The Politics of Pulp Investment and the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST)
“A primeira presença do papel no Brasil, sem dúvida, é a carta de Pero Vaz de Caminha, escrita logo do descobrimento de nosso país.”
Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association, Bracelpa

“O Brasil é gordo de terras. São 360 milhões de hectares cultiváveis. Arguto, Pero Vaz de Caminha logo atinhou que, aqui, ‘em se plantando dá’. Muitos ainda não entenderam o recado. Preferem o "em se cercando, ninguém tasca". Há muita terra neste país para pouca gente. Basta dizer que 44% pertencem a apenas 1% dos proprietários rurais. E há muita gente Sem Terra. São cerca de 15 milhões de pessoas perambulando por estradas e acampamentos, teimando em sonhar que entre tanta terra ociosa, hão de encontrar o pedaço de chão que os redima da indigência e do risco de favelização na cidade.”
Frei Betto for the Landless Movement

“E desta maneira dou aqui a Vossa Alteza conta do que nesta Vossa terra vi. E se a um pouco alonguei, Ela me perdoe. Porque o desejo que tinha de Vos tudo dizer, mo fez pôr assim pelo miúdo. Deste Porto Seguro ... primeiro dia de maio de 1500”
Pero Vaz de Caminha

---

3 Carta a El Rei D. Manuel, Dominus: São Paulo. 1963. The letter sent to the king of Portugal after the encounter of Brazil in 1500 by Pero Vaz de Caminha.
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# Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRACELPA</td>
<td>Associação Brasileira de Celulose e Papel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPEDES</td>
<td>Centro de Pesquisas para o Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul da Bahia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>Conselho de Defesa Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMI</td>
<td>Conselho Indigenista Missionário</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTAG</td>
<td>Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Comissão Pastoral da Terra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Dynamics of Contention</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Embedded Autonomy of a Corporation vis-à-vis the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>Embedded Autonomy of a Movement vis-à-vis the State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FASE</td>
<td>Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEPAM</td>
<td>Fundação Estadual de Proteção Ambiental – Rio Grande do Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETAGRI</td>
<td>Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNAI</td>
<td>Fundação Nacional do Índio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBAMA</td>
<td>Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCRA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Ministério do Meio Ambiente</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores</td>
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<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais <em>Sem Terra</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDR</td>
<td>União Democrática Ruralista</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR</td>
<td>Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais</td>
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<td>WRM</td>
<td>World Rainforest Movement</td>
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Preface

At dawn on April 4, 2004, Brazilian Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) members cut the barbed wire leading to a eucalyptus plantation of the paper pulp company Veracel Celulose in Southern Bahia, stepped in, uprooted four hectares of eucalyptus and planted beans and corn. The movement justified the three thousand five hundred landless workers’ action by noting that “You cannot eat eucalyptus”. The Landless Movement seeks to contest corporate resource exploitation through this kind of protest, taking place increasingly since the Red April of 2004. These protests were disruptive and aimed to transform the public opinion on pulp investments and industrial plantations: “To cut the eucalyptus of a paper and pulp multinational is a symbolic gesture as was, some years ago [during the World Social Forum in January 2001], the destruction of a transgenic soy field in Rio Grande do Sul,” explained a movement coordinator. The movement aims to slow transnational capital moves, especially the expansion of industrial monoculture plantations, using this type of contention. In this case study, I assess the degree to which it has attained this goal and, if so, where, how and why.

If the Landless Movement had not managed to carry out the April 2004 Veracel protest, I would probably never have heard about pulp, Veracel or eucalyptus. Moreover, the federal court in Eunápolis would probably not have reached its July 2008 verdict demanding that Veracel uproot a significant part of its eucalyptus plantations. O Globo, the largest Brazilian daily newspaper, followed the 2004 occupation closely for days, reproducing the new movement’s framing of pulp investments. These symbolic, massive, disruptive and pioneering protest acts have drawn widespread, transnational attention to pulp investment. In this research, I ask what economic outcomes the protests had. When is the expansion of industrial plantations slowed, and what is the role of social movements in this? What mechanisms of contention does a proficient social movement employ? To address these questions, I analyze the confrontation over paper pulp projects in Brazil.

The main actors in this study on the influence of movements in natural resource conflicts are, first, the paper and pulp corporations, one of the world’s most extractive operation-dependent

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4 Walmir Assunção, regional coordinator of the MST, Southern Bahia (O Globo 5 April 2004; author’s interview June 2004, Eunápolis, BA).
5 The Red April has become the month of the strongest protest for the MST, a tradition of demanding justice for the massacre of 19 movement members by the Military Police in Eldorado do Carajás, Pará, in April 1996.
7 I follow Charles Tilly’s classic definition of social movements, which highlights movements as intrinsically relational, and tied to a state-society interaction. A social movement consists of “a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness” (Tilly 1994: 7 In: Giugni 2004: 7).
8 I follow the conceptualization of mechanisms defined in McAdam et al. (2001: 24) as “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations”. I conceive mechanisms as techniques that social agents utilize to achieve their goals. Instead of the term mechanism, one could replace this with technique, but I utilize the previous.
industries. This multinational sector has been moving more heavily to the global South at the beginning of the 21st century, selling forest assets and downsizing in the global North, making new investments in the south together with some Northern and Southern governments. This phenomenon is closely linked to the general globalization of the political economy and trade liberalization in world politics over the last two decades.

The second actor is the MST, or O Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra. The movement was established officially in 1984. Since then, it has turned into a sustained grassroots movement with 25 years of experience. In January 2009, the social mass movement of the rural poor had 370,000 settled families on 7.5 million hectares of land and over 200,000 camped families, with an average of eight persons per family. It had an estimated total of 1.5 million members, according to its own figures. Over a quarter of Brazil’s agrarian settlements belong to the MST (Carter 2009: 15). Carter and Carvalho (2009) estimate 20,000 activists engage in coordination. The movement has over 2,000 publicly funded schools in camps and settlements, offering free education to over 160,000 children and youngsters; it has made over 50,000 people literate and educated 4,000 teachers in its internal higher education system (Brasil de Fato 2009). Comprising five percent of Brazil’s rural inhabitants, the MST, amid its many limitations, “has demonstrated unusual longevity and sophistication for a popular movement” making it Latin America’s most important social movement (Carter 2009: 18). The globally paradigmatic poor people’s movement – which most movements are not – is the central actor in the larger Latin American movement actively contesting industrial plantations. They propose a real, existing alternative to industrial plantations and corporate resource exploitation: non-corporate agriculture, most of which is chemical-free, and non-corporate resource exploitation, which is labor rather than capital-intensive, fitting better to the realities of the global South.

Besides the interaction of the MST and the paper industry, I also explore the complex role of the various Brazilian state actors and institutions (government ministries, agencies, institutes, courts, and legislatures), at all levels (federal, state, and municipal) in the politics of plantation investment. In the 100 interviews I conducted with the key informants, governmental officers, company directors and social movement activists all saw the movement resistance efforts as the biggest challenge to pulp investment continuation. For

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9 I define as state actors all persons in the executive, legislative and judicial spheres of the federal, state and municipal levels of the state. The MST has gained the sympathy of some courts, judges and public prosecutors (by embedding with the judiciary), as well as some elected representatives at the federal, state and municipal levels who have drafted new legislative frameworks supporting the movement. In some cases, since the state agents may be people who belong to the MST, the categories are not mutually exclusive but complementary and possibly simultaneous.

10 I adhere to Eakin’s (2001: 178) conceptualization of the state, which he has also applied to the Brazilian state: “the state is not some abstract concept, but rather (in Weberian terms) a set of institutions and the collection of individuals in those institutions”. Furthermore, Drèze & Sen’s (2002: 45) conceptual differentiation of the state and government directs the analysis: “The state is, in many ways, a broader concept, which includes government, but also the legislature that votes on public rules, the political system that regulates elections, the role that is given to opposition parties, and the basic political rights that are upheld by [the] judiciary. A democratic state makes it much harder for the ruling government to be unresponsive to the needs and values of the population at large … we have to ask questions not merely about the nature of the actual government in office, but, going beyond that, also about the nature of the state of which the ruling government is only one part”.
example, in a foresters’ seminar at the University of Helsinki I attended as a student and an ethnographer, Stora Enso director Weine Genfors worried that if such resistance as in the state of Rio Grande do Sul since 2005 expands to the rest of Brazil, there would no longer be large tree plantations (*Industrial Forest Plantations* 2007). In the view of Bracelpa, Brazil’s paper and pulp front organization, the MST, organized indigenous peoples, and most recently the Afro-descendant *Quilombola* communities are the greatest threat to the advance of the industry’s power (author’s interview with Ludwig Moldan, Bracelpa, June 25, 2008). I will assess whether, how and by the utilization of which mechanisms of contention this claim holds true by comparing different cases and outcomes across varying contexts and periods.

What is the role of resistance to the expanding transnational flow of natural resources? I argue that a theory of contentious agency can help to answer this vexing, urgent and important question. I compare empirical evidence across pulp conflict cases in the world’s arguably most important industrial plantation and forest resource country, Brazil, which produces 25% of the world’s food and contains about 14% of the world’s forests (FAO 2001). Bringing social movements into the core of explaining political and economic processes has been abnormal in the North American political science tradition since 1950s (McAdam et al. 2001), as well as in forestry and the paper industry – their actual governance and their study – until a few years ago, still remaining in the shadows. This study has the most to offer to those circles; people within them can understand more fully the trajectories of pulp projects and the politics around corporate resource exploitation in general.

Going beyond the claim that movements are important, the contemporary movement analysis offers sophisticated tools to assess how movements matter (Andrews 2004; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; see also the symposium on the measurement of mechanisms of contention in *Qualitative Sociology* 31, no. 4, 2008). The latest research tools can answer the question of exactly what mechanisms produce the outcomes of movement activism. I provide answers to the questions how movements matter in influencing economic outcomes by outlining a new theory of contentious agency promotion importance in the shaping of corporate resource exploitation and conducting systematic comparison of its influence on the economic outcomes of all 14 Brazilian bleached pulp projects/holdings.

I combine a broad theoretical argument and specific, detailed empirical case studies, producing a theory of when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation. The analysis of economic outcomes is not nearly as well understood as policy outcomes; especially rare have been studies of how

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11 Bracelpa is the representative organization of the paper and pulp companies in Brazil to the present. It is a powerful, but still relatively quite limited organization in comparison to, for example, the Finnish forest industry lobby, Metsäteollisuus ry, which also includes the ever more important furniture, panel and construction sectors. Bracelpa limits itself to pulp and some paper. Bracelpa’s political power vis-à-vis Brazilian government policy has been a significant factor behind the rapid expansion of pulp investments since the end of the 1990s (see also Kingstone 1999).

12 Brazil ranks first in the export and production of several food commodities, such as sugar (42% of global exports), ethanol (51%), coffee (26%), orange juice (80%), tobacco (29%), and ranks in the top four in the export and production of beef (24%), poultry (35%), soybeans (35%), soy meal (25%), corn (35%) and pork (13%) (USDA 2005).
movements affect industry development (Vasi 2009), and corporate social responsibility (Soule 2009). Particularly dire is the need to understand better the causal mechanisms of contention influencing economic outcomes.

In the social sciences, agency refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices (Giddens 1984). I suggest that the creation of particular social mechanisms can foster human agency, the capacity of humans to act and to make choices, and get involved and participate in politics. Human agency operates before, during and after it builds and is built by social mechanisms. Building on and going beyond the dynamics of contention (DOC) research program started by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001), who urge scholars to go beyond the structure/agency debate, I agree that what happens within political trajectories and conflicts can better be understood as the result of the intersection of a number of causal mechanisms. My major theoretical point is to show how such intersections create specific types of human agency. Seeing political processes and human agency as constituted by social mechanisms, I consider how two types of human agency, contentious and corporate agency, operate, interact and are created.

By contentious agency, I mean non-routine agency that challenges the established order in contentious ways and is created by particular mechanisms of contention. Contentious agency differs from conventional agency in the mechanisms that produce agency. I investigate the mechanisms that produce a growing sense of agency and self-worth, encouraging people to contest issues and seek for major social and political transformations. For this reason, I analyze the MST as an emblematic social movement constructed by specific mechanisms promoting contentious agency.

I make a case for the impact of contentious agency on the path of capital accumulation. This has not been usual in the literature. By a combination of looking at standard social movement variables, such as framing and protests, as well as focusing on the construction of networks and relations with the state actors as a key part of agency, instead of just seeing the behavior of movement outsiders as an exogenous “political opportunity structure”, I attempt to improve previous social movement theorizing. I focus on a specific form of contentious agency, which fundamentally challenges the right of capital to shape the process of accumulation and development. This is right livelihood-promoting contentious agency, which is a specific and limited sub-type of the general contentious agency. Right livelihood signifies production not disturbing the peace and harmony of others, but increasing these. For example, if an investment project causes people to become landless, the business is not fulfilling all the conditions for right livelihood. All the mechanisms of contention I delineate aim to foster

13 Ion Vasi’s (2009) and Sarah Soule’s (2009) research are two pioneering examples of the recent rising interest on explaining economic outcomes of movements.

14 In comparison to McAdam et al. (2001), who, perhaps due to their largely structuralist background, still in 2001 emphasized broad change processes and other “structural factors”, I argue human agency and interaction should be put into an equal standing with these in the DOC research program. I provide an elaborated framework for the dynamic analysis of mobilization. This had already come a crucially long way in the tentative framework of McAdam et al. (2001: 45, figure 2.1) in comparison to the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics (2001: 17, figure 1.2). I will continue the amendments and elaboration towards a more dynamic theoretical framework.
contentious agency, in order to change economic outcomes and business towards the lines of right livelihood. I am up to decipher the social mechanisms that promote result-oriented contentious agency that seeks to force and expand right livelihood-type production.

This is a story of capital and its resistance. The argument of slowing down capitalism by ragtag social alliance cobbled together to do so was first made by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (2001 [1944]). This book is part of the broad effort to bring Polanyian analysis more directly into conversation with the social movement theorizing. For Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 147), the late 19th century English regulatory movement responded spontaneously against the advance of the free market capitalism idea, as this new process was damaging society by the commoditization of nature and human beings. In the larger picture, pulp investments belong to the historical quest for raw material by Northern governments and corporations – which Southern social movements increasingly contest. Previous cases in the history of the paper industry in the global North show that countries like Finland and Sweden managed to push for significant regulation and structural transformation, shifting power relations and the land/forest tenure in the first half of the twentieth century. Polanyi would call these political economic moves a counter-movement, in which the “organic society” manages to resist the commoditization of the fictitious commodities land, labor and money. However, resistance had generally not yet managed to slow down Southern industrial tree plantation expansion until 2004. After all, even the MST, perhaps the strongest of the Southern movements, is a new, lower class social movement with limited power and capacity in comparison to the corporations pushing for industrial plantation expansion. Even against these odds, depending on the mechanisms of contention and case-specific conflict dynamics, in some cases the movement has managed to slow and even reverse plantation expansion since 2004.

Drastic power relations mark the large-scale plantation-dependent pulp project model, conflicts around the world centering on mills encircled by tree plantations. However, it is intriguing that in the first decade of the twenty-first century in a number of cases the landless movements, indigenous people and traditional populations of the global South have engaged in increasingly important resistance in their scuffle with the current pulp investment model.

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15 For a similar recent effort, see for example Ronaldo Munck’s (2007) *Globalization and Contestation: The New Great Counter-movement*.

16 One cannot speak of just pulp mills, as the current investment model essentially includes large areas of surrounding fast-wood tree plantations, making them thus pulp projects, not just pulp mill investments. In the current model, the production of pulp is concentrated in large units controlled by a limited number of engineers and paper workers – forestry operations and land ownership is also concentrated in the hands of companies instead of farmers.

17 “Traditional populations” is an official legal ethnic/work category in Brazilian law, offering land rights and privileges, as well as ethnic auto-identification to such populations as rubber tappers, coconut breakers, and fishers. I refer to this category, which offers these populations the right to set up their own sub-political territories, such as extractive reserves, where they can live, work, produce food and protect nature simultaneously.

18 One example of the successes of movements resisting the pulp investment model relying on monoculture plantations comes from Peru. Under the state support of the Alan Garcia government lessening the legislation protecting the Amazon, the Chilean pulp and paper CMPC company announced plans to invest in the Amazon to plant trees and to build a pulp mill. Following the plan, in August 2008 “more than 3,000 indigenous and
On the whole, these types of social movements are largely nonexistent in the traditional home of the pulp industry, the global North, but have come to the fore of resistance against large investments throughout the global South. There are however important regional differences in the economic outcomes of resistance, even within Brazil, which my conceptual framework will tease out. In a number of cases, the resistance has not been effective in slowing eucalyptus plantation expansion in Brazil (for example, in Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas Gerais). The central question then becomes what exactly is the process by which the resistance of industrial plantations can succeed in discontinuing or slowing their unchecked expansion? What mechanisms help to sustain and give force to the pushing and resisting processes? The cases here offer some evidence of these processes and the mechanisms underlying them in Brazil.

I analyze the hypothesis that corporate resource exploitation can be slowed down – brought towards right livelihood - more effectively and likely when the resistance is formed by, utilizes and promotes contentious agency. When contentious agency promotion is not active, the slowing of plantation expansion (dependent variable) is a more unlikely economic outcome of monoculture-based investments. I disaggregate contentious agency promotion into its constituent parts and formulate a new theory of when and how this process can support the reaching of right livelihood-type business. In order to understand corporate resource exploitation, I argue that differences in the mechanisms promoting contentious agency have to be taken into account, as they can influence the resource exploitation pace and style considerably. My conceptualization holds that contentious agency can be promoted by a series of mutually supporting mechanisms: a) organizing and politicizing; b) heterodox framing; c) protesting by pioneering, highly disruptive but nonviolent acts; d) networking with allies in the society; and e) embedding with state actors and state remediated politics whilst maintaining autonomy. When the mechanisms of contention concatenate in a particular way they produce a process of contentious agency promotion. They are all necessary and form a causal chain, which results in contentious agency if activists actively built, maintain and update each of the mechanisms. Causation does not mean that the

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19 I draw on the conceptualization of frames as “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” (Zald 1996: 262) and the notion that “framing is not simply an expression of preexisting group claims but an active, creative, constitutive process” (McAdam et al. 2001: 16).

20 All of the mechanisms were formed as heuristic devices to order the rich empirical material and the analysis, by induction after four years of field research, and via deduction by consulting the earlier social movement, the MST and general social scientific literature. I have come up with these mechanisms by induction (participant observation) and deduction from a wide range of social movement theorizing. For example, mechanism b and c specify the “innovative collective action” mechanism of McAdam et al. (2001).

21 McAdam et al. (2001: 24) defined processes as “regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations.” In comparison to mechanisms, processes are larger phenomena.

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*campe
tino* protesters from various parts of the Amazon region declared an indefinite national strike against the new legislation” (WRM 2008), a mechanism of contention which resulted in the Peruvian Congress repealing the legislative decrees the government had signed to help extractive corporations into the Amazon on 22nd of August 2008. This led to the discontinuation of plantation land expansion even before it had started in the Peruvian Amazon, similar to the attempt at eucalyptus plantation expansion in Rio de Janeiro by Aracruz that was blocked in 2002 by a resistance network of which the MST was one prominent agent.
mechanisms follow each other automatically; efforts are required, and certain contextual conditions must be met.

If contentious agency has been active in cases of slowed plantation expansion, and inactive in cases of unchecked plantation expansion, it can then be inferred that the hypothesis is strongly supported. This is no mystery story: the findings suggest that contentious agency has influenced corporate resource exploitation pace and style. Besides analyzing this hypothesis, I utilize the empirical case to consider and theorize the importance of the contentious agency promoting mechanisms a-e in their interaction with a set of mechanisms, which promote corporate agency. I argue that plantation expansion (including the possibility of contraction) is explained by the dynamics of contentious agency and corporate agency in given political systems. If contentious agency has influenced an economic outcome of slowed plantation expansion even when corporate agency has simultaneously been strongly promoted, the hypothesis would carry an even stronger explanatory power. Such a finding would suggest that contentious agency matters even in a situation where the political opportunity structure, corporate agency, and the state-industry alliance (regarded as synonyms here) have been active and are much stronger than the resistance.

Tracing mechanisms at work will allow the analyst to show causation. This is a much wider claim than what is made in Dynamics of Contention (McAdam et al. 2001), whose claim was limited to showing how particular mechanisms combine into broader processes. As McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001: 13) write: “To explain contentious politics is to identify its recurrent causal mechanisms, the ways they combine, in what sequences they recur, and why different combinations and sequences, starting from different initial conditions, produce varying effects on the large scale.” I consider how the mechanisms combine into broader processes, into dynamics between the MST, the state, and the paper industry. The MST-state-paper industry interaction can be said to have really started in 2004. At this point, in the beginning, the most important task of a researcher has been to observe, document and analyze what are the mechanisms that a) the MST utilizes, b) the paper industry utilizes, and c) how these interact with the state and each other. The DOC approach proposes the analyst to see social phenomena from the viewpoint of interaction and dynamics, focusing on processes that combine different actors. This is the goal here.

I theorize that the explanatory power of the mechanisms of contention (a-e) is imbued in their interaction with mechanisms that produce corporate agency. The interactive dynamics between corporate and contentious agency are largely state remediated. Corporations and movements meet in dynamic political games. I have inducted four such dynamic games for corporate resource exploitation-based politics. These are land conflicts, electoral politics, ideological and identity politics, and institutional games. Corporations and movements use distinct but interactively linked mechanisms to influence economic outcomes via these games. For example, movements protest corporate land access by land occupations; thus are formed land conflicts. MST members use voting power to counter corporate electoral campaign financing; thus are formed electoral politics. Movements and corporations seek ideological and identity congruity and certification from state actors, especially the government; thus are
formed ideological games. Last, both movements and corporations seek to embed the state institutions and structures whilst maintaining autonomy; thus is formed the institutional game. The mechanism that allows the analyst to decipher the respective roles of movements and corporations in the last three interactive dynamics I call embedded autonomy by either movements or corporations. Together with protesting and corporate land access, these mechanisms are even more directly interactively linked to the politics of pulp investment than the other corporate (more of these below) and contentious agency-forming mechanisms (a, b, d), which operate more closely within movements or corporations, but are also not bounded to internal dynamics.

Peter Evans (1995: 12) originally used the concept of embedded autonomy to refer to a developmentalist state that embeds with the society whilst maintaining autonomy, escaping capture by private interests but still listening to them. I extend and flip the concept here to analyze a social movement, arguing that effective social movements are those that embed with the society and the state whilst maintaining autonomy. E-EAM is the shorthand for the Embedded Autonomy of a Movement. Even though autonomy cannot be expected when embedding with the state, this interaction has allowed the MST, I argue, to manage to maintain considerable autonomy by distinct mechanisms, considering the level of embedding it has in relation to the state. Besides utilizing the concept of embedded autonomy to assess the interaction of a movement with the state, I also use it to assess the interaction of corporations with the state. The Embedded Autonomy of Corporations (EAC) and e-EAM explain a big part of the state-remediated dynamics between movements and corporations.

I have also identified, by induction from the empirical material, the most important mechanisms transferring power to corporations to expand resource exploitation and thus thrust to corporate agency within the investment area. I do not assess the corporate mechanisms as rigorously and systematically as the mechanisms of contention; the focus here is on contentious agency. Nevertheless, because contention can be understood only relationally, as interactively constituted, the analysis must cover the dynamic relations between state actors, corporations and movements. The corporate resource exploitation, corporate agency creating mechanisms include, firstly, land access by a corporation, which can take many forms, principally land buying, but also land renting and outsourcing: the total land access of a corporation in various forms correlates with the growth in eucalyptus plantation coverage in the investment area. This is a directly interactive mechanism, directly linked to the politics of pulp investment. So is also the already mentioned corporate embedded autonomy with the state. Indirect, less embedded interactive mechanisms (not directly within the four dynamic political games) are the capital accumulation style and investment model that a company selects; industry formation, cooperation, and market competition and fluctuation. Corporate social responsibility (CSR), on the other hand, is a corporate mechanism that can be used in conflict remediation, which can connect corporations and contenders directly, without the active remediation within the state. In the Brazilian politics of pulp investment, such conflict remediation has taken place, more specifically, if CSR has met with the networking mechanism (d); if networked allies of the MST have helped
the movement to get into direct talks with corporations. As of yet, this has not been common, for which reason the main emphasis is on the state remediated conflict dynamics.

In my analysis of corporate agency, profit, investment and market gains and losses are not independent of the influence of the state, which has a central role. The “free markets” were planned, as Polanyi (2001 [1944]) already has claimed. As a Canadian pulp company director argued, “Adam Smith’s invisible hand will not build pulp mills” (George Landegger, Cf. Carrere & Lohmann 1996: 103). Plantation expansion is explainable by the strategic decisions of companies and their allies in the government, which evaluates the importance of a given area for investment purposes, and activates mechanisms in order to promote corporate agency and thus expand industrial plantations. The strategic decisions (following the interaction between broad change processes and the attribution of importance to an area/issue by a social group or business) taken by the actors are a causal mechanism explaining the activation of both the corporate and contentious agency promoting the mechanisms.

It is noteworthy that plantation expansion can also be discontinued if the mechanisms promoting corporate agency do not function or contradict each other, or do not function in the local conditions. For example, there are several contradictions within capitalistic expansion, as the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated, and the paper industry itself is a very litigious sector, constantly producing problems for itself. The world’s pulp and paper production follows the cyclical crisis, as the system keeps on investing in overcapacity, which then leads to discontinuation of investment followed by sudden peaks in investment, as if nothing was learned from the past. I assess the global paper industry as a system and a part of global capitalism, and the Brazilian paper industry as a sub-system within the transnational setting.

Corporate agency has been the most important process explaining plantation expansion until now. Can it explain all the economic outcomes? The research tests whether the corporate agency alone can explain corporate resource exploitation, especially the slowing down or reversal of corporate resource exploitation, or whether contentious agency should be considered as well. Social movements are unlikely to be the main process determining whether plantations expand in a given area or not. Nevertheless, I argue that the resistance by social movements is a considerable influence on the expansion of industrial plantations. This factor has to be taken into account more seriously than before.

The hypothesis proved to be robust (see the Findings). Contentious agency can slow or even reverse the expansion of industrial plantations, whereas when contentious agency promotion is inactive, unchecked plantation expansion was the outcome. The rule applied to all the assessed 14 pulp conflict cases. The hypothesis gained strong support even in situations where corporate agency promotion was simultaneously active. The finding raises the need to develop a new theory that explains the dynamics within and between the processes of contentious and corporate agency promotion and the relations of these processes with economic outcomes. The new theoretical framework I create helps to answer to what degree, when and how contentious agency matters. I disaggregate the processes into their constituent mechanisms, so that anyone interested in understanding when, how and why industrial
plantation expansion is slowed by resistance movements, can obtain as complete an explanation of the phenomena in play as possible. I thus provide guidelines for disaggregating and assessing the mechanisms promoting contentious and corporate agency, the main processes explaining corporate resource exploitation.

The Politics of Pulp Investment and the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST) has several important theoretical and political implications. Politically, the research implies that an efficient social movement can utilize mechanisms of contention to promote awareness and consciousness of one’s position, potential and agency among its members. This research should be understood as a study of the initial phase of the growing conflicts over corporate plantation expansion in the contemporary world. It is possible that the mechanisms creating contentious agency will be activated more widely in the world, challenging global capitalism. Theoretically, the research implies a need to shift attention from structural or rational choice theories to the relations, dynamics and processes that explain politics. Until now, there has been no clear, comprehensive and dynamics and process-focusing theory on when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation. The original contribution of this research is to provide such a theory, and utilize it to offer an extensive explanation on the conflicts over pulp investment in Brazil, the globalization of the paper industry, and slowing of industrial plantation expansion in the global South. This theory, with its generally applicable conceptual and methodological framework, can be used to determine when, how and why contentious agency can slow down or reverse or at least influence the expansion of corporate resource exploitation and help consider investment or contention potential in a given area and political system. The theoretical framework, research design and results of this study apply, with due precautions, at least to corporate resource exploitation-based conflicts. Major contextual differences between societies and times shape the functioning of the generally observable characters of mechanisms, processes and the dynamics of struggle.
1. Mobilizing Against the Transnational Flow of Natural Resources

I assess the hypothesis that corporate resource exploitation can be slowed down – brought towards right livelihood - more effectively and likely when the resistance is formed by, utilizes and promotes contentious agency. The hypothesis provides the opportunity to contribute to and challenge some parts of social scientific theory, especially theories in the social movement literature. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001; 2008) suggest social movement research should move towards dynamic analysis of intersections between movements, authorities and opponents. I seek to provide such a dynamic framework. The conceptual framework draws from a wide array of theories in social science – theories I consider useful in the study of contentious politics and specifically in movement outcome analysis.

This introductory chapter outlines the MST as an example of contentious agency and local resistance to the transnational flow of natural resources; the methodology; the research project; and the key concepts, the theoretical framework, and the dynamics of contention research program. I consider how contentious agency is promoted, and how this process influences conflict outcomes. I delve into the structure-agency debate, introducing the classic conceptual tools of social movement research such as the “political opportunity structure”, which I use and question in this research, joining McAdam et al. in arguing that there is a need to move towards a more dynamic, process-based approach, which forms the core of the new theory. I will discuss the earlier theory, pointing out why one has to strive for a new conceptual framework that follows the guidelines set by McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, and foreshadowing how (by utilizing which theories and concepts) I will pursue this agenda.

The Brazilian Landless Movement: an Example of Contentious Agency

In 1996, Brazil had some 371 million hectares of land usable for agriculture, of which 230 million ha were in use and 141 million ha, or 38% were unused and unproductive (Rose 2005: 203). One percent of the farmers owned 46% of all lands according to The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística) 2009 statistics. Brazil has an estimated 3.3 to 6.1 million landless families (Carter 2009: 7). Members of the MST are current or future small-scale farmers. In 1992, small farmers, the numerical majority, owned only 12% of the Brazilian land, reflecting the fact that the worst level of inequality and living conditions in Brazil are found in the rural areas (Hoffman & Centeno 2003: 370), especially in the northeastern sertão (Scheper-Hughes 1992). Family farming presents 10% of the national GDP, employs almost 75% of the rural workforce and is responsible for producing over 70% of the food consumed in Brazil (IBGE 2009, Censo agropecuário). Most of the middle- and large-scale production, such as soya-bean, cattle/beef and fruit production is exported.
A fast-growing part of Brazil is used for industrial plantations, including tree/forest plantations, agrofuel plantations and genetically modified soybean plantations. Brazil will soon be the leading exporter of chemical pulp in the world, surpassing Canada. In 2007, Brazil exported about 6.5 million tons of chemical pulp, and ranked second in the total production of chemical pulp with over 11 million tons (Finnish Forest Industries Federation 2009). The main destinations of the global market pulp were China, the USA and Germany (ibid). The pulp exported to China from Brazil accounted for 3.7% of Brazil’s total exports to China (Ellis 2009: 53). Brazil has recently consolidated its position as a principal resource source and strategic partner for China, and it is expected China will be Brazil’s main trading partner by 2010 because of dramatically rising exports of soy products, iron and petroleum, these commodities already accounting for 70% of the total exports (Ellis 2009: 49). The rising demand in China alone will maintain heavy pressure on Brazilian lands, promoting a steady expansion of industrial plantations and corporate resource exploitation.

The Brazilian countryside has an ever more important role in the transnational flow of natural resources, in that whatever happens at the micro-level of industrial plantation investment in Brazil defines a series of important political issues in world politics and regional politics in the European Union, East Asia, North America and Africa. Both the increasing securing of natural resource extraction from Brazil, and the possible curbing of the export-oriented plantation economy will result in land cover changes, consumer habit changes, market transformations, changes in the food balance, and changes in the world’s forest, energy and food clusters, which are increasingly interrelated and interlaced. Likewise, changes in the world’s natural resource politics influence Brazil very strongly, precisely because the country relies quite heavily on the exportation of natural resources, even though it has managed to diversify its economy into manufacturing and services.

Without the historically created large land ownership and landlessness, the Brazilian Landless Movement would not exist. The MST aims at a general transformation in Brazilian society. Recently, it has started to criticize and oppose ever more vehemently the transnational flow of natural resources out of Brazil, because it sees this as a central element in the consolidating global agribusiness based on corporate resource exploitation. MST’s broad and initial objective was to occupy unproductive lands and territorialize them with a new type of collective culture. As João Paulo Rodrigues, the coordinator of the National Office (a top post) in São Paulo, conveyed in an interview in June 2008, the objectives of the MST are still, “Firstly, to conquer land. Secondly, to define the agrarian reform, together with the other rural movements. Thirdly, seek for a new society” (interview at the national “headquarters” of the MST in São Paulo, September 10, 2006). The MST wants to change society, explained Rodrigues: “It can be socialism: and the people will decide how this will take place, with arms or without. For this reason the MST joins together with Via Campesina and CMS … in Brazil the MST is still weak compared to all the other powerhouses.” This is why the MST’s second goal is greater movement-impact on agrarian reform policy, and the third goal is general societal transformation. These directly influence the principal goal and tactics. The camping tactic, consolidated in the second half of the 1980s, is the core of the movement’s
tactical repertoire: as a living symbol of the land problem, camps serve to exert continuous political pressure (Ondetti 2008a: 77, 79).

Photo 1: MST “Lulão” Camp in Eunápolis, Bahia, June 2006

The photo from the Lulão camp/settlement in Eunápolis in Southern Bahia, close to Veracel, illustrates what a camp looks like. The area was gained in the 2004 Veracel occupation and was on its way to being turned from a camp into a real settlement with houses. The people were already producing food.

Empirically, the hypothesis is a tool to analyze the role of the MST in pulp project outcomes. How has this landless movement influenced the resistance to and economic outcomes of pulp projects? What can one learn from the MST’s example on the road to a more balanced struggle for land between movements and companies? In what can the MST promote democratic industrial policy, transparent investment decision-making, and construction of development alternatives? What mechanisms secure continuity and success, even relative and transitory, for social movements?

By utilizing the word agency, the concept of contentious agency acknowledges that mechanisms and processes are not mechanistic, that is, free of human agency. Specific social actors can build social mechanisms, which in turn produce their agency. Nevertheless, the concept of contentious agency simultaneously emphasizes that also social mechanisms are important in producing social dynamics and outcomes, not only the persons or entities utilizing or identifying with a given mechanism. I see the central goal of social science as being to cover the processes and mechanisms creating social dynamics and human agency,
both generally and in particular contexts. By the concept of contentious agency, I offer a mechanism-based alternative theoretical explanation to both the ego-emphasizing rational choice and “free will” accounts, as well as to the overtly structural accounts that see little meaning in human agency. After all, humans constitute social mechanisms.

Contentious actors use disruptive techniques to make a political point, change a policy or influence economic outcomes. Contentious acts such as roadblocks, land occupations, squats and street marches, disturb the normal activities of society. Where Tarrow (1998: 3) distinguishes between conventional and contentious action, the concept of contentious agency developed here emphasizes how specific mechanisms create and foster a specific type of agency, contentious agency. Thus I am especially interested in a process that fosters the spread of contentious action through time and across space. If five interrelated mechanisms are simultaneously active, utilized and built by a social actor, then contentious agency is promoted and spreads. If the mechanisms a-e are active, that is, promoted by people, then contentious agency is active.

A set of specific mechanisms of contention (a-e) needs to be active for contentious agency to be promoted. Any social actor can utilize the general contentious agency. General contentious agency does not have to aim to promote right livelihood; it can have any goal. Within civil society, fascist skinheads, for example, can also utilize and be constituted by contentious agency if they use techniques a-e. Furthermore, even though I focus on a citizen actor, the MST, contentious agency could also be developed by state and multilateral institution actors, if these were to contentiously challenge the prevailing global orthodoxy. For example, an interstate system-focusing analysis of contentious agency could focus on the challenge posed by The Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA) to the capitalist world-system. In this type of interstate-level analysis, one would consider whether, how and when ALBA utilizes mechanisms a-e to create right livelihood-oriented contentious agency in the world-system processes, and whether this challenge has resulted in countering abusive resource exploitation in the inter-state system.

Not all social action, or actors usher in a process promoting contentious agency. Most social action, even if contentious, does not actually promote contentious agency. I argue that only when mechanisms a-e are actively utilized by contentious social actors these can develop contentious agency. If any of the mechanisms a-e lack, then the resulting agency is something other than contentious agency. To check whether the agency of a given social actor is contentious, one has to first assess the action quality, and then see if the social actor is constituted by and utilizes all of mechanisms a-e. Sidney Tarrow (1998: 3) offers a guideline for checking whether action is contentious and not conventional or routine: “Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities”. I follow this guideline. Once the action quality has been checked, the task of the researcher is to see whether the social actor uses mechanisms a-e, if the mechanisms are active in a given setting and within a certain group. The noun, the MST, is not equivalent to the term contentious agency. Some local sections of the MST can be
described as developing and utilizing contentious agency; others not. By comparing the local MST sections to other movements in the areas’ in question, such as the indigenous peoples or other rural inhabitants’ groups, I seek to point out that the term contentious agency – the mechanisms of contention that create it – can be generalized also to study other contexts and conflicts, not only the MST.

In general, all of the requirements listed by Tarrow are fulfilled within the MST; its members do not have a regular access to institutions in comparison to the paper corporations; compared to the official viewpoints of the government and the corporations, the MST members make new and unaccepted claims regarding pulp projects and eucalyptus monocultures; the MST members seek to fundamentally challenge the authorities and the corporations. Even though for example organizing and politicizing might seem as conventional social movement actions, in the case of the MST these are not; the contentiousness of actions is defined within the cultural and political context, the dominant symbolic system in question. In the context of Brazil, the way the MST organizes people into camps and settlements and politicizes them is clearly contentious in the eyes of the majority. The heterodox framing and the protesting mechanisms are by definition contentious. Also the networking with allies is contentious within the MST, because it does not retain its networking into simple advocacy or alliance-building work, but seeks to spread its model, which is contentious in itself, so that other groups of people could replicate the contentious MST model. Lastly, also the embedded autonomy by the MST is contentious, because the movement does not allow the state to define the way state resources are utilized within the movement spaces; the MST fashions its own curriculum for state funded schools in the camps and settlements, and does not accept conventional agricultural technical advice, but trusts in its own agronomists’ organic farming techniques, just to name two examples how the autonomy-maintenance is contentious. I will show, however, that there is important variation depending on the region of the country on the combinations of these mechanisms of contention within the local MST sections. In some areas, the MST members actively utilize perhaps one or two of them; in others all of them. I will compare these combinations of mechanisms of contention to the economic outcomes (the respective areas’ pulp projects’ plantation expansion pace and style).

After five years of participative observation, I have concluded that some local sections of the MST fulfill the requirements of contentious agency – their actions are contentious and they actively utilize mechanisms a-e – for which reason I study the movement’s ideal model and actions as a product of mechanisms that the local movement members use. I argue that groups of people promoting contentious agency effectively, such as the self-denominated members of the MST can make a difference in resource conflicts, and even more generally, on the road towards strengthening democracy, if this is the goal of the groups. In the case of MST, direct democracy and participation in decision-making and fulfillment is a basic guideline.

22 I define democracy as the power of the people to make decisions that alter their lives, like the principle that everybody has one vote which has the same value in decision-making. Situations where this rule is not followed, where people do not have the power or where one person’s vote counts more than somebody else’s, are less democratic than those polities or investments in which people have more power and there is a greater equality between the votes. For helpful discussion on democracy in the realm of transnational political economy and
Movements can promote contentious agency by particular practices, actions and communication. I argue that a-e depend on each other, and are requirements of each other. Once these movement mechanisms are in action, they foster the education of contentious subjects, activists with a contentious *habitus*. The activeness of the mechanisms, as well as their combination, determines the depth, pace and spatial transmission of resistance promotion. Induction from movement leader interviews and field observation led me to theorize that the activeness of all mechanisms is a necessary condition for contentious agency to be promoted. Also, the systematic comparison of 14 cases and mechanisms a-e has helped in determining the causality between the mechanisms. These mechanisms form a virtuous cycle. When the mechanisms creating this cycle are active and connected, the top-level process of contentious agency promotion advances. Only the concatenation of mechanisms a-e produces contentious agency.

Concatenation of mechanisms a-e provides strength for the Brazilian Landless Movement. If one takes protest acts away, the MST is more likely to gain less or no land, which weakens the organizational base, the daily, politicized practices and heterodox framing, and the networking and embedding mechanisms. Likewise, if the networking and embedding mechanisms deteriorate, the power of land occupation/invocation decreases: these might even be made constitutionally illegal because of the lack of embedding with the state apparatus. The daily, politicized practices and heterodox framing as well as organizing would be harmed by a weakness in the embedding mechanism, as the movement would not obtain resources.

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23 Bourdieu has briefly described habitus as socialized subjectivity (Bourdieu 1998a: 20-23). Bourdieu’s agents socialize into a habitus, which regulates their actions but also defines who and what they are. Bourdieu has three premises for habitus: (1) it becomes active only in relation to a field, and thus depends on the state of the field. (2) Habitus always either strengthens – when expectations encounter opportunity – or may weaken: it endlessly transforms. (3) Habitus is controllable by socio-analysis and consciousness. (Bourdieu 1990: 116.) For example, a pulp industry mechanical engineer habitus (1) becomes active only in relation to the field of mechanical engineers in the industry; (2) strengthens as the expectations for a career encounter in harmony with objective opportunity – people have a real chance to rise up the career ladder if they succeed; (3) can transform into a *contentious habitus* or be controlled in other ways by those with this habitus, or others, when socio-analysis and consciousness of this habitus increase.

24 The use of invasion or occupation to define the acts of the Landless Movement involves a political and ideological choice. Those critical of the MST normally denominate its acts as invasion. The Brazilian media and public use both invasion and occupation and the MST uses the word occupation (Hammond 2004). The choice of wording does not really describe what is happening, as almost any action where a certain entity occupies a space can be called occupation or invasion. For example, on 11 June 2008, Landless Movement members escaped from the rubber bullets of police into a supermarket in a demonstration against Governor Yeda Crusius’ pulp-favoring policies in the centre of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul. Brazilian TV news channels reported the episode as “an invasion of a supermarket.” On the other hand, the media generally does not call an illegal land grab, *grilagem*, typical of Brazilian agribusiness, an invasion. The more neutral news channels utilize the word occupation. For example, Rio-based daily business magazine *Jornal de Comercio* called the April 2004 Veracel act by the MST an occupation. I will use the word occupation as it is a more analytic and neutral concept than invasion. I treat the territorial and social spaces as neutral and different social agents as having equal rights to claim these areas.

25 The 1988 Constitution allows occupation of land not fulfilling the social purpose requirement set out for the definition of productive property in articles 184-186. The Constitution also stipulates that the land appropriation process cannot be slowed down, interrupted, or made more difficult in any other way. However, the MST laments that this slowing down of the agrarian reform happens all the time. Social function is obviously an ideological question, one of values. Currently the municipal *planos diretores* decide what fills the social function.
like school funding, and because the reduced autonomy would allow the dominant system to overrule the contentious movement mechanisms. If politicized practices or organizing mechanisms were curtailed, the EAM and protesting would be harmed. In fact, a strong organizing mechanism, which creates a strong organizational base, is a necessary condition for developing and performing ever more contentious, challenging and pioneering protest acts. Pioneering protests against pulp holdings depend also on the heterodox framings of large-scale pulp projects as a principal enemy of the agrarian reform; the ideological strategizing work done by leaders is a necessary condition of protesting. Networking and embedding whilst maintaining autonomy are not necessary conditions for protesting, but if these are not active, the expected outcomes of the protests are worse for a movement.

The hypothesis suggests that if contentious agency is promoted, a process starts by which the resistance can manage to slow down or reverse resource exploitation. This happens either soon, or in the future when the process has created enough strength for the resistance vis-à-vis the “political opportunity structure”, which in the case of investment politics is defined by the dynamics of corporate and contentious agency in given political systems. Contentious agency has usually been directed against the state: in the case in hand, however, a prominent social movement principally challenges transnational corporations, the ways in which enterprises utilize resources. That is, they challenge transnational corporate resource exploitation, where the environment, land and resources are commoditized by corporations and sold as products into global markets with a principal focus on making profits. The conflict takes place simultaneously in particular and interlaced dynamics between transnational, national and local political systems.

Methodology

Charles Tilly, who developed the analytical tools with which to study the repertoires of contention (Tarrow 2008), insisted that “only well-validated theories of social movement dynamics will give analysts a secure grip on social movement outcomes” (Tilly 1999: 270). To formulate and examine those theories, one needs to follow a six-step approach:

1. To formulate clear theories of the causal processes by which social movements produce their efforts;
2. to limit investigations to the effects made plausible by those theories;
3. to work upstream by identifying instances of the effects, then seeing whether the hypothesized causal chain was actually operating;
4. to work downstream by identifying instances of the causal chain in operation, then seeing whether and how its hypothesized effects occurred;
5. to work midstream by examining whether the internal links of the causal chain operated as the theory requires; and
6. to rule out, to the extent possible, competing explanations of the effects (Tilly 1999: 270).

I will follow this call by: (1) formulating a theory of when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation; (2) limiting the investigation of the effects of contentious agency on plantation expansion; (3) identifying several cases in which eucalyptus plantation expansion was slowed down, then seeing whether contentious agency was actually operating; (4) identifying several Brazilian pulp
conflicts which involved contentious agency, then seeing whether this had slowed plantation expansion; (5) examining whether the internal links between the mechanisms promoting contentious agency and the dynamics of contentious and corporate agency in resource-based conflicts operated as the theory requires; and (6) examining the hypothesis against two control process: cases where contentious agency was not active; and the mechanisms that create corporate agency, in all Brazilian pulp project cases and in different periods.

This research follows the case study approach, which has been a natural base for the analysis of environmental, natural resource-related conflicts (Lewicki, Gray & Elliot 2003) as well as regional, Latin American social movement-related rural conflicts (Seligmann 2005: 233). A strategy of collecting rich empirical material, typical of case studies, makes it possible to develop innovative theories and ideas (Laine, Bamberg & Jokinen 2007: 38). The case study approach can explore phenomena that require detailed understanding. Case studies can reveal the mechanisms and processes in the resistance of corporate resource exploitation.

The map below shows the location of the Brazilian pulp projects/holdings. I have analyzed all the ten operating bleached short fiber pulp holdings with a nominal production capacity of at least 390,000 pulp tons per year, as well as four investment projects / eucalyptus plantation expansion attempts: Stora Enso, Aracruz and Votorantim VCP in Rio Grande do Sul (RS); Aracruz in Rio de Janeiro (RJ). I have compared the plantation expansion outcomes across all pulp holding cases.

26 This covers over 85% of all the pulp qualities produced in Brazil, as the bleached, short fiber pulp produced in massive pulp mills dominates in Brazil. The lowest nominal capacity (390,000 tons per year) is produced by Jarí, which is not shown on the map as it is situated in the Amazon region at the border of Pará and Amapá, far away from the other pulp investments.

27 The circles denominate the estimated area of operation / possible eucalyptus plantation expansion of each pulp project/holding, and are not accurate but estimated, very roughly indicative distinctions. The map base on which I have added the yellow circles to indicate the pulp investment project locations has been downloaded from the Wikipedia Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brazil_topo.jpg [04.8.2009].
I spent long periods during four years (2004-2008) in the Brazilian countryside doing extensive field research on industrial plantation conflicts, participant observation within the entities involved (companies, industrial associations, social movements, NGOs, and state institutions), and conducting in-depth interviews. I focused attention on the states of Bahia (BA), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Espírito Santo (ES), São Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Pará (PA). I did not do field research in the pulp holdings in Minas Gerais (MG) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MG do Sul), covering them through media analysis. I did an extensive study on the existing research, official documents, archives and media accounts.

In-depth interviews with key informants and long-term participant observation in the field are the methods required to be able to gather data. Indeed, the process by which I was able to delineate the mechanisms, operationalize them and muster evidence to back these heuristic tools, required four years of intense field research. Only after long reflection on a massive database, theoretical readings and consultation with colleagues, did the processes appear to me as adequate heuristic devices to structure this Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).
The methodology included such tools as process-tracing, triangulation, discourse analysis, media analysis, in-depth ethnography, semi-structured interviews and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of empirical cases on a large set of dependent variable outcomes, processes and mechanisms. The QCA methodology, developed by Charles Ragin (1987), utilizes Boolean algebra to produce truth tables that allow drawing causal inferences on a large number of explanatory mechanisms in a small N comparative case study. QCA fits well with a mechanism-based approach, as mechanisms are best understood as being active (1) or inactive (0). The traditional QCA followed here does not allow evaluating the strengths of mechanisms, or their probabilistic, statistical explanatory power, but relies on logical inference based on induction. In the case of variable-based research this is a problem; in a mechanism-based analysis this does not matter. Normally QCA has been applied on a variable-based research; the methodological novelty here is to apply it on a mechanism-based research.

The QCA technique was developed by Ragin (1987) for solving the problems that are caused by making causal inferences on the basis of only a small number of cases. Although well known, QCA has not been widely used, as most social scientists opt for either non-systematic qualitative analysis or quantitative analysis: “Among qualitative researchers, only Charles Ragin (1987, 1994) and a few other brave souls have attempted to fit small numbers of cases into rigorously systematic analyses of key variables” (McAdam et al. 2001: 81). The method is based on the binary logic of Boolean algebra. Besides allowing maximizing the number of comparisons that can be made across the cases under investigation, it is a helpful technique in systematizing and formalizing a qualitative comparative analysis. There were two main reasons for adopting this methodology. First, I have a relatively small number of cases (N = 14), which makes it hard to perform a quantitative analysis. Secondly, I wanted to make as comprehensive consideration and comparison of different mechanisms of contention and their relation to economic outcomes as possible. The technique answers to both of these calls. It alleviates the small N problem by allowing inferences to be drawn from the maximum number of comparisons that can be made across the cases under analysis.

The QCA technique also allows the analysis of multiple causation and interaction effects. Ragin (2009) writes: “Boolean methods of logical comparison represent each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. … The goal of the logical minimization is to represent - in a shorthand manner - the information in the truth table regarding the different combinations of conditions that produce a specific outcome.” The research applies the methodology and provides truth tables for the various Brazilian conflict cases, both for contentious and corporate agency, before and after 2004. As this is a logical and not a statistical technique, the comparable variables (in this case mechanisms) can have only two values (1 = active; 0 = inactive). The division of 0 and 1 will always be arbitrary. However,

28 I undertook a discourse analysis of the media treatment of MST-paper industry relations, taking some representative examples into a detailed analysis. After a systematic analysis of general media coverage in the main newspapers and television news, I chose to study in detail the news in the largest daily newspaper, the Rio-based O Globo. I placed most attention on the media coverage after the April 2004 Veracel occupation, the first 10 days of the month. The analysis appears in chapter six.
assessing the strengths of mechanisms is far more difficult than seeing whether they are active or not. One could even argue that the DOC research program does not allow for judging the strengths of mechanisms, as they are by definition either active or inactive. Thus, the Boolean algebra fits well to DOC-theory based research. Mechanism-based research does not have the same methodological QCA technique problem as variable-based research, as mechanisms are either active or inactive.

As a Finnish scholar and citizen, I have found it a natural choice to direct my intellectual inquiry toward the transformation of the increasingly globalized paper and pulp industry. I started to conduct research on the paper and pulp industry while writing a master’s thesis on the MST in Latin American Studies (Kröger 2005). While doing ethnographic research in Rio de Janeiro’s lush countryside on a 20-year-old land reform settlement in April 2004, members of the MST occupied a section of a eucalyptus plantation of Veracel Celulose, a joint venture between Aracruz Celulose and the Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso in the state of Bahia. It was a logical step to go to Bahia to redefine my master’s thesis as a study of the interaction between the paper and pulp industry and the Brazilian Landless Movement. I have been on that road ever since. After finishing the master’s thesis on the Veracel case in 2005, I continued by expanding the study to cover other Brazilian states and pulp conflicts. The result of these years of research is this doctoral dissertation.

I went to all kinds of research sites, even those that seemed irrelevant at first sight. Probing through various territories controlled or marked by this or that entity, an understanding of the Brazilian rural mosaic started to emerge. Visits to indigenous villages, large and small city suburbs, middle-class neighborhoods, various industrial sites, farming facilities and agribusiness investments, traditional and new areas and groups, provided a heightened understanding of the specificity of the MST and the paper industry in Brazil. An eye for the local territorial differences developed in the field. The extreme south of Bahia was my starting-point and was followed by Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo and other pulp investment states, including Rio de Janeiro, Pará and northeastern states where there are no large pulp conflicts. During this period, I jumped into comparing pulp production with other agribusiness operations, in order to see the paper and pulp sector specificity in Brazil. I interviewed the executives of the paper and pulp industry, not only in Brazil, but also in Finland. To conduct research in multiple locations was crucial. I studied other social movements in the countryside and cities to see the distinctiveness of the MST. I also did field

I consider that new industrial plantation-dependent pulp investments are part of agribusiness, even though the paper industry has not been traditionally considered as such. When the forest industry utilizes natural forests, it can be considered as forest business. When it relies mostly on tree plantations for raw material, which is then processed into semi-processed commodities sold on the world commodity markets, such as pulp, the sector reminds one much more of the modern agribusiness operations, such as soybean and ethanol trade and production, than forest industry. This is the case especially when assessing pulp investments by the impacts they create: the vast majority of conflicts related to modern pulp investment derive from plantation expansion and displacement of rural populations, a feature the paper industry now shares with other agribusiness operations. When a company plants more than 100 hectares with the same tree species in rows and lines, this is an industrial plantation, a tree plantation, and no longer a forest. Consequently, it makes little sense to speak of forestry or reforestation in connection with large-scale pulp investments. Many within the forest industry currently share the understanding that large-scale pulp investments belong to agribusiness and plant plantations, not forests.
research and participative observation within rural movements and NGOs linked to the paper industry conflicts and to the MST in Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Colombia.

I had several roles. My position as a researcher was one of a critical insider in relation to the MST and outsider in relation to the paper industry. At the end of the research period in 2008, following research and experiences in the Latin American countryside, I helped to establish Maattomien ystävät ry, a Finnish solidarity association interested in the condition of landless people around the globe. Most were open to my research. I also acted during the research period as a free-lance journalist writing articles and news about the phenomenon I was studying for the Finnish and transnational media. I gave public and academic lectures and actively participated in the debate over the paper industry transformations, writing several research and op-ed newspaper articles (Kröger 2007a, b, c, d; 2008a, b, c, d).

Outline of the Project

By analyzing the contentious agency activeness across all bleached short fiber pulp investments/holdings in Brazil, this comparative case study argues that contentious agency explains the variation in slowing corporate resource exploitation. The study implies that to understand investment policy, one has to analyze differences in contentious agency creating mechanisms, not simply the interaction of industry, markets and states. Next, I quickly survey the chapters of this book.

The second chapter outlines the broad world political dimensions of the Brazilian pulp conflicts; the main reasons for tree plantation expansion and resistance; the earlier research on and main qualities in pulp investment conflicts; and the effects of contention in the Brazilian pulp conflicts.

The third chapter forms a new theory for analysis of corporate resource exploitation resistance, discussing the dynamics of contentious agency and corporate agency and connecting the dynamics to industrial plantation project outcomes. The new theoretical framework builds on and goes beyond the process and mechanism-emphasizing dynamics of contention (DOC) research program suggested by McAdam et al. (2001; 2008). After these theoretical considerations, I draft a detailed research design that can be used in the analysis of corporate resource exploitation resistance, disaggregating all the important dynamics, processes and mechanisms in the politics of paper investments in Brazil. In the subsequent chapters, I systematically follow this research design, providing detailed analysis supporting each theoretical and empirical claim.

The fourth chapter uses the example of the MST to analyze movement-controlled mechanisms of contention: organizing and politicizing a social actor (a); heterodox framings (b); Pioneering, disruptive but nonviolent protest acts; (c) and the embedding of the MST with the society (d) and the state (e). The chapter argues that the Landless Movement has created mechanisms that can slow plantation expansion. If social actors create a virtuous cycle in
which organization, politicizing, protests, networking and embedding continuously support each other, concatenate, they foster contentious agency. The solidity and growth pertinent to the MST has been a product of contentious agency. All the mechanisms a-e are crucial. Without protests, for example, contentious agency promotion is ineffective. Through contentious agency, the MST members enact a personal and social power relation transformation in the social, symbolic and physical space.

The fifth chapter assesses the historical roots and the contemporary state of the paper industry. It opens up the government-business alliance behind new pulp projects, its historical trajectory, transnational and Brazilian dimensions and reasons. States and business have been in unison since the start of the industrial revolution (Evans 1995; Polanyi 2001 [1944]). Since state involvement is a given, the appropriate question is not ‘how much’ but ‘what kind’ of involvement the state has in society (Evans 1995: 10-11). I follow this research agenda, seeking to delineate the Brazilian variation in state involvement by a historical examination of the roots, specificity and transformation of the paper industry system. I situate the transnational dimensions of pulp investment, arguing that the Brazilian politics of paper investment are played out in a specific national sphere, rather than in a transnational setting. I also discuss the key concepts and processes of capital accumulation, such as the accumulation by dispossession analyzed by David Harvey (2003), as this concept helps in understanding the causes behind the origins of landlessness in industrial plantation expansion, and their socio-economic, environmental and developmental consequences. The most significant finding is that the state support enjoyed by the industry dramatically influences the corporate land access opportunities and thus the establishment of pulp projects. This chapter considers what makes the pulp investment possible, what makes it active, and the following chapter assesses in detail how corporate land access actually functions. Chapter 8 continues the state-industry interaction assessment, incorporating explicitly the MST influence.

The sixth chapter delves into the Brazilian land question, the history of land concentration and dispossession, the expansion of agribusiness, showing various ways and cases of how pulp investments have dispossessed rural populations. An analysis of the various forms of corporate land access used by paper companies explains how plantations expand in Brazil. The future push of the industry is to expand inland and by outsourcing. The chapter concludes by considering the transnational dimensions and new dynamics in tree plantation expansion.

The seventh chapter, focusing on the period from 2004 to 2008, depicts the main qualities and dynamics in the Brazilian pulp conflicts by various case studies. Between 2004 and 2008, new pulp investment projects in Brazil were concentrated in Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Espírito Santo and Bahia. Some investments can be found scattered around other parts – in the Southern states, the North in Amapá, the Centre-West in Mato Grosso do Sul, and in Minas Gerais. I start by assessing the only early plantation expansion slowing case, the blocking of Aracruz’s entrance to Rio in 2002. I argue that the MST has considerably influenced plantation expansion since 2006 in some states owing to a change in strategy – and thus mechanisms – in 2004. The chapter demonstrates how symbolic protest acts shook public opinion and some state actors into seeing pulp investment within a movement-created frame.
delve into various episodes of contention (with varying outcomes) both theoretically and empirically, analyzing many types of protest against pulp investments in differing times, contexts and by distinct mechanisms, offering a comparative account of why the MST has managed to slow plantation expansion in some cases. I analyze the primary cases of Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia in detail, providing supporting comparative analysis on the other pulp investment locales around Brazil. The Espírito Santo case, where, after a landmark strategic shift in 2005, the indigenous groups started replicating the MST model, thus producing contentious agency, shows that mechanisms of contention can be replicated across movements. The MST has spread the mechanisms sustaining resistance and mobilization into the heterogeneous resistance front against the pulp investment, ensuring a broader network of contention. Pioneering protest acts rise to a prominent explanatory role. This is the most important chapter of the book. In its end are presented the findings of the whole research.

The eight chapter is important in demonstrating that the slowing outcomes came in spite of, or in the middle of, rising corporate agency. This leads to the logical conclusion that contentious agency has risen relatively even more than corporate agency in some cases, which nevertheless in substantial terms is so much stronger that one cannot speak of a general victory by the resistance. The chapter divides the analysis of dynamics of contention into three political games where the MST and the paper industry meet: electoral politics, ideological and identity game, and institutional and structural game. It shows how the state alliance enjoyed by the paper industry has simultaneously gained strength, but also been more contested, as the resistance has gained the sympathy of some state actors. The issues that the resistance network, principally the MST, by its disruptive protest acts has framed as problems have gained increasing attention. I argue this is due to a simultaneous embedding of the resistance with the sub-national and municipal legislatures, and some parts of the state apparatus: Ministério Público, Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA), Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI) and the Ministries of Justice and the Environment. The resistance to eucalyptus plantation expansion has become MST-driven since the Red April of 2004. This has led to resistance successes – even in the face of worsening political opportunities for resistance. Movements have influenced the plantation expansion speed, sometimes even halting it locally, but the general trend of corporate plantation expansion has not been reversed. In such a case, from the viewpoint of the contenders, one would speak of a general, offensive victory, not of a resistance success.

The ninth chapter sums up the arguments, explaining the conditions under which and why plantation-based investments are politicized, turn into conflicts, and lead to particular outcomes. Pinpointing the theoretical and political lessons to be drawn from the politics of

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30 The Ministério Público is a key state institution explaining contemporary democratic transformation in Brazil. The role of this institution is extensive and specific to Brazil: you could translate it roughly as the public prosecutor’s office, but it covers more than that (Hocstetler & Keck 2007). Even though state institutions with the same name exist in other Latin American countries, these are not as powerful as in Brazil (ibid.) Besides companies and other civil society entities, it can inspect and prosecute public officials and institutions. However, its actuation and role depend heavily on the state actors. In Rio Grande do Sul, the MPE prosecutor has led an attack on the MST. In Bahia, the MPE has been a vanguard of the MST agenda in the public spheres. Ministério Público can be seen as the result of the Brazilian society’s Polanyian double-movement sectors that seek to regulate the economy and society.
paper investments, the chapter assesses how this research has contributed to social scientific theory, particularly contentious politics, resistance outcome, social movement, Brazilian studies and transnational state-business-social movement interaction theories.

Conceptual Framework

In the social theory of structuration proposed by Giddens (1984), humans are capable of changing the social structures they inhabit (this is called agency), but structure also influences human behavior. Structure and agency are complementary forces, but have often been regarded in social theory as dichotomous (in the study of the MST, most recently by Ondetti 2008), which is problematic. In the field of contentious politics and social movement research, McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001; 2008) suggest an approach labeled positivist constructivism by Lichbach (2008), and relational relativism by Tilly (2008) in which one should not consider agency as a variable as one will do better by breaking it down into the mechanisms that produce agency and interact with structure. I will follow these theoretical lines, analyzing the mechanisms and causal complexes producing contentious agency and corporate agency respectively. Contentious and corporate agency interact with the structure, whose change is visible and measurable in the expansion of industrial plantations.

I use the concept of contentious agency to refer to contentious changing of the social structures by social actors. The agency is contentious if it challenges the orthodox, accepted trajectory of development promoted by more powerful actors, such as corporations and governments that extend industrial plantations. As directors and owners make decisions to extend plantations after considering the influence of government support, natural conditions and the markets, the concept of corporate agency includes these elements some might consider “external” to companies. Industrial plantations cannot be extended by nature or “free markets” alone, since they are always a sign of strong human intervention, that is, agency on the part of somebody. This is why corporate and contentious agency – their interaction – can explain the expansion of industrial plantations to a sufficient causal degree, even though they do not cover the whole picture.

In order to analyze the mechanisms systematically, I utilize the partition approach, which breaks processes into their constituent mechanisms. Besides disaggregation, the partition approach “studies one mechanism at a time, does it well, and then moves on to the next mechanism, searching for interactions and interdependencies, concatenations and combinations, among the mechanisms” (Lichbach 2008: 348). Following this approach, I can muster evidence on the existence of mechanisms promoting contentious agency, that is causally relevant to the slowing of plantation expansion. I seek to respond to the call by Lichbach (2008: 350): “We need accounts of how social systems emerge from causal processes of contention, how they solidify, and how they come to structure social, economic, and political life.” I assess how the social systems of MST and the paper industry emerge,

31 Personal communication with Sidney Tarrow, 23 May 2009.
32 According to Pierre Bourdieu (1991), the term “orthodox” can be used to describe the standpoint and discourse of that actor which currently occupies a better position – more capital, i.e., power – in a given setting.
solidify, and structure social, economic, and political life while clashing in the contentious episodes occurring over pulp investment projects. Moreover, I consider the outcomes of these contentious episodes, pointing out the new processes set in motion by the expansion or slowing of industrial plantations, focusing on the social movement aspect.

I build on multiple-mechanism, joint-effect outcome assessment, in which outcomes are the fruit of many mechanisms. Multiple methods of measurement can produce a better representation of the phenomena studied than single-method research (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2008). In his *Freedom is a Constant Struggle*, Kenneth Andrews (2004: 22) maintains that movements should engage in multiple mechanisms of influence to obtain the best outcomes. Giugni identifies four interrelated mechanisms that have influenced social movement-involving conflict outcomes historically. These are movement organization and protest activities within changing political opportunity structure, and the impact of public opinion (Giugni 2004: 4). Combining ethnographic induction with deduction from Giugni, McAdam et al. and other social movement theorists’ proposals, the first two identification of Giugni became mechanisms a (organization) and c (protests) respectively. The last two I combined into mechanisms d (network of allies) and e (embedded autonomy of the movement), as well as into the analysis of the control process. This uniting of agents and structures allows one to escape the theoretical dichotomy between “movements” and their “political opportunity structures”. To complement Giugni’s set, I added other qualities to the mechanisms and created a new mechanism: heterodox framings (b), a cognitive mechanism creating targeted campaigns within the movement, among other things. By a systematic comparison of cases, I investigate whether there is a causal relation between contentious agency formed by a virtuous cycle between mechanisms a-e (see figure 1 below) and resistance outcomes.

Only action maintains movements: perhaps the most typical feature of movements is that they protest. Likewise, only capital moves maintain corporations in the markets: perhaps the most typical feature of companies is that they invest. For a social movement, the deepening virtuous cycle of contentious agency promotion envisioned in figure 1 can ensure actions and support advancement of their agenda.
The mechanisms come in a sequence: from a follows b, after which the movement can utilize c, d or e, or all of them. If a movement uses all of c-e, this will foster further organizing, politicizing and heterodox framing work. In such a case, a loop, a virtuous cycle is created between the mechanisms of contention. This cycle will maintain the contentious agency and make it grow. The disaggregation of the main process, contentious agency promotion, as deriving from mechanisms a-e serves to assess what type of process is more prone to slow corporate resource exploitation. Without the disaggregation, this research would be able to say that movements matter or do not matter, but not exactly when and how. I will show that the mechanisms a-e have to be in a particular sequence. They are techniques and phases of contentious agency promotion. At the base is mechanisms a, followed by b. Only after these two phases have been fulfilled, can the social actor initiate further actions. A movement may utilize protests (c), networking (d), or embedding (e), or all of them to further its goals. The larger processes and dynamics are bound to vary, but in their technical form the mechanisms of contention are generalizable across contexts.
To construct the right mechanisms and link them is essential as the instruments of protest, means of contention “are not easy to establish when they are not already there, and they certainly require a good deal of initiative and acumen” (Drèze and Sen 2002: 369). Since Drèze and Sen do not analyze the mechanisms by which contentious agency can be promoted, I consider specific strategies of mobilization whose assessment, as Goodwin and Jasper (2004) and Hobson (2003) argue, has been absent in contentious politics research. Also McAdam et al. (2001: 37) note the scarcity of the type of analysis provided here: “the classic approach to social movements concentrates on mobilization and demobilization; it provides relatively weak guides to explanation of action, actors, identities, trajectories, or outcomes.” I seek to provide heuristic tools to assess precisely these issues. In-depth explanations of strategies have been quite absent in Latin American social movement studies such as Deborah Yashar’s Contesting Citizenship in Latin America (2005), which left scope for future research that focuses on strategies. Since one has to take the broad change processes not affected by movements into consideration as well, I situate the MST influence in relation to the paper corporations and the Brazilian and world-capitalist political systems – after all, the political processes and systems in which the actors act influence the mix of mechanisms.

In their Dynamics of Contention, McAdam et al. (2001: 25) suggest that three roughly separable but combined mechanisms explain collective action in contentious politics. These are environmental, cognitive and relational mechanisms. I find the distinction useful, and utilize it to assess the contention of corporate resource exploitation. Environmental mechanisms “mean externally generated influences on conditions of social life” (ibid). In this case, the advance of eucalyptus plantations reduces opportunities to build agrarian reform settlements for the Landless Movement member families, which is an environmental mechanism supporting the need to mobilize. Corporate mechanisms which promote corporate agency and thus plantation expansion, are the most significant environmental mechanisms affecting the politics of paper investment. However, the study of external influences is not enough, as my hypothesis maintains: environmental mechanisms are not the only mechanisms when considering plantation expansion. In the actual construction of resistance, environmental mechanisms are equally important with cognitive and environmental mechanisms; they all lie behind the decision to mobilize. As important as external influences are the cognitive mechanisms movements employ, which “operate through alterations of individual and collective perception” and may “show people shifting in awareness of what could happen through collective action” (McAdam et al. 2001: 26). The MST excels in this realm, promoting contentious habitus-creation. I examine cognitive mechanisms at length through the analysis of the interconnected mechanisms a-e. Finally, as important are also relational mechanisms that “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks”. This conceptualization by McAdam et al. is extremely helpful, as it most clearly shifts the analysis of social change from the static structure-agency debate into the new paradigm of dynamic, relational change.

I also build on the concepts of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu maintained that the structure and positioning of agents and changes in society always take place as simultaneous, relational shifts and transformations in the social, symbolic and territorial spaces (Bourdieu 1990: 113-
If something happens in the territorial space, this change must come with equal, correlating changes in the social and the symbolic spaces of the area in question. For example, when eucalyptus plantations expand (territorial space), this change must correlate with the social and symbolic space. Pulp investments come with a change not only in the territorial space, but also in the local social space, by involving the creation of landlessness, for example, and in the symbolic space, producing a pro-pulp investment policy. This basic guideline helps in connecting changes to all aspects of life. However, Bourdieu’s view is quite static. Even though he offers a causal explanation by arguing that the social space – relational positions of agents, power relations, and the political economy – is a sociological precondition and the source of any symbolic system (Bourdieu 1991: 43, 51; 2000: 113-114, 180), his theory focuses on the analysis of structures rather than dynamic processes. In spite of giving primacy to the changes in the social space over changes in the other spaces, Bourdieu’s theory does not explain change very well. Nonetheless, it works as an excellent tool to connect issues and check what the situation in a given place is at a given point of time.

To add temporality and the explanation of change to Bourdieu, I turn to the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) research program offered by McAdam et al. (2001; 2008). I see the territorial, social and symbolic spaces of Bourdieu as snapshots, topography in a given time and place of the environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms that McAdam et al. (2001) argue are the three categories into which mechanisms explaining social change fall. Thus, environmental mechanisms operate in the territorial space, relational mechanisms in the social space, and cognitive mechanisms in the symbolic space. This merging of DOC and Bourdieu is a novel theoretical development.

As the field of contentious politics research has been dominated before by a largely structuralist foundation that “paid more attention to the origins of contentious episodes than to their internal processes” (McAdam & Tarrow 2009: 3), I focus on investigating the internal processes and mechanisms. The changes in the externally generated influences on conditions of social life – in environmental mechanisms – do not explain mobilization automatically or alone. Besides these, we also have to look at the relational and cognitive mechanisms of contention, since the interaction of all three explain the causal chain. It seems that even McAdam et al. (2001: 45, figure 2.1) had not totally grasped this, but retained a slight bias towards the importance of external broad change processes as the trigger of mobilization. Environmental and relational mechanisms alone are unable to explain mobilization, even though Charles Tilly might have disagreed with me on this.33

In their tentative figure 2.1, “Dynamic, Interactive Framework for Analyzing Mobilization in Contentious Politics”, McAdam et al. place “Broad change processes” as the primary origin of contentious politics. This, in my view, shows still a reliance on structuralist thinking. From the “Broad change process”, arrows run into the “Attribution of Threat/opportunity” by polity members and challengers. This emphasizes the origins of contentious politics to start from

33 Claim based on the speech by Sid Tarrow at the American Political Science Annual Meeting special session on Charles Tilly’s work (Toronto, September 4, 2009). Tarrow noted that Tilly did not like the idea that cognitive mechanisms would explain mobilization.
environmental mechanisms, “social change processes”, and only after this pass through other mechanisms such as attribution of threat and opportunity (2001: 28; 43-51). I have to disagree with this way of presenting the origins of mobilization. The figure 2 below presents in a refined way how the origin should be understood in my view.

