Participation or further exclusion? Contestations over forest conservation and control in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania

Heini Vihemäki

Doctoral Dissertation
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University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Development Studies
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Opponent

Prof. Roderick P. Neumann
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies
Florida International University
Miami

Pre-examiners

Prof. Roderick P. Neumann
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies
Florida International University
Miami

Prof. Ari Lehtinen
Department of Geography
University of Joensuu

Supervisors

Prof. Juhani Koponen
Institute of Development Studies
University of Helsinki

Dr. Anja Nygren
Institute of Development Studies
University of Helsinki

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Mr Peter Kabimba
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Abstract

This Ph.D. thesis Participation or Further Exclusion? Contestations over Forest Conservation and Control in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania describes and analyses the shift in the prevailing discourse of forest and biodiversity conservation policies and strategies towards more participatory approaches in Tanzania, and the changes in the practises of resource control, including the scope for the different actors and groups who are considered to form the community, to participate in resource control, in a specific historical and socio-economic context. I analyse whether, how and to which extent the ‘targets’ of such interventions have been able to affect the formal rules and practices of resource control, and benefit from them. I also explore their different responses and strategies in relation to conservation.

I approach the problematic through exploring certain participatory forest conservation interventions and related negotiations between the local farmers, government officials and the external actors in the case of two protected forest reserves in the southern part of the East Usambaras, Tanzania. The theoretical approach draws from theorising on power, participation and conservation in anthropology of development and post-structuralist political ecology. The material was collected in three stages between 2003 and 2008 by using an ethnographic approach. I interviewed and observed the actors and their resource use and control practices at the local level, including the representatives of the villagers living close to the protected forests and the conservation agency, but also followed the selected processes and engaged with the ‘non-local’ agencies involved in the conservation efforts in the East Usambaras.

My findings indicate that the discourse of participation that has emerged in global conservation policy debate within the past three decades, and is being institutionalised in the national policies in many countries, including Tanzania, has informed and shaped the practices of forest conservation in the East Usambaras, although in a fragmented and unequal way. Instrumental interpretation of participation, in which it is to serve the goals of improving the control of the forest and making it more acceptable and efficient, has prevailed among the governmental actors and conservation organisations. Yet, there is variation between the different projects and actors promoting participatory conservation regarding the goals and means of participation, e.g. to which extent the local people are to be involved in decision-making. The actors representing ‘communities’ also have their diverse agendas, understandings and experiences regarding the rationality, outcomes and benefits of being involved in forest control, making the practices of control often unstable and fluid.

The elements of the exclusive conservation thinking and practices co-exist with the more recent participatory processes, and continue to shape the understandings and strategies of the actors involved in resource control. The ideas and narratives of the different discourses are reproduced and selectively used by the parties involved. The strict regulations and rules governing resource access in certain categories of land continue to be
disputed by many. Furthermore, the history of control, such as past injustices related to conservation and unfulfilled promises, undermines the participation of certain social groups in resource control and benefit sharing. This also creates controversies in the practices of conservation, and fuels conflicts regarding the establishment of new protected areas.

In spite of this, the fact that the representatives of the communities have been invited to the arenas where information is shared, and principles and conditions of forest control and benefit sharing are discussed and partly decided upon, has created expectations among the participants, and opened up opportunities for some of the local actors to enhance their own, and sometimes wider interests in relation to resource control and the related benefits. The local actors' experiences of the previous government and other interventions strongly affect how they position themselves in relation to conservation interventions, and their responses and strategies. However, my findings also suggest, in a similar way to research conducted in other protected areas, that the benefits of participation in conservation and resource control tend to accrue unevenly between different groups of local people, e.g. due to unequal access to information and differences in their initial resources and social position.
Acknowledgements

After finishing the work, I remain very grateful. This research project, or rather a research journey, has not only taught me much about how to conduct ethnographic research, and about previous and more recent ways of defining problems and solutions in conservation debate, and challenges in the efforts of involving local people in the control of protected areas. In addition, I have received a wider understanding about theorising on the relationships of power between the actors and institutions in protected area management, and control of natural resources in more general. The journey has also given me the chance to meet with many interesting and inspiring people from diverse backgrounds.

This research would not have been completed without the assistance and support of many people, including colleagues, supervisors, friends, family, and especially the individuals and organisations with whom I worked while collecting material in the fields, villages and forests of the East Usambaras and beyond. I would especially like to thank all the informants for their time and patience. Many of the staff of the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) and the Amani Nature Reserve (ANR) and the tour guides of the ANR, and other organisations working the study area, were giving me a lot of their time and sharing their insights during my stays in Tanzania, of which I am grateful. Special thanks to Mr Everist Nashanda (FBD), Mrs Anna-Leena Simula (Savcor Group Ltd), Mr Veli Juola (Embassy of Finland, Dar), Mrs Nike Doggart, Mr Boniphase Mtui and Mrs Daines Mgidange (TFCG) and Dr. Neil Bugress of the Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Forests Project, for their contributions and assistance.

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In Nairobi, October 2009
Heini Vihemäki
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFIMP</td>
<td>Amani Forest Inventory and Management Plan</td>
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<td>ANR</td>
<td>Amani Nature Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Community-Based Conservation</td>
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<td>CBFM</td>
<td>Community-Based Forest Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community-Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Forests</td>
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<td>CMEAMF</td>
<td>Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOAG</td>
<td>Deutch Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft (the German East Africa Company)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCADP</td>
<td>East Usambara Conservation and Agricultural Development Project</td>
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<td>EUCAMP</td>
<td>East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme</td>
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<td>EUCFP</td>
<td>East Usambara Catchment Forest Project</td>
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<td>EUFLR</td>
<td>East Usambara Forest Landscape Restoration</td>
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<td>EUM</td>
<td>East Usambara Mountains</td>
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<td>EUTC</td>
<td>East Usambara Tea Company Ltd</td>
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<tr>
<td>FINNIDA</td>
<td>Finnish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBD</td>
<td>Forestry and Beekeeping Division</td>
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<td>FR</td>
<td>Forest Reserve</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environmental Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoF</td>
<td>Government of Finland</td>
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<td>GoT</td>
<td>Government of Tanzania</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ICDP</td>
<td>Integrated Conservation and Development Programmes</td>
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<td>ICRAF</td>
<td>World Agroforestry Centre (previously called the International Centre for Research on Agroforestry)</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>JFM</td>
<td>Joint Forest Management</td>
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<td>MNRT</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism</td>
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<td>MaB</td>
<td>Man and Biosphere</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NFP</td>
<td>National Forest Policy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Payments for Environmental Services</td>
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<td>PFM</td>
<td>Participatory Forest Management</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal</td>
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<td>RAP</td>
<td>Resettlement Action Plan</td>
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<td>REDD</td>
<td>Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
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<td>Sha.</td>
<td>Shambaa</td>
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<td>SHUWIMU</td>
<td>Shirika la Uchumi Wilaya ya Muheza (Muheza Development Corporation)</td>
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<td>SIA</td>
<td>Social Impact Analysis</td>
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<td>SSM</td>
<td>Sikh Sawmills</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>Swa.</td>
<td>Swahili</td>
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<td>TANAPA</td>
<td>Tanzanian National Parks</td>
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<td>TCFO</td>
<td>Tanga Catchment Forest Office</td>
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<td>TFCG</td>
<td>Tanzania Forest Conservation Group</td>
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<td>TFCMP</td>
<td>Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Traditionally Protected Forest</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>VEC</td>
<td>Village Environmental Committee</td>
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<td>VFM</td>
<td>Village Forest Management</td>
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<td>VFR</td>
<td>Village Forest Reserve</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCS</td>
<td>World Conservation Strategy</td>
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<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Resource Institute</td>
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<td>WUM</td>
<td>West Usambara Mountains</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. Contested means and outcomes of conservation

They are looking for excuses that we are cutting down the trees while they are the ones who do harvest big trees up there and simply use it. While we as a village have the construction of a school here [which bothers us] to the level that we will ask the top minister, let us ask at the same time [for the permit] to cut down trees, and then the fallen logs, that are many that we could saw, but we are not allowed…but they are going and sawing the living trees. Now don’t you see that we are being despised here?

(A member of the Village Environmental Committee in a meeting, 5.4. 2005, IBC Msasa)

The above comment illustrates recent concerns and contradictions experienced by local people, and especially those of them supposed to share the responsibility to protect the forests with the government authorities, in the East Usambara Mountains, in north eastern Tanzania. The member of the environmental committee blames the tea company for cutting down valuable timber trees, including indigenous species, close to their village, whereas the villagers are not allowed to harvest such trees in the village and farm lands. Such discursive strategy that questions the conditions of resource control and access, and indicates open resistance towards the controlling practices is not uncommon to the village leaders and the representatives of the villagers in the East Usambaras.

As in many other sites of high biodiversity value, with a variety of natural resources and a long history of their utilisation, the area is of interest to various groups, such as the people living close to the forest reserves, commercial interests, the government and its different agencies, researchers, as well as conservation organisations. The diversity of actors and institutions involved, and the multiple arenas where the control of resources is negotiated in protected areas, makes conservation an often socially and politically challenging process (Wilshusen 2003a, 43). Ultimately the forest, and more broadly biodiversity, conservation efforts are about relationships of power: What is the meaning of the landscape or elements of it, to whom or to which groups are they conceived to belong to, and who has a right to them (Holmes 2007, 190), and the authority and means to control them.

In order to try to solve the conflicting interests and to enhance more sustainable and equitable conservation, so-called participatory or people-oriented approaches to protected area management have been introduced around the world. However, the ‘success’ of such models in relation to the diverse ecological, social and economic goals set for them continues to be a source of debate in research and policy fields. One of the questions discussed is whether ‘community participation’ in conservation efforts makes them socially more equitable and inclusive, and if, under which conditions. In this research project, I explore certain participatory forest conservation
interventions and related processes, their logics, contradictions and social outcomes in the context of two forest areas in the southern part of the East Usambaras. My key interest is on whether and how the ‘target population’ who are, at least formally, supposed to benefit from and participate in the management of protected areas, have been able to affect the rules and practices of resource control, and to which degree they have benefited from the related changes in resource control, and why.

Through the analysis of discourses and practices of different actors, groups and organizations involved in forest conservation efforts in the East Usambaras, I argue that in spite of the inconsistencies in the interpretations between different parties about the goals and means of conservation, and continued use of the exclusive strategies of control by some of the actors representing the government, opportunities have emerged through the interventions for some of the local actors to enhance their own, and sometimes wider interests in the negotiations over resource control. Yet, the benefits tend to accrue unevenly between different groups at the local level, e.g. due to unequal access to information and the differences in the initial resources available. In addition, the local actors’ experiences of and involvement in the previous government and other interventions strongly affect how they position themselves in relation to conservation projects and activities, and their responses and strategies in relation to them.

In this chapter, I first address the history of thinking on and discussing participation in development and conservation debate, and the tensions related to multiple premises and objectives connected with it. Furthermore, the social and political context of conservation interventions in Tanzania is addressed. Then, I discuss shortly the environmental and social characteristics of the East Usambaras and review previous research conducted on the nexus of society and natural resources in the Usambaras. Lastly, the research problematic, the questions and the structure of the dissertation are outlined.

1.2. Intellectual origins of ‘participation’

As suggested by Cleaver (1999, 597), participation has become one of the buzzwords of development during the past decades, or what she calls an “act of faith in development”. The concept of participation has its historical roots in alternative development thinking and critique of the top-down approaches to development that flourished in the 1970s and in the 1980s (Nelson & Wright 1997; Cooke & Kothari 2001). For instance, Participatory Action Research was perceived among some international NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) as a means for the ‘people’ to define their own goals. The idea was that development should generate more self-sufficiency rather than make the people depend on the service provision by the state (Nelson & Wright 1997, 3). In the critical discourse on development, participation was largely promoted as a means through which the ‘people’ or ‘communities’ can distance themselves from the state.
However, the roots of participation can also be traced to other arenas, including the policy debates in the ‘developed’ countries (e.g. Arnstein 1969; Nelson & Wright 1997), where the underlying rationality was quite different. In Britain, for instance, there was an interest among policy-makers and academics to get a larger number of citizens to participate in public decision-making in the 1960s and 1970s, in order to legitimate decisions and plans made by the local councils (Nelson & Wright 1997, 2). In addition, in the developing world, the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank (WB) started to emphasise ‘community’ and ‘family’ as means to increase self-sufficiency of the poor in the 1980s, curiously assimilating concepts used by the advocates of alternative development. In the following decade, the WB further developed its notion of participation. In addition, a call for ‘participatory development’ was presented by the representatives of Southern NGOs, who voiced their concerns at a large conference organised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1990 (Nelson & Wright 1997, 2-3). Therefore, the intellectual origins and rationalities underlying the concept of participation in development thinking were diverse, and included contradictory ideologies.

The aims of participation are thus multiple due to its long history and “accumulated meaning” (Nelson & Wright 1997, 6). In the context of development, one of the outlined objectives has been to make the ‘local people’ more active in making decisions on issues that affect their living conditions. Participatory approaches to development have been justified in terms of sustainability, relevance and empowerment (Cooke & Kothari 2001, 5). In addition, it has thought to have indirect social effects, for instance through altering the social and power relationships within the ‘community’ or between the ‘beneficiaries’ and the government. For instance, Hickey and Mohan (2004) argue that participatory processes may create space for (re)negotiation of social relations, although they do not necessarily lead to in-depth changes. The continued popularity of participation is also related to the fact that participation has conceptually been connected to democratisation (e.g. Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Baker 2006). In the normative sense, participation in decision-making is understood as a hallmark of democratic practice, which gives legitimacy to the decisions made (Baker 2006).

Participation in development interventions has been, and continues to be, promoted for various ends, some of which have been labelled ‘transformative’ and others ‘instrumental’ (Nelson & Wright 1997), although such concepts are not unproblematic or clear-edged. Cleaver (1999, 598) makes a similar distinction between participation grounded on an efficiency argument and participation based on equity and empowerment arguments. In the transformative version, participation appears as a process leading to empowerment of the stakeholders whereas in the instrumental version, participation is a means to fulfil the predetermined goals (Nelson & Wright 1997; Cleaver 1999), such as protection of biodiversity or building of infrastructure. However, in practice, both of these rationalities may affect and underlie a specific intervention or policy.
The concept of empowerment is commonly associated with the transformative notion of participation, and tied to certain assumptions on the nature of power. The concept has been approached through a ‘power to’ model, where the power of an individual or group is understood to be able to grow unlimitedly. In this theorising, groups or individuals that have previously been more or less excluded are assumed to be able to alter the power differentials and their lives when they change their understandings and attitudes (Nelson & Wright 1997, 8; Cleaver 2001, 37). Empowerment has also been understood as processes that help marginalised people to recognise and exercise their own agency better (Cornwall 2004). However, the degree to which the marginalised social groups are assumed to be able to alter the power relations depends also on whether the emphasis is put on individual and structural aspects of power. Others suggest that change in the consciousness of the individuals does not suffice to change the relations of power, but a structural change is required, such as change of laws (Nelson & Wright 1997). In the radical empowerment theorising, empowerment is associated with both individual and class action, which are supposed to lead to structural changes that will further enhance the position of the subordinated groups. Yet, the ideas about structural change do not necessarily fit in well with the mainstream interpretations of development (Cleaver 2001, 37).

