Community, Power, and Colonialism
-The U.S. Army in Southern Arizona and New Mexico,
1866-1886

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Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XIV, on the 3rd of April, 2009 at 12 o’clock
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Abstract

Empire is central to U.S. history. As the U.S. projects its influence on a global scale in today’s world, it is important to understand that U.S. empire has had a long history. This dissertation offers a case study of colonialism and U.S. empire by discussing the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of the U.S. Army during the conquest of southern Arizona and New Mexico (1866-1886). It highlights some of the defining principles, mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism and shows how U.S. forces have in years past constructed their power and represented themselves, their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Using insights from postcolonial studies and whiteness studies, this work balances its attention between discursive representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), pays attention to silences in the process of historical production, and focuses on collective group mentalities and identities. In the end the army experience reveals an empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. White officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men not only wanted the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime but also colonial (mental/cultural) authority and power, and constructed their identity, authority, and power in discourse and in the social contexts of the everyday through difference. Engaged in warfare against the Apaches, they did not recognize their actions as harmful or acknowledge the U.S. invasion as the bloody colonial conquest it was. White army personnel painted themselves and the army as liberators, represented colonial peoples as racial inferiors, approached colonial terrain in terms of struggle, and claimed that the region was a terrible periphery with little value before the arrival of white “civilization.” Officers and wives also wanted to place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and respectable class who led the regeneration of the colony by example: they tried to turn army villages into islands of civilization and made journeys, leisure, and domestic life to showcase their class sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often, however, their efforts failed, resulting in frustration and bitterness. Many blamed the colony and its peoples for their failures. The army itself was divided by race and class. All soldiers were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army. As colonized labor their position was defined by tension between integration and exclusion and between freedom and colonial control.
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Several institutions and many individuals helped me in making this project come true. The work began in 2003 when the ASLA-Fulbright fellowship, together with the funding from the Academy of Finland, enabled me to spend three semesters at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Time in Lincoln proved invaluable. I not only had the opportunity to participate in excellent courses and seminars in my special field, but was introduced to postcolonialism and whiteness studies, and managed to do much of my primary source research in excellent facilities. I first would like to extend my profound appreciation to my advisor John Wunder for his hospitality, kindness, and guidance. His breadth of knowledge, ability to offer constructive criticism, and his empathy serve as a model to all historians. Margaret Jacobs, Victoria Smith, and Michael Tate deserve thanks for their patience in hearing my ideas, for their encouragement, and for sharing their thoughts on colonialism, the Apaches, and the army. Also thanks to David Wishart, Kenneth Winkle, and Peter Maslowski. Research fellowship from the Arizona Historical Society allowed me to finish my research in the U.S. In Tucson, James Turner and Bruce Dingess made we feel welcome in what was my first visit to the heartlands of old Apacheria.

Erkki Kouri served as my dissertation advisor at the History Department, University of Helsinki. I wish to express my gratitude for his supervision and for believing in me. At all times he has been very supportive of my research and always found the time to help me and listen what I had in mind. I also want to thank Hannes Saarinen for his counsel during the final stages of the project and Markku Peltonen for his support when I got started. I am also more than thankful to my advisor Markku Henriksson. His remarks, direction, and friendship made my work much better. The year-long grant from the Finnish Cultural Foundation provided me with the wonderful opportunity to write my study full time and University of Helsinki’s grant for finishing the doctoral dissertation allowed me to concentrate on the final revisions of the manuscript. I am also appreciative of the financial assistance from the History Department at the University of Helsinki, the Chancellor’s Travel Grant, and the Finish Doctoral School of History that made my research and conference trips possible.

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Map of Apacheria

Part I INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
A Colonizer Community in the Southwest

“In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression…The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native.”¹ -Frantz Fanon

“Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.”² -Friedrich Nietzsche

1.1 The Argument

This dissertation offers perspective on the structures of power, identity, and community and on the significances and meanings of whiteness and class in nineteenth-century colonial encounters by discussing the United States Army in southern Arizona and New Mexico during the post-Civil War era of military conquest (1866-1886). It is a critical interrogation of the ways power, privilege, and difference that lay at the heart of colonialism were constructed, managed, and contested by one group of white colonizers during a particular project of U.S. empire-building.³

³ Historian Partha Chatterjee claims that at the heart of colonialism is the rule of difference. However, the meanings of difference, historian Frederick Cooper writes, are always contested and rarely stable. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 14-34, especially 16; Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23. Colonialism can be defined as the coercive incorporation of people into an expansionist state and invidious distinction, or as the conquest and control of other peoples’ land and goods - including the appropriation of material resources, exploitation of labor, and interference with political and cultural structures. In the common understanding colonialism is usually associated with aggression, conquest, economic exploitation, and dominance over indigenous peoples by whites, ethnically Europeans. Colonialism, as an integral part of modern capitalist development, was not an identical process in different parts of the world, but everywhere it locked the original inhabitants and the newcomers into the most complex and traumatic relationships in human history. Empire can be defined as a political unit that is large, expansionist, and which reproduces differentiation and inequality among people it incorporates. The relationship between colonialism and imperialism is sometimes confusing and often interpenetrating. Imperialism can be seen as a global system, or as something that originates from the metropolis, whereas colonialism is the takeover of territory and what happens locally in a colony. See Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 2-7, 20; Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 2-3; Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 5-6, 15-43; Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 26-28.
This work is founded on a premise that conquest and colonialism should be seen as processes where understanding the white colonizers conscience, mentality, and identity are as crucial as capturing the colonized (subaltern) voice or narrating the battles fought and dispossessions enacted. It not only places the spotlight on white officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men, and pays less attention to black troops, but also declines to see officers and soldiers primarily as “men of action,” as has been common in most historiography. Instead it approaches white army people as a group of colonizers who constructed identity and authority in discourse and in the social contexts of the everyday through difference. White army people, especially officers and wives, not only wanted military power - the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime - but also colonial (intellectual/mental/social/cultural) authority and power. To achieve it they constructed colonial knowledge, hierarchies, and otherness using race and class as sorting techniques and markers of difference.

Like elsewhere in the post-Civil War trans-Mississippi West, the U.S. Army in southern Arizona and New Mexico represented an intruder on indigenous lands, executing the expansion of an empire and waging a ruthless offensive against indigenous tribes (mainly Apaches and also Yavapais). Scattered across southern Arizona and New Mexico, numerous army villages, officially called forts or camps, formed distinctive colonizer-islands. They were imagined social entities and living

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4 This work offers some comparisons on the status and social life of white and black troops when applicable. The choice to focus on white army people is logical also because there already exists several good social histories of black soldiers in the West and because no black troops served in Arizona until 1885, the very end of the period under investigation here. While New Mexico had more black soldiers their presence was still irregular: some black infantry units were stationed in New Mexico right after the Civil War and one black cavalry regiment served there from 1876 to 1881. For black soldiers, see James N. Leiker, *Racial Borders: Black Soldiers Along the Rio Grande* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); Charles L. Kenner, *Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867-1898: Black & White Together* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); William A. Dobak & Thomas D. Phillips, *The Black Regulars, 1866-1898* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); Monroe Lee Billington, *New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, 1866-1900* (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1991).

5 I use “white army people” or “white army personnel” when referring to officers, their wives, and white soldiers as a whole. Discourse can be understood as a spoken or written treatment of a subject in which it is treated and handled at length. It is collectively produced, surrounding and constituting a particular matter. It rests on a notion that language constructs the subject and thus no human utterance is innocent. Also, there exists no rigid demarcation between event and representation. All ideas are ordered through some material medium. This ordering imposes a pattern on them: a pattern which Michel Foucault calls “discourse.” The concept of discourse is meant to uncover the interrelation between the ideological and the material. Discourse can be understood as a domain within which language is used in particular ways. This domain is rooted in human practices, institutions, and actions. Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 36-39, 55.

6 I use both “camp” and “fort” when referring to individual army villages. The official designation of each village varied over time. For instance, Fort Bowie, Arizona, was originally called a fort after its
spaces where the life strategies and visions of the army elite of officers and their wives and the working-class enlisted men defined community culture and dynamics. Army villages were sites where difference and identity were established, displayed, and guarded both in discourse and in daily lives. Army people were bound together by membership in the same institution of violence and by shared living environment, but torn apart (divided) by class and race. In some ways the army’s social and racial makeup represented a microcosm of the U.S. society. White, mostly native-born, officers and their wives originating from the East sought to transplant eastern middle-class values and practices and to turn army villages into “islands of civilization.” Officers and their wives made journeys, leisure, and domestic life showcase their class sensibilities and level of sophistication and they wanted to claim genteel identity and to place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and privileged class, the social and cultural cream of white middle-class who embodied respectability, progress, and civilization. White soldiers were mainly urban workers from the East or recent immigrants from Europe. In the army they and the recently emancipated black soldiers were reduced into working-class laborers and servants whose success in colonial warfare was often poor. The army made locally hired indigenous soldiers colonized labor, a special workforce characterized by constant tension between integration and exclusion and between indigenous freedom and colonial control. All soldiers regardless of race were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. Enlisted men constructed worlds of resistance and boundaries against the arrogant army elite, while indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the impacts of colonialism by working in the army.

In their search for colonial authority and power white army people engaged in a process this work calls imperial meaning-making. When army men and women represented their own role and the colonial landscapes, societies, peoples, and events, they assigned certain meaning and value to all and evaluated and categorized everything in relation to their norms, imperial agendas, and ideas of progress and civilization (or modernity). This meaning-making was not only about labeling, or making colonial places and peoples understandable, but about their control, reordering, and incorporation. Army discourses purportedly produced the “truth,” which in turn meant

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establishment in 1862, then designated as camp, and again changed to fort on April 1879. Robert W. Frazer, *Forts of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 4.

colonial authority and power to those constructing the discourses. As was the case with other white colonizers around the world, in reality the product of army people’s writings, their “truth,” was nothing more than subjective colonial knowledge, or what one might call “white mythologies,” to borrow a term from the postcolonial theorist Robert J.C. Young. The goal of army’s imperial meaning-making was to gain a sense of purpose and justification for the U.S. invasion on other peoples’ land, legitimize army presence and actions, and make the army important not only in the context of southern Arizona and New Mexico, but in terms of nation/empire-building. Army stories tried to make colonial warfare, the “othering” of peoples, the establishment of exploitative labor systems, and the reordering and regeneration of the supposedly “peripheral” colonized region to better suit the national model seem right and normal, even necessary. In the end, army representations would ideally make colonialism look more like liberation and subjugation like betterment. Army members would produce an illusion that instead of establishing a racial social hierarchy grounded on white middle-class supremacy, crushing indigenous peoples and cultures, and starting a massive exploitation of natural resources fueled by outside investments, the U.S. regime was mainly about spreading civilization and progress to the Southwest.

This study does not offer an all encompassing chronological story of the military actions of the U.S. Army in post-Civil War Arizona and New Mexico. Neither is it meant to provide a definitive word on U.S. colonization of the Southwest, although it more than touches on this matter as well. Nor is this a story of U.S.-Apache interactions, or a history of the people outsiders have called Apaches, or of any other indigenous group. It is also not a study of the army institution, but rather of the people who formed the army community. It is a critical description of the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of a group of colonizers, a case study of colonialism and U.S. imperialism that seeks to understand the dynamics and reasons that shaped the actions and the authority-, community-, and identity-building of a particular body of white colonizers. It discusses how white army members positioned themselves in relation to the different peoples they encountered and towards the place facing colonialism. What factors, concepts, and

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8 Robert J.C. Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2004). For Young “white mythologies” means “the West’s greatest myth -History.” See page 2. Although relatively few scholars have studied the practice, officers, as well as their wives and the common soldiers, in other colonial armies around the world undoubtedly also produced colonial knowledge. In his recent article, historian Douglas M. Peers recognized that educated and resourceful British officers generated colonial knowledge and certain readings of Indian society through their literary, scientific, and artistic activities. Douglas M. Peers, “Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India, 1780-1860,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33 (May 2005), 157-180.
categories they used when producing class identity and racial difference? Who qualified as white in army minds? This study goes beyond mere description to unravel the motives and purposes, to ask why white army people constructed identity, community, and colonial knowledge the way they did? It exposes army claims of difference and subjects them to scrutiny. It asks what was the point in army representations and actions, and what motives did they serve?

When applying the postcolonial method, which involves taking a critical stance, adopting a close but suspicious reading of sources, and recognizing that knowledge is connected to operations of power, this study seeks to balance attention between discursive representations (army stories) and the material realities of social experience (army actions) and to map the connections between the two. It hopes to understand the experiences of past persons, but also to describe the construction of identities and relations in discourse and the changes in the representations of persons, things, and events. This study also pays notice to silences in the process of historical production, seeing silencing as an activity in the arsenal of the colonizers seeking colonial power.9 Furthermore, this investigation focuses on collective group formations, identities, representations, social relations, and machinations of exclusion and inclusion. It rests on the belief that a person was a representative of his or her race, class, gender, nation, or some other socially constructed collective first, and an individual only second. This method of partially subduing individuality for group collectives allows for discussions of power between, and within, social structures - communities and the world that surrounded them - and social reading of representations, thus providing structure for the investigation of the army experience and a way to understand the general mentality of the white army members.10

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9 According to historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot, history means both the facts of the matter and a narrative of those facts, both “what happened” and “that which is said to have happened.” The production of traces, Trouillot continues, is always also the creation of silences. Some peoples and occurrences are noted from the start, others remain absent in history. Silence means an active and transitive process: one engages in the practice of silencing. Mentions and silences are thus active, dialectical counterparts of which is history is the synthesis. Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance). Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), especially 2, 26, 29, 48-49.
10 The downside of this method is that it appears to hide individual dissent. It may come out at times as if white army people had only one voice, one will, or one point of view, which, of course, was not the case. My intention, however, has not been to reveal every opinion that some army member at some point expressed, but to study the collective and discuss the general mentality, while still recognizing that diversity, dissent, and disharmony existed.
This work has several analytical aims. First, it sets out to connect and reenergize the academically peripheral post-Civil War U.S. Army history with currents of modern scholarship, proving that the army not only offers an excellent laboratory for studies of social history, like the historian Sherry L. Smith has acknowledged, but also for labor history and cultural history of colonialism. When treating all soldiers regardless of race as workers and soldiering as work, this study hopes to widen the boundaries of what counts as work and who as workers in U.S. history. Second, this work tries to bridge the gap between two scholarly fields by using insights from postcolonial studies to discuss the history of the U.S. West. Third, this study will contribute to the current debates concerning the predominance of race, whiteness, and class as factors explaining social formation and identities in U.S. society during the late 1800s. It refuses to see whiteness as normative and racially unmarked, but treats it as a socially constructed colonial signifier of difference.

Fourth, by seeing America’s westward expansion as imperialism/colonialism, this work makes the nineteenth-century conquest of the trans-Mississippi West a phase in the building of a global superpower, the U.S. empire that continues to define itself today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and all over the world. In an age when the U.S. projects its influence on a global scale, it is illuminating to examine how U.S. power has been constructed historically, how U.S. forces have in years past represented themselves, their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Traditionally only a few scholars wrote of the United States as an empire. Although that has begun to change during recent times, many of those who acknowledge that the U.S. was or is an empire have usually either omitted the nineteenth-century conquest of the trans-Mississippi West, paid little attention to it, or approached it as an “internal affair,” thus not fully confronting the real nature of what was a conquest of other peoples’ lands. While there are some western historians who approach United States’ westward

11 Sherry L. Smith, “Lost Soldiers: Re-searching the Army in the American West,” Western Historical Quarterly 29 (Summer 1998), 150-163. Military history in general pursues a broad and sophisticated research agenda today. In a recent review essay historian Robert M. Citino divides military historians into three major groupings. There are the traditional operational historians, the war and society scholars, and a new cadre of historians who emphasize culture and the history of memory. Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” American Historical Review 112 (October 2007), 1070-1090.

12 Those who do not focus on the trans-Mississippi West but recognize that the U.S. was an empire already during the nineteenth-century westward expansion include Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006) and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004). For the new wave of empire studies, see especially Amy Kaplan and Donald F. Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). For an older classic, see William Appleman Williams, Empire as
expansion as an imperial project, the majority of historians, especially those who are not experts of the U.S. West, still rather commonly date the beginning of U.S. imperialism to the occupation of the Philippines and the Spanish-American War in 1898. This work begs to argue otherwise. It demonstrates that the nineteenth-century conquest of the West is an ideal place to begin making visible the long history of U.S. empire and for understanding some of the defining “principles,” mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism. The U.S. West not only provides an example of colonialism that needs to be explained in the framework of U.S. empire, but an important theater in the transnational process of settler and extractive colonialism which brought much of the world under the domination of western powers and market capitalism. Even in our current post-decolonization era, the U.S. West offers an example of colonialism that has proven permanent and “successful” from the colonizers perspective.

1.2 Postcolonialism as Research Paradigm

Postcolonial studies questions the European narrative of progress and modernity and the assumption that the western male or female point of view is normative and objective. This study applies certain insights from postcolonial studies and its critics to guide its investigation of the army. In other words, this dissertation situates the nineteenth-century U.S. Army, and thus also the conquest of the trans-Mississippi West, in the debates and currents of postcolonial studies.

First, this dissertation adopts the basic postcolonial premise that knowledge is not innocent but connected to operations of power and in service of colonial conquest. Postcolonial theorists, most notably Edward W. Said, have claimed that the power of the colonizers was bound to, created, and sustained by the discourses of colonial


For one such recent work, see Paul T. McCartney, *Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006). In his classic study *The Age of Empire*, Eric Hobsbawm ignores continental conquest and argues that between 1876 and 1915 the Americas remained unaffected by the process of partition where the world was divided between western powers. He writes that “the Americas in 1914 were what they had been...in the 1820s.” The United States’ “only direct annexations were limited to Puerto Rico...and a narrow strip along the new Panama Canal.” Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (1987; reprint, London: Abacus, 2003), 57-59, see also 67.

Other terms used to describe the “field” include postcolonial theory, postcolonialism, postcolonial scholarship, or critical colonial studies. Although not a uniform theory, postcolonial studies offers a flexible thematic network that influences research themes, approaches, strategies, and how evidence is viewed. It works as a basis from which to reconsider the colonial, imperial, and anti-colonial past, and the postcolonial present.
peoples, places, and projects that colonizers themselves constructed and imposed on the minds of the colonizer and colonized alike. Importantly, the discourses, Said writes, could “create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe.” The colonizer groups, like the white army people in southern Arizona and New Mexico, gained in strength and identity when establishing their “truth,” a vision of reality that promoted the difference, often in fact the binary opposition, between the familiar “us” and the strange “them.” Identity was constructed through opposition to others and white army men and women decided who they were by reference to who they were not. Opposition and difference were crucial to colonizers self-conception and to the workings of colonial power; if the colonized were irrational, barbaric, wild, lazy, and static, the colonizers were rational, civilized, moral, hard working, and progressive. What structured and enabled the discourses, Said continues, was “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures.” Colonizers depended on a notion of flexible positional superiority, which put the colonizers in a whole series of possible relationships with the colonized without ever losing them the relative upper hand.15

Second, this investigation firmly believes that colonialism needs to be explained as a place- and time-specific phenomenon. Acknowledging that postcolonial studies have challenged conservative histories and invigorated historical research, historians such as Dane Kennedy and Frederick Cooper have criticized postcolonial theorists for favoring ahistorical analysis of literature over thorough understanding of historical contexts. Postcolonial studies often produce a too static and abstract generic colonialism, Kennedy and Cooper point out, thus obscuring the complexity and particularism involved in colonial projects.16 Analysis of representations should not replace all discussion of events and material reality or ignore change over time. Also, investigations of colonial relations and identities need to acknowledge that the


16 Dane Kennedy, “Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory,” in James D. Le Sueur, ed., The Decolonization Reader (New York: Routledge, 2003), 10-22; Cooper, Colonialism in Question. For critiques of Said and postcolonial theory by non-historians, see Young, White Mythologies.
colonizers’ texts reflected the historical contexts in which they were produced and were shaped by the agendas and motivations of the specific people who produced them. In short, studies need to be grounded on specific historical cases and contexts. As the historian Gregory Mann writes, colonial histories require a sense of place. Only then can scholars, in the words of historian and anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler, fully strive “to understand how the macrodynamics of colonial rule worked through interventions in the microenvironments of both subjugated and colonizing populations and through the distinctions of privilege and opportunity made and managed between.”

In the history of the U.S. West the emphasis on place has been one of the central themes at least since the New Western History began to expand the field some two decades ago. New Western History not only directed focus on gender, race, the 20th century West, the everyday history of everyday peoples, and environmental history, but defined the U.S. West as the trans-Mississippi region. Scholars such as Patricia Limerick saw the U.S. West as a “place undergoing conquest and never escaping its consequences” or as “one of the great meeting zones of the planet.” Place is “the center, not the edge” of New Western History. Still, while scholars have exhaustively debated the distinctiveness of the West as a region in the contexts of the United States, they have rarely pursued transnational comparisons or adapted research agendas, approaches, and structures from postcolonial studies. It is almost as if the two fields have been kept

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20 For histories of the U.S. West that have applied ideas from postcolonial studies, see Jeffrey Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Margaret D. Jacobs, “Maternal Colonialism: White Women and Indigenous Child Removal in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 36
apart by an invisible barrier. While colonial studies could use New Western History’s thorough focus on place, putting the U.S. West in colonial/imperial perspective widens the frame of reference, making the region and its history part of the global story of European settler and extractive colonialism, and also brings New Western History new intellectual context that stresses the relationship between knowledge and power and the subjective representational nature of history.

This study has sought to keep in mind New Western History’s ideas of place and the complex nature of colonialism that Said, Kennedy, Cooper, and others advocate. It not only strives for a balance between events and representations, but narrows its description of identity and power to a specific colonial arena and time, thus underlining the significance of place. It also follows another trend of postcolonial studies that emphasizes the vulnerable and contested nature of colonizer projects, identity, and community, and stresses the importance of the everyday and the domestic sphere.

Although postcolonial studies, especially the Subaltern Studies school represented by such scholars as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi Bhabha, has placed much effort on discovering the (perhaps undiscoverable) agency of the colonized, many postcolonial scholars have at the same time often treated the colonizers as a harmonious and unified mass or as all-powerful machines who produced successful hegemonic projects. In reality the success of any colonial enterprise, including the army’s in the Southwest, was always partial and relative. Colonial power was never total and the colonizers could never fully transplant the social practices and norms of the metropole. This led to insecurity and frustration, which was only further intensified by the fact that the colonizer groups were not only often in competition with each other but riddled with inner rivalries and contests. Communities were vulnerable and disharmonious entities that needed to be created, maintained, and guarded. As a consequence of the limitations of power and all the uncertainty colonizer identities were never stable, but riddled with doubt, fear, and confusion. Scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler write that identity was so vulnerable that even the distinction between the colonizer and the colonized had to be continually affirmed and reproduced. Furthermore, private lives and the management of the household played an important function in creating and securing the colonizer

community and in defining its boundaries and membership criteria. It was far from irrelevant how one lived and traveled, what one ate, how one consumed, or spent leisure time.21

Finally, it was Said’s ideas that brought colonialism from distant places to the heart of European culture as he demonstrated how Europe constructed itself and its others in relation to each other. Europe had no meaning apart from “the other,” or the colonizer apart from the colonized. In recent years scholars like Stoler, Antoinette Burton, and Catherine Hall have demonstrated how colonialism was a process where the metropole and the colonies made each other, the links between them being relations of power.22 This work seeks to demonstrate that the army people built their identity and power in relation to the colony and the metropole (Eastern United States). What happened in the Southwest, the construction of colonial knowledge, race, and class, was not confined to the Southwest but connected to the imperial center. When army men and women moved back and forth between the colony and the metropole, their ideas and the colonial knowledge they produced moved with them. They offer an example of how white America encountered other peoples and distant lands. In many ways the national character of the United States and the identity of white America was, and still is, constructed through perceptions of different peoples and places throughout the world.

In sum, my study of the U.S. Army in southern Arizona and New Mexico not only sees U.S. history as imperialism/colonialism, but argues that the army people constructed their power in both discourses and in everyday lives. It also sees that colonialism, as a multidimensional global project, can be approached through the local while keeping in mind that the colony and the metropole were always connected. In conjunction, it holds that colonizer projects were imperfect, colonizers’ power far from complete, and their communities fragile entities where the private sphere formed an


important venue for defining and displaying the criteria and boundaries of community and identity.

### 1.3 Whiteness and Class

Although both New Western Historians and postcolonial scholars have stressed the importance of race, they have too often relied on a racial logic where the colonizers represent the normative whiteness and the colonized the complex dark other struggling against white supremacy.\(^{23}\) Omitting any discussion of the contested and constructed meanings of whiteness equals naturalizing it, treating it as the silent omnipotent norm against which everything is juxtaposed.

Whiteness studies, the “new history of race in America,” as historian Peter Kolchin dubbed the field, sees race firmly as a social construction; a public fiction. Whites are not born, they are somehow made, and this making is class-, time-, and place-specific.\(^{24}\) Not only do whiteness and class need to be analyzed together, by treating them as interpenetrating factors, but whiteness can also be understood as a contested hierarchy of white ethnicities. In his influential *Whiteness of a Different Color*, historian Mathew Frye Jacobson claims that during the mid-1800s whiteness was rethought throughout the United States. Massive immigration of “undesirable” Europeans fractured all-inclusive formulations of Anglo-Saxon superiority and shifted the emphasis on degrees of difference among various white ethnicities. This hierarchical whiteness reflected the perceived supremacy of the native-born Anglo-Saxons, while questioning the whiteness of many white ethnic groups, especially the Irish and the Jews. Only when whites encountered people they considered alien from themselves in the trans-Mississippi West and later overseas, Jacobson continues, their fear of imperial

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\(^{23}\) There are exceptions. See, for example, Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge*; Tomas Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). In his seminal work Foley asserts that in Texas during the early 1900s whiteness meant not only not black and not Mexican, but that poor whites were seen as a social problem and were losing their whiteness and the status and privileges that whiteness bestowed. Successful whites racialized poor whites and located them in the racial hierarchy as the “trash” of whiteness. Foley, *White Scourge*, 5-8.

contamination, decline of white power, and white poverty led to a construction of a new nation-wide pan-white racial identity.\textsuperscript{25}

For Jacobson, as soon as whiteness was confronted by the realities of conquest in the West it again turned uniform and unproblematic. This claim is worth a closer investigation. Relatively few studies of the U.S. West have, however, discussed how whiteness was constructed differently by different people, or what whiteness meant in the many areas and various contexts of the post-Civil War West. Our understanding of the changing and subjective notions of whiteness in the West remains partial. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the discussion on the character of whiteness in the West by investigating how, why, and if one group of white colonizers saw whiteness and class as meaningful when constructing their identity, power, and relations to others. Whereas Jacobson advocates recasting the history of European immigration and assimilation into the United States as a racial odyssey, this work hopes to introduce more accurate ways of seeing race, whiteness, and class in the U.S. conquest of the trans-Mississippi West and to regroup army history as journeys in the making of race and class within the frameworks of colonialism.\textsuperscript{26}

\subsection*{1.4 Army History, Western Expansion, and Colonialism}

As the historian Michael L. Tate has pointed out, top-down stories with association to conservative politics, outdated methodologies, and avoidance of the dominant paradigms of modern social history have often been synonymous with the historiography of the post-Civil War U.S. Army. Many innovative scholars see army history as peripheral in academic scholarship, a direct outcome of the shortage of good monographs, a proliferation of unfair generalizations, and almost an outright banishment of the army as an element in the history of the U.S. West.\textsuperscript{27}

The situation is unfortunate, although it does not mean that historical scholarship of the army in the West does not exist. Fairly good, although often uncritical, studies chronicle the army campaigns (especially on the Plains and the Pacific Northwest), the army’s role in government’s Indian Policy, its non-combat role in enabling the


\textsuperscript{26} Jacobson, \textit{Whiteness of A Different Color}, 11-12.

\textsuperscript{27} Michael L. Tate, \textit{The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), ix-xvi. For example, standard works of New Western History like Patricia Nelson Limerick’s \textit{The Legacy of Conquest} and Richard White’s \textit{‘It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,’} almost totally omit discussion of the army.
settlement of the West, architecture of the army villages, army officers perceptions of Indians, and the lives of key army commanders. Several army historians have also touched on army-civilian relations in the West. Their approaches have been, however, very different from this study. Following the example set by Robert Frazer and Darlis Miller, some have discussed the army’s role in regional economics while others have limited their interest to the socio-economic relations between one army village and its nearby civilian settlements.

In army scholarship the lack of modern social history, especially studies concentrating on white troops and officers, and labor history is obvious. For instance, although some historians have recognized that manual labor took most of the soldiers’ time, they, unlike this dissertation, have failed to approach soldiers’ lives through the medium of labor, discuss soldiering as work, or treat soldiers regardless of race as workers. In social history, studies of black soldiers have been in the forefront, opening the discussion on race and the army. While black soldiers have received welcome scholarly attention, the social history of white soldiers and officers remains much less studied. There exists no proper monograph focusing exclusively on the social worlds


30 For studies that recognize labor as an important part of soldiers daily life, see, for example, Don Rickey, *Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 83-84; Billington, *New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers*. Kevin Adams, “‘Common people with whom I shall have no relation’: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the Post-Civil War Frontier Army,” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2004) is an exception. Still, even Adams fails to include indigenous soldiers in his analysis of labor.

and identities of the post-Civil War army officers. For social history of white army personnel one has to turn to Edward Coffman’s massive general work The Old Army, which covers the army from its initiation to 1898. Other options include Don Rickey’s over forty-year-old history of enlisted men, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, and Patricia Y. Stallard’s thirty-year-old thesis on army wives, Glittering Misery. Both Rickey and Stallard’s studies still prove informative but outdated and celebrative of U.S. conquest.32

This lack of social history is peculiar, because as Sherry L. Smith wrote a decade ago, the army "offers an especially rich source of materials regarding the everyday life of everyday people" and therefore “is a particularly useful laboratory for testing all kinds of theories and for raising questions about social interactions between people of different classes and ethnic groups.”33 The lack of scholarly attention to whiteness and the army is particularly notable. Perhaps it serves as an indication of the army historians continuing tendency to see whiteness as the unproblematic and unexplained norm. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the varied aspects of whiteness, class, and manhood remain largely unexplored, especially when one considers that the army offers such a natural field for that kind of work.

Furthermore, army discourses remain understudied. Arguably, some studies discuss, usually rather superficially, the perceptions and opinions that (usually high-ranking) officers voiced regarding certain regions or indigenous groups. Sherry Smith has even written an entire book on army officers’ perceptions of Indians in general.34 Still, no study has approached the army’s relationship to a certain region or indigenous group or the army’s inner dynamics from the perspective of meaning-making, authority-building, and identity-construction. No student of the army has stressed how army representations and texts produced colonial knowledge and functioned as sites in the production of army authority and power; how white army people’s discourses and actions enabled each other. Nor has anyone seriously investigated the motives, agendas, and logic behind army discourses. In short, army scholarship has failed to connect the

34 Smith, View From Officers’ Row.
army to the currents of postcolonial scholarship, especially to ideas that stress the relationship between discourses and power.

Like much of army history, the history of the Apaches or the U.S.-Apache wars has been mainly top-heavy, descriptive, oriented towards answering what happened and where, instead of why and why does it matter. They might provide entertaining reads, but leave out discussions of social history, labor regimes, and also colonialism in their hurry to simplify the story and stay simultaneously superficial in analysis but very detailed on descriptive chronology of battles and military campaigns. Many studies repeat a standard and selective set of Apache “outbreaks,” military campaigns, and actions or inactions of army commanders and Apache leaders; a chronological “Apache war” narrative.35

A fundamental problem has been the tendency of scholars to side with the white army personnel, especially with the officers and their wives. Historians have adopted the point of view of army people, accepted their representations at face value, treated their opinions as the “truth,” and even uncritically adopted the army’s racialized terminology. It seems that in their admiration for the army many scholars have not fully realized how the writings of army men and women represent only subjective opinions, a narrow view serving the agendas of the army people, not objective facts. For instance, in several works the Southwest is categorized as a “hostile,” “brutal,” “unattractive,” and “mean” land just like the army people often represented it.36 Also, when historians have had something to say on labor and leisure in the army posts they have reproduced the categorizations of officers and shown little sympathy for the workers. They have, for instance, regarded enlisted men’s leisure activities like drinking and gambling as “major problems” which “plagued” the army, or as “constant scourges for which the army


never found a remedy.” Some have divided enlisted leisure activities to “licit” and “illicit” spheres.  

The recycling of army terminology is painfully obvious in the many works where free Apaches continue to be labeled “hostile.” Historians have also universally called the U.S.-Apache wars “Apache wars,” a selective term that denies and downplays U.S. aggression and in fact hides their whole participation. Moreover, several historians have painted the army’s mission as a “defense” of a western frontier, or claimed that the army introduced a “lasting peace” rather than waged an unnecessary and ruthless war that contributed to the creation of a race-based colonial regime. Even in a recent article it is still the Apaches who raid, plunder, and take advantage to ambush weak, tired white travelers and poorly defended merchants, while the army occupies “a slender network of defensive posts,” from which it “slowly eroded Indian resistance.” Some historians like to claim that the army was nothing more than a constabulary force, making colonialism appear rather faultily as a domestic police issue. In these histories, the indigenous peoples, whose homelands were being invaded and life-ways crushed, remain the aggressors. Scholars have failed to assess the destructive effects of colonialism, or question what rights the army had in an area where indigenous peoples lived and ruled. They have avoided the fact that the army was an intruder engaged in a ruthless offensive aimed at geopolitical power. This has led to a situation where the


38 See, among others, Robinson, General Crook, 105, 135, 275-277; Worcester, Apaches, 144, 146, 297; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 7, 102, 106, 239.

39 See, for instance, Kraft, Gatewood & Geronimo, 208; Marc Simmons, Massacre on the Lordsburg Road: A Tragedy of the Apache Wars (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997); Joseph C. Porter, Paper Medicine Man: John Gregory Bourke and His American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 6; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 371. This study calls these conflicts U.S.-Apache wars to suggest a more suitable term for general and scholarly use. Still, even this term is too narrow because the Apaches also fought Mexico.

40 For studies that claim the army was “pacifying the country” or aiming for “a lasting piece,” see Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 202; Kraft, Gatewood & Geronimo, 12. See also Wooster, Military and United States Indian Policy, 6-7. One scholar characterizes the army’s mission in the West as “internal pacification” that took place on a “hostile frontier” located “beyond the bounds of civilization.” Stallard, Glittering Misery, vii, 12-13.


army’s offensive character as part of the colonial conquest and invasion of other peoples’ lands has been belittled, obscured, and almost denied.

1.5 Chapters

This work is divided into three parts and eight main chapters. Chapter 2 sets the historical context through a (re)interpretation of U.S. colonialism in the Southwest. It places the region and its power struggles at the center of discussion, emphasizing the geopolitical power of the Apaches and seeing the U.S. as an invader on other peoples’ lands.

Part II has three chapters that discuss how officers, wives, and white soldiers produced certain “truths” of the landscapes, peoples, and settlements they encountered on their mission to southern Arizona and New Mexico. Chapter 3 investigates army journeys: travel methods and routes, the significance of class, and army representations of the journey. It argues that journeys functioned as sites in the production of colonizer power. The next chapter turns the spotlight on army relationship with the Apaches. It investigates how and why white army people made the Apaches the colonized other, the principle enemy of the U.S. regime. It also discusses the relationship between colonial knowledge (army stories of Apaches) and government (army’s acts of violence and reservation management targeting the Apaches). Chapter 5 charts army discourses of the Southwest landscapes and Hispanic and white peoples and settlements. It pays attention to how army people produced the region as a whole and as a living space, and how they represented the region’s past, present, and futures and constructed their own mission and importance.

Part III shifts the discussion to the contested dynamics and intimate social fabrics within the army community. In chapter 6, the focus is on the army elite’s identity and the orchestration and representation of public and domestic space in the army villages. Chapter 7 looks to life in the army villages through the lenses of labor and leisure. The principal aim is not to describe or list all types of labor and leisure activities, nor to count their prevalence on a monthly or yearly basis, but rather to discuss how labor and leisure structured the army community and helped define the collective identities and differing cultures of the white elite and white enlisted men. The last chapter discusses what it meant that the white army people’s “main enemy,” the Apaches, became workers in the multiracial army. It not only tackles the workers story, but also
demonstrates how the white army people partially integrated and valued the indigenous workforce, but still excluded and othered them as colonized labor.

Displaying less emphasis on chronological narrative, the whole work is mainly thematic, the chapters exploring the diverse facets and change over time in army representations and actions. Each chapter functions like a window offering a view into a house that is the white army colonizers experience in southern Arizona and New Mexico. Ultimately, these chapters describe structures of thought and human interaction and the workings of power.

1.6 Sources

Published memoirs, journal pieces, official reports, and the diaries, letters, and papers of white army men and women constitute the backbone of this study. Army officers were among the first white Americans with college-level training to enter the Southwest. Sherry L. Smith has noted that officers and their wives “realized they were a part of historically significant events and often kept personal documents regarding their experiences.”43 A substantial number of the army elite expected to write memoirs and many did, although not all published their writings. Many private reminiscences, letters, and diaries have been edited for publication later. Although the best known army memoirs by Captain John G. Bourke, Lieutenant Britton Davis, Lieutenant Thomas Cruse, and Martha Summerhayes, a captain’s wife, proved helpful, many less familiar reminiscences were of equal value. Among others they included the writings of Ellen McGowan Biddle, Frances Boyd, Fanny Corbusier, Eveline Alexander, and Julia Davis, all officers’ wives, and those of officers such as Frederick Phelps, Anson Mills, Joseph Sladen, William Corbusier, and W.H. Carter. On one level memoirs could function as a way to preserve family history, but they often displayed other importance as well. Many army people, not only the high-ranking officers like generals George Crook, Oliver Howard, and Nelson Miles, turned their writings into manifestos of personal and collective importance.

In addition, officers and their wives engaged in extensive personal correspondence with relatives and friends back East and contributed to professional journals and various local and national papers. For example, Lieutenant John Bigelow wrote a field journal of the 1886 “Geronimo campaign” to the *Outing Magazine*, while

Lieutenant Frank Upham had his Southwest experiences published in *The Overland Monthly*. Others published articles and private letters in papers as varied as the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, *Harper’s Weekly*, *Cosmopolitan*, *The Great Divide*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Altoona Morning Tribune* (Pennsylvania) and the *Los Angeles Star*. Many of these have been included in Peter Cozzens’ *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars*, a valuable collection of numerous primary accounts by officers and soldiers (and one by an army wife), many of them difficult to find anywhere else.\(^{44}\)

Although less frequently, some enlisted men also published stories of their experiences. For example, the memoirs of Sergeant John Spring first appeared in serial form in *The National Tribune*.\(^{45}\) Besides Spring, the texts by Anton Mazzanovich, Clarence Chrisman, Will C. Barnes, E.A. Bode, William Jett, George H. Cranston, Fred Platten, Harry Wright, William Neifert, “Gashuntz,” and Neil Erickson constitute the core of soldiers’ primary accounts. For understanding Apache responses to colonialism, especially as colonized labor, this study consulted the oral histories and studies by anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians such as Morris Opler, Grenville Goodwin, Eve Ball, and Keith Basso.

The Arizona Historical Society in Tucson contains many valuable collections of unpublished army letters, diaries, and manuscripts used in this work. The papers of Will Barnes, Clarence Chrisman, Joseph Widney, and Anton Mazzanovich, to mention just some, offered rich avenues of research, as did the selection of materials found at University of Arizona, Special Collections. Annual Report’s of the Secretary of War hold not only reports by officers, but interesting data on army movements, desertions, reenlistments, and social characteristics of army villages. Also of help was the University of Nebraska-Lincoln microfilm copy of the Yale Collection of Western  


America, which includes several rare published works.\footnote{The collection contains, for example, William T. Parker, \textit{Annals of Old Fort Cummings} (Northampton, MA.: Privately published, 1916); Mrs. M.A. Cochran, \textit{Posie, or From Reveille to Retreat: an Army Story} (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Company, 1896); George F. Price, \textit{Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry} (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1883).} Census data and Constance Wynn Altshuler’s encyclopedic collection of army biographies \textit{Cavalry Yellow, Infantry Blue} supplemented these discoveries as did War Department’s \textit{Circular no. 8}, which has information on the structures of the army villages.

Overall, the primary source base contains a rich selection of materials that bring out the white army voices and demonstrate that army personnel, especially the elite, actively expressed and circulated their “truth.” In this work, sources were used to reveal experiences of past persons, to understand the construction of knowledge, identities, mentalities, and relations in discourse, and for detecting the changes in the images and representations of places, peoples, and processes. Sources were interrogated to uncover no absolute truths, but to illustrate subjective experiences and tendencies. They told about the character of the army community, its experiences, identities, mentalities, relations, representations, divisions, hierarchies, and group formations - the visible and hidden manifestations of power among a certain colonizer body.
Chapter 2

From Apacheria to U.S. Southwest: A Short History of A Place Facing Colonialism

This chapter sets the historical contexts for the investigation of the U.S. Army community. It tells the history of transition from Apacheria to U.S. Southwest from a regional perspective, making the place facing colonialism the center of historical investigation not the peripheral edge buried under the tide of U.S. expansion. During the second half of the nineteenth-century the United States became a continental empire when invading much of the western half of North America. When building its empire the United States purchased (Louisiana, Alaska, and southern Arizona), negotiated (Oregon), or fought short one-sided wars of aggression against European rivals, their offspring states, and indigenous powers. Following in the footsteps of the Apaches and the Spanish, in 1846 the U.S. was the latest invader entering a historically contested region known today as the American Southwest. Intoxicated by a vision that it was destined to dominate the continent relying on market capitalism and white supremacy camouflaged as Manifest Destiny, U.S. took lands stretching from Texas to the Pacific from Mexico in an aggressive war in 1846-1848. Ending the war, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 brought New Mexico and Arizona under nominal U.S. rule.¹ To control southern Arizona and New Mexico, however, the U.S. was forced to fight two wars, not one. Although historians often only count the U.S.-Mexican War as a “real” war, the second war of conquest the U.S. fought against the Apaches. The present work argues that the Apaches, not Mexico, represented the leading power in the region during the time of U.S. arrival. Although driven out of the Plains in the 1700s by the Comanches, the Apaches regrouped and reoriented their trading-raiding power against the line of Spanish-indigenous forces in the Southwest. Until 1886, when the remnants of the Apaches’ geopolitical power were

¹ New Mexico Territory was established in 1850, and in 1863 its western half was separated as Arizona Territory. Both territories had to wait until 1912 for statehood. The intention of the Gadsden Purchase, which purchased the area that is mainly today’s southeastern Arizona, was to secure a snow free route for the transcontinental railroad. See Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Manifest Destiny, a popular belief, held that the U.S. represented a chosen nation with a divine right to expand and spread “civilization” across the continent. See Anders Stephenson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995). For the U.S.-Mexican War, see Paul Foos, A Short Offhand Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican-American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Jack K. Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Brian DeLay, “Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War,” American Historical Review 112 (February 2007), 35-68.
crushed by the U.S. and Mexican forces, Euro-American powers remained fragile and contested by the Apaches whom they could not dictate, control, or ignore.

2.1 The Spaniards and Apache Power

The government led Spanish colonization in North America rested on a combination of aggression, trade, and conversion. The Spanish aimed to find riches, incorporate subjects to the crown and to the Catholic Church, and increase Spain’s geopolitical power in relation to European rivals. The Spanish introduced horses, sheep, and cattle; firearms, metal tools, and the printed word; typhoid, measles, and smallpox, transforming the Southwest. They also established colonial bureaucracy, a formal set of living spaces (plaza-centered towns and missions), a social class system, and the Catholic faith.\(^2\) Spanish colonies California, Arizona (Pimeria Alta), New Mexico, and Texas were established at different times for different purposes, and never developed regional identity, or lines of communication with each other, but being largely self-sufficient held strong local character. Until Mexican independence in 1821 ended the Spanish era, Spanish colonization remained plagued by a shortage of European colonists, troubled economics, peripheral position in the empire, concern over the increased power of other European empires, mainly the French who had established presence in Louisiana, and, perhaps most importantly, by powerful and expansionist indigenous neighbors.\(^3\)

The Spanish first entered New Mexico in the 1500s, imposing themselves on the sedentary Pueblo Indians. Suffering from diseases, burdened by tributes in food, blankets, and labor, and subjected to forced conversion to Catholicism, the Pueblos revolted in 1680 and threw the Spanish out. Twelve years later the Spanish returned and established stronger ties with the Pueblos by keeping out of their religious matters and lands. Still the Spanish society remained weak and precarious, confined to a narrow strip along the upper Rio Grande around Santa Fe and Taos in north-central New Mexico. Relying principally on agriculture, sheep herding and trade, the Spanish communities were populated by a mix of Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans


from Central America, the Pueblo villages, and surrounding bands. The Spanish never gained a foothold between their El Paso base and the upper Rio Grande settlements, which meant that New Mexico was isolated from the rest of the empire. Whereas the Apaches were all over New Mexico’s Spanish settlements, the Utes and the Navajos flanked Santa Fe from the north and the west and the Comanche empire stretched east all the way to the Texas plains. Spaniards discovered that they were often unable to impose the rules but had to form alliances and use gift giving, trade exchanges, and incorporation of indigenous peoples in relations with their neighbors.

The Apaches not only cut off New Mexico from connections to the south, but also stopped Spanish advancement north in Sonora, thus keeping the Spanish mostly out from the area that today is Arizona. What little was gained by the Spanish in Arizona was almost all lost after Mexican independence. Hamlets such as Sopori, Canoa, even Calabazas with its rich mines were abandoned. In 1849, Apaches forced the abandonment of Tubac and Mexicans remained only in Tucson. Even Tucson, with its population of 465 Mexicans and 486 Manso (“tamed”) Apaches in 1831, was as much an Apache community as it was Mexican.

The fragmented and multilayered Apache society consisted of extended families, bands, clans, and tribes who shared similar culture and language, and an interconnected living space, but no political authority or common social sphere. In the mid-1800s the main divisions (from east to west) included the Jicarillas, Mescaleros, Chiricahuas, and

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4 The social system divided people by casta, which equated social class with racial ancestry. The main terms to describe ancestry, and thus social status, were espanol (Spanish), indio (Indian), mestizo (mixed Spanish-Indian), mulatto (Spanish-Black), zambo (Indian-Black), coyote (dark-skinned mestizo) and castizo (light-skinned mestizo). Social status was connected to skin color, darker skin attached to manual labor and slavery, and whiter skin linked to honor and wealth. Wilson, *Myth of Santa Fe*, especially 28-31; Ramon A. Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), especially 196-199.


the Western Apaches. During the 1600s the nucleus of Apache power had been located on the southern plains of New Mexico and Texas, their influence reaching from Sonora all the way to what today is Nebraska. In the 1700s, the expansionist Comanches contested the Apaches on the Plains for the control of crucial natural resources, New Mexico’s markets, and the flourishing trade routes between the Pueblos and the horticultural prairie villages in the east. The Comanches pushed Apaches out of the Plains in three distinctive sequences, beginning in the upper Arkansas basin between 1700 and 1727, continuing on the Llano Estacado in the 1730s and 1750s, and culminating in west Texas in the 1750s and early 1760s. During the wars some Apache bands vanished altogether, while others saw their numbers rapidly decline. For example, the once powerful Lipan Apaches challenged Comanche and Spanish presence in west Texas. Overwhelmed, the Lipans weakened quickly. Many relocated westward merging with other Apaches groups or into the Spanish settlements, while others ended up as captives. In the 1800s only a handful of Lipans were left.

Not only devastating defeats in battles but slave raids took a toll on Apache manpower and jeopardized their capacity to wage war successfully. Human captives functioned as the keys to power in the borderlands, the central currency used to purchase guns and horses. French, Spanish, and Comanches used captives also as a labor force and some were adopted by their captor society. In Spanish communities, indigenous captives, among them the Apaches, became a special group of domestic servants and laborers called genizaros. Many were also sold to labor camps located all over Mexico’s mining and farming regions. Some Apaches found themselves as far away as Cuba. Masses of Apaches died in captivity because of poor treatment and horrendous living conditions. The younger children were often sent to missions for

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8 Hämäläinen, “Comanche Empire,” 34-37, 62.

conversion. For instance, New Mexican parish records between 1700 and 1760 display the baptisms of nearly eight hundred Apache women and children.\(^\text{10}\)

Other factors contributed to the Apache defeat. Unlike the Comanches, the Apaches never fully embraced equestrianism, which handicapped their mobility. Their semi-sedentary life made Apaches vulnerable to cavalry attacks and guerilla warfare. Apaches were also chronically short on allies. Old rivalries and the fear of the Comanches guaranteed that allies were not forthcoming. Realizing the power of the Comanches, even the Spanish usually shied away from backing the Apaches. Furthermore, Apaches were increasingly shut out from trade exchanges. As a result they lacked access to modern weapons, which the Comanches got in numbers from the east.\(^\text{11}\)

In the 1700s southern New Mexico and Arizona became the new heartlands of Apacheria. The western edge of Apacheria was set against the Yavapais, Akimel O’odham (Pimas) and Tohono O’odham (Papagos) in and around the area where the Gila and Salt Rivers meet. From there the Apache rim extended via northern Sonora and Chihuahua to west Texas and all the way to northeastern New Mexico. While Apacheria shrank and was exposed in the east and the north, it continued to expand to the south and the southwest. As the Apaches refocused their trading-raiding power southwards between the 1750s and 1770s, the Spanish losses, according to anthropologist Ana Maria Alonso, included thousands of deaths, abandonment of settlements, huge losses in livestock, paralysis of the mining industry, and the decline of commerce.\(^\text{12}\) Often operating in small independent cells Apaches constructed complex, changing, and fragile relations with their semi-sedentary neighbors and Spanish/Mexican settlements that were geographically specific and changed through time. From the people around them Apaches wanted horses, crops, cattle, manufactured goods, and captives. Some Apache groups, becoming more dependent on Euro-American trade goods, relied heavily on raiding and trading, but several also mainly sought their subsistence from farming, hunting, and gathering.

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\(^\text{12}\) Alonso, Thread of Blood, 26-27.
In the late 1700s the Spanish authorities sought to hold back the Apache pressure by paying and giving food to the Apaches so that they would leave Spanish property alone. Mexico, however, could not afford to pay, and when Sonora offered bounties for Apache scalps the wars again escalated in the 1830s. While they depopulated much of Sonoran countryside, the Apaches also suffered heavy losses and saw their trade and wealth decrease.\(^{13}\) When U.S. forces arrived to Santa Fe, the Apaches, continuing to expand their influence southwards, remained vulnerable masters of the territory ranging from the Pecos River in New Mexico to the junctions of Salt and Gila rivers in Arizona, and from north-central Sonora and Chihuahua to central Arizona and New Mexico.

2.2 U.S. Army and Continental Conquest

Historian Michael L. Tate has labeled the nineteenth-century U.S. Army in the West as a “multipurpose” army. All the army’s “purposes,” however, were connected to empire-building. “It is significant,” historian Richard White writes, “that the first strong federal presence in the West arrived in the form of conquering armies.”\(^{14}\) This testifies to the violent nature of U.S. expansion. The army not only represented the federal government in the West, but in many instances it functioned as the engine of U.S. expansion. For one thing, the army was actively involved in the exploration of “new” areas, thus contributing to expansion early on.\(^{15}\) Some historians claim that the army was also heavily and systematically involved in the near destruction of the buffalo, which greatly helped U.S. conquest of the Plains. At times the army aided civilian authorities in law enforcement in the colonizer communities.\(^{16}\) The army was also called on to provide relief for white migrants and to build roads and telegraph lines. It was not rare that the army also secured economic interests, guarding railroad construction and offering protection for mines and ranches. The military also promoted the spread of


\(^{16}\) David D. Smits, “The Frontier Army and the Destruction of the Buffalo, 1865-1883,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 25 (Autumn 1994), 313-338; Clayton D. Laurie, “Filling the Breach: Military Aid to the Civil Power in the Trans-Mississippi West,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 25 (Summer 1994), 149-162.
white settlement by other methods. It went to places whites had not reached, trusting that the army’s presence would lure in settlers who saw profitable business opportunities in the needs of the army. Most notably, however, the army waged war to gain the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime. It fought against any group who refused to submit and hand over their lands to the U.S. Much of continental conquest was accomplished by disease, railroads, and the sheer force and numbers of white colonizers who took the lands and used them to support settler societies and extractive industries, but the army made certain that the U.S. had no competition for sovereignty in the various regions of the continent the Americans desired. Army presence made it known to any indigenous group, European power, or white secessionist that the U.S. reigned, or would seek to reign sovereign. During colonization, the army not only made sure indigenous peoples were pushed to the margins but that they stayed in their place. As the enforcer of colonial order it was the army, not the local militia or police, whose job was to use force against indigenous peoples if they left their prison camp-like reservations where the army had first concentrated the survivors during the U.S.-indigenous wars.

Throughout its history the United States has in fact had two armies, the volunteer citizen army, variably called militia, National Guard, or Organized Reserves, and the regular U.S. Army. Although the institution likes to trace its roots to the Continental Army formed in 1775 to fight in the American Revolutionary War, the regular army was reluctantly created by Congress on June 1784. During the decades following independence the army’s status remained uncertain. Many influential parties, among them President Thomas Jefferson, were indifferent towards the army institution and considered the military profession as altogether unnecessary. They believed the United States was an unmilitary country where a regular army was highly inappropriate and in fact stood against the principles of the republic. The army purportedly represented a threat to democracy as it was feared that professional soldiers without loyalties to local citizenry could easily become politicized. Many thought it best to rely exclusively on the citizen militia. The common people, especially outside the conflict zones, rarely demonstrated their support for the army. In fact, the public rather preferred to forget that the nation even had an army. Ignoring the lack of enthusiasm for the army, the federal
government nevertheless wanted its own troops to represent federal interests in the West and to handle Indian affairs. This is why the unpopular army continued to exist.¹⁷

Prior to the Civil War the army strength varied from a few thousand men to little over ten thousand. When the army was reorganized in 1866 after the Civil War, Congress fixed its size to 54,000 men. Reductions soon followed as the army continued to be unpopular especially among southern representatives resentful over Reconstruction in the defeated South. In 1869 army strength was limited to little over 30,000 soldiers and by 1874 the army numbered 25,000 enlisted men and 2,000 officers. The army was divided into regiments, which were further partitioned into companies/troops. Geographically the troops were assigned to one of the three military divisions: the Atlantic, the Missouri and the Pacific. The divisions contained various military departments, such as the Department of Arizona, separated from the Department of California in 1871 and part of the Division of the Pacific. Departments were further divided into districts and sub-districts. New Mexico was a district in the Department of the Missouri, which belonged to the division of the same name. The department commander was the key link in the army’s command chain. Ideally he was high enough to be able to gain perspective without losing focus on local conditions. The army was administrated under a coordinate system between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War. In theory, the Commanding General was in “command” of the army. However, the War Department, headed by the Secretary of War and aided by the many powerful staff bureaus, like the Pay Department and the Adjutant General’s Office, which controlled many of the army’s daily routines, remained resolutely outside the Commanding General’s control. At the head of the army hierarchy was the President of the Unites States, whose authority was unchallenged. He could with his prestige and power of appointments set the tone for overall military policies and guidelines. The power of the Congress was also substantial because it decided the army budget through annual allotments.¹⁸

Until the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the army was kept busy with wars against indigenous peoples. After the War of 1812 that gave the U.S.

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control of the Ohio-Indiana region, the major wars revolved around the government’s removal policy. This policy aimed to relocate eastern tribes into a permanent Indian Territory established west of the Mississippi River. Usually it was the army’s job to execute the removal, forcing reluctant tribes, such as the Creeks and the Cherokees, to move. From 1850s the army’s main engagements were against the Apaches, the loose Lakota-Cheyenne-Arapaho alliance on the northern Plains and the Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes on the southern Plains. While the battle at Summit Spings in 1869 and the Red River War in 1873-1874 ended armed confrontation on the southern Plains, the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 and Wounded Knee broke the power of the tribes in the north. In the Pacific Northwest the army also confronted the Modocs and the Nez Perce trying to hold on to their land base and political sovereignty in the face of American aggression. While proving “successful,” the army’s campaigns often amounted to cruel and indiscriminate total war where the commissary, villages, and non-combatants and combatants alike became targets.

2.3 U.S.-Apache Wars

The United States began to penetrate Apacheria after Mexico in 1821 abolished Spanish restrictions against foreign trade and residents. Stretching between New Mexico and Missouri, Santa Fe Trail became the main avenue for U.S. commerce and economic conquest, reorienting the region towards the U.S. According to historian Andres Resendez, the economies of Mexico and the United States “were as different as night and day during the first half of the nineteenth century.” Between 1800 and 1860, Mexico’s total income declined 10.5 percent, whereas that of the U.S. rose 1,270.4 percent. U.S., enjoying a string of economic booms, experienced revolutions in industry and transportation. Demographically, Mexico remained at 6 million people, while to U.S. moved from 5 to 32 million. When the U.S.-Mexican War in 1846 broke out Mexico’s north was in practice already incorporated into the fast-growing and dynamic Pacific Northwest.

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American merchants had gained control of the region’s markets, being able to supply New Mexico with products unavailable from other sources. From the Apache perspective American traders at first represented an interesting opportunity, not a challenge to Apache power. Americans offered a plethora of manufactured items, including new and more efficient weapons. Even the army looked like a potential ally (the Apaches still lacked allies) in the struggle against Mexico. When more Americans arrived and set up permanent bases (overland trail stations, army villages, mining camps, and towns) the Apaches realized that they faced invasion and occupation: the Americans were determined to steal their lands and strip them of their power. Already in the 1850s U.S. authorities in New Mexico tried to convince the Apaches that they should move into segregated and oppressive living spaces called reservations. American activity brought clashes and disrupted Apache patterns of gathering and hunting, thus increasing the importance of raiding for subsistence, which in turn made Apaches targets for U.S. aggression.

In 1860, miners assaulted the band of perhaps the most influential Apache leader, Mangas Coloradas. Three years later Mangas was captured by volunteer soldiers during negotiations. Soldiers taunted him and burned his feet, and when Mangas responded he was shot down and killed, his body thrown in a ditch after being decapitated for “scientific purposes.” Afterwards military reports fabricated a story of an escape attempt. In 1861 another important Chiricahua Apache leader, Cochise, made a narrow escape. Army lieutenant George Bascom first invited him and several of his relatives for a parley and then arrested them, thinking, wrongly, that the Apaches had stolen some cattle and kidnapped a young boy. Cochise claimed innocence, but while he managed to get away his relatives were not so lucky. The army executed them after negotiations with Cochise, who had captured some whites after escaping, did not materialize.

Historians often represent that until 1871 the Apaches held the initiative, the army heroically “defending the frontier” and struggling to respond in the face of a general Apache “menace.” This viewpoint is flawed in many ways. For instance, it
confuses the invaders and the invaded, making the Apaches the aggressors and the main cause for violence. Furthermore, it gives the picture that all Apaches took part in the wars as a cohesive force. In reality, there never existed any united Apache front. Many just wanted to be left alone and stay out of the Americans reach. Others fought to maintain their geopolitical power and freedom, some simply to survive in the face of colonial violence. Also, the army was not so much passive as it was unsuccessful in negating the Apaches independence and military power. Projecting military force onto a colony that lacked infrastructure, railroad connections, and large masses of white American colonizers, and offered a terrain and adversary unlike the white soldiers had ever encountered, was easier said than done. To complicate the situation for the invaders the Apaches were not similarly vulnerable to any particular life-source as were the equestrian buffalo hunters of the Plains who faced a catastrophe when the buffalo herds were nearly exterminated and when whites occupied key spots of nutritious grasslands and river bottoms necessary for the tribes’ large horse herds. The elimination of the mainstay of indigenous life was considerably more difficult with the Apaches who relied on a combination of gathering, hunting, agriculture, trading, and raiding.

Some Americans were concerned that the Apaches would block the routes connecting California to the east and keep Arizona and New Mexico permanently unsettled and unused. Warfare turned increasingly vicious in a climate filled with racial antagonism and desire for vengeance. Often the colonizers proved unable, unwilling, or too indifferent to identify Apache groups correctly. Thus any group thought to be Apaches often became legitimate targets for aggression. For instance, in 1871 a joint force of Hispanics, whites, and Tohono O’odham Indians from Tucson ambushed and slaughtered an Apache encampment near Camp Grant. Many Apache children were also taken captives, never to be seen again by their families. The survivors were heartbroken and angry in part because they had camped near Grant under military protection.23

In the early 1870s, partly frustrated that all Apaches had not submitted to U.S. control, and partly appalled by outrages like the massacre at Camp Grant, the federal government planned new initiatives in Apacheria. First, in 1871 and 1872 government’s

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peace emissaries Vincent Colyer and General Oliver O. Howard toured the region and made reservation pacts with various groups. Pressured by war and dwindling resources, Cochise’s Chiricahuas accepted a reservation on the Mexican border. The White Mountain (San Carlos) Reservation was to become the home for the Western Apaches, while the Mescaleros got a reservation in New Mexico. Second, targeting those Western Apaches and Yavapais, a tribe the army usually erroneously counted as Apaches, who chose not to come to the reservation (or did not know they were supposed to come in) the army launched the Tonto Basin offensive. Arizona’s military commander George Crook deployed several small converging detachments, which combined regulars and indigenous enlisted men and were supplied by mobile mule pack trains. As the military targeted villages, fields and other food sources, horses, and all material property, the campaign devastated numerous Apache and Yavapai groups, totally exterminated some, and drove others into armed confrontation or reservation confinement. In 1874 there were few if any free Apaches left on U.S. soil. Apacheria was fast turning into an occupied homeland, the U.S. Southwest. Only some Chiricahuas still remained free in the Sierra Madre Mountains in Mexico. The remote reaches of the Sierra Madre represented the small patch that remained of the once extensive sub-continental empire, Apacheria.

Having seemingly won the war, the federal government advocated concentration. The Chiricahua reservation was terminated, and Western Apaches and Chiricahuas from Arizona and New Mexico driven to San Carlos. This proved a disastrous policy. Many refused to go, while others escaped across the border the first chance they got, thinking the government had betrayed them. San Carlos proved a terrible living space. Not only did bands and tribes who detested each other have to live in close proximity, but the soil was often inadequate for subsistence, rations short, and agents corrupt. In addition, the government subjected Apaches to various “civilizing” policies that aimed to dismantle Apache identity and culture. One disillusioned Apache leader was Victorio. He detested San Carlos and tried to persuade the government to allow his band to live near their homes in the Ojo Caliente area in New Mexico or with the Mescalero Apaches in their New Mexico reservation. The government stubbornly refused and ordered Victorio to return to San Carlos. He could not live there, but instead started a guerrilla campaign.

that shocked the borderlands. Thousands of troops from both sides of the border chased Victorio’s outfit, usually gaining minimal results. It was the Mexicans who finally destroyed Victorio and most of his group in a battle at Tres Castillos on October 1880.25

On San Carlos further unrest soon arose when a messianic Ghost Dance movement led by Noch-ay-del-klinne, a Western Apache shaman, worried federal officials. They imagined that the shaman was preaching a call to arms against all whites, and decided to solve the matter by arresting him. On August 1881 a column of cavalry from Fort Apache set out for the shaman’s village on Cibecue Creek. On their way back with Noch-ay-del-klinne in custody a fight erupted between the white troops and the shaman’s Apache followers. Soon a fear of a general uprising swept across the region and the army overreacted with a show of force as troops from all directions poured into the Southwest. Many terrified and suspicious Chiricahuas fled the reservation, while some Western Apaches refused to surrender and hid in the Tonto Basin country. In the summer of 1882 the army crushed the latter in the Battle of Big Dry Wash.26

During the 1880s the military’s aggressive hunts became increasingly ineffective against small Apache groups who, in their quest to live outside white control, often made rapid raids to U.S. soil to capture Apache women from the reservation, or to obtain guns, ammunition, supplies, and horses, and then hid in the Sierra Madre. For instance, during the summer of 1881 the remnants of Victorio’s group led by Nana rode a thousand miles in southern New Mexico and Arizona. According to historian Dan Thrapp, Nana’s group killed fifty Americans, captured hundreds of horses and mules, fought several skirmishes with the soldiers - winning most of them - and eluded over one thousand soldiers and civilians chasing them before returning to the Sierra Madre.27 Similar dashing strikes followed in 1883 and 1885. While the army was almost powerless to stop the Apaches, white settlers grew even more angry, frightened, and puzzled by the Apaches speed, skill, and determination. To rid the region of Apaches many whites advocated extermination or removal.

27 Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 211-216.
In army eyes, all free Apaches, even if living most of the time on Mexican soil, represented a danger to U.S. security and had to be hunted down or brought under U.S. control. Although the Apaches in the Sierra Madre made sporadic campaigns because their trade connections were becoming increasingly limited, there is little to suggest that this relatively small and war-fatigued hybrid group, which included mostly Chiricahuas, but also some Mescaleros, Navajos, and Comanches, planned by 1883 to abandon the Sierra Madre and reclaim residence in their now occupied southern Arizona or New Mexico homelands. At this time the Apaches held the Sierra Madre as a sanctuary: it had trees, grass, game, one’s friends and relatives, safety, and happy, normal life outside colonial control. The Apaches search for freedom did not last. In 1883 the army invaded the Sierra Madre. Caught off guard, the Apaches agreed to try reservation life once more.

By 1885, however, the circumstances at San Carlos, further worsened by the conflict between the civilian and military branches of the federal government over reservation management, had turned the reservation into a hotbed of rumors, accusations, and cliques swirling around Chiricahua war leader and shaman Geronimo. Dissatisfied with what he saw was meaningless reservation life and fearing that the army would send him to the Alcatraz penitentiary or, worse, turn him over to local civilian authorities all too eager to hang him, Geronimo and his followers fled. The army went after them, but gained few results. Only in early 1886 did a column of Apache soldiers manage to convince Geronimo that it was in his best interest to talk with the region’s military commander. While the March 1886 peace conference at Canyon de Los Embudos convinced most Chiricahuas to surrender and face two years imprisonment in Florida, Geronimo had second thoughts and bailed out. Following a fruitless campaign, where 5,000 soldiers chased approximately forty Apaches, of whom little more than ten were men, the army resorted to a peace overture by sending two Chiricahuas, Ki-e-ta and Martine, accompanied by Lieutenant Charles Gatewood, to negotiate with Geronimo in Mexico. They convinced Geronimo to surrender on September 4, 1886. The army removed Geronimo’s band, and in fact all those Apaches the army labeled Chiricahuas, to Florida as prisoners of war. Relocated first to Alabama

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and then to Oklahoma their imprisonment lasted for twenty-seven years. After
Geronimo’s surrender, only few individual Apache “outlaws” concerned the military.
Large operations were over and organized Apache military power crushed. In 1886,
fifty years after the U.S.-Mexican War, the U.S. had gained the monopoly of violence
in the Southwest.30

2.4 The U.S. Colonial Regime

Throughout the territorial period (1850-1912) Americans imagined the
Southwest’s potential for extractive industries and settler societies, and through mining,
farming, ranching, town building, and railroad construction the newcomers started to
establish their dominance. However at first it seemed that nobody was coming. The
majority of the millions of European immigrants who sailed to the eastern seaports of
the United States never reached the border region. Not only was the journey from
eastern cities to the border area a chancy and costly endeavor, but the “remote”
Southwest, lacking manufacturing and industrial foundation, offered little immediate
economic promise. When the news of the California Gold Rush spread in 1849
thousands of white American invaders rushed to California. Approximately 50,000 of
them traveled through southern New Mexico and Arizona but only a few stopped.31 In
years to come small mining booms in Arizona and New Mexico tended to be
overshadowed by richer findings not only in California but in Colorado, Nevada, Idaho,
and Montana. The first real mining boom in Arizona started in 1858 on the Gila River.
New placers were opened up north of Yuma where the mining towns of Ehrenberg and
La Paz sprang up. Gold was discovered at Pinos Altos, New Mexico, and both silver
and gold were also discovered near Prescott and Wickenburg, Arizona. Still, fewer
miners and little capital usually followed the initial enthusiasm. Fear of indigenous
power, poor transportation connections, and the long distance from markets kept the
mining in its infancy. According to a classic mining history, the potentially rich veins in

30 For Geronimo and the “Geronimo campaign,” see Odie B. Faulk, *The Geronimo Campaign* (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Angie Debo, *Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place* (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Louis Kraft, *Gatewood & Geronimo* (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 2000); L.G. Moses, “Geronimo: The Last Renegade,” in *Etulain & Riley, Chiefs &
Generals*, 85-104.

31 Sheridan, *Arizona*, 52-53. The population of New Mexico at the 1850 Census was 61,547 and in 1860
93,516 people. Most were still concentrated in the Santa Fe area and the percentage who lived either in
southern New Mexico or in Arizona was minimal. The first Arizona Census (1860) shows Arizona with
only 6,482 inhabitants, of whom 2,421 were listed as “white.” Census Office, *Statistics of the Population
of the United States at the Tenth Census* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), 49, 72,
380.
Arizona and New Mexico seemed to remain an ever promising, but usually elusive attraction.  

Many of the white settlers often surged forward in search of good living and profits following the military. For instance, the modern metropolis Phoenix came into existence to supply the markets at Fort McDowell. White colonizers occupied selected islands of supposed wealth whereas the majority of land remained in the control of indigenous tribes. According to historian Thomas Sheridan, “prospectors descended like locusts on one strike after another, stripping away the nuggets and surface veins, and leaving behind their sluice boxes and shacks.” This aggressive, extortive settlement pattern left many ghost towns in its wake. In the Southwest the civilian conquest was in fact often an urban spread, although popular myths liked to cast it as an agrarian expansion. Pre-railroad Arizona had a diverse, yet small, assortment of white colonizers, including a contingent of Mormons. Many of the early arrivals tended to originate from the South, advocate slavery, and show at least sympathy for the Confederate cause. Following the confusion of the Civil War, when the Southwest was briefly invaded by Confederate forces, few mines managed to stay in operation but a bigger boom had to wait until the late 1870s. Then, in 1878, rich silver findings created the town of Tombstone. The finding attracted thousands of people into southeastern Arizona and produced tens of millions of dollars worth of silver.