The broad change processes and the attribution of threat/opportunity are in a constantly changing dynamic relation. In theory, mobilization may occur when either one changes. These are both dependent and independent of each other. We have cases where agents do not attribute threats or opportunities to broad change processes even though they should have done this, and vice versa. The new framework sees human agency in the structures and structure in the agency. In the case of pulp investments, mobilization against them depends not only on environmental mechanisms (the advance of plantations, dispossession), but also on cognitive mechanisms (a social actor’s consciousness, awareness, articulation, conceptualization, and valuation of what is happening, reflected as changes in the symbolic space) and relational mechanisms (positions and dynamics of actors in the social space). Neither the arrival of capital in the form of investment, nor the supposedly large number of landless people dispossessed by plantations explains mobilization alone. One has to look not only at the mechanisms and processes pushing mobilization, but also at the pulling mechanisms such as the attribution of opportunities and threats, often based on the strength of landless organizations, produced by earlier contestation capacity-endowing mechanisms developed by activists. In a number of cases, plantations have not caused severe dispossession. In even more numerous cases, plantation expansion has not led to active resistance. To take the first case, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul tree plantation expansion led to the discontinuation of agrarian reform between 2005 and the very end of 2008, but has not dispossessed peasants and created landlessness as extensively as, for example, Veracel in Bahia (INCRA RS 2008, MST 2008).
In practice, I argue that for significant mobilization to occur and spread, the attribution and the broad change processes have to be in at least some congruence. The figure 2.1 in McAdam et al. already included the idea that if the external environment changes but the members or challengers do not attribute threats or opportunities to this change, mobilization will not occur. What I am adding is the idea that if threats or opportunities are attributed based on false ideas about broad change processes, it is unlikely that mobilization leading into major social movement contestation and campaigns even can follow. This simple but major insertion helps to explain why, for example, the movements of the global South have taken the role of vanguard and maintained struggle instead of the citizens of the global North in the transnational contenders against the negative impacts of globalization. A more precise example: the transnationalization of the paper industry has influenced both Finland and Brazil. However, the Finns have not rebelled as much as the local Brazilians, because, firstly, the broad change process has not led into so severe physical, real-world, structural and socio-economically felt oppression and violence. It would be too idealistic to assume that people would mobilize in earnest, for a long period, contentiously and without compromises albeit not experiencing some severe lack in their livelihood, such as lack of food, shelter, or problems with health. On the other hand, structural violence alone is not enough, but mobilization requires also ideological and identity work by people who organize and politicize themselves and frame the changes. Brazilians (more specifically, the MST members) have resisted more fiercely than Finns (more specifically, closed pulp mills’ now unemployed workers) because of the attribution of greater threat and opportunity to the move of pulp production from Finland to Brazil, than Finns. The new framework emphasizes equal interaction between attribution and broad changes: the MST in the ever-more agribusiness-ruled Brazilian countryside scores highly on both the categories. When considering which groups have the potential to become global counter-movement and mobilization leaders, the landless rural workers’ face very strong structural violence and severe lack in basic livelihood, whilst becoming simultaneously much more politicized and organized than most other movements, not to speak of other social groups.

Earlier research both supports and demonstrates a need for the new mobilization model. For example, Ruth Reitan (2008: 56) found that the trenchant strength of the transnational activist network lies in the fact that communities in physical places feel under attack. These communities bear an identity seriously threatened by neoliberal globalization. Also Reitan (2008: 56-7) argues that environmental, cognitive as well as relational mechanisms explain contention. However, her amended scale shift process model still retains the DOC’s mobilization origin understanding, where an arrow runs from “broad change processes and trigger events (structural violence of neoliberal globalization)” to other mechanisms of contention (Reitan 2008: 50). Both McAdam et al. (2008: 45) and Reitan (2008: 281-2; footnote 56) note that environmental mechanisms are not necessarily “outside” of a movement, but can be analyzed into other mechanisms. But both of them still treat broad change processes and triggers as key to sparking the process of mobilization. It is best to break down the assumed broad change process into constituent mechanisms, dynamics, and agency. This reveals that, for example, the “structural violence of neoliberal globalization” is
a more complex phenomenon than assumed, and is not coming from outside, but also created in political dynamics, where potential contenders also have agency, even though this agency was passive and not contentious. They definitely have attribution power, and this is not following after external changes, but in equal relational terms with them.

The attribution meets with the broad change processes, and the more closely they match, the more profound can the mobilization and the ensuing dynamic interaction between members and challengers become. Observe that I wrote “can”, not “will”. The mobilization and the dynamics of contention that follow and possibly lead to the desired outcome of lessening the structural violence depends from this initial mobilization moment on from a whole new set of mechanisms of contention. They depend on the promotion of contentious agency. And this is where I will place most emphasis: on what happens after the mobilization. But before this, I had to make more dynamic what I thought was a still structuralist explanation of the origins of mobilization.

Marxist scholars provide tools to spot the changes on the environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms, focusing especially in the relational mechanisms, such as class dynamics. Where capital accumulates via a process of predatory capitalism, which Marx called primitive accumulation, dispossession and resistance may follow. For example, Tania Murray Li (2007) who has studied landless resistance in Indonesia, and Beverly Silver (2003) who studied global capital moves and resistance offer analyses that highlights how changes in the relational mechanisms cause mobilization. Li (2007: 20) explains that “interventions that set the conditions for growth simultaneously set the conditions for some sections of the population to be dispossessed”. Besides noting this broad change process, Li (2007: 280) emphasizes also the importance of the practice of politics: the “primary mode of engagement is political: asking questions, provoking debate, and conducting analysis that helps to expose unfair rules, greed and destruction”. Her research is an amalgam in which environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms explain mobilization. I follow this line as well. In the spirit of these accounts, I show how changes in the relational and environmental mechanisms influence mobilization, as well as how they do not automatically lead to mobilization. There are many empirical cases of dispossession not leading to resistance, even when the local people have had the means and the opportunity. Contentious agency or lack of it offers an explanation into why there is such variance.

Environmental (expansion of plantations), cognitive (framing pulp investments as a problem), as well as relational (change in the rural class-structure) mechanism explain the origins and dynamics of pulp conflicts. The externally generated influences on conditions of social life –

34 In the case of Brazilian pulp projects, I would not necessarily speak of “neoliberal globalization.” Firstly, because of the conceptual problems associated with the assumption that the actual reforms that took place in Latin America following the Washington Consensus were “neoliberal” (Williamson and Kuzinsky 2003). Many of the changes were not, and, as I will later on assess, it is questionable if pulp projects in Brazil are a neoliberal endeavor. They are partially neoliberal, but, even more importantly, state corporatist Brazilian investments where the state development bank is the key financer, not the transnational capital. I would assume this is the case in other parts of the global South as well. Most critical globalization studies utilize the concept of neoliberalism perhaps too easily, without seeing what Williamson and others actually proposed in the original Washington Consensus, and what were the policies that governments followed in the 1990s.
environmental mechanisms – “may stimulate critical analysis” (Li 2007: 26), but to grasp the dynamics of contention and the causal chain behind mobilization in their totality, the changes in and the operation of cognitive and relational mechanisms are also to be analyzed. I have summarized the causal influence of these three mechanisms in the case of industrial plantation expansion as the “importance of the area/issue to the actor”. This causal mechanism triggers the other mechanisms by which the actors promote their agency. The interaction of “attribution of threat/opportunity” and “broad change processes” leads to the evaluation of the “importance of the area/issue to the actor”.

The figure 2 emphasizes the importance of the meaning of a given territory/space to a particular social agent or business. Importance of an issue or territory to a group follows a particular institutional background, history, and culture of the social agent in a given political context. First, a person acknowledges that the changes in the conditions of social life are important. Secondly, strategic visions may trigger the building of contentious agency-promoting mechanisms: these are often completed with the “other” in mind, which points to the centrality of dynamic interactions within the deepening mobilization process. Thirdly, depending on the activeness of the mechanisms of contention and their concatenation, outcomes of conflicts are influenced, again depending on the dynamics between the key processes in a given political system.

**From the Political Opportunity Structure to the Dynamics of Contention**

How far have we come? The earlier movement scholarship has generally found that external structures, or political opportunity configurations as Brockett (2005) calls them, are by far the most important in explaining movements and their outcomes rather than action or internal factors (Lichbach 1998). In 1994, Sidney Tarrow (1994: 150; cf. Ondetti 2008a: 26) argued that “the frequent collapse of social movements that seemed well organized and brilliantly led suggests that both the sources of movement power, and their limits, are the results of political opportunity”. Tarrow (1994: 85; cf. Ondetti 2008a: 34) defined political opportunity as the “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”. This concept underscored the openness of the polity rather than the specific action and organizationally created mechanisms promoting collective action. It assumed that calculations of outcomes determine whether one starts forming a movement to challenge authorities – or if one is already a member of a movement, whether one will protest. Thus, the concept of political opportunity structure studied the world outside a social protest movement (Meyer & Minkoff 2004: 1458). In sum, “Political opportunity theory promises a means to predict variance in the periodicity, style, and content of activist claims over time and variance across institutional contexts” (ibid.). The classic utilization of this concept explains changes by transformations in the formal political arena, changes in opportunities for protest. The classic version assumes that people are rational, taking conventional political means rather than contentious. If they use contentious means, they do this mostly because they have the opportunity.
The classic conceptualization of political opportunities is rather structuralist and static, problematic and utilized in very different ways by scholars. Meyer & Minkoff (2004: 1458), in their attempt to save the concept, argue that issue-specific opportunities should be separated from the general openness in the polity. However, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for scholars to agree how to separate the general and issue-specific opportunities. Thus, the conceptualization forces them to make definitional rather than empirically testable claims. For example, Ondetti (2008a: 17) is so heavily committed to the classic political opportunity theory that he argues that the theory is “clearly the most effective perspective for explaining the landless movement’s ups and downs”. However, on another part of his recent large study on the Brazilian landless movement, Ondetti (2008a: 94) claims:

> Whether we see the movement’s emergence as a result of activist strategy is a question of definition more than of empirical analysis. … Liberation theology was a major cultural innovation that produced a powerful collective action frame ... [and] brought organizational innovations ... that played a critical role in the rise of the landless movement.

As the classic concept of political opportunity leads to definitional rather than empirical analysis, the DOC research program encourages to seek for a more dynamic conceptualization. I attempt to see more structure in movements and more action in the political opportunities and, most importantly, more relations, interactions, dynamics and processes. This way one can create a more balanced analysis of social transformation processes, an analysis that does not assume political opportunities are above particular actors, or that movements are pure action and no structure. Through a detailed analysis of specific processes, one comes to see how both agency and structure are omnipresent, how political opportunities and action are constantly shaped by each other, how all structure can be seen as action and all action as structure in specific processes of transformation.

As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) suggested, I look for a dynamic conceptual framework that transcends the rational choice and structuralist extremes. The demand in the literature for a process-focused theory is urgent. Meyer (2004: 141) urges that we “adopt a process-oriented approach to political opportunities that explicitly examines how they work and how the responses that social movements provoke or inspire alter the grounds on which they can mobilize”. For example, the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “a direct response to the civil rights movement” and “opened institutional access for certain claims and claimants” (Meyer 2004: 140-141). Rothman and Oliver (2002: 116), who studied the anti-dam movement in Southern Brazil, argue that “a more complete theorization of external-internal movement linkages” is required. Emphasizing contentious politics as mechanisms, dynamics and processes means to address these questions and to utilize the old key concepts, like political opportunity and agency, but in a new, process- and mechanism-directed way.

All theoretical concepts in the new approach developed here gain a new meaning tied to processes. This framework suggests a practical way for contentious politics research to analyze the construction of conflicts and their participants, rather than continue to study movements or structures alone or as static phenomena. Thus, the point is to assess how actors form; how institutional trajectories and everyday decisions, ideas, acts and practices create
contentious and corporate agency. A set of supporting theories outside of the social movement literature can help to boost the conceptual framework and supply the powerful analytical tools needed to reveal the mechanisms and processes.

Firstly, I sketch out the environmental mechanisms influencing plantation expansion and the possible subsequent mobilization, drawing from a long tradition of institutional analysis in political science, especially political economy. Starting from Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]), the political economy and the institutional approach has argued that “markets, embedded in political and social institutions, are the creation of government and politics” (Zysman 1994: 243). The state influences corporate resource exploitation directly and indirectly (the state is somehow present in all the corporate mechanisms).

Secondly, I situate the main actors in the Brazilian context by utilizing Bourdieu’s differentiation and correlation of positions in the physical, symbolic and social spaces (1984), works of Brazilianists studying the Brazilian political system. The approach of McAdam et al. (2001; 2008) is a truly remarkable theoretical breakthrough in the sense that it can be used to put the static analysis of Bourdieu and many scholars utilizing the institutional analysis (Campbell 2004: 14) into motion. Together these provide a powerful combination. I will merge Bourdieu’s theory with the other theories, especially in investigating the MST system, fields, habitus-creation and the symbolization of eucalyptus and land, and in assessing the paper industry system.35 I also use Bourdieu’s theory on the inseparability of economic and symbolic functions (1991), showing how corporations and social movements would be wise to understand the importance of the symbolic power of an object.

Thirdly, as institutionalism still requires further investigation of the influence of ideas (Hall & Taylor 1996; Campbell 2004), I utilize well-developed sociological and anthropological methods and theories to study cognitive mechanisms. Since concepts such as “ideology”, “cultural transmission”, “hegemony”, “symbolic system”, and “habitus” can pinpoint the role of cognitive mechanisms in social change, I will next briefly define the way I use these concepts. Central to my analysis is the concept of ideology.36 To understand resistance, I have

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35 Bourdieu sees the social world as constructed of various fields, whose control and resources, capital, the agents of the fields fight for (Bourdieu 1998a: 15-24). In the fields, agents invest in order to maximize capital, “all fields are the site of competition and conflicts” (Bourdieu 2000: 183). Fields are a conjunction of habitus struggling to gain capital by the field-specific rules. A field imposes rules: looking into a wider social structure than the field one can see how specified a given field’s rules are. Bourdieu follows Max Weber in stating that one has always to consider the agents, the division of a system into fields, and the interests and interactions these agents and fields have, be they conflict, competition or cooperation (Bourdieu 1998b: 57; 2000: 177). Bourdieu distinguishes two symbolic systems; one that is “produced and thereby appropriated by the group as a whole” and another in which specialists or, more precisely, “a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation” creates the symbolic system (Bourdieu 1991:168). The MST appears to follow the second category. Fields link directly to heterodox framing. Only the existence of a specialized field creates the possibility of the orthodox and heterodox discourses to exist (Bourdieu 1991: 277). Fields have their own histories. The internal structural tensions of a given field define the role and characteristics of each actor in a field, independently of outside factors.

36 Ideology is an active and strategic component of cognitive mechanisms. Following Mayer Zald (1996: 262), who utilizes the term in social movement research, “ideology is the set of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the political world”. I study the usage of daily, politicized rituals and symbolizations as cultural transmission of particular knowledge, building on Urban
to determine how the MST members identify themselves, construct their cause and the pulp investment schism. To tap into the MST's ideological set, I will use Bourdieu (1984; 1990; 1991; 1996; 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2001; 2004) to assess how a symbolic system organizes meanings inherent to the movement and reflects both a social space as well as a territorial space, an autonomous space for counter-hegemonic resistance. Bourdieu (1991; 1998a) argued that one has to make heterodox claims to challenge the established order. The heterodoxy has to contest the prevailing orthodoxy, in this case the legitimacy of utilizing eucalyptus for large-scale pulp production. I assess the internal hierarchies of the MST organization, its specific fields of ideologists and militants, the crafting of a specific Sem Terra habitus, and the creation of alternative symbolic, social and territorial spaces. These organizational features support the efficiency of the movement in a battle against powerful interests. Furthermore, I point out how one needs to turn knowledge into practice to do this, how subjects become active participants in the processes they build, and how power always includes resistance in itself.

These points on contentious agency rely partly on Michel Foucault (1994; 2004) and Gramsci (1971): however, I do not engage explicitly with a Foucauldian or Gramscian analysis, even though their contribution remains in the background of the theoretical framework. The cultural motion analysis of anthropologist Greg Urban (2001) helps to identify two different ways in which culture moves: dissemination and replication. Thus, I use Urban (2001) to show how the MST has institutionalized a questioning psychology, a pedagogy of the oppressed; how one needs replication, the organizational spread of an inquiring, contesting attitude; and how the MST has spread its mechanisms into the network of allies resisting eucalyptus expansion. Finally, all these theories are merged into a theoretical framework guided by the principles of the dynamics of contention approach.

(2001), and as a struggle in which the rationales within an ideology have to be constantly defended, as Foucault (1994) suggests. I see ideology as a primary social phenomenon in which the interplay of symbolic with social and territorial systems, changes and congruence in symbolic capital define social positions, power relations and territorial change. Orthodox Marxists see ideology as the “false consciousness”; whereas other Marxists come close to the understanding of ideology as discourse explained above, which I follow. Ideology is neither false nor correct.

37 Only competing discourses and symbolic acts can make the issues in hand visible and frame them. The established truth is transformed into a battle between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, when the issue is discussed instead of remaining hushed. Those who Bourdieu nominates as controlled parties will then want to show the artificiality of the existing order, while those in control try to maintain it (Bourdieu 1991: 165, see graph).

38 One of the most complete collections of orthodox visions on eucalyptus is found in the GIT Forestry Consulting’s Eucalyptologics Blog, a eucalyptus fanatics fan-site which offers extensive and hilarious eucalyptus-adoring excerpts, studies, news and opinions from around the world: http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/eucalyptologics-on-sustainable-eucalyptus-cultivation [10.8.2009]

39 The cultural turn in the social sciences and the humanities has provoked more balanced analysis: for example, McAdam et al. (2001; 2008) and McAdam & Tarrow (2009: 3) shifted to a much more equal analysis in the DOC research program, balancing structuralism and agency-based culturalist accounts in social theory. I also draw from the cultural turn. Social movement researcher Mayer Zald has conceptualized culture as “the shared beliefs and understandings, mediated by and constituted by symbols and language, of a group or society” (Zald 1996: 262). Culture is a network of symbols and practices providing templates for behavior. Power relations and institutions also provide moral and cognitive frames for action (Hall & Taylor 1996: 939). Because of the eclectic meaning of “culture”, I will not utilize the concept often: for analytic reasons I prefer to utilize the more precise concepts of institution, practice, ideology and symbol. Nevertheless, my understanding of culture is crucial as an eclectic view of culture is behind my theory, analytical framework, methodology and the whole study and its interpretations.
Concluding Remarks

I assess the hypothesis that corporate resource exploitation can be slowed down – brought towards right livelihood - more effectively and likely when the resistance is formed by, utilizes and promotes contentious agency. Where the political opportunity theory Ondetti (2008a) used to explain the MST’s development explains the surge and succeeding trajectory of the movement in Brazil in comparison to other countries, it cannot explain the fact that there has been regional variation between Brazilian states in plantation expansion outcomes. I argue that the variation derives to a considerable degree from regional dissimilarities in the combination of mechanism a-e activeness. Brazil cannot be understood simply as a single political system, even though it is this in the broad sense. The Brazilian Federation has states and municipalities with relatively great autonomy. In the sphere of tree plantation conflicts, “State and municipal governments are allowed to have specific policies and rules in favour [of] or against the development of Pinus or Eucalyptus plantation in the region they control, as long as they do not contradict the constitution” (Piketty et al. 2009: 185). In this research, I demonstrate there is a need to shift focus on the “political opportunities” at the most immediate local level to mechanisms promoting contentious agency. One can thus explain why the pulp investment resistance has slowed plantation expansion in Rio Grande do Sul, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, but not in Mato Grosso do Sul, or Minas Gerais.

The rural exodus caused by pulp projects has been argued to be the strongest in the Extreme South of Bahia (I will discuss this in detail later on). However, the resistance has been the strongest in Rio Grande do Sul, not in Bahia. This is due to the stronger contentious agency by the MST in Rio Grande do Sul in comparison to Bahia. The MST was founded in Rio Grande do Sul, even though the region had the most equitable landowning structure in Brazil. Based on this, I concur with Ondetti (2008: 81) that the grievance or dispossession of people is not the best explanation of the surge in the landless movement. Instead of arguing for the primacy of political opportunity structures as the best explanation, I argue that none of the cognitive, relational or environmental mechanisms have the primacy. In Indonesia and Thailand, pulp investments have dispossessed people even more severely than in Brazil, marginalizing landless people (Marchak 1995: 216). However, resistance is strongest in Brazil, more specifically, in those parts of Brazil where the MST members have, firstly, desired and, secondly, managed to build mechanisms promoting contentious agency.

What one has to primarily look for, then, is not the dispossession of rural populations, but the promotion of contentious agency. As development theorists Drèze and Sen (2002: 379) point out, “the political salience of selective misery depends not only on the specific number of sufferers, but also on the effectiveness of public discussions that politicize the sufferings involved”. Awareness of one’s potential to be active in changing the world leads to the execution of one’s human capabilities.40 This power-relational, transformative realization is

40 Paulo Freire suggests that “to change [Brazil] implies to know that to do this is possible” (Freire 2000: 53, cf. Teivainen 2003: 79, my translation). Thus, Freire bestows central importance to the role of cognitive mechanisms in the promotion of social change. Teivo Teivainen (2003), in research inspired by Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed, has brought the lessons of Freire into the global context and the realm of world
an experience the Landless Movement constantly offers to the most incapacitated and agency-stripped people. The MST can offer real and existing alternatives that help in building another type of world from the bottom up, as it is able to put direct democratic principles into practice on its own. It can be an effective social assistance / social work organization, gathering marginalized people into its camps and organizing them to work in self-organized, self-supporting units. Furthermore, the MST can restore people's dignity, initiative and capabilities – they are able to organize and start to produce. The MST has managed to fulfill the two requirements Drèze & Sen (2002: 29) find essential in what I call the promotion of contentious agency endowing mechanisms:

Voicelessness can be overcome in two distinct ways. One is assertion (or, more precisely, self-assertion) of the underprivileged through political organization. The other is solidarity with the underprivileged on the part of other members of the society … both self-assertion and solidarity may be regarded as important parts of the creation of social opportunities, with intrinsic as well as instrumental value.

It is precisely because of the conservative legacy of the Brazilian state, society, and political culture that real change – new mechanisms and processes – come from the counter-hegemonic, alternative organizations like the MST (assertion) and from the sectors that are sympathetic to it – some parts of the state and civil society (solidarity).

The Brazilian political system is in need of contention, since without outside contentious pressure, the state would be less efficient in its policy-making and exercising processes. The organized demands of concerned citizens, the vigilance of the public is “essential to ensure the adequate functioning of public services” (Drèze & Sen 2002: 92). In their Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in State and Society, Hochstetler & Keck (2007: 18) argue that in Brazil “the policy process requires a political mobilization all the way down. Even then, enforcement remains a difficult problem”. Thus, one has to place the study of contention influence in a prominent position. Brazilian policy institutionalization “depends substantially on the voluntarism of committed individuals, and owes as much to short-term improvisations (jeitos) as to a longer-term process of embedding procedures” (ibid).

Contentious agency is a required element of adequate policy-led social transformations. “The weak enforcement capacity and low levels of institutional continuity characteristic of the Brazilian state” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007: 19) mean that turning policy into practice requires contentious agency promotion. In the environmental politics setting, “Not only the early stages, but also the maintenance of institutional processes frequently required the continuing active agency of actors outside the institutions themselves” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007: 224). When state institutions and policies are highly mutable, consistent citizen support for the continuation of a given policy or institution offers stability, even if the contender is built by and influences society by disruptive and at the first sight even destructive mechanisms, such as land occupations/invasions. In achieving sweeping policy changes in Brazil, being vigilant in taking advantage of sudden disruptions matters much more than institutional continuity politics, arguing that the dominant cultures should learn from the dominated cultures, and that this liberating and cosmopolitan pedagogy can strengthen global democracy.
(Hochstetler & Keck 2007: 227). The Landless Movement capacitates people and offers constant venues to contest and thus build contentious agency. It offers social organizational continuity and pressure where state institutions falter or change.
2. Brazil and the Globalization of the Pulp Industry

Globalizing corporations are an obvious field of inquiry for one who wants to understand the constitution of global economy and its transformations. Another aspect of the global economy can be revealed by studying its have-nots. For the landless peasants, who are increasingly transnationally organized by such movements as La Via Campesina, a world economy run by corporations is not a destiny: the landless are more than often the leftovers of corporate resource exploitation.\(^{41}\) As residuals, when mobilized, the landless become contenders against abusive and exploitative corporations. To study this complex, conflictive and capricious interaction in the case of the Brazilian pulp conflicts offers a fruitful viewpoint to the local consequences of world political processes.

The pulp conflict cases can be used to understand local consequences in the globalization of the political economy and the latest changes in the Brazilian society and politics. These are cases of entrenching the commoditization of the global South, ushered in by the globalization, financialization and increased resource exploitation by corporations. These are also cases of local and national contention turning into transnational activism, a case of upward scale shift (see Tarrow 2005; Reitan 2008) and frame extension in which a significant national movement, the MST, shifts objects and claims upward from targeting the Brazilian state to targeting transnational resource exploiting corporations.\(^{42}\) The April 2004 Veracel occupation, as well as the 2006 Women’s day Aracruz laboratory destruction causing economic damages of over 200 million reais to the company, can be considered pioneering events, perhaps even a critical juncture, in the strategy of the MST, and worldwide in the contention over corporate resource exploitation. Protests against corporations have become much more numerous and coordinated since 2004, involving a new focal point (pulp corporations) and new actors such as the Via Campesina and the indigenous people, different objects, and broadened claims that seek to curb corporate resource exploitation, especially agribusiness expansion, not simply to do a traditional agrarian reform. Furthermore, particularly since 2009, the MST is suggesting that it will create small and medium sized agroindustry and rural service sectors alongside settlements (interview, Neuri, MST São Paulo, December 2009), which is a significant shift in objectives from the traditional agrarian reform that idolized small-scale family farming.

The case demonstrates the quality, dynamics and consequences of world political processes in a local context. The contenders over pulp investments have to face a transnationally networked web of government-paper industry alliances. The role of the Brazilian state has been one of alignment and cooperation with the transnational paper industry. An extensive study by the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment on industrial tree plantation conflicts alleges that the relations between the Brazilian state and the paper industry are consolidating

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\(^{41}\) La Via Campesina (2009) is a transnational “movement of peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers” with millions of members in 69 countries. It is one of the largest global networks resisting neoliberalism and capitalist resource exploitation. For an excellent study on its importance, see Ruth Reitan’s *Global Activism* (2007: 148-188).

\(^{42}\) McAdam et al. (2001: 331) define scale shift as “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened claims.”
at a growing pace (MMA 2005: 53). Vinha (1999) argues the Brazilian government has a fundamental role in the interaction between social movements and the paper industry. This is a different vision from that offered by theories that see the role of states as generally diminishing due to “neoliberal” reforms. While the present case shows how the Brazilian state corporatism favoring large developmentalist investments has not waned, some Southern governments seeming to be ever more closely allied with transnational corporations, the case also shows how the role of the state vis-à-vis corporations – and especially transnational capital – has transformed so that big business has even more power than the state. Brazilian social scientists Alvaro Bianchi and Ruy Braga (2005: 1745) argue that during the presidency of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva:

> Instead of launching an alternative mode of doing politics, the program of the Workers’ Party affirmed a state logic with a view to gradually updating the economic structure of Brazilian capitalism by means of successive transitions directed by the state, avoiding the active intervention of the subaltern classes in this process.

On this view, important parts of the Brazilian state institutions and the current governing coalition have found an ally in the transnational and national large-scale capital. The analysis of the rapid rise in pulp investment belonging to the export-led ethanol diplomacy line of President Lula da Silva confirms the findings of Bianchi and Braga. The general economic policy and especially the industrial policy of President da Silva have favored industrial plantation expansion rather than agrarian reform. According to Raquel Alberti (2008), since the 1990s, when the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy was abandoned, the process of financial globalization has conditioned the macroeconomic policy of Brazil. The agrarian policy has also been in harmony with the macroeconomic policy. The rise of agribusiness, ethanol diplomacy and new pulp investments are empirical evidence supporting the claim that Brazilian land is increasingly seen as a financial asset, especially in the government and business sectors. The presidencies of Collor, Cardoso and da Silva have shared a macroeconomic policy that extends economism and the commoditization of land, labor and money. However, besides a burgeoning corporate power, during da Silva’s governments a new Brazilian middle class has appeared (Neri 2008), many poor people have been raised from extreme poverty and hunger (Kingstone & Ponce forthcoming), democracy has been strengthened as state bureaucratic capacity and meritocracy have increased

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43 The study by Brazil’s Ministry of the Environment found that pulp disputes, especially in the most contentious axis of Espírito Santo and Southern Bahia, are a special case, allowing their observer a privileged view in detecting the crucial relations between governmental agencies, companies and society (MMA 2005: 50). This research supports this finding, since in the course of observation, I have come to see state-company-society relations more clearly – and not only in Brazil, but in various other parts of the world, and not only in the paper industry but in other sectors as well.

44 Ethanol diplomacy was the distinguishing trait of the diplomatic relations between Lula da Silva and the Bush government, and became the central foreign policy of da Silva’s government. Ethanol diplomacy focuses on the export-oriented production of raw materials like ethanol, grain, minerals and pulp from Brazil. The Lula government’s policies and politics follow the interests of the corporations and economic sectors that profit from these activities. The Lula administration has traveled around the world opening up frontiers for the companies in the agribusiness sector. Ethanol diplomacy is a sign of strong corporate power within a state, which companies use to drive their interests in expanding markets. Ethanol diplomacy marks the internal and external economic policies of the Lula government, which can be seen as a growing consolidation of a transnational capitalist class, as pointed out by Robinson (2007; 2008).
(Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Ondetti 2008b) and many contentious social actors have more scope for contention than before. My analysis will support most of the findings above. Since 2003, the MST has had to take agribusiness as the principal target, because of the rising alliance between the Lula government and corporate-led resource exploitation. Simultaneously, the Lula government has offered relatively more tolerance for contention, at least until the end of 2008 (this research is limited to the end of 2008), even though lacking behind in its agrarian reform promises. These three factors have led into the proliferation and radicalization of protests by the MST against corporate resource exploitation, including multinational pulp production projects.

Tree Plantation Expansion and Resistance

New pulp investments started being planned by government-industry alliances and the powerful agents in the globalizing political economy, such as the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and forest industry corporations, in the 1960s. However, the historical roots go deeper. The world political setting in which large-scale plantation-based pulp investment surged could be argued to be a post-colonial legacy. The last five hundred years’ of plantation colonialism and global natural resource extraction by the North has established the political systems on which modern industrial plantations are based. The last twenty years of rapid globalization and relative liberalization of world trade has intensified corporate resource exploitation. Paper companies have been in a hurry to adapt to the transformed structure in the global paper markets and the global natural resource economy. With cheap transportation costs, efficient tree plantations, and the rapid globalization and commoditization of natural resource markets in the last 20 years, Aracruz, Votorantim and other Southern market pulp producers have reaped high profit margins, extremely low cost structures, captured market pulp markets, and forced traditional Northern companies to compete harder than ever. To compete, the Northern paper companies had to join in the race for cheap Southern pulp. They also started to invest directly in new pulp plants and plantations, such as the Veracel holding depicted in the map 2 below.
Map 2, produced by Veracel and offered on their website, summarizes what a new pulp holding looks like. Currently the dark grey areas, covered by eucalyptus, have expanded, furthermore, the map does not cover the areas owned or otherwise controlled by Veracel, reserved for nature protection according to the Brazilian laws, for example, which doubles the tract of land influenced by plantation expansion.

To make the pulp investments in Latin America and Asia possible, Stora Enso, the world’s second largest paper producer, had to sell most of its large forest resources in the Nordic countries in 2004 (Weine Genfors, Stora Enso, Industrial Forest Plantations Programme 2007). The operating capital in wood supply of Stora Enso in Sweden dropped from 1.7 billion euros in 2003 to less than 100 million euros by 2005: one billion of the revenue gained from forest asset sales was earmarked for buying plantation land in Latin America (ibid). Sales in the north were one source from which Stora Enso acquired capital to start to invest in pulp projects in places like Brazil, China and Uruguay. A new mill costs over one billion
Euros: plantations required for such a one million ton mill cost 250-300 million euros of the sum and because of the highly capital intensive nature of pulp investments, private funds of even the biggest global players in the paper business have not been enough to establish new pulp investments in the global South.

Funds and support for industrial plantation expansion in Brazil have been argued to come principally from the state (Ianni 1978, Foweraker 1981) as well as from the private sector (Jepson 2006). Jepson (2006: 858) argues that private colonization cooperatives and corporations developed into critical organizations in the process of agricultural expansion. She acknowledges that “the state was not completely removed from influencing the trajectory of frontier advancement” (Jepson 2006: 858), a point which this research develops, following the accounts of Ianni and Foweraker, which emphasized the crucial role of the state-industry alliance in industrial plantation expansion in Brazil. However, following Jepson, I also assess the expanding role of transnational corporations such as Stora Enso in providing part of the funds for plantation expansion in Brazil.

The case of pulp projects shows that plantation expansion depends heavily on state involvement, particularly the channeling of low-cost and preferential credits by governments to the industry. Industrial policies supporting the establishment of pulp projects have been fundamental to their emergence, because these are highly capital-intensive investments. The expansion of pulp-based plantations requires far more euros per hectare than the expansion of other industrial plantations. The paper industry has successfully lobbied for open access to the coffers of state and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, via the help of the EU and the Finnish government, Finpro and the Finnish embassy in Washington. Only open access to state credit can sustain the heavily capital-intensive large-scale pulp investment model.

The role of states is crucial in industrial tree plantation expansion. Chart 1 depicts the financing given by the government-controlled National Development Bank BNDES to the paper and pulp industry (BNDES 2009), and the annual expansion of eucalyptus plantations destined for pulp production (Bracelpa 2009). The BNDES has a larger budget than the World Bank, and is the crucial reason why this highly capital-intensive pulp projects have targeted Brazil with such vigor. According to Chart 1, the growth of the expansion of eucalyptus plantation lands has skyrocketed since 2000, correlating with a surge in state financing. Note that the values in the y-axis are nominal, BNDES credits shown in millions of reais and the plantation expansion shown in square kilometers.
As chart 1 indicates, there is a clear correlation between the government-industry alliance (BNDES crediting) and plantation expansion. Going beyond explaining the strength of correlation, as is typical in the correlation and variable-dominated political science research agenda, I follow McAdam et al. (2001) and determine how these are linked to one another. BNDES financing really took off only a few years after 1996, when the paper industry lobby Bracelpa managed to get substantial BNDES financing (Kingstone 1999). I argue that the institutional and structural support, indicated by the BNDES credits as well as the ideological support, are important definers of corporate land access ability, indicated by surge in the area covered by eucalyptus. Gains on institutional and ideological games give advantages also on the other dynamic political games that define economic outcomes.

Based on chart 1, one million reais of BNDES financing seems to roughly correlate with one square kilometer of eucalyptus plantation expansion. This is not to say that the money would go directly into plantation expansion, or explain the expansion alone, even though this suggests that institutional state support correlates with corporate land access. BNDES funding is the most visible sign of the specificity of the Brazilian plantation expansion. In pulp
investment expansion, domestic funding is more important than transnational, since half of
the Veracel investment credits, for example, came from the BNDES, and most credit for the
founding of the new pulp giant Fibria, which enabled VCP to buy Aracruz in 2009, came
from the BNDES. However, Brazilian pulp investments also have transnational and world
political dimensions.

I argue that the MST has been a crucial force in slowing the expansion of eucalyptus
plantations. The two federal court rulings in mid-2008 in São Paulo and Bahia to restrict tree
plantations of pulp companies were responses to continuous protests by the movement. Court
rulings and legislative changes have been found to be signs of considerable movement
influence in conflict outcomes in general (Andrews 2004: 6). The indigenous movement in
Espírito Santo, gaining a parcel of 11,000 hectares of land in 2007 was an outcome indicating
tremendous movement influence, as was the acquisition of land by Instituto Nacional de
Instead of Aracruz eucalyptus, a 5,000 hectare part of the farm now has a settlement for over
300 landless families. This was part of 13,000 hectares acquired by INCRA in the region of
São Gabriel at the end of 2008 for over 600 landless families: without contentious agency by
the MST, these lands would have been planted with eucalyptus. Aracruz was already trying to
buy the land, and the plantation expansion was just a question of corporate agency promotion.
These resistance successes not only slowed plantation expansion, but also turned the would-be
plantation land into agrarian reform settlements for the landless rural workers. Sympathetic
state actors in the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) slowing
Stora Enso’s pulp investment project in Rio Grande do Sul for two years was a plantation
expansion outcome in which the MST had an important influence as well. In that case, the
MST utilized all mechanisms a-e to influence the land conflict and especially EAM to forge a
state apparatus-MST alliance.

These cases show the importance of studying social movements. However, the literature on
contentious politics has shown that social movements are only one form of resistance, and are
often not even at the centre of contention (Tilly & Tarrow 2007). For example, researchers
like Paul Burstein claim that collective action by movements is largely unsuccessful in
changing public policy (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 128). It is against the odds that the MST would
manage to alter the pro-pulp investment policy of the Brazilian government. However, the
above cases suggest that the MST is a central actor in a resistance process that can slow, and
in some cases even discontinue, plantation expansion. Many earlier cases demonstrate that
some protest activities have had crucial impacts on policies. Giugni (2004: 2) gives the
examples of street demonstrations that helped bring down Eastern European communist
regimes and the 1995 Greenpeace action against Shell, which depressed sales and promoted
important changes in the company.

The role of movements has to be critically assessed. Despite a large body of research, “We
still have little systematic understanding of the consequences of social movements,” claims
political scientist Marco Giugni (2004: 2). Many social movement scholars believe protests
are efficacious, but few investigate whether this is the case in detail as they concentrate on the
origins of the movement (Andrews 2004: 2). Indeed, any study of Brazilian environmental politics should include movements in the analysis, argue Hochstetler & Keck (2007: 225), who have studied Brazilian environmental politics extensively: “it makes little sense to study institutional developments purely in terms of formal structures, policies, and procedures”. Hochstetler & Keck (ibid) suggest that one has to identify “the constellation of linkages that sustain or undermine a particular policy or set of policies, both inside and outside government, and the mechanisms through which this process occurs”. This is exactly the approach this study pursues.

The current Brazilian dynamics of the MST versus corporate plantation expansion can be considered a case of resistance. Miguel Enrique Stédile from the Rio Grande do Sul State Coordination argues:

This is a resistance struggle. If we would be more successful, this would be an offensive struggle … in few years, paper companies acquired almost 1 million hectares only in Rio Grande do Sul, a volume much higher than the areas appropriated for agrarian reform in 25 years. This is a long fight without time limits, but there are signs that we could win (Email interview, December 4, 2008, my translation).

If corporate agency remains on its current thrust, plantations will most likely continue to expand –mechanisms promoting plantation expansion remaining equal – the MST tries to slow this process. As Igor Felipe Santos from the National Coordination put it in my interview (the MST, São Paulo, Santos 2008): 45 “We are in a situation of resistance. We are not advancing, but trying to avoid the loss of political and economic space to the agribusiness … The Movement is an important force in the resistance to the advance of paper and pulp companies.” However, as both these MST coordinators imply, there is potential for a change in the general dynamics of contention: opportunities are always there. 46

Future research should assess whether a turning point in pulp investment has taken place between 2004 and 2008 in Brazil and worldwide. During the field research period (2004-2008), explicit and targeted resistance to pulp investments expanded radically in comparison to the 1999-2003 period. The number, length and intensity of pulp plantation-based conflicts have constantly risen, and this tendency will most likely continue, as both corporate and contentious agency are simultaneously still likely to remain active in many areas. Even

45 Santos coordinates the public and international relations of the MST, and the responses he gave me were actually summaries of lengthy discussions that the national coordination had after I had asked what the official opinion of MST on this or that issue was. Thus, the interviews with Santos in this research reflect the official movement frame that he has passed on to me.

46 To offer a case for comparison, the 1925 discontinuation of corporate land expansion in Finland, following new laws and an extensive agrarian reform policy (Donner-Amnell 2004), is a period in which a social movement had such a strong contentious agency that it transformed the whole society (Kuisma et al. 1999). However, there are important structural and historical differences, which entail different conflict and social change trajectories, even though the dynamics are roughly similar. For example, the early transformations in Finland produced a forest industry cluster whose members such as Pöyry have exerted considerable barriers for countries outside the core of the global paper industry system to follow the path of Finland. Furthermore, Brazil is in a less favourable position within the capitalist world-system, and has to often take the type of funding-tied investment model that is suggested by experts from outside and inside the country.
though they continue to expand, the future of new pulp investments has proven to be more difficult since 2006. At present, resistance is surging in several investment areas.

Pulp Investment Conflicts

Research on pulp investment conflicts is spreading in the academic world. However, there is no systematic, large-scale and comparative research on the topic. On the other hand, research on the MST has boomed especially since the 1990s: I both extend and contest earlier findings on the movement. Using the new conceptual framework applied to a new and crucial empirical case of state-business-social movement interaction, I also assess the validity of the earlier research on Brazilian state-business relations, discussing the local, national and transnational political and theoretical implication of research results.

The academic research has followed from the increased attention social movements and NGOs have given to the eucalyptus advance. Some studies have delved into this in detail. The Brazilian Ministry of the Environment study (MMA 2005) is the best available background information package on this, even though it is quite messy and not finished. Marchak (1995) and the more critical Carrere & Lohmann (1996) offer a good global analysis, which however does not include the latest developments or delve into the contentious agency theme. There have been publications by NGO people, foresters and experts on conflicts and the socio-economic-political-environmental consequences of pulp projects (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003; Lang 2007; De’Nadai, Overbeek & Soares 2005; Movimento Mundial Pelas Florestas Tropicais 2003; Andersson & Bartholdson 2005; IOS 2005; Fase, Greenpeace, Ibase 1993; Carrere 2006). However, social scientific study of this subject is just starting, as Marchak (1995) pointed in her pioneering research. David Sonnenfeld (1996; 2002) studied the paper and pulp industry extensively, especially in South-East Asia, where a group of Finns also conducted a study of pulp investment impact (Kuvaja, Ulvila & Wallgren 1998). Academic socio-economic impact analysis of Brazilian pulp investment has risen in recent years, concentrating on analysis of the extreme south of Bahia. The developmental consequences and problems caused by pulp investment has been analyzed by Almeida et al. (2008); Carvalho (2006); Joly (2007; Netto and Silva (2008); Miranda (1992); Pedroca (2004); Silva (1993); Dias (2001); Santos & Caetano (2004), and Salomão (2006). Salomão (2006) studied the impact of the pulp-caused rural exodus of poor and ethnically black population of Espirito Santo into the favelas of the state-capital Vitória. Her thesis corroborates the rural exodus argument, as does the Southern Bahia-focused analysis in Joly (2007). Simone Ferreira (2005) has analyzed the struggle between the quilombola communities and Aracruz in Espirito Santo in particular. Barcellos and Ferreira (2007) investigated the role of quilombola and indigenous women in the eucalyptus conflicts in Espirito Santo. Others have discussed pulp conflicts in Brazil in short research papers. Mariana Setúbal (2007) included pulp conflicts in a general overview of Brazilian social movement struggles in 2006. Henri Acselrad (2004) considered the Brazilian eucalyptus-related and other environmental conflicts from the point of view of regional planning and territory. Acselrad (2006) also studied environmental conflict resulting from the developmentalist line of the Lula government, including Landless Movement actions criticizing the paper industry. Aracruz has generated most research. Recent scholarship has focused on the land battles with the Tupinikim and Guarani Indians (Andrade 2007; Ondetti 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Welch 2006; Chaves (2000); Desmarais (2007); Baletti, Johnson & Wolford (2008); Lerrer (2008); Medeiros & Leite (2004); McNee (2005).
The practices of forest corporations continue to reflect the visions, beliefs and analysis of engineers, business administrators and foresters. As Patricia Marchak argued in her 1995 book *Logging the Globe*, “The sociology and political economy of forestry have been sparsely populated fields of inquiry in the past.” This limitation of critical visions of the industry has created a series of problems. The current large-scale pulp investment model, for example, requires extensive plantations, which are hard and in some cases almost impossible to establish without causing strongly negative impacts on the local populations and nature. Thus, examining the social, political, and economic issues, which are critical in forestry, can help to solve various problems of industrial tree plantations (Marchak 1995: xix).

The 21st-century pulp mill ventures in the global South are immersed in ever more global ties of trade and production circulation. About half of all Brazilian eucalyptus pulp turns into tissue paper, a quarter into special papers and the last quarter into printing and writing paper, whose relative weight will rise because of the growing markets in Asia (Interview with João Cordeiro, Pöyry, March 2008). The Brazilian sector produced 10.4 million tons of pulp and 8.6 million tons of paper, ranking Brazil as the 7th largest producer in pulp and 11th in paper globally (Primapagina 2006). Nowadays, plantations carry on the pulp and paper business, not the mills. The mechanisms ensuring core business have been transformed: now paper companies want to secure their own fiber base, either leased or controlled in some other way. Fast-wood pulp is at the bottom of the value chain, since softwood plantations producing items like sawn logs and veneer logs offer much higher returns (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003: 9). New pulp investments are nevertheless highly profitable, repaying themselves in few years and yielding some 150-200 million euros of profit per year (Pakkasvirta 2008). The return is about or more than 40% for new pulp investments such as Veracel’s, profit margins unheard of in most legal businesses.

Logistical costs are the most significant in a new pulp investment project, defining the success or failure of the project. Thus, some believe that mill size can increase no further. I concur with the prognosis in social spaces where heightened industrial plantation competition between corporations, and even more importantly, contentious agency, are gaining force. Uruguay is currently the most favored haven for huge new pulp projects – the country lacks an organized and significant landless or indigenous movement, and does not have intercorporate competition for agrarian lands of such intensity as Brazil (Kröger 2007a). In the Uruguayan social space, thus, the pulp investment size-maximizing of corporate agency can expand without resistance. However, the size maximization has limits as well, because the most crucial cost of current pulp investments is the logistic cost of trucking the wood from the plantations to the mill: if the distance goes beyond 100 kilometers, costs increase so that it is generally more profitable to build another mill than expand the size. Below is a photo from the Veracel investment in Bahia:


50 Observations from the Industrial Forest Plantations course, August 2007, University of Helsinki.
Pulp investments rely on fast-wood plantations of eucalyptus or other species. In Brazil, the main material for paper pulp production is *Eucalyptus*, mostly from the companies’ vast and nearby plantation holdings. A minor part of the land required for plantations is rented by companies or gained by outsourcing contracts from private producers, but the vast majority of wood comes directly from company-owned land. In total, Brazil had over 3.5 million hectares of eucalyptus plantations in 2006 – this figure includes all plantations, not only pulp-eucalyptus (Piketty *et al.* 2009: 181). The photo 3 below shows a typical pulp mill, Veracel in Bahia:

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51 Brazil is the main country worldwide in the plantation of short-rotation *Eucalyptus grandis* and hybrids (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003: 7).
Photo 3: Veracel Pulp Mill in Eunápolis, Bahia, June 2006

Photo 4 shows the product coming from the pulp mill above. The bleached pulp is ready to be shipped to the world.

Photo 4: Veracel Pulp Mill From the Inside, June 2004

Social scientific research on the paper industry can reveal the political aspects and especially the power relations explaining fast-wood plantations and the surge in large-scale pulp projects. Even though local political systems and processes acculturate new pulp investments, there are tremendous similarities in the new projects across the globe, and thus many similarities in the paper industry disputes all around the world. In the traditional home of the industry in the global North, like Finnish Lapland, the crucial matters affecting the use of
forests and land are outside the circle of local decision-making, as argued by the Finnish political scientists Linjakumpu and Valkonen (2006: 10). This is also the case in Latin American pulp disputes (Kröger 2007a; 2007d). Civil society in the global North surely feels the pressure of the paper industry, but now the industry is finding the most suitable working environment in Latin America and other parts of the global South, not in the global North. Northern civil society and the state have often managed to transform the practices and attitudes of the industry. The grassroots challenges of the globalizing paper industry vary from the socio-environmental conflicts due to logging operations in indigenous land in the global North to tree plantation-based schisms in the global South.

Landless movement grievances about industrial tree plantation expansion arise from socio-economic and environmental damage concerns. According to a series of academic studies drawing from official statistics and observations by citizens and state agents, the Extreme South of Bahia, where Veracel and Bahia Sul (owned by Suzano) have mills and Aracruz have plantations, has been the area with one of the highest rural exodus accompanying the eucalyptus plantation expansion by pulp projects. However, rural exodus or any other broad change external process does not necessarily or causally or even potentially correlate with the level of mobilization, even though it may serve as a causal reason to mobilize, and indeed, will be a significant causal process for the mobilization to continue to gain depth and not stop abruptly. If the problem is solved, what is the need to continue the mobilization? The world history offers plenty of accounts of peasant uprisings that ended after they got land. Besides landlessness, many of the grievances about industrial tree plantation expansion arise from environmental damage concerns. Also these have to be framed by someone for mobilization to occur, and, in the long run mobilization, be in some congruence with the framings. As the technical analysis of the socio-economic and environmental impacts of pulp projects will show, even though paper companies systematically deny that tree plantations have deleterious environmental impacts, in some cases such claims are not based on scientific research.

Even though much has changed in the policies of the paper and pulp industry since the 1990s, the distinctive qualities of new pulp projects remain essentially the same. This investment model has come under heightened criticism. The heavy concentration of efforts into maximizing corporate profits has generated a blinkered pulp investment model with tremendous impact. An eclectic model with small impact makes conflicts less frequent. The current thrust of resource exploitation by large-scale pulp investments in the global South is unsustainable and generates growing conflicts. Industry specialists, such as researchers at the Center for Transnational Forestry Research (CIFOR), have voiced rising concern over the quality of risk assessments and socio-environmental safeguard procedures associated with the financing of pulp mill projects (Spek 2006). It is already known that the type and cost of fiber sources, essential in pulp mill investment, have not been analyzed rigorously enough (Spek 2006).

I add substantially to the risk assessment and industrial policy literature, suggesting that companies, governments and stakeholders should place much more emphasis on the role of dispossessed rural populations, landless movements in the investment areas. Entire pulp
projects can fall because of the formation of efficient resistance to tree plantation expansion. I provide empirical evidence for the claim that to maintain socio-economic safeguards for the local populations and the investors, the current pulp investment model should be transformed into a sustainable development-endowing model. Following Teivo Teivainen (2002), I assess how the globalization of the political economy has brought a need to bring economic decisions more closely into the realm of democracy. Pulp investments are decisions influencing many lives, and, until now, an arguably shallow democratic process has formalized the decisions by which the paper industry has globalized. Both local Brazilians, as well as Finnish taxpayers who pay for the export credits central in promoting the paper industry globalization, for example, would have to have more knowledge and power in the process for it to be labeled truly democratic. The MST, and several NGOs, such as IBASE in Brazil and the export credit agency reform campaign in the global North, have demanded a more transparent democratic pulp investment decision-making process, especially as most of the financing comes from public institutions. The hypothesis suggests that the stronger the contentious agency of the resistance, the more likely these debates will spread, which would most likely lead to more strident and more wide-spread demands for democratizing the investment process.

**Plantation and Mill-Based Conflicts**

Paper investment conflicts, broadly speaking (including paper, pulp, cardboard, and logging) split into two main categories, each indicating quite singular dynamics and thus requiring distinctive research designs. The first type of conflict is plantation-based struggles over land and forest expansion by the paper companies. Typical cases include the current Brazilian situation analyzed here; Finland at the beginning of the 20th century, when land buying by paper companies was severely limited by a law in 1925, and the companies had to start to use other forms of land and forest resource accessing, such as buying wood from small producers; Chile and the Mapuche indigenous struggle, most of which is still coming; the 2008 Peruvian attempt to expand the large-scale pulp model into the Amazon, but which organized civil society managed to stop; Indonesia; India and many other South-East Asian countries with varying, mostly negative results and continued tree plantation expansion. The circles in Map 2 below indicate the South American areas where pulp conflicts have been most severe: these include Eastern Bahia and Espirito Santo in Eastern Brazil; São Paulo; Mato Grosso do Sul; Southern Brazil; Amapá/Pará in the Brazilian Amazon (these conflicts have been dormant for 20 years); Uruguay/Northeastern Argentina; and Southern Chile:
This research is distinct from studies that focus on mill-based conflicts, which are normally struggles over pollution and present quite different dynamics and actors. Examples of this second pulp conflict type started to appear after the initial protests in Europe in the 1980s,
when it was discovered that the pulp bleaching phase, utilizing elemental chlorine, produced dioxins and furans, which have carcinogenic links and potential toxicity (Dalcomuni 2000: 149). Researchers vary in their attribution of reasons for the ensuing regulation, that is, resistance success. For Dalcomuni (ibid), environmental and government groups targeted pulp production in Europe simultaneously but separately, dramatically regulating the levels of chlorine. She also emphasizes that consumer awareness in Europe has had spillover impact in other parts of the world, including Brazil, driving stricter regulation of pulp mill pollution (Dalcomuni 2000: 153). In Finland, the general account is that local municipal and environmental movements managed to push for stricter regulation of mill emissions in water. For Reinstaller, differences in economic and social policies explain the stricter regulation of chlorine emission in the Swedish pulp industries than in the United States (Reinstaller 2005). Collins emphasizes technological innovation within paper and pulp companies (Collins 1994). I have previously argued that the earlier research has overlooked the importance of social movement pressure, for example, in the famous Botnia mill conflict between Uruguay and Argentina in Fray Bentos since 2005, where the resistance forced strict mill regulation standards (Kröger 2007a; 2007b).

Examples of pulp mill-based conflicts include the resistance of mill pollution in Thailand since the 1980s, whose outcome was stricter regulation (Sonnenfeld 1996; 2002), and the 2004 Chilean “Black Swans” case, where the pulp mill emissions of Celulosa Arauco (Celco) in Valdivia killed black swans down-river and caused citizen and environmental protests. I do not deal with the politics of paper investments concerning this second category of conflict – if I did, my dependent variable would not be land expansion by paper companies, but the pollution emission rates of mills. In addition, the mechanisms of contention would be different, as the dynamics of land-based conflicts differ from factory pollution-based conflicts. Controlling mill wastewaters normally leaves landholding patterns the same. A focus on pulp waste regulation would not explain the possibly substantial shifts in the socio-economic relations underlying pulp investment. In sum, the entire research process would be different. Furthermore, it could easily be argued that the pollution by pulp mills is no longer as acute a socio-environmental problem as the pressure caused by large-scale plantations. Plantations have not been regulated as strictly in the global South as pulp mill emissions, even though there might arguably still be reasons to tighten the regulation both in mill and plantation operations.

Effects of Contention in the Brazilian Pulp Projects

In this section, I broadly link the contentious agency to the effects of contention, without going yet to specificities of how the effects were achieved. The MST was successful in its April 2004 Veracel protest. The government promised to appropriate 30,000 hectares of land for the MST families during 2004 in the region in which Veracel operates, and thus the
landless left the eucalyptus plantation (O Estado de São Paulo 2004). The Veracel occupation managed to slow plantation expansion: several MST settlements established on the lands gained in the protest are now a standing proof of this. Without the protest, these lands would have turned into eucalyptus plantations for Veracel, as the company was just about to plant trees in these areas. Since this outcome, the MST has continued protests, and other civil society actors have aligned themselves with its framings and agenda and created ties with the movement, replicating its mechanisms of contention. This has led to further cases of plantation expansion slowing, especially since 2007 and in the latter half of 2008. The expansion of plantation lands has not only been slowed or discontinued, but these lands saved from eucalyptus have been earmarked for agrarian reform or other uses that the resistance stipulates. This suggests that the politics of industrial plantations is a zero-sum game, a fight over access to limited land and natural resources.

The table below summarizes the outcomes of all Brazilian pulp holdings’ plantation expansion initiatives between 2004 and 2008. The first column indicates the size of the mill / investment, the second indicates the outcomes of plantation expansion. The indicators of why the plantation expansion cases were considered as partially slowed down or as discontinued are given in brackets.

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52 In interviews with the author, the movement coordinators claimed that Veracel had promised 20,000 hectares directly to the MST.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Holding (and the state)</th>
<th>Capacity in Tons per Year</th>
<th>Plantation Expansion: Continued Unchecked; Slowed Down; Discontinued; Reversed. (Indicator, empirical proof)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aracruz (RJ)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Discontinued (Expansion attempt resulted in less than 2,000 hectares of eucalyptus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aracruz (ES)</td>
<td>2,330,000</td>
<td>Reversed (Government gave the indigenous groups 11,000 hectares that Aracruz had planted with eucalyptus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracel (BA)</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>Slowed (MST gained 30,000 hectares of settlement promises in 2004; Veracel was ordered to uproot 47,000 hectares in 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (SP)</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
<td>Slowed (The resistance obtained a court decision to stop eucalyptus expansion in São Luiz do Paraitinga municipality; a municipal law restricted plantation at Capão Bonito municipality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stora Enso, Aracruz (RS)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Discontinued (the MST protests made the company decide to leave the state; INCRA did not concede license for the expansion of plantations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzano (BA)</td>
<td>855,000</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (RS)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP, Suzano, Ripasa (SP)</td>
<td>809,000 810,000 560,000</td>
<td>Continued  Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP/IP (MS)</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cenibra (MG)</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari (PA)</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 The capacity figures are from 2007 (Bracelpa 2008), except for the VCP/IP Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) pulp holding, figures from the company website. Now the pulp production capacities are dramatically higher in many holdings, because expansion.
54 Aracruz has been owned by VCP Votorantim since September 1, 2009, as VCP bought Aracruz and the companies merged into a new corporation called Fibria.
55 Votorantim Papel e Celulose.
56 Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo 2009.
57 The research period covers the episodes until the end of 2008. In August 2009, the President of Brazil gave a special permission for Stora Enso to plant on the border zone in spite of the decisions of INCRA. In spite of this, Stora Enso left the state and decided to try to expand via Veracel, as it considered it impossible to operate in Rio Grande do Sul because of the vigorous MST protests.
58 Ripasa is a joint venture of VCP and Suzano, each owning 50% of the company.
59 International Paper of Brazil.
60 Celulose Nipo Brasileira.
In June 2008, a federal court in Bahia sentenced Veracel Celulose for environmental crimes and ordered it to uproot 47,000 hectares of eucalyptus plantations. In a remarkably similar resolution, a federal court in São Paulo condemned VCP in the municipality of São Luiz do Paraitinga, on 28 August 2008. The court ordered the immediate suspension of eucalyptus planting, as VCP had covered over 20% of the municipality with its eucalyptus plantations. In August 2007, in Espírito Santo, Tupinikim and Guarani indigenous communities regained over 11,000 hectares of land (about 27,000 acres) from Aracruz Celulose in a legal case that showed the company had violently accessed the area with the state support of the military regime. The Brazilian Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, decided to sequester the land accessed by Aracruz for 40 years. For the North American Congress on Latin America, “Genro’s decision testifies to the growing capacity and organization of the country’s rural civil society” (NACLA 2007). The MST also won an important battle in December 2008 over Aracruz Celulose in Rio Grande do Sul (RS), as it managed after years of protests, law-suits and pressure to gain acquisition of a 5,000 hectare piece of the Southall farm, already destined for the Aracruz eucalyptus plantation, but now settling almost 250 landless families. In total, the struggles against Aracruz in RS brought MST 13,000 hectares, settling over 600 families in 2009, and more lands were coming.

The World Rainforest Movement – an NGO closely following tree plantation conflicts and a vehement critic and creator of heterodox information on the subject – called the July 2008 Veracel decision “historic” in “the popular struggle against eucalyptus monoculture plantations” (WRM 2008). The federal court ordered companies to “carry out environmental impact assessments in all of the areas where they are located, along with mandatory public hearings with the rural populations affected by them” (ibid). The Public Prosecutor Wagner Giron filed the suit, arguing dramatically that pulp corporations “do not respect any environmental norms whatsoever. They plant the trees on mountains, in native forests, encroaching on springs and drying up waterways. There have already been cases of poisoning of human beings and deaths of fish and animals here, all as a result of this violation of environmental norms” (Radioagência NP 2008).61 When state actors share a heterodox, contender-created framing, contentious agency has surely become embedded in the state.

The case suggests that when enough people in a particular place get angry, local judges will make decisions in line with the heterodox frame that the resistance provides. During the field research spanning 2004 to 2008, the transformation from pro-pulp attitudes towards pro-land reform attitudes was remarkable in communities like Eunápolis, whose inhabitants came to realize the pulp investment did not bring what it promised. Normal citizens in small cities from a heterogeneous political spectrum were talking like landless movement members of the need to curb eucalyptus expansion and to slow the growing power of the company over all aspects of life in the community. Mayors of nearby cities, like Jânio Natal (PR) from Porto Seguro argued that his city “suffered most with Veracel. There was a huge rural exodus. Small farmers sold their lands and went to look for a city where they would have a better life.

61 FASE personnel did the interview with Giron. The Brazilian human rights organization FASE has also been active defending rural populations. MST, WRM and FASE form the core of the Alert Network against the Green Desert.
They all came to the periphery of Porto Seguro.” The mayor also pinpointed that there was a significant reduction in the cultivation of beans, manioc, potato and papaya in the region affected by the plantations (A Tarde 14/10/2008).

The MST has managed to influence public opinion in pulp project locales: now public opinion considers that pulp investments have negative influence on local companies. This is an ideological victory in the view of João Pedro Stédile from the MST.62 Santos from the National Coordination claims that “The principal merit of the MST and La Via Campesina is to break the consensus that exists in favor of neoliberalism and agribusiness” (Email Interview, December 11, 2008). Furthermore, the case of Stora Enso in Rio Grande do Sul came to public notice and influenced the image of transnational companies negatively, the paper industry in particular.

I provide detailed analysis of the dynamics within one contentious politics type, investment politics, and within this, the sub-category of plantation-based conflicts. I compare the MST to other Brazilian movements involved in land conflicts, which create specific conflict dynamics: it is not appropriate to compare a landless movement to movements whose goal is not land. The issues at hand and the actors involved greatly influence movements and conflict dynamics. In focusing on the conflict type to which the movement belongs, one can see that the MST has been an exception in comparison to other movements. This shows the importance of agency.

Concluding Remarks

The current global corporate resource exploitation pace is unsustainable. The imbalance is felt especially in the global South that produces a growing part of global resource consumption. With its huge, tropical environment and abundant resources, Brazil ranks high in the global resource production. However, the wide-spread and enduring domestic and transnational perception of Brazil as having limitless land and resources is a myth, argues Peter May (1999). This myth has led to a series of serious problems for those who face the consequences of the myth, namely, the rural populations living in the middle of the supposedly endless natural wealth. Many people have been stripped of their right to the lands they inhabit, left without legal land titles and trampled on by the people and entities promoting the view of Brazil as a haven of natural resources to be utilized. A recurrent dilemma is that “constraints on effective access to natural resources by the majority of the rural population continue to restrict their efficient and sustainable use” (May 1999: 1). This historic dilemma between large underutilized areas – not as endless as assumed by the myth – and effective land access goes by the name of the land question.63 Large-scale pulp projects clash with the land reform-

62 Speech at the strategic meeting focusing on activism against eucalyptus plantations in Belém, Pará, 31 January 2009, as part of the World Social Forum. Information sent by the Finnish landless friendship association, Maattomien ystäväry.
63 For good worldwide analysis of all the aspects of land questions past and in the present, see the classic studies by Peluso & Watts 2001; Kautsky 1988 [1899]; Blaikie 1985; and Mann 1990 and Rosset et al. 2006.
promotion. For the MST, the problem in the current pulp investment model is both the large area required by the paper industry and the “non-productivity” and “non-social function” of pulp investment:

The paper and pulp companies compromise national sovereignty. The situation is very critical in the environmental sense, and in other senses creating sovereignty, as these companies do not respect the constitution, citizens or indigenous populations … The companies put the agrarian reform at risk. The most serious act is the expulsion of rural populations (Interview, MST São Paulo, September 2006).

During the dictatorship, pulp companies such as Aracruz enclosed peasants, Indians’ and Quilombos’ lands. The legacy is that complex land conflicts dot the contemporary pulp business. Traditional populations want their lands back, and some state institutions in the newly democratic Brazil are showing a green light, even though the more conservative and authoritarian-minded, like the ministry of agriculture and Ministério da fazenda, along with the police forces, like the Military and Federal Police, are on the side of the pulp corporations.

The rural populations inhabiting the areas where pulp projects expanded plantations moved to the nearby cityslums, as I witnessed in the field research between 2004 and 2008. This urbanization is part of a global trend: it is corporate resource exploitation, such as agribusiness, mining and large dam projects that drive rural populations to cities. The case of pulp projects can be considered as a highly illustrative case of the general phenomenon discussed by Mike Davis in his Planet of Slums (2006), in which he asks why more than one billion people live now in slums.

The pulp conflict cases are symptoms of the wider clash between agribusiness and the agroecology phenomena. These are distinct projects changing the countryside. Even though it causes dispossession and socio-political power concentration, agribusiness is a more productive form of rural space usage and agriculture than the traditional latifündio. It is a modern way of land usage, in the same way as the agroecology is a modern version of traditional land-human relations in Latin America (Kröger 2008b). What is new is the manner in which agribusinessmen – in general, the sector is almost wholly peopled by men – invest in new land and machinery and find or buy new companies instead of becoming consumers. This is not typical for a Latin American businessman or entrepreneur in the countryside or hinterlands (Brown, Jepson & Price 2004). The global paper industry follows this pattern of reinvestment instead of consumption. A partial reason for pulp investment is the relatively low land price in comparison to the expected future cash flow mills will bring by offering fibre year after year to global markets. The struggle takes place between a pro-agribusiness and pro-agrarian reform policy between big industrial plantation-expanding companies like the paper corporations and the Brazilian Landless Movement.

Even though the Brazilian state and government is ever more bound into the global economy, there are also signs of a simultaneously consolidating democracy. In a review article on recent scholarship on structural changes in Brazil, Brian Wampler (2005: 252) sums up how

64 Latifündio has become the equivalent term “not just of large holdings, technological backwardness and lack of productivity, but also the synonym for relations of power, oppression and the absence of rights” (Medeiros 2005: 29).
“Tremendous political and social change occurred in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s, which forced political and civil society actors to revamp their strategies and practices to respond to the demands of the new environment”. In this new environment, a plethora of groups experiment with new policies and strategies. The mechanisms used by social movements in Brazil have changed, as Kathryn Hochstetler (2000) has noted. She shows how movement approaches now come in many shapes, varying from lobbying the lawmakers, action by participatory institutions, direct mobilization, and production of social services and networking with other NGOs (Hochstetler 2000). Wampler (2005) concludes that the surge in new groups and strategies is a step towards the consolidation of Brazilian democracy, a claim that the general advance of social movement society studied by Meyer and Tarrow (1998), empirically observable in this Brazilian case, supports. The promotion of contentious agency can be a process that strengthens democracy, if the social actor using contentious agency has democracy as its goal. Alberto Melucci (1998: 428) argues that “The degree of democracy in a society is measured by its capacity to redefine institutions and rights, thereby gradually reducing the inequality and violence that society itself produces”. Contenders over developmentalist and economist investment projects and industrial policies, such as the MST, have strengthened democracy because they push for the redefinition of Latin American institutions, rights and mechanisms that still produce high levels of inequality and violence. Popular sector groups have had an enormous role in democratization, for example, in Western Europe and South America (Collier, Ruth 1999). In fact, besides sometimes succeeding in translating their agendas into public policies, new Latin American social movements have come to give new meanings to the notions of democracy and citizenship (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar 1998: 2). Especially important has been the Basismo movement, which has fostered grassroots democracy in the Latin American countryside since the 1970s (Lehmann 1990). The MST model builds on the Basismo movement.

This research tries to contribute to the debate over the possibility of substantial social and economic change. Consolidation of democracy is a macro-process that helps explain the slowing of industrial plantation expansion, because democracy delimits the process which promotes corporate agency at the expense of society. However, even within a democratic polity, molding an orthodox investment model towards sustainable investment requires that someone provide alternative framings for development. Movements can channel the wishes of the majority, the poor of the countryside in the areas influenced by industrial plantation expansion. In such a situation, movements promote the power of democracy within the economy. By offering alternative frames, well-organized social movements can both deepen democracy and push for regulation and more sustainable, equitable and publicly accepted investment and development policies. As Peter Evans (2008b: 276) puts it in a study of counter-hegemonic globalization: “Movements build political power through contestation, and building political power is the most important prerequisite for constructing alternative institutions”. A movement that has national and transnational power, but which, more importantly, also serves as a progenitor process through embedding with the society and the state, can spread the mechanisms of contention to a wide array of groups.
3. Theory of Contentious Agency and Corporate Resource Exploitation

In this chapter, I generate a framework for analyzing when and how contentious agency can slow or reverse corporate resource exploitation. Sustained corporate mechanisms create capacity for corporate agency; sustained mechanisms of contention create capacity for contentious agency. Capacity is not enough, since one has to still believe that change is possible and desire it. The support given by the state to movements and corporations is important. The interaction of these three processes forms the dynamics that explain natural resource politics. Figure 3 presents the conceptual framework, the basic dynamics in contentious politics applying to industrial plantations (note that I will present gradually more nuanced versions of this; the idea here is to present the complex dynamics in the simplest way).

Figure 3 sums up the general dynamics between the MST, the paper industry and the state. Note that transnational processes, market changes and environmental changes, which influence both corporate and contentious agency are factored into the processes mentioned above, as well as the state in ways that I decipher in detail later on. I offer more detailed figures, that explore the specificities of this interaction step-by-step, naming the arrows. The purpose of figure 3 is to present the main dynamics in the politics of paper investments in the most simplified way. As figure 3 shows, one can pose the problem in the following
conceptual way: the dynamics explaining plantation expansion is the interaction between contentious and corporate agency within a given political system. Contentious agency loses explanatory power to the degree that corporate agency weighs more, in which sense this is a zero-sum game. Crucial to the politics of paper projects is the struggle for natural resources as well as state support.

In the dynamic investigation of investment politics, I suggest, the political opportunity configuration can be conceived as defined by a struggle between the corporation and its contenders within the political systems where the conflict takes place. A strong industry-government alliance signifies few political opportunities for those wishing to resist investment. Vice versa, a strong movement-state alliance signifies good political opportunities for resistance. Political opportunities vary depending on the case and, through time. The suggested conceptualization merges agency with political opportunities, escaping from the dichotomy between the two, and placing the primary focus on the dynamics of contention.

In figure 3, the unnamed arrows depict the top-level processes explaining the expansion of plantations (the dependent variable). I will break these unnamed arrows – the top-level processes – into the constituent lower-level process-types and their constituent mechanisms, which together produce the top-level processes leading to either plantation expansion (upper arrow running from corporate agency promotion to y), or to the slowing of plantations (lower arrow running from contentious agency promotion to y). I will delineate the process types by which the actors forge alliances and gain support from the state and the political system, as the small arrows in the middle suggest.

The table 2 disaggregates the mechanisms promoting contentious and corporate agency. Three lower-level process types produce contentious and corporate agency: the MST-state apparatus alliance, land conflicts, and the industry-government alliance. These upper- and lower level processes are results of specific mechanisms, summarized for both of the main processes in table 2.