But how participation became justified and why was it conceived appropriate in the context of conservation? Partly, it can be explained by the merging of the organisations and languages of conservation and development in the 1980s at the global level. In addition, the problems of and critique towards the previous forms of controlling protected areas, both locally and more widely, led the environmental organisations and other agencies involved in conservation to rethink and redirect their approaches.

Among the early developments which reflected the growing importance of participation in the global conservation debate was the launching of the Man and Biosphere (MaB) Program. It was started by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in the 1970s, and emphasised the value of incorporating the needs and perceptions of local people in the establishment and management of reserves (Wells et al. 1992). The underlying idea was to make the population affected by the protected area to accept to the predetermined goal of conservation. Another key process was the evolution of the concept and discourse of sustainable development. Since sustainable development started to gain prominence in the 1980s, conservation became increasingly conceived to be compatible, or at least possible to combine with development (e.g. Benjaminsen 2000; Adams 2001).

One of the early examples of this was the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) launched by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and its partner organisations in 1980. Conservation was the principal issue the report addressed, but it made the argument that development was a major means of achieving conservation (Elliott 2006). This shift was reflected in the commonly used definition for conservation, presented in the WCS (IUCN et al. 1980): “the management of human use of the biosphere so
that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to the present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.” In addition, the World Congress on Parks and Protected Areas in 1982 was an important event in the shift towards understanding of conservation as a ‘people-oriented’ activity (Wilshusen et al. 2003). The congress agreed that the needs of the local people should be integrated in the planning of protected areas (Adams et al. 2004). Furthermore, after the Brundtland commission’s report *Our Common Future* (1987), conservation and development were generally conceived as “the opposite sides of the same coin” in many of the organisations working in these fields (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila 2003, 418).

Participation became one of the normative principles of sustainable development in its mainstream interpretation (Baker 2006). The increasing popularity of the concept among conservation and development organisations was related to this conceptual marriage. However, the multiple meanings and goals of participation can be identified also in the context of conservation. For instance, participation has been conceived as a way to make conservation more inclusive to the needs of the local population, socially just or legitimate, efficient, and sustainable. For example, in the World Bank’s report *Participation in Forest Management and Conservation* (Banarjee et al. 1997) benefits of participation were to accrue to the people who live in the forest or their vicinity, in terms of their more sustainable management, and to the national governments, whose economic burden would reduce. The objective of participatory approaches and policies has been to democratise decision-making, but also to reduce the costs of the management.

In spite of the merging of conservation and development conceptually, and efforts to find ‘win-win’ solutions to conservation (e.g. Adams et al. 2004; Fay 2007), large gaps exist between the concepts in practice, especially in the conservation side of the coin (Brechin et al. 2002; Campbell & Vainio-Mattila 2003). In the conservation agencies, an ambiguity has persisted about whether social and political development, such as empowerment of citizens and poverty reduction, or conservation, or both, should be the most important concern (Brockington 2002; Adams et al. 2004; Borrini-Feyerabend & Tarnowski 2005). In spite of the fact that the assumption about the necessity of local support for the survival of protected areas is widely accepted by the different parties of the debate on conservation (Brockington 2004, 412-413), the parties, such as experts and conservation organisations, typically stress one side of the coin over another. This tension concerning the ultimate objective is also reflected in the diversity of accounts on participatory conservation. One of the suggested challenges is that the target population such as forest adjacent communities, or some actors among them, may also pursue goals that are in contradiction with the conservation goals (e.g. Enters & Anderson 2001; Vedeld 2002, 22; Brockington 2002, 9-10). Thus, view of participation as an end, potentially leading to social transformation, is uneasily combined with the goal of strict conservation.
In addition, persistent disagreement can be noted about whether, and if, under which conditions, participation and the related institutional and organisational reforms can create more space for the citizens vis-à-vis the state in resource control, and with what social and environmental implications (e.g. Berkes 2004; Borrini-Feyerabend & Tarnowski 2005). This complexity does not only occur in global discourses. The outcomes of conservation interventions also depend on the historical, economic, and cultural dimensions of resource control (Holmes 2007, 190). The processes through which the actual practices of resource control change in specific contexts therefore include many uncertainties. The discourses, institutions and strategies of resource control are negotiated, supported and possibly challenged by the variety or actors supposed to implement, participate in and benefit from the interventions.

1.3. Social and political context of forest conservation in Tanzania

Economically and socially, the conditions of funding and implementing diverse conservation interventions are challenging in Tanzania. In terms of macro-economic indicators, Tanzania has improved its performance in recent years, but the average income level is still very low. The income per capita (GNI) of Tanzanians was estimated at US$ 400 in 2007\(^1\) (www-source, World Bank 2008a), so Tanzania is categorised as a low-income country by the WB. Furthermore, in the latest Human Development Index (HDI)\(^2\) of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which seeks to illustrate broader understanding of well-being, Tanzania is ranked as 152 out of 179 countries (www-source, UNDP 2008). Dependency on development assistance has been a prominent feature in the funding of various sectors of the Tanzanian government, including the natural resource sector. In 2005, the amount of official development assistance to Tanzania was in total more than US$ 39.3 per capita or 12.4 percent of the GNI (UNDP 2007, 292). At the same time, however, Tanzania is rich in other terms, as it is one of the most biologically diverse countries in the globe (Newmark 2002).

Tanzania is considered to be among the nations with the largest coverage of protected areas, although the exact figures of area under protection depend on the source and criteria used. According to Brockington (2005, 102), about 29 percent of the terrestrial surface area is protected, whereas a review by World Resource Institute (WRI) suggests that as much as nearly 40 percent of the land area is protected (www-source, WRI 2006). However, not all of the reserves are efficiently controlled in practice. Overall, the government expenditure for forest conservation activities has reduced over the past two decades (interview of the former Director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division, 19.1.2008, Morogoro). Borders of the forest reserves are often poorly defined (Newmark 2002, 11).

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1 The figure is for mainland of the United Republic of Tanzania only.
2 The HDI is a composite index which measures average achievement in three dimensions, including a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (www-source, UNDP 2008).
In addition, against the macroeconomic situation, poverty reduction is at the focus of national policies. Therefore, it is evident that the efforts to enhance conservation objectives through establishing new protected areas and intensifying the control of natural resources have significant implications also to the conditions of social and economical development.

Due to historical reasons, biodiversity conservation is addressed within several sectors of the government, foremost wildlife and forestry sectors. The different types of protected areas and reserves have their own institutions and organisational structures. The National Parks fall under the authority of Tanzanian National Parks (TANAPA) that was established in the end of the 1950s. Game Reserves, where limited sport hunting and local consumptive use of the resources is permitted, are under the Department of Wildlife (Barrow et al. 2001), under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). The Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) is the main governmental organisation in forest control and conservation, also located under the MNRT. The FBD provides overall policy guidance for the forest sector and some technical oversight and supervision (Wily & Dewees 2001). Within the past years, steps were taken to transform the FBD into the Tanzania Forest Service (TFS), an Executive Agency, with support from donor community. The objectives of this reform were e.g. to improve efficiency and reduce public expenditure. However, allegations of corruption and weaknesses in revenue collection in the forestry sector recently led to the suspension of the process (www-source, World Bank 2008b).

Biodiversity and forest conservation issues are mostly addressed in land, forest and wildlife policies. In addition, other natural resource related policies, such as mining, may be relevant for the control of the protected areas. In the new natural resource policies, land is officially divided into (1.) reserved land set aside for wildlife, forests or other purpose, (2.) village land that are governed by village councils and assemblies, and (3.) general land which is managed by the Commissioner of Land, under the President (LNRLPS 2004). According to the policies, village councils, which represent the lowest level of local government in Tanzania, are responsible for managing the trees, water and other supplies in the areas under the village. In the village land, people can also hold customary rights of occupancy, which means that if they have lived long enough on the land, they have equal rights to it as those people who have already had previous legal status of land rights (granted rights of occupancy). Clearing the forest or other vegetation or inheritance have been normal ways to acquire rights to land (Twaib 1996, 84). However, the rights of the farmers and villages to the land are limited in the sense that the President may transfer village land to general or reserve land if public benefit so requires or if land is needed for investment (LNRLPS 2004). In addition, historically, the holders of customary rights have often been treated in an inferior way in relationship to holders of granted rights, also called statutory rights (Twaib 1996; Neumann 1997b). Furthermore, in order to a certain land area to be officially

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3 The non-transparent practices in the forestry sector have been described and discussed by Milledge et al. (www-document, 2007).
recognised as village land, the land must be mapped and registered, which requires resources, and can take a long time.

In Tanzania, the total forested area is about 33.5 million hectares (ha). Approximately 60 percent of the forests are located outside the government forest reserves, on general and village lands. The government forest reserves include plantations, productive forests and protective forests. Most of the forested area is classified as miombo woodlands, and the rest are mountain forests, mangrove forests and coastal forests. In the village land, there can be both reserved and non-reserved forests, as well as forests that are controlled by individuals or families under customary rights.

Conservation is officially an important policy goal, especially in the mountain areas with high biodiversity, such as the East Usambaras and other Eastern Arc Mountains, and the coastal forests. Biodiversity conservation objective has been mainly promoted in the central government forest reserves, but the government spending on forestry and forest conservation has remained low. Within the past decades, many conservation activities and projects have been pushed and funded by external actors, such as environmental NGOs, donors and multi-lateral funding institutions (e.g. Woodcock 2002, 148). This is the case also with support to designing and testing participatory approaches to conservation. One of the large scale interventions in the Tanzanian forest sector in the recent years has been the Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project (TFCMP), funded by the WB and implemented by the FBD. The outlined aims of the TFCMP are to assist the government in policy implementation, develop a framework for sustainable management of the forests, and strengthen the role of different stakeholders, including private sector, individuals and communities in forest conservation and management (WB, 2003)\(^4\). In addition, a component of the World Bank funded project, Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Forests (CMEAMF), funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) through the UNDP, has been developing a special conservation strategy for the Eastern Arcs in the past years (e.g. FBD 2006).

Forest loss is estimated to be around one percent annually, but there are various figures on the extent of deforestation. At national scale, the overall estimates of deforestation vary between 90 000 ha and 500 000 ha per year (e.g. www-document, Milledge et al. 2007, 34). Among the direct causes of deforestation are agricultural extension, forest fires and logging (Newmark 2002). In addition, more indirectly, so-called structural factors underlie deforestation, including land ownership patterns, lack of capacity to enforce the rules, and economic interests. In recent years, corruption in the forestry sector and the involvement of some government’s forest authorities in illegal timber trade and other forest products has also been increasingly discussed in the public. According to a recent study ordered by an environmental NGO, the trade statistics suggest that China imported ten times more timber products from Tanzania than appear on Tanzania’s own export records (www-document, Milledge et al. 2007). This also means that most of the potential revenues from the exported forest products to the state

\(^4\)The TFCMO started in 2001 and is planned to continue until the end of 2009.
do not materialise. Among the NGO circles, the forest loss in Tanzania, and more widely in tropical forest-rich countries, has been connected to the increasing influence of commercial agents and economic forces, such as Chinese business\(^5\), and the global demand for valuable timber species. This is a wider phenomenon in the discourse of the conservation NGOs, as trade is becoming recognised as a key global threat that contributes to deforestation and biodiversity loss globally (www-document, WWF 2005).

In Tanzania, the natural resources and conservation policies have developed gradually. The colonial era had been marked by a process of tightening state control and the weakening of the customary rights in the forest and wildlife reserves, but also beyond them (Neumann 1998, 115-120). Much of the elements of colonial control were inherited in the post-colonial regime. However, the control was not always efficient in practice, and the enforcement of the rules varied spatially and over time. For instance, in Mkomazi game reserve, established after the Independence (1961), the affected herders could easily circumvent the restrictive rules for a long time (Brockington 2002, 42). However, to address the problems of previous ‘top-down’ conservation, there was a shift towards ‘community conservation’, and what has been described as one step further, ‘community-based conservation’ in the wildlife policy (Goldman 2003). In community-based wildlife conservation, the principal goal was to actively incorporate the communities into the management and ownership of the resources (Goldman 2003, 836). Among the experiments of community participation in wildlife conservation in Tanzania are Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Selous and Mkomazi game reserves (Neumann 1997a; Brockington 2002) and Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem (Goldman 2003). Some of the participatory approaches and experiences used in the wildlife management have also been taken into account when planning conservation of protected forests, for instance in the East Usambara Mountains (EUM).

In principle, the management of the forest reserves in Tanzania has been decentralised during the past ten years. This is in line with the broader trend of decentralising natural resource control in many parts of the Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ribot 2003). In Tanzania, the local governments and their District Forest Officers have primarily been responsible for managing most forest reserves, as well as forests on general land. In addition, some of the biologically and environmentally most valuable forests are formally controlled by the central government, including so-called Catchment Forest Reserves (CFR). Increasingly, forests are also managed by the villagers, under different community-based and joint management systems. According to the National Forest Policy (NFP) of 1998, participatory management and conservation of forests is to be put in place also in the areas that have been previously under the central government’s authority, which were built on exclusive rules of control (NFP 1998). These areas include the CFRs in the Eastern Arc Mountains. The Eastern Arc Mountain consists of thirteen separate mountain blocks, which have special flora and

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\(^5\) In 2003, the export of timber from Tanzania to China jumped. Arguably, China has dominated the timber export from Tanzania and Mozambique in the early 21st century (www-document, WWF 2005, 57-59).
fauna mainly due to their geological characteristics and direct climatic effect of the Indian Ocean (Burgess et al. 2007, 210-211). In the areas where the forests have been reserved more or less strictly for many decades, such reforms may create potential for new contestations and contradictions in forest control.