In New Mexico, many newcomers formed strategic alliances by marrying into Hispanic families. After the Civil War, the Irish and the Germans formed the largest immigrant groups and German Jews gained prominence as merchants and creditors. Already during the Mexican period U.S. commerce had only widened the gap between the rich and the poor. According to historian Deena Gonzalez, the American rule

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Keith L. Bryant Jr., *Culture in the American Southwest: The Earth, the Sky, the People* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 32-66.

impoverished the majority of residents in population centers like Santa Fe and much of the region, stealing the Hispanic land base through legal and extralegal maneuverings and reducing the Hispanics to marginalized wage earners with lowly valued and paid jobs controlled by whites. Those Hispanics who defended their rights, families, or lands became easily labeled as “bandits” or troublemakers. The newcomers quickly controlled New Mexico’s new railroad and mining, its law firms and banks, and the largest newspapers. Whites led both political parties and constituted virtually all federally appointed officials.

The racial split widened throughout the years and by the end of the century, some historians argue, a racial fault line between Hispanics and Anglos, not class or wealth, defined one’s place in the Southwest. Thomas Sheridan writes that in Arizona an economic pecking order was organized largely along racial lines. At the top were the owners and managers of the railroads, copper mines, and land-and-cattle companies, all of whom were Anglos. In the middle were businessmen, ranchers, and farmers, mostly Anglo but also a few prominent Mexicans. At the bottom were people who had only their own labor to sell. Anglos dominated most skilled labor positions in the mines and

37 The term “Hispanic” here refers to all people of some Spanish descent, while “Anglo” or “white” describes all non-Hispanic whites. Deena J. González, Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-15; Charles Montgomery, The Spanish Redemption: Heritage, Power, and Loss on New Mexico’s Upper Rio Grande (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 8, 33-48; Hall, Social Change, 210-217. For a recent if uncritical overview of New Mexico history, see Thomas E. Chavez, New Mexico: Past and Future (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006). For Anglo-Hispanic marriages and their variable contributions towards Americanization in New Mexico, see also Thomas Jaehn, Germans in the Southwest, 1850-1920 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005); Darlis A. Miller, “Cross-Cultural Marriages in the Southwest: The New Mexico Experience, 1846-1900,” New Mexico Historical Review 57 (October 1982); Sandra L. Myres, “Mexican Americans and Westering Anglos: A Feminine Perspective,” New Mexico Historical Review 57 (October 1982); Resendez, Changing National Identities, 124-145. For intermarriage in Arizona, see Sheridan, Arizona, 109-112. It is telling of the U.S. attitudes that in New Mexico the greatest obstacle to statehood was the Hispanic majority. This was also true for Arizona, although there the Hispanic population was much smaller. Many whites were unwilling to admit large numbers of what they called “inferior Mexicans” into the American democracy. With statehood the Hispanics could use their majority position and occupy most elected offices. Territorial status diverted the selection to the federal government, more eager to advance white economic interests than worry over the fate of the Hispanic people. Boosters of statehood sought to Americanize the Hispanic population through education in the English language, conversion to Protestantism, and modernization of agricultural and commercial practices. For race and statehood, see Wilson, Myth of Santa Fe, 72; Hall, Social Change, 216-217; Lamar, Far Southwest, 486-504; Montgomery, Spanish Redemption, 72-78; Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), especially 239-245.

on the railroads, while Mexicans occupied the unskilled positions. They laid track, ran
cattle, picked cotton, and hauled ore.39

In the early 1880s, transcontinental railroads instigated a cultural and economic
revolution in the Southwest, breaking the grip of distance. According to one scholar,
“the railroad ushered in the trappings of eastern society.” In Santa Fe gaslight appeared
in 1880, followed by waterworks two years later and electricity in 1891. Rail lines
boomed established centers and brought whole towns into existence. More whites were
coming and going with increasing speed. Also, while manufactured goods and luxuries
were brought in, large quantities of extractive produce, most notably copper and cattle,
were shipped out.40

Industrialization increased copper demand exponentially in the late 1800s and
southern Arizona developed quickly into one of the world’s leading copper regions. By
1900 mines in Clifton, Morenci, Jerome, Bisbee, and Globe-Miami produced tens of
millions of pounds of copper every year and employed thousands of workers.41 Copper
towns turned into miniature colonies where workers arrived from established mining
areas in Germany, Scotland, Ireland, and Cornwall. Many Mexicans, Italians, Spaniards,
Czechs, Serbs, Montenegrans, and Bohemians also flocked to the copper mining
communities. By the 1880s other mining communities also attracted men from different
European countries. For example, the silver mining town Tombstone had significant
Irish, German, and Jewish minorities.42

Stocking the Great Plains and the Southwest, more than five million heads of
cattle were sent out from Texas after the Civil War. In Mexican times, drought, lack of
markets, and natural predators had kept the number of cattle relatively low in New
Mexico and Arizona, while during the 1850s and 1860s most cattle passed through to

39 Sheridan, Arizona, 170.
40 William G. Robbins, Colony & Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 31-34, 89-90; Montgomery, Spanish Redemption, 44;
Sheridan, Arizona, 103-105, 112-123; Lamar, Far Southwest, 169-176, 462-485; Richard J. Orsi, Sunset
Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the American West, 1850-1930
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
41 Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), 20-33; Sheridan, Arizona, 161-175; Lamar, Far Southwest, 462-467.
42 For European immigrants in the Southwest, see Gerhard Grytz, “‘Triple Identity’: The Evolution of a
German Jewish Arizonian Ethnic Identity in Arizona Territory,” Journal of American Ethnic History 26
(Fall 2006), 20-49; Gerhard Grytz, “The German Arizonians’: Ethnic Identity and Society Formation on
a Southwestern Frontier, 1853–World War I” (PhD dissertation, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2003);
Elliott Robert Barkan, From All Points: America’s Immigrant West, 1870s–1952 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2007); Ferenc M. Szasz, Scots in the North-American West, 1790-1917 (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2000); Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant
Workers in the North American West, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
Sheridan, Arizona.
California. Only during the 1880s did cattle fever, spurred by railroad development, sweep across the territories. While Anglo ranchers took control of New Mexico’s eastern plains and Arizona’s ranges, outsider investments multiplied and cattle poured into the region. The violent decline caused by drought, blizzards, and overgrazing that hit the Plains only increased the momentum and rapidly every source of permanent water in the borderlands was taken. In the early 1890s as many as two million head of cattle and sheep occupied the grasslands in Arizona, whereas in New Mexico the number of cattle reported in 1890 was more than 1.6 million, a dramatic increase to the 347,000 heads in 1880 and 57,000 in 1870. The range could not take the pressure that such a number of stock caused. The market became glutted when nervous owners tried to sell their herds as prices plunged. After the widespread bust the cattle industry regrouped. In Arizona sheep spilled over from California combined with Mormon and Navajo sheep expanded to the shrinking domain of the cattle. New Mexico had been the heartland of sheep ranches all along with nearly five million heads in the late 1880s.43

According to historian William Robbins, the trans-Mississippi West, including Arizona and New Mexico, was “the great natural-resource reservoir and the investment arena for eastern U.S. and western European capital.” At first the newcomers extracted beaver and bison skins, followed by timber, crops, and cattle, and also gold, silver, copper, oil, coal, and, eventually, uranium. The West and its raw materials in part transformed modern living.44 To gain control over Apacheria the U.S. employed a militarized form of colonial expansion, where the government sent its troops and representatives to conduct expeditions, build infrastructure, protect white colonizers and the interests of capital, and wage wars to subdue those indigenous peoples the state imagined as a threat to its colonial venture. The establishment of the U.S. regime, secured by the end of the U.S.-Apache wars in 1886 and cemented by Arizona and New Mexico’s statehood in 1912, created a new order of life in Apacheria: a social,


economic, cultural, and political reorganization of the whole area. The U.S. subjected the region to forced integration into the nation and the world economy, while also creating a race-based hierarchy that privileged whites, displaced and marginalized most Hispanics, and through destructive conquest excluded and subjugated the region’s powerful indigenous groups.
Part II THE COLONY
Chapter 3

Journey to the “Outside”: The Army on the Road to the Southwest

“The regiment…was ordered to Arizona, that dreaded and then unknown land, and the uncertain future was before me.”

Martha Summerhayes, officer’s wife

In 1869, Julia Davis, having just returned from a year-long honeymoon in Europe, hoped that her husband, a U.S. Army officer, would get assigned to a pleasant station somewhere near their Oakland, California, home, where they could safely raise their infant son. When the orders finally arrived, they brought the worst option imaginable. Captain Murray Davis was to take charge of a body of troops crossing the desert to Arizona. “I thought of my husband going down and the dangers of Indian warfare, and being perhaps killed by savages, whilst I was far away, and I could not bear it,” Julia Davis wrote. Feeling uncertain about the journey and their destination, her husband insisted that she should stay in California. Julia Davis, however, decided otherwise. She packed hastily, took along her son and a nurse, and caught her husband en route in San Diego. “All my friends of course cried out I was mad. I should die of hardship and fatigue, and my husband would have to bury me in the desert,” she remembered. After some heated arguments with her husband, Julia Davis joined Company A, Eight Cavalry, numbering twenty-four enlisted men and two officers, for the journey of forty-one days and approximately six hundred miles to Camp McDowell, Arizona Territory. Seeking to ease their anxiety concerning the journey and trying to make sure that time spent on the road would be as pleasant as possible, Davis secured travel facilities and accommodations of the highest quality available, brought along servants, and stocked wagons with an abundance of material comforts.

This chapter describes U.S. Army journeys to southern Arizona and New Mexico during the two post-Civil War decades. The spotlight is on the army experience on the road, before white army men and women reached their Southwest stations. The discussion is divided into four sections. First evaluates the army’s position in post-Civil War U.S. society and the transient nature of army life. Second deals with travel routes

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2 Jim Schreier, ed., “‘For This I Had Left Civilization’: Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 1869-1870,” Journal of Arizona History 29 (Summer 1988), 185-188.
and methods. The third part investigates the significance of class in shaping the travel experiences of army people. While few scholars, most notably Kevin Adams, have written of the class division which divided the officers and their wives from the enlisted ranks, they have not fully discussed how class was played out in the context of army journeys. By discussing class and army journeys it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of the main social division which separated the white army people. The army’s caste system did not structure life only inside the army posts, but class identity and the learning of place were also produced on the road to colonial stations.

Finally, this chapter discusses how white army men and women represented their journeys and the places through which they traveled. What did the army people make of the journey? How did they define their relationship to their surroundings or take control over them? How did travel methods shape army representations? Approaching army texts as travel writings, this work links the texts army men and women produced to a complex and multifaceted genre. It argues that in colonial context travel was much more than movement across space, and that journeys in fact functioned as sites in the production of colonizer identity and power. They were domains where the superiority and difference of the colonizers was established in relation to the colonial terrain they had come to invade. According to anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt, travel writings were an important means in producing “Europe’s differentiated conception of itself in relation to something it became possible to call ‘the rest of the world.’”

Travel writings can be categorized as one form of imperial meaning-making where the travelers produced a certain subjective story assigning specific meanings to themselves, the journey process, and to the landscapes, peoples, and settlements they saw. They judged the suitability of the travel region for the purposes of the colonial regime, defined the region’s value, and produced certain images, categorized as “truths,” for the western world.

For years historians of the U.S. West have been fascinated by a specific form of travel: overland migration. They have traditionally approached it as a heroic endeavor where determined white men and women faced overwhelming odds and dangerous

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3 For the class division which divided the army, see Kevin Adams, “‘Common people with whom I shall have no relation’: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the Post-Civil War Frontier Army” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2004).
4 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), 5. For travel writing and colonialism, see also, for instance, Sara Mills, Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women’s Travel Writing and Colonialism (New York: Routledge, 1991); Peter Hulme & Tim Youngs, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
nature. Some scholars have also discussed European visitors like Sir Richard Burton, the famous British explorer, in the West. Despite the interest in the genre, the army remains absent in most descriptions of travel in the West. For example, Martin Padget’s recent work, Indian Country, which focuses on travels in the Southwest between 1840 and 1935, ignores the vast amount of army texts pertaining to the subject and includes only one army narrative. Arguably, army explorers form an exception. The exploits of men like John Fremont, a member of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers, have been aptly covered in many works. However, while some histories of military campaigns pay attention to “travel” conditions and experiences in the field and a few studies briefly notice army wives travels, the journeys of line officers, their wives, and enlisted men have in general received limited scholarly interest. In most works the army is always somehow readily present in the West, there is no journey or travel writings. It seems as if army members did not have anything to say about how they got to different locations. This all is rather unfortunate because white army men and women traveled from one region to the next often and wrote plenty of the journeys they made.

Those few historians who have described the travels of army wives have usually rather uncritically celebrated the wives “bravery” in the face of “primitive conditions” and “terrible hardships,” thus failing to subject the wives’ writings to critical interrogation as subjective colonial discourses. One could say that this kind of approach is rather symptomatic of the histories of overland emigration in general. Most works do not connect travels in the West to colonialism, approach travel as a domain

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where the travelers produced their identity and constructed their power, or critically question the motives and agendas that shaped the travel texts. Even a recent work like Padget’s, which deals with representations of travel and sees travel writings as a means used in the incorporation of the Southwest to the United States, is still more inclined to discuss how travel texts produced the cultural geography of the region rather than how travel writings were made to increase the power and importance of their producers, or how they established colonial hierarchies and relations of domination.9

The discussion of army journeys and the investigation of army narratives as colonial travel writings not only opens a previously little discussed side of army history to critical interrogation, but links army writings to the establishment of colonial power and identity. It also allows us to see how a group of colonizers who were the official representatives of the colonial regime, and specialists in violence directly responsible for military conquest, produced their entrance to a region they had come to take control of. Because of its mission of conquest, the army is an especially valuable group for understanding the relationship between travel narratives and colonial power.

3.1 Transient Conquerors

In the Southwest the army represented a congregation of foreigners. Apart from the indigenous soldiers, all army people originated from other regions, even continents. Those white enlisted men who did not come from the urban workers of eastern cities usually arrived straight from Europe, being most often Irish or Germans. For instance, in 1886 the enlisted ranks had 11,377 native-born and 10,163 foreign-born whites. Of the latter 3,640 were German and 3,518 Irish.10 As a rule, the army did not enlist white enlisted men from the small local population in the Southwest. The federal government deemed the supply of possible recruits insufficient both in quantity and quality. Most recruiting was instead conducted in the more populous eastern states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. In the East, as historian Edward Coffman argues, soldiering was in general viewed as a low status occupation. Popular beliefs reflecting the anti-army atmosphere of the nation held that enlisted men were of questionable character and unfit to work in real and meaningful occupations. In public discussion soldier often was used as a synonym for all that was degrading and low. “Soldier! Will you work? No, sir-ee; I’ll sell my shirt first” was a saying that reveals the popular

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9 Padget, Indian Country, especially 3-4, 11.
10 Annual Report Secretary of War (hereafter ARSW), 1886, 594.
attitude towards soldiers in the East, Coffman writes. Contrary to the popular image, however, it was fairly difficult to get accepted into the army. In the 1880s, only 28% of the applicants proved successful. Loathed by the general public, the man who volunteered as a common soldier ventured West in search of better life and new opportunities. Many enlisted to find a steady job, especially important in times of economic uncertainty, while others wanted adventure. There were also those who saw the army as a way to escape their troubled past, while several immigrants joined to ease their transition in a new land.\footnote{After the Civil War, cavalrymen enlisted for five years and those in the infantry for three. This was changed in 1869 so that all white and black volunteers served for five years, after which it was possible to re-enlist. Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 328-335, 401} Although scholars like Coffman do not emphasize it, undoubtedly there were also many who wanted to make their lives more important and meaningful, and imagined that participating in western conquest and nation/empire-building was a way to do it.

Officers and their wives represented a different social class and white ethnicity than the enlisted men. Of the 2,140 officers in the army only 176 were foreign-born in 1886. As a group the officers claimed a native-born established background. For instance, of men who served in the Southwest, Lieutenant William Carter declared himself a seventh-generation native-born, while Major Adna Chaffee made it known that he was eight-generation native-born of English ancestry.\footnote{ARSW, 1886, 594. For Carter and Chaffee, see W.H. Carter, From Yorktown to Santiago with the Sixth U.S. Cavalry (Austin: State House Press, 1989), 4-6; Adna Chaffee papers, file 1, Arizona State Historical Society, Tucson (hereafter ASHS). For similar examples, see Leighton Finley papers, University of Arizona, Special Collections (hereafter UASP); Anson Mills, My Story (Washington D.C.: Published by the author, 1918).} Army wives came from alike backgrounds. For instance, Eveline Alexander was born in Utica, New York, and raised in the comfortable surroundings of her family’s large country estate on the shores of Lake Oswego near Auburn. Educated by private tutors and also attending an elite school, she was related to many of the “first” families of New York and customary to mingling among the society in New York and Washington D.C. Alice Kirk Grierson was born into a prosperous upper class merchant family in Ohio. She attended first-class schools and became a school teacher before marrying into the military. Still another army wife who went to Arizona, and who supposedly descended from Oliver Cromwell, was from a distinguished Pennsylvania family, her father being a prominent lawyer and judge.\footnote{Sandra L. Myres, ed., “Evy Alexander: The Colonel’s Lady at McDowell,” Montana: Magazine of Western History 24 (Summer 1974), 28-29; Alice Kirk Grierson, The Colonel’s Lady on the Western} Many also wanted to emphasize that they came from a long line of army
officers who had helped to make the nation great in the past. One army wife noted that her great-great-grandfather already served his country, while his father was in the army for fifty years, and his husband, brother, and son all also served.  

After the Civil War almost 40% of officers came from New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio alone. Geographically and culturally the officers were northerners, or “Yankees,” and a southern officer proved a rarity. In the East, the prospects for an average army officer looked rather dismal after the Civil War. Many officers were veterans of the war that had been their highlight in the public eye. When the struggle ended people were tired of the fighting, anxious to forget its horrors and continue their lives in pursuit of peaceful endeavors. Industrialization, historian Robert Utley writes, made many think that war had become a thing of the past. War was considered so destructive to economic productivity and material well-being as to be unthinkable. Furthermore, there was no very strong constituency or interest group in the East that would have depended on the army or spoken for its welfare. Quite the opposite, many southern democrats were antagonistic towards the army because of Reconstruction. When army size was drastically reduced and most of the remaining troops sent either west of the Mississippi River, or to supervise Reconstruction, army presence and influence disappeared from the everyday lives of peoples in the East. As a consequence, the public and the established element soon forgot that the nation even had an army. When an eastern society lady was introduced to a colonel of the army in 1885, she responded that “I supposed the Army was all disbanded at the close of the war!”  

Unnecessary and unwanted in the East, army officers and their dependants could identify with other middle-class people who saw their position decline and opportunities disappear in the increasingly industrial post-war society. Historian Brenda Jackson notes that many middle-class whites short on their luck moved west in search of wealth and social prominence. While declining business opportunities forced members of established merchant and farming families to relocate, army officers moved because conquest called them west. Many tried to make the most of the opportunities expansion brought. Although few officers were obsessed with the glorious days of the Civil War.

Footnotes:


15 Quote in Coffman, *Old Army*, 215, see also 219. See also Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 65.

16 Brenda K. Jackson, *Domesticating the West: The Re-creation of the Nineteenth-Century American Middle Class* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).
and looked back to the war when constructing their identities, most, especially of the
younger generation, built their identity in the framework of continental conquest. 17

In the West officers and their wives, a group with uncertain national status,
constructed new opportunities for making themselves important. Those in southern
Arizona and New Mexico liked to cast themselves as a unique group of magnificent
men and women; honorable, brave, refined, and thoroughly American. Their collective
identity was founded not only on ancestry, but even more so on notions of character.
Character was what made the officers and their wives in their own eyes. More than
white ethnicity it was character that defined their whiteness and secured their class
status. It helped them set themselves apart from all others, to think that they were better
than the rest. In their own writings officers were “fine men,” educated and intelligent
gentlemen, while their wives and daughters were “ladies,” cultured and gentle, and
together they formed a society refined in tone. They claimed they had a high moral
sense, great integrity and a generally recognized high standard of honor which made
them “exemplary citizens” deserving the admiration of all respectable and reasonable
people. 18 This idealized collective sense of self was established, elaborated, displayed,
maintained, and guarded in discourse and in daily lives as the army entered, lived, and
operated in the colonial terrain of southern Arizona and New Mexico.

Officers and soldiers did not live permanently in one army village or in a single
territory/state. Rather they constituted a community of transient conquerors, moving
from one place to the next, crisscrossing the continent in irregular intervals. The army as
a rule limited the term of service in regions considered remote and unhealthy from two
to four years. Only a few exceptions occurred to this general pattern. One was the Sixth
Cavalry that spent a decade and a half in the Southwest. However, even the Sixth
changed territories during its stay, being in Arizona from 1875 to 1884, and then in New
Mexico until 1890. The situation was rather similar for the Eight Cavalry that was
stationed for almost a decade in Arizona and New Mexico. Overall, however, the
turnover of army units in the Southwest was high as regiments routinely, yet in random
intervals, changed places. In all, between 1868 and 1886 Arizona or New Mexico had

17 For the army looking backwards, see Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1985), especially 144-146.
18 Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, 2 vol. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 62; Frank D. Reeve, ed., “Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier’s
Memoirs,” New Mexico Historical Review 25 (1950), 51; ARSW, 1875, 123; Biddle, Reminiscences, 164.
For officers sense of self during the post-Civil War period, see also Adams, “Common People;” Hutton,
Phil Sheridan and His Army, 142.
soldiers from all of the army’s ten cavalry regiments except the seventh. Furthermore, in Arizona served men from eight different infantry regiments and in New Mexico from six.19

In addition to changes of army units, a stream of discharged men, deserters, and new recruits created plenty of army traffic to and from the Southwest. The turnover for enlisted men was high as the army replaced an estimated twenty-five to forty percent of the approximately 3,000 men stationed in Arizona and New Mexico each year.20 The officers likewise moved frequently. For instance, Frances Boyd, born and raised in New York City, was on the move almost constantly since marrying Orsemus Bronson Boyd fresh out of the military academy at West Point in 1867. In a period of six years the couple lived in Nevada and then moved to Arizona where they resided at Whipple Barracks and Camp Date Creek. From there they continued to New Mexico, living in Fort Stanton and Fort Union before entering Fort Bayard in 1873.21 Not all officers moved as much as the Boyds and most stayed in their designed stations as long as their units did. Still, although the whole Sixth Cavalry was stationed in Arizona in 1878, 2 out of 7 staff officers and 10 of 36 field officers were outside the territory. In the Twelfth Infantry, also serving in Arizona, 3 of 5 staff officers and 7 of 27 field officers were not in the Territory. Most of the absentees were either on leave in the East, on temporary detached service, or en route to join their command, and thus bound to enter the Territory sooner or later.22

19 For unit movements and the number of companies stationed in Arizona and New Mexico, see ARSW, 1868, 52-60, 732-45; 1869, 42-43, 130-131; 1870, 68-71, 86-87; 1871, 90-91, 104-105; 1872, 20-33, 106-115; 1873, 27-37, 58-69; 1874, 7-18, 70-81; 1875, 36-45, 142-155; 1876, 42-67; 1877, 16-39; 1878, 12-25, 63-64, 117; 1879, 18-31; 1880, 10-32; 1881, 50-64; 1882, 32-45; 1883, 60-73; 1885, 84-91; 1886, 84-95. For the recommended limit on consecutive service in an “undesirable” area, see ARSW, 1872, 66. For the Sixth Cavalry, see also Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 194; Carter, From Yorktown, 239-241, 256.

20 Robert M. Utley has calculated that each year death, desertion, and discharge claimed from twenty-five to forty percent of the enlisted force in the whole army. Utley, Frontier Regulars, 23.

21 Mrs. Orsemus Bronson Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). Some hated the uncertainty, but others grew accustomed to moving. See Boyd, Cavalry Life, 131, 205-206, 226; Lydia Spencer Lane, I Married A Soldier; or Old Days in the Old Army (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1893), especially 210-211.

22 ARSW, 1878, 120-121, 125-126. For the movement of individual officers, see also Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 37-56, 109-135, 187-221, 305-327; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona; Mills, My Story. One special group of army travelers were the paymasters. Up to 1872 paymasters arrived from San Francisco for their tour of Arizona, demanding in readiness a large number of animals and wagons for their transport. By 1874, paymasters operated from within Arizona, making their headquarters in Prescott and Tucson. They served all army posts except Yuma, which a paymaster from San Francisco handled. In 1878, Arizona paymasters were stationed at forts Yuma and Lowell. Usually soldiers were paid every two months, so these officers journeyed regularly throughout the region. See ARSW, 1872, 76; 1874, 66; 1878, 117; Henry Winfred Splitter, ed., “Tour in Arizona: Footprints of an Army Officer,” Journal of the West 1 (July 1962).
In all the army established a considerable presence in the rather thinly populated Southwest. Of the 6,834 white, including Hispanic, males residing in Arizona in 1870, 1,885 were white soldiers. In 1880, the situation had changed considerably with the influx of Anglo civilians, but still the 1,581 white soldiers were probably the largest occupational group in the society of 35,160 Anglo and Hispanic whites of both sexes. Furthermore, the number of soldiers increased throughout the 1880s as the army poured manpower to end the U.S.-Apache wars. In 1885, Arizona had 2,235 soldiers. New Mexico had a much larger “white” population all along due to a long history of Spanish/Mexican settlement. In 1850, when New Mexico became a U.S. territory, it had at least 57,000 Hispanic and roughly 2,000 Anglo residents. The number of Anglos increased only gradually. When railroad tracks reached the proximity of Santa Fe in 1880, the Anglo population remained at little more than 10,000, while the white and black soldiers numbered 1,207. Well into the twentieth-century the majority of New Mexicans were of Spanish/Mexican origin. It should also be noted that most of the civilians lived in the north-central section of the Territory along the Rio Grande, while the majority of army camps, with the exception of forts Wingate, Marcy, and Union, were located in the Apache-dominated southern New Mexico.23

3.2 Travel Routes and Transports

The thousands of soldiers who traveled to the borderlands could not rely on engine power alone to reach their destinations. Indeed, in 1866-1867 when the regular army returned to the Southwest from the Civil War no transcontinental railroad traversed the region and no water routes, except on the lower Colorado River, penetrated it. Incoming and outgoing troops were forced to use a mixture of boats, wagons, stage coaches, mules and horses to reach their destinations. Many of the enlisted ranks also walked. Later, train travel figured in the mix. For instance, when Will C. Barnes, a soldier in the U.S. Army Signal Corps, was ordered to Arizona in 1880 he first used the transcontinental railroads to reach San Francisco and then sailed

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on a steamer to San Diego. From there he took the stage to Yuma on the Colorado River and then continued by rail to its terminus, which at this time was some 135 miles distant. After waiting two days for a vacant seat on a stage coach he journeyed onward to Tucson. There, after finally receiving orders for his destination, Fort Apache, Barnes took the eastbound stage coach, changed to a two-seated open buckboard after a ride of 125 miles, and got to Fort Grant via roads, he wrote, “just as nature made them: a foot deep in dust in dry weather, and often bottomless mud in wet weather.” Again spending a few days waiting, his journey continued by buckboard to Fort Thomas, where, following another delay of four days, Barnes wrote that he faced a “solemn-faced old government mule,” which was to serve as his transport for the rest of the way. Traveling onwards on a rough, steep, and “perfectly awful” trail for several days, and following a small skirmish with the Indians, the party Barnes had joined reached its goal, Fort Apache. Following weeks of traveling by ocean steamer, train, stage coach, buckboards, and finally on mule-back, and via several stop-over stations, few towns, and a number of army posts, Barnes finally made it to his new military home.\(^{24}\)

While Barnes traveled alone, the majority of soldiers and many of the officers and their wives, like Julia Davis, arrived in sizable army columns. The army penetrated the region both from the east and the west. Usually soldiers assigned to New Mexico moved in large columns overland either via Fort Union and Santa Fe in the northeast or, more rarely, El Paso, Texas, in the south.\(^{25}\) To reach Arizona army personnel and their families often ventured by way of Pacific Ocean and California. If departing from eastern U.S., the first step was a sea voyage via the Panama Isthmus to the Pacific seaports. After 1869, the traveler might take a transcontinental rail trip to San Francisco, which took approximately nine days from New York.\(^{26}\) From San Francisco army travelers continued, often by boat, southwards either to Drum Barracks, outside Los Angeles, or to San Diego. Since the early 1870s both supplies and troops were increasingly transported from southern California by steamboats around Cape San Lucas to the mouth of the Colorado River and then up the river by small steamers to


forts Yuma and Mojave, and the village of Ehrenberg, which functioned as entry points into Arizona. The army argued that this water travel offered greater dispatch and economy, and better conditions for both humans and materiel than did the overland route through the Sierra Nevada and the Mojave Desert. To make water transportation more feasible, the army had in fact begun establishing steamboat traffic on the Colorado River first in the 1850s, and this water route played a significant transportation function until the railroads reached the river in 1877. For its part, the overland route involved few alternatives. One could take the route across the desert from Drum Barracks to Ehrenberg or Fort Mojave, approximately 285 miles, or from San Diego to Fort Yuma, 200 miles. The major drawback of the whole ordeal was that at worst as much as half of the capacity of wagons had to be preserved for water and forage. From Mojave, Ehrenberg, and Yuma onwards overland travel was the only alternative. From Mojave the main routes lead further inland towards Prescott, while Yuma roads went in the direction of Tucson, the two towns functioning as main gateways in the movement of military troops and supplies to the Arizona inland.27

With the army came an abundance of animals, manufactured goods, and a wide array of other belongings. Although the army wanted to encourage the use of local products to supply the troops and posts, in practice much was imported. As late as 1877, the eve of the railroads, Arizona ranchers could not produce enough animals to feed local army villages and Indian reservations. Supplies mostly arrived from the same direction as peoples, the way from California having the monopoly in Arizona, with the exception of Fort Apache that was at least occasionally supplied from the east, and New Mexico being penetrated from its northeastern and southeastern corners. For instance, in 1877 contractors operated nineteen routes from California and one from Colorado to reach Arizona posts, while army villages in New Mexico were maintained by eight routes from the East.28

27 ARSW, 1869, 124-125; 1871, 77; 1872, 153; Tate, Frontier Army, 73-74. In the late-1860s there was an alternative route from California by water to Guaymas in Sonora, and thence overland to Tucson for bringing supplies to southern Arizona. For army’s journey descriptions to Arizona, see for example Mills, My Story, 136-143; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 19-76; George F. Price, Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1883), 144-145.
28 Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995), 119, 130. By 1882 railroads had driven many freighters out of business and only few routes remained in operation with reduced rates. See ARSW, 1878, 355-357, 362; 1882, 356-357, for an overview of contracts, rates, and supply routes to New Mexico and Arizona. For New Mexico, see also ARSW, 1870, 17; 1872, 47; 1877, 66. Supplying soldiers in Arizona was a significant military expenditure. For example, in 1869, flour, whether delivered by land in wagons from Yuma or purchased and delivered locally, cost five to six times as much in southeastern Arizona than in San Francisco. Ration for a horse was equally expensive in
During the 1860s and the 1870s wagons led by mule and ox teams functioned as the only mode of supply transportation overland. With plenty of heat and dust, the lack of grass and water endemic, and the roads too few, lengthy, and in uncertain condition, the movement of supplies was expensive, slow, uncertain, and irregular at best. In addition, army posts were widely scattered, some distant from the main roads, and therefore hard to reach. At worst, even roads passable by wagons did not exist when posts were established, but had to be made by military labor. Problems piled up as wagons fell to pieces, mules became unserviceable, and materials arrived in insufficient quantity and poor quality. Sometimes a post even ran out of supplies and had to be aided by others.\textsuperscript{29}

Whether the troops started their journey towards the Southwest from the Great Plains, the Pacific Northwest, or east of the Mississippi River, the distances traveled proved immense. While the companies of the Third Cavalry marched 1,190 miles on average from Wyoming to Arizona, the First Infantry and Tenth Cavalry from Texas averaged 489 miles. Even longer journeys awaited the Twelfth Infantry when sent from Arizona to the east, with trips averaging 2,602 miles.\textsuperscript{30} Not the distances alone, but the fact that travel overland was conducted in often massive columns made the journeys time-consuming, slow, and cumbersome before the railroads crossed the Southwest. When the Fifth Cavalry left the Southwest in 1875 and was replaced by the Sixth from Colorado, Indian Territory, and Kansas, half a regiment, approximately 300 to 500 men, moved at a time. Similarly, when the Eight Cavalry departed New Mexico and exchanged places with the Ninth from Texas the transfer was conducted entirely by overland marches half a regiment at a time. The army columns, which consumed vast amounts of water, food, and forage, appeared like moving clouds of dust when looked upon from distance. It was not uncommon that the transfers took several months to complete. For instance, the men and women of the Eight Cavalry spent anywhere from eight weeks to three or four months on the road.\textsuperscript{31} It was altogether impossible for any army traveler to reach the borderlands in just few days. Even the relatively “short” trip

\textsuperscript{29} ARSW, 1868, 56-57; 1869, 122-123; 1870, 15-16; 1871, 77; 1872, 73-75; 1877, 148; 1878, 195.
\textsuperscript{30} ARSW, 1882, 352-354; 1883, 536; Finley papers, notebook 1881-85, UASP.
\textsuperscript{31} Carter, \textit{From Yorktown}, 175-178; ARSW, 1875, 36-38, 77, 131-132; 1876, 451; Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 241-248. For variation in regiment size, see, for example, ARSW, 1873, 26-39; 1874, 7-19; 1877, 30-43.
between San Diego and Fort Apache took six weeks, and from Fort Smith, Arkansas, to Fort Union, New Mexico, troops in 1866 marched 68 days.32

In the 1880s the transcontinental railroad changed the methods and time the army spent traveling to and from the borderlands. From the west the Southern Pacific Railroad arrived at Yuma in 1877, and in 1880, the year Will Barnes used it, the lines reached New Mexico. A year later the railroad crossed both territories. The second line to achieve this was the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad that branched from the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad and built west from Albuquerque in 1880 joining the Southern Pacific on the Colorado River near Fort Mojave in 1883. Entering New Mexico from the north, the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe built southward, connecting with the Southern Pacific and Texas & Pacific near El Paso at the extreme western corner of Texas in 1881.33 No longer were all troops forced to march most of their way. For example, in 1882 one cavalry company returning from Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to the Pacific coast marched only approximately 200 of its almost 1,600 travel miles. In another instance an infantry unit from Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, rushing to join the Victorio campaign in southern New Mexico was able to do most of its journey by rail. The rail trip of 1,081 miles took only five days.34 It is easy to see that the effect of the railroads on travel speed was phenomenal. For instance, one military surgeon journeyed by rail from New York to Bowie Station in southeastern Arizona in 6 days in 1884, while twelve years earlier his much shorter trip from northern Nevada to a central Arizona post had lasted 51 days.35

The overall impact of the railroad on army’s travel methods was still limited. First, although long overland marches and boat trips became a thing of the past, in troop movements between the two territories, or from Texas, marching continued as a viable option. When in 1883 the Fourth and Sixth Cavalry exchanged places between New Mexico and Arizona most of the units made the whole way by marching. One of the

33 Sheridan, *Arizona*, 103-105, 112-123. For evaluations on the importance of railroads on military mobility, see Tate, *Frontier Army*, 75-79; ARSW, 1883, 295-315.
troops spent 27 days on the 440 miles from Fort Stanton, New Mexico, to Fort Huachuca.\textsuperscript{36} Interestingly, the units of the Tenth Cavalry marched from Texas to Arizona in 1885 following the Southern Pacific rail lines. Only some of the officers and their wives were allowed to make use of the comforts of train travel.\textsuperscript{37} Second, most Southwest army villages were not located in the proximity of the first rail lines. Thus reaching them by rails alone was impossible. After the Southern Pacific and Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe joined with the Texas & Pacific only just one, Fort Craig, of the three southern New Mexico posts was along their routes, forts Bayard and Stanton being distant. The military soon reoccupied both forts Cummings and Selden, which had been abandoned few years earlier but were now conveniently located near the railroad. The situation was similar in Arizona. When the first transcontinental line crossed the territory, forts Huachuca, Bowie, Grant, McDowell, Mojave, and Thomas were all within 65 miles of the rail lines, but Apache, Verde, and Whipple Barracks, the location of department headquarters, were approximately 100 miles from rails. Only Fort Yuma had a railroad stop, and Fort Lowell was within a very short distance of one in Tucson.\textsuperscript{38} In all, marching, riding, or wagon transportation never became totally irrelevant during the period of U.S.-indigenous wars, although railroads by the early 1880s had made the journeys much faster and brought convenient stops within Arizona and New Mexico for those army travelers able to utilize the trains.

3.3 Class and Travel

The preconceptions held by white army personnel varied from ignorance to fear. In theory by 1866 the Southwest was not a totally unknown place for white Americans. Merchants, trappers, miners, and explorers had traversed the area decades earlier, as had American armies during the U.S.-Mexican war and the pre-Civil War years. While early nineteenth-century explorers such as Stephen Long and Zebulon Pike gave the West little chance of permanent white settlement, constructing an image of the Plains and beyond as the “Great American Desert,” in the 1840s and 1850s another famous


\textsuperscript{37} John G. Bigelow, “Historical Sketch of the 10\textsuperscript{th} U.S. Cavalry,” 21, in Records of United States Army Commands, Record Group 98, National Archives; Finley papers, notebook 1881-85, UASP.; Mason M. Maxon papers, box 1, file 1, ASHS.

\textsuperscript{38} ARSW, 1880, 31-32, see also 209-210; 1881, 65-70. As the transcontinental lines branched out an increasing number of posts became located on the rail routes. For the situation in the late 1880s, see Maxon papers, file 3, ASHS.
explorer John Fremont proved a great publicist for expansion. His reports served as popular literature and were read as adventures and as tracts urging western settlement.39 Still, in 1866 not many Anglos actually lived in southern Arizona and New Mexico. Farming, ranching, and mining had not boomed yet and most pre-Civil War merchants preferred Santa Fe over Tucson. Also, the majority of white explorers had not included southern Arizona or New Mexico in their routes. Thus the knowledge of the area and its terrain remained incomplete. Before leaving the region to the hands of volunteers during the Civil War years, the regular army had established its presence in southern Arizona and New Mexico, but it is unclear how much the post-Civil War generation of army men and women knew of these earlier portraits. Probably some did, but many seemed unaware of what awaited them. According to Martha Summerhayes, an officer’s wife, “old campaigners...knew a thing or two about Arizona,” but the younger generation whom she belonged to “did not know.” “We had never heard much about this part of our country,” she wrote.40 In the late 1870s and early 1880s many continued to claim that they had limited knowledge of southern Arizona and New Mexico and did not know exactly what to expect. When receiving orders to travel to Arizona, Will Barnes noted in his diary that in his mind Arizona “seemed like a fairyland so far away was it.” An officer felt that he was about to enter a truly unknown region of which “civilized people” knew little about. There were those for whom the region was entirely off the known world and some could not even locate it on the map.41 There were also still those who were frightened by rumors and tales. Entering Arizona in the 1880s an army wife wrote that “We did not much relish the prospect of going to Arizona, for many and lurid were the tales that were told of the dreadful heat, the sand storms, the Gila monsters, centipedes, tarantulas etc., but when Uncle Sam said ‘March,’ we marched.”42

Regardless of one’s expectations, army officers and their wives’ class sensibilities and image of themselves demanded that they try to maintain certain lifestyle and level of refinement during their journeys. Ideally, they hoped to arrange

40 Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 46.
leisurely journeys which would allow them to display their status and claim genteel identity. In reality, during the pre-railroad era many travelers proved unable to organize the kind of journeys they wanted. Many a traveler grew frustrated and disappointed. The trip proved too long and arduous, and the exposure to the elements too real and painful. Journeys became exhausting struggles against heat, dust, and exhaustion for the unprepared and overconfident travelers who discovered that they did not enjoy their time on the road.

To guarantee a successful journey, servants, either civilians or soldiers, were thought highly necessary and the officers and their wives tried to make sure that they had maids, body servants, nurses, and other lower class workers to accompany them, do much of the work, and provide for comforts.\textsuperscript{43} It was also important that accommodations in boats and wagons were as comfortable as possible and reflected the travelers’ sense of self, their ideas of proper style and taste. In boats officers and their wives preferred to reside in what they referred as “very comfortable” staterooms. Books, singing, conversations, and games ideally made the days pass quickly. While officers and their families sought to enjoy cheerful leisure in the company of “respectable” people, servants made their beds, hauled travel trunks back and forth from the vessel’s hold, and served drinks and meals.\textsuperscript{44} For the overland journey many spent much money and effort in making their wagons more refined. It is probable that they utilized servant labor for that purpose. One couple had their wagon fixed with white canvas, “elegant green blanket to line the top to keep off the heat and protect the eyes,” curtains for ventilation and privacy, removable seats that made room for bed, and little pockets inside the wagon to put small articles in. The owner of the wagon saw it as “convenient and elegant a thing as one could imagine.” She was certain that “a queen might be proud to ride in it.” To further enhance their class sensibilities, many insisted that they should not have to drive the wagons themselves, but that hired teamsters or assigned drivers from the enlisted ranks were suitable for that purpose.\textsuperscript{45}

Officers and wives also relied on material abundance for making their time on the road more pleasant. They took along a large supply of different goods, including bags,

\textsuperscript{43} For servants, see, for example, Grierson, \textit{Colonel’s Lady}, 158; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization.”\textsuperscript{44} For boat travel, see Summerhayes, \textit{Vanished Arizona}, 24-27, 36-39; Joseph Corson reminiscences, UASP.; Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 27; Oliver O. Howard, \textit{My Life and Experiences among Our Hostile Indians} (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 125; Gustav von Hemert Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Joseph P. Widney letters, June 29, 1867, ASHS.\textsuperscript{45} Mills, \textit{My Story}, 136-137. See also, Grierson, \textit{Colonel’s Lady}, 158.
books, cases, linen, sewing materials, china, silver, fresh and canned fruits, candles, chairs, mattresses, and matting for the floors. Much of this the army people categorized as necessary for “survival” en route, the rest was for their new homes in the army posts.\textsuperscript{46} Julia Davis stuffed her baggage wagon with “linen, books, a bed, pictures, curtains—everything I could think of for house-keeping.” Under the assumption that nothing could be obtained along the route, she tried to take with her as much as possible.\textsuperscript{47} It is telling of the officers and their wives dependence and trust on material goods that many complained they were unable to take all they wanted. In general, three large army chests, or approximately 1,000 pounds consisted the limit of package allowed for one officer, and for the delivery of excess materials he had to pay extra. Many who regarded these limits as ridiculously small for survival became furious, while others resorted to apathy. Some who had plenty of surplus materials insisted that they “must take it” all, or otherwise they “could not exist.” When told to pack, others managed only a paralyzed stare on all their belongings. They felt unable to decide what to take and what to leave out. The actual packing the officers and their wives left to their servants, not wanting or sometimes even knowing how to pack themselves. One officer’s wife, for example, confessed that she was utterly helpless in packing all the materials as she simply did not know what to do.\textsuperscript{48}

On the road certain events, like meals, also allowed officers and wives to display their sense of style and sophistication and to strengthen their status. On one wagon journey, some managed to enjoy a menu of coffee, eggs, bacon, bread and butter, condensed milk, and hard bread for breakfast and canned meat, vegetables, bread and butter, coffee, and canned fruits for dinner. More important than what was eaten was how the meals were organized. They were conducted rather elegantly on a red and white tablecloth spread on the ground, the participants sitting on boxes with their tin plates, cups, knives, forks, spoons, and napkins. Another traveling party had brought for their dining pleasure a special tent furnished with a board floor.\textsuperscript{49} Again the servants played a crucial role by usually both preparing and serving the meals. All the materials and the fact that the meals were set in the manner they were despite the outdoor venue on the road demonstrate how officers and wives cherished a certain way of life, making an


\textsuperscript{47} Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 188.

\textsuperscript{48} Summerhayes, \textit{Vanished Arizona}, 19-21; Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 26. For the 1,000 pound limit see Grierson, \textit{Colonel’s Lady}, 175.

\textsuperscript{49} Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 30; Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 245.
effort of trying not to allow travel conditions to alter acceptable conventions or standards too much.

Dress was another important symbol of class status. For her overland journey, Julia Davis wore a blue serge dress, no hoops or extra skirts, hair braided in one long tail, and a hat large enough to hide her almost entirely. She wrote that she had adjusted her appearance, thinking she was ready to meet the demands of the journey. Others came less prepared, demonstrating in their appearance and dress that they were prepared “to suit 5th Avenue” than a 600 miles ride in army ambulance, as one observant army wife wrote. There existed those who traveled even without any bedding or tents, thinking ignorantly that they would sleep at ranches. When this proved impossible they were forced to spend their nights in the wagons or rely on the kindness of others who let them in their tents.

Disappointment, however, proved more general and widespread. For one thing, travel accommodations were often judged as improper. When Julia Davis started her journey overland towards the Colorado River, she felt rather inadequate that her white topped wagon pulled by four horses had only a simple mattress laid in it. “In this we were to live, sleep, and travel,” she wrote in a somewhat sour tone. Many army wives quickly found out that all their material abundance did not make them immune to the presence of heat, sand, and dust. Often the circumstances caused their appearance to crumble and entertainments to fail. For instance, one wife became disgusted with her “rather fagged and seedy” dress, feeling remorseful that she had not brought along enough “thin wash-bodices” to battle the dust which covered her from head to toe. Another wife regretted that the expected entertainment of playing cards every evening did not materialize because all were too exhausted to play after a day of traveling in the intense heat. In addition, fires, wagons rolled over, and other accidents occasionally caused material disasters and mental stress, especially damaging because many were certain that the Southwest did not offer the kinds of clothes and other belongings they would consider purchasing. Anything destroyed was only compensated for by lending from others or by ordering materials from the eastern United States.

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50 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 188.
51 Lane, I Married a Soldier, 143. For army elite’s travel clothing, see also James Worthington letters, July 16, 1880, ASHS.
52 Corbusier, Recollections, 29-30.
53 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 188.
54 Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 59; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 159.
55 See for example Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 188-190.
On boats, circumstances also often interfered and spoiled the enjoyment. Intense heat alone could increase discomfort in the ship space to a point where no one had the energy to keep up the conversations or entertainments. Troubled by the presence of racial strangers, some felt their journeys suffered because the river streamer crews on the Colorado River composed mostly of “savage” Indians. Lack of service, amenities, or companionship also made the trips arduous at times. Some fell seasick and grumbled that “cooking was about as bad as it could be.” Those who had the opportunity went ashore at ports in search of better food and refreshments. “I mustered what Spanish I knew, and told...I would pay...any price for a cup of coffee with fresh milk,” one desperate army wife wrote. Luckily she possessed an ample supply of dollars that bought not only coffee with milk, but coconuts, fresh butter, chicken, and creamy biscuits, thus filling her needs and compensating the supply on the boat. In general, officers and wives could easily afford to improve their travel diet by purchasing food at high cost wherever it was available. In another instance, an officer and his wife were able to invest eighteen dollars - more than a month’s salary for an enlisted soldier - for apples, lemons, and oranges to refresh their otherwise tedious journey.

The common soldier did not worry exceedingly about entertainment or his clothing style, nor did he travel in staterooms or rode in wagons, unless his strength gave out. Enlisted men came in a flatboat towed by the steamer where the officers were and went ashore to the river banks to sleep their nights. Traveling by rail, one soldier remembered that when the officers chose to ride in a caboose the enlisted men had to crawl into box cars. Also, when the officers enjoyed the Pullman cars, the soldiers journeyed in day-coach. When the officers rode in their wagons, the enlisted men, not belonging to the “happy favored” class, as one of them sarcastically remarked, marched. In the long columns many soldiers felt that they were choking from the dust. Whatever the mode of travel, the class division between enlisted men and the elite persisted. Many enlisted men had difficulties accepting the situation and resorted to bitter irony in their writings. Soldiers, for instance, wrote that “after a march of 268 miles we reached this

56 Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 24-27, 36-39; Joseph Corson reminiscences, UASP.; Corbusier, Recollections, 27; Howard, My Life, 125; Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widney letters, June 29, 1867, ASHS.
57 Mills, My Story, 138
corner of the human garden, Fort Yuma, California, upon which, I can safely say, ‘the
eyes of Heaven shed but few tears.’ Yes, here we are, shirtless, shoeless, and I might
with propriety add brainless.” This man obviously felt that the marching they had just
done had been a foolish ordeal conducted in terrible surroundings and circumstances.
However, rest periods usually proved short and an early breakfast, or what one soldier
dubbed “supper, so barely did the time escape being twelve o’clock midnight,”
consisted the usual routine on the road.59

To the amazement of the enlisted men, officers sometimes left them to struggle
by themselves. For example, one enlisted man recollected that when his unit marched
from Drum Barracks to Yuma officers found the trip “somewhat tedious” in their
ambulances and therefore left the columns in charge of non-commissioned officers and
rode ahead as quickly as possible to the next resting place. One nightly sand storm not
only blinded and sickened this group of enlisted men who traveled without their
officers, but made them take the wrong path. Not realizing their folly until after many
miles and knowing absolutely nothing about the nature of the country they were in, they
continued hoping to reach Yuma. Utterly helpless in what to them was “terra
incognito,” soldiers grew angry and desperate, their ranking sergeant deserting and the
next in rank being placed in arrest. The low point was reached when one soldier
perished and was buried in the sand. The party was rescued only by Mexican teamsters
who took them to a stage station following three nights and days of desperate
wanderings in the desert. Finally, after two more days of marching, they reached Yuma
with blistered feet, burnt skin, and clothes in tatters. The ranking sergeant who had
deserted was found wandering about by the Yuma Indians. According to one of the
soldiers, the sergeant was physically and mentally a wreck. It is unclear if he ever fully
recovered.60

When officers and their wives carried along as much as they could or were
allowed, enlisted men had very few materials for transporting. At one instance, a party
of three officers, two wives, and their two children, accompanied by six soldiers filled
as much as four army wagons and one ambulance with all their belongings. Despite the
fact that the women and children traveled in the ambulance, the party had plenty of

59 “Gashuntz,” “On the March to Fort Yuma,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 53-55; Reeve, “Soldier’s
Memoirs,” 42.
60 Gustafson, John Spring’s, 34-40. According to Sergeant John Spring, the soldier buried in the desert
was set down in official records as “deserted,” and the whole episode hushed up. For other cases, see
Enlisted men also lacked the means to ease and refresh themselves on their journeys like the officers did. They had no servants to take care of them, few personal luxury items, or much money to supplement their poor rations by purchases from civilians. Fresh meat was a rarity and fresh vegetables almost never seen. It was a combination of bacon, beans, beef, hardtack, and coffee that kept the enlisted men going. Under stress, some were forced to resort to stealing and selling government property to purchase food or beer and alcohol from civilians. Although some officers realized that common soldiers were worse off than they were, the enlisted men were still expected to serve the needs of the elite, to cook and serve their food, make their beds, and construct their tents. One veteran army wife gave the following advice to a newcomer: “You must never try to do any cooking at the camp-fire. The soldiers are there for that work, and they know lots more about it than any of us do.”

When enlisted men or other servants were not available, officers’ wives disliked the situation immensely. One wife recollected that during one journey she personally had “for the first time in my life, and under the greatest disadvantages, to cook an entire meal.” She learned to make coffee and grill bacon, “but never to enjoy cooking over a camp-fire.”

As a rule, the needs and desires of officers and their wives always superceded any considerations of enrolled men. When officers and their wives tried to make sure they would travel in relative comfort, seeking to isolate themselves from the conditions, to avoid physical exhaustion, and ensure that they were surrounded by servants, the enlisted men sweated their way into the borderlands. The only occasion they saw first class travel space or any luxury items was when serving the officers and their wives.
3.4 Representations of the Journey

During the pre-railroad era army men and women wrote most of the western route to Arizona. The way from California to Arizona clearly captivated their imagination and stirred their emotions. In general, what the army people had to say of their journey, and of the landscapes, settlements, and peoples they saw, did not amount to a flattering description. Army travelers made their voyage to southern Arizona and New Mexico a journey to “the outside,” a perilous descent, a contest, and a struggle from the civilized world into a foreign and remote wilderness.\(^65\) Journeys became sites that tested the army people’s resilience and character and established their superiority in relation to the colonial terrain.

The beginning of the journey the army often represented as “normal” civilized traveling, a quiet prelude to upcoming challenges. One army wife traveling overland wrote that during the first days after Los Angeles she saw the most beautiful country imaginable. Roads were good and nights were spent at people’s homes enjoying good food and comfortable beds. Everybody felt happy and confident. On the fifth day, she wrote, things changed. Then, she claimed, her party left the known world behind them and entered the endless track of sand and terrifying heat of the California desert.\(^66\) As they crept closer to the California-Arizona border, army travelers’ discourses turned increasingly sour. Described by one traveler as “a true Sahara,” the section in and around Yuma appeared as an intensively scorching and desolate dump of sandy and rocky wastelands with little water and furnace-like winds. The illusions of army travelers, if they had any, were quickly shattered. They could not understand or much less value the place they had come to. Even the Colorado River brought little relief. Instead, some described it very unfavorably as a mighty, untamed and even savage river, while for others it was shockingly “nearly half sand.”\(^67\) Also, the military post on the Colorado River, Fort Yuma, the army dubbed “the hottest place that ever existed.” It is telling of their take on the place that almost all travelers repeated a well-circulated

\(^{65}\) Many of the army referred to the journey back from southern Arizona and New Mexico and into the states as “going inside.” Thus, following this logic, the trip to the Southwest became a journey to the “outside.” See, for example, Corson reminiscences, UASP; Corbusier, Soldier, 73, 87; Corbusier, Recollections, 66.

\(^{66}\) Boyd, Cavalry Life, 95-101.

\(^{67}\) Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 30-45; Dingess, “New York Private,” 59; Upham, “Incidents,” 85; Crook, His Autobiography, 162; Howard, My Life, 126.
army legend which told that a soldier who had died at Yuma after a while returned to beg for his blankets, having found hell too cold a place for his tastes. 68

While white army people were shocked and disgusted with the kind of environment and landscapes they encountered, they did not like the people any better. According to officers and their wives, the Colorado River area was occupied mostly by racially inferior strangers: “very poor class” Mexicans, “lazy, more than half-naked Indians,” or half-breeds. These people, the army represented, were nothing but “savages” and lower class robbers and murderers who could not establish control over nature or build a prosperous and moral society anywhere, let alone in such a taxing environment. For that purpose, army people implied, a better class of (white) men and women were needed. That there lived only a handful of white people and few or no middle-class whites only proved in army eyes that the area lacked “proper” society and was “foreign” and “inferior.” Army narratives also claim that the few settlements in the area were of poor quality and inferior, thus proving the backward and decadent nature of the whole society. Gila City, once a boom town for silver, the army represented as a miserable one adobe house town on the verge of disappearance. One army observer stopping over commented that the town was “not exactly a city, to be sure,” but rather a sight of “a few old adobe houses and the usual saloon.” Settlements like Arizona City or Ehrenberg on the Colorado River the army categorized as “entirely isolated from the world,” “far out of the world,” or, alternatively, “the home of the bad man.” Arizona City was described as “quite a town, balls and shootings being the order of the day.” Some painted it as “a distinguished village” consisting of two rows of adobe huts along a wide street, with no walk but where the foot sinks in the sand ankle-deep, with plenty of villainous dens, and “indeed little else.” “One might travel a long way before seeing a more God-forsaken looking city,” one officer said of Arizona City. 69

Adding to the distress of the incomers were the troops leaving the region. “From the great joy manifested by them all, I drew my conclusions as to what lay before us, in the dry and desolate country we were about to enter…When we departed, I felt, somehow, as though we were saying good-bye to the world and civilization,” one army

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68 For the blanket story, see ARSW, 1872, 153-154; Summerhyes, Vanished Arizona, 33; Guy V. Henry, “Cavalry Life in Arizona,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 97; Cochran, Posie, 38; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 107.

69 Howard, My Life, 131; Corbusier, Recollections, 28, 39; Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 97; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 74-75; Biddle, Reminiscences, 150, 165; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 135-175, 193; Cochran, Posie, 37-38.
wife recalled.70 Those getting out felt liberated and few expressed any regrets. Getting away from “the outside” meant a much expected return to civilization and to the true United States. One officer recollected that “so disgusted with our Arizona experience were all the officers [of three companies] that when the boat pulled out of Yuma, we took off our shoes and beat the dust of Arizona over the rail, at the same time cursing the land.”71

Army men and women had labeled the Indians near the Colorado River as harmless naked savages, ignorant wretches who lived a stone-age existence.72 However, as the travelers left the Colorado River behind them their take on the area’s indigenous peoples changed dramatically. East of Yuma army people traveled in areas occupied by Maricopas or Tohono O’odham, and further to the north they entered Yavapai or Pai territory. Still, although not yet nowhere near the heartland of Apacheria, and thus unlikely to encounter any Apaches, the fear of Apaches led to a siege mentality where many army people saw Apaches everywhere. They not only confused Yavapais for Apaches but imagined that behind every rock was an Apache ready to attack at any moment. Images of all-powerful, ever-looming, and cunning Apaches who purportedly desired white peoples blood haunted army men and women’s minds.73 In their discourses some recounted vivid tales of past atrocities they had heard from some more or less reliable source. Others pointed old “massacre” sites along the route, where “helpless” white pioneers or soldiers had in years past fallen victim to Indians’ cruelty. “This whole land is red with murder and massacre,” was the typical army message.74 The travelers felt they needed numerous lookouts and guards to increase their sense of control and security. According to one officer’s wife, units stuck close together allowing no stragglers, because “we knew the Indians were watching us, and we never knew when they might attack.” Although many were certain they were in harms way, no Indians usually attacked. This, the army people explained, was because the troops moved in large numbers and the cowardly Apaches did not dare to confront them.75

70 Summerhays, Vanished Arizona, 35.
71 Mills, My Story, 152. See also for example Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 220-221; Schneider papers, box 2, file 18, Widney letters, June 18, 1868, ASHS; Adams, “Arizona Adventure,” 51.
72 See, for example, Biddle, Reminiscences, 147-151; Mills, My Story, 140-141; Howard, My Life, 125-130.
73 See, for example, Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 70-73, 109-112. For a more through discussion on white army people’s views of Apaches, see chapter 4.
74 Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widney letters, July 14, 1867, ASHS. See also Dinges, “New York Private,” 56; Upham, “Incidents,” 85; Howard, My Life, 132-135; Mills, My Story, 142-144.
75 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 190. For army views of Apaches as too cowardly to attack large parties, see, for example, Mills, My Story, 139-140.
The “Apache threat” which shadowed many army journeys was a useful device for the colonizers. For one thing, surviving to tell the tales of “massacres” and “savages” turned journeys into struggles that tested the army people and made them heroic, increasing their sense of self-worth and superiority. Also, the writings of murderous savages camouflaged and validated the army’s mission of conquest: it was right and human to try to bring order and civilization to this kind section marked by chaos. Army stories sought to establish the inferior character of the area and to make it empty of civilization. In army stories the area between the Colorado River and Tucson, Prescott, or some army village, was void of almost all society excepting those dangerous Indians. Only few isolated spots of habitation characterized this “Indian country.” Some wrote that “after passing Fort Yuma, we were in the Indian country and had quite left all civilization behind.” Others pointed out that the area was described by total emptiness. “As far as the eye could reach not a sign of life could be seen; we seemed to be the only living people on the planet.” One wife was stunned “that such a forlorn district was comprised within the limits of the United States.”

After the Colorado River, army narratives explain, travel conditions only further deteriorated. Roads were labeled nonexistent or barely passable. One officer described the principal road from Yuma towards New Mexico as “a dreary, sandy waste of quite four hundred miles.” Rest stops along the route army people considered “primitive to the extreme,” with purportedly unsanitary washing conditions and inadequate eating facilities. For instance, one soldier was stunned when, in the heat of 110 degrees, he dined under a brush shelter accompanied by myriads of hungry flies that wanted their share of the food, waited on by a Yuma Indian woman naked from the waist up, wearing only a breech-clout. For him the situation bordered on the unbearable and unfathomable, and certainly was dislikable.

Julia Davis was utterly disappointed with the conditions. “Not a tree…not a green thing of any kind…the monotony only broken by rocks…You cannot fancy such a country!” She continued that “Every day the sun came up fierce, unclouded, into the dazzling sky, and burned over our heads, and grew hotter and hotter, and the alkali sands scorched our eyes, and choked us until we gasped for breath, and the heat from the ground seemed greater even than the heat from the sun.” Revealing her ignorance of

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76 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 190; Biddle, Reminiscences, 154; Mills, My Story, 140.  
78 Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 6-32; Barnes papers, ASHS.
the region, Davis confessed that before the journey she “had dreamt of a tropical vegetation, and forests and prairies,” but found “a desert - great bare purple rocks, and still more bare tracks of sand.” For Davis and many others, nights seemed almost unbearable, at least during the summer months, and many people unable to sleep grew totally exhausted. Adding to the distress was the uncertainty of water. When found it was often undrinkable, strongly impregnated with sulfur and alkali, so that children got sick and even horses turned away with disgust. Some represented that for them the shock of their travel surroundings had become almost too much to bear. According to one army wife, “From the cold, bracing climate of Oregon we found ourselves in a few weeks on the arid deserts of Arizona, breathing and almost stifling in the dust that was thrown into the ambulance by the wind that always seemed to blow in the wrong direction.”

In most army discourses the journey became represented as a struggle against an environment that was “hostile” overall. The army made it seem that it was at the mercy of an uncontrollable nature. It was as if the travelers were plagued by an entire arsenal of dangers and hardships the dreadful region subjected them to. In addition to heat, lack of water, and dust already discussed, the voluminous sand could spur into “lively activity” in “dreadful” storms that terrified, “blinded and choked the men and mules.” Even rain, although rare, was considered dangerous. Torrents soaked the travelers and destroyed their belongings as well as the roads. Quicksand and whirlpools in the Colorado River awaited any soldier unlucky to fall overboard. Furthermore, all vegetation and animals seemingly had thorns and prongs. Disgusted, one private recollected that from Yuma to Tucson there was “just one stream of snakes,” the soldiers killing from five to thirty per day. Mirages also added to misery. Images of ships at sea, cities, and lakes nourished false hopes and sudden joys, only to disappoint. Those heavenly mirages only “made the heat hotter, and the desert drier, and the sand more choking than ever,” army people remembered.

79 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 189, 192; Cochran, Posie, 36. See also Crook, His Autobiography, 163; Corbusier, Soldier, 71.
80 Cochran, Posie, 36.
81 Mills, My Story, 141-142; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 158; Howard, My Life, 129.
82 Corbusier, Recollections, 29-30.
83 Dinges, “New York Private,” 57, 59; Corbusier, Soldier, 71; Corbusier, Recollections, 27. For more army narratives regarding heat, wildlife, sand, and poor water, see Schneider papers, box 2, file 18, Widney letters, June 18, 1868, ASHS; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 46; Anton Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona Army Posts during the 1880s,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 332; Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 97.
84 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 190; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 45. See also Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 12-13.
sky offered a pleasant diversion to some. “There seemed to me thousands more stars visible than I ever saw before, and so intensely vivid, so clear, and yet so far off.” If not troubled by fears of snakes and other creatures, officers at times found pleasant enough places for taking leisure pauses for sightseeing the mountain landscapes. These encounters were filled with gentlemanly naturalizing, description of the “strange” flora and fauna from the outsider perspective, everything judged in terms of elegance, utility, strangeness, and ugliness.

For many the journey retained its pessimistic nature to the end. After weeks of traveling on desert trails and roads, there waited one final disappointment for Julia Davis. She wrote that “Then came the exclamation, ‘There it is. This is Camp Mac Dowel. We have reached our destination!’ I looked in vain. I could see nothing! There were the same scorched mountains, the same uncouth rocks, the same dazzling sand, the same glare and drought; but where was the Camp, the dwellings, the home of which I had been dreaming. Those low mounds, which looked only like hillocks, as we drew near were, I discovered, the dwellings.” Devastated by her first impressions of the army fort, Julia Davis must have seriously questioned whether the taxing journey had been worth it.

The railroads that traversed southern Arizona and New Mexico in the 1880s had a profound impact on army travelers’ representations of the journey. Historian David Wrobel writes that in their texts many civilian emigrants in the West drew a stark juxtaposition between overland travels and Pullman Palace Car traveling, contrasting the demands of the past with luxuries of present. The same happened with army travelers. In army minds railroads symbolized progress and practical travel comfort but also final conquest over what they claimed was a hostile terrain. The railroads made the trip faster and much more comfortable, and also isolated the army people from the unpleasant surroundings they so eagerly wrote about. In trains, officers and their wives had a better chance to rest, relax, and enjoy pleasant socializing and leisure. As a result, journeys lost most of their exoticism and “shock value” and travel to the borderlands became “normal,” “ordinary,” and “uninteresting.” Travel became something not many army men or women wrote about anymore or paid much attention to. Those who did

85 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 189; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 51-52.
86 See among others Mills, My Story, 139.
87 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 190.
write liked to compare the ease and comfort of the railroad era with the unpleasantness and hardship of the past. One army wife wrote that “remembering the days, weeks, and even months spent in traveling on the river, or marching through the deserts, I could not make the Pullman cars seem a reality.” An officer voiced a similar opinion: “When I hear others carelessly mention a trip by rail…as a journey of few days…a momentary feeling akin to envy or anger comes over me, and it is difficult to realize that it has been possible for even steam and the locomotive to accomplish such results-to have apparently annihilated the absolute waste and desolation through which we passed so wearily.”

**Conclusion: Penetrating the Wilderness**

The U.S. Army created constant traffic to and from southern Arizona and New Mexico during the post-Civil War years as thousands of men and massive amounts of supplies traversed between the states and the Southwest. Before the 1880s and the transcontinental railroads the journey was a time-consuming and complicated experience that took weeks or months to complete as army people had to use a variety of travel methods to reach their destinations. Most army officers and their wives did not exactly know what to expect, but were still often hesitant about the long journey beforehand. It seems that while few actually wanted to go to Arizona or New Mexico, there were several who simply awaited leisurely journeys. Officers and their wives generally shared a desire to ensure that the journeys would fulfill certain class standards and levels of refinement. They placed much effort and money in trying to make their trips as enjoyable as possible. They sought to secure elegant travel accommodations, an abundant supply of material comforts, and the help of lower class servants. In sharp contrast, enlisted men often marched or occupied second-class facilities on boats and trains while being simultaneously reduced to servant status by the dominant officers and wives. Soldiers journeyed almost empty-handed and lacked the means and the power in the army hierarchy to make their journeys more enjoyable or luxurious.

The journeys of officers and their wives ideally displayed their class sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often the attempts and ambitions, however, clashed with the realities of travel. Weeks and months on the road took their toll. Upholding personal appearance and proper social activities became difficult as travelers grew weary and

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exhausted. First-class accommodations in boats and elegantly decorated wagons inadequately sheltered from the heat and dust. Material wealth or the attention of servants poorly compensated when the food and water supply was judged poor and uncertain, resting places miserable, or when traveling in the “barren” desert surrounded by purportedly dangerous Apaches and vicious rattlesnakes, or when one was seasick and stuck for days in a boat hit by crushing heat. Also, much to their disgust officers and their wives could not haul all the luxury items they would have wanted, which made them more bitter and miserable. Furthermore, encounters with ecstatic army men and women who were on their way out of the Southwest also dampened the spirits of many.

The failure to travel in the style and comfort one wanted and thought one’s class position demanded, a result of the gap between ambitious standards and the realities of travel circumstances and methods, contributed to a growing aggravation, disgust towards travel surroundings, and to a feeling of resentment over the whole journey. On the other hand, the journeys functioned as sites in the production of army power. By making the journey a struggle that tested the travelers and made them (successfully) face “savage Indian danger” and “hostile environment,” and also by representing their travel surroundings as inferior, odd, and uncivilized, white army people sought to establish their own superiority in relation to the colonial space they had to penetrate and take control of. In a way the journey functioned much like a rite of passage, a test that celebrated the officers and their wives’ character and perseverance as superior beings who pushed through all the obstacles. Army representations made it clear that the colonial society or even the purportedly “hostile” environment along the travel routes proved no match for them. Army people gained in authority and identity when establishing a vision of reality that promoted the difference, or even binary opposition, between them and the environment, settlements, and peoples they encountered. In army’s “imperial eyes” the sections traveled through were foreign and weird, unsuitable for civilized tastes and peoples and offering only uncontrolled and unused nature, an occasional desolated and stagnated village, and vast emptiness. In many ways, army discourses made the journeys seem as if they were a transition from the known world to the unknown, a descent into a region outside the nation and civilization in its current condition. Stories of inferior and empty places were one way to make U.S. conquest

90 Term “imperial eyes” is from Pratt, *Imperial Eyes.*
seem right and legitimate. They hid the true nature of army journeys as harmful and unjust invasions into other people’s lands. As lands void of proper civilization, the places through which the army traveled became represented ripe for the taking and readily available for civilization.

Unwanted and irrelevant in the East, white army people tried to make themselves important by claiming to be superior in relation to the colony and by penetrating “hostile” regions and opening them to “civilization” and “progress.” When in the 1880s the army was able to travel all the way to Arizona and New Mexico in the comfort provided by trains, the journey lost its struggle aspect and in consequence most of its bitterness and exotic qualities, and, paradoxically, appeal. Travel to southern Arizona and New Mexico became “normal,” or uninteresting. Journeys were quick and comfortable, and the travel region, the army claimed, increasingly tamed by forces of civilization.
“The territories of Arizona and New Mexico have been raided by bands of hostile Apaches. Many citizens have been murdered and much stock stolen. To the old settlers the terrible atrocities committed by these red demons are not new, as Cochise, Victorio…and Geronimo have in years past broken from their reservations and, defying the troops, have murdered, robbed, and mutilated the miners and settlers who ventured unprotected in this region.”

1 James S. Pettit, Lieutenant, U.S. Army

“The Apaches are the lowest type of human nature known on our continent. They live in utter poverty and wretchedness, having no clothing and no property…They are very cowardly until brought to bay where they fight with the utmost desperation, knowing no such thing as quarter.”