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65 I have followed the disaggregation table in Falleti & Lynch (2008: 335) as an example when producing this table for the politics of paper investments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Processes and Mechanisms in Natural Resource Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top-level process</strong> (what explains plantation expansion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentious agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process-as-type</strong> (what relations produce the top-level processes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Mechanism-as-example** (what mechanisms create the processes above) | *Indirect mechanisms:*  
a) Organizing and politicizing  
b) Heterodox framing  
d) Networking with allies  

*Direct mechanisms:*  
c) Protesting  
e) Movement embedding with the state whilst maintaining autonomy  
(EAM): contributions to state actors, ideological congruity search, advocating with institutions linking the state and movements |
| **Mechanism-as-cause** (what causes the example mechanisms to be active) | Importance of an area/issue to a social group | Importance of an area to a corporation |
| **Mechanism-as-indicator** (how can the example mechanisms be observed to be active in this case) | *Indirect mechanisms:*  
a) Existence of alternative space AND revolutionary attitude  
b) Heterodox eucalyptus discourses  
d) Existence of a strong local coalition network directed against eucalyptus monoculture OR replication of the MST model by other social actors in the area OR transnational networking  

*Direct mechanisms:*  
c) The number of directed, pioneering, re-symbolizing, disruptive and massive land occupations and other protests  
e) Embedding: Voting, promising social peace against demands, the congruity of state actor discourses and decisions with the MST. Autonomy: movement-controlled decision-making and utilization of external resources |
| **Mechanism-as-indicator** (how can the example mechanisms be observed to be active in this case) | *Indirect mechanisms:*  
- The business makes profit  
- Industry coalitions exist and act  
- The company seeks real dialogue  

*Direct mechanisms:*  
- Surge in the area covered by eucalyptus in the investment area  
(EAC) Direct election financing by companies, investment project support by technocratic developmentalist government discourses and policies, BNDES credit given to paper companies |
The valuation of the importance of the investment area by the actors is a mechanism-as-cause initiating further support for and construction of corporate and contentious agency. Mobilization and the dynamics of contention can gain strength following this mechanism. The mechanism has a specific quality, as it is causal (see Table 1 in Falleti & Lynch (2008: 335). The strategic importance of the area to the actors activates top-level processes of corporate and contentious agency promotion. It triggers the mechanisms, such as protests (c) or corporate land access, by which plantations are expanded or slowed. In the case of the MST, if the movement considers a given area or issue important, this leads to protests and extending embedded autonomy-seeking in the area in question – mechanisms a, b, d and e permitting. If mechanisms a-e are active, the movement should have the contention capacity to turn their judgment on the importance of the area into action and be able to slow plantation expansion. For example, in the case of Rio Grande do Sul, the MST deemed the area as strategically most important for the movement, and consequently managed to block plantation expansion in cases where mechanisms a-e were active, as I will show. In the case of corporations, the judgment that a given area/issue is important leads to corporate land access and deepening government-industry alliance-seeking, corporate mechanisms permitting. I produce tables in which I assess the strategic importance of the 14 pulp-holding areas and projects for both of the actors.

What then defines the strategic decisions? Environmental mechanisms, such as accumulation by dispossession, fluctuations in global markets and economic cycles, and in the environment, surely influence strategy. Likewise important are cognitive and relational mechanisms. But what about the contents of these: are strategic judgments rational? I have argued that if they are not, i.e. if the broad change processes and the attribution of threat/opportunity are not in correlation, mobilization and the dynamics of contention will not continue for long. One could criticize this viewpoint by arguing that some part of human decisions and desires is bound to be irrational, a mystery out of the reach of positivist causal-chain analysis. The specific strategies of actors vary a great deal depending on the ideology, culture, symbolic system, social position, habitus, correlation of forces, conflict dynamics and irrational elements. The reasons for strategic decisions are hard to spot before the decisions have been made, but after observing the actors’ actions in the world, these can be used as references to indicate some but not all sources of strategic decisions. I will assess some sources of the MST’s strategizing. Some of the paper industry and its government alliance’s sources of strategizing I assess also. The analysis uses Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic system and habitus in particular, as well as historical institutional analysis probing the institutional trajectories of entities acting in the political economy, which can be used to predict and analyze the specificities of social actors and reasons for their strategizing. The explication of causal mechanisms serves to partially answer the question why. Answers to the question why cannot be fully achieved.

The ideology of paper corporations becomes apparent in analyzing the judgments and strategic decisions corporations make on the importance/suitability of an area for a pulp project. The evaluation of the importance of the investment area to the industry is based on various interviews, the Industrial Forest Plantations Programme at the University of Helsinki
in August 2007 (designed for and run by paper industry executives and experts), and on my field research. The strategic importance of the area as well as expansion costs for the industry are influenced by many factors, including land prices as well as the forestry efficiency rate – these depend on the regulatory framework set by the state, not merely on the available land or on natural conditions. As Zysman (1994: 243) puts it: “Markets do not exist or operate apart from the rules and institutions that establish them and that structure how buying, selling and the very organization of production takes place”. Whatever the complex rationality and irrationality behind the decision, the relative importance of the investment area to the actors activates and directs their actions. The paper industry privileges lands closer to the sea, transportation routes, and in the fastest eucalyptus-growth areas – qualities defined in political processes and not purely by nature. Likewise, some areas are more important to the MST than others; the assessment is based on several interviews with the movement leadership in São Paulo, who put separate areas of the country into a ranking based on their strategic importance to the movement. The Landless Movement is most concerned about lands suitable for agrarian reform, such as *terras devolutas*, and areas considered as movement strongholds, such as Rio Grande do Sul. Until now, paper companies have not considered the likelihood of contentious agency in their strategic decisions when investing in Brazil, having been too self-assured to establish plantations even in the stronghold of the MST. The rapidly unfolding new reality of the southern industrial plantation conflicts has meant that companies are starting to take the contention much more seriously into consideration when investing.

As movements do not exist in a vacuum, the efficiency of contentious agency promotion by the mechanisms to hand has to be studied in relation to the conflict dynamics, actors and issues at stake, as well as across different contexts. Movements can be understood only as relational entities (McAdam et al. 2001), in the same manner as states and industries are always relational entities. Thus, this is an analysis of contentious agency and corporate resource exploitation, not of the MST *per se*. I seek to add to the earlier research on the Landless Movement and social movements by employing a conflict-centered research framework, illustrated in a bit greater complexity than in the previous figure in the figure 4 below:
Figure 4 shows up the dynamics of contentious agency and pulp-based corporate resource exploitation in Brazil. It still carries the “political opportunity” language to situate the classic movement research to the new approach. The outcomes, plantation expansion, expansion slowing, discontinuation or reversal, are defined in specific political dynamics; in this case, land conflicts, electoral politics, ideological game, and institutional game. The actors meet in land conflicts: they seldom meet directly, as they utilize the mechanisms in the figure to gain the upper hand in land conflicts, both directly and indirectly by allying themselves with the government and the state apparatus. By the direct mechanism of EAC, the paper industry has forged a government-industry alliance supporting plantation expansion. By EAM, the MST has obtained a part of the state-apparatus – some sympathetic state actors, institutions and legal frameworks – to support it in land conflicts. The struggles for alliance-building with the state and the government greatly influence land conflicts.66

The sub-mechanisms corporations utilize when embedding with the state depend on the political game in question. EAC splits into the following sub-mechanisms: contributions to state actors (within electoral politics), promising taxes/ideological congruity (ideological and identity game), utilizing and lobbying for structural and institutional support mechanisms

66 In the politics of pulp projects, when choosing sides, elected executives have almost entirely been on the side of pulp plants – this is why I call the relation a government-industry alliance, not a state-industry alliance. As most of those in favor of the MST come from other parts of the state than government, I call the relation a state-apparatus-MST alliance.
linking the state and corporations (institutional game). Corporations are not alone in these political games, but they meet with the MST, which also forms part of the interactive dynamics. EAM splits into the following sub-mechanisms: contributions to state actors (electoral politics), ideological congruity seeking (ideological and identity game), advocating with institutions linking the state and movements (institutional game).

The more embedded a contentious actor is in the political games in relation to industry embedding, the more likely it will reach its goal of slowing plantation expansion – other mechanisms supporting it. Likewise, the more embedded the corporation is in relation to movement embedding, the more likely it can expand plantations at a rapid and unchecked pace. The comparative analysis of these two process types during different times demonstrates the struggle for the state, and can help to explain the differing investment outcomes between the pulp holdings. The actors also influence land conflicts directly, as the central boxes under “direct mechanisms” suggest. The paper industry accesses land as it buys and outsources land for tree plantations. The MST weighs protest acts, mainly land occupations, against the plantation expansion.

As figure 4 shows, contentious agency promotion creates better political opportunities for resistance, whereas corporate agency promotion leads to worse political opportunities from the resistance point of view. The stronger the resistance is relationally in the mechanisms and processes in figure 4, the greater the likelihood that its estimations that political opportunities are suitable are correct. When we look at the recent successes of movements in the resistance to plantation expansion, we can see these have come from winning land conflicts, which in turn has been the result of direct and indirect mechanisms promoting contentious agency. Political opportunity configurations, this research design suggests, should be seen as the relative strength of the actors within the processes active and most relevant in the specific conflict case. Figure 4 bridges the dichotomy between movement agency and the configuration of political opportunity a movement faces.

The strong government-industry alliance has made political opportunities highly unfavorable for those challenging the Brazilian pulp investment. The likelihood of failure has been high in the resistance against the projects. Moreover, the potential of failure has continued to rise as the support for plantation expansion has become an ever more high-profile issue for the Brazilian government since 1990. Still, in the midst of these worsening political opportunities, that is, increasing corporate power stemming from a closer government-industry alliance, the outcomes of pulp conflicts have led to the slowing of plantation expansion in some cases. As we shall see, variation in the local mechanisms promoting contentious agency can explain these events. The empirically observable conflict outcomes suggest that, even in the midst of a very negative configuration of political opportunities for contesting investment projects, contentious agency promotion matters greatly. This finding is in contradiction with most of the earlier findings on the role of political opportunity in contentious politics. However, this finding does not mean that political opportunities are not important in analyzing the MST. As Miguel Carter (2009: 40) points, Brazilian landless movements consider the political opportunities at hand and have only a very limited range of rational choices when selecting
strategies: “For lack of a comprehensive pro-poor reform policy in the countryside, peasant
groups have been left with few alternatives to strong-arm, pressure tactics”. However, the
results of protests (c), findings suggest, depend much more on the simultaneous exercise of
mechanisms a, b and d, than on the configuration of political opportunities.

Nevertheless, even though the promise of plantation resistance turning into a widespread
phenomenon powerful enough to turn into an offensive pro-regulation policy-making process
lies in sustaining mechanisms promoting contentious agency, movements alone are unlikely
to achieve substantial victories if the transnational and national political opportunity
configuration is not largely favorable. Still, “Brazil’s democratic land reform should be
considered a significant political achievement” (Ondetti 2008a: 230). However, “a major
change would require a constitutional reform relaxing the restrictions on the expropriation of
private landholdings, especially the ban on seizing productive land. It is very hard to envision
such a reform gaining approval in the foreseeable future”, argues Ondetti (2008a: 236).
Nevertheless, this is the goal of the MST in the new occupations of productive pulp
investment lands. The movement witnesses how corporate agribusiness operations enclose
the remaining suitable land faster than ever. In order to survive, the MST and other land
movements committed to struggle have to secure a new configuration of political opportunity,
challenging corporate agency by increasing contentious agency. The Brazilian resistance
cases that have led to the slowing or even discontinuation of some pulp holding expansion
implies that from now on, if the contentious agency continues to expand, social movement
resistance can at least slow, and even help to discontinue or reverse these investments in some
places. Next, I will construct a research design based on the methodology and this theoretical
framework.

Research Design

The research design has been set up to explain systematically how much importance one
should place on contentious agency promotion in explaining plantation expansion, to
elucidate the case well and thoroughly, going to the micro-level analysis of the processes
promoting contentious and corporate agency. In states where major targeted pulp protests
have not been mounted or the organization of resistance by the MST is weak or inexistent,
like Mato Grosso do Sul, plantations have expanded unchecked. This implies that the
interaction of contentious and corporate agency explains the discontinuation or slowing of
land expansion by paper companies. In general, active corporate agency has greatly favored
the expansion of plantation lands. In 2007 and 2008, however, plantation expansion has been
discontinued or slowed in various areas around Brazil. One thus has to turn to a detailed
analysis of the mechanisms that promote and delimit contentious and corporate agency.

Figure 5 sums up the research design I utilized in analyzing the politics of paper investment in
Brazil. Again, this is not yet the most complex and complete figure, which is yet to follow.
The research applies this comparative analytic framework to pulp company holdings across
Brazilian states in periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008, to draft tables from which the
importance of processes and mechanisms can be deduced. Both the contentious agency (a-e) and the corporate agency promoting mechanisms influence plantation expansion (y). Corporate agency acts as a counterfactual, since if both contentious and corporate agency increase and we still have a slowing or discontinuation of corporate plantation land expansion, the hypothesis is defended by the empirical findings. The analysis of a control process (corporate agency) is useful to extend the hypothesis that a contentious agency-promoting social actor can slow the business-government alliance that normally ensures corporate land expansion. Bringing in counterfactuals complements the thesis and the theory, makes it more comprehensive and dynamic. The top-level process of contentious agency promotion can slow or discontinue plantation expansion, even when the complementary and interlaced process of corporate agency promotion is active simultaneously. This research design can be used to validate a link between cause, action and outcome in contentious politics.

Figure 5 below shows the relations in play in the politics of industrial plantations. For example, increased land access results in the expansion of plantations, which then increases profits of the company – this loop-back mechanism further hastens the top-level corporate agency. Mechanisms are not exogenous; for instance, the nature of state support for the industry and market transformations factor into the MST’s decisions about what pulp holdings to target.

The direct mechanism of protest and EAM may discontinue or slow the expansion of plantation lands, and may thus result in the creation of agrarian reform settlements instead of
eucalyptus plantations, dependent on the availability of land and state resources. These settlements in turn support the organizing and politicizing mechanism (a) and thus promote contentious agency. This shows how the environmental mechanisms are actually not entirely beyond the movement’s influence, but are influenced in episodes of contention. On the other hand, companies buy land and foster a government-industry alliance, attempting to expand plantations, which lead to profits that then further corporate agency. This loop can lead to rapid and unchecked expansion of plantation lands if contentious agency does not challenge the establishment of the loop mechanisms. As already argued, the actors consider the influence of the broad change processes such as political dynamics and the markets in assessing the strategic importance of a given area for their operations, and they are also parts of the dynamics and the markets. For these reasons, I have factored the supposedly external “environmental mechanisms” such as change in the natural conditions or in the markets into the corporate and contentious agency, as well as state support. Support given by the state actors is divided, as some are on the side of the resistance and others on the side of the industry. The MST gains agrarian reform settlements by the mechanism of direct protest acts, and indirectly by the mechanism of embedding with the state (the influence of this mechanism is indicated by the unnamed arrow running from state support to y in figure 5). The new settlements support the movement in slowing plantation expansion in the future.

**Dependent Variable: Plantation Expansion**

Land expansion by companies is a quantifiable and empirically observable variable. I decided to narrow the dependent variable to this simple measure, as it comprehends a wealth of implications. Firstly, since the current pulp investment model depends on large land areas, a look at land expansion is a useful indicator for investment outcome; without lands for tree plantations, there will be no mills. Second, this dependent variable is directly relational; land expansion implies a political and conflictive course of action, as land does not just emerge from a void. Thirdly, land expansion in its general form can be analyzed across drastically different institutional, political and cultural contexts, like Brazil, Finland and Indonesia. It is a quantitative measure – and yet, the story that is told by focusing on this variable offers rich portrayals of disparate political ecology trajectories of local populations encountering the large-scale model of pulp investment. The land expansion focus can tease out particularities and similarities of political change when industrial plantation capitalism, the commodification of land into the capitalist world-system, encounters different local processes.

The dependent variable measures the reversal, discontinuation, slowing or unchecked continuation of plantation land expansion by paper companies. Satellite photos, statistics, field research and documents can be used to determine this. For example, in the case of Stora Enso in Rio Grande do Sul, plantation expansion was discontinued at 46,000 hectares, because the MST protested strongly against the investment since 2007. In the case of the Aracruz pulp project in Rio Grande do Sul, expansion was not discontinued – Aracruz continued planting eucalyptus on new lands – but slowed, as the MST managed to obtain the 11,000 hectare Southall farm for its member families to settle on after a several years’
occupation and struggle with Aracruz, who wanted to buy the farm for their eucalyptus plantation. In Mato Grosso do Sul, on the other hand, expansion of eucalyptus plantations owned by VCP has continued totally unchecked, due to active corporate agency and inactive contentious agency promotion in the area.

The dependent variable (y = reversal, discontinuation, slowing, or unchecked continuation of plantation expansion) can be used in a larger comparative global study. Firstly, the notion of private land ownership by companies is not present in many investment countries – for example, in Mexico, China, Laos and Uganda companies have to secure land access by leasing or contracting land utilization rights from governments, as corporate land ownership (especially foreign) is forbidden, conditional or restricted. Secondly, companies have growing de facto control over a much greater land area than they officially claim to possess by direct ownership or other contractual deals; outsourcing programs and the contractual commitments farmers make to deliver raw material from their plantations to companies should thus also be included in the figure for land expansion. In fact, this outsourcing is currently the principal method of plantation expansion in many places. Thus, following these two issues, one should not measure plantation expansion merely as land ownership, but as land access expansion by companies. Thus, the precise dependent variable is ‘plantation land access expansion’, which signifies the expansion of those land areas that are accessed primarily by corporate resource exploitation. The plantation land expansion variable serves to explore the land struggles also over such lands that were destined for pulp production (which a paper company was trying to buy or obtain in other ways) but the resistance movement managed to direct for its primary access. Such was the case in Rio Grande do Sul between the MST and Aracruz on the Southall farm in December 2008.

The most important reason for selecting plantation expansion as the dependent variable in resource conflict analysis is the fact that it not only demonstrates the losses of the companies, but the victories of the landless movements as well, since the reversal or slowing of land expansion means a direct victory for the movements. There is normally a myriad of companies and other organizations venturing into the tree plantation and land speculation business when the news of a major paper company’s plan to build a pulp plant reaches the supposed target area. The ensuing land speculation means that not all of the lands covered by tree plantations or reserved for them are directly or even indirectly controlled by paper companies, which makes land access analysis complex. This was the case, for example, in Rio Grande do Sul in 2008 during a general boom in tree plantations, fostered by the state governor’s extension-favoring policies, credit programs, and political, legal and police support. It was hard to track the ownership or control of all the tree plantations and potential plantation land expansions in the projected investment sites. Not only were the lands numerous and fragmented, but many were not even officially regulated or put into the governmental statistics. In general, countries where land ownership – not to mention land control – are shadowy, as in most of the global South, offer a great methodological dilemma: what statistics should one trust? According to the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment report (MMA 2005), if all the land claims in the official cartórios were added up, the country
would be twice as big as it is: the overlapping demands make it hard to identify ownership or control by statistics.

In spite of all these issues, fortunately, satellites and sophisticated geographical methods have attempted to map tree plantation expansion in recent years. Fortunately, one can increasingly rely on secondary studies by critical specialists in universities on land expansion. Furthermore, even though the problems noted above might lead to some discrepancies in assessing corporate land access, the general trends that follow from pulp investments as a rule demonstrate a clear and massive land expansion, apparent even by rough estimations or by company-produced calculations so that the measurement problems are relatively minor. I used the land expansion estimates produced by paper companies, industry-organizations and the state as the dependent variable. Lastly, in the cases compared here, all the actors concerned, as came out in interviews with the state officials, resistance movements and paper companies, perceived the fact of plantation expansion, even though there were discrepancies between them. In the end, plantation expansion is a definite, quantifiable, variable measuring industrial plantation investment outcomes which allows comparison and is quite trouble-free.

Disaggregation of Mechanisms

McAdam and Tarrow (2009: 7) acknowledge that there is still a long way to go to develop the measuring of mechanisms. Thus, I have given key attention to methodological considerations, seeking to respond explicitly to the questions of how to detect mechanisms a-e empirically and what empirical traces will show that e-h have occurred.

Indirect Mechanisms

I have separated a, b and d as indirect mechanisms endowing contention power in resource conflicts from c and e, which are direct mechanisms more directly related to interaction with the state and the industry than the indirect mechanisms meant to strengthen the movement organization and its networking with allies. Next, I show how I have analyzed the indirect mechanisms, after which I present the direct mechanisms fostering the relative power of contentious agency in investment politics. I also discuss the direct sub-mechanism both corporations and movements use to embed into the electoral politics: contributions to state actors.

Several mechanisms of contention have to be active simultaneously for contentious agency to be promoted. First, passive people have to become rebels. This is achieved by the mechanisms of organizing and politicizing (a). Second, the rebels have to have a cause: the cause is created by the mechanism of hetedox framing (b). Third, the rebels with a cause have to manifest themselves, make the cause and their contentious attitude known to the public: this is achieved by pioneering protesting (c). Lastly, for contentious agency to spread, be allowed to be expressed now and in the future, and for the contenders to gain resources, the
mechanisms of networking with allies (d) and embedding with the state whilst maintaining movement autonomy vis-à-vis the society and the state (e) are essential. When these mechanisms are active, contentious agency promotion occurs. Next, I will shortly and explicitly delineate the indicators I have utilized to measure whether the mechanisms are active or not.

Organizing and politicizing a social actor (a)

Following the advice of McAdam et al. (2001: 26) that “in general terms, when a mechanism is at work, we see interactions among the elements in question altering the established connections among them”, the organizing and politicizing mechanism is active in the following instances. 1) New movement habitus overtakes conventional habitus (individual and professional level transformation). As a result, a revolutionary attitude is created. 2) New and alternative spaces, such as settlements or landless camps are being formed (collective, social level transformations). As a result, an alternative space is secured for the movement.

The first could be characterized as a qualitative change, and the second as a quantitative change strengthening the organization. To be judged as active, both quantitative and qualitative conditions had to be fulfilled. Qualitative changes are hard, but not impossible, to observe, requiring long-term participatory observation within the movement. Habitus has certainly changed when a member takes a professional habitus specific to the MST. The surge in the number of technicians, doctors, administrators and other professional categories within the movement reflects the activeness of the organizing mechanism in qualitative terms. Quantitative changes by the mechanism can be assessed for a large number of cases by collecting data on the creation of new settlements and camps within the MST in a given area.

Assessing the contentious habitus and ideology-creation is crucial in understanding resistance outcomes. Firstly, the unity of the movement members, ideological congruity in the investment area, is important. Secondly, ideological congruity will not produce results if mechanisms do not employ daily, politicizing practices. Mere intellectual talk is not enough for fostering contentious subjects. Thirdly, the ability of movement leaders to create heterodox cognitive frames, new symbolizations by practical demonstrations such as mass protests is essential. Cognitive mechanisms, directed both to internal and external consumption, is extremely important in promoting contentious agency and changing the opinions of both public and state actors. Furthermore, all of the mechanisms of contention in which I am interested in here have to form alternative territorial spaces in order to function and potentially manage to challenge corporate resource exploitation, which by definition is a land and resource utilizing activity. Contending social actors should create alternative spaces that allow the concrete construction of viable alternative economic and political projects. Only if such utilization of space was present as a core component of the organizing and politicizing efforts, I deemed the mechanism a to be active.
The organizing and politicizing mechanism creates alternative territorial, social and symbolic space where questioning, criticizing, contending, innovative, and transformative, utopian ideas and attitudes can surge and be expressed. It creates higher likelihood for novelty to arise. The politicizing practices should be non-dogmatic, and foster a search for freedom, contention and a transformation-searching attitude. In its organizing work, the MST creates specific sectors and levels at which movement members can maximize their common efforts. The organizing and politicizing practices separate specific functions for leaders and coordinators, ideologists and militants, and circulates activists in many professional positions within the MST system.

In the elaboration of the mechanisms and their assessment criteria, I followed primarily induction from empirically grounded observations, and secondarily deduction from earlier theories. One might ask why not adopt Tilly’s (1999) famous WUNC-measurement (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment of movement members) to assess movement strength. By now, and especially after reading until the end of this and the following chapter, it should be clear that mechanism (a) is a far more complex and nuanced mechanism, involving also other issues than those covered by WUNC. WUNC can quickly express the strength of a movement as it displays itself for example by a land occupation, as I will later point out. But it cannot explain exactly how movements create their strength; WUNC is more of a topographical check rather than a dynamic assessment tool. This is why I chose not to follow WUNC. When the guidelines of the MST alter connections among people, for example, when families join a movement camp, establishing relations within the movement circles instead of only within their old social circles outside the MST, the mechanism a is at work. How quickly and how many activists with a contentious habitus the organizing and politicizing can produce and mobilize to participate in pioneering protests (c), reflects the activeness of the mechanism, but does not yet explain it.

Indicators that help to assess the mechanism’s activeness must be delineated based on movement accounts and field research. The assessment was based on the interviews of movement leaders, participative observation and comparison within different MST subdivisions, and consulting the MST’s own database where the movement leaders have set baselines for the analysis of success via organizing and politicizing practices. The movement calls this organicidade. The organicidade involves both the organizational issues such as the number of members and settlements, as well as ideological formation assessment, and is done systematically by the movement leadership in order to assure quality and enhance practices.

Heterodox framing (b)

The mechanism b creates a cause for the rebels created by mechanism a. It fosters a directed attitude among the members of the group. The mechanism is either active (1) or inactive (0). As indicators of the mechanism, I observed the acceptance of heterodox framing, that attempts to steer corporate resource exploitation towards right livelihood, among the majority of the group members in question. The new ideological standpoint should be alternative and
radically heterodox. In the case of pulp conflicts, the heterodox framing condemns the large-scale pulp model and offers an alternative economic use for the land, resources and socio-political space in question. If this heterodox framing followed the lines of right livelihood and was accepted by the majority of the movement group members in the investment area, I deemed the mechanism to be active.

The assessment was based on interviews, participative observation and comparison among different social groups. By interviews, media analysis, assessment of “public opinion” and participative observation, the mechanism b explores the activeness of the heterodox pulp investment frame, its acceptance by the local movement members. If the heterodox framing-process is strongly supported by movement members, this means that the orthodox view of pulp investments as “good” is being transformed by mechanism b. Campaign-specific heterodox framings, such as the criticism of industrial tree plantations, stem from the movement’s heterodox cognitive frames: the sets of ideological practices specifically interpreted and summarized by the movement ideologists, such as the MST versions of liberation theology, political ecology, development theory and the pedagogy of the oppressed associated with Paulo Freire. It is important to note that novelty and change arise principally via mechanism b. The ideological sets mentioned above are all able to foster a sense of deeper human agency within the oppressed. The group members come to understand and promote the view that change is possible, that even utopian aims are to be strived for. Only then can the new ideological standpoint be called a new heterodox framing.

When mechanisms a and b are simultaneously active, then a movement is forming rebels with a right livelihood-seeking cause. The mechanism b supports mechanism a, they overlap, come hand in hand and form the core of contention; they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the promotion of contentious agency.

Networking with Allies (d)

This mechanism measures the role of the networked movement allies by observing the utilization of three different types of networking strategies. First, I observed if the resistance had formed a broad local coalition network to resist the advance of corporate resource exploitation. In the case of pulp conflicts, since the end of the 1990s the resistance had formed the Network against the Green Desert, a broad coalition involving NGOs, social movements, trade unions, and people and organizations from a very ample specter of the civil society. The Network was active in many investment areas. In the absence of a conscious effort to form a broad local network resisting tree plantation expansion, I deemed the sub-mechanism to be inactive. The MST was normally in a central position in forming such networks locally, bringing together different sections of the civil society to campaign for a defined economic outcome, that is, plantation contraction. For example, in Rio Grande do Sul, an extensive network of allies supports the MST. It consists of the trade union CUT, the teachers’ union, which is strong in the state, rural movements such as Via Campesina, MAB, MPA and the
women’s movements, and several environmental NGOs. I denominated the coalition-forming networking as sub-mechanism d1.

Second, I observed the extent of transmission of the MST model within the society in the investment area (d2). If I observed that other movements had replicated the MST model because of MST’s active mechanism transmission efforts, this indicated that networking by the sub-mechanism of replication was active. For example, in Espírito Santo, indigenous peoples started to replicate the contentious agency-endowing model of the MST after they failed to slow plantation expansion by conventional political pressure, like negotiations with Aracruz.

Besides alliance-formation (d1) and replication (d2), I also assessed the sub-mechanism of transnational networking (d3). If the pulp conflict case in question involved a clear transnational networking effort that aimed to influence the economic outcome of the project in question, then I deemed the sub-mechanism of transnational networking to be active. For example, in the case of Veracel in Bahia and Stora Enso in Rio Grande do Sul, the mechanism was clearly active between 2004 and 2008. The Landless Friendship associations in Sweden and Finland made protests in front of the Stora Enso offices in Sweden and Finland, and demanded acts from the Finnish government to curtail the negative economic outcomes of the pulp projects. In the case of the VCP/IP project in Mato Grosso do Sul, I did not note any efforts to utilize the transnational networking, so I judged the sub-mechanism to be inactive. If any of the sub-mechanisms d1, d2 or d3 were active, I deemed the networking mechanism d to have been active in the 2004-2008 period. The distinction between them helps in writing the narrative and pinpointing the specific conflict dynamics in different cases.

My aim is not only to perform a qualitative comparative analysis on Brazilian pulp conflicts, but to provide methodological and theoretical guidelines so that future research could make an even more detailed comparative analysis across a wider set of corporate resource exploitation cases. This is why the theoretical section carries more tools and potential for detailed assessment than is actually systematically undertaken in the empirical parts in the coming chapters. The framework covers already a wide array of different mechanisms, and for this reason it is not justifiable to go into the detailed assessment of sub-mechanisms; to acknowledge their existence and theorize their function is more than enough at this point.

### Direct Mechanisms

**Pioneering, Disruptive and Nonviolent Protests (c)**

This mechanism measures the number of major, pioneering and targeted pulp protests that re-symbolize eucalyptus and land. If even one pioneering protest occurred during the observation period, the mechanism was deemed to be active. First, I included those major acts that reached the mass media, protests by the MST on which the Folha de São Paulo wrote
news articles. It was not enough if there was just one brief notice of a protest by the MST or the groups following its model – to count as a protest, the act had to be the focus of at least two substantial articles in the *Folha*. I also crosschecked by reading other two newspapers, *O Globo* and *Jornal de Comercio*, ensuring that these also dealt extensively with the protests. Furthermore, only highly disruptive and symbolic acts were counted, that is, for example, acts involving the cutting of eucalyptus and an act of re-symbolization by planting food crops or other similar acts – a simple land occupation without cutting eucalyptus did not count as a pioneering protest. Nor did an occupation that involved less than 300 people: the counted protests included 700-3,500 contenders. Last, I removed from the list the protests that were not pioneering, but simply emulated an earlier protest type without attempting to establish or experiment with a new protest type. New, previously unseen protests have a far higher potential to break the silence and bring media, corporate, NGO, research and state attention. Novelty and innovation are key qualities bringing efficiency to the protesting mechanism. For the militants involved in the acts, they are also far more powerful tools for the promotion of contentious habitus formation. Mechanism c overlaps with and complements all the other mechanisms.

**Embedded Autonomy by a Movement (e), the Interaction of EAM and EAC**

This mechanism assesses the movement autonomy and political presence, based on the analysis of sympathetic state actors and state institutions, the ideological, decision and policy congruity between state actors and the MST agenda. There are many parts of the state apparatus that have been utilized by the resistance, depending on the case, in the politics of paper projects. I assessed the utilization of EAM (active or inactive) based on: 1) embedding with the state apparatus and 2) maintenance of relative movement autonomy. If both of the conditions were fulfilled, the mechanism was deemed to be active. As mentioned, EAM is in dynamic interaction with EAC, both of which are largely remediated by the state actors. EAM splits into three political games: electoral politics, ideological and identity game, and institutional and structural game. I considered EAM to have been active if the movement utilized all of the following: concentrated voting that brought heterodox framing-sharing candidates to power (electoral politics); promising social peace and rural development, and being understood by movement-friendly state actors (ideological and identity game) and; the congruity of some state actor discourses and decisions with the MST goals (institutional game).

Embedding was deemed to have occurred when it was clearly generated by the movement and when, for example, the following conditions were fulfilled: the opening of official investigations at the Ministério Público (this was absent in the unchecked plantation expansion cases); INCRA support (this channel was most usable in the Rio Grande do Sul cases – in others, the INCRA/MST alliance did not have power over the plantation expansion issue); court decisions (federal judges condemned plantation expansion out of hand in the

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Veracel/Bahia and VCP/São Paulo cases); municipal and state-level legislative restrictions (especially in the Aracruz/Rio de Janeiro case and many other minor cases); or federal government land acquisitions and expropriations (in the Aracruz/Espírito Santo Indigenous land demarcation case, in which the Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, demarcated the area). One method was to search the official archives of the state and federal Ministério Públicos for all the pulp company investigations they had conducted.

To count as autonomous, a movement had to maintain integrity against the state, company or other influences detrimental to the movement’s ability to curb plantation expansion. The movement had to be able to control the utilization of outcoming resources either directly via organizing and politicizing practices, or indirectly via the support given by the networked allies or embedded state institutions. For example, in the case of VCP in Rio Grande do Sul, the MST embedded very well with INCRA, but experienced challenges in maintaining autonomy, as 40 MST farmers remained on the side of VCP and not the MST in a conflict over outsourcing eucalyptus plantations of VCP within agrarian reform settlements. However, I consider EAM to have been active within the local MST in the VCP RS area in 2004-8. All the other major issues were controlled by the movement: it decided how to utilize and organize the schooling of the landless kids, for example. This case shows that embedding with INCRA was in fact helpful in reducing the initial number of 160 farmers on the side of VCP to 40.

It is interesting to note that the embedding of the MST with the state apparatus or with the society is not necessarily an autonomy-endangering act: the threats to autonomy depend much more on the acts of those who want to embed the MST. In fact, the INCRA support, gained via embedding with the institute, was crucial in maintaining relatively high MST autonomy in the face of the embedding attempt by VCP. The EAM mechanism allows comparative analysis of the local MST embedding with the state apparatus and autonomy vis-à-vis the society and the state in the pulp project areas. Besides this embedding within the ideological and institutional games, there is also an electoral political game, which interferes with the struggle for the state apparatus.

Both actors in the politics of industrial plantations in the Brazilian political system participate in electoral politics, which is a primary channel of becoming a state actor, or appointing them, in Brazil. The actors attempt to get parliamentary politicians on their side: the industry by the mechanism of financing election campaigns and promising work and investment, the movement by offering land, housing, food production and social peace, mobilizing members to distribute election propaganda and endorsing a movement-supported politician with numerous votes. If direct support was given, either in the form of campaign financing or campaigning, the mechanism was deemed to be active. I briefly analyze election financing donated by the pulp corporations. I also consider the MST agency in electoral politics by considering the intriguing situations of politicians such as President Lula da Silva, whose electoral campaigns have been supported both by corporate financing and by the MST grassroots-level campaigning. How do politicians respond to constituents in conflict with each other?
The electoral politics and ideological and institutional embedding are inter-connected mechanisms. In Rio Grande do Sul (RS), the MST has an active EAM, but the electoral victory of pro-pulp investment governor Yeda Crusius (PSDB) in 2007 slowed the effectiveness of this mechanism, at least temporarily. The new governor has placed pro-pulp state actors in key state institutions and launched a counter-attack against the MST’s pulp project contestation, attempting to cut both the movement’s autonomy as well as its access to state support and resources. This points to an active and relatively more successful EAC than EAM. However, in spite of the counter-attack by a strong state-industry alliance, the expansion of Stora Enso pulp plantations was discontinued, the Aracruz expansion first significantly slowed and later discontinued. Also VCP left the state in 2010; but until the end of 2008, VCP was still actively and without major problems expanding plantations in the state, and as I end the research period into the end of 2008, the VCP 2004-8 episode cannot be considered a case of plantation contraction.

All the three RS pulp projects were interrupted in the beginning of 2010, and clear signs of this strongly resistance-influenced development were visible already in 2008. The reason for the Stora Enso investment slowing can be traced directly to the INCRA and its MST-inclined state actors and legislative framework (EAM was in operation here), as well as to Via Campesina’s and MST’s protests. MST’s continued protests for 8 years in the area Aracruz wanted to buy led into the discontinuation of Aracruz plantation expansion. A significant episode occurred in early April 2009, when the counter-attack trying to delegitimize the movement, led by the state governor and the local Ministério Público’s prosecutor Gilberto Thums, was abandoned because of the pressure by the MST and its network of allies. When giving up the proposal to shut down the MST schools, Public Prosecutor Thums explained: “We did not take the power of the movement into consideration. The movement is stronger than any institution” (Zero Hora 2009, my translation). These points are just initial examples of empirical proofs that support the hypothesis that the discontinuation or slowing of pulp plantation expansion is influenced by contentious agency.

To understand the role of contentious agency promotion, it has to be assessed in its dynamic interaction with corporate agency promotion, in which state support is central. Even though the reasons for the government support enjoyed by the industry are complex and multiple, the level of support is easily detectable. The government-paper industry alliance strength, visible in BNDES credit, relies on executive, legislative and judicial allegiances, both federal, state and municipal (local holding-impact area). I assessed many EAC mechanisms in order to point out not only that the government-industry alliance exists, but to explain why and how it functions. I studied the executive links by determining whether the policy demonstrates a clear pro-plantation support by executives (ideological and identity embedding). I assessed legislative links by the election financing of politicians by the paper industry (electoral politics). Judicial links were determined by studying major legal decisions and investigations (Ministério Público, Polícia Federal) in favor of plantation expansion (institutional game). Paper companies enjoy government support from the active thrust of structural and institutional support, and ideological congruence. Embedded autonomy of paper corporations vis-à-vis the state in the realm of institutional and structural politics by: 1) relational
mechanisms I denominate “institutional”, such as state corporatism, neoliberalism and clientelism. 2) Relational mechanisms I denominate “structural”, such as elite power maintenance within a clan of related Brazilian elite families. The ideological congruity within the ideological and identity game is maintained by such shared ideologies as technocratic developmentalism, which maintains an epistemic community between the corporations and the government. These mechanisms channel state support for the corporations: available financial resources increase because state credit from the Development Bank BNDES and plantation expansion costs are eased due to lower tax and regulation levels. The state support is crucial for the corporate land access and pulp investments in general. It is notable that the paper corporations enjoy high autonomy in relation to the state, and aim to increase this, for which reason I denominate the corporate mechanism most directly influencing pulp projects’ economic outcomes as EAC.

Concluding Remarks

Even though this research design is built for analyzing natural resource conflicts in Brazil, with due caution the framework can be used in the search for generalizable processes and mechanisms that help in explaining the capacity for contentious agency and outcomes of corporate resource exploitation. McAdam et al. (2001: 24) maintain that mechanisms are “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” but can work and intersect differently depending on the context and the presence of other mechanisms. In the next chapter, I will embark on the analysis of the importance of the MST by applying the new conceptual framework and research design outlined in this chapter.

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68 According to historian José Murilo de Carvalho (1997: 3, my translation) who has studied clientelism and other Brazilian power relation-explaining concepts in detail, clientelism is “a relation between political actors that involves the concession of public benefits in the form of jobs, fiscal benefits, tax cuts, in exchange for political support, especially in the form of votes”. All the notions of clientelism imply an exchange between actors of unequal power (Carvalho 1997: 10). The clientelist relation refers especially to the widespread form of relations between the government and voters in the Brazilian political culture, which is based on co-optation, clientelism, populism and state corporatism (Carvalho 1997: 9).
4. Mechanisms of Contention and the MST Model

In this chapter, I assess the generalizable mechanisms of contention (a-e) that create the MST. In some parts of Brazil, the movement members have been able to build contentious agency by using mechanisms a-e simultaneously. The specific combination these mechanisms take in the case of this movement I call the MST model. I analyze first the organizing and politicizing mechanism; then heterodox framing, protesting, and networking mechanisms, closing the chapter with considerations on the embedded autonomy of the movement.

The main link of the MST to the state is the distribution of land for settlements, and to succeed in making this process faster, and to impede the land to slide for corporate utilization, the MST requires to build its own techniques of contention ranging from a to e to pressure the state and the corporations. Even though the MST seeks the explicit goal of discontinuing the current pulp investment model, this is not their principal goal. Pulp investment resistance is a by-product of the movement’s general goal of changing the attitudes and mentalities, to construct a new society. Still, the MST is the single most important member of pulp-protests and networks such as the Network against the Green Desert that has the sole aim of driving the large-scale pulp model down. It has been central actor in establishing these networks of allies, enlarging them, and gaining victories by them. Most resistance against the pulp investments in Brazil involves the MST in one or more fundamental ways.

Albeit officially found in 1984, the Landless Movement really took off only in the mid-1990s, after general media attention given to massacres of MST members on the 17th of April 1996 in Eldorado dos Carajás (Ondetti 2006; Hammond 2004; Welch 2006: 206). After this date, land occupations increased dramatically in Brazil, peaking in 1997 (ibid). The MST is a peasant movement: most Sem Terras, the self-identification of the members of the movement – “come from peasant backgrounds, have a personal or family history tied to land possession, and a class identity” as well as a culture connected to land access and peasant life-style (Vergara-Camus 2007: 8). The MST is not simply a peasant movement, but a specific type of post-traditional peasantry (McNee 2006). It is a radical alternative in comparison to the state and other leftist organizations and social forces. Indeed, the Landless Movement is a counterculture with a specific counterpolitical goal. It has always been a contentious political actor. The movement would not exist if there was no historically and politically constructed inequality in the Latin American land tenure. It would not exist without an active militancy and strenuous work to construct the mechanisms of contention everyday. Wolford and the earlier contentious politics research suggests that one needs to focus on the internal dynamics and development of movements instead of keeping on explaining their origin. Thus, I focus on what happens after the movement joining.

Murders of Landless Movement members are common in Brazil, normally at the behest of big landowners and companies. In 1996, the military police slaughtered 19 MST members in Pará. The MST still commemorates the event. Many camps I visited had 19 little coffers brought out in ceremonies like the Mística to remember those members who died in the struggle for land. After twelve years, those responsible for the massacre are unpunished. In 2008, the Swiss Syngenta company bought a hired gun to kill an MST activist in the South of Brazil. Police have been shooting at the MST members in pulp investment disputes, but as yet no one has died.
Firstly a few words on the joining. Wendy Wolford (2003a: 168) writes: “in the case of the MST, the common analytical focus [in earlier research] on agricultural restructuring, political opportunity, and religious organization has hidden the fact that a significant portion of movement members desperately tried to avoid joining”. In general, the movement educates the new members after inclusion, turning them from peasants into new *Sem Terra* subjects with particular ideological goals, politicized practices and heterodox framings of the world. The MST is the biggest of the hundreds of landless peasant movements that have emerged in the last 30 years in Brazil. The Latin American *BASISMO* movement, the establishment of base communities by the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, was one of the most important constitutive mechanisms in the formation of the MST. *BASISMO* was one of the mechanisms that strongly influenced the rise of new Latin American social movements and grassroots democracy in the 1970-80s (Lehmann 1990). By using the notion of praxis and the pedagogy of the oppressed, Base communities have been preaching the theology of liberation for more than 40 years, especially among the rural poor. This and other initial and later politicizing mechanisms are still fundamental to the daily practices and struggles of the MST.

The movement belongs to the faction putting emphasis on local and transnational long-term sustainable development with social and environmental aspects incorporated into a model of small-scale agroecological cooperative production. The MST continually transforms and includes people from Brazilian regions with different realities: it is a movement and not a system, argued the coordinator of the national coordination, João Paulo Rodrigues (Interview, MST São Paulo, April 2008). The official MST discourse seeks a collective culture and autonomy from the state. Even though the movement embraces socialism, there are many other ideological currents active within it. The movement members are not forced into following the official ideological guidelines, but have extensive local democratic decision-making power. For example, one MST settlement I visited in Rio Grande do Sul had rented hundreds of hectares of land from the land markets and planted genetically manipulated soybean to be sold on the commodity markets. There are power relations and multiple and distinct internal currents seeking power within the MST. The movement has developed “a discernible capacity for innovation and adaptation”, ensuring strategic creativity and the creation of solutions to practical problems (Carter 2009: 21). Carter mentions as an example the successful fostering of agroecology to curb the problems of the petro-chemical agricultural system. Their BioNatur, created in 1997 has turned into the largest producer of organic seed in Latin America. Without condemning this or that feature of the movement and its members, I place emphasis on the impact of these features on the creation of contentious agency, and the subsequent outcomes of pulp investment conflicts.

**Organizing and Politicizing**

The MST model is based on a strong organizing and politicizing mechanism. According to Bourdieu (1991), the structural positions, the relations between social actors form the social space. Contentious agency can be promoted by transforming the structural positions, that is, by creating an alternative social space, a new organization. Within the MST’s organization,
landless peasants live and relate to other in a social space quite different from the Brazilian society’s dominant social space. The organizing and politicizing mechanism positions of people in habituses where they participate daily in movement activities. The mechanism encourages most MST members start to act in sectors (like health, education) and at different levels (base unit, brigade, state, national, transnational). This forms an effective positioning grid that strengthens the organization. The MST has mastered a pyramidal structure that permits both bureaucratic control at the top and local initiative at the base. As contradictitious as it might sound, this is both a direct democracy promoting and hierarchically bureaucratic movement.

An efficient organizing and politicizing mechanism builds crossing forms of organization, such as separate fields, levels, and sectors in the case of the MST. This effectively increases social capital and fosters a sense of belonging, knitting people together and making the social actor systemic. The MST has a multifaceted yet flexible organization, operating through a scattered network of collective groups. Besides this participation- and activism-ensuring organizational grid, the mechanism also directs people into specified fields within the movement. As Bourdieu (1991) indicates, particular fields perform particular organizational functions. In the MST, the ideologists, called leaders, specialize in creating heterodox framings, which the field of militants then spreads by its key position within the organizational grid as coordinator of sectors or specific levels. The MST leaders (ideologists) are not as numerous as coordinators (militants), and the distinction between these may be blurred, as the organizing and politicizing practices constantly support people to change positions within the organization. The practices form competent and trained activists. Most movement members carefully test, re-apply and vigorously enhance the organizing and politicizing guidelines.

Kenneth Andrews (2004: 25), who links movement’s internal qualities to contention outcomes, has found that “strong movement infrastructures have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and funds”. The organizing and politicizing mechanism provides a strong movement infrastructure, it offers a secure haven from which to initiate continuing protests. In the case of the MST model, the settlements and camps the members created as outcomes of successful struggles are the standing, empirically observable proof of an efficient organizing. When utilized by a peasant movement, the mechanism serves as a capability-expanding nexus for those who are most in need of support, the rural poor.

The MST has specific sectors for the following areas: politics, production, formation, marshalling (frente de massa), communication, health, human rights, culture, youth, transnational relations, finance and projects. These have their own functions, logic and division of duties depending on the local realities and the scale of operations. Most people within the movement act in the sectors or are in direct contact with them daily. The MST sectors help to overcome the dilemma of collective action posed by Olson (1971) in such a way that all members of the movement feel personally rewarded and that their efforts are
special and appreciated in all sectors and at all levels. The creation of sectors fosters involvement and participation and is a key to fostering capacity for agency, especially contentious agency.

The MST refashions the socio-political borders and divisions in Brazil by dissecting areas, naming not only camps and settlements but also larger territories. It has its own territorial system, units of operation ranging from camp to settlement to brigade to the state and national levels. It also has extensive transnational ties through La Via Campesina and other peasant organizations, with operations in over 80 countries and counting. The territorial system is not a hierarchical power-chain. The national level does not control the other levels by force, but is actually of different quality, dealing more with ideological and strategic planning than with administration, which the members take care of themselves by acting in the relevant sectors and levels.

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The organizing and politicizing mechanism, by positioning people in equal but differentiated habituses, creates a democratic learning culture. As Wolford (2003b: 507) points out, “Leadership in the movement is carefully structured to be as horizontal as possible and all offices are, in principle, occupied temporarily”. However, there are a few distinguishing ideological leaders who have been vital in providing heterodox frames within the movement since its inception, and lately also in the pulp investment disputes. This feature has rather been a decisive strength than a weakness in comparison to other movements in terms of the influence of movement organization to resistance outcomes. However, if the movement leaders start to gain personalized, authoritarian power over its members, the organizing mechanism has failed to maintain a democratic learning culture, and it is likely that the movement will start to lose members and efficiency in its struggles. Direct democracy has made the movement organization stronger.

As in Basismo, administration is handled by the smallest units of the MST, called núcleos de base, base units of some 7-10 persons, as well as democratically by their members and coordinators in each settlement and camp. Base units, which deal with all issues of importance and then pass their ideas forward, consist of the most heterogeneous group of people possible, formed this way by coordinators so that democratic principles and the exchange of ideas, creating a consensus out of diverging views and backgrounds, can take place. The broad administration is a group of militants and rotates constantly. They do not earn a salary but the necessary costs of transportation are covered. Most militants have to put time aside from their daily work for militancy, which means they have less time for their families and earning a livelihood. The productive base covers the costs: extra production gains, reaped especially by the southern cooperatives, liberate some members around the country to work a full day in movement militancy.

What is the structure of governing in the MST like, besides being democratic-centralist? The national coordinators replied that: “our structure is not made ‘to govern’, it is democratic. The MST is a quest for auto-sustainability; to create groups of 10-50 families, each of which has two coordinators.” The internal power structure, they continued, “depends a lot on each
community where people live.” The MST selects the coordinators at the national level democratically: “To have a function at the national level one has to be active at the base level. The base selects, it is very participative.” (Interviews, MST São Paulo, 2006, 2008) Once a decision is made after long discussions encompassing all levels, all have to obey it (Vergara-Camus 2007: 154). In the course of time, this probably leads to a more internally coherent organization, in which people are closer to each other’s opinions before discussions, and more likely to make decisions.

This mechanism promotes integrity within the MST, which is important in struggles in extremely hard conditions and against powerful landholders. From this point of view, the MST has already coped with many of the challenges any organization normally faces in Brazil, like clientelism, political patronage and other power relations that have traditionally twisted associations to conform to dominant ways and turn into conventional rather than contentious agency. Patronage and clientelism are at the center of political and social life in Brazil (Eakin 2001: 171; Kingstone & Power 2000). The MST has departed from these traditional power relations.

Social movements that are successful in resistance are normally more bureaucratized, centralized and escape factionalism (Gamson 1990, In: Giugni 2004: 4). Precisely because of its organizing and politicizing mechanism, the MST is highly bureaucratized, maintaining a decision-making and execution structure characterized as centralized democracy. The MST escapes internal division by a fine balance between local democracy and guidelines that compel dissidents to either mold themselves to an acceptable framework or leave and join some other of the countless landless movements, or form their own independent struggle with less influence but more room for maneuver (including room for conventional agency promotion). Functional sectors create an efficient organizational network, which the movement embeds with society and the state, for example, by professionalization of members into various social fields.

Professionalization has advanced swiftly within the MST. The thrust of the movement is to train as many militants and members as possible in its internal professional technical and political educational institutes. There the movement members learn the mechanisms of contention (a-c): theories, tactics, strategic thinking, and technical skills ranging from political negotiation, teaching, healthcare, mass organization, agriculture, communication, and transnational and public relations to administration. The movement educates its own lawyers in its own university named after Florestan Fernandes, an important progressive statesman.

In the early 1990s, the MST started an in-house legal services sector. Via this pragmatic and interactive add to the organizing and politicizing mechanism, labeles the Human Rights Sector, the movement advanced considerable, as it managed to “systematise its legal policies; offer a point of contact for the agglutination and coordination of external legal support; comment officially upon individual cases; represent the legal plight of landless workers at a national level; and produce legally oriented publications” (Meszaros 2007: 12). Meszaros stresses that this was not “a legal service in the usual mould.” In fact, also this new sector was
enmeshed into the virtuous circle that characterizes the MST and gives it strength. “The connection between movement and lawyers was intended to be organic. Instead of contracting outside professionals, the movement began training its own cadres. … These characteristics would help ensure the legal department meshed fully with the movement’s wider objectives.” (Meszaros 2007: 12)

From Camps to Settlements

Besides the interactiveness and interconnectivity of the sectors and mechanisms producing the MST, there is an important spatio-temporal quality marking the organizing and politicizing mechanism’s efficiency. A good organizing and politicizing, like all good mechanisms of contention, combines environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms. After a typical period of camping for three or more years, the MST members pass into agrarian reform settlements. This is a crucial moment. The spirit of solidarity, material scarcity and harsh conditions, suffering under the plastic bag shacks, cold water, severe weather, bugs, insecurity, mud and dirt, the feelings of brotherhood and a shared struggle in the camp, turn into something new. People obtain land and state loans to build housing and start production. At this point, some opt not to continue within the MST, as they have acquired land. The MST’s goal is to assure this does not happen. It does this principally by means of ideological and emotional practices that tie people together, fostering a shared agency in protest acts, and allowing activity in society whilst requiring active movement agency.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) have argued that in movement analysis it is fundamental to separate social movement bases from movement campaigns. Bases consist “of everything from movement organizations, networks, participants, to accumulated cultural artifacts, memories, and traditions”, while campaigns involve a sustained public and collective challenge to state actors in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those state actors (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 192). However, in the case of the Brazilian Landless Movement, bases and campaigns are intriguingly indistinguishable. The camp is both the base and the campaign. The construction of bases is a crucial element in campaigns for agrarian reform and a new society. Building bases, territorially bounded camps and settlements, is in itself the campaign. The interlinking of bases and campaigns, ideology, organization and protest acts by the MST is precisely why the movement has been able to sustain long-term resistance and continuous successes in impacting political opportunity structures and public opinion.
Settlements gained are the key to marketing the movement, to bringing new people into it as they see land is actually distributed to members. Many poor people constantly calculate the rationale and cost-benefit of joining the MST in comparison to continuing whatever they are doing. Others face no other choice and see the MST as the only way to subsist: the conditions of entry vary greatly according to context. However, having once entered the movement, it provides the family food, shelter, protection and work. The movement organizes members to partake in continuing mass demonstrations, whose costs can be heavy: massive occupations can last a long time and require support. Using these occupations and protest acts, the members acting within the movement can hope to gain land that the state actors at INCRA have earmarked for the Landless Movement members initially making a claim for appropriated land.

The movement promotes the idea that “one has to suffer to gain something” (interview, MST São Paulo, September 2006). In practice, this means staying in the harsh conditions of camps in the collectivization period. To pass through camps is the preferred road to becoming settled, even though this period is not necessary – what it normally is, however, as land expropriation and acquisition by the state is bureaucratic, slow and lacks political will, and thus, lacks funds. Brazil has good institutional grounds for land reform, like INCRA, and if the state wanted agrarian reform, it could easily just increase funding through these channels. Still, even though land expropriation and settlement would be quicker, the MST prefers people to go through the camping phase. As members of the Landless Movement, people have to conquer land, not just acquire it. The MST opposes state-led agrarian reforms. At the
camping phase, the militants can judge who is suitable to receive land in the settlement. This pre-conditioning and selection is extremely important for the future vitality of the new rural community. At the same time, the selection is a transformative process. The camp is where contentious agency emerges as a sum of mechanisms a-e, through which people pass, and is consolidated at the individual and group level. Many do not want to enter this process, for several reasons, like laziness, resistance to particular issues or the ideals of the movement, personal conflicts and so on and thus opt to leave the movement at the camping phase.

Extensive studies on Brazilian rural settlements have found that in general these have led to better conditions for the settled families (see studies in Medeiros & Leite 2004). Normally, landless settlements are both economically and culturally successful, creating new capital for their members and their surroundings (ibid.). Besides serving as an economic base to support the movement, settled families have gained power in local politics. Like all real structural transformations, settlements have resulted in new political actors, configurations and power relations. A land occupation and subsequent settlement decision mean that the state recognizes the conflict over land and thus has to intervene. The settlement is an important space in which all who witness settlement success either question, break up with, or create new ties or in some cases fortify local political traditions (Medeiros & Leite 2004: 47-49). Because settlements were formed in the process of land conflicts, the struggle lives on in Brazil: they are the reason for the formation and continuity of the MST (ibid.).

The MST needs a constant flow of new families to enter the movement, and a constant flow of new settlements to settle families, otherwise, the process by which it gains strength ceases. This happened after 2005 in Rio Grande do Sul (RS), because of severe difficulties in enlisting new members and settlements, a situation aggravated by tree plantation expansion. The movement had to grasp at ever more desperate means to try to break the stalemate. It had to ram deeper into the sub-urban areas with added force to seek out people to join, talk possible newcomers into joining the movement (interviews, MST RS, May 2008). In such a situation, the militants cannot control the quality of the families entering so strictly, and there are many who have to be educated into the peasant lifestyle and farming. Settlements composed of these people, especially if close to cities, may end in turmoil or great difficulty. The ways of the favela still live in the minds of the people. The successful settlements consist of people with a strong background in farming (interviews, MST RS, May 2008). In the end, the Rio Grande do Sul stalemate was resolved only at the end of 2008, as the movement managed, after a protracted battle, to get six hundred families settled on 13,000 hectares previously destined for Aracruz eucalyptus plantations.

Some observers of the MST, both within and outside the movement, lamented that in the settlement phase the spirit of the campers’ unity died immediately. In this sense, the movement ate itself. As one acquires land, the central objective of contention is attained and the movement loses its grip on people. Some people and groups of people not happy with the rules of the MST opt to leave and found their own separate smaller settlements, more similar to traditional peasant culture in Brazil. This fact has led the MST into developing wider fields of activism, such as professionalization, to gain the active participation of its settled members.
Space is a central element in the MST’s success: the movement has mastered the art of territorializing a physical and social space with an alternative organization and ideology. This territorialization could be considered a type of rooted, spatially defined ethnogenesis: one is amongst a quite radically different ensemble of people in stepping from the traditional countryside of small cities into a Landless Movement camp or settlement. John Guidry (2003: 190), who has studied space, citizenship and social movements in Brazil, argues that space is essential: “everyday life and its power relationships change as new ideas or concepts are given a spatial expression that renders them manifest and contestable in a concrete way”. Building on Henri Lefebvre and Manuel Castells, he emphasizes space in movement outcome assessment: “movement success means changing how people conceive of equality in the spaces of everyday life, work, and leisure, as well as making new conceptions of equality tangible and concrete in everyday spatial practice” (ibid). Following this, one would assume that in such a spatially marked movement as the MST, success and transformation of the dominant culture would have an even more radical and faster rhythm, and be crucial in attaining success. Guidry (2003) studied urban movements in Brazil, which face much greater limitations in their refiguring of the space than a rural movement like the MST, which receives a substantially larger area, further away from all kind of other impacts, and can thus redefine its own path with greater flexibility. The MST cuts pieces of the territory and builds movement structures in these spaces: settlements, camps, land occupations, roadblocks, marches and squats, the visible territorial space of the MST. This is why I use alternative space and contentious habitus formation as indicators of the activeness of mechanism a.

The MST and pulp investments belong to very different systems, which both try to win over the same territorial, symbolic and social space. At a deeper level, the conflict is about different human-land relations and cultural transmission mechanisms. Culture moves in two ways, argues anthropologist Greg Urban (2001: 64), by replication and dissemination. I argue that power and agency are formed in a distinct way for actors following these. Replication

If I had not met Simula, my access to the MST would have been much harder and the research results less encompassing and deep. Simula is a psychoanalyst working for the MST, especially the movement’s social companies and helping in crisis reduction. He has worked for ten years for the MST, especially in the south of the country and in São Paulo. Simula was an important key informant, with whom I spent weeks doing interviews. He helped me to access the MST. Simula explained the background of innumerable issues related to the MST and Brazilian politics, economy and business. Earlier, he had worked for years as a vice-president of the Finnish state-owned Valmet company, producing tractors in Brazil. Currently the company continues by the name Metso in Brazil, and is the world’s leader in pulp line production. Thus, Simula could explain both the industry and the movement-viewpoint on the conflict, as well as the transnational dimension, as he is a Finn who has lived for decades in Brazil.
seeks to make sure that others follow the same replicating patterns in their spheres of action. The MST model spreads by replication, grouping people into patterns of replication typical of the MST. People are to produce their living compounds by themselves, to start to farm for their subsistence. They also have to be ready for more collective mobilizations of the movement and, most importantly, in effect, spread the MST model further themselves by the metaculture of replication by teaching others to replicate it. The replication-type cultural motion is a key to creating self-aware and locally organized, lasting contention.

Contentious agency can be created only by mechanisms that promote and spread the metaculture of replication. Comparatively, corporate agency depends on and moves itself by the metaculture of dissemination. The paper and pulp industry relies on this metaculture. Cultural transmission by dissemination “focuses only on the demand for things, not on the replication of those things” (Urban 2001: 64). Paper companies are not eager to share their accumulated knowledge of building and operating pulp and paper mills. No paper company will teach how to build a pulp mill, since they sell paper. This is metaculture of dissemination par excellence, trying to limit and gain a monopoly over the production of an object while maximizing demand for it.

The mere existence of cultural motion based on replication is an obstacle to a metaculture of dissemination operating within the same social space. Often the paper industry representatives have labeled their opposition ideological. This type of characterization may refer precisely to a fundamentally different metaculture. The negative views, however, which Sem Terras have of agribusiness in general, have a lot to do with the mechanisms of contention based on the metaculture of replication that the movement seeks to expand throughout the same social and territorial space. This is why the MST vehemently opposes patented genetically manipulated seeds owned by companies like Monsanto, since these are perhaps the most drastic contemporary form of cultural transmission by dissemination. Landless workers know by experience that if the agents of dissemination once destroy the patterns of replication, or make them disappear for some time, it might become impossible to regain the metaculture of replication.

In the end, this a question of power relations, a question about the control of your own life, a question about social mechanisms, if these are operated and designed by somebody up the ladder of dissemination or are replicated by yourself. This is a question of agency. Contentious agency attempts to point up these drastic power relation and cultural transmission mechanism differences. The strength of the MST organization is in promoting an alternative territorial, social and symbolic system and remaining the most viable, continuous and stable option for the landless to change their lives and society. Since politicizing and organizing has to work both at the social and personal agency transforming levels, I assess in detail the ways the MST fosters a Sem Terra habitus.
Crafting *Sem Terra* Habitus

When people join the MST, they generate a new sense of personal and collective agency. The MST and movements following it depict conquering land by one’s own struggle as the most important agency-delivering mechanism. One should win land by one’s individual and landless group and contentious action. The attainment of land by contention rather than by conventional means fosters contentious habitus instead of passive habitus. A contentious habitus is a great help, if not a necessary condition, in achieving contention goals. As Dugan and Reger (2006: 467) write: “groups will have a better chance at achieving their goals if members are able to create a unified voice, and if leaders include and draw from the strengths of those they recruit, thus allowing a sense of agency”. The MST is an alliance of workers and professional skills of all types, composed of “all the working people of Brazil” (various militants used this expression). It has members from all the strata of the society, as inclusion is not limited, and anyone can join. Members are encouraged to take their future into their own hands, to be autonomous, to “do it yourself,” or more precisely for the movement promoting cooperation and human interaction, to “do it ourselves.” This attitude is the basis of a social actor promoting contentious agency.

The MST militants and technical personnel of the state teach new movement members how to produce, how to plant and cultivate the land, how to build a house. This is important, as many of the new landless in the South and Southeastern Brazil are second-generation landless from the city *favelas* with little knowledge of farming. The newcomers go through an ultra-politicized time on entering the MST. They seldom have any experience in seeking for anything other than personal or family goods, coming from a society idealizing hard values like the intrinsically accepted inequality of human beings and ensuing naturalization of the failure of the weakest. Brazil has a relatively weak sense of solidarity – practices like *mutirão* have not been common in comparison to other Latin American countries (Vergara-Camus 2007: 104). Furthermore, in the face of injustice, everyday violence and domination, even the most deprived Northeastern rural workers meekly accept their lot (Schepers-Hughes 1992: 508). These are power relations the MST seeks to transform. Slavery-like conditions and hard work with low remuneration is generally accepted – rural workers are normally no revolutionaries or even reformists, partly because they accept that they should not receive more for the manual work they do. A manual job is inferior to office work or administration. This dominant symbolization is a powerful class distinction: the middle-class and the elite try to avoid manual work. The reason for this avoidance is the concept of manual work as something dirty, a symbol of belonging to the lower classes. Such symbolizations mean that Brazil is a society penetrated by a hyper-consciousness of class position: the MST can utilize this fact, but is also challenged by it.

The movement members become involved in politics, working with this or that sector, committee, task or socio-political setting. The organization of people into political spaces takes place all the time both horizontally as well as vertically. The result is an effective matrix for socialization of a movement-specific habitus. The practical work like farming and teaching creates *Sem Terra* habitus and is the proper place for its exercise. The motives for
going into a camp are individual and practical, but the members of the movement share what happens after that. The new Sem Terra subjectivity and collectivity becomes a form of identifying oneself. All a person experiences on coming to the MST is very new from the individual point of view: it is a revolution. The movement makes persistent efforts to educate its members in technical, political and other professional areas. Most members embrace the MST as their new big family and engage very deeply with the movement, devoting their lives to it as activists and militants. To be a part of the MST is to be in a collective in comparison to the individualistic experience of personhood.

The MST model is not perfect, but a model with 25 years of empirical experimentation and learning from mistakes. The guidelines of the movement, its rules and structure, do not work as written or thought out by its idealists, but with variations. For example, the base unit model works only in some local MST movements, as everything depends on the people involved. Changes in the operating environment influence the transformation parameters and range as well as the movement mind-set. The MST is partly a mirror of what happens in the Brazilian society and the global economy, and partly an entity driven by specific ideologies and ideologists. Next, I will analyze the specific ideological background of the MST and their relation to the politicizing practices, and after that, to the heterodox framing.

**Ideological Background and Politicizing Practices**

Researchers have identified many political, social and cultural currents on which the MST had the opportunity to build on at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 80s. Most acknowledge that the theology of liberation was certainly among them, even though scholars draw differing conclusions about how much it affected the MST (Chaves 2000; Fernandes 1996; Stédile 1993; Harnecker 2002; Wright & Wolford 2003; French 2007: 430; Branford & Rocha 2002; Burdick 2004; Houtzager 2001). Ondetti (2008: 93, italics mine) writes:

>The grassroots organization and consciousness-raising work of activists associated with the progressive church were of critical importance in the movement’s emergence. … the agents provided an ideological framework, rooted in religious faith, which served to legitimate popular organization and political pressure for land reform. This ideology was diffused through CEBs, youth groups, sermons, leadership training courses, and the numerous pamphlets published by the CPT and other church entities.

The Roman Catholic Church decided in 1961 to focus on land tenure issues among rural workers in Latin America, and has since spread the gospel that “the land is a gift of God” (Wolford 2003b: 505). These institutions (CEBs and CPT), the specific ideology and power relation conception they maintained, were important, especially in the early days of building the landless movement. This ideological pathway, together with the pedagogy of the oppressed, the dependency theory and political ecology that have accompanied the theology of liberation later on, enabled the construction of the MST’s real-world practices such as land occupations. The impoverished members of base communities reflected on their economic and political oppression and came to understand in this light that God liberated his people in the exodus and elsewhere and could do the same for them. The liberation theology followers’
faith in the Scriptures gives them hope. Their organization into Christian communities gives them the means. In the MST, praxis signifies information, reflection, and action intended to transform the reality of the subjects involved by carrying on fight for land (Fernandes 1996: 228-229). As Harnecker (2002: 12) writes, under liberation theology “a growing number of peasant families begin to understand that they will conquer the land only through struggle. Occupation of the land then becomes the main instrument of pressure and the first school for the political awareness and the socialization of thousands of peasants.” Praxis makes the MST members understand the meaning of resistance. The construction of knowledge within the MST takes place through praxis, where the interpretations of reality are fundamental for the daily experience of and interplay between reflection and action.

The MST puts its ideologies into daily practice, enacts daily politicized rituals and symbolizations, a feature that distinguishes the movement from most social movements. The struggle of the movement gains depth by these symbolic rituals and daily, politicized practices. Without mystical, strongly emotional rituals, the MST would not have the contentious force it has. Pertti Simula argues that Mística is the core of the movement. Leonardo Boff and Frei Betto, both central MST ideologists, have written a book about Mística and spirituality, in which they briefly describe Mística: “A person is led to experiment by celebrations, songs, dances, dramatizations and realization of ritual gestures a revelation or illumination held by a determined and closed group” (Betto & Boff 1999: 12). The Mística is a communitarian religious experience, normally generating a very strong positive impact, many MST members said. It is a trial to raise spirits, in order to start a collective job with ease, force and harmony. However, at times the ritual has turned into a routine, a form repeated without spirit, Simula argues. For him, the best part is the singing together and showing of force by thrusting a fist into the air, to get energies moving. In Mística, the MST members perform a drama displaying symbols that tell a teaching history that people can re-live. Normally the plot starts with a story of subjugation of the indigenous people, prisoners or slaves. The drama offers a scene of torture, followed by the reaction of the oppressed, who liberate themselves by a victorious fight. Words written on paper and displayed in solemnity, concepts like “solidarity”, “peace” and “love”, ends the Mística play, Simula relates. Each base unit has to prepare a Mística for a specific day, which means that everybody both acts and watches, participates in the spectacle almost daily.

These are daily, politicized practices. Mística is a key contentious agency fostering ideological practice, as it leads to the experiencing of one’s past, present and potential future agency and power relation positions in the emotional, spiritual and collective spheres and as a part of a great mystical utopia and epic poem. Mística has mystical dimensions, and mystical has specific meanings within the MST. Boff writes:

Mystical signifies a joint of deep convictions, of grand visions and strong passions that mobilize the people and movements in their desire for change, or that inspire practices that are capable of confronting any difficulties, or sustain hope in the face of historical failures. In the socio-political mystical, utopia always exists as an action. (Boff 1993: 154, my translation)
The MST seeks a change in the behavior and culture by politicizing practices, such as collective laundries, kindergartens and other practical tasks and social gatherings, alongside discussion of new values. Of the transformations carried out by the MST within Brazil, politicizing people into seeing themselves as citizens and land access as the natural right of all is arguably an even greater feat than its achievements in terms of settlement creation. The politicizing mechanism encourages members to solve their problems together through very practical common sense. For example, the schoolbooks of the MST portray how one stick breaks easily, whereas many sticks together do not break (see Cerioli & Broilo 2003). In the power relation revolutionizing, politicizing mechanism of the MST, Brazilian *individuos* become *pessoas*. Many members proclaimed to me how happy they were since becoming “conscious of concepts”, “aware”, “becoming hungry for information” (interviews, MST, 2004-2008). Politicized practices follow Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed, practices spread by the organizing mechanism. Especially important has been the investment in popular education, argues Carter (2009: 23): “the movement has placed a uniquely strong emphasis on providing an education to its participants and raising popular consciousness”. This offers channels for everybody to rise to the top of the organization, which is a striking difference from most Brazilians who face the inequitable private/public primary school system as a class-dividing mechanism. The UNESCO has rewarded the MST education system utilizing the pedagogy of the oppressed.

Photo 6: MST School in a Camp in Eunápolis, June 2004

The MST’s 8,000 teachers have provided adult literacy classes for more than 50,000 people and educated 250,000 children (Carter 2009: 23). Note the eucalyptus plantation on the background of this roadside camp’s school.
The struggle for land educates. Cutting the barbed wire is not only an act towards the *latifúndio*. Those who have gone through a land occupation argued in interviews that to cross the line is also a personal act of liberation, a way to embed oneself into the society in a new way. I would argue that the feelings are so strong in the protests, as the individual and the group cross the line of orthodoxy, in many senses. The strong feelings at protest moments indicate that protests are the fundamental mechanism that unites mystique and discipline simultaneously to create a new, contentious agency. Carter (2009: 24) eloquently writes:

> Feelings of enhanced self-control and greater self-esteem have inclined MST participants to channel their contentious behavior through constructive means. The movement’s sense of mystique and discipline are interwoven in subtle ways. Together, they elicit and channel the emotions that give vitality, courage and perseverance to the MST’s struggles. They are its intangible sources of power.

The politicizing practices induce a growing number of people to defy the current pulp investment model, among other things. However, simple politicization is not enough, as movements need to direct the newly politicized members into acting for a particular cause. By itself, the organizing and politicizing mechanism creates rebels without a cause. Coupled with heterodox framing, this mechanism directs rebellion towards a certain goal. Next, I assess the specific form of the framing process in the MST. Together organizing, politicizing and framing create rebels with a cause.

