mill’s writings provided no negligible assistance, if only to be deplored (see esp. N Herbst 1887 9 [51], KSA 12, 360-1, for a lengthy quotation from Mill’s reflections on “die Sucht zu herrschen”).

2126. In Nietzsche’s notes, Emerson is even referred to as the *gedankenreichste* character of the 19th century (N Juli 1879 41 [30], KSA 8, 588 & Herbst 1881, 12 [251], KSA 9, 602). As for his correspondence, one can, for example, find the following comments: “Der *neue* Emerson ist etwas alt geworden […] Die früheren Essays sind viel reicher, jetzt wiederholt er sich, und schliesslich ist er mir gar zu sehr in das Leben verliebt. - “ (KGB Mai 1876, II/5, 164); “[…] ich Emerson wie eine *Bruder-Seele* empfinde (aber sein *Geist* ist schlecht *gebildet.*)” (KGB Dezember 1883, III/1, 463); “Ich weiß nicht, wie viel ich darum gäbe, wenn ich nachträglich bewirken könnte, daß eine solche herrliche große Natur, reich an Seele und Geist, eine *strenge* Zucht, eine wirkliche *wissenschaftliche Cultur* durchmachte. So wie es steht, ist uns in Emerson ein *Philosoph verloren* gegangen!” (KGB Dezember 1884, III/1, 573.) Cf. also section II.b.2 above.

2127. For this line of interpretation see Havas 1995, 189-190, incl. note 12, who is referring back to Cavell 1995. Havas unites Mill, Emerson and Kierkegaard with Nietzsche but observes that the last of them “tended in general to blame our morality rather than our reflectiveness for the difficulties that beset anyone who would, in the present age, be an individual”. Let it be said that neither Cavell nor Havas quote from Mill the passage on eccentricity or thematizes the issue in the specific terms of eccentricity.

2128. See Emad 1994, 194.


2130. See, in particular, Mill 1858; cf. also Mill 1859, 293.

2131. See Pelikan 1985, 40-56.

2132. See Clark 1990, ix.

2133. See Eucken 1879, 125. Running the risk of mingling two different thinkers I merely point out that there is, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little on Paracelsus, in Nietzsche’s texts, yet he seems to have profited from the great 16th century quack in coming to terms with pre-Socratic thinkers (see N Frühjahr 1873 26 [1], KSA 7, 571). Another reference is a note on “Paracelsi mirabilia”, on Paracelsus having revealed wondrous things that require from the listener “ein muthiges Herz wie ein Löwe” and “die unschuldige Geduld eines Lammes” (N Frühjahr-Herbst 1881 11 [111], KSA 9, 480).

2134. Minson 1987, 3-5.

2135. Emerson 1836, 63.

2136. Emerson 1836, 35.

2137. Ibid. 13 & 29 & 56 & 64 & 61.


2140. Ibid. 314.

See Hubbard 1958, 16-24, who discusses Nietzsche’s writings “Fatum und Geschichte” and “Willensfreiheit und Fatum” (not contained in KSA) with an eye on the Emerson translation published in the very same year, 1862, that is, Führung des Lebens by Mühlberg. The quotation about deity is taken from Tuerk 1975, 13. George J. Stack has recently translated Nietzsche’s two essays in English, see Stack 1993.


Poirier 1987, 36 & 73 & 86 & 193-4, counts Michel Foucault as sharing the problem.

Montcriol 1982, 18.

Pasolini 1975, 150-1.

See Harris 1975, for the entries “concentric”, “eccentric”, “eccentric fitting”, “eccentric load” and “echinus” in architectural jargon. Symmetry and nonsymmetry, being set on or offset from, are vital features of architectonic design both in aesthetical and engineering terms. Eccentricity in constructing is related to, for instance, the head and the shaft part of the column and its superstructure having a different central line.

See Parker 1846, for the entries “centering or centre” and “arch”.

See Vasari 1550/1568, chapter on Michelangelo in the third part of the book. I am using the Finnish translation, so I withdraw from a more exact notation. The original lines read: “Non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concetto./ Ch’un marmo solo in sé non circonscriva.”


Stavrou 1964, 12.

See Tuerk 1975, 10.

Emerson 1841, 280.

Emerson 1841, 286.


Deleuze & Guattari 1972, 21.