2 Andrew J. Alexander, Major, U.S. Army

During a late Spring evening in 1885 in Cloverdale, near the Mexican border, a group of army officers had the opportunity to indulge themselves in a banquet of fine dining, Cuban cigars, and costly liquids, compliments of a large cattle company. They exchanged “blood-curdling tales of Indian warfare,” as one newspaperman in attendance remembered, when a sudden and alarming commotion occurred. Rifle shots and “the heart-chilling war whoop” made one officer jump “for his sabre, yelling ‘Apaches, by God!’” The order “to arms” was shouted from a dozen different throats and in few minutes time the troops advanced “against the enemy.” What they found were frantic U.S. Army indigenous soldiers. After coming across bears these soldiers had fired the shots and made the noises, and now they tried to “convey the intelligence to the officers” that “their exertions were unnecessary,” the newspaperman wrote. Discovering their error, the disappointed officers slowly and silently returned. Having anticipated a fight with the Apaches they were so utterly upset and ashamed that all “exacted a promise of absolute silence in the matter.” Although the newspaperman considered it just a “ludicrous incident” of army life, this episode highlights the white army mentality towards the Apaches. It demonstrates how officers and soldiers not only

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regarded Apaches as their enemy but also proves how their mindset was occupied by fear, frustration, embarrassment, and the desire to use force.³

This chapter continues to map white army people’s imperial meaning-making by examining the strategies and reasons behind their construction of the Apaches as the colonized other; the antithesis of whiteness and the main enemy of the U.S. regime in the Southwest. It is interested in why and how army people singled out the Apaches and created certain regimes of truth about them; what was the nature of those “truths,” and what imperial agendas did they serve? Furthermore, in order to demonstrate how Apaches were made special in army discourses, this piece applies a comparative framework by discussing army representations of the Akimel O’odham, a Southwest indigenous group known to nineteenth-century white colonizers as the Pimas. Third, the chapter tackles the connections between army’s making of Apaches and acts of governing (war of “pacification” and reservation management) targeted against the Apaches. Many studies of colonialism have shown a direct linkage between the construction of knowledge about subject peoples and the imposition of control over them.⁴ Often knowledge and actions evolved in a symbiotic relationship feeding each other. The experiences and practices in governing fueled certain types of representations, whereas colonizers’ stories revealed what was imaginable in terms of colonial policy, what actions were seen as possible and logical, and what were disqualified from the realm of possibility.

Since this chapter deals with representations and images and their relationship with acts of colonial violence and government, it mainly concerns white army men and women and not the Apaches. In fact, army discourses pretty much bury Apache side of the story in colonial imagination, from which its recapture can be a difficult task. Still, in many ways Apache viewpoints and activities, the subaltern voice, function as sobering and critical counter-images to the colonial production of the other, and thus deserve some attention even in a piece that is about colonizers discourses and government.

³ For the Cloverdale episode, see Michael M. Rice, “Across Apache Land,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 504-506.
4.1 Constructing Apaches as the Enemy of Whiteness

When reading army texts it quickly becomes evident that white army people considered Apaches important. Although, in general, officers’ wives wrote more of housing, domestic life, and leisure, for most officers and enlisted men the Apaches proved their most popular topic. It seems that everyone pretended to be an expert in Apache affairs. The titles of professional or newspaper articles and even memoirs the army people wrote confirm the preoccupation with the Apaches. No other Southwest indigenous tribe came close to receiving the same amount of army attention. Neither did the white or Hispanic residents. In fact, officers and enlisted men did not write nearly as much of each other than they did of the Apaches. It tells volumes of the level of their interest that some army men, and a few women, became so obsessed with Apaches that they saw some where there were not any. They, for instance, rather commonly labeled Yavapais as Apaches.

The reasons why no other group captured so much space in army texts or held such a prominent role in army imagination as did the Apaches are linked to struggles for geopolitical power. Clearly, army men’s attention was on conquest and warfare. After all, the army’s principal mission was to achieve the monopoly of violence in southern Arizona and New Mexico for the U.S. regime. Apaches, in army minds, represented competition. Although, as several historians have noted, indigenous peoples never posed a serious threat to national security and the United States never needed to mount a full-scale war by calling up millions of volunteers, the situation looked less evident, and

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6 Some thought that the term “Apache” meant the same as “simply wild” and that this justified categorizing Yavapais as Apaches. Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, Recollections of Her Army Life, 1869-1908, Patricia Y. Stallard ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 59; Oliver O. Howard, My Life and Experiences among our Hostile Indians (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 129. On page 147, General Howard claims that the Apaches acted as a congregation of the worst indigenous elements in the region, drawing membership from various tribes. Army men with the wildest imagination argued that almost all Indians in the region were “called Apaches,” or made the Apaches the largest Indian nation in the West, extending from California to Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico, and numbering 60,000 warriors. Camillo C.C. Carr, “The Days of Empire-Arizona, 1866-1869,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 19; Bruce J. Dinges, ed., “A New York Private in Arizona Territory: The Letters of George H. Cranston, 1867-1870,” Journal of Arizona History 26 (Spring 1985), 56. In reality, the Apaches numbered probably less than 10,000 people and their influence did not reach California or Utah.
more frustrating for the army, at the local level. Army personnel believed that it was the Apaches who in fact ruled the borderlands, having already stalled the advance of one European regime, the Spanish, and now possessing the potential to deter another empire. If not for the U.S. Army, some of its men imagined, the Southwest would forever remain in Apache hands.

In order to replace them as the dominant group, white army people sought to strip the Apaches of all their authority. They constructed categories of difference that undermined everything about the Apaches, their personal character, culture, and way of life. Army discourses of Apaches should be read as army’s efforts to establish the Apaches difference and as attempts to increase the army’s power over people categorized as “Apaches.” White army people hoped to identify Apaches as a separate warrior race with particular moral, cultural, and physical attributes. They sought to produce Apache society as rootless, backward, and oppressive towards women, and Apache appearance as uncivilized. They also tried to depict Apache character as lowly and predatory, Apache reign as illegitimate and destructive, and Apache way of war as unmanly and abnormal. Army people’s goal was to make U.S. conquest appear less violent and more right and desirable. They wanted to produce an image of themselves as righteous liberators, or saviors of the Southwest, by casting the blame for colonial violence on the Apaches. As the military subjugation of the Apaches turned out to be a prolonged task that lasted for decades, and as white army men grew to realize their own limitations in colonial warfare, their representations became more sour and vicious, so that in the end the army represented Apaches as almost sub-human racial enemy; the enemy of whiteness.

It needs to be noted that army actions and thinking were not straitjacketed by any strict federal policies. Indeed, as historian Robert Wooster discovered, the army and the government conspicuously failed to formulate an overall policy for dealing with the Indians during the post-Civil War era. The army’s commanders were busy with inner rivalries and uninterested in indigenous conflicts which they rarely regarded as “real”

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wars (understood as conflicts against and between European powers). Thus officers at the local level not only enjoyed considerable leverage in how they orchestrated army campaigns and colonial violence but also had the freedom to imagine the character of their enemy. Furthermore, it is obvious that the military did not invent the Apaches anew, but that the borderlands had a long tradition of hating the Apaches. A cycle of trading and raiding had made the indigenous and Spanish/Mexican peoples not only familiar with each other but often also suspicious and hateful. Spanish/Mexicans throughout the region often viewed the Apaches as their enemy, as did many of the Pueblos, Akimel O’odham, Tohono O’odham, and others. However, it is almost impossible to assess how much the army people knew or cared of these traditions, many circulated by non-English speaking peoples. Many white civilians also advocated the subjugation (some even the extermination) of all Apaches. Although army men and women realized this, many of them despised the civilians and thus did not necessarily hold the civilian opinion in high value. In all, when examining army representations it is good to keep in mind that the Apaches, as the most powerful of the region’s inhabitants, had long caused others to fear and hate them. It is this tradition that the white army people, consciously or not, continued and rewrote.

4.1.1 Apache Society

Conquest usually demands that the invaders pay some attention to the enemy society. In the Apache case most white army people often had few opportunities to observe the life of free Apaches. Only those stationed in or near reservations could gain some knowledge of the Apache society in its captive state. Others often relied on a combination of rumors, hearsay, and imagination. Still, the army story is surprisingly coherent. Seeking to affirm their own identity as “civilized people,” white army people stressed how different, uncivilized, and backward the Apache society was, how it differed from white middle-class tastes and standards. One strategy army people applied was to represent Apaches as nomads and vagabonds who aimlessly wandered the Southwest. Army texts used phrases like “roamed around” to describe Apache existence. They also referred to Apaches as gypsies of the Southwest, “Arabs of

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9 Wooster, *Military and United States Indian Policy*.  
Arizona,” and “the vagrants among Indians.” While choosing to emphasize nomadism, army people built on an established Euro-American colonial tradition. By the 1800s, historian John Noyes writes, labeling peoples as nomads functioned as a global vehicle for differentiation; for creating, managing, dislocating, and dispossessing indigenous peoples and legitimizing control over space. As nomadism signified unmediated response to land by people occupying a barbaric limit of civilization, characterizing Apaches as nomads made them uncivilized people whose rights for their land could be simply ignored because they did not use the land “properly.”

Importantly, to qualify as nomads Apaches were not supposed to farm, establish “proper homes,” or, most significantly, show signs of attachment to any particular place. Thus, for example, Apache farming is strongly de-emphasized and often omitted in military narratives even when officers personally saw or destroyed Apache fields. In army minds Apaches might have “favorite haunts,” but no specific area they would call home. Furthermore, in army texts Apache villages amounted to rude and disordered congregations of brush shelters covered with leaves and grass. Called “wicky-ups,” these dwellings supposedly failed to reach the standards of proper homes. To prove their point that Apache life was rootless and crude some wrote that the Apaches lived like wild animals in their “holes in the ground.” In reality, many Apaches, though not all, combined farming with hunting and gathering. Some even raised a surplus of corn and wheat which they traded with the Yavapais who did not farm. Apache homes, both the circular dome-shaped “wickyups” and the more rare conical tepees, were often practical and well-built centers of Apache life, suited for the climate and terrain.


Apaches, living in small kin-based groups, spent most of their time in restricted areas moving relatively short distances according to seasonal food sources and temperature changes in the lowlands and the mountains. They left their homes only for larger meetings and some ceremonies, trading, and raiding/war. Emotionally Apaches were strongly connected to their home areas, which often held spiritual meaning for them. Apaches certainly were no restless wanderers and the notion of Apaches aimless nomadism should be understood as a product of the army imagination, a vehicle in the army’s effort to establish the Apaches otherness.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to nomadism, army people used personal appearance as a vehicle in the construction of difference. While nomadism supposedly symbolized undeveloped connection to the land, appearance in part revealed the Apaches primitive state and taste and their brutal character. Apache body painting was collectively condemned and feared by army people who made it a symbol of radical animal-like otherness. For instance, one army wife dubbed the Apaches as “horrible” men “painted to look uglier than nature made them, with their dreadful sheaves of arrows on their cruel faces.”\textsuperscript{17} In a letter home one army surgeon wrote that “I hate them [Apaches] already, they are a mean vicious set, I know by their looks they are not to be trusted.”\textsuperscript{18} Apache styles, which defied Euro-American taste, confused and repulsed army people. For example, when Apache men combined necklaces of bright beads or silver coins and little shells with shawls wrapped around their heads like turbans, skins, moccasins, cast-off military drawers, and shirts, of which some were worn like a blouse, it all proved a too weird a mix for white army people to make sense of. Moreover, “Apache nakedness,” which usually meant a limited use of Euro-American type of clothing, signified primitiveness and danger in troubled army minds.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{17} Jim Schreier, ed., “For This I Had Left Civilization: Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 1869-1870,” \textit{Journal of Arizona History} 29 (Summer 1988), 193. See also Slicher, “Tour in Arizona,” 78, 86.


\textsuperscript{19} Howard, \textit{Famous Indian Chiefs}, 77-78; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 44; Sweeney, \textit{Making Peace}, 91, 100-101; Carr, “Days of the Empire.” 19. When one Apache wore trousers ripped up from the middle and each leg used independently, they became leggings and were so altered, an army man thought, “that to fail in their original purpose which was to cover nakedness.”
Depictions of Apache gender roles also served to justify U.S. conquest. In a typical army view Apache society relied on women’s constant laboring because the men were supposedly naturally inclined to avoid “real work.” Army people made the Apache gender roles the exact opposite of the late nineteenth-century white middle-class ideals, which valued men’s work outside the home and defined women’s life to the domestic sphere where the “fragile ladies” were ideally aided by servants. In army discourses, Apache men, in possession of “tyrannical” domestic powers, forced their women to build and maintain camps, chop and carry wood, get water, cook, tan hides, take care of the children, and to produce textiles, while men themselves only “loafed around.”

According to one officer, every day for an Apache woman “is a life of toil and drudgery, and woe to the woman who refuses to perform her appointed task” as she will meet the fury of her husband. Furthermore, the army wrote that the perverse Apache society degraded women not only as laborers but as commodities that the men could purchase for the price of few horses. When adding that Apache men’s “uncontrolled” sexual drive also subjected the women to the “unnatural” practice of polygamy army people depicted Apache men as the sole cause for what was wrong with Apache gender roles. In reality, Apache society was matrilineal, and women owned the homes, controlled much of the property, and held great influence in the household. When a man married he often moved to live with the family of his wife and was expected to be respectful and work hard for his new in-laws. Lazy men were not tolerated. Also, polygamy was the exception, oftentimes resorted to by men of high status or forced by warfare which caused a shortage of men. Even then the men usually could not choose their brides but had to marry their first wife’s sister.

Although army men portrayed Apache women as hapless victims who yearned, perhaps unconsciously, for civilization to rescue them, army men were also careful to protect their own status and whiteness by keeping Apache women at arm’s length. In a region short on white women, and army villages abounding with bachelors, most enlisted men and officers remained silent on the sexual attractiveness of Apache women. It was obviously a taboo subject. Those who discussed the matter resorted to various representational strategies for establishing the sexual undesirability or

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21 Howard, My Life, 148; Loring, “Report,” 188.
22 Opler, Apache Life-Way, especially 154-181, 316-400, 416-420; Goodwin, Social Organization of the Western Apache.
unavailability of Apache women. Some wrote them off as born murderers who hated the whites and thus could not be approached or trusted, while others emphasized Apache women’s unavailability by writing of their chastity and the absence of prostitution and adultery in Apache society. Still others represented all Apache women as hideous creatures. For instance, one army paymaster noted that the vast majority of Apache women he met did not make “a second look necessary or desirable.” Some of them, the paymaster continued, might present a little attraction to “a backwoodsman, a Mexican greaser,” or a post cattle herder, but never to a civilized middle-class man.

Like in many colonial settings, in the case of army men and Apache women the true nature of intimate relations remains difficult to uncover. What is known is that some Apache women served the officers and their wives as housekeepers or nursemaids and that sometimes officers and soldiers mingled with Apache women in dances and other social events. According to one officer’s wife, in these events young lieutenants could express interest in “the prettiest” Apache women, trying to offer them trinkets, beads, mirrors, and boxes of soap to “gain their favors.” She thought the women cared more for Apache men although they accepted the presents given by the officers. Also, it was rather common at some locales where the government had concentrated Apaches that both Apache men and women visited the nearby army villages and sometimes even the households of officers. Some army wives, for instance, complained that their privacy was invaded by the unwelcome intruders. One nervous woman wrote that whenever Apaches stared through her windows “I would move away at once, out of range of their wondering eyes. I could not endure to be watched so curiously.” An officer thought that the army villages seemed to present never-ending attraction for Apaches, who “hang about all day, picking up anything that is thrown to them, will shovel snow, bring wood, or hay, or any such work, a whole day for a pint of corn, and seem perfectly satisfied with that.” Obviously, if poverty drove Apaches to perform all these odd jobs in army villages for a small amount of corn, the possibility that some white army men exploited Apache women by offering them money, food, or other rewards in exchange for sex should not be excluded. In some places, all Apaches were

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23 Wright, “In the Days,” 499; Loring, “Report,” 185, 190-191; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 86; Howard, My Life, 214; Sweeney, Making Peace, 98-100; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 46.
24 Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 91. For an officer’s opinion on how mixed marriages lowered white men, see Howard, My Life, 524-533.
required to vacate the army villages and stay outside their limits from dusk till dawn. Perhaps this was a safety measure against violence but also against possible sexual encounters. Whatever the reason, the opportunity for sexual encounters definitely existed between army people and the Apaches, although army discourses liked to paint Apaches as unsuitable partners for “civilized” white people.

4.1.2 Apache Rule

“What part of the country was not occupied by the reptiles and cactus seemed to be…well held down by the ubiquitous and perniciously active Apache,” one officer wrote in the late 1860s. In army narratives southern Arizona and New Mexico was an “Apache paradise,” but Apache rule was supposedly nothing but a “reign of terror.” Army texts portrayed the Apache regime as the opposite of what they thought the U.S. rule stood for. Apache reign was represented as a dreadful nightmare that had lasted for centuries ruining every interest for the development of the country. Apaches, army people continued, had not established anything worthwhile. They had built no monuments to celebrate their control, nor kept any records “except those written in the blood of many people,” an officer wrote. In army minds the main reason for the dreadful nature of the Apaches time in power was the character of Apache men who were purportedly nothing but “savages,” “murderers,” or “red-handed thugs, marauders, and assassins.” It seems as if most white army people felt the same way, so similar is their message. Free Apaches symbolized murder and mayhem, uncontrollable rage and cruelty. Some army men claimed that Apache men were consumed by hatred, others defined them as “cruel, crafty, and wary,” “absolutely wild,” famous for “treachery and cruelty,” or people who delighted “in lying and deception.” One army man was certain that “truth was not in them [Apaches].”


Thus, while white soldiers and the officers and their wives all made the Apaches the dominant force in the Southwest, they also not only represented Apache rule as a destructive form of government, but made Apache men colonial villains. In army narratives Apache men were rarely individuals or rational actors but rather a uniform mass of treacherous, deceiving, hateful, and cruel murderers. They represented humanity in its most vicious, dangerous, and unpredictable state. Apache men were incapable of creating any sort of civilization and unfit to govern anything, the army claimed. They were the white army people’s other, their binary opposite and the antithesis of white manliness and civilization. When producing this kind of discourses army men claimed honesty, rationality, and fairness as the sole possession of whites, unattainable by the free Apaches.

In their effort to distance the Apaches to the lowest rungs in the colonial hierarchies some white army people went even further. One strategy they applied was to represent Apache men not just as any murderers but as a distinct warrior race whose love of strife and bloodshed was inborn and instinctive. First of all, in these narratives aimless and brutal warfare stood out as the sole and “natural” purpose of Apache life, its only meaning and goal. Apaches’ “position towards any outsiders” was “constant unrelenting war,” was the opinion of some army men, while others added that “war was his [Apache’s] business, his life and victory his dream.” Still another officer wrote that it was “difficult to realize that there could be any of the Apache tribe who were friendly to anybody.”

If, in army eyes, the army did not seek to harm anyone who “did not deserve it,” then the Apaches were again its opposite, a group whose instincts and impulses made them wage constant war against all mankind. Importantly, army discourses produced the Apaches as a racial enemy, “the natural and hereditary enemies of the whites,” as one officer wrote.

Furthermore, as a distinct warrior race, a number of army people asserted, the Apaches belonged to the realm of nature. Some army men tried to argue that Apaches...
were so different that they hardly qualified as humans anymore. In their thinking
Apaches behaved like animals and possessed powers and abilities that did not belong to
men but to animals. Apaches were supposedly able to, for instance, sneak, hide, and
vanish from the face of the earth, or turn indistinguishable from the color of the rocks.
Some compared Apaches to snakes, both being supposedly always ready to strike.31
Others asserted that Apaches “stalked” their prey, “the unsuspecting and innocent”
white settlers, travelers, or miners, like “wild beasts.”32 Still others believed that the
Apaches could “scent danger,” be “tireless” when pursued, or unaffected by change
from snow-covered mountains to parched sand deserts, and able to travel from fifty to
seventy miles on foot on any day.33 When white army people portrayed Apaches as
more animal than human they also used expressions such as “bucks” or “wolves” to
describe Apache men.34 Some did not hesitate to call Apaches “bestial savages” and
“brutal beasts.” White army people ended up representing the Apaches as an enemy
who had lowered themselves to the level of their surroundings, becoming a part of
nature. Whites, on the contrary, were supposedly above nature, seeking to control and
use it. Therefore, in army reasoning, the power of the Apaches ultimately equaled that
of wolves or bison, and could be nullified for the sake of a higher civilization and a
superior white race.

Although many of the white army community recognized few differences
between the various Apache groups, and constructed a monolithic image of Apache
murderers and beasts, some singled out the Chiricahua Apaches, the last to resist the
U.S. in the 1880s, as the “elite” of the Apaches. Army cast the Chiricahuas as better
warriors than the others, more independent and skilled at operating in the borderlands
environment. These army narratives did not see the Chiricahuas as a more honest, fair,
or honorable Apache tribe, however, but dubbed them as “the wildest and fiercest,” and

31 Forsyth, Story of the Soldier, 265; Bourke, On the Border, 37; Parker, Old Army, 156; Carr, “Days of
the Empire,” 19; Merritt, “Incidents,” 156. Apaches were “children of nature” who lived “close to the
earth, close to the pulse of their mother,” an army wife wrote. Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 84.
32 John G. Bigelow, Jr., On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1986), 28; Forsyth,
Thrilling Days, 81-82; Corbusier, Recollections, 55.
33 Carter, From Yorktown, 179-181; ARSW, 1883, 166; Cruse, Apache Days, 186; Forsyth, Thrilling Days,
80; Frank D. Reeve, ed., “Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier’s Memoirs,” New Mexico Historical Review 25
(1950), 55.
34 For Apaches referred as “bucks,” see Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 211; Britton Davis, “The
Difficulties of Indian Warfare,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 490-491; Lawrence L. Mehren, ed., “Scouting
for Mescaleros: The Price Campaign of 1873,” Arizona and the West 10 (Summer 1968), 177; Carter,
From Yorktown, 242, 249; Bourke, Diaries, 33; George Crook, Resume of Operations against Apache
Indians (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), 7. For Apaches referred as wolves, see
Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 25.
“the most bloodthirsty of all the Indian tribes,” so “savage and brutal by instinct” that they “hesitated no more at taking human life, when excited by passion, than in killing a rabbit.” Thus in army logic the “best” Apaches were the worst human beings. When ranking its enemy, the army made its purportedly most formidable and skilful adversary the “worst of the worst,” the “tigers of the human race,” as one officer called the Chiricahuas. With a sense of irony one Chiricahua wrote of white attitudes towards his people: “We were described as being as dangerous men as the world had ever produced.”

If the Chiricahuas were a “special group” for some army men, select Apache leaders like Cochise, the Chokonen (Chiricahua) Apache, also captured a formidable place in the army imagination. Cochise in army texts was both a man of high quality, “every inch a man,” and “very much like any statesman,” and a “wily, cruel, and bloodthirsty” murderer, a wild and desperate warrior who had “waged a relentless war upon all whites.” For some, Cochise represented the ultimate savage. One army wife saw that Cochise was the “more savage chief” of “the savage Apaches.” After Cochise, who died on his reservation in 1874, Victorio and Geronimo, both also Chiricahuas, received most attention in army writings. Like Cochise, Victorio was viewed as a murdering statesman. He allegedly “ran a bloody trail across” Arizona and New Mexico and “treachery, cunning, and cruelty seemed stamped upon his face.” Then again, some army men described Victorio as “a good man who was troubled for his people,” a man of great personal courage, and a superb tactician in war. However, it was Geronimo who personified the Apache warlord for a number of army people. Geronimo was hated by officers who painted him as a “ruthless marauder” guided by “warlike instinct.” Geronimo supposedly saw all whites as enemies and “left a trail of blood behind” him wherever he went. Although he died as an old man in captivity in

37 Bourke, Diaries, 63-64; Sweeney, Making Peace, 25, see also 63-98; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 136; Howard, My Life, 121, 205; Adams, "Arizona Adventure," 51. See also Parker, Annals, 31; A.M. Gustafson, ed., John Spring’s Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 51; Platten, Ten Years, 38; Cruse, Apache Days, 59-60.
38 Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 112; Sweeney, Making Peace, 31; Cruse, Apache Days, 7, 157; Carter, From Yorktown, 199, 208. Interestingly, when Victorio excelled in war some whites had to imagine him part white. Rumors of his Spanish ancestry circulated as Victorio’s tactical skills seemed ill fitted for a “savage” Apache.
1909, for many Geronimo remained a cruel beast to the end. “Until death stilled the heart of that savage breast, his black, beady eyes still flashed hatred for the white people,” one soldier claimed.39

In general, officers produced highly subjective representations of Apache leaders, as they did of Apaches in general, to strengthen their own perceived superiority. While army narratives gave men like Victorio, Cochise, and Geronimo certain status, they also made them cruel predators and thus much like all other Apache men. Unlike the Apache masses, however, in army narratives Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo were marked as the parties most responsible for the nature of Apache rule, and thus cast in the role of main villains in the play that was U.S. colonialism. For example, many army men blamed Cochise personally for a decade of warfare, whereas close to 5,000 army men projected all their anger and bitterness towards Geronimo in the mid-1880s when chasing him and his small group across the borderlands. Moreover, although it is logical that the army men wrote most of Apaches who for years warred against the U.S., it is still notable that in comparison almost nothing was written of men of equal stature who did not fight the U.S. The lives of Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo, and thus the whole Apache leadership the army cared to register, often seemed to have any meaning only when set against U.S. expansion.40

4.1.3 The Apache Way of War

Like their representations of Apache society, rule, and character, the white army people’s portrayals of the Apache way of war were primarily about creating and maintaining distance between the white army society and the Apaches. Frustrated by their own shortcomings in colonial warfare and needing further assurance of their own superiority and that it was right to take the Apaches land, white army people set out to prove that the Apache way of war was at its core an abnormal and even unmanly practice that stood against “civilized” principles. For one thing, the Apaches supposedly

39 Platten, Ten Years, 38; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 356; Miles, Serving the Republic, 228; Parker, Old Army, 165; Anton Mazzanovich papers, file 5, "Trailing Geronimo" typescript, ASHS.
40 It is also noteworthy that army attention in part made Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo famous (or infamous) throughout the western world. Here the significance of accident is illuminating. If there would have been no Gadsden Purchase in 1853 following the U.S.-Mexican War, the Chiricahuas Cochise, Victorio, and Geronimo would have remained “Mexican Indians.” Then they might have remained as unfamiliar names for the general western public as are all the Yaqui leaders who resisted the Mexican government. For Yaqui resistance, see Bruce Vandervort, Indian Wars of Mexico, Canada and the United States, 1812-1900 (New York: Routledge, 2006); Shelley Bowen-Hatfield, Chasing Shadows: Apaches and Yaquis Along the United States-Mexico Border, 1876-1911 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998).
did not have “proper” war aims and motives. For some army men the overall Apache objective was stealing, while others saw general destruction as the Apaches’ only goal; the burning of houses, killing of stock, and “slaughter of everything human.” As a rule army men failed to publicly recognize that the Apaches in reality resorted to armed violence to preserve their geopolitical power and self-government, to defend their homes, families, and lands, to battle starvation, and to gain freedom from persecution. As far as the army was concerned the Apaches also did not fight “right,” but their methods equaled mere murder, ambush, and assassination. There supposedly was nothing honorable or courageous in their conduct. Apaches gave no quarter nor fought “bravely” in the open, but “would prefer to skulk like the coyote for hours and then kill his enemy, or capture his herd,” an officer claimed. According to another officer, the Apache “mode of warfare was peculiarly his own…His creed was ‘fight and run away, live to fight another day.’ To fight soldiers merely in defense of his country, he considered height of folly; and he never committed that folly if he could avoid it.” Still another officer thought that when compared to Apaches, even the Plains Indians were “knightly” in their warfare.

What most annoyed white army men, however, was not the seemingly unorthodox fighting methods or lack of “civilized” war aims but the fact that the Apaches made the army men look bad. The main problem from the white soldiers or officers’ perspective was that the Apaches moved too quickly: they seemed to be always fleeing and never stopping to fight it out. "When they fought, they struck and ran, hid and struck and ran again. The band closely pursued scattered like quail, and like quail they had only to drop to the ground to disappear," an officer wrote. Describing a common turn of events, one enlisted soldier complained that the Apaches “lead us a merry chase for two weeks or more, doubling and twisting along the backbone of the various mountains, occasionally descending into valleys to make a killing of some defenseless Mexican miner or rancher, and to kill a beef and to steal fresh horses…At

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41 Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 7. See also Parker, Old Army, 154-156, 165; Loring, “Report,” 185; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 115; Sweeney, Making Peace, 31; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 116, 124; Ellen McGowan Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1907), 155-156; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 80, 81, 83; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 104; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 14; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 114.

42 Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 74; Carter, From Yorktown, 252-253; John G. Bourke, An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre (1886; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 34-36.

times we were so close to them that we found their camp fires still burning; again they
would lead us by a considerable number of miles. There was no way of heading them,
as their direction and destination were unknown; all we had to do was to patiently
follow on the signs they left in their wake.”

In circumstances like these white soldiers engaged in numerous futile chases,
often only embarrassing and exhausting themselves. They frequently could not even
locate the enemy let alone force the Apaches to fight. Apache warfare, a soldier wrote,
turned out to be “like hunting for the proverbial ‘needle in a haystack.’” Even when
they caught the enemy there was a great possibility that the soldiers either ran into an
ambush or were powerless to prevent the Apaches from escaping at will. While officers
liked to claim that standing battles would destroy the Apaches, the large majority of
actual engagements between the troops and the Apaches were quick skirmishes, which,
according to one captain, consisted of “a few seconds of hot, blasting, exciting work,
rapid shots and shouts, a rush of terrified squaws, a whiz of two or three wildly aimed
arrows, a dash through the huts and a firing chase into the ravine beyond, in which we
were soon left hopelessly behind, shots of pursuers and pursued gradually dying
away.”

White officers and soldiers were poorly prepared for warfare in the Southwest.
Upon graduating officers trained in the military academy at West Point knew little of
the field army, the West, and even less about fighting indigenous tribes. Training at the
academy had a technical base, with a smattering of the liberal arts, but very little tactics
or strategy and practically nothing on colonial warfare. Officers were expected to learn
their trade in the field. White enlisted men were also unprepared for warfare in the
West. Their backgrounds - many were working class urban dwellers or recent
immigrants - did not make them ideal fighters in the colonial terrain. Also, after
recruiting, soldiers received hardly any training but had to learn to fight the hard way: in
the field in Apacheria.

Journal of the West 2 (June 1972),” 159-161.
45 Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 31-32, see also 33-36.
46 King, “On Campaign,” 170. See also Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 87-104, 108-118; Parker, Old Army, 157-
165; Mehren, “Scouting for Mescaleros, 171-190; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail; Clarence Chrisman
papers, ASHS; Guy Howard papers, ASHS; Frank West journal, University of Arizona, Special
Collections (hereafter UASP); ARSW, 1868, 63-66; 1880, 86-89, 93-110. For army narratives of standing
battles, see Carter, From Yorktown; Cruse, Apache Days; Will C. Barnes, “The Apaches’ Last Stand in
47 Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars,” 32-33, 43.
One historian argues that the officers’ sympathy for the terrible plight of the Indians made them think that warfare against them lacked all glory.\textsuperscript{48} It seems that in the U.S.-Apache wars poor performances in the field rather than any sympathy for the Apaches led the officers to this conclusion. When facing the Apaches the confidence of white soldiers slowly eroded. Army men, many of whom regarded the battles and armies of the Civil War as the standard, complained that the chasing, waiting, hiding, and ambushing of U.S.-Apache wars was degrading and mere brutal banditry. The whole business lacked easily understandable concentrations of troops, front lines, clear divisions between combatants and “civilians,” open confrontations, or strict European-style tactics and strategies. Instead, colonial war in the Southwest proved a dismal succession of inglorious days devoted either to futile searches or to guarding of strategic water holes and mountain passes. During the latter, whiskey, not Apaches, proved often the most formidable enemy, as one scholar noted. The whole affair seemingly had little or nothing to recommend it. One enlisted soldier judged the conflict to be far from a civilized war, whereas for an officer it all was “a wild, vigorous experience-less like soldiering than any service I ever encountered.”\textsuperscript{49} Others doubted if there was any glory to be won in this “savage” warfare. Many of the army might have agreed with an enlisted man who stated that “it was not a war to be proud of. Neither officers or men were very happy over it.”\textsuperscript{50}

Several officers grew to dislike field service, wanting to have nothing to do with it. For example, one officer declared that he desired “post duty & a chance to study,” rather than spend futile days campaigning.\textsuperscript{51} There were those soldiers who became complacent about the whole deal, not giving much effort or placing much importance in catching any Apaches. “We are out on what is supposed to be a scouting expedition, but…we are not going to put ourselves out of the way much to hunt for them.

\textsuperscript{48} Paul Andrew Hutton, \textit{Phil Sheridan and His Army} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 145-146.

\textsuperscript{49} E.A. Bode, \textit{A Dose of Frontier Soldiering The Memoirs of Corporal E.A. Bode, Frontier Regular Infantry, 1877-1882}, Thomas T. Smith ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 145; King, “On Campaign,” 163; Kim Allen Scott, “’Whiskey is the Most Formidable Enemy in this Campaign,’ Capt. Gustavus Cheney Doane’s Fight with Boredom and Vice during the Geronimo Pursuit,” \textit{Journal of Arizona History} 48 (Spring 2007), 31-52. See also Leighton Finley papers, 1885 notebook, UASP; Chrisman papers, ASHS; Bigelow, \textit{On the Bloody Trail}. According to one officer, the so called Victorio campaigns in 1879-1881 “resemble the operations of the cowboys and other bands of robbers on the frontier, or the parties of train-robbers in Missouri.” \textit{ARSW}, 1881, 118.

\textsuperscript{50} ARSW, 1875, 122; Barnes, \textit{Apaches & Longhorns}, 87.

\textsuperscript{51} James Worthington letters, ASHS. On officers’ frustrations, see also Bourke, \textit{Diaries}, 81-82; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 128; Bigelow, \textit{On the Bloody Trail}, especially 103; Pettit, “Apache Campaign Notes,” 532; Adna Chaffee papers, ASHS; Marian E. Valputic & Harold H. Longfellow, eds., “The Fight at Chiricahua Pass in 1869,” \textit{Arizona and the West} 13 (Winter 1971), 374, see also 378.
[Apaches],” one enlisted man wrote. An officer who failed to find any signs of Apaches dryly noted that “I was so little surprised at the result of our search that I was scarcely annoyed at it.”52 Some white army people even dared publicly to question the competence of white soldiers in colonial warfare. They voiced what most army men already knew but did not care to emphasize: the Apaches were making a mockery of white troops. Some wrote that the troops “do not seem to be accomplishing anything,” others recognized that in their mode of warfare the Apaches were “more than equal to white men, and it would be practically impossible with white soldiers to subdue the Chiricahuas in their own haunts.” The officer who wrote the latter statement saw that regular white and black troops were helpless in pursuing the Apaches: “we cannot afford to fight them; we are too culpable, as a nation, for the existing condition of affairs.”53 This kind of thinking had the potential to place the superiority and privilege of whiteness in question. As self-doubt and frustration crept into army narratives, it proved a serious matter in a colonial system grounded on the rule of difference and the supposed superiority of the white colonizers. Most white army people did not go this far. They could not risk losing the sense of superiority they had constructed in relation to the enemy. Instead, they hurried to claim that statements questioning the overall competence of white manliness in colonial warfare were mere “bad rumors.” Many felt certain that as civilized men white soldiers and officers would in the end compel the “inferior” Apaches to submit. “As for Apaches or other Indians out-shooting, out-marching, or out-stripping our men in the long race, I do not believe it,” one general wrote.54

4.1.4 Fear of the Colonized

Warfare against the Apaches made many white army men and women nervous and fearful. As one scholar of colonial culture and history has observed, colonial rule was frequently haunted by a sense of insecurity, terrified by the obscurity of native mentality and overwhelmed by indigenous societies’ apparent intractability in the face of government. Colonizers felt their power to be severely limited and inadequate, and

52 Chrisman papers, diary, October 23, 1885, ASHS; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 106-107.
53 Alice Kirk Grierson, The Colonel’s Lady on the Western Frontier: The Correspondence of Alice Kirk Grierson, Shirley Anne Leckie ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 166; ARSW, 1883, 166-167, 174. For some, Apaches represented a perfect specimen of the “racing type of athlete” who have no superiors in physical excellence and as mountain climbers. The “thought of attempting to catch one of them in the mountains gave me a queer feeling of helplessness,” an officer told. See Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 80; ARSW, 1886, 165.
54 ARSW, 1886, 181, see also 12-16, 72-73, 164-176.
thus fear and paranoia guided their representations. Showing their nervousness troops in the field could start shooting at random against anything thought to be an Apache. Officers mistakenly shot their soldiers, different commands sometimes fired at one another, and some troops gunned wildlife or shadows and echoes in canyons thinking it was the Apaches. Moreover, the purportedly uncontrolled potency of Apache men was imagined as a serious threat for white army women. The army elite represented that sexual slavery, “fates worse that death,” awaited white women captured by Apache men. As a precaution some wives, when outside the army villages, carried weapons to defend themselves and to prevent the possibility of captivity. When their husbands were in the field some officers’ wives at the posts fell into a state of terror, fearing that Apaches would kill their husbands and then come for them. Some soldiers and officers also acknowledged that they were often afraid when having to engage the Apaches. “If you saw the Indian, you were probably in no great danger, whereas if you did not see them, you might be in the greatest danger,” one officer thought. Duties that included close supervision of Apaches were often described as the most dangerous work imaginable. There were those who were startled by the prospect of encountering large numbers of Apaches alone. For example, one soldier who drove a supply wagon between a field camp and a military post admitted that “I was terribly afraid to die.” He felt very much alone, especially at night, fearing that the Apaches would attack him.

Interestingly, army men and women did not feel safe in the army villages but feared a general Apache revolt. They imagined that Apache groups planned a large-scale uprising that would bring together all the Apaches and perhaps also the Navajos and others. Although any general uprising was a real possibility only in the feverish army minds, the army people might have not realized this and in their discourses they

placed themselves on fragile ground, isolated, outnumbered, and destined for possible annihilation. Rumors that Apaches had left their reservation unauthorized, or had been seen in the vicinity of army villages led to insecurity, often causing a peculiar siege mentality. It was not uncommon, an army man told, that people did not dare “to go away from the Post half a mile. The Indians are all around and are liable to pop out from behind a stump or rock and shoot you at any moment. At some of the posts here they have a guard accompany the officers to the water closet [outhouse].” According to officer’s wife, “there might at any time be Indians lurking around, and it was not safe...Oh, those dreadful Indians. You know they were always lying-in-wait.” Later she confessed that “we never were attacked really, though we had more than one alarm. We were too cautious for them.” An enlisted man remembered that he and others in his company took “no chances with the Indians” and slept with their six guns fastened to their belts and carbines under their heads. They were so cautious that they even wore revolvers when going to the privy.\(^{61}\)

Touring the region in 1871, an army paymaster traveled from what he saw as one vulnerable army village to the next. For him the situation was especially serious at Camp Grant, where “one small company” of infantry, about 25 men was surrounded by 900 Indians “full of treachery” and liable to “massacre the garrison at any moment.” The post was “at the mercy of the Apaches,” he wrote.\(^{62}\) In reality, although at times Apaches, or somebody thought to be Apaches, stole cattle near posts and fired scattered shots toward one, they almost never actually attacked. Probably the only attack happened during the 1881 Cibecue clashes against Fort Apache. So there were few precedents or facts to support this level of army anxiety.\(^{63}\)

It is significant that the very one-sided images of the Apaches the army produced, where the Apaches were constantly dehumanized and made some sort of monsters, brought the fractured army community closer together. Officers and their wives and the white enlisted men held similar views or constituted a united front. The common

\(^{61}\) For the quotes, see Gressley, "Soldier with Crook," 37, see also 36; Schreier, "For This I Had Left Civilization," 193, see also 195-196; Harry C. Benton, ed., "Sgt. Neil Erickson and the Apaches," Westerners Brand Book (Los Angeles Corral, 1948), 122. For the siege mentality, see also Upham, "Incidents," 90-91; George B. Sanford, Fighting Rebels and Redskins: Experiences in the Army Life of Colonel George B. Sanford, 1861-1892, F.R. Hagemann ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 11; Sweeney, Making Peace, 31; Carr, "Days of the Empire," 26; Baldwin, Army Wife, 67-68; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 55-57; Cochrans, Posie, 49.

\(^{62}\) Splitter, "Tour in Arizona," 78, 80, 83-84.

\(^{63}\) For the 1881 attack on Fort Apache, see Cruse, Apache Days; Carter, From Yorktown; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns.
Apache enemy functioned as a vehicle for cohesion among white army people divided by class lines. It is revealing that both the officers and white enlisted men liked to represent that the Apaches considered all whites, regardless of class, ethnicity, and gender, as their enemies. The Apaches were purportedly filled with such vicious racial hatred towards whites that they wanted to kill everyone they came across. “Once having shed the blood of a white man” the Apaches developed “an unquenchable desire” for murder and “wild craving for the blood of the whites,” some army men argued.64

It is quite plausible that army people intentionally exaggerated the danger to emphasize the lowly character of Apaches and their own courage when facing “stressful” and “dangerous” circumstances. Producing discourses of fear would not only make the army people seem exceptionally brave, but the Apaches that much more horrendous, thus making their “punishment” more legitimate. On the other hand, self-doubt could have made white army people so insecure that they really felt they had much to fear. No matter which reasoning holds more relevance, or if both do, what appears certain is that white impotence in colonial war, the difficulty of subduing the Apaches militarily, poisoned army discourses and made army men angry. That the Apaches refused to fight in the open and waged war so “unfairly” that “civilized” persons could not know when and where they executed their “cowardly” murders and assassinations made army people despise the colonized and created a strong desire to “teach the Apaches a lesson.” When army people established their “truth” of Apache society as backward and oppressive, made Apache character treacherous and cruel, Apache rule brutal terror, and way of war cowardly and uncivilized, it became possible for white army people to feel free and justified to use any amount of force against the Apaches. Because of the kind of imagery they had produced, white army men no longer had to treat Apaches as humans. They had made Apaches free game, blurring the Apaches humanity and masking the U.S. role as the aggressor. Frustrated by repeated failures in the field and by their fear of the colonized, white army men were ready to kill when they got the chance.

4.2 Representing the Akimel O’odham

For the army, the Apaches were special and unlike the other tribes they encountered in the Southwest. A short discussion of army representations of another

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64 Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 114; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 80-81; Pettit, “Apache Campaign Notes,” 532; Sweeney, Making Peace, 65.
central Arizona tribe, the Akimel O’odham, or Pimas, demonstrates what in fact was special in army views of Apaches. It also highlights the impact failures and frustrations in warfare had on the mentalities of white army men and on the nature of discourses they produced.

First, army writings of the Pimas, which amount to a mere fraction of the volume of text produced of the Apaches, constructed the Pima relationship with the whites through the medium of friendship and submission - not hostility, power, and savage brutality as was the Apache case. Army texts made Pimas a “non-hostile” and “friendly” tribe, who represented no competition for the U.S. regime. For instance, one officer declared that the Pimas were “our firm and trusty friends.” Others characterized the Pimas as the most respectable, intelligent, and hospitable people ready to assist anyone wearing the army uniform. An often repeated military narrative even claimed that the Pimas were most proud of the fact that they had never killed any whites. Whether true or not this comforting message was what defined the Pimas in the eyes of white army people.65

Unlike the Apaches, the Pimas were represented as “semi-civilized.” They not only lived in “adequate” houses and were “agriculturalists” practicing sedentary farming, but were also “well dressed,” “fine looking,” honest, and well behaving. It was also important for the army narratives to cast the Pimas as victims of Apache cruelty and to portray Apaches and Pimas as “hereditary enemies.” This strategy was not meant to indicate similarity between the whites and the Pimas but to cement the universally wicked composition of the Apaches. It can be argued that on the hierarchies of racial and cultural difference army people viewed the Pimas as having a position somewhere between themselves and the Apaches. The army often represented the Pimas as unimportant, harmless, degenerate, and simple savages, easily controllable and permanently inferior to whites. Perhaps the Pimas were capable of integrating themselves into the lower levels of Hispanic or white society; but more likely, army people felt, they would vanish. As one army man put it, “Pima wants are simple, their hopes and ambition limited. Having practically reached their stage of advancement, passively waiting for the preordained degree, which will obliterate them from the

65 Carr, ”Days of the Empire,” 21; Cruse, Apache Days, 156-157.
country, from which they have done almost nothing to develop, and in which they will leave no trace, or even rude monument as a record of their existence.”

In the end, Pimas served the army’s imaginative geography for two main purposes. As anti-Apaches, Pimas offered an example of Indians “welcoming” the Americans, recognizing their superiority and thus never resorting to violence, instead keeping out of the way. As victims of the Apaches, Pimas brought a sense of authority and righteousness to the army’s “othering” of the Apaches as the enemy of mankind.

4.3 Violence: “Apaches Deserve Punishment”

“Our officers are zealous and ambitious, and our men willing and courageous. It is only a question of time; the result is certain. Many times in the history of the world have small, determined bodies of men defied great nations, as did the pirates of the Mediterranean in the great Roman Empire, but all have met the same fate, and let us hope that in the end there may not be a single Chiricahua left in Arizona to perpetuate the memories of these bloody tragedies, or to incite other tribes to the butchery of the citizens who bring their lives and fortunes to swell the growth and prosperity of our great West.”

As the above text produced by a junior lieutenant demonstrates, army men not only believed in the use of force and in their own superiority, or represented victory certain in the end, but, when comparing Apaches to pirates, wanted to assure everybody that Apaches were the aggressors, who in their allegedly deep and vicious hatred of all white people foolishly defied “a great nation.” White army people claimed that the Apaches were the cause for violence, a threat and danger to all decent people and thus deserved and needed to be militarily subjugated. According to this army “truth,” the invading U.S. Army represented the aggressed (or the victims) and stood for peace and the righteous cause. Somehow the army completely forgot that they were invaders on Apaches’ land.

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In army minds the Apaches had supposedly brought violence on themselves. Apache aggression, the army claimed, had led to a situation where the life and property of white colonizers would never be safe and peace never possible as long as an Apache remained free. Apaches, the army logic went, would not accept peace if not compelled by force. Therefore the army created a fantasy that force alone would make the region and the Apaches peaceful: to establish peace, the army simply “had” to subjugate the Apaches. Army policy was, as one historian wrote, “to destroy off-reservation Apaches.” Few army men openly acknowledged that this was in any way wrong. In army thinking, violence against the Apaches was a necessity as Apaches needed to learn to know their place in the colonial hierarchies and to appreciate the strength and superiority of the whites. According to one officer, “the murderous devilish Indians would be cornered for the whipping they needed.” Apaches required “a lesson,” “chastisement,” or “punishment” to correct their “insubordination,” other officers claimed. What was needed, the army believed, was not simply to occupy certain areas, but to permanently paralyze the Apache capacity for military action and to prevent their free access to their homelands. A few officers reasoned that even the extermination of Apaches was a plausible option when “every other means fail to protect our people.”

To cement the distinction between the army and the Apaches and to further hide the army’s role as the invader and the aggressor, army discourses applied a specific rhetoric for describing Apache activity. In army texts Apaches engaged in “murderous raids,” in “outbreaks,” or went to “warpath,” while the army on the other hand always conducted more neutral “expeditions,” “operations,” “pursuits” or “campaigns.” Army also “hurried to the field,” set out “guard” or to “give protection” to some specific place,

70 Parker, *Annals*, 17; Nickerson, “Major General,” 11-12; Carr, ”Days of the Empire,” 31, see also 33; Crook, *His Autobiography*, 174-183; Carter, *From Yorktown*, 189, see also 184, 196, 206, 228; Mehren, "Scouting for Mescaleros,” 177-179. For the army mentality, see also ARSW, 1875, 133; Howard, *Famous Indian Chiefs*, 115; Cruse, *Apache Days*, 208. One officer wrote that “If offensive operations...are not presumed they [Apaches] may remain quietly on the mountains for an indefinite time...and yet their very presence there will be a constant menace and require the troops...to be at all times in position to repel sudden raids.” Crook, *Resume of Operations*, 7, see also 3, 16.
71 ARSW, 1869, 121-122, 127-129. Another officer who wrote at the same time thought “there seems to be no settled policy but a general idea to kill them [Apaches] whenever found. I am also a believer in that if we go for the extermination.” Green, "Interesting Scout," 44. Still another officer, feeling that the only peace indigenous peoples in Arizona deserve is the one found in death, advocated a war of extermination “against all hostile tribes.” See James Deine, “An Incident of the Hualapais War,” in Cozzens, *Eyewitnesses*, 39.
and went “to capture” Apaches. The message is simple and easily detectable: Apaches equaled danger and savage aggression while army was in the right. Tellingly, to hide their guilt and even participation, the army people never spoke of U.S.-Apache wars, but instead wrote of “Apache problem,” or “Apache troubles.”

Furthermore, Apaches supposedly posed such a threat that all not living under U.S. supervision were categorized as “hostiles” in army writings. In practice, an Apache became a “hostile” the minute he or she was outside the reservation boundaries, except when working for the Americans. Apaches were so threatening and uncontrollable from the army’s perspective that even an infant or an elderly qualified for being labeled “hostile.” It is clear that Apache freedom is what “hostile” was all about when any free Apache was automatically “hostile” in white army eyes. The phrase “hostile Apaches” abounds in many army writings. Also, it is rather common that army texts leave out the word “Apaches” entirely and use only the term “hostiles” when referring to free Apaches. By labeling Apaches “hostiles” white army people criminalized and othered an entire people. They did this to further prove their point that war was the Apaches fault and to obscure the true horror of colonialism in which white colonizers were engaged. “Hostile” proved a useful vehicle when the army wanted to distribute guilt and validate its own actions and innocence.

In their narratives white soldiers could criticize themselves for not killing enough Apaches. They could also claim that the destruction of a few Apaches was a great “success,” and the annihilation of whole Apache groups a cause for general rejoicing. One soldier, for instance, proudly wrote that an Apache “band simply ceased to exist”

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72 On army terminology for Apache activity, see Biddle, Reminiscences, 168-169; Carter, From Yorktown, 228, 242, 249; Crook, Resume of Operations, 6; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 35; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 113-114; W.B. Jett, “Engagement in Guadalupe Canyon,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 495; Mills, My Story, 190; Crook, Resume of Operations, 6; Bourke, Diaries, 65; Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 26; Benton, “Sgt. Neil Erickson,” 126; Platten, Ten Years, 15; Dinges, “New York Private.” 56. For the terminology used to describe army doings, see Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 79; Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 26; Parker, Old Army, 152; Bourke, Diaries, 55; Carter, From Yorktown, 188, 191, 242-244, 247, 249; Cruse, Apache Days, 156.

73 George Crook, “The Apache Problem,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 593-603; Corbusier, Soldier, 160; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 192; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, especially 82; Cruse, Apache Days, 48; ARSW, 1885, 125; 1874, 125; 1886, 73.

74 For free Apaches as “hostiles” in army texts, see Corbusier, Soldier, 77; Corbusier, Recollections, 132; Carter, From Yorktown, 188, 203, 243-245; Crook, Resume of Operations, 6; Parker, Old Army, 153, 167; Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 53; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 100, 107; Bourke, Diaries, 36, 37, 134; Elliott, “Geronimo Campaign,” 430-435; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 87; Anonymous, “Early Days in Arizona with the Fifth U.S. Cavalry,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 144. Page numbers referred here represent only a small fraction of times the term “hostile” appears in these texts. Another common term for free Apaches in army texts was “renegades.” See Carter, From Yorktown, 199, 242; Crook, Resume of Operations, 6; Bourke, Diaries, 101; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 79, 82; King, “On Campaign,” 163.
after his troop completely “smashed” them.\textsuperscript{75} Upon hearing that a command had killed twenty-five Apaches, an officer wrote in his diary that “such good news served to enliven us all.”\textsuperscript{76} The army’s mentality reduced the Apaches to a status of free game. In his official report one general “encouraged the troops to capture and root out the Apache by every means, and to hunt them as they would wild animals.” Thinking that a warring Apache was nothing but “madness personified,” another officer, still blaming the Apaches, wrote that “exasperated, our senses blunted by Indian atrocities, we hunted them [Apaches] and killed them as we hunted and killed wolves.”\textsuperscript{77} In a peculiar manner some army writings turned violence into a good-spirited sport. Many enlisted men made it seem as if “hunting Apaches” was ideally something of a grand adventure, not the reality of frustrating chasing and skirmishing it often was. These “Apache hunts” ideally offered plenty of excitement for the “racially superior” whites. For example, one enlisted man remarked that his troop was “prepared for a little fun with the redskins, everybody being in anguish for an engagement.” Another man wrote that his “soul was thrilled at the prospect” of fighting the Apaches: “What were a few Indians as against the white man…here’s the real adventure at last.”\textsuperscript{78}

Blind to their own brutality, some officers and enlisted soldiers collected or purchased Apache scalps as souvenirs to be mailed back east or made into decorative articles such as lamp covers.\textsuperscript{79} Some even went after dead Apache bodies, seeing them as market commodities or as collectibles. One enlisted soldier told that when three Apache soldiers were hanged for taking part in “a mutiny,” he and two of his comrades tried to obtain their bodies, but found the graves empty. Two years later a post doctor revealed to this soldier the three skeletons he had missed. All were “neatly mounted” in the doctor’s cabinet. The doctor confessed that he had paid three soldiers $25 each for

\textsuperscript{75} Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 113, 211-212; Carter, \textit{From Yorktown}, 207-208, see also 232; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 170, 173. Cruse insisted the soldiers attack “had saved many lives, much property.”


\textsuperscript{78} Bode, \textit{Dose}, 152; Barnes, \textit{Apaches & Longhorns}, 22, 30-31, see also 60, 110. See also Wright, “In the Days,” 497-499. When one soldier was ordered to a hospital due to condition of his eyes, he felt that it was a “deathblow” to his hopes of any more Apache fighting. See Mazzanovich papers, file 6, “Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS.

\textsuperscript{79} Barnes, “Apaches’ Last Stand,” 278; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 42, 45, 47; Bourke, \textit{On the Border}. 

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digging the grave. “We enjoyed a good laugh over the incident after I recounted my part of the story,” the soldier wrote. Moreover, another soldier who had found a skeleton of an Indian in a cave some miles from a post, kept the skull in the telegraph office as a trophy, whereas a sergeant delivered the body of a dead Apache to a mercantile business in Prescott. While he received sixty dollars, which for him equaled several months wages, the corpse was placed on display in the store window.

Ultimately, the army’s greatness was measured by its capacity to destroy, although this destruction was camouflaged as the only way to counter the actions of a supposedly ferocious enemy and as a necessity for the advancement of freedom, prosperity, and civilization. This mentality that celebrated violence and the use of force ranged from the common enlisted soldier to junior officers and local commanders, and eventually all the way to Washington D.C. For instance, in 1881, the Commanding General William T. Sherman telegraphed to Arizona that “sooner or later some considerable number of these Apaches will have to be killed by bullets.” Soldiers directed their frustrations at whomever they could catch as long as they could be thought to fit the category of “Apache.” Often they caught nobody, but many times some unsuspecting Apache fell victim to army aggression. For example, at one time a lonely Apache women tending her stock was seized by a group of enlisted men. After two dismounted men “attacked her, front and rear” but were unable to capture her, another soldier threw a rope around the woman and dragged her behind his horse, shouting in his frenzy that “I’ll kill this one.” A noncommissioned officer, who saved the woman’s life, wrote that “the men were furious at the interruption to their sport. She was nearly dead. Her face was gashed; her arms were full of cuts, and her body was terribly bruised.” The woman was taken to the nearest post as a prisoner, her condition “explained as due to a fall.” An Apache informant tells a story of a Mescalero man who went into Fort Stanton on a promise of security. He was caught by the soldiers butchering hogs. Having a big kettle of boiling water, the soldiers threw the Apache into it. Apache narratives also tell stories where the soldiers directed their hatred towards

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80 Mazzanovich papers, file 6, ”Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS. See also Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 93-95 for another case.
81 Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 102; Platten, Ten Years, 37.
82 ARSW, 1881, 144-145.
83 Wright, “In the Days,” 498-499.
Apache babies by taking them by the heels and crashing their heads against wagon wheels.\textsuperscript{84} 

During major army campaigns the troops who managed to engage the enemy were not shy at attacking sleeping villages, fields and other food sources, horses, and all material property. For example, the Tonto Basin offensive and its aftermath in 1872-74 against Western Apaches and Yavapais held the characteristics of an indiscriminate genocidal war devastating numerous indigenous bands. Historian Timothy Braatz has accurately noted that the Tonto Basin campaigns “were one-sided, murderous onslaughts, carried out by well-armed and organized soldiers against scattered bands of malnourished and poorly armed families; the expeditions were not heroic, romantic, or admirable.”\textsuperscript{85} Murder and mayhem measured the success of these “killing expeditions,” as one army surgeon admitted they were.\textsuperscript{86} Another participant remembered that “as we entered Tonto Basin, no hunting was allowed, except for hostile Indians.” “Night marches were made to surprise the occupants about the break of day, when the killings were usually made. Women could not be distinguished from men at long range and especially when they had bow and arrow to take part in the fight.”\textsuperscript{87} In his diary of the campaign one officer spoke openly of the “extermination of hostile Apaches.” While being “afraid” to “miss much of the fun” if other commands found the enemy “earlier than we,” this officer hoped “to inflict upon the hitherto incorrigible Apaches a chastisement from the effects of which they can never recover.” He explained that “by sneaking upon them [Apaches] in the night we can, by good luck, make our attacks at day-dawn and kill their warriors whilst asleep” Looking forward to “big killings,” he also entertained the idea that “if we clean out the Tonto [a Western Apache group] this winter we shall give Cocheis [Cochise and his Chiricahua Apaches] hell in the spring.”\textsuperscript{88} 

The most (in)famous episode of the Tonto Basin operation saw a group of Yavapai men, women, and children, mistaken by the army as Apaches, caught defenseless in a cave where they fell victims to an indiscriminate slaughter by the troops. “Never have I seen such a hellish spot as was the narrow little space in which the hostile Indians were now crowded…the bullets striking against the mouth of the

\textsuperscript{84} Eve Ball, with Nora Henn and Lynda Sanchez, \textit{Indeh: An Apache Odyssey} (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1980), 201.  
\textsuperscript{85} Braatz, \textit{Surviving Conquest}, 137.  
\textsuperscript{86} Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 40.  
\textsuperscript{87} Corbusier, \textit{Soldier}, 79.  
\textsuperscript{88} Bourke, \textit{Diaries}, 34, 37, 45-46. See also Crook, \textit{His Autobiography}, 174-183.
cave seemed like drops of rain pattering upon the surface of a lake,” one officer wrote at
the scene. Approximately seventy-six Yavapais were killed in this Salt River Cave
Massacre.\textsuperscript{99} Tellingly, troops universally celebrated this great slaughter, and
characterized the event as “an important contribution” during which the army had
delivered, in the words of one participant, “the most signal blow ever received by the
Apaches in Arizona.” For one soldier the massacre represented “a fair sample of the
work done by this Fifth Cavalry during their three and one-half years in Arizona.”\textsuperscript{90}
White army people had become so blinded by the vicious Apache imagery they had
produced that they could not only inflict violence indiscriminately but also see Apaches
where there were none. As said already, the troops present at the Salt River cave wrote
and many historians since have believed them that they fought Apaches, whereas they
in fact had engaged a group of Yavapais.\textsuperscript{91}

As in other occasions, the army refused to take the blame and made the killing of
Apaches (and Yavapais) during the Tonto Basin campaign the fault of the Apaches:
“Not one of the Apaches had been killed except through his own folly; they had refused
to…come in; and consequently there had been nothing else to do but to go out and kill
them until they changed their minds.”\textsuperscript{92} Army rhetoric claimed that the army had
inflicted only “prompt chastisement” on the Apaches or that they had been “forced to
submit to authority,” thus becoming “lately-hostile Apaches.” The army’s actions
supposedly made “the condition of Arizona…more hopeful than at any former
period.”\textsuperscript{93}

Officers and soldiers were so caught up in punishing the Apaches that they at
times thought that the Apaches should be made to beg for peace, preferably to ask for it
on their knees.\textsuperscript{94} During the Tonto Basin offensive some Apaches who wanted to
surrender were not allowed access to reservations until they were considered thoroughly
subjugated. One group was bullied into delivering the heads of some of their leaders to
prove their “peaceful intentions.” The deal was that if the Apaches would kill their

\textsuperscript{99} Bourke, \textit{Diaries}, 50-51.
\textsuperscript{91} See among others Forsyth, \textit{Story of the Soldier}, 284; Anonymous, “Early Days,” 145; Bourke, \textit{Diaries},
50. For historians, see Joseph C. Porter, \textit{Paper Medicine Man: John Gregory Bourke and His American
West} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 19; Dan L. Thrapp, \textit{Conquest of Apacheria}
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 127-131; Ralph H. Ogle, \textit{Federal Control of the Western
Apaches} (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 113-117; Frank C. Lockwood, \textit{The
\textsuperscript{92} Bourke, \textit{On the Border}, 213.
\textsuperscript{93} Price, \textit{Across the Continent}, 148; ARSW, 1873, 51-52. See also ARSW, 1875, 136.
\textsuperscript{94} Bourke, \textit{Diaries}, 61.
leaders, then the “common Indians” of the band would be allowed to live. If not, all would be declared outlaws and never again permitted to surrender. As a result of this coercion, several decapitated heads were brought in, for which the army paid a bounty. Then the army placed the heads on display as trophies. In their narratives officers justified their actions by claiming they had wanted to avoid turning reservations into “a refuge for criminals” and thus had in fact acted to further the cause of peace and justice. From the army perspective, these Apaches were “wretches” with whom the military dealt justly. The Annual Report made the decapitated men into criminals who “after long careers of crime, met the fate they so richly deserved.” The report also assured that “there was no other way but to secure these outlaws at any price.”

White soldiers rarely admitted that their actions caused unjustified suffering to the Apaches. On the contrary, as seen, army people usually chose to emphasize Apache cruelties, omitting their own. For instance, one army wife wrote that “Arizona seemed to me a very burying-ground—a huge cemetery—for men and women killed by Indians.” However, some army people pointed out that white greed, “the almighty dollar,” and desire for land or reservation mismanagement by civilian agents had contributed and increased the violence. Others saw that white civilians sometimes too easily blamed crimes committed by whites or Mexicans on the Apaches. “All the murders that occurred were attributed to the Apaches. A man could wear moccasins, kill his neighbor, and succeed in laying the blame on the dreaded Apaches.” Offering a very rare critical view, one enlisted soldier questioned the army’s actions. He saw that the “Indians got a raw deal” from the government who hunted them down and starved them on reservations. Obviously feeling guilty of what had happened, he protested that he should “have deserted the United States army and gone with the Apaches.”

From Apache perspectives the army acted at times like an indiscriminate killing machine seeking Apache extinction. Historical data seems to support the Apache case. Even the army’s own statistics demonstrate that the government killed 1,965 Indians

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95 ARSW, 1874, 61-63. Interestingly, the Annual Report does not elaborate on the bounty, perhaps deeming that it would cast the military in an unfavorable light. For this episode, see also Nickerson, “Major General,” 15-17; Crook, His Autobiography, 181-182 Corbusier, Soldier, 84, 192; Bourke, On the Border, 220; Merritt, “Incidents,” 161.

96 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 111, see also 155. See also Merritt, “Incidents,” 159; Nickerson, ”Major General,” 16-17; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 25, 109; Mazzanovich papers, file 5, “Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS; Wright, “In the Days,” 500-501.

97 Gatewood, “Campaigning,” 218. See also Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 139, Crook, Resume of Operations; ARSW, 1883; 1885; 1886.

[mostly Apaches and Yavapais] in Arizona and New Mexico between 1866 and 1886. In comparison, only 127 enlisted men, some of them indigenous soldiers, and 10 officers were killed by the indigenous forces. According to data collected from local newspapers, between 1866 and 1878 altogether 1,759 Apaches were killed in Arizona compared to 493 non-Apaches.\(^9^9\) While the numbers vary somewhat, the overall pattern is evident. Relatively few soldiers were killed by Apaches or other indigenous groups, whereas the Apaches, who probably numbered approximately ten thousand people in the mid-1800s, experienced massive devastation at the hands of the colonizers. The same happened to the Yavapais. In twelve years between 1863 and 1875 they lost all their territory in central Arizona and half of their total population.\(^1^0^0\) It is no wonder that some Apaches felt the intention of whites was genocide. Normal life for Apaches became filled with constant fear of attacks and killings. According to one Mescalero Apache, “Apache mothers quieted their children by telling them that the soldiers would find and kill them if they were noisy.” In these circumstances, “even babies dared not cry.”\(^1^0^1\) A close reading of army texts also shows how the alerted and suspicious free Apaches typically wanted to avoid all contacts with the white troops. They had good reason to suspect that the troops would want to hurt them.\(^1^0^2\)

Many Apaches were driven to violence by the colonial intrusion, by whites’ “mistaken” attacks against them, by the depletion of game and declining trading opportunities, or by indiscriminate war and reservation imprisonment. When a group of Apaches stole some cattle or supplies to cope with hunger caused by the U.S. invasion, the army, or the civilians, often retaliated against any group thought to be Apaches. The army also conducted “pre-emptive” strikes against those Apaches it imagined represented a threat to its power. All this enraged many Apache groups and shattered any trust they had in peaceful cooperation.\(^1^0^3\) For some Apaches submitting to colonial authority became an unthinkable option. If not destroyed by U.S. aggression, they saw

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\(^{99}\) Chronological List of Actions &c., With Indians from January 15, 1837 to January, 1891 (The Old Army Press, 1979); Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, Massacre at Camp Grant: Forgetting and Remembering Apache History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), 53.

\(^{100}\) Braatz, Surviving Conquest, 177.

\(^{101}\) Ball, Indeh, 200-201. For Apaches who felt that the intention of whites was genocide, see Ball, Indeh, 78-81, see also 35, 47. For Apache views on the destructives of war, see Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 131; Ball, In the Days, 3-10; Ball, Indeh, especially 4-12, 70-74.

\(^{102}\) For Apaches trying to avoid encountering white troops, see Sweeney, Making Peace, 70-71, 84-87; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 56; Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 111; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 135, 357; Howard, My Life, 209-211, 216-219; Crook, His Autobiography, 164-165; Ball, Indeh, 41, 108; Ball, In the Days, 71; Bourke, Diaries, 60.

\(^{103}\) For Apache opinions on white aggression, see Ball, Indeh, especially 19-20, 26-27, 78-81, 83, 111, 200-201; Ball, In the Days, 191.
that what awaited them was a culturally destructive, dehumanizing, and poverty stricken existence on the reservations where outsiders increasingly controlled their lives. Often Apache parties who refused to live on the reservations had high percentages of women and children. For example, those Chiricahuas who left San Carlos on May 1885 had 92 women and children and only 34 men. However, this gender imbalance did not prevent the whites from creating images of these parties as congregations of vicious, blood-hungry outlaws who had to be hunted like dangerous animals. The Annual Report in 1886 confirmed that “the chief object of the troops will be to capture or destroy any band of hostile Apache Indians found.” According to one Chiricahua, those who left the reservations regarded themselves dead already. They knew they were “doomed, but some preferred death to slavery and imprisonment.” Others felt more optimistic. “We’ll not be killed. We’ll be free. What is life if we are imprisoned like cattle in a corral. We have been a wild, free people, free to come and go as we wished. How can we be caged?” However, after 1886 there were practically no free Apaches left, all had been killed or “caged.”

The army’s subjugation of free Apaches was linked to the vicious Apache imagery white army people had produced in their discourses. The army’s imagery of Apaches made it easier for them to not only use violence but to celebrate it. It made them feel justified in trying to crush all persons identified as free Apaches. This use of force, on the other hand, required the army to dehumanize their enemy, make them evil and deserving of violence. This vicious cycle, the army’s search for colonial power, devastated many Apache lives and ended their existence as free peoples.

4.4 Imagining Apache Futures

Following the use of force, some army personnel began to imagine futures for the “subjugated” Apaches living in captivity. Some white army people imagined that the Apache survivors, now that they had been “tamed” by violence, could possibly be “civilized.” This, they felt, would require the help and guidance of whites. As the military debated the future of Apache lives in their private and public writings, reflecting on the possibilities and pace of Apache progress towards modernity, they determined what was to be the normative life for the colonized Apaches. The basis of

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104 Elliott, "Geronimo Campaign," 428. Another source tells that approximately hundred and forty people left the reservation, of whom thirty-seven were men. Ball, In the Days, 177.
105 ARSW, 1886, 166.
106 Ball, Indeh, 40, see also 37-42; Ball, In the Days, 62, see also 28, 80, 180.
this Apache “regeneration” was the premise that white American culture superseded all others and possessed inherent privilege.

At first it must be pointed out that many white army men and women did not care much about Apache futures. Indeed, the majority of army writings pay no or only passing attention to this subject, and usually only the most high-ranking officers seemed to have much to say. This is interesting when one remembers that most army texts, especially those produced by men, contain ample discussions of Apache character and acts of war. Seemingly, the majority of the white army community lost interest after the Apaches ceased to be seen as a military threat. When stripped of their freedom and geopolitical power, the Apaches, in army eyes, seemed to belong to the Southwest’s inglorious and uncivilized past. Thus, concerning oneself with Apache futures would amount to a little more than a waste of time.

Among those army people who wrote of Apache futures there were those doubted how wise it was to “civilize” the Apaches. They thought it best that the Apaches should remain cut off from the American society. Some justified their stance by claiming it was a waste of government money to try to “civilize” such a distinct race through forced alterations of their habits and lifestyles. “The Indians may possibly be civilized and Christianized in some measure, but they will all die in the process, as so many tribes of the human race before them,” wrote one general. Apaches supposedly simply lacked the ability to reach the levels of “civilization.” “They are savages, pure and simple,” an army man wrote. Even the more careful estimates warned that the process would take a long time and the army should not hurry.107

Those who believed that “civilizing” Apaches was not only possible but the “right” thing to do often employed an ambivalent desire to justify conquest and colonization by seeing it as a civilizing mission offering backward peoples the benefits of the dynamic American culture. By utilizing concepts like primitiveness, backwardness, and underdevelopment some members of the army saw Apache present as white past. The question was how could the Apaches somehow gain momentum and reach the white present? All this makes the concept of time a vehicle of power, and Apache “liberation” a procession towards modernity. Somehow, the army divided Apache life into a native sphere, which consisted of Apaches’ “own” backward customs and practices and was something that should be erased once and for all, and a civilized

107 ARSW, 1875, 122; 1881, 118; Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, 2 vol. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 351.
sphere, where logic and rationality introduced by the white colonizers replaced the indigenous order of things and directed Apache lives towards a more progressive future.