With the existing forest policy and law, villages can participate in the management of the forests in the village land, and share the management responsibility with the FBD, districts or private companies in case of reserved or private forests. In the forest policies, the terminology in Tanzania is organised around the concept of Participatory Forest Management (PFM), which includes two major models. Overall, the PFM has been introduced in order to institutionalise or ‘scale up’ participation in natural resource management (e.g. Blomley & Ramadhani 2006). In principle, this reflects the trend of decentralisation of natural resource control in many African contexts, which is about “transfer of power from central to local authorities” (Larson & Ribot 2004, 3). The two main approaches of PFM are (1) Joint Forest Management (JFM) and (2) Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), which are discussed more in chapter four. According to optimistic assessments on PFM, Tanzania has one of the most advanced community forestry jurisdiction in Africa as reflected in the policies, law and practice (Wily 1999). However, the extent to which management authority is to be devolved in the case of forests of high biodiversity value is to be more limited, as implied in the policy model of JFM.

The advocates of community-based approaches view that high level of community involvement, in which communities are given owner-rights, or at least full management authority, would be the optimal strategy also in the reserved forests (Wily 1999; Wily & Dewees 2001). In the policy debate, the overall experiences suggest that PFM, and especially CBFM, are promising in terms of forest recovery or maintenance (www-source, Magugu et al 2008; Swiderska et al. 2008). The positive impact of community involvement in forest management and conservation for forest condition has also been recorded in three comparative studies conducted in different regions of Tanzania, although further assessment is arguably needed to verify the findings (Blomley et al. 2008). However, the effects of the PFM initiatives for livelihoods appear to be more uncertain (Swiderska et al. 2008). Several articles in a recent review on the experiences of PFM in the country, published by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG)\(^6\), suggest that the challenges are many, including limited understanding and capacity among the districts, weak legal literacy among the villagers and lack of ‘tangible benefits’ to them (Meschack & Raben 2007; Blomley & Ramadhani 2007; Pfieger & Moshi 2007). Particularly, the benefits to the villages from the forests of high conservation value are considered to be too few, (e.g. Kajembe et al. 2005; Blomley & Ramadhani 2006; Meshack & Raben 2007).

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\(^6\)TFCG is an environmental NGO supporting and implementing conservation in different parts of the country, but especially in the Eastern Arcs. Its history is related to the growing activism among the conservationists working in the Eastern Arc Mountains in the end of the 1970s (Rodgers 2000, 87-88).
where as others have stressed the lack of proper rules, regulations and norms (e.g. Kajembe & Kessy 2000).

1.4. Bio-physical environment, forest conservation and social setting in the East Usambara Mountains

The East Usambaras are a part of the Eastern Arcs (figure 1), which is a mountain range spreading across Tanzania and southern part of Kenya. The EUM are located in Muheza, Mkinga and Korogwe Districts, in the coastal region of Tanga. The area comprising the EUM covers about 130 000 ha (Hamilton 1989b, 29). However, there is some variation between different sources in delineating the area to be included as ‘the East Usambaras’, as noted by Johansson and Sandy (1996).

Figure 1. The location of the East Usambaras and the other Eastern Arc Mountains in Tanzania. Source: Reuterswärd and Vihemäki (2007).
The Eastern Arc Mountains are famous for their high level of biodiversity and number of endemic and near endemic species (Rodgers & Homewood 1982; Burgess et al. 2007). In average, less that 30 percent of the estimated original forest-cover remains in the East Arc Mountains, whereas in the EUM the figure is larger, more than 40 percent⁷ (Newmark 2002; Burgess et al. 2007). According to Burgess et al. (2007, 216-217), the EUM are among the three most important mountain blocks in the Eastern Arcs, in terms of having a high number of endemic and near-endemic species of vertebrates and large trees. Due to their special flora and fauna, the EUM have sometimes been compared to the Galapagos Islands (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 198). Furthermore, a recent report of the Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project represents the East Usambaras as “emerging as one of the most highly regarded natural treasures of the country” (URT, MNRT 2006, 4). Since the early 21st century, funding for diverse conservation activities in the Eastern Arcs has been channelled through a special trust fund that is now a component of the TFCMP. In addition to such global and national values attached to the site, however, the forests are valued for many reasons and used for several purposes more locally and regionally, e.g. as water catchments and as a source of timber, building material, vegetables, traditional medicines and other forest products.

Geographically, the main range of the EUM starts at 150-300 meters above the sea level. The mountains are bound on all sides by steep escarpments rising abruptly from the surrounding lowland areas. The highest peak of the area, Mount Nilo, lies at the altitude of 1506 meter. The East Usambaras are separated from drier and higher West Usambara Mountains (WUM) by Lwengera valley. The edge of the EUM is located about forty kilometres from the Indian Ocean (Hamilton 1989b, 29). The climate of Amani, a division located in Southern part of the EUM, has been described as humid or perhumid throughout the year (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 201). There are normally two rainy reasons, usually from March to May and around November.

In all, the landscape is very diverse and fragmented, including different types of forest, eucalyptus and teak plantations, scattered settlement and more compact villages, small-scale agriculture, large tea fields, camps of the tea industry’s workers and tea factories. Different types of forests, including plantations, cover about 45 000 ha of the 90 000 ha land area in the EUM that were classified in the 1990s (Johansson & Sandy 1996, 6; Newmark 2002, 12). Majority, or about 74 percent, of the areas classified as natural forests are reserved for protective purposes, mainly as CFRs (figure 2), but some also as Village Forest Reserves (VFR). In the past 20 years, maintenance of biodiversity has become the most central goal of forest conservation in the area. For instance, the establishment Amani Nature Reserve (ANR) in 1997 was an important symbolic act in terms of promotion of biodiversity conservation. It was also the first time when such a

⁷ The variation in definitions of the boundaries of the EUM also complicates the estimation of forest loss over time (c.f. Sandy & Johansson 1996).
legal category was launched in Tanzania. Furthermore, new nature reserves have been planned and gazetted in other areas in the EUM and the Eastern Arc Mountains (URT, MNRT 2005; Interview of a high level FBD officer, 4.1.2008, Dar es Salaam). Therefore, experiences of different groups of the operation of control mechanisms and their diverse outcomes in the case of the ANR may provide useful information for the actors and organisations involved in such processes.

Figure 2. The boundaries of the Amani Nature Reserve, Catchment Forest Reserves and other forest reserves in the East Usambaras’ landscape during the last stage of the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme. Source: Sjöholm et al. (2001, 5).
The forest inventories conducted in the East Usambaras indicate that the forests are fragmented into nine large blocks, ranging from about 250 ha to 9,000 ha (Newmark 2002, 140). Forests outside the reserves are located in the categories of village and general lands. Fragmentation of the natural forests has been conceived as a major challenge for biodiversity conservation. Efforts to connect the forest patches with so-called conservation corridors have been thus suggested by the experts (e.g. Newmark 1993; Newmark 2002).

In addition, conservationists and organisations supporting forest conservation in the EUM are concerned about the fate of the non-reserved forests. These are considered under threat by fire and unregulated utilisation, such as the extension of agricultural land, logging of timber and cutting of poles, mining, grazing and hunting (www-source, Malugu et al. 2008). In the conservation literature, population growth, poverty and expansion of small-scale agriculture are typically considered as the major threats to the forests.

The total population of the East Usambaras was estimated to be about 128,000 individuals in the end of the 1990s, with the average village population of nearly 2,400 individuals (Kessy 1998, 61). The majority of the inhabitants living in the EUM are Washambaa (Swahili for Shambaa) by their ethnic background, but there are several other ethnic groups, including the Wabondei (Swa.) and Wazigua (Swa.) that have also traditionally resided in the EUM and their surroundings. Furthermore, immigrants from other parts of the region and the country have moved in to look for work in tea fields, other jobs or land over the past decades. The boundaries between ethnic groups are not strict, e.g. intermarriages occur and the villages are socially mixed. Swahili is the most common means of communication in public matters and meetings, although people with ties to a specific language group also tend to use their own vernacular language. The nearest large city, Tanga, with the population of about 200,000, depends on the East Usambara and Sigi river for water supply (Roe et al. 2002, 60).

Most of the people living in the mountains depend on small-scale farming. Tea plucking provides some villagers temporary work on the higher altitudes, although it is not well paid. In addition, there are ‘tea camps’, built by the tea estates for their full time workers. The farmers grow both cash crops, such as bananas, maize, and beans, and subsistence crops, e.g. cardamom, sugarcane, cloves and other spices. It has been estimated that sixty percent of the farmers in the highland areas grow cardamom, and the crop covers about half of the area allocated for cash crops (Reyes et al. 2006, 133). Cultivation of sugarcane is increasing in many areas in the EUM, changing the land use from agroforestry to more open farming systems. In general, the villagers conceive that they own the plots that they cultivate, although they do not usually have official documents on them.

Among Washambaa people, who still form the majority of the mountain dwellers, land is traditionally ‘owned’ by men, although women can access land use rights through marriage or occasionally through inheritance. Nowadays, there are thus also women who ‘own’ land. In the
EUM, women who are considered to originate in the village may inherit their husbands’ land, while the women who have only become inhabitants of the village through marriage usually cannot claim ownership to land (Rantala et al., draft 2009). In addition, people who do not otherwise have access to land have to rent land from others.

Local people use the forests, both reserved and non-reserved, to fulfil their needs, most importantly to get fuel wood (Kessy 1998; Jambiya & Sosovele 2001). Some of them have also benefited from the income generating activities started under different development and conservation projects in the area. The EUM is among the first areas where diverse participatory models of forest conservation have been developed and tested in Tanzania (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006). Since the 1980s, the mountains have been the target area of interventions that have sought to harmonise social development with conservation. Organisations such as IUCN, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and different donors, notably the Government of Finland (GoF) and European Union (EU), and the Government of Tanzania (GoT) have financed and implemented various conservation and development activities in the area, including participatory conservation and management of the forests.

1.5 Previous research on society and natural resources in the Usambaras

Other researchers addressing the historical, economic and social aspects of natural resource management and control in the EUM, and the Eastern Arcs more broadly have taken partly different starting points from the one adopted here. In addition, historically and geographically, they have approached their topics on narrower or broader scopes, partly overlapping with my research. The short review of some of the previous academic explorations serves to give background to the research area and this research project. The previous research projects also provide interesting historical insights into the changing relationships between the inhabitants and their bio-physical environment, and their encounters with the colonial state. I partly draw on their works when I build the historical picture of natural resource use and politics in the study area, in chapter four.

One of the prominent researchers who have explored the interplay between society, culture and environment in the Usambaras is Prof. Steven Feierman, from the University of Pennsylvania. In his historical and anthropological work, Feierman concentrates in the West Usambaras and examines in depth the Washambaa people’s history, culture, economy and political system (Feierman [1974] 2002, 1990). In *Peasant Intellectuals*, published in 1990, the researcher’s interest is on the leadership structure of the Washambaa. Feierman argues that among the central features of the political thinking of the Shambaa was the connection made between fertility of the land, leadership and rain. In addition, he explores the changes brought in the political thinking by the colonial rule, and reactions of the different groups of people to the changing political system. Furthermore, the mountain farmers’ struggle against the imposed soil conservation scheme.
during the British colonial period, and its connections to the independence movement is addressed.

A more recent exploration on the history of the West and East Usambaras is provided by Prof. Christopher Conte (2004) in his book *Highland Sanctuary*. Conte approaches the area and his topic from the perspective of environmental history, focusing on the interactions between the mountain environment, colonial state and its representatives such as experts, and the population. The time frame of Conte’s work stretches from the first millennium A.D. until the end of the 20th century, although the main focus is on the changes in the environment and society-environment relationships during the colonial era. Geographically, more attention is given to the WUM, although the landscape changes and colonial and post-colonial interventions in the East Usambara Mountains are also addressed. Conte argues that instead of the often prevailing simplistic pictures about indigenous people living in harmony with the forest or destroying them, the relationship between the population living in the different parts of the Usambaras and the forests was a dynamic one. Over time, the selective use of the forests of the mountains led to a markedly “humanised landscape” (Conte 2004, 11). There were periods of exploitation, forest loss and regeneration, which operated in different combinations, and sometimes led to unexpected changes in the environment.

Another detailed piece of research on the Usambaras is *Changing Roles in Natural Forest Management in the Eastern Arc Mountains*, by Dr. Kerry Woodcock (2002). It examines the history of forests and people, focusing on the changes in the forest management approaches in the East Usambaras and the Udzungwa Mountains from pre-colonial period onwards. Woodcock examines the management systems through analysis of the relationships, responsibilities, rights and returns of the communities and other ‘stakeholders’ in relation to the forests. Woodcock (2002, 126, 150-155) distinguishes four historical periods of forest management: local customary, technocratic, participatory and political negotiation, which are each dominated by different management paradigms8, and argues that the actual control of the forests has weakened over time, despite the outlined shift to participation in the 1990s. In this context, participatory management refers to an approach where forests are, at least in principle, managed for and by the ‘people’. Woodcock (2002, 1-10, 148-155) suggests that participatory projects have suffered from an economic bias, as the local people have been in the role of beneficiaries instead of being an actor in resource management. The reason for this lays, in her conception, in the unbalanced relationships between the parties: the state has largely controlled the rights and responsibilities to access and use the forests.

My interest is more in how the practices of forest conservation and control are created, shaped and/or maintained by the actors involved in conservation efforts in the EUM. In addition, I address the changes within a more limited time frame and in the forest areas that are, or are planned to

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8Paradigms are defined in this context as “a coherent and mutually supporting pattern of concepts, values, methods and action, amenable to wide application” (Woodcock 2002, 5).
be, under a strict control in the EUM, mainly because of their biodiversity values. I do not consider the assumption of the existence of clearly cut management paradigms as a suitable starting point. Instead, I conceive that it is more likely that the policies, as well as practices of control include elements of what Woodcock separates as management paradigms. As suggested by Blaikie and Jeanrenaud (1997, 60), “...while the genealogy of conservation paradigms may be traced to a relatively pure set of mutually consistent principles, policy and strategy documents are hybrid”. In addition, the picture of uniform rationalities within the stakeholder groups, may distort the actual situation, where multiple interests and rationalities do exist on different ‘sides’. For instance, research has shown that during the colonial period, a variety of views about the relationships between the ‘communities’ and the ‘nature’ existed among the administrators engaged conservation in the precedents of Tanzania (Neumann 1997b, 1998; Conte 2004).

Yet, I share with Woodcock (2002) an interest on the relationships between the intended goals and planned forms of forest and natural resource control, and the actual relationships between the different stakeholders involved in conservation. However, my goal is not to make an account on the management challenges facing the protected forests in the East Usambaras as such, nor to conduct a detailed historical analysis of people-forest relationships in line with Conte (2004). Instead, through exploring the discourses and interactions between the actors involved in and affected by ‘participatory’ forest conservation efforts, I seek to understand how the actual practices of control evolve. My interest is especially on how different groups of local people are able to affect the practices of forest control and the constraints they face due to other actors and processes at play. The concept ‘local people’, although admittedly a very general and simplistic, is used here to refer to the farmers living in the study area. They are affected and, to varying degrees, involved in the diverse conservation interventions. Yet, it does not mean that their lives would be somehow disconnected from non-local actors or processes, quite the opposite.