**Heterodox Framing**

This section introduces the central symbolic and ideological qualities of the MST. I also present the general qualities in mechanism b. A set of heterodox framings, identifications, and symbolizations – a specific symbolic system – marks the Landless Movement. Mechanism b has to be maintained by mechanism a, demonstrated by mechanism c, and spread by mechanism d, otherwise contentious agency will not be promoted, I argue. Mechanisms a-e construct an alternative symbolic, social and territorial space for the movement. All these spaces connect in Bourdieu’s theory (1991). I craft a process-based analysis by merging Bourdieu with the dynamics of contention approach (McAdam *et al.* 2001; 2008), in which cognitive, relational and environmental mechanisms, respectively, explain in a more dynamic way what goes on inside, between and in the external relations of Bourdieu’s spaces.

**Formation of Militants and Objectified Symbolic Capital**

Militants face the strongest pressure to follow and spread the official movement frames flowing from the ideologists. To ensure compliance, the militant never works alone, but always in pairs, a man and a woman. As militants work, they also carry out their personal household tasks or if moving from camp to camp, sleep and eat in communal areas or in someone’s house, where these normally young movement members become sons and daughters of the host family unit. Militants go through an extensive and continuous program. A key work is Che Guevara’s book on ideal militants. Militants try to follow the guidelines. A central idea is to sacrifice oneself totally, to replace individuality with the cause of the people
and the revolution, stemming from the Christian liberation theology idea of letting go of one’s ego for the sake of humanity. All kinds of responsibilities and chores occupy the militants in their daily work without a salary. Observing their responsibilities and stressfully changing life, with little clue about possible future placement, the situation of militants in the MST seems dauntingly exhausting.

Most of the militants are young, as the MST prefers to give them alternatives to moving to the cities to join the phenomenon of new peasant generation attracted by the lure of city-life. The ideologists want members who have been within the MST since birth or childhood to lead the movement. This policy is part of a wider social phenomenon within the Brazilian peasantry, the consolidation of the rural/peasant youth as a new political actor. Rural sociologists have argued that the rural youth is a new political actor and has become a protagonist, conquering a place in public and social movement politics (Castro et al. 2007: 16-17). Brazilian youth is building new rural utopias for themselves as a way to stay in the countryside. A Bahian militant explained what her militancy meant to her in June 2006 when I was visiting the camp she co-coordinated:

The most important in the work of a militant is humility and love, you need a lot of love. When you have a conscience, you know how to react as an MST-member in differing situations, and you can increase the conscience of others. For me gaining a conscience was easy because I love the movement. It took six months. All in the MST have to be ideologically similar. … As we come from different backgrounds, and nobody knows anyone else, we talk more of the movement than about ourselves. (My translation)

Revolutionary zeal harnessed from Che’s and other ideal-type militant’s books and lives is a source of energy for doing all a militant has to do. Historical framing connects the militants by a cultural pathway to earlier militants who have lived in Brazil and in other similar settings around the world. The framing capitalizes on earlier contentious agency by launching cultural pathways between the past and the present. Running with ideological spirit, some militants told me they could personally feel the presence of earlier militants. The movement draws from the history of Palmares, Canudos and other similar cases, framing the cultural elements of the MST as having also been present earlier in the history of Brazilian contention. These historical resources in the construction of a group-identity give legitimacy to the present suffering, framed as only a small issue in the long line of contention.

The MST ideologists foster a conception of land as the result of everybody’s struggle. Selling land would harm the very mobilization and efforts of the movement; indeed, one would destroy the prevailing ideology. By symbolizations, one can invoke ideology and relate it to objects. In the MST, land as a principal object becomes so richly imbued with key meaningful events and symbolizations that the landless are emotionally tied to land. Obtaining land is the biggest personal gain for those within the system of the MST: the transformation from a servant, from rural worker to farmer, from extreme poverty into self-determined subsistence or even prosperity is a huge step, bringing tears to movement members’ eyes and creating a

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71 Palmares was a historic community of escaped slaves in the 17th century Brazil. For analysis of Palmares, see Anderson 1996 and Kent 1965.
sacred tie to the land. Land is associated with work, production and subsistence in the MST – to its use-value – but also with other schemes. In the official ideology, *Sem Terras* love the land, and they can die for it. Land has a divine quality as it comes from God. Emotions bond one to the land: land is imbued with the personal and collective sorrows and joys of *Sem Terras*. 

In the MST’s symbolic system, land does not have exchange-value, only use-value. Vergara-Camus notes how *Sem Terras* corrected themselves in his interviews if they slipped into expressions like ‘my farm’ by replacing them as ‘our settlement’; for Vergara-Camus (2007: 230), *Sem Terras* did this to exercise the use-value and not the exchange-value of land. This invocation of the official movement symbolization carries the ideological sets to the cognition of committed system members. Vergara-Camus found that settlers outside of the MST in the Brazilian countryside saw land through the exchange-value principle, whereas in the MST, the use-value along with other valuations of land reigned. I have also witnessed these differences. The clergymen of Liberation Theology acculturated Marx’s separation of “land for working” and “land for business”: this separation was adapted within the MST in a much stronger manner than in other Brazilian peasant spheres (Vergara-Camus 2007: 104). The concept of “land for those who work it” has gained strong currency within the MST. The discourse distinguishes all those who do not personally work the land, and with all who just work on the land but do not have direct access and control of it, like wage-labourers, other landless and typical social movements.

The specificity of the MST’s land discourse reflects a group-identity in formation. The ideologists attempt to frame the members within the symbolic system as active subjects, in contrast to their previous oppressed position. The “land for those who work it” discourse forms a speech community, since one has to learn to speak in a specific manner in the MST and use certain key words and discourses. If one utilizes the “land for those who work it” discourse and follows the practices coming with it, one is already pretty far advanced in becoming a fully accepted *Sem Terra*: after all, discourses create a symbolic system, tying systemic habitus together. The land discourse is an example of how a symbolic system defends the subjectivity-in-formation by setting boundaries of access to the ideology.

Land is a central objectified symbolic capital for the MST. The MST maintains that land does not belong to anybody. It is the gift of god and one should use it for producing food via family agriculture. The paper industry, treating land as a commodity, ends up threatening the whole MST collectivity, its people and struggles. To make this clear, I excerpt an interview with the MST-member Hilario da Silva: “Our fathers conquered the land through the struggle. It’s everything for them. They want to be buried here. Land allowed them to sustain their family. For them it’s pure gold. … The land and the *assentamento* are sacred” (cf. Vergara-Camus 2007: 231). The relation of a local actor like the MST farmer with a place and land is holistic and personal, creating much more intensive and dedicated action in conflict situations than the less binding tie to a place a multinational actor like the paper industry confers on its members. Expatriate directors and outsourced seasonal plantation workers are emblems of the less land-tied paper industry members and the underlying metaculture of dissemination. The MST’s
alternative symbolizations signify that members within the movement want autonomy to make decisions regarding their land use themselves and retain the control by replication. Thus, these decisions will probably not include selling or leasing the land. For example, the MST sees the small-scale outsourced plantation of eucalyptus by a farmer as negative as this ties the eucalyptus grower into the pulp company.  

Creating Heterodox Frames

“Cultural symbols are not automatically available as mobilizing symbols but require concrete agents to turn them into frames of contention”, argues Sidney Tarrow (1998). I claim further that heterodox framings are required to challenge, turn and transform power relations. Frames should provide alternative modes of action. Movements need leaders who have knowledge and words to address such complex transnational issues as the spread of pulp projects. Activists need to know for whom, how and why to address issues, how to mobilize people, and how to turn knowledge into heterodox framings. MST members participate at a plethora of political processes in the local and national levels (Medeiros & Leite 2004: 49). Movement vanguard Stédile has summed up the MST’s self-framing in the following words:

The novelty of the MST is that it cultivates the generosity of the camponês, that radicalism of the camponês, that spirit of sacrifice that the camponês has. We join this, what comes from our culture, with organizational principals [sic]. It gives a tradition to the working class to change capitalism. What traditions? Love, learning, discipline, respect for the collective, always work together, don't think that you're more important than the others, leadership, and freedom. And this is what makes up the MST. (Interview in: Garmany & Maia 2007: 141-142).

In 2004, before resistance to pulp investments increased and became successful, important transformations in the MST strategy and framing took place. There has been an ideological shift from the narrow agrarian reform focus to a more general contestation of multinational capital. In 2007, reflecting this change in attitude in 2004, Stédile argued that “Our enemies are the agribusiness, the transnational companies, the banks and the financial market” (Letraviva 2 August 2007). In my interview on the paper industry relations, another MST militant, Ana Hanauer, according to whom youngsters are now assuming responsibility for the movement from the old vanguard, said, “you do not sit at the table of the enemy … we have no other option than to fight” (interview, MST RS, 2008). Such movement strategies and framings flow from the master-ideologies they adopt. Spalding (2007) has studied the Zapatista resistance in Mexico, which serves as a theoretical comparison of the importance of

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72 The company pays up front for the farmer to deliver the production. If there are problems and the farmer cannot deliver the agreed amount of eucalyptus, he falls into a circle of debt dependency with the pulp company, the MST national leadership insists (Interview with Igor Felippe Santos, MST São Paulo, April 23, 2008).

73 She participated in a Via Campesina women’s occupation of a Stora Enso’s eucalyptus plantation close to the frontier with Uruguay in Rio Grande do Sul in March 8, 2008.

74 This is the general view of the dominant ideological current within the MST. There are, however, other more reformist currents. In many local struggles with the local pulp projects, the local MST sections have indeed sat into the same table with “the enemy” to negotiate. Even though there are differences, the MST is basically everywhere a much more radical movement than most rural movements, maintaining protests whilst possibly negotiating. There are also different protest types the movement uses.

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the upward scale shift (Tarrow 2005) in the MST’s strategy in 2004. In large-scale investment resistance cases in Brazil, the master ideology was liberation theology first. After democracy, this expanded into a political ecology-master ideology, as Rothman and Oliver (2002: 128) found by a case study of a South Brazilian dam resistance movement. This change in strategy and framing has first taken place among the MST ideologists and then spread through the movement.

In general, the arrival of pulp investments, an external enemy, thrusts movement members as well as outsiders towards the movement framing. Based on four years of observing the typical trajectory following pulp investments and the building of the mill, I suggest that within two years maximum, local population will become much more sympathetic to the MST framing of what is happening to a pulp investment impact area. This is because large-scale pulp projects do not bring the positive benefits they widely market to the people in the planning phase, as I suggest in the next chapter. This trajectory took place both in Southern Bahia and in Rio Grande do Sul. It may also happen in Mato Grosso do Sul, but only if the MST manages to utilize the mechanisms a-e. However, following the refined “origins of mobilization” model I elaborated earlier, environmental mechanisms are in constant interaction with the cognitive and relational mechanisms that imbue importance of an area/issue within a social group. From this interaction follows mobilization; this is sustained if there is sufficient correlation between the broad change process and the attribution of threats/opportunities. After the initial mobilization, the variance in the concatenation of mechanisms of contention - which themselves interact more or less with the corporate mechanisms of resource exploitation, meeting in dynamic political games – explains differing trajectories in episodes of contention.

After organizing and politicizing, movements face the task of heterodox framing. The DOC process offers detailed tools for assessing framing. Ruth Reitan (2008: 42-43) has condensed and elaborated the steps of framing; her clear presentation offers a ground to briefly explain the main phases of MST’s heterodox framing in the politics of pulp investment. The MST has utilized belief amplification in its purest form: it has homed in beliefs about the seriousness of the socio-economic problems of large-scale pulp projects, which it blames as causally responsible for the problems, stereotyping the antagonist, and portraying itself as being responsible to stand up. The MST has used also the more profound framing strategy of frame extension. The pulp protests are part of the shift in objects and claims from Brazilian agrarian reform to the resistance of transnational corporate resource exploitation. The MST, especially after the broad change process of global agribusiness expansion has grown and the movement has created closer ties with Via Campesina, has felt compelled to extend the boundaries of contention to focus on transnational agribusiness. Therefore, pulp turned into a major target of heterodox framing for the MST. Signs of this were in the air in discourses already before April 2004; but the true critical juncture came with the Veracel occupation. The empirically observable occupation of territory and the accompanying framings made it clear that a frame extension had taken place. Pioneering protesting led into the inclusion of pulp as a core heterodox framing target for not only for the MST, but also many others within the society

75 However, the Mato Grosso do Sul VCP/IP investment includes not only a pulp mill, but also a paper mill, which can ameliorate the negative impacts by creating more jobs and tax revenues.
and the state. The framing was not only linked to the protesting mechanism; it was also linked to networking, bringing new allies, especially environmental movements and state actors critical of eucalyptus plantations.\textsuperscript{76}

The way heterodox frames move within the society, the state, and the resistance network depend on the cultural pathways, modes of cultural motion. For an official ideology and frame to spread within a social actor, pathways of cultural transmission have to be created. To ensure the construction of a genuinely different alternative, the MST has founded its own media. I participated in the five-year celebrations of its weekly newspaper \textit{Brasil de Fato} in São Paulo in April 2008. João Pedro Stédile said that the MST created its own newspaper to dispute hegemony in Brazil. The movement builds its own media and does not seek to conquer the major media in the country. “If \textit{O Globo} one day speaks well of us, watch out. They will have bought us then. They may speak badly of us. This is their role.” Stédile sketched a strategic vision for the MST militant-packed auditorium of São Paulo’s Catholic University: “We are living the planting time, not the harvest period. We prepare for future transformation, when the masses come and rise.” The discourse demonstrates the long-term strategy of the MST and its total rejection of the possibility of armed resistance. By sustained contention mechanism transmission by replication, the movement fosters the large masses of the population to “rise” and join the movement. To get there, movement frames have to be spread to society. For the MST, the way to do this is mounting disruptive, resymbolizing protests, networking with allies and embedding with the state.

**Protests: Framing Eucalyptus as a New Symbol in the Struggle for Land**

The MST’s protests center on creating powerful symbolic displays. Earlier social movement literature convincingly shows that there is a strong correlation between the use of disruptive tactics and contention outcomes (Gamson 1990; Giugni 2004: 3). Disruption is a more successful tactic than moderation – which stands in contradiction to Robert Dahl’s classic findings (Cf. Giugni 2004: 3). Violence has a mixed history. A number of studies have found violence to be detrimental to a resistance movement (Giugni 2004: 3). The DOC research program maintained that movements should engage in collective innovative action. I share and elaborate these findings.

The MST’s land occupations, squats and roadblocks aim to dramatize a public demand and bring state authorities to the bargaining table (Carter 2009: 27). However, even though these acts in themselves violate the private property rights and laws, their goal is to support the rule of law, including property rights, by “targeting, for example, estates of dubious or illicit proprietorship” (Carter 2009: 30). The movement has a “dedicated and expanding network of close to 500 lawyers” to support its activities, running legal cases and lobbying the judiciary (ibid.). In fact, as I argue, the movement has gained even more from the judiciary than from

\textsuperscript{76} See Reitan (2008) for a more profound theoretical discussion of the linkages of framing and networking.
the executive, especially in the case of pulp investment resistance, but also in general. In 1996 a major victory for the MST came, when “Brazil’s highest court ruled that land occupations designed to hasten reform were ‘substantially distinct’ from criminal acts against property” (ibid.). The MST has “actively contributed to shaping the debate on the nature and function of law” in the Brazilian society notorious for its “un-rule of law” (ibid.) (see also Meszaros 2009, 2007, 2000).

The MST brings harvest tools like large knives to demonstrations. In these symbolic acts, it uses symbolic politics, portraying itself as potentially disorderly, but peaceful so far. If the authorities give in to the MST’s demands, it will not exercise the potential for disorder it could cause. The MST generally succeeds in gaining attention by this tactic, and thus pushes forwards its agenda into society, even though many would not agree on the movement or method, because of its disruptive tactics. I argue that visibility promotes contentious agency when protest acts engage in symbolic politics that displace an object from its traditional place, thus raising consciousness and arbitrary opinions in minds that were previously indifferent to the issue linked to the object. In this case, the MST has displaced the central objectified symbolic capital of eucalyptus and land from their proper places by protest acts.

I identified land and eucalyptus as the central objectified symbolic capital (see Bourdieu 1991) in the pulp conflict as it is by their symbolic stability, public acceptance and legitimacy, that the maintenance or fall of the pulp investment model depends. The MST action has led to breaches, transformations in the value of the objectified symbolic capital in the investment areas. This signifies that the MST has managed to transform the cultural stock by its symbolic politics, which is crucial, as “when and how movements add to or change the cultural stock are an important dimension for understanding social change in general” (Zald 1996: 274). Crucial to effective protest acts in the case of pulp investment resistance has been the tactical decision of the MST to occupy eucalyptus plantation land while carrying their tools and food. As Figure 6 below depicts, in these protests eucalyptus is cut with the knives and used to build shelter. Land occupations displace objects and bodies from one site to another. MST members put their bodies where they ought not to be as a fundamental part of their disruptive protests. Sem Terra bodies displace objects like eucalyptus from their circles of dissemination into circles of replication by turning the eucalyptus tree bound for paper production into a material for shelter-building. In a re-symbolizing act that tries to shake the meanings and social position pulp investments enjoy, eucalyptus is replaced by food crops. At the analytical level, this signifies the contestation of established order, a claim of power, a demonstration of force and attitude by the movement. Charles Tilly (1999) would call this a WUNC display: participants' concerted public representation of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. It is by protests that the MST most forcefully tries to encounter the state and society to make its demands heard. Heterodox frames created by ideologists (mechanism b) seem to gain their true importance when manifested by mechanism c.
The April 2004 Veracel occupation appeared as a conflict in which the actors had considerable differences in their values, beliefs and ways of understanding the world. The orthodox frame stated that the use of land for eucalyptus monoculture is good, and that plantations are needed. In contrast, the heterodox frames consider industrial plantations bad, in differing ways, and suggest many alternative models for land usage, all arguing that the land could be used in a better way.

The basis of a symbolization mechanism is the displacement of an object to a different, unusual space. Symbolization puts people on the alert and thus heightens awareness. As an object moves from its familiar place to another domain, this dramatically increases our “awareness of the nature of the object, the characteristics of its original place, and the congruity of its new position. Such displacements, then, lead to a heightened awareness of all social processes, especially of the arbitrary nature of ideological constructs which sustain social life” (Damatta 1992: 71). In the case of social movements, Tarrow (1998: 122) finds, “It is the combination of new frames embedded within a cultural matrix that produces explosive collective action frames. Combining them depends on the actors in the struggle, the opponents they face, and the opportunities for collective action”. In the April 2004 Veracel occupation and many other similar protests, the Sem Terras symbolized eucalyptus and land by occupying a privately owned, socially unproductive eucalyptus monoculture land in their terms to cultivate corn, rice and beans on it. They cut down eucalyptus, a new symbol in an old struggle for land, and framed it – not for pulp production – but for housing construction. This symbolization effectively led to some social re-appraisal, in Brazil and transnationally, of eucalyptus and land as symbols of widespread clashing phenomena, such as the land question of the global South, landlessness, dubious monoculture plantation expansion, and
contestable pulp investments. The occupation formed a special space in which the *Sem Terras* set the real world moving by symbolic reframing.

Theoretically, the case demonstrates that if perplexity and discussion of the objectified symbolic capital starts to take place on a socially significant scale, this will call the value of capital into question. The effectiveness of land holding and expansion thus depends on the framing of key objectified symbolic capital. Manifestations can unveil “the founding violence that is masked by the adjustment between the order of things and the order of bodies” (Bourdieu 2000: 188). Cultural capital transfer “enables the dominated to achieve a collective mobilization and subversive action against the established order” (ibid.). The MST attempts to transfer cultural capital by re-symbolizing land and eucalyptus. By symbolic actions, protests transfer cultural capital from the symbolically powerful multinational corporations to the needs of the political game involved in the land question.

Building the protest mechanism requires the earlier building of the organizing and politicizing and framing mechanisms. Each new step, each innovative add into the repertoire of contention, each act of pioneering protesting requires a stronger base of organizing and politicizing. The resistance against pulp projects has been for the MST a conscious attempt to experiment with new, unforeseen protest types. The first pioneering act was the April 2004 Veracel occupation. The second was the 2006 Aracruz tree laboratory destruction in Rio Grande do Sul. The third was the 2008 occupation of Stora Enso. The tendency has been for the acts to become ever more contentious. For the MST, this is necessary, even though the more pioneering the act, the stronger base, resources, planning and time it requires from the militants. Furthermore, the rise in the level of contentiousness leads into higher risks for the movement and its members. Nevertheless, new pioneering acts are being developed still (interview, Kelly, MST SP, 2009).

The number of protests is less important than their quality. In the first pioneering, nonviolent, symbolic protest aiming to reframe pulp projects – the 2004 Veracel occupation – the MST occupied a piece of a eucalyptus plantation, cut eucalyptus and planted food crops. In March 2006, MST members entered a research site of Aracruz Celulose in Rio Grande do Sul and destroyed test trees, an act described as vandalism and terrorism in the Brazilian media, and subsequently, in many minds. Even so, the MST calculated that they benefited from the attention. The MST did not count the protest as violence, although its acts can be interpreted as such. Hammond (1999) argues this has played in favor of the movement, as it can use both the law and disorder. The Aracruz act of 2006 was a pioneering protest.

The women of Via Campesina decided they have to mark the 8th of March as a particularly important day of struggle, and for this reason they needed to utilize innovative and highly disruptive methods (Interview, Kelly, MST São Paulo, 2009). The goal for the MST was to “cause damages to the company, to open a debate, and mark a difference” (ibid). The act was a conscious experimentation of new methods (destruction that caused a direct loss of about 200 million reais for the company). It involved new elements in both its outer look and inner planning. Such a protest needed a far stronger organizational and ideological base; it also
required what Kelly called a “conspiracy”, the limitation of crucial information and planning to a smaller circle of people than is normally the case within the democratic centralism of the MST. Fewer militants knew about the details of the act beforehand than in the case of “normal” land occupations or protests, which also continue to be an important part in the repertoire of contention to the movement. The new protest methodology attempted to avoid assimilation of the protesting mechanism, the softening of the cutting edge of the disruptive protesting mechanism. Kelly explained that the assimilation happens easily. In the 1980s, to occupy land was a radical act. In 1997, the National March was a novelty that created a lot of attention, whereas occupations had become a normalized, assimilated part of the political game. Two years later in 1999, a similar National March, a replication of the protest form, did not receive anymore the same attention. The April 2004 Veracel was a pioneering act: and it created enormous public interest.

The MST has many different types of protests, all of which have their meaning. The Red April protests have a different methodology than the 8th of March Women’s Day acts; the former focus on creating pressure and on negotiation, whereas the latter are openly hostile and do not even want to engage in negotiation. The 8th of March protests seek direct confrontation and are very important for the formation of the women (ibid). The acts involve a small leadership, secrecy, non-violence, but attempt to cause considerable economic losses and the loss (desgaste, prejuizo) of reputation, business reliability and performance to agribusiness corporations (ibid). The new protest type changes the rules of the interactive, dynamic political games. Protests are to be understood relationally. In general, the regulation of conflict in rural Brazil has been backward. Hammond (2009: 156, 169) writes:

> The occupation process and the violent response to it constitute a repertoire of collective action that follows a premodern pattern corresponding to the lack of a modern, rational state structure in rural Brazil. … Occupation and retaliation both represent local, direct action that is aimed at an immediate target and that, if successful, achieves a goal directly.

The pioneering protests are crafted within this conflict dynamics; but they also seek to change the prevailing interaction by introducing new elements to the backward repertoires of collective action. Pioneering protests ensure constant updating of the conflict dynamics within the countryside. Others, if they have the capacity, are likely to follow the MST’s example in attempting to inflict considerable economic losses to corporations that they would wish to follow the lines of right livelihood. In this, it will be extremely important not to cross the line and inflict violence to other persons, but to do acts motivated by a volition seeking the peace and harmony of all. Right livelihood cannot be attained by violent means. However, some have interpreted the acts of the MST and Via Campesina as violent. Hammond (2004) argues these claims to be common rhetorical moves designed to discredit the movement. According to Hammond (2009: 173), the occupations and the retaliation differ in legitimacy: “landowners inflict violence to protect privileges that have often been acquired illegitimately; land occupiers act to assert their rights and achieve justice in the countryside.”

The new type of pioneering acts that seek to cause economic losses have to be carefully planned and assessed so that they do not contain violence, even though they cause economic
losses to those not following the lines of right livelihood. In some cases during 2009, the MST leader Neuri Rossetto agreed (interview, December 2009), they had made some mistakes, and are currently reviewing their repertoire of action. He named the 2009 act in which the movement cut the orange trees of Cutrale, the worlds’ biggest orange agribusiness, which had bought illegally appropriated, squatted state land. In the act, the MST destroyed the oranges; this was a mistake according to Neuri. The oranges should have been given to the hungry. Partly as a result of this act, which raised anger and condemnation among the public, a third Parliamentary Investigation (CPI)\textsuperscript{77} was set in the fall of 2009 to investigate the MST, which both hindered its advance via EAM and made this complementary direct mechanism even more important. This demonstrates that if any of the mechanisms is impure, others are bound to be harmed. Right livelihood – and contentious agency promoting this – can be ensured only by nonviolent means.

According to the truth tables presented in the findings, pioneering protests have been a central technique in curbing corporate resource exploitation at least a bit towards right livelihood. The effectiveness of the pulp companies’ land expansion depends on the power or lack of power of the alternative approaches to organizing the social, symbolic and territorial space. When the alternatives thrive, new land symbolizations circulate in society. In such a situation, corporate land access becomes a mechanism not simply denominated as buying/selling, but something else. The commoditizing “buying” and “owning” activities acquire the tag of “invading”, colonizing or conquering the land. This type of symbolic political transformation took place in many areas where eucalyptus plantation was questioned by re-symbolizing protests. The new heterodox framing of plantation expansion as “invasion” has at times been legitimized by the state actors, but came originally from the contenders. The way the heterodoxy got into the public opinion and court decisions was initially produced by a re-symbolizing disruptive protest act. The heterodox frame is gaining ground in the pulp investment areas where the MST protests actively, resymbolizing land and eucalyptus, as later chapters will indicate.

The Network of Allies and Embedded Autonomy of the MST

Next, I evaluate the ways in which the MST simultaneously embeds, firstly, with other land reform actors in Brazil; and secondly, the state, while maintaining autonomy. Carter (2009:

\textsuperscript{77} CPIs are a principal manner of doing politics and investigating wrongdoings in Brazil, and have been the focus for major political debates such as the impeachment of President Collor, the mensalão corruption scandal of the PT, and so on. The mere establishing or not establishing of CPIs is one of the most heated disputes between the legislators, because CPIs are extremely powerful political tools that can lead to immediate executive orders. Even politicians willing to investigate a given matter may criticize the setting up of a CPI, as is the case if it seems that these critically attuned politicians would not have enough power to push for the conclusions they would like the CPI to reach. Thus, a careful analysis of the correlation of powers precedes the setting up of CPIs. CPIs have been begun before possible questions or denunciations arise on a certain matter, to insulate the issue from debate. The often invisible power relations in the parliament explain the otherwise incomprehensible resistance to beginning an investigation of a matter by the same politicians who pressed strongly for the handling of that question. When the Brazilian media reports on CPIs only few know what is really in question behind the curtains and certainly the citizens in most cases do not get even close to the whole picture.
22) has argued that “the movement’s birth and ongoing expansion would not have been possible without the contribution of numerous partners, notably within Brazilian civil and political society”. The comparative study of pulp conflict cases suggests that these resourceful allies played an important role, but disruptive protest acts are even more important in slowing corporate resource exploitation. Allies were more important in some conflict cases than others. In general, the MST has considerable relative autonomy and does not seek to isolate itself. Besides this research, also Vergara-Camus (2007: 279) has found that the MST participates in all political fronts while consciously maintaining autonomy. I share this observation, which is useful in assessing the strategies by which a movement is able to contest a state-industry alliance promoting corporate resource exploitation.

Networking with Allies

A network of allies strengthens the MST’s position in the politics of paper investment. The network includes actors that explicitly favor the MST and actors that are overtly or covertly allies in the specific resistance struggle against pulp investments, even though they might not accept everything in the MST. Next, I will consider why the MST has managed to create this network of allies, and what role it plays in the politics of paper investment. I also assess the role of the MST in the greater process by which contentious agency promotion fortifies a new Brazilian social movement society.

The MST is a progenitor movement offering a master-frame, a working model for the land struggle. It belongs to a recent Latin American phenomenon in which popular movements force governments to listen to their demands by land occupations, squats, roadblocks and other forms of physical space control. The MST challenges authoritarianism not only within its organization, but also in the society touched by its activism. Zald (1996: 271) argues that this confers success on movements: “successful movements have their tactics and frames appropriated by other movements; they become exemplars providing training grounds and models. Failing movements are less likely to provide ideological and symbolic models.” The metaculture of replication inherent to the MST explains how the movement has propagated its model to other movements, created a network of allies, and embedded with the state whilst maintaining autonomy. Resistance model transmission is an endeavor in which the MST has been especially active.

Urban’s cultural motion mechanisms of replication and dissemination can be used to elaborate the earlier theorizing around the process of scale shift, by which movements can accrue a wider network of resistance. McAdam et al. (2001: 333) theorized that localized action can gain a larger scale via brokerage and/or diffusion, which are then followed by attribution of similarity, emulation, and coordinated action among the wider scale of contenders. Brokerage signifies making connections to groups or spaces that have not been earlier in connection with each other, whereas diffusion signifies the activation of already connected networks for a particular campaign. This distinction has proved helpful to analysts of scale shift, even though it might sometimes be difficult, and in most cases at least arbitrary, to define what groups or
spaces were connected before the scale shift and what were not. By adding replication and dissemination as two distinct types of cultural motion, I suggest that also the style of networking, not only the earlier relations of the networking agents, matters.

Both brokerage and diffusion can take place via replication, or alternatively, dissemination. The style of networking impacts the outcomes of brokerage/diffusion. The organizing and politicizing mechanisms of the networked agents are bound to follow the style of networking. Dissemination and replication explain how the style of networking influences the ensuing changes in the internal dynamics of the involved network agents. Inserting the metacultures of replication and dissemination, furthermore, allows reconsidering other elements in the scale shift process.

The MST is capable of fostering external coalitions and networks. But the most interesting and particular feature of the MST’s networking work is its insistence on transmitting the metaculture of replication, and not merely brokering or diffusing to gain allies. Of course, the movement also allows organizations based on dissemination to join networks. But it continually pushes these to become more and more replication-oriented. The MST has fostered cooperation within the pulp investment resistance network by the creation of regional forums and by wide-spread networking. Compromises, plurality and joint actions mark resistance networks like the Network against the Green Desert. Rede Alerta Contra o Deserto Verde, established in 1998. The World Rainforest Movement (WRM), the Federation of Social and Educational Assistance (FASE) and the MST are the central actors in the network.

For a practical adaptation of the scale shift theory, see Ruth Reitan’s (2008) thorough and elaborated analysis of transnational scale shift towards global activism. The work discusses also the MST’s transnational networking via the Via Campesina.

The DOC scale shift process included emulation as a necessary mechanism. Emulation could be roughly compared to Urban’s replication. I share the empirically grounded finding of Reitan (2008: 49) that emulation is not a necessary mechanism; it may well be that the cultural motion within networks and the internal operation of its member organizations is not based on replication, but on dissemination.

For example, I was left wondering if “attribution of similarity” and “emulation” is required for scale shift to occur, or if these are possible but not necessary phases in the process. The metacultures of replication and dissemination create different types of organizing mechanisms; replicators are more likely to attribute sufficient similarity to their institutional equivalents, that is, other replicators. It important to spot cases where dissemination is transformed into replication. This is more important than spotting if the networking endeavour is characterizable as brokerage or diffusion. When social agents following dissemination are turned into social agents following replication, the result will be not only a far more effective alliance, but also a far more potential base for further scale amplification. For example, when rural populations depended on the external markets for buying their food turn into MST farmers that produce their own food, replication has occurred, and the dissemination networks on which the capitalist market-society is based has lost customers. If these customers, the passive rural populations, had remained mostly within the metaculture of dissemination, they would not be as willing to participate in the struggles of replicators.

Most of the analysis of networks still lacks or oversees the important differentiation of two metacultures of cultural motion that Urban offered. For example, David Grewal’s (2008) *Network Power: the Social Dynamics of Globalization*, as well as the DOC (2001), could have solved many central problems and created a much more nuanced assessment by incorporating replication and dissemination into explaining globalization and contentious politics.

Reitan (2008: 19) elaborated the DOC scale shift model by identifying three types of attribution among activists (worthiness, interconnectedness, and similarity), each producing solidarity of differing qualities and with distinct impacts on the cohesiveness of networks. A shared metaculture of replication can cut across all types of networks, be they constituted mostly by worthiness or similarity; it would be interesting to investigate whether networks where replication dominates show distinct outcomes than those based on dissemination. I would hypothesize they do. That they produce distinct type of activism is obvious.
which is most active in southeastern Brazil. It has organized enormous meetings with over a
hundred heterogeneous organizations varying from syndicates to social movements, research
centers and all kinds of associations. The network has managed to embed itself into the state,
markets and even within the paper industry. For example, Aracruz’s Industrial Workers’ trade
union, SINTICEL, partakes in the Green Desert network, which heavily criticizes their
employer. The network has created Latin American and transnational ties by participating in
the World Social Forum. It disseminates the negative experiences of the large-scale pulp
investment model and replicates resistance in locales where the model is about to
territorialize. Aracruz acknowledges the other side: “The Green Desert Network (led by NGO
FASE) and the MST can be considered today the major opponents of the company” (Aracruz,
Cf. MMA 2005: 91). The goal of the resistance network is to reverse the advance of tree
plantations, to require the rule of law and enhance the situation where tree plantations already
exist. The network wholeheartedly condemns the large-scale pulp model and accepts no
cooperation with the paper industry.

For the best outcomes, both brokerage and diffusion are important. Besides social and
organizational appropriation, the MST-based network has created and been created by
inventing novel social movements. The MST has helped to found urban movements, most
importantly MTST, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (Movement of the Homeless
Workers), active in São Paulo but spreading around Brazilian cities, as well as in pulp
investment areas like Southern Bahia. MTST follows the organizing, protesting, occupying,
framing and politicizing practices of the MST quite closely in its urban occupations for
homeless workers. Its camps and new housing areas are a striking change from unorganized
squats or favelas sprawling up the hills or on unused lands. MTST finds new communities
with a strong sense of community and solidarity. It is an urban extension of the MST’s model.
The MST has recently started to work in cities even more directly, particularly in the south
and southeast, recruiting in the favelas of cities like Porto Alegre. In pulp investments areas,
the transmission of the MST model among the homeless workers has been easy, as rural
exodus has brought people without other opportunities to seek advice from the MST. Thus
they turn to social struggle, which most movements in Brazil have abandoned, according to
the MST (interview, Igor, National Coordination, December 2008). The MST has also found
a new model for settlements close to cities. In this model, urban-rural areas on the outskirts of
cities turn into settlements for urban workers where they can cultivate their food, build a
house and a community and produce items directly for the city food markets.

I witnessed various mutual actions by the MST and urban dwellers in which rural and urban
workers came together to demand rights from the authorities. In one such case, the MST
helped to found an MTST in Porto Seguro downtown for a lona preta (black plastic) camp
that had not managed to get the promised housing from the city in its independent attempts.
These people had lost their houses years ago in floods, and the city had not yet met its
obligation to offer housing, so the people had lived under black plastic-bag shacks for years.
One night in July 2006, the military police came and torched the camp – allegedly because of
the close ties between the local judge and the landowner, as the MST and camp members
argued in interviews. People managed to run away from the burning camp. The police left
nothing standing. The next day was a day of rallying: the MST came to support these people, and I went along with the folks of the Lulão camp in Southern Bahia, next to Veracel, where I was doing field research. The eviction was illegal, said demonstrators, as according to the law the police must give prior notice and make the expulsion during the day. The police act signified for the camp members that people who embrace power might burn down dwellings in the middle of a city without any threat of punishment. What is sure – I witnessed this all – is that such actions bring the historically distanced city-dwellers closer to the MST, encouraging the MST model to expand into new contexts. City workers with almost no previous contact with the kind of ideological and cultural elements incorporated by the MST members very quickly became interested in conversations and joined actions with the Sem Terras. One cause of the MST growth is these state and business policies that cannot stand the existence of an organized, mobilized society.

The MST has framed the land question as a national, all-Brazil issue. Brazil is divided into states that show legal-political and socio-cultural variance. Diversity means that not many social actors within Brazil have succeeded in creating even a functioning let alone significant organization, even at state level. The MST has been tremendously successful in this sense. The MST is a national landless movement in comparison to the other movements, which are regional or local and separated. The MST became national in earnest at the end of 1990s, when other radical progressive movements in Brazil decided to opt for integration into the political system instead of mobilization (Vergara-Camus 2007: 353). The MST remained the primary motor at the grassroots level. However, it does not limit its actions to the national political sphere, and very actively promotes landless movements in Latin American countries and worldwide with other peasant movements through La Via Campesina. The MST model expands by the transmission of mechanisms of contention, by a networked replication. For example, I observed in field research in Venezuela in May 2007 how the Frente Nacional Campesino Ezequiel Zamora (FNCEZ) is a strong sign of such transmission. The goals of the MST is to soon become a transnational actor, perhaps to fashion itself only as La Via Campesina, because its enemies, corporations allied with governments, are also transnational (various militant interviews, 2008). The MST members meet constantly with a plethora of Latin American, European, Asian and transnational social movements, putting great effort into building a transnational network of allies.

The MST has been an important actor bringing different civil society actors of the left together in Brazil and in Latin America. It has created two official spaces/platforms for the civil society to meet, the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS) and the Popular Assembly. The CMS has been most actively utilized in São Paulo and gathers especially trade unions and political parties. The Assembly is principally a platform to meet the Church. However, informal platforms are still more important than these formalized spaces (interview, Neuri, MST São Paulo, 2009). The MST was one of the founding partners behind the World Social Forum (WSF). The WSF was actually found after the failure of earlier attempts to form a more radical and social movement-based space. According to Neuri, who has been the representative of the MST in the WSF since its start, in the 1990s the Zapatistas proposed for the MST that they could together form a new platform that would transnationalize their
radical new movements to other parts of the world. The MST wanted to include also other Latin American social movements, with whom it had been building up networks already for years. It wanted to create a wide coalition. The Zapatistas agreed to this, and to a careful organization of the future event together with other movements. However, Neuri disclosed that the two representatives of the EZLN continued from São Paulo to Belem, and after talks with its mayor, pronounced that the future meeting would take place in Belem. The MST felt that the EZLN had betrayed their deal and called off the meeting, which they would never have organized in Belem. The relations of the MST and the EZLN are still shadowed by this event. The MST sent several militants to join the campaign of EZLN in the last years, but these representatives were not given any serious attention; Subcomandante Marcos did not even receive them, Neuri lamented. As a substitute to the forum of radical social movements, MST helped in forming a space for discussion, the WSF. After ten years, the MST sees no future in the WSF: Neuri argued it has been dominated by NGO’s such as Ibase that just want to talk and are not creating themselves real alternatives. For this reason, the MST aims to organize a new platform of social movements of the ALBA that would function as a real alternative globalization transmission base, as a decision-making and campaigning platform instead of simply as a space of discussion (ibid).

The Embedded Autonomy with the State

In this section, I assess the relation between the MST and the state, and the general importance of embedding in the state whilst maintaining movement autonomy in promoting contentious agency. Classic social movement studies, for example, the civil rights movement research in the United States, have argued that movements normally have to choose between state support and autonomy (Meyer 2004). Movements certainly need to mobilize a substantial pool of resources (Zald and McCarthy 1987 in: Giugni 2005: 1). Brazilian federal laws mandate the provision of credit, infrastructure and basic services to agrarian reform settlements (Carter 2009: 16). The MST has secured this pool in that its members and communities have managed, as citizens with rights in Brazil, to demand schools, healthcare, agrarian technicians and other state- and legally-guaranteed institutions. However, the MST implants the state support within and by its own movement mechanisms. A constant flow of resources keeps the movement vital. It is impressive that this has not jeopardized the movement’s critical ideology and relative autonomy. I see this character of the MST as a type of embedded autonomy, developing the classic conceptualization of embedded autonomy by Evans (1995). This is an addition to the literature on social movements, as the case of the MST does not fit really into the previous schemes.

National politics, the pressure exerted by the resistance on the state, is a crucial axis around which natural resource disputes revolve. According to Khagram (2004: 3), who studied large dam resistance outcomes in the global South, “outcomes are most likely to be altered when domestic communities and social movements capable of sustaining mass mobilization and linked to transnational advocacy efforts contest these projects”. In comparison to Khagram, perhaps owing to the difference in conflicts over large dam projects and large pulp projects,
the embedding of the Landless Movement within the domestic state and society has been more important than transnational action.

Figure 7 below illustrates how the EAM mechanism functions. Once the movement has secured a set of state institutions driving its agenda, laws governing these institutions and sympathetic state actors to staff them, it has used an important extra mechanism of resistance (EAM) besides protests. The government has had to give in to the demands of the movement, for example, by granting state actor positions to movement sympathizers or more resources to the pro-MST institutions like INCRA, or allowing greater legitimacy to contention. This shows that a movement has had an important role in resistance outcomes, even where state institutions have made the final decisions. The MST has always targeted state actors, especially state and federal-level executives and land reform institutions, trying to press for “higher” political presence for its agenda whilst maintaining autonomy. Continuing on utilizing and developing EAM signifies advancing up the steps of embedded autonomy by the Movement, as Figure 7 implies. Figure 7 demonstrates how social movements can utilize the mechanisms of embedded autonomy, how the rise up the steps of embedded autonomy brings benefits in the process of struggling for the state apparatus support:

![Figure 7: Steps of State Embedding by a Movement (EAM)](image)

The MST is relatively autonomous as it can determine or negotiate the type of external intervention in its communities (Vergara-Camus 2007: 114). The MST’s symbolic system, which plays a key role in this, is created by organizing, politicizing and framing, protesting and networking, and supports the MST in maintaining integrity and relative autonomy even when the movement embeds with the state. The movement has multiple sources for securing funding and support – its own cooperatives and members, foreign donors (the EU, Venezuela, Cuba and Canada, for example), state institutions, individuals and many NGOs, thus escaping dependence on only one provider (Carter 2009: 22). The state support is important: “Between 1995 and 2005, three associations linked to the MST received 19.2 million dollars from the
federal government” (Carter 2009: 22). Wolford (2003b: 500) has gone so far as to argue that the MST “is effective because the movement has established itself as a successful mediator between the settlers and the Brazilian State”. I do not go into such a strong claim, arguing that embedded autonomy with the state is just one of the mechanisms of contention that have brought contention capacity and success to the MST in comparison to other comparable movements.

The networking and embedding outcomes of the MST have to be assessed in their socio-political context. In spite of the network of allies and embedded autonomy, the MST members face severe political opposition and violence along with other landless people. Its main opponents are the ruralist caucus (bancada ruralista) which represents the latifúndio in the congress, and in the civil sphere UDR, União Democrática Ruralista (Rose 2005: 204-206). In addition, the sub-elites, i.e., police, death squads, paramilitary and criminal groups like capangas and jagunços formed or protected by the landed elite, pursue the MST militants. One can also add most of the judges to these elite violence forms (Rose 2005: 206-212). In this political system, fostering a network of allies, a social movement society, and embedded autonomy becomes very important.

Where for Wolford (2003b: 514) “the MST’s ability to maintain participation turns on its presentation of the movement as the primary mediator between a cruel State and its members”, I argue that the crucial participation-booster is a movement model which endows contentious agency. The claim made by Wolford is a part of the explanation, but it alone cannot explain the success of the MST. Various other movements similarly or even more radically frame themselves as mediators with the state; for example, the Rubber Tapper’s Union, CNS, for whom I worked for a few months in the Amazon in 2005. The mediator role is a widespread feature of most associations and movements driving the political aims of their constituents’ vis-à-vis the Brazilian state. The MST fosters a particular understanding of state functions like schooling and healthcare in its settlements and camps, and it offers these with its own types of institutions. Vergara-Camus (2007: 180) argues that the MST actually replaces the state; this is clear above all in social relations and practices. “The enforcement of norms, rules, and practices within settlements lies in those power relations much more than in state power” (Vergara-Camus 2007: 183). If one does not depart from the dominant Brazilian symbolic system, from the conventional and conservative culture, it is impossible to create contentious agency. Thus, the MST tries to limit incoming cultural traffic and extend its impact on state policies and public opinion. For example, the MST has met personally with the highest political authority in the executive-centrist Brazilian political system on various occasions. Presidents – like Itamar Franco in 1988 and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1997 have vetoed or helped create modifications in agrarian reform laws after hearing the MST as the specialist in the field (Vergara-Camus 2007: 304). The MST has always had very strong interaction with the state, especially with the parliamentary political machine. The movement was instrumental in founding PT, the Workers’ Party, and still participates very actively in elections (Vergara-Camus 2007: 292), usually voting for PT candidates, and interacts with the state in other ways to gain access to its resources.
The embedded autonomy by a movement is a mechanism of contention that relies on a fine balance between autonomy and embedding. Some members of the movement would desire a strong embedding with the state, whereas others want to emphasize autonomy. For example, the election of the MST leader Walmir Assuncão as a *deputado* into the Bahia parliament in 2006 has raised these issues within the MST in Eunápolis, the area of Veracel in the Extreme South of Bahia. The MST section south of Eunápolis, Teixeira de Freitas, supports a more confrontational and autonomous stance, whereas Eunápolis a deeper embedding. With the embedding and linking of a MST leader with the Wagner-led government policies that support Veracel, MST members in Eunápolis have been suggested to take less confrontational stance towards the company. They “sit into the table of the enemy” as the MST ideologists would put it.

The general movement embedding within the state is currently generally quite deep. According to the national movement leadership member Neuri (interview, MST São Paulo, 2009), the situation is such that a further embedding would make it difficult to foster and maintain a good network of allies. A further state embedding would result in fewer struggles and protests and in a higher importance given to negotiation instead of confrontation. This would then compromise the other mechanisms of contention that promote contentious agency creation, such as the protesting. Thus, the national leadership does not encourage the movement members to strive for political power with the cost of losing autonomy.

The MST has maintained autonomy by many strategic and ideological choices, for example by deciding not to register as a legal entity. Judges are not sympathetic to their cause: the majority criticize the movement’s non-existent legal status, since they cannot fine it, for example. These judges claim that if the MST was a registered NGO, agrarian reform would be faster for the *Sem Terra*s. For the movement members, this is just political rhetoric. Strategically, it would be disastrous for the movement to register officially, because in Brazil “the constitution is not respected” (Interview, a national coordinator, MST São Paulo, September 2006). The MST would have to pay fines and its militants would get more prison sentences, if it were a legal entity. “The MST does not need to be an NGO to achieve its objectives”, a São Paulo national strategic coordinator concluded. Indeed, the movement gains from its positioning between “law and disorder”; as Hammond (1999) has brilliantly remarked, the MST can put a lot of pressure on the state actors, as they are afraid of the potential proliferation of disorder; at the same time, the movement can argue for the rule of law.

The movement has remained outside the institutionalized form, a trait that differentiates many social movements in Latin America from the movements in Western societies whose momentum comes and goes, even though they are officially still in existence. Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 26) probed the issue of expanding institutionalization, putting the possibility that by institutionalization, social movements might lose their power “to surprise, to disrupt and to mobilize, and to provide a meaningful and effective alternative form of politics for those without access to more conventional means of influence”. Historically, argue Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 25), movements “gained their power to build constituencies and occasionally
influence authorities with their power to disrupt, to surprise, and to create uncertainty”. This still seems to be the case. As the MST is a deeply-rooted grassroots organization, the last glimmer of hope for the most marginalized, it has to retain its bottom-up structure to gain new members. For this and other reasons, avoiding institutionalization has been a conscious strategic choice, which has allowed it to maintain an important degree of autonomy.

Autonomy does not mean isolation. The movement members use the capitalist market. Simultaneously, the MST defends its members against the markets. *Sem Terras* are less dependent on markets as they cannot default and lose lands because of market fluctuations. The MST has more space to act, and a solid organizational base, as it does not connect overwhelmingly to the markets. In comparison, Brazilian pulp companies such as Aracruz and Votorantim incurred massive losses as a result of speculation, currency derivative losses in the transnational financial market collapse and unexpected dollar fluctuations in the fall of 2008, losses that brought the companies and their stocks down dramatically and halted their expansion. The state had to interfere and help Votorantim to buy Aracruz by offering ample credit through the BNDES. These market losses offered the MST opportunities to propose an alternative economic model. The 2008 financial crisis offered a fertile ground for the MST to question reliance on external markets, financial capitalism and export-monoculture, to show how non-corporate farming secures jobs and capital. In this sense, the embedded autonomy vis-à-vis markets – having the option but not the requirement to use the markets – is proving to be a very productive and sustainable organizational strategy.

Many movement members have become experts embedded in the state. Professionalization has generated movement power by tying movement members into professional habitus categories and fields within the state – as we have seen the movement has its own teachers, agronomists, technicians, cooperative bankers, nurses, accountants, administrators, politicians and state officials – while retaining them within the movement ideologically and in practice. The increase in roles taken by movement members and increased access to the most varied fields has allowed the MST to enhance its embedded autonomy, and thus gain power. Building on Bourdieu’s (1984; 1991) concepts of field and capital, in both theory and practice a movement can trade and create capital in more areas as its members gain a habitus accepted and proficient in those fields. This ensures embedded autonomy in practice. The MST has managed to embed with the state whilst maintaining autonomy, to spread its model and exert influence while keeping an eye on and control over incoming impacts and attempts at co-option. Professionalization of the MST members does not mean that the movement will turn into a formal or official organization. In fact, professionalization allows them to embed better with the official spheres of the state and the society, whilst maintaining the flexibility of a non-registered organization, of a social movement.

If the resistance utilizes at least one channel of embedding with the state, many other channels may soon be actively used. Municipal legislators, federal police, judges, attorneys, public defenders, regulatory bodies, INCRA, IBAMA, FUNAI and other institutions soon joined into an alliance or at least showed sympathy with the resistance against the expansion of eucalyptus plantations where one of them showed sympathy. In fact, all the cases where
expansion was slowed involved a plethora of specific channels utilized by the mechanism of embedded autonomy by the resistance movement. Likewise, the cases in which expansion continued unchecked were those without utilization of the embedding mechanism. In the Aracruz Rio Grande do Sul case, the MST embedded first with the INCRA and the state and federal governments in 2002 when the area was to be appropriated. However, the Supreme Federal Court overruled the decision, because of the judge’s connections with the farm owner, argued Miguel Stédile (2009) from the MST. Aracruz had attempted to buy the Southall farm, which was in dispute, for eucalyptus. However, as the MST embedded with INCRA, and INCRA managed to strike a direct acquisition deal with the Southall farm owner, Sem Terras gained land for hundreds of families. The owner offered his farm to INCRA as he was heavily in debt to the state (Email interview, INCRA RS, August 11, 2009). This was a major resistance success, as the region of São Gabriel where this happened was the only municipality in Rio Grande do Sul that did not yet have a massive agrarian reform settlement (ibid.): the area was of extreme strategic importance to the MST. In this case, the movement has started to utilize mechanisms a-e in earnest since 2006. The active embedded autonomy of a movement is the final mechanism required for contentious agency to be promoted. The hypothesis suggests that only when mechanisms a-e are fully operational can resistance manage to slow or reverse corporate resource exploitation.

On the other hand, successful embedding by the MST will surely unleash a wave of counter-attack, because also corporations and large landholders want to embed the state. Such was the situation in 2009, after successful movement embedding. The Supreme Federal Court, the federal parliament, state governments and important parcels of the state bureaucracy that were previously embedded by the MST have mounted a campaign that aims to criminalize the MST and to strip the resources it has gained after successful embedding into the federal executive power (interview, Neuri, MST São Paulo, 2009). For example, the parliamentary anti-MST politicians have placed an anti-MST bureaucrat into the key position in the important Tribunal de Contas de União to whom all who have received and utilized state resources have to report about the money utilized. In the conservative political system of Brazil, the embedding by a social movement is bound to be a dialectic and slow process with successes and setbacks. Only a strong autonomy will ensure the maintenance of movement integrity in the long run of embedding with the state.

Concluding Remarks

I have studied the organizing, politicizing and framing, protesting, networking, and embedding mechanisms that promote contentious agency, if used simultaneously. I assessed the MST model as an example of a contentious agency-endowing movement. The MST model has not been fully operational everywhere, as later chapters will show, since the model is an ideal, and only sometimes have activists been able to construct it. The model’s sustainability depends on the mechanisms the members maintain and develop daily. When people join the MST and start building mechanisms a-e, they generate a new sense of individual and collective agency, a Sem Terra habitus. The experience of participating in a contentious movement politicizes marginalized people into active agents. The MST and the movements
following the model depict the mechanism of conquering land by one’s own struggle as a crucial contentious agency-delivering experience. A proper landless activist should not accept land the state offers, but win land by landless group activism. This line creates contentious agency instead of passivity or conventional agency.

The analysis in this chapter supported a series of previous research findings, providing a detailed assessment of the mechanisms behind the MST success. For example, the Gramscian analysis by Karriem (2008) and Wittman’s (2008) anthropological analysis support my claim that the creation of mechanisms promoting contentious agency has been central to the MST success, both at the personal and social levels, ranging from the local to the transnational scale, politicizing movement members, a network of allies, and state actors. I provided detailed analysis of the specific mechanisms by which the MST promotes political participation. It comes as no surprise that the MST has advanced constitutionality and the rule of law in Brazil, as Laureano (2007) and Meszaros (2007) have pointed out. However, the biggest conquest of the MST is to be found in the transformation of “faceless” people into Sem Terras, into a community of citizens (Laureano 2007: 223). MST participants have been able to “overcome previous sentiments of disempowerment and fatalism, and foster a strong sense of agency” (Carter 2009: 24).

The MST has formed a virtuous cycle, in which mechanisms of contention churn and convert ideology into efficient practices. Organizing, politicizing, framing, protesting, networking and embedding are closely interconnected in the MST. The movement organizes ideology, turning it into practices and protest acts. It institutionalizes, professionalizes and puts into daily practice its ideological transmission, ensuring continuity and autonomy by a comprehensive educational, counter-hegemonic ideological repertoire mixing theology of liberation, the pedagogy of the oppressed, Brazilian dependency theory, and political ecology. Its protest acts are simultaneously organizational bases as protests turn into land occupations and camps. The protesting mechanism aims to create symbolic power and cultural capital in moving objects from a conventional space to a contested space. The impacts of re-symbolizing acts like disruptive protests can surprise those who focus narrowly on objects as having their value determined by purely economic measures. The different symbolizations of eucalyptus and land make it possible to use them in different economic domains. The orthodox vision uses eucalyptus principally for pulp; others would like to use it for constructing settlements. If there were only one type of objective and purely economic use for eucalyptus and land, other economic uses would not create vexation among the parties. Finally, the movement efficiently embeds with state and society, in spite of a considerable degree of autonomy.

I have argued that contentious agency promotion has been possible by creating a virtuous cycle between mechanisms a-e that support each other and overlap. These mechanisms concatenate: first comes a, which can be followed by b. If these are active, a movement can further boost its potential by networking (d). It can participate directly in political games, aiming to influence economic outcomes via dynamic interaction within the state. If it is constituted indirectly by mechanisms a, b and d, and directly by c and e, it will promote contentious agency.
5. The Government-Paper Industry Alliance

This chapter explores why and how pulp projects form in Brazil, which is essential to understanding what the MST faces in its resistance. Both the capitalist world-system and the Brazilian political system explain why and how the forest industry has taken an export-pulp shape in Brazil. Brazil is huge, a country where domestic mechanisms promoting corporate resource exploitation specific to the country are more important than elsewhere. Thus, I focus on the mechanisms by which the Brazilian state and corporations promote corporate agency within the Brazilian paper industry. However, I also assess the transnational dimensions, the history of the still-globalizing paper industry system, which is still controlled by the core countries in the global paper industry system, especially Finland, even though Brazil is becoming quickly ever more important in shaping it.

I decipher corporate mechanisms, whose simultaneous activeness explains the corporate agency promotion activeness in a given pulp-holding case. In this, I do not go into such detailed analysis as in the case of mechanisms of contention: my focus is on contention, not corporate resource exploitation. However, I will delineate the main traits of the corporate mechanisms to explain what is going on in the paper industry and the politics of pulp investment in Brazil. In this chapter, the attention is on the historical and present relations of the paper industry and governments. The corporate land access mechanism I analyze in detail in the next chapter, where I also consider the influence of Brazil’s plantation-focused colonial legacy in the current industrial plantation expansion. In the chapter eight, I derive explanations for corporate agency activeness from the involvement of the industry in financing electoral campaigns (electoral politics) and from institutional and structural support mechanisms in the Brazilian political system’s state corporatism and elite power. The chapter eight also assesses the role of developmentalism as an ideology that emphasizes orthodox, hierarchical and technocratic order and progress and private property rights over human rights (mechanism h). These mechanisms promote corporate agency and expand industrial plantations. This and the following chapters extend the hypothesis to test that, even in the midst of worsening political opportunities – active corporate agency – the resistance can slow plantation expansion. This finding contradicts the political opportunity theory and the institutional/structural analysis of the political economy, which see socio-political transformations, mobilization and conflict outcomes as defined mostly or even entirely by the opportunity structures.

This chapter uses earlier research theoretically to point out how legislation and lobbying generates business success more than market forces, also in Brazil (Kingstone 1999, Doctor 2003, Diniz & Boschi 2004). In the institutional approach utilized here, the “market” is a social construct (Fligstein 2001; Bourdieu 2005). As John Zysman (1994: 253) writes, “a government can intervene and deeply affect who wins and loses in the marketplace”. In the case of industrial tree plantation legislation, not market forces, have been the most important dynamics-setter (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003: 17; MMA 2005). Foresters, engineers and business analysts have argued however, that market forces, industry-specific technological
transformations and natural conditions are the determining factors in pulp investment location. For example, using an analysis of 15 European countries, Bergman and Johansson (2002: 1) argue that large-scale paper and pulp investments have been determined mostly by three market variables: “wages, the USD/ECU exchange rate, the price of paper and the installed production capacity”. In contradiction to their findings, I argue two distinct processes – not variables – are much more significant in explaining new pulp project location. These are 1) government support given to the industry and 2) state repression of social movements protesting against investments. The first argument I assess in this and the eight chapter, the second in the rest of this thesis.

The earlier research that relies heavily on multivariate analysis downplays or neglects the importance of political processes and political actors like governments and social movements in driving change in pulp project location and its model. Li et al. (2004: 18) acknowledge this caveat in the traditional paper industry research, suggesting that, “resource availability, corporate tax policies and environmental regulations should also be investigated”. I have heeded their call. Battles for resources, taxes and regulations, in other words, politics, have a crucial impact on the expansion of tree plantations. Technological changes and market costs are to be analyzed in conjunction with politics. Technological transformations and market fluctuations embed with political processes. This type of institutional analysis readily escapes from the neoclassical analysis of the economy (Evans 1995), which is a theoretical reason to offer an institutional, politics-as-mechanism approach. Politics influences costs, technology, “natural conditions”, and country-specific regulatory frameworks that impose pesticide, fertilization and land use limits.

**Contemporary Paper Industry**

A specific set of actors responsible for particular mechanisms create the modern paper industry system. The key actors within the sector are a transforming set. I have identified the following as critical actors in the system (see also Carrere and Lohmann 1996, who provide a similar analysis). Since they all have certain interconnected functions, I analyze the industry as a system:

- Consultants and entrepreneurs (for example, Pöyry) = *role as ideologists and strategists* (provide planning, the creators of the large-scale model).
- Paper and pulp companies (Aracruz, Stora Enso, VCP) = *realization, territorialization of the system* (producers, as well as “markets”).
- Chemical industry (BASF, Bayer, Kemira, etc.) = *benefactor, push factor* (providing fertilization, chemicals).
- Machinery and equipment companies (Metso, Andritz) = *push factor* (providing technology within the large-scale, capital-intensive investment model).
- Investors (governmental banks, investment banks, commercial banks, export credit agencies, companies) = *necessary support for expansion* (providing credit).
Governments and lobby groups (Brazil, Uruguay, EU, Finland; Bracelpa) = networking (providing crucial political support).

Media, research & certification institutions = justification (providing supportive, legitimizing discourses).

The capital-intensive, highly controversial large-scale pulp investment model could not be territorialized without the active and aggressive networking and support of investors, governments, lobby groups, media, certification and research institutions. To start with, pulp projects, like other agribusiness operations, come with an in-built symbiosis with the chemical and machinery companies. These supply the paper industry; they are a push factor behind new pulp investments and ensuing land commoditization, providing for and dependent on the chemical and machinery needs of ever-larger pulp plants, and tree plantations.

Even more central are the consulting companies, who act as ideologists and masterminds behind the large-scale pulp investment model. The Finnish Pöyry Consulting is the leader in new pulp project planning in the world and in Brazil. According to a company executive, João Cordeiro, the company provides intelligence information and services for the paper industry (Interview, Helsinki, 2008). Most of Pöyry’s profit comes from the engineering consultancy on pulp mills and elaboration of environmental licenses and studies like EIA/RIMA, the Environmental Impact Analysis required before investment. Pöyry is a catalyst of big investments, analyzing the site, buying equipment and providing engineering services and supervising the construction of the pulp mill. A paper and pulp company can buy a pulp mill as a package nowadays. Pöyry takes care of everything, coordinating various suppliers (Interview, Cordeiro, Pöyry Helsinki March 2008). Five hundred professionals are enough to plan a pulp project from scratch. “Before, you could not buy a pulp investment as a package, it came in parts,” Cordeiro explains.

Marchak (1995) has argued that even though Pöyry does have enormous influence, its success lies rather in two simple features typical of the market economies: it happened to have the right skills to offer at the right moment, and its notions of global development match those of most governments, companies and aid agencies. Carrere & Lohmann (2006: 89) analyze as Pöyry’s skills:

Lobbying governments, evaluating forest and land resources, lining up contracts from close colleagues in ‘aid’ agencies, subcontracting lucrative work out to potential allies, doing feasibility studies or market surveys, establishing tree nurseries, and designing or engineering factories. Relying on contracts both from state and transnational agencies and from the private sector, Pöyry and its fellow consulting corporations serve as crucial go-betweens linking the interests of transnational and national business and officialdom and bringing together Northern machinery and techniques with Southern land and forests.

Pöyry has most of the world mapped, and is ready to offer intelligence on where paper companies should invest and how. Carrere & Lohmann (1996: 89) write: “Playing a crucial indirect role in pulp and paper manufacture are a handful of Northern forestry and engineering consultancy corporations whose business is promoting, investigating, planning, designing and
setting up pulp and paper mills or logging and plantation operations”. Everything starts with a feasibility study to see if it is worth it for a company to build a mill in a particular location. Pöyry then monitors the company in all the phases, with a mixed team of Pöyry and paper company staff. “Pöyry is 15 years ahead of the industry, of investment decisions, as you have to plant trees before the pulp mill,” Cordeiro explains (interview, Helsinki 2008). This places heavy agency and responsibility on Pöyry. The consultancy defines to a large extent the future parameters of paper industry expansion. However, Cordeiro argues, “The initiative normally comes from the client, even though Pöyry does the screening.” He lamented that there are fewer and fewer sites for pulp investment, as the current pulp “production reminds one much more of agriculture than industry”. The future will see expansion inland along main railroad and water routes, both existing and possible.

Large-scale pulp projects are extremely capital-intensive and normally only huge corporations are able to set them up. The paper industry system prefers big players: most banks provide financing only for projects over fifty million USD or in some cases at least 10 million USD. This exclusive admission implies that the system is a very conservative network of a limited number of players. However, these characteristics of the system – few players and the need for close ties with financiers – impose great risks on paper producers. Risky relations mean market dependency, as was shown in the fall of 2008 financial crisis, when Aracruz lost over US$ 2.13 billion dollars and Votorantim over 800 million dollars in currency derivative losses, resulting in Votorantim buying Aracruz from the Lorentzen and Safra Groups, paying R$ 2.7 billion reais to both of them using loans provided by BNDES (Correio Braziliense 2008).

Besides susceptibility to market fluctuations, the forest industry is a natural resource sector. As such, it depends on governments that allocate natural resources. Marchak sees this as the only difference between the forest industry and manufacturing industries. In the paper industry,

Public funding for economic development is everywhere the norm, and it is not only the gestation period of trees that makes it essential, but rather a combination of the absolute cost of most large-scale developments and the unwillingness of private investors to take substantial risks or deal with uncertainties (Marchak 1995: 340).

Efficient lobbying is essential for the paper companies to succeed, as they are so dependant on the state and natural resources. It was only after 1992 that the paper and pulp companies in Brazil started to form lobbies: Bracelpa replaced the old national and transnational company lines (MMA 2005: 52). Following unification into Bracelpa, the Brazilian paper industry started to act as an entity instead of acting on company-specific lines (ibid.). This suggests that the paper and pulp industry system really consolidated in 1992, as a countermeasure to the Rio Earth Summit (see also Carrere & Lohmann 1996), and has since fortified its status as a unified political-economic actor. Bracelpa is a typical corporatist association; according to its president, Horácio Lafer Piva, its goal is to unite the paper and pulp industry companies in
Brazil and lessen internal competition.\textsuperscript{82} Bracelpa’s attitude to the resistance is that “the social movements should ally with us and not the contrary” (Embanews 2007). The association undertakes extensive socio-political activity: for example, it influences public opinion by giving awards to journalists who write positively about the industry and appears continuously in the media (Bracelpa 2007).

There is interconnectedness between the companies besides membership of the same lobby-organization: Klabin, Aracruz and Suzano are situated in the same street in São Paulo, Avenida Faria Lima (Valor Econômico 2007). According to Stora Enso’s João Borges,\textsuperscript{83} these compete between each other but have common interests (interview, São Paulo, 2008). Bracelpa defends industry interests vis-à-vis the state, among which Borges mentioned taxation, logistics and relations with the federal government. On the other hand, João Cordeiro from Pöyry argued there is not much competition within the paper industry in Brazil, pointing to the close family relations of pulp company owners (interview, Helsinki, 2008).

The Brazilian and global paper companies are merging increasingly. In the 1990s, the Brazilian pulp producing group was limited to the biggest six players, who bought smaller companies. They are competitors but since the concentration phase of the 1970s have also bought controlling cross-holdings in each other (MMA 2005: 13). In 2003, a few companies – Aracruz, Cenibra, VCP, Suzano/Bahia Sul and Jari – were responsible for 93% of pulp production in Brazil (IOS 2005: 14). The web sites of pulp companies in Brazil resemble each other very closely in their design, content and overall style. The companies have written them with the same audience in mind: the transnational investors. The consolidation is continuing.

All these factors support the claim that the paper industry, especially in Brazil, is a quite unified system. However, there are also different pulp models within the global forest industry cluster apart from the large-scale pulp model relying on industrial tree plantations. One example is the small alternative pulp projects, which can utilize a great variety of fibers as raw material. A leading company of this kind is the Finnish Chempolis. According to the company website:

\begin{quote}
Chempolis Ltd is a leading-edge company in the development and delivery of environmentally sustainable biorefining technologies and production solutions for industrial utilisation of non-wood and non-food feedstocks. These materials include straws, grasses, bagasse, energy crops, bast and leaf fibres, among many other biomass resources. […] in a study by IFC (a private sector arm of the World Bank), Chempolis’s technology was evaluated as the most economical and environmentally sustainable non-wood pulping technology […] in a study by the Department of Energy of the USA, Chempolis’s technology was evaluated as the most energy-efficient pulping technology (including modern wood pulping technologies) (Chempolis 2009).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{82} “New players, with different views of Brazil, are arriving and we are literally very occupied in establishing the conditions for this, as we consider that our competition is not in here, but out there,” said Piva. (Embanews 2007, my translation from Portuguese)

\textsuperscript{83} Borges has worked as a forest director for the pulp industry since 1982, firstly in the Amazon in Jari, then for Veracel between 1995 and 2003, and now for Stora Enso since 2004.

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Viable alternatives exist for the current large-scale monocultural tree plantation pulp investment model. In this light, the choice of continuing with the large-scale model can be explained by looking into the historical, built-in interests of the large-scale model’s technology, know-how and its most important contacts. The dominant players in the global paper industry system, Metso, Pöyry, Stora Enso, Fibria, chemical companies, state actors linked to these, as well as scientists and engineers with patents and research lines supporting the large-scale model, are those who most actively promote the corporate agency that seeks to capitalize by territorializing large-scale pulp projects in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Indonesia and China.

A Regional, Globalizing Industry

One has to observe the transformations and structure in the global paper industry system to understand the Brazilian case. According to João Cordeiro from Pöyry, the forest industry is not yet global, but rather a regional or continental industry. Nevertheless, it is starting to globalize, Cordeiro argues (interview, Helsinki, 2008). Some countries still act as a centre in the globalizing paper industry system. Finland has been the centre of paper innovations for the last 40 years; the Finnish forest industry companies have been vital in establishing the large-scale pulp plant model since the 1960s. However, as it reached the end of the 20th century, the Finnish forest cluster was not doing so well. According to The Economist (2000), “European paper corporations, whose returns on capital have not exceeded 10% in recent years, have also done badly. Paper corporations everywhere have been destroying reams of shareholder capital.” The Economist explains why the paper giants face problems: “Yet it is not the arrival of the digital age and the ‘paperless’ office that is to blame for the industry’s troubles. They arise from a classic old-economy problem: global overcapacity … Even the biggest corporations usually lack the market power to nudge prices upward” (ibid). Not able to raise prices, corporations started to seek ways to lower costs, argues The Economist. The trend since the 1990s has been to construct more and more efficient factories, such as Veracel’s pulp mill.

Cost-effective companies can guarantee good profit margins and thus the capacity to control the prices on the markets by reducing or increasing output temporarily. Companies have been merging to attain this goal: “The bosses of the big paper companies explain the merger wave with visionary strategic statements ... bosses say their home markets of North America or Europe are mature, and that acquisitions grease the way into growth markets. Others again see deals as a way to lock in vast quantities of inexpensive feedstock in such places as Brazil” (ibid.). The paper industry has been expanding markedly: “over the past decade investment banks have invested some $40 billion in pulp mills, as demand for paper has soared. Some industry analysts foresee over $50 billion in new investment by 2015, much of it in Brazil, China and Indonesia” (The Economist 2006).

New pulp investments are highly profitable, generating some 200 million Euros profit per year, thus paying themselves back in a matter of few years (Pakkasvirta 2008). Besides
profits, a huge new mill brings power over the markets. Companies like Stora Enso are such huge players that they themselves create the markets by a one million ton pulp mill like Veracel: in such a case “I’m the market”, as a Stora Enso wood supply executive said (Genfors, Weine 2007). However, the drive to construct pulp plants will soon lead to overcapacity, especially as the market demand for pulp and paper fluctuates greatly. In the latter half of 2008, even many of the most efficient pulp mills in Latin America, like Botnia in Uruguay, shut down for a period as demand decreased.

To whose interests does the overcapacity created by new investments play? Marchak (1995) forecast that overcapacity would have devastating effects on northern producers and not on the southern simply because of the cost differential. Since 2007, Finland has surely witnessed this, as companies have shut mills and paper workers have lost jobs, directly parallel with founding companies like Veracel in the south. However, strictly from the point of view of the shareholders as mere shareholders and not as members of a national economy, northern shareholders have obtained more dividends and value through the increased profitability of companies such as Stora Enso since the end of the 1990s.⁸⁴ “Esko Makelainen, senior executive vice-president of Stora Enso, the world’s second-largest paper producer: ‘Today we are much more disciplined and more focused on creating stable returns.’ And more global ... 90% of [Stora Enso’s] turnover is outside Finland” (The Economist 2006). A thorough transformation has run through Stora Enso in the early 21st century, according to its directors. Stora Enso is now “more focused on creating stable returns” (ibid.). The entry to Latin America and China is the result of this new discourse of discipline and returns. Gone are the 1970s when what mattered was that factories were plentiful and output increased. Instead of production, the bottom line is now the bottom line. The pulp produced from eucalyptus in South America signifies fewer production costs in comparison to Finland.⁸⁵ The goal is to make production plants that are more cost-efficient than the already cost-efficient ones, and then shut down the less profitable but still profitable mills, as has been the case at many profitable Finnish pulp mills closed from 2005 forwards. Veracel replaced Stora Enso’s profitable Kemijärvi mill, as it was even more profitable. Besides being set in the contemporary global capitalism emphasizing quartile profits, the globalizing paper industry system also draws from a long history of power struggles with workers, fiber providers and the rest of society, to which I turn next.