Ibid. 20-1. Cf. Scott 1990, 29-30, on the “rhythm of identity formation and identity decline” and the promise inherent in this: ”If the center of the emerging quality of identity affirms its own generative process and does not identify itself and its valence by reference to endurance and universal validity, and if it centrally affirms a decentering momentum, then the recoil of its power will not mean blind repression, self-sickening, and return of energy through regression.”


Cf. Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 12, on the “cyclical unity” as distinct from the “linear unity” in both Joyce and Nietzsche.

Eisler 1902, 58-9. The physiological research and theory construction was mastered by such younger contemporaries of Nietzsche as Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt’s pupil, Ottmar Dittrich 1903, 222-3, wrote about the functional setting of the nerves. He described the neural activity as an interplay between the center (“group of bodies of nerve cells characterized by the same function of their parts”) and the periphery.
(dendrites and fibres as the conducting extensions plus the peripheric ganglia). In each center, there are tracts or paths for intracentral, centripetal and centrifugal movements, and centers may effect each other as well as other cells than neurons. What is unclear to Dittrich, in the whole “functional relationship”, is the way in which some centers seem to be specialized in hemming and other in stirring action. In any case, the task of centers is either to excite or lame the system.

2161.Ibid. 76-7.
2163.Mach 1885, 20-1.
2165.This passage is also noted by Schmitt 1998, 20, in his account of the circle symbolism in Nietzsche.
2166.See Brock 1981.
2168.See KGB III/2, 308.
2170.See Rockmore 1986, 3-4 & 23-43.
2171.See Houlgate 1986, 9-10, quoting from Walter Schulz and Karl Brose, respectively.
2172.Sartre 1943, 13. Cf. his analogous treatment, p. 25, of the scholastic view of ontological statements: “But in actuality there is no vicious circle, for it is not necessary again to pass beyond the being of this meaning toward its meaning; the meaning of being is valid for the being of every phenomenon, including its own being. The phenomenon of being is not being [...] [B]ut it indicates being and requires it [...]”
2176.See Kurtz 1966, 23.
2177.Kant 1781/1787, 114 (B 68-69) & 131 (B 131-146).
2178.Schopenhauer 1818/1844/1859, I/2, 554.
2181.Althusser 1973, 71-2. This passage was suggested to me by my philosophical friend Mikko Lahtinen to whom I hereby express my gratitude.
2184. Ibid. 86-8.
2185. Ibid. 89-92.
2186. See Dumbrajs 1994, 2-4.

2187. For a recent attempt to bring Nietzsche’s work, though from another direction, in the context of modern physics, see Bhaskar 1993, 136.
2188. Pirsig 1974, 92.
2189. Ibid. 92-4 & 69-70.
2190. Ibid. 94-5.
2191. Ibid. 93.
2192. Roberts 1988, 224.
2193. Ibid. 224-5.
2194. Ibid. 222 & 224 & 226.
2199. See Neurath 1981 for essays from 1936 to 1938.
2200. Müller-Freienfels 1927, 481.
2202. Frank 1917, 233.
2203. Putnam 1990, 6-18, 52.
2204. See Putnam 1990, 6, for the funny announcement: “I want to do something which a true Kant lover might regard as virtually blasphemous: I want to begin this essay by mediating on a remark of Nietzsche’s. I trust that the remark is one that Kant would not have been offended by.”
2206. Another reader that comes to my mind is Jean-Michel Rey 1971.
2208. Baudelaire 1860, 256.
2209. See Ziegler 1900, 202.
2210. Kant 1755, 280-5.

2211. Cf. Deleuze 1962, 121-2, for a reference to this passage. Deleuze wishes to recover the positive sense of philosophers as a discontinuous chain of untimely critics, as a “broken chain” or a “succession of comets”.


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Abbreviations:


HEI = History of European Ideas, Vol. 11, 1989: “Nietzsches Influence on Contemporary Thought”.


ML90 = magazine littéraire, septembre 1990: “Le nihilisme”.

ML92 = magazine littéraire, avril 1992: “Les vies de Nietzsche”.


MTNF = Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (Book Series: de Gruyter, Berlin)

NS = Nietzsche-Studien (Yearbook: de Gruyter, Berlin)

RIFD = Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, LII, No. 1, 1975: “Dibattito su Nietzsche”.


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