1.6. Research justification, problem and objectives

This research project aims to extend the understanding on the social processes, power dynamics and diverse social outcomes of allegedly participatory conservation interventions. The theme is relevant as the changes in strategies used in the conservation interventions may affect the position of the local people in resource access and control, and the different social groups among them. As a result of the conservation interventions, the population affected by them may eventually become more included or excluded from the decision-making and the control of forests and related resources. However, the changes brought by the interventions depend also on the social and economic context, and often occur in unexpected and uneven ways (e.g. Li 2007a). For instance, there is indication of community-managed wildlife conservation areas of Tanzania being exclusive to certain groups or wider community (Goldman 2003; Igoe & Croucher 2007).
The questions underlying the study include the following: Does the rather strong critique presented in some accounts (e.g. Olson 2001; Brockington 2002; Li 2002) concerning increased state control through participatory conservation and natural resource management initiatives seem valid in this context, and why? Are there any signs of socially transformative potential of the participatory conservation, in terms of challenging the previous power relationships between the actors involved in the resource control, and if so, how?

My theoretical and methodological approach builds on theorising on the social and political aspects of conservation and resource control in the field of political ecology (e.g. Neumann 1998; Zerner 2000; Brockington 2002; Nygren 2005; Li 2007a; Brockington 2008) and on explorations the role of actors, their practices and concepts, in shaping different interventions and their outcomes in development sociology and anthropology of development9 (e.g. Nujten 2005; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Mosse & Lewis 2006). Central to both broad approaches is the interest on the dynamics of power in development interventions and related processes, and natural resource control efforts.

Yet, the approaches are theoretically and methodologically broad in themselves, and they are not totally without contradictions internally, or in relation to each other. Political ecologists typically focus more the structural or more permanent aspects of power, although they also approach it from different theoretical traditions. They may, for instance, enrich their conceptual arsenal with (neo-)Marxist theorising on power or the notion of governmentality, and draw from the Foucauldian tradition. As many researchers of political ecology (Zerner 2000, 16; Brechin et al. 2002, 42; Wilshusen et al. 2003, 2), I conceive conservation foremost as political and social process in which various goals, discourses and interests towards the protected areas and their resources confront each other and sometimes even lead to conflicts. Conservation is ultimately an effort to control access to natural resources and shape the symbolic and material meaning of ‘environment’. However, in contrast to the approaches that have emphasised the governmentality element in political ecology (e.g. Bryant 2002), I assume that power operates both ways, and that the ‘subjects’ of the conservation schemes and control efforts can and do shape the interventions and their outcomes by their different strategies.

In line with recent theorising in development anthropology and sociology, I conceive that the actors’ operations, strategies, social relations, but also their contextual constraints, are crucial to explore for understanding development (and conservation) interventions and their outcomes (Mosse & Lewis 2006, 1-13). This means paying attention on the ways the actors involved in interventions struggle and negotiate over meanings, and simultaneously translate and generate interests. This implies the importance of studying the practices and strategies of the actors and groups involved in resource control. However, mere focus on the actors may

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9 More discussion on the characteristics and assumptions of the approaches will follow in the next chapter.
also risk over-estimating their power and ability to affect and transform the power relationships (e.g. Nygren 1995; Nujten 2005; Mosse & Lewis 2006). Therefore, assessing the influence of spheres of power on the actors’ behaviour and scope for transformative action is essential, including how the multiple, and often over-lapping, legal and other institutions support and or constrain the actors’ strategies in relation to natural resources (c.f. Nygren 2004; Neumann 2005; Lund 2008). This also means contextualising the actors’ understandings, strategies and responses against the history of the area and the characteristics of the institutions of natural resource control.

I ask whether and how the change in the official discourse of conservation is supported and/or challenged by the farmers living next to the protected forests. My interest is in how the discursive change at the level of policies and formal institutions is reflected in their understanding, and their position in decision-making regarding forest control and resource use. In relation to this, I analyse the negotiations, co-operation and disputes between the actors involved in given conservation interventions. The cases I explore address the processes of developing and practices of JFM in areas where the forests are, or are planned to be under strict protection in the southern part of the EUM. I shed light on the changes, ruptures and controversies in the discursive and other strategies of control, and position of the different actors. My focus is on rather recent changes during the last twenty years, and specific interventions that have promoted conservation objectives in the selected villages. The analysis on the ways in which such reforms are promoted, accepted and/or challenged by the parties involved can provides us some idea also about the larger-scale changes in the society-state relations. The main themes and questions are as follows:

The institutionalisation of participatory conservation:

- Which have been the key actors promoting ‘participation’ and its integration into the specific conservation interventions in the EUM, and at the level of forest policies?
- What does ‘participation’ mean in the given context, and for different groups?
- What are the official justifications, goals and means of ‘participation’?

The agency and strategies of the local people in relation to conservation efforts:

- How are the concepts of participatory conservation and the related institutional and organisational reforms conceived, used and possibly resisted by the local people, and different groups among them, and why?
- Have they, or some of them, managed to promote their own goals through the change in the dominant discourse and related reforms?
- What institutional and other limitations have they faced in promoting their interests?
The practices in the control of natural resources:

- Which actors, groups or organisations currently claim to have the authority to control the forests and the related resources? By which strategies do they practice control?
- Is their authority being contested by the others? How and why?
- Which interests and goals do the actors involved in conservation and control of the forests promote?

1.7. Structure of the dissertation

The thesis consists of seven chapters. In the second chapter, I review and reflect upon the previous studies on politics of conservation interventions and control of natural resources, and the assumptions on power embedded in them. I also shed light on the arguments used by different sides in the debate on the rationality and implications of participatory conservation, to highlight the diverse meanings given to the concept in the context of natural resource management and conservation. Then, I address how the questions of power, conservation interventions and social transformation have been conceptualised in previous research on resource control and conservation, focusing on traditions of political ecology, peasant studies and ‘actor-centered approaches’ to the study of development interventions. In the end, I outline the conceptual framework adopted in this research, in which focus is put on analysing the means, scope and limits of the agency of the local people in shaping the outcomes of conservation interventions. In chapter three, I describe the methodological choices and the study area, and discuss questions related to research ethics and the strengths and limitations of the methods and material.

In Chapter four, I discuss the history of land use and forest conservation in the EUM, and more broadly in the Usambaras and Tanzania, and the implications of the colonial and post-colonial policies on natural resources on the livelihoods of the mountain dwellers. Through the review of the past research and analysis of documentation, I show how the policies on the forests and land, and the exclusive rules of access supported by them, weresometimes opposed by the subjects, by both open and more hidden strategies. In the end of the 1980s, and 1990s, there was increasing focus on the enforcement of the forest regulations in the East Usambaras through donor funded conservation projects but at the same time effort were made to involve the ‘communities’ in conservation. Yet, the idea of communities’ participation in forest control was justified, interpreted, and received in different ways by the actors and groups involved in the forest conservation activities. Initially, the approaches used were rather instrumental and targeted to create acceptance to conservation and compensate for the decreased or lost access to the forests to the local people, but gradually also more substantial participation, in terms of devolving decision-making power, started to gain support.
Thereafter, I focus on specific conservation interventions in the EUM, and the related forms of exclusion and inclusion of the local inhabitants from resource control. In the fifth chapter, I address the power dynamics between the actors involved in the planning, management and control of the first nature reserve of Tanzania, the ANR. In spite of the multiple efforts made and resources allocated by the conservation project to achieve the consent of the surrounding villages when establishing the reserve, and diverse means of promoting collaboration and community participation in the actual management, some of the rules and restrictions are largely felt as imposed or unfair by the villagers. I argue that the idea of conservation is not resisted as such, quite the opposite, but the local farmers, especially those who used to benefit from the forests in some way and those who do not have access to alternative resources, still question the conditions and means of the resource control in different ways.

In chapter six, I examine the relationships and struggles between the villagers, governmental actors and conservation organisations related to the process of establishing a new strictly protected area in the EUM, the Derema Corridor. It this conservation effort, people’s acceptance was sought through negotiations at different levels, and by promising compensations for those who had had fields in the proposed reserve. By analysing the documentation and the actors’ responses and actions, I show how the farmers living next to the proposed reserve, and who used to depend on using the area, tried actively to secure their rights and make use of the conservation process through discursive and other strategies. However, the possibilities of affecting the conditions of conservation and securing access to compensations was not very wide to the affected farmers, and the process led to several disputes and resentment.

In the last chapter, I summarise the main contributions of this dissertation to research on protected areas, the debate on participatory conservation. I argue that through the process of institutionalisation, the discourse of participation has informed the practices of conservation and resource control, bringing some new actors and groups to the arenas where information is shared, and principles and conditions of forest control and benefit sharing are discussed, and decided upon. However, the practices of resource control are more ‘hybrid’ than the official policy discourse implies. This is as the elements of different discourses related to natural resources and conservation are reproduced and selectively used by the parties involved in the control, shaping their strategies and interactions with other actors and groups. The practices of control result, and change, as a result of constant negotiations between, and shifting interests of the actors and parties involved, which are also connected to changes in the wider economic and social environment. Social transformations have thus occurred, but in uneven and sometimes unexpected ways.
2. Conservation, participation and power relationships

2.1. Shifting conservation discourses and diffuse practices of control

In the thinking on conservation, the assumptions on the characteristics of societies, their different sub-groups and their relationship to the ‘nature’ or bio-physical environment have varied over the years (Anderson & Grove 1987; Adams 2001; Wilshusen et al. 2003; Berkes 2004; West et al. 2006). Within the past three decades, different participatory approaches have been designed in order to correct the alleged flaws and negative outcomes of the earlier conservation models and strategies of protected area management. The changes in the dominant conceptualisations among the conservation organisations, donors and the government bodies involved in conservation efforts are not likely to be without implications for the actual practices of natural resource use, access and control. Yet, the practices are also shaped by the social and environmental conditions in different localities, existing arrangements of resource control and the dynamics in the broader social and economic context.

In this chapter, I first explore the shifting meanings of the term conservation, and ways of conceptualising the problems and solutions of loss of biodiversity. Particularly, I address the conceptualisations in so-called participatory discourse, and different versions of it, regarding the role of ‘community’ in conservation. The notion of ‘participation’ and rationalities underlying the shift in conservation thinking are also analysed. This is to set the following discussion on power in to the context of the protected area management thinking. However, in practice, the picture is less polarised than the idea of separate conservation discourses would suggest (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997; Adams & Hulme 2001; Igoe & Croucher 2007). For instance, the previously influential ways of thinking continue to underlie the understandings of different organisations and actors (Brockington 2002, 10).

Next, I discuss theorising on power dynamics of conservation efforts, mechanisms of resource control and responses to them. I first address the theorising that draws on the governmentality notion of power. Although this perspective has highlighted how powerful ideas can transform the landscapes and change the position of different groups, it may easily underestimate the role of the agency (e.g. Rossi 2004). In order to understand the limits of the mechanisms of control embedded in the ‘formal’ institutions and techniques of government, it is important to address other spheres of power, including the strategies used by the ‘targets’ of conservation efforts, such as local land users. The research tradition on control and conservation that draws from peasant studies and focuses upon hidden and open forms of resistance helps to reveal the counter strategies of the ‘targets’ of diverse control mechanisms. This is of interest also bearing in mind the alleged turn to fortress or exclusive conservation thinking in the recent past (e.g. Adams & Hulme 2001; Brechin et al. 2002; Adams & Hutton 2007).
In the end, I clarify the approach I adopt for exploring the power dynamics and outcomes of specific conservation interventions in northeast Tanzania. In line with recent theorising in development anthropology, I assume that there is some scope for translation, reinterpretation and ‘manoeuvring’ by the actors involved in a certain intervention (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 2005; Lewis & Mosse 2006), including efforts to enhance local people involvement in the control of protected areas.

2.2. Multiple meanings, aims and means of conservation

One way to approach the diversity of conceptions on how to best regulate the relationships between people and the non-human nature or biophysical environment is to distinguish between different discourses of conservation and management of protected areas\(^{10}\). The concepts of conservation and protected areas are closely related, in the sense that protected areas have been, and still are, considered important for biodiversity conservation among experts of conservation (e.g. Brandon 1995; Ghimere & Pimbert 1997). They include different categories, which emphasise different functions or aspects of conservation, for instance, national parks and biosphere reserves.

In the 1980s and 1990s, political ecologists\(^{11}\), and others working on the nexus on environment and development, started to explore forms of symbolic power in resource control and conservation, often conceptualised as discourses, and the patterns of domination they produced or contributed to (Bryant & Bailey 1997, 21-22; Wilshusen 2003a, 52-54; Neumann 2005, 92-94). In general, domination can be understood as power that works against the interests of the dominated people or groups, as it “impedes them from living as their own nature and judgement dictate” (Lukes 2005, 85). Scholars analysed discourses on development and environmental degradation, and their effects on the social, economic and environmental conditions (e.g. Neumann 2000; Adger et al. 2001; Paulson et al. 2005; West et al. 2006). In the context of protected areas, the prevailing position of a given set of simplified representations of society-nature relationships was shown to imply diminishing access to the natural resources by the indigenous population living next to the protected area (e.g. Neumann 1997a; Neumann 1998). An important area of criticism towards the exclusive thinking and strategies of protected area management by political ecologists was their often negative implications for social justice (Wilshusen et al 2003).

In spite of the fact that discourses are conceived central in constituting social reality in post-structural approaches to power, there is no

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\(^{10}\) Alternatively, the knowledge frameworks and solutions have been conceptualised as conservation narratives, or paradigms (Elliott 1996; Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997; Adams & Hulme 2001; Brockington 2002).