⁸⁴ The Finnish state is the largest single shareholder in the company, retaining directly and indirectly, 35.5% of Stora Enso’s votes at the end of 2008, via Solidium Oy, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland, The State Pension Fund and The Local Government Pensions Institution (Stora Enso 2009: 67).

⁸⁵ An economist of Paperiliitto, the Finnish Paper Union, Esa Mäisti, has calculated that in Nordic countries the tree & pulp mill costs are four-times higher than in Brazil. Furthermore, paper industry workers in Finland earn 8-10 times more than in Brazil. However, the labor costs are almost irrelevant when considering the total cost structure of producing pulp, the Finnish Paper Workers’s Union argues. “Sellun tuotanto ja työntekijöiden oikeudet Brasiliassa”, publication of a study by SASK and Observatorio Social on the Social Responsibility of Veracel. Helsinki: 7.6.2006.
Paper Industry History

The critical moment in modern papermaking history was the French Revolution, when a papermaking model based on the modern paper-machine replaced a model in which skilled papermakers made paper by hand from rags like old linen. Making paper was not easy at the inception of the modern paper industry system during the French Revolution. The increased wage demands and organization by paperworkers at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, following the French Revolution, led into a deep abyss between the paper barons and workers. As barons did not offer wage rises, the revolutionary paper-workers resigned. However, the French revolution needed paper to continue spreading revolutionary ideology. Due to the need for paper and the demands by the paper patrons, the French revolutionary regimes deemed the protests of paperworkers unlawful, against the free exercise of work. In spite of this, paperworkers remained united in the face of high pressures to return to work – against the government-business alliance of the time. Papermakers were crucially short of labor as the resistance of paperworkers lasted longer than expected. The solution came in the form of a new technology. (Rosenbaud 2000: 145.)

The first papermaking machine was invented, not because of an industry-specific need for it, but because no consensus was found between the workers and the industry-government alliance. The reason for the new technology was the capital-owners’ desire to triumph over the workers, argues Rosenbaud (2000: 147), writing that the resistance by labor “was shredded by the machine”. At a critical juncture, “Nicolas-Louis Robert patented the papermaking machine in 1799 … Robert’s machine mechanized movements that had been the monopoly of skilled men … the device was a response to the paperworkers’ esprit de corps … Robert intended to rid the industry of the workers themselves” (Rosenbaud 2000: 147-148). Following their failed dream of making “machines of men”, the papermakers installed the machine itself. After the machine, the owners established a strict working order inside the paper mills. However, “the dream remains an illusion”, as papermakers still depend on workers. (Rosenbaud 2000: 151.) Ever since this critical juncture, the industry has invested in capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive paper production technology. Even though the expanding paper industry became a crucial employer in Sweden, Finland and Canada during the 19th and 20th centuries, the mechanization drive that intensified with the automation of mills has led to a steady decline in employment since the late 1960s, even as production has increased (Marchak 1995: 6).

Besides factory workers, the paper industry depends on forestland. After two centuries of increasingly accumulated and restricted paper production capital, the original dream of a totally labor and resistance free factory remains unattained. The dream seems to be even further away since 2004, as important social movements in the global South have come to challenge the same imperative paperworkers faced during the French Revolution. The stakeholders in Western papermaking societies have organized in the last 100 years to such a degree that the paper industry looks for social spaces with less accrued resistance force, like the societies of Latin America and Asia. “Were it not for labour unions at home, we would be moving all of production capacity to countries like Brazil,” said a Stora Enso official to the
Financial Times in 2005 (cf. Lang 2008). In this passage, a paper industry representative explicitly alleges that organized civil society has a powerful impact on paper investment location. The corporations dislike this power relation, as explicitly shown in the above passage, and want to find a society where they are in power.

Multinational corporations seek power across political systems, not merely profit. Evans (1979: 35) elaborates: “Just as imperialism is not simply capitalism, multinational corporations are not simply profit-making capitalist corporations. Corporations remove control over production from those engaged in production; multinationals extend the alienation across political boundaries”. Quartile-profit maximizing capitalism might lead one to assume that corporations seek only profit. However, a close inspection of industry culture, roots and ideology shows that industrial groups can be systems that seek to expand, continue and excel in system-specific goals. Issues specifically important to a sector matter. Sector-specificity ascribes historical and ownership-marked traits and goals to industries.

The global South is a potential new safe haven in which industry can attain transnational transformations. Multinational corporations transform the power relations in Northern societies through low-cost investment in the global South. Increasingly, the main battle-line in the corporate resource exploitation is between transnational corporations and the societies they influence. States operate somewhere in between as instruments in this struggle. It is an outdated view to see the recent transformations in the globalizing economy as a struggle between different national capitals and states, argues William Robinson (2007). However, in the large-scale pulp investments around the global South, some states and national economies, especially Finland, still wield considerable power and gain relatively more than others do, even though some parts of society stand to lose in Finland as well, including paper workers losing jobs to production relocation. If the currently active mechanisms creating the paper industry continue to gain force, the result will be an ever-more integrated, merged and transnational paper-producing system, as the quote above from the non-existent national sympathies of the director of Stora Enso exemplifies. Such a system would be even further away from the ideals of right livelihood.

The Brazilian Paper Industry

The current Brazilian pulp export-focused paper industry is situated in a continuum in the historical flow of wood from Brazil to Europe in one form or another. Large-scale eucalyptus plantations are a direct continuation of the Brazilian land relations of colonial and imperial times. The industrial part of the paper and pulp industry gained its initial and recurrent character in the Western European industrial and social revolutions. The shape of the paper industry system in Brazil is an amalgam of two historical paths, firstly, the colonial political economy of natural resource extraction from the periphery and, secondly, the industrialization

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86 The passage hints that a weakly organized society is even more important than state support for large-scale pulp investments. Even more important than analyzing the role of states is considering the role of resistance, which is why this research is concerned with contentious agency, and not simply the state-business alliance.
and monopolization of economic operations and power by corporations at the centre of the
global capitalism. Until now, this congruence of mutually supporting historical institutional
trajectories has sustained the industry against major modifications. Against this setting, the
slowing of plantation expansion as an outcome generated by a social movement is a
tremendous alteration.

The Portuguese colonized the area known today as Brazil principally for the sake of forest
resource extraction and even named it after a forestry operation, the cutting of Brazil-wood
from the coastal area. Those working with the cutting of Brazil-wood destined for European
dye markets gained the professional title of Brasileiros, Brazilians. Following the depletion
of Brazil-wood, the wood extraction process turned to cutting Southern Brazil’s Araucaria
forests in the 19th century. English companies took most of the profits to Europe and in
exchange left behind railroads and other infrastructure through which they exported the
highest technology of the time to Brazil, thus fostering England’s internal industrialization
and leaving in place an infrastructure for future resource exportation from Brazil. In the
process, the companies used the infrastructure to deplete almost the entire stock of Araucaria
forest (Interview with Borges, Stora Enso, 2008).

The Second World War forced Brazil to start producing paper and pulp in greater quantities,
as it could no longer import from Europe. The growth of the sector was very slow until the
authoritarian President Getúlio Vargas initiated a period of protectionism starting in the
1930s. Since then, high import tariffs and other measures led to some growth in the internal
market. These political economic conditions favored paper producers in Brazil: a large part of
this development took place due to the protectionist measures of Vargas’s federal
government, assuring the domestic market for the national producers (Instituto Observatório
Social 2005: 8). In this period, the national Klabin, Suzano and Simão groups became central.

In 1941, Indústria de Papel Leon Feffer & Cia, later renamed Suzano, became one of the first
large-scale producers as it opened a paper mill in São Paulo. In an important sectoral
development, the paper industry united in 1944, establishing a specific lobby, Associação
Nacional dos Fabricantes de Papel e Celulose (ANFP). The new association focused only on
paper and pulp. This restriction continues today, marking an export-oriented rather than
widespread industrialization-aiming policy for the forest industry cluster in Brazil.

The dependency school and world-system theorists have aptly pointed out how the name indicates the relation
between Brazil and Europe, the area and its people being destined to produce raw material.
It is interesting to note how central the forestry sector has always been in the Brazilian society and state. The
Brazilian government founded its first environmental institution, the Pine Institute because of the early araucaria
cutting. The Pine Institute is the predecessor of the current IBAMA, an institute under the Ministry of the
Environment. The legislation and policies governing the paper industry sector thus remain under this ministry.
However, the industry “should be under the Ministry of Agriculture as it is a productive sector, you produce
wood like grain”, Borges explained. The paper industry would like to be governed by the laws of agribusiness
and not by the stricter laws of the Ministry of the Environment. Indeed, to make a comparison, the agribusiness
sector under the Ministry of Agriculture has much more liberty than the paper industry. This also explains in part
the far more damaging impact of many other agribusiness operations than pulp production, principally the
destruction of the Amazon rainforest.
In 1955, the Feffer family started to contemplate the possibility of using eucalyptus for pulp, and later started production under the company name Suzano. Alongside Suzano and some other national players who had tested eucalyptus in Brazil, the Norwegian entrepreneur Erling Lorentzen – married to the sister of King of Norway – featured prominently by introducing a master plan to export eucalyptus on large scale from Brazil. The choice of pulp production from eucalyptus limited forest industry industrialization in Brazil. In Finland, the forest industry organized around a more extensive production sphere, promoting the construction of the world’s most diversified and wide-spread forest cluster. This happened in Finland well before the Brazilian choice was made, and, considering the central role of the Finnish forest cluster and corporations in the globalizing paper industry system, it has to be noted that the earlier development in Finland created a transnational corporate agency that influenced the establishment of a export-pulp paper industry in Brazil.

The years after the 1964 coup were critical in the establishment of the state support mechanisms creating the export-pulp industry and government alliance that is still alive today. The military government created the first forestry engineering schools. These emerged from the departments of agriculture, and focused on tree plantation productivity (interview, Borges 2008). Since then, companies have always directed the formation of foresters in Brazil to ward their own interests (ibid.). To implement the pulp exportation master plan, Lorentzen founded Aracruz Celulose S.A. and created extensive diplomatic and market ties both in Brazil and around the global North. Entrepreneurs like Lorentzen and the Finnish Jaakko Pöyry were the crucial figures helping to bring together the actors and corporate agency promoting mechanisms required to set up the current large-scale pulp investment model in Brazil in the 1970s. They constructed a paper industry system and linked the system to the state, thus creating mechanisms promoting corporate agency. By doing so, the Brazilian forest industry was limited to export-pulp production for the global markets. Thus, the Brazilian sector became an integral part of the consolidating global economy, fixing its place as a commodity provider for the globalizing paper industry system.

The large-scale eucalyptus pulp model reflects Brazil’s clear connection with North American and Western European markets, especially transnational agribusiness, the plantation-led “Green Revolution” process in the countryside. In investment areas, pulp became a central vehicle for the establishment of absolute private property rights that led to land concentration and commoditization as well as wage labor, as the next chapter argues. Capitalist agriculture replaced the significant Brazilian peasant economy in the 1960s (Vergara-Camus 2007). The co-occurrence of a pulp industry relying on eucalyptus plantation emerging immediately after 1964 elucidates the importance of a state alliance for the setting up of large-scale corporate resource exploitation.

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89 Forestry research was mostly concerned with limited production increase until the 1990s, when a more holistic approach united the development of genetic material, fertilization, and soil preparation research (Interview, João Borges 2008). There is strong and widespread cooperation between universities, state institutions and pulp companies, open exchange of information and technological advancements, which also characterizes other Brazilian industries, explained Borges. Such relations are typical in state corporatist systems, as the state supports development by large-scale corporations.
State-Financed Expansion

Since the genesis of new business enterprises takes place through financing, assessing the politics, actors and rules underlying the industry financing can help to reveal its origin and trajectory. The contemporary Brazilian pulp industry is the result of state, multinational and local financing. Evans (1979: 53) argued famously that these triple alliances led to some industrialization in Brazil, which reflects a developmental move from periphery and classical dependency into semi-periphery and dependent development. Most of the funds in pulp investments have come from the Brazilian state. Some has been multinational, offered by the World Bank, European and North American private and state banks, and state-backed Northern export credits. The final elements of pulp investment financing has been borne by local capital from Brazilian oligarchic conglomerates such as Votorantim and Safra, controlled by powerful elite families.

The military government established in 1964 used the Vargas-founded BNDE, the National Bank of Economic Development, later named BNDES, the National Development Bank to power an export-pulp sector (MMA 2005). BNDE decisively influenced the creation of the paper and pulp industry by financing foreign and national investors (ibid.). A pivotal example was the establishment of Aracruz’s first mill, for which BNDE contributed US$337 million in the form of loans and share purchases: “Without the state support, the plant could never have been set up”, argue Carrere & Lohmann (1996: 150). BNDE also placed conditions on the credit; only large-scale endeavors receiving loans. A requirement of one thousand tons per day of pulp production was established, along with guarantees of fiber supply (MMA 2005). This excluded small and medium-scale competition and ensured an oligarchic property and production structure amenable to the technocratic developmentalist policy that Brazilian governments and leading oligarchs have followed since the times of Benjamin Constant in the 19th century.90

State support was not limited to BNDE finance. In 1966, only two years after the setting up of the military regime, tree plantations obtained strong fiscal incentives and negative interest-rate loans until 1987. In 1966, the authoritarian regime passed Law 5.106, which allowed deduction of reforestation projects from tax liabilities. This led to exponential growth in the cutting of native forests and increased land access for the paper industry. Production of short-fiber eucalyptus pulp started after a decade of planting trees at the end of the 1970s with the building of the first new large-scale mills. Entrepreneurs invested in huge plantations of eucalyptus and pine, plantations ravaging 26.6 million hectares of native forests. (MMA 2005: 10.) Establishing industrial tree plantations was free and actually generated profits; since the rate of return for landowners planting eucalyptus was 663% due to the fiscal incentives (Bull et al. 2006: 19, 25-26). Brazil was no exception: in this period, governments offered pulp investments “subsidies for start-up costs, taxation incentives, land grants, and relaxation of labour laws and other legislation” all around the world (Marchak 1995: 15). The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) argues that paper industry incentives led

90 Constant was a military man, heavily influenced by the ideas of Auguste Comte and the founder of the Brazilian positivist movement and the Military Club.
to market distortions and ecological hazards. “Subsidies led to a greater concentration of land ownership and an increase in deforestation” as well as driving the consumption of paper products, as these are made artificially cheaper (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003: 38). Under the authoritarian regime, state support was extremely beneficial for corporate actors. Landowners in Brazil rushed for the wealth to be made by acquiring fiscal incentives, planting trees in rows and lines, without control and rapidly. The rush resulted in several undesirable consequences, not only from the local populations, but also from the industry-viewpoint: poor location selection, fragmentation of plantations, improper land use, cutting of rainforests and use of good agricultural soil. Many established plantations were very far from the markets, which further watered down the competitive advantage. (Bull et al. 2006: 26.) The predatory plantation expansion, which I assess in detail in the next chapter, had the effect of driving rural population to the cities and securing land access that pulp companies could use in the future to expand.

The rules of financing and the specific political forces deciding on credit led to the setting up of an oligarchic paper and pulp industry in Brazil. The scale was to be massive, in line with the Brazilian technocratic elitism (drawing from Brazilian positivism, which is a separate thing from the scientific positivism or legal positivism) and state corporatism. The military-controlled state lacked unity as well as autonomy vis-à-vis corporations, even though the regime had a higher degree of autonomy than the subsequent ones (Nelson 1995: 111). The state corporatist regime gave the role of paper and pulp making to a consortium of large companies and national banks (Banas 1984: 216). When the initial private pulp investments failed in spite of all the state support, the state was there to assume the risk, to provide a safety network for speculative entrepreneurs. Since private banks and national economic groups were not interested in financing the plantation and pulp expansion in the 1970s, the industry had to turn to public funds and bailouts. For example, the notoriously failed Daniel Ludwig’s Jari Project in the Amazon fell into the hands of the state. Jari imported a floating pulp mill from Japan – a colossal failure – and the Brazilian state had to pay the external debt left by this failed private investment (Banas 1984: 216).

The earlier research shows clearly that tree plantation operations received extensive state support. Even though not as massive as the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) support given to other industries, deemed by the military regime as more crucial, one can conclude that the support for the paper industry was a) considerable and b) came from the state, not markets or private sources.

**Eucalyptus: A Plant of Neoliberalism or Developmentalism?**

The resistance network has called the eucalyptus used in industrial tree plantations a neoliberal plant: “it grows very fast, leaves nothing behind and uses a lot of water”, said one Network against the Green Desert activist. But even though eucalyptus might be a neoliberal plant in some minds, it was established in Brazil before the neoliberal era, as shown above, under the 1964 to 1985 military dictatorship, an era the Brazilian political scientist Armando
Boito (2007: 60) labels monopoly-favoring developmentalism. President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) initiated the neoliberal reforms aiming to diminish the influence of the state in the economy. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (“FHC”) (1995-2003) continued the neoliberal policies. Did these reforms manage to cut the state support enjoyed by the paper industry? The answer would seem to be no, quite the contrary, state support increased, which is a puzzling anomaly for those who see neoliberalization as diminishing the role of the state.

In the 1980s, Latin America experienced a lost decade of economic stagnation after the economic growth of the 1970s. Brazil was beset by seemingly uncontrollable inflation, an external debt crisis, and the average rate of growth dropped from over 5% to about 2% during the last two decades of the 20th century (Luna and Klein 2006: 37). One solution suggested by the neoliberal agenda was privatizations. In the 1990s, the plantations of the public Vale do Rio Doce steel company in Southern Bahia were sold to Veracruz, the predecessor of Veracel. Interestingly, as ownership has become private, public incentives have been augmented. Since the 1980s, Marchak (1995: 273) adds, *de facto* fiscal incentives grew as the Brazilian state gave increasing attention to publicly funded research and training of foresters that benefited corporations. She claims that the private profits continue to grow as the initial and continuing state support has resulted in research payoff (ibid.). However, profits have concentrated as the state has passed the plantations it owns onto private corporations (Bull et al. 2006, MMA 2005). In this sense, eucalyptus represents neoliberalism.

In the wake of the 1990s, according to Peter Kingstone (1999: 240) Brazil was just turning from the import substitution industrialization (ISI) state corporatist model to the neoliberal model, and many of its business sectors faced enormous pressures in having to compete with the global markets. The lost decade of the 1980s forced the Brazilian paper and pulp industry to reduce costs, export more and focus on productivity, modernization and professionalization in the management of companies. This was achieved by a national program of paper and pulp, a strong packet of state support that led to a new cycle of investment in the 1990s. (MMA 2005: 13.) What was interesting about the pulp & paper sector in 1990 was that it was “amongst the most competitive sectors [of Brazil] in the global economy” (Kingstone 1999: 234-235). Thus, to transform it or to invest in it seemed of little macroeconomic importance to the Brazilian government in comparison to financing other sectors of the economy, which were not so competitive. According to Kingstone, neoliberal reforms never threatened the Brazilian paper & pulp industry – and in spite of this, the industry strongly criticized the neoliberal reforms of Fernando Collor’s government at the beginning of the 1990s. The industry association Bracelpa devoted “much effort to lobbying for improved financing from the BNDES, which it secured in 1992 and then again in 1996” (Kingstone 1999: 234-235).

In total, Bracelpa and BNDES argued that the state had to invest US $13 billion between 1996 and 2005 in the paper & pulp sector (Kingstone 1999: 234-235), and the state met this estimate. The 21st century pulp wave thus came to enjoy the fruits of the earlier lobby that had guaranteed 13 billion for the sector. Veracel gained a US $495 million low-interest loan from the BNDES. Following the comfort the pulp & paper sector gained from the Brazilian State, the sector has never again opposed neoliberal reforms (Kingstone 1999: 234-235). It had no
reason, as it had secured plentiful state credit and thus market liberalization only favored their competition position with others through preferential and extensive state backing.

During the 1990s, the paper and pulp sector became a clear and crucial priority of the BNDES in comparison to the earlier phase during which it also received massive support but was not among the crucial sectors. The dramatically increased BNDES resources seem to be at the very heart of explaining the pulp investment wave after 1990. In a 1998 report by the BNDES, called “The Brazilian pulp and paper industry investment requirements” (Fingerl & Filho 1998), the words required, obliged and necessary appear repeatedly. The report aimed to legitimize and secure a massive increase in state funding for the paper industry, which it managed to do. In the BNDES discourse exemplified in Fingerl & Filho (1998), a “market demand” requires, obliges and makes necessary the spending of public money to ensure private export-pulp production increases. The logic clearly contradicts the liberal invisible hand self-regulating market-theory, portraying a paper industry deeply reliant on industrial policy, particularly loans. If the market demand forecast was objectively true – which such forecasts can never objectively be, as they construct the markets and reality depending on the relative position and power of the discursive agent – the invisible hand would take care of supply in the free markets. In the liberal economic discourse, it would be profitable to produce for the new demand even without state loans – and production would be on a sustained and healthy base only in a “free market” situation. The 1998 BNDES report seemed to go against the neoliberal doctrine in its heyday – a sign of the continuity of state corporatism in Brazil. This suggests that one should carefully assess expert prognosis of a supposed increase in demand that is accompanied by a will to legitimize a need for credit, examining these demands in terms of the underlying industry-specific interests. The BNDES report and support are evidence of a strong state-business alliance, which renders the paper industry very far from the ideal of a free-market business – for better or worse depending on one’s viewpoint.

The neoliberal reforms that sought to dismantle such state intervention in the early 1990s, the Washington Consensus recommendations, were not implemented as suggested but in a country-specific way in Latin America (Kuczynski & Williamson 2003). True, in some areas the state retreated, but in others, like involvement in the promotion of the agribusiness export industry, state influence grew tremendously. The paper industry case shows how deeply-rooted institutional mechanisms such as the Brazilian state corporatism have actually been maintained active by neoliberalism, as contrary as this might sound. In spite of the neoliberal policies aiming to dismantle or diminish the welfare state institutions’ role, at least in principle (Harvey 2005), the way these policies were implemented in Brazil increased state support for the paper sector. The strong state support allows the argument that pulp investments are an emblem of a strengthening developmentalism within the Brazilian government’s policy.
Nature alone does not bring fast-wood plantations. Some eucalyptus species can be cloned: for the paper industry, this is a great advantage, as trees other than eucalyptus do not have this quality. Historically, eucalyptus emanated from Australia in the 19th century with the European colonizers, who spread it around the world, intending to make use of the wood. However, the tree has become a harmful plant in many ecosystems. After decades of breeding, however, the plant has turned into a highly efficient material for producing good quality pulp, which can then be turned into high-quality paper products. For example, in the Northern Finnish city of Oulu a Stora Enso pulp plus paper plant uses eucalyptus pulp from Veracel. The Oulu mill used to produce pulp from both pine-trees (long fibre) and leaf-trees (short fiber): now it can focus on the pine trees as it receives short-fiber pulp from Brazil. Short and long fibers are used in various papermaking processes: Brazilian pulp is mostly short-fiber and largely destined for global commodity markets. In papermaking, “long fibres of cellulose are preferable to short ones” (The Economist 6 Jan 2005). Genetic engineering of trees, breeding and selection of trees with most suitable genes for the purposes of the industry is one part of the technical explanation of Brazilian eucalyptus productivity.

Other explanations for the fast-wood plantations, apart from the natural conditions, are the extensive utilization of pesticides, herbicides, fertilizer, efficient logistics, machinery and low tax, labor and public relations costs that the Brazilian legal framework and pro-pulp policies commit to new pulp investments. Industrial plantations of eucalyptus are highly productive.

91 Eucalyptus grandis and its hybrids with uruphylia, the urograndis, roots very quickly and well to the soil. Veracel uses the urograndis. Eucalyptus re-stems after being cut, other species not. If you take a piece of eucalyptus, cutting one piece of it, and place it into the soil, you will have soon a new eucalyptus tree stemming (interview with Borges, Stora Enso, June 2008).

92 The short-fiber pulp accounts for most pulp production in Brazil. In 2003, long-fiber pulp production was only 17% of total production, which was not enough even to satisfy the domestic demand for this fiber. (Instituto Observatório Social 2005: 14.) In 2005, there were 255 paper and pulp industries, 25 had their own tree plantations. Divided into 11 states and around 365 municipalities, the industry exported 52% of pulp production to global pulp markets. This is a very high number in comparison to the 23% global share that market pulp has in the overall global pulp production. (MMA 2005: 10.) Market pulp is the pulp that goes to free markets, whereas most of the worldwide pulp, 72%, goes to integrated paper mills and other uses.

93 Genomics has studied eucalyptus in order to create an economically more efficient, fast-growing plant. See, for example, a Brazilian genomics research: Grattapaglia 2004. In Uruguay, the Royal Dutch/Shell created eucalyptus plantations – now serving the Finnish UPM-Kymmene’s and Metsä-Botnia’s Botnia Mill in Fray Bentos – to develop a tree species with less lignin, a substance linking cellulose you have to remove so that the cellulose fibers do not glue together. This process of removing lignin requires “an enormous amount of chemical and mechanical effort” (The Economist 6 Jan 2005).

94 Joly sums the governmental easing of taxes and regulations which Brazilian pulp investments have enjoyed. In Espírito Santo, organized civil society managed to impose a law that demands ecological zoning: this legal instrument has disciplined eucalyptus plantations in Espírito Santo but is nonexistent in Bahia, according to Joly (2007: 17). At the beginning of Veracel’s construction, the mayor of Eunápolis gave the company a permanent discount on the municipal tax (ISSQN), lowering the tax on the legal minimum of 2% of the turnover of the company (Joly 2007: 18). In 2005, a new mayor increased the ISSQN to the maximum of 5% – which affected all business in the municipality – and resulted in Veracel turning into the principal source of income for Eunápolis municipal government (Joly 2007: 75). Later, in 2006 and 2008, as I interviewed the Eunápolis taxation authorities (see interviews), they claimed they attempt to get even higher taxes from the company which has made around 150-200 million euros of profit per year, leaving only a small part of this to the municipality. Pulp companies also receive other tax breaks, for example, for the importation of machinery. As they are export-oriented, the Law of Kandir (Lei Complementar No. 87/96) has decreed since 1996 that pulp companies do not
as modern forestry science, especially in Brazil, has developed row spacing, planting techniques and forest management, raising productivity from 14 to 40 cubic meters per hectare per year between the 1970s and the present (Piketty et al. 2009: 181). In fact, many practices produce the fast-wood plantations, and leaving one out would lead to slower growth. The Brazilian legislation allows the world’s most extensive usage of fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides. Plantation managers use from 200 to 400 kilograms of fertilizers per hectare planted with trees in Brazil, according to the forest director of Stora Enso, João Borges (interview, 2008). Borges also acknowledged that without the usage of herbicides, fertilization, and cloning, the growth of eucalyptus would fall by at least 50 percent (interview, 2008). Luiz Rodriquez, a forester from the University of São Paulo, argued that ants have to be controlled, most soils in Brazil are so acid that lime has to be added before tree plantations can spread, and if seeds are used instead of clones, the eucalyptus plantation will yield much lower, more random production (Rodriquez 2007). As the multiple explanations for high-growth eucalyptus reveal, pulp investment and industrial plantations in general are not simply technical questions, but deeply immersed in politics and society.

Several negative socio-economic impacts have steered large-scale pulp investments out of the confines of right livelihood. Economist Karina Oliveira (2008: 7) from the Federal University of Bahia finds that eucalyptus plantation “has promoted the expulsion of the ‘man of the countryside’ and intensified the process of land concentration, besides provoking significant environmental losses”. A group of six researchers found that pulp “provoked a land tenure concentration in the countryside, reduction in the number of workers in the countryside (permanent and temporary) and family work, which resulted in a process of intense rural exodus and a socio-economic reorganization” (Almeida et al. 2008: 17). Netto and Silva (2008: 106) argue, based on the official state issued IBGE and Censo Agropecuária statistics that “In this way, the landscape of the Extreme South will become monotonous ... the countryside loses the capacity to produce food for its inhabitants and for those in the cities, turning to attend only the market. ... the companies began to dictate the rules in the totally open and politically weakened territories”. Even though the GDP generally rose in the pulp holding areas, the human development index studied by the UNDP grew less in these municipalities than in those where pulp investment did not take place, representing generally lower levels than the national average (Almeida et al. 2008: 12). In comparison to Finland, where paper investment was responsible for generating tremendous welfare (Kuisma et al. 1999, Donner-Amnell 2004), in Bahia’s municipalities with pulp projects the living conditions of inhabitants did not improve (Almeida et al. 2008; Carvalho, Márcia 2006; Joly 2007; Netto and Silva 2008; Miranda 1992; Pedreira 2004; IOS 2005; Silva 1993; Dias 2001). Based on the official statistics, Almeida et al. (2008: 15) point out a principal reason: “there

have to pay the ICMS taxes (a tax on the circulation of goods and services), which is one of the principal revenue sources of Brazilian state government budgets (Joly 2007: 41). Joly notes that since 2002 the federal government has had to compensate the state government losses arising from the Law of Kandir, which signifies that the public sector pays twice to accommodate these investments (ibid).

95 Stora Enso technicians explained that the company uses fertilization consisting of phosphate, nitrogen and potassium in the first year to prepare the soil and continues to apply this in the following years if the area needs it. The costs of fertilization are 30–40 % of the total forestry operations costs, according to conversations I had with Votorantim foresters and Brazilian researchers.
was a very large reduction in the rural employment due to the impacts of eucalyptus plantation.” In 1980-2000, when tree plantations expanded in the area to accommodate the construction of pulp mills, the rural population fell by 51% (ibid). The process of land concentration by the monoculture-reliant pulp investment expansion increased the rural exodus and jobs disappeared in the countryside according to official statistics (Oliveira 2008: 136-7). The rural exodus led to pressing and serious problems of urban marginalization, diseases, prostitution, crime, unemployment, cost of living inflation and speculation in the land and real estate markets, besides destroying jobs in other sectors (author’s field research, 2004-2008; Joly 2007: 86; Netto and Silva 2008; Carvalho, Márcia 2006). According to the official IBGE statistics, between 1970 and 1996 the Gini index, measuring the concentration of wealth, inequality from 0 (all equal) to 1 (maximum inequality), showed a tremendous increase from 0.575 to 0.744 in the Extreme South of Bahia. Simultaneously, the number of 50-100 hectare sized farms diminished from 3443 to 881.

The existing independent scientific peer-reviewed research shows clearly that the local people are rightfully worried about the environmental impact of tree plantation expansion. Depending on the area, especially the local soil, fast-wood plantations, particularly eucalyptus, have caused severe damage to the soil, water flows and ecosystems in many places around the world as extensive eucalyptus plantations may salinize and acidify some soils and decrease stream flows (Jackson et al. 2005). Synthesizing over 600 observations, a group of 10 scientists published a report in *The Science* summarizing that in general, tree “plantations decreased stream flow by 227 millimeters per year globally (52%), with 13% of streams drying completely for at least 1 year” (Jackson et al. 2005: 1944). However, even though this is the general trend, plantations have different impacts depending on the soil, the nature and the region-specific environmental regulation and its execution. The impact of tree plantations on biodiversity is a function of what they replace (Cossalter & Pye-Smith 2003: 13). The Brazilian pulp holdings produce various impacts on the soil and stream flows. In general, eucalyptus requires lots of water to be productive. The research by Jose Stape, Dan Binkley and Michael Ryan (2004: 17) indicates that “the productivity of fertilized tropical plantations of Eucalyptus is most likely constrained by water supply, and that water supply substantially affects the efficiency of resource use as well as biomass allocation to roots, stems, and leaves.” A series of high-quality peer reviewed research papers proves that eucalyptus is significantly less efficient in its water use than most trees. The increased water use by eucalyptus “may lead to desertification and lowering [the] ground water table” and result in “scarcity of aquifer resources for deep-well-irrigated-agriculture in arid and semi arid climates” (Zahid and Nawaz 2007: 540).

Eucalyptus growth is highly dependent on water supply and atmospheric humidity at the plantation site. The supply of water is clearly a key factor at mapping regional potential growth of *Eucalyptus* plantations and in accounting for substantial variation in growth between years (Stape, Binkley and Ryan 2007). In areas with less than 100 mm of rainfall per year, such as the Pampa grasslands in South America, eucalyptus plantations influence the soil very negatively. “Salinization occurred rapidly where rainfall was insufficient to meet the water requirements of tree plantations and where groundwater use compensated for this
deficit, driving salt accumulating in the ecosystem” (Nosetto, Jobbágy, Toth and Jackson 2008: 1). In many areas in the global South, dry areas are expanding because of the global climate disruption, and the expansion of tree plantations in drying even the groundwater in the areas where rainfall is insufficient to meet the demand of eucalyptus monocultures. Research in Chile documented that when native forests are cut and replaced by exotic plantations, this forest cover and land-use change decrease water yield and summer runoff dramatically in these watersheds: “Fast-growing forest plantations reduce water yield” in small and large watersheds (Little, Lara, McPhee and Urrutia 2009: 162). Based on scientific research, eucalyptus plantations are most likely to change the hydrological regime in the pulp investment areas for the worse, especially in dry areas and when industrial tree plantations displace native forests. Pulp conflicts centre increasingly on water usage and not only on land and state support distribution.

Overall, the environmental impacts of pulp investments are a result of the socio-economic systems and livelihoods displaced by plantations – the displaced economic activities can continue in even more precarious ecological settings than the pasturelands and degraded areas paper companies allege they focus on when buying land for tree plantations. Furthermore, plantations can cause extra losses in biodiversity, on top of the displacement function. In Uruguay, “Research on eucalyptus afforestation shows depletion of the ecosystem services associated with grassland and loss of the resilience capacity of the system” with serious negative “impacts on soil organic matter, soil physicochemical properties, the hydrological cycle and on biodiversity” due to the expansion of tree plantations (Cespedes-Payret, Pineiro, Achkar and Panario 2009: 175). The situation in Brazil is probably better, as especially Bahia receives more waterfall than Uruguay. However, the execution of legal norms governing tree plantations is haphazard, argues the Ministério Público of Bahia, for example, in its various legal cases brought against Veracel Celulose in 2008 (A Tarde 2008). Companies do not study or monitor the impact of tree plantations rigorously enough. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) report on Veracel found that the company had no research to probe the influence of eucalyptus on the local waterflow before, during or after this investment (FSC Surveillance of SGS Qualifor in 2008. Forest Management Audit of Veracel, Brazil, 26-28 March 2008). The environmental license of the company requires such measuring, but no one except NGOs, social movements, some state actors, and a few researchers seem to be interested in enforcing their requirement. Currently no one is systematically monitoring the impact of tree plantation expansion in pulp holdings.

In general, pulp companies obey the environmental regulations of Brazil much more strictly in comparison to soybean or sugarcane planting activities and do not generally cause such damage to soils or use fertilization or pesticides as much as other agribusiness operations. However, the environmental standards for making pulp could be stricter. Firstly, a body of basic independent research should accompany the process of plantation expansion. Currently, a large part of the earlier technical research on the environmental impacts of vast eucalyptus plantations has been financed by pulp companies and does not fulfill the requirements of good, peer-reviewed and critical scientific standards in other ways. For example, BNDES, the Brazilian Development Bank which also heavily finances the industry and owns part of it,
being thus in a dependent position, has published on the environmental impacts of eucalyptus in its own journals. One such analysis by Marcos Vital, an economist of the BNDES (Vital 2007), draws exclusively from the pro-pulp publications on the issue, discarding the more scientific analysis, for example, in the gold standard scientific journals, like The Science. The pro-industry analysis of the environmental impacts appears as attempts to legitimize the investments, not objectivity-seeking critical research, as the extensive independent peer-reviewed research cited above indicates.

Capitalism, Pulp Investment and Development

State corporatist regimes are of great utility for the short-term goals of paper corporations, as they depend on massive state support – indeed, the recent pulp investments have taken place precisely where state corporatist relational mechanisms are active, as in Brazil and Indonesia. The industry seems to desire a) strong state support and b) support that excludes state control over the sector. The paper industry managed to get state resources and simultaneously avoid state control, a double-victory portraying the Brazilian state as “captured” by private interests. However, there is an active ideological congruity between the companies and the government, both agreeing, in developmentalist terms, that pulp investments bring economic development for the country as a whole. Thus embedded autonomy by corporations (EAC) is a more precise mechanism to explain the state-paper industry relations than the classic Marxist state capture. The Brazilian state supports the creation of competitive advantage for the pulp investments over other economic sectors, especially in investment areas, and in comparison to other pulp mills around the world.

The developmental alternatives and the success of industrial policy in a given country are influenced by world political and economic structural factors. World-system theorists Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 2001) and Giovanni Arrighi (2007) have argued that the character of the globalizing world-system is capitalistic, and that capitalism is defined by its global extension. The capitalist world-system greatly defines the role of individual states in the global hierarchy: there might be a hegemon, and certainly there are core countries, a semi-periphery and peripheral countries. As Arrighi et al. (2009: 30) claim: “The extent to which specific welfare and developmental strategies can attain their objectives is subject to world-systemic limits”. One should especially look at the world-systemic impacts of transnational capital markets, oil prices and general industrialization drives to understand what is happening in a given country or investment project area.

The import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies that Latin America, especially Brazil, followed, starting roughly from 1930 and lasting until the end of the 1970s were designed to help the periphery escape dependency, the force of the world-system. ISI policies led to some growth, but also showed that once markets opened up, the local manufacturing companies

96 In many parts of the world, including Brazil, pulp is now produced in specially negotiated tax-free zones, leaving very little for the host country. In Brazil, the Law of Kandir frees the operations in which over 95% of pulp is exported from export taxes, the pulp being taxed by the Kandir Law in the importing country.
were not very competitive. The manufacturing corporations produced by ISI could not compete on the open markets, whereas businesses relying on the extensive natural endowments of Brazil, exporting wood products, food and minerals, were made increasingly competitive by the economies of scale. Coming to the 1980s, the general solution, suggested the Washington Consensus (Kuczynski & Williamson 2003), was to open markets to let the exports flow and to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). However, this strategy has also proven difficult, even detrimental to local economic development. Arrighi et al. (2009: 36) contest the common view that FDI is the key to economic success: “FDI rarely, if ever, initiates economic expansions. Rather, it flows where economic expansions are already in full swing, at best amplifying and prolonging them”. It has also become questionable whether natural resource extraction investments can lead to development (Nugent & Robinson 2002), as they export the produce in bulk or semi-processed form: this is the role of periphery and semi-periphery in the global order.

Marxist analysts such as Harvey (2003; 2005) tend to emphasize the role of state capture and utilization by capitalists as fundamental to the process of capital accumulation. Bianchi and Braga (2005) argue that the Lula government has become a vehicle for transnational finance capital. Besides supporting this claim, the pulp investment case demonstrates that the Lula government is also a servant of the globalizing industrial plantation corporations. The consolidation developments within the Brazilian pulp industry in 2008 into ever-larger corporations – Votorantim bought Aracruz, creating a gigantic pulp producer, a deal backed by BNDES financing – demonstrate a trend to growing corporate power, and consequent control over the Brazilian state and government. Evans (1995; 2008a) argues that a state that is autonomous whilst embedding with the society, directing development, and supporting the economy in specific ways, is more prone to lead to capital accumulation than a state captured by capitalists. Investments are most likely to turn into development under the conditions characterized by the embedded autonomy of the state in relation to industry (Evans 1995); more precisely, within the framework of a 21st century developmentalist state (Evans 2008a). Nugent and Robinson (2002) argue, by comparing various Latin American states, that those countries where no single elite consolidated its power, but rivalry prevailed between elites and accumulation by dispossession was not so strongly present, such as Colombia, were able to turn their natural endowments into success-stories rather than into curses.

The new Brazilian economy is increasingly under foreign ownership, and privatization has led to severe cut in social and labor rights, argues Boito (2007: 60). Personal ties and preferential corporatist channels entail privileged access to executive power for big business. The efficiency and influence of the business lobby in comparison to other lobbies neutralizes or excludes the representation of labor from corporatism (Diniz & Boschi 2004: 121-122). Referring to Evans's Embedded Autonomy (1995), Diniz and Boschi (2004: 124-125) argue the Brazilian state has to gain autonomy and systematically transform its institutional framework from the legacy of state corporatism into neocorporatism. The presence of corporations within the Brazilian state is felt in many ways, according to Eli Diniz and Renato Boschi (2004), who have investigated how the Brazilian business lobbies became central political players in the 1990s (see also Schneider 2004). Lobbies have focused on influencing
regulatory politics by legislative action, and because of their efficiency in this, business interests are defended in the federal parliament. I asked João Cordeiro from Pöyry Forest Consulting about the role of Bracelpa in politics. He argued that it is not a lobby organization. In addition, other members of the paper industry denied outright that Bracelpa was a lobby group, saying it is simply an organization of the paper and pulp industry. Do these discourses attempt to hide the agency of the sector in the political sphere, as the research by Kingstone and others that has shown in detail how Bracelpa is a central player in the political game in Brazil would suggest?

This could be economically justifiable – if not politically or socially – if the state support for corporations generated more welfare for the Brazilian national economy and citizens than the amount of state support required in market intervention. That is, the policy would be justified if pulp investments genuinely promoted development. As John Zysman (1994: 252) argues, the “success in influencing the outcome of a particular competition does not necessarily imply that the government gains growth advantages for its economy. For example the cost of the support may exceed the rents captured in which case the aggressive government may actually reduce the national welfare”. Any conclusion on the rationality of state support thus depends on the analysis of the national welfare cost-benefit ratio. To define this, we have to first see what are the processes by which capital accumulates, since these influence decidedly the welfare creation and its costs.

**Dispossession and Capital Accumulation**

The expansion of new pulp investments into the global South has resulted in the release of cheap raw material, pulp, whose price has come down as the low-cost production has expanded, into the global economy. Following Marx and Harvey, the expansion serves as a way to resolve the problem of overaccumulation inherent to capitalism, and to produce the rate of return that stock markets demand from companies. Marx’s classic account explains capitalist development as resulting from primitive accumulation, in which a wide range of processes dispossesses labor, and a class of capitalists accumulates capital. David Harvey (2003: 145) has summarized these processes of primitive accumulation:

> These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the national debt, and ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation.

Harvey (2003: 145-6) argues that these processes are still powerfully present, as “many formerly common property resources, such as water, have been privatized (often at World Bank insistence) and brought within the capitalist logic of accumulation” and “family farming has been taken over by agribusiness”, especially in the global South. Harvey (2003: 146)
redirects Marx’s early sketch of this process, suggesting that primitive accumulation “entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession”. Harvey redefines the process as “accumulation by dispossession”, as the mechanisms of primitive accumulation have changed:

Some of the mechanisms of primitive accumulation that Marx emphasized have been fine-tuned to play an even stronger role now than in the past … above all we have to look at the speculative raiding carried out by hedge funds and other major institutions of finance capital as the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession in recent times (Harvey 2003: 147).

New mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession, such as the patenting and licensing of genetic material, capital-intensive modes of agricultural production, and wholesale commodification of nature in all its forms, have also surged, suggests Harvey (2003: 148). Accumulation by dispossession releases a set of assets at very low cost: overaccumulated capital can easily seize such assets and turn them to profitable use (Harvey 2003: 149). The new, as well as the old mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession, are easy to spot in the expansion of industrial plantations in Brazil. In the case of pulp conflicts, companies extended eucalyptus plantations over *devoluta* lands, for example, claims the MST. This has led to the rise of landlessness, local populations in pulp investment areas have gathered into landless camps such as in the photo 5 below.

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97 In Brazil, *terra devoluta* is a legal category of land. The 1850 Land Law is still used to define *terra devoluta*, following the criterion of exclusion: “*devolutas* are, in the frontier zone, in the federal territories and the Federal District, the lands, that not being owned, nor applied to any public federal, state, territorial or municipal use, do not form part of the private domain” (Law 601 in the 1850 Land Law, my translation). Law 6.383 of 1976 has declared that *terra devoluta* is uninhabited land not registered or possessed by anyone, a category which has to be defined either by an administrative or judicial process (Presidência da República 1976). Since the 1980s, the Supreme Federal Court has maintained that a public entity has to prove that the land is “*devoluta*”, and that *devoluta* lands are not registered in anyone’s name (Silva 1999).

98 From April 2009 until the end of July 2009, the MST occupied a piece of a 20,000 hectare land area in Bahia, claiming Veracel had illegally occupied this *devoluta* land, and demanding the land to be turned into agrarian reform settlements. I do not assess this episode of contention in detail, as it is outside the field research period (2004-2008) and the conflict is still ongoing.
While expanding plantations over devoluta, indigenous, peasant, quilombola and other publicly or commonly inhabited or uninhabited land, pulp companies have been able to seize hold of zero or very low-cost land assets and turn them to profitable use. As Marx described, this type of primitive accumulation “entailed taking land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation” (Harvey 2003: 149).

I have factored in the land enclosure – legal, illegal, coerced and voluntary – caused by pulp projects into the conceptual framework. The juxtaposing of corporate and contentious agency as a zero-sum game reflects the accumulation by dispossession as a central environmental mechanism (by the advance of plantations which is not directly controlled by the movement) and a relational mechanism (by the creation of a powerful corporate actor in the same social space, which creates a landless peasantry) explaining the dynamics of industrial plantation expansion. In this sense, my conceptual framework draws from Marx and Harvey. However, I disagree with them on two points: 1) in the role of accumulation by dispossession as the central or only causal process explaining the rise of resistance (to the degree that Marx and Harvey suggest this), and 2) in the role of accumulation by dispossession as the central driver behind long-term capitalist development. To take the first point, Harvey (2003: 162) argues that accumulation by dispossession provokes political and social struggles and vast swaths of resistance: I show that this is not the only necessary causal chain, as dispossession does not necessarily provoke struggles. I argue that the existence of a contentious agency is also important, by showing cases in which similar accumulation by dispossession has resulted in no sustained mobilization, if the local population or the local MST has not desired and managed to start building mechanisms a-e. The managing is caused by environmental,
cognitive, and relational mechanisms of contention. Desiring is free human agency that is bound to vary irrationally and rationally dependent on the cultural and ideological background of the individual and his/hers habitus within his/hers most important social fields. A careful reader will note that I am departing both from the agency-emphasizing rational choice and cultural studies and the structuralist understanding of social change.

To take the second point, I rely on a series of development theorists who contest the view that accumulation by dispossession is the driving force of capitalist development. Harvey (2003: 162) argues that “You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs, the old adage goes, and the birth of capitalism entailed fierce and often violent episodes of creative destruction. While the class violence was abhorrent, the positive side was to obliterate feudal relations, liberate creative energies, open up society” and so on. In contrast to this view, Giovanni Arrighi (2007) has shown how the almost complete dispossession of the South African peasantry from land and livelihood – in order to create a massive, controllable work force – led over time to raising labor costs, making capital accumulation very hard where such accumulation by dispossession was operating. There is a huge difference between Harvey and Arrighi in, for example, the way they see the recent Chinese development. For Harvey (2005: 120-151), the Chinese development is just a reflection of the global spreading of neoliberalism and accumulation by dispossession. For Arrighi (2007), the principal reason for the recent Chinese ascendancy was accumulation without dispossession, brought by the Chinese revolutionary agrarian reforms and other later policies. Gillian Hart (2002: 206-230) compared the East Asian economies with the South African; showing how the agrarian reforms and distribution of productive assets to a larger population led to capital accumulation in East Asia, whereas the full proletarianization of the African peasantry led to a long-term rise in labor costs and economic stagnation. In addition, Arrighi, Aschoff & Scully (2009: 39-40) point out that “Just as the Southern African tradition has ultimately narrowed domestic markets, raised reproduction costs, and lowered the quality of the labor force, so the East Asian tradition has simultaneously expanded domestic markets, lowered reproduction costs, and raised the quality of the labor force”. Kuisma et al. (1999) make a similar point about the history of Finnish capitalist development, arguing, like Arrighi et al. (2009) and Hart (2002), that it is accumulation without dispossession that leads most effectively to capitalist development. Such capitalist development is more humane, long-lasting, balanced, competitive and growth-entailing than the predatory capitalism produced by accumulation by dispossession.

In fact, capitalism can follow the lines of right livelihood, and in such case, these business operations are ethical. Even though right livelihood and capitalism do not go hand in hand in most of the contemporary cases where transnational corporations are involved, the great majority of small and medium-sized business operations around the world are characterizable as both right livelihood and capitalism. These businesses promote peace and harmony of others and do not abuse others, whilst seeking moderate remuneration for entrepreneurs and workers.
Historical institutional analysis has proposed the varieties of capitalism approach to argue that there are many forms of capitalism to be analyzed (Hall & Soskice 2001; Gourevitch 2003; Crouch 2005; Rodrik 2007). A series of political system-specific institutional trajectories define the local qualities of capitalism (Zysman 1994), even though also a definable global capitalism exists and connects these specific forms of capitalism (Wallerstein 1974; 2001; Robinson 2007). For example, Japanese capitalism draws also from the long institutional history of Japan (Tyson & Zysman 1989), and Brazilian capitalism has been assessed as a partly specific form as well; for example, by Marshall Eakin (2001) in his *Tropical Capitalism* and by Peter Evans (1979) in his *Dependent Development*. Striking a balance between the specificity and global dimensions of capitalism, Evans showed there are both specific characteristics in Brazilian capitalism as well as global, and these can be explored by assessing both the world-systemic and local processes defining Brazilian capitalism. He argued by an analysis of the alliance between state, national and multinational capital in Brazil that a look into the periphery or semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system reveals more clearly the history of capitalism, the way capital accumulates, than accounts of the core of the system (Evans 1979). Following Evans’s line in analyzing the developmental consequences of new pulp investments, I contrast Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession with accumulation without dispossession and the variety of capitalism literatures.

**Development?**

The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen (1999) argues that the opposite to accumulation by dispossession, that is, the expansion and exercise of human capabilities, freedom and democracy, are the keys to development and sustainable capital accumulation. The resolution to the economic stagnation of the global South, a result of the historical and continuing accumulation by dispossession, the leading development theorists suggest massive land redistribution accompanied by education, social welfare and a set of human capability maximizing policies (Evans 2008a, Sen 1999, Drèze & Sen 2002). Specifically addressing the problem of industrial plantation expansion, Arrighi *et al.* (2009: 39) discuss how the South African increase in plantations and the accompanying dispossession decreased the “subsistence economy’s ability to subsidize labor in the capitalist economy”. A subsistence economy, such as that organized by the MST and the Agrarian Reform Program, is a backbone of support for the development of a variety of economic sectors. Families with land could gain part of their livelihood from the farm, and do not need such great salaried remuneration for the members working outside the farm. This results in a competitive advantage to the economy, protects the economy and the population in cases of world-systemic fluctuations, to which pulp investments and the local economy relying on them are extremely vulnerable.

If set in highly populated rural areas, the current pulp investment model expands by the mechanism of accumulation by dispossession, and as such does not maximize the potential that the natural endowments and human capabilities in the investment areas might have for
capital accumulation and development. The current pulp investment model actually works against development. The expansion of pulp agribusiness desecrates the farmers’ base of sustenance, land to cultivate. Joly (2007: 1) writes that “the land ownership concentration, caused by the massive land acquisition by the company, and the large group of migrants moving into Eunápolis after its installation, are not compensated by the jobs and taxes created by Veracel, bringing only few benefits” to those who live in the region. Based on the empirical fact of rural exodus and concentrated land ownership, demonstrated in the development theory to be very detrimental to development (Drèze & Sen 2003), Joly (2007: 1) argues that the “discourse of regional development” utilized by the pulp company “does not yet consider the earlier inequalities embedded in the territory, but has only deepened these”. Eunápolis is a living example of this development, where people turn to the MST or marginalization, which offers little under the strong private property vigilance of Brazil. I observed how thousands of people in the Extreme South of Bahia joined the MST after the Veracel investment construction phase ended. The MST was the biggest job creator in the region, not Veracel, which was the biggest job cutter at the end of the construction phase.

Pulp investments also bring some benefits. A radical increase in the investment area’s GDP increases local taxes, exports bring hard currency and benefit the trade balance, and machines needed for operations boost industrialization in the São Paulo paper industry and machinery cluster. Industrial plantation expansion also develops the infrastructure of rural areas, especially transportation networks. However, they also result in the monopolization and fluctuation of economic life and the loss of economic diversity, as production is monoculture-based and the rural populations move to the cities. As compensation, people find a wider range of consumer goods in the cities in the initial phase, but soon run out of capital as rural peripheral cities offer limited ways to make money. However, the current Brazilian government and the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES, as well as the paper companies, assume industrial plantations bring growth. They deny that pulp investments function by accumulation by dispossession. But when observing these investments more closely, it is hard not to see a congruence between pulp investment, the developmentalist ideology, the paper industry practices (not discourses) of development, and accounts of how capital accumulation takes place.

I agree with Harvey (2003) that accumulation by dispossession does exist and certainly describes many processes present in the expansion of the capitalist world-system, but I disagree that this is a necessary step or the fundamental principle driving capital accumulation. For example, one can make the case that the rise in total capital accumulation in the area in question would have been higher were the assets used to set up pulp investments utilized in a way that does not dispossess the local population, does not enclose the local lands, but promotes human capabilities. Episodes of accumulation by dispossession have massively destroyed potentialities that were there but were not given the chance of realization. Many comparative positive cases, for example, Finnish developmental history, show how real economic growth, national capital accumulation, started after a popular party and social movement rising and subsequent legislation and regulation cut the processes of accumulation by dispossession (Kuisma et al. 1999). The completion of the agrarian reform, universal
education, extension of rights to all and the whole of the country, alongside the fostering of state embedding and autonomy, led Finnish development, especially after the Second World War.

Fast-wood tree plantations are a contrast to buying the pulp material from real forest or small-scale wood producers. Small-scale real forests are the wood source of the paper industry in Finland, after 100 years of forest owners’ cooperative movements and agrarian reforms (Kuisma et al. 1999). Finland outlawed forest purchases by paper companies throughout the country in 1925, following a pro-agrarian view that was “shared by most farmers, some intellectuals and the emerging popular parties” who understood that corporate forest concentration “was a threat not only to agriculture and the farmers but to the nation as a whole” (Donner-Amnell 2004: 182). This decision was a continuation of the long historical processes of democratization, power relation equalization, the promotion of contentious agency and curbing of corporate agency, the hope of producing social change in and by land tenure transformations:

In Finland, peasants’ land property rights were already confirmed by the Association and Security Act driven through by Gustav III in 1789, and it was put into effect by distributing lots in the great distribution that started in the 18th century. Thereafter, the forest industry had to rely on tens of thousands of forest owners for its wood acquisition. The wealth brought by the forest industry through them spread to society generally and brought an increasing number of people within reach of education and civilization. This strengthened Finnish democracy. (Helsingin Sanomat 2009, my translation).

In the 1920s, the Finnish small- and medium-size farmers’ cooperative movements (such as Pellervo) pushed for far-reaching reform to the country’s forest industry (Kuisma 1999: 16). These democratizing moves cut accumulation by dispossession, that is, predatory capitalism. By political manoeuvres, the Pellervo-movement:

United the development of the wood-processing industry to the interests of tens of thousands of small forest owners by restricting the forestholdings of large companies, thus preventing the country’s vital natural resources from falling into the hands of a centralised business oligarchy. Indirectly this can be considered one of the most important turning points in Finnish history. It created the economic and political basis for building a democratic, prosperous and industrial state, prevented it from becoming an export-dominated oligarchy, and forced the wood-processing industry to seek its future through developing competitive technologies rather than depending on cheap raw materials (Kuisma 1999: 16).

Brazilian pulp investments do not offer their surroundings or nearby population macro-economically important inter-industrial synergy benefits (Teixeira & Guerra 2000: 94-95). However, they do benefit the heavily industrialized hubs in Brazil, especially São Paulo, which produces machinery and equipment for the pulp mills in Latin American rural areas. Some developmental benefits remain in the São Paulo region, but plantation forestry generally benefits global industrial hubs by the import of relatively cheap raw materials, semi-processed materials and new business for their machinery and engineering companies (Marchak 1995: 15). The most important benefactors in new pulp projects in the global South are Finnish forest cluster corporations. The Finnish forest cluster participated very actively in creating Veracel Celulose. For example, Jaakko Pöyry Tecnologia Ltda made a deal of 14
Due to these distinct institutional trajectories, in the Latin American economies pulp mills rely on extensive monocultural tree plantations, which cannot be compared in any form to the Finnish forests. Bahian economists Teixeira and Guerra (2000: 94-95) argue that large-scale pulp mill investments are cluster investments that do not reflect economic growth in the local economy or for other industries at the state level. The car or oil industries, which are also problematic in the reflection-sense, have a multi-level macroeconomic impact in relation to pulp investments (ibid.). Some companies in Finland benefit, but only a few in Brazil. Thus, new pulp investments portray Brazil as a dependent economy. Evans (1979: 28) elucidates this process in its general form:

The introduction of manufacturing on the periphery also lacks the traditional ‘multiplier effect’ associated with manufacturing investments in the center. Peripheral economies are ‘disarticulated,’ that is, corporations on the periphery are not connected to each other in the same way as corporations in an autocentric economy. Corporations in dependent countries buy their equipment and other capital goods from outside, so that the ‘multiplier effect’ of new investments is transferred back to the center.

In Finland, pulp mills network widely with society and use local suppliers. They buy machines and equipment from the domestic economy. When the paper industry markets pulp investments as industry for the Latin American politicians, the wording employs the image of industrialization. Thus, many politicians from the left to the right, lured to the developmentalist thinking of Latin America, accept these investments. One equalizes industrialization with development. However, because a pulp investment hardly creates any other industry around it in Latin America, taking the benefit abroad and relying on tree plantations, industrialization remains a dream. The analysis of variance and changes in corporate mechanisms help to explain why pulp investments are large-scale tree plantation-

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99 However, as the global demand for harvesters declined in fall 2008, Ponsse withdrew their industrial operations back to Finland, to place jobs in Finland rather than in Brazil. This shows that there are big differences between companies’ national ideologies and management cultures within the Finnish forest industry cluster, as companies like Stora Enso have not shown any such nationalism like Ponsse.

100 The Botnia SA investment in Uruguay is a slight exception in this sense – at the local level – as it also includes the building of a new chemical industry and other industries required in the pulp production process. This process of industrialization is not, however, spontaneous but dictated from above, with vigilance for the interests of Botnia. The most important industrialization benefits from the Botnia SA Uruguay investment are created in Europe, particularly in Finland that imports most of the machines and equipment used in the construction and upgrade phases. (Kröger 2007a.)
utilizing endeavors in Brazil and many other parts of the global South, but not in Finland. The specific mechanisms creating industries explain why they take the form they do.\textsuperscript{101}

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I argued that the state and the paper industry have been intrinsically tied since the emergence of the sector. I have analyzed the role of the top-level control process, corporate agency promotion, in explaining plantation expansion. The last chapter will continue this endeavor. I will provide a detailed tracing of the political mechanisms that increase the state and political support enjoyed by the paper industry. By now it has become clear that state support promotes corporate agency directly and indirectly as states establish the frameworks for plantation costs and markets by regulation, finance and other means.

The paper industry has been a highly politicized business sector since its modern appearance at the end of the French Revolution in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The first paper machine was created by paper producers to reduce the power of organized paperworkers. Later, a technocratic competition for the largest machine came to mark the system-specific struggle for pride and prestige (Western 1979; Kerski 1995). This, coupled with the establishment of large-scale plantations in political systems where governments suppress resistance by local populations, are the two processes explaining the current large-scale pulp investment model. Tree plantations surely enjoy the natural tropical endowments of Brazil, but are not conditioned by this. Markets, technology and nature are instrumental in pulp investments. The bottom line is politics.

\textsuperscript{101} To give a comparative example, in Finland the institutional and structural mechanism creating the national industries used to be social corporatism until the beginning of the 1990s (for social corporatism, see Pekkarinen \textit{et al.} 1992). After this, a new mechanism emphasizing neoliberal principles instead of a broad social contract between the employers and the employees has gained impetus (For the rise of neoliberalism in Finland, see Patomäki 2007). Factory closures, especially within the Finnish pulp industry, has followed this substantial change in mechanism h (for more information on the Finnish pulp industry transformations, see Kröger & Pakkasvirta 2006; Pakkasvirta 2008a; Pikkarainen 2008).
6. Land Conflicts: Tree Plantation Expansion and Dispossession

This chapter assesses the land conflicts between the agribusiness corporations and Brazilian rural populations. This interaction takes place within the conflict culture of the backward Brazilian state. These conflict dynamics are very different from the political game within the modern Brazilian state; I assess these more complex and multiple dynamics influencing economic outcomes in the coming chapters. Here I focus primarily on the rudimentary form of land grabbing and the organized resistance to this in the global periphery where the modern state and the rule of law have not yet totally arrived. Together with the next chapters, this chapter shows how the interaction between the corporations and movements takes place within the state, and influences economic outcomes of corporate resource exploitation. The chapter starts with an outline of the Brazilian land question and evolves into an analysis of tree plantation expansion and its impact on the dispossession of the rural population. An analysis of corporate land access types and cases demonstrates the ways by which dispossession takes place or does not. The chapter is a prelude to the next one, which analyzes resistance especially after 2004, when it became more serious.

The new pulp investments and dispossession by the tree plantation expansion began worldwide in 1964, the year when the globalization of the paper and pulp industry really started. We can simultaneously spot the establishment of corporate mechanisms in many different parts of the global South, in order to establish pulp projects. Thailand passed restrictive land laws, declaring rural populations traditionally living on the land without official title “squatters” and evicting them (Marchak 1995: 224). In Indonesia, Suharto’s dictatorship implanted a pulp investment cycle (Marchak 1995: 270) after a bloody civil war against alleged socialists in which more than half a million people were killed (Li 2007). The Suharto regime established a “tight link between corporations, officials, and the police who protect investor interests in the pulp and paper industry” (Li 2007: 265), which continues until today, as Human Rights Watch (2003) has extensively documented. All around the world, the United States was pressing countries to adopt restrictive measures against alleged socialists – which could mean anyone – aligning themselves with dictators and corporations. By the EAC, government-industry alliance consolidation ensued; as a consequence, also democratic and cooperative transformations like progressive land reform policies were labeled as communist and suppressed. In many countries on their way to sustained welfare state-type development, a complete u-turn was taken, favoring corporate land access and outright corporate land grabbing. New and old mechanisms of corporate resource exploitation promoted the alliance-building of governments and the paper industry. In Chile, the most crucial Latin American pulp investment destination together with Brazil, rural populations were dispossessed by the forest industry, driven into rural towns where “poverty, unemployment, and deficient service systems depress all inhabitants” (Marchak 1995: 319) – a finding paralleled by my field observations from the Brazilian pulp investment sites. Export revenues have mounted but no additional jobs have been offered. The indigenous Mapuche people in Chile have been
especially marginalized, “displaced from their forest lands because they could not prove ownership” (Marchak 1995: 320).

These global comparisons show the Brazilian case is not unique; rather, it is a part of a world-systemic transformation. Besides connecting the Brazilian case to the world-systemic transformations, I offer an analysis of the land access mechanism by which the expansion of plantations took place in Brazil. Firstly, I assess the point at which pulp investment conflicts surge, that is, the clash between the Brazilian agrarian question and the advance of agribusiness in the global South. Agribusiness has arisen through the so-called Green Revolution, starting, interestingly, as pulp investments in about 1964. I go first through the history of the general Brazilian agrarian question, then assess the role of MST in it, and turn then to specific assessment of regional differences and separate mechanisms of agribusiness and pulp investment expansion.

**History of the Brazilian Land Question**

Since colonialism started in Brazil, the same persons who had extensive land possession wielded most political power. Before 1850, one could obtain Brazilian land by simply squatting (*posses*) or occupation via a state land grant scheme (*sesmarias*) (Nugent & Robinson 2002: 27). From 1850, purchase has been the required official form to obtain land (Rose 2005: 201). Land was plentiful – in fact there was too much of it but labor was scarce (Miller 2007: 101). Environmental historian Shawn Miller (ibid.) has found that the Latin American *latifúndio* was created as a way to block the spread of the few immigrant farmers around small estates, to keep them out of land and maintain them as labor for the big landowners. By creating obstacles to land ownership, restricting squatting, tenancy and sharecropping, forcing the poor to work for others, reverting unused land to the state and selling this on a price beyond to the landless workers, the 1850 Land Law (*estatuto da terra*) offered free labor for plantation owners (Costa 1985: 82 – 83). The law was created to protect the landholding interests of the landed elite, serving only the interests of São Paulo and Minas Gerais large-scale coffee producers: it led effectively to large-scale plantation economy expansion (Nugent & Robinson 2002: 27-28).

The landed elite wanted to avoid land expropriation in the abolition of slavery pressed on them by England. Thus, the Republican Constitution of 1891 and the 1917 Civil Code followed the 1850 Land Law, and sought to guarantee the absolute nature of the right of ownership (Medeiros 2005: 27). The control of labor and the crushing of anyone possibly in the way of big landowners’ interests is an old paradigm in Brazil. Palmares, the community of escaped slaves, was crushed in the 17th century (Anderson 1996; Kent 1965). Similarly, the Brazilian army slaughtered the community of Canudos at the end of the 19th century as its existence as a successful and autonomous collective farm came to threaten the labor supply of big Northeastern landowners (Levine 1992). The landlords saw that land was in abundance but labor was scarce (Nugent and Robinson 2002: 27). After the 1888 abolition, slaves, immigrants and workers had little chance to accumulate the money needed to buy land. As
Joaquim Nabuco, an abolitionist, noted, “Abolition without a land reform is no real abolition” (Cf. Rose 2005: 201).

The proponents of the agrarian reform aim to solve the historical land concentration and make unused land productive. These proponents are mostly small-scale farmers (camponês)\textsuperscript{102} and rural wage workers (trabalhadores rurais).\textsuperscript{103} Camponeses as a group originated in Brazil after abolition, as the Brazilian government imported 1.6 million poor (but white) immigrant farmers from Europe to replace the slaves (so unfortunately black in the eyes of the elite) in 1875-1930. Some ex-slaves became camponeses and mixed with the new immigrants. The relational mechanism by which the immigrant camponeses were subjugated by the landed elite was that of colonato, in which the small-scale farmer was a type of partner, receiving a house, a bit of land and part of the farm’s production – but no salary (Oliveira & Stédile 2005: 10-11). The parliament did not write the land rights or other rights of these rural workers into a law and they remained under the land tenure established by landowners.

Even after abolition, up to 1947, the Brazilian agricultural frontier expanded and large landowners dispossessed peasants as they had done for centuries (Medeiros 2005: 28). A major transformation came in the Constitution of 1947, which included article 147 decreeing the use of property subordinate to the social good. “Since then, the debate about the meaning of, the limits and the potential of agrarian reform has centred on the question of the social function of property”, argues Leonilde Medeiros (2005: 27), a specialist on the Brazilian agrarian reform.

The main reason for the lack of Brazilian agrarian reform has been the stubborn and powerful resistance by the landed elites, argues Rose (2005: 52-53; 199-230). In 1964, President João Goulart tried to push through an agrarian reform. Goulart defended the view that “capitalistic nations, socialistic nations, nations in the West and in the East have all come to the conclusion that it is not possible to advance and live together with massive rural plantations” (cf. Rose 2005: 72). Article 8 of the Agrarian reform law that Goulart suggested would had paid for the appropriated private land in twenty-year government bonds whose value would be equivalent to the declared tax value of the land (Rose 2005: 53). The landed elites had no interest in such a measure as, to avoid taxes, landholders had downsized their officially declared land value to zero or close to zero. As Wright & Wolford point out, President Goulart or “Jango”, as he was called, had wide support: “only the rich and the generals did not know that Brazil needed an agrarian reform” to prosper economically, to make rational, productive use of its unused lands (cf. Wright & Wolford 2003: 261).

The world-system, directed at the time of the 1964 coup by the Cold War, set the limits to agrarian reform. The United States was the largest foreign investor in Brazil at the time, and feared peasants movements were planning a Marxist revolution, points out Rose (2005: 38). R.S. Rose, who has studied the history of elite violence and social control in Brazil

\textsuperscript{102} Refers to people who have their own farm and work on it for themselves.

\textsuperscript{103} Refers to those who work for other people’s farms and not on their own. Normally rural workers work on huge plantations of sugar-cane, soya-bean or eucalyptus, or as cowboys.
extensively, argues that the CIA, FBI and the Government of the United States under the rule of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson offered military equipment, police training, torture and intelligence methods, financing, direct monetary aid and political support to establish a dictatorship in Brazil to overthrow Goulart’s European social democratic-style government with the Brazilian military (Rose 2005: 33-35; 38; 41-42; 50-51; 58; 66). Landry (1976: 78), on the other hand, argues that “The level of demand and conflicting interest groups prior to the coup brought political uncertainty and near economic disaster”. According to Landry, an authoritarian order had to take over, as the country would be ungovernable democratically and pluralistically.

Whether or not large landholders or the US government played a central role in the Brazilian coup of 1964, the consequences of the turn to authoritarianism were massive, particularly for the rural populations. The dictatorship excluded peasant associations in particular from the decision-making (Landry 1976: 78). Between 1960 and 1980, Brazil saw the expulsion of 28 million rural workers and peasants from the countryside to the miseries of urban favelas unable to offer jobs (Sparovek 2003: 24), resulting in a plethora of landless people and favelados. In the so-called “Green revolution”, the landed elite displaced with ease the camponeses dwelling on the lands without legal title and replaced the labor with machines (Oliveira and Stédile 2005).

Wage earners replaced that part of the colonos workload that machines could not take care of. Stédile and Oliveira (2005) suggest the large and medium scale farmers preferred a wage working contract instead of the colonato scheme, as it conferred even more power on the employer. Where the relational mechanism of colonato created rural power relations that could be characterized as some sort of feudalism, the promotion of wage-work is a product of new relational mechanisms. Agribusiness utilized industrial plantations to fashion power relations typical of the capitalist world-system, and subsequently transformed the Brazilian countryside. Agents that supported this process were the corporatist syndicates friendly to the military government, such as CONTAG, which led the unionization of the rural population, especially plantation workers. The aim of this mechanism was to strip the camponês of the land-right claims of colono and posseiro and position him as a rural wage earner, argue Stédile and Oliveira (2005: 11). This process, an example of corporate agency promotion, was generally successful from the viewpoint of large farm-owners. Thus, there is now a mass of landless rural workers in Brazil.

During the last two governments, Brazil experienced a methodical reorientation of rural space. The land area of agribusiness has increased by 14% annually, at the same time as production has grown by 56%. However, a zero percent increase in employment has accompanied these gains (I Encontro de Estudos Rurais, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, RJ, June 2006). Since industrial plantations do not offer more jobs, the Landless Movement questions the social function of monoculture plantations.
MST in the Agrarian Reform

The MST argues that to occupy land not fulfilling the social function is a constitutionally legal act. Currently, the expropriation of land for the social interest is the principal means of obtaining land for the poor (Medeiros 2005: 33). The Agrarian Law of 1993 (Law no. 8629 of 25/02/93) controls the expropriation of landholdings that do not fulfill their social function. However, because of the pressure by the large landowner interest-presenting the ruralist caucus in the parliament, expropriations were made subject to judicial proceedings and the requirement necessary to fulfill the social function remained high; for example, no productive land can be expropriated. (Medeiros 2005: 36.) Thus, the Brazilian agrarian question revolves around the definition of the private and social functions of land.