4.4.1 Reservation Regeneration

As segregated spaces, reservations functioned as the primary setting for Apache regeneration, which the army thought should be attempted through new forced regimes of work, leisure, worship, and celebration. Although reservation administration usually rested on the civilian agents of the Interior Department, army officers still controlled Apache reservations from time to time and thus had opportunities to put their visions into practice. Even when proclaiming, as one officer did, that the army’s guiding principle in Apache government was “justice to all,” it was the army leaders who dictated what this “justice” actually meant. As a rule, army personnel reserved agency and the capacity for rational action for themselves, while Apaches remained passive recipients guided by instincts. Apaches were “wards of the nation,” unfit for self-government and unable to represent themselves. Their “regeneration,” the army planned, would result in time, and by most patient watchfulness and care.  

One officer wrote that because the Apaches had never been “domesticated” like the blacks and do not speak “our language” and are “ignorant of our manner of life,” they must be segregated and taught so that their interests become identical with the whites. After that they should get land in severalty and eventually the ballot, so that they might become politically equal. Most did not think that far ahead. They rather concerned that the Apaches immediately needed firm rules and authoritarian rulers who would dismantle their existing power hierarchies, cultivate a spirit of subordination through severe sentences and punishments, and exercise control over every sphere of life, thus making regeneration possible.

In general, the officers knew nothing more suitable for strengthening the Apaches’ moral fiber and backbone than manual labor. According to one officer, “idleness was the source of all evils, and work was the only cure.” Even if officers themselves disliked manual labor intensely, it seems that they viewed it necessary for men of lower classes and inferior races. They not only wanted to make the Apaches work but also the white and black soldiers, as a later chapter of this study will

108 Carter, From Yorktown, 247; Crook, Resume of Operations; ARSW, 1883; 1885; 1886.
109 ARSW, 1883, 167-168.
110 Bourke, On the Border, 214.
demonstrate. In officers’ thinking, manual labor was beneficial because it allowed the lower elements to learn their rightful place in the society. If not working in the army, Apaches usually engaged in agricultural work. They collected hay or raised crops, oftentimes under close white supervision. The big plan was to recast the Apache division of labor by placing men in farm work and women in the domestic sphere in accordance with the late nineteenth-century white middle-class ideals, and to encourage Apache participation in the market with their new produce. Many officers were absolute that Apache men “must be made to work” in order to become “industrious” and “hard working” individuals. According to one officer, work will ensure that Apache men “will drop from the list of worthless idlers and relieve the Government from the responsibility of caring for” them. The best way to get Apache men interested, officers imagined, was to offer them money and opportunities to spend it so they could see the benefits of their efforts.\footnote{For the quote, see ARSW, 1884, 131-132. For army opinions, see also Howard, My Life, 167, 179; Bourke, Diaries, 92; Crook, Resume of Operations, 2-5; Green, “Interesting Scout,” 44-45; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 94-97. For work in the reservations, see ARSW, 1874, 61-64; 1883, 181-182; 1884, 131-136; Crook, His Autobiography, 183; Corbusier, Soldier, 84; Bourke, On the Border, 215-229; John G. Bourke, “Crook’s Campaign in ’72,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 142; Parker, Old Army, 150-151. Some officers favored the establishment of Apaches as pastoral rather than agricultural people, while others saw that to the Apaches should be sent practical artisans and mechanics. See Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 102; Loring, “Report,” 201.} Although some Apaches had experience in raising crops, white military people ignored that knowledge as backward and obsolete when making farming a vehicle for their colonial vision.

In addition to acquiring industrious habits, army people represented that the Apaches were to be taught reading and reason, to wear proper clothes, and to keep themselves clean. Ideally the Apache village was to be transformed from “chaotic and rude” to “orderly” by providing, an army man wrote, Apaches houses and beds to sleep in.\footnote{Loring, “Report,” 201.} Army officers in charge of Apaches thought they owned the Apaches time. They tried to regularize and reorder the everyday by deciding when Apaches were to work, when to receive rations, and how their public and private life was orchestrated. On the San Carlos reservation in the 1870s the Apaches were made to live in villages with regular streets. Every morning at seven, these villages were policed with the greatest care. The streets “were cleanly swept” and every Sunday there was an inspection to see that no garbage had accumulated and that the elevated beds and blankets were clean. Apaches were ordered to work details each morning, laboring in the fields or making adobe. Among other things the Apaches “planted fifty acres of land and made an
irrigating ditch five miles long to bring the water to their fields.” An officer wrote that the Apaches worked under best discipline, were “very happy and well behaved.” The officer was especially proud that his Apaches even learned to “always uncover the head when saluting a stranger.” Army men represented that the Apaches desired more work, wanting nothing so much as to work like the whites. To make this reorganization of Apache time and life function smoothly each Apache man at San Carlos was numbered and had to carry with him, day and night, his metal check, with the number and designation of his tribe stamped thereon. The officer in charge then had a corresponding record with the number of members in each family and a personal description of every man. This was the way the army controlled what every Apache did or did not do.

Besides work, army narratives focused heavily on two Apache customs that purportedly demonstrated the backward nature of Apaches’ life-ways: the practice of cutting the noses of adulterous wives and the brewing of indigenous “beer” called tiswin. In army texts, the nose cutting received no understanding and was ferociously attacked as “a mutilation,” “inhuman custom,” and a “cruel practice.” The military was “determined to put an end to” it by sentencing the perpetrators to the guardhouse. For army people nose cutting symbolized the supposedly despotic powers of Apache men over women. By putting an end to it army people hoped to curtail male domestic authority and win over the sympathies of Apache women, to convert the latter for the colonizers’ cause. What the army men ended up doing was getting themselves mixed in Apaches domestic disputes and insulting and infuriating Apache men who could not stand to be treated like children.

Tiswin manufacture the army also considered forbidden and detachments of troops again and again searched Apache camps and destroyed the supply, once again maddening many Apache men. Rising out of fear, the effort to terminate tiswin brewing was tightly connected to white prejudices against the indigenous consumption of alcohol. Army people widely believed that the Apaches would turn troublesome and uncontrollable at the moment they touched anything stronger than water. “Indians when sober may be managed, but with Indians drunk no one can predict the consequences,”

113 Bourke, Diaries, 88-91; Bourke, “Crook’s Campaign,” 142.
114 ARSW, 1874, 61. For army management of reservations see also Charles P. Elliott, “An Indian Reservation under General George Crook,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses; Davis, Truth about Geronimo.
115 Bourke, Diaries, 92; Bourke, On the Border, 17; Loring, “Report,” 189; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 84; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 87.
an officer stated. In their discourses army men made tiswin “a frightful intoxicant” and “a fearful sort of whiskey,” which supposedly produced “a drunk from which they [Apaches] scarcely recover in five days.” Army imagined that if allowed, the Apaches would “part with anything he may possess” to get tiswin and organize “drunken orgies” that would only result in fights and killings. Clearly, army men did not trust the Apaches to exercise self-control. Being oftentimes heavy drinkers themselves, army men forced temperance on the Apaches. Army’s logic held that it was necessary for the Apaches to refrain from drinking so that they might be able to rise in the hierarchies of civilization. In all, whites barely camouflaged their fears in the rhetoric of sobriety. Many recognized tiswin was merely a mildly intoxicating “light beer” that had to be consumed in excessive amounts to have any effect. Yet, for the officers it was the root of all evil, simply intolerable.

Rationing, much like the reorganizing of village space and the regulation of labor and cultural practices such as nose cutting and tiswin manufacture, functioned as another colonial instrument designed to alter Apache behavior. As Tim Rowse has suggested in his study of colonialism in Australia, rationing was a vehicle for surveying and controlling colonized peoples. The different goods and the ways they were distributed, Rowse writes, formed the relationship through which the forging of social regularities and routines often took place. As a rule, it was the Apaches who had to make the effort and arrive at the agency to receive the white man’s food. Apaches had to live close to the points of distribution to make the symbolic crossing to the military, wait where told, proceed in an order dictated by whites, and receive with gratitude what was given, after which they were allowed to disperse in the proximity of the rationing place. For example, rationing at Fort Apache in the early 1870s started in the morning as the Apaches had to gather near the post from all sections, each band seating themselves separately, men generally distinct from the women. Their appearance was still of their own choosing, perhaps reflecting conscious resistance to this colonial ordering. Officers counted each band and then distributed ration tickets, after which the 1,500 people present were admitted, in a line, to a small stockade where they received “their ration of corn in their blankets as it was scooped out to them” and a piece of beef.

Howard, My Life, 216, see also 182-183; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 97.

Carter, From Yorktown, 211, see also 242; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 87; Upham, “Incidents,” 91; Loring, “Report,” 193; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 50-51. Often Apache chiefs were held responsible that no tiswin was made. See ARSW, 1883, 172.

Rowse, White Flour, White Power, especially 1-10, 204-207.
Each Apache seemingly protested with remarks of “most obscene character” that they wanted more, and snatched any morsel they could put their hands on. In three hours all was over, and the people dispersed, the next rationing taking place in five days time.\footnote{Splitter, "Tour in Arizona," 86-87. At another time the Apaches were seated on the ground in the forest opening to wait patiently for the distribution of bred. See Howard, My Life, 165.}

On another occasion, an officer wrote that at the intervals of four days he was “to watch, feed, and regularly muster and count” the Apaches. Thus the Apaches were closely watched and made to perform the same rituals in intervals of few days. It was all ideally very official and rigid, which probably made it even more irritating an ordeal for the Apaches. The officer added that his “duty was conscientiously performed and duly certified to by official witnesses.”\footnote{Upham, "Incidents," 90.}

Some officers even strove to control how the Apaches used their rations. They suspected, for instance, that the Apaches used all their corn to make alcohol. Others felt that when reservation Apaches received “government bounty,” or, in other words, were fed by the expense of whites, they should be grateful and obedient.\footnote{Nickerson, "Major General,” 14; Miles, Personal Recollections, 342; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 39.}

Apaches were also forced to use a ration card, which functioned both as a form of surveillance and a symbol of status because one could not get food without it. The card was in fact the key to survival in the colonial world. When the Chiricahua leader Victorio was refused rations after patiently waiting in line, he confronted the reservation agent who had promised him food but failed to mention that he needed a ration card. The agent was persistent that the card was required, and that it would take a month to process it. When Victorio complained that a month is a long time without food, the agent refused to continue the conversation and ignored the Apache leader.\footnote{Ball, In the Days, 61-62.}

As in other, more recent, imperial missions, American invaders in the Southwest could not comprehend that someone would refuse to be “liberated.” To army minds the new regimes in the reservation and white tutelage meant the “liberation” of Apaches from their old habits and culture. The Apaches, army people felt, should show the army proper appreciation and gratitude. When the Apaches did not openly embrace this forced liberation, army people saw that it was the Apaches inherent “worthless” character that most hindered their progress, making stealing and war more congenial to
their natural instincts than farming or living in peace. Some argued that the Apaches remained “docile” only because of the heavy military presence. “Were the military removed they would immediately resume their well-known hostility to the whites,” one officer wrote. Logically, army people’s remedy for what they recognized as “Apache stubbornness” included tighter discipline, increased industry, and swift punishment for any Apache thought to resist white authority. Those Apaches who did not follow suit faced time in the guardhouse or something worse, like imprisonment outside the Southwest. For instance, Kaytennae, a Chihenne (Chiricahua) Apache, who, refusing to accept the new reservation order was labeled a troublemaker by the military. He faced a speedy sentencing to Alcatraz, a federal penitentiary outside San Francisco. Interestingly, when the army released Kaytennae after less than two years in the prison the officers represented his “reformation” as ideal. According to a high-ranking officer, Kaytennae, ”who less than two years ago was the worst Chiricahua of the whole lot, is now perfectly subdued…thoroughly reconstructed, [and] has rendered valuable assistance…His stay at Alcatraz has worked a complete reformation in his character. I have not a doubt that similar treatment will produce same results with the whole band.”

Some officers thought that continued conflicts with the Apaches during the late 1870s and early 1880s were the result of Apaches being given too much freedom on the reservations. White supervision had been purportedly too lenient. The blame supposedly rested on civilian agents. Army people characterized the best of the agents as ignorant men who did not understand their work or the Apaches and quickly grew disheartened, while the worst purportedly cheated, stole, abused, and starved the Apaches, and thus damaged all military efforts. Officers contemplated that the Apaches “innate desire to slay, pillage, steal, and create havoc generally” was only

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123 See ARSW, 1871, 78; Davis, “Difficulties of Indian Warfare,” 488-489; Parker, Old Army, 152; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 80-81; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 86.
124 Loring, “Report,” 185. See also ARSW, 1876, 100.
125 Crook, Resume of Operations, 10. See also Elliott, “Geronimo Campaign,” 427; Ball, In the Days, 162-167; Davis, Truth about Geronimo. In 1886 the reservation Chiricahuaas received “a somewhat similar treatment” as they, Kaytennae included, were removed to Florida as prisoners of war. This was in part because the army leaders were certain that the Chiricahuas not only showed no interest in improving themselves but also hindered the advancement of others. In truth, the vast majority of the Chiricahuas farmed and raised stock, and tried to make a living.
126 See, for example, Nickerson, “Major General,” 14; Carter, From Yorktown, 184-185, 210; Crook, Resume of Operations.
127 Corbusier, Soldier, 158-159; Bourke, “Crook’s Campaign,” 142; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 89; James Denver correspondence, Kautz letters, ASHS; Chaffee papers, ASHS.
further abetted by the robbery and mismanagement of the agents. Embittered and cynical, officers claimed that the entire government in Washington and the civilian population was ignorant about the Apaches. In this way members of the army tried to claim the right to manage the Apaches. They would have everybody to believe that only they knew the Apaches, and nobody else should interfere. Ambitious and often overzealous officers refused to listen to anybody else, including the Apaches, or to acknowledge that their actions might be insensitive or racist and damage Apache lives. Officers insisted that they were in the right when it came to defining the Apaches, or to fighting and governing them.

4.4.2 Abducting Apache Children

An even more direct method than reservation government for Apache “regeneration” was the abduction of Apache children. In a region where captivity raiding, exchange, and adoption had fundamentally shaped cross-cultural interactions for centuries, the army reinvented an established tradition. Although never large-scale, army people captured a number of Apache children. For instance, following a battle in 1868, Major Andrew Alexander took a teenage Apache girl to Camp McDowell. “She was a pretty little squaw so I sent down to the guard house and had her brought up, and she looked so intelligent that I concluded to keep her,” the major’s wife, Eveline Alexander, wrote. Immediately, Eveline started vigorously “civilizing” the frightened and confused girl, whose life had been turned upside down. She was taught to eat with knife and fork, to sew, and her hair was shingled to “improve her appearance.” Eveline bathed her personally so she might become a nurse for the Alexanders’ infant baby. Writing to her parents, who earlier had expressed great concern about the infant “falling into the hands of the Apaches,” Eveline declared that now the baby was “being rocked to sleep by a bona fide wild Apachee, who a week ago was roaming the mountains, guiltless of any other covering but her ‘maiden modesty.’” Eveline renamed the girl Patty, a “short for Apachee,” she explained, and trained her to become the family servant. Harsh discipline kept the girl in line. She “must learn to

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128 Gatewood, “Campaining,” 213. See also ARSW, 1870, 8-9; 1875, 122-123; 1877, 140-147; 1883, 159-170; 1884, 128-129.
129 Cruse, Apache Days, 38-41, 185-186, 204-206; Bourke, Diaries, 471-472.
obey me,” Eveline insisted, contemplating at one time the possibility of starving her to submission but eventually resorting to threats about sending her into the guardhouse. Apparently, the girl both accepted her new part in the colonial world and harbored silent resistance, as she later not only accompanied the Alexanders’ as “part of the family” to their estate in Willowbrook, New York, but rebelled against her captors by running off to marry a black soldier, much to Eveline’s dismay.131

Sometimes Apache children captured at skirmishes were made army troop’s “pets,” like one officer called them. He wrote that the 9 and 10 years old Apache youngsters that had been “adopted” by the troops at one army village were “never given any dinner until they had each first shot an arrow into the neck of an olive-bottle inserted into one of the adobe walls of the quartermaster’s corral.”132 In another case, an Apache boy first lived with the soldiers of the Sixth Cavalry, before at the age of fourteen he became a valet for two bachelor lieutenants. After they left the region, his new “owner” was the family of Major Biddle. The Biddles’ dressed the boy in white man’s clothes and made him work as the family’s house servant, until he enlisted as a “scout.” To the Biddles’ disappointment, the boy soon ran away, but made one final appearance at the family’s quarters, this time his face painted, hair matted with mud, and blanket around his shoulders. “He was just as much Indian as the others, who had never lived in a house or been with civilized people…There are too many generations of Indians back of them, and the few years of civilization are soon forgotten,” Mrs. Biddle bitterly wrote.133

Army visions called for the death of the warlike predator Apache army men and women had been so eager to imagine and the birth of new cloned-like copies of white people. Usually army people did not want to learn anything from the Apaches. Nor did they think the Apaches themselves knew what was best for them. Instead, being stubbornly captivated by their productions of Apache character as illogical, irrational, non-industrious, and incapable of self-government, white army people thought only they knew how to orchestrate Apache futures. Also, army people were convinced that modernization of Apache lives had to be forced on the Apaches if necessary. In the end,

131 Myres, "Evy Alexander,” 32-34.  
132 Bourke, On the Border, 40.  
133 Biddle, Reminiscences, 180-183. One enlisted man adopted and “systematically” educated two Apache boys, who nevertheless after more than six years wanted to return to live on the reservation with their people. Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 89-91, 122-127.
Apaches did much more than just survive this colonial “regeneration” or “liberation.” Like the Biddle’s Apache boy or Eveline Alexander’s servant girl, they orchestrated a multifaceted and viable resistance, seeking ways to retain their identity as Apaches and refusing to transform themselves into poor clones of the whites. On the reservations, Apaches could, for example, avoid work imposed upon them, work slowly or carelessly, try to disrupt the rationing process, or drink tiswin in secret. They carved space in the limited opportunities of the reservation, distancing themselves from white administrators, and silently rejected colonial policies even when nominally accepting their premises when, for example, converting to Christianity or laboring in the colonial army. The many modes of colonial resistance went largely unnoticed by whites. They only saw the cutting of noses of adulterous wives, tiswin drunks, and open vocal defiance to white authority. In the end, colonial government was unable to fully penetrate and destroy Apache identity and desire for self-rule; their cultural traditions and ceremonies, language, social norms, and economic cycles reformed and retained validity to the twentieth-century and beyond.

4.5 Colonial Knowledge and Apache History

In the 1970s, almost one hundred years after the military panicked at Cloverdale, a noted historian Donald E. Worcester wrote the following: “Life was a daily battle for survival, a grim contest with a hostile environment and savage predators both animal and human. Rugged mountains and endless desert, this was Apacheland, and the Apache were truly products of their brutal environment…completely at home in any part of that tortured land: they suffered hunger and thirst and extremes of heat and cold without complaint. They saw an enemy in every stranger; they trusted no one outside the band…A warrior people, Apaches were born and reared for combat.” Worcester’s one-dimensional description of Apaches is not by any means exceptional among scholarly texts. In fact, a closer examination makes it seem rather typical. For example, a history of New Mexico written also in the 1970s insists that “nomadism was in their [Apaches] blood, and once they acquired the horse and a new mobility, soft words of missionaries or the feeble efforts of Spain’s scant soldierly could do little to check their

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134 For Apache resistance on the reservations, see, for example, Watt, Don’t Let the Sun; Ball, Indeh; Ball, In the Days; Merritt, “Incidents,” 157-158; Davis, Truth about Geronimo; Davis, “Difficulties of Indian Warfare,” 488-489.

predatory ways.”

Also, in what is regarded as a classic study of the Southwest, historian Howard Lamar explains that the Apaches represented a “permanent, hostile Indian population” and an “Indian problem.” From the days of first Spanish arrivals, Lamar writes, Apaches had made “every generation of settlers” know “the fear, or the harassment, of savage Indian warfare.” Lamar also refers to the Apaches as “natural raiders” and “a constant terror to white colonists.”

The eminent historian of U.S.-Apache wars, Dan L. Thrapp, saw that “the tribes of Apacheria were a product of their habitat, harsh, cruel, and pitiless.” Even a more current work by historian Edwin Sweeney still claims that “the Apaches were a warlike and nomadic people who roamed the Southwest.”

The above quotes from standard works on Southwest and Apache history written between the 1960s and 1990s show how terribly one-sided, and obviously flawed, western understanding of the Apaches remains. The studies also demonstrate how Apache images are still firmly connected to the knowledge the colonizers produced in the 1800s. In fact it seems as if generations of historians have constructed their histories of Apaches and U.S.-Apache wars by uncritically copying and recycling white army people’s representations of the Apaches, accepting subjective army writings as the truth. There at least is no shortage of similarities between army texts and historical studies. For instance, in both army writings and scholarship the Apaches aimlessly “roam” as nomads and, importantly, hold the role of the aggressors. Although some scholars, like army men, recognize white greed and rivalries between federal branches, they still often place the blame for the U.S.-Apache wars on the warlike character of the Apaches. The stereotypical Apache in much of scholarship remains a guerrilla warrior; cunning, cruel, and almost animal-like savage naturally inclined to war and violence just like the white army people portrayed him. In most works Apaches come out as predators and as perpetrators of constant terror. Furthermore, like white army men, some historians single out the Chiricahuas, labeling them as “the fiercest” and most “warlike” of the Apache tribes.

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Even the best biographies of Apache leaders that aim for a “balanced perspective” tend to echo the premises of colonial knowledge. For instance, in his portrayal of Cochise, Edwin Sweeney makes the Chiricahua leader a war machine whose life was defined by constant raiding and pillaging, and little else. For Sweeney, Cochise appears more as the aggressor than the aggressed. Sweeney also depicts Cochise as the supreme “fighting Apache,” courageous and wise, but also as a man who possessed “uncompromising” and “fierce and abiding hatred” towards whites and Mexicans. Cochise, Sweeney maintains, “showed no mercy to his enemies, who, if captured, were tortured to death in a slow, painful, and inhumane way.” Sweeney even states that Cochise “hated Americans…more fanatically than any other Apache. It mattered little that only a few whites had actually wronged him; he hated them all.” There seems to be little historical evidence to support these kinds of broad generalizations. War was definitely intense and harsh sometimes, but the Apaches were, for instance, also known to spare their enemies and take captives. It is also known that some whites rode among the Chiricahuas. Also, in Sweeney’s account the big picture, the U.S. aggression on other people’s lands, gets overshadowed by the seemingly constant Apache raiding.  

It is also interesting to note that those Apaches exhibiting leadership on the reservations or seeking peaceful alliances with the Americans have never inspired much interest in historical studies or from the army people. Western interest does not seem to reach Apaches at peace.  

Overall, it is painfully obvious that many historians, consciously or not, seem to have sided with the army, approaching the U.S.-Apache wars from the perspective of the colonizers. One standard work makes the brutal Tonto basin campaign a great success and praises it as “classic in conception, almost flawless in execution, and decisive in results.” Elsewhere in the same study the author seems to regret that the soldiers in the late 1860s were not able to inflict enough damage on the Apaches. Timothy Braatz accurately noted: “when the military historians are critical of the soldiering, it is often for not being brutal enough.” One historian, for instance, scolded

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140 Sweeney, *Cochise*, xiv, xx-xxiii, 166, see also 265, 366. Sweeney also refers to the conflicts in the 1860s as “Cochise wars” and the 1870s and 1880s as “Victorio and Geronimo wars,” thus hiding U.S. quilt and participation.

141 There seems to exist biographies of only those Apache men whom the western world has recognized as leaders of armed resistance against the white Americans. See Sweeney, *Cochise*; Kathleen P. Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Angie Debo, *Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Kraft, *Gatewood & Geronimo*.

officers “for wasting their time” while their subordinates “showed commendable zeal” in killing “savages.”

Furthermore, historians have adopted the army’s racialized vocabulary. Much of the terminology scholars have used to describe the army, the Apaches and their activities continues to be taken directly from the army texts. Historians, for instance, discuss the “Apache problem” or the “Apache threat” when referring to U.S. conquest of the Southwest. However, there is no “army problem” in these studies. Scholars also write that the Apaches “pillaged and murdered,” “terrorized,” and “rampaged,” or that they “were elusive and cunning,” “vicious,” and “a menace” “spreading terror and destruction.” Some claim that the Apaches “engaged in wild and tenacious rebellion.” In many studies the Apaches also go “on the warpath.”

On the other hand, in the same studies the army is treated very differently. It never “terrorized” or was a “menace.” Instead, the army “made campaigns,” “went into action,” or “achieved triumphant military success.” The army also had “punitive commands,” “expeditions,” or “efforts,” and “exhausting chases,” where it “hunted the renegades,” or “operated” against the Apaches. It is also regrettable that the term “hostile,” applied by white army people to describe all Apaches not succumbing to U.S. control, abounds in historical scholarship. Some of the older studies, especially, apply the term frequently when referring to free Apaches, but it is sometimes used in more recent works as well. For example, Sweeney’s biography of Cochise, published in 1991, repeatedly refers to Cochise and his group as “hostiles.” Sweeney also divides the Apaches into the “incorrigible,” “unpacified” and “wild” and the “tame” and “friendly.” From these historians one could

143 Braatz, Surviving Conquest, 16. The example is from Ogle, Federal Control, 67.
144 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 169, 375.
146 See, for example, Utley, Frontier Regulars, 196-198, 375; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 115, 246; Leiker, Racial Borders, 49, 59; Roberts, Once They Moved Like the Wind, 133, 179; Don Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 14.
first of all ask “hostile to whom?” How can one label a group of people “hostile” and pretend to write a balanced and unbiased history of them? When using the term “hostile” to describe free Apaches historians not only repeat colonial rhetoric but take the side of the colonizers. It is telling that no historical study describes white Americans as “hostile” towards the indigenous peoples, not to mention labels whites as “hostiles” as a people. 147

Because of their uncritical use of colonial knowledge historians have shied away from seeing the Apaches as fully human. It seems as if only a few scholars who have written of U.S.-indigenous wars in Arizona and New Mexico, most notably Timothy Braatz, Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, and Victoria Smith, try to understand the indigenous perspective and question what right the United States had in occupying other people’s lands in the Southwest. Colwell-Chanthaphonh is also among the few who are critical towards how Apache history has been constructed. 148 For more balanced scholarship historians need to try to understand the Apache perspectives and motivations and stop recycling the knowledge and terminology produced by the colonizers. Scholars must place the colonizers’ texts under critical scrutiny and interrogate them as time-, place-, race-, and class-specific subjective colonial knowledge. They must also try to recover the subaltern voice. Apache men and women were active decision-makers, with a full range of emotions and motivations. This should be evident to all historians, but too often seems not to be. Apaches came from a rich and complex culture, cared deeply for their homes and families, and envisioned geopolitical and economic strategies while trying to maintain their power and survive in the face of U.S. invasion. Historians must move beyond colonial knowledge in order to avoid repeating the stereotypical Apache in one form or another. To make this all possible

147 Sweeney, Cochise, 242-243, 266, 270. For the careless use of the term “hostile,” see, among others, Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, 168-169, 183; Porter, Paper Medicine Man, 9-11, 19; Simmons, Massacre on the Lordsburg Road, 52; Robinson, General Crook, 105, 135, 275-277; Leiker, Racial Borders, 51; Debo, Geronimo, 80, 145; Hatfield, Chasing Shadows, xi, 11, 17, 19, 22, 58; Rickey, Forty Miles, 10-11, 14-15, 214; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 360, 375, 381, 385, 389; Worcester, Apaches, 144, 146, 297; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 7, 102, 106, 239; David D. Smits, “Fighting Fire with Fire: The Frontier Army’s Use of Indian Scouts and Allies in the Trans-Mississippi Campaigns, 1860-1890,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 22 (1998), 74. Smits also repeatedly labels those indigenous men who worked in or with the army as “friendlies.” As a rule, the pages mentioned here offer only a small fraction of the times the label “hostiles” appears in these works.

historians must at first demonstrate a willingness to understand the U.S. invasion of the Southwest “as the imperialist conquest that it was.”

**Conclusion: The Racial Other**

The army’s making of the Apaches can be viewed as part of the global process of pushing indigenous peoples to the margins so that western capitalistic dominance of the world can be established. Army representations and actions provide an example of how enemies were made and dealt with during long-lasting colonial wars. They also show how a group of colonizers hammered out their visions of humanity in a particular colonial setting; how the colonizers established and categorized difference between themselves and those people they regarded as the enemy in order to gain colonial authority. Through both their discourses and actions white army people sought colonial authority over the Apaches; they wanted to gain military power and, in conjunction, also the power to determine what the Apaches were all about.

The army’s central mission in the Southwest was to gain the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime and in army people’s minds the Apaches represented competition. On one level white army people seemed confident that Apaches represented an inferior uncivilized foe destined to step aside in front of a supposedly more advanced white civilization. On the other hand, however, white army people often viewed the Apaches as a dangerous threat. Whites not only feared the Apaches but recognized that they had the potential to question the white soldiers’ honor and masculinity and make the whites seem militarily impotent. Difficulties in colonial warfare increased the frustration, hatred, and fear among white officers and soldiers, which in turn contributed to the viciousness of the Apache-imagery they produced. Army discourses of the “submissive” and “friendly” Akimel O’odham certainly prove how white army people represented very differently those indigenous groups whom they did not fear or view as a threat. In contrast to Akimel O’odham, Apache men in army texts were as a rule predatory and inclined for murder, cruelty, and treachery, and Apache women were undesirable victims of their men’s tyranny. Army men and women recognized few individual differences, but treated Apaches as a mass of inferiors with unflattering traits and characteristics. As racial and cultural others, binary opposites of whiteness and civilization, Apaches were represented as a distinct and inferior race who

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hated the whites and had constructed a reign of terror. All free Apaches the army labeled “hostiles,” which made them nineteenth-century “terrorists” and colonial villains. In army eyes, the Apaches constituted a constant threat to civilization and freedom, and supposedly listened only to force and deserved to be punished. Eventually army discourses and actions undermined not only Apache rule, but also their humanity. Army visions of Apaches showed very little respect for Apache culture or lives, no desire to listen to or understand Apache motivations. Most white army people represented that the Apaches murdered and pillaged because it was in their nature. It is difficult to detect in army narratives any notion that the Apaches were fully human, active choice-makers basing their actions on particular geopolitical and social realities or strategies that reflected specific cultural or individual motivations.

“The most crucial development” of conquest, according to historian David G. Gutierrez, was the “construction of elaborate set of rationales which are designed to explain why one group has conquered another.”150 When making the Apaches inferior and brutal bloodthirsty extremists, white army people wanted to justify army actions and establish why the Apaches’ geopolitical rule rested on horrendous foundations. Army texts made it appear that because of the nature of Apache rule and the character of the Apaches the U.S. invasion was neither unjust or harmful but honorable and right, that colonial aggression and dominance was in fact liberation and betterment, a necessity where the whole region, eventually even the Apache survivors, were saved from the darkness of a destructive Apache rule. In army texts Apaches became the group against which the “innocence” and “good intentions” of white army people could be contrasted. White army people made colonial aggression appear more justifiable, intelligible, less shameful, and fundamentally less violent than it in reality was. In the end, the legitimacy of army actions, whether armed violence or reservation “regeneration,” rested on the artificial distinctiveness of Apaches the army’s subjective discourses had produced. In reality, the colonial knowledge army men and women produced of the Apaches amounted to little more than colonial fiction, or fevered imaginations, woven together to justify the colonization of free Apaches and their lands. In hindsight the Apache case seems to confirm that the knowledge produced by the colonizers continues to hold a strong influence even today. The ahistorical stereotype of the Apaches is one of the legacies of conquest. The Apaches, perhaps more than any

other indigenous group in North America, still symbolize the “wildness,” “fierceness,”
and “cunning” of indigenous peoples.

For the army community the Apache enemy proved important in terms of
identity-production. It is notable that even if not all white military people built exactly
similar stories of the Apaches, the differences tended to be minor. By representing
Apaches as the racial other, all white army people hoped to strengthen their own
position and the status of whiteness in the colonial hierarchies, reducing the Apaches to
the lowest rungs and making whiteness signify superiority and privilege. A common
enemy also brought cohesion and unity inside the army community. As they all chose to
single out the Apaches as a distinct race by producing similar discourses, white army
people emphasized their own collective unity and downplayed class difference.
Chapter 5
“The Devil’s Garden” or “Our Great Western Empire”: White Army Men and Women and the Place Facing Colonialism

“One part of the desert…is called ‘The Devil’s Garden,’ from its denser growth of all thorny varieties of the cactus and other prickly shrubs, making it difficult to pass. We begin to think the name might be applied with much propriety to almost the whole territory.”¹ - “Sabre,” Paymaster, U.S. Army

“Arizona was then [1875] out of the world and was thought to be a country fit only for the Apache to live in. The Almighty made it last and didn’t have much material left.”²-Fanny Corbusier, officer’s wife

Visiting Clifton, an Arizona mining town, Lieutenant John Bigelow seriously pondered whether he should go without supper when his only choice to get one was to enter “a typical mining town amusement hall.” Bigelow felt most uncomfortable dining in such an establishment filled with Mexicans, Americans, Irish, Germans, and others gathered principally around the bar, playing billiards, engaged in heated conversations, or enjoying the square and round dances with themselves or in the company of lewd women. “I took in the animated scene,” he wrote nervously, still harboring a quick exit. Luckily Bigelow was shortly introduced to “a couple of well-dressed gentlemen” of which one was the governor of the territory. That eased his nervousness, the restaurant having not only customers from the respectable white middle-class but also a separate space reserved for them. “I had no further concern as to the propriety of my situation,” Bigelow concluded, being now able to enjoy his evening in the company of respectable men.³

Not far from Clifton, the recently established Southern Pacific Railroad whistlestop and cattle shipping center Maley, Arizona, was renamed in 1880 in honor of Brevet Major-General Orlando B. Willcox, the commander of U.S. troops in Arizona. Celebrating the first white child born in town Willcox had sent a silver cup with his initials to the parents in hopes that the boy be named after him. As a result not only the boy but the whole town got the general’s name. On board the first train to Willcox the

general received a standing ovation from an enthusiastic crowd, who shouted the town’s new name “Willcox, Willcox!” Although all the attention undoubtedly nourished the general’s self-esteem and his sense of status, it was still a rather dubious honor that a town like Maley was named after him. After all, at this time Maley, like Clifton, was no town for white middle-class tastes. For one thing, although recently penetrated by the railroad, it was still seemingly at the mercy of an inhospitable and uncontrollable environment and thus poorly reflected civilization’s triumph over nature. Not only did hard winds cover the town’s streets and houses with alkali and dust, but at times, the violent wind could all of a sudden turn into an equally aggressive cloudburst, after which, a soldier wrote, “it was water, water, everywhere” as the usually dry surroundings turned into a veritable lake. Not only this, but, as in Clifton, the social scene was not yet controlled by middle-class rules and values. Anton Mazzanovich, an Austrian-born enlisted man, explained that Willcox was filled with gambling joints, saloons, and dance halls that were regularly packed with Chinese, white cowboys, Mexicans, Indians, and black and white soldiers. Unlike the officers, soldiers like Mazzanovich seemed to enjoy the atmosphere. “Here was the real thing,” Mazzanovich wrote of the vibrant, free, and fun-loving town where enlisted men could indulge in gambling and the enjoyment of “tarantula juice” free from the restraints of white middle-class control so pervasive inside the army villages.

Concentrating on the patterns of representations and knowledge production, this chapter continues to chart white army people’s imperial meaning-making and relationship to the colonial terrain outside the army villages. It investigates how officers, their wives, and white soldiers represented southern Arizona and New Mexico past, present, and futures; how they made the region fit their norms and agendas. First, the discussion centers on how army men and women produced the Southwest landscapes. How did they experience the colonial environment, represent it, adjust to its demands, and claim control and superiority over it? The second part describes how the army people classified and described the white and Hispanic peoples and settlements. How they assessed the region’s social makeup in relation to incorporation? The third and forth part turn to the images army men and women produced of the region as a whole? Had the place potential for white colonization? The final section analyzes how

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army people represented their own role in enabling the possible futures of the Southwest. How they constructed their own mission and its meaning and value, and built collective self-importance. All along the purpose is to gain a fuller understanding of white army people’s identity and relationship to the place facing colonialism. This connection was fundamentally about power and difference manifested through class and race. It was also of the ability to claim the historical truth for the discourses produced by the army. White army people did not set out to write booster literature or to enhance any myth of the West. Like in their travel writings or when discussing the Apaches, they strived to establish the truth and their own importance.

In western history investigations of image-production have applied terms such as myth-making, boosterism, or the invention of tradition to describe the practice. Myth-making is often connected to popular culture and representations of the West in shows, arts, movies, and literary fiction. Boosterism sold promises of prosperous places and futures and was usually guided by economic motives. In a narrow sense it applies to efforts of literature that sought to promote a specific place in order to attract people - settlers or tourists - and/or investments into that area. Invention of tradition is linked with cultural traditions, the creation of common stories and unifying heritage for certain nation, region, or ethnic group. These traditions get often performed and enforced through public or private remembering and celebrations.⁵ Imperial meaning-making is a connected genre, another narrative of historical facts used for subjective purposes that tries to establish the character of a place and people, and to say what has happened and is happening, and what it all means. Meaning-making can be seen as an attempt of direct access to colonial authority and power by the people somehow involved in the enforcement or execution of the colonial invasion. It was the way the colonizers produced themselves and the places and peoples they encountered with the needs of the colonizers in mind. Whereas myths, boosterism and invention of tradition celebrated certain “real” or “invented” aspects of a place or cultural heritage, and tended to be positive (often overtly so) in tone, meaning-making was harsh, condemning, and critical if that suited the agendas of the colonizers who produced the stories and images. For example, in booster literature the landscape, wherever it happened to be, was

incomparably good, but never foreign or unusual. In meaning-making this was not the case as the investigation of the army texts proves.

Historians of the Southwest have usually concentrated on how during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century certain images and stories of north-central New Mexico (especially Santa Fe and the Pueblos) produced a specific regional multicultural narrative designed, in part, to attract settlers and tourists. Promotion and image-making pertaining to southern Arizona and New Mexico has received less scholarly attention. Also, army men and women have rarely been considered as a group of image-makers. Scholars probably still erroneously cling to perceptions of officers and soldiers as men of “action” engaged solely in Indian warfare and isolated from the western society, not having anything to say about it.

5.1 “Lost in Apacheria”: The Landscapes

Army men familiarized themselves with southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes most intimately when engaged in military patrolling and campaigns demanded by army’s mission of conquest. Expected to wrestle the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime, army men could not remain secluded in their own villages, but had to establish presence in the “wilderness” by taking the war to the home ground of the indigenous people. “In the field” army people often judged and evaluated the land not only in terms of practical movement but also possible future use. As discussed in previous chapters, the search for the enemy and travel to southern Arizona and New Mexico proved difficult and unpleasant for the unaccustomed invaders. It was the same with movement in general. White army men often found themselves loathing the landscapes, uncertain of the way, and mentally alienated from their surroundings. They were lost in Apacheria.

In 1871, Arizona’s new military commander Lieutenant-Colonel George Crook and his party toured Arizona. On their way from Camp Apache to Camp Verde they lost the trail, which they had been assured existed, in the Mogollon Rim. They experienced

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6 Wrobel, Promised Lands, 41.
7 See, for example, Victoria E. Dye, All Aboard for Santa Fe: Railway Promotion of the Southwest, 1890s to 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005); Marta Weigle & Barbara A. Babcock, eds., The Great Southwest of the Fred Harvey Company (Phoenix: The Heard Museum, 1996); Wilson, Myth of Santa Fe.
8 It is telling of the way scholarly mainstream isolates army people that a recent study of Germans in New Mexico fails to include perhaps the largest occupational group of Germans in the area; the U.S. Army enlisted men. See Tomas Jaehn, Germans in the Southwest, 1850-1920 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005).
severe difficulties in a country cut up by ridges and canyons. Luckily a thunderstorm solved their water problem and eventually the outfit managed to stumble on a trail. After some further off-road traveling, they located their destination exhausted and bewildered by the landscapes of their new colonial home.\(^9\) Although the route was soon dubbed “Crook’s Trail” as a statement to army’s symbolic conquest and possession of the wilderness, another army group going the opposite direction three years later nevertheless experienced some difficulties. This time one lieutenant failed to return to camp after being out shooting turkeys. A frantic hunt was organized for the missing officer, but when search party after another returned with no news the situation began to look desperate. Luckily the lieutenant was finally found. Unaccustomed to the country he had carelessly walked directly over the edge of a chasm and fallen into a ravine twisting his ankle. Having only one shot left in his rifle, exhausted and hurt, he had laid “helpless in the wild fastnesses of the mountains,” as Martha Summerhayes, an officer’s wife who was with the party, wrote. She felt it had been a very precarious situation as the place was so “extremely dangerous.”\(^10\)

Army people dubbed different places in southern Arizona and New Mexico as “dangerous” in part because they lacked “signs of civilized regions,” meaning mainly roads the army could judge as “proper.” Maps, the army claimed, also either did not exist or they all proved wrong. Writing of the situation in the early 1880s, Lieutenant Thomas Cruse states that there was still, in the era of railroads, hundreds of miles “hitherto absolutely unknown.” Cruse dubbed those sections “wild” and “almost terra incognita to any but the Indians. A few important points, such as springs and water holes and peaks, were known to a few hardy frontiersmen and Army men, but often their situation was conjectural, indefinite.” Cruse also complained that sometimes when enemy movement was reported near some ranch or creek, there was absolutely nothing to show where such places were or how the troops would get there.\(^11\)

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\(^10\) Martha Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona: Recollections of the Army Life of a New England Woman* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 74-75, see also 213-218 for difficulties in finding the right road on another instance. Besides “Crook’s Trail,” the army took control of mountains and springs by naming them. See Gustav van Hemert Schneider papers, box 2, file 16, Joseph P. Widney letters, January 8, 1868, ASHS; Frank Reeve, ed., “Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier’s Memoirs.” *New Mexico Historical Review* 25 (1950), 123.

In general, the two parties on “Crook’s Trail” and Lieutenant Cruse were no exceptions. In fact it was rather common that situations arose when officers had to acknowledge that “no one knew anything about the country we were in.” Of course not all army patrols were lost all the time, but it is evident that white army people’s knowledge of the terrain remained imperfect and partial at best all the way the 1880s. The result was that the army could not locate the places it sought and frequently lost its way. This maddened many and evidently shaped the nature and tone of their representations. Not only was movement in practice burdensome but many realized it was difficult to establish army control over the colonial landscapes or to claim superiority over their surroundings when the soldiers obviously had difficulties in just moving about. Although some scholars claim otherwise, white army men often did not adjust to the demands of the natural geography of the Southwest. Instead, to mask their unfamiliarity and occasional sheer helplessness, they represented that the territory not only lacked proper maps or roads and was thus an “unknown country,” but that the landscapes were profoundly inhospitable, dangerous, wild, and treacherous as to be completely unsuitable for the civilized campaigner. Thus, in army eyes “the problem” was with the landscapes not with the army. Marking the landscapes abnormal and uncivilized, a terrain defined by absence and difficulties, helped army people to gain symbolic superiority over them. Like during their journeys to the Southwest, the army again approached the landscapes increasingly in terms of confrontation and contest. Army men made themselves the “victims” who had entered a treacherous terrain of extremes. In a situation where any movement was portrayed as an ordeal, a test of strength, endurance, and character, successful army movement in itself became to signify civilization’s conquest of the savage wilderness.

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“We had struck into the wilderness, and with no trails or roads to follow, we took our way guided by the distant mountains, or by the points of the compass,” wrote Captain Joseph Sladen when on his way to negotiations with the Chiricahua Apaches in 1872. Sladen’s commanding officer referred the paths they had to take as “ugly and often fear-inspiring.” Others agreed. Army men and women liked to write about their trials on the rough off-road paths as they pushed through the “uncivilized” landscapes. They encountered “woods and thickets” and “prickly shrubs,” canyons “wild, jagged, and precipitous,” or lava boulders and volcanic rock with keen and sharp edges. Some negotiated crumbling alkali flats where clouds of choking dust surrounded everyone foolish enough to enter. Others claimed to struggle through “almost impassable” trails among “numberless” buttes and “rugged” mountain crags, while still others were forced to climb up and down dangerous high mesas, hills, and mountains for several nights, battered, bruised, and thirsty. As movement amounted to a heroic ordeal, a typical day was something like an “interminable, heart-breaking, rock-climbing struggle,” in the words of an officer.

When the landscapes in army discourses offered an entire arsenal of rough, dangerous, and difficult terrain, and little else, it is easy to see that in army eyes the colony was not yet subject to human control. Army stories convey a clear message: southern Arizona and New Mexico looked rather unpromising for white futures in their present condition. What was especially worrisome was that the region seemed destitute of water, which was important not only in terms of personal survival but also for building civilization. No water equaled no civilization. The necessity to find water, rather than best roads, enemy signs, or rumors of enemy activity, many times determined the phase and direction of military movement. Tellingly, when stumbling on water, accidentally or not, soldiers often preferred to stay put until at least the next morning rather than continue. One soldier proclaimed that “All I care for is water. If we have plenty of that I am all right.”

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where the soldiers expected, but water found was also usually categorized as of inferior quality, “dirty” and undrinkable, filled with alkali and sulphur.  

For the army, water, like the landscapes in general, proved uncontrollable. Some troops were forced to dig for water while others had to buy it from civilians. Thirsty soldiers could offer a month’s pay or all they had for just one swallow. It was not unheard of that army columns had to go without water from twenty-four to thirty-eight hours. According to one witness, there were “terrible marches where men maddened with thirst would open their own veins and drink their own blood.” One time a column traversing the edge of the Florida Mountains in New Mexico in search of Apaches was forced to skip rest after coming upon an empty water source. Continuing onwards, the troop examined every ravine and canon, but found nothing. After a while things began to get bad. Men’s lips cracked and blood oozed out, some became unable to articulate, turning delirious, and throwing themselves on the ground. There were those who tried to find shade by sticking their heads under small bushes. The men in best condition traveled ahead in search of water, but returned empty handed. Discipline and order was now gone as men started to collapse and wander out on their own. Then, one soldier luckily struck water, which saved the column from exhaustion and death. All were not as lucky as this troop, as men sometimes perished from lack of water. For example, while chasing a group of Mescalero Apaches, one lieutenant became lost and wandered for more than 40 hours without water. He was found alive but died soon afterward.

In army texts, southern Arizona and New Mexico was also marked by exotic and supposedly vicious wildlife: the landscapes were represented as the domain of tarantula, scorpions, centipedes, Gila monsters, and rattlesnakes. Again the army saw things through the specters of danger and struggle, and again it seems that the army tried to convince everybody that the colonial environment truly was utterly dangerous and thus worthless in its present state. A common trend in army discourses is to represent insects

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18 Joseph Corson reminiscences, University of Arizona, Special Collections (hereafter UASP); Carroll, *Papers*, 249; Gatewood, “Campaigning,” 219-223.


and reptiles violating army people’s personal sphere, entering their blankets on the ground or threatening their bodies suddenly and without warning. Rattlesnakes especially were used as symbols of the repulsive and treacherous nature of the colonial environment. In one case, an army wife on her way from Camp Thomas to a camping site in the mountains witnessed harmless rabbits, goats, quail by the hundreds, horned frogs, and a hedgehog, but gave most attention to dangerous tarantulas and rattlesnakes. The latter caused commotion as they invaded the road “to resist,” she wrote, the party’s advancement. Against the rattlesnakes “we had a regular fight,” she concluded.

In army stories the sun itself got portrayed as uncontrollable and dangerous. It was “pitiless,” and the heat it caused “frightful” and “insufferable.” Sun made the days “intensively hot,” “boiling hot,” or “frightfully hot,” army men and women wrote. The sun’s heat, only further establishing the unpleasant and unwelcoming character of the region, became one of the central symbols of the area and the subject of countless stories. For instance, one army surgeon wrote that the heat was such that men could not touch stones if exposed to the sun, or chisels or anything of steel to open ammunition boxes, and so had to open the boxes by dropping them on sharp rocks.

Numerous army people wanted nothing to do with the Southwest. In a letter back home, one army surgeon complained that getting around in the Southwest proved “the roughest life I ever saw, and as soon as I can get out of it, I think I will…I have always had a desire to see frontier life, to see the great west—to see the Indians and the Indian


25 Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 70. Although heat was what most wrote of, some also pointed to other extremes in the weather when discussing harsh and unpleasant winter conditions of knee-deep snow, icy roads, and cold bitter winds. See Spliter, “Tour in Arizona,” 87-90; Bourke, Diaries, 66. For winter freeze and wind, see also Schneider papers, box 2, file 16, Widney letters, January 8, 1868 and January 9, 1868, ASHS; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 48, 208.
fights. I have seen the west and all the frontier life I care to see, but the chances are that
I will see more before I leave Arizona.” Resorting to irony, this officer also suggested
an alternative for the Southwest landscapes: “I would much prefer a feather bed.”26
Trying also to approach the situation with humor one captain remarked that because of
the tough landscapes the Cavalry in the Southwest was reduced to a corps “in which you
walk, have the privilege of helping your horse, he in turn carrying your saddle.”27
Others found the situation less funny. They wrote that it was usual that men “cursed the
land” when traversing forward.28 For some, movement was to be avoided if possible.
Inside this region “one passes from one extreme to the other but would prefer rather to
remain in the worst than encounter the torture of a journey over the miles on miles of
confused and jumbled masses of rocky mountain peaks to reach the better,” one officer
wrote.29 In an effort to win sympathy and to further differentiate the region both the
officers and enlisted men characterized their challenges so extraordinary that no
outsider could understand them. “Those who have never traveled through this region,
with its high mountain ranges, deep rocky canyons, and wide sandy plains, will fail to
comprehend the trials, hardships, and annoyances which the troops are required to
undergo.” Army personnel were convinced that people “in the states” could not believe
that such mountains even existed or that they were in any way passable.30

As seen, in army discourses southern Arizona and New Mexico was a wild
landscape unaltered by human hand. Although a few observers pointed out that some
sections could be suitable for farming or ranching, especially if irrigated, many army
people were not too optimistic that the Southwest landscapes in their present condition
would prove attractive for agriculture or other “civilized” industries, excepting perhaps
mining. The quantity and quality of trees canceled out forestry in army minds. It was the
“inferior cacti, low mesquite bushes, and similar shrubs,” the only things “hard enough
to survive” that dominated the purportedly unforgiving environment.31 Not only did the

26 Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 37-40, 47.
30 James S. Pettit, “Apache Campaign Notes, 1886,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 532-533; Anson Mills, My
Story (Washington D.C.: Published by the author, 1918), 148. See also Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 206-
207, 210; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 44; Mehren, “Scouting for Mescaleros,” especially 184; Carter,
From Yorktown, 192.
31 See Parker, Annals, 5; Sandra L. Myres, ed., “Evy Alexander: The Colonel’s Lady at McDowell,”
Montana: Magazine of Western History 24 (Summer 1974), 34; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 75; Grierson,
“Journal,” 26. For more optimistic evaluations of the land, see John H. Marion, Notes of Travel Through
the Territory of Arizona (Prescott: Office of the Arizona Miner, 1870).
trees and grasses lack economic potential in army texts, but their everyday use was presented as difficult at best. The Mesquite was unconquerable for axes but not to crowbars, whereas “no fire could burn” the Palo Verde, the army argued. The Galleta grass was always mowed with a heavy hoe instead of a scythe, and its “thorns wreaked havoc” on animals and men. In fact, everything growing on the ground seemingly had uninviting long thorns, as sharp as needles.32

In addition, army people seldom praised the fertility of the soil. Instead, all flat land was represented as nothing but sand plains plagued by “terrible sandstorms” and almost destitute of water.33 The region’s rivers the army represented as either empty dried stretches of sand, and thus of no use, or as extremely uncontrollable and treacherous “raging torrents,” with swift currents and rapidly rising surfaces. One observer saw the Rio Grande as a strange, treacherous, and fearful river.34 Irrigation could prove difficult and rainfall in itself was far from ideal for farming. Rain was not only scarce, but violent. Lieutenant Frederick Phelps was stunned to discover that the whole cemetery at Fort Union vanished after a cloudburst sent waves of water into the valley where it was located. The water caused a hillside to slide into the valley, and the graves, including the family of Phelps, were buried under twelve feet of sand and rock.35

Some became convinced the landscapes were in fact cursed. One officer’s wife remarked that the country she was in “was as silent as the sentinel. There was something appalling in the grandeur of the scenery…a sea of mighty mountains…Everything was of a somber hue. It seemed as if the Creator had cursed the country. Even the lizards and horned toads, the only living creatures, were like the country gray and bloodless.”36 Another observer considered the whole region “a ‘hell of a country’ in the truest sense of the word,” while an army paymaster traversing from one army village to

32 Nickerson, ”Major General,” 14; Carr, ”Days of the Empire,” 25.
33 Dinges ”New York Private,” 57. For sandstorms, see Mills, My Story, 189; Grierson, “Journal,” 35.
34 For Rio Grande, see Mrs. Orseminus Bronson Boyd, Cavalry Life in Tent and Field (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 160-161. For other rivers, see Carter, From Yorktown, 197-199; Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 83; Grierson, “Journal,” 12; Corbusier, Recollections, 55-56.
35 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 187-188. For an incident when an officer’s wife and child were swept away during a storm, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 197. For aggressive cloudbursts, see John G. Bourke, On the Border with Crook (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 41-42; Ellen McGowan Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1907), 204-205; Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 80, 93; Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 11.
36 Cochran, Poste, 61.
the next dubbed Arizona as the “Devil’s Garden,” and an army surgeon’s wife was certain that “the Almighty made” the region “last and didn’t have much material left.”

Rarely did white army people paint southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes as worthy living environments for whites. Although some wrote of the region’s tremendous variation in climate in a positive light, admired some heavily wooded mountain streams, dark pine forests, or isolated fertile valleys, or mentioned “the peculiar and strange” beauty of the desert, they always remained a small minority in army texts. Captain John G. Bourke offers a good example how ambiguous even the more “positive” writers were. In his diary Bourke wrote that he had witnessed “with varying sensations of pleasure or discomfort…much scenery, good, bad and indifferent, plain, mountain, fruitful field and arid desert, bubbling spring of crystal freshness and stagnant pool of slime and alkali.” However, even when Bourke saw beauty and awe-inspiring landscapes, he still easily resorted to the prevalent army stereotype of the Southwest landscapes as “asperous mountains,” “profound canyons,” and parched flanks filled with thorny and leafless vegetation. Bourke was still an exception as for him the landscapes offered a combination of the scenic and awesome and the weird and terrible. Yet, southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes were never “normal” or “promising” for Bourke either.

In sum, officers and their wives and the white enlisted men in general approached the landscapes in terms of absence, struggle and confrontation. All paid attention to similar issues, told relatively similar stories, drew parallel conclusions, and thus displayed a relatively united front. In army minds, southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes stood for vast emptiness, rough and treacherous canons, broken and almost impassable mountain chains, deadly desert plains of sandy waste, dangerous wildlife, heat, and lack of water and proper trees. White army people, who obviously regarded their homes in the East or in Europe as the norm, could not identify with the Southwest landscapes, found little of value in them, and had difficulties adjusting, and therefore distanced the landscapes into the realm of the extreme, exotic, and perilous. However, army discourses did not deny the landscapes’ hidden potential for alteration by people

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39 Bourke, Diaries, 118, see also 46-47; Bourke, On the Border, 1-2.
40 For standard descriptions, see Annual Report Secretary of War (hereafter ARSW), 1886, 7; Carter, From Yorktown, 178, 233; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 76, 79; Anton Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona Army Posts during the 1880s,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 332.
representing a superior culture capable of controlling and shaping nature. A purportedly vacant area, southern Arizona and New Mexico, in army minds, needed civilized people to make it prosper.

As in their writings of the Apaches, some scholars have adopted the army’s language uncritically when describing the region. For example, one well-known history of the Southwest speaks of the “cactus-studded wastes of Arizona,” while a standard monograph on Apache history describes the land as “hostile,” “brutal,” and “tortured.” Historian Howard Lamar claims that the environment in the Southwest was “hostile” and that the “nature remained mean and unproductive.” He also speaks of “this unattractive region” Even in a recent study historian Louis Kraft refers to the “burning temperatures and hostile terrain of the Southwest.” Another new study on the Santa Fe Trail employs descriptions like “hostile terrain,” “a far land,” or “harrowing country” to mark the region. When scholars use colonizers’ narratives as normative truths they enter a treacherous terrain validating the colonizers subjective discourses and ignoring all the biases, contexts of colonial power struggles, and hidden agendas of imperial meaning-making that made the narratives the way they were. In the process scholars also continue to hold the environment of Western Europe or northeastern United States as the norm, against which everything else gets measured and valued.

5.2 Borderlands Society
5.2.1 Mexicans

Often ignoring all class differences among the Mexicans, officers and their wives in southern Arizona and New Mexico generated a stereotype of Mexicans as backward and ignorant inferiors who lacked in civilization and did not fit the Anglo-Saxon framework of whiteness, thus constituting a foreign element on U.S. soil. The army used perceptions of lifestyle and intelligence as vehicles when typecasting Mexicans and differentiating them from “real” whites. For one thing, in army eyes the Mexicans

were completely distanced from modernity, lacking all ambition. They purportedly did not even know how to use money and wanted always to avoid work, thus being unable to create anything of any significance. In the words of one army wife, “a long line of idle ancestry, together with every tendency of climate, surroundings, and viciousness, had so developed indolence in the natives as to utterly incapacitate them for any serious employment.” Mexicans liked to bask in the sun, she wrote, but all heavier tasks “were left for more energetic hands.” As “idle loafers” Mexicans were judged to have little intelligence and live much like animals. The typical Mexican, an officer stated, was “the commonest sort, the sort that sits on a mud floor in preference to sitting on a chair, and is used to the companionship of pigs and chickens.” In a very paternalistic and racist manner, some members of the army interpreted Mexicans as ignorant and impoverished people who recognized whites as their superiors, mentors, and protectors, much liked parents were to their children.

Furthermore, officers stressed the Mexicans mixed-race status and their close association with the Indians, representing these as signs of contaminated whiteness. That the Apaches and the Mexicans were purportedly “cousins” had resulted in the reduction of Spanish culture and character in army eyes. “The primitive life” of the “Mexicans is but little better than that of the surrounding Indians, with whom they associate and mix as if of the same race,” one officer told. Others were convinced that when the Spanish and the Indians had amalgamated into the Mexican they had produced “a vicious man,” no longer properly white either in culture, character, or physical appearance. Visiting Tucson one army surgeon wrote that the extensive “intermingling and mixing with Indian blood” had made the countenance of Mexicans heavy and dull. For him the Spanish-Indian blood amounted to a miserable, worn out, degraded, shiftless, and worthless race. Even pure Indian blood supposedly contained more promise. Even Mexican women were often represented as physically unattractive and uninteresting as well as intellectually simple and ignorant. In a region that had very few Anglo women until the 1880s, army officers’ refutation of Mexican women shows their determination to retain a certain ideal of pure whiteness. Some officers also resorted to

47 Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widney letters, July 6, 1867, ASHS.
applying differentiated scales of attractiveness. Even if a few “senoritas” could be considered pretty or sweet, they were not really beautiful as white women were, but only so according to the standards “in this part of the world,” like one officer assured.\(^{48}\)

In all, army men and women represented the Mexicans as an example of Euro-American empire-building gone wrong: Mexicans represented a warning of what could happen to officers and wives if they did not remain vigilant in guarding their whiteness. When “becoming” Mexicans the Spanish had supposedly compromised their European heritage of industriousness, progress, and morality in front of “Indian savages.” What made the matter worse was that the Mexicans had seemingly fallen militarily at the mercy of “their Apache masters.” Many officers openly declared that the Mexicans were no longer any better than the much hated Apaches.\(^{49}\) Some went even further. Making his way from one border village to the next army surgeon Leonard Wood was certain that it all was “a godforsaken country and godforsaken people live in it…I really do not feel any sympathy when I hear that the Indians have killed a half a dozen or more of the people. I think the Indians better than the Mexicans.”\(^{50}\) That the area Wood is describing was on the Mexican side of the border only proves how little difference the border made. Mexicans on either side were classified as cowardly racial foreigners in army narratives. If anything, they painted Mexicans south of the border a little more ignorant (a result of the absence of Anglo influence), helpless, and subordinate to the Apaches.\(^{51}\)

Labeled as vassals of the Apaches, doubts rose in some army minds on whose side the “cowardly” Mexicans really were. They could not be trusted and were thought to provide protection, food, guns, and ammunition to the Apaches. Once, an officer claimed, a group of Apaches entered the town of Cañada Alamosa, New Mexico, in broad daylight to trade and obtain information while hundreds of soldiers were chasing them. Apaches even had their wounded taken care off while their leader Victorio lived with a Mexican for ten days. Although this was widely known nobody reported it to the army, this officer bitterly complained.\(^{52}\)


\(^{49}\) ARSW, 1883, 174-175; Splitter, "Tour in Arizona,” 87; Elliott, "Geronimo Campaign,” 438-439, 446.

\(^{50}\) Wood, \textit{Chasing Geronimo}, 49.

\(^{51}\) Britton Davis, \textit{The Truth about Geronimo} (1929; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976); Elliott, “Geronimo Campaign.”

\(^{52}\) ARSW, 1880, 97-98. See also Cochran, \textit{Posie}, 46.
As officers and their wives generated an imagery of Mexicans as untrustworthy, unproductive, and unintelligent people who equaled mixed-blood messiness and submission, they not only established their own positional superiority in relation to the Mexicans but made the way for the march of white civilization. As longtime residents of the region, the Mexicans had had their chance to shape the land and to create progress. However, in army eyes they, like the Apaches, had utterly failed. Instead, the Mexicans had only managed to contaminate their own racial purity and, what was possibly even worse, to subject themselves to Apache rule. Unlike the landscapes (and the Apaches), Mexicans were not really threatening or dangerous from the army perspective. Rather they were trivial and pitiful; in the end unimportant somewhat like the Akimel O’odham. Using dogs as allegory, one officer’s wife explained the difference between the white middle-class the officers and their wives represented and the Mexicans. Shep, “our darling black and brown collie with a white shirt and a white collar” when approaching Mexican houses would attack their “cur dogs” who barked at him and “bite right and left, scatter the group, and then walk or trot quietly away.”

While the officers and their wives stood for high-status cleanliness of the all-powerful yet graceful collie in this example, the Mexicans were nothing but “cur dogs,” who could only bark but not really bite, or threaten their pureblood superior.

The representations of the Mexicans by officers and wives differed little from the opinions shared by most white Americans of the era. Since the U.S.-Mexican War attacks had escalated against Mexicans as an inferior race that lacked the propensity for democracy and did not properly develop land to its full potential. Historian George Montgomery writes that many whites regarded Mexicans as people whose natural traits justified the advance of the seemingly industrious and progressive Anglo. Anglos, Montgomery adds, “conquered ethnic Mexicans by taking their resources while defining them as racially inferior and properly marginal to white society.” However, where officers and their wives differed from many of their contemporaries was in their open criticism of white settlers who had made their way to pre-railroad southern Arizona and New Mexico.

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53 Corbusier, Recollections, 138.
5.2.2 Whites

In the thinking of most officers and wives, lower class whites represented another example of unproductive people wholly unsuited to establish progress and civilization. Officers and wives categorized these whites as common and boring, poor people in character, culture, and success in life engaged in a foolhardy search for “marvelous mines” and gold. Lower class whites, “on their way to find gold at the rainbow’s foot,” were supposedly only good for land schemes, busted dreams, and promotions of nothing.\textsuperscript{55} For others they stood for the “unrefined and grotesque,” poorly mannered and dressed elements of white civilization who purportedly only introduced venereal diseases, indulged in alcohol, and altogether acted “more or less emancipated from the restraints of civilization.”\textsuperscript{56}

Officers and wives felt certain that lower class whiteness differed from the whiteness they and other middle-class people represented. In their minds whiteness had a class divide which manifested itself in behavior, culture, and character. The lower class elements represented a sort of “trash” of whiteness, the underclass of whiteness which was not defined by bravery, honesty, or intelligence, but instead by bad manners, dishonesty, and stupidity. The “trash” of whiteness purportedly represented the surplus of prosperous white communities. Some officers claimed that these whites had arrived to the Southwest in search of refuge when unable to make it in the “normal” white society in the East. Nothing but “miserable vagabonds who have come here to escape from the hands of Justice,” was how one officer described their character. The most critical army voices were even ready to claim that the lower class whites were “no less barbarous” than the Apaches.\textsuperscript{57} These lower class whites, like the Mexicans, could only endanger the very foundations of white civilization and futures in the Southwest. What was all the more worrying for officers and wives was that in their eyes the Mexicans and lower class whites played a dominant role in the pre-railroad southern Arizona and New Mexico society, setting the standards of respectability that only ensured the border communities would remain harsh and altogether uncultured and undeveloped.

\textsuperscript{55} Bourke, \textit{Diaries}, 141-142; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 23, 62-63.
\textsuperscript{56} Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 77; Howard, \textit{My Life}, 128, 156. In 1867, one army surgeon met a large number of southern emigrants on their way to California. For him, they represented an unfavorable, poor, and ungrateful people cursing the government that fed them. These whites, the surgeon wrote, were below the levels of northern blacks and should have been left without government aid. See Schneider papers, box 2, file 15, Kidney letters, September 4, 1867, ASHS.
\textsuperscript{57} ARSW, 1871, 67; Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 39, 43; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 54-55; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 200.
Interestingly, white ethnicity, a growing concern in the East, was a matter rarely voiced in army writings. Being Irish or Jewish did not place one’s whiteness in question. For example, one officer when scouting for Apaches passed through “the oasis” of Solomonsville where his party was presented with “great meals of meat and vegetables.” “All this through the kindness and hospitality of the Solomon Brothers, Jews, and two of the fairest and squarest men that I have ever met in my wanderings over this earth,” the officer wrote. It is interesting that although this officer felt the need to introduce the two brothers by referring to their ethnicity, he did not let that dictate his attitude towards them, but wanted to stress how the brothers were “respectable” men who helped the army.\(^{58}\)

In general, it was social position, manners, character, and attitude towards the army that took the center stage when officers and wives evaluated and categorized whiteness outside the army villages. Lower classes were excluded for not acting white, whereas being for example a Jew mattered in itself little. The boundaries of social acceptability were never rigid, however, but fluid and dynamic, adjusted to meet the region’s supply of candidates.

In major towns like Santa Fe and Prescott officers and wives often preferred to gather for strawberry picnics, receptions, banquets, and charity functions with the local businessmen and officials. Oftentimes the civilian elite planned festive celebrations in honor of high-ranking officers like Generals William T. Sherman, Nelson Miles, and George Crook, thus only reinforcing the army elite’s sense of self-importance.\(^{59}\) In these jovial situations of mutual respect, the army elite painted their civilian associates as “respectable” people. They were “brave, hearty, and generous frontiersmen,” one army person wrote, altogether admirable people who built civilization.\(^{60}\)

Officers and wives associated also certain values and characteristics to whites, especially families, living outside towns in stage stations and farms. They were often seen as welcoming and hospitable common people who faced dangers and lived in “unenviable solitude” in “godforsaken small roadside stations.” For one officer, the


hospitality of the ranches made it worthwhile to journey over Arizona’s deserts, forests, and mountains, whereas for an officer’s wife the proximity of white ranches made the country instantly more soothing and pleasant. When coming to a valley with a house, some domestic animals and fields, one enlisted soldier wrote that he felt “a great relief and delight” on seeing these “signs of civilized life” after experiencing “nothing but sand, dust, rocks, cacti, thorns, greasewood, rattlesnakes and the enormous venomous lizards, there called Gila monsters.” As these examples demonstrate, officers, their wives, and the enlisted men recognized a certain class of ranchers and farmers - usually white families - as representing the forces of civilization and carved an image of them as hardy pioneers who contributed to the future prospect of the colony and made a better future for themselves on the outskirts of the known world. 61 These people clearly deserved the army’s respect, and, sometimes, pity for living such a risky life on the “world’s edge.” Perhaps there existed a sense of shared fates, the army desiring to see another group of “respectable” white outsiders taking on the challenge of the purportedly inhospitable border area.

In army usage the label of “respectable persons” was often applied as a fluid categorization adjusted to meet the region’s supposedly low standards. In one case, an army wife living in the village of Ehrenberg noted that her associates were those “few white men there” who “led respectable lives enough for that country.” She added that “the standard was not high.” It is unlikely that this woman would have considered these men proper associates if encountering them in her home in New England. For her, the men’s behavior and character barely sufficed the low standards of the Southwest. 62 In other instances, the officers as a rule insisted that those people they socialized with held status as leading elements of the society, no matter whom the persons actually were or what their occupation was. For instance, although one lieutenant dined with a vaquero and mingled with a deserter from the Mexican army, he assured the readers of his journal that he never lowered his rigid standard concerning his associates’ respectability. 63 An army surgeon stationed at Fort Yuma often socialized with the Sisters of St. Joseph both at the convent and at his home. In his journal he wrote that

61 For the enlisted man’s opinion, see A.M. Gustafson, ed., John Spring’s Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 46. For the other quotes, see Bourke, Diaries, 121; Biddle, Reminiscences, 161. See also Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 76; Myres, “Arizona Camping Trip,” 61; Corbusier, Recollections, 67-68; Baldwin, Army Wife, 61; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 155-156; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 141, 144. Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 23.

62 Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 165.

63 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 60-61, 92-93, 100-101, 119. For army elite’s associates, see also Bourke, On the Border, for example 78-79.
these women definitely represented refined eastern values, thus being “much superior” in education and birth not only to sisters usually located in such remote stations but also in comparison to all others in the surrounding community.64

A further proof of the army elite’s fluid case- and place-specific boundaries of respectability is the case of Corydon Cooley, a white rancher, prospector, and government scout. Despite the fact that Cooley had married an Apache woman, officers described him as an “outstanding figure,” always hospitable and “valuable in that lonely land.” In officers’ texts Cooley lived in “baronial splendor” in a “good and comfortable” ranch. His company included an Apache wife, who was always referred to in army texts by her Anglo name, “Molly.” She was cast much like a proper housewife, described as a “quiet, well-mannered” woman and Cooley’s interracial children were portrayed as “most attractive.” However, at times some army wives found it difficult to hide their disapproval. One officer’s wife, who enjoyed Cooley’s hospitality and spent a night at the ranch, was especially troubled by the thought that Cooley might have more than one Apache wife. When her husband refused to dwell the matter, she had no choice than to sort her prejudices in her own mind.65 The fact that Cooley had worked in alliance with the military, proved a valuable asset in dealings with the Apaches, and had been a splendid host in a region short on social companions made him an honorable figure in army discourses and outweighed his interracial relationship with the “enemy.” Indeed, Cooley’s interracial relationship was usually represented as a well-thought strategic alliance that only proved his energetic and honest character.