\(^{11}\) Political ecology is a wide and growing research field. It evolved in the 1970s and 1980s through efforts by various researchers to combine elements of political economy, peasant studies and cultural ecology in their explorations on environmental and social changes and their interlinkages (Paulson et al. 2005).
agreement on the definite meaning of the concept. For instance, theories differ in the degree to which discourse is assumed to have autonomous power to cause social changes (Rinne 2006, 32), and at what level they are seen to operate. Adger et al. (2001, 683), define discourses broadly as shared meanings of a given phenomenon. In their view, a certain discourse is shared by a smaller or larger group of people, and discourses can be identified on local, national, international or global scale. Neumann (2004, 822) presents that various definitions of discourse emphasise desires, imaginaries, ideologies and metaphors to produce textual products that both reflect and shape relations of power. Peet and Watts (1996, 14) argue that “...discourse as an area of language use expressing a particular standing point and related to a certain set of institutions”. Moreover, in their definition, Peet and Watts (1996, 14) draw from Barnes and Duncan (1992), and conceive discourse as a framework consisting of a specific combination of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices. In this view, the concept of discourse is broader than being just a textual product as it covers also other practices than text. A discourse is defined here broadly as a way of conceptualising the problem and defining the solutions to it, e.g. how to best arrange the relationships between human and non-human nature. The discourses are also conceived to be embedded in certain institutions that shape human behaviour (c.f. Peet & Watts 1996), but still subject to change through processes of negotiation, confrontation and reinterpretation, as discussed in more detail later on. In the following, I analyse certain conservation discourses regarding the objective of securing biodiversity values, as they appear in the sphere of policies and protected area management strategies.

Overall, the discourses that have been identified by researchers in relation to biodiversity conservation partly over-lap with those of natural resource management. The difference between the terms ‘natural resource management’ and ‘conservation’ has become blurred with the merging of development and conservation goals since the early 1980s (e.g. IUCN et al. 1980). I have chosen to use the term conservation, as my interest is on processes that are situated in the context of protected areas and efforts to resource control within and around them. In the protected areas, the goal of preserving ‘nature’, ‘wilderness’, or more recently, ‘biodiversity’ or its elements in an undisturbed or very limitedly altered condition forms a central part of the underlying rationality, in spite of the widening of the objectives of conservation. In these areas, strict limitations for human use in specific areas are usually an important part of the protected area management strategies.

Multiple meanings have been, and still are, attached to the term conservation in itself. The ways of framing conservation are connected to differences in the conceptions regarding the relationships between society and nature (e.g. Campbell 2005; West et al. 2006), and the underlying value judgements. Conservation can, among other things, mean a preservationist thinking where preservation of nature from intensive human impact is a central objective. This can be justified by both bio-centric and anthropocentric values, including aesthetic and economic values. One of the
first and most famous national parks globally, Yellowstone, can be considered as an example of this line of thinking. The park was established in 1872, with the principal objective of preservation of ‘wilderness’ (Neumann 1998; Adams 2003).

Since the establishment of the first protected areas, the preservationist thinking has influenced the practices of resource control in many colonial and post-colonial contexts. In Africa, the separation of people from the areas and their resources has been a prevailing model of protected area management since the colonial era, reflected in the creation of national parks and different types of reserves (e.g. Anderson & Grove 1987, 1; Adams & Hulme 2001, 10). This type of exclusive conservation discourse is often referred to as ‘fortress conservation’ (e.g. Adams & Hulme 2001; Brockington 2002). Others have named the approach where the state limits the use of the specific areas and natural resources as ‘coercive conservation’ (Peluso 1993) or a ‘fences and fines’ approach (Adams & Hulme 2001, 10). The fortress conservation generally includes the idea of creation of protected areas, exclusion of the people as residents, the preventions of consumptive use and minimisation of other forms of use.

However, the degree to which the people have been conceived as a threat to nature and to which degree they have been thought to co-exist in harmony has varied. For instance, at the early stage of conservation efforts in Africa, the presence of African population could be accommodated in the landscape, as the so-called Eden myth about undisturbed nature incorporated the myth of a ‘Noble Savage’ (Neumann 1998, 18). For instance in Tanzania, presence of indigenous population in national parks was first allowed, even if this practice lasted only for a short time. In addition, the idea of undisturbed wilderness in itself was not always accepted by all the actors both within and outside the colonial governments (Adams 2003, 36).

Moreover, since the early days of conservation, other conservation efforts have focused more on production goals, with the aim of creating and sustaining management regimes that allow the regulated use of natural resources, including forests, wildlife, and marine ecosystems. For instance, in the precedents of Tanzania under the colonial rule, not all the conservation interventions were primarily about preserving something authentic, but more concerned with environmental issues, such as soil conservation and erosion control (e.g. Koponen 1994; Neumann 1998; Conte 2004). Instead of strict conservation with zero tolerance of utilisation, the strategies of control of these areas were concerned with a variety of values and allowed regulated use. Yet, critical researchers argue that common to different types of conservation interventions under the colonial and post-colonial regimes in Africa was a very limited concern with their social implications, such as livelihoods of the local population (Anderson & Grove 1987, 2-3; Neumann 1998; Adams & Hulme 2001; Conte 2004), so in this sense they can be considered to illustrate the fortress conservation thinking.

There is some over-lapping in the terminology between concepts of natural resource management and conservation. Coercive conservation has also been used to describe efforts that aim to enhance production goals, such as establishment of state-controlled forest reserves for timber production (Peluso 1993).
Within the three past decades, many important conservation organisations have increasingly incorporated the objective of ‘sustainable’ use of resources in their rationality. Some argue that it has even replaced the preservationist discourse of conservation (e.g. Benjaminsen 2000). As argued above, during the 1980s, at the global scale, the conservation discourse shifted towards a more anthropocentric direction, paying more attention to human needs (e.g. Adams & Hutton 2007). The idea that conservation is compatible with development was also one of the central ideas of sustainable development. Furthermore, increasing popularity of the concept of biodiversity was connected to the change in the conservation. This conceptual change was also related to the evolvement of technological advances that allowed for commercialising biological resources and the development of the scientific field of conservation biology (Neumann 2005).

In addition, the theorising in ecological science started to question the previous explanations about human-environment interactions, and the existence of ‘pristine’ environment until the recent past (Agrawal & Gibson 1999, 632) and the idea of homeostasis of ecosystems. Biodiversity conservation can be considered anthropocentric in its approach, as biodiversity is seen as closely linked with human needs (e.g. Raven 1995, 15). However, the same areas that were earlier targeted to promote nature, forest or wildlife conservation can presently be targeted for biodiversity conservation. Thus, there is likely to be some over-lapping, and elements of different versions of conservation thinking, in the actual discourses used by the actors promoting conservation, and the institutions of protected area management and resource control.

Emphasis on community involvement in protected area management, or what is here referred as participatory conservation, can be identified as its own discourse. The participatory thinking and approach is well exemplified in the assertion made by Pimbert and Pretty (1995) in the preface of their publication *Parks, People and Professionals*, that “…it is necessary to find ways of putting local people back in conservation”. It exemplifies well the notion of restoring the people-nature relationships by making the ‘communities’ or ‘people’ responsible for resource control. Since the 1980s, emphasis on local participation has had a prevailing position in many protected area management strategies and policies. Yet, within this broad discourse there are several elements and different models, or what can be called ‘sub-discourses’ that are discussed in more detail below.

In addition to participatory and fortress conservation discourses, so-called neo-liberal conservation has emerged and gained support among conservation circles within recent years (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997; Adams & Hutton 2007; Igoe & Brockinton 2007). Within this strain of thinking and organising protected area management, estimating the economic benefits and costs of conservation are stressed and increased market regulation is suggested instead of state regulation (Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997). Furthermore, Igoe and Brockington (2007, 433) conceive that neoliberalism is closely connected with the emerging ‘hybrid’ governance model in conservation circles, where communities, NGOs, states and companies are supposed to share responsibility over the protected area management. This
thinking also underlies the conservation-business partnerships and private sector involvement in resource control that are becoming more common (Adams & Hutton 2007; Igoe & Brockington 2007). Other market-oriented approaches to conservation include debt swaps, ecotourism, so-called ecocommodification and export and bioprospecting (Zerner 2000, 4). Furthermore, neo-liberal conservation discourse entails the experiments on ‘direct payments’ for biodiversity conservation (Adams & Hutton 2007, 170). The neo-liberal conservation resonates also with the broader neo-liberal agenda of down-sizing the state, stressing self-governing individuals and promoting the role of the private sector. In practice, however, elements of different discourses can be combined in the design of policies and planning of interventions (e.g. Blaikie & Jeanrenaud 1997), so their boundaries do not appear solid as the categorisation presented here would imply.

2.3. Premises, promises and problems of participatory conservation

Underlying the shift to a participatory conservation discourse at the global scale, there are diverse justifications and rationalities, including economic efficiency, better environmental control, and questions of social justice. The ‘failures’ and expensiveness of many of the previous schemes led to interest in and efforts made to create alternative conservation models. In line with the mainstream sustainable development thinking, participatory approaches to controlling protected areas have also been justified by arguing that protected areas should be seen as exploitable resources that can be managed to fulfil both development and conservation goals (Hulme & Murphree 2001, 1).

In relation to the efficiency premise and economic rationality, one of the underlying ideas of participatory conservation is that because the ‘local community’ is close to the forest or wildlife it has, or should have, most incentives for and/or knowledge on managing it in a sustainable way (Brosius et al. 1998). It is also assumed that if communities are involved in the management of protected areas, the benefits they receive will create them incentives to become good stewards of nature (Agrawal & Gibson 2001, 7). Furthermore, in Blaikie’s (2006) account, one of the common goals in participatory approaches has been to integrate local knowledge, supposed to be ‘environmentally sound’, better in to management systems. This is supposed to render the management more efficient, and finally, more legitimate.

In a general sense, legitimacy can be conceived as “...any behaviour or set of circumstances that the society defines as just, correct and appropriate” as defined by Wilshusen et al. (2003, 14). The assumption of increased legitimacy of conservation efforts through participation of local people is closely connected with the idea of social justice (e.g. Wilshusen et al. 2003; Korhonen 2006). Others have used the concept ‘environmental justice’ to address questions of distribution of environmental amenities and risks within human society (Neumann 2005, 164). Since the 1980s, representatives of social movements and critical researchers have pointed
out the marginalisation effects of ‘fortress conservation’ for rural and groups in different contexts, e.g. exclusion from access to resources (Wilshusen et al. 2003). The assumption of enhanced social justice for the previously marginalised groups in the context of fortress conservation has thus been used as a justification for participatory conservation by researchers (Brechin et al. 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2003; Brockington 2007). For instance, Wilshusen et al. (2003) strongly advocate the need to combine biodiversity conservation activities with promotion of social justice. However, legitimacy and social justice are both attached to moral judgements, e.g. what is considered as just behaviour or fair decision-making practice. As Wilshusen et al. (2003) note, they are not easy to determine independent of the context. They suggest that such understanding and agreement on the course of action “for both conservation and human dignity” can be achieved through concerted negotiation (Wilshusen et al. 2003, 15). Yet, the formal consent on how the protected area should be controlled as a result of negotiations may not reflect what the parties consider as legitimate, if the conditions of negotiating agreements do not fulfil certain preconditions, e.g. equal access to information.

In addition to these diverse rationalities underlying participatory conservation discourse, the terminology on participation is rather broad. Various researchers have presented their own umbrella concepts and definitions for different conservation models. Community-based conservation, participatory conservation, people-friendly and community conservation are among overall concepts used to describe a variety of approaches that take into account the local livelihoods and try to involve the ‘communities’ in the management of protected areas, forests, wildlife or biodiversity (e.g. Adams & Hulme 2001; Agrawal & Gibson 2001; Enters & Anderson 2001; Campbell 2006, 284). Furthermore, Brechin et al. (2002, 44) use the concept of people-oriented conservation. With the concept, they refer to different strategies, including collaborative management, community-managed or indigenous reserves, community-based natural resource management as well as Integrated Conservation and Development Programs (ICDP). Although in many accounts these various approaches are often addressed simultaneously, they may have substantial differences in their design principles (Adams & Hulme 2001), and in terms of their actual outcomes.

Different projects vary in terms of how they relate to nature and society, and in which terms they aim to involve the local people or ‘communities’ (Adams & Hulme 2001). Therefore, it is useful first to categorise them in relation to their principles on participation. Liz Alden Wily (2002, 9), a researcher and a consultant of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in East Africa, suggests a division to be made between (1) benefit-sharing approaches, where the goal is to add local co-operation to existing government regimes, and (2) power-sharing approaches that “look at local communities as potential forest managers in their own right”. Wily (2001, 11-12) criticises the projects and policies that focus only on sharing benefits due to their limited social effects. However, in the context of protected areas,
there is often a limited interest to give considerable authority to the local people.

At the level of policy formulation and planning, one can distinguish between diverse participatory or people-oriented approaches to conservation. On the side of the population living close to the protected area, they range from receiving information to strategies that try to ‘empower’ the people (Barrow & Murphree 2001). The approaches can also be categorised in terms of what roles they assign to the participants. An example of such a categorisation is given by Barrow and Murphree (2001), who draw their accounts of Pimbert and Pretty (1994) and Oakley (1991), see table 1 below. In this typology, participation is mainly viewed from the perspective of the outsiders, such as development and conservation agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation typology</th>
<th>Roles assigned to local people</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Told what is going or has happened. Top-down, information belongs to external professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information giving</td>
<td>Answer questions from extractive researchers. People not able to influence analysis or use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Consulted. External agents listen to views. Usually externally defined problems and views. People not involved in decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Form groups to meet predetermined objectives. Done after major project decisions made, therefore initially dependent on outsiders but may become self-dependent and enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Joint analysis and actions. Use of local institutions. People have stake in maintaining or changing structures or practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-mobilisation or empowerment</td>
<td>Take decisions independent of external institutions. May challenge existing arrangements or structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. A typology on roles assigned to ‘local people’ in participatory development or conservation programmes. Modified from Barrow and Murphree (2001).

According to Barrow and Murphree (2001), the first two categories in the table do not fall under ‘community conservation’, as they do not involve local collective action. In their perception, collective action is thus among the main criteria for participation. However, in terms of the assumed level of participation, also less ambitious approaches may change how the actors involved conceive their scope for action, and operate individually or collectively. For instance, in some cases, more profound forms of participation may be a side effect of the less ambitious conservation or
development intervention (e.g. Sundar 2001). In the following, the characteristics and assumptions of certain participatory conservation approaches are reflected upon against the above typology in order to shed light on their differences.

It should be noted, however, that although the typology can be used to identify the explicit goals of the interventions, it also consists of a set of simplifications. It cannot be thus considered as an unproblematic tool to prescribe the actual effects of interventions. The typology does not take into account the contingency and fluidness of power relations. In addition, the meanings of key terms used in the interventions, such as ‘community’ or ‘participation’ may vary even within one organisation (Nelson & Wright 1997, 6-7). In practice, the effects of interventions are influenced by contextual and contingent issues, such as the array of existing institutional arrangements, negotiations between the parties, and the characteristics of the organisations involved in management.