What has the role of the MST in the agrarian reform been? This question helps to understand the way movements influence the environmental mechanisms they face. Perhaps most critically, considering the legitimacy of contentious episodes such as land occupations, the Landless Movement promoted the writing of pro-movement elements into the 1988 Constitution, managing to push for a much better constitution than what came before (Wittman 2009: 123). The 1988 constitution “made it possible for political forces on the left, linked to popular movements, to occupy institutional spaces of local power in a way never seen before in the history of the country” (Fedozzi 1997: 19 In: Guidry 2003: 200). However, the Estatuto da Terra established by the military regime after the 1964 coup was even more progressive than the 1988 Constitution (Lerrer 2008: 52). By this comparison, the 1988 Constitution becomes “the great institutional defeat of agrarian reform in Brazil” (Lerrer 2008: 67). Still others undermine the impact of the whole “massive document”: the 1988 constitution goals “were little more than declarations of intent” for Hochstetler & Keck (2007: 226). However, the struggle for land in Brazil continues to revolve around the 1988 Constitution (Medeiros 2005).

In the struggle for land, the MST has embedded the state apparatus, gaining powerful, sympathetic allies. The most important allies the MST currently has are the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and the institute under this ministry responsible for land reform in practice, INCRA. Also important is the federal government of Lula da Silva, which somewhat sympathizes with the MST and some other contentious agency promoting movements (but not with all), in spite of many differences of opinion regarding the correct industrial policy. Brazil has also a constitutional framework that makes the agrarian reform possible, at least in theory. Wittman (2009: 123) writes:

In response to grassroots pressure, Article 186 of the 1988 constitution exhibited a conceptual advance in the content of the social function of land, with four specific legal criteria: rational and adequate use (based on legislated norms of economic productivity); adequate use of available natural resources and preservation of the environment; compliance with labor regulations and land use that favors the well-being of the owners and laborers.

In practice, this constitutional framework setting the parameters for land reform is very outdated. In principle, the agrarian reform should advance by the process of land
expropriation for the social interest. For a rural property to be expropriated, it has to
disrespect its socio-environmental function. At this point the effectiveness of the law stops, as
the methods for measuring socio-environmental function are outdated. One of the most
important methods is to evaluate the index of productivity, which measures how much the
property produces in relation to its capacity. The last time the index of productivity was
defined, in 1975, was based on the production data from 1960. Thus, tremendous increases in
productivity since 1960, both in agribusiness and agroecology-based agriculture, make it
practically impossible for a farm not to pass the required 1960 productivity limits. For this
reason, Brazil still has huge land areas that are apparently unproductive, which could easily
produce much more, but cannot be expropriated. The strong Ruralist caucus resistance to the
updating of the index of productivity is the single most important political maneuver
explaining the lack of agrarian reform and the continuation of latifúndio in Brazil. However,
against all the odds, in August 2009, the MST gained a massive victory as the government
agreed to update the productivity indexes that define whether land is productive or not. This
change, which Ondetti (2008a) saw as almost impossible due to the demanding political
opportunity structure, could be explained in greater detail by considering the contentious
agency of the MST.

The expropriation of unproductive lands for the Brazilian landless does not harm the export-
oriented agribusiness, as the lands seriously needed for agrarian reform are minuscule in
comparison to the current extension of industrial plantation-based operations. As the land
expropriation method is mostly out of the repertoire of the MST and its allies in the state, the
current alternative method is land-buying by INCRA, utilizing the 1962 Law 4.132, which
allows acquisition of productive lands. If there are difficulties in land expropriation and the
agrarian reform is stalled, and the federal government offers funds, the local INCRA can
make use of Law 4.132/62 and make public offerings to obtain farms in the area against
payment. Thus, farm owners offer farms for the state to buy, often in order to discharge their
public debts by offering land in exchange (interviews, INCRA RS, 2008-9). The purchase
method is stridently criticized by many, as it is likely to actually be profitable to the farm
owners, who get a good price for their lands, and can rely on the state buying even in times of
market fluctuations when private entities would not buy. The most troublesome part in land
purchase is that it does not really resolve the problem of property concentration, simply
turning the initially often doubtfully gained land titles of large landowners into currency.

Even though controversial, the state’s land purchase method provides land for some landless
families, and is pushed for the MST in cases where nothing else works. The pressure by the
MST is fundamental, as no federal government has been willing to utilize money voluntarily
to buy land for the landless. In fact, the MST protests and embedding with the state are
essential in assuring the state liberalizes funds for land purchasing. In the case of pulp
investment conflicts, the purchase method has been the main way the MST has gained
settlements and managed to block the expansion of industrial plantations into unproductive
lands. An exemplary case of this is the Southall farm acquisition by INCRA for the MST in
Rio Grande do Sul, as the next chapter shows. Next, I briefly continue assessing the specific
role of the MST in the agrarian reform, after which the analysis of pulp investment conflict starts.

**Contentious Agency and Land Conflicts**

Territorial dispossession relates to symbolic violence inflicted in the social space and felt personally as very low self-esteem. This makes territorial dispossession of lands easier, because one does not conceive of one’s own power or potential for agency. In such cases, land is not conceived as the right of all citizens, but rather as a consequence of possible citizenship, which the person with a low self-esteem feels he/she can never attain. In her famous book, *Quarto de Despejo*, Carolina Maria de Jesus sees the *favela* where she lives as trash room of the Brazilian society (Maria de Jesus 1960). The book demonstrates a principal mechanism of subjugation and subsequent dispossession in Brazil: imaginaries of purity and cleanliness. Hygienic symbolizations are powerful tools in maintaining psychological disempowerment and conventional habitus. Behind the curtains, the dominated identify themselves as dirty in comparison to the elite that is made of pure, clean, superior, dreamlike transcendental figures. Most of the Brazilian elite and middle class would never sleep in an MST camp since this is dirty, dangerous and not proper for their class.

Where the *favela* is the trash room of the city, the landless camp is the society’s trash room in the rural areas. The extra that does not fit into the model of agribusiness ends up on the shoulders of mass movements like the MST. In the region of Extreme South of Bahia, eucalyptus expansion has pushed those people who do not fit into the model of agribusiness into landless movements and other agrarian reform schemes, or into the periphery of cities. “We feel like the rest, like we were the rest for Veracel”, an ex-worker of the company in the *Rosa Luxemburgo* MST camp sadly said (interview, MST Bahia, 26.07.2006). Before the existence of the MST, the trash of the countryside migrated to the cities. Now there is new hope in the countryside. Many are returning from the shanty-towns into the countryside, not as *posséiros* or rural workers, but rather as post-traditional peasants (McNee 2007), aiming for the first or last time for a plot of their own land.

To gain relational understanding of the mechanisms of contention and see what impact the replication of the MST model has in resistance outcomes, I observed many land reform entities, aiming to position the MST amongst the actors in the Brazilian agrarian reform. The Landless Movement has been the key actor in the agrarian reform since the formative period of the early 1980s and especially since the early 1990s. In addition, other movements inspired by the MST, like the MPA and *Movimento dos Atingidos de Barragens* have been active. Depending on the locale, the MST has controlled the Rural Workers’ Unions (STRs) by holding their presidencies. STRs represent both family farmers and rural workers. *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* (CUT) is STR’s mother organization. Most landless people do not belong to the MST, but to other land reform schemes, like the CONTAG’s, which has eight million members (Vergara-Camus 2007: 297). The CONTAG has always been a central land reform actor. Even though less radical, its members sometimes do land occupations.
Brazil has many types of competing agrarian reforms. Thus, a central objective of the MST is the “conquest of agrarian reform” (interview, João Paulo, 2008). The MST and the CONTAG have many divergences. The latter was in corporatist cooperation with the military-led and other governments, and it organizes the rural plantation workers of new and old latifúndio. The MST would like to see these landless rural workers gain their own land to cultivate instead of continuing as low-paid and disciplined wage-earners for the latifúndio. In comparison to the MST, the CONTAG is an extension of the state, a way to pacify rural anxiety by channeling people away from contentious agency and into striving for only slightly better working conditions. The CONTAG is institutionalized and clinically state-like in comparison to the MST, argued a movement leader (Interview, João Paulo, MST São Paulo, 2008). The CONTAG was against the creation of the MST and STRs, wanting to retain its corporatist monopoly over the organization of rural workers (Vergara-Camus 2007: 298).

Even though aiming for landless struggle unity, the MST also differentiates itself from other landless groups, which compete for the same piece of land to territorialize their system and agrarian reform there. The number of Brazilian landless movements depends on the definition of landlessness: by one account there was a staggering 200 landless movements in 2000 (Chaves 2000: 1-15). These are produced by differing mechanisms in their common fight for agrarian reform. To give an example, one marginalized landless group in comparison to the MST is Liga dos Camponeses Pobres or the League of Poor Peasants. The principal difference between the MST and the League is in their mechanisms: the latter uses aggressive mechanisms and has no coordinators in comparison to the MST, which uses mediation and has coordinators. The state oppresses the League much more than the MST (El Diario Internacionanal 2005). Sem Terras sometimes described other landless movements unofficially as renegades and misfits. Officially, they are allies on the same path to land reform just with differing mechanisms of contention.

If landless workers do not find desirable results with the MST, they have a variety of other organizational options to advance their interests. About half of those who entered the camps in Southern Bahia remained with the MST after six years: many came just to see what the MST is and decided not to follow its rules or left for other reasons, as the militants in the area explained to me in July 2006 (interviews, MST Bahia). It is often hunger and fear of starvation, in desolate regions where even the MST’s impact does not reach, that makes the people turn to another road. Sometimes it is the two percent tax collected by the MST from its settlements (Wright & Wolford 2003: 257), which makes the landless search for alternatives, perhaps feeling that they do not get a commensurate return from the MST. Some see the MST as too dogmatic, rigid, socialist, manipulative, or collectivist. Whatever the reasons for the existence of over 200 landless movements, they are not as organized as the MST. Camped on

A look at the Amazon clarifies the distinctive approach of the MST in relation to other rural organization. The CONTAG organized the military governments’ environmentally destructive and economically disastrous colonization schemes that moved people from the dry Northeast backlands to the Amazon rainforest. The government built collective farms in the jungle and deprived some indigenous people and traditional extractive populations of land for the sake of this type of agrarian reform.
the roadsides under *lona preta* – in huts made of wood and black plastic bags – the smaller landless groups often act in groups of only a few families. They do not have the momentum the MST has. The government-business alliance can easily defeat a small number of land occupiers. For an example of one episode of contention in the north of Minas Gerais, 200 police officers of the *Polícia Federal do Brasil* forced three families off a land occupation (*Liga dos Camponeses Pobres do Norte de Minas* 2005). This was very easy in comparison to removing 1,000 MST families. It is more difficult to gain knowledge of the smaller landless movements and their struggles, as they normally have no power to summon the media to the spot.

An active civil society involvement is necessary in Brazilian policy-processes and in securing that the law is applied to all and equally. The MST has taken a leading role in this process, as other landless movements have been either too weak or unwilling. Without the MST’s contention, as an interviewed Brazilian environmentalist in the study by Hochstetler and Keck (2007: 226) argued, “The politicians and bureaucrats in the state and federal capitals would simply compromise away any gains that had been made”. The MST does not disdain law: it tries to bridge the abyss between Constitution’s social rights and their weak enforcement, which arises from the primacy of property rights of the Civil Code in most judges’ decisions (Carter 2005: 15). Property rights rank higher than human rights in Brazil. The main purpose and activity of the police forces and the paramilitary groups such as death squads and private armies is to defend private property, as Brazilian crime statistics indicate (Rose 2005). When the options are to remain poor individual against the property rights regime or to join the MST, many opt for the Landless Movement, even though they would find this dubious. Thus, the advance of the MST fortifies processes emphasizing the human rights.

For an agrarian reform to succeed, one requires political mobilization, political will and a legal structure. Currently, only the first of these is at hand. At the beginning of the military dictatorship, controversially, an extensive legal structure for a land reform was crafted, but there was no mobilization or political will, so the land reform did not take place. The Lula government land reform policies are not going to resolve the land question: they would be mere poverty alleviation programs, as credits and help for initiating production have been minimal, claims Vergara-Camus (2007: 251). The MST leadership saw serious shortcomings not only in the legal structure, but also in the political will of the second Lula government (interview, MST São Paulo, September 2006). The MST argues that the agrarian reform policy is in line with the government’s clientelist policies searching for the pacification of the poorest by reducing extreme poverty through charity like *Bolsa família* or minor transformations like distributing a small piece of land. For real agrarian reform to take place, suggests the MST, loans and land areas distributed by the state should be much larger, in better areas and in line with a major structural change in society (interview, João Paulo, MST, 2008). Next, after these Brazilian rural movements’ accounts which contextualize the importance of the contentious agency, I will analyze the mechanisms explaining the relation between pulp investments and dispossession.
Corporate Land Access Forms

Agribusiness Expansion

A typical way to understand the transformations and different ways of living in the diversified mosaic of the Brazilian countryside has been to analyze the resistance of capitalism through alternative usages of space (Brandão, Carlos 2007). Brazil boasts a mosaic of local farm – farmworker relation histories. In the South, the independent European-style immigrant peasantry was strong, whereas the northeast, the heartland of slave-plantations, still shows these historical marks in the relations between plantation workers and their employers. In São Paulo, a special relation between coffee and other farmers allowed the wage worker to plant his own subsistence crops between the export commodities under the colonato system (Vergara-Camus 2007: 72). This system is still alive, and considered by the paper industry as a way to access land. In São Paulo, the paper industry has tried to expand through colonato schemes where small farmers and settlements plant both eucalyptuses for pulp companies as well as subsistence crops. Interestingly, these approaches have been far more successful in São Paulo than in Southern Brazil, or in the Northeast. Most likely this has to do with the different historical farm-laborer systems. In the northeast, people have been more prone to indulge in traditional total-control relations, whereas in the South they prefer an autonomous stance in relation to their land use. However, historical differences are diminishing, as new powerful phenomena like agribusiness and agroecology modernize and homogenize the Brazilian countryside into two very antagonistic blocks.

Closer links with the world-system since the 1960s have meant that Brazilian agricultural production has followed global market developments. With the consolidation of wage labor and capitalist relations, regional differences in Brazil have been decreasing since the 1960s in comparison to the countryside of other Latin American countries, argues Vergara-Camus (2007: 51). Rises and falls in this or that commodity price or dollar value have been a heavy burden on the rural entrepreneurs. Since the 1960s, the federal government has been building a competitive advantage in mechanized and large-scale agricultural production. The government has offered tremendous subsidies, loans and political support for agribusiness (Houtzager 1998), a policy which continues. Lula’s ethanol diplomacy supports the export of commodities like soya-bean, ethanol and pulp. Developmentalist projects in Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) improve export infrastructure.

The most important transformation phenomenon for recent years in Brazil has certainly been the agribusiness expansion and its influence on the rural areas, and will be in years to come. Agribusiness requires heavy mechanization, pesticide and fertilizer usage, or genetically modified seeds, for which only large and medium scale farmers have capital (Papma 1992: 149). The general trend is the continuing commoditization of land and labor. Carlos Brandão (2007: 59) has argued that agribusiness advances by the mechanisms of land conquest and workforce appropriation. A prevalent land acquiring mechanism – and the base of innumerable Brazilian land conflicts – is grilagem (land grab), in which a grileiro falsifies documents so that he can illegally appropriate land based on fabricated proof. The grileiro is normally a
powerful patron with a prominent political, legal and economic position. *Grileiros* use various different names and register small holdings as individual farms, even though they belong in the end to one family or enterprise and, thus, form a *latifúndio* farm.

At a deeper level, agribusiness expands by symbolic domination universalizing the rural space; it melds the symbolic richness of community cultures into a uniform logic of agribusiness. This shows how the expansion of agribusiness is due not only by environmental mechanisms, but also by cognitive and relational mechanisms. Agribusiness has planned this domination carefully and consciously, Carlos Brandão (2007) argues. Innovations like genetically manipulated organisms have led to higher tension in the countryside (Brandão, Carlos 2007: 61-62). The agribusiness logic divides almost all the rural time and space into commoditized pieces.

Someone wanting to carry out agrarian reform in Latin America should do it right about now, as in the future the global framework will become increasingly unfavorable. Active global corporate resource exploitation will push export-oriented agrarian policies ahead of food sovereignty and agrarian reform-emphasizing policies. It is very unlikely that an agrarian reform agenda could combat both the rising power of transnational corporations and the parallel interests of the United States, China and Europe to secure ethanol, soya-beans, food crops, meat and pulp from Brazil, especially considering the large and powerful Brazilian constituencies in favor of an export-oriented commodity economy.

Since the so-called Green Revolution, the transnational model of agricultural production has been based on the extensive use of fertilization, pesticides and herbicides (Miller 2007: 153, 234). Agribusiness encounters an executive-centric political system in Brazil that concentrates power in the top executive, the president. If the president wanted, he could bring about agrarian reform. Currently, Latin American countryside is rapidly becoming a vast mechanized export plantation. A Stora Enso executive who has worked for years in Brazil commented on Lula’s land reform policy: “Lula has been talking about land reform – it is like Jesus, everyone talks” (Genfors 2007). The paper and pulp industry in Brazil is not concerned with the leftist discourses of Lula: they already know on whose side Lula is. Even though his discourse in the past sometimes deviated into elite bashing, in practice Lula is now the man of agribusiness. Ethanol diplomacy has taken the place of agrarian reform on Lula’s policy agenda.

**Predatory Land Access Mechanisms**

Even though initiated in 1964, Brazil’s market pulp investments really took off in 1974. From that moment on, as the Ministry of the Environment report alleges, the military government imposed the large-scale pulp model with an iron hand, and “all attempts to rectify the situation were treated with the same formula of ignore-delay-suffocate” (MMA 2005: 52). Pulp projects are part of a struggle for land in which it is not clear who intruded whose land, due to the land question and dubious land access. Tree plantation companies acquired
Brazilian land from 1960s to the 1980s by harsh mechanisms. In the northern regions of Brazil, the corporate land access mechanisms depicted below by the Ministry of the Environment report are still common:

Before the company establishes itself in the region, men arrive wearing the clothes of rich farmers, driving pick-ups and wanting to buy land from small producers. Even though it was argued that there were no cases of death or explicit physical violence, the non-articulation and non-organization of local farmers put them into too vulnerable a position to take an informed decision. (MMA 2005: 37.)

CPT, the Pastoral Land Commission has extensively documented this indirect as well as direct brutal rural violence inherent to tree plantation expansion. Some of these accounts have led to devolution of tree plantation lands to traditional communities. In the state of Amapá, the court found Champion, a company exporting trees to produce pulp abroad, guilty of accessing land illegally by grileiros and extortion (MMA 2005: 37). In Pará and Amapá, plantations destined to produce pulp drove ancient communities and small-scale farmers from their lands. A Parliamentary Investigation (CPI) suggested the devolution of 370,000 hectares of lands occupied by the eucalyptus plantations of Jari Celulose to resolve the land conflicts that evolved from the massive dispossession (MMA 2005: 39).

The Jari Project invaded indigenous land, “like most other MNC’s” in the 1960-1970 period in Brazil (Arruda, Souza & Afonso 1975: 164). This has not been the case only in Brazil, but around the world, Marchak alleges, “where there are still indigenous peoples, both forestry in natural stands and plantations deprive them of land. Typically, they are dispersed or pushed to the margins of the forest.” (Marchak 1995: 14) Aracruz in Espírito Santo, according to NACLA,

Illegally appropriated land from the Tupinikim and Guarani, building its first factory in an aldeia called Macacos. This was easy, since there were no formal registers of indigenous populations or their lands. Moreover, the corporation had the full support of municipal, state, and federal governments, and was able to acquire land through a variety of ways, including grilagem, or falsifying deeds (NACLA 2007).

Worldwide, “as land was claimed for plantations, both natural trees and people were moved out”, argues Marchak (1995: 301). The Brazilian dictatorship, especially the Geisel government policy, based rural development on large enterprises and wiped out “petty production units, intensifying the proletarianization of the Brazilian countryside and, simultaneously, marginalizing a large sector of the rural population” in a labor-transforming process in which Jari’s owner, Daniel Ludwig, played “an important role as a corporate agent” (Arruda, Souza & Afonso 1975: 185).

Besides dispossession and repression of small-scale farming, some pulp investments also inflict slavery upon rural people. Debt slavery and other “modern” forms of slavery still exist in the Brazilian countryside. The following companies: Jari; Votorantim; Suzano de Papel e Celulose – the second biggest maker of paper and cardboard products in Brazil with plants in Bahia, for example; Eucatex – the fourth-largest wood products company; and Ripasa

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105 Amapá and Pará states do not have direct conflicts between the MST and the paper industry currently, as the MST is not present in the pulp-producing parts of these states, as the movement concentrates land reform initiatives on non-rainforest areas.
Celulose – the fifth largest paper producer have been accused of enslavement within the paper and pulp industry (Rose 2005: 224-225). Stora Enso claims that it offers exactly the same benefits for its workers in Brazil as in Finland. The Finnish companies normally offer somewhat higher salaries to their workers in Brazil than the domestic ones, and do not utilize slavery. This does not mean that Stora Enso is a totally labor-friendly company. The builders of Veracel mill unionized under the trade union CUT organized a strike at the end of 2004 on the Veracel construction site, where workers said conditions were dangerous. The strike lasted for many days. Workers demanded better working safety, higher salaries and enhanced daily food packages. I could not gain access to the site surrounded by eight walls in 2004 when doing field research in the area, so I could not check whether the accusations were accurate.

Most worryingly, tree plantation expansion still witnesses brutal violence and occasional murders. In February 2007, an armed guard of the French-German steel producer Vallourec & Mannesmann (VM), a tree-planting company in Minas Gerais, murdered Antonio Joaquim dos Santos, a 32-year-old agricultural worker, on a eucalyptus plantation that had been certified with FSC. He was a villager in the Canabrava community that has been dispossessed of their land and access to basic natural resources since 1975 by the expansion of tree plantation companies. “Seizing Antonio Joaquim, the two armed guards hired by VM, known as C and J de Casmina, tied him up, hit him and fired two shots into his mouth in front of his daughter,” according to a communication on 27 February 2007 by the Network against the Green Desert. Because of the violence, the MST members keep guard during the night, for example in such huts as the one below built at the entrance to a camp in Rio Grande do Sul.
Modern Mechanisms of Land Access

Not all tree plantation expansion is dispossession, repression, slavery and murders. Most corporate land access, I observed, takes place as normal business transactions where land changes ownership. Some proprietors are looking for paper companies to sell their land to. Some sell land because they want to, and understand the results of the decision, i.e., the impossibility or great difficulty of returning to the land as a farmer, because of the currently rapid expansion of plantations and the increased price of good agricultural land. Others sell because they need to. If one gets isolated in the sea of eucalyptus, alone in the midst of silent trees with no life, as often happens in pulp investment areas, the life becomes difficult and lonely. Brazilians love to interact and the lack of social contact is a serious matter (Ribeiro 2000). For Finns who plan extensive tree plantations, to leave small-scale farmer families isolated in the middle of trees would not seem to be a major problem, as their country has a notion of distance and isolation rather as privileges and positive signs than as deprivation. For Brazilians whose neighbors have moved out, the pressure to follow them is heavy. Often small farmers do not have the money or the means to visit friends and relatives far away.

Besides becoming cut off, a further boost to selling lands to paper companies comes from debts to banks. In various locations, state-hired agronomists advise farmers to take extensive loans from banks and start production based on pesticides, fertilizers and heavy soil usage. Often these schemes fail, as they are not appropriate to the locality. Soils erode and toxins
ravage the land, and as a result, farmers’ incomes drop, and they end in a debtors’ prison. Banks foreclose on the lands, and the paper industry buys them. This badly advised debt—forced selling phenomenon is widespread in Brazil, and is intensified by one of the world’s highest interest rates, which offers little time to look for the best offer when the downturn comes. The access to credit for non-corporate agriculture, meaning agroecology, on the other hand, is very limited.

Paper companies may try to persuade people to sell their lands, benefiting from a domino-mechanism of buying one farm and then waiting for the others to fall. The new personal histories of Brazilians faced with eucalyptus plantations, collected while doing participative observation in these areas, tell of the domino effect. Brazilians do not want to live next to eucalyptus plantations, as they perceive them as potentially dangerous, ugly and deathly. People worry that pesticides and fertilizers will spread to their lands and waters. People said that eucalyptus offers excellent hide-outs for criminals: In Bahia, it has become common to run into the trees and wait for the fuss to subside. One can run into a eucalyptus plantation for dozens of kilometers unseen and come out wherever. Eucalyptus is aesthetically ugly to many: many also connected it to subordination. The plant represents in this sense for the locals “multinational companies with money” and “capital, which condemns”, as two informants put it.

Modern pulp companies buy, rent and outsource lands by sophisticated methods. Experts in land access look for maximization of the productive variables like land and water availability to establish eucalyptus plantations in the best areas. Some companies are more conscious of environmental impacts than others are, looking to diminish these and to follow the guidelines. There are still many issues to address, and the Stora Enso technical personnel seemed to be more aware and willing to address the problems in interviews than the Stora Enso directors, who seemed to be more cautious about their public image and thus tried to hide all misconducts. “We have to be more conservationist”, one unnamed technician working for Stora Enso as a planner for land access explained to me. By the demand for nature conservation, which has already partially taken place, he meant the company practice of not planting in areas that would block the culturally important traditional open views in the Pampa of Rio Grande do Sul. The transformations in landscape, the conceived cultural ugliness of tree plantations, might actually be even more detrimental to the companies’ public image than any other factor, because eucalyptus and pulp projects gain their legitimacy in struggles over symbolic value.

There is wide variation in land prices depending on who is selling, who is buying, at what time, situation and location. When Stora Enso buys lands, it generally has to pay more, as it is a multinational. Locals think the company has more money than national companies do—which is true. In total, to plant a hectare of eucalyptus in Rio Grande do Sul in the area where Stora Enso operated cost almost 3,000 reais. This value only includes the land area planted with eucalyptus, but due to environmental laws, pulp companies generally need to buy twice this amount of land to preserve the other half, which means that a planted hectare cost 6,000 reais. (Interviews with Stora Enso personnel in Rio Grande do Sul, May 2008.)
Land prices have soared dramatically. For example, in Bahia’s eucalyptus zones the land price is four to six times higher on average than just a few years ago (interviews with trade union leaders at the STR Eunápolis, 2006). As a consequence of increased land access by paper corporations, for example, in Eunápolis the rural exodus has been greatest in Brazil and the land price has increased ten-fold, with three companies owning more than half of the land, according to Cepedes, a local NGO (interview, June 2008). Five thousand small-scale farmers have become unemployed and migrated to cities during the last four years due to the construction of the factory and Veracel’s land acquisitions (IOS 2005). This makes agrarian reform and family or middle size food-producing agriculture difficult, even impossible. At the same time as land prices rise, there are more buyers. For example, Southern Bahia received a wave of immigrant farmers in recent decades from the southern Espírito Santo state due to the earlier dispossession caused by Aracruz. The Bahian locals estimated a fifth or more of the farmers in the Southern Bahia are currently those displaced by the earlier extensive eucalyptus plantations in Espírito Santo. As Veracel and other companies have also set up pulp investments in Southern Bahia, these people have little choice but to try to move northwards in the hope of somewhat cheaper land. However, this is no longer possible, as the northern areas are also used for plantation purposes: from the west the soya-business pushes in to the western areas of Bahia (Brannstrom 2005), in the Southeast ethanol sugarcane dominates. In the north, the dry caatinga, sertão desert looms, with the severest agricultural and living conditions in the whole of Brazil (Arons 2004). In comparison to the sertão, the lush Southern Bahia is a paradise. Since people can no longer move northwards, they join the landless movements. A similar pulp plantation expansion is going on in all Brazilian pulp investment areas.

Paper company executives maintain they do not buy small-scale farms. I asked about land access and planting activities from Otavio Pontes from Stora Enso’s Latin American division in various interviews. He replied in one email: “Veracel does not buy farms of less than 50 hectares and most of the farms bought had more than 200 hectares.” Nevertheless, in contradiction, Veracel’s soil and land manager told me the company buys farms smaller than 50 hectares all the time (taped interview, July 2006). He showed me some such areas, which I filmed, and which were visibly smaller than 50 hectares. When I did field research in the area, I found many farmers who had sold their family farms to Veracel, farms smaller than 50 hectares. One such farm was in the community of Água Rosada, belonging to Senhor Adelino, and I took video and photos of the former farm recently planted with eucalyptus. Surrounded by eucalyptus walls, all the birds of the area were flocking to a single standing fruit tree. The former house stood in ruins with eucalyptus sprouting from the smashed floor. In a matter of months, one would not recognize the once lush farm at all. Based on the clearly observable fact that small farms had been bought, the official story became doubtful. Not all land came from big cattle-ranchers. New evidence amounts weekly of practices outside official accounts, and now after the MST and allied NGO’s protests, public prosecutors have noticed the misconducts and started to file lawsuits against Veracel and other pulp projects.
Interaction of Contention and the Counter-Attack

The development of large-scale pulp model contestation has been a long process. So has the development of the counter-attack. I will next turn to this dialectic political development. Criticism and concern over the ecological impact at tree plantations became widespread in the 1980s. Pulp plantations started to encounter resistance around the world. The industry has tried to overcome the resistance by offering an expert-crafted master plan that considers everything, at least in theory. Jaakko Pöyry became the master in these plans worldwide: “its reports formed the basis for most of the forestry operations” since the 1970s. (Marchak 1995: 81.) One of the most vocal critics of the master plan has been the World Rainforest Movement (WRM), a coalition of non-governmental tropical forest groups. It has pointed out the many defects of the master plan. However, in spite of its severest criticism, the WRM has not managed to discontinue or transform the pulp investment phenomenon.

Starting from the “Green Revolution modernization” of the countryside, rural areas have become hostile to many local peasant groups. This has resulted in grievances, rational interest-defense, new heterodox frames and the adaptation of new models of resistance. The most important result of this dialectic in Brazil was that Brazilian social movements produced a set of ideas called socio-environmentalism. This is “an environmentalism that is more politicized and further to the left than one sees elsewhere” and carries “unusually strong interpersonal relations among environmentalists in state and civil society institutions, who work together in both blocking and enabling networks” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007: 10-11). In recent years, during the radical advance of pro-agribusiness policies, this paradigm has evolved into the more encompassing environmental justice paradigm, which demonstrates how the poor and politically marginalized normally pay the highest price in natural resource politics.

The pulp companies have had a central role in the general worldwide and Brazilian business-social movement conflicts. For example, the directors of Aracruz “played a leading role, through the Business Council for Sustainable Development, in preparing big business for the Rio Earth Summit in 1992” (Carrere & Lohmann 1996: 151). Brazilian social movements achieved a capacity to professionally document and denounce the impacts they suffered due to pulp investments only after the exponential socio-environmental NGO growth period following ECO 1992 Rio conference (Hochstetler & Keck 2007). The movements achieved this capacity in spite of the growing counter-attack and the anticipation of criticism by corporations prior to ECO 1992. In a central pulp investment dispute example, prominent NGOs Fase, Greenpeace and Ibase took aerial photos, gathered personal accounts of locals, logging companies’ contracts and other documents demonstrating Veracruz, the predecessor of Veracel, cutting tens of thousands of hectares of the Atlantic rainforest in Floresta Rio Doce between 1992 and 1993. This data the NGOs assembled into an extensive dossier (Fase, Greenpeace, Ibase 1993) and used as a legal document. The prompt national environmentalists’ endeavors saved some 5,000 hectares of the Floresta Rio Doce from the land acquisition of Veracruz. This could be considered a partial early slowing of plantation expansion.
In environmental questions, the entities interested in natural resources attempt to redefine nature by legal categories, so that their actions would be perceived as legitimate and ethical. In an interview, João Borges from Stora Enso defended Veracel’s action by saying that environmentalists have mistakenly thought the cut area in 1992-1993 was Atlantic rainforest, even though it was a forest in stage of intermediate or advanced regeneration from earlier clearings. “It is difficult for a common technician to know the difference”, Borges explained (interview, 2008). One can legally cut forests in regeneration. The struggle over natural resources revolves around technical competence and terminological definitions reminiscent of the usage of technocratic cultural codes of order and progress to enact authority and thus legitimize one’s actions. However, the lately acquired civil society capacity to disseminate information has started to be increasingly able in the legitimization struggle, utilizing the accepted modern mechanisms of documentation and lawsuits.

Mobilization is in a dialectic game, not only with the state policies and general social transformations, but also with the counter-attack that follows when movements attain their goals. Organized and professional counter-attack aims to curb the contentious agency criticizing large-scale pulp investments. Repression of resistance to pulp projects is easier when the opposition is isolated. As Carrere & Lohmann (1996: 115-116) suggest from cases around the world, repression has been easier when opposition has been “small-scale, poorly-coordinated, out of the public eye, or saddled with an unfavourable public image”. Several public relation corporations such as the US-based Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin (MDB) specialize in consulting pulp companies on how best to cope with the resistance. MDB’s view is that radical power relation transforming movements are the most likely to be successful. Based on a MDB document, Carrere & Lohmann (1996: 121) write: “The group likely to present the most effective challenge to advancement of corporate interests, MDB concludes, are ‘radicals’ interested in ‘social justice and political empowerment’, who cannot be restricted to single technical issues”. The public relation specialists’ advising corporations seem to have reached the same conclusion as this research.

In Rio Grande do Sul, following resistance to pulp investment projects since 2006, the state governor Yeda Crusius, in alliance with the paper and pulp industry and large landowners and traditional powers dating to the authoritarian regime, have tried to delegitimize the MST since 2008 and cut off its pool of state resources. This de-legitimization tried to deprive the MST of the list of accepted social actors, and the simultaneous state resource cuts aimed to paralyze the functioning of the EAM mechanism. However, these de-legitimization attempts are against the tide of rising movement society and the expanding network of allies of the MST. At beginning of April 2009 the charges against the movement were dropped because of active support for the MST by its network of allies.

A Transnational Conflict?

The case of pulp conflicts reveals that the more deeply rooted a given social actor, such as an industry or a social movement, is in the Brazilian nationalist framework, the more likely it is
to attain its goals. In general, transnational ties of social movements have favored these in their struggle against large-scale investments (Khagram 2004). However, in the case of Brazilian pulp projects, transnational ties have been partly detrimental to the resistance. Transnational ties of resistance movements, such as indigenous groups and environmental NGO’s, have been systematically misrepresented to the public by those in favor of large-scale investments in order to cash in nationalist sentiments, utilize the force of Brazilian nationalism in opposing all alternative development projects and to represent their Brazilian supporters as “manipulated by outsiders”. This has also been the case in pulp conflicts, where Aracruz for example has advertised itself as “100% Brazilian”, and represented the resistance of the indigenous as manipulated and directed by the interests of competing companies and groups in Europe and the United States.

Most of the financing for pulp projects comes not from transnational circles, such as the World Bank, but from BNDES. In order to resist pulp investment in Brazil, it has made much more sense for the resistance to operate principally in the realm of Brazilian politics. The transnational ties of the opponents in pulp conflicts can be used in opponent framing to harness the maximum amount of public nationalistic support in Brazil. For example, the MST has deliberately focused its pulp protests against transnational corporations, against outsiders such as Stora Enso. It has avoided national companies like Votorantim VCP, putting most effort into the struggle against transnational or globalizing capital.

Latin America is becoming ever more tied into the global economy. William Robinson (2008: 75) shows how the relationship between the extra-regional transnational corporations and the Latin American capitalists is “not one of comprador, or managerial underlings, but of partnerships that promote the process of TCC [Transnational Capitalist Class] formation”. The case of pulp project expansion, with its joint ventures, sectoral pulp lobby organizing, industrial networking, and the distribution of the latest advances in the technologies between all companies operating in Brazil (interviews with Borges, Stora Enso, June 2008 and Cordeiro, Pöyry, February 2008), supports this analysis. The de facto globalization of the paper industry and the simultaneous negative connotation this has in Brazil has meant that it has made perfect sense for the pulp industry to consciously try to present itself as “100% Brazilian”, to hide its transnationalization.

Transnational advocacy campaigns, whether criticizing or driving investments, function on the principle of maximizing the visibility of the proposed development projects. This kind of transparency would be detrimental in the Brazilian pulp conflicts. Even to hint that the problem could not be solved by the Brazilians themselves, that the pulp investment process could not be controlled by Brazilians, incites irritation in both parties. The promoters and resisters of pulp investments share this nationalist sentiment. Transnational ties can help the actors to gain power in the struggle, but the utilization of these transnational networking mechanisms has to be accompanied by careful concealment of such networking, because the cost of transnational exposure is likely to be higher than the benefits. For these reasons, and the still globalizing nature of the paper industry system, tied to certain core countries such as Finland, and influenced heavily by the increasingly important, heavy-state support of the
Brazilian political system, my analysis of Brazilian pulp conflicts and investments focuses more on the domestic than transnational dynamics. The heavily local quality of action present in this case is not exception. Much of the collective action, planning, and the activists are local even in theoretically transnational advocacy campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Since 2008, an important new channel has opened as new friendship association of the landless was formed in Finland. Actions via this transnational networking could prove to be crucial to promote dialogue and policy transformation within the paper industry, pulp projects, and financing. Visibility-raising and advocacy could effectively lead into transparency and towards greater corporate social responsibility. Transnational advocacy in the Rubber Tappers’ case in the end of the 1980s was fundamental in pressuring the Brazilian state to change its Amazon policy and cast a closer eye to the problems (Keck 1995). A parallel pressure on the Finnish state and paper corporations by Finnish activist groups and on the Brazilian state and corporations by the MST and its Brazilian allies is required for truly lasting solutions, because the problem is transnational. I will not assess the impact of these transnational ties to the pulp conflicts in greater detail, because of the limitation of research period to the end of 2008. However, it seems clear that future research should consider the transnational advocacy campaigns carefully, as these might explain changes in the some economic outcomes of some pulp projects, such as Stora Enso in Rio Grande do Sul, to a considerable degree.

A transnational ally, Maattomien ystävät Ry in Finland, has given opportunities for the MST and Stora Enso to resolve their conflict by a dialogue, or at least start this process where companies eager to follow the tenets of corporate social responsibility could meet with their stakeholders. These attempts to initiate a new direct and transnational channel have emerged only since 2008, and have been mostly unsuccessful, partly because the MST does not know what it exactly wants the company to do. And partly because of gross misunderstandings, arrogant attitudes, attempts to discredit the movement, and negative comments by some company directors simultaneously as others tried to engage in a dialogue. Thus, the pulp conflicts have still remained largely within the confines of the Brazilian state, even though they are bound to become more transnational.

**New Dynamics: Expansion of Plantation Outsourcing**

As the old dynamics of confrontational and contentious land conflicts within the backward state interacts with the expansion of the modern state, new interactive processes have emerged to characterize the schism of tree plantation expansion and local livelihoods and social peace. The most important of these new interactive process sub-types is the expansion of plantation outsourcing. The forms and responses to outsourcing vary a great deal. The MST’s ally, the Movement of Small Scale Farmers (MPA), whose members are not landless but have land, calculates that between 1973 and 2003 Aracruz in Espírito Santo received R$ 13 billion from the federal government, whereas agriculture in the whole state of Espírito Santo was given only R$ 1.5 billion (MMA 2005: 49). The MPA and the MST argue that it is much more effective to use state and natural resources for small-scale agriculture than to channel
resources into pulp. Both the contemporary Brazilian case and the historical Finnish case would suggest that big paper corporations currently seek to impose corporate property systems with monopolistic or oligarchic control over the state and natural resources.

However, the conflicts over natural resources are dynamic and complex phenomena: victories for some bring about changes in the strategies of others. The intensified battle over state and natural resources has led to some transformation pressures in the pulp investment model. The most significant of these are the various outsourcing programs for tree production, which the industry and many consultants conceive as solutions to land struggles. The land access methods are under constant transformation, and are not limited to simple direct land buying by companies. The multiple land access forms make corporate land access ever more complex to track down. These forms might be attempts to disguise part of the de facto control of land and natural resources by companies – still prevalent in these schemes – under the guise of private small-scale ownership. On the other hand, according to Veracel, forestry partners programs reduce “the company's need to acquire new land for the planting of eucalyptus trees since it also makes it possible for third parties to produce wood destined for our mill” (Veracel Celulose 2007).

Securing an own wood-procurement base is the biggest competitive advantage of paper corporations in the developing countries. Companies rely on outsourcing only when the price of land gets too high – because of their own land buying activities’ inflationary pressures – and thus outsourcing will never be the principal wood source (Joly 2007: 50). On a more critical note, Anita Kerski argues that the paper industry engages in outsourcing programs when resistance becomes too organized:

If resistance to seizures of land for plantations is stubborn yet isolated, small-scale, poorly-coordinated, and out of the domestic or transnational public eye, military suppression may result; if protests are more widespread and well-coordinated, contract farming schemes may be rolled out instead as a way of gaining local people's active collaboration in raw material production (Kerski 1995).

In the case of Brazil, the finding by Kerski seems to hold true. As the higher price of land drives companies to adopt outsourcing schemes, subcontractors have the opportunity to demand higher rents for their lands. This has happened in Southern Bahia since 2005, with the consolidating organization of sub-producers into associations such as Associacão dos Produtores do Eucalipto de Extremo Sul da Bahia (ASPEX), which demand increasing prices for wood from companies. The outsourced eucalyptus growers of Veracel in Bahia organized themselves into a producer association (ASPEX) in 2007 – as a result, they have mounted resistance against the pulp company, demanding higher prices for wood (Interview with Guttenberg Pereira Souza. June 13, 2008. ASPEX, Treasurer and Accountant, Eunápolis, Bahia). The outsourcing schemes soon become more costly than even land buying, so that the maintenance of local social peace becomes the principal motive to maintain outsourcing. Whenever possible, in the absence of organized resistance monitoring corporations, paper companies will seek to expand into ever more dubious territories. For example, Veracel has
had to resort to planting eucalyptus on a 20,000-hectare area the MST labels as *devoluta*, as government land marked for agrarian reform owing to its unproductiveness.

In general, land markets originate in the dynamic interaction between the two processes, resistance and the government-industry alliance building: land price fluctuations follow the progress of this power struggle. Chart 2 below shows the extension of directly pulp company-owned eucalyptus plantation land in individual Brazilian states (Bracelpa 2009), as well as the extension of outsourced tree plantations destined for the production of pulp (Bracelpa 2008). According to the Chart 2, outsourcing has been most common in Bahia, and least common in Mato Grosso do Sul – curiously the state with the weakest MST-resistance organization against pulp investment expansion.

Eucalyptus plantations continue to expand rapidly by outsourcing schemes in several pulp areas. However, the producers have started to organize, which has produced increasing conflict. For example, Veracel has had serious conflicts with its own outsourced producers (ASPEX). Votorantim in Rio Grande do Sul has also had conflicts with outsourcing. The MST farmers who initially farmed eucalyptus for Votorantim uprooted their outsourced
plantations in 2008. I will assess these two outsourcing-related conflicts in more detail in the following chapter.

MPA and the MST vehemently criticize outsourcing. The MPA sees the outsourcing (called many things, such as fomento and poupança florestal, depending on the program issuing company) as a principal mechanism for the current paper industry advance. Because of the mounting contention, especially since 2004, the industry is in a minor crisis with various judicial processes, court decisions and denunciations over the already plummeting size of eucalyptus plantations. Companies want to diminish their visibility by outsourcing lands, to become less vulnerable. They market fomento programs as a step towards resolving the conflict, towards community development. The small-scale farmers of Espírito Santo find that:

At the end of the fomento contract, the producer has land degraded by poisoning, disappearance of springs, along with other problems, and totally incapacitated for the cultivation of cereals or herbs, for example. The plantation of eucalyptus yields 25 times less return than the cultivation of cereals and vegetables. (Cf. MMA 2005: 79-80.)

In many parts of Brazil, the struggle for natural resources has been going on for so long and so bitterly that there are groups that do not accept even the fomento, like the MST, MPA and the indigenous people in Espírito Santo. They see a deeper structural interest conflict over the scarce and divided state and natural resources, and do not want to support these minor changes in the current pulp investment model, seeking a greater, absolute victory. The state supports the outsourcing. Key informants argue that the links between governors, most parliamentarians and media with the paper and pulp corporations are extremely close; for example, in Rio Grande do Sul (interview, Stela Farias, PT deputado estadual in RS, 2008). The federal government, through the Ministry of National Integration, which has always been a close ally of the paper industry, has offered millions to small-scale farmers to plant trees.

Ordinary interest groups are taking the MST’s mechanisms into their repertoire. These traditionally and structurally political antagonists have started to use some mechanisms of contention to resist a common foe – the pulp company with its extending tree plantations. This adaptation of mechanisms of contention even by the MST antagonists is a strong argument supporting the hypothesis of the relevance of contentious agency in politicizing industrial plantation expansion, and in helping to explain the variation in the outcomes of pulp investment projects in Brazil. For example, in 2008 ASPEX started active contention to demand for higher prices and changes in the contracts, as well as higher ethical standards from the company. They shared the MST’s viewpoint that plantations should not be owned mainly by a pulp company. They planned protest acts like surrounding the mill with agricultural machines and trucks if the company did not compromise in negotiations, and getting the media to witness the immorality of the company, as the treasurer and accountant of the organization conveyed to me in an interview (Guttenberg Pereira Souza, 13 June 2008). In another case from Southern Bahia, cattle-ranchers ranging from small to large-size producers, feeling the crunch of pulp companies, formed a movement of Sem Pasto (those without pastureland) in August 2008 following the substantial legal victories against Veracel gained by the resistance network led by the MST to fight for land for their cattle amidst the
eucalyptus. As the expansion of eucalyptus plantations has reduced the pasturelands dramatically, cattle-ranchers have been forced to take over lands in the centre of the city of Eunápolis, which caused problems such as traffic accidents and poor fodder for the cows, argues the prosecutor João Alves da Silva Neto (Núcleo Mata Atlântica. 2008).

To understand the role of organizations like the ASPEX fully would require a new study. Their role is ambiguous: while outsourcing allows companies to extend plantations outside directly owned land, organized outsource producers can squeeze, and have increasingly upped the price they demand for wood, made the companies compete with each other, and demanded greater regulation and control of the corporations. In these attempts, they utilize contention mechanisms they borrow from the MST, such as disruptive protest acts, networking and embedding with the state. They sympathize with the MST’s viewpoint that the current pulp investment model should change more than with the companies, which they have criticized heavily in the local media. The principal reason to form producer organizations has been precisely to curb corporate agency by organizing local small- and medium-sized fiber producers. However, as this process is still under way and explains only a relatively small part of plantation expansion (see chart 2), it is hard to draw had and fast conclusions on its importance. This process can actually be examined under the two processes identified and does not need to be recognized as a separate process yet. Outsourcing contracts have until now been mostly either promoted and defined by companies, or repressed and regulated by resistance, and I will discuss cases of both in the next chapter. Both the corporations and the resistance attempt to get hold of the outsourcing farmers, who are also attempting to influence the corporations and the movements. These outsource producers are in an increasingly powerful political position, as they can utilize either of the main processes identified here – contentious or corporate agency – to promote their interests.

Concluding Remarks

I have discussed the background of pulp conflicts, which draw from the long history of the Brazilian agrarian question and from the world-systemic agricultural transformation in the so-called Green Revolution. I assessed the specific roles of the MST and agribusiness in agrarian reform and plantation expansion. The chapter then analyzed predatory and modern mechanisms of plantation expansion, discussing various ways by which the paper companies have assured the land base for eucalyptus plantations. The forms of the corporate land access have transformed drastically over the decades, and the most important definer of these transformations appears to be the activeness of the resistance, the organization of civil society, and the government support enjoyed by the industry. This shows that the resistance can force the corporate mechanisms to change towards the lines of right livelihood. Differences among local resistance and conflict dynamics explain also differences between

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106 The analogy between a Sem Pasto movement and a Sem Terra movement is obvious. Instead of relying only on the traditional ruralist caucus political support, big ranchers decided to take direct local action by mobilization. This might suggest that the paper industry has a stronger say vis-à-vis the Brazilian government than cattle-ranchers, at least regionally in pulp investment areas.
the companies in their land access forms. A new and rising tendency in plantation conflicts is
the politicization of outgrower producers’ organizations, which can lead to a stronger
resistance network, balancing the power struggle between the paper corporations and the local
civil society. It seems to be easier to set up large-scale projects when there is no contentious
agency. In such a situation, the prevailing political dynamics conveying an active corporate
agency are less likely to be efficiently contested.

The MST argues that increase in agribusiness like tree plantations is in opposition to agrarian
reform, as the success of one depends directly on the failure of the other. Pulp companies
acquire farms that the MST has occupied many times to facilitate their expropriation for
agrarian reform. After these strategic acquisitions worth tens or even hundreds of millions of
reais, small-scale farms next to the giant eucalyptus farms fall increasingly under the
influence of pulp companies. Government offers small farmers funds and other incentives to
plant trees. In spite of the clear agency of the paper industry entrepreneurs and companies
discussed in this chapter, they do not assume responsibility for the dispossession caused by
eucalyptus expansion. Marchak (1995: 276) found that the paper “companies do not discuss
the displaced peasantry; they deem it to be a responsibility of government”. Not much has
changed in these company attitudes since 1995.
7. Dynamics of Brazilian Pulp Conflicts

In this chapter, I compare episodes of contention, explaining why plantation expansion discontinued or was slowed in a few cases between 2004 and 2008, but in only one case before 2004. Most emphasis I place on the case of Veracel in Bahia, some emphasis on Aracruz in Espírito Santo, and quite a bit of emphasis on the Stora Enso, Votorantim and Aracruz cases in Rio Grande do Sul, as I did extensive field research in these areas. The other cases function as points of comparison.

The 2004 Veracel occupation was the turning-point in the politics of paper investment, a primary case that demonstrates the qualities of a protest that was effective in slowing plantation expansion in Brazil. I contrast the conflict of the MST to the indigenous Pataxó group in their similar land struggle with Veracel, showing why the Pataxó did not manage to slow plantation expansion, whereas the MST did. I then assess the role of the Brazilian mass media by a discourse analysis of the way the O Globo journal reported on the Veracel occupation. I conclude the section on the Veracel conflicts by discussing the steps that the re-symbolizing protest mechanism (c) takes.

In general, I show how the public is growing increasingly wary where contentious agency is in operation. Pulp conflicts have been mounting for the last thirty years, gradually becoming more serious. Traditionally, the axis of Extreme South of Bahia and Northern Espírito Santo have been the most serious region of tree plantation conflict. In general, conflicts related to tree plantations have been the most widespread in Minas Gerais: over 60% of the state’s municipalities have long had tree plantations. Slavery, child labor and other drastic violations of human rights still exist in the tree plantations of Minas Gerais (MMA 2005: 118-168). However, these plantations are mostly for vegetal coal production and steel mills, and I will not cover them in this analysis of pulp investment. Some plantations in Minas Gerais are pulp investment related.107 Minas Gerais conflicts have not involved the MST as a protagonist and, interestingly, plantation expansion has not been slowed or discontinued, which supports the research hypothesis. In a wave of actions linked to the Brazilian NGO Forum in ECO 1992, Greenpeace symbolically closed Portocel, Aracruz’s Espirito Santo export port in May 1992 (Carrere & Lohmann 1996: 154). However, this protest act did not result in plantation slowing, which supports the hypothesis that besides symbolic protest acts, efficient organization, political practices and embedded autonomy are also required. In April 1993, NGOs raised public civil action number 93.01.1000399-5 in the Ministério Público Federal in the court against Veracel, then called Veracruz Florestal Ltda. Finally, in July 2008, the federal court in Bahia sentenced Veracel to pay large fines, uproot eucalyptus and replant tens of thousands of hectares of rainforest. This can be considered as an expansion slowing. More

107 Cenibra, established in 1973 and owned by Japan Brazil Paper and Pulp Resources Development Co, was the only pulp company with a pulp mill in Minas Gerais in 2005. Now many companies are expanding operations in MG. Cenibra owned 233,778 ha of land in 2005. Its conflicts derive from the pollution of rivers by effluents and toxins from the pulp mill and plantations. (MMA 2005: 160-162.) Besides Cenibra, International Paper do Brasil also operates in Minas Gerais state, having direct and outsourced fomento plantations. For more detail on the Minas Gerais plantation disputes, see the extensive description in the MMA report (2005: 118-168).
might be coming, as public prosecutors and NGOs have also accused Veracel of other environmental crimes.

São Paulo has a completely different conflict dynamics than other states where the MST operates (Interview, Neuri, MST São Paulo, 2009). This is because everything that takes place in the state circulates much more widely and profoundly. Also smaller struggles for land gain national attention. The actors have more dynamic, modern forms of acting in the most modern state of the country than in the peripheral states (ibid). In São Paulo, the MST periodically occupies Votorantim VCP’s plantations, and the “preoccupation with the hydrological impacts of eucalyptus monoculture is omnipresent in the public opinion” (MMA 2005: 173). The MST accuses Votorantim of planting on lands designated for agrarian reform. The main conflicts in São Paulo relate to water resources and land ownership, following the general dynamics of tree plantation conflict in Brazil. In 2008, Votorantim was sentenced by a federal court to a substantial uprooting of trees in São Paulo. In comparison to the other pulp holdings in São Paulo – Ripasa, Suzano and International Paper (IP) – only in the conflict around Votorantim VCP expansion can the outcome be argued to be plantation expansion slowing. The mechanism that explains this discrepancy is the active protests by the MST against VCP: in other cases, the MST mounted no significant protests and thus expansion continued. The MST has an active network of allies in São Paulo, and an active organizing and politicizing effort (inference from interviews with several MST leaders in São Paulo). The expansion of plantations by VCP was slowed. In July 2004, Capão Bonito’s Municipal Assembly approved a law that limits and regulates tree plantation expansion, banning eucalyptus from cultivable land (Piketty et al. 2009: 186). The Mayor, Mr. Tamura, explained that land should be used for grain rather than eucalyptus cultivation, as grain offers higher global profitability, more jobs, and causes less environmental impact (ibid.). VCP has claimed the municipal law is against the private property rights of the constitution (ibid.). The Supreme Federal Court has not yet handed down its decision, but Aracruz has received the right to bypass similar laws in Espírito Santo. Thus, it is more accurate to depict the São Paulo conflict outcomes as a partial slowing of plantation expansion rather than as a discontinuation, since the slowing might be temporary. I will not assess these conflicts in greater detail than this, but turn to Bahia, Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Sul, where I did the field research.

**Rio de Janeiro / Aracruz: Early Contention**

The only clear plantation slowing case before 2003 was the discontinuation of Aracruz expansion to Rio de Janeiro (RJ) in 2002. In 2001, after Espírito Santo (ES) deputies had prohibited new plantations in Espírito Santo by state law 6.780/2001, Aracruz tried to expand into Rio de Janeiro (MMA 2005: 115). Aracruz planned to plant tens of thousands of

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108 São Paulo (SP) was the state in which exotic tree plantation for industrial purposes started in Brazil. It also has the biggest markets for paper and pulp products. The plantations center namely on the municipality of Sorocaba that had about 330,000 hectares in 2004. (MMA 2005: 168-171.)

109 As is typical in economic developments in Brazil, the RJ tree plantation initiative took place within a framework of internal transformation in one state and the ensuing interaction of this change with the federal state
hectares of eucalyptus plantations in the eastern parts of Rio de Janeiro state to supply pulp mills in ES. The governor of Rio de Janeiro, Antonio Garotinho, signed a contract with Aracruz supporting the move. After this, an impressive process of societal organization and mobilization followed the Aracruz-RJ state contract. Politicians from right to left united forces against the plantation expansion attempt (Pedlowski & Föeger 2004). Municipal vereadores in the expansion area positioned themselves against the state governor’s decision, together with the petroleum industry workers’ unions which were strong in the area, the MST, the Organization of the Brazilian Lawyers (OAB) and various other important organizations.

In the state of Rio de Janeiro, land reform is harder to achieve, as there is not so much land to be distributed. Thus, against the threat of eucalyptus plantation expansion in 2002, the MST took various actions against the governor’s decision, demanding resources for agrarian reform instead of policies favoring eucalyptus plantations of a neighboring state company. With the impact of the nearby Rio de Janeiro city’s strong NGO and academic field, alongside many concerned politicians, the resistance network managed to push for a strict law in the municipality of Campos (next to Espírito Santo). The law regulated all possible future eucalyptus plantations and put a maximum land limit of 3% on eucalyptus plantations in the municipality. This counts as a long-term plantation expansion discontinuation: currently there is less than 2,000 hectares of eucalyptus plantation in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

The case implies that finding municipal political leaders that support the industry is important for the plantation expansion. National and state level executive support the industry has already assured, problems come at the local level. For example, in the RJ case, severe disputes over environmental legislation between those in favor of Aracruz – like the Federation of Industries of RJ State (FIRJAN) – and the Alert against the Green Desert Network, including the MST, ended in the victory of the latter. However, these disputes continue. Aracruz tries to find some municipality in Rio that has not yet created strict legislation for tree plantations, like Itaperuna. (MMA 2005: 117-188.) The MST fights back, trying to convince their municipalities to take the agrarian reform route. Since 2003, a specific law demands ecological and economic zoning before tree plantations can be expanded (Piketty et al. 2009: 185). Plantations have to stay far from rivers and cities, on whose perimeter they are prohibited. For every 100 hectares of planted trees, the company has to plant 30 hectares of native Atlantic Forest species. Carlos Minc, who was a central state actor promoting the law with the NGOs and movements, argued that the law prevents RJ from experiencing the fate of Espírito Santo, where eucalyptus plantation led to serious problems, including falling Atlantic rainforest and soil dessication (WRM 2005).

This early contention example was the only one where expansion was slowed. Especially important in this case was the powerful network of allies and the embedded autonomy of the system. If you make a transformation in the economic structure of one state, you will certainly have direct impact on at least one other state. This is especially the case with the land ownership changes, which immediately cause the previous landowners to relocate – often into another state.

110 One of the leading politicians behind these efforts was state-level deputy Carlos Minc, who became the Secretary of the Environment for the state of RJ in 2006 and Lula’s Minister of the Environment in 2008 as Marina da Silva resigned.
MST with municipal legislators in Campos and the state deputados, like Carlos Minc. Organizing, politicizing and framing, protesting and networking and embedding mechanisms were all active. Apart from this example, no other case showed plantation expansion discontinuation during the 1999-2003 period, not to mention the earlier times. Interestingly, the Rio de Janeiro plantation discontinuation case was the only one in which all the mechanisms the hypothesis suggested as required in plantation expansion slowing were active in the period.\footnote{In February 2010, the RJ parliament made a decision to allow 60,000 hectares of eucalyptus plantations in the Northeastern parts of the state. This point to the fact that the conflict dynamics and economic outcomes are a constantly changing phenomena. The decision was characterized as a balancing act to the earlier far too “strict” regulation. It came after Minc had taken a more relaxed view on corporate regulation and moved to Brasilia to work as the Minister of Environment in the Lula government. I will not deal with these dynamics after 2008 in greater detail than this.}

**Bahia / Veracel: Heterodox Framing and the Public Opinion**

The April 2004 Veracel occupation was a significant attempt at heterodox framing of pulp projects. Deemed by many as productive land, the massive occupation of eucalyptus plantations by the MST attracted widespread media attention. If the land was productive, the act was illegal under Brazilian law. If the eucalyptus plantation was unproductive and did not fulfill its social purpose, the occupation was legal. Judged by the number of activists, this was the biggest land occupation in the history of the movement.

The conflict was resolved by the power of mass demonstration, negotiation and high politics, not arms. The state governor dispatched federal and military police to quell the demonstrators with brute force, had the occupation continued. The MST members carried large knives and other working tools usable in self-defense. A violent clash was possible. Foreign investor eyes were on the conflict; the *Financial Times* was writing on it. Many newspapers framed the MST as a threat to foreign capital and investment in Brazil. The response to the occupation and its results were swift, as the Brazilian government promised in the rapidly initiated talks to buy land for the occupying families, 15-25 hectares for each, along with other promises pleasing the MST, like technical assistance for the land reform institute, INCRA. As a result, the MST withdrew from the area. According to the vice-president of Stora Enso in Latin America, Otavio Pontes, the government asked Veracel to buy land for the landless to settle, and promised to repay the company the value of the land in five years:

> The government offered to pay for the land using a title called TDA (Títulos da Divida Agrária) due in 5 years. Veracel accepted to collaborate with the government and bought the land, the camp has been cleared and the group of camped persons moved to the new area. … So, there was a collaboration from Veracel, not a donation. Of course there is a financial loss represented by the 5 years that the government will take to reimburse for the land purchased. (Pontes, Otavio. Email interview, 22 July 2006).
This counts as plantation expansion slowing. The MST had hit a good target. They were able to gain sympathy from a large audience and provoke debate in spite of, or perhaps because of, using the questionable mechanism of a disruptive protest (c). From an environmental justice perspective, the occupation was legal for the MST. It argued that monoculture tree plantations do not fulfill the social purpose requirement set out for the definition of productive property in articles 184-186 of the 1988 constitution. But more important than this legal battle was that over the value of eucalyptus and the right to utilize land for eucalyptus instead of food production. Indeed, as I argued in the chapter four, and as the movement noted, symbolism was fundamental to the protest action.

The government promised many things to the MST in April 2004, but delivered them only partially. Most of the promises remained unfulfilled in July 2006, when I visited Southern Bahia for the second field research period. Veracel had kept on planting throughout 2006 and started doubling the investment in 2007. The living conditions and economic opportunities in the area were deteriorating owing to the increasing price of land, lack of agricultural land for small-scale farmers and the sales of current small-scale and medium-scale holdings for the production of eucalyptus.\textsuperscript{112} It was clear that the disappointment in the area was likely to spur demonstrations against pulp investments again. And this was what happened.

The main goal of the protest acts is to generate debate, to attempt to change perceptions: “it is important to do something to create attention,” argued Santos from the MST’s National coordination (interview, MST São Paulo 2008). The mounting contention in the public opinion, for which the MST has offered the frame, has helped on the road to substantial legal decisions taken in the latter half of 2008 in favor of the MST agenda. I observed changes in public opinion as the Veracel project evolved. In 2004, before the investment, the public almost hanged the most active pulp critics in Bahia. In 2006, roles had changed, the public throwing stones at Veracel's cars and considering early resistance as a vanguard. In 2008, state actors started restricting plantation expansion since the MST had been continuously pointing out the need to slow pulp expansion.

In the MST national coordination’s view, their eucalyptus actions have resulted in a “general debate on and attention to the green desert after April 2004: we have had actions against the large-scale pulp industry since 1994, but these have not managed to break the silence. These were acts without impact – which are the same thing as not to do them. It is important to do something to generate attention” (interview, MST São Paulo 2006). Why were the actions ineffective before 2004? The Veracel occupation managed to re-symbolize eucalyptus and land, and not only that, but do this in such a disruptive manner that the mass media had to reproduce and thus disseminate the heterodox movement framing throughout the society. When protests are massive, disruptive and re-symbolizing, they are more likely to generate attention.

\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, the government of Lula da Silva was increasingly unwilling to buy private land for the agrarian reform, and distributed mainly only state land.
Another signal of the influence of the Veracel occupation was the way it shook the company profoundly. After the action, Veracel took countermeasures to prevent future protests. It donated cars and funded police operations, besides financing the construction of new military police barracks next to its factory, in the words of the police chief, for stopping ‘an accumulation of people’ next to Veracel (Veracel Celulose 2004). Furthermore, in a clear hardening of its line, the joint venture placed personnel from the Aracruz branch in executive positions in Veracel. Stora Enso tried to sell their part of the whole investment, and in general, their relations with Aracruz came even more problematic. This suggests that Aracruz and the way it handles business have gained power within Veracel since the MST encounter. After initial protests by the MST that have slowed plantation expansion, the general tendency in the resistance cases has been for companies to launch counter-attacks.

Movement coordinators acutely aware of the transformations in investment areas explained that the MST offers jobs, pulling people, many of them ex-workers in the boom and bust construction phase of mills, from the misery of suburbs to orderly camps. People who have been promised a lot, like pulp mill construction workers, but end on the roadside with the MST, hate the pulp companies. Eucalyptus surrounds their habitats and cities. In this kind of investment expansion it is increasingly easy for the MST to gain sympathizers from most sectors of society and the local state.

The people now have the alternative frame, which the MST has provided by its visible protest action. They just have to adhere to the frame, as the progenitor movement has offered a way to conceptualize what is happening to their home. As the heterodox frame exists, all even seemingly minor fractions and arrogant acts, negativities of plantation expansion, company actions, are incorporated into the long list of grievances. Thus, the alternative frame gains even more support among the public. Eventually, changes in the public opinion, initiated by protest acts, can result in the discontinuation or even reversal of plantation expansion. As I have argued, this is more likely to happen if the mechanisms promoting contentious agency are maintained, as the policy-making process in Brazil is slow and often requires external pressure. The public opinion can greatly enhance the contentious agency promotion’s relative impact, as the resistance gains sympathizers via networking with a growing number of allies in the society.

While walking around the Lulão settlement in Eunápolis, which the MST won in the Veracel protest, in July 2006, the culture-sector coordinator Gildásio, “O Cabaçinha”, said to me: “Veracel has almost two hundred thousand hectares; it is a multinational with a Babylon on Earth.”

113 According to a personal communication with Anna Fanzeres, consultant of UNDP Brazil and the director of the MMA 2005 report, Rio de Janeiro, September 2005.
When I returned to Lulão in June 2008, Gildásio was dead. Other inhabitants of the settlement alleged he died from a combination of alcohol consumption and eucalyptus plantation poison he was exposed to in an occupation of a plantation treated with pesticides. This kind of death, which people attribute to the companies, and the visible disrespect in cases like the cemetery plantation, help explain why the resistance and the public opinion of pulp investments has become increasingly emotional and contentious.

I give an example of the numerous acts that persuade the public to adopt the MST’s alternative frame and symbolization. In 2006, Veracel planted eucalyptus next to a communal cemetery, isolating it with trees, and even prohibiting general access to the cemetery by putting up signs denying access to it. After this act aroused indignation, Veracel put a sign on the cemetery stating that they allow access for the relatives of the dead. However, Veracel does not have any right to deny anybody access to cemetery: Brazilian cemeteries are automatically a property of the federal state and open to everybody under Brazilian law. Veracel took the signs down as outrage grew in the local population.

Because of such acts and the company attitude, anger was very apparent in the investment area: Veracel workers commented to me that they prefer not to use company symbols as they are being scorned by more than half of the locals. People in the streets made jokes about the company’s promises. The local news was full of Veracel-bashing. For example, the Eunápolis-based daily newspaper Gazeta Bahia wrote in its editorial:

Veracel Celulose demonstrates in a devilish way an enormous coarseness and indifference to our people … Our community is fed up with the Veracel Celulose presidency’s narrow-minded policies … that
make communication with the population difficult ... Veracel, Aracruz and Stora Enso ... are insulting the intelligence of our people (Gazeta Bahia, July 21, 2006, my translation).

In another text, the local newspaper laments the rate at which farmers are selling their lands: “that feeling for land, it’s lost” (Gazeta Bahia July 9, 2006). This local media discourse reflects the public opinion in a region gradually losing its traditional cattle farms and orchards, ceding land for the expansion of eucalyptus monoculture.

The Failure of the Pataxó Protests

I visited indigenous communities to get an idea of their conflicts with the paper industry, to reflect on the particularity and connections of their pulp company interaction with that of the MST’s. On one trip, I drove from Eunápolis to the indigenous Pataxó areas in the extreme South of Brazil. In an interview, the cacique of Aldeia Guaxuma of the Pataxó Indians, pointing to the green mass starting some distance behind a straw-roofed hut said, “Any day now we will cut this eucalyptus. Eucalyptus is not the future for us, the future and life is to have our own land” (Manoel “Vaquiero”, Pataxó cacique, interview, July 21, 2006). Veracel bought land from farmers who held indigenous areas irregularly and hastily sold them as they came to realize that land expropriation was looming, explained Manoel “Vaquiero”. For this and other reasons, for him “Veracel lacks consideration” – it should have known those are indigenous lands, even though irregularly held by others. After buying the land, Veracel, knowing these were indigenous lands according to the cacique, quickly planted eucalyptus to make it harder for the indigenous people to get the now productive lands through a legal process.

The Pataxó have followed on the heels of the MST, attempting to resist eucalyptus expansion on their lands. However, even though facing the same political opportunity structure – the same local state-company alliance as the MST in Eunápolis, they have not succeeded. I will explain why. The Pataxó Indigenous people of Bahia have tried to replicate the MST’s protest acts. Following the MST’s Veracel protest leading to the MST members gaining land, the Pataxó cut the National Highway running through their lands for 72 hours in 2004. They alleged the company was trying to encircle their village with eucalyptus. However, they got almost no media attention. Their protest act was not massive, nor was it symbolic in the sense that the media would have promulgated the re-symbolization of eucalyptus by the Pataxó for the public, as the media did in the MST protest case. As the mechanisms were distinct, they produced distinct outcomes. Besides this, the Pataxó movement is not as strongly organized as the MST (no sectors or levels of organization – because of a difference in comparison to mechanism a), has weak ideological congruity assuring practices in comparison to the MST (some of the Pataxós were actually on the Veracel side – because of a difference in mechanism b), does not have embedded autonomy (FUNAI influence is so great that one cannot speak of autonomy – because of a difference in comparison to mechanism e), and does not have an extensive network of allies (because of a difference in comparison to mechanism d).
In September 2005, when President Lula was at the inaugural session of Veracel “saying how perfect everything is”, as the Casique “Vaqueiro” put it in my interview, the Pataxó occupied Veracel’s eucalyptus plantation and spent a month there, cutting some eucalyptus and planting some food crops, following in some respects the MST protest mechanism. However, the Pataxó act was not massive (less than 300 protesters). The Pataxós did not attract the attention of the head of the state or the transnational media, which is a striking difference from the April 2004 Veracel action by the MST. Perhaps the Pataxós were not conceived of as a threat. Why? I would argue this was due to the lack of mechanisms a-e in comparison to the MST. The difference in mechanisms of contention explains why the MST is the most important single actor in the extensive resistance network against pulp plantation expansion. This empirical observation in the initial field research is why I decided to focus on the MST and not some other part of the resistance, and why I hypothesized that contentious agency is promoted when mechanisms (a-e) are present simultaneously and completely, a process increasing the possibility of resistance success.

The indigenous people seemed very upset by eucalyptus plantations, saying the land was first-class, but after three eucalyptus harvests it serves for nothing (interviews, Pataxó tribe members, July 2006). Environmental damage was even more obvious in the indigenous accounts of pulp investment impact than in the MST’s accounts: “The springs of the rivers are all drying up and now the water is poisoned … It was God who left us this river, now there is the eucalyptus bush; nobody fishes anymore.” Even though the ideological condemnation of eucalyptus was strong within this group, some of the Pataxó were on the side of Veracel, as the company gave them material benefits. As a solution to the problem, the casique called for the kind of organizational structure I have described as the embedded autonomy of a movement: “We need to make an indigenous movement – with no involvement of FUNAI”. To answer the calls of the Pataxó, the MST and CIMI are helping in the mobilization of an autonomous indigenous movement linked to the Network against the Green Desert. The co-option of some of the Pataxós points to the importance of embedded autonomy, to a need to ensure that the movement itself divides the resources it attains from the state and the companies by its struggles.

As the MST got settlement areas after the Veracel protests, people in these settlements did not see the land as coming from the state or the company, but as the fruit of their own active agency to conquer the land by and within the MST as Sem Terra subjects (several interviews, MST Bahia 2004-2008). In this way, embedded autonomy ensures that the contentious action ends by fostering agency, in particular cultivating the conception that the group will gain the best results if all members promote contentious agency personally and collectively. To the extent that the Pataxó will manage to create a full virtuous cycle of contentious agency, the more likely they are to influence plantation expansion outcomes. As their numbers are small, their resistance definitely has to involve active networking with other groups. In 2009, the Pataxó started to vigorously foster embedding with the state, fostering close links with legislators, which points to possible future expansion slowing and land gains for the Pataxó. However, before such conflict outcomes, the Pataxó have to strengthen their own movement; both organizationally and ideologically. Next, I will turn to the analysis of the Veracel case, in
the final section assessing the way the new framing of eucalyptus by the MST fared after the Veracel protest, identifying steps by which disruptive protests change the public opinion.