However, sometimes the classification was not as flexible and the officers judged the supposedly “respectable” elements as inferiors who could not be counted as truly middle-class. In Tucson, the major center of southern Arizona, “the who’s who” of the town and the officers at times mingled. Still, some officers were far from impressed by the social scene. For example, in 1872 a “grand baile” of approximately hundred people, “half of whom were Mexicans,” was arranged in honor of a military paymaster visiting the town. This flattered the paymaster, but when the festivities began he quickly became very critical. For him the event and the people lacked refinement and style: “The lovely señoritas were generally rather gaudily dressed, delighting in bright and varied colors, after window curtain styles.” Only a “few could pass for good-looking,” the older women being universally “very ugly,” he continued. For the paymaster the enjoyment

64 Corson reminiscences, UASP.
65 Cruse, Apache Days, 152-153; Bourke, Diaries, 95; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 105-107.
seemed too “unrestrained” and the dancing was done with very little grace of person or motion. In all the people “I could not discover anything but dullness, and attempts at finery which seemed to fit their persons about as tidily as if they had run and jumped into them.” This, the paymaster concluded, “represented the elite of Tucson,” a miserable and sorry-looking lot of phonies who tried desperately to emulate proper middle-class standards. The next day the snobbish paymaster quickly exited Tucson. For him, the town’s “respectable” classes had represented a disappointment with whom socializing was a distasteful experience.66

The attitude white civilians were thought to show towards the army was of crucial importance in determining the nature of army representations. If whites for any reason criticized the military or were even thought to entertain such ideas, officers and their wives quickly forgot all notions of solidarity and altered their representational strategies. In an aggressive tone the officers called white merchants unsophisticated vultures who only preyed the military for lucrative contracts or kept up the hostilities with the Indians because it was in the merchants’ economic interest that the territory was filled with troops whom they could exploit. Some of the army argued that there was no limit to the greed of these civilians.67 Ranchers supposedly lied about Apache sightings because they wanted cavalry protection in order to sell forage at exorbitant prices, while towns used all methods to induce the soldiers to come in and spend their money in gambling, drinking, and shopping.68 At times some officers even went as far as to claim that the vast majority of civilians in the Southwest abused the army in every way imaginable. The printed press was cast as one the main villains. Many papers, like the Tombstone Epitaph, Arizona Daily Star, and Clifton Clarion were represented as “the censors of the army” or “the organs of thieves,” as one officer dubbed them. In these publications “every officer was a coward and every enlisted man a hoodlum and a thief,” the officer wrote.69 Obviously, the press painted images the officers did not cherish and felt obligated to respond. Being called a coward was an insult of the worst kind that offended the officers’ sense of integrity and manliness which rested on notions of bravery and high moral character.

Officers sought to reinforce their sense of manliness and gallantry by ridiculing civilian militia men as inefficient, brutal, and cowardly. In army men’s eyes, civilians

66 Splitter, "Tour in Arizona," 81-82.
67 Corson reminiscences, UASP; ARSW, 1868, 46-48; 1880, 97-98.
69 ARSW, 1880, 97-98; 1883, 165; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 80; Gatewood, "Campaigning," 218.
were no real soldiers, far from it. It was certain, like on officer stated, that “the citizen soldiery of Arizona have not as yet distinguished themselves above the Government mercenaries.”

Often the relationship between the army and the militia was represented in terms of rivalry between the gallant, honest, and righteous soldiers and the dishonest and disorderly civilians. It is evident that the army did not want the civilians militarized. In one instance, when a group of cowboys rode into an army camp, these “would-be terrors of the plains,” as one soldier called them, harassed the soldiers and after refusing to be arrested commenced firing at them. The soldiers fired back and drove the cowboys out of camp “with a shower of lead at their heels.”

In another case a group who called themselves the “Globe Rangers,” but whom one officer referred to as “an organization of barroom Indian fighters,” confronted an army troop telling them that Apaches had stolen their horses. The “rangers” tried to claim as their own “every good-looking horse in the herd” confiscated by the army troop. They proved such unreliable men as to argue that a horse belonging to one of the officers was theirs. The officer, “getting madder every second at their evident lying,” sent the “Globe Rangers” on their way without any horses. They reappeared days afterwards at a battle site seeking to loot some Apache corpses. Again the army stopped their efforts, but after the troops left, the “civilian warriors,” as one soldier wrote, robbed and looted the dead Apache bodies, whose scalps they later bartered at one army village.

In the end, officers and their wives’ representations of pre-railroad southern Arizona and New Mexico society display a fear that there really existed no good white element in the region. They worried over the shortage of honest and hard-working middle-class doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals whom they imagined would work hard and create civilization and progress. While some felt shocked to discover that the region had no white civilian physicians, others noticed an alarming shortage of white women.

Officers and wives believed that “respectable” white women would introduce proper domesticity and bring civilization to the region. Officers felt that many of those white women who had arrived to the borderlands acted

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70 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 40.
71 Chrisman papers, diary, Feb. 7, 1886, ASHS.
73 Schneider papers, box 2, Widney letters, ASHS. For lack of white physicians, see Corbusier, Recollections, 150, see also 57; Frank K. Upham, “Incidents of Regular Army Life in Time of Peace,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 93. Many army surgeons welcomed the extra income civilian communities affording to pay for medical attendance offered. See James Worthington letters, ASHS. For an officer who felt the region had no good society, see Nickerson, “Major General,” 13.
unwomanly. For instance, army narratives tell of a woman in Prescott who “made herself notorious by associating with packers and miners. She wore a man’s hat and a man’s sack coat. She didn’t swagger, but frequented saloons and drank and gambled with the men.”

That proper white middle-class associates were in short supply is further demonstrated by how highly officers and their wives valued eastern visitors. Family members and people with a recognized status in politics, economy, or arts - in other words people who could labeled “respectable persons” - were much welcomed. For example, one army wife was proud that a dinner held at her home not only included high-ranking officers but one Mr. Jerome, “a cousin of Lady Randolph Churchill,” a well-known society lady in the United States. For another army wife the visit of the well-known artist Frederick Remington proved an occasion. She proudly recalled that Remington “made many of his watercolors in the shade of our quarters.” However, the fluid standards of respectability were again linked to behavior and perceptions of character, and not all visitors were equally welcomed. When the well-known ethnologist Frank H. Cushing arrived at Fort Apache with the Zunis, the officers ignored him. Cushing was judged as having “gone native,” living with the Zunis and adopting their ways. Even his appearance was too much like the Indians. Eventually Cushing had to settle for the hospitality of a non-commissioned officer.

5.2.3 Settlements

Officers and their wives used the race and class of the occupants as well as the orchestration of public space, including building styles and materials, as vehicles for establishing the value of Southwest settlements and to mark and differentiate them. They, for example, painted Rio Miembros as a place of “about twenty miserable adobe houses all occupied by Mexicans,” while Cañada Almosa amounted to a Mexican

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75 Lady Randolph Churchill was the mother of Winston Churchill. Mills, My Story, 200. For visitors, see also Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 100; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 179-180, 189.
76 Corbusier, Recollections, 147.
77 Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 43-44. Frank Cushing lived for four and a half years at the Zuni Pueblo, where he learned to speak Zuni, was adopted by a family, and underwent initiation into a religious society. His subsequent publications of Zuni social organization, myth, and ritual presented the first detailed picture of their culture. Wilson, Myth of Santa Fe, 86.
hamlet, “a mere collection of adobe huts.” In a similar style Florence was represented as a town of two streets and approximately twenty adobe huts.

However, it was Tucson, the region’s center, that epitomized the dark, foreign, and morally corrupt Southwest. It resembled other “unfit” towns in the region both in housing and people, being only a little larger. For one thing, Tucson was an adobe town. The prevalence of one-story adobe houses, “all the same color as the dirt in the streets,” made Tucson an insignificant, degenerating, and crumbling “dirty Mexican pueblo” in army minds. One officer called Tucson a “queer, straggling old Spanish town, built with the proverbial Spanish disregard of straight lines and right angles.” Tucson’s streets appeared far below civilized standards, having no sidewalks, pavement, or lamps. There was also no use of addresses and all streets were in filthy condition due to lack of organized drainage, the officers complained. The town’s social order appeared as decadent as its public space. For officers and wives Tucson was wide-open, all night, hurrah town of the Southwest where bars and prostitutes supposedly constituted the principal business while Mexicans, and some lower class whites, made up much of the populace. The main street, the prime showcase of public space, was filled with bars that played “rude music” and had “a motley assemblage of Mexicans, Indians, soldiers, and all manner hard-looking men, smoking, betting at monte, and drinking mescal.” Officers and wives felt disgusted. They described that the spiritual center of this community, the church, was just a crumbling Catholic adobe structure, a wholly inadequate house for the serving of the lord. Furthermore, the town lacked the time discipline that orchestrated lives in the army villages and in other supposedly civilized sections of the world. Church bells set the rhythm of the day and one supposedly rarely heard months, days, or weeks mentioned. There was not much use for watches and clocks. After seeing the town one officer was certain that Tucson was “as a foreign a town as if it were in Haiti instead of within our own boundaries.”

That the principal town in the region was so dominantly Mexican obviously troubled many officers. In 1872, one officer voiced his concern that only approximately 300 of the town’s 2,500 inhabitants could be labeled as white. It is not know whether he
included in his estimations the soldiers at Fort Lowell, located on the outskirts of Tucson. If he did, then he saw only a handful of civilians he could identify as white. Six years earlier an enlisted soldier traveling through wrote that with the exception of soldiers and teamsters in transit, there was not over a dozen white men in the town, and not one white woman. In the end, many of the army wanted to have nothing to do with this regional center. Tellingly, one officer’s wife was glad to pass Tucson without stopping.  

81

Officers and wives displayed a very different take on the Anglo-dominated Prescott. They painted it as a delightful and desirable home for middle-class tastes, a rapidly growing and improving town that possessed an “excellent” and growing society of lawyers, engineers, and other white businessmen and their families. Importantly, the town was not controlled by Mexicans and lower class whites. According to an officer’s wife, Prescott was such an excellent place because it had “a good element from the beginning, and disorderly people were not allowed to remain long.” An officer dubbed Prescott as a “thoroughly American town,” an intelligent and bright family society which was not “burdened with the same class of loafers who for so long a time held high carnival” in many other places. Importantly, and in stark contrast to many other places in the region, Prescott was not only seen as “safe,” but also as a well-built place of log and brick, not adobe, houses. In short, for officers and their wives Prescott was everything Tucson was not; white, not Mexican; built of frame and brick buildings, not adobe; and a place where lower class elements did not rule the social scene but were run out of town by “decent” people.  

82

In New Mexico, Silver City held a status somewhere between Prescott and Tucson in army eyes. Officers from the nearby Fort Bayard made many friends at neighboring Silver City and often drove there for entertainments. They wrote that the town had “every element” represented, from the “most cultivated, from the transplanted branches of excellent Eastern families” to the “ rudest specimens of frontier life, who had never seen anything else, and were devoid of all education.”  

83 Silver City was compactly built, having importantly one or two brick houses which pleased the officers
and their wives and symbolized progress and the town’s “American” character. One officer declared in 1872 that the brick houses were “said to be the only ones in the Territory.”

It seems that for officers and wives the prevalence of adobe alone signified an inferior cultural order connected to a foreign Mexican/indigenous “tradition.” In this they did not much differ from the majority of white Americans in the area, who, historian Keith Bryant writes, “rejected the ‘mud towns’ they found in the Southwest.” Whites “wanted buildings and homes of wood or stone, glass windows, wooden floors, and metal ceilings and roofs.” Southwest settlements deviated from officers and wives’ standards of normality in many ways. They lacked white residents, middle-class social order, and familiar elements of public space, including brick or wood houses, sidewalks, parks, green lawns, or straight and orderly streets associated with the “white” Protestant cities or small towns and villages in the East. This all made the settlements foreign and inferior in the eyes of officers and wives. It also made the places legitimate targets for change. For the Southwest to become “civilized” the supposedly unworthy towns had to be rebuilt by incoming middle-class whites. In this regard Prescott represented a good beginning, a glimpse of the future.

Most white enlisted men saw things quite differently. For them Prescott never was a favorite place, but rather too quiet and boring. Many failed to mention the town in their writings. Instead, soldiers preferred settlements such as Tucson. While officers saw these places as nests of vice and as miserable collections of huts and dirt, for white enlisted men they proved sanctuaries from the restrictive codes of middle-class propriety so dominant in the army villages. These towns represented such an attraction that it was impossible to keep the soldiers away from them. In many locations a mixed cast of colonizers and colonized interacted and created common grounds around rough leisure worlds. In enlisted discourses Tucson was described as a town “bubbling with life and motion.” One soldier was thrilled that every other building on the business street was a saloon. For him gambling that ran steadily twenty-four hours a day, and the fact that the most elegantly dressed men in the town were the faro-dealers and

84 Sweeney, Making Peace, 44. The bigger New Mexico center Santa Fe in the north the army usually described as an “old Mexican city” with few Americans, no water, trees, or good shops. Still, Santa Fe was never judged as harshly as Tucson by the army. See, for instance, Corbusier, Recollections, 50-51.
85 Keith L. Bryant Jr., Culture in the American Southwest: The Earth, the Sky, the People (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 36, see 36-50 for the Anglo remodeling of Southwest towns. See also how the Anglos at first rebuilt Santa Fe in Wilson, Myth of Santa Fe.
87 Corbusier, Recollections, 28. See also Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 74-75.
saloonkeepers was perfectly acceptable. He saw that gambling was not only the principal business, but “a respectable profession.” The intermediate buildings on Tucson’s business street, filled with prostitutes “of every age and every race and color,” also represented a welcomed site for the lonely soldiers. That places were packed with a crowd of men of many nationalities, teamsters, bull-whackers, black and white soldiers, miners, Mexicans, and Indians only “offered a wonderful variety of humans,” a soldier wrote. All were “happy-go-lucky people,” another added, enjoying all the activities to the fullest. Later in life one soldier felt nostalgic that those “happy days” had passed into history as the region had, in his words, “matured.”

Obviously enlisted men were able to carve social freedom and opportunities to enjoy life in borderlands towns that did not exist inside the military villages. It seems that this applied equally to white and black soldiers. In his study of black soldiers in west Texas, historian James Leiker has observed that while officers never left their post after dark because they regarded the neighboring town of Santa Angelo filled with murderers and horse thieves, enlisted men frequented the town, finding suitable company and interesting social life. Whereas officers shunned the settlements’ standards and social composition, black enlisted men, like white soldiers in Arizona and New Mexico, enjoyed what opportunities they could discover.

On the other hand, white enlisted men represented a less straightforward story of the region’s settlements than the officers did. Like officers, soldiers were outsiders too, and not all simply embraced the colonial settlements or viewed the kind of activities they offered in a favorable light. Not unlike the officers, some white soldiers were very critical of what they saw. For instance, Tucson in 1880 was referred by one enlisted man as “a sorry-looking Mexican town” with narrow and crooked streets and countless dogs, burros, and chicken fights and Spanish-speaking residents. Like officers, white soldiers used race and building styles to differentiate the settlements. According to one soldier, although Tucson was the largest place he had seen since leaving San Francisco, it was still mere Mexican town made of mud. “I have not seen a house built of wood since I left the Pacific coast,” he regretted in a letter home. “The buildings which

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89 Leiker, *Racial Borders*, 73. See also Bode, *Dose*, 156-157. A visitor to Bracketville, west Texas, was astonished to enter a town where indigenous peoples, white, black, and indigenous soldiers, Mexicans, and others comprised a mixed group of people in search of recreation. This visitor noted that “such an assortment of humans I never saw before.” He is quoted in Leiker, *Racial Borders*, 74.
deserved the name of houses,” another soldier wrote, were of adobe with flat mud or dirt floors and roofs. Other structures, the soldier felt, were even worse, being built of mesquite poles and the long wands of the candlewood. They had chinks filled with mud plaster, doors of rawhide stretched over rough frames, and as windows simply apertures in the walls. Tucson’s social order also troubled some enlisted men who felt the place was unsuitable for civilized white men. One soldier wrote that though Tucson was a source of amazement and amusement, it “was surely no town for a young man whose immediate forebears traced straight back to the first Puritans.”

5.3 “Inhospitable Wasteland”

Place mattered for officers and their wives. It was just that in their eyes pre-railroad southern Arizona and New Mexico landscapes and society amounted to a dangerously compromised, immoral, underdeveloped, and foreign section of the continent. In fact, when the army people claimed that the Southwest differed from acceptable standards and represented the area largely unsuitable for white settlement and futures in its present condition, they also distanced the region as a whole to the fringes of the known world. When one officer termed “that great world” outside the Southwest as “God’s Country,” he indicated that in the Southwest he had been forced out of God’s orbit. Others, opting for more secular discursive strategies, argued that the Southwest was cut off from the “busy world” and pointed out that the region was plagued by distance and poor linkages to the metropole and the rest of the world. Distance made sure, for instance, that the region’s living standards remained inadequate. Many army members wrote that the supply of available commodities was weak and the price of things available shockingly expensive. They grumbled that, for example, a parlor lamp that in San Francisco cost three dollars was twenty-five dollars in Prescott, and that the same trend held for soup plates, flour, eggs and many other commodities. “The price of some things would make your hair stand on end,” one officer’s wife complained in a letter to her relative back home.

90 Dinges “New York Private,” 56-57; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 46-47; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 17-19. Enlisted men’s critical representations were not restricted to Tucson. One soldier painted Albuquerque, New Mexico, as a Mexican village of adobe “mud house[s].” For him, Belin, south of Albuquerque, was “a town of ancient looking buildings with a population three hundred years behind present civilization.” See Bode, Dose, 141-143.


92 Mills, My Story, 146. See also Boyd, Cavalry Life, 128-129; Corson reminiscences, UASP.
Feeling of exclusion from the “real world” was a serious matter, a common and painful mentality that contributed to bitter narratives. Army men and women used terms such as the “gloomy region,” “wretched Territory,” “distant and dreary desert,” savage “far frontier,” “the extreme frontier” or “that far-away country” to describe the Southwest.93 One army wife dubbed the place “an inhospitable wasteland,” while an officer termed it a “difficult and dangerous region.”94 Others opted for even more darker and sinister imagery of murder, blood, and violence. Statements such as “this whole land is red with murder and massacre,” and “hostility appeared to be the normal condition of everybody and everything, animate and inanimate,” represent common views amongst the army.95 So does the characterization of the Southwest as a “dark and bloody ground.”96 What all these texts testify to is that in army eyes the region as a whole was regarded not only as a periphery but a very unpleasant and deeply troubling periphery.

When thinking about southern Arizona and New Mexico as a whole or as a living space no army people ever saw it as similar to the regions most of them originated from; the eastern United States, Britain, Ireland, Germany, or the Scandinavian countries. The only suitable comparison they could come up with in the “old world” was the Middle-East, for most whites a distant and exotic place. When both the officers and their wives and the enlisted men compared the region’s landscapes and peoples to those in the Bible it only further cemented the mythic aspects and “otherness” of southern Arizona and New Mexico. For instance, army people imagined that Mexican customs “recalled those of the Israelites as described in the Bible,” whereas Mexican villages were purportedly similar to those in Palestine.97 Tucson “reminded me forcibly of the small hamlets I had seen in the Holy Land, the more so as the women, all half-breeds, wore about the same dress as the Palestine women and carried upon their heads water-jars of the exact pattern

93 Parker, Annals, 6; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 130; Jim Schreier, ed., “For This I Had Left Civilization: Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 1869-1870,” Journal of Arizona History 29 (Summer 1988), 193; Cruse, Apache Days, 20; ARSW, 1878, 43; Carter, From Yorktown, 239, see also 241; Howard, My Life, 141-142; Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs, 112; Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widow letters, June 23, 1867, ASHS.
94 Biddle, Reminiscences, 152-154; Cruse, Apache Days, 194. See also Mills, My Story, 152; Carter, From Yorktown, 181; Merrill J. Mattes, Indians, Infants, and Infantry: Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the American Frontier (Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 1960), 249-250.
95 Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widow letters, July 14, 1867, ASHS; Nickerson, “Major General,” 13. See also Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 101; Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 75-76, see also 80-81, 83; Parker, Annals, 7-8; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 111, 155.
96 King papers, ASHS.
97 Biddle, Reminiscences, 157; Corbusier, Recollections, 52; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 88. See also Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 13.
in use in the Orient,” one army man wrote. When he encountered camels, the remnants of the army’s pre-Civil War experiment, in the Arizona desert, this man thought they looked as natural in the Southwest terrain as those near the pyramids of Egypt.98

If the eastern United States represented the home, or center, of army men and women’s lives, in the Southwest they felt they were as far away from home as imaginable. One officer’s wife stationed at Camp McDowell explained her feelings in a letter to her family in New York. “We have one great advantage in being here at the end of the earth. We cannot be sent a mile east or west, north or south, without coming nearer home. That is, from any other point we have more ease of access and can get home in a shorter time.”99 Also in a personal letter, an army surgeon vented his feelings. “Arizona is a poor place to live - anyone that has ever been here can testify and everyone seems to be looking forward a time when they will leave. Tis as out of the way and as far from a railroad and civilization a person can get in the United States.” Disheartened, he even suggested that there was no “use in the government sending troops here to protect so miserable a country at such an enormous expense - better let the Indians have it.” For his part, Commanding General Sherman suggested in the 1870s that whites should withdraw and either force Mexico to take Arizona back or leave it to the indigenous inhabitants.100

Unsurprisingly, officers and their wives viewed the Southwest as a good place to get away from. “The change from Arizona desert to Washington ballroom was…delightful,” one officer stated. “We were to enjoy to the utmost the pleasures of the society…in the beautiful and gracious city,” he wrote. Relocating to Angel Island outside bustling San Francisco, one officer’s wife felt that she and her husband could only now “began to live, to truly live; for we felt that the years spent at those desert posts under the scorching suns of Arizona had cheated us out of all but a bare existence upon earth.”101 Even short breaks, such as detached service and leaves, were welcomed enthusiastically. One officer considered recruiting duty a lucky break. After a few days rest in San Diego, California, “the long nightmare of three years service in Arizona was partially dispelled, if not entirely removed,” he wrote. Some army people even

98 Gustafson, John Spring’s, 46-47, 115-116. For a description of the army’s pre-Civil War camel experiment and linkages to “the Orient” through “Bedouin” and Arabian horses, see Cruse, Apache Days, 196-197.
101 Parker, Old Army, 191; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 231, see also 219-221.
categorized duty in the East as “light duty” while calling time in Arizona as “hard duty.”

Examining the officers’ personal histories and places of death it comes apparent that practically none of them returned to the Southwest permanently when retiring from the army. Lieutenant George Eaton counts as a typical case if there ever was one. Born in Maine, he was assigned to Arizona in 1873 and spent three years in the region after which he left for the Plains. When Eaton finally retired, he did all kinds of things, except return to the Southwest. Eaton bought a cattle ranch and worked as a mining engineer in Montana before relocating to New York and eventually to Florida where he died. Another officer, Major David Perry worked in the Southwest for almost a decade in the 1880s but declined to return after retiring. He died in Washington D.C. A random sampling demonstrates that officers who served in Arizona passed away in places such as New York, Atlantic City, Vancouver, Milwaukee, or even in Los Angeles, but not in Arizona or New Mexico. In fact, the vast majority of these officers lived their senior years east of the Mississippi River. Of course this sample is far from exhaustive, but it nevertheless demonstrates that in relation to the Southwest officers stayed outsiders to the end. Exceptions to the rule were temporary, and even those usually forced by professional considerations. One of the rare returnees was Captain Mason M. Maxon, who took part in the Southwest campaigns of the 1880s. He retired in 1891 and worked as a professor of military science at the University of Arizona, Tucson in 1903-04. However, he stayed for that one year only. In 1934, Maxon died in Cincinnati, Ohio.

It was no wonder that officers never returned. Some of them were concerned that a prolonged stay in southern Arizona and New Mexico would expose them to imperial contamination, damaging their character and reducing them to the level of their surroundings. An especially troubling sign for some officers was that the enlisted men had already seemingly degraded themselves by embracing the colony’s relaxed norms

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103 For Eaton, see Constance Wynn Alshuler, Cavalry Yellow & Infantry Blue: Army Officers in Arizona Between 1851-1886 (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1991), 116-117; Eaton, “String for the Bow,” 177; for Perry, Alshuler, Cavalry Yellow, 259-260; for Maxon, Mason M. Maxon papers, ASHS; Alshuler, Cavalry Yellow, 225-226. For the officers’ places of death in general, see Alshuler, Cavalry Yellow. The random sample was taken from pages 13-14, 68, 99, 158-159, 192-193. It is notable that many officers died in or near Washington D.C.
and styles. Not only did the soldiers enjoy their time in the supposedly immoral activities offered by the region’s settlements, but their appearance was often far from what the officers thought acceptable for representatives of a “civilized nation.” To the readers of his journal back East Lieutenant John Bigelow explained the situation he was forced to confront: “Our column would be a curious sight for a European officer. Most of the men ride in their blue flannel shirts, their blouses strapped to their saddles; one big sergeant wears a bright red shirt, and looks not unlike a mounted fireman; some of the men take off their blue shirts and ride in their gray knit undershirts. There are all sorts of hat worn, of Mexican and American make...Some of the men wear over their blue army trousers the brown canvas overalls, intended to be worn only on fatigue; some wear civilian overalls. There are few trousers not torn or badly worn...Here is a man with a single spur; here one without any. The carbines are variously carried; some according to regulations...The men’s feet are some in shoes and some in boots.”

If we assume this officer provides an accurate portrayal of most soldiers, then, from the officers’ viewpoint, imperial contamination was already taking its toll among common soldiers. “It would be most unreasonable to expect of our troops, campaigning on the frontier, the trim appearance preserved by European troops on a campaign,” Bigelow laconically added as if accepting the inevitable.

Interestingly, enlisted men themselves were more care-free about the effect the Southwest might have upon them. “The inner man always comes to the level of his environment,” one soldier confidently wrote without any visible concern over the matter. There was no need for alarm; acting like other people in the region was acceptable. Only rarely did a soldier voice his concern. “I don’t know how I should act in the society of ladies now, as I have not been seen but one unmarried white woman since I came into the territory nearly 3 years [ago],” one soldier pondered while waiting for his discharge and return home to the East.

Obviously, concern over the enlisted men’s standards never was the main issue for the officers or their wives. They prioritized their own lives and middle-class sensibilities and the enlisted men represented in some ways predictable lower class casualties. Still, some worried. Like with the Mexicans, what was imagined to be

104 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 197-198.
106 Wright, ”In the Days,” 499-500.
happening to some enlisted men was a warning of what might result to oneself if not vigilant. An underlying danger of falling below acceptable standards, becoming a brutish commoner like so many of the region’s whites, was often present in army elite’s discourses. For example, when being invited to a dinner after a long campaign, one officer was more than little anxious that his “blouse, the back of my blue shirt (the only one I had left) was missing, my long hair reached almost to my shoulders, my beard, untrimmed for three months, fell on my breast, and I had on my head a soft wool hat, the crown of which was missing entirely and the brim had also been torn off.” He felt he could not attend a “civilized” dinner in such a state and was determined to refuse the invitation. In another case, an officer’s wife returning from New York in the comfort of a train broke down and cried at the bearded and dusty appearance of her husband at the station. He “looked like a tramp,” the wife wrote. The shameful husband agreed that he was in “a disreputable condition.” As in the previous example, the circumstances had managed to gain a temporary upper hand, marking the officer almost unrecognizable in front of his wife.108

Worried, some wrote that living in the colony could make one “look like an Indian.” In the end, it did not take much to cross the line of propriety. For example, after killing a hawk and placing the tail feathers in his hat, one army man “concluded I looked too much like an ‘Injun,’ & took them out.”109 However, in the thinking of officers and their wives it was always something more than physical appearance alone that was at stake; contamination threatened one’s character and would make one unfit to return to civilized middle-class life outside the Southwest. One captain wrote that he had learned “by experience that residence in New Mexico and Arizona, if too prolonged, produces the champion breed of liars.”110 Shortly before his departure back home, another officer feared that his stay in Arizona had turned him into an unrecognizable “savage.” “You must not disown me if you find me grown part-savage with this frontier life. It is not calculated to add much polish to manners,” he wrote to his family beforehand. He also worried that the “real world” back home had moved on and he, having spent so much time out of touch with civilization, would have difficulties fitting in. “Will everybody have changed and the town have forgotten me

108 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 221; Corbusier, Recollections, 47; Corbusier, Soldier, 87. See also Wood, Chasing Geronimo.
109 Grierson, “Journal,” 45. See also Biddle, Reminiscences, 189.
when I come? It seems a long, long time.”¹¹¹ After returning from the Southwest one
officer’s wife acknowledged that “I could not break away from my Arizona habits.” She
smoked cigarettes, slept all afternoons, and wore only white dresses “partly because I
had become imbued with a profound indifference to dress.” Her New England aunt who
regarded all foreigners with contempt worried that everybody would think she had
become a Mexican. “I was in the bondage of tropical customs, and I had lapsed back
into a state of what my aunt called semi-barbarism.” Defying her aunt and the
“whirlpool of advanced civilization” this army wife challenged the rigid ideals of
middle-class standards and teased her family by exaggerating her “Arizona habits.” In
private she turned her experiences into manifestations of personal strength, being proud
that she had endured all the hardships of colonial circumstances and managed, at least in
her own mind, to keep her middle-class mindset intact.¹¹²

Many white enlisted men agreed with the officers and their wives that southern
Arizona and New Mexico amounted to a remote periphery. They categorized the place,
for example, as “wild country” located outside civilization, or as “a miserable place.”
Some dubbed it “the most godforsaken country that can be made.”¹¹³ Still, there existed
many soldiers who enjoyed their time in the region and felt a strong connection to the
place in its contemporary state, something the officers never did. Amongst enlisted men
one is able to find positive comments about the time spent in the borderlands. Looking
back later in life one soldier was convinced that Arizona was the place “where I spent
my happiest and most adventurous years” engaged in the “defense of my adopted
country.” Another soldier equaled his time in Arizona as ”unalloyed happiness.”¹¹⁴

Whereas officers retired for civilian life outside the Southwest, many enlisted
men stayed in the region. One officer was almost annoyed when he noted that in
Arizona “one cannot travel far in uniform without being spoken to by someone who has
worn the army blue.”¹¹⁵ Following their discharge soldiers ended up trying a great
variety of occupations. Some ran ranches and provided services for travelers, others
became stagecoach drivers carrying mail and passengers. After his discharge one man
carried mail for the government and went into the cattle business, selling most of the

¹¹¹ Schneider papers, box 2, file 18, Widney letters, May 20, 1868, ASHS.
¹¹² Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 222-223.
¹¹³ Fred Platten, Ten Years on the Trail of the Redskins, Thomas E. Way ed. (Williams, AZ: Williams
News Press, 1963), 14; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 21; Dinges “New York Private,” 57; Anonymous,
“Early Days in Arizona with the Fifth U.S. Cavalry,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 144.
¹¹⁴ Mazzanovich papers, file 1 and file 4, ASHS; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 138.
¹¹⁵ Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 157, see also 59.
beef to the troops. Another private purchased a half interest in a ranch and livestock near Camp Crittenden, Arizona, and made a living hauling wood and forage to the military post. He stayed in the Southwest for several years. In fact, many enlisted men made the Southwest more or less their permanent homes. For example, George J. Henry from Akron, Ohio, who had worked in the military in the 1880s in Arizona, first retired to civilian life in Tombstone. After reenlisting for service in Cuba and the Philippines by the end of the century, he again chose to come back to Arizona and to remain there. He operated as the caretaker at Fort Apache and was also in charge of a fire station at a ranger station before dying in 1940.

In sum, while producing a self-imposed fear of decivilization, and building representations of a dangerous and distant periphery, officers and their wives made the Southwest a region of questionable character, a terrible living space on the fringes of the known world, and the most remote place from home where they personally could not think of living in. In this way, they again rejected the Southwest. However, the situation was different for the enlisted men. Although some considered the Southwest a wild and remote place, they did not share the need to distance themselves from the place nor did they in general fear any kind of contamination on their characters. Many saw the place as a suitable living space and enjoyed their life in the Southwest.

5.4 “Our Great Western Empire”

In the end, white army people really did not want the Indians or Mexico to retain the Southwest, but to establish the backward nature of the region at the time of U.S. invasion. While the tendency in army discourses to emphasize the Southwest’s “distant location,” “extreme landscapes,” and “inferior society,” plagued by a shortage of proper white middle-class inhabitants, did give an impression that the region was too different from the true “Anglo-Saxon” United States to have white futures, army people’s strategy to represent the region as somehow void of proper society or settlements or as “empty of civilization” also meant that the region was readily available for the white middle-class who represented progress and civilization. Although officers and their wives undoubtedly personally disliked their colonial surroundings, on another level they represented the region as dangerous, remote, and decadent to make the U.S. invasion

117 George J. Henry papers, ASHS. For others who stayed, see Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, xi-xxiii; Platten, Ten Years, 43; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 13-22.
look right and necessary. They made it seem that white middle-class futures of industry and progress were needed to save the region. One of the army people’s main points was that if the border area was to be truly incorporated into the nation, the threatening and repulsive uncolonized present the army had painted had to make way for a prosperous, industrious, and civilized colonized future. In army minds southern Arizona and New Mexico as a whole became targets for massive change.

There occurred a noticeable sift in army representations that describe the late 1870s and early 1880s. Army people increasingly began to interpret and imagine the colonial realities in a different manner. They added to the stories of danger, remoteness, and decadence images of white middle-class futures of industry and prosperity. Somehow the Southwest was really not the “outside” after all, but rather “our outside,” a dark ground perhaps, but increasingly penetrated by the light of the United States. The army elite wanted to believe, as one officer stated, that the region could be made into a valuable part of “our great Western Empire.”

It must be stressed that this change in army representations did not take place overnight nor was it complete. It was gradual and only partial, and two parallel stories coexisted: the peripheral, lower class, and foreign Southwest and visions of a more middle-class, “modern,” and “progressive” American development.

As seen, officers and their wives did not wish to identify with the borderlands landscapes and societies as they were. Instead they sought desperately to change them. Officers wrote enthusiastically that the “civilized world” was teeming with “wonderful advances” that must penetrate the border area as rapidly and overwhelmingly as possible. The railroads represented the key in turning the region around.

The transcontinental railroad would break the harmful grip of distance connecting the Southwest and the rest of the nation. While the whole Southwest had no railroads in the mid-1870s, by 1882 Arizona alone had 576 miles of track. In a matter of a few years the borderlands was efficiently linked to the world economy and subject to the invasion of industrial capitalism. Many army members praised the effect of the railroad. “The progress in building railroads…has been one of the wonders of this western country,”

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118 Nelson A. Miles, *Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles*, 2 vol. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 53. When traveling back to the states many army people wrote that they went back to the “inside.” Thus, for them the Southwest represented the “outside.” See Corson reminiscences, UASP; Corbusier, *Soldier*, 73, 87; Corbusier, *Recollections*, 66.

119 Denver correspondence, Kautz letters, ASHS; Corbusier, *Soldier*, 162-163.
one officer felt. Others added that the railroads would not only be the best, speediest, and least costly mode to “protect the inhabitants” from Indians and Mexicans, but would allow a total turnaround when bringing in large numbers of “respectable citizens,” which would lead to the development of “proper” society and infrastructure, lure investments to develop the mines, and allow speedy exportation of the region’s riches. In short, railroads would enable a massive influx of middle-class whites who would, the army imagined, build a thriving and moral society and the development of industry - mining, ranching, and farming - that would introduce wealth and prosperity.

Not all were convinced. Some army members doubted whether the entry of lower class elements would cease. With the railroads, they claimed, would come mixed groups of white, Mexican, and Indian bandits, who as public enemies “hover like vultures” over the advance of transcontinental railroads. These “vultures” would then plunder “honest settlers” or worse, keep the “respectable” classes from coming. However, in general the army answer for future “betterment” was the large-scale colonization of the area by middle-class whites and the arrival of machine civilization. Many officers and their wives made it seem that wherever white middle-class made its mark, things began to improve. For instance, one officer was certain that whereas a region void of the American touch was dreary and unpleasant, showing few signs of human occupancy, barren and desolate, lacking roads, houses, and settlements, any area where there were decent white Americans there already existed signs to suggest “a prosperous and growing population.” According to another officer, “there can be little doubt that when the Territory shall receive an immigration of thrifty farmers, it will become one of the most prosperous countries in the Pacific slope.” In army narratives the 1880s was increasingly represented as a time of “marvelous developments.” In the early 1870s it was common for an officer to acknowledge in his official report that the region “is full of the precious metals,” and still write pessimistically that the country was too expensive for military operations and that “if the army would be withdrawn, the settlers would quit as well.”125 During the rest

120 ARSW, 1882, 101, 152. See also Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 291. For the relationship between the army establishment and the railroaders in the West, see Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 39-41, 172-179.
121 Denver correspondence, Kautz letters, ASHS; ARSW, 1872, 154; 1883, 295-315; Bourke, On the Border, 447.
122 ARSW, 1879, 164; 1880, 215; Bourke, On the Border, 447.
123 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 34-35.
124 ARSW, 1868, 47-48.
125 ARSW, 1872, 154
of the decade, the tone in annual reports grew increasingly hopeful. High-ranking officers felt that a few years of peace and better transportation facilities would make the Southwest into one of the most productive regions of precious metals.\textsuperscript{126} However, it was in the 1880s that the previously “neglected” land, in army view, was beginning to be used the right way. Finally farming thrived, releasing the “natural bounty” of the region and changing the value and appearance of the landscapes for the better. “Wonderful growth,” in the words of an army wife, had made the deserts over which she used to travel “productive and beautiful.”\textsuperscript{127} Others added that irrigation made the region’s productive soil “blossom.” One officer was enthusiastic that farms near Roswell, New Mexico, produced “marvelous crops of melons, alfalfa, fruits, and vegetables.” A few army texts celebrated that sheep and cattle raising also “forged ahead.”\textsuperscript{128} Clearly these writings made it seem that whites were finally taking control of wilderness, taming and subduing it.

Although they often valued independent small farmers as the backbone of a prosperous society, officers nevertheless usually represented mining as the most probable candidate for becoming the engine of economic improvement in the Southwest. “The vast growth of the mining interests in the southern part of this Territory [Arizona]…can hardly be appreciated without being seen. Towns have sprung up as if by magic. The sound of mills is heard all over this section, and the flow of bullion is large and increasing every day.” All this brings in large number of settlers who live upon the wants of the miner, and large herds of cattle and horses, wrote one army man. Many white army people, even some enlisted men, seemed certain: the Southwest of the 1880s was booming. Progress and development were remaking the region.\textsuperscript{129}

As seen, the officers or their wives did not regard the Southwest as a place where they personally wanted to live after retirement. Many nevertheless showed their faith in the white futures of the Southwest by investing into the region’s industries. Officers became involved in mining, real estate, and ranching endeavors. Already in the late-1870s, Arizona’s military commander Colonel August Kautz was certain that “if I stay out here a few years longer I shall own so many mines that if they don’t make me rich I

\textsuperscript{126} ARSW, 1875, 137; 1876, 98; 1878, 193.
\textsuperscript{127} Mills, \textit{My Story}, 146-147.
\textsuperscript{129} ARSW, 1880, 215. For enlisted men, see Barnes, \textit{Apaches & Longhorns}, 9-10.
shall be very poor.”

Some men like General Benjamin H. Grierson acquired land just for speculation, or invested heavily and suffered setbacks when their schemes failed to pay off. However, there were those who made rather lucrative transactions. For example, one major sold three lots in El Paso for $2,500, which equaled the annual salary of sixteen first-year enlisted soldiers. Usually officers failed to strike it rich, yet they shared a new sense of optimism. Some openly declared that Arizona had an abundance of gold only waiting for discovery by the whites, whereas one junior lieutenant who invested his money in town lots during the 1880s acknowledged that he did it because he was “so full of faith in the country.”

Enlisted men usually had no money to invest. Instead, they tried to strike it rich through their own initiative and toil. In the field, soldiers searched for riches with more enthusiasm than they did for Indians. Some men carried large horn spoons with which they washed the soil here and there, hoping to discover gold. In one case, a sergeant discovered silver when scouting in the Mogollon Mountains. After his discharge he organized mining enterprises, but his efforts were cut short when he lost his life in a fight with the Apaches. In another instance, soldiers camped near Knight’s Ranch, southwest of Silver City, entered the mining game in a peculiar fashion. The men “ran over the mountains in search of minerals” or “secretly worked with pick and shovel in lonely places, expecting to strike it rich and become millionaires in short time.” These activities not only reveal where the true interest of many enlisted men was during the military campaigns, but demonstrates their trust in the region.

In many texts Southwest landscapes changed from threatening wastelands to productive entities, but also to timeless places of escape suitable as destinations for affluent eastern visitors. The region would prove ideal for outings; gazing at the other-worldly wonders of the exotic and “uncivilized” in a subjugated, controlled, and named form. By the 1880s, officers and their wives increasingly began to bring relatives for

130 Denver correspondence, Kautz letters, ASHS. See also Corson reminiscences, UASP; Corbusier, Recollections, 149; Mills, My Story, 186.
131 For the major, see Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 182. For setbacks, see Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 154-155, 184, 188. For detailed studies of General Benjamin Grierson, his family, and their ventures in the Southwest, see Bruce J. Dinges, “Colonel Grierson Invests on the West Texas Frontier,” Fort Concho Report 16 (Fall 1984), 2-14; William H. Leckie and Shirley Ann Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His Family (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).
132 Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 100; Cruse, Apache Days, 239, 242-245. See also Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, for example 77-78, 136; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 181, 186-187.
133 Corbusier, Soldier, 80.
134 Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 111-112, see also 195 for another enlisted man engaged in mining who was killed.
135 Bode, Dose, 157.
visits to enjoy “the fine weather, the new and interesting scenes and colorful natives.” As an example of the nostalgia that quickly took over, one visitor in the early 1880s arrived with the intention to discover “exotic western gunmen” before they were gone.\textsuperscript{136} Besides mythic gunfighters, the army found visitor potential in nature, in areas such as the White Sands in New Mexico, or the Grand Canyon and the Petrified Forest in Arizona.\textsuperscript{137} Some saw the Southwest as a future health resort and spoke highly of the effects of the climate and springs. They felt excited when, for instance, bathhouses and a hotel were constructed near Hot Springs, New Mexico.\textsuperscript{138}

When officers and wives enjoyed leisure trips to indigenous and Spanish ruins, they claimed that these sites were just waiting to be discovered by eastern visitors seeking monuments of “ancient civilizations.”\textsuperscript{139} The old towns, missions, cliff dwellings, and canals also allowed army men and women to construct a “dim prehistoric past” for the region. Although the builders of cities and canals actually remained a mystery, the ruins supposedly told one thing: “They possessed a far superior civilization to the blood-thirsty races that now occupy their places.” Many imagined that “ancient” civilizations had once flourished in the Southwest and that the region had succumbed into chaos by the time the Americans “discovered” it. One officer, convinced that a wonderful and powerful people had once occupied the region, puzzled whether the Apaches had caused the decline.\textsuperscript{140} In this history the army constructed the United States received the role as a civilizing force that brought new hope to a place reduced to barbarism.

In many army minds the region’s settlements had also begun to change. Economic development meant “better built” towns and a more sophisticated social order. A surgeon’s wife felt relieved that progress had purportedly forced the “old timers” to make room for farmers.\textsuperscript{141} According to another officer’s wife, “the melancholy howl of the coyote, aforetime heard in the echoing darkness, and rattle of stage coach, with crack of whip and galloping mules as it clattered up with whoops and shouts and often a shot fired by a bibulous passenger, are sounds now banished by the

\textsuperscript{136} Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 148-149, 192, 237.
\textsuperscript{138} Charles Andersson papers, UASP; Bode, \textit{Dose}, 155.
\textsuperscript{140} Splitter, “\textit{Tour in Arizona},” 77, see also 84; Henry, “\textit{Cavalry Life},” 100. See also ARSW, 1877, 143; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 47; Carter, \textit{From Yorktown}, 178.
\textsuperscript{141} Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 150.
chime of church bells, whistle of locomotives and rumble of Pullman coaches over the
greatest railroads on the continent.” The place formerly known as the land of cacti,
deserts, and implacable Apaches was quickly gaining sovereignty and taking her place
with “the States of the Nation.” The “whistle of the locomotive,” people, and wealth
were taking over, an officer concluded.

Even such a nest of vice as Tucson was now imagined as more respectable.
Officers represented that Tucson had changed “the most appreciably of any town in the
Southwest; American energy and American capital had effected a wonderful
transformation.” Tucson was no longer an old Spanish place but also an American city,
with “delightful” Spanish and American society. Civilization was taking over when the
railroads brought, for instance, theatrical companies to perform in Tucson. While
Silver City still had some Mexican shanties as “an ugly reminder” of old days, it also
had many more frame houses, of which most were fitted out “in grand style.”
Somebody had even brought “a piano to these wild regions.” Arguably “the principal
city of the district,” Silver City was supposedly on its way for prosperous white
futures. Willcox was also transformed. “The lonely adobe stage station and telegraph
office was gone. In its place I found a wide-awake little city with broad, well-shaded
streets; comfortable homes, prosperous-looking business blocks, electric lights, city
water, and other evidences of civilization,” one enlisted soldier wrote. For him, the
advance of civilization had washed away the rough colonial town.

In general, progress was imagined as all powerful in most army minds. General
Nelson Miles, commanding Arizona from 1886, triumphantly declared that “our
progress knew no bounds.” One army wife stated that the Arizona she had known in
the early 1870s “had vanished from the face of the earth” after being overwhelmed by
the forces of progress. In 1891, an officer felt that Arizona had been thoroughly
transformed in a little over a decade. However, some had their doubts. According to
one wife, Arizona was “an unknown country then [1880s] to the majority of people, as

142 Baldwin, Army Wife, 60. See also Bourke, On the Border, 231-232.
143 George F. Price, Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1883), 153.
144 Bourke, On the Border, 450-451; Biddle, Reminiscences, 198-199; Cruse, Apache Days, 182. The new
era in Santa Fe also offered ample entertainment. It was even possible to go shopping there now, where as
before the army elite had sent away for most articles needed. Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 176-182.
145 Bode, Dose, 156.
146 Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 24.
147 Miles, Personal Recollections, 320, 341.
148 Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 291; Bryan B. Rogers, An Average American Army Officer: An
indeed it now [1907] is to many...none knows what the development of this wonderful country will be.”¹⁴⁹ A few found the commitment and effort of the white populace lacking. Whites allegedly arrived only to make their fortunes not their permanent homes. This is a paradoxical accusation as virtually none of the army elite wanted to stay in the region for good. Nevertheless, they argued that many white settlers exhibited a changeful mode of life which led to disregard of permanent improvements. For example, one lieutenant criticized the lack of trees planted. He saw it as a neglect due foremost to “the failure to appreciate the influence of timber upon climate and agriculture” and the “hard utilitarianism of our frontier populations, the lack of aesthetic sense and consequent blindness and indifference to the improving effect of timber upon the landscape.”¹⁵⁰ Interestingly, there were some among the army who regretted that the Southwest was becoming more like the rest of the country. They felt that the region was losing its exotic qualities. Some also pointed out that all the modern appliances and luxuries did not seem to belong to the place.¹⁵¹

In sum, while the army’s discourses generally painted the Southwest as an unattractive and remote wasteland, there happened a noticeable change in army representations during the late 1870s and early 1880s. Army people increasingly began to tell stories that made the region a more legitimate part of the nation. Their need to see change equaled an impulse to avoid recognizing any value in the social and environmental diversities of the region as they existed at the time when, in army minds, the region was nothing but an inferior wasteland. In other words, the region as the army found it was represented as having no value. Only progress could redeem the Southwest and make it a suitable living space for whites.

5.5 Representing the Army’s Mission

When white army men and women produced southern Arizona and New Mexico as a distant periphery ripe for regeneration by people representing a superior civilization, they reserved a special role for themselves as a group that made progress possible. It is notable that when parading the army’s excellence, white officers, their wives, and enlisted men wrote in unison. They represented the army as a white collective where class disharmony was silenced. White army people imagined

¹⁴⁹ Biddle, Reminiscences, 189-190; Al Sieber papers, ASHS.
¹⁵⁰ Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 128
¹⁵¹ Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 238-239.
themselves as a group of magnificent men and women, the first line of white civilization, and the one thing that secured the territories of Arizona and New Mexico. They were never too modest, but very anxious to gain national prominence and to make themselves historically important.

One discursive strategy white army people used was to place the army “always in the vanguard of civilization” leading its thrust into the “most isolated parts” of the world.\footnote{ARSW, 1878, 194; Bigelow, “Historical Sketch,” 23; Baldwin, Army Wife, 59.} According to an officer’s wife, the Southwest was the most “barbarous country where the foot of the white man had never trod” before officers entered it with their soldiers. She added that the army not only “made it possible for the great railways to be built across the continent,” but the army villages “made it practicable for the pioneer and early settler to take up ground, raise cattle and till the soil, for he, too, was protected by the soldier.”\footnote{Biddle, Reminiscences, 207-210.} In these self-triumphant texts, the army went to places where other whites did not dare. Writing in the early 1900s, one enlisted man felt that the soldiers, whom he not too modestly called the “winners of the west,” had made the ultimate sacrifice. Many men were “buried in unknown graves” when they “gave up their lives at the burning stake, surrounded by yelling savages…in order that the great West might be redeemed…all this that the sturdy pioneer might have the chance to build a home for those of present generation.” For this enlisted man, and to many others like him, it was the “heroic sacrifices,” and “bravery, courage, and determination” of soldiers that made possible the settlement of the “vast empire west of the Mississippi river.”\footnote{Mazzanovich papers, file 4 and file 12, ASHS. See also Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona,” 339.}

Army’s identity rested on notions of bravery and heroism. They sought to convince everybody that the army always faced discouraging odds, which only made its men so much braver. “It was a small Army with large tasks,” was a favorite cry amongst army men.\footnote{Anonymous, “Early Days,” 144; Sweeney, Making Peace, 31. This is a rather ridiculous stance when one considers the fact that the army represented the power of an industrial giant engaged against fragmented indigenous groups lacking industrial base and numbering no more than a few thousand people.} Army people also liked to claim that when white civilians were “terror-stricken,” prone to “state of constant terror,” or “depressed by the raids and the wide path of destruction made by the elusive savages,” the army did not falter but “encouraged” the civilians and made the Southwest “safe for the incoming pioneers and
prospectors.”

According to one officer, “It is to the credit of the United States army that a body of men in the Southwest, so few in number and belonging to races not trained to endure such hardships, furnished so much protection to settlers scattered over so vast a region. Many a life and ranch, and even hamlet, were saved by the timely appearance of a detachment of Uncle Sam’s rough riders.” Displaying their sense of racial superiority, one soldier proudly wrote that he and his comrades showed “the redskins that the white man was there to stay.”

Army men and wives also liked to remind everybody that they not only paved the way or protected others, but engaged first-hand in improving the region. The army increased its self-importance by emphasizing its role as the builder of roads and telegraph lines. It also planted hundreds of trees, and constructed small dams, sewage, and irrigation systems in effort to utilize and control the region’s precarious water supply. The army did all this for the sake of progress. Some officers, for instance, claimed that the telegraph line the army constructed “will facilitate commercial business and promote further development of the Territory,” or that the line “has done much to ameliorate the conditions of persons in public and private life whose lot has been cast in this remote portion of the territory of the United States.”

As a group of heroic men (and women), army people never recognized themselves as enforcers of violence or invaders on other peoples’ land, but rather painted the army’s mission as a defense and the acts of violence committed either defensive or retaliatory, and always necessary. They wrote that the army offered “a thin line of protection for civilization” along the Southwestern “Indian frontier,” tried to settle the “Indian business,” or participated in “the history of Apaches troubles in Arizona.” They imagined that they were performing a mission of bravery, unceasing

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156 King papers, ASHS: ARSW, 1886, 165; Crook, Resume of Operations, especially 1, 21; Carter, From Yorktown, 205. For similar statements, see also Parker, Old Army, 156; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 93; Merritt, “Incidents,” 156-161; ARSW, 1879, 166; Parker, Annals, 10.

157 Gatewood, “Campaigning,” 214; Platten, Ten Years, 36. See also ARSW, 1879, 166; Parker, Annals, 10.

158 ARSW, 1873, 51; 1874, 125. For the army constructing roads, see Corbusier, Recollections, 63; Schilling collection, box 1, UASP; ARSW, 1868, 65, 67; 1876, 103; 1878, 196; 1880, 210; Cruse, Apache Days, 32. For the building of telegraph lines, see Carter, From Yorktown, 192-193; ARSW, 1871, 68-69, 78; 1872, 77; 1873, 51; 1874, 65, 124-125; Corbusier, Soldier, 87. For the planting of trees, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 169; Mills, My Story, 190. For efforts to control water at forts Grant, Mojave, Apache, and Lowell in the mid-1880s with iron pipes, reservoirs, iron tanks, and steam pumps, see Corbusier, Recollections, 147; Mills, My Story, 190-193; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 166-167, 172-173; Schilling collection, box 2, file 3, UASP.

159 Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 3; Carter, From Yorktown, 178, 247; ARSW, 1868, 46-47, see also 44; 1882, 11; Elliott, “Geronimo Campaign,” 427; Mills, My Story, 200; Corbusier, Soldier, 159-160; Bourke, Diaries, 61. Cruse, Apache Days, 7; King papers, ASHS.
and unremitting vigilance, where all actions had been necessary, honorable, and justifiable. What in reality was conquest and colonialism became a road to peace and progress in army texts. Army members made themselves peace-bringers and peacekeepers who allowed “the peaceful settlement of the country under military protection,” as one officer wrote. “Our duty was to end wars and establish peace,” another declared. In this way, army people tried to secure moral superiority. Theirs was the righteous cause, their methods most humane, and their goal peace and prosperity. Those with the boldest imaginations saw that the army was not just any peace-bringer, but the body who succeeded where the Spanish had not, in ending centuries of bloodshed. In his pamphlet, one officer wrote that the army brought peace into a conflict that had been fought since “the days when the lieutenants of Cortez…first penetrated those regions.”

White army people did not stop there. They felt justified to complain that they should get more recognition and gratitude both at the local and national level. Many grew frustrated and bitter over the nationwide reluctance in recognizing Indian war veterans as national heroes. According to one officer, the nation that had proven so appreciative of Civil War soldiers or Spanish War and the Pacific Islands veterans, always overlooked the Indian wars. The people in the East would give “but nothing, absolutely nothing, for our brave boys” who fought against the Indians in the West. This officer felt compelled to ask “Are not our Indian War Veterans worthy of respect?” One officer’s wife insisted that “the army has not been given the credit it deserves.” Although the Southwest was now “thickly settled and worth millions of dollars for the government, people are still unappreciative, knowing nothing of the great work done by the army in securing the West,” she wrote. Thinking of themselves as the cornerstone of the republic and American democracy, white army people had grown tired of being overlooked. In their own minds, they had made progress possible through sacrifices and suffering and thus deserved to be recognized as national heroes.

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160 Carter, From Yorktown, 250-252; Schilling collection, box 2, UASP; Bourke, Diaries, 471-472.  
161 Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 103.  
162 ARSW, 1879, 164; Bourke, On the Border, 213.  
163 ARSW, 1874, 66; see also 1879, 166; Nickerson, “Major General,” 19; Bourke, On the Border, 220. See also Carr, “Days of the Empire,” 33.  
164 Cruse, Apache Days, 86.  
165 Parker, Annals, 16-17, see also 38-44.  
166 Biddle, Reminiscences, 207-210. See also Carter, From Yorktown, 193.
**Conclusion: Wretched Present, Thriving Future**

Through their discourses army officers and their wives reduced the Southwest and its landscapes, peoples, and settlements to an understandable and manageable whole and labeled and categorized colonial space in relation to their visions of what a proper region and society ideally looked like. Southern Arizona and New Mexico deviated from their standards, and officers and wives often felt uncomfortable and disgusted, claiming to find little of value in what they saw. This sense of alienation and difference structured the discourses. Officers and wives represented the landscapes as desolate and empty, offering only a whole variety of obstacles, challenges, and dangers to a civilized person. Villages/towns allegedly lacked familiar elements of public space and decent society found in the “white” Protestant towns and villages in the East. For officers and wives, crooked dirt roads, seemingly primitive adobe housing, the prevalence of bars and gambling houses, and the high percentage of Mexicans and lower class whites marked the settlements as foreign, unworthy, and immoral. They assigned to the Mexicans the role of racial degenerates and backward foreigners who had contaminated their own whiteness when associating with the Indians and subjecting themselves to Apache rule; and they judged the lower class whites not for their white ethnicity but for failing to act white. The small size and questionable quality of the white middle-class troubled many. For officers and wives, being categorized as part of the “respectable” class was connected to perceptions of manners, attitudes, and character, but also a fluid definition adjusted to meet the region’s supply of candidates. Sympathetic towards those they regarded as “civilizing forces,” officers and wives could also be highly protective of their collective image and usually instantly reduced all civilians thought to question the army into greedy exploiters.

The army represented the Southwest the way it did to make the U.S. invasion seem legitimate, right, and necessary. The border area was a dynamic entity in army discourses, a region constantly in the making. Its “peripheral location,” “unused landscapes,” and “inferior society” made it seem that the region would remain permanently different from the true “Anglo-Saxon” United States, but the army elite’s strategy to represent the region as having no proper society or civilization also made southern Arizona and New Mexico readily available for white middle-class takeover in the name of progress and civilization. So did the strategy of constructing a dim prehistoric past for the region. Army people claimed that the area had experienced a long and constant decline at the time the U.S. forces arrived. In this story the Southwest
was practically worthless and in a state of decadence when the army, and the white middle-class and machine civilization, whose entrance the army made possible, arrived to “save” the region.

Officers and their wives distanced and labeled the peoples and settlements with the region’s reordering and incorporation in mind. They evaluated different peoples and settlements by their (un)suitability for white middle-class futures. That the lower elements or the Mexicans did not present “respectable” whiteness made them especially unwanted in regards to the region’s ideal social makeup and dangerous to any future progress. Also, the “empty” landscapes and towns such as pre-railroad Tucson symbolized the static, peripheral, and disorderly contemporary state of affairs, whereas towns like Prescott signaled the arrival of progress, the remaking of the region to better suit the national model. Officers and their wives openly celebrated progress in the form of middle-class settlers, industry, and the railroads. Many claimed that a rapid and profound change was taking place in the 1880s: the landscapes were becoming productive and places like Tucson “respectable” once “civilized forces” took over. In this way, army discourses made U.S. colonialism not harmful but a necessity for the region’s well-being and survival.

Officers and their wives secured colonial authority by producing a certain relationship towards the place facing colonialism that ultimately manifested their not-belonging. First, they placed themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies and built their identity and authority by setting themselves apart from their colonial surroundings. When forced to live in a society they felt was not structured by the legacies and preferences of white middle-class Americans, the army elite felt a need to protect and distance themselves mentally from the local way of life, seeing the region as an unsuitable living space for themselves. Also, by representing the region’s peoples and settlements as uncivilized, worthless, and peripheral, army officers and their wives expressed that nobody or nothing in the Southwest society was equal or above them. As representatives of the refined native-born middle-class, they believed they constituted an anomaly in the backward and un-American border society. Second, officers and their wives increased their colonial authority and collective importance by claiming that they represented a group who saved the region, brought peace, and steered the place towards better white futures. They imagined that, if not for them, the region would have remained a dark and bloody ground. Army people’s sense of superiority also gave them the possibility to imagine that they had constructed the truth about the region’s past,
present, and future. All white army people seemingly never questioned what qualifications they might have for representing the “truth” about the region. They took their expertise for granted, as part of their privileged status as members of a purportedly superior culture.

White enlisted men approached the colonial terrain from a somewhat different perspective. Although they, much like the officers and their wives, also saw the landscapes in terms of confrontation, thought that the region was wild, peripheral, and remote, and imagined themselves as the heroic vanguard of civilization, enlisted soldiers did not share a need to distance themselves from the place facing colonialism. Their identity did not rest on being set apart from their surroundings. They enjoyed the more relaxed social scene found in many of the settlements, and did not fear imperial contamination, although many felt that there was ultimately something wrong and odd in a society that was so different from what they were used to. When officers and their wives rejected the colonial present, white enlisted soldiers negotiated that very present as potential living space for themselves, yet believed in civilization too.

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"My residence [was] a two-roomed adobe hut, with mud walls and floor, open to the thatch of brush, and without any article of furniture. This was our refuge. For this I had left civilization, and comfort, and security!"¹ - Julia Davis, an officer’s wife

In the summer of 1871, Lieutenant Frederick Phelps arrived to Fort Bayard with his wife. The post was located ten miles east of Silver City near the Santa Rita Mountains, in the midst of the mining district in southwest New Mexico. Coming from an established Ohio family where college level education was the rule, his father and grandfather having served as language teachers, lawyers, state supreme court judges, and farmers, Phelps initially felt unease adjusting to his new home. Although Phelps appreciated the companionship of officers and their wives, and felt that the locality was somewhat “picturesque,” the army village itself represented for him “everything undesirable,” a “lonely, isolated post six hundred miles” from the nearest symbol of civilization, the railroad. Phelps complained there was nothing to eat except meager government rations consisting mainly of beef, coffee, bacon, sugar, rice, pepper, salt, and vinegar, and a few extra cans of vegetables. Also, if not for a bachelor officer who let them have his house, the Phelps’ home would have been a tent. The house, originally built as a stable, proved an utter disappointment. It had a most peculiar parlor with one wall of stones, one of adobe, one of pine logs set on end, and one of slabs from the sawmill, Phelps described. The floor was rough boards, ceiling canvas, roof mud, the door of two boards on wooden hinges with a wooden latch, and the only window had immovable sash. The smaller room had no window and the floor was of hard smooth mud. Phelps’ house also included two tents, one used as a dining-room and the other as a kitchen. Although Phelps represented the house as a low, dark, and uncomfortable dwelling occupied by a number of dangerous tarantulas and centipedes, he also wanted to give an impression of the army elite’s capacity as civilized people to endure and

¹ Jim Schreier, ed., “For This I Had Left Civilization: Julia Davis at Camp McDowell, 1869-1870,” Journal of Arizona History 29 (Summer 1988), 190.
overcome such “hardships.” After improvements, Phelps tried to convince his readers, the home became “quite cosy and comfortable.”

The army made its occupation of indigenous peoples’ lands known by establishing posts on their homelands. Army posts functioned as bastions of U.S. power, or, as historian Durwood Ball called them, “armed national islands,” providing aid, security, and escorts to settlers, businessmen, and government officials, and offering the troops bases from which to conduct their offensive operations. The scale of conquest led to a situation that after the Civil War the army was scattered in more than two hundred posts from the Mexican border to the Canadian. More than anything else army posts were villages, living spaces where army men and women were able to put into practice their visions of proper life and social order, while simultaneously constructing specific identities and status for themselves. Villages functioned as social and cultural sites through which the values, norms, and practices of the metropolitan society were funneled to the colonized region. Army villages were also contested spaces, where the main social division separated the officers and their dependants from the lower class civilian servants and enlisted ranks. This chapter places the spotlight on the mentalities of officers and their wives, and discusses how their collective identity and position as the village upper class, the army elite, was constructed, displayed, and maintained through the orchestration and representation of public and domestic space.

Being always a tiny minority surrounded by large masses of immigrant and working-class enlisted men, officers and their wives could hardly rely on numbers when constructing their collective identity and importance inside the army villages. For example, in 1869 there were fourteen army villages in Arizona, with an average garrison of one hundred and fifty men each. Each village usually had only approximately two to six officers. When Camp Crittenden in 1870 had 143 white soldiers, only six officers lived there. One surgeon remembered that Fort Bowie during the late 1860s was a two officer post. In 1870, Bowie had six officers amongst

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3 Durwood Ball, “Fort Craig, New Mexico, and the Southwest Indian Wars, 1854-1884,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 73 (April 1998), 169. For the number of army posts, see Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 13. After the continent was in U.S. control the number of army posts rapidly declined. In two years alone, 1890 and 1891, about a fourth of all posts were abandoned. In 1894 there were only 80 posts left. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 282.

4 *Annual Report Secretary of War* (hereafter ARSW), 1869, 124.
approximately 300 soldiers. There were even fewer wives. In 1870, Bowie had four wives while at Camp Crittenden there lived none. Two years later Bowie and Crittenden had only one officer’s wife at each post. Even Whipple Barracks, the department headquarters, had only two wives in 1871.\(^5\) Besides soldiers and officers and their dependants, other residents in the villages included a highly variable number of laundresses, civilian servants, laborers, freighters, and merchants.

**6.1 Village Locations and Public Space**

As instruments of conquest, most army villages were temporary establishments, seldom intended or designed for long-term use. From time to time the army determined which villages were to be abandoned, which should be spared for the time being, and which were to be maintained longer. For example, the *Annual Report* for 1882 handed permanent status only to forts Grant and Huachuca in Arizona and forts Marcy and Wingate in New Mexico. Forts Thomas, Apache, Lowell, McDowell, and Whipple Barracks in Arizona and forts Bayard, Cummings, Union, and Stanton in New Mexico the report categorized as temporary and specified that in ten years time they would no longer be necessary. Forts Bowie, Mojave, Verde, and Yuma in Arizona and Craig and Selden in New Mexico the report judged suitable for immediate abandonment.\(^6\)

According to one officer, “the ever-changing location of Indians” determined village locations.\(^7\) In reality the situation was slightly more complex than that. Established near transportation routes, supply centers, reservations, and settlements, army villages were meant to enable successful conquest by their mere presence alone. For example, while Fort Bowie was placed to guard Apache Pass, a strategic route from California to the East, Fort Bayard was to guarantee the successful operation of an important mining district in southwest New Mexico. Forts Whipple, Lowell, and Marcy were situated in or near the major population centers of Prescott, Tucson, and Santa Fe.

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\(^5\) Gustav van Hemert Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Joseph P. Widney letters, July 21, 1867, Arizona State Historical Society, Tucson (hereafter ASHS); *Federal Census — Territory of New Mexico and Territory of Arizona: Excerpts 1860, 1864, and 1870* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), 133-143; Henry Windfred Splitter, ed., “Tour in Arizona: Footprints of an Army Officer,” *Journal of the West* 1 (July 1962), 83-84, 86; Anson Mills, *My Story* (Washington D.C.: Published by the author, 1918), 146. See also Mrs. Orsemus Bronson Boyd, *Cavalry Life in Tent and Field* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 123. While several officers had their families with them, enlisted men were usually single as the army was against their marrying. Still, a few soldiers had their families with them.

\(^6\) *ARSW*, 1882, 11-17.

\(^7\) *ARSW*, 1875, 122.
respectively, whereas Fort Cummings was located near a spring, the only source of water for forty-five miles on either side.⁸

Army men and women often complained that in determining village locations, considerations of human comfort were given little weight. Heat, lack of vegetation and game, and the occurrence of diseases were the most common vehicles used to label the village sites. According to one army narrative, Fort Thomas, established in 1876, was “next to Yuma, the hottest post in the republic and the most sickly, excepting none.” Located on a very low and hot valley squeezed in by mountains some six or seven thousand feet higher than the valley and only six or eight miles apart, the village received very little rain. What rain there was either fell on the mountains or was absorbed by the arid atmosphere before it reached the valley. This felt like a bad joke amongst the village residents to whom the location resembled an oven. In addition, a malignant fever troubled the occupants, causing several deaths among the soldiers. Ice would have saved many lives but the War Department was reluctant to issue any because of the cost. It is telling of the way the army elite took care of their own that when a daughter of one of the officers got the fever, a two hundred pounds supply of ice was delivered in twelve hours from another army village.⁹

Many a village location was estimated in the same way as Thomas. During late 1860s and early 1870s the sites of camps Crittenden, Goodwin, Date Creek, and Grant were all judged unhealthy and “extremely malarious.” According to one army wife, eighty percent of the men at Camp Date Creek suffered from malarial fever, whereas another army informant wrote that Camp Goodwin was “cursed” with malaria so that not only was everyone regularly sick but it was almost impossible for the soldiers to get well there. In 1871 Goodwin was abandoned, Crittenden two years later, and finally Date Creek in 1874. Grant was relocated in 1873.¹⁰ In New Mexico, a resident dubbed Fort Craig as “one of the most desolate posts on the frontier” as the village was situated on the edge of an almost perfectly level plain covered only with gravel and scarcely a bush. The site of Fort Selden included nothing but “sandy and sterile soil, resting on

⁹ Mills, My Story, 189-190.
¹⁰ Surgeon-General's Office, Circular no. 8, A report on the hygiene of the United States Army, with descriptions of military posts (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1875), 534; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 121; Schneider papers, box 2, file 15, Widney letters, November 20, 1867, ASHS; John Huguenot Marion, Notes of Travel Through the Territory of Arizona (Prescott: Office of the Arizona Miner, 1870), 7; Frazer, Forts of the West, 5-9.
volcanic rocks.” Some described Camp McDowell as being “fearfully hot” for the three summer months, and claimed to have measured 116 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade, while others called it “the most unhappy post at which we ever served.” It is noteworthy that not all agreed. More rarely officers and their wives portrayed the village sites in a positive light. One army wife even found the climate at McDowell to be pleasant especially during the fall, when the weather was “the most charming imaginable.” Also, the surroundings of Fort Stanton were represented as pleasant, residents enjoying nearby streams alive with fish. Game of almost every kind was also found in the vicinity. Also the climate was perfect, not too warm or too cold. “To breathe was like drinking new wine,” one army wife at Stanton wrote. At Whipple Barracks the army village itself was supposedly far from handsome, but the blue skies, the wonderful rugged mountains, and the mystery of the desert made the location bearable to some.

Before the early 1900s army villages differed in their design and use of building materials. Although the Quartermaster General’s office in Washington D.C. suggested designs, the officers at the local level usually constructed the villages trusting their own preferences and using the materials at hand. Often the villages were set to reflect the army elite’s perceptions of what a proper American settlement should look like. The villages displayed a hierarchical and segregated layout in housing, combined with shared public areas and buildings. Usually, as historian Alison Hoagland writes, the army village consisted of a dozen or more buildings “organized around an open space, much like a village green; the buildings were a mixture of style and materials, much as if they had been built by private citizens over several decades; lesser buildings appeared in a disorderly arrangement, away from the center; and trees, porches, sidewalks, and gardens contributed to the domestic atmosphere.”