Integrated Conservation and Development Projects represent an approach where conservation of biodiversity or wildlife is intended to be linked with social and economic development outside the protected area (Brandon 1995; Newmark & Hough 2000). They rely on the assumption that success of protected areas ultimately depends on the co-operation of and support among the population surrounding the park (Brandon 1995). Others have named such models as protected area outreach (Barrow & Murphree 2001, 31). The key management priorities come from conservation objectives, but they are to be enhanced through educating and creating benefit flows for the local population. For instance, in the ICDPs, income-generating groups can be created to support outside the ‘core’ conservation area, in so-called buffer zone area.

In principle, the ICDP approach is more about sharing the benefits and costs, than about changing the forms of decision-making. They have been applied in the protection of wildlife, but also in case of forest conservation areas, such as the East Usambaras (Stocking & Perkin 1992). In Brandon’s (1995, 142) account, although ICDPs are a shift away from traditional conservation thinking and approaches, their primary objective is still to ensure the conservation objectives. In practice, the ICDP programs may carry with them some of the conceptual legacy of previous, ‘fortress conservation’ discourse and strategies of control. For instance, Korhonen (2006, 62-63) points out that in the ICDP approach, as it was applied in Ranomafana Park in Madagascar, the local people were conceived principally as a problem to conservation, which could only be addressed through further enforcement and education. In relation to the typology of participation, the integrated projects are closest to the consultative or functional approach in their design, as the conservation goal sets the frames for other activities, and the representatives of the state, or other agency entrusted with the management authority, is to maintain the ultimate ownership and decision-making authority over resource use and control.

In addition to ICDPs, different types of co-management or collaborative management models, built on the idea of sharing management responsibility
between different parties, have been developed and tested. These approaches usually involve the creation of management agreements between the different groups, or ‘stakeholders’, who participate in it (Barrow & Murphree 2001, 33). For instance, in relation to forests, this approach is illustrated in the Joint Forest Management model applied also in Tanzania. Originally, JFM was developed as a management regime for state-owned forests targeted to production in India. Some argue that this is a counterpart to extractive reserves of Latin America (Neumann 2005), but there is also regional variation in how the model is defined. In terms of the typology of participation, co-management can be best categorised as functional or interactive participation, depending on the context. In functional participation, the objectives are set by ‘outsiders’ whereas in interactive version, the processes of designing the agreements and implementing them requires some joint analysis and action by the different parties. This implies that the ‘local people’, or at least some groups among them, can have some authority in the decision-making over the protected areas and their resources.

More substantial level of participation and ‘power-sharing’ can be assumed to occur in Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and Community-Based Conservation, or CBC (Newmark & Hough 2000). Some authors also use the term CBNRM and CBC as general concepts to refer to different forms of participatory management and conservation regimes (e.g. Argawal & Gibson 2001; Blaikie 2006). In CBC, the major objective can be defined as sustainable management of natural resources through devolving control over the natural resources to the ‘community’ (Barrow & Muphree 2001, 31-34). In addition, the community-based models generally seek to create economic incentives for the communities to manage the resources and establish institutions for the effective local management. In terms of their outlined objective of devolving decision-making power to the local actors, such approaches potentially lead or contribute to the last stage of the ladder of participation, or so-called empowerment or self-mobilisation.

Both positive and negative accounts can be found on how diverse participatory interventions change the position of the actors and groups in development or conservation, and how they have altered the practices of resource control, sometimes even regarding a single intervention, such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe (Blaikie 2006). According to a review on devolved natural resource management initiatives by Shackleton et al. (2002, 5), especially in the cases where local communities were well organised, and they were able to make alliances with NGOs, they succeeded in securing greater control and benefits from the natural resources. In addition, it has been suggested that co-management systems, such as JFM, may actually ‘empower’ new actors and groups in the resource control (e.g. Sundar 2001), so less ambitious forms of participation may also result in more substantial transformations. In principle, such new community-oriented resource management models may open up a new arena within which state-society relations can be reformulated (e.g. Li 2002). The representations inherent in a given ‘new’ discourse related to resource control may therefore help the
‘target group’ to make claims regarding access to resources, although the actual outcomes cannot be prescribed as they depend on several other processes.

Yet, Mohan & Stokke (2000) present in their analysis of participatory development that an emphasis on local participation can also underplay the role played by the state and trans-national power holders. It has also been asserted that the central authorities often continue to retain key aspects of management authority in devolved or community-based natural resource management reforms, including the control of profitable opportunities (Shackleton et al. 2002; Katila 2008). Critical accounts generally stress the failure of participatory models of conservation and natural resource management to genuinely ‘empower’ local people or give them usable rights or assets (Enters & Anderson 2001; Vedeld 2002; Sayer et al. 2005, Korhonen 2006). Furthermore, the resources available in community-based projects can be ‘captured’ by local elites (Platteau & Abraham 2002; Schackleton et al. 2002). Often, the most positive assertions on the role of communities as agents of decentralisation, participation and collective action pay little attention to the actual heterogeneity of actors within the communities (Nygren 2005).

For instance, in India and China, researchers have identified situations where men, especially those in the village leadership positions, have dominated the forest management committees, decision-making and training (Schackleton et al. 2002, 5). Kumar (2002) also points out that through assuming that each village or group of villages is a homogenous community without distinctions between gender, wealth or status, the distribution of benefits will often strengthen the local elite while the most of the poor will be excluded. Another aspect of the socially stratified practices of ‘participation’ in many interventions is that the socio-economically most disadvantaged groups may not have resources and time to participate in the activities (Cleaver 2002).

The problems related to the concept of community have been one of central areas of criticism in the accounts of participatory conservation. As Argawal and Gibson (1999, 633) note, community is often simplistically perceived to be based on one small spatial unit, having shared norms and a homogenous social structure. However, the model is static, and does not take into account the diversity among groups defined as communities. Assumed communities are politically fractured and socially differentiated along multiple factors (Li 1996, 510; Enters & Anderson 2001, 176; Kumar 2002; Nygren 2005). Furthermore, the divisions within a community or a group of people are changeable; communities may present a unified front to a perceived threat from outside, or may be divided and re-divided by internal struggles over land and resources.

The boundary between community and what are assumed as its counter forces, such as state and markets, has also been questioned (Li 2001). For instance, in Tanzania the State has been an important employer, and many households have members who work for it in some way or another (Snyder 2008, 297). Furthermore, the population units described as
communities may be ‘embedded’ in the state, e.g. being historically created by the state and/or through the administrative ties (Li 2001, 164-165). The assumptions embedded in the strategies of participatory conservation efforts often do not hold out in practice (e.g. Agrawal & Gibson 1999). The heterogeneous character and uneven position of different groups within the population supposed to form a community has been acknowledged also by the international agencies that fund forest and other conservation interventions, including WB (Benerjee et al. 1997).

Moreover, on the ecological side of the debate, the main criticism towards the projects that seek to combine conservation and development goals is their failure in protecting biological diversity (Wilshusen et al. 2002, 26). The expectations regarding the effects of local participation on the biodiversity conservation objectives have also argued to be too high (Vedeld 2002, 16). Especially, some conservationists have conceived diversion of conservation programs into development activities as problematic and would prefer to keep conservation as separate from other objectives (e.g. Kramer et al. 1997). Terborgh and van Schaik (1997, 32) argue that strictly protected areas are needed in the future to serve as the “last bastions of nature”. Others have taken a more moderate stake in relation to the potentials and limitations of participatory conservation thinking and practices (e.g. Brandon 1995; Attewell & Cotterill 2000).

As Adams and Hulme (2001), and Brechin et al. (2002) note ‘failings’ of many people-oriented conservation projects have lead to the resurgence of the fortress conservation discourse. The advocates of return to more centrally-led conservation support their views with arguments about the effectiveness of strictly protected parks for conservation (e.g. Bruner 2001). It has been argued that a ‘neo-protectionist turn’ has occurred amongst conservation practitioners within recent years, which would mean re-regulation of the protected areas and further territorialisation (Büscher & Dressler 2007; Igoe & Brockinton 2007). Others suggest even a more radical change of conservation, with increased emphasis on the use of violence. Neumann (2004) argues that along with the emphasis on strict control of protected areas, there is an ongoing process of militarisation of conservation. In Igoe and Brockinton’s (2007) conception, the neo-liberalisation merges with the neo-protectionist turn in conservation. Yet, one can find certain contradictions in this argumentation. Neo-liberalism has the underlying rationality of reducing the role of state in directing the development of different sectors, whereas enforcement of rules by the conservation authorities usually requires more state involvement.

However, despite this alleged turn to neo-protectionist or fortress discourse of conservation, the emphasis put on participation has not disappeared from the conservation arena. The concepts of benefit sharing and participation are continuously used to justify conservation efforts to donors and policy makers, and ‘imposed’ conservation schemes are arguably being represented as benefiting and supported by the communities (Blakie 2006; Igoe & Croucher 2007). Those who advocate community involvement in conservation have emphasised various points in their argumentation, e.g. improper implementation of the previous projects and/or absence of efficient
institutions at the local level, as well as weak local participation (Brechin et al. 2002; Wilshusen et al 2003; Berkes 2004; Brockington 2007). Some stress the role of institutions and restructuring of them as a key to success (Wily 2001; Chattre 2008). According to, Chhatre (2008, 13), the “success” of community-based natural resource management policies depends on the extent to which new or old institutions are made accountable.

In general, proponents of participatory discourse argue that, despite the problems, participatory approaches to resource control provide a means to challenge and change the previous forms of control (e.g. Sundar 2001; Ylhäisi 2003), and make conservation more legitimate and socially just. Wilshusen et al (2003, 14-15) stress the need for negotiating agreements between the parties involved in the protected area control in order to improve the legitimacy of the institutions regulating access. In the context of India, Sundar (2001, 352) argues that JFM may be the first step “in making state legitimacy work”, although this often creates conflicts or tensions between the actors. This is in line with the idea of transforming society through participatory development (e.g. Hickey & Mohan 2004).

As the discussion above illustrates, there is a wide range of variation in how the formal discourses embedded in the policies and management strategies describe the optimal institutional arrangements for enhancing conservation, its connection to social development and the role given to ‘communities’ in conservation and resource control. However, the contents of these institutionalised discourses are seldom in line, or fully coherent with, what occurs ‘on the ground’. Therefore, it is useful to address the previous research and related debates on the operation of different forms of power in the context of protected areas.

2.4. Conservation as governmentality

Along with the analytical interest on symbolic aspects of power, such as identification of dominant discourses and their power aspects, researchers of political ecology have approached conservation interventions through the framework of governmentality (Bryant 2002; Robbins 2004; Li 2007a), albeit often combined with other approaches to power. The governmentality approach draws from Michel Foucault’s thinking on power and transformation of statecraft between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe (Bryant 2002). Internalisation of state control was conceived as a central element of the change process, and the key question for the state was about “…finding ways in which ‘subjects’ could be brought to internalise state control through self-regulation” (Bryant 2002, 270). Later on, the notion of governmentality, and related conceptual tools, has been extended to analyse the working of power in other regions and historical eras, as well as the intended and unintended effects of interventions of non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations (e.g. Bryant 2002; Li 2007a; 2007b).

In this perspective to power, the activity of government is largely about defining the boundaries of action, rather than simply acting on people.
(Cornwall 2004, 80). The underlying idea of governmentality is that disciplining institutions and related practices can make people to behave in a certain way without any apparent coercion (Ribot & Peluso 2003, 156). The consent of the subjects is rather assumed to be achieved through social technologies and internalised, self-imposed norms, mediated through social institutions. Social technologies are conceived as being instantiated in language and discourses.

An example of how this framework is adopted is provided by Bryant (2002), who has conducted research on the operation of NGOs in biodiversity conservation, including their ‘empowerment’ efforts among the indigenous population in Philippines. Bryant (2002) argues that the conservation efforts promoted by the NGOs are ordered around increased internalisation of state rule through governmentality techniques. Bryant’s focus is on two aspects, deployment of knowledge and visibility, such as mapping of areas of high value for protection, in the extension of government. The conservation NGOs arguably contribute to the processes in which the indigenous people become Foucauldian-style subjects in that they start to govern themselves and are the subject of control measures by others (Bryant 2002, 281). Bryant (2000) argues that both the ‘top-down conservation’ and the ‘bottom-up’ or participatory models of conservation authorise certain voices to speak for nature, and the nature becomes internalised during the processes. In a similar manner, Sundar (2001, 352) presents that community involvement in ‘joint management’ of the forests in India is often merely a shift to micro-disciplinary forms of power, as the citizens start to internalise the imposed restrictions. Bryant (2002, 297) is, however, alert to the fact that there is at least some scope for the people whose livelihoods and lives are altered by conservation efforts to make a change in the course of actions, through empowerment process. In fact, it is argued that the operation of the NGOs may offer a new opportunity of resistance for the indigenous groups.

Yet, following Rose (1999), Bryant argues that the processes of empowerment are “bought at a price” as they tend to lead to a loss of freedom from surveillance and control (Bryant 2002, 286-287). In this conception, then, the empowerment of the ‘target population’ does occur as a result of the NGOs’ operations, but it takes place unevenly and leads to ambiguous outcomes. This is an important point, as it suggests that the actual effects are not as totalising as the notion of governmentality would suggest. Bryant does not, however, shed much light on the social dynamics in the process, such as possible re-interpretations of the prevailing discourses of conservation by their ‘targets’. However, the processes of increasing control are often incomplete and ongoing in practice, as they are being contested and opposed by the groups and actors on the ground (Peluso 1992; Vandergeest & Peluso 1995).

The role of expert knowledge in and controversial outcomes of CBNRM have also been addressed by Blaikie (2006), even though he does not use the notion of governmentality. Blaikie explores CBNRM regimes in Malawi and Botswana and suggests that in practice, the models have not altered the dominant position of expert’s knowledge in relation to ‘local knowledge’. The limits to the change derive from various sources. He argues that, firstly,
there is a confrontation between formal science that is based on foundations of logical positivism, and local knowledge, which, in its turn, is embedded in particular environmental and social histories and continuously being negotiated in day-to-day situations. The local knowledge, which itself is a contested issue, has not succeeded in negotiating with an equal basis with scientific knowledge. Instead, it is claimed to have been transformed into something different by what has been offered by powerful ‘outsiders’, such as experts (Blaikie 2006). In a similar manner, in the case on CBC of wildlife in Tanzania, Goldman (2003) implies that the CBC in Tarangire-Manyara Park has remained largely a top-down endeavour, where the Maasai resource management practices and knowledge has been pushed to the margins.