**Mass Media and the Transmission of Heterodox Frames**

Social movements play a key role in signaling relevant issues, as policy makers might not automatically respond to changes in public opinion. Aligned public opinion is a powerful resource for social movements that aim to attain sweeping policy changes (Giugni 2004: 6). Since the dictatorship, the public opinion has mattered more and more in Brazil. Now, the large landholders need the help of the public opinion more than in the yesteryear of authoritarianism. All the breaches the MST and others manage to make in the public image of industrial plantation expansion and state policies securing pro-agribusiness policies are very dangerous. As the MST has gained at times great support because of media attention, agribusiness has started to counterattack fiercely (Lerrer 2008). This dynamic is present generally in the media war over resource conflicts. For example, the forest industry in Finland is constantly engaged in media battles with environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, consumer groups of Germany, and the indigenous Sami people (Joutsenvirta 2006; Linjakumpu & Valkonen 2006; Hellström 2001; 2002).

When state actors or the dominant media have incorporated views congruent with the MST’s ideological set, this can be considered a resistance success. The ideology of the MST is an ample product, a set of various currents. The MST ideology is not limited to the movement itself, but may extend and spread around society. Earlier social movement research supports the claim that the transmission of ideology, incorporation of views and demands by others, especially by the privileged in relation to the movement, is a successful outcome sign (Melucci 1996). In such transmission cases, a movement can be said to be successful in the struggle to construct public opinion.

In the pulp investment dispute the Brazilian media has been generally on the side of the paper industry. Media powerhouses can decide the policy issues that will be addressed, since the media shed light upon conflicts, names conflicts, and hides them. Nine family conglomerates generate 85 percent of the Brazilian news media (Carter 2009: 9). At the same time, the television-watching rate in Brazil both in term of per capita and quantitatively in time per person is the highest in the world (Gomes, Laura 1998) and Brazilians watch mainly one network: *Rede Globo*. *Globo* has “60 percent of the television audience and as much as 80 percent of broadcast advertising” in Brazil (Castilho 2005). This media structure yields incredible power over the construction of reality and spread of ideas to a few elite families. The main media outlet, the *Globo* Network, was a creation of Roberto Marinho and the military dictatorship in the 1960s and 70s (Page 1995: 169). The power of *Globo* in imposing beliefs and worldviews is unmatched in Brazil; it is “Beyond the Citizen Kane”, as the title of a documentary film by British director Simon Hartog (1993) on the *Globo* phenomenon puts it. The concentrated media homogenizes Brazil (Hammond 2004; Page 1995: 173; Rose 2005).
As 19 MST members were murdered by the military police in Eldorado dos Carajás in the state of Pará in 1996, the MST gained the favor of the public as the news telecast live footage of the event portraying the peaceful protesters and the violent police response. *O Globo* used the opportunity and made a *telenovela* on the MST (Hammond 2004). At the outset, the *telenovela* depicted the MST in a positive light as victims, but soon changed the frame to display the MST as following a misguided path, using unsound methods. The public opinion on the MST followed the media framing (ibid.). The MST acknowledges the power of the media, and tries to offer alternative sources of information and frames, hoping these were distributed by the media. According to the MST: “In Brazil, the means of communication are dominated by the dominant classes and their economic interests, and thus, it is not possible to hold an open debate. Because of this, our protests have the role of making noise in the media, demonstrating the situation and the existence of resistance by the rural workers.” (Email interview, Santos, MST São Paulo, 11 December 2008, my translation). However, this is only a secondary tactic for the MST: as its principal challenge to media concentration is building and operating its own radio stations and publishing newspapers and books. This alternative media is extensively used and forms the main news channel for its members and its network of allies. Instead of trying to reform the existing media institutions, which it deems unrealistic, the MST wishes to create an alternative symbolic system, as shown in chapter four. Running after the media wanting them to write positive things, might easily lead to co-opting a movement and compromising the contentious agency promoting mechanisms.

A discourse analysis of the articles published in the largest daily, *O Globo*, during the 2004 Veracel conflict illustrates the relations between the state, the paper industry and the MST. A detailed and systematic analysis of these discourses reveals important issues in the conflict, positioning it in the Brazilian social context. This is a prime example, as it demonstrates the public sphere connections of the case, allowing assessment of the mechanisms by which the heterodox pulp investments frame can spread, even in a conservative society. The analysis that follows supports the general finding of Hammond (2004) that the media have been a mixed blessing for the MST. The argument of this section is that in spite of great media aversion, the MST still managed to get their principal political message through – the symbolization that differentiates eucalyptus from food crops – which indicates the effectiveness of the protest mechanism (c). This explains why disruptive protests are essential in contentious agency promotion and conflict outcomes.

The Veracel occupation was the principal news of *O Globo*’s sixth of April 2004 number. A huge picture of the landless with large knives dominated the front page, with the caption, “Armed up to the teeth: farmers show the *foices* used to cut trees and plant beans in the invaded farm.” While displaying the act in itself as illegal, the article sympathized with the MST goal. The journal dedicated a special section to land conflicts as it was the month of Red

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114 I did a discourse analysis of the media treatment of the MST-paper industry relations. All translations are mine. The findings on the media attention to the MST-paper industry dispute support Hammond’s general research results. Surprisingly, the business-journal *Jornal do Comercio* from Rio de Janeiro presented the MST-Veracel encounter at the beginning of April 2004 positively, and more accurately than any other media, I would argue. *O Globo* gave it mixed attention.
April. “Nobody eats eucalyptus,” read the headline in an article that displayed the most important symbols: eucalyptus, fazes, and landless farmers. The article’s main point was that the MST has a strong hierarchy where leaders command. In this, the journal diverged from the MST ideologists’ official movement-frame of a highly democratic grassroots organization. However, the journal shared with the MST notion that agrarian reform policy is in a structural controversy with the government’s agribusiness policies. The MST coordinator of Southern Bahia was cited: “We got tired of waiting for solutions. The moment to act arrived. We will not wait any longer.” O Globo cited the leaders of the MST regarding the issue directly: “Veracel possesses the majority of lands available for agriculture, which impedes more effective actions by INCRA.” The Agrarian Development Minister, Miguel Rossetto, represented the government view of the conflict: “Our government follows and will rigorously follow the legislation and judicial decisions,” a statement which positions government under the rule of law. On the other hand, the government conceals its own active agency by positioning itself as passive.

The MST / Veracel conflict remained the main news in Brazil on the seventh of April. A front-page picture of MST’s eucalyptus cutting came with the text, “Actions: Leaders of the MST defend destruction.” The line of O Globo became more critical. Time had passed and the initial re-symbolization was reconsidered. Analytically, first, the dominant system relented somewhat, as the re-symbolization opened a new space, allowing the heterodox discourse to slip into the middle of orthodoxy. As time passes, it seems, the orthodoxy has time to strike back to maintain the order of symbols. From a mixed blessing, the media turned to framing the MST along the lines of demonization. For example, now O Globo interviews the Minister of Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues, who is framed as the government representative, instead of the MST sympathetic Minister of Agrarian Development interviewed a day before.

It is at this point that the paper industry starts to benefit from the ancient battle lines between large landowner orthodoxy and heterodox discourses aiming to make an alternative use of land. Now “the MST challenges the most dynamic sector of the economy,” argues the editorial of Globo, adding that “a company producing eucalyptus represents agro-industry.” The media, traditionally linked with large landowners, looks for new allies for the agribusiness promotion process. The agribusiness framing of pulp is shared also by the MST, but not liked by some paper industry people, who would like to market large-scale pulp projects as the best possible industrialization and not plantation-based agro-industry. It is because of the agribusiness characterization of pulp investments that O Globo considers pulp companies dynamic. The journal did not engage into any detailed analysis of pulp investments: O Globo positions them as parts of agribusiness, automatically “highly productive” because of the larger agrarian question, linked to much stronger interests than those of the paper industry. The pro-agribusiness frame into which the Brazilian mass media places the pulp projects signifies that they either stand or fall with the success of the agribusiness sector. The media gives a mixed blessing not only to the MST, but also to the pulp sector: the linking to latifúndio automatically ends up bestowing enemy status on the MST and opens up space for further criticism of pulp investments.
On the 8th of April 2004, *O Globo* no longer treated the Veracel-MST case as its main news. A small article simply informed the reader that “A deal between the MST and Veracel may be struck today: the meeting in Bahia will look for solutions to the invasion of the farm.” On April 9, the MST was again the main news. The front page blared, “‘Only by shouting’: Landless make new invasions and the MST says that it will spare productive areas.” *O Globo* gave the Veracel case five pages, and again let the heterodox frame of the MST come out unmodified. Walmir Assunção from the MST Bahia says: “With the MST it has always been on the basis of shouting,” referring to the criticism by *O Globo* of land occupations as illegal invasions. One article mentions how the MST left the Veracel plantation. The whole episode of contention was in *O Globo’s* opinion a sign of the Lula government’s weakness and softness, as it did not suppress the reckless and uncivilized landless movement that was “shouting”. It seems that *O Globo* criticizes precisely the breaking of silence, the heterodox frame challenging the orthodoxy of technocratic developmentalism.

Re-symbolizations are prime mechanisms of social transformation. All use them. Some use them more effectively than others. The MST uses re-symbolization to defend the destruction of eucalyptus production. It does not try to hide destruction, as it explicitly uses the word, whilst claiming that this is not violence: “To occupy productive land is not violence … violent action is that of latifúndio against the landless who just want to work and guarantee the survival of their families,” the MST coordinator, João Paulo Rodrigues, said in the *O Globo* article. In this discourse, the MST links the symbols of “violence” and “latifúndio”, contrasting these with the symbols of “work” and “family”. Perhaps manipulating such basic symbols led to the fierce response by the *O Globo* editors: “The destruction of eucalyptus has enormous symbolic weight. It is an obvious act of the MST arrogantly crossing a dangerous frontier to set foot in the fertile territory of agribusiness. It should serve as an alert for the authorities and provoke the energetic and immediate reaction.” As a resolution, *O Globo* editors demanded the state to use force – rule by law – instead of the rule of law.

The highly symbolic quality of the Veracel protest – explicitly perceived by the media, by the MST, by the general public and companies – made the case very dangerous, a symbolic struggle that required counteraction. The media response to the action demonstrates the powerful potential of disruptive protests. Based on the above discussion, I suggest that the framing mechanism (b), the transmission and embedding of the movement frame in the state (e) and society (d), follows these steps:

1. The MST alleges that pulp investment and eucalyptus plantations are unproductive (b).
2. A symbolic battle ensues, apparent in protests (c), by which the heterodox framing (b) is revealed to the public.
3. This battle is given value and importance by the media / society
4. The dominant system condemns the questioning of the orthodox framing. Entities aligned with the dominant system demonstrate their conservative, orthodox attitudes in their discourses.
5. The traditional symbolic frontiers shift, under heightened transformation pressure due to incursion of contentious agency into the prevailing system.

6. For most conservative sectors, using O Globo’s editorial discourse as a reference, the correct way to curb this “dangerous crossing of the border”, is “an energetic action”, i.e., physical violence.

7. The contenders have already managed to spread the alternative frame, which then takes on a life of its own, molding public opinion, the action of the state actors, and the conflict dynamics. People unaware of the pulp question become interested. The policy-making process and legal processes are hastened; people bring the issue into the spotlight, which will result in greater and greater transformation, if the new frame is constantly made available by protests (c) and the new frame’s transmission is supported by other mechanisms (a, b, d, e).

Disruptive, symbolic protest actions are an especially important mechanism when the goal is social transformation in a society dominated by conservative attitudes. Symbolic protests break the ice. Next, I will utilize research material from the Espírito Santo / Aracruz case to support the thesis that contentious agency promotion can help in slowing plantation expansion, and is theoretically necessary to explain the variation in expansion outcomes.

Espírito Santo / Aracruz: the Indigenous Turn to Contentious Agency

The Espírito Santo resistance cases show how important disruptive, symbolic protest acts are. The indigenous Guarani and Tupinikim people followed the conventional tactic of negotiating with Aracruz until 2005, which produced no decisive results. Once they followed the MST’s model, they started to enjoy the conflict outcomes they sought. I will narrate first the early resistance stories, which led to plantation slowing, and then the story leading to plantation reversal.

Because of the almost endless accusations of law and rights violations brought against the pulp companies, especially Aracruz Celulose, the state has had to take a more sensitive position, giving in to its critic. Besides many episodes in which the complex state-level and federal-level Brazilian courts have debated over who must consider the legal procedures brought against Aracruz, there have been political investigations like CPIs (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito) in state and federal parliaments, as well as municipal and state legal initiatives to prohibit new plantations. Where states and municipalities have tried to regulate the industry, the highest federal state institutions have generally been on the company side. In an important illustrative example, the Supreme Federal Court, the STF, suspended the future effects of Espírito Santo’s proposed law banning eucalyptus expansion in June 2002. A sympathetic politician, Deputado Estadual Nasser Yossef (PSDB) presented a bill (no. 6780, 3 October 2001), elaborated by the Network against the Green Desert, prohibiting further pulp plantation expansion in Espírito Santo until an environmental and economic zoning (EZZ)

115 An extensive list of these can be found in the ES-based journal Século Diário.
was concluded (MMA 2005: 75). The state assembly approved the law (MMA 2005: 115), which resulted in temporary plantation discontinuation, that is, plantation expansion slowing. Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) and Confederação Nacional de Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil (CNA), at the suggestion of Minister Maurício Corrêa representing the interest of Aracruz, then demanded that the Supreme Federal Court (STF) issue an *Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade* suspend the law. STF suspended the effects of the state-law in favor of the company, arguing the law prohibits plantation for an indefinite time. Corrêa claimed the law represented a “disorientation of the legislative function of the state, which would have regulated the right of property, which is a matter of Civil Law and thus belongs to the exclusive legislative competence of the Union” (*A Gazeta* 2002). During the year the land procedure judgment took, the law banned Aracruz from planting new eucalyptus. This slowing of plantation expansion was temporary and did not result in contrary measures, that is, distribution of land to the indigenous or landless. This is a centralized state actors and corporations victory for corporate resource exploitation over local democracy.

The dynamics between the legislative and judicial powers present in this case is not an exception in the Brazilian policy battles. Matthew Taylor has studied in detail the political role of courts in Brazilian politics, especially in policy-making. The judiciary as an institution helps to frame policy by becoming a veto point where actors that have lost at the legislative level can reverse or at least delay the execution of policies they resist (Taylor 2008: 155). Taylor (2008) emphasizes the importance of the policy, the policy salience of the issue involved in its interaction with other characteristics of the political and judicial system. Coming from the social movement-viewpoint, also Giugni (2004) emphasized the role of the specific policy issue in influencing the outcomes. Both of these empirically grounded theoretical points are relevant in this case. The characteristics of Brazilian pulp disputes as primarily linked to land utilization and agrarian policy places them on the possibly hardest economic policy platforms in Brazilian politics. It is easy for pulp corporations to utilize the political and judicial setting prepared for centuries by the landed elite to maintain large-scale land holdings; and, likewise, extremely difficult for the contenders to utilize the judiciary, especially its upper echelons, as a veto point in policy framing. The economic outcomes of pulp conflicts have to be understood against this background. Also the influence of the MST has to be seen in this light. In fact, the embedding of the MST within the judicial institutional game has presented a positive development considering the rule of law in Brazil. Meszaros (2008) has assessed the role of the MST as a balancer and demander of the rule of law in detail. Since the early 1990s, the movement has given an invaluable push towards the harmonization of the judiciary as an institutional platform where all would have equal access in Brazil, and which would not be utilized as a veto point to cover the losses in the electoral politics, in the ideological game, or in land conflicts. Until now, the use of the courts has shaped Brazilian policy processes dramatically (Taylor 2008): courts remain the last stronghold of the power elite in the Brazilian politics. I will open up these dynamics in detail in the following chapter.

After the state-level parliamentary regulation was proven ineffective in discontinuing plantation expansion, other democratic means had to be sought. The resistance, together with
their sympathetic politicians established a 2002 CPI to investigate the irregularities and alleged illegal actions of the company in the acquisition and licensing of eucalyptus plantations. Aracruz tried to block this CPI at all costs, requesting help from senators, party leaders, some government executive politicians and the media, and trying to get the support of Bancada Federal do Estado i.e., all the federal deputies from Espírito Santo state. Aracruz called the CPI a plan by politicians to extort money from the company, created by its transnational competitors in the pulp industry. In spite of all these attempts, the CPI was established. For some reason, it never concluded its work or published a report. (MMA 2005: 86.) After these failed attempts to slow plantation expansion through routine politics by embedding with the elected parliamentarians and the state apparatus, resistance turned to ever more direct action to pressure the company and state actors.

As pointed out in chapter four, the MST has had a forceful impact on grassroots entities in Brazil. It has increasingly supported the indigenous people in their disputes, offering new contention mechanisms, and heterodox framings to use. This has resulted in a considerable transformation in the attitudes and practices of the indigenous people in Espírito Santo and Bahia. On 19 February 2005, following the MST advice and model, the indigenous people in Espírito Santo turned to radical acts from their earlier relatively cooperative and relatively confrontational attitude with Aracruz. In an assembly, they proclaimed: “We came to the conclusion that the Agreement with Aracruz did not manage to resolve our problems; on the contrary, it has caused us even more difficulty, generating economic dependency, division between aldeias and the weakening of our culture” (cf. MMA 2005: 68, my translation). The transformation of frame and strategy was drastic: “The struggle for land, which is also the fight for the physical and cultural existence of Tupinikim and Guarani will, from now on, be our principal objective and we will not cease until we manage to totally recover our lands” (cf. MMA 2005: 69, my translation). They would no longer negotiate with Aracruz. This was a critical juncture, a strategy bringing the indigenous a victory in their land struggle.

After the mechanisms of the indigenous peoples toughened up, becoming more contentious, Aracruz commenced a thorough counter-attack campaign trying to prove that the indigenous populations in Espírito Santo were actually not indigenous. The company placed huge signs around the state labeling the indigenous groups as non-indigenous, thus contradicting their ethnic auto-identification and the National Indian Agency’s (FUNAI) view that they are Indians. Aracruz had been planting eucalyptus on the disputed 11,000-hectare tract for years and had a lot to lose. Adopting mechanism c, the indigenous Guarani people occupied this plantation land and cut down a part of the eucalyptus. The encounter resulted in physical violence between the police and the populace. However, violence has generally played in favor of the social movements, which have gained sympathy (Giugni 2004). In 2007, after waves of land occupation and other protests by the indigenous people, the government claimed the contested piece of land was indigenous and instructed Aracruz to cut the remaining eucalyptus. This counts as a plantation expansion reversal.

The indigenous communities and other groups have started to slow plantation expansion as they have replicated the contentious agency promoting mechanisms propagated by the MST.
In this way, the networking of the MST is crucial, as all other constituencies that join the struggle against a commonly framed enemy strengthen the resistance network. In September 2006, the indigenous cut and burned several hundred acres of the eucalyptus plantations of Aracruz Celulose (AC), “and for two days the following December, they and about 500 MST members occupied the port through which AC and three other corporations export cellulose, costing them an estimated $21 million”, as NACLA elucidates in its Report on the Americas (2007).

Finally, in November 2006, ex-minister Bastos promised the Tupinikim and Guarani that he would demarcate their land by the end of the year. Yet by the time he left office in January, he had not done so. … The Tupinikim and Guarani returned to occupy the remaining 27,000 acres of their land in July of this year [2007], reconstructing the aldeias of Olho d’Água and Corrego d’Ouro. The occupation had the full support and participation of the the MST … Given the overall advance of agribusiness interests in Brazil, [Minister of Justice Tarso] Genro’s decision in August [2007] to demarcate the 27,000 acres for the Indians was surprising to all. There is no doubt it resulted from the unrelenting pressure on the government from rural civil society, whose growing voice of discontent, especially from the MST, and the threat of further mobilizations and more radical actions, ultimately forced Genro to fulfill his predecessor’s promise. His decision was a blow both to AC and to the power of agribusiness, which until then had seemed unstoppable. According to Overbeek [from the Federation for Social and Educational Assistance (FASE)], the MST’s solidarity with the indigenous movement was crucial. ‘In the decisive moments of struggle by the Indians,’ he says, ‘the campesino movements were there.’ … With this latest victory under its belt, Brazilian rural civil society will likely be inspired to further amplify its struggle against agribusiness. (NACLA 2007)

The outcomes of the ES indigenous-Aracruz case has made it a crux of contention mechanism transmission, transforming strategies and practices of grassroots organization around Brazil. The quilombos of Espírito Santo followed the example of the MST-indigenous alliance and started a land struggle against Aracruz, adopting the land occupation mechanism. Soon afterwards, the National Articulation Coordination of Rural Quilombola Communities (Conaq) took the same attitudes nationwide as the MST and the ES quilombos. Based on various key informant accounts, the mechanisms explaining the new contentious stance were multiple, including the greater pressure placed by growing corporate agency imposed on the indigenous people, the organizing help and heterodox framing offered by the MST, and the willingness of the larger indigenous movement to change the mechanisms producing their movement, as well as their allegiances. It is interesting to note that conflict outcomes

116 Currently, perhaps the most severe pulp conflict is between the Afro-descendant quilombola communities and Aracruz. There have been promises by Lula and other politicians to establish a human rights commission to investigate the accusations of use of paramilitary troops by the Aracruz against the quilombos, amongst other promises, but these discourses have not been translated into action. (MMA 2005: 85.) The paper industry does not see quilombos as quilombos but calls them negros (Interview, Bracelpa, June 2008). In the same manner, it does not accept indigenous peoples as indigenous but calls them caboclos, mixtures of white with Indian – a word with pejorative connotations in Brazil. There is surely an ethnic/racial component in pulp conflicts, but I will not discuss this in detail, as I am aware there is a series of other studies conducted by Brazilian scholars on the gender, racial and ethnic characteristics of pulp conflicts. As an example, see the thesis by Simone Ferreira (2002).

117 The ES indigenous have hardened the line together with the indigenous people around Brazil. Increasingly politically organized in federations like the Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira (COIAB), Conselho Indigenista Missionário or the Indianist Missionary Council (CIMI), the indigenous people are breaking with FUNAI and possibly other state institutions with which they previously cooperated. The most autonomy-favoring movements are retaining ties only with the Ministério Público Federal, whose role is to
change precisely when the political opportunity structure is most unfavorable, and when the contentious agency promoting mechanisms are in operation and spread. This demonstrates how the political opportunity theory cannot explain mobilization in all cases: one should primarily look into the changes in processes, mechanisms and conflict dynamics.

The worse political opportunity structure – limitation of the usability of conventional parliamentary means of resistance due to their capture by the corporate agency – has led to replication of contentious agency. The political opportunity theory assumes that better opportunity structures explain mobilization; this case contradicts the theory. Owing to the growing strength of the government-paper industry alliance, the worsening of political opportunities and the promotion of contentious agency, resistance to pulp is spreading among the traditional contesters and throughout society. In an important company interview, in which an Aracruz director explicitly acknowledges the company’s direct impact on local land prices, an exception to most pulp company interviews, the company proclaimed it is in conflict not only with the rural working class, but also with the large-scale farmers and cattle-ranchers:

With the large-scale cattle-ranchers of the region, the situation cannot be characterized as a conflict, but there is a normal feeling of unhappiness by these entrepreneurs because the forest companies are competing with them on land, which leads to inflation of hectare prices, making an expansion of pastoral land difficult for them. (an interview of Carlos Alberto Oliveira Roxo, Director of the Environment in Aracruz, cf. MMA 2005: 89).

The Espírito Santo case supports the hypothesis that contentious agency probably leads to a more abrupt slowing of plantation expansion (greater areas, reversal of expansion, by difficult-to-change decisions and policies). It also shows that contentious agency can be replicated to influence conflict outcomes. A similar case in Bahia suggests that the replication of contentious agency across movements may increase the possibility that state actors take the side of the movements. By 2008, the homeless of the region had organized into a homeless Sem Teto movement integrated with the MST. From September to October, one part of this movement in Eunápolis occupied an area of Veracel. “We will not leave before rules are established for the use of soil for this company. We want homes and not eucalyptus plantations,” said Wedson Souza Santos, the president of the movement’s Eunápolis association.

The public prosecutor of the area, João Alves da Silva Neto, followed the occupation closely. Instead of the usual condemnation of occupations as invasions by Brazilian judges and governors, the state actor entered on legal action against Veracel, accusing the company of predatory expansion: “I will denounce the expansion this company has carried out by irregular licensing and false documents”, the public prosecutor affirmed (A Tarde 14/10/2008). In this case, mobilization by the MST, conscious building of a network of allies, replication of contentious agency, clearly led to the slowing of plantation expansion. Both the Espírito Santo and Bahia replication cases suggest that the wave of contention has spread defend the citizen rights through its prosecutors, even against state institutions and companies. Simultaneously, indigenous people have increased ties and cooperation with other social movements.

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from the MST to other social movements and state actors. Next, I will turn to the analysis of the Rio Grande do Sul cases, which further support the thesis.

Rio Grande do Sul

In the Gaúcho state of Rio Grande do Sul, a heated debate regarding tree plantations and pulp investments has raged since 2005. The state has experienced a boom in plantations as the state government started financing, giving political support and relaxing environmental legal framework to set up huge pulp mill projects suggested for the region by Stora Enso, Aracruz and Votorantim. As in other states, some municipalities have prohibited the plans to establish pulp mills on their territory, and the MST has been an initial driving force demanding regulation. Organizing around the Forum of Exotic Invading Species and Sustainable Development of Rio Grande do Sul (MMA 2005: 192), the Gaúcho society – NGO’s, governmental institutions, individuals – is increasingly organized to resist plantation expansion. The forum does research and systematization of information as well as influencing public politics and legal framework creation. There are many pulp conflicts in Rio Grande do Sul. The southern part has experienced increasing problems of creating economic livelihoods for its inhabitants. Traditionally this region of Pampa – 63% of the state territory is Pampa according to the Ministry of the Environment118 – has been the site for rice fields and cattle ranching, but nowadays these are disappearing because of deteriorating profitability. (MMA 2005: 194.) Scientists have demonstrated that pampas is one of the most delicate biotypes, easily damaged by fast-wood plantations (Jackson et al. 2005; Nosetto et al. 2008). Tree plantation by corporations has increased substantially, altering the traditional ecosystems, winds, economic activities and demography drastically.

In an episode of land reform starting in 1995, INCRA was able to acquire land because of its low price and ready availability, resulting in the settling of over 11,000 people in 287 settlements, mainly coming from the north of the state, replacing the traditional cattle-ranching latifúndio with family agriculture in some areas. However, the rate of new settlement has abated considerably since 2003 because of the lower availability of land. Agribusiness expansion has led into a halt in agrarian reform. (MMA 2005: 196.) The slowing of agrarian reform in southern Rio Grande do Sul has taken place alongside a marked increase in tree plantation by pulp companies and the efforts of the state government to set up furniture and wood-producing in the region, argues the MMA study. Land markets have risen and the buying of lands by the government for new agrarian reform areas became increasingly difficult since 2003, in parallel with industrial plantation expansion. (MMA 2005: 197.)

The conflicts have had quite different dynamics from each other, and have resulted in different outcomes, as I will suggest next. Paper companies take the debate and conflicts in Rio Grande do Sul very seriously. The opinion of a Stora Enso executive was that if the

118 In contradiction with the finding of the Ministry of the Environment, Sabrina Bicca from Stora Enso’s Sustainability sector in Rio Grande do Sul said, “the people have a myth of the Pampa biome; it does not exist anymore.”
discussions taking place in 2007 and before were to spread, there would be no more big plantations in Brazil (Weine Genfors, August 2007). He referenced to movement protests and the legal action that seven NGO’s started against Stora Enso, Votorantim and Aracruz in 2007 asking for the plantation of eucalyptus to be restricted. Even though there has been no definitive judgment to this general and remarkable suit by August 2009, Stora Enso was forced to discontinue planting trees in 2008, and Aracruz’s expansion in the state was significantly slowed by the MST and INCRA. The MST was also a crucial player in the seven NGO’s legal action: the MST cannot start its own legal proceedings, as it is not an official NGO, so its role in all pulp conflict cases has been to provide initial strategy, advice, push and provide crucial information and legal advice to start the proceedings via the networked NGOs.

In Rio Grande do Sul, expansion by Stora Enso and Aracruz slowed, and VCP expansion continued unchecked, extending even within MST settlements. Next, I will assess why and how there is variation in the outcomes of these three episodes. First, I will assess the conflict with Votorantim, whose eventuality was unchecked plantation expansion. The company managed to extend plantation even within an MST settlement, which would suggest, following the hypothesis, weaknesses in contentious agency promotion.

The Resistance to Votorantim’s Expansion by Outsourcing

The paper industry also tries to expand into the agrarian reform lands but, in this attempt, it has faced not only resistance by most of the settled MST families, but also by INCRA. Analyzing this business-social movement-state interaction shows how the state embedding by a movement functions.

Darkness surrounds us. The night of Rio Grande do Sul passes as we roll down the highway with the local MST leader, Gelio Silva, at the steering wheel. He points out to the left side of the road: “Eucalyptus covers this roadside on a 40-km strip. Votorantim bought the lands a while ago from a latifúndio that wanted to avoid his lands ending up going to the landless movement via INCRA’s agrarian reform program.” The next day Gelio shows me around a 10-year-old MST settlement, Novo Arroyo Grande, where the advancing eucalyptus surrounds 85 families living in the area. I stay in the house of Gelio’s parents, just one hundred meters away from a two-month-old VCP eucalyptus plantation, already well grown. Soon the traditional Pampa will be out of sight, say the numerous MST farmers I visit the next day. While inspecting the planted area closer, it becomes obvious that Votorantim has not respected the legal safety perimeter, but has planted eucalyptus next to a public, university-owned water reservoir, and next to a landless settlement. Thus, the plantation is not only legally irregular, but also cuts the access between the settlement and the important water reservoir.

In the same region, under the label of Poupança florestal, Votorantim approaches small farmers to gain access to their lands in a eucalyptus plantation outsourcing scheme for a possible future pulp mill. Some settlers within the MST started planting eucalyptus for pulp
companies in 2003, but this process stopped in 2007. According to INCRA, in Rio Grande do Sul, the activity in which family farmers cede their lands for corporate eucalyptus plantation takes place mainly in the triangle between Pinheiro Machado, Pedrosolho and Piratini. In the contracts, the farmer plants eucalyptus and cultivates it, and then the company hypothetically buys 90% of the production, leaving 10% of the wood for the farmer’s own usage/sale to whomever. Since 2006, Votorantim VCP signed 160 contracts with farmers of the MST’s agrarian reform settlements, totaling 1,000 hectares. As INCRA, the Agrarian Reform and Colonization Institute, discovered the existence of these contracts, the institute notified the farmers they would withdraw the agrarian reform lots of those settlers who planted trees in the VCP scheme. According to the law, agrarian reform lands like settlements belong to the state for at least ten years, after which the state might theoretically privatize land for farmers as private property, for which the farmer would have to pay\textsuperscript{119} (interview, Dietrich, INCRA RS 2008). Mozar Dietrich, the superintendent of INCRA in Rio Grande do Sul, said that the institute followed Brazilian law in this case (interview, Dietrich, INCRA RS 2008). As Votorantim found out that INCRA was charging them and their contracts as being illegal, the company lawyers visited the institute. After talks, VCP discontinued the illegal outsourcing program, explained Dietrich. INCRA also contacted the MST, asking them to discontinue tree planting for VCP. About 120 farmers cut down their eucalyptus plantations, many of which covered the whole area designated for the settler family to produce food. Under the illegal scheme, the families were becoming dependant on the corporation, discontinued planting food crops, and were to buy basic food from the markets, which was in complete contradiction to the idea of agrarian reform – for which reason INCRA had to act (ibid.).

I visited many farms where the MST farmers had cut eucalyptus and were now using the land for agricultural purposes. Eucalyptus was still growing in some parts. “It is a real nuisance and hard to get rid of, like a pest. After you have planted it, it grows again and again even if you cut it down and even if you turn the soil many times”, said one farmer – the same story was repeated various times by others. However, the story was not unanimous, as forty of the original 160 MST farmers under Votorantim’s outsourcing scheme resisted INCRA’s notification. As a movement, the MST did not interfere by demanding these farmers cut down eucalyptus. This is a sign that the movement gives a high degree of freedom to members and settlements to decide what to do. Indeed, the MST does not even have any legal means to force its members to do this or that, or a hierarchical executive system to impose such measures. This finding is a striking difference to many earlier MST studies arguing that its leaders coerce the members and the MST is harming democracy (see, for example, Martins 2003; Caldeira 2008; Navarro 2002; Graziano 2004). I argued that the MST maintains cohesion by distributing a movement-ideology, and creating fields, rituals and practices that promote ideological congruity. It is the state, in the form of INCRA, which has a legal role as a state institute to regulate and order settlements, that takes disciplinary measures under the rule of law. Many MST studies (including Caldeira 2008) fail to note that the rules members

\textsuperscript{119} The MST is against the privatization of land, seeking collectivity and a scheme in which lands will remain state property, under the guidance and control of those who cultivate and live on the land. This way the movement avoids selling the land, speculation, and maintains the goals of sustained agrarian reform.
might tell the interviewers are imposed by the MST are actually imposed by INCRA and the Brazilian laws. The discipline in the MST is subtle, taking place by mechanism a.

In a counter-attack, Votorantim offered company lawyers for the defense of the forty MST families continuing to grow eucalyptus, promising it would defend the farmers in court. The company and the forty farmers obtained a tie with INCRA: the court decision let the outgrowing farmers finish their first eucalyptus planting cycle of seven years. After this, only partial justice in the opinion of INCRA, the institute started to withdraw the lot rights of these forty families. Votorantim came again to defend the forty tree-farming families. As a compromise, INCRA managed to negotiate a deal in which the settlers’ planted only one cycle instead of the two agreed in the contract between the VCP and the settler. Farmers have to repair the damage to the land caused by the eucalyptus – INCRA also managed to get a clause through that VCP has to repair the roads when driving trucks and harvesters to forward the outsourced trees. (Interview, INCRA RS 2008.) Even though this case led to the slowing of plantation expansion on agrarian reform lands, I do not count this as a general slowing, because 40 farmers continued under the VCP outsourcing scheme, effectively letting the company extend its plantations even within the movement territory.

In this case, INCRA was defending the MST – in the other cases it has been the other way around. For example, in the 2004 Veracel act, the MST demanded and assured more resources for INCRA. The embedding of INCRA within the MST does not strip the movement of autonomy, as the movement still decides how to use the resources. Rather, this relation subsists in a movement-led embedded autonomy: by EAM, a movement can rely on the laws of state institutions to maintain internal cohesion and discipline without the need for internal policing. In the countryside, settlers are quite easily led to sign all kinds of contracts not beneficial to them. Companies acting on the verge of legality can penetrate movements and gain the allegiance of movement members. On the other hand, the case shows how the MST still has autonomy in relation to the state to the extent that some movement members can join with a company and win concessions even against laws. Interestingly, this case shows that embedding with state institution presents the MST not only with challenges in maintaining autonomy, but also opportunities and situations in which state actors that enforce agrarian reform laws defend the autonomy of the MST vis-à-vis society, represented here in the form of VCP.

This episode shows how the pressure and subsequent help of the Brazilian state is important for the MST. The struggle over the setting of institutions, laws governing them, and state actor positions is essential in investment politics. The next episode of contention, in which plantation expansion was discontinued, also supports the hypothesis, as did this VCP outsourcing conflict, where expansion continued due to the non-completion of the virtuous cycle between mechanisms a-e (as c was lacking). The case demonstrates that even though the embedded autonomy of the movement vis-à-vis the state apparatus is active, this will not automatically or alone lead to the slowing of plantation expansion. If the ideological congruity is not assured or if there are no significant protest acts, EAM seems to be of less importance. Indeed, without protesting (c), the more likely outcome is unchecked and rapid
plantation expansion that can even penetrate the movement. If the contentious agency falters, the main process resisting plantation expansion is routine politics. However, I am not aware of any case where state actors have resisted pulp plantation expansion independently of social movement pressure.

A Multinational Corporation on the Brazilian Borderlands: The Case of Stora Enso

Since it started buying land for eucalyptus in Rio Grande do Sul in May 2005, Stora Enso has become a key player in a very interesting legal and political struggle within the Brazilian land question. In May 2008, the corporation had 46,000 hectares of land in an area in the vicinity of Rosario do Sul municipality close to Uruguay. The area is within a 150-kilometer national security perimeter, where land buying for any activity by foreign enterprises requires a study by INCRA and approval by the National Council of Defense (CDN), headed by the President. By May 2008, INCRA had granted Stora Enso the authorization for 17,000 hectares, which still needed the approval of the CDN. INCRA’s RS Superintendent Dietrich claimed that because of several legislative proposals by politicians tied up and funded by paper companies, the perimeter law could theoretically change so that one would not have to request the authorization of INCRA, but could gain access to start the permission process directly at federal level (interview, INCRA 2008). However, the bills did not proceed through the parliament.

The legislative change case demonstrates, like other similar paper industry legal procedures, how the industry systematically side-steps local democracy and public bodies. Stora Enso did not consult INCRA any more – even though this is required, as frontier land deals have to be approved by the institution – as it believed the federal government would intervene or the parliament would change the law. “We did our part”, said Dietrich: “All these lands bought [by Stora Enso] are illegal, null, if the law of the national frontier does not change”. INCRA notified the Federal Police and the Ministério Público of the illegal activity, so that they could prosecute the company. Dietrich also claimed the cartórios were acting illegally as they approved the land claims of Stora Enso, a case that INCRA denounced as well. In addition, Dietrich argued that the governor acted irregularly: “The government of Rio Grande do Sul is giving environmental licenses to pulp investments because it is not serious. It could not do this as the eucalyptus plantations of Stora Enso are illegal, but the Ministério Público Federal is not managing to stop the expansion.” The Ministério Público Federal, responsible for overseeing the legality of state, government institutions and citizen actors in Brazil, as well as the Federal Police have started extensive investigations of pulp expansion. As an outcome of the Stora Enso land dispute, Superintendent Dietrich saw in May 2008 that “Stora Enso will lose all these lands, because the bill will not proceed.”

The statistics of INCRA show that the rural exodus has been vast in the state; what is worse, according to the institute, all the land bought by Stora Enso was producing food before and
the paper companies knew this. Stora Enso executives claimed in my interviews that they did not know it was illegal for them to buy land in the frontier area. “They were badly advised by their lawyers”, claimed the INCRA superintendent. As INCRA had notified the authorities of the offence, the company executives visited the state institute and promised to send them the land purchase documents for authorization. This took a very long time, eighteen months, and the company sent only a small part of the documents to INCRA, claimed Dietrich. “In 2007, Stora Enso was in crisis in Rio Grande do Sul: they have been even buying deputies and senators, who came here to push us. However, the law requires me to supervise. If Stora Enso wants to stay here, they will have to change the law,” he explained. The superintendent had obviously become a central figure because of his official position in the conflict.

As the case shows, the state is a vast and complex entity with sections which contradict each other. The Agrarian Development Ministry, under which INCRA belongs, is against the spread of eucalyptus plantations. IBAMA, the natural resources institute, is partly in favor and partly against. Many informants (including politicians like deputados and mayors I interviewed) claimed that the earlier PT governments of Rio Grande do Sul were against pulp plantations. Pulp investments kicked off only recently as PSDB gained control of the state machinery in Rio Grande do Sul. However, in Espírito Santo a PSDB politician and minister has been the central sympathetic state actor ally of the resistance network, and in Bahia, Jaques Wagner, the PT governor is a strong supporter of the pulp industry, suggesting that party lines seem to be quite irrelevant in Brazilian investment politics.

After gaining power, the government of Yeda Crusius wiped out or silenced environmentalists from the state apparatus in Rio Grande do Sul (interview, Farias, 2008; see also Miola 2009). Political-economic private interests have captured the state and government, which is not listening to the experts and technicians of state regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Foundation of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (FEPAM) that cedes plantation licenses (ibid.).

According to the superintendent Dietrich, the state or federal-level governments are not prisoners of the rules of the world-system, but follow the pro-pulp policies as they want to: “They believe there is no problem in these policies.” In Brazil, many state institutions are led politically and not bureaucratically. This means that, for example, the Supreme Federal Court and the environmental regulatory agencies make political decisions in their judgments instead of informed decisions based on the rule of law. This exposes the state to the game of private-interest seeking. For example, the governor Yeda Crusius has appointed her own followers to the most important positions in all state institutions, including FEPAM, taken over the state machinery by displacing bureaucrats capable of making knowledge-based decisions by politicians who make choices based on their nested interests.

The MST decided to act against the state-industry alliance. On the eighth of March 2008, the worldwide women’s day, the women of La Via Campesina occupied a small part of Stora Enso’s eucalyptus plantation in Santana do Livramento. Many protest participants, including Jocerlei de Fátima, who lives in a settlement in the area and does part of the national
coordination of the MST’s production sector, gave me accounts of the episode in interviews. The occupation led to police violence against the women and children, the great majority of whom were members of the MST. A five per cent minority from other social movements that make La Via Campesina joined the action. According to de Fátima and many other protest participants, the police surprisingly attacked the women and violently imprisoned them in the initial phase of the action. The police confiscated the food and material brought to set up a camp on the site, but these were later recovered by the women. The women also said that during the imprisonment, police treated the women and children badly, leaving them without food. Photos showed that many suffered physical injuries from rubber bullets, horses and beatings. The reason for the violence against La Via Campesina women was the local police force, the *Brigada Militar* of Rio Grande do Sul, and its “cruel colonel”, argued de Fátima. Below, a photo of the protesters, taken by Stora Enso personnel just before the violence in Rio Grande do Sul:

**Photo 10: La Via Campesina’s Stora Enso Plantation Occupation, Santana do Livramento, Rio Grande do Sul, March 2008**

Governor Crusius promoted the colonel after the attack on La Via Campesina women. The south of the state is one of Brazil’s most decadent nests of stubborn *latifúndio*, many of the informants said – including members of the *latifúndio*, in an introspection on their bankrupt situation (interviews in the Sindicato Rural in Rosario do Sul, 2008). *Coronelismo* still exists
in the area, and the *Brigada Militar* acts outside of the law, de Fátima explained. At the end of 2008, the “cruel colonel” was accused of participating in a massive corruption scandal – the MST and its allies pressed countermeasures against their subjugation by the colonel. In 2009, the colonel was forced to leave his position, after a MST member, Elton Brum da Silva, was murdered by an agent from the Military Brigade in an episode of contention connected to the MST-Aracruz Southall dispute.

Rio Grande do Sul has experienced the most violent but also the most even battle between the pulp industry and the MST. Various women who participated in the Stora Enso action told me they had not yet even started demonstrations against transnational corporations. One reason for the resistance is the fear that the region will dry up: “If it continues like this [with further pulp investments and eucalyptus plantations] we will have to start to breed camels” said one anonymous MST farmer in Santana do Livramento. In an interview, João Borges, the forest director of Stora Enso Latin America, explained to me that the women of the MST actually attacked the police with arms, and the police were just defending themselves, as anyone would. Borges described the MST members as guerrillas, highly dangerous and violent; some of them have been trained in Cuba to follow guerrilla tactics. I asked about the violence against the women from Borges. He systematically denied any Stora Enso agency, putting responsibility on the society and the state. He claimed that the MST women first attacked the police with knives, starting the violence and that “the authorities have to execute laws, the court’s decisions have to be followed. Police did this; the company has no control over it, it depends on the government of the state” (interview, Borges, May 2008). The Brigada Militar destroyed the video footage that would had shown what happened.

The discourse of paper companies utilizes the technocratic legal code, placing the conflict within the parameters of law and technical standards and beyond political, moral and ethical questions. This discourse aims to create an interaction frame where the companies have no agency. It is the law that is to be blamed, if someone is to be blamed apart from the occupiers. However, Stora Enso proclaimed in a press release that they asked the government to expel the occupiers. This puts responsibility for the police violence on the company, which should have known violence was predictable. They either accepted the possibility of violence, or were ignorant of the historical Brazilian police violence against the poor and especially the MST. Stora Enso promised not to engage in violent acts any more after the incident because of NGO pressure, especially by the Finnish *Maattomien ystävät ry*, a landless solidarity association. In my interview, Borges said that “After the invasion [in March 2008], we contacted the government and said we do not accept violence and asked them to guard our lands more efficiently to avoid occupations.”

The Stora Enso action resulted in positive outcomes for the MST, as the company sat down at the negotiation table with the movement, and promised many changes in its practices. In addition, the contention against a multinational company extended the transnational network of allies, as the recently founded Finnish association found a reason and material in the Finnish company case to protest against the prevailing company practices. Protests by Finns in front of the Stora Enso headquarters were front-page news in major Finnish newspapers, as
was knowledge of the practices of Stora Enso and the whole pulp investment issue in Finland.
This was important, as the company is controlled by the Finnish state and headquartered in Finland.

If Stora Enso had been aware of the embedded autonomy of the MST vis-à-vis INCRA, they should have understood that their pulp investment would not gain the acceptance of this crucial institution. There are a few institutions supporting the agenda of the MST in Brazil, and Stora Enso happened to stumble upon one of these. The company decided not to continue investment in RS, as it began to consider the operation environment impossible to handle. This shows how disruptive resistance can lead to plantation expansion reversal even against the most demanding political opportunity structure, in which a governor and a president cede special rights for corporations acting on the fringe of legality. Stora Enso could have continued plantation expansion, but chose not to because of the MST protests, transnational and local networking and embedding with the INCRA.

The organization, ideological congruity, the network of allies and embedded autonomy of the MST, along with protests, have all been growing, active and important in the Stora Enso case. The promotion of contentious agency was helpful in discontinuing plantation expansion. The transnational dimension in this case has given even more power to the resistance network in Brazil, which suggests that it is easier to protest against transnational than largely Brazilian companies. Transnational companies are more vulnerable, as they are not rooted in the Brazilian state corporatist and elite-family centered political system, and as they can be attacked on many fronts. The MST can exploit nationalist sentiments in resisting multinationals. Thus, the politics of paper investment in Brazil shows signs of increasing domestic monopolization of pulp production instead of transnationalization and competition. The last section of this chapter offers further evidence supporting the hypothesis, before I summarize all the evidence.

The Battle between the MST and Aracruz for the Southall Farm

At the beginning of May 2008, more than 1,200 MST families camped next to the Southall farm in the municipality of São Gabriel in Rio Grande do Sul. Almost all the MST families in the state joined the new occupation. Aracruz had announced its intention to buy this massive property, but INCRA had already also marked the area as suitable for agrarian reform. The MST aimed to pressure the state government to expropriate the land and to protest against the plantation land expansion by Aracruz in the state. I was in the area during this event doing field research. My intention was to arrive at this massive camp and see the scene at the spot. Alas, my plans changed – as is typical while doing research on a movement and conflict under constant threat of violence – as the episode quickly evolved into a potentially bloody clash.

The governor of the state, Yeda Crusius, ordered the Brigada Militar forces to surround the camp – an area of 16 hectares officially bought by INCRA – and block the entrances and exits
to the camp. More than 1,800 police with full riot gear surrounded the camp. The police started to check everybody and arrested all who had a police record, for example, if one had not voted in elections (it is compulsory to vote in Brazil). Six militants were arrested. As a supporting protest and pressure, the Rio Grande do Sul MST organized roadblocks in fifteen municipalities. I was in Nova Santa Rita settlement in the municipality of Santana de Livramento, next to the border of Uruguay, observing as the MST farmers blocked the federal highway next to their agrovila with four tractors and a crowd of 80-100 people. The Federal highway police, whose responsibility it is to oversee transit on federal highways, was there already waiting, called for by the MST coordinators. They cleared the traffic jam caused by the roadblocks. “The police has started to check people in Southall and will certainly arrest our companheiros and confiscate peoples tools … we will stop the traffic here” announced an MST activist to the crowd gathered on the road. A force of 1,800 police – a small army in full riot gear prepared for a war – “cleared the tools”, ferramentas like large knives and other accessories usable both in agriculture and self-defense. Sem Terras wondered about the absurdity of police and government actions in sending such an “army” against farmers, spending so much public money for nothing: “They are attacking workers and social movements when there are criminals on the periphery of cities”, one coordinator said.

The MST kept on blocking the highway several times during the day. In a very alarming and potentially violent subsequent decision, the governor declared a state of emergency in the fifteen municipalities where the MST had roadblocks. If the MST had continued the blocks, the local courts could have ordered the Brigada Militar to intervene and clear them violently. However, because of the pressure exerted by the MST around the state, Brigada Militar withdrew from the MST occupation next to the Southall farm. This kind of organized pressure would have been hard to create without active organizing and ideological congruity promoting mechanisms – the Rio Grande do Sul MST is the top of the line in these categories in Brazil.

This episode is a telling example of the contemporary MST-paper industry-state relations. The MST does not even meet the industry, just the state in the form of law enforcement. Some parts of the state are not inimical to the MST, while most are inimical. The federal police was friendly towards the MST as the Minister of Justice Tarso Genro and the Lula-led federal government is considered by the MST to be on their side on some issues, and is not likely to use violence against it. The general line of the Lula presidency has been to ameliorate conflicts, to intervene and postpone structural problems by quick, violence-avoiding tactics. The Federal police eager to help the MST – up to the point of deciding with them in a very friendly negotiation the time to go to eat and to return to the roadblock – indicates about the soft Lula government line as the federal police receive guidelines directly from the federal government. Before Lula’s era, repression was much more severe, claimed the MST militants. The federal police created a barrier between the MST and the lines of jammed cars and people to avoid direct contact and violence. One can see how the state places a barrier between the MST and society. Theoretically, the federal police encapsulate the MST in its own space, peacefully but still forcefully, into a type of embryo. This case also indicates the separate roles of the federal and state-level state actors and institutions: depending on who’s in power, the setting is very different for the resistance.
The line of the Yeda Crusius government in Rio Grande do Sul is contrary to Lula’s attitude to contention. Crusius employs a highly confrontational line, promoting violent and radical officers, “colonels” of the *Brigada Militar* under her command, continuing in this sense the dictatorship period’s hard line indented to crush and not to ameliorate contention. Crusius has criminalized social movements in the state, according to various MST interviews (MST RS, 2008). The Lula government, even though somewhat willing to let the MST promote contentious agency, also suppresses the movement. Lula favors structural policies against the MST interests, such as agribusiness expansion loans and the spreading of social assistance programs that deliver basic food for the poorest, cutting the number of those willing to win land to farm food for themselves by joining the MST. Crusius, on the other hand, wants to crush the contentious agency of the MST.

The MST activists demonstrated their lack of fear of the authorities during the roadblock. They shouted to police cars running by: “Go spend the state’s gasoline, go.” Some blocked drivers tried to protest, and there were close-to-physical conflict situations, but peaceful order prevailed. I wondered why the ordinary citizens did not just come and clear the roadblock. The MST members replied that the public, not to speak of the *latifúndio*, are far too afraid of the movement to do anything. The image created by the mass media, on which people rely as they rarely have any real-life contact with the MST if one is not a long-time neighbor of a rural settlement, portrays the MST as able and willing to commit unimaginable atrocities and violence if provoked. Thus, many are afraid of the MST, as they are led to believe the movement is a terrorist organization. Interestingly, the big landowners, who theoretically have the most power, are the most terrified (based on interviews in the Sindicato Rural 2008). They consider the MST a very able and organized guerrilla organization, as I found out on a visit to the Rosario do Sul *Sindicato Rural*.120 According to the MST members, *latifúndio* only has the guts to fight against women and to strike using hired guns in the dark (interviews, MST RS, 2008). The *latifúndiarios* are “not men, but cowards,” several *Gaúcho* MST members asserted with a look of moral superiority in their eyes.

The MST members used the roadblock to take hold of the territorial, symbolic and social space, demonstrating they have just as good a right to occupy it as the state or any other actor. Some people struck by the roadblock questioned the MST’s rights to do what they were doing, saying, “There are no laws” or “no justice in this country”, to which the MST activists responded: “Yes we have justice in this country, justice for the rich.” According to one MST militant active in the roadblock, the protest showed society that, “we are united and can occupy the road or whatever space.” In this way, the MST demonstrates and attempts to disseminate contentious habitus to the society.

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120 The visit was organized by Sabrina Bicca from Stora Enso, as a part of my field research trip to the investment area, so that I could also interview the “neighbors” of Stora Enso, as Bicca described the Sindicato Rural members. This conservative and traditional landowner organization, many of whose members are *latifúndio*, has links through the state-level organization FARSUL to the national CNA. It was surprising that Stora Enso did not even consider the MST settlements as their neighbors, even though hundreds of *Sem Terras* lived just next to the advancing eucalyptus fields in the area.
Occupations are much more than struggles for the social space. They are personal experiences around which power relations revolve; they are empowerment medicine for those typically dominated in the society up to the point of denying their own subjectivity, agency and political potential. “This is a continuous fight”, a young male militant explained, waving the MST flag on the roadblock. He wanted to emphasize that protest acts are not individual episodes, but a continuum. Perhaps he was trying to say that protests are just signs of underlying *mechanisms of contention* under constant construction. Analytically, protests are emblems of the dynamics between mechanisms of contention and conventional, routine politics – they are friction points. Observing them can disclose alternative social mechanisms in comparison to the dominant system. A close ethnographic observation of occupation situations can reveal the most important aspects of state-business-social movement relations. These are excellent empirical sources to spot the promotion of the contentious agency, transformation of power relations, in action.

The MST managed to significantly slow the Aracruz RS expansion. An earlier protest against Aracruz in Rio Grande do Sul by the MST helped towards the 2008 plantation expansion slowing. In 2006, 1,500 La Via Campesina Women-sector farmers occupied a laboratory developing genetically altered eucalyptus breeds, framed as destruction of research by the mass media (five million tree seedlings and Aracruz greenhouses, worth tens of millions reais according to some estimates). La Via Campesina used this nation-wide and global act to protest against genetic manipulation, multinationals and particularly monocultural plantations that take space from agricultural production. According to various interviews and my observations, the action created a very negative image of the MST as a vandal in many parts of Brazil, especially the big cities like Rio de Janeiro. Why did this action not manage to incite sympathy?

The MST called this episode their most important protest against the paper industry (interview, Santos, MST SP, April 22, 2008). Even though controversial, in the MST’s view the action was highly beneficial, as it was an opportunity for a nation-wide debate on monocultures and the action itself. Many in Rio de Janeiro – where I was at the time – called the action, following framings in main media, an outrageous act of terrorism, an act against progress and development. The act aimed to foster a public debate on exotic monocultures, a matter which has been hushed up in the opinion of La Via Campesina. It did not entirely succeed, as an attack against a “laboratory” went so strongly against the technocratic ideology, central in the ideological and identity mechanism creating congruity between corporations and the state in Brazil. However, even though largely condemned by the masses, in some important state institutions and intellectual circles the MST and its allies gained

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121 Cândice and José Brandão (2006) have briefly studied the action of the Via Campesina Women on 8 March 2006 against the Aracruz Celulose laboratory in Rio Grande do Sul. From their viewpoint of legal sociology delving into the legality, impacts and significance of the case within the Brazilian legal world, Brandão & Brandão (2006) find that this action received plenty of attention in the Brazilian media. The protest has proliferated. For example, Christa Berger, deconstructing “facts” and naming used by the news, sees the 2006 Aracruz protest as a construction of the mass media, contrasting the dominant media framing with the coverage presented by minor media (Berger 2006). This approach is very welcome, as the mass media views have infiltrated even into the scientific literature quite unchecked, especially in the pulp investment disputes.
sympathy as a result. The pulp investment conflict certainly became an even better-known issue in Brazil. This and the 2004 Veracel action can be considered as the protests bringing most media attention and publicity to the critics of the pulp investment model. The 2006 Aracruz action did not obtain a mixed blessing from the media like the 2004 Veracel action, but was condemned outright. Nevertheless, both protests offered heterodox frames, and arouse people especially in the state of Rio Grande do Sul to the debate – people who had growing grievances against eucalyptus expansion, lesser political opportunities, but no heterodox frames until the MST offered new ways to see pulp investments.

The outcome of the Southall farm occupation, with the accompanying pressure by earlier protests, and concurrent statewide roadblocks, were very positive for the MST. Aracruz did not manage to buy the lands, which were instead destined for the settlement of 246 MST families in December 2008. Five thousand hectares of the Southall farm were now supporting 246 more families than before. The MST gained in total 13,000 hectares of land for over 600 families in the same region from the protests against the eucalyptus expansion. The farm owner, Alfredo Southall, offered the farm himself to INCRA (email interview, Keila Reis, INCRA RS, 12.8.2009) as he was heavily in debt, owing about R$ 50 million, 20 million Euros, to the Brazilian state (the Banco do Brasil, Previdência Social and Receita Federal) (personal communication, Iagê Miola, August 12, 2009). INCRA and the federal government paid R$ 31.68 million reais (Jobim 2008), deducted from the Southall debt, to buy 5,000 hectares, which makes the MST's victory even greater. For Iagê Miola, doing research on the relaxation of environmental laws due to pulp investment in Rio Grande do Sul (see Miola 2009), the federal government probably made the Southall acquisition meet the MST demands and, without doubt, this was a tremendous victory symbolically for the MST (personal communication, Miola, August 12, 2009).

Five hundred MST members commemorated their victory by a march to the coming settlement site in Estância do Céu, visiting communities that had helped the MST in the long Southall acquisition episode since 2003. In 2003, eight hundred landless for the first time occupied the non-producing Southall farm, demanding it be turned into a settlement. The MST and the INCRA, as well as the state and federal governments, had already looked at the possibility of appropriating Southall at the end of the 1990s, when the expropriation process started. However, the Supreme Federal Court overruled the expropriation process, because of some mistakes in procedure by INCRA, for which reason the 2008 victory was an even greater feat for the MST. It managed to defeat an earlier Supreme Federal Court decision, the biggest Brazilian pulp company, and the hostile state and ambiguous federal governments. MST coordinator Luciana da Rosa claimed the case was very important:

"Our fight and our conquest show that the latifúndio in this São Gabriel region are broke and that the project of agribusiness and pulp companies was beaten. We conquered the lands that before were destined for the plantation of eucalyptus, but will now produce food for the table of the countryside farmer and for the city worker. This will show that agrarian reform really works (RadioAgência NP 2008)."
This counts as a slowing of plantation expansion of Aracruz in Rio Grande do Sul. Besides the massive and costly protest acts, the outcome was due to the active mechanisms a-e, and the great strategic importance of the area in question for the MST. The most important mechanism in the Aracruz case was the massive protest by roadblocks and many camps in the contested area. The MST massed all its camp members in the state at this one battle, leaving the Votorantim plantation expansion resistance, for example, aside (no major protests were held against the VCP). This concentration of limited resources proved to be an effective strategic decision. It has to be remembered that even though the MST is a strong social movement, its resources are limited in comparison to the paper industry or the state. However, rare successes like this breed more contentious agency. The MST managed not only to slow plantation expansion, gaining the piece of land for itself, but also to attract thousands of new members to its ranks as people saw that contention wins.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I considered pulp investment conflicts as battles for shared and limited state and natural resources. The turn to contentious agency did not simply result in increased visibility for the heterodox framing of eucalyptus and land, but distributed land to the protesting families instead of turning the contested land areas into eucalyptus plantations.

I briefly assessed early resistance cases, of which only one, the Rio de Janeiro resistance, led to the discontinuation of expansion. In the remaining early cases (1999-2003), as the findings table in the next chapter suggests, plantation expansion continued. This brief comparison supported the hypothesis. All of mechanisms a-e were active in the Rio de Janeiro case, and managed to overcome the force of corporate agency. The outcome was plantation slowing, especially due to the strongly embedded autonomy of the MST and other civil society organizations replicating a heterodox frame of pulp investments, and due to an active network of allies. The MST also protested twice against the expansion attempt in front of the governor’s palace in Rio de Janeiro.

Utilizing research material from the Veracel case, I argued that the highly symbolic quality of the MST’s eucalyptus plantation occupation is a primary explanation for long-term slowing of plantation expansion. Even though the establishment of the alternative frames led immediately only to some concessions that count for slowing of plantation expansion, in the long run the establishment of alternative frames is the essence of any attempt to reverse the expansion. Conventional acts do not have such a strong influence, because they fail to address the deeper power relation conceptions, maintaining the unequal socio-political and individual-level power relations. Resymbolizing protests become the visible, physical emblem proving to the public that a radically distinct type of agency exists in Brazil. Power relation transformations, the turn from conventional to contentious agency, are the invisible core of more visible changes, such as the increase in MST settlements and camps.
Contentious agency is replicable and created by specific mechanisms. By comparative case study, I argued the MST has been the central movement in the resistance front including indigenous peoples, socio-environmental NGOs and others. Those who have promoted mechanisms a-e, like several local MST organizations and the Espírito Santo indigenous peoples, considerably influenced the expansion of plantations, as the hypothesis suggested. The MST lost the battle for preferential access to the executive power but gained some relatively important allies in the judiciary and the state apparatus because of its embedded autonomy. For a movement, this type of strategy or outcome might actually be better, especially in the sustained long-running battle the MST always builds. Executives, governors and presidents come and go, but the judiciary retains their positions longer. Success also came from a strategy of concentrating on one company at a time: in 2006, the MST targeted Aracruz and managed to get land for its indigenous allies and, since 2008, they have focused on Stora Enso. The MST had never received as many calls to talk about eucalyptus monocultures as after the 2006 Aracruz protest (Interview, Kelly, MST São Paulo, 2009). For this reason, the movement calculated the protest to have been worthwhile, and continued to develop the new methodology, even though many condemned the act. In April 2009, the MST also gained a crucial victory against the counter-attack following the resistance successes in Rio Grande do Sul.
Findings

A detailed comparison of the land expansion of pulp investments in different regional contexts within the same political system shows that the dynamics between the processes of corporate agency and contentious agency promotion explain the variation in plantation expansion outcomes to a great degree. These processes influence plantation expansion both directly, in land conflicts, and indirectly, in seeking state support. As tables 3 and 4 below show, if the MST has visibly protested against pulp projects, maintaining an active contentious agency, the expansion of eucalyptus plantations has been slowed or even reversed. In comparison, if the MST has not organized resistance, such as in the cases of Jari Celulose in Pará, Cenibra in Minas Gerais, and Votorantim/International Paper of Brazil (VCP/IP) in Mato Grosso do Sul, plantation expansion has not been slowed to even the slightest degree. Therefore, there is apparently a causal relation between conflict outcomes and contentious agency. In conflict cases where mechanisms a-e have not operated simultaneously – where the contentious agency has not been active – plantation expansion has continued unchecked. In the 2004-2008 period, some pulp-holding expansion was discontinued or slowed, which is a decisive transformation in comparison to the 1999-2003 period. On top of the table are the slowed or discontinued cases, on the bottom those in which plantation expansion has continued unchecked.

I analyzed the activeness of the contentious agency in its interaction with corporate agency, producing tables for the 1999-2003 and 2004-2008 periods. These allow us to consider causes to variation in plantation expansion outcomes. Table 3 demonstrates that an active contentious agency has resulted in the slowing, discontinuation or reversal of plantation expansion, even though corporate agency promotion has remained active.
Table 3: Plantation Expansion as a Product of Contentious and Corporate Agency, Comparison of Two Periods Across 14 Pulp Holdings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pulp Holding (and the Brazilian state)</th>
<th>1999-2003</th>
<th>2004-2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aracruz (RJ)</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aracruz (ES)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracel (BA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (SP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stora Enso, Aracruz (RS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzano (BA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (RS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP, Suzano, Ripasa (SP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP/IP (MS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cenibra (MG)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari (PA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tables function as an explanatory structure useful in the comparative analysis of comparable cases. This conceptual framework was a very useful guide for writing a narrative. It should be applied in a more global scale to show its general potential. Tables 3 and 4 outline the stories I narrated on Brazilian pulp conflicts. I call the 2004-2008 period the turning-point, as it portrays many cases in which the contention strategy transformed and produced changes in mechanisms of contention, and, thus in conflict outcomes. These outcomes imply a transformation in the politics of paper investment in Brazil. We may expect that the many new court cases begun in the 2004-2008 period will lead to even more powerful resistance and that the companies will respond to this by withdrawing in some areas and counter-attacking in others. For example, Stora Enso is likely to withdraw from Rio Grande do Sul and attempt to expand in other countries. On the other hand, if contentious agency becomes inactive, plantation expansion can start in the areas now experiencing plantation

<sup>122</sup> The MST protest in front of the Governor’s Palace in Rio de Janeiro, March 2002.
contraction. Table 4 below shows the findings of in-depth field research between 2004-2008 in Brazil within various pulp investment sites and the MST, in locales where the paper and pulp companies already had investments prior to the MST organization of resistance, or were planning investments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holding (and the Brazilian state)</th>
<th>Importance of the Area/Issue</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Y Plantation Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aracruz (ES)</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reversed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracel (BA)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Slowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (SP)</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Slowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stora Enso, Aracruz (RS)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzano (BA)</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP (BA)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP, Suzano, Ripasa (SP)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP/IP (MS)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cenibra (MG)</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari (PA)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on table 4, most important thing seems to be to utilize mechanisms a-e simultaneously. The strategic importance of the area to the MST does not seem to play a key role. The protesting mechanism seems to be of most importance. The difference between Aracruz in RS

123 The MST-supported indigenous peoples and quilombola occupations and uprooting of large eucalyptus land areas 24/07/2007; Aracruz export port (Portocel) occupation by the MST and the Indigenous peoples 12/12/2006; the MST-supported eucalyptus land occupation by the indigenous peoples in Aracruz, burning and uprooting of eucalyptus 07/09/2006. There was also a eucalyptus land occupation in Teixeira de Freitas on an Aracruz farm 07/04/2008, but this did not have a pioneering quality but followed the 2004 Veracel occupation type.


125 Occupation of VCP eucalyptus farm Fazenda Una in Taubaté 17/05/2004.

126 Women’s day occupation of Tarumá farm and roadblocks 04/03/08.

127 Southall farm protest and roadblocks around the state 22/05/2008; Aracruz eucalyptus breeding site destruction in Barra do Ribeiro 08/03/2006. Both of these were pioneering, new type protests.

128 The local MST did a large eucalyptus land occupation in Teixeira de Freitas on Suzano farm (16/04/2006). However, this protest act was not of a pioneering quality, but closely resembled the April 2004 Veracel occupation. Thus, it did not qualify as a pioneering protest.
and VCP/IP in Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), for example, could be explained by difference in the protest mechanism alone. The strongest explanatory power seems to be the lack of major protests against VCP/IP: major protests were mounted in the period of 2004-2008 against Aracruz and Stora Enso. If c is absent, the virtuous cycle of contentious agency is not complete. The table indicates that when a-e are active simultaneously, the economic outcome is more likely to be plantation slowing. From this, it can be deduced that the main process will not produce its results, if protest actions are taken away. The two Bahian cases, Veracel and Suzano, are interesting: in both, protests were utilized, but only in one of them can the resistance be argued to have slowed the expansion of plantations. This anomaly can be explained by the difference in the quality of the protests: in the Veracel case, the protesting was pioneering; the Suzano act merely replicated the earlier protest.

A comparison between outcomes and active mechanisms suggests that the mechanism of embedding with the state apparatus, filing lawsuits and utilizing a variety of official channels to file class actions against pulp companies’ activities was active in all the cases where plantation expansion was slowed. Indeed, almost all the cases where plantation expansion has been slowed, discontinued or reversed have derived in the last instance from a sustained legal process in which mechanisms a-e support the official process where corporate actions are being investigated by officials in the state apparatus. However, legal decisions alone have not been able to curb plantation expansion. For example, Stora Enso decided to withdraw from RS mostly due to the contentious episodes, considering the state impossible to operate in because of the MST resistance. Judges, courts, attorneys, police, ministers, politicians and other authorities have made decisions, new laws, given judgments, or left the companies without proper authorization, for which reason the expansion of plantations has been slowed. In all such cases, however, the initial investigator and framer of the pulp problem has been the local resistance front, in which the MST has been crucial.

Observing temporal changes, embedded autonomy by a movement requires the prior construction of mechanisms a-d. To be able to embed with the state can be a goal of a movement, but it may also be that the movement gains sympathetic state actors even without conscious effort, when judges, prosecutors and so on adopt the movement’s alternative framing and start to promote the goals of the movement on their own. It is enough if a state actor with most relevant power in a given episode of contention adheres to a movement framing. For example, in the case of Aracruz (ES), the Minister of Justice was the right person to embed with. In the case of Veracel, judicial power (judges and prosecutors) has turned increasingly to the side of the MST, even though executive and legislative powers have not.

Up till now, the conflict has revolved around the state, and there is only one case (Stora Enso, RS) where the resistance has managed to influence the industry directly, or by some other way than via the state, so as to slow plantation expansion. If the resistance managed to pressure pulp buyers and consumers, this might lead to a non-state intermediated expansion slowing, but this has not been the rule so far. There is also a possibility for conflict remediation, if movements and corporations sit in the same table and are ready to make
substantial changes. This could take place primarily if the industry adopts more profoundly the tenets of corporate social responsibility, and the MST's network of allies support the meeting of the two poles. Direct, non-state mediated conflict resolution could influence economic outcomes.

I tested the explanatory power of contentious agency promotion in the interaction between this process and the promotion of corporate agency (the control process). The corporate agency has remained active while moving from the 1999-2003 period to the 2004-2008 period. An active process signifies that the type of actions and relations the process promotes are gaining power. The government-industry alliance, represented by the BNDES funding applied to the paper and pulp industry during these periods (BNDES 2009), more than doubled from R$ 6,092.8 million to R$ 14,218.9 million. Furthermore, the strategic importance of many previously unutilized areas grew. The possible locales for pulp projects had to be sought inland and farther from the industrial hub of São Paulo and the areas where eucalyptus grows fastest.

Pressure on lands throughout the country grew stronger throughout the 1999-2008 period as the result of a general agribusiness boom. This boom was promoted by the interlinked and mutually supporting and dependent process of liberalization of global agricultural trade, the rising power of agribusiness corporations, the ethanol diplomacy of the Lula da Silva government, and the biohegemony that social actors expanding industrial plantations gained in many countries in this period, including Brazil. Thus, the stronger corporate agency that ensured greater corporate resource exploitation was promoted both by transnational, world-systemic changes, as well as by Brazilian governmental diplomacy and policies – processes which are in fact strongly interrelated and dependent upon each other, as Brazil produces 25% of the world’s food and a large proportion of the world’s natural resources, most of which it exports (USDA 2005). Lands that were not so valuable or even considered for pulp investments before now came into consideration. It was notable that huge new projects started in Rio Grande do Sul, the strategic importance of the area growing from low to high for Stora Enso and VCP, and from average to high for Aracruz, which already had operations in the state. VCP/IP opened a new large pulp project in the interior of the country, in Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), which can be seen as the start of a new wave of pulp investment in the interior. Almost all investments had previously been close to the sea because of export-orientation and the high relative costs of transportation in producing pulp. The strategic importance of the area to the industry markedly influences the push towards a rapid pulp plantation expansion by the building of corporate agency. Again, this development is not automatic but depends on the building of corporate mechanisms and the interaction of these with the politics of pulp investment, on the dynamics of the resistance and the corporations. The next chapter will return to this dynamic interaction, opening up the way the EAM and EAC processes interact. This will help explaining more in detail the step from contentious agency promotion to

129 To counter-balance the long distance to an export port in São Paulo by a new railroad, the VCP/IP investment in MS has shorter distances from the eucalyptus fields to the pulp mill. This is an even more crucial cost factor than the long distance to the ports, as the wood procurement in general presents 40-70 percent of all costs, transportation dominating within these costs.
economic outcomes; in fact, this is a result of politics of pulp investment involving many parties, and not determined solely by internal movement mechanisms.
8. Corporate-Movement Dynamics as Political Games within the State

Governments are dynamic, contested, continuously recreated entities. The DOC research program requires rendering state actors in dynamic, relational terms (McAdam et al. 2001: 345). It also requires analyzing all politics as operating though interaction involving members, challengers, and subjects of a given polity. This chapter will continue this work by assessing the multiple political games, the largely state actor intermediated interactive dynamics, by which the MST and the paper industry create the politics of pulp investment. These dynamics are Electoral politics, Ideological/identity game, Institutional/structural game, and Land conflicts. The last of these I have already studied in great detail in the previous chapters, but the first three require more attention.