The parade ground was the village center, around which the buildings were organized. For instance, Fort Bowie in the mid-1870s had three sets of officers’ quarters

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11 For Craig, see Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 45. For Selden, see Surgeon-General’s Office, Circular no. 8, 295.
12 Sandra L. Myres, ed., “Evy Alexander: The Colonel’s Lady at McDowell,” Montana: Magazine of Western History 24 (Summer 1974), 30, 32, 35. For the unfavorable assessment, see James Worthington letters, November 1, 1879 and July 23, 1880, ASHS; Mills, My Story, 150.
13 Ellen McGowan Biddle, Reminiscences of a Soldier’s Wife (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1907), 164-168; Mills, My Story, 145. For Stanton, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 164-165.
on the south side of the parade. East side had another set of officers’ quarters adjoining
the adjutant’s office, and a building containing the post library, schoolroom, the post
bakery, and a set of company quarters. Another set of company quarters and two large
storehouses were located on the north side. Behind the company quarters were the
mess-room, kitchen, a bath-room, and lavatory used by enlisted men. The west side was
reserved for the post hospital. A short distance in the rear of the south end of the
hospital was the guardhouse. Quarters for married soldiers were at the old post site,
while the shops, stables, and corral were to the north. The post garden was a quarter of a
mile distant from the village proper.\(^\text{15}\)

The layout, although nowhere identical, was similar in most villages. The parade
ground divided village space to the officers’ realm, the enlisted section, and the
common part. Usually at least one side of the parade was reserved for officers’ homes,
and the soldiers’ “neighborhood” was typically located on the opposite side, away from
elite eyes. The rest included “shared space” occupied by administrative, commercial,
and other public buildings. In some places a roadway encircled the parade ground.
Whipple Barracks, for instance, had the soldier’s quarters, kitchen, and bakery on one
side, with the officers’ quarters opposite, and the storerooms on the another side, with
the guard-house, adjutant’s office, and laundresses’ quarters opposite. At Camp Verde
the west side of the parade ground had enlisted men’s “world” with the company
quarters and the guard-house, and the east side the officers’ quarters. The south side was
the domain of “the shared public space,” including an administrative building with
offices for the adjutant, quartermaster, and commissary, a school-room, and a “lower
class” section with three sets of laundresses’ quarters and another building used by
married soldiers. Outside the main circle were the hospital, the magazine, and bakery,
while the gardens were about a mile and half above the village and the post cemetery
two miles northeast.\(^\text{16}\)

A “typical fort,” historian Robert Utley wrote, “looked more like a village than a
fort” as only a handful displayed stockades or other defenses.\(^\text{17}\) Officers and wives also
recognized this. Due to lack of stockades, some officers thought that the forts really did

\(^{15}\) Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 532-533.
\(^{16}\) Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 535, 552-553, 555.
\(^{17}\) Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (1973; reprint,
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 81. In the Southwest, Fort Cummings, entirely surrounded
by an adobe wall ten or twelve feet high, was an exception. Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 128-129.
not live up to the meaning of the word.\textsuperscript{18} Compared to New England village landscape the army villages, however, looked somewhat different. Sutler’s buildings acted as stores and kitchens, canteens (in the 1880s) and mess rooms imitated bars and restaurants. Blacksmiths and sometimes carpenters and other skilled craftsmen provided their services somewhat like in the “normal” civilian villages. However, the army posts, for one thing, completely lacked meetinghouses and chapels. Religion in general was very much downplayed in the army. Also, although some villages had a reading room or a library they were often poorly stacked and in shabby condition. Also the school houses, the few places that had them, seemed to enjoy only minimal usage.\textsuperscript{19}

Furthermore, the parade ground sometimes looked less than ideal “village green.” For instance, at Camp Date Creek the village center was all rock, without any grass on it, while the parade at Fort Yuma was “a stony lawn - the rocky hill roughly dressed and made smooth by filling in with fine stone.”\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, although the army villages had no high houses and the buildings were only one or one-and-a-half story structures, which increased a village-like feel, the houses, unlike in the east, were not only poorly built but made mostly of adobe. In the mid-1870s, forts in New Mexico like McRae and Selden were entirely of adobe, Stanton of stone, while Bayard was of adobe, stone, and log. In Arizona forts Bowie, Lowell, McDowell were adobe constructions, while Apache was built of wood, mostly of rough-hewn pine logs. Seven years later the situation was still much the same. Forts Bowie, Craig, Lowell, McDowell, Mojave, Stanton, and Verde were made of adobe, Whipple of frame, and Yuma of brick.\textsuperscript{21}

Army villages were never ready, but objects of constant improvement.\textsuperscript{22} In order to make public space more eastern village-like, the army attempted landscaping. According to one officer, Fort Yuma was transformed into a real garden by directing water through ditches from the Colorado River. The village gained an ample garden of vegetables and rows of planted trees. “Everything is green and beautiful, but only

\textsuperscript{18} Oliver O. Howard, \textit{My Life and Experiences among our Hostile Indians} (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 126.

\textsuperscript{19} In 1879, forts Bayard, Stanton, and Wingate in New Mexico had schools attended by average of only 10, 13, and 10 enlisted men each, while in Arizona forts Bowie and Lowell had the only schools, and only in Lowell ten enlisted men participated. The schools did have some children as students. Four years later school attendance was still unpopular among enlisted men, only 38 men participating in Arizona. ARSW, 1880, 295-296, 316; 1883, 54-56.


\textsuperscript{22} For the constant rebuilding and repairs of the villages, see also next chapter.
because here water has been brought to land which was once called the American desert,” one of the army wrote. It was a joy to see “the green leaves within the enclosure, and it gave us all a keen sense of comfort to escape from the intolerable dust and heat outside into the spacious quarters of [the] major.” In army minds Yuma had the reformed appearance of an oasis in the desert. So did Whipple Barracks, which in 1876 had “a good stream of water running through the garrison and some small willows and cottonwood trees” planted. At Fort Stanton the army placed new trees around the parade ground and to facilitate their growth dug a ditch with water constantly running on it that kept the trees always moist.23

Often the projects failed. At Camp McDowell a line of cottonwood saplings were planted after 1865 at short intervals along the sides of the parade ground for ornaments and shade. Watered “assiduously” for two years, the trees reportedly at first flourished, but then showed signs of decline in spite of attention paid to them, and eventually came to be neglected. In 1869, one army wife, judging McDowell unsuitable for gardening, wrote that there was “not a green thing to be seen” in the village. Although another wife felt differently, arguing that “anyone can have a garden here if he chooses to take the trouble,” a decade later the attempts to construct a post garden at McDowell, and to make the desert bloom, had failed, the garden being neglected and overgrown with weeds.24

Projects turned more ambitious in the 1880s. The army, for instance, ran water to Mojave, Apache, and Lowell through elaborate systems of iron pipes, reservoirs, tanks, and steam pumps.25 To battle chronic water shortage at Grant the army channeled water from the mountains above to a newly built reservoir, from which it was driven onwards through a system of pipelines. Grant got a sprinkler system and a sewage system that made possible bathrooms inside the houses and water closets outside. Although scarce and of poor quality in the past, now water was deemed so plentiful that the army built six fountains. Also, water was used to irrigate cottonwood trees every day, and for increased gardening. The ultimate monument to progress and to the army’s mastering of nature, however, was the large cement-walled pond, named Lake Constance, on the parade ground. As this rebuilding at Grant was completed, officers claimed that the

23 For Yuma, see Oliver O. Howard, Famous Indian Chiefs I Have Known (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 39, 41; Howard, My Life, 126. For Whipple Barracks, see Mills, My Story, 145; Biddle, Reminiscences, 164-165. For Stanton, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 169.
24 Surgeon-General’s Office, Circular no. 8, 545; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 192; Mills, My Story, 149; Worthington letters, June 13, 1880, ASHS.
25 Frank Schilling collection, box 2, file 3, University of Arizona, Special Collections (hereafter UASP).
precarious uncertainty of water was a hindrance of the past. The post “certainly looked at its best, all beautifully green, the lake full of clear water, the fine mountains playing and the sun shining through them.” It was not only ironic, but a telling reminder of the overconfidence of the army that, according to historian Constance Wynn Altshuler, Grant was abandoned because of water shortage in 1905.  

### 6.2 Domestic Space

Although officers, their wives, and the enlisted ranks were aliens under the same sky and held residence in the same villages, they did not live like a united community of equals. Not only were elite houses physically separated from the enlisted buildings, but the houses themselves were very different and reflected a clear hierarchy and differentiation. Enlisted men lived densely in large barracks where there was no privacy and little space for each individual. As a rule two men were forced to share a bunk, before in 1871 and 1872 enlisted men began to get their own separate beds. Often the comforts and furniture were also minimal. For instance, at Camp Grant soldiers lived in four large shingle-roofed adobe barracks, 120 by 20 feet, warmed with fire-places and stoves. Aside the bunks, there was not much furniture. In Fort Apache soldiers occupied overcrowded barracks of rough-hewn logs, chinked with mud and roofed with boards. They had neither floors nor ceilings, with only one door in the front and a small window in the rear. Two-story bunks and a few benches and tables, all manufactured by the soldiers, constituted the furniture. Reportedly the men preferred to sleep in the open air during the summers to avoid “the persecutions of the numberless bed-bugs which infest the quarters.”

Sometimes the enlisted men did not even have any barracks. In the early 1870s soldiers at Camp Date Creek had to occupy a storage house. However, usually soldiers ended up living in tents. For example, in 1869 at Camp McDowell four companies of enlisted soldiers slept in tents, while one troop occupied an adobe barracks. Officers, however, had houses. In addition, the post included houses for the blacksmith, a

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28 Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 528, 536.

29 ARSW, 1872, 75.
hospital, guardhouse, sutler’s store, and commissary/bakehouse. Even the laundresses appear to have lived in some sort of houses. By 1874 the situation had improved somewhat as apparently all soldiers lived in adobe dormitories.\(^{30}\) Still, it is safe to say that the construction of enlisted men’s barracks was never the first priority. Fort Lowell was relocated on March 1873, but almost two years later the soldiers still lived in old and worn-out tents, two men per tent. The tents offered no protection from the heat of the sun in the summer or from the cold of winter. Lowell, however, already had two sets of officers’ quarters, a store-house, and “a very fine guard-house.” Under these circumstances an enlisted soldier opting for better quality housing had to arrange to have himself locked up. When the soldiers eventually received funding to erect barracks at Lowell, it was not because the army saw that adobes were better than tent canvas, but because they proved cheaper.\(^{31}\)

On the question of their own housing, officers and their wives insisted on the necessity of private homes, usually one or two family houses handed out according to rank. While colonels were officially supposed to get five rooms, second lieutenants were allocated only one. Often the post commanders’ houses were elegant and spacious, at least when compared to enlisted men’s barracks. At Fort Grant in 1874 the commanding officer lived in a 50 by 90 feet building traversed by a hall from front to rear, and by one from side to side, cutting the house into four portions, each containing two rooms. In the rear, under the same roof, an extension contained a dining-room and kitchen. There were also rooms in the attic for the use of servants and for storage. The whole structure was surrounded by a veranda. Other officers lived in semi-detached houses, 50 by 68 feet, containing, for each officer, three rooms plus a detached kitchen and dining-room as well as attic space and a veranda. The buildings were all constructed with stone walls and shingle-roofed. At Fort Bowie, the officers’ quarters were adobe constructions, with dirt roofs. The main part contained two rooms, 15 by 15 feet, separated by a hall, and a wing in the rear, which had a dining-room and kitchen.\(^{32}\) In the mid-1870s Fort Bayard had new quarters under construction for officers to replace the “old log huts.” The new adobe houses, with shingle roof, consisted each of a hall, bedroom, dining-room, with pantry attached and cellar underneath, and a kitchen. The rooms were 16 by 16 feet, and 14 feet high. A yard with adobe or stone walls was

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\(^{30}\) Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 186, 191; Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 545. For the prevalence of tent living among enlisted ranks, see also ARSW, 1868, 50.

\(^{31}\) Fort Lowell records, ASHS; Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 541-542.

\(^{32}\) Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 532-533, 536.
attached to each house. The yard had a wood-shed, water-closet, bathroom, chicken-coop, and a servant’s room. A covered porch was set to extend in front of each building to increase the village-like feel.\footnote{Surgeon-General’s Office, \textit{Circular no. 8}, 247.}

Officers and their wives dreaded the possibility that they would have to reside in tents, although when such was the case the tents were much more spacious and luxurious than the ones given to enlisted men. Disliking the tents immensely some officers and wives felt content with any house. For instance, one couple were pleased with their “primitive” log house at Whipple Barracks because they were under the impression that in most other places in the region all were housed in tents. Also, even though one family was disappointed that their house was not finished when they arrived at Fort Selden, they still felt lucky that the rooms already available for occupation proved “larger and better than a tent.”\footnote{Mills, \textit{My Story}, 145; Lydia Spencer Lane, \textit{I Married A Soldier; or Old Days in the Old Army} (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1893), 188.}

Although private houses implied stability and a certain standard of civilization, often the quality of the houses available failed to meet the demands and expectations of officers and wives. Army wives especially, but also officers, constructed a plethora of representations of the housing, judging and valuing their homes by using the building materials, orderly appearance, and level of comfort as measurements. For instance, at Camp Date Creek, Fanny Corbusier, an army surgeon’s wife, wrote that she was forced to occupy a two room adobe house with dirt roofs that had been shingled over and ceilings of shelter tents sewed together. In this odd dwelling the roof of the separate dining room and kitchen was canvas that leaked badly, and floors were pounded earth so that in the wet season pools of water became muddy. The Corbusiers placed bowls to catch the water, but still the stove got so wet it was hard to keep the fire going. Much to their distress the Corbusiers also found numerous rattlesnakes, Gila monsters, scorpions, tarantulas, and centipedes in the ceiling, on the dirt floor, on their furniture, outside their front door, and among the piles of rocks near the post; in other words almost everywhere.\footnote{Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 32-35.}

Also describing her life at Camp Date Creek in the 1870s, Frances Boyd, an officer’s wife, wrote that the far from adequate adobe house she occupied consisted of “one long room, with a door at either end, and two windows on each side.” The room had to be divided by a canvas curtain to have a sitting-room and a bedroom. “We felt
very happy on account of having a floor other than the ground,” although it was only rough planks, which had shrunk so that they had wide spaces between them. The adjoining vacant house was used as a dining room, and a separate kitchen stood far away in the opposite direction. Being left unfinished the walls of rough brown adobe crumbled in the dry atmosphere, and large holes formed, in which vermin, especially centipedes, found hiding-places. “I never dared place our bed within at least two feet of” of the walls because the centipedes “were so plentiful that I have frequently counted a dozen or more crawling in and out of the interstices,” Boyd noted. “Scorpions and rattlesnakes also took up their adobe with us, and one snake of a more harmless nature used almost daily to thrust his head through a hole in the door. Altogether we had plenty of such visitors.” She admitted that they killed so many snakes that to obtain a plentiful collection of rattles. In all, Boyd felt that “for surely no one ever lived more queerly.”

She categorized the housing conditions to be far from normal, or acceptable, and below the standards of what she felt her class position demanded.

Army wives’ representations of housing at Camp Date Creek formed rather a typical case. The situation was usually just as “queer” in any of the villages, although the exact nature of deficiencies, or what some of officers and their wives termed as “oddities,” varied from village to village and from house to house. In addition to what they thought was utterly incomprehensible and substandard construction, where, for instance, floors and windows did not exist and every wall in a room could be of different material, one of the most troubling issues for officers and wives seems to have been that the houses failed to provide security. Not only snakes and other wildlife, but fire and water caused damage and made life uncertain. For instance, in September 1876 a fire destroyed the stockade building and all officers’ quarters at Camp Mojave, Arizona, whereas in 1881 three major fires were reported which ruined the headquarter-office building at Whipple, a bakery at Apache, and officers’ quarters at Verde. Next year another fire destroyed a set of officers’ quarters at Fort Apache. If fires seemed frequent enough, so did water damage. In 1866, flooding partly destroyed the first Camp Grant, while at Camp McDowell before the early 1870s almost all roofs leaked and walls cracked and washed away. Another example, this time from Fort Lowell, shows that in 1879 the roofs in the officers’ quarters and barracks leaked to such an extent that new roofs were immediately needed. The situation at the post hospital was

37 ARSW, 1877, 191; 1881, 447; 1882, 265. For fires, see also Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 235-238.
perhaps the worst. The building leaked so badly that it was almost impossible to protect patients and property, not to mention to preserve the rooms in proper hospital condition. Walls and floors were soaked and stained by water and mud passed through the roof so “as scarcely to be recognized or endured as hospital walls.” In 1883, storm damage was reported for camps Bowie and Price.\(^38\) When she lived in Fort Bayard, Frances Boyd felt that it was beneath her status to inhabit a log hut with “no floor,” damaged by dust and sudden storms that either washed right through the house from the open doors or, alternatively, uprooted the whole structure. Inside the houses, Boyd claimed, the ladies were forced to mount chairs or tables to escape mud baths and take refuge under umbrellas until after the storms subsided. While some bachelor officers saw their roof give in several times, one fresh army bride witnessed a storm pass through her house from the open doors. The storm soaked her fancy eastern carpet with mud, streaked and discolored her white curtains, and turned her pictures and ornaments unrecognizable. “I never saw a more dismayed and discouraged woman,” Boyd wrote of the bride.\(^39\)

A number of army people saw the use of adobe - linking it to inferior Mexican tradition - as synonymous with lack of comfort and proper sophistication. As in officers and wives’ representations of the region’s settlements, abode became a tool in labeling the standards of living space, often marking them unfit. For one army wife, Fort Mojave in the early 1870s represented a “mere collection of adobe buildings with no special pretensions to comfort.”\(^40\) Others acknowledged the practical wisdom of adobe buildings against outside heat.\(^41\) For them the poor quality of housing was not a question of adobe alone. Wood and brick could prove equally miserable choices.\(^42\)

Army houses often did not provide proper comfort or much valued security, and thus they proved poor examples of middle-class living and failed as sanctuaries for middle-class privacy. However, officers and their wives held a strong belief in progress and wanted to represent themselves as a group who could make civilization happen. Their identity called for a proper home and therefore, domestic spaces, much like the public spaces, became targets for an endless improvement. The army elite shared a strong desire to “beautify” their homes. It seems that many a wife especially approached this task with energy and zeal. Reflecting middle-class ideals, in the gender ideology of

\(^{38}\) Frazer, *Forts of the West*, 6; Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 545; Fort Lowell records, May 1, 1879 and July 1, 1879 letters, ASHS; ARSW, 1883, 589.


\(^{40}\) Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 106-108. See also Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 44.

\(^{41}\) Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 30, 32, 35.

\(^{42}\) Biddle, *Reminiscences*, 164-165.
the army elite domestic space was the primary domain of women. Being considered mere camp followers with no official position in the eyes of the army irritated some wives, but it did not diminish their attempts to portray themselves as a civilizing force whose loyalty was to their husbands and the army and who exercised their power primarily through the domestic sphere. Army wives displayed “sweet goodness and devotion” and “surely in no other life can women be found who are at once so brave and true,” one wife wrote. 43 Many claimed that the mere presence of officers’ wives made the villages instantly more “home-like” and comfortable. 44 However, in the end many of the wives did not reach their goals, but grew frustrated by their inability to make the homes copies of eastern middle-class houses.

Julia Davis at Camp McDowell was one energetic wife determined to make her house a civilized home. “Thankful I was now for all the baggage I had carried. The bed was put up; the pretty lace curtains arranged both for it and for the window; and I had beautiful linen, part of my wedding out-fit,” she wrote. The walls, she felt, had to be improved. “I had no idea of sitting down on a packing-case and gazing on mud walls, if I could do better. Happy was I when I succeeded in having those mud walls whitened, when I hung up my pictures, arranged my photographs, and placed my books on the shelves improvised from a packing-case.” It seems that McDowell lacked lumber to make furniture. However, Davis was seemingly untroubled by the lack of materials at her disposal. Proud of her resourcefulness and confident that she could overcome all obstacles, she improvised: “packing cases made everything-toilet-table, seats, book case, sofa, wardrobe, all the necessities of life.” When tables and chairs proved “things unknown,” Davis had rough boxes and chests to serve the purpose. Also, “our own trunks and boxes covered with gaudy chintz…and with their tops well stuffed with hay, supplied as seats and lounges.” Chintz and muslin and “a little skilful arrangement did wonders.” In addition, she had a chimney contrived, and the blacksmith made her a pair of iron dogs. “When we had a fire it was just as nice as it could be.” In the end she was relatively please with the improvements, thinking she had made best of the situation: “it was the cunningest little house when it was all fixed up, and the wonder of everybody who saw it.” 45

45 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 192. For the lack of lumber, see Mills, My Story, 150.
Another wife shared the optimistic spirit of Julia Davis. She spread curtains to hide the adobe walls as much as possible, arranged curtains as festoons over and around the front door which was part glass, and covered the hard and dry mud floors with a carpet. “How much good a little fixing up does,” she wrote.\textsuperscript{46} In their house the Corbusiers had ample matting to cover the floor, a “comfortable couch” from a rough-board frame, hospital bed-springs and a mattress covered with cretonne. The also had two walnut rockers and two folding carpet chairs, china, lamps, and a few books. One resourceful wife made adornments for her house by sewing. She made window curtains and upholstered a lounge and two chairs “in pretty light blue cretonne with apple blossoms on it.”\textsuperscript{47} An army surgeon in Fort Bowie had windows made larger, inserted glass, and had new writing tables, bookcases, chimneys and fireplaces built. His goal, he wrote, was the same as it was with the others: to turn his accommodation into “quite a civilized apartment.”\textsuperscript{48}

Some were less pleased with the results of their efforts than others. Many a times the women felt that they were forced to settle for less than ideal solutions when constructing their domestic spaces. Some felt troubled that there was no room for all their belongings. Although army wives could arrive with more than a dozen large trunks, they were “glad to find simply storage,” while the “pretty contents never saw the light,” one wife wrote. Another added that when the time for unpacking all the chests and trunks came “there was no closet, there were no hooks on the bare walls, no place to hang things or lay things, and what to do I did not know. I was in despair.” She was “born and brought up in a spacious house, with plenty of bedrooms, closets, and an immense old-time garret.” Thus, she wrote, the “small space of one room and a hall” and the “forlorn make-shifts for closets, and the absence of all conveniences, annoyed me.”\textsuperscript{49}

Many who had to resort to makeshift complained that their homes were never properly furnished or that they altogether lacked articles that would qualify to be called furniture. One couple had a makeshift construction of a chest with cushions on top and covered with the carriage blanket “doing duty” as a divan. This divan with two tables and three chairs “furnishes (?)” the parlor, they wrote. Resorting to irony, this couple added that their bedroom was “being luxuriously” filled with a bedstead and a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{46} Mills, \textit{My Story}, 149-150.
\bibitem{47} Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 34; Biddle, \textit{Reminiscences}, 168.
\bibitem{48} Schneider papers, box 2, file 15-16, Widney letters, November 20 1867, and December 4 1867, ASHS.
\end{thebibliography}
washstand, and the dining room “amply furnished with one table.”\textsuperscript{50} An army surgeon covered the rough mud ceiling of his roof with unbleached cotton, had his book shelves suspended from the rafters by the same material torn into strips. One hanging over the fireplace was filled with bottles of all sizes that contained every form of vermin and reptile found in that region. One of his visitors felt that “they were not elegant mantel ornaments.”\textsuperscript{51}

6.3. Domestic Life

Furniture was in part migratory like the officers and their dependants as much of it was imported to the region. However, when the officers and their wives moved out of a village many of their belongings remained and were sold in auctions. These events proved not only valued social gatherings but a practical way to get rid of the baggage officers and wives did not need or could not carry with them. Many also appreciated the money obtained to cover the often expensive moves. Auctions also allowed an opportunity for social evaluation. One wife hired a man to scrub their house until everything shone, being aware of how articles were examined by other military ladies looking for spots and specks. She managed to secure rather lofty sums, selling, for instance, eleven white china soup-plates for $22, a cooking stove for $80, and a sewing machine and a piano for $100 a piece.\textsuperscript{52} Some even sold their clothes, because as we “had generally been in the Territory some years…the civilian clothes brought in would not do very well after getting back to the States.” Ellen Biddle, an officer’s wife, was told by her husband not to go to the auctions as they had already so much stuff that they would never get rid of it. On the day of their own auction at Whipple Barracks the house and grounds were crowded with people and the Biddles made many times more money than expected. Still they were left with several wagons filled with furniture, and boxes, in addition to dogs and horses and other belongings.\textsuperscript{53}

These auctions give a glimpse of the relative wealth of officers and their wives, which in part made them the upper class in the army villages. They had furniture and clothes for sale, and also money enough to buy materials at not so modest prices. When enlisted men moved to another village, they usually had nothing to sell and little to

\textsuperscript{50} Mills, \textit{My Story}, 150. See also Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 44.
\textsuperscript{51} Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 157-158.
\textsuperscript{52} Lane, \textit{I Married A Soldier}, 165-166, 194-195. For arguments of the high cost of travel to and from the Southwest, see Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 192; Lane, \textit{I Married A Soldier}, 165-166; Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 35.
carry with them. Their means, with a starting salary of $13 month, were equally limited when it came to consumption. Proper domesticity for the officers and their wives included a certain standard of living, hard and costly to maintain in the colonial terrain. In everyday life, one army surgeon acknowledged, it was expected that an army officer “lived well.” “It is wrong” or unbecoming for an officer “to be too economical.” Many an officer and wife struggled to uphold an acceptable standard, although their pay was ten to thirty times that of enlisted soldiers. While more than a few fell in debt, officers and their wives remained determined to compensate the shortcomings of colonial life by ordering as much as they could from the outside. At one village, a couple sent to San Francisco for doors and whitewashed moldings, while one army wife was ready to order a $75 pipe for her husband. Several sent east for their wardrobe, ordering pants, suits, and other articles which sometimes took as long as fourteen months to reach them. There was also little guarantee of what, if anything, actually arrived. One army wife used forty-two dollars for a hat she never actually wore because it was the wrong kind. She also wrote that many were annoyed when unable to ease their situation and buy luxuries no matter how much they spent. She thought that sending east was bound to result in weary waiting and taxing disappointments, whereas local supply was nonexistent.

Although moderately wealthy, officers and wives in the Southwest could rarely purchase the sort of food they wished. To their eastern taste the food supply appeared severely limited and the prices of any luxury product exorbitant. The lack of appropriate dishes proved a problem especially when visitors arrived and expected to be treated to a meal suitable to their class standing. In dire circumstances, one officer’s wife thought chocolate, macaroni, prunes, raisins, and currants as almost too much of a luxury. Another complained the lack of fresh meat, milk, or eggs. She especially disliked living on canned food, declaring that “I have hated canned food ever since” residing in the Southwest. However, the situation varied somewhat from village to village, when, for instance, at Whipple Barracks in the 1870s the commissary was described as “excellently supplied,” and the officers managed to obtain almost anything they

54 Worthington letters, November 1, 1879, ASHS.
55 Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 194; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 132-133, 137; Worthington letters, May 29, 1880 and July 16, 1880, ASHS. For debt, see Biddle, Reminiscences, 191-192; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 231.
56 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 214-220.
57 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 128-129, 139-140; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 193. See also Corbusier, Recollections, 33-34. For the cost of things, see ARSW, 1872, 153.
wanted. Also, many tried to solve the problem by raising their own food. They not only cultivated small garden patches, but had cows and chickens on their backyards and sheds. A few even earned extra income by making butter and raising chickens and turkeys. One wife, for example, not only had all the chicken, eggs, and turkey her family could consume, but plenty to give away to close friends, and also more than two hundred chickens and fourteen turkeys for sale.

In the early 1880s, as the railroads made importing various products easier, the selection in the army villages grew considerably more diverse. For instance, at Whipple Barracks the railroad introduced much-coveted fresh lobsters and oysters. Opening an oyster can one army wife wrote that “such a sight had never before been seen there. Fine fresh fat oysters brought in ice all the way.” She felt “they were delicious,” even with the price of seven dollars apiece. The commissary ledgers from Fort Apache between 1880-83 show that officers had the opportunity to purchase cigars, tobacco, pipes, salmon, lobster, shrimp, clams, oysters, tomatoes, peaches, jam, pears, apples, milk, tea, sugar, etc. It was common that officers made purchases for at least $20 to $40 a month, some spending close to $100. Dinners in the 1880s became relatively well-supplied and more elegant. One, for example, included “soup, fish, claret, meat, vegetables, olives, champagne, pudding and coffee, a dish of flowers in the center of the table and flowers in the finger bowls.”

Proper domestic life for officers and their wives included being connected to the world back East, staying in touch with both national events and personal friends. Officers had an appetite for letters and eastern papers and magazines and they petitioned their acquaintances and relatives to supply them. “Among us here we take nearly all the papers and Journals,” one officer announced. For instance, one army surgeon wanted two local papers from his home region, in addition to five national publications,

58 Mills, My Story, 145-146.
59 Biddle, Reminiscences, 174. See also Boyd, Cavalry Life, 123-124, 129, 230-231; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 129; Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 36; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 165-166; Schneider papers, box 2, file 15, Widney letters, November 20, 1867, ASHS; Lane, I Married A Soldier, 189-190; Corbusier, Recollections, 37.
60 Biddle, Reminiscences, 193.
61 Fort Apache Commissary Ledgers, 1875-1883, box 3, ASHS. For army wives shopping, see Biddle, Reminiscences, 185-187.
62 Mills, My Story, 199-200. See also description of a visit by Commanding General of the Army, General William T. Sherman, at Whipple Barracks where he was treated to a dinner and a ball. Joseph Corson reminiscences, UASP.
whereas an army couple received many English and French papers from their friend.\textsuperscript{64} Often officers and wives, however, felt that the linkage was arduous to maintain because of the slow and irregular mail service. Mail arrived perhaps only once a month in the 1860s and it was no wonder that many felt they missed out on what was going in the “real” world. “We are so distant from civilization that our papers from San Francisco are always a month old and our letters from that to an indefinite time.” According to one army surgeon, letters were the “most unreliable things imaginable here.” They travel for months and often you still do not get them. Sometimes this surgeon had to do without letters and papers for several weeks, which severely saddened his spirits.\textsuperscript{65} Mail service improved over the years but still varied significantly from village to village. While in 1874 some locations received mail once a week if lucky, forts Bowie and Lowell, having post-offices, got mail six and five days a week respectively. The same year it took approximately three to four weeks for a letter from Washington D.C. to reach Camp Apache, fourteen days to Fort Bayard, and only seven to nine days to Fort Union.\textsuperscript{66} Mail always remained an eagerly anticipated event, a lifeline to the East. It was common that the road over which the mail rider arrived was closely watched by all. “If overdue, nothing else could be thought or talked of until he [the mail carrier] arrived, and we received our news from beyond the border,” one officer’s wife wrote.\textsuperscript{67}

Eastern letters and papers not only played an important function as sources of news, or as symbols of civilization, breaking the feeling of isolation, but were an integral part of daily life. One army surgeon felt that time passes on extremely slowly while being chronically short on papers, but when news came the hours seemed much more pleasant.\textsuperscript{68} Letters and papers were read over and over again, sometimes out loud, often in privacy. Some resorted to rationing the meager news supply. One wife gave her


\textsuperscript{65} Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 30; Schneider papers, box 2, file 14-18, Widney letters, ASHS. The quote is from a July 21 1867 letter. See also Chaffee papers, ASHS. In 1872, two weeks after the presidential election some officers, much to their frustration, had still not heard any word of the outcome. See Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 40-42.

\textsuperscript{66} Surgeon-General’s Office, \textit{Circular no. 8}, 248, 283, 306, 531, 533, 542. Letters from Washington to Camp Apache usually took a circuitous route: From Washington via San Francisco to San Diego; from there to Tucson, thence to Camp Bowie, the nearest post-office; from Bowie by cavalry couriers to Camp Grant, then to the San Carlos reservation, and finally to Camp Apache.

\textsuperscript{67} Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 170. See also Summerhayes, \textit{Vanished Arizona}, 87.

\textsuperscript{68} Gressley, “Soldier with Crook,” 39.
husband a paper at a time, placing it on the breakfast table so that the husband could imagine he was reading the news.\textsuperscript{69}

Elite households had to run smoothly and efficiently to serve the needs of their resident families and visitors and to reach the army elite’s norms of proper domesticity. For all this, civilian servants, as well as soldier laborers, were needed. Servants formed a racially diverse group. In addition to soldiers, they included enlisted men’s white wives, Mexican and African-American women, indigenous men as house servants and women as wet nurses, and Chinese men.\textsuperscript{70} Elite women ideally chose the role of household manager and supervisor, not doer but planner, observer, and matron. These “ladies,” as the officers’ wives were categorized, did not cherish domestic work. Many came from backgrounds that they expected lower class people to perform those tasks they deemed too exhausting, uninteresting, or trivial for themselves. They believed it was improper for a “lady” to get her hands dirty. The category “lady” in itself was a claim for privilege, refined character, and social importance. It was also a handy device in making clear the difference between the officers’ families and other women in the army villages. No servant, laundress, or enlisted man’s wife ever truly qualified as a “lady.” For instance, when Eveline Alexander, a major’s wife, wrote that in 1868 Camp McDowell had “about half a dozen soldiers wives,” but only one lady besides herself, she marked the class boundary between ladies and others. Similarly, Julia Davis remarked upon arrival at Camp McDowell that “there was…one other lady in the camp, and now the female society would be doubled.” Like Davis, oftentimes officers’ wives remained silent on other women. When defining “female society” Julia Davis omitted her own female nurse and the several soldiers’ wives and laundresses residing in the village where close to 400 men were stationed. Another lady living in a small army village even overlooked all other women in the area when she noted that “I was the only woman within at least fifty miles.”\textsuperscript{71}

Many officers and wives discovered that it was difficult to build refined middle-class domesticity when one had to constantly worry over the servants. For one thing, simply getting any help in the “peripheral” Southwest was frequently represented as an

\textsuperscript{69} Lane, \textit{I Married A Soldier}, 64. \\
\textsuperscript{71} Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 31; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 192, 197; Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 123.
almost impossible task by the "ladies." One wife wrote that “I have no one to help me but a little girl, 12 years old. The company going out deprived me of a cook. You can imagine my hands are full with cooking & sewing & all.” Some tried to recruit servants while on the road to the Southwest. One couple, for instance, found a twelve year old Chinese boy as no woman could be induced to go to Arizona. As the boy heard wild stories of Indians, he had to be locked up in Los Angeles to prevent his escape. At Camp Date Creek, the boy was released and “proved a treasure” as he knew how to wash and iron, thus freeing the officer’s wife from such unpleasant tasks.\(^\text{72}\)

Many also represented that the available servants proved expensive, difficult to control, and of inferior quality. They complained that a cook could not be gotten for under $50 per month, and for a housemaid one had to pay $25, while when sending to San Francisco for a nurse for an infant the price asked was $100 a month. One army lady, who was ready to pay fifty dollars a week to anyone who would care for herself and her newborn child, found no help.\(^\text{73}\) Some servants changed their minds en route, wishing to avoid living in a place so remote, whereas white servant women often quickly married enlisted men. According to one officer’s wife, “women were so scarce, and men so plenty, that no matter how old or ugly, a woman was not neglected,” but “had scores of suitors for her hand.”\(^\text{74}\) Eveline Alexander brought her maid from the East. Initially the maid seemed very content and happy, having plenty of attention from the enlisted ranks. Less than a year later she had grown so homesick that she left for back East. “I think she felt weary of life in Arizona,” Alexander wrote.\(^\text{75}\) While some painted their servants as reliable, or devoted to their masters, others represented their help as a less than perfect workforce: incompetent, untrustworthy, and ignorant. For example, one woman wrote that her Mexican servant girl was a “very ignorant and stupid creature” with an “impervious brain.” Another had hired two lovers she categorized as “worthless.” The man had been discharged for theft and the woman, although “amicable,” was also supposedly violating “more than one of the commandments.”\(^\text{76}\)

\(^{72}\) Grierson, *Colonel’s Lady*, 167; Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 89-92, 124.

\(^{73}\) Biddle, *Reminiscences*, 173, 184; Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 221-222.


\(^{75}\) Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 31-37.

\(^{76}\) Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona*, 98-100, see also 144-146; Lane, *I Married A Soldier*, 190-192. For incompetent servants, see also Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 221. For reliable and devoted servants, see Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 31; Biddle, *Reminiscences*, 151-152, 175-176.
Occasionally some wives, much to their displeasure, were forced to cope without any help. Pampered and frivolous, many were utterly ignorant of household duties. Some expressed that they did not know what to do because of the “utter absence of so much that is considered indispensable in ordinary homes.” Many failed in their efforts. One army wife, for instance, tried washing her own clothes, but after washing, drying, and starching had “clothes so stiff” that she could not get them off the lines. She cried as she carried water from the kitchen to loose them. Unable to wash her family’s clothes she had to have her husband to appeal to a superior officer so that the army laundresses would do their laundry as well.\textsuperscript{77} Several officers’ wives gave birth to their children in the army villages instead of traveling back home for the occasion. Many also complained of the hardships they had to endure and of the difficulty of caring for the newborns. For many, childcare was another unfamiliar task. Ideally nurses took care of the babies, whereas schooling after a certain age was done in the east. Sent away to boarding schools, parents stationed in the Southwest did not sometimes see their children for many years.\textsuperscript{78}

**Conclusion: Imperfect Islands of Civilization**

In general, officers and their wives liked to imagine the army villages as islands of civilization, as places of refugee in a peripheral colony. One army surgeon, for example, categorized Whipple Barracks as a civilized place in the midst of wilderness. An officer entering another army post wrote that he had come upon a pretty village: “It was always like coming into civilization for a campaigner to find and visit an army post.” He continued that “here again we met brotherly greetings, generous hospitality, and home comforts…quarters appeared elegant, the grass plot greener than ever, and even the deep-cut river close at hand seemed to murmur sounds of peace and good will.”\textsuperscript{79} As living environments, army villages represented experiments in modernity where eastern middle-class ideas and ideals of public space and domesticity as

\textsuperscript{77} Corbusier, *Recollections*, 36. See also Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 135, 221.


\textsuperscript{79} Worthington letters, May 24, 1880, ASHS; Howard, *My Life*, 147, 164, 182. See also Boyd, *Cavalry Life*, 106-107, 118-119, 157; Biddle, *Reminiscences*, 165; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 190-192; Grierson, *Colonel’s Lady*, 165.
envisioned and transplanted by the officers and their wives were played out. The army post, its village-like layout, imagined mastery over nature - exemplified by the urge for landscaping and other improvements - and hierarchical housing, where the masses lived in inferior dwellings and the elite in individual homes of refinement and taste, was meant to offer an example of what a respectable American settlement looked like.

In reality, however, many grew to a painful realization that no matter how much they tried the villages remained far from perfect as living spaces and that their homes would never live up to expectations. In short, frustrated army personnel give an impression that the villages at least partially failed as showcases of civilization and middle-class lifestyles. The unbearable locations, odd building styles, improvised furniture, and the vulnerability of domestic space to natural forces damaged attempts of proper domesticity. So did the difficulties in maintaining certain lifestyles and consumption patterns. Lack of selection in foodstuffs and other luxury items, irregular contacts with the “real world” in the East, and the difficulties in getting good servants made the kind of life officers and their wives envisioned difficult to reach. Even money did not solve all the problems. Luxury foods, “respectable” furniture, and good servants, for instance, were hard to come by no matter how much one spent. Overall, officers and their wives made it seem as if the lowly and peripheral colony prevented them from building more comfortable villages, from matching their households to their ambitions. That there often existed a wide gap between desirable level of refinement and reality resulted in stress and frustration when one tried to bridge the gap. Still some maintained that no matter how bad the situation supposedly was they as a “civilizing force” of resourceful and energetic people could make things better. They did not let the less than perfect living spaces bring them down or reduce their sense of self-worth. Others became convinced that in the army villages “ordinary modes” of domestic life would fail to prevail. They represented life as something of a shared misery. None could envy the other, as all lived “with no comforts whatever” in villages where “disappointments were well nigh endless,” one wife claimed. Misery, on the flip side, built cohesion. “One reason that made our army life endurable was the constant exchange of grievances, and our real sympathy one for the other,” the wife wrote.  

Chapter 7

**Manual Labor, Leisure, and the Construction of Social Order in the Army Villages**

“Practically the posts, and especially the small posts, are garrisoned by enlisted laborers rather than soldiers...the larger part of the actual labor, as well as the building required at the posts, must now be done by enlisted men...”

- John Pope, General, U.S. Army

“I never got drunk, though I...saw [drunk] men [soldiers] deadly sick and rolling around and doing most unseemly and idiotic things and descending to the lowest level a human being is capable of.”

- William Bladen Jett, Corporal, U.S. Army

“This morning at breakfast Col. Stacey asked me, if I would go to Graham Mountain, which is 10,500 feet above the sea,” one officer’s wife at Fort Thomas wrote. The trip upon which she was about to embark in 1879 was actually a work detail, a six-day outing for nine soldiers ordered to cut timber for building construction. For the officer in charge, May Stacey, it was an opportunity for a refreshing leisure trip with his family. Stacey, his wife, and their three children took with them their servants and refreshments that included watermelons, Rhine wine, whiskey, turtle soup, pickles, oysters, peaches, and pears, and other fineries. To guarantee the family’s comfort, an additional soldier cook and driver accompanied the party.

While the soldiers struggled forward in the August heat, Mrs. Stacey traveled under a sheltering canvas in the army ambulance. Yet she thought it appropriate to complain of the circumstances: “Nothing I hate worse than bumping in an Ambulance, excepting riding in a hot car, or a rocking ship. What kind of vehicle I would like I cant tell, might like a balloon.” At camp, her “rough” trip was compensated. “Our tents up, carpeted with canvas, my cot with a good hair mattress, clean white sheets and pillows with heavy white mission blankets bordered with blue, looked very inviting. Brussells [Brussels] carpet, camp chairs, trunk, and a dressing case with hanging glass looked quite like living and very cosy,” she wrote. It is safe to say that the enlisted men prepared all this and that their camp life was significantly different, having perhaps no tents to sleep in and only a simple ration of hardtack, beans, and coffee, which they cooked themselves. To ensure that he had time for leisure, May Stacey placed a sergeant

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1 Annual Report Secretary of War (hereafter ARSW), 1877, 67.
in charge of the work detail, which freed him from their supervision. Staceys made
social calls at Fort Grant, located near the combined leisure/work site, hiked the
mountains to enjoy the scenery, marveled at beautiful flowers, practiced some target
shooting, and studied. When writing and studying French, Mrs. Stacey used to sit in the
ambulance watching her children, who were looked after by their nanny, play. The
children, “as busy as bees,” had their camp located some distance away so not to disturb
adult recreation. When returning to Camp Thomas, Mrs. Stacey and the children were
too tired, and sick, to attend a fine dinner prepared for their arrival by the wife of
another officer. After a bath, they went to bed while May Stacey gathered his energy to
dine with the other officer and his wife. The army elite’s social etiquette demanded that
he accept the invitation. No fine meal, or even a bath, awaited the enlisted men.
Probably they dragged themselves straight to bed and back to work next morning as
construction workers using the very timber they had hauled in.³

This chapter continues to investigate army village life. Manual labor and leisure
function as the lenses through which to approach the construction of social order and
identity and the meanings of whiteness and class among white army people. The
principal aim is not to describe or list all types of labor and leisure activities, nor to
count their prevalence, but rather to understand how labor and leisure structured the
army community and to describe what kind of culture, identity, and social order
emerged among white army people.

7.1 Labor
7.1.1 The Army Elite and Labor

In the army villages the division between management and labor was clear.
Officers did not do manual work and they and their wives preferred to avoid most
domestic chores if possible.⁴ Although the demands for labor were abundant in the army
villages, it is practically impossible to find references from their personal writings or
from the official records of officers participating. Many probably felt that manual work
was something that ill suited their status. Their identity as middle-class people partly

³ In Mrs. Stacey’s account the enlisted men remain mostly invisible. Her narrative does not mention how
much timber the men cut and hauled to the post, or even if they returned with the Staceys. Sandra L.
Myres, ed., “An Arizona Camping Trip: May Banks Stacey’s Account of an Outing to Mount Graham in
1879,” Arizona and the West 23 (Spring 1981), 57-64.
⁴ For officers and their wives dislike towards domestic work, see ARSW, 1875, 174-175; 1881, 35; Frank
310-311; Alice Kirk Grierson, The Colonel’s Lady on the Western Frontier: The Correspondence of Alice
rested on personal avoidance of manual labor and on the power to get others to work for them.

Usually officers did not discuss how they spent their days in the army villages. A rare individual admitted that officers often did not have enough to do, or that writing consumed most of their time. “Thinking” and “supervision of general things” was what some gave as the answer. What it meant exactly is difficult to ascertain. One officer’s wife wrote that “my husband was the busiest man imaginable. He had not only to command his company, but was also in charge of all stores and buildings.” This rather evasive statement does not tell how much effort or time this all actually demanded. One officer, also “commanding a company,” admitted that his chores included inspecting the troops once a week. This took fifteen minutes of his time. It was not uncommon that officers delegated, like May Stacey did at Mount Graham, the supervision of labor parties, military training, and inspections to the non-commissioned officers. It was also not rare that most administrative duties, the task of “being in charge of buildings,” fell to a junior officer or clerks (civilians or enlisted men). One young officer, assisted by two clerks, felt overwhelmed, and wronged, when he had to make reports and papers from daylight till dark as temporary quartermaster, commissary, treasurer, signal officer, and ordnance officer.

Still, in the minds of officers and wives manual labor was far from insignificant. The labor of others was what kept the army villages going and made public spaces and elite households more closely resemble much-coveted eastern middle-class standards. In elite minds, white enlisted men represented a suitable workforce. Hiring large numbers

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5 Mrs. Orsemus Bronson Boyd, *Cavalry Life in Tent and Field* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 130.
of civilians was often impossible due to shortage of funds and poor availability of workers. Thus the enlisted men proved a logical choice. One officer, for instance, admitted that work is what is required of soldiers. Indeed, officers and their wives treated white enlisted men predominantly as a class of manual workers unfit for self-government. This perception of soldiers as a lower class workforce was so dominant that it overshadowed the question of white ethnicity.

During the post-Civil War years many native-born whites in the United States felt the need to differentiate themselves from the large immigrant element, to construct boundaries against a threatening Irish, German, and East-European presence. It was as if the native-born needed to reassure themselves that only they were thoroughly American. One would imagine that the mostly native-born officers and their wives certainly had an immediate reason to share this fear when approximately half or more of the residents in any army village occupied by white troops were immigrants. For instance, the 1870 Federal Census shows that Fort Bowie, Arizona, housed altogether 340 white males, of whom 192 were foreign-born. During the same time Camp Crittenden had a total of 196 white males and 105 of them were foreign-born. At Camp Goodwin the numbers stood at 175 and 102, and at Camp Grant at 313 and 177. Each village had a foreign-born majority and the entire immigrant element was also predominantly lower class. Of the twenty-one officers living in these four posts only four were foreign-born.

Although the army was clearly divided into immigrant-heavy enlisted ranks and mostly native-born officers, officers and wives did not target the immigrant issue in their discourses. They did not fear that “immigrant hordes” would overpower them in the army villages or that the few immigrant officers would contaminate the officers corps. Instead officers and their wives usually remained silent on white ethnicity. It was very unusual that an officer in the Southwest would go so far, as one army surgeon did, as to argue that “thoroughbred” Americans with unmixd blood of many generations - not the melting pot kind - were the hope of the country. It was equally rare for an officer

8 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 22.
11 Officer corps was out of reach for most immigrant whites. Although there were 3,640 German-born soldiers there were only 34 German officers in 1886. The number of Irish soldiers was 3,518, but only 67 officers were Irish-born. In addition, the army also had 454 Scandinavian-born soldiers, but only three such officers. ARSW, 1886, 594; Federal Census, 1870, 133-151.
to write that one of his comrades was “a typical Irishman, had come into the regulars from the volunteers, and as an officer was absolutely worthless.”\textsuperscript{12}

The lack of anti-immigrant discourses resulted in part from the fact that officers were able to control as subordinates in the army hierarchy most immigrants they had to meet on daily basis. White soldiers did not represent competition or a threat in elite eyes, but instead a group of social and intellectual inferiors suitable to serve them. For officers and their wives the difference between them and the enlisted men was not a question of white ethnicity, or even military rank in itself, but of human character resulting from difference in class status. Those officers who wrote about the issue saw that white soldiers were often of questionable intelligence and competence.\textsuperscript{13} Some sought to represent the elite-enlisted men relationship as a form of patriarchal devotion between two classes widely set apart. In these texts the enlisted men represented a simple and intellectually shallow class of common people who understood to respect their superiors, whereas the officers and their wives displayed a caring (bordering on arrogant) compassion for the men much like parents had towards their children.\textsuperscript{14} Officers and their wives came to see white soldiers not as immigrants first but as lower class people also because white ethnicities never formed an overwhelming majority among white enlisted men, but the enlisted balance in any village was approximately even between native-born and foreigners. For instance, Camp Crittenden had 65 native-born and 78 foreign-born white enlisted men in the 1870 census.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, labeling white soldiers simply, or foremost, as immigrants would have been inaccurate, especially when white soldiers themselves did not construct their collective identity around their immigrant backgrounds.

On one level the fact that officers did not make much noise of white soldiers’ ethnicity is a sign of a larger silencing of white enlisted men. Compared to, for instance, how much they had to say about the Apaches, officers were practically silent on the character of white soldiers. Often officers and wives had nothing to say about the white soldiers or even acknowledged their presence. Perhaps they considered white soldiers as too common, uninteresting, and trivial to merit discussion. One symptom of this


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Federal Census, 1870}, 133-151.
silencing is that officers and wives often failed to acknowledge the identity of laborers, or to discuss actual labor processes and their significances. Only a few army wives referred to some of their soldier servants by name. But in most cases things just got done somehow. In army texts it is very common to find remarks like “new quarters were to be erected as hastily as possible” or that “much was accomplished towards the erection of quarters in brief time.” This narrative strategy made the laborers invisible drudges and not only showed the contempt the army elite felt towards work and workers, but insinuated that everything was done for them, not by them.

7.1.2 Enlisted Men’s Labor Tasks

Enlisted men did basically three kinds of labor: work in army villages, work outside the villages, and domestic work/personal service for officers and their families. As a rule, the army removed the locations of its military villages when unhealthy position or operational strategy required it. Altogether, between 1866 and 1886 there were, in addition to several ephemeral temporary camp sites, at least sixteen “permanent” posts in Arizona and fourteen in New Mexico. In 1886 only four army villages in Arizona and one in New Mexico remained at the sites where originally established without never being temporarily abandoned or relocated. However, labor resulted not only from the abandonment of old posts and the building construction of new ones, but from the never-ending rebuilding and improvement of existing ones. The numerous demands of the officers and their wives on public and domestic space to reach the standards of “civilization,” their desire to make the post more comfortable by rebuilding the world they had left behind in the East, combined with the poor quality of construction doomed army villages to a chronic cycle of repairs and rebuilding. For example, a report published in 1875 by the Surgeon General’s Office stated that although Fort Selden was established in 1865 it was “not yet completed.” It would seem that the villages were made anew every few years. For example, the 1875 report indicates that all present buildings except the guardhouse at Whipple Barracks were constructed during or since 1872, although the post had been at its current location since 1864. Also, according to the same report, many of the buildings at Fort McRae, New

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Mexico, were new, even though the post dated back to 1863. Camp McDowell was established in 1865 and had the “first set” of principal buildings finished in 1866. However, the roofs leaked almost from their first exposure, and the walls cracked and washed away, until, in spite of constant repairs, many of the houses became almost untenable. In the early 1870s McDowell was rebuilt; adobe dormitories for soldiers, officers quarters in 1872 and 1873, three storehouses and a new bakery in 1872, and the hospital in 1874.18

The overall need for rebuilding and repairs seemingly declined little over the years. In 1879 there were seven sets of officers quarters at Fort Lowell and all needed new roofs, as did the four sets of enlisted barracks, the adjutant’s office, the quartermaster’s and commissary, the store rooms, the guardhouse, the bake house, as well as the post hospital. The leakage in the existing roofs was estimated as “far greater than with ordinary private houses in this vicinity.” Apparently the dirt roofs had been filled with the wrong kind of dirt. So much dirt had also been placed on the roof that it was already considered dangerous for the safety of the occupants. Some of the adobe walls were also damaged by leakage, while doors and windows were warped and rickety owing to the dryness of the climate. In addition, all the officers’ kitchens and some rooms, and all the enlisted quarters needed flooring, and many places could use a good coat of paint.19 One officer wrote in 1881 that the posts in New Mexico are of the “frailest and least substantial character, and require constant repairs…In a few years hardly a remnant of the original materials is left, and still the buildings are as worthless as ever.”20

In these circumstances the enlisted men had their hands full when officers as a rule trusted “the labor of troops” for the construction work in the army villages.21 For example, Fort Apache was constructed entirely by enlisted labor, as was apparently Fort Thomas. Two years after the selection of a permanent site, many men still lived in tents at Thomas and were kept busy constructing quarters for themselves and their officers. Even then, enlisted men, like the party led by May Stacey, had to haul logs from the

19 Fort Lowell records, July 1, 1879 letter, ASHS.
20 ARSW, 1881, 123. See also ARSW, 1885, 464-480.
21 ARSW, 1875, 77; see also 1877, 137; George A. Forsyth, *The Story of the Soldier* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1900), 102, 105; Fort Lowell records, ASHS.
mountains or get adobe from the ruins of old Camp Goodwin for building materials. One soldier stationed at Fort Craig wrote that men of the Fourth Cavalry were kept busy building new quarters all summer, fall, and winter in 1882. They made adobe and brought pine timber for the rafters to the quarters by mules and wagons from the San Mateo Mountains. After the Sixth Cavalry replaced the Fourth in New Mexico in 1883, it also immediately assumed the task of “building quarters, putting in water-works, and improving the posts generally.” Troopers continued slaving until spring of 1885, when increased warfare with the Chiricahua Apaches forced these enlisted laborers to abandon their shovels and axes temporarily and take the field as soldiers.

It seems that often soldiers moved like migrant workers, traversing from one building project to the next. After doing repairs to old post buildings at Camp Bowie a troop of soldiers was sent to establish Camp Wallen. According to one of the men, the new military village came into existence through “all this unpaid labor, carried from day to day, from month to month, by men enlisted for military service.” Dissatisfaction created by this work detail resulted in several desertions. Those who stayed, however, continued laboring at a new location, Camp Lowell, the following year.

Free men before enlisting, many enlisted soldiers found that in the army their lot was hard manual labor under tight surveillance. Constant labor made one soldier cognizant of his fate: “The man who enters the United States Army…will find that he works as hard as any day laborer who ever lived, and often harder.” Army villages were in fact nothing less than “government workhouses,” and as such they were commonly known by the enlisted ranks, “constantly employed as laborers in building and repairing,” as one soldier wrote. An officer felt that soldiers had to act as “brevet architects, carrying a hod and doing odd jobs of plastering and kalsomining.” Usually

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22 Will C. Barnes papers, series 3, diaries, ASHS; Cruse, Apache Days, 29; Constance Wynn Altshuler, Cavalry Yellow & Infantry Blue: Army Officers in Arizona Between 1851-1886 (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1991), 314; Frazer, Forts of the West, 12; Myres, “Arizona Camping Trip.” For Fort Apache, see Surgeon-General’s Office, Circular no. 8, 527.
25 Gustafson, John Spring’s, 56-59, 127-128.
26 Barnes, “In the Apache Country,” 622.
27 Don Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 94; ARSW, 1882, 68, see also 69.
every available enlisted soldier was “from morning till night employed as an adobe maker, an adobe turner, an adobe layer, a plasterer, carpenter, or builder of some sort,” another man remarked.28 If not working in construction others discovered that their lives consisted of hauling water and wood or keeping the villages clean and tidy. An officer forced one soldier to act, in the soldier’s own words, “as a sprinkling wagon.” He was ordered to carry water from a nearby ditch and water the camino in front of the officers’ quarters to reduce the amount of dust that rose into the air.29

Gardening or farm work formed a part of the enlisted men’s labor complex. It was common to appoint one man from each company as gardener, and others were ordered to dig irrigation ditches, hoe weeds, cultivate crops, and assist in planting and harvesting.30 In places such as forts Bayard, Union, Verde, and Whipple men raised “large quantities of vegetables” including pumpkins, peas, peppers, onions, and carrots. At Union the soldiers even constructed a hothouse to ensure production during the coldest winter months.31 Sometimes men avoided gardening simply because local circumstances did not permit any planting. For instance, Camp Mojave did not even have a garden, whereas, according to one officer, the men at Fort Craig never succeeded raising anything.32 However, it happened that the lack of success in raising crops did not prevent the officers from ordering the continuation of attempts. Once, following the initiative of the regional commander stationed in San Francisco, four companies constructed a farm in the excessive summer heat at Camp McDowell. The farm was designed to produce grain as forage for the army animals, but nothing for the men. Exhausted and half-famished, the soldiers slaved eleven hours a day tending the farm, first digging an irrigation ditch several miles in length, and clearing the land of dense growth of mesquite trees, bull brush, and cactus. By the time the officer who initiated

32 Surgeon-General’s Office, *Circular no. 8*, 548; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 47-48. See also ARSW, 1884, 133; James Worthington letters, June 13, 1880, ASHS; Schreier, “For This I Had Left Civilization,” 192.
the project realized that no success would result from this farming endeavor, several of
the soldiers had already died.\textsuperscript{33}

It was not rare that men had to work whatever the weather. Sweating in a terrible
heat of over 100 degrees, they suffered from sunburns and exhaustion to the point of
fainting. If one refused to go on he was sent to the guardhouse or subjected to some
other form of punishment. For instance, one man was tied up by his wrists so that he
could not touch the ground. He passed out as a result.\textsuperscript{34} Work was also used as
punishment. For example, some prisoners had to cut wood for officers all day under the
hot sun. On another occasion approximately sixty military prisoners were sent to Fort
Bayard to quarry stone for the new buildings when the post was rebuilt. Of all the
miserable chores he had done the most disagreeable for one man was guarding fellow
enlisted men when they were subjected to this kind of punishment. Discipline was
meant to keep the men in line and make them obedient workers fearful of their
superiors. Discipline was obviously hard when, for example, almost all men at one
village had spent some time in the guardhouse during their enlistment or when one-third
of a company could be in confinement at the same time.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition to construction, repair, maintenance, and farm work, soldiers also
performed various extra duty labors in the quartermaster service with meager extra
compensation. The Annual Report for 1878 shows that Arizona posts had 227 enlisted
men on extra duty, ranging from fifty-one at Camp Apache to nine at Camp Mojave and
Whipple Barracks, and none at Camp Lowell. Most often soldiers functioned as
laborers, teamsters, and carpenters, but also as herders, packers, tinsmiths, saddlers,
painters, messengers, and blacksmiths. Work as ferry operators, butchers, packers, and
mail-carriers appeared in the records more rarely. Several men - ten in 1878 and thirteen
in 1881 - were also detailed as clerks responsible for administrative duties at the army
villages.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Carr, “Days of Empire,” 26-27.
\textsuperscript{34} Dinges, “New York Private,” 63. See also Gustafson, \textit{John Spring’s}, 108-109, for a case when men
were required to work all day and without breaks during the hottest hours even though a troublesome
malarial fever “shook the garrison.”
193-194.
\textsuperscript{36} ARSW, 1878, 306-308; 1881, 190; Gustafson, \textit{John Spring’s}, 74. Enlisted extra duty continued to play a
significant role in Arizona, with only a few posts having large numbers of civilian employees in the
1880s. \textit{ARSW}, 1885, 412-413. For soldiers’ comments on extra duty, see Clarence Chrisman papers, diary
entry, February 10, 1886, and May 5, 1886, ASHS.
The soldiers’ extra duty pay was usually approximately 20-25 cents a day. The sum did not even cover expenses caused by the work details such as worn out clothing. Furthermore, the soldiers’ pay in general compared poorly with salaries of civilians on the army payroll. For instance, teamsters received $35 to $45 per month. Even the lowest-paid civilian positions, usually occupied by Hispanics, at Fort Union and Union Depot in New Mexico earned $30 per month in the 1860s. When the monthly pay for first-year enlisted man was only $16, before reduced to $13 in 1871, the exploited position of enlisted soldiers becomes obvious. In fact, in the whole Southwest almost any worker earned more money than the common soldier. For example, the members of the Texas Rangers, a state-run police force heavily involved in colonial conquest, reportedly got thirty-three dollars a month, whereas ordinary cowboys received from twenty-five to forty dollars a month. Even Chinese laborers who built the Southern Pacific Railroad made much more than the soldiers, receiving a dollar a day, fifty cents less than white workers demanded, while miners at Tombstone silver mines earned four dollars a day. In Santa Fe, male day laborers in 1870 got $1.60 a day if white and $1.10 if Hispanic. Even white female domestics in Santa Fe made more than the soldiers, earning $1.75 a day. Hispanic female domestics, however, got only 55 cents a day, and if working six days a week and twenty-four days a month, they equaled the salary of a first-year private.

Outside the posts soldiers improved transportation networks and guarded government property. Roads held an obvious significance, allowing more rapid and increasingly massive penetration of colonial spaces. The U.S. needed an effective system to link the colonies with each other and with the imperial center in the east. While soldiers often guarded railroad construction crews, road building and maintenance were enterprises that required hard manual labor from the enlisted men.

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37 ARSW, 1869, 125; Richard Flint & Shirley Cushing Flint, “Fort Union and the Economy of Northern New Mexico, 1860-1868,” New Mexico Historical Review 77 (Winter 2002), 35-36; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 346-350. Historian Don Rickey writes that men whose previous experience qualified them as skilled laborers were allowed extra duty pay of thirty-five cents a day, others twenty-five cents, which was reduced in the 1880s to twenty cents. Rickey, Forty Miles, 95. In 1885, one soldier performing extra duty as a teamster wrote that he received extra pay of $10 per month. Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 24.

For example, one labor detachment replaced an old route from Camp Verde to the territorial capital Prescott with a fine graded road, while another built a road from Camp Apache to the Zuni villages in New Mexico, a distance of approximately 100 miles. The latter allowed communication with Fort Wingate, Santa Fe, and beyond.\textsuperscript{39} When the military ordered Camp Reno established about 85 miles northeast of Camp McDowell, the new site proved inaccessible to wagons and soldiers had to construct a trail and improve it into a wagon road as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{40}

The most extensive military telegraph system in the nation was in the Southwest. By 1872 the army in Arizona had no telegraphic communication, but the following year a line reached from California to Prescott and Tucson via Fort Yuma and Maricopa Wells. Not surprisingly, a great part of the work was done by enlisted men, who constructed 540 miles of telegraph line in ninety-seven days.\textsuperscript{41} But that was just the beginning. In Texas the army completed 1,218 miles of wire. Extending lines to different military villages and maintenance of the existing lines, which immediately followed the initial construction, kept men busy from California to Texas. “A number of men were killed in the performance of this lonely and thankless duty,” one officer observed. “The magnitude of this work can only be appreciated by an examination of the map and a knowledge of the country over which the material had to be shipped,” he added.\textsuperscript{42}

During 1875 the Arizona lines were extended to camps Lowell and Verde, and troops were still in the process of building them to camps Grant, San Carlos, Apache, and towards the New Mexico border. Meanwhile, on the New Mexico side telegraph communications descended from Santa Fe, where telegraph from the states had reached in 1868, down the Rio Grande River and on to Arizona.\textsuperscript{43} Although in 1876 no line reached camps Apache or Bowie, or had connection with New Mexico, the next year lines went to both Bowie and New Mexico. Still in 1877, the workload of soldiers, if anything, just increased. Troops not only extended lines, now nearing completion at

\textsuperscript{39} Fanny Dunbar Corbusier, \textit{Recollections of Her Army Life, 1869-1908}, Patricia Y. Stallard ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 63; Schilling collection, box 1, UASP; Tate, \textit{Frontier Army}, 78.

\textsuperscript{40} An additional burden was that all the buildings and shelters at the new village were ordered made by the labor of enlisted men from the materials at hand. ARSW, 1868, 56-57.

\textsuperscript{41} ARSW, 1871, 68-69, 78; 1872, 77; 1873, 51; 1874, 65, 124-125; Corbusier, \textit{Soldier}, 87.

\textsuperscript{42} Carter, \textit{From Yorktown}, 192-193. For Texas, see Tate, \textit{Frontier Army}, 69-70.

camps Apache and Thomas, but executed extensive reconstructions and repairs on the original line. The telegraph needed constant attention much like the army villages. Also like in the army villages the quality of work proved a disaster, and lines were down as often as they were up. The poles were also less than fitting. According to one Signal Corps private, “one pole out of fifty, perhaps, could be called straight. The rest were as crooked as a ram’s horn.” In 1882, seemingly little had changed. The lines had been extended to San Carlos, presumably in the making since 1875, and to forts McDowell and Huachuca, with recurring repairs by enlisted laborers continuing.44

As civilian servants were often expensive and difficult to hire and keep in service, officers and their wives regularly used enlisted men as domestic laborers. It was customary to make soldiers perform household tasks that officers deemed too trivial, common, or difficult for themselves. This included about everything, and enlisted men functioned as all-around repairmen who fixed verandas, floors, and ceilings, and laid down carpet and moved furniture at the officers’ quarters. They also substituted as foragers of supplies, personal aides, and babysitters. While some had to tame wild horses for the use of officers or tend to officers’ horses, others found themselves milking cows to satisfy the army elite’s craving for fresh milk.45 In addition, soldiers functioned as personal security guards. For example, one officer’s wife demanded that three soldiers guard her house; all were stationed just under her bedroom window. This was in addition to a soldier cook and his husband’s orderly, who slept in a tent by the kitchen near the rear of the house.46

One common domestic duty for soldiers was cooking, even though their products seldom managed to live up to expectations. Indeed, as happened with building and telegraph construction, a fundamental gap existed between elite desires and the quality of enlisted work. According to one officer’s wife, “We had a soldier, an ex-French

45 Cruse, Apache Days, 197-198; Martha Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona: Recollections of the Army Life of a New England Woman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 80; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 221; Sandra L. Myres, ed., Cavalry Wife: The Diary of Eveline M. Alexander, 1866-1867 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 56-57; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 124; Anton Mazzanovich papers, file 6, “Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS; Adna Chaffee papers, ASHS. Servants of officers received their extra pay, if they got any, from the officer they worked for, the amount varying a great deal. Don Rickey estimates that it usually ranged from five to ten dollars a month. Rickey, Forty Miles, 111-112. One officer in the Southwest wrote that he paid his soldier cook $20 a month, but this seems like an exceptionally high sum. Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 310.
soldier named Blot, to cook for us. He was an indifferent cook and very erratic, so we
didn’t keep him long. Our next incumbent was a big Swede named Sorensen, who
prided himself on having cooked at the sailor’s home in San Francisco. He treated us to
raisin soup and other strange dishes.”47 What was perplexing in the practice of using
enlisted soldiers as personal servants was its illegality. From 1870 military regulations,
or “hateful laws,” as one officer’s wife named them, forbid the practice. The officers
and wives’ strong opposition sparked by concern for their own comfort, however, made
sure that the law was oftentimes ignored. That officers and their wives would have to
regularly perform their own domestic work was a much dreaded scenario, avoided if
possible.48

While soldiers had received a taste of the army’s class hierarchy during their
journeys, in the army villages the grim reality really hit them. The soldiers’ main
occupation was to function as fulltime multitask servants and laborers who were under
the unchallenged control of officers and their wives, fulfilling all their whims and
wishes. The enlisted man has to “quietly accept the fact that no matter what he thinks
about an order, he must unquestionably, unhesitatingly, and promptly obey it,” one
officer wrote.49 Another added that the soldier’s life “consists almost wholly” of guard
duty and manual labor. “It would seem that every pleasant and attractive feature of a
soldier’s life had been purposely effaced and excluded from that of the American
soldiers.” Importantly, manual labor deprived the soldier of military training. For
example, one officer wrote that his personal soldier cook was excused from most
military activities, while the cook of another officer was freed from all other duties.
Target practice, riding lessons, or drills, in other words, actual military training, was
often unavailable, and many officers considering that drilling men was highly
unnecessary.50 As soldiers were forced to learn the life of manual laborers all day and

47 Corbusier, *Recollections*, 33. For soldier cooks, see also Baldwin, *Army Wife*, 67, 75, 82; Corbusier, *Recollections*, 29-30; Myres, “Evy Alexander,” 33; Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona*, 50-51, 78, 85, 168, 201-203. Soldiers also had to cook in their own companies. Laundry was something the soldiers did not do as the military hired civilian laundresses. Some officers wanted to abandon this practice and make the enlisted men do their own and the officers laundry. See *ARSW*, 1875, 175.
50 Gustafson, *John Spring’s*, 107, 125-126; *ARSW*, 1878, 196; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 310. See also *ARSW*, 1875, 177; 1877, 67; 1880, 212; Guy V. Henry, “Cavalry Life in Arizona,” in Cozzens, *Eyewitnesses*, 99-100. The officers’ lack of enthusiasm towards military drill is perhaps partly explained by the training many of them had received at the West Point military academy. According to one historian, the West Point “curriculum had a technical base, with a smattering of the liberal arts, and tended to yield time only begrudgingly to instruction in military tactics and drill.” Thomas T. Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars, 1802-1891.” *Military History of the West* 24 (Spring 1994), 32-33.
every day, this not only left no time for training but also nurtured no skills suitable for a soldier. The Annual Report reads that “it is an incontrovertible fact that when soldiers are required to work as common laborers eight hours a day they are in great measure unfitted for their proper duties.”

7.2 Resistance and Leisure in the Enlisted Ranks

Although the evidence is thin, some enlisted men evidently substituted their soldier identity and saw themselves primarily as servants. For instance, Andrew Peisen was an army man who reenlisted seven times, but did little actual soldiering. Instead, he worked as a personal servant for General George Crook for twenty years until the end of Crook’s life. Peisen’s willingness to reenlist time after time testifies to his acceptance of his status as a servant. However, the average white soldier disliked his life. Whatever the pragmatic reasons behind their enlistments, enlisted men had expected to land an honorable vocation, something which would nourish their self-esteem as brave men in service of the nation. When building barracks, constructing roads, or serving officers and their wives, the soldiers found themselves performing something for which they had not signed on. Commanded by officers and their wives alike was probably an insult and an embarrassment to the white soldiers’ masculine pride. It seems that many army wives cherished their power over soldier servants and used it willingly.