In the interpretations of power that draw from the theory of governmentality, emphasis is put more on the constraining effects of hegemonic discourses of the state on the social realities and position of the subjects. However, the discourses that underlie acts of government can be contested or resisted, in relation to their relationship to each other, or in terms of their internal structures (Wilshusen 2003a, 53). The possibility for social change can be conceived open, as a given discourse can also be reinterpreted on the course of interventions. This is also the assumption that I take in this research - the one-sided interpretation and analysis of governmentality processes tend to conceal other aspects of power, such as resistance, as it deprives the subjects their agency, as noted by Leach and Fairhead (2000) and Rossi (2004). By equating power and knowledge, which is understood as dominant discourse, the governmentality view may limit the extent to which actors can be seen actively to manipulate knowledge (Rossi 2004). The strong emphasis on ‘disciplining discourses’ also risks producing a monolithic model of the State and neglecting other political and economic forces that shape the contestations over environment and resource use (Moore 1996, 126). Narrow focus on governmentality, in my interpretation, risks bypassing the possibility of changes in the previous relationships of power, and the role social actors can have in that change.

2.5. Control, territorialisation and resistance

A central concept of this work, as in many political ecology works related to conservation, is control. In this sense, conservation can be conceived an effort by state or other actors to control bio-physical nature and its resources, human interaction with it and access to the protected areas and natural resources at stake. For instance, Peluso (1993) argues that conservation has been used as a justification for state’s efforts to increase control in many developing countries endowed with high biological diversity, often by using different means of coercion and violence. In relation to the control of land and other natural resources, one can approach the operation of control through the concepts of ‘territoriality’ and ‘territorialisation’, which are the subject of analysis here.

Following Vandergeest and Peluso (1995, 387-388), I understand territoriality as an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or
control people, phenomena or relationships by delimiting or asserting control over a specific area. Territorialisation is about excluding or including people within given geographic area, and controlling the actions of people and their access to natural resources. Often territorialisation is promoted by the state, but in the context of ‘hybrid’ governance (e.g. Brockington & Igoe 2007) it can also be promoted by other actors, such as NGOs or businesses, or ‘community members’, such as village committees established to monitor and manage the resources. The actual techniques through which the state, or some other agency or individuals, seek to establish control over natural resources and populations’ behaviour, however, vary. Instruments of territorialisation may include e.g. classification by area, communication of the boundaries and restrictions on a certain territory, as well as mapping and registration of land titles.

One form of territorialisation is the introduction of new formal or informal institutional mechanisms, such as regulations and sanction systems on use of natural resources. In a democratic system, the institutions are basically thought to result from democratic decision-making processes. In this sense, they are supposed to present a legitimate source of power and control. However, the level to which such formal institutions are actually seen as legitimate is also context dependent, and often institutions do overlap (Ribot & Peluso 2003; Wilshusen et al 2003). In addition, it has been suggested that the participatory strategies of resource control can be used to legitimate the continuation of or increased state control, which can lead to exclusion of local people, or some groups among them, from the control of the natural resources and access to them (Pimbert & Pretty 1995; Brockington 2002; Li 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2003). In a similar way, Olson (2001, 400) argues that both centralised and decentralised forms of control have functioned as a means to promote the state’s interests.

Nevertheless, territorialisation is often unstable in practice (Vandergeet & Peluso 1995). The use of the diverse control mechanisms by the state (or other agencies) affects the scope of action of the ‘target population’, but it may operate in a way that contradicts the original purpose. The social and economic outcomes of the control efforts, such as the implementation of coercive conservation strategies, have often given an impetus for the negatively affected groups to resist the control (e.g. Peluso 1992; Neumann 1998; Neumann 2005). The term ‘affected’ refers to the changes that people experience in their lives as a result of the conservation intervention, including both material and symbolic spheres. It has been argued that the majority of the communities affected by conservation in Africa continue to face social and economic marginalisation, in the sense of impoverishment and lack of access to resources (Wilshusen et al. 2003, 31-32). In addition, the affected groups or individuals may have to change their identity, e.g. from farmers to wage-labourers or migrant workers, as a result of the establishment of a new protected area on previous agricultural or pastoral land. Such effects are also likely to bear significance for the responses and strategies of the individuals and groups in relation to the conservation and territorialisation efforts.
Many political ecologists have shown that strict control mechanisms by the colonial and post-colonial governments in the South have typically led to marginalisation of weaker grass root actors from resource use and control (Peluso 1992; Bryant & Bailey 1997; Adams & Hulme 2001). The marginalisation often polarises the difference in social and economic position between those who benefit and those who loose from conservation interventions. Yet, the marginalised groups have sometimes been able to circumvent the rules they perceived illegitimate or were not able to abide to (Brockington 2002; Conte 2004). Often, such imposed conservation and control schemes have led to resistance by the local people or certain groups among them (e.g. Feirman 1990; Peluso 1992; Neumann 1998).

The resistance to state control efforts is often characterised by its hidden nature. Writing in the tradition of peasant studies, Scott (1990, 4-5) identifies a discursive form of resistance that he names ‘hidden transcript’, as opposed to the ‘public transcript’ that characterises communication in situations where domination by one group over another occurs. The members of subordinated groups use hidden transcript when they can communicate off-stage, that is, without the direct presence and observation of the more powerful people, such as members of the elite. Yet, also the members of the dominant class can have their own hidden transcript, which differs from the language they use ‘on-stage’ (Scott 1990, 10). In addition, the hidden transcript does not only include speech, but it can include a variety of activities. For instance, it may mean ‘illicit’ acts such as poaching, illegal exploitation of natural resources, avoiding of paying taxes, or intentionally shabby work for landlords (Scott 1990, 14; Bryant & Bailey 1997, 43). Furthermore, gossip or boycotts can be used by the farmers as tactics to oppose a negatively experienced interventions (Scott 1985), including conservation efforts (Peet & Watts 1996, 34; Holmes 2007). In Scott’s account (1990, 20), focus on the hidden transcript, of both dominant and dominated groups, helps to map the dissent among the oppressed actors, and in certain conditions, even overt rebellion.

In practice, the patterns of resistance can be difficult to identify, as the subjects, such as small-scale farmers who oppose certain control efforts, may not want to draw public attention to their resistance. This is as the efficiency of their resistance strategies also depends on it being hidden (Feierman 1990, 42). However, the outcomes of the hidden resistance tend to remain highly uncertain. For instance, Chottray (2004) argues that ‘participatory’ management in a particular watershed project in India was unable to bring about any clear social transformation in the patterns of resource control, as the project staff strategically made use of alleged consensus among the target population. The lack of open dissent in the public meetings was thus used as a means to ‘negate’ politics in the project.

Neumann (1998) also uses the concept of hidden resistance in his analysis of history of wildlife conservation and related social and political struggles in Arusha National Park of Tanzania. Neumann (1998) uses the concept of moral economy to illustrate how the solidarity among the farmers, in specific conditions, affected their acts of resistance towards the imposed conservation rules and the authorities. For instance, the village leaders did
not always inform the authorities of the identity of the people who had breached the rules. However, there is considerable ambiguity in the concept of hidden resistance. A single act of forest fire can be interpreted as customary land management practice or as political protest, and one act can have different dimensions (Neumann 1998, 47-48). In addition, as Holmes (2007, 193) argues, there is a risk of overestimating resistance in cases of illegal use of resources. Political and livelihood aspects of acts, such as hunting or cutting of trees, can be mixed in practice. It is thus difficult to know with certainty the exact motivations of an act of another person, which may sometimes remain unclear or unknown even to the individual.

The social context and the culturally embedded values also affect the forms of resistance (Holmes 2007, 198). The acts of resistance can be socially stratified within a ‘community’ or a group of people considered forming one. Feierman (1990, 41) argues that there have been important differences within many African societies in the occurrence and scope of resistance. For instance, the subjects of the African rules could resist Europeans at the same time as the rulers of the communities surrendered. Through his research on Washambara farmers’ struggles against imposed colonial soil conservation schemes in the Usambaras, Feierman shows how the outcomes of negotiations between the farmers and the State depended on the social position of the individuals. The individuals who were most able to mediate between dominance, conceived as “the discourse used by the ruling group”, and more local discourse, were mostly characterised by their social position (Feierman 1990, 4-5). Those peasants were able to turn “the language of hegemony” against the hegemonic power, or the British colonial rulers (Feierman 1990, 40). Therefore, even though certain discourses may be influential, it would be erroneous to assume that they are only introduced from above, but they can be affected, resisted or modified by the subjects.

I assume that conservation of forests or biodiversity is largely about territorialisation, and increasing the control of biophysical environment and populations. Yet, territorialisation is increasingly promoted also by non-state actors and organisations that have interest in conservation, such as conservation NGOs (e.g. Bryant 2000; 2002, Igoe & Brockington 2007). As the previous literature indicates, conservation efforts, even if they are marketed as ‘participatory’, can create resistance among the local population. For instance, more open or hidden counter-discourse may evolve as a result among the subjects whose living conditions the conservation efforts alter. However, this does not mean that the control strategies are necessarily met by open or hidden resistance by all of their ‘targets’, as some of them may also benefit from the interventions, or use the discourse of ‘participatory conservation’ to promote their own interests.

The opposition between the State and the local people, sometimes assumed by environmentalists or supporters of peasant struggles, can also be over-estimated (Li 2001, 167). The dichotomy between the discourses of the State and of the ‘people’ and the contradicting interests is not always the case, as historically and anthropologically oriented research at different geographic contexts implies (Moore & Vaughan 1994; Brosius 2006; Lund 2008). In some situations, the adjustment of the argument is made to the
circumstances (Lund 2008), so the use of discourses by the actors also depends on the audience. In addition, the process of discourse formation in itself may be rather complex and hybrid. For instance, Moore and Vaughan (1994) show in their research on agricultural history in Zambia, how the scientific interpretations and colonial policies concerning the agricultural practices were also affected by the interpretations of the 'objects' of the research and their encounters with the administrators. The interpretations of the parties were thus mutually determining. The actual level, dynamics and effects of the counter discourse thus need further exploration. The theoretical and methodological insights developed in the actor-oriented school of development sociology, and so-called anthropology of development, are useful to address in examining the scope for the actors to affect the implementation of conservation, and more generally development, interventions.

2.6. Actors’ means and scope of shaping the relationships of power

In Norman Long’s (1992a; 1992b) version of actor-oriented development sociology, the focus of analysis is traditionally on multiple realities and diverse practices of social actors. The concept of power and understanding of discourses is understood in a dynamic sense. The scope for the different actors involved in a particular intervention to challenge the previous power configurations is conceived to be rather wide. Instead of operating through governmentality mechanisms, discourses and their elements are conceived more as resources that the actors can take advantage of and shape when they seek to promote their own goals (e.g. Long 1992b, 23-24). In general, power is seen as the outcome of “…complex struggles and negotiations over authority, status, reputation and resources, and necessitates the enrolment of networks of actors and constituencies” (Long 2004, 30). The understandings and practices of the social actors in shaping the realities they face, such as the interventions, are of key interest in the actor-oriented sociology of development.

In this line of thinking, all social actors are considered capable, even in the condition of severe coercion or restricted social space, of processing social experience, formulating decisions, acting upon them, as well as innovating and experimenting (Long 1992b, 22-25). Organising capacities are a prerequisite for active agency, as the actors’ ability to affect others is bound to the actions of other agents. Agency, in order to be strategic, thus needs the emergence of a network of other actors who become partially enrolled in the ‘project’ of another person or persons. In addition, several actors may occasionally form a collective actor whose interests can differ from those of the individual actors (Long 2001). The term collective actor is used to refer to a coalition of actors who, at certain moment, share similar goals, interests, or values, or a certain definition of a situation, and who agree to pursue certain ends.

The French school of anthropology of development, exemplified e.g. by the work of Olivier de Sardan (2005), has some affinity to the Norman Long’s
actor-oriented school discussed above. It stresses that the negotiations and reinterpretation of the ideas, goals and mechanisms applied in a particular development intervention involve actors at various levels, and occur in several social arenas (Olivier de Sardan 2005). However, an important reservation compared to the Long’s actor-oriented approach comes from the observation that the social actors usually possess uneven material and symbolic resources. There is always some variation in terms of how much various resources the actors and groups have (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 186). The idea of ‘brokers’ can help in explaining the differences in their positions in the processes of negotiation and re-interpretation of the discourses. In the account of Lewis and Mosse (2006, 16), brokers are conceptualised as persons who deal in people and information in the interventions in a way that not only may advance their more or less narrow interests “…but also more broadly in the maintenance of coherent representations of social realities and in the shaping of their own social identities”. While they mediate between the different groups and forms of knowledge (or discourses), they are likely to reformulate ideas. Focus on the strategies, translations, and understandings of the brokers, who act as mediators between the discourse and rationality of the goals and interests of a project and those of the assumed beneficiaries may help to better understand the changes and possible inconsistencies in outlined objectives and the actual practices of an intervention.

In addition, brokers or mediators may build alliances between the parties involved, which can turn out to be a key factor in shaping the outcomes of particular interventions13. The ways through which the negotiations over natural management regimes are represented and shifts in the interpretations by different parties bear relevance for their outcomes, such as the distribution of income from natural resources. Fay (2007, 82-88) argues in relation to the debates on joint management of two protected areas in South Africa that the idea of mutual gains or “win-win scenarios”14, promoted by conservation agencies, turned out to be less useful or even detrimental from the point of view of securing the local interests. In the case of Makuleke, a community involved in the conservation of a corner of Kruger National Park in South Africa, the community representatives tried to make allies with the NGOs which, instead of the win-win scenario, interpreted the negotiation situation in a conflict perspective, as it fit better with their concerns and experiences. The case also shows the dynamisms of discursive strategies used by certain actors and groups in the negotiations over resource control. As suggested by Olivier de Sardan (2005, 63), the actors involved in particular interventions can navigate between several logics, depending on the situation. However, the case shows the contingency of the outcomes of such processes, it was much related to the assembly of actors participating in the negotiation.

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13 In Norman Long’s terminology, the alliances of actors could perhaps be called collective actors.

14 This narrative is commonly used in South Africa by the conservation stakeholders to mask the conflicting interests regarding the protected areas and their resources (Fay 2007).
Similar conception on possibilities opened up by participatory interventions appears in Wilshusen’s work (2003b) on a biodiversity conservation project in the Coastal Pasific region of Colombia. Wilshusen (2003b, 86) argues that the project, in which participation first took place more or less only in the paper, gradually lead to new negotiations between the different interest groups regarding goals as well as means of the project and “...began to build new boundaries of authority”. Activists from previously marginal groups were able to rearticulate understandings of participation, biodiversity and territory to counter previously dominant understandings. Therefore, particular conservation interventions that may first seem to impose expert knowledge and forms of organising the relationships between society and environment may turn out to be used by their subjects to promote their own goals.