The main task of this research has been fulfilled already before this chapter. Findings have been presented and the hypothesis has gained robust support. This will be a stepping stone for future research, that can now start directly from dynamics, as the actors involved and their main conflict lines have been defined. Nevertheless, this chapter is essential, as to understand the step from contentious and corporate agency into the economic outcomes, one must assess the dynamic interaction between these on various political games. It is by and through these games and political dynamics that economic outcomes are defined. The figure 8 opens up the pulp conflict dynamics as political games. It is the final figure wrapping up the whole research in its complexity of mechanisms, processes, dynamics and outcomes. It contains also potential for future research; for example, the corporate social responsibility and direct conflict resolution without the presence of the state is an issue that should be studied in the future. Here I have left this out as such direct conflict resolution attempts have insofar been unsuccessful and no real interaction has surged there. The figure 8 sums up the politics of pulp investment in Brazil; I will explain it next.
Figure 8: Economic Outcomes as a Result of Dynamic Politics between Contentious and Corporate Agency

- "Importance of an Area/Issue to a Social Group" ➔ "Broad change processes"
- Organizing and Politicizing a Social Movement
- Heterodox Framing of Corporate Resource Exploitation
- Networking with Allies

The State

- Tolerance - Repression
- Human Rights - Property Rights
- Police - Paramilitary Violence

Corporate Agency

- Corporate Land Access
- Campaign Financing

Industry Formation and Cooperation, Market Competition and Fluctuation

"Importance of an Area to a Business" ➔ "Broad change processes"

Forming a Company, Investment Model and Capital Accumulation Style

Corporate Social Responsibility

Economic Outcomes, Resource Utilization Pace and Style

- Activist Prosecutors
- Meritocracy
- Rule of Law
- State Corporatism, Neoliberalism
- Power Elite; Lobbying

Social Justice
- Economic Policy
- Technocratic Developmentalism

Promise of Social Peace, Livelihoods

Promise of Jobs, Taxes, Exports

Voting
- Party and Lawmaker Allegiances
- Regulatory and Legal Framework

Networking with Allies

Figure 8: Economic Outcomes as a Result of Dynamic Politics between Contentious and Corporate Agency
The state plays a brokerage role, mediating between the interests of the paper corporations and the pressure from the MST and its allies. The state connects to the MST for example by the EAM mechanism, where the MST attempts to maintain autonomy whilst embedding with the state institutions and structures. The state, via its Land Reform Institute INCRA, tries likewise to protect the MST settlements from outside corporate interests that would harm the agrarian reform project that intends to increase food production and social peace by settling landless families. The MST also attempts to influence the executive and legislative powers by participating in electoral politics, mostly on behalf of the Workers’ Party (PT) politicians. The paper industry also resorts to electoral politics, offering not votes as the MST members but money for electoral campaigns in exchange for preferential connections to the executive and legislative spaces. By the sub-mechanisms of EAC and EAM, the two actors attempt to gain greater leverage on the different spaces and platforms of the state. In this game, the paper industry is in a far more beneficial position; it enjoys of the already active institutional mechanism of state corporatism that offers a preferential channel for corporations to receive subsidies via such executive-controlled institutions as the Brazilian Development Bank. The continuity of this institutional mechanism, alongside the introduction of another pro-corporation institutional mechanism since 1990, neoliberal policies, accrues the paper corporations a very comfortable interaction with the government, which can be characterized as an alliance. This is true even more so because of the relational mechanism of ideological congruity that currently connects most parts of the Brazilian state with the resource exploiting corporations. Most state actors still share the ideology of developmentalist development. However, with the election of President da Silva, the MST witnessed a prominent ideological congruity with the top executive of the state. This gave benefits both for da Silva who could identify himself with the poorest of the poor and the progressive left, as well as for the MST, which could utilize the ideological and identity congruence to show they have an ideological ally within the state. President Lula da Silva has played this brokerage role extremely well, even though according to the MST he has failed on many fronts. These political games show that it is better to see social change and phenomena such as politics rather as processes and dynamics than as structures. Next, I will explain each of the political games where EAC and EAM meet (electoral politics, ideological game, and institutional game) separately.

Electoral Politics: Contributions to State Actors

Because control over state institutions and laws is crucial in the dispute, it is no wonder that the struggle over access to the state has increased dramatically as the dispute has been exacerbated. Political party and candidate election financing by pulp companies has continually increased, as an analysis into the publicly accessible website of *Supremo Tribunal Federal* demonstrates.\(^\text{130}\) I have measured the activeness of the EAC and EAM sub-

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\(^\text{130}\) Even though helpful for research, the official election campaign statistics should not be trusted too much, being based on the candidate’s own explanations of their election financing, so that many do not even give full details and some give none at all. Furthermore, it is extremely easy to falsify any receipt in Brazil or circulate money by *caixa dois* and other corruption measures. Quite certainly, the real figures for political support given by companies are much higher, and are not limited only to those candidates named in the database. However, it
mechanism “contributions to state actors” by analyzing corporate election financing and targeted voting by the MST.

All pulp companies have given money to candidates in the Brazilian elections. Stora Enso gave R$ 24,000 to Yeda Crusius, the then-winner of the 2006 gubernatorial race in Rio Grande do Sul state, a paltry sum in comparison to Aracruz, which gave R$ 281,556 or Votorantim that gave Crusius R$ 200,000.\(^{131}\) It is notable that Crusius is just one political candidate which the paper companies are financing. In the Rio Grande do Sul state alone, Aracruz financed 70 candidates to the tune of R$ 1,217,346. Aracruz gave more than US$ 200,000 for Lula’s two presidential campaigns (NACLA 2007). In 2006, Stora Enso financed candidates from all parties to the tune of R$1,006,604. The CEO of the company, Jouko Karvinen, explained the contributions to the Finnish NGO Maattomien ystäväry that demanded explanation from the company as well as its board, in which the Finnish State is the most powerful shareholder. In a letter dated 29 August 2008, Stora Enso claimed it financed “the election campaigns of Brazil’s President, governors, federal and state representatives, and senators.” Veracel gave R$ 1,170,000 in the 2006 elections, focusing its support on Bahian governor Jaques Wagner (PT, R$ 100,000) and Paulo Souto (PFL, R$ 200,000).\(^{132}\) Where Veracel bet on two candidates, Aracruz and Votorantim spread their largesse more widely. After counting together the sums from the official Supreme Electoral Court statistics, Aracruz gave in total R$ 5,523,353 reais to political representatives in the 2006 elections and Votorantim Celulose e Papel S/A gave R$ 1,657,379.\(^{133}\) Aracruz is clearly leading this table of figures.

Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2007: 1) from the IMF, the University of Amsterdam and the World Bank respectively, have studied election contributions by companies in Brazil. They find that election “contributions help shape policy on a corporate-specific basis … contributing corporations substantially increased their bank financing” (ibid.). Preferential financing decisions by politicians conferred on the election-campaign contributing companies are common in Brazil (ibid.). Politicians have power both in state-controlled funds like BNDES and in many public and private banks as board members. The circle of money between powerful state and corporate actors is the principal political tie of favors between

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\(^{131}\) One euro was worth about 2.7 Brazilian reais in April 2008. See the public election financing data offered online by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (www.tse.gov.br), “ELEIÇÕES”, “prestaçao de contas” section, 2006 elections, then click on “Consulta a prestação de contas final de candidatos e comitês financeiros”, and type the name of Yeda Rorato Crusius, 45 (state: RS, governador) in the “candidato” and “receita” search formulae. You can see that, for example, just one paper company, Aracruz Celulose, has given her 281,556 reais according to these official statistics (which probably do not include all the support, as it is not obligatory to reveal all sources of financing), under different registration numbers. Furthermore, these figures might overlap, as, for example, Stora Enso owns half of Veracel and it is not clear from the data source how much it has contributed to the financing of elections by Veracel, or whether this is also calculated in the direct financing by Stora Enso.

\(^{132}\) Besides Veracel support, Wagner and Souto also received 200,000 reais from Aracruz.

\(^{133}\) But as the company is a conglomerate of various economic activities, including cement, construction and finance businesses, one would eventually have to total their efforts as well to weigh the political clout of Votorantim through the financing of elections in Brazil.
companies and politicians, Claessens et al. argue (2007). In addition, the development theorists Drèze & Sen (2002: 9) point to the negative influence of electoral campaign financing: “Economic inequality can seriously compromise the quality of democracy, for example through the influence of money on electoral processes, on public decision-making, and on the content of the media. Overcoming the inequalities of power associated with economic privilege is an important aspect of democracy in the full sense of the term”. This is not big news. What is interesting is that in spite of extensive electoral campaign support, the Brazilian state is not totally in favor of monocultures or pulp mills. Especially when it comes to certain ministries and personalities, and especially at state and municipal levels, the unanimity of the state-paper industry alliance declines. For example, in São Paulo “the acceptance of monocultures is not so generalized and municipal and state-level parliamentarians have already expressed their concern with the level of territory occupation ... trying to regulate these practices” (MMA 2005: 179).

My field research around Brazil suggests that the acceptance by municipal politicians of a particular monoculture, like eucalyptus, depends greatly on the location and the existence of organized resistance. If the industry is situated outside the municipality, the municipality does not gain tax revenues from the mill and social movements can publicize this fact. One can see that in Southern Bahia, the municipalities of Porto Seguro, Belmonte and others not possessing a pulp plant have made laws prohibiting eucalyptus plantations. In such situations, following negative public opinion on pulp projects, the politicians correctly calculate that it is economically better to use the land for agriculture that produces food for the local markets. These produce many more jobs and tax reais per hectare than mechanized monocultures without a processing plant in the municipality.

Pulp project disputes demonstrate how certain politicians are “owned” by either companies or social movements, trying to pass legislation in their favor. For example, a 2004 state-level attempt in São Paulo tried to pass a law requiring environmental impact analysis (EIA) from tree plantation projects larger than 100 ha. This attempt was strongly resisted as too expensive a move by the producers and politicians from the PFL, PPS and PT parties, who created the Parliamentary Front for the Defense of Reforestation in the State of São Paulo and barred the legislative initiative (MMA 2005: 181). PFL and PPS are typical Bancada ruralista parties, and the PT has become an integral ally of agribusiness, monoculture and the latifúndio block.

What happens when a politician gains support and receives attention claims from opposing political fronts is an interesting question. The MST calculated that in 1998-2002 it had seventeen PT deputies and four others as its supporters, whereas the Bancada ruralista had 83 deputies and a large majority of senators compared to the five senators supporting the MST (Vergara-Camus 2007: 305). The MST’s João Pedro Stédile argues that companies specifically tied up deputies in the parliament. He has calculated that, for example, Vale do Rio Doce has 47 deputados in the parliament, Aracruz has 16, Banco Itaú has 27 and Grupo Gerdau has 27 (Letraviva 2/8/2007). The MST attempts to slow company financing by supporting particular candidates by electoral mobilization. Carter (2009: 9) comments on the electoral politics centering on the MST and its adversaries:
Between 1995 and 2005, landless peasants had an average of one federal deputy for every 612,000 families, while the large landlords had one deputy for every 236 families. The political representation of landlords was therefore 2,587 times greater than that of landless peasants. As a result of these disparities, each of Brazil’s largest landlords had access to U.S. $1,587 from public coffers for every dollar made available to a landless family. The numbers speak eloquently for themselves.

The MST and the paper industry support the same individuals, like Jaques Wagner (PT), now governor of Bahia. The ambiguity felt by an individual politician encapsulates the dilemma faced by the politicians in power. Most state actors have not been worried in resolving problems as this would eventually discomfort some of their supporters. What ensues is politics as usual: pulp investments continue even though the MST has its politician in the number one post in the country. However, Lula and Wagner are at the same time the number one politicians of the paper industry as well. Pulp investments like Veracel are the “face of the Lula government”, Wagner said at the mill’s inauguration. For the MST, “Lula is more a friend of the enemies [than of the MST]. Lula is not our enemy, but the current economic model is. One person does not make a difference, only the combination of people can make the transformation” (Interview, Santos, MST São Paulo, 2008). The MST sees the grassroots mass organization as the only way to bring transformation about. Parliament is only a reflection of the society, “a space to be occupied” but not a priority, João Pedro Stédile from the MST said.

Local politicians have little power to implement transformations when one company owns over two-thirds of municipal land, as in the case of Votorantim in Capão Bonito (SP). Its mayor has asked the state governor, federal president and the company owner by letters for regulation and policy transformations to make more varied use of land, but with no response. The municipal politicians in Capão Bonito passed a law restricting the planting of eucalyptus. Votorantim alleged the law was “breaking the Constitution, forbidding the free exercise of economic activity” (cf. MMA 2005: 180). Another São Paulo case comes from the municipality of São Luis do Paraitinga, in which an act regulating tree plantations of Suzano was first accepted unanimously. When the bill proceeded for the mayor for approval, he vetoed it and returned it to the municipal chamber, which surprisingly wholeheartedly favored the veto (without counting the initiator of the bill). The Ministry of the Environment researchers found that “in this case, the lobbying by Suzano was intense” (ibid.).

The MST has no way to ensure support from elected politicians as long as they receive electoral campaign funding from companies bent on plantation expansion. Active election financing by paper corporations has made it better for the MST to embed with the state institutions instead of giving direct contributions to state actors. This shows how the effectiveness of mechanisms depends on the conflict dynamics, the activeness, quality and combination of mechanisms utilized by opponents.

The relations of the Lula presidency and the MST deserve a few more lines. Many expected Lula to utilize his new power as the most influential state actor to form a radical partnership with the MST. Meszaros (2007: 16) argues that the Lula presidency could have supported the agrarian reform agenda by several legal measures. The “government could exercise its
authority in clearing cultural and legislative obstacles to land reform; could use its constitutional powers in making senior judicial and other appointments, including the Attorney General; and could adopt a more benign tone in its public pronouncements” (ibid.). Between 2003 and 2008, the Lula government did not engage in violence and direct oppression of the movement, as all the earlier governments had done. Its legal discourse towards the MST has “oscillated between brinkmanship and conciliation” and sent out mixed messages (ibid.). Some of these the MST could utilize. Lula appointed Claudio Fontelles as the new Attorney General. In 2003, he publicly endorsed a key argument advanced by the MST: “that property was not absolute and could, under certain circumstances, be occupied.” (ibid.) Meszaros points out how “setting the tone in this way would encourage and embolden young prosecutors to question landowner claims instead of taking them at face value. It also strengthened the MST’s wider public claims.” (ibid.) In fact, the pioneering 2004 Veracel occupation should be seen within this new legal and political opportunity configuration: with such backing and endorsement, it could target the largest investment in the first Lula term, Veracel, to force the economic policy to be in line with the new legal discourse.

Lula was too timid in appointing judges to the Supreme Federal Court; this backslashed, as the court rejected on procedural grounds the first major expropriation order signed by Lula (Meszaros 2007: 17). The Supreme Federal Court has been systematically on the side of the dominant legal orthodoxy, the power elite and corporate interests, and acted in such manner also in the pulp conflict cases. This should not be seen as a defeat of the MST within the institutional game, but as a defeat within the electoral politics, since Lula had the chance to appoint more progressive judges, but decided not to do this. The reasons can be seen as an amalgam of Lula’s corporate campaign financing, need to form a broad coalition, and ideological congruity with the agribusiness and technocratic developmentalists. Nevertheless, in 2009 Lula updated the agricultural productivity indices dating back to 1975, which was seen as a major victory by the MST and INCRA. The real influence of this measure in advancing the agrarian reform remains to be seen. Meszaros (2007: 17-18) judges that “while the Lula government has increased public funding for land reform and family farming, ultimately it has done nothing to undermine those power relations.” The support given by Lula for large-scale pulp projects supports this judgment. Electoral politics have given some advancement towards the goals of the MST, but mostly curbed these. In comparison, the recent changes in the institutional game have been far more beneficial to the MST.

Institutional Game: Structural and Institutional Embedding

I have measured the activeness of institutional and structural mechanisms by analyzing the BNDES financing given to the paper industry. Besides election financing, institutional and structural legacies, state corporatism and elite power play a role in the actual support enjoyed by the plantation industry in Brazil.Authoritarianism, elites and corporatism have been a classical (Schmutter 1974; Malloy 1977; Schwartzman 1977; Collier & Collier 1977; Kaufman 1977; Diniz 1982) and recurrent (Collier, D. 1995; Carvalho 1997; Wiarda 2004) focus in the analysis of Brazilian politics. I turn to these next, before closing this chapter with
analysis of the ideological congruity between the pulp projects and the Brazilian state. First, I assess the historically built-in institutional dynamics that favor corporate agency and that the MST has started to challenge. After this, I open the structural game, which still strongly favors corporate agency due to the existence of a power elite, but which has started to also even out by the society-wide expansion of contentious agency and the advance of a social movement society that follows this process.

State Corporatism and Neoliberalism: Institutional Embedding By Corporations

President Getulio Vargas’s regime implanted state corporatism in the Brazilian society in the 1930s. The idea came from Italian Fascists and Brazilian intellectuals like Oliveira Viana, who argued that the real culprits behind the non-development of Brazil were the latifúndio and the clientelist politics and local power relations these maintained. To modernize Brazil, suggested Viana, the State should cut latifúndio impetus by giving society a strong hand, ordering the social development of the citizens through the practice of state corporatism. (Viana 1922: 269, 323 Cf. Carvalho 2004: 169.) In state corporatism, the state would actively promote links between its own structures and the leaders of both companies and labor. Hierarchy was the watchword: the elite established new corporate forms of power as direct political power through Café com Leite politics declined. Most agree the corporatist ties between the labor unions and corporations with the state have continued to dominate within the Brazilian economy, politics and society (Boito 2007; Mancuso 2007; Gomes 2004; Diniz and Boschi 2004; Power and Doctor 2004), even though according to Collier and Handlin (2009) important change towards an associational network has taken place in Latin America. The same elite controls both the industrial and agricultural sectors via state corporatism. Ruth and David Collier (1991) have called this radical reworking of the institutional framework in the 1930s a critical juncture. As there has not been any other authentic critical juncture, the Brazilian institutional framework has remained largely intact until today (Power and Doctor 2004). In the last years, some intertwining of pluralist and state corporatist practices has taken place, for example by the establishment of some neo-corporatist institutions (Doctor 2007), but state corporatism continues to be the marking institutional framework.

Brazilian corporatism dates back to centuries of centralized imperial rule and monarchy. Landry even dates the political thought behind Latin American corporatism back to ancient Rome’s patrimonial state (Landry 1976: 71). State corporatist structures mean that trade unions and industries do not organize horizontally over industry or profession specific lines, but hierarchically (Power & Doctor 2004). This practice continues in spite of some attempts to dismantle the state corporatist institutions’ legacy and power, and to transform it into neo-corporatism in which more of society, like civil society associations, are listened to by the state (Doctor 2007). State corporatism cuts the ties of the Brazilian paper industry system

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134 The notion refers to the First Republic politics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, when the latifúndio from the coffee-producing state of São Paulo and the livestock/milk producing Minas Gerais state shared power. The two states’ latifúndio combined forces for a national politics, which produced the name Café com leite politics.
from the society and other industries. This sectarianism explains why those gaining from the pulp industry advance are totally in favor of it, even though the macroeconomic impact on the country and especially the sub-regions might be negative. Lack of cooperation and industry-wide organization and systematization for the benefit of the economy is one of the principal obstacles for the growth of the Brazilian economy (Power and Doctor 2002; 2004). Simultaneously, state corporatism transforms social power to corporations. In Brazil, corporatism facilitates state-business linking and large business interests even today (Mancuso 2007). Besides Mancuso, Eduardo Gomes (2004) also finds that neoliberalism has fortified the state corporatist system in Brazil.

These findings go against the overall belief and theory on the non-compatibility of neoliberalism and state corporatism. When these two institutional mechanisms are exercised simultaneously, the results appear to be devastating for competition and civil society, as companies can use state resources to buy off competitors and crucially shape the marketplace and society, whereas social movements and associations lack direct state access. This signifies that corporate agency is supported by institutional mechanisms. The paper industry operates with the Brazilian state by a relation that could be characterized as embedded autonomy by corporations (EAC). In this institutional interaction setting, it is easy for the paper industry to utilize lobbying to reach its goals.

**Activists Prosecutors, Meritocracy and Rule of Law: Institutional Embedding by the MST**

Besides the inclusion of neoliberal support in the set of state-industry alliance fortifying institutional mechanisms, some changes have taken place since 1990. Some non-corporate agents, such as the MST, have achieved closer relations with some parts of the state. In the case of the MST, I call this relation embedded autonomy by a movement (EAM), developing the classic concept by Evans (1995). The movement has managed to embed several state institutions, including judicial and legal platforms. Meszaros (2007:2), who has studied the relations of the MST with the rule of law in Brazil, finds that legal practitioners and the MST are in an increasingly rich interplay, and that the movement has a sophisticated legal discourse and strategy. Meszaros emphasizes that the 2002-initiated Lula presidency “undoubtedly gave a distinctive new slant to the MST’s relationship with the State in general and the rule of law in particular” (ibid). In spite of remarkable continuity, the latest research on the Brazilian political system and activism has found that some changes have been taking place recently (Ondetti 2008b; Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Kingstone & Ponce forthcoming). New generations of young meritocratically selected state bureaucrats, in innovative institutions like the Ministério Público, alongside the social movements they generally sympathize with, like the MST, and from which they gain new frames by which to interpret the old reality, have started to undermine the stronghold of the institutional and structural mechanisms promoting corporate agency. Here I will open the relationships of the MST with the state from the viewpoint of the interactive process I have dubbed institutional game, focusing on how the MST engages with this game.
The typical understanding of the institutional game, institutional normality within the Brazilian political system with strong antagonisms and caricatures of movements such as the MST and equally strong ideals of law are “deceptively simple” (Meszaros 2007: 3). There’s a wide gap between the way the MST sees and utilizes the law, and the dominant legal orthodoxy in Brazil. Time and again, progressive MST-scholars point out how the land occupations and other contentious protests should not be understood as illegal, as failures of the rule of law, but rather as products of extremely unequal land ownership circumstances and the historically-built division of the Brazilian state into modern and backward parcels (Hammond 2009). The conflict culture approach, utilized in the study of forest conflicts by Hellström (2002), also emphasizes how local political systems, the cultural context, produce the conflict dynamics. Thus, the institutional game that the MST engages with should not be understood as an alternative, but an added interactive process that the movement can utilize besides participating in the contentious interactive process of land conflicts. The earlier research on environmental policy and conflicts in Brazil by Hochstetler and Keck (2007) emphasized how an amalgam of routine and contentious actions has best led to the desired outcomes. Meszaros (2007: 5) goes even further, arguing that the success of the MST has been borne exactly by the more contentious strategy its leaders created:

In fact, the alternatives had been tried and found wanting. The MST was born of a strong sense of past failures, including the assassinations of rural trade union leaders, the glacial pace of land reform, and the excessively debilitating legalistic culture of existing rural organisations.

This research has presented empirical evidence supporting the general claims of Meszaros. However, the truth tables produced by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis technique indicate that only the concatenation, simultaneous utilization of contentious and routine embedding mechanisms produces the economic outcome the movement seeks. This becomes understandable by the slow and abrupt Brazilian policy-process that requires frequent outside reminding by contention (Hochstetler and Keck 2007) and by the features of Brazil’s justice system, composed by a very strong complex of formal and informal mechanisms that turn the system “notoriously unjust, bureaucratic, crippling slow, and saturated with class bias” (Meszaros 2007).

The Brazilian justice continues to be very selective. The 1988 Constitution failed to offer a sufficiently unambiguous programme to resolve the controversy between different views on the way the agrarian reform should be dealt with. The contradictory legal documents and clauses turned litigation to be the principal official channel for the resolution of land conflicts:

Although the Constitution asserts the conditions under which the State can and cannot appropriate property for the purposes of agrarian reform, it does so through an elaborate legal, administrative, economic and social web mediated by judges, administrative agencies (for example Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária [INCRA]) and politicians. Conflict was built in from the start. A complex battle is now being waged inside the legal establishment for hegemony. (Meszaros 2007: 8).
Meszaros shifts the attention towards the conflict cultures and dynamics of contention viewpoint, and away from the non-interactive analysis of a single social actor. He shows how “most of the tensions between the MST and the legal order can be traced to the latter’s fabric and operating dynamics rather than to the MST’s supposedly irresponsible or lawless approach” (Meszaros 2007: 9). The relations between the MST and legality include a variety of reciprocal determinations and not only tensions, especially since 2000, as the MST has started to see the potentialities of law. In the 1980s, the MST did not have yet experience or interest in the institutional game with the law. The initiative to start an interaction seems to have come from progressive legal practitioners. Meszaros (2007: 10) narrates:

Sympathetic lawyers scurried hundreds of kilometres from one occupation to the next and then back to the courts, improvising the best defence they could to legal counter attacks. … Clearly, the MST’s underdevelopment of legal expertise, at its simplest, the failure to present an adequate defence in court because lawyers were unavailable, was leaving the movement badly exposed.

The movement started a “painstaking construction of legal personnel networks and arguments” which resulted in a slight but relatively important leveling of the battle (ibid.). In general terms, the game is still very unequal. However, “were it not for the dedicated body of lawyers and paralegals willing to offer these services on a voluntary basis, the MST’s legal presence would be a fraction of its current size” (ibid.). In the early 1990s, the MST developed both in-house legal services as a part of its organizing and politicizing mechanism, as well as networked increasingly with the National Network of Popular Independent Lawyers (Rede Nacional de Advogados e Advogadas Populares, RENAP), officially created in 1996. Exchanges between the radical legal profession and the MST have become continuous and deeply influenced both. Interaction with leading lawmakers, such as Plinio Sampaio (PT) led into the MST ideals being included in the 1988 Constitution and the National Agrarian Reform Program, besides developing “a more mature and nuanced legal conception” within the MST (ibid.). Leading leftists lawyers sought actively to incorporate the institutional legal game as a pillar of the mechanisms of the movement they saw carrying great potential for social transformation in Brazil. (Meszaros 2007: 11-12). This points to a very interactive process.

In negotiations with centrist and conservative politicians and other state actors, law exercises a bridge building capacity for the MST. The movement has started to use law as a way to put others into defensive, not just to defend itself. (ibid.) This is highly visible also in the increasingly proactive heterodox framing and exposing of irregularities of corporate resource exploitation. In the case of pulp conflicts, the MST has systematically been the primary investigator who brings forth illegalities of investment projects, which state actors such as public prosecutors then take under a systematic and official examination, to be passed to tribunals for legal proceedings. The Rio Grande do Sul cases, the São Paulo cases, as well as the Veracel case are clear examples of this interaction between state actors and the MST.

When courts have emphasized the importance of a contextual approach and substantively oriented legal reasoning, rather than the purely formal characteristic of the dominant legal orthodoxy, this has played in the favor of the MST that faces extremely unequal structural
mechanisms. In the pulp conflict cases, the MST initiated the legal offensive by utilizing contextual and substantive legal reasoning. It argued that the large areas required by eucalyptus plantations, and their negative socio-economic and environmental damage, have to be considered as the motivation behind the symbolic destruction of eucalyptus. Since 2007, the offensive has furthered, as public prosecutors and judges have officially documented even direct and clear breaches of the purely formal legal codes. In the politics of pulp investment, the legal interaction is increasingly on the side of the MST. The officially denounced breaches of the law has put the companies such as Stora Enso and Veracel into the defensive.

If the battle was fought only on the legal front, the economic outcomes would be much more beneficial for the MST. But the institutional legal game in itself contains much more than the law; state corporatism and neoliberal policies give preferential institutional access to the state to the corporation. Besides this, institutional politics interacts with the electoral politics and the ideological game, as well as the land conflicts, which all are strongly determined by the burden of the structural game that favors corporate land access. The executive powers, such as Governor Wagner (PT) in Bahia, have undermined the work of public prosecutors and even judges, giving special rights to Veracel and other pulp companies operating in the state. The higher up the battle goes within Brazil (from the municipal to the state and federal levels), the more influence the electoral politics the structural embedding by corporations has. Following these dynamics, transnational networking with allies seems to be a viable mechanism to influence the economic outcomes.

In general, the MST claims that large-scale pulp projects do not fulfil the social function required by the law. The 1988 Constitution requires a property to fulfil its social function to be accorded legal protection. Otherwise the land can be appropriated for the agrarian reform. To demonstrate pollution or abuse of labour rights have earlier been enough for public prosecutors to win lawsuits in courts that have had to acknowledge the investment did not fulfil the social function even though it was productive otherwise. That is, in front of the law, such business operations were not productive. In all the pulp holding cases where the economic outcome was plantation slowing, discontinuation or reversal, prosecutors and other state officials issued open letters dealing with the social function of pulp projects in much the same terms as those advanced by the MST. These have not been just coincidental acts, but clearly a product of deeply embedded interactions between the MST's in-house legal sector and the state institutions’ actors. Currently, Meszaros (2007: 16-17) clarifies, Brazilian legal professionals are responsive towards innovative strategies advanced by the MST, and the movement has an increased capacity for creative case construction, legal issues woven into the very fabric of occupations.

The institutional embedding mechanism operates by interactions between the MST’s legal specialists, activist prosecutors, and judges. It is no surprise that the Ministério Público has given a big part of the support. The institution has been analyzed to be one of the most independent sectors of the state (Sadek and Cavalcanti 2003: 220). Independent prosecutors do not have to obey the structural embedding by corporations or the pressures by executives influenced by the electoral politics. Autonomy positions them outside the dominant
ideologies, including the legal orthodoxy intermeshed with class interests of the haves. This shows how, in the end, the best solution for all would not be the advancement of EAC or EAM, but the advancement of embedded autonomy by the state, as Peter Evans (1995) argued. For this to happen, the judiciary in Brazil should gain more autonomy vis-à-vis the power elite and the corporations. The prosecutors are essential to activating the courts, but the judiciary has also acted to curb potential excesses by activist prosecutors (Taylor 2006). When both prosecutors and the judiciary sideline with the MST framing, the embedded autonomy by the movement has succeeded in turning into a mechanism that together with the other mechanisms and embedding with other interactive processes brings the economic outcomes sought after by the activists. As Meszaros (2007: 18) points out, currently “the Rule of Law in Brazil depends greatly upon correlations of force at a given moment in time, micropolitical arrangements and the willingness of operators of the legal system to use their powers in a particular way.” For this reason, EAM and EAC are so important in defining the economic outcomes; movements and corporations can exert great influence as the autonomy and embedding by the state is still wanting.

**Power Elite: Structural Embedding by Corporations**

The institutional mechanism of state corporatism was created to cut the power of structural mechanisms which created and maintained a power elite in Brazil. Viana, the architect of Brazilian corporatism, was concerned by the basic structure of Brazilian society, in which solidarity is distributed mainly only in private spheres of interaction like the family or clan for the powerful families’ unions (Carvalho 2004). However, state corporatism functioned to promote rather than curb the power of elites. A series of evidence supports the claim that a power-elite still exists in Brazil and keeps on accumulating power as long as the current structural and institutional mechanisms are maintained. Eakin (2001: 173-174) writes that “In the 1990s, 287 of Brazil’s 300 largest corporations were controlled by families … the continuity of elite families and their networks is impressive”. This also applies to the paper industry, since few families own the paper and pulp companies in Brazil. The paper business families know each other very well, and are friends (João Cordeiro, interview March 2008). This would suggest that a particular social group controls the paper industry. Márcio Pochmann finds that Brazil is also a prisoner of national elite: five thousand family clans control forty percent of the national wealth and a tenth controls three-quarters of all (Santos 2006). One percent of the population controls more wealth than the poor half (Medeiros, Marcelo 2005: 249). Five thousand Brazilian families, 0.001 percent of the population, control 40% of the country’s GDP (Pochmann, Guerra, Amorim & Silva 2006). The economic model of accumulation by dispossession is supported and maintained by the elite.

The Brazilian state favors the elite business sectors, monopolistic and oligarchic corporations. The state uses clientelist patronage ties (Hoefle 2000) and is patrimonial, which works as “an invisible barrier to the introduction of fundamental reforms”, such as the agrarian reform (Roett 1999: xvi). The elites obstruct transformation because the system of power favors their interests and simultaneously weakens “popular participation and the involvement of the
ordinary citizen in the affairs of the state” (Roett 1999: xvi). This signifies that corporate agency and the expansion of industrial plantations is supported by the strongly biased power relations that characterize the structural game.

Economic growth under this institutional trajectory cannot resolve the dilemma of underdevelopment and the corresponding inequality caused by primitive accumulation-type capitalism, as “wealth and political power are associated” (Medeiros, Marcelo 2005: 251). High salary earning positions – the economic elite – belong mostly to political elites: these positions offer their holders “a privileged position from which to influence in the legislative and legal process, the administration of the public machine, the hiring of large quantities of workforce or even in the formation of public opinion” (ibid.). Marcelo Medeiros (2005: 265, my translation) writes:

There are signs that wealth in Brazil originates or at least is perpetuated by relation with the State. The fusion of economic and political elites creates the conditions for the state machine to orient its actions for the benefit of the rich, not only by macroeconomic or infrastructure and investment politics, but also by the use of social politics that do not have a distributive character.

Power relations and the social structure have remained remarkably unchanged throughout the tides of history. Raymundo Faoro’s (1984) concept of the Brazilian bureaucratic stratum helps to explain this. Faoro maintained that the state had expanded itself everywhere in Brazilian society, and that little it mattered who had the power. The bureaucratic stratum rendered change impossible and turned everyone partaking of it into parts of the leviathan. Faoro argued that one had to seek change outside the unwieldy state (ibid.). The practical solution was the end of dictatorship and concurrent expansion of civil society.

Social Equity and Social Movement Society: Structural Embedding by Movements

Some contextual, societal transformations in which the MST is now a significant agent favor the movement in the structural game. David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (1998) argue that since 1964 we have seen the rise of a new order, which they call the social movement society. According to Marco Giugni (2004: 10), a new social movement family emerged in the West through the cycle of student and New Left protests, peaking in 1968. Immanuel Wallerstein (2001) goes even further, arguing that 1968 was a turning-point in the whole world-system. Brazil has also a rapidly consolidating social movement society based on grassroots mobilization, of which the MST is a crucial builder. Even though social movements have not had absolute success, their role, strength and breadth have definitely increased in Brazil. The MST has tapped into this phenomenon – and is its prime mover – by fostering a network of allies. This is a distinctive argument in comparison to most research, which sees the general political opportunities as external to movements, or the Brazilian societal context as depressing, crushing and immutable. In line with me, Collier and Handlin (2009) argue that participation by associational networks is currently the predominant popular participation mechanism in political activities in Latin America, which has moved from the traditional
union-party hub to associational networks. Since the 1950s, associations have gained increasing influence over the traditional corporatist policies, which points to a major transformation in interest regimes and popular participation strategies (ibid.). A social movement society as envisioned by Meyer and Tarrow (1998) has taken hold of Latin America, a society extending in breadth and depth rapidly. It is crucial to link one’s organization with this major structural factor and, in the case of a social movement, do this embedding through retaining autonomy and diffusing a model of resistance throughout a heterogeneous network.

Active corporate agency does not signify that movement power could not have developed simultaneously. The Lula presidency has also offered social protection through several programs for marginalized groups and a new middle class has emerged in Brazil as incomes have surged and the economy grown (Neri 2008). Even though the Lula years have been better for the Brazilian economy and the people than earlier governments, which explains Lula’s great popularity, this does not mean things could not had been even better. Nevertheless, the rise of pro-agribusiness policies and corporate agency together with a rising middle classes, social protection and the activeness of the MST suggest that market/corporate power can increase simultaneously with social equity and movement power. Still, corporate agency has greatly outweighed that of power of contentious agency in Brazil. Besides the electoral politics and the institutional and structural game, also the ideological game explains this.

**Ideological and Identity Game: Government-Industry Congruity**

Pulp investments territorializing in Brazil are supported by the technocratic developmentalist visions of the government. The Brazilian state, economy and society have not been captured by Robinson’s (2008) Transnational Capitalist Class or corporate conspiracy, but merely encounter national actors in Brazil willing to form partnerships, actors like the Lula da Silva presidency, whose visions of development are ideologically harmonious with the projects proposed by the paper companies. Pulp investment projects are conflicts between contentious and corporate agents with government still mostly on the side of corporations.

The Brazilian government supports pulp production by structural and institutional means in a circle of favours with the widespread election financing of politicians by the paper industry, but also in sharing with corporations the developmentalist vision of large-scale investment as the key to economic development. I have measured the activeness of EAC and EAM by analyzing the congruity and difference between government and company discourses framing pulp investments and those resisting them. Typically, the government actors have shared the orthodox corporate framing of pulp investments as “good” and the resistance to them as “bad”. Export-pulp promotion is understandable as it provides quick and plentiful foreign currency to balance the trade and foreign debt deficits of Brazil, helping to maintain an orthodox monetary policy and keep the transnational financial regime supportive of Brazil. According to Hammond and Filho (2007: 8), “Lula, ‘more Catholic than the Pope’ and
determined to shore up his own transnational credibility, insisted on a surplus in the national budget even greater than that imposed by the IMF”. I argue that this policy of President Lula, which is a basic reason for the heavy subsidization of export-oriented agribusiness, is dictated not only by the prevailing financial and technocratic order of the capitalist world-system, but also by the legacy of Brazilian ideological currents, namely Brazilian positivism. Eucalyptus plantations, trees in ordered lines extensively utilizing pesticides, fertilization and machinery, are a visible symbol of technocratic elitism, which denies that issues are political, and is based on the idea that progress is best promoted and defined by technocratic elites and experts, and that the society and the economy should be hierarchically ordered. This vision of development is a shared quality in the epistemic community between the state and the paper industry, as the photo of a cutting phase eucalyptus plantation below, taken next to the Veracel mill in Bahia, demonstrates:

Photo 11: Veracel Plantation in Harvest Phase, Eunápolis, June 2006

The proponents of the current pulp investment model find an ideological ally in the Brazilian governments’ technocratic elitism-reliant policies. Together these readily form an epistemic community based on the shared technocratic understanding of how development is created. The epistemic community is created by a specific ideological mechanism that unites by discourses and practices those within sectoral state corporatist circles. Anthony P. Mueller (2000) has analyzed the Brazilian positivism of order and progress, from which the Brazilian-type expert-led developmentalism draws, in the following way:
Positivism says that scientism is the trademark of modernity and that in order to accomplish progress, a special technocratic or military class of people is needed who are cognizant of the laws of society and who establish order and promote this progress. The prevalent ideology of a large part of the ruling elite [of Brazil] stands in sharp contrast to the traditions held by the common people.

The paper industry can utilize this historical legacy, activating the cultural stock of technocratic elitism by discourses that refer to such key concepts as “order and progress” and “property right”, framing themselves as promoting these, and their opponents as attempting to destroy them. This is because developmentalism, and thus developmentalist projects such as pulp investments, draw their force from the mechanism maintaining technocratic elitism. In Brazil, the paper and pulp industry encounters a National Development Bank (BNDES) – a federal public company associated with the government through the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade – at ease with supporting developmentalist investments. Because of the Development Bank’s and government’s technocratic developmentalist ideology and plentiful resources and mechanisms to channel this enthusiasm, Brazil is the haven of new pulp investment.

A look into the “other”, those outside the circle benefiting from corporate power, can reveal the qualities of the mechanisms promoting corporate agency even better than an analysis of them per se. When the outsiders use mechanisms of contention (a-e) to question corporate resource exploitation, the powerful have to respond by protecting their innocence and rightfulness. In an illustrative pulp conflict example, as 150 MST members occupied a VCP Votorantim eucalyptus plantation in Taubaté (São Paulo) in May 2005, the main owner and president of the Votorantim Group, Antônio Ernirio de Moraes, argued that Brazil was moving towards “total anarchy” (Barros 2005). Moraes strongly condemned the new strategy of the MST of targeting productive plantations, seeing that “Instead of order and progress, now the motto is disorder and dereliction” (ibid.). The passage aptly depicts the battle lines where technocratic developmentalist discourses can be utilized as an ideological mechanism of corporate agency promotion by the paper industry, and against anyone who attempts to question the orthodoxy of developmentalist industrial policy. Osmar Zogbi, the president of Bracelpa, presented the viewpoint of the paper industry after the MST had targeted pulp investments in Bahia and São Paulo: “To invade productive areas is a political question. We want the government to secure property rights, because the national and transnational companies are fearful in relation to this” (ibid.). Such discourses activate the EAC sub-mechanism, by which an epistemic community and ideological congruity is created and maintained between the government and the industry. It is clear that the acts of the MST questioned the validity of this link, and the functioning of this mechanism, since Zogbi refers firstly to the occupation as a “political question”. Occupations surely politicize the question of pulp investments, taking it out of the realm of the economy into the broader field of politics. Bracelpa’s discourses attempt to maintain the alliance of state, national and multinational companies are fearful in relation to this” (ibid.). Such discourses activate the EAC sub-mechanism, by which an epistemic community and ideological congruity is created and maintained between the government and the industry. It is clear that the acts of the MST questioned the validity of this link, and the functioning of this mechanism, since Zogbi refers firstly to the occupation as a “political question”. Occupations surely politicize the question of pulp investments, taking it out of the realm of the economy into the broader field of politics. Bracelpa’s discourses attempt to maintain the alliance of state, national and multinational capital in Brazil, even in the face of contentious agency attempts to include also the social movements and the larger civil society in the alliance. The technocratic developmentalist discourse attempts to conceal its own political nature, the power relations it envisions. The passage also demonstrates another fundamental point: those utilizing EAC, relying on
developmentalist visions of industrial policy and an orthodox conceptualization of property rights that forgets the process by which “property” was forged in the first instance, are “fearful” before the rise of contentious agency. An efficient state embedding by a social movement will require ardent political work within the ideological and identity game. This means that movements will have to try to transform the dominant symbolic system, to contest the prevailing ideological orthodoxies. This requires efficient bridge-building and communication.

Concluding Remarks

Both top-down processes, such as the ever more meritocratic selection of judges, public prosecutors and other state actors, as well as bottom-up processes such as contentious agency promotion can support the construction of a social movement society, the rule of law, and stronger democracy in Brazil. If this tendency continues, corporate resource exploitation can be more rigorously assessed, criticized and regulated. However, it might be that this is not the future trajectory. In such a situation, I suggest, we can at least attempt to find reasons for the discontinuity by a rerun of this research framework in the new period, assessing whether the mechanisms and, thus, dynamics distinguished here have changed, are still active, or if wholly new mechanisms have emerged to shape natural resource politics.

Stricter regulation and democratic revamping of mechanisms by which political power is concentrated at the top are required to change the current pulp investment model. However, this will not be easy, as the paper industry is very adverse to any real regulation. The perception of plantation-reliant companies in Brazil is that their sector is already excessively regulated (MMA 2005: 231), and thus they resist all attempts at and discourses of regulation. As an executive of a Finnish paper industry consulting company with business in Brazil put it: “if we have too many rules and regulations, what can we do?” (Indufor, Industrial Forest Plantations Programme, 2007). As long as EAC remains relatively stronger than EAM or the embedded autonomy by the state, it is unforeseeable that the economic outcomes would be significantly different.

During the research period, the growth in the strategic importance of pulp-holding areas and the simultaneous spur in available state financing (achieved via EAC) increased the power of corporations. Against this backdrop, worsening the configuration of political opportunities to slow plantation expansion by the resistance, the more widespread slowing of plantation expansion in 2004-08 in comparison to 1999-2003 becomes an even more interesting and vexing empirical fact. This anomaly can be explained by a simultaneous rise in contentious agency promotion, directed principally by the Brazilian Landless Movement. A comparative analysis considering the control process (corporate agency promotion) supports my hypothesis.
9. Discussion and Conclusions

This research project has provided an opportunity to criticize, question and test some earlier research findings on the MST, social movements and the contentious politics theory. Next, I will sum up the theoretical implications of the study. After this, I discuss the political implications and conclude the study.

Theoretical Implications

I followed the six-step research approach of Charles Tilly, in order to create and examine a new theory of when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation. In this theory, I (1) identified that investment politics, accumulation by dispossession, industrial plantation expansion and pulp investment can be brought towards the lines of right livelihood by contentious agency promotion; (2) limited the investigation of the effects of contentious agency to plantation expansion; (3) identified pulp-holding cases in which eucalyptus expansion was slowed, then, investigated whether contentious agency was operating by breaking this into its constituent, interconnected mechanisms; (4) identified pulp conflicts where contentious agency was in operation, then scrutinizing whether this had influenced the slowing of plantation expansion; (5) examined whether the internal links between the mechanisms promoting contentious agency operated as the theory requires; and (6) showed that the main process driving plantation expansion – corporate agency promotion – cannot alone explain variation in expansion outcomes. I tested the hypothesis against a control process, the mechanisms that create corporate agency, in all Brazilian pulp-holding cases and in different periods, concluding that the variation in plantation expansion outcomes can be explained by analyzing the dynamics of the contentious and corporate agency in which the state support plays a crucial intermediating role, but not by analyzing corporate agency or the state only.

Based on the validation of the theory by the six-step approach, contentious agency promotion helps greatly in explaining the variation in plantation expansion. Contentious agency alone cannot explain the whole process, but systematic comparison of empirical evidence from 14 pulp holding cases in Brazil shows that the analysis of contentious agency should be included in explaining the variation in expansion outcomes. This is because contentious agency can slow or even reverse the expansion of industrial plantations, even in situations where corporate agency promotion is simultaneously active. In all the five cases where mechanisms a-e have been active, plantation expansion has been slowed. Likewise, in all the nine cases where some of these mechanisms have been absent, contentious agency promotion has not been fully active, and thus the process has not been able to slow expansion. The nine cases of unchecked plantation expansion correlate with the absence of the contentious agency promotion but not with the activeness of corporate agency promotion. This implies that contentious agency has considerable explanatory power when seeking to understand when, how and why plantation expansion is slowed in spite of the active corporate agency promotion.
In a review of the political opportunity and protest schism, David Meyer (2004) argued that it is best to compare differing outcomes, political opportunities and movements in varying contexts and protest coalitions. Following this call, I constructed a new theoretical framework for the concept of contentious agency promotion. I studied contentious agency and corporate agency promotion as processes: the latter presents itself as the political opportunity configuration for resistance in investment politics. This conceptualization of political opportunities escapes from structuralism, demonstrating how what social actors do is rooted in institutional trajectories that guide their actions. Rather than analyzing structures, I followed McAdam et al. (2001; 2008) in arguing that contentious politics researchers should focus explicitly on finding out what the processes, mechanisms and alliances that constitute episodes of contention are.

Central questions include what real-life power struggles between actors conflicts are rooted in, and what the specific dynamics present in conflicts in the political systems in question are. The contentious agency of the MST in itself impacts corporate agency, creating opportunities, affecting costs, financing and state support enjoyed by the industry, and is not separable from the political system. Instead of bi-polar arguments, we need analyses that see movements, corporations and state actors in relational and dynamic terms rather than essential and static, as actors tied into particular conflicts, agency-networks and processes. A dynamic conceptual framework can do this. Contentious agency is constituted in its interactions with the state actors and the corporate agency. Contention of corporate resource exploitation arises in the interaction, the dynamic relations between contentious and corporate agency.

Mechanisms work in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (McAdam et al. 2001: 24). The mechanisms created as heuristic tools in this research are generalizable to other contexts, but work differently because of the particular combinations of processes, their interaction with the political systems, and because of specific conflict dynamics, such as plantation-based pulp investment disputes. The research implies that contentious agency is produced by the mechanisms of a) organizing and politicizing practices, b) heterodox framings, c) protesting, d) networking, and e) embedding and autonomy-maintenance. The content of these mechanisms may vary, but the form remains equal or closely similar across contexts. For example, the heterodox framings (mechanism b) of the MST have drawn from the ideological sets of liberation theology, dependency theory, pedagogy of the oppressed and Brazilian socio-environmentalism. Still, mechanism b functions the same even when generalized to other contexts where powerlessness, passivity and conventional political life is turned into active, contentious habitus, and towards maximization of human capabilities via the promotion of right livelihood.

Contentious agency is empowerment medicine. Considering that democracy entails one vote one value and the setting is such that contenders do not have as much power in a given realm as those they are challenging, the promotion of contentious agency can extend democracy in the given realm if used for such a goal. Contentious agency could be used to promote not only national but also global democracy. However, to validate these claims, the new theory of contentious agency promotion should be tested by a transnational, global democracy analysis.
in which contentious and corporate agency are analyzed primarily on a transnational, not national level. \(^{135}\)

Besides deciphering the process of contentious agency promotion, the research also drafted and tested a new theory of when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation. The most important process to analyze in seeking to understand industrial plantation expansion, is corporate agency promotion, especially the EAC mechanisms by which the industry creates and maintains an alliance with governments. I assessed these mechanisms in detail. As the mechanisms promoting contentious agency are generalizable to other contexts, so are the corporate land access and the EAC sub-mechanisms promoting corporate agency in the plantation-based industries: contributions to those struggling to become state actors in the political system (electoral politics), institutional and structural support (institutional game), and ideological congruity within an epistemic community (ideological game). These direct mechanisms promote corporate agency and consequently, plantation expansion. There is also a set of indirect mechanisms conveying corporate agency: forming a company, investment model and capital accumulation style; industry formation and cooperation, market competition and fluctuation; and corporate social responsibility. The building of these is triggered by the strategic decisions of entrepreneurs, following the importance of a given area/issue to these, which in turn is defined by the constant interaction of broad change processes with the attribution of opportunities/threats. The interaction of attribution with broad changes also triggers the mobilization process; but its continuation depends on the concatenation of mechanisms of contention, on the active utilization of techniques a-e by the activists.

If contentious agency is present, then plantation expansion becomes a more complicated phenomenon, and mechanisms a-e have to be analyzed to understand it. The influence and changes in the nature, markets and other “external” processes are factored into the agency of the actors, as they make strategic decisions based on the way they process the information. This processing of information is influenced by the interaction between environmental mechanisms and the cognitive and relational mechanisms producing agency.

The mechanisms can exist in all political systems, but their activeness, specific contents, and combinations are likely to vary. For example, the EAM and EAC sub-mechanism “contributions to those struggling to become state actors in the political system” is also generalizable. However, it takes specific forms depending on the political system: where electoral politics does not exist, this mechanism takes another form, such as a fight for political alliances and sympathies by offering gifts to those who fight for the state actor positions. Still, the mechanism is the same, and its scope helps to assess how the contributions of corporations to the state actors in the political system influence the expansion of plantations, and vice versa. Mechanism “corporate land access”, is also generalizable, but it

\(^{135}\) Given the current state of global governance regimes, such studies could focus on the transnational spaces or potential spaces for the promotion of global democracy, such as the WSF, the UN system, and the Bretton Woods institutions, but also on internet-communities and networks as well as other less actor- and physical space bounded dynamic terrains.
takes various forms. For example, in several important countries in which the paper industry increasingly operates and plans pulp investments, and where other types of plantation-based multinational investments are also gaining hold, the general land access mechanism helps in analyzing plantation expansion. If one was to focus only on one form of land access, such as land purchase and owning, one would limit the political systems where the theory applies. In Russia, China, Uganda and a number of other countries, the state controls the land, and foreign companies must access this in other forms than direct purchase. Other parts of the EAC mechanism are also generalizable, as institutional and structural support, as well as ideological congruity within an epistemic community between corporations and states can exist anywhere. However, these mechanisms also take specific contents depending on the political system. In Brazil, state corporatism and neoliberal policies are the specific contents that the mechanism of institutional support takes. The maintenance of the power elite explains the Brazilian power relations and the structural support enjoyed by corporations expanding plantations. Ideological congruity and an epistemic community between the industry and the state actors is maintained by discourses, practices and policies which principally follow shared visions of development. In the case of Brazil, these epistemic community-binding ideas are technocratic elitism and developmentalism, which both place more value upon property rights than human rights.

Political Implications

Large-scale plantation-dependent pulp investments follow one model in the global South. Some but not major differences exist between them depending on the area, the political system, the conflict dynamics, and the corporate social responsibility and other managerial techniques. Resistance comes in many forms: or does not come at all. I have argued that local people can resist plantation expansion, even in the middle of an active corporate agency, depending on the exercise of contentious agency by mechanisms of contention.

The large-scale pulp model continues to dominate new pulp projects around the world. Pulp mills in the global South rely on extensive monoculture tree plantations. Nevertheless, things could be even worse: the Brazilian paper industry seeks to be governed by the laws of the Ministry of Agriculture and not by the stricter laws of the Ministry of the Environment, under whose jurisdiction the forest industry currently falls. The corporate agency specific to the paper industry seeks to expand the size of paper and pulp lines and plantations not only for direct logical reason like profit maximization, but also due to a historical thrust maintained by an industry seeking power over the state and society. Only external forces have been able to shape the heavily conservative, tradition-continuing industry that has been in need of a drastic change for decades.

Paper corporations exert growing power over markets, national governments, and states. Companies like Stora Enso are such huge players that they themselves create the markets by constructing a one million ton pulp mill like Veracel: in such a case “I’m the market”, as a Stora Enso wood supply executive said. What is interesting is that in spite of broad electoral
campaign support by paper corporations, the Brazilian state is not totally in favor of monocultures or pulp mills. This is partly explained by the companies’ own mistakes in running pulp operations and pushing heavily and in dubious ways for the expansion of plantations. For example, Stora Enso directors seem to be unaware of the land access methods of Veracel, or deliberately providing accounts that differ from the facts provided by the company’s own land acquisition specialists in my interviews.

However, mistakes and bad corporate practices are not enough to explain the rise of resistance. A systematic comparison of 14 pulp investments shows that state actors have adopted a more critical pulp investment stance in places where the MST and other critics have provided an alternative, heterodox frame, conceptualized pulp investments in a new way and embedded the state. This conflict could be eased when the state actors take a more balanced policy-line that takes into consideration the social movements and the local populations and not simply the paper corporations.

The ongoing resistance to paper investments even against the most adverse odds in the global South astounded Marchak (1995: 331): “Despite its transnational organization, the plethora of transnational agencies backing it, the global consulting and engineering corporations urging it forward; despite military regimes and client-state governments; despite jail terms for opponents and exile for some; the global forest industry has failed to silence environmental activists”. In spite of the media war, government support and credit favoring pulp expansion, the MST has managed to achieve greater support, has fostered an extensive network of allies and an embedded autonomy relation with the state apparatus. The MST has managed in the construction and transmission of a heterodox framing of pulp and eucalyptus in the maturing investment areas through its protest actions. After the resistance-created heterodox framing has challenged the experts, state officials around the global South are starting realize that rural populations also have rights to their traditional homelands, the right to participate and gain from development. This anomaly can be explained by contentious agency promotion.

In the April 2004 Veracel occupation, the MST showed it had taken a new line of political action. Now the Brazilian landless movement frames transnational corporations as its principal adversary. This framing correlates with the reality, which is important, as the world has actually become much more transnational and transparent lately. The new strategy brings the issues that concern the movement, for example eucalyptus expansion, to the attention of a far larger global audience than the old framing, by which the MST saw as its principal adversary as national traditional large-scale farmers and the Brazilian state. Through protests against multinational corporations, the MST can bring the debate into transnational circles, attract the attention of the transnational investor, government and civil society actors. Protests against more clearly Brazilian actors, such as the Votorantim VCP, do not gain nearly as much international attention as protests against joint ventures such as Veracel or foreign direct investments such as the Stora Enso Rio Grande do Sul pulp investment project. Furthermore, in struggling at a transnational level, the social movement can attack and defend itself in numerous spheres in comparison to limiting itself to national contention. The new
transnational corporation challenging and right livelihood promoting strategy of the MST seems to have worked well for the movement.

In all cases where plantation expansion was slowed, state actors have executed orders in the form of court decisions or institutional support for the MST instead of the paper industry. The MST’s role in these decisions has been one of a long-term, enduring resister, that constantly spreads contention and keeps alternatives on the table. The thesis shows that continuing resistance bears fruits eventually if certain mechanisms are utilized in a specific manner. The seeds of contention can bear fruit any time, even after a substantial delay, as state institutions, especially in Brazil, take a long time to handle bureaucratic issues like legal cases.

Based on the findings, I argue that pulp investment expansion can be slowed, even reversed, when specific mechanisms promoting contentious agency are active. In 1995, Patricia Marchak (1995: 206) argued that “the plantation economies are in for a good long run, and they have the competitive edge to stay in the business” worldwide. A point well made: this seems to be the case still, but not so much as in 1995. True, trees grow quickly and efficiently in the South – both for natural as well as for political reasons. However, an end to the reckless plantation expansion might loom through the growing resistance:

Even seven years is too long for the poor to wait. People have to eat, and eucalyptus plantations do not provide food … plantations, then, evoke battles over land rights, and in these battles it is usually the poor who lose … the burgeoning army of landless peasants and indigenous peoples is increased whenever land is taken over for plantations (Marchak 1995: 206-7).

In 1995, one could not see the results of the dynamics illustrated by Marchak. One would have expected that the “burgeoning army of the landless” would turn to resisting pulp projects, mobilize, and aim to slow plantation expansion. Nevertheless, this has not been the case in most of the contexts of pulp investment, not until recent years. The dynamics Marchak described in 1995 have spread since then. Now the dynamics of pulp investment are marked by conscious contention, with outcomes in which plantation expansion is slowed where mechanisms a-e are active. I have given empirical evidence that this new dynamics in pulp investment politics is spreading, not unilaterally but in specific cases, and shown how and why. Carrere & Lohmann foresaw this development of spreading contention in their 1996 book Pulping the South. They argued that “well-informed and well-organized citizens at local, national and transnational levels can find common ground and put a halt to the global advance of the currently-dominant model of tree plantations and paper manufacture” and that they were “already starting to do so” (Carrere & Lohmann 1996: 253). Marchak’s general remark continues to hold true: large-scale tree plantations are still the business as usual in most parts of the world. However, starting from 2004 and especially since 2006, the business has not continued as usual in those investment areas where contentious agency has been active. The latter half of 2008, the end of my field research period, was a historic moment at which popular resistance in Latin America against pulp investments started to gain novel sympathy from some legislators as well as judges and public prosecutors. These dynamics of contention were a surprise to many in the paper industry.
Even though some state actors have tried to curb plantation expansion by laws and decisions, the resistance has not managed to get governments on its side. As Miguel Enrique Stédile from the MST puts it:

> It is true that there are sectors of the judicial power that start to manifest themselves against these investments, as in the cases of Bahia and Espírito Santo, but at the same time there is an interested part in the executive power, national and state-level, which pressures and makes flexible the laws to permit the action of these companies. (Email interview, MST Rio Grande do Sul State Coordination, December 4, 2008)

One can expect the conflict-ridden episodes to continue and extend. This may produce transformations in the pulp investment model, if not in the near future, then in the long term, in which case the initial struggles between 2004 and 2008 discussed here are to be considered as the critical juncture in the expansion of the paper industry globalization into the global South. The resistance successes might accumulate and thus lead to a situation where one would not call the mobilization resistance, but a process powerful enough to set the broad natural resource policy. Such a dynamics would be characterized by sweeping policy changes: agrarian reform policy would come before agribusiness investment in the policy agenda of the Brazilian government. This type of transformation in industrial policy took place in Finland in 1925, for example. However, it is problematic to compare the historical Finnish and the contemporary Brazilian settings, as the contexts are very different and the agency of the Finnish forest cluster interferes with the possibility of formulating policies that would balance the struggle for land in Brazil. Far-reaching changes are possible in state-industry-social movement relations. Resource-based conflicts are transforming and processual, dynamic intersections involving at least some mechanisms of contention and most likely a combination of mechanisms promoting industry-government alliances.

Even sweeping policies balancing the conflict would not mean, however, that the conflict would be resolved. The recent wave of large-scale pulp projects in Brazil has shown that changes in the capitalist world-system, especially at the heart of the global paper industry system where the Finnish forest cluster figures prominently, influence and correlate with changes in the semi-periphery, such as Brazil. Dialogue and conflict resolution is hard in the current situation; the struggle revolves around pressuring the state. The struggle for natural resources in Brazil has been going on for so long and so bitterly that social movements do not want to support minor transformations in the current resource exploitation regime but seek for absolute victory. For the MST, for example, the condition for even starting talks with the Stora Enso is the full discontinuation of operations.

Conflicts are likely never to be resolved. National-level policies are unlikely to be able to make the struggle balanced, if significant changes do not take place in the global paper industry system. Such significant change could be the adaptation of a small-scale, non-monoculture pulp model. Such an investment model would follow the human capability maximizing lines of a 21st-century developmentalist state sketched by Peter Evans (2008b). If such a heterodox pulp model comes to displace the orthodox large-scale model, one can assume that significant changes have also taken place in the capital accumulation model and
in this case, in the transnational corporate resource exploitation. However, it is unlikely that these significant changes in the capital accumulation model or the global paper industry that forms part of it will come independently of the interaction that transnational corporate agency has with transnational contentious agency that questions the hegemony of investment based on capital accumulation by dispossession.

The political haven offered by the Brazilian government for export-oriented large-scale plantation-based projects seems to be a vital component in explaining recent transformations in the globalization of the paper industry. The industry has turned from relying mostly on industrial operations into being driven by plantation expansion, and in Brazil encountered one of the friendliest governments in supporting pulp production. While pulp-processing mills were the key element in pulp and paper capacity expansion in the past, now the expansion of plantations is the bottleneck. As Carrere & Lohmann (1996: 50) argue, “wood represents 40 to 70 per cent of the variable cost of making pulp, which is in turn the most important cost in making paper”, making wood procurement costs the competitive differentiator. Even though the state-paper industry alliance is very strong, the Brazilian state – or any state – is a site of conflicting interests. The Brazilian Ministry of the Environment study found that the industrial tree plantation sector and the socio-environmental entities live in parallel universes; the state is situated between them. “In the passage of the years, state and federal governments more or less favored the business sector. Currently, some governmental entities are intrinsically partners of the business sector and others for part of the segment on the opposite side” (MMA 2005: 231). State-business-social movement dynamics are multi-faceted. Both businesses and social movements connect closely with the Brazilian state. Indeed, as this research on the Landless Movement influence in slowing the land acquisition by paper corporations shows, Brazil is not only the stronghold of agribusiness, it is also the country where the rising transnational natural resource flow is vehemently criticized.

The principal ways for movements to produce political change are “alterations in power relations between challengers and authorities” and “provoking broader and usually more durable systemic changes, both on the structural and cultural level” (Giugni 2004: 230). The MST has had relatively great impact at this level, taking into consideration the conservative and transformation-averting state and corporate actors that promote corporate resource exploitation. Economic outcomes, transformations in the dynamics of investment politics could be much more important for a consolidating democracy and the curbing of capitalism to the lines of right livelihood than policy changes. Extending Amartya Sen’s (1999) capability approach from the individual to the organizational level, social movements are not only means; they are also the ends. When movements create and exercise contentious agency, their members build up their own capabilities. Contentious agency is a great aid for the resistance, but to continue repressing protests might not be the best way forward for anyone. As we have seen, this has not even worked; since the creation of mobilization-limiting mechanisms by the powerful in Brazil has not managed to hold back resistance. Marchak (1995: 332) has suggested that struggles inevitably become more militant between the privileged and the poor if things continue this way. This is because two quite deeply rooted processes are working
against each other. Conflicts deepen without major transformations in the pulp investment model.

Change is more likely to come from contention than by company or government actions; indeed, early signs of plantation slowing documented in this study already show that a transformation era is here. Thus, the stronger the contentious agency, the sooner the current pulp investment model will be forced to change. Based on the research findings, contentious agency can be a way towards transformation. It is precisely because political opportunities are so limited that mechanisms of contention is the direction from which change comes.

Based on this research, the most severe conflicts are still to come. Analysis of the current mechanisms of contention allows one to predict what kind of thrust, by what mechanisms, the future will unfold. The building of mechanisms of contention, and the already existing mechanisms, will keep the criticism coming and conflicts worsening. This is not only because the capacity for contentious agency is growing. What is more, the paper industry now understands the critical potential contention has, and is starting to slow movements such as the MST by all possible means. If done well, this might also curb the resistance. However, the building of a Brazilian and global social movement society by networked resistance support the initiative to transform the global corporate resource exploitation. Thus, it is possible that the counter-attack will not succeed – as already witnessed in April 2009 in Rio Grande do Sul, when the MST, with its network of allies, forced the opposition to drop attempts to criminalize the movement.

To succeed in its investment, the industry will have to modify its organization of production, strategies, mission and tactics to fit the rising social movement society (see Meyer & Tarrow 1998). This is hard, even impossible, if the mechanisms that currently produce corporate agency in the global paper industry system do not drastically change. The way corporate agency is produced has to change. The main reason for this is that current mechanisms create a large-scale pulp model imposed upon different contexts with little adaptation, a rigidity which is a boost in the usurpation of a social movement society. If there is a new or latent movement in the investment locale, the large project can help to arouse and activate people into contention. Movements are established and gain power as investments do not mold into projects fostering sustainable development and people do not find ordinary ways to tackle them. When the large-scale investments relying on the maintenance and intensification of extreme power disparities meet with contentious agency, conflict is bound to arise. Rigid investments magnify the growing role of the social movement society, thus inevitably forcing them to transform because of a resistance backlash.
Concluding Remarks

I assessed the hypothesis that corporate resource exploitation can be slowed down – brought towards right livelihood - more effectively and likely when the resistance is formed by, utilizes and promotes contentious agency. The hypothesis provided the opportunity to contribute to and challenge some parts of social scientific theory, especially theories in the social movement literature. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001; 2008) suggested social movement research should move towards dynamic analysis of intersections between movements, authorities and opponents. I provided such a dynamic framework.

The hypothesis proved to be robust. The findings, based on the systematic analysis of empirical evidence across 14 pulp investments in Brazil, strongly support the hypothesis. The new theory of when and how contentious agency can slow down or reverse the expansion of corporate resource exploitation helps to explain in detail the reasons behind the variation in the outcomes of plantation-based investments. Expansion, especially variation in expansion outcomes, is explained not only by corporate agency promotion, whose analytical conceptualization this research developed, but by the dynamics this process has with the promotion of contentious agency and the state support that intermediates between and influences plantation expansion and conflict. The contentious agency of the MST explains much of the variation in plantation expansion outcomes. The findings suggest that the promotion of contentious agency has a causal relationship to the slowing of plantation expansion. By comparing combinations of mechanisms of contention in different contexts, various times, across different movements, and against counterfactuals by a fine-grained analysis of state-business-social movement dynamics in contemporary Brazil, the research shows that the promotion of contentious agency is a process that can slow corporate resource exploitation. It is not enough simply to study structures, variables or contexts to understand conflicts. The actions of the actors, by the utilization of agency-promoting mechanisms, make a huge difference in the dynamics of contention and investment politics. Contentious agency turns passive people into active citizens who question and transform power relations. The project of building contentious agency makes a big difference when one observes where episodes of contention, like land conflicts over large-scale projects, turn from local discontent into transnationally acknowledged conflicts.

This research has investigated the mechanisms of contention which ensure contentious agency for social actors. The findings suggest that a social actor that builds on these is more likely to succeed than one that does not. Successful movements manage to set up alternative social, symbolic and territorial spaces, frame political lines, urge society to question the status quo, build ties and demand changes from politicians, and enforce the proper functioning of state institutions. These dynamics are extremely important when the goal is to slow or reverse corporate resource exploitation. If organized civil society actors do not demand policy process continuity, the rule of law, and constitutionality, the excesses of corporate resource exploitation are unlikely to be regulated and democracy is unlikely be fostered. This is especially true in political systems where the policy process is slow, marked by strong private interests and unresolved structural hierarchies. Such systems include the capitalist world-
system and the Brazilian political system. The state-paper industry alliance indicates that
global capitalism and the Brazilian federal state and government are increasingly
interconnected and mutually dependent. Simultaneously, the growing contentious agency by
Brazilian social movements and sympathetic state actors, the slowing and reversal of
corporate resource exploitation, suggests that global capitalism is in conflict with the views,
actions and policies of a growing number of the Brazilian municipalities, state parliaments,
the local judiciary and local state institutions, not to mention local populations.

I suggest that social movement studies need to give much more emphasis to mechanisms
promoting contentious agency, because, as the research findings imply, the variation in
outcomes is hard if not impossible to explain by political opportunity alone. Indeed, such a
research design limitation would have generated the arbitrary result that plantation expansion
was slowed in 2007 and 2008 in some pulp holdings, whilst the corporate agency, political
opportunities, were highly beneficial for plantation expansion. The Brazilian case suggests
that in the absence of strong mobilization of resistance, it is easier to ensure large-scale
plantation investment. This happened, for example, in the case of Mato Grosso do Sul, where
International Paper and Votorantim VCP ensured a paper plus pulp investment in 2008
without any significant resistance or hindrance to corporate plantation expansion, and in
Southern Bahia, where the Pataxó indigenous people did not manage to slow the plantation
expansion by Veracel, whereas the MST did.

What produces differences in plantation conflicts is the combination, interaction of
contentious and corporate agency within the political games largely remediated by the state.
The qualitative comparative analysis suggested that particularly important have been
pioneering, nonviolent, disruptive, massive and symbolic protests. The more truly new the
pioneering acts are, the more beneficial the outcomes are from the movement-viewpoint.
Heterodox framing and pioneering protests provide a more detailed explanation of how
movements work towards their desired goals than the “innovative collective action”
mechanism offered by McAdam et al. (2001). Pioneering acts and heterodox framing by the
MST do not produce simply “innovative shifts in the locus, forms, and meaning of collective
action” (2001: 48); because of their distinctiveness in comparison to other episodes of
contention in the world, they are also central in influencing economic outcomes. The MST
uses effectively both the law and the disorder; it embeds with the state institutions and
participates in electoral politics as well as ideological and identity games remediated by the
government and the state at large, but simultaneously partakes in land conflicts. The
simultaneity of contained and transgressive mechanisms allows the movement to reap benefits
on many fronts, and cover losses on some fronts by strengths on others; and the synergy effect
makes the outcomes greater than their sum. Radicalization by evermore pioneering protests
against corporate resource exploitation has led into both polarization at the ends of the
political spectrum, but also into convergence, in which rising contradictions at both extremes
of a political continuum drive less extreme political actors into closer dialogue (for a detailed
explanation of convergence and polarization, see McAdam et al. 2001: 162). Both
polarization and convergence have helped the MST, because it, unlike most movements, is
able to act within the palace as well as on the streets.
Due caution is required to generalize the research framework and findings. Taking into consideration local varieties and specificities in contention and capitalism, the framework can be applied wherever there are corporate resource exploitation-based conflicts, such as land-dependent investments, agro-combustible complexes, large dams, open-pit mines and agribusiness endeavors. Nevertheless, each of these sectors should receive particular analysis, because of conflict dynamics and actor-specific differences.

I have analyzed the complex dynamics of pulp investment politics in Brazil. The principal mechanisms of contention promoting the process by which contentious agency consolidates are: a) organizing and politicizing members of a social actor; b) framing issues in a heterodox way; c) pioneering, disruptive, re-symbolizing protests; d) networking with allies; and e) embedding with the state apparatus whilst maintaining autonomy. The creation of a virtuous cycle among these mechanisms, a process in which each one of them reinforces the other, has positioned the main contentious actor of Brazil, the MST, as a forerunner in global industrial plantation expansion resistance. This process sustains a high level of mobilization and resistance. Corporate mechanisms together with mechanisms of contention create the main dynamics of industrial plantation expansion. Their forms in a given political system reveal the specificities of the politics of corporate resource exploitation.

If movements like the MST are crushed because of counter-attacks, which started in earnest against the MST in 2008 and expanded throughout 2009, precisely because the contentious agency questions industrial plantation expansion and transnational corporate resource exploitation, the mechanisms of contention may radicalize where the state-industry alliance attempts to retaliate. Industrial plantation conflicts are a symptom of larger transformations and pressures in the globalized political economy. The political lessons to be drawn are that movements matter – in a specific way, depending on their mechanisms of contention – in influencing investment outcomes. This should be taken into consideration in planning new large-scale projects, resistance to them, or their reform.
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