Many had a hard time recognizing any status or honor in lives defined by manual labor. Due to “unsoldierliness of our garrison service…our men have not the pride in their uniform of soldiers engaged in regular civilized war,” one officer noted. An enlisted man who had first thought “what a fine thing it would be to go west at Uncle Sam’s expense” and be

Still, the necessity of drill and especially target practice became a recurring theme in official reports during the late 1870s and early 1880s. See ARSW, 1879, 167, 171; 1881, 124-125; 1882, 7; 1883, 136, 170. According to one officer, “squadron and regimental drill were known only by tradition to most” in the 6th Cavalry. Carter, From Yorktown, 254. One enlisted man noted that the “truth is, the only thing I enjoyed about being a soldier was cavalry drill.” Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 30.

51 ARSW, 1880, 212.

52 Crook mentions his lower-class soldier servant just once in His Autobiography, giving only his last name and the information that Peisen accompanied Crook to Arizona. See the editor’s footnote in George Crook, His Autobiography, Martin F. Schmitt ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 162.

53 For enlistment reasons, see Coffman, Old Army, 333-335.

54 See, for instance, Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona.

55 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 64, 197-198, 201-202. Recruiting Service report for 1877 speaks of the restlessness and discontent among enlisted soldiers apparent in frequent applications for transfer or discharge, and in desertion. ARSW, 1877, 46.
“settled in employment for five years,” soon found his distaste: “I was a slave in Uncle Sam’s service.”

The army seemingly questioned the white soldiers’ racial privilege by placing them in a position where they worked side by side doing similar tasks with men and women of color. Those white soldiers who served with black troops soon found out that they were treated much the same. Not only did they get equal pay but for the army it seemed to matter little whether a soldier was white or black, he was always a potential laborer first. When black infantry men served in New Mexico from 1866 to 1869 and black cavalry from 1875 to 1881, the men spent many of their days laboring in the army villages. Labor tasks were much the same as they were with white soldiers; rebuilding, repairs, road work, gardening, etc. Furthermore, in the households of officers, white soldiers had to compete and work on equal standing with white women, black, Hispanic, and indigenous men and women, and with Chinese men. However, they had no competition from white civilian men. Few self-respecting independent white men in the Southwest wanted to become domestic laborers, a job regarded more suited for women and people of color. As we have seen, the civilian domestic workers, regardless of their race, received, as a rule, better wages than the white soldiers. What made white soldiers furious was that the army did not even compensate them for the abundance of menial and unmanly work tasks with good wages or enjoyable working conditions. Quite the opposite. Pay was far below civilian standards and work was performed with little regard for personal comfort and accompanied by fear of punishment.

Many white enlisted men felt trapped. Uprooted from their home regions enlisted soldiers had been displaced in the Southwest doing hard labor tasks that seemed substandard for free white men. No longer were they capable of self-government and their position in the army as laborers placed their identity as free white men in question. Soldiers became aggravated and began to envision different methods of resistance. Their resistance was manifested at work, through desertion, and in leisure.

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56 Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 4-5, 43. When his term ended the soldier wrote that “I felt like a man let out of prison after having been found ‘not guilty,’ or like a mocking bird able, in the heart, to sing all the tunes of liberty in the world.”

7.2.1 Resistance at Work

There existed many ways to show disapproval during the working hours. For one thing, as the new work day began many resorted to feigning sickness. Even if after inspection the military doctor refused admittance to the sick list and marked a man fit for duty, soldiers managed to delay work, which alone made the effort worthwhile.58 Some men hid to keep out of work, while others resorted to expressing their grievances in local newspapers. However, freedom of opinion in the military was in short supply, and writing in civilian papers was a risky endeavor, which could lead to imprisonment.59 There were also those who protested their lot by selling government property they had stolen during their work details.60

Working slowly was a widespread form of resistance. One private admitted that “it usually took four or five soldiers to do what one good citizen would have done. They [soldiers] worked as slowly as possible.” Another man wrote that when at work soldiers “would contemplate how to work without doing anything.”61 Officers and their wives often regarded soldiers as an unskilled and incompetent labor force that produced poor quality work.62 However, perhaps the terrible cooking and the questionable quality of construction in the army villages and on the telegraph line was not purely a result of enlisted incompetence, or tight budgets, cheap materials, and unfamiliarity with local weather and building materials, but of enlisted resistance, men doing their work as badly as they could without getting caught. If poor quality of work was indeed deliberate and a conscious act, then it functioned as a powerful signal of working class resistance against the army’s social order, demonstrating the determination and the resourcefulness of the enlisted men. The army elite never discovered this form of resistance. Desertion, however, they did see and compare to a “plague.”

7.2.2 Desertion

Desertion functioned as the most radical act of resistance. It also represented the most selfish act of resistance because it meant the abandonment not only of manual labor, but the comradeship of fellow enlisted men. Yet just because it functioned as a

58 Corbusier, Recollections, 134.
60 ARSW, 1868, 52, 60-61. See also ARSW, 1875, 176-177.
61 Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 13-14; Bode, Dose, 18. See also Bourke, On the Border, 7.
62 One officer wrote that soldiers “either fail to” work or do their tasks “very imperfectly.” Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 22.
major expression of free will against the officers, desertion also was an important representation of enlisted empowerment. Desertion, if successful, allowed the soldier to regain his freedom and capacity for self-government. Although a radical act, desertion was still also limited, because the soldiers never deserted to join the enemy, just to leave the army.

Some did not even make it to the Southwest before realizing that they had enough. One troop transferring from the east by ship experienced its first desertion during the trip across the Isthmus of Panama. Upon reaching San Francisco, the whole regiment, which started with 90 men per company, was thinned to an average of 50 through desertion.63 These men possibly had joined the military to get free passage to California, but on the other hand some of them might have grown frustrated with the army’s harsh social order and decided to get away as soon as possible. Because of better transportation connections, larger white populace, and multifaceted economic opportunities, California was an easier place than Arizona in which to run away for anyone who soon after enlistment became fed up with the army.

Throughout the years desertion proved a very popular choice. Some army villages almost emptied as so many men left. For instance, at one time a post in the Southwest reported that 54 of its 86 men had recently deserted. The Department of California, to which Arizona then belonged, lost 694 men in 1868 and 163 during the first nine months in 1869. The pay cut in 1871 caused a mass exodus from the army as desertion rates jumped from 9.4 percent of the enlisted strength to 32.6 percent, which meant approximately 10,000 men. The desertion rates gradually declined, being 4,606 men in 1874 and usually less than 2,000 at the second half of the decade. Still, in the 1880s over 3,000 men or close to 15 percent deserted every year. For instance, in Arizona 204 men fled in 1883, which was pretty close to the army average.64 The highest number of desertions took place during the first year of service. Probably this was due to the shock of facing the realities of military life. Those who adjusted observed the situation around them. “Men came, enlisted and deserted, and still I was there, apparently to stay,” one

63 Gustafson, John Spring’s, 27-28.
64 For Arizona, see ARSW, 1869, 125; 1883, 50. After the peak in 1871 desertion rates for the whole army declined so that (by fiscal years, ending June 30) there were in 1873: 7,271; 1874: 4,606; 1875: 2,521; 1876: 1,844; 1877: 2,516; 1878: 1,678; 1879: 1,965; 1880: 2,043; 1881: 2,361; 1882: 3,741; 1883: 3,578; 1884: 3,672; 1885: 2,927; and 1886: 2,090 desertions. For desertion figures, see ARSW, 1873, 222; 1875, 330; 1876, 72; 1877, 49; 1878, 26; 1879, 35; 1880, 33; 1881, 72; 1882, 52; 1883, 80; 1885, 74, 100; 1886, 104; Coffman, Old Army, 346.
soldier wrote. However, those who stayed did not necessarily enjoy their position. For instance, one enlisted man who had worked in the army for years wrote that he had “twenty years of the bitterness of the service at his tongue’s end.” The army generally had rather modest reenlistment figures, which indicate that the majority of men had little enthusiasm to make it their career. For example, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1874, only 699 men re-enlisted, although the next year the figure climbed to 1,986. Not counting desertion, approximately 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers were to be discharged in a normal year in the early 1870s.

To compensate for the exploitation of their labor, men often fled with a good horse, rifle, and other government property, which they sold to civilians. One officer wrote that nowhere had he seen more military materials on civilians than in Arizona. Many hoped to strike it rich in California, reach Salt Lake, Mexico, or simply vanish from the vision of the federal government to live their lives in the West. Some men supposedly joined the many cattle rustlers’ gangs throughout the Southwest. One corporal, who fled to Mexico, ended up in the Mexican army as a captain fighting French-backed troops. During leave from Mexico, however, he was caught in San Francisco and sentenced to three years imprisonment in Alcatraz for deserting the U.S. Army.

To ensure that not all white enlisted men left the army, the army held a portion of the soldiers salary “in trust” until they were discharged, organized pursuits and ambushes, and paid a bounty for captured deserters. Officers made enlisted men hunt down their deserted comrades. In the late 1860s the reward for bringing back a deserter stood at $30 and rose to $50 during the next decade. Some officers proposed that $100 was not too much. As a first-year private earned only $13 a month, the army proved willing to pay many times that amount to get the man back. The goal was to punish as many as possible and to make them examples for others planning to desert. One soldier was sentenced to hard labor clearing the parade ground for a full year, while others

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65 Bode, Dose, 19. For desertions during the first year of service, see ARSW, 1881, 210.
66 Harry R. Wright, "In the Days of Geronimo," in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 498.
67 ARSW, 1875, 177
68 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail; ARSW, 1868, 50, 52, 60-61; Cruse, Apache Days, 67; Gustafson, John Spring's, 59.
69 ARSW, 1868, 51, see also 67; 1882, 70; Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona,” 339; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 28. For chasing deserters, see Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 132-135; Myres “Evy Alexander,” 34; Robert K. Grierson, “Journal kept on the Victorio Campaign in 1880,” 3 (typescript copy in the possession of the author). Beginning in the late 1860s enlisted men saw a certain percentage of their pay confiscated by the government. The men could only get the money after serving a full term of five years with a good service record. Coffman, Old Army, 349.
received prison sentences for 3-5 years. Desertion had other risks as well. While some perished in the desert, others were presumably killed by the Indians.\textsuperscript{70} Regardless of the risks and the army officers’ strategies of punishment, desertion did not stop during the period under investigation.

The bounties, energy placed on pursuing deserters, and the harsh punishments indicate that the officers saw desertion as a major problem. The basic reason for desertion was the enlisted men’s sense of individual freedom and stubborn refusal to yield to class rule and manipulation. However, only a few officers publicly acknowledged this. A rare exception recognized that excessive manual labor had something to do with desertion, but thought that nothing could be done to amend the amount of work.\textsuperscript{71} Some officers contemplated that better-paying civilian jobs or poor living conditions in the army villages played a role in desertion. For many, however, the poor quality of enlisted men was the main cause for desertion. Some thought that soldiers only wanted free transportation to the West, while others dismissed soldiers’ complaints of harsh treatment and rigid work routine as unjustified grumbling of intellectually handicapped, untrustworthy, and inherently lazy men. “I firmly believe that harsh treatment of soldiers by officers…is at this time a very rare exception to the general rule, and the error, if there be any, is in the opposite direction” a general wrote.\textsuperscript{72}

As a solution some officers suggested that soldiers should be enlisted from the states and territories west of the Mississippi to assure supposedly better quality of recruits, thus getting rid of the bad elements: urban laborers and recent immigrants.\textsuperscript{73} For others the remedy was more hard work, tighter discipline, and harsher punishments. Work was supposed to make the soldiers obedient, industrious, and content. Curiously, officers themselves were vigilant and energetic, and overall maintained good character without any manual labor. The logic went that common soldiers were naturally inclined to complain and idle their time away. Free time posed a danger as it allowed soldiers to think for themselves. Some officers were convinced that the enlisted men had too much free time on their hands or that their life was too monotonous and boring.\textsuperscript{74} If there just


\textsuperscript{71} ARSW, 1883, 50; Bourke, \textit{On the Border}, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{72} ARSW, 1871, 45; Coffman, \textit{Old Army}, 371-373.

\textsuperscript{73} For ideas officers had concerning desertion, see also ARSW, 1872, 49; 1876, 453-454; 1877, 65-66; 1882, 71; 1885, 115.

\textsuperscript{74} Bigelow, \textit{On the Bloody Trail}, 33; Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 18.
was enough work then there would be no time for soldiers to stop and reflect on their situation and thus less chance of desertions.

In a curious manner historians have taken up on this idea. Many have claimed that monotony and boredom characterized the lives of soldiers, and that men had nothing to do. In reality the average enlisted soldier was usually too busy working as a manual laborer to have any time for monotony. Work details were numerous and contained a wide variety of tasks. Also like the officers, some scholars have found the reason for desertion in enlisted men’s character and in the supposed monotony of army life. Historians have viewed desertion as a major problem that compromised the army’s efficiency, but rarely as an acceptable avenue of escape for the oppressed enlisted soldiers.

7.2.3 Leisure and Class Consciousness

Historian William Dobak writes that enlisted men pursued amusements “to maintain relative emotional and psychological equilibrium” in the face unpleasant and often dangerous life. Dobak is partly correct in that many soldiers saw leisure important and as a balance to rest of army life. However, leisure was more than just a diversion. Enlisted ranks created leisure as a refuge that contested the prevalent elite-directed social order. Leisure worlds formed the base of enlisted resistance, an isolated sphere from which officers were excluded. For better or worse, those who stayed in service faced life in the army villages, far away from their friends, relatives, and homes in eastern cities or in Europe. For many, the army village was their only home, and there was nothing to look back to, nowhere special to go, and nobody to miss. When military life included plenty of backbreaking labor and small pay, leisure became an avenue for enlisted men’s self-expression and freedom. Leisure was a less radical expression of freedom than desertion, but it was the only time the enlisted men had control of themselves and their lives when in service.

Enlisted men’s leisure world was almost exclusively male as an overwhelming majority of soldiers had no families. This and the army’s arduous labor routine, in

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76 See, for instance, Rickey, *Forty Miles*, 137-155.
addition to the men’s working class backgrounds and the frustrations of colonial warfare in the Southwest, explain why partying and drinking had such an important role and why leisure was rough. Leisure signified a time to let go, escape everyday burdens to enjoy life to the fullest, and to be spontaneous and reckless, sometimes regardless of consequences. Soldiers bought alcohol from civilians camped outside the army villages, visited bars in nearby towns, went to the post sutler, or manufactured some themselves. Often just outside the post boundaries lay a set of more or less movable saloons and brothels, tempting the soldiers to pass their free time. Sometimes these establishments even followed the troops to temporary camps in the field.78 When their money ran out men resorted to other methods. One soldier remembered that men short on money made something they called “Indian fire water” from mescal. A soldier who drank it once “was tied up for two days and never drank again.” Not all men drank but most did. One soldier, who tried to avoid too much alcohol himself, knew but two other enlisted men who did not drink. A soldier could drink for joy or frustration, and at times he drank a lot when his finances allowed that, but he never drank in the company of officers. Come payday - usually only once in two months - and the soldiers would release their energies and get “blazingly, gloriously drunk,” like one officer recalled.79 “Payday was one of the greatest events in a soldier’s life,” one historian writes. It was a feast surrounded by days of famine. Men would often spend all they got, usually on alcohol or gambling. Some men built up debts (either to other soldiers, the post sutler, or to the owners of nearby saloons and brothels) so that large percentage of their pay was already spent when the paymaster arrived. On payday these men often paid their debts and immediately started making new ones.80

Closely linked to drinking were games and gambling. At one time a detachment found a billiard table in the saloon of a deserted town. They shook off their exhaustion from a day’s march by playing billiards all night. One reporter who visited an army camp wrote that soldiers gambled recklessly, considering their narrow means. Bets of

78 See Kim Allen Scott, “‘Whiskey is the Most Formidable Enemy in this Campaign,’ Capt. Gustavus Cheney Doane’s Fight with Boredom and Vice during the Geronimo Pursuit,” Journal of Arizona History 48 (Spring 2007), 31-52.
ten, twenty, or even fifty dollars were made in the games following pay day. Finding opportunities for gambling was easy enough in the Southwest, provided one had the money. Many towns had flourishing collections of gambling houses. Enlisted men’s weakness for gambling was so well known that small town gamblers sent telegrams of imaginary “Indian troubles” to lure in detachments of soldiers into their town to gamble.\(^\text{81}\)

Certain that drinking, gambling, and visiting prostitutes represented a danger to the prevalent social order inside the army communities, endangering the soldiers’ efficiency not only in military campaigns but as workers, officers tried to control the soldiers’ access to leisure. One way was to drive off whiskey peddlers and prostitutes from the proximity of army villages. Another was to make sure that the post sutler kept the price of alcohol high, so that poorly paid enlisted men could not afford but a few drinks. For example, when in one army village the products of Anhauser-Busch were valued at one dollar a bottle, a soldier could spend his whole monthly salary on just thirteen beers.\(^\text{82}\) Also, officers again believed in the power of work: work would keep the men away from improper leisure. Even in a temporary field camp one officer was determined to make sure that his men had plenty to do. He made the men build floors for tents and an adobe oven for baking fresh bred. Men also had to execute dozens of other camp chores designed to make sure they would not have the time to engage in leisure. Still the men found the time to visit the saloons and brothels located in the proximity of their camp.\(^\text{83}\)

As was the case with desertion or refusal to work, the officers were not shy at punishing the men for being drunk. After payday, many soldiers, close to 15% in one garrison, faced court-martial charges. These proceedings became commonplace, and the sentences were directed at disciplining enlisted lives. Fines that could surpass a month’s pay took away the enlisted men’s drinking money, whereas several days in the guardhouse were supposed to make men fearful and obedient.\(^\text{84}\)

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\(^{82}\) Cruse, *Apache Days*, 30.

\(^{83}\) Scott, “‘Whiskey is the Most Formidable Enemy in this Campaign,’” 38.

Again the success of these control measures remained incomplete. Enlisted men faced the possible punishments rather than submit under pressure. Drinking and partying continued. Elite control and enlisted resistance led to occasional excess and even to confrontations. In their defiance troops could get drunk during army campaigns or when visiting towns and army villages. On one occasion a column of troops made a stop in the midst of a scouting expedition at Fort Bowie to obtain rations and other supplies. The paymaster happened to be at the post and the men received two months pay. Ignoring the presence of officers, “practically all the detachment tanked up,” wrote one observer. The men engaged in such a “joyous spree” that they got expelled from Bowie. During their eight mile ride to Hay Camp, one officer gathered stragglers and took care of loose horses, while many men grumbled, fell off their horses, and insisted on taking a nap “for a few minutes.” As things progressed an officer confronted a drunken soldier who refused to obey orders and drew a carbine on him. “Then reason seemed inferior to force,” the officer wrote, “so I whipped out my revolver and jammed it against his breast. I told him that if he moved in the slightest I would kill him at once and without compunction, adding that I was entirely sober and knew exactly what I was talking about.” The soldier, seemingly sobering up quickly, lowered his weapon and cried out his apology.  

As seen, behind the sometimes extravagant joy of drinking was despair. Some soldiers reached such a state that they could lie, or steal and sell anything to get a drink. In order that he could satisfy his desires secretly, one inventive soldier hid four quarts of beer in a brook that ran near the army village where he lived. Another soldier stole the shoes of a sleeping comrade, while another sold ten packages of cartridges, which were government property, to obtain six bottles of beer. The threat of random violence was also present. One soldier woke up when the enlisted man he was sharing a tent with grabbed him and “wanted to know what I was doing in the bed with him anyway, and threatened to shoot me if I did not get out.” This bed-fellow, known to be fond of drink,

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86 Mazzanovich papers, file 4, “When the Comet Hit Tucson in 1881,” manuscript, ASHS.

87 Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 22; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 48-49.
obviously had become somewhat paranoid. Another enlisted man was named “Booze” by his comrades because “he spent all his money for drink and drank all any other would give him,” a soldier wrote. One day while being designated as room orderly, “Booze” went up and down the bunks sniffing and searching for hidden liquor. He apparently found plenty, drinking till he “not only could not walk but until he could hardly sniff.” This “Booze” also “drew a pistol on me once because I refused his offered drink,” the soldier continued.

Often enlisted men’s leisure showed little variation from post to post. According to one soldier, there was not much entertainment for the men except card playing and drinking. Men spent their time before paydays discussing how much money they would have to gamble with, buy liquor, and spend on the “demi-monde.” It seems that military campaigns and constant laboring to improve the posts reduced opportunities for those leisure activities which required extensive planning and organization. However, if time, finances, and circumstances allowed, enlisted men occasionally engaged in sports and organized theater activities or dances. Reading was also practiced by some, although often library facilities were poor. Fourth Cavalry headquarters at Fort Huachuca had a good regimental library, but it was boxed up, and, according to one officer, there were “no indications of impatience on the part of the garrison to get at it.”

The enlisted men’s leisure world was orchestrated to distinguish them as a group from the officers and to construct common identity. Soldiers bonded through leisure, they established their own difference from the arrogant elite, and constructed boundaries towards army control. While limited time and finances directed enlisted leisure, so did desires to avoid copycatting the styles and patterns of officers and wives, or to limit activities to those they saw as appropriate. For example, drinking or gambling represented not only activities officers and wives often disapproved, but where men created communal ties and a sense of group identity while also fulfilling personal

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89 George H. Neymier, also known as “Booze,” enlisted on September 11, 1879 in Cincinnati, Ohio. He served his whole term of five years, being discharged September 10, 1884, with character rating of “good.” Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 21, 46.
ambitions. In regards to nationality and white ethnicity the white enlisted man was a cosmopolite, recognizing difference, but thinking it secondary to class solidarity. “In no other army were members of so many countries together as in that of the United States. In a single post, or in a single company, the nations of the civilized world were represented.”\(^2\) Still, no ethnic pecking order existed either in leisure or labor. As with the officers and their wives, white ethnicity mattered little as a segregating factor among white enlisted men. In all, white enlisted men were surprisingly egalitarian and communal, according to one historian.\(^3\) On the other hand, participation in enlisted men’s leisure world was close to a social necessity. If a man refused the company of his peers on a regular basis he could find himself isolated, driven out of their social sphere. Ostracized by the majority of their fellows, some men deserted, while one soldier attempted to make the unbearable situation bearable by avoiding fights with his fellow enlisted men even when they provoked him and by joining them in their parties, offering drinks when it was his turn to do so, all the time being nominally present as “one of the boys” while remaining in fact a critical outsider.\(^4\)

### 7.3 Leisure as Middle-Class Privilege

For officers and their wives, leisure represented a cherished and preferred lifestyle towards which they concentrated much of their energies. As with the enlisted men, elite leisure was an important field where class identity and cohesion was constructed and displayed. Inside the army villages leisure was set to funnel social power towards the officers and their wives to such a degree that they would think they had acquired a superior monopoly because of it. Proper leisure life in part enabled officers and wives to imagine their superiority in relation to others and to set themselves as the army village upper class and also as the cream of white civilization in the Southwest. When enlisted men constructed leisure as opposition to an oppressive class-based labor regime, elite leisure, much like elite housing and domesticity, was set to function as a showcase of transplanted eastern white middle-class practices and standards. Leisure also codified acceptable elite behavior and social companions. All the time elite cohesion was enforced by strict social control. What mattered for officers

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\(^3\) Kevin Adams, “‘Common people with whom I shall have no relation’: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the Post-Civil War Frontier Army,” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2004).

\(^4\) Walker, “Reluctant Corporal,” 14-15, 18-20, see also 5; Baldwin, *Army Wife*, 533, see also 52.
and their wives was the company with whom one associated, the type of activities one indulged in, and how one represented oneself.

### 7.3.1 Life of Leisure

Those officers and their wives who arrived and those who already lived in the army villages were expected to show an understanding of the leisure regime from the moment of contact. As soon as possible, the new arrival was to call on the commanding officer, and officers of lower rank were to make a call on him as well. Also, if an officer’s wife arrived at the post unaccompanied it was expected that other officers and their wives call on her within forty-eight hours. The exact timetable or the order of whom called on whom might have variations, but when the whole business of calling got underway there ideally was no end in sight. One officer’s wife remembered her initiation at Whipple Barracks: “Such a welcome as we had! I had hardly gotten the dust from my face and hands when General and Mrs. Kautz were announced, and soon after all of the staff officers and their wives and many others.” Right away “champagne was opened and our health and hearty welcome drunk.”

Even when an officer and/or his family temporarily visited a post, the resident officers and wives were expected to entertain the new arrivals. This act built cohesion and guaranteed suitable comfort and luxury for those moving about. While the hosts offered food, shelter, and entertainments, the visitors were expected to show proper gratitude. Sometimes the hosts felt very uncertain and stressed. Some were afraid that their standards were not high enough and the visitors would feel unsatisfied. One wife wrote that she never objected to entertaining men, but had reservations about the wives due to her own “plain” living. When a high-ranking general arrived hours earlier than expected, an officer’s family went into panic mode. They hurried the house, dressed, sped up the food preparation, and also acquired new grocery articles in perfect

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pandemonium. Luckily, they managed to pull it off and the visiting general seemed pleased, commending his hosts.  

Sometimes the arrivals received nothing, a potential social catastrophe for the hosts who risked losing face. When one traveling party had to sleep on a dirt floor with nothing but army blankets and sheepskins, officers and wives at the post offered numerous apologies for not being alert enough to provide a suitable reception. With almost tears in his eyes, the post surgeon later tried to convince the visitors that if he had known of people coming he would have at least sent over hospital cots to provide better sleeping arrangements.

On the other hand, officers and their wives valued their social protocols so highly that it was an insult and close to an impossibility to turn down offers of hospitality even if one wished to do so. When in 1871 Colonel George Stoneman, the military commander of Arizona, was removed from his position as an inefficient failure, and his replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel George Crook, arrived, a mandatory dinner was arranged. “I had to accept out of politeness, but never passed through such an ordeal,” Crook wrote. His hostess “while trying to be polite, could not help showing in every action that she would like to tear me to pieces, and there I had to sit and sit, and if she only knew how I hated to go to Arizona, she might feel differently.” One’s travel condition also did not make a difference. When one officer tried to decline an invitation for a dinner, feeling that he was too ragged and dirty following his travels, the couple welcoming him proved persistent and there was little this officer could do but to accept. Also, after a fatiguing journey with a sick infant one army wife arrived at their “resting” stop, Camp Verde. However, “there was not much rest,” she wrote, “for we had to sort and rearrange our things and dress ourselves properly…Jack [her lieutenant husband] put on his best uniform, and there was no end of visiting.” Tired and worried, she had to endure it all. In the end, she was still not bitter, obviously accepting the social rules. “The day would have been pleasant enough but for my wretched condition,” she remembered.

In the army villages leisure ideally surrounded the officers and especially their wives. The wives had no official duties, and their lives revolved around the domestic

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100 Crook, *His Autobiography*, 162.
102 Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona*, 127.
sphere. However, they preferred to leave domestic chores to servants if possible and concentrated on supervising their households, managing and planning the constant improvements the domestic spaces were subjected to. They gave much of their attention to leisure, both in and out of their households. For one officer’s wife a typical day included riding or driving in the morning, sewing part of the day, and preferably visits and socializing. Overall, officers and wives indulged in a wide range of activities. Many enjoyed reading and ordered a wide selection of periodicals and newspapers. Some studied foreign languages and literature, while others practiced genealogy, mineralogy, botany, history, and constitutional and international law. Officers also enjoyed good whiskey and cigars, and some liked to gamble. While enlisted men drank without any control, the officers liked to give the image that they always behaved like gentlemen, never becoming too intoxicated or brawly. In truth, heavy losses and heavy drinking did sometimes occur. For instance, one lieutenant lost six hundred dollars at cards one night and an additional twenty dollars to whiskey and tobacco. Among the elite, gambling divided opinions. While some officers gambled openly, others could barely confess that they enjoyed the atmosphere, and had to quickly assure that they had no inclination to participate. Many apparently favored a total ban on gambling in the army and at some army villages in the Southwest gambling was considered off limits.

Riding, short leisure trips, and hunting proved popular leisure activities. The sense of freedom and the thrill of riding drew many officers and their wives for an afternoon of excitement. For one army wife rides on horseback composed “the chief charm of army life.”

On their leisure trips outside the army villages the elite ascended mountains, engaged in nature-watching and sightseeing, and enjoyed many picnics. Some displayed a desire to study and collect local wildlife, whether it was birds, lizards, snakes, or other reptiles. Many more had an interest in old indigenous cliff dwellings

103 Biddle, Reminiscences, 167-168.
104 Bourke, On the Border, 12; Finley papers, notebook 1881-85, UASP; Cruse, Apache Days, 201-202; Myres, Cavalry Wife, 73, 120. For leisure reading habits, see also Myres, ‘Evy Alexander,’ 33, 38; Upahm, “Incidents,” 89; Schneider papers, box 2, file 16, Widney letters, December 15, 1867, ASHS.
106 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 232-233. For leisure riding, see Baldwin, Army Wife, 80; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 200-201, 239; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 201; Finley papers, notebook 1881-85, UASP; Myres, Cavalry Wife, 110.
107 Worthington letters, May 24, 1880, ASHS. For picnic and leisure trips, see Schneider papers, box 2, file 15-16, Widney letters, October 23, 1867, and January 1, 1868; Corbusier, Recollections, 141-142;
and town sites, performing as part-time historians, archeologists, and curious tourists making notes, sketches, and collecting materials. Officers and wives found a plethora of “interesting ruins of buildings and walled-up caves,” great “white mounds, the ruins of temples and cities of the Aztecs,” and elaborate canals, “large as the Erie canal.” One officer remarked that “we felt all the excitement of explorers of an unknown land and enjoyed in anticipation the surprises in store for us whenever we moved from one place to another.” Another enthusiastically told that “We collected at least a wagon load of stone implements…and many pieces of pottery, from which could have been almost the complete vessels.” It would appear that army men and women in general were fascinated by Indian artifacts, including clothing, arrow points, pottery, and other remnants, and that they obtained these artifacts either by buying them from Indians, confiscating some from battle-sites, by personally searching the old dwellings, or digging from the ground. In addition to indigenous sites, officers and their wives found some monuments from the Spanish era suitable sites for leisure visits. Especially San Xavier de Bac - a Spanish mission church outside Tucson - was the destination of frequent visits. One of army wife called the place a “splendid monument of civilization,” officers and their wives enjoyed the scenery and atmosphere. Some were so inspired that they spent hours painting at the mission. The army elite had the financial capability and available time to seek these entertainments. But more than that, all these activities were linked to the social necessity of displaying certain class-based notions of refined taste in leisure. They were also showcases of one’s manliness. Climbing mountains, for example, was represented as a symbolic act of conquest and a victory claim for civilization.


Carr, “Days of Empire,” 30, see also 23; Corbusier, Soldier, 119.

Corbusier, Soldier, 87, 119, 148-149; Schneider papers, box 2, file 16, Widney letters, January 1, 1868, ASHS; Myres, Cavalry Wife, 102, 105-108; Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 100. Enlisted men also showed an interest in old indigenous sites, but usually less “scientific” than the officers. See Chrisman papers, diary entry, September 28, 1885, ASHS; “Gashuntz,” “On the March to Fort Yuma,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 54-55. Some soldiers supplemented their incomes by selling artifacts they had gathered from the roads or from battle sites. Mazzanovich papers, file 6, “Trailing Geronimo,” typescript, ASHS.

For army comments on San Xavier del Bac, see Boyd, Cavalry Life, 151-153; Summerhayes, Vanished Arizona, 241-242; Bourke, On the Border, 97; Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 101.
While some army wives found tennis to their liking, hunting represented the most important leisure sport for the officers to showcase their sense of manliness. Officers included many enthusiasts who would go hunting anytime, anywhere, no matter what the military situation. Some did not even leave their quarters, but engaged in shooting game from their verandas. Others organized hunting trips that lasted several days. Ideally, a supply of horses and hunting dogs were used to go after foxes and wolves, copying European aristocratic practices. In some families hunting seemingly functioned as a sort of rite of manhood. Claude Corbusier, son of army surgeon William Corbusier, shot his first deer at Fort Grant during the winter of 1887-88. His mother wrote of the event: “Father arose from his bed, and awakening Claude, he pointed to a grove of black oaks on a slope near the foot of the mountains and told him that probably a fine fat buck was feeding there, to go afoot and keep a good lookout…In less than two hours the other boys, who were watching, shouted, ‘Claude has shot a deer,’ as they saw him on a great boulder waving his hat…It was a large black-tailed buck, and Claude was pronounced a skilled hunter.”

Behaving right and hunting “honorably” was very important when building an image of masculine gentlemen. For instance, when some officers used dynamite to catch fish they were heavily criticized, not so much for wasting government explosives, but for the use of such an ungentlemanly hunting method. The hunt allowed officers to imagine that they mastered nature. They canceled the hunt when it was “too easy,” the thrill of the chase was missing. The perceived value of the animal hunted often mattered more than the necessity of bringing food to the table. Officers desired to hunt deer, turkey, and even bears. One officer wrote that “I did not see a deer or anything else that a sportsman would fire at, unless it were a cotton-tail rabbit. Most sportsmen disdain such game.” He continued that “I cannot call it a hunt, having seen nothing worthy of a shot.” Officers could complain that game was scarce around a post, although only the more valued big game could not be found, but when there was still an abundance of ducks and the occasional wild turkey and sage hen. As hunting was seen by some as a

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112 For tennis, see Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona*, 80-81.
113 Bourke, *On the Border*, 11; Summerhayes, *Vanished Arizona*, 171; Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns*, 35; Corbusier, *Recollections*, 61-62, 64; Corbusier, *Soldier*, 76-77. Revealing their personal priorities, officers could complain that it was difficult to obtain horses for hunting and riding parties when the animals were so exhausted from military campaigns. Bourke, *On the Border*, 12. See also Chaffee papers, ASHS.
114 Corbusier, *Recollections*, 139-140. See also the father’s version in Corbusier, *Soldier*, 119-120.
115 Biddle, *Reminiscences*, 176-177; Gustafson, *John Spring’s*, 109-111; Bigelow, *On the Bloody Trail*, 49-50, see also 21; Baldwin, *Army Wife*, 68. For officers hunting, see also Bourke, *Diaries*, 30; Charles P.
test of one’s manliness, unsuccessful hunts often brought painful ridicule from fellow officers. For example, when Lieutenant Vroom, “a good shot and fond of hunting,” returned to the post one day wet and “duckless” he was heavily ridiculed. The spring he had fallen into was thereafter known widely in the army as “Vroom’s folly.”

Although officers sometimes took enlisted men along on their hunts, the latter functioned in subaltern positions as servants, trackers, and helpers. Still, if an opportunity presented itself many enlisted men also liked the thrill of the hunt, preferably without any officers. Although the soldiers recognized aspects of honor and masculinity involved, a need to fulfill more basic needs - they badly needed food to supplement their meager diet - drove them.

Elite leisure was often very couple-oriented as many of the most common activities such as riding, social calls, picnics, trips to ruin sites, concerts, dances, dinners, and parties included both men and women. Only hunting and gambling were predominantly male endeavors. Often officers and their wives had to rely on their own imagination and energy in coming up with leisure activities. Only rarely was it possible to visit shows offered, for instance, by circuses or theatrical companies, which began to tour the Southwest. Both officers and wives participated in organizing leisure. While men concentrated on their club rooms, if they had one, and on hunting excursions, the wives often took the lead in arranging more elaborate events. They usually bore the responsibility for decorations and costumes needed for the parties and planned the transfer of barren rooms and hallways into elaborate ballrooms, decorated with canvases and flags, and stacked with bayonets and swords.

Elliott, “The Geronimo Campaign of 1885-1886,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 435, 440; Biddle, Reminiscences, 190; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 118-119; Schneider papers, box 2 file 17, Widney letters, March 11, 1868, ASHS; Myres, Cavalry Wife, 110, 121; Wood, Chasing Geronimo, 50, 63, 75.

Baldwin, Army Wife, 69.

117 For enlisted men hunting and fishing, see Chrisman papers, diary entry, November 8, 1885, and November 27, 1885, ASHS; Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona,” 336; Neifert, “Trailing Geronimo,” 560; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 110-114; Platten, Ten Years, 17-19. Sometimes ex-soldiers or Apaches provided the officers with fresh game. See Corbusier, Recollections, 139; Gustafson, John Spring’s, 109; Sherry Robinson, Apaches Voices: Their Stories of Survival as told to Eve Ball (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 169; Howard, My Life, 188. Hunting could be dangerous. A bear hunting trip made by three Apache soldiers and one white enlisted man ended when a bear tore off the right side of one of the men’s faces. This unlucky individual also suffered a broken and mangled right arm and leg, but recovered. See Platten, Ten Years, 18-19.


119 Boyd, Cavalry Life, 198-199, 205-206, 229.
Typical elaborate activities in the army villages included masquerades and special costume balls. At one calico-themed masquerade officers and their wives appeared, for example, in black mask and domino, in dark blue bicycle suit with red calico sash over one shoulder and around the waist and decorated with a number of stars, crescents, and bows. Some came as colored women - acting the part in black face. The commanding officer’s wife, who joined in as Mother Goose, later thought it was “a swell hop, swell dress, and swell supper.”\(^{120}\) While “Indian-costume” balls were popular in some places, at Fort Apache the dance parties had Apache leaders on the guest list. One such dance took place in an officer’s quarters decorated with evergreen boughs and musicians from the enlisted ranks playing the banjo and guitar. A quadrille was formed with the officers on the opposite side of the Apache leaders. “To meet the savage Apache on a basis of social equality, in an officer’s quarters, and to dance in a quadrille with him! Well, the limit of all things had been reached!,” one of the participants remembered. Despite reservations, officers accepted the invitation to participate in dances arranged at the Apache camps.\(^{121}\)

Christmas and other holidays were special events where eastern “home” surroundings and traditions were imitated. The traditional Christmas hunt at Fort Apache was a necessity much like evergreen decorations. In 1879, a five-day outing produced twenty-five deer and close to fifty turkeys. These, added to the eggnog, champagne, and “other trimmings” made the holidays an expansive celebration, isolating the elite from colonial realities and nourishing their ideas of self-importance. Also, on the Fourth of July the military ideally feasted “in grand style,” with music, games, horse races, and athletic contests.\(^{122}\)

Music symbolized refinement and high-status and served as a link to home and as a symbol of western civilization. Officers and their wives enjoyed assembling together to listen to music whether it was playing the piano and other instruments at somebody’s

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\(^{120}\) Grierson, *Colonel’s Lady*, 169-170.


home or listening to bands in concerts. Their ears, one officer wrote, were desperate for music when the only thing in the colony resembling a melody was the howl of the coyotes.\textsuperscript{123} The presence of a regimental band improved the entertainment at any military village, but most villages spent most of their time without one because the regimental band was usually stationed at the regimental headquarters. Therefore, the arrival of a band became a much expected occasion. This was true at Fort Apache in 1881, when one moved in after an absence of ten years. At Fort Grant, a band was equally well received and it did not disappoint, but “gave frequent open-air concerts” and serenaded an officer and family when they arrived at the post. When the band departed, life became “a little dull,” as one officer’s wife remarked.\textsuperscript{124}

Although everywhere officers and their wives tried to arrange proper leisure activities, in reality leisure life varied from village to village. The size and location of the army village had a great effect in determining the nature of leisure. In some isolated villages, outside society for officers was virtually nonexistent.\textsuperscript{125} If the number of officers and wives was also minimal, leisure life inevitably shrunk. However, even in these locations most tried to create activities that would reach high standards, although some were content to complain about the lack of social functions and companions. For an army surgeon, who had only one officer as his company, studying and books helped to render his time endurable.\textsuperscript{126} There existed another side to the lack of regular social life. When some visitors finally arrived, expecting to be entertained according to social norms, hosts in the smallest posts dreaded this because they had to push their imagination to its limits in order to arrange suitable offerings and activities.\textsuperscript{127}

The number of ladies was important in determining the nature and frequency of activities. No wives cut down the number of dances and parties. Still other activities could be arranged. An officer remembered that although he and his wife were mainly dependent on each other and the few bachelor officers for society, they still managed to

\textsuperscript{123} Schneider papers, box 2, file 16, Widney letters, December 15, 1867, ASHS. See also Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 82; Summerhayes, \textit{Vanished Arizona}, 239.
\textsuperscript{124} Corbusier, \textit{Recollections}, 131; Grierson, \textit{Colonel’s Lady}, 178, see also 159; Barnes, \textit{Apaches & Longhorns}, 100. See also Biddle, \textit{Reminiscences}, 187-188; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 91, 182; Bode, \textit{Dose}, 164. In 1876, an exceptional event took place in Santa Fe, when three regimental bands concerted there. This was because the Sixth Cavalry relieved the Fifth in Arizona and both columns met at Santa Fe and because Santa Fe also served as the location for the headquarters of the Eight Cavalry. Carter, \textit{From Yorktown}, 175.
\textsuperscript{125} Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 137-138.
\textsuperscript{126} Schneider papers, box 2, file 14, Widney letters, July 21, 1867 and September 4, 1867, and file 16, December 15, 1867, ASHS; Baldwin, \textit{Army Wife}, 68; Carr, “Days of Empire,” 25.
arrange trips into surrounding countryside, to its hills, rivers, and Indian camps, where they found plenty of interest.  Furthermore, it did not take many wives to arrange more refined events. For example, at Camp McDowell in 1869 an army wife demonstrated that with just one other lady present she could still hold a “respectable” wedding anniversary party.

On the other hand, in some small army villages officers and their wives were forced to maintain frequent social activities. Usually these places were located in the proximity of busy travel routes. At Camp Date Creek, which was on a well-traveled Prescott road, there were only one or two army wives in the early 1870s to organize what they remembered as “constant parties.” According to their memoirs, the effort was fatiguing, but they apparently had little choice. The situation was similar at Fort Yuma on the Colorado River through which many army people heading to Arizona traversed.

At large posts located near towns the activities were at their most numerous and varied. As department headquarters, Whipple Barracks had a large contingency of officers and many more traveled through, keeping social life active. For instance, when army surgeon William Corbusier and his family visited the post on September 1873, all the officers and their wives called upon them. This almost overwhelmed the Corbusiers as close to twenty people crowded into the quarters. At Whipple “there was a continual round of gayety,” dances, luncheons, dinners, play rehearsals and shows at the officers’ Dramatic Society. Entertainment of some kind was offered almost every day and evening. One officer’s wife remembered that officers at Whipple Barracks also used to meet at each others houses to smoke and discuss various matters, most often the Civil War or Reconstruction. If for some reason there was nothing happening, they could make visits to nearby Camp Verde for dinners and dances. Near large towns the leisure scene of the army village and the town often mixed. This happened between Whipple Barracks and Prescott, whereas Fort Lowell, located on the outskirts of Tucson, was linked to Tucson by a special coach line to benefit the movement of

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130 See Corson, reminiscences, UASP; Henry, “Cavalry Life,” 97. For Camp Date Creek, see Corbusier, Recollections, 37; Boyd, Cavalry Life, 123-124.
131 Corbusier, Recollections, 38-39.
132 Mrs. M.A. Cochran, Posie, or From Reveille to Retreat: an Army Story (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Company, 1896), 72; Biddle, Reminiscences, 166-167, 180; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 165.
officers. Also in Santa Fe and Fort Marcy ample entertainment with dances, theater, social calls, and other social intermixing was commonplace.133

The most elaborate series of parties took place when General George Crook relinquished his command of the Department of Arizona and departed on March 1875. Crook was the guest of honor in no less than three high-volume and high-class send-offs. First, the people of Prescott held a complimentary reception for him in the town’s new brick building. The building in itself was a valuable symbol of whiteness and progress and stood in contrast to Hispanic adobes so prevalent in the region. Thus the location was more than suitable for white middle-class gatherings. Captain John G. Bourke, Crook’s aide, wrote that when all the invited quests arrived “for a short time the hum and rattle of wheels bore a faint resemblance to Broadway.” After Crook had recovered from this congregation of speeches, feasting, music, and dancing, he took part in the farewell ball organized at Whipple Barracks the next evening. Tens of guests invited from the notables of the garrison, town, and from beyond flocked to Whipple and the club room was decorated with evergreens hanging from the walls, ceilings adorned with stars and wreaths of the same material. Over each window “hang guidons and sabers and the regimental standards…bearing the fecund record of noble service, occupy the corners.” Preparations and guests made it “one of the finest affairs ever known on the Pacific Coast,” Bourke added, again judging the event in relation to outside standards. The supper was supreme, the band played marvelously, champagne flowed, and good order dances whirled. In Bourke’s estimate it was an affair “beyond criticism and beyond description.” Next morning after breakfast a final grand farewell was organized at a rendezvous on the road to Fort Mojave. Ladies, officers, and citizens gathered for a few more glasses of champagne and a few more speeches. Over 125 people were present. After this last display of class elegance and refinement, Crook and his entourage were on their way.134

133 See James Denver correspondence, letter 60, ASHS; Mills, My Story, 145-146; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 168, for the social connections between the army elite at Whipple Barracks and the people of Prescott. For the others, see Splitter, “Tour in Arizona,” 81-82; Cruse, Apache Days, 182; Grierson, Colonel’s Lady, 176-182; Howard, My Life, 145-146; Mazzanovich, “Life in Arizona,” 332; Glover papers, “My Life in the West” typescript, 32-37, ASHS.

134 Bourke, Diaries, 134-139. Crook’s trip to his new station in Omaha, Nebraska saw plenty of additional entertainments, receptions, and banquets. Two large ones were held in San Francisco and Omaha. En route, Crook was detained at Salt Lake for two weeks. He was treated “like royalty,” with some kind of entertainment provided almost every night. Crook, His Autobiography, 187; Bourke, On the Border, 240. When the Commanding General of the army, William T. Sherman, visited, the citizens of Prescott gave him also a reception. See Biddle, Reminiscences, 179-180.
Crook’s farewell parties perhaps more than any other single episode reveals the kind of leisure life officers and their wives wished for themselves in the Southwest borderlands. In contrast to all the small army villages where one or two officers strived to construct a respectable leisure life, or to the endless social calls with the same few faces, Crook’s sending off set the level of elegance and style achievable even in the colonies. At best, leisure could be almost comparable to Broadway and eastern festivities, at least it was the best on the western half of the continent, as Bourke wrote. Crook’s massive farewells also demonstrated what the officers and their wives thought they as a class stood for. The parties made them feel important, almost like royalty and offered a vision of a social order where officers and their wives were privileged and celebrated as the highest element in the society.

7.3.2 Social Control and Disharmony

As their leisure life demonstrates, officers and wives often sought to construct an image of themselves as a cohesive and united group. Reaffirming their collective ethos many were prone to praise each other in their private writings and official reports. One wife, for example, described the officers and wives at Whipple Barracks as “delightful,” “interesting,” “congenial,” “beautiful,” and “most agreeable.” It was not uncommon that in an official report a colonel applauded the “prompt, cordial, and intelligent action,” and bravery and energy of his subordinates. While this colonel did not mention any enlisted man by name, he did list the names of no less than 32 officers, some of whom he mentioned more than once. The elite also celebrated its members in death, painting images of heroic sacrifice and high moral standards. For instance, when two officers in Arizona drowned in a swift torrent, one army wife wrote that “there was universal sorrow throughout the whole Territory, where they were known and loved.” One officer represented that the loss of these officers of “the highest order” was “sincerely mourned, not only by the regiment, but by all the frontier community from Kansas to Arizona.”

135 When moving to Fort Grant she found “some agreeable people,” but was more reserved with her praise. Biddle, Reminiscences, 166-167, 203-204.
136 ARSW, 1880, 219-220.
137 Biddle, Reminiscences, 205, see also 200-201; Carter, From Yorktown, 196-199. See also Boyd, Cavalry Life, 311-315; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 187-188.
sterling young officer,” and another “a signally brave, energetic, and skillful Indian fighter.”

Undoubtedly officers and wives in general formed a closely connected group and felt a strong sense of common destiny, which was only increased by frequent marriages of officers to close female relatives of another officer. For instance, when Lieutenant Leighton Finley chose to marry the niece of his company commander his choice was typical. Intermarriage was the rule and examples are near endless. This tradition also continued from one generation to the next. Nevertheless, officers and wives also often formed a less than harmonious hierarchical collective in which social control clashed with highly individualistic and ambitious people.

Although rank brought status and certain privileges, rank in itself was still secondary if a person did not manage his or her everyday life appropriately. The right kind of behavior and level of sophistication were essential in determining the standing of officers and their wives, their worth in their own eyes and in the eyes of their peers. There were many ways a person could be criticized by his/her peers. Some did not even have to do anything but still were judged by their snobbish peers as intellectually shallow. According to one officer’s wife, “the only lady besides myself at the post is…a very plain woman but perfectly unobjectionable. We exchange visits occasionally in which we talk of chickens (not to take too high a flight for her).”

Others got judged for supposedly misusing their rank. One officer, according to his subordinate, was “jealous of his rank” and bullied his subordinates. This officer took even a slight variation or exceeding of an order, or doing anything without first consulting him, as an insult to his authority. He did not behave properly but turned “savage in a moment” and hid behind his rank. Thus his subordinate officer strongly disliked him and labeled him “a hard man to get along with.” Others saw that rank allowed some to gain unjust privilege. Disharmony often resulted from the allocation of living space in the villages as the number of rooms assigned to each officer varied according to rank. A matter that irritated many was how a superior officer arriving to a post could automatically out-rank his inferiors, and expel them from their quarters. No
matter how much effort was placed in fixing one’s quarters, when the order came that a superior officer wanted to move in, one had to go. “Up come the carpets. And down come the curtains. You must obey orders. And must not complain; But while you are moving, You take an oath, mental, Never to have so much Trouble again.” Subordinates were forced to move to whatever was available, which sometimes was not much. Following a move one wife found herself in a deserted kitchen used as a storage room for miscellaneous debris.\footnote{Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 119-120; Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 131.}

Often there was no excuse for improper behavior. Perceived ingratitude infuriated one army wife, insulted that people whom she had cared for when sick and given wardrobe when in need did not appear appreciative.\footnote{Boyd, \textit{Cavalry Life}, 133-134. See also Corson, reminiscences, UASP.} In a personal letter a colonel’s wife at Fort Grant complained that she felt “so tired” of the family of a subordinate lieutenant: “They annoy me till I feel desperate sometimes.” She claimed that the girls of this family had company every night and made such a racket “that it is impossible to sleep, it even wakes the children. I wish the whole of them would be ordered to San Carlos or some other place where they will not be a torment.”\footnote{Grierson, \textit{Colonel’s Lady}, 167, 215. A little over a year later the lieutenant found himself at San Carlos. See Altshuler, \textit{Cavalry Yellow}, 352.} In another incident, a colonel bullied a junior lieutenant for disobeying an order to report at Santa Fe although the lieutenant had received more recent orders from a higher authority to proceed to Texas. The real reason for the colonel’s anger was that the lieutenant’s wife had earlier refused to meet him. “He informed me that if I would apologize to him personally for my wife’s refusal to meet him he would overlook the matter.” When the lieutenant refused he was threatened by a court-martial and told to remain in Santa Fe. According to the lieutenant, the colonel was a distinguished soldier, but overbearing and arbitrary, a foul-mouthed brute in conversation and a hard drinker utterly despised by all, so that many of the ladies wanted to avoid his company altogether.\footnote{Luckily for the lieutenant the colonel fell dead the next morning and the court proceedings never went further. Reeve, “Soldier’s Memoirs,” 195-197.}

If one was a suspected drunk, or judged to act in unruly manner, others often represented him/her as a worthless person who deserved to be socially ostracized or dismissed from service due to his incompetence. Dismissal was often a matter of personal disgrace, a falling out of class. For example, Lieutenant Pendleton Hunter was categorized by his subordinate officer Frederick Phelps as a pleasant, jovial man with a good reputation as a Indian fighter, but unfortunately a drunk. When the army was
reduced in January 1871, and “an order was issued to get rid of worthless officers.” Hunter was dismissed. Four years later, Phelps encountered Hunter as a barkeeper at Las Animas, Colorado. “I spoke to him, but he looked me straight in the eye and told me that I was mistaken.” Phelps was certain that he recognized Hunter. “He was evidently ‘down at the heel,’ but still had pride enough not to wish to be recognized, so I said nothing, and have never seen or heard of him since.”¹⁴⁶

Among the elite, gender roles were tightly defined and any failure to act accordingly led to social confrontations. If a man did not take proper care of his family and, for instance, gambled his money away, he was heavily criticized. Also, although officers valued their women highly, they were quick to point out if anyone behaved out of her role. One officer supposedly was a plain, blunt, and a good soldier, but completely under his wife’s thumb, who always addressed him as “Commanding Officer,” and never by name. The man was judged weak while the wife’s behavior, which ridiculed the husband, was unacceptable.¹⁴⁷

Like one historian has noted, “jealous officers often magnified petty quarrels into major controversies.”¹⁴⁸ Things could get so bad in some villages that all elite members were on “unfriendly terms” with each other. For example, at Camp McDowell in 1871 one army wife held that the commander of the post was overbearing, tyrannical, and addicted to drink. She wrote that there were many quarrels between him and the officers, “so that in the garrison of five companies, there were few friendships.”¹⁴⁹ The poor promotion opportunities inside the army escalated the individualistic drive and made people competitive and oftentimes bitter. Many were so hungry for high rank that they spent their lives striving for the top rung. In their search for honor and advancement, officers and their wives turned clannish, forming cliques around high-ranking generals. In the time of Geronimo’s surrender in 1886, certain officers were devoted supporters of General George Crook, the commander of the Department of Arizona between 1882 and 1886, while others favored his successor General Nelson Miles. Crook and Miles fought for the honors of bringing an end to U.S.-Apache wars, both claiming that it was their methods and their work that caused the collapse of Apache military power. Crook’s devotees, men like Captain John Bourke, painted

¹⁴⁹ Mills, My Story, 150-151. For similar statements, see also Worthington letters, November 1, 1879, May 4, 1880, and May 29, 1880, ASHS; Lane, I Married A Soldier, 188.
Crook as a man of exceptional status, a great hero of the republic, and as a man who possessed great firmness of character and was genial, modest, and unassuming. Miles constructed an image of himself as the savior of the Southwest and a man of national importance. It was said that Miles even had presidential ambitions.  

Conclusion: Two Worlds

In the mid-1880s, officers from Fort Grant had a retreat built for themselves up in the nearby Mount Graham for use during the hot summer period. To this “favorite resort,” as one of them named it, officers, their families, and visitors, with the necessary servants, went to enjoy the “beautiful grassy flat bordering a small stream of cold water and surrounded by pines, aspen, and other trees.” Not surprisingly, enlisted men were ordered to cut trees and construct log cabins for elite use. Much as had happened on Colonel Stacey’s combined leisure outing and wood cutting expedition from Camp Thomas almost a decade earlier, here again enlisted men worked while officers and their wives relaxed. Naturally, living spaces were also segregated. Soldiers tents were located lower down the creek on the opposite side of the brook from the officers. When the soldiers labored, officers and their guests often ascended the summit of Mount Graham to catch the grand views of mountain ranges and long broad valleys that reached Mexico. The evenings they spent around campfires talking and singing, two soldier cooks preparing lofty meals. The cooks were “very necessary adjuncts when one considers the numerous and healthy appetites,” one army wife wrote. A special pack train operated between the camp and Fort Grant, keeping the camp supplied with “whatever was necessary to make us comfortable.”

As this leisure/labor camp in the Graham Mountains affirms, the social order in the army villages was constructed on a fundamental divide between the army elite of officers and their wives and the enlisted men. A fixed hierarchical boundary kept up by both groups segregated the two classes from the 1860s to the 1880s and they failed to

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151 Mills, My Story, 195-199; Corbusier, Soldier, 118-119; Corbusier, Recollections, 142-144. The pack train even brought up a cooking stove.
meet in the realm of labor or leisure. Officers and their wives preferred not to work, but enlisted men were forced to act as poorly paid plasterers, carpenters, and even servants. Subjected to tight discipline they performed unmanly and menial tasks and had to compete with people of color and women, who, to make matters worse, usually received higher wages. It was the officers and their wives’ ideas of proper village space that in part called for a sufficient laboring population. In their eyes, use of enlisted labor did not mean exploitation but was only good for the character of lower class men. Indeed, officers often represented labor as a necessity for the enlisted ranks, whom they categorized as unsuitable for self-government.

In leisure, both groups sought to construct their own separate worlds with differing ideas of acceptable leisure practices and behavior. Officers and their wives directed their ample means and energies for accomplishing a rich and complex leisure life, copying eastern middle-class standards. Their social world was set to construct and display their imagined superior status as a congregation of magnificent and refined men and women. They formed a cohesive group, who shared a strong sense of unity. However, on the flip side, they could be highly competitive and prone to many petty quarrels. Their social order did not tolerate improper behavior, but instead emphasized conformity. Many white enlisted men worked with little motivation, producing often questionable quality of work. Some felt like slaves. Soldiers focused their energies on creating their own separate leisure world as a form of resistance. Leisure, which often revolved around drinking and gambling, was an escape from the drudgery of everyday existence, a manifestation of joy, loneliness, and despair. The most radical form of resistance was desertion, a total abandonment of the army community, a negotiation of radically new identities motivated by desire for economic and personal independence in place of servitude.
Chapter 8
Colonized Labor: Apaches as Army Workers

“Ours was a race of fighting men-war was our occupation. A rifle was our most cherished possession…there was not a man who did not envy the scout his rifle.”¹—James Kaywaykla, Chihenne (Chiricahua) Apache

"I had no confidence in the Indian scouts. If they were true to the military they were false to their own people….no use for men who would hire at the rate of $13 per month to trail their friends and relatives for delivery to their enemy.”²—Nelson A. Miles, General, U.S. Army

“A whole bunch of us went…to San Carlos to try to enlist,” Tlodilhil (“black rope,” also known as John Rope) said as he remembered his journey in the mid-1870s. As part of a large gathering of Yavapais, Tonto Apaches, San Carlos Apaches, and White Mountain Apaches, Rope and his brother rode double on the only horse they managed to obtain to reach the agency on the White Mountain Reservation. In his early twenties, Rope did not hurry for any social celebration, or to join a raiding or war party, but, tired of reservation poverty, he came to find work in the United States Army. At San Carlos, Rope lined up with the rest of the men. Following a physical examination, white officers, who acted as employment agents, hired forty men. Many hopefuls were left out, but Rope proved lucky. Leaving the reservation the next day as part of the multiracial army workforce marked the beginning of a decade of periodic employment as colonized labor for Rope.³

As discussed in chapter 4 “Apaches in White Army Minds,” white army people as a rule represented Apaches as cruel murderers and barbarous enemies of civilization in order to undermine the Apaches power in the region and to justify army actions and the U.S. takeover. This chapter describes what it meant when the Apaches worked in the U.S. Army as soldiers alongside white and black troops and under the command of

white officers during the U.S.-Apache wars; how the colonized temporarily occupied the ranks of the colonizers. While discussing how the army sought to manipulate the Apaches and what kind of discourses white army personnel produced of the Apache workforce, this piece is also interested in the workers story; how Apaches caught in the margins of empire actively sought ways to influence and counter the reshuffling of power in their world by working in the army.

Like so many indigenous peoples in the Dutch, British, and French empires, Apaches were hired as soldiers because the colonial power needed their expertise to gain the monopoly of violence and secure control over the colonial terrain. Labeled “scouts” in army discourses, Apaches worked as soldiers although they were never institutionally incorporated nor accepted by white army personnel as full members of the army community. Apaches performed much the same labor tasks as white or black soldiers, but were also used for special labor roles. They received equal wages, but as a second-rate racialized workforce, their job security was uncertain at best. Their only alternatives for army work were reservation captivity or war with the U.S. regime. Yet, Apaches proved able to use the fluid and even paradoxical labor system for negotiating the impacts of colonialism on their lives. Army work brought economic security and temporary freedom, a certain latitude to pursue goals that would have otherwise been impossible because of colonizer control. Some managed to build considerable army careers, others disliked permanent employment outside their indigenous communities. Work could also create strife and divisions within the indigenous communities. This complex web where there was constant tension and negotiation between integration and exclusion, between valuing and othering, and between indigenous freedom and colonial control was the colonized labor system. Men from many indigenous groups worked in the army during the post-Civil War U.S.-indigenous conflicts. However, the diversity of labor tasks, the length of the labor experiment, and army’s dependence on indigenous laborers’ performance makes the Apaches the most comprehensive example of this kind of labor recruiting.

Scholars like Colleen O’Neill and Brian Hosmer have ably demonstrated that rather than being simply a disruptive process, indigenous participation in the American

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labor market was an actively sought way for negotiating the changes brought upon by U.S. conquest.\(^5\) Despite the surging interest, indigenous workers, as O’Neill points out, still remain on the margins of broader questions of economic development, labor, and working-class histories of the U.S. West. Scholars remain more likely to discuss the experiences of white, Asian, African-American, and Mexican workers.\(^6\) Arguably, by allowing colonial stereotypes regarding indigenous “avoidance” of labor the explanatory power they do not deserve, historians continue to keep indigenous labor peripheral in the larger story of continental conquest and U.S. colonialism. This is especially true for the post-Civil War decades, where the general image of indigenous role is to offer military resistance to the whites or to passively experience cultural disintegration on the reservations, and little else.\(^7\) Studies on Native American labor have mostly failed to integrate indigenous soldiers into their narratives, thus missing one opportunity to tackle this prevalent image.\(^8\) In many cases, as an option to armed resistance and reservation captivity, the army introduced indigenous men to wage labor and the operations of the American labor market.

For their part, standard army histories have generally placed indigenous soldiers on the fringes of the military worlds. Studies that examine the lives of the common soldier have ignored indigenous presence, while histories of army campaigns often notice indigenous contributions only in passing, merely reminding readers that

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\(^7\) Apaches have rarely been recognized as workers. One historian, for instance, notes that Apaches provided no labor for the capitalists. Shelley Bowen Hatfield, *Chasing Shadows: Apaches and Yaquis along the United States-Mexico Border, 1876-1911* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 9.

\(^8\) In fact, much of Native American labor history is concerned with the twentieth-century. It seems that the few studies that address the nineteenth-century usually deal with California and Pacific Northwest Indians. See William J. Bauer, Jr., “‘We Were All Migrant Workers Here’: Round Valley Indian Labor in Northern California, 1850-1929,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 37 (Spring 2006), 43-63; Michael Magliari, “‘Free Soil, Unfree Labor: Cave Johnson Couts and the Binding of Indian Workers in California, 1850-1867,’” *Pacific Historical Review* 73 (August 2004), 349-89.
indigenous men participated in the action. Although they have focused explicitly on indigenous soldiers, historians like Thomas Dunlay and David Smits have treated indigenous men as the army’s sidekicks, categorized usually as “allies,” “auxiliaries,” “friendlies,” or, most often, as “scouts,” using the term widely circulated in the discourses of white nineteenth-century army personnel. Indicating that indigenous duty was mainly reconnaissance, the term “scout” poorly describes what Apache men actually did in the army. Furthermore, Dunlay, Smits, and others have concentrated in their rather uncritical descriptions on how indigenous soldiers performed during various operations, how valuable they were for the army’s cause, how the Indians were able to fight their “own people,” or what white officers thought about the “scouts” and their motivations to enlist. Unlike the present study, historians in the past have failed to connect indigenous army experiences to the frameworks of colonialism and resistance. They have, by and large, failed to investigate the workers’ story or see army writings as subjective colonial discourses through which the power of the colonizers was constructed. Neither have they discussed the patterns of inclusion and exclusion evident in the army’s indigenous labor utilization. Importantly, never have these scholars approached indigenous men as members of the army community or as real soldiers.

In all, the discussion of indigenous soldiers as a colonized workforce not only helps in breaking unnecessary mental barriers that isolate indigenous peoples or treat them as passive bystanders of history, but establishes the multiracial, instead of biracial, character of the army, and complicates the understanding of labor in the U.S. West.


also offers a warning against any simple models of colonialism that claim generalizations that are too abstract or always see whites and indigenous peoples as opposites. Recognizing that, like black and white troops, indigenous men deserve to be discussed as members of the army proper and as workers does not mean claiming that indigenous work experience or status was identical with black or white soldiers. It was the very difference that made the indigenous workforce colonized labor.

8.1 Army Work as Colonial Resistance

Like whites and blacks, Apaches became soldiers voluntarily. If others joined to find secure employment, meaningful careers, adventure, or, in the case of immigrants, to familiarize themselves with the new country and language, indigenous men were compelled to enlist by circumstances born from colonial competition. Apache men were active participants and choice-makers to whom military work was an attempt to take charge of their own lives, a way to resist the crushing impacts colonial intrusion had brought on their lives. Work functioned as a potential way to protect themselves, their families, their homes, identity, land, and life-ways in the face of violence and aggression and to advance their own geopolitical and cultural interests in a time when the Apaches self-government was severely threatened.

In the mid-1870s the federal government thought it would gain a better control of Chiricahua and Western Apaches by moving all of them to one reservation. The government chose San Carlos as the designated place. Many Apaches grew to dislike the overcrowded and barren area immensely. One Apache, for instance, thought San Carlos was “the worst place in all great territory stolen from the Apaches.” Apache life in San Carlos was often marked by poverty, disease, and quarrels. Groups who detested each other had to live in close proximity and the often corrupt reservation agents also made Apache life more difficult by embezzling rations and funds and by subjecting the Apaches to government’s modernization policies. The agents, for example, blocked most hunting and all raiding and warfare and sought to turn Apache men into poor clones of white people following the yeoman farmer ideal. From the start, however, sedentary farming was hampered by an inferior supply of arable land and inadequate seeds and tools. Apaches were also reluctant to recognize farming as a man’s avocation. Jason Betzinez, a Chiricahua Apache, was certain that if the Apaches on the

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11 Eve Ball, with Nora Henn and Lynda Sanchez, Indeh: An Apache Odyssey (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1980), 37, see also 47.
reservation “had been set at some activity in which they were interested or experienced they would have been happy and would have exhibited great exertion. This is shown by the zeal in which some of our Apaches enlisted…they were as happy as bird dogs turned loose in a field full of quail.” Another Apache confirmed that army work “was a relief from the dreary, monotonous existence on the reservation. To Apaches a reservation is a prison.” These statements show how Apaches not only preferred to work as soldiers rather than full-time farmers, but recognized army work as a way to escape the hated colonial control on the reservation.

When the federal government treated all Apaches living outside U.S. control as “outlaws” or “hostiles,” Apaches quickly realized that their options were threefold: life as free men in war against the Americans (and also Mexico), captivity and farming on the reservations, or military work. The latter held the most potential not only for increased self-rule and freedom, but for a safe and more prosperous life. Many chose to work. For instance, the son of one Chiricahua soldier explained that the famous leader and shaman Geronimo had asked his father to go against the U.S., but his father refused, preferring to make friends with whites and work for the army, thinking that it was the best option he had. Most army documents also support the conclusion that many Apaches opted for army work. For example, one officer responsible for recruiting wrote that "It was difficult to tell which ones to take when all were so eager to go...a body of fine men was selected as could well be secured in any country. They repeatedly told me they meant to fight; that they intended to do [the] best they could.” In 1886, the agent of the Mescalero Apaches reported that the Mescaleros had responded cheerfully to the request for army service, with half of their men already enlisted.

Apaches used army work for fulfilling a variety of personal ambitions and group objectives. For instance, when the reservation Western Apaches were struck by

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13 Ball, *In the Days*, 80.


15 *Annual Report Secretary of War* (hereafter *ARSW*), 1885, 185-186; Opler, *Apache Odyssey*, 34. See also Robinson, *Apache Voices*, 142-143, 148; Ball, *Indeh*, 200-203, for Mescalero willingness to enlist during the 1880s.
Chiricahua raiders who came in search of ammunition and women, many did not trust that white soldiers would protect them or advance their interests. Western Apaches wanted to fight back and retrieve captured relatives themselves. However, if they were to act on their own, Western Apaches would risk being labeled “hostiles” by the whites. The only way open was to join the army and the Apaches knew this. Even when formal enlistment was unavailable, sometimes Apaches nevertheless sought to join army troops in the field as “volunteers.” Many Apaches also understood army work as a way to end warfare, which, they hoped, would take the federal government off their backs and make normal life possible. For some, army work represented a possibility to make friends with the whites. John Rope stated that he worked in the military “in order to help the whites against the Chiricahuas because they had killed a lot of people.”

Others, also recognizing the futility of war, used army work to enable their relatives to surrender unharmed. “The scouts saw that the outlaws didn’t have any show, so they tried to save as many of them as possible,” one Apache later confessed.

On the other hand, Apaches made the choice to work partly because they were born into a world where competition with indigenous enemies and Euro-Americans had contributed to a strong military culture. The army offered the kind of work Apaches could recognize and respect, and use to suit their own cultural notions of manliness. Apaches were trained from childhood to be responsible for hunting, defensive and offensive warfare, and manufacture, or acquisition, of weapons. Hunting, raiding, and warfare formed the nucleus of Apache male identity; these activities constituted the primary avenues for men to gain status and wealth. Defense of their own people and

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16 Quote from Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 154, see also 116, 130, 209. See also Eva Tulene Watt, with assistance from Keith H. Basso, Don’t Let the Sun Step Over You: A White Mountain Apache Family Life, 1860-1975 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004), 4-10. One officer wrote that when an alarm of expected Chiricahua attack reached the Western Apaches, their camps turned into armed fortresses with supplies of arms the officers did not even dream existed. Britton Davis, The Truth about Geronimo (1929; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), 56, see also 10.

17 Quote from Opler, Apache Odyssey, 49. See also Robinson, Apache Voices, 102; Betzinez, I Fought with Geronimo, 50, 121.