In addition, by adopting a certain discourse and transforming it, the local actors may be able to more efficiently approach the other parties involved in a given contestation. For instance, Brosius (2006, 283) argues that phenomenon of resistance to external actors' interventions, and related forms of action and discourse, are open to multiple interpretations. In an examination on the Penan’s attempts to halt logging of rainforests in Sarawak, Brosius (2006) argues that the arguments put forward by a group of Penan actors can be viewed not exclusively as acts of resistance, but at the same time as act of engagement. In their efforts, the Penan attempted to communicate with the other groups, such as timber loggers or civil servants, across the difference. They tried to frame their messages in ways that were intended to be understandable to the other groups. Yet, as others have noted, the strategic use of a certain discourse among the Penan is more common among a particular set of people, including politically active elderly men (Bending & Rosendo 2006). Therefore, the use of a given discourse ‘strategically’ may also vary in relation to social differences within a ‘community’.

However, a source of critique towards the actor-oriented theorising, from the view point of some development sociologists (e.g. Mosse & Lewis 2006) and political ecologists (e.g. Wilshusen 2003a; Ribot & Peluso 2003; Nygren 2004) is that the assumptions underlying the actor-oriented studies may underestimate the significance of the structural power in affecting and constraining the lives and opportunities of individuals and groups. Structural forces often contribute to unequal conditions for different social groups to promote their interests and objectives in the participatory development or conservation interventions. For instance, the institutions and organisations backed up by participatory natural resource management projects have been found to be accountable to up-wards, rather than to the local population (e.g. Ribot 1999).

Furthermore, one of the persistent features in many African states is the high level of rent-seeking or what is commonly labelled as ‘corruption’ (Olivier de Sardan 2005), which can limit to ability of the actors to change the previous patterns of resource control. In addition, when corruption is common, decentralisation of natural resource management, in the sense of transfer of powers from central government to lower levels in the political-
administrative and territorial hierarchy, may simply allow more actors, such as local elites, to participate in corrupt activities (Larson 2005, 52). A similar tendency may occur in the geographically more limited conservation and development projects, although this also is likely to depend much on the form of reforms and existing social relationships. The risk of elite capture increases if there are valuable resources involved and representation of different groups in the governance structure is more or less 'biased' towards some groups. In addition, larger political economic conditions tend to limit the scope for actors to change their position. For instance, lack of infrastructure, poor market prices and unemployment condition the forms of agency and collective action.

The recent works conducted in actor-centered research on development indicate that the agency of the ‘target population’ of an intervention can shape the practices of resource control, but the degree of this remains uncertain, and context-dependent. Through reinterpretation of the discourses that are introduced from ‘above’ by a conservation project or government agency, or through forming alliances with other groups and actors, the local actors may affect the practices of conservation. The ways in which the diverse actors interpret the concepts and their diverse means of promoting their agendas in the negotiations and decision-making can thus also alter the material conditions. Yet, the fact that the actors are not in even positions in the negotiations over the concepts, principles and conditions of resource control, implies that the limits of their agency and the variation between different groups, need to be addressed. This includes paying attention to the differentiated access to available resources by different groups, and reasons underlying it.

2.7. An actor-centered approach to explore the practices of ‘participatory’ resource control

As the above discussion shows, there is a diversity of accounts in the policy arena and research on whether, and if, under which conditions, the discourse of participatory conservation, and related institutional and organisational reforms in resource control, can bring out more socially just and accepted conservation. Optimistic assertions of participatory programs and policies assume that the related processes may create space for (re)negotiation of social relations, and thus contributing to social justice (e.g. Wilshusen 2003b; Hickey & Mohan 2004). Yet, it is not evident that ‘community’ or the individuals and groups that are considered to form one, are likely to have a more say in the control and allocation of resources through such interventions. Others conceive that participatory projects and policies are merely, or mostly, a rhetoric and strategy under which state control of people and resources (or territorialisation) is extended.

The governmentality perspective to conservation or other efforts to increase control and bring about ‘development’ stresses the ways in which discursive power through the operation of institutions and social techniques, changes the understandings and practices of the actors. However, in my
perspective, such processes are complicated by the fact that there are often several competing institutions in a given social arena where such processes take place, such as forest conservation or land tenure (Nujten 2003; Wilshusen 2003a; Nygren 2004; Lund 2008). In addition, the governmentality techniques may not be effective in affecting the ‘subjects’, or they may have unintended effects (Nujten 2005, 17). Therefore, the hegemonic position of a given discourse and related mechanisms of control, and increased territorialisation as a result, should not be taken for granted, but made an object of empirical study.

In this research project, I assume that discursive power operates at different spheres, including the institutions of resource control and the interpersonal sphere of power. Therefore, discourses are not considered one-sidedly as patterns of domination, and being disconnected from practice in a given field. I assume that discourses are embedded in the social institutions, such as law or more informally defined codes of conduct (e.g. Peet & Watts 1996; Neumann 1998; Bryant 2000). The institutions, and the discourses embedded in them, can be assumed to operate in a given way as long as they are ‘put into practice’ and followed afterwards. Through their institutional dimension, discourses can thus shape human action and interaction. Yet, in line with Anthony Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory, I assume that social structures and agency, which refers to transformative human action, are mutually constitutive. The discourses or their elements, such as the meaning of participation or benefit sharing, can also be transformed ‘on the way’, and by the subjects of particular control efforts.

In the analysis of the interpersonal sphere of power in conservation interventions, I conceive discourses as symbolic resources that the actors may deploy in the negotiations over the control of land or other resources. For instance, if conservation efforts and related changes in the patterns of resource control and access are experienced as being imposed by certain groups, they can lead to various forms of resistance, and weaken the control of the protected forests or other resources. In addition, so called hidden transcripts (c.f. Scott 1990), which also include other forms of action than speech, are part of the interpersonal sphere of power. Alternatively, however, the elements of the participatory conservation may gain acceptance among certain actors and groups at the local level, be reinterpreted, and gradually lead to transformations in the practices of resource control. The elements of the ‘dominant’ discourse, such as participation of communities to the control of resources, may also be used as strategies of resisting ‘imposed’ elements of conservation. Therefore, I focus my analysis on the agency and different discursive and non-discursive strategies of the different groups, especially so-called brokers, and their limitations in formation of resource control practices.
3. Methodological choices, research ethics and positionality

3.1 Epistemological position

Epistemologically, the research traditions that I have been mostly engaged with differ partly in their conceptions on the nature of scientific knowledge and its position in relation to other forms of knowledge and action. Yet, within these research fields exploring the nexus of development, power and social change, there are diverse theoretical-methodological approaches and responses to epistemological questions. What is then the scientific knowledge’s relation to social and material reality, and to which extent can or should researchers contribute in offering ‘solutions’ and promoting social transformation?

My interest is, on one part, on the methodology and theorising by certain scholars of development anthropology, or what others have named ethnography of development (Mosse & Lewis 2006), and on the other part in political ecology, which has also connections to social constructivism. Many of researches have been influenced by the actor-oriented school of development that evolved in the 1970s and 1980 among scholars working on rural contexts in Africa and South America. The actor-oriented approach also derived some of its key ideas from the Manchester school’s critical theory (Long 1992a, 7-8). In the critical theory, scientific knowledge is assumed to have an emancipatory potential, and thus enabling transformation of reality. However, the scholars of anthropology of development distance themselves of the most normative thinking in development studies, and stress the importance of empirical open-endedness in research (Mosse & Lewis 2006, 1-13).

In the actor-oriented framework, the social scientist is generally assumed to construct knowledge by combining the accounts of the actors, and other sources of knowledge. As argued by Olivier de Sardan (2005, 63), its methodological approach “…combines fieldwork focused on actors’ points of view and strategies (a process that is by definition ‘participatory’) with an ‘as-objective-as-possible’ analysis of their contradictions and contexts (a process which is by definition ‘extractive’).” This approach can also be conceived as a form of methodological individualism, in that it gives priority to the conceptions and actions of the actors ‘at the base’ of development interventions (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 63).

The researchers working from the post-structuralistic theoretical perspective usually are engaged with some version of social constructivism. They emphasise the constructive aspects of knowledge, including knowledge produced by scientific institutions (Peet & Watts 1996; Neumann 2005). Discourses, including those produced by science, construct possibilities, constraints, categories and knowledge (Neumann 2005, 98). Yet, thinking from the point of view of social constructivism rises up questions about the limits of knowledge, its truth value and relevance for practice. In the most extreme forms of constructivism, scientific knowledge appears only as another discourse, which paves the way to relativism. In relativism, there are
also no means of justifying higher reliability of one form of knowledge over another.

This idea, however, is not accepted by all constructivists, e.g. scholars of post-structuralistic political ecology (Neumann 2005). As Fairhead and Leach (1998) argue in their comparative research on deforestation dynamics in West Africa, the mainstream scientific knowledge about the rate of deforestation, also supported in the policies, was not consistent what had happened in the bio-physical environment. Through careful analysis of biophysical data, and tracking of 'alternative perspectives' from the population living in the area, they were able to show inconsistencies in the scientific knowledge and other discourses on forest history, and challenge the previous dominant discourse on deforestation\textsuperscript{15}. Thus, cross-checking or triangulation through using different types of information and sources is an important methodological ‘tool’ that can help to over-come the challenge of being trapped in relativism. In line with the scholars representing actor-oriented methodological approaches, or those deriving from them, many political ecologists also stress the possibility of emancipation opened up by critical research.

So-called constrained constructivism and critical realism are epistemological alternatives to the strict version of constructivism (Neumann 2005, 49-51). Constrained constructivism stresses that our understanding of the world and society is structured by our interactions with the world, as well as positionality, which encompasses diverse historical, cultural, geographic and social dimensions. This reminds of Bourdieus' idea on reflexivity in social science. The social location or 'habitus' of the scientists is essential in that it conditions knowledge (Delanty 1997, 115).

There is also some over-lapping between critical realism and the constrained constructivism. Critical realism argues that science does not exist in vacuum from other forms of knowledge. Yet, as realism in general, critical realism defends the need for causal explanation, also in social science (Delanty 1997, 129-130). Critical realism can be divided in to research methodologies, in relation to how abstraction is produced, namely extensive or intensive (Sayer 1992). Intensive methodology is based on detailed exploration of relationships of causality between given objects. Critical realists assume that social reality can be explored in a meaningful way although our concepts of it are theory-laden.

I position myself nearest to the critical constructivist approach to epistemology, which Delanty positions close to critical realism. The difference between the two is the critical realists' concern for discovering generative mechanisms within an objectively existing social reality (Delanty 1997, 112). Critical constructivism argues that empirical reality can only be known through our cognitive structures. It departs from the autopoietic versions of constructivism in which science, including social science, is perceived as a closed system of knowledge, disconnected from public discourse, and other

\textsuperscript{15} In Reframing Deforestation, Fairhead and Leach (1998) argue that the extent of deforestation has been largely over-estimated in the region, as the actual deforestation has been only 1/3 of the estimation suggested earlier.
forms of knowledge (Delanty 1997, 139-141). In critical or ‘radical’ constructivism, a hermeneutic relationship to reality is assumed, so there is social reality outside science. Yet, the critical version of constructivism does not assume that social science could be used for emancipation as such, because of the condition of indeterminacy in modern era. Instead, social scientific knowledge is conceived as emancipatory in the sense that it can play a mediatory role in clarifying the direction of social change.

3.2. Research as a process

I first personally encountered biodiversity conservation as being problematic, such as the assumptions underlying conservation projects and some of their contradictions, during my first visit to the East Usambaras in 1999. At that time, I had the opportunity to work with some small-scale farmers in Amani, southern part of the EUM, while conducting my undergraduate studies in forestry. Some of the forest conservation activities appeared to stay in a rather sharp conflict with the local people’s needs and aspirations, in spite of the idea to make conservation compatible with the promotion of social and economic goals. This short stay made me pose questions about the ability of the selected strategies to meet the given goals in a longer term, e.g. whether promotion of cash crop cultivation would diminish the pressure towards forest resources and provide a sustainable mode of production and income for the local farmers. This experience, and several other reasons, led me to conduct doctoral studies in the area. The EUM was an interesting site to conduct research also because it was among the first places where ICDP model and JFM had been tried out biodiversity-rich forest areas in Tanzania.

Shifting from a forestry perspective towards a social scientific one made me think about the problematic from a less managerial viewpoint. I became more interested in ‘how and why questions’, e.g. how conservation projects were affected by and, on the other hand, shaping the relationships between the different groups and organisations. My methodological approach evolved on the course of the study when I became more familiar with the previous and on-going theoretical and methodological debates. From the beginning I was more interested in exploring particular interventions and processes in a particular spatial setting, rather than on the global or national scale, although they are of course interconnected.

The empirical material in the study area was collected in three stages between 2003 and 2008. The first field work in the southern part of the EUM lasted for about seven weeks in the end of 2003. However, the field was broader than the specific study area. I also spent a few weeks in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, visiting officials at the FBD’s offices, and research institute and libraries. By the time of my visit in 2003, I had formulated some preliminary hypotheses regarding the multitude of interests on and meaning of the forest and other ‘resources’, which were likely to cause disputes in the conservation efforts and shape their outcomes. I was also interested in the differences between the principles and assumptions of
forest conservation as they appeared in the policy level, where community involvement was stressed, and the practices of resource control and benefit sharing. This preliminary field work stage enabled me to rethink the questions and to get a better overall picture of the area, the diverse actors and their concerns.

An important, and even ‘critical’, event during my first field work was a visit to IBC Msasa. The atmosphere in the village, especially in Makanya sub-village, was very tense because of the on-going compensation dispute related to the establishment of a forest corridor, designed to enhance biodiversity conservation. The situation I encountered in the village made me interested in studying the Derema process further during the next trip. In addition, the villagers I met in IBC Msasa were mostly very willing to discuss and share their experiences and views on the conservation intervention.

Later on, I develop my ideas and approach through discussions with my supervisors and colleagues, and reading and reflecting upon the experiences and materials I had acquired. In addition, I discussed the research with others who had worked in the area. This gave me an opportunity to compare my ideas with those of other ‘outsiders’. I became more interested in analysing the power dynamics, strategies and outcomes of processes, where the conservation and control of the forests was negotiated between the actors and different social groups. I made an effort to identify and explore in more detail particular processes or ‘cases’ in relation to the resource control and conservation. In this sense, my research can also be characterised as a case study. Case studies usually consist of identifying and exploring in detail critical cases, which enable to build up knowledge on social phenomena in a very context-sensitive way (Flyvbjerg 2001). In case study approach the analysis is primarily guided by small questions, which start from the empirical realities.

Yet, there was interaction between theoretical debates and my personal experience and observations made in