18 Training of adolescent boys was focused on serving them in raiding and war situations they were expected to face in life. Hard physical exercises, like long runs or swimming in icy rivers, training in fighting skills and tactics, and knowledge of weapons were standard. For Mescalero Apache training, see Opler, Apache Odyssey, 64-65, 68-69; for the Chiricahuas, Morris E. Opler, An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social & Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 65-74, 134-139; and for the Western Apaches, Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 288-298.
offensive against their enemies was how men were measured. “Ours was a race of
fighting men-war was our occupation,” one Apache man declared.19

The army drew both youngsters and adults. For young men army work
represented an avenue on which they could to continue their training to respectable
manhood. For instance, when John Rope worked his first enlistment, he acted as an
“apprentice” to his older relative, as was the custom for Apache youngsters learning
their way. “You have done lots of work for me, getting wood, water, building fires, and
cooking. You have done the right way,” the cousin told Rope. Rope himself explained
that “when we young men joined up as scouts, our old male relatives would tell us to do
whatever the older scouts wanted us to do. If we didn’t work hard as we should that
would be no good.”20 For older men, army work provided an opportunity to cement
their position within their own communities. According to one Chiricahua Apache,
“being chosen as scouts was a recognition of a warrior’s ability to fight…Scouts were
admired and envied by other men.”21

Army work was all the more attractive because it offered a source of income for
the worker and his family in times of chronic poverty and starvation. Historian Eve Ball
wrote: “I’ve learned that Apache scouts knew which side of their bread was buttered
and acted accordingly.”22 The army gave Apache soldiers the same pay as white and
black enlisted cavalry men, at least $13 per month. Like white and black soldiers,
indigenous workers also received food, clothing, horses, guns, ammunition, and other
equipment such as blankets and canteens. They even got additional compensation if
they provided their own horses or they did not need uniforms. Also, at least some
Apache soldiers were successful in drawing military pensions, thus proving that
economic benefits were not necessarily limited to the period of employment itself. Most
spent their earnings immediately on necessities like food, clothing, utensils, and stock
for their families. Some sent for sheep and horses all the way from California. “We
could never save our pay because we had our families to care for,” Rope acknowledged.

19 Ball, In the Days, 156. For adult roles in Chiricahua society, see D.C. Cole, Chiricahua Apache, 1846-
1876: From War to Reservation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988); Opler, Apache
Life-Way, 332-354. It is important to note that not all Apache men were born warriors. Instead,
individuals were free to make their own decisions. If a man refused to join a raid or a war party he could
usually do so. Still, oftentimes Apaches held bravery and honor acquired through exploits in raiding and
war in such high regard that a man who steadfastly refused to join these activities was socially ridiculed and
ostracized. His extended family would feel deeply ashamed by his apparent laziness.
20 Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 108.
21 Ball, In the Days, 80.
22 Robinson, Apache Voices, 72.
Part of their earnings was also used for leisure, most notably gambling. It seems that the army realized that it was the welfare of people close to them that motivated Apache workers and distributed extra rations of food, blankets, or other equipment to the soldiers’ families. Furthermore, Apache soldiers often had the opportunity to confiscate enemy property in the field. This included hundreds of horses and proved an important addition to their earnings. Horses especially were valued and useful commodities. Enemy property proved such an attraction that Apache men occasionally volunteered without pay if they could just obtain the plunder.\textsuperscript{23}

Still, the quality and quantity of materials obtainable from the military were not always superior to those that could be gained through raiding or trading. For example, the army issued plenty of single-shot Springfield rifles, considered inferior to Winchester repeaters, often favored by those Apaches living outside white control in the 1880s. Also, Apache enlistees received only limited amounts of ammunition, not only because the army was very cost-conscious but because ammunition was such a valuable commodity, especially for free Apaches, that the army feared Apache soldiers would trade or gamble the supply.\textsuperscript{24}

Although their life and options were such that many Apaches were more than willing to work for the army, it has to be recognized that if the Apaches for some reason proved reluctant when the army wanted their services, the officers, at least occasionally, were not shy at pressuring them. During a meeting in October 1882, General George Crook cornered a congregation of Western Apache leaders on the reservation and represented that they had no alternative but to work. He told them that “You can’t have

\textsuperscript{23} For pay, allowances, and property, see Ball, \textit{Indeh}, 47; Basso, \textit{Western Apache Raiding}, 104-109, 185, 199, 307; Alchisay et al., “Apache Story,” 299; Opler, \textit{Apache Odyssey}, 33, 49; John G. Bourke, \textit{On the Border with Crook} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), 221-222; William J. Ross letter book, University of Arizona, Tucson, Special Collections (hereafter UASP); Fort Apache Commissary Ledgers, box 3, Arizona State Historical Society, Tucson (hereafter ASHS). Occasionally, captured horses were killed to prevent indigenous soldiers focusing all their energy on them instead of campaigning. See George Forsyth, \textit{Thrilling Days in Army Life} (1900; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 107. For pensions, see Basso, \textit{Western Apache Raiding}, 154; Watt, \textit{Don’t Let the Sun}, 13. David Smits hints that many indigenous soldiers in the West had difficulties obtaining any compensation for their military service, but does not provide evidence to support this general claim. See Smits, “Fighting Fire with Fire,” 83.

any rest here until those Chiricahuas are brought in, and you must bring them in. You must do this at once.” Apaches argued that the Chiricahuas “never belonged to us. They are Mexican Indians, and have always raised trouble.” Crook bluntly responded: “That makes no difference, you get the credit of it, and you’ve now got to go work and bring them in here as I tell you. They are intermarried with you, and you will get the blame of all the mischief they do. It depends on yourselves whether or not you shall go to your own lands to plant.” Crook warned that the Western Apaches would be held at the San Carlos Agency and counted every day until the Chiricahuas were brought back. There was little the Apaches could do. When they attempted to convince Crook that the Chiricahuas were not their friends any more than they were friends of the whites, Crook would hear none of it. All he wanted was to get the Apaches to work. In a peculiar fashion the army not only held all Apaches jointly responsible for the actions of those resisting the U.S. regime, but indicated that ending the U.S.-Apache wars was a job for those Apaches who did not resist the Americans. Following the meeting, many Western Apaches became military workers. The army rewarded them for their obedience as almost two-hundred Western Apaches received permission to relocate from the hated San Carlos to their homes in the Cibecue and Carrizo Creek area near Fort Apache.25

In sum, despite the army’s occasional pressure, army work represented perhaps the best chance many Apaches had for taking control of their own destinies. For many, army work offered an attractive option when compared to life in reservation captivity or war with the U.S. Work offered the Apaches economic inducements, a chance to advance their own interests, and an opening to prove their manliness in a manner they knew and cherished. Army work held much promise in a world terribly short on any. It is easy to see why so many Apaches volunteered.

8.2 Apaches at Work

The army in the Southwest employed some indigenous soldiers during and immediately after the Civil War. Most came from the Pimas, Maricopas, or Papagos, although some were “Manso” Apaches, a group who had largely integrated themselves into the Mexican society, and whom the whites in general did not consider “true”

25 ARSW, 1883, 179-181. See also Smits, “Fighting Fire with Fire” for an interpretation that stresses the coercive nature of indigenous enlistment.
Apaches. In 1869, first Western Apaches promised to enlist when Cibecue Apache chief Miguel offered men from his group to the service. However, it was not until 1871 that Crook, as the commander of Arizona, initiated a more systematic hiring of Apache workers that culminated in 1886. Usually anywhere from 100 to 200 Apaches were employed at any given time, but during crisis the numbers peaked at four hundred men. Apaches were stationed at various military villages, or at the army camps and agencies on reservations. For instance, in 1878 Arizona’s four indigenous companies were stationed respectively at forts Apache, Verde, Thomas, and in a temporary camp near old Camp Wallen close to the Mexican border. Like white troops, Apache companies changed stations. Between June 1879 and June 1880, Company A was still at Fort Apache, but Company B now operated from McDowell, C from Bowie, and D from both Huachuca and Thomas.

Apache units patrolled reservation boundaries and the international border, apprehending trespassers or chasing small groups. They also played significant roles in most major military campaigns. For instance, the Tonto Basin offensives against Western Apaches and Yavapais in 1872-74 had small company size units of white cavalry accompanied by detachments of indigenous soldiers. Although the idea at first was that Apache soldiers would lead white soldiers to the enemy, they in fact both located the enemy and did much of the actual fighting, proving indispensable for the success of the army. When in 1879-80 the military launched its manhunt for the group


27 ARSW, 1869, 122.

28 Army Reorganization Act of 1866 authorized up to 1,000 “Indian scouts” for the whole army. Sometimes local commanders circumvented the limitations. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, 43-57. For Arizona, see ARSW, 1877, 148; Vanderpot & Majewski, Forgotten Soldiers, 5. During the 1870s, the Interior Department, usually responsible for reservation government, also developed an indigenous armed constabulary force of its own. See Michael L. Tate, “John P. Clum and the Origins of an Apache Constabulary, 1874-1877,” American Indian Quarterly 3 (Summer 1977), 99-120. Also, in 1877 indigenous men served as Arizona territorial volunteers, mustered into service by the governor. See ARSW, 1877, 139-140.

29 ARSW, 1878, 59-61, 166-117; 1879, 168-170; 1880, 216-222; Will C. Barnes papers, series 3, diaries, ASHS.

led by Victorio, Apache companies from Arizona took part in full combat role in the campaign that traversed New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.\textsuperscript{31}

In the 1880s, as the army went after small and highly mobile units of Chiricahua Apaches, the importance of Apache soldiers only increased. A pool of laborers from different Western Apache and Chiricahua Apache groups often handled the army’s main offensive responsibilities, while white and black troops took defensive roles guarding ranches, waterholes, trails, and roads. When, in 1883, the army invaded the Sierra Madre Mountains in search of Chiricahua Apaches, the expedition was composed of 193 Apache soldiers and only 42 white enlisted men.\textsuperscript{32} During the 1885-86 “Geronimo campaign,” almost every column included a detachment of Apache soldiers and the main offensive thrust against the Chiricahuas consisted of two separate groups of approximately 100 Apache soldiers and a troop of white cavalry each. Designed to serve as a rallying point for Apache soldiers, white cavalry was eventually abandoned entirely, as it only retarded the mobility of the Apache workforce and, as in previous years, was often unable to engage the enemy. According to some estimates, the “Geronimo campaign” saw over 500 Apaches in the army.\textsuperscript{33}

Besides field operations, Apache soldiers worked on a plethora of tasks, some similar to the work white and black soldiers performed. Because of their skills, officers assigned Apaches as hunters whose work was to provide game for white army men. This might explain why John Rope claimed that he “just hunted deer” when staying at a military village. Also, when white soldiers tended post gardens, Apaches herded cattle, cultivated the soil, and arranged and weighed hay sold to the military by reservation Indians.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, if reservations were under army supervision, Apache soldiers, together or without white troops, often took on the duties of the police. Acting, like one officer noted, as “home guards,” their tasks included upholding the general order and

\textsuperscript{31} While in 1872-74 Apache soldiers had been an integral part of almost every unit in the field, in the war against Victorio they formed a minor element in a large concentration of army forces. See ARSW, 1880, 86-89, 93-98; Charles B. Gatewood, “Campaigning against Victorio in 1879,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 213-223. For Apache employment in the late 1870s, see also ARSW, 1878, 193-194; 1879, 164, 168-170.

\textsuperscript{32} ARSW, 1883, 174; Bourke, Apache Campaign, 40.


\textsuperscript{34} Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 115, see also 200; Fred Platten, Ten Years on the Trail of the Redskins, Thomas E. Way ed. (Williams, AZ: Williams News Press, 1963), 18-19; Robinson, Apache Voices, 169; Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 44-55.
the apprehension of “outlaws.” At one time, for instance, a large dance was organized on a reservation to lure in one Apache man who had escaped after killing several people. A company of Apache soldiers concealed themselves near the dancing ground while special spies mingled with the crowds. When the wanted man made his appearance, Apache soldiers quickly seized him.\textsuperscript{35} Rope preferred campaigning in the field and disliked work in the Apache communities. There were many killings among the Apaches and it was the Apache soldiers who had to go after the suspects and sort out matters under the double pressure of white officers and Apache kin and family.\textsuperscript{36}

It seems that Apache soldiers rarely performed manual labor that occupied much of white soldiers time. Still, Apaches gained experience as strikers, or body-servants, for officers. For this some got $5 extra pay per month. At least one officer felt that work as a servant did not include any exhausting physical labor. He wrote that the hardest work his Apache servant did “was saddling my mule, smoking my cigarettes, and loafing around” the cook tent. At times, like when indigenous troops represented the sole garrison force at Fort Huachuca, they had to perform at least guard duty and other necessities, or to attend regular inspections and musters.\textsuperscript{37} Military training proved as uncommon among Apache soldiers as it did among white and black troops. Only occasionally did Apache soldiers practice shooting, for example.\textsuperscript{38}

Apaches also worked in assignments not common among other troops. They proved a valuable diplomatic asset when opening contacts, participating in public discussions, and circling amidst camps during negotiations with free Apaches. In addition, some Apaches went on reconnaissance missions across the international border. Others acted as special military spies. One officer explained that “the duty of these scouts was to report to us every indication of discontent or hostility that might arise among the Indians on the reservation. They took no part in campaigns, but were employed solely to keep us posted on symptoms of unrest or agitations that might lead to serious difficulties in or between the various tribes, or even outbreaks.” For this purpose, women were also recruited. These Apache spies worked in secret, their identity

\textsuperscript{35} Quote from Charles P. Elliott, “An Indian Reservation under General George Crook,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 407. See also ARSW, 1883, 171-172; Betzinez, I Fought with Geronimo, 127-129; Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 132-133.
\textsuperscript{36} Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 184-185.
\textsuperscript{37} Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 106; Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 184; Vanderpot & Majewski, Forgotten Soldiers, 15; Will C. Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns: The Reminiscences of Will C. Barnes (Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press, 1941), 54.
\textsuperscript{38} Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 148.
hidden even from each other. They communicated with the officers individually and at night using middlemen as interpreters and contacts.39

For leisure, Apache soldiers arranged social dances, gambled or played games like hoop and poles in their own company or with the Apaches they had captured. Usually white soldiers had the role of onlookers, but at times they participated in hunting, shooting contests, horse races, and gambling. Apache soldiers often enjoyed various social, victory, and war dances. Although many white army men regarded Apache dances as barbarous and uncivilized, sometimes the army encouraged these dances and made officers join in. For example, before departing to the Sierra Madre in 1883, the commanding officer asked the Chiricahua soldiers to perform their war dance, which would bring protection and power to their upcoming endeavors.40 Like white soldiers, some Apache soldiers used alcohol for leisure. Of course not all drank, but minor incidents when Apache soldiers “tanked up” in some village or trading post and became temporarily unable to perform their duties were relatively frequent. Sometimes alcohol consumption led to potentially explosive scenes. Once, for instance, a whiskey-drinking Tonto Apache soldier shouted, shot in the air, and cursed the Chiricahuas of his company, daring them to send their best man to fight him. The white officer in command disarmed him and had him tied to a tree to sober up.41

Like white and black soldiers, Apaches usually worked in racially segregated company size units, and were commanded by white regular army officers. The

39 Crook, Resume of Operations, 9-10, 23; ARSW, 1883, 160-161; Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 38-39, 55; Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 176; Ball, In the Days, 162-163; Ball, Indeh, 49-50. Middlemen were white or mixed-race men who worked in the military payroll as trackers or chiefs of scouts. One of the most intriguing of them was Mickey Free, son of an Irish father and a Mexican mother who as a child was captured by the Apaches. For Free’s life between Apache and white worlds, see Victoria Smith, “White Eyes, Red Heart, Blue Coat: The Life and Times of Mickey Free” (PhD dissertation, Arizona State University, 2002).


41 Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 86, see also 159. For other potentially hazardous encounters with dangerously intoxicated Apache soldiers, see Henry W. Daly, “The Geronimo Campaign,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 451, 485; Harry R. Wright, “In the Days of Geronimo,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 500. One officer mentioned that once an Apache soldier while drunk was shot in the face so badly in a Mexican town that he was forced to be sent back home. See Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 521. For intoxicated indigenous soldiers, see also Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 108, 125; Hanna, ”With Crawford,” 512.
composition of Apache units varied from those where the workers came from one particular local group or band to multi-band or -tribal outfits. For example, one Apache soldier recalled that his company included eight White Mountain, twelve San Carlos, and five Chiricahua Apaches, whereas another unit had not only San Carlos, White Mountain, and Chiricahua Apaches but also some Yumas and Mohaves.\(^{42}\)

When it came to methods of pursuit and fighting in the field, Apaches did not have to perform like other soldiers. While whites and blacks progressed in formations and conducted themselves in a regularized manner like the officers ordered, the army never bothered to regularize the behavior of Apache soldiers and turn them into copies of white soldiers. Not only was the army only superfluously interested in integrating its Apache workforce, but leading officers in the region felt that better short-term results were gained by letting the Apaches perform their work as they wished. Orders from Arizona headquarters to officers in command of Apache soldiers dated August 14, 1885, asserted that Apache soldiers “understand thoroughly what is expected of them, and know best how to do their work. They understand this business better than we do...only directions that can be given to them is to explain what you expect of them, and let them to do their work in their own way. We cannot expect them to act automatically as drilled soldiers do. Their best quality is their individuality, and as soon as this is destroyed or impaired their efficiency goes with it.” The orders also stated that officers should never direct Apaches in details, because they will not like it and will only become loafing time-servers.\(^{43}\) This way the army sought to take full advantage of Apaches abilities as independent warriors. At times even the officers stayed behind and allowed Apaches total independence.\(^{44}\)

The Apaches were not expected to dress like other soldiers. They could draw uniforms, but did not have to. Officers characterized Apache soldiers as “a motley load,” with “almost naked forms.” The usual costume included the soldier’s blouse, a pair of cotton drawers, a waist cloth, moccasins, and a red headband. The latter “resembling [an] oriental turban,” was the only piece of clothing even close to

\(^{42}\) Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 109; Davis, Truth About Geronimo, 161-165.
\(^{43}\) The orders are printed in John Bigelow, Jr., On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1986), 43-44.
\(^{44}\) For Apache freedom of movement in the field, see Hanna, “With Crawford,” 510-511; Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 519-520, 524; Thomas Cruse, Apache Days and After (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 55-56.
mandatory issue.\footnote{Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,”, 519; John F. Finerty, “On Campaign after Cibicue Creek,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 238; Hanna, “With Crawford,” 509; Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 112; Ball, Indeh, 252. In 1890, the army issued a standard blue uniform, ornaments, and insignia of their own for the indigenous soldiers. Vanderpot & Majewski, Forgotten Soldiers, 8.} Being allowed to perform field service or to dress as they pleased were arguably markers of difference in a workplace that held regularity in high value.

While Apache soldiers engaged in wide variety of work duties and enjoyed unquestionable freedom of action and appearance, the army retained certain privileges for white and black soldiers. Unlike to many other minorities or immigrants in U.S. history, army work did not bring the Apaches any rights in American society. Whereas white and black soldiers were free men before and after their work periods, white authorities saw Apaches as dependant tribal subjects and made them return to the reservation after the work terms expired. Furthermore, Apache soldiers were cut off from lines of mobility beyond the non-commissioned ranks, whereas white soldiers had the opportunity to get promoted from the ranks. White and black soldiers also had a reliable job for five years at a time, after which it was possible to reenlist. Apache work contracts, on the other hand, often only ran up to six months, but had no fixed length.\footnote{ARSW, 1877, 148; Cruse, Apache Days, 38; Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 196-200.} Reenlistment, in general, was possible only if white officers came hiring again.

Treating Apache soldiers much like "hired men for cause," the army tried to exercise full control over worker selection, deciding when indigenous soldiers were hired, where they worked, and in what capacity. Also, officers had the power to punish or fire Apache soldiers for such minor reasons as refusing to give the game they had hunted for themselves to the white soldiers. When in service the Apache soldiers’ choices were limited. They could work poorly or threaten to quit if one of them was too severely punished.\footnote{Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 120-126, 133-134; Alchisay et al., “Apache Story,” 300. Some Apaches left the army because of personal mistrust towards the officers. See Ball, In the Days, 163. For threats, see Vanderpot & Majewski, Forgotten Soldiers, 17; Ball, In the Days, 80. For disarming and discharging indigenous soldiers, see also Corbusier, Soldier, 81.} However, this usually did not prevent the officers from disciplining their subordinates. For instance, one Apache soldier who refused to fight a close relative was placed in irons, sent away to a post, and placed in the guardhouse. His charge was mutiny. After some time in confinement, officers opted to release and reenlist him.\footnote{Hanna, “With Crawford,” 514-515; Daly, “Geronimo Campaign,” 451; Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 519.}

In an army that could claim job stability as one of its rare merits when compared to civilian working class life, Apache job security in general was a joke. Still, the Apaches were in a privileged position because the army preferred them over men from
other tribes. After all, most of the potential indigenous labor force in the Southwest remained unemployed most of the time. Although, for instance, some Navajos and Yavapais worked in the army, the officers frequently questioned their trailing and fighting abilities, courage to engage the enemy, and motivation to stay in service. The Hualapais, a mountain people from northern Arizona, enlisted in the early 1870s after suffering devastating defeats in the hands of the colonizers. After the Apaches began to provide a steady supply of workers, the army no longer needed the Hualapais, and they faced almost continuous unemployment, poverty, as well as relocation to a Colorado River reservation. Some Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos were also frequently hired because whites considered them the enemies of Apaches. Still, officers almost universally regarded their impact in the field inferior compared to Apache soldiers. Although small numbers of non-Apaches continued to find army employment throughout the 1880s, they were often nothing more than second-tier replacements filling the companies. Like one officer explained, the “Indians of other tribes…were not believed to possess the skill and endurance necessary to surprise the vigilant Chiricahua.”

It seems that most Apaches did not even desire permanent employment outside their indigenous communities, and that shorter work periods suited them perfectly. John Rope, for instance, was able to establish the kind of army career that suited his wishes. Rope did not avoid work because of fear, although he must have recognized the strife army work caused among many Apache groups. He simply did not want to work all the time, but opted to stay at home, fulfilling his domestic duties, for months between enlistments. Lieutenant John Bigelow observed that many Apaches were willing to

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50 One officer estimated that approximately 10% of the Hualapai population died in wars during the late 1860s. See William R. Price, “A Scout among the Havasupai and Hualapais Indians,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 233. Unable to live on the lowland deserts of the Colorado River, where they sickened and died, Hualapais left to their old areas, trying to avoid contacts with the army. The army did not interfere as long the Hualapais had no troubles with white settlers. At times, the army distributed food to the Hualapais. Only in 1883 their status for reservation was recognized. For army discussion regarding the Hualapais, see, for example, ARSW, 1875, 121, 133-135; 1876, 100; 1879, 165; 1880, 208; 1881, 476; 1884, 133.
51 For army views on Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos, see Frank Schilling collection, box 2, UASP; ARSW, 1869, 123; Cruse, Apache Days, 156-157; Anton Mazzanovich papers, file 6, “Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS; Anonymous, “Early Days in Arizona with the Fifth U.S. Cavalry,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 144-146.
52 Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 518.
53 Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 93-186.
join the army, but not to stay for long periods. Bigelow wrote that many Apache soldiers did not re-enlist right away, but took a break to spend time at home because of their strong "domestic instincts." Although work was periodic, some managed to build rather extensive careers. One Chiricahua man for instance first worked in the military in the 1860s in and around the Bosque Redondo reservation in New Mexico. He had also joined the army against the Comanches on the Southern Plains and worked for a spell with some Navajo soldiers. After marrying and starting a family he again worked in the army several terms during the "Geronimo campaign." His work periods in the army proved random, but in all extended over three decades. Others worked even longer. For instance, Apache private DeKlay first enlisted on June 14, 1885 and his final discharge was dated May 31, 1929, whereas Askeldelinny (Little Major), a sergeant, first came to service on June 2, 1879 and quit for the last time on May 1, 1925.

In sum, when the Apache workers performed a multitude of tasks ranging from active offensive operations to spy duty and guard work on military posts, they did the work tasks of regular soldiers but also performed special labor roles unavailable to other troops. Although privileged over other indigenous candidates and enjoying some freedoms in dress and conduct, Apache soldiers were also denied certain rights granted to black and white soldiers. Ultimately, as colonized labor Apache soldiers were a special workforce who had to balance between the white army world and the indigenous communities.

8.3 A Precarious Labor System

The army engaged in war against Apaches and thus Apache soldiers fought against other Apaches. The Apaches did not imagine that they formed one community, a nation, or people. In the mid-1800s the main Apache divisions included the Mescalero, Chiricahua, and Western Apaches. Anthropologist Morris Opler divided the Chiricahuas into three major bands, the Chihenne, the Chokonen, and the Nednhi, while ethnographer Grenville Goodwin counted five Western Apache groups (San Carlos, Cibecue, White Mountain, and Northern Tonto, and Southern Tonto), which he further

54 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 89.
55 Opler, Apache Odyssey, 48-50. This Chiricahua man and his family were returned to the Mescalero reservation in 1889 because the wife was a Mescalero, and in accordance with the matrilocal Apache culture the whole family identified themselves through her.
56 Vanderpot & Majewski, Forgotten Soldiers, 29.
portioned into twenty bands and numerous local groups. Identification has caused much difficulties for outsiders as Apaches remained mostly outside Euro-American control until the reservation era in the 1870s and because Apaches moved and regrouped. Adding to the confusion many of the groups had variable names given by their indigenous and Euro-American neighbors. At the bottom of Apache organization were extended families towards which a person felt most obligations, responsibilities, and loyalty. Beyond this a common bond usually also existed between people who belonged to the same local group, band, or clan, but it was only the occasional large war parties, trading events, and ceremonial celebrations that drew distant people together. Bands sometimes joined together, but not often, and there existed no obligation to do so. According to Opler, the bands of the Chiricahua Apache tribe usually lived in peace with each other, recognizing a common bond. There was no common name for the tribe however or any kind of political organization. The band achieved the political consciousness that the tribe lacked. Band referred to a certain geographic location, had a specific name, meant increased opportunities for interaction among its people, and did contain a recognized leader or leaders assisted by subordinates. The range and complexity of interactions between various Apache bands and tribes varied considerably from intermarriage, trade, and alliances to avoidance and animosity. Any Apache unity was a constructed fantasy, a reality only in the minds of some American colonizers.57

Thus, when, for instance, Chiricahuas disrupted Western Apache lives through attacks, horse thefts, and kidnapping of young women, some Western Apaches did not hesitate to join the army to exact revenge or retrieve captured relatives. Still, army work divided some Apache groups and raised bitter feelings. One Apache who had enlisted at least six times felt that he had to stop as “there were too many Indians about who wanted to kill me.” Apparently he had gained so many enemies because working in the army.58 The situation was especially heated among the Chiricahuas, the last to fight the U.S. In 1885 an estimated forty-three Chiricahua men left San Carlos to fight the U.S., and more than fifty enlisted in the army, while another eighty stayed on the reservation. Of the latter approximately half also worked in the army during the campaign that followed. Some Chiricahuas considered the Chiricahua soldiers as traitors and cowards

57 Only Western Apaches had clans, the Chiricahuas did not. For Apache social organization, see Grenville Goodwin, The Social Organization of the Western Apache (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942); Opler, Apache Life-Way, especially 67, 140-186, 462-472; Ball, Indeh, 22. For Chiricahua unity, see Ball, In the Days, 45; Geronimo, His Own Story, Frederick Turner ed. (1906; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1996), 54-57.
58 Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 196-203.
who in a time of crisis abandoned their own kinsmen. They even identified the red
headband Apache soldiers wore as a symbol of servitude. \textsuperscript{59} For others, Apache soldiers
were worthy of admiration and envy, whereas those warring against the U.S.
represented a nuisance. One Apache told that “I remember how it was at Fort Apache.
Most of the Indians were peaceful. They were attending to business. They were raising
crops. They had their sheep and cattle and were getting along very well. Then somebody
would say, ‘Geronimo is out again,’ and there he would be with a small band of about
forty men up in the mountains. Pretty soon he would raid a settlement here, or kill a
person, and the whole tribe [Chiricahua] would be blamed for it. Instead of coming and
getting his rations and settling down and trying to be civilized, he would be out there
like a wild animal, killing and raiding. Then they would organize the Chiricahua scouts
and send them out after Geronimo’s men. In this way he caused Apache to fight Apache
and all sorts of trouble to break among our people.” \textsuperscript{60}

Colonial control was partial at best and the line between “us” and “them,”
colonizer and colonized, was not just blurred, but changing and perilous. As semi-
incorporated workers, the Apaches found room for “changing sides” between the army,
the reservation, and the Apache groups that fought the U.S. The army actively
contributed to this situation by hiring Apaches who just had surrendered and by
ignoring suspicions of past offences if Apaches showed a willingness to work. For
example, when, in 1883-84, a company of indigenous soldiers was reorganized, the
long-serving Western Apaches had to make room for the recently surrendered
Chiricahua. The army cast off the Western Apache workers while rewarding the
Chiricahua for surrendering. The army was not aiming to create a permanent
workforce, or to build long-term loyalty and careers, but provided only short-term
employment. \textsuperscript{61} The army’s policy led to a situation where, as one officer wrote, “the
scouts of one year would be turning the Territory topsy-turvy the next, & the officer
commanding a company of scouts would be pursuing a party of ex-scouts with an
assortment of ex-hostiles.” \textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Davis, \textit{Truth about Geronimo}, 150-152; Crook, \textit{Resume of Operations}, 6; Opler, \textit{Apache Odyssey}, 49;
Ball, \textit{In the Days}, 80, 154-180; Ball, \textit{Indeh}, 47, 251-252.
\textsuperscript{60} Kenoi, “Chiricahua Apache’s Account, 72. Samuel Kenoi was very critical towards Geronimo, but
admitted that some of those who stayed in the reservation were sympathetic towards him. See also Ball,
\textit{Indeh}, 303.
\textsuperscript{61} Davis, \textit{Truth about Geronimo}, 77-78, 82, 106. See also King, “On Campaign,” 164; Shipp, “Captain
Crawford’s,” 518-520; Cruse, \textit{Apache Days}, 178-180; Bourke, \textit{On the Border}, 182.
\textsuperscript{62} Charles B. Gatewood collection, “Gatewood on Experiences among the Apaches” manuscript, ASHS.
Another officer worried that army work had educated a large body of Apache men to more accurate use
The actions of Massai, a Chiricahua, illustrate this fluid space Apaches operated in. Massai enlisted into the army in 1880, but two years later he deserted and joined Geronimo’s group, which had taken Massai’s family from the reservation to the Sierra Madre. His family secured, Massai returned to San Carlos, only to break out with Geronimo and others in 1885. Weary of war, Massai went back to the reservation. The army did not arrest him, but allowed him to reenlist. In 1886, when the army made all Chiricahuas prisoners and sent them to Florida, Massai jumped off the train en route, found his way back to his home region, and continued to live outside American and Mexican control. He captured a Mescalero Apache wife and had several children. While his family later returned to the reservation, Massai never did. He was apparently killed.

The well-being of his family combined with bitterness towards U.S. control and realization of the destructive futility of war drove Massai. Although Massai enjoyed considerable leverage in negotiating his position between the Apache and white worlds, in the end his options narrowed and he was forced to live in personal exile as a “dangerous outlaw.”

Chan-deisi provides another kind of example of how an ex-soldier could become a hated enemy of the U.S. On May 27, 1873 at San Carlos, Chan-deisi, who by then was a discharged soldier from the army, sought ration tickets. Being denied them, he protested and supposedly shot and killed an army lieutenant trying to arrest him. Whether Chan-deisi did the killing is not entirely clear, but he was declared an outlaw nonetheless. Chased by white and indigenous troops, Chan-deisi was killed in June 1874. Thereafter his head adorned the post at Camp Apache. The killing cemented Chan-deisi’s reputation as an “Apache villain.” This label has shown some remarkable persistency in historical scholarship. For instance, in Dan Thrapp’s words Chan-deisi was as “vicious renegade” leader “as ever ravaged the countryside.”

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63 Kenoi, “Chiricahua Apache’s Account,” 86-87; Robinson, Apache Voices, 87-100. See also Ball, Indeh, 248-261. For other Apaches who “switched sides,” see Ball, In the Days, 156, 163, 177; Ball, Indeh, 47-51, 98-100; Daly, “Geronimo Campaign,” 487, 674; Robinson, Apache Voices, 54, 112, 154-157. Pages 79-85 chronicle the story of “Apache Kid,” an army worker who became one of the most widely publicized outlaws in the Southwest.

Over time Apaches learned that the army cared for the indigenous workforce only when it suited the interests of the army. For instance, already in the late 1860s two Cibecue Apache groups led by Miguel and Pedro wanted to live in cooperation with the whites and encouraged their men to join the army. These groups contributed a steady supply of men who worked with success against White Mountain and Tonto Apaches. According to one historian, Miguel firmly believed that a close alliance with the whites was necessary for his group to remain on their own land. He proved wrong. Although a special relationship between these groups and the army had developed as soldiers from Camp Apache visited Apache camps for hunting, dancing, and feasting, and vice versa, it took only a few questionable reports of stolen cattle for the distrustful army to order the two groups to relocate near Fort Apache. Shortly thereafter, in 1875, when the army had seemingly won the U.S.-Apache wars, the federal government envisioned a policy of concentration. The Interior Department orchestrated the removal, this time to San Carlos. The first move had caused dissatisfaction as it forced Miguel and Pedro’s groups to abandon their homes and relocate into areas where the very people they had fought against in the army resided. But it was the second relocation that demonstrates the nature of colonized labor.

Although Pedro’s group was luckily saved at the last moment because the local army commander argued that some indigenous soldiers were needed near Fort Apache, Miguel’s group had to go. Miguel himself had been killed after the first move in a quarrel that had grown frequent. Now Diablo, Miguel’s successor and a sergeant in the army, pleaded their case. He promised that his group would not need any help from the whites, but could provide men for the army if just left alone. Diablo was bluntly discharged two months prior to the expiration of his term of service and ordered to move his people. Years of laboring in the military got his group nowhere. Frustrated and bitter, Diablo raised trouble against Fort Apache and Pedro’s group. Some officers even claimed that he was instigating a revolt among the Apache soldiers. But there was nothing he really could do and his group had to go into San Carlos as betrayed people. Soon, however, some of them started to escape back to their home areas. Then the

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government used Apache soldiers from Pedro’s group to prevent Diablo’s Apaches from returning.  

The Cibecue clash in 1881 and the fate of Cibecue Apache shaman Noch-ay-del-klinne further demonstrate the uncertain position of Apaches soldiers. Noch-ay-del-klinne had in fact been one of those Apaches from Pedro’s and Miguel’s group who were the first to enlist in the early 1870s. Later he faced the bitter removals, but when at work his record had been good. One officer described him as an honest, generous, and sober man in a report made during the mid-1870s. However, this was quickly forgotten when in 1881 Noch-ay-del-klinne preached a controversial Ghost Dance doctrine, which worried white officials and caused them to act. Noch-ay-del-klinne’s arrest in his village at Cibecue Creek ended in armed confrontation during which not only was the shaman and some white soldiers were killed, but Apache soldiers present were blamed for mutiny. In a later interview, Apache soldiers expressed their loyalty to the army and their desire to avoid fighting the white soldiers whom they regarded as their friends. They claimed that the clash had been unexpected and that they had run away when the shooting started to get out of the range of fire. To contradict this Apache version, white participants argued that it was Apache soldiers who had planned the whole affair and opened fire against the whites.  

During the weeks that followed, some Apache soldiers surrendered as the army, fearing a general war, poured troops into Arizona. Army reported that some Apache soldiers were killed by the San Carlos police and by the troops, while many remained out of the military’s reach. Eventually two Apache soldiers received prison terms while

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68 One Apache soldier claimed that the cook of Colonel Eugene A. Carr, who commanded the troops at Cibecue, fired the first shot. Whites thought that the Apache soldiers were so intoxicated by the shaman’s teachings that regardless of enlistment they could not stand to see him taken away by the military for possible imprisonment. It is possible that Apache soldiers were pressured to desert by their own relatives who were present during the arrest, or that they feared they would be overrun by their kin or by the terrified white soldiers. For Apache versions, see Alchisay et al., “Apache Story,” 295-310; William B. Kessel, “The Battle at Cibecue and Its Aftermath: A White Mountain Apache’s Account,” Ethnohistory 21 (Spring 1974), 130-133; Ball, Indeh, 52-55. For white army men’s, see ARSW, 1881, 139-147, 153-155; 1882, 143-152; Cruse, Apache Days, 93-145; Carter, From Yorktown, 209-237; Barnes, Apaches & Longhorns, 50-91; Mazzanovich papers, file 4 and file 5, “Trailing Geronimo,” typescript, ASHS. For a newspaperman’s version, see Finerty, "On Campaign," 236-261.
three were sentenced to death by hanging. Mutiny, as the colonizers saw had happened at Cibecue, was a strike from within, making it a terrible showcase for colonizer vulnerability and an insult thrown at the face of white power and prestige. However, this is not the whole story. What is interesting is that one of the Apaches hanged had actually been reemployed by the army when he had surrendered after the Cibecue clash, but then again arrested and sentenced. Also, one of the men sent to Alcatraz worked in the army a few years later, while several others were never punished, but were instead hired back by the army because Arizona’s military commander considered them too valuable as soldiers to be brought to trial.69

All these examples demonstrate the unstable space in which Apache soldiers functioned. Their position between inclusion and exclusion was very uncertain and potentially precarious. On the flip side, colonized labor system could sometimes prove risky also for white officers who were too open and vocal in their faith for indigenous troops. Many high-ranking generals and policymakers saw the employment of indigenous soldiers, especially in some sort of visible combat role, as a direct insult to their racial pride and esprit de corps.70 Commanding Arizona from 1871 to 1875 and again from 1882 to 1886, General Crook was an eccentric in his own army because he continually advocated a bigger role and more responsibility for the indigenous workforce. He argued that “in operating against them [Apaches] the only hope of success lies in using their own methods, and their own people,” and that “there never has been any success in operations against these Indians, unless Indian scouts were used...regular troops have always failed on our side of the boundary line.”71 Although good results, amicable relations with many superiors, and an understanding of the value

69 For the Apache soldier who enlisted after surrendering, see Collins, Apache Nightmare, 177-179, 183, 198-205; for the one who worked in the army after his prison sentence, see Harry C. Benson, “The Geronimo Campaign,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 553. For a detailed study of these events, consult Collins, Apache Nightmare. For other works, which usually point the blame on the Apache soldiers, see Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, especially 220; Worcester, Apaches, 234-258; Roberts, Once they Moved Like the Wind, 195-201. One recent work refers to the event as “Cibicu mutiny…instance of serious Indian disloyalty.” Smits, “Fighting Fire with Fire,” 81.

70 Two of the army’s highest ranking officers wrote respectively that “the soldiers should possess the attributes of civilized men. They [Indians] do not possess the stability or tenacity of purpose...They cannot appreciate responsibility or the sacredness of an oath...a race so distinctive from that governing this country that it would be neither wise nor expedient to recruit our army from their ranks” and that “moral effect will be bad” on white soldiers “if we have to get Indians to whip Indians.” Both quoted in Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, 66-67.

71 ARSW, 1883, 166; Crook, Resume of Operations, 20-22. See also ARSW, 1871, 78. Crook regarded white troops as obstacles for successful operations in the Southwest, being unable to engage the enemy despite ample opportunities. He saw that especially during the 1885-86 campaign all successful encounters with the enemy took place because of the work of Apache soldiers.
of good publicity kept an officer with so unorthodox views in an active leadership position, his dismissal from the Arizona command was only a matter of time.

After failed negotiations with Geronimo’s Chiricahuas in March 1886, Commanding General Phil Sheridan directly attacked Crook’s use of Apache soldiers, questioning the Apaches loyalty, and demanding a change. Trusting and valuing the Apache soldiers, Crook tested his mandate by asking to be relieved of his command.72 His request was swiftly approved, and his replacement General Nelson Miles received orders of “the necessity of making active and prominent use of the regular troops of your command.” In other words, the army command in Washington ordered Miles to place white soldiers in a more prominent role and displace the Apache soldiers. Thereafter the contributions of Apache soldiers were increasingly belittled and omitted in official statements and reports. Their numbers dropped although the importance of those who stayed remained crucial for the army’s success.73 Never being comfortable with the kind of role they had been given by Crook, army command wanted clearer borders between white and Apache soldiers. It was evident that Apache men could be hired and used, but must be employed as assistants to white troops with little or no publicity, never compromising the honor of whites. Still, what triggered censure of Crook was not only his heavy reliance on Apaches soldiers and the placing of thousands of white and black soldiers he had at his disposal in secondary roles, but also the lack of effective results. In the 1870s, when his military victories in the Southwest were more decisive, Crook got an almost unprecedented two-grade promotion, but in 1886 he was pushed aside.

In the end, Crook paid a small price. His career was not considerably damaged by his trust in Apache soldiers. Shortly after departing Arizona he was enjoying pleasant

72 Sheridan messaged Crook that “it seems strange that Geronimo and party could have escaped without the knowledge of the scouts,” and that “the offensive campaign against him [Geronimo and the Chiricahuas] with scouts has failed.” Crook replied that “there can be no question that the scouts were thoroughly loyal and would have prevented the hostiles leaving had it been possible.” “I believe that the plan upon which I have conducted operations is the one most likely to prove successful in the end. It may be however that I am too much wedded to my own views in this matter, and as I have spent nearly eight years of the hardest work of my life in this Department, I respectfully request that I may be now relieved from its command.” See Crook, Resume of Operations, 12-16. For an insightful although rather uncritical biography of Crook, see Charles M. Robinson III, General Crook and the Western Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), especially 104-159 and 247-286 for his time in the Southwest. Also of interest is Darlis A. Miller, “George Crook: The Humanitarian General,” in Richard W. Etulain & Glenda Riley, eds., Chiefs & Generals: Nine Men Who Shaped the American West (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2004), 105-128.

73 ARSW, 1886, 12, 165. In his memoirs Miles wrote that “I had no confidence in their [Apache soldiers] integrity and did not believe they could be trusted.” Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, 2 vol. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 495.
times in the form of receptions, dinner parties, theater, poker, and extended hunting trips in his new command in peaceful Nebraska. Two years later, he even went on to gain a coveted promotion to the rank of a major-general, and a move to the bustling Chicago. While Crook enjoyed “retirement” from active combat command, the real human cost of colonized labor system fell to the Apache soldiers.

In September 1886, Chiricahua Apache soldiers witnessed an abrupt end to their army work. Martine, a Nednhi (Chiricahua) Apache, who was said only to want a quiet life at San Carlos so that his family would be spared from the trials of war, joined the army when asked by General Nelson Miles to locate a group of Chiricahua Apaches under Geronimo and persuade them to surrender. “We got relatives up there… We want to take our people back so they won’t suffer. We tell Geronimo we came to help him and his people. If he kills us that’s alright. We got to do something to help our people,” Martine explained. For his success, Martine was promised money and a new home on the reservation, but, after accomplishing his mission, was instead made a prisoner of war and sent to Florida with Geronimo. At the same time, the army lured the reservation Chiricahuas into the agency and lined them up. Surrounded by white soldiers, they were disarmed, transported to the railroad, and sent also to Florida. Among the Chiricahuas were many who worked or had recently worked in the army. Some soldiers were even refused their pay when made prisoners. Chiricahua lives fell apart “when they thought they were all at home at Fort Apache,” as one of them later recollected. All the while white soldiers guarded them, the very men they had worked with just shortly before. “After these Indians had gone through all these hardships for the good of the people of these two states, they did this to them… Many of these scouts and most of the other Indians were farming… Some of them had sheep, some had goats, some had mule teams, wagons, harnesses; some of them had horses and fine saddles… We didn’t know where we were to be taken… Some thought we were going to

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Robinson, *Apache Voices*, 49-52. See also Ball, *Indeh*, 106-114. Geronimo’s surrender has been the target of extensive scholarly attention, much more so than the removal of the Chiricahua soldiers. Usually the significance of Martine and his fellow Chiricahua Kaetah has been downplayed and the role of army lieutenant Charles Gatewood, who accompanied the two Chiricahua peace emissaries, emphasized. Gatewood is also quite regularly made the “victim” of glory-hungry jealous comrades and commanders. See Thrapp, *Conquest of Apacheria*; Louis Kraft, *Gatewood and Geronimo* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Adam Kane, “Army Politics and Indian Wars: Charles B. Gatewood and the Geronimo Campaign of 1886,” *Military History of the West* 26 (Fall 1996), 109-128; Worcester, *Apaches*; Roberts, *Once They Moved Like the Wind*. 

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be taken to the ocean and thrown in. Some thought we were going to be killed in some other way,” one Chiricahua expressed the confusion.\footnote{Kenoi, “Chiricahua Apache’s Account,” 83-84; Ball, In the Days, 191-194; Opler, Apache Odyssey, 49-50; Ball, Indeh, 122-136.}

The majority of Chiricahua men had worked in the army several terms over the years, yet the colonial power rewarded them with imprisonment and removal when no longer needing them. The army had in fact entertained the idea of removing all Chiricahuas several times. During the winter of 1885-86 the plan had been abandoned because fears of what it might do to those Apache soldiers then scattered throughout the region in active service.\footnote{ARSW, 1886, 71.} The army command believed that the only way to end the U.S.-Apache wars was to remove all Chiricahuas as far away from Arizona as possible. The logic went that the reservations could not contain the Chiricahuas, as frequent breakouts throughout the 1880s demonstrated. Also, if reservation Chiricahuas were sent away then those resisting the U.S. would have no place to go back to and no linkage left that would tie them to the Southwest. Then they would want to surrender more easily and follow their kin. In a way, the reasons for removal were the same as the reasons why the army hired Apache workers: their military skills in the Southwest environment. By sending the Chiricahuas into a totally alien environment, the army made sure that the Apaches’ military power ceased to trouble the U.S.\footnote{For the removal, see Odie B. Faulk, The Geronimo Campaign (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 152-175; Angie Debo, Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 271-279, 299-312.}

It is sad and somewhat ironic that when the Chiricahuas were sent away, large numbers of the only group in the army community who were born and raised in the Southwest ended up deported. In Florida, the Chiricahuas died in alarming numbers. Eventually, they had to endure as prisoners of war for twenty-seven years, only gradually relocating westward, first to Alabama and then to Oklahoma, but never to Arizona. Even when they were released in 1913, their options included staying in Oklahoma or moving to the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. No Chiricahua Apache reservation exists in Arizona even today. In fact, the repatriation of the remains of Geronimo to Arizona has yet to occur.\footnote{As recently as the 1990s, Arizona’s majority legislators continued to spurn efforts to repatriate Geronimo’s remains. L.G. Moses, “Geronimo: The ‘Last Renegade,’” in Etulain & Riley, Chiefs & Generals, 86. For Chiricahua imprisonment, see H. Henrietta Stockel, Shame and Endurance: The Untold Story of the Chiricahua Apache Prisoners of War (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004). Oddly, as prisoners of war several Chiricahuas were again enlisted into the army at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. See Ball, Indeh, 161; Debo, Geronimo, 372-374.}
8.4 White Army Personnel and the Search for Authority over the Colonized Workforce

The fluid, yet uncertain and dangerous space Apache soldiers occupied as colonized labor is further illustrated by investigating how Apache workers were valued and othered in white army personnel’s discourses. As already shortly discussed, Apache soldiers were often highly regarded by army commanders such as General Crook who were responsible for hiring them. Still, in the end, Apache soldiers were often marginalized and excluded by whites who felt racially threatened by the efficient indigenous workforce.

It was white shortcomings in colonial war that opened the way for Apaches to join the army payroll. Indigenous recruits brought much needed local expertise to an army that otherwise represented a congregation of outsiders in the Southwest terrain. When the Apaches were trained to military work in the Southwest environment from childhood and felt comfortable and at home in the terrain, most white army people, like previous chapters of this dissertation have shown, cursed the land and wanted nothing to do with it. As Apaches pursued, located, fought, killed, and captured resisting indigenous peoples seemingly with ease, other troops were often unable to engage the enemy. They could not always even keep up with the indigenous soldiers. Although testimony is scarce, some Apache soldiers also realized the helplessness of the whites. Crook was not alone in thinking that Apache soldiers were needed to secure the Southwest for the U.S. According to one officer, “it was the opinion of those most experienced in Apache warfare, that, if the government had failed to take advantage of tribal animosities, Arizona would have remained as undeveloped to-day as it was when acquired by the United States.” These officers, however, were always in the minority.

While Apache soldiers took over offensive tasks, most white and black troops were forced to occupy defensive roles guarding mines, ranches, and waterholes. Many probably never saw any military action and disliked every minute of their monotonous

79 Opler, Apache Odyssey, 237; Thrapp, Conquest of Apacheria, 126.
80 Carter, From Yorktown, 181. Colonel August Kautz, who commanded the Department of Arizona from 1875 to 1878, felt that one indigenous company was equal to six companies of regular cavalry in war against the Apaches. Kautz is quoted in Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, 53. In his annual report for 1869, General E.O.C. Ord, then commander of Department of California, already believed that Apaches fighting other Apaches could bring an end to the war in a short time. ARSW, 1869, 122. See also ARSW, 1880, 109; Bourke, Apache Campaign, 30-37; Davis, Truth about Geronimo, 80.
days. In an army that equated offensive action with military glory, it looked from the white soldiers’ perspective that Apache soldiers were in danger of stealing what little military prestige and honor there was in this colonial war. Racial hatred and jealousy led to a reaction in which white officers and enlisted men, using varying representational strategies, sought to push Apache soldiers to the margins of the military world.

One strategy white army men, officers and soldiers alike, used to distance the Apaches was to talk of them as “scouts,” not as soldiers. “Scouts” was the term under which indigenous troops were officially hired and therefore its use was in some ways natural. On another level, being called “scouts” in everyday interactions and in private unofficial correspondence meant that the Apaches were in fact set apart from the army in a very concrete manner. “Scout” was not a soldier, but something else entirely. At best it indicated adjunct membership but more often meant being cast as the “other.” Many officers and their wives used terms like “Indian scouts” or, usually, plain “scouts” to hide the individuality of Apache soldiers and to reduce them to an anonymous and irrelevant mass. To a certain extent this practice was not only about racial difference but also a question of class. Often only members of the army elite, prominent civilians, and Apache leaders were referred by their name in officers and their wives’ writings. While army stories helped to make Apache men like Cochise, Geronimo, and Victorio household names in the western world, they did not bother to identify most of the “scouts” or even the white or black soldiers. In one way, it seemed to make little difference whether the soldiers were white, black, or red. In the eyes of the officers and their wives they all represented an anonymous mass.

Probably disliking the idea of having to acknowledge Apaches as members of the army, some white army men and women chose simply to forget Apache presence altogether. They remained silent, thus making Apache soldiers invisible. Silence was not accidental, but a useful strategy. By not writing of Apache soldiers these army people undoubtedly contributed to the Apaches insignificant and peripheral status in the army community. Those army personnel who discussed Apache soldiers in more
detail often distanced them to the lowest rungs in the colonial hierarchies. Many army men advocated a more prominent role for white troops by attacking the character of Apache soldiers. For example, one Apache soldier, called “Dutchy” by the officers, was supposedly a “most incorrigible and vicious scoundrel” and “a drunkard, a thief, and a murderer.”

Others white army men categorized as either unworthy, poorly motivated liars who would not “fight for real,” or as horrible savages. According to one officer, “the Apache is a savage of the lowest type…He can be bought for a small figure to kill his father or mother or any of his relations.”

Still others, men like General Sheridan writing to Crook in 1886, questioned the loyalty of Apache soldiers. One white soldier, for instance, was uncertain as to whether the army "had any use for these Apache scouts, as they are treacherous and could not be depended on in a emergency."

Wild tales sometimes circulated that Apache soldiers had turned on their white comrades, especially following the Cibecue incident in 1881. Lieutenant John Bigelow caught one of those rumors with the arrival of the army paymaster to his camp in the field on January 1886. According to Bigelow, the paymaster told that "a detachment of Indian scouts out with soldiers... [had] killed two of the soldiers and made off, undoubtedly to join the hostiles.” No such thing had taken place, but that Bigelow did not discredit the story right away tells something of the army mentality where the loyalty of Apache soldiers was constantly doubted.

Besides Cibecue, Apache disloyalty proved a persistent and distressing myth, nothing more. In an army plagued by the desertion of white soldiers, desertion rates for Apache soldiers were never near as high. John Rope’s narrative gives the impression that desertion was rare. Also, one officer claimed that only three Chiricahua soldiers deserted during the 1885-86 campaigns. During the Battle of Big Dry Wash in 1882 only one Apache soldier of the entire company deserted. Still, some contradictory

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84 Daly, “Geronimo Campaign,” 451, 485. For another army opinion of Dutchy, see Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 519.

85 ARSW, 1877, 143, see also 1886, 11-12, 72-73; Lawrence R. Jerome, “Soldiering and Suffering in the Geronimo Campaign,” Joe A. Stout, Jr. ed. Journal of the West 2 (June 1972), 157, 163-164.

86 Mazzanovich papers, “Trailing Geronimo” typescript, ASHS. See also Pettit, “Apache Campaign,” 535; Collins, Apache Nightmare, 59-60; ARSW, 1882, 146.

87 Bigelow, On the Bloody Trail, 119-120. For false reports of Apache soldiers disloyalty, see also Davis, “Difficulties of Indian Warfare.”
evidence also exists. According to Lieutenant James Parker, most of the forty White Mountain Apache soldiers serving with his column in 1885-86 deserted.\(^8^8\)

The army also included many who “admired” Apache military skills. However, even when they were impressed by the Apaches physical endurance, knowledge of terrain, individual skills in concealment and use of weapons, and the suitability all of these for warfare in the Southwest, white army men could not admit Apaches as equals or superiors as such. They had to construct an alternate story where the skills of Apache soldiers were derived from their perceivably non-civilized attributes, and where Apache soldiers were represented as inhuman animal-like war-beasts. In these discourses, the Apache soldiers required no rest or even water. “The constitution of these people [Apache soldiers] and the amount of hardship they were capable of enduring was extraordinary. They could travel on foot for forty or fifty miles in a day without taking nourishment, rest, or indulging in a drink of water…this made them, as soldiers, superior to the white,” one soldier wrote.\(^8^9\) An officer voiced that the Apache soldiers “carry almost nothing but arms and ammunition; they can live on cactus, they can go more than forty-eight hours without water...they have incredible powers of endurance.” He added that the Apache troops supposedly “moved with no semblance of regularity, individual fancy alone governed...with vision as keen as a hawk’s, tread as untiring and as stealthy as the panther’s.” This officer was convinced that “the Apache was the perfect, the ideal, scout of the whole world.”\(^9^0\) Even in these “more positive” army writings Apache soldiers were still very much the “other,” dubbed by their white comrades as “beings from another world,” “greyhounds,” “bloodhounds,” or “tigers of human species.”\(^9^1\)

When Apaches were excluded in army discourses, one could expect that social relations between white army people and Apache soldiers were full of animosity. However, that does not seem to have been the case. Apart from Cibecue there is very little evidence of any major clashes or disturbances between white and Apache soldiers.


\(^8^9\) Bode, Dose, 157-158. One officer believed that all Apache soldiers had to capacity to go over any mountain or hill, no matter how steep. See Hanna, “With Crawford,” 511.

\(^9^0\) Bourke, On the Border, 467-468; Bourke, Apache Campaign, 21-22. See also Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 79.

\(^9^1\) Shipp, “Captain Crawford’s,” 519; Wesley Merritt, “Incidents of Indian Campaigning in Arizona,” in Cozzens, Eyewitnesses, 160; Carter, From Yorktown, 181; Forsyth, Thrilling Days, 80.
either in the field or in the army villages. For instance, John Rope lists only few minor quarrels. Usually disagreements concerning who got to eat the game the Apaches had hunted. Some evidence even exists of common leisure between white and Apache soldiers. Also, in a peculiar practice white army men sometimes renamed Apache soldiers. Alteration of names was not yet permanent as it was in boarding schools and did not mark any upward rise in status. Names did not resemble proper Christian names, but were rather loosely devised structures. Nicknames whites gave to indigenous soldiers included Nosey, Washington Charlie, Indian Chicken, Slim Jim, Rowdy, Yuma Bill, Jacko, Popcorn, Whiskey, Dutchy, Peaches, and Deadshot. Although renaming can be seen to indicate good-humored and informal social relations between white and indigenous soldiers, the practice had multiple significances. Being a practical necessity for daily identification, new names relocated Apache soldiers to a sphere of understandability. According to one officer, “any American who would attempt to burden himself or his memory with a number of Indian names would soon be hopelessly lost.” Also, much like when naming landscapes, in renaming Apache soldiers whites took possession of Apaches and asserted their own superiority. One soldier wrote that when giving names whites “made pets” of the Apache troopers, thus effectively reducing Apaches in the colonial hierarchies and also questioning the Apaches manliness. From the Apache standpoint, new names given by the military might have marked sifting subjectivities, or overlapping identities, but more likely they proved a necessary evil, perhaps even an insult, or at best harmless fun. In Apache society, person’s own name was something very important and often additional names were invented and used to protect the real one, to save it from too much exposure or possibly embarrassing usage by other people. It would be interesting to know what kind of names Apache soldiers used to describe white army men. Some evidence, although undoubtedly romanticized by patriarchal white officers, does exist. These names include

92 Basso, Western Apache Raiding, 93-185. See also Bourke, Apache Campaign; Bourke, On the Border; Cruse, Apache Days.
94 Elliott, “Indian Reservation,” 408.
“Long Nose,” “Big Foot,” and “Tall Captain.” One lieutenant, however, the Apache soldiers dubbed as “Nantan Greenhorn” for his ignorance of Apaches.95

In sum, for the vast majority of white army people Apache soldiers were never equals or real soldiers. To establish the Apaches difference, white army discourses silenced the Apaches, cast them as anonymous “scouts,” or described them as unreliable barbarians and uncivilized predators. Even in the more “admiring” army texts, Apache soldiers were represented more as instruments at the officers’ disposal than as real humans. In fact, it seems safe to conclude that soldiers or not, being an Apache often meant being seen as the opposite of whites, and it certainly meant being excluded from the army community. The army’s othering of the Apaches was a question of military honor and racial hierarchy, designated to secure the privilege of whiteness. It was only logical that white army people sought to draw attention away from their own poor performance in the U.S.-Apache wars. By ignoring, distancing, and downgrading Apache soldiers, white army people sought to establish their own superiority and colonial authority over the indigenous workforce. In white army minds, giving Apache soldiers too much praise or admitting them as full members of the army community would have been dangerous, as it had meant placing the fragile covers of whiteness in jeopardy, questioning the privilege and power of the whites, and undermining the purported superiority of their culture.

Conclusion: A Race-Based Labor System

After the armed conflict in the Southwest ended in September 1886, it came apparent that large numbers of Apache workers were no longer needed by the U.S. regime. Still, a handful of “scouts” found work until the 1940s, and the army did experiment with “full” formal integration of indigenous soldiers in the 1890s. Four Apache companies were then hired into white regiments, but, according to Michael Tate, the enterprise collapsed within six years because of white prejudice and lack of indigenous interest in permanent employment outside their own communities.96

Frederick Cooper, historian of colonialism, has noted that when the need for colonial soldiers rose empires needed to soften differentiation and enhance

95 Ball, Indeh, 55; Elliott, “Indian Reservation,” 413.
Colonial power was never total and to strengthen their position, empires needed to partially incorporate the colonized by opening the door for participation in colonial institutions. This inclusion, often temporary and dangerous, allowed for opportunities for the colonized. The Apache case reveals how an uncertain, even perilous, but also liberating and interdependent, labor system was created when this partial integration was resorted to in the Southwest.

From the workers perspective, army work was about taking charge of one’s own destinies when being threatened by colonialism. Whereas reservation life meant captivity, cultural onslaught, and poverty, and warfare against the U.S. signified destruction and suffering, army work offered a promise of security, a chance to end war, save relatives, retrieve captives, exact revenge, confirm ideas of manhood, achieve status, and avoid poverty and starvation. In other words, wage labor in the army allowed Apaches to survive amidst the chronic warfare, poverty, and cultural onslaught brought upon them by colonial intrusions. As colonized labor, freedom was still temporary, restricted, and potentially dangerous. Work for the colonizers brought no rights in the colonial society, nor did it save from forced exile. When labor ended, workers went right back to reservations. They could not actively pursue army careers, but had to wait for officers to come calling again. Colonized labor system was both rigid but also fluid. The army tried to control the Apache workforce by giving Apaches certain privileges, but retaining others for the white and black soldiers. The army made the rules, but Apaches not only used the work for their own aims, but created space for movement unintended by colonizers. Individual Apaches were able to move from the army to the reservation and to the factions fighting the U.S., but this was dangerous and Apaches could end up in personal exile or hanged.

The experiences of Apache soldiers show how the U.S. used the labor of colonized peoples. Colonized labor also demonstrates how the U.S. conquest of the Southwest was carried on the shoulders of the indigenous inhabitants; how the U.S. regime achieved its power by involving the colonized peoples in building the systems that oppressed them. It shows how the colonial drawing of boundaries, learning of place and establishment of colonial relations of reciprocity were managed in the West. The position of Apaches on the margins of the new colonial order was reinforced and maintained through their labor experiences. Work made Apaches members of an

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organization and community that did not really want them, but still needed their expertise to cement the organization’s own power. The army was as willing to favor Apache workers over candidates from other indigenous tribes, and to offer them a wide range of important work tasks and equal compensation as it was to controlling and limiting their work periods and mobility. The army offered a semi-incorporated status for the Apache workers, but nothing permanent or stable. By denying full institutional integration, and by othering them in discourses, the army made its Apache soldiers inferior and thus their exclusion logical, even inevitable. Valued by some but othered by many, partially included, but mostly excluded, the Apaches were always kept on the margins of the army community as a subaltern workforce; randomly employed, socially excluded, and easily exploitable and expendable. The army had the power to treat indigenous workers as unequals because in the last half of the nineteenth-century Apaches were a falling power with rapidly disappearing geopolitical influence, whereas the U.S. presented a rising force, a continental and global superpower in the making.
Conclusion: An Empire of Denial, Difference, and Frustration

“In the American view of the past, the United States was not a classical imperial power, but a righter of wrongs around the world, in pursuit of tyranny, in defense of freedom no matter the place or cost.”

- Edward W. Said

Empire is central to United States history. Conquest and control of other people, their lands and resources are among the nation’s defining factors from pre-independence to the War on Terror. The nineteenth-century conquest of the trans-Mississippi West represented a stage in the making of a global power. Those scholars who acknowledge that the United States is and has been an empire, and not all do, have tried to understand what specific characteristics define it. Some of them, like the historian Niall Ferguson, argue that the United States is an empire in denial. A widely-accepted belief holds that the United States has never been an aggressor, writes historian Marilyn B. Young, because, supposedly, it does not commit aggression. Also, the hostility of others purportedly cannot be a response to American actions, because the United States does not invite hostility but only reacts to it. Often empire is camouflaged in special rhetoric designed to justify U.S. actions and to gain moral authority for its cause. The prevalent story has the United States restoring order and spreading or securing freedom and democracy. It also seems that the U.S. always confronts “evil states” or “menaces,” whether they be the Soviets, Islamic fundamentalists, or Apaches. According to historian Thomas Bender, Americans have shown a constant incapacity to see themselves as the enemy, or to recognize their cause as unjust or their actions as cruel and unnecessary, but have instead made American ideals and interests into universal human ideals for all peoples and cultures. Still, the United States is also an empire of difference. “An essential part of American national identity is based on difference,” on a desire to define America as distinct from Europe (exceptionalism) or those peoples the Americans have called “uncivilized” or “savage,” Bender writes. Americans have

systematically presumed a position of superiority to those people whose land they coveted or whose trade they sought.\(^4\)

When looking at the U.S. empire through the lens provided by the U.S. Army in post-Civil War southern Arizona and New Mexico we can see an empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. All white army people produced difference and otherness in discourse and in everyday life in order to make themselves powerful and important and to legitimize U.S. conquest. The construction and maintenance of officers and their wives’ identity and power rested on notions of difference. Wanting to distinguish themselves from the colony and its peoples, they represented themselves in opposition to, or in struggle against, the colonial landscapes and peoples. Feeling superior and powerful, officers and their wives claimed that nobody or nothing in the region was their equal or able to beat them, and represented themselves as saviors of the Southwest and leaders in the process to civilize the region.

Officers and wives rejected southern Arizona and New Mexico as it was before forces (railroads, capitalism, and the white middle-class) from the imperial center (eastern United States) changed it. They disliked the place and distanced it by constructing images and representations of an inferior wasteland located outside the realm of civilization and characterized by dangerous environment and harsh society. Many approached the landscapes in terms of struggle, as obstacles that tested their character and strength. In this way they could claim control and superiority by mastering the landscapes, by surviving “hostile nature” and “Indian danger.”

“Civilized,” “honorable,” “brave,” “refined,” and “respectable” were the foundational concepts on which the officers and their wives constructed their sense of self, their faith in their superiority, and their justification to rule the West. In this thinking white privilege was crucial but white ethnicity, so troublesome a question in the eastern United States, mattered less. The mostly native-born officers and their wives did not single out the immigrant element as a threat, and although the boundaries of “respectable persons” was often a fluid concept adjusted to meet the purportedly low standard of candidates in southern Arizona and New Mexico, being an acceptable social companion was never a question of white ethnicity. Being Irish or a Jew was secondary to character, intelligence, manners, and behavior - in other words class. Most civilians,

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officers and their wives felt, had difficulties acting like whites. They supposedly lacked respectable character, being the surplus of civilized society. Mexicans did not qualify as white in army eyes, but were categorized as backward racial degenerates who symbolized European empire-building gone wrong. Racial otherness defined not only the Mexicans but also the indigenous groups. All white army people painted the Apaches, whom they saw as competition, as a vicious warrior race, the quintessential evil and the enemy of mankind. Army prejudice towards the Apaches was a racism of contempt, it minimized the humanity of what it hated and saw as a threat.

In the army whiteness was fractured by class. Although they displayed a united front when it came to the Apaches or to the nature of the army’s mission, inside the army villages and during journeys officers and their wives and the white enlisted soldiers were divided by a class barrier. Officers and wives wanted to lead the regeneration of the colonial periphery by example, transplanting and replicating eastern middle-class lifestyles and culture. They sought to display their status, class sensibilities, and level of refinement in leisure and domestic life and during army journeys. Ideally army villages were set to function as islands of civilization. This called for a sufficient labor force. Treated as unfit for self-government, white (and black) soldiers functioned as an underclass, a socially inferior working class the officers and their wives often remained silent about. White soldiers were suitable for manual labor and for serving the officers and their wives in the villages and during journeys. As workers they were subject to harsh punishments, meager pay, unmanly domestic work chores, work with women and people of color, poor living conditions, and unchecked power of the officers and their wives. Some white soldiers felt like slaves. They organized resistance by working inefficiently, by deserting, and by creating a rough leisure life segregated from the officers and wives. White enlisted men did not distance themselves from the colony but enjoyed its freedoms. Many made southern Arizona and New Mexico their homes after retiring. Still, many also cursed the land and approached it in terms of struggle, in no small part because of their poor own performance in colonial warfare. Many also were critical of the character of the settlements and peoples, eventually welcoming “civilization” and progress full-heartedly. White enlisted men were outsiders too and believed in their own racial superiority and in the privilege of whiteness, especially in relation to the Apaches.

Uncomfortable with the presence of racial strangers and feeling threatened by their performance, officers and their wives and the white enlisted men often distanced
and silenced the Apache troops, forcing them to the margins of the army world. When Apaches chose to work in the army to combat the impacts colonialism had on their lives, they became a special racialized labor force, colonized labor. This labor system was characterized by constant tension between integration and exclusion and between indigenous freedom and colonial control. Apache soldiers, valued over other indigenous workers, performed a wide range of important work tasks and received equal compensation. Yet, they were not granted full institutional integration but discharged when the army no longer needed their special expertise.

Officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men in general make it seem that they were in complete denial over the nature of their actions as invaders. Their representations not only made the marginalization of Apache soldiers and Mexicans appear normal, but also made colonial aggression against the Apaches (and Yavapais) seem justifiable and intelligible, and less racist and violent than it in reality was. White army people did not question their right to operate on other peoples’ land. They never saw their own actions as excessively violent or harmful although they were engaged in offensive war and eager to use violence against any people thought to be free Apaches. Furthermore, in army logic violence was represented as the fault of the Apaches. The army claimed it only reacted to violence and sought to establish peace and save the region from its contemporary state of decadence. In all, the army personnel displayed a refusal and incapacity to understand others. They did not bother to ask what the Apaches, or anyone else in the region, thought. Proving their good intentions in their own eyes, officers and wives invited “the sub-human” Apaches to become human through reservation regeneration and the adoption of Apache children.

White army people turned colonialism into liberation. They not only made the Apaches the colonial villains to justify U.S. conquest but fabricated a history for the region where the U.S. was represented as a savior that brought an end to centuries of chaos. On one level army narratives had claimed that southern Arizona and New Mexico was a no man’s land in order to change it. By making the Southwest backward and unused, army narratives tried to give an impression that the region was ripe for U.S. takeover and that the U.S. invasion was right and even necessary: only the arrival of machine civilization, industry, and the white middle-class could save the region and make it a worthy part of the nation. In this process white army men and women reserved for themselves a heroic role as nation-builders and liberators who made southern Arizona and New Mexico safe for prosperous white futures. Unwanted and irrelevant in
the East, army people sought to make themselves important by penetrating “hostile” regions, subduing “dangerous” colonial villains, and opening “peripheral” places to “civilization” and “progress.”

White army experience and representations also reveal an empire of frustration. All did not go as the colonizers planned and they had to learn that their power was limited. Frustration, and insecurity and bitterness, was the result of white army people feeling that they did not achieve their goals or that they had to struggle too much. Inside the army villages living spaces seldom managed to reach ambitious standards and proper leisure proved difficult to organize. Furthermore, from the army viewpoint the colony and its peoples seemed to be against them. Apaches stubbornly resisted and did not welcome “liberation” and “regeneration” in the reservations. Neither did the Apaches fight right, but questioned the manliness of white soldiers with their “unorthodox” ways. A growing doubt over one’s superiority made colonial warfare a distasteful matter for many soldiers and officers. Many also feared the Apaches. An additional insult to the racial pride of white soldiers was that it seemed that the Apache soldiers were in danger of stealing what honor there was left in colonial warfare.

Furthermore, the supposedly inferior, inhospitable, and odd landscapes, in addition to dangerous wildlife, made movement a nightmare filled with frustration and disappointments. Many also felt troubled by the character of the colonial society, doubting whether the region had any prosperous white futures. This made them question what they were doing in such a place that was perhaps not worth “liberating.” Some officers and wives even feared that a prolonged stay in southern Arizona and New Mexico would contaminate their characters. What was worse was that the nation seemed ungrateful and unaware of the army’s contributions in spreading civilization and prosperity.

Disgusted and disappointed, cursing the purportedly inhospitable colony and the ungrateful nation, many officers and wives wanted out of the colony as soon as possible and they could not conceive living in the region permanently. It never occurred to officers and wives to place the blame on themselves. They insisted that other peoples, or the colony and the nation had let them down and prevented them from fulfilling their “good intentions.” The promotion of national prestige and an intense desire to advance their own position and their vision of America motivated the white army colonizers to such an extent that they had no inclination to understand or acknowledge any other “truths” than their own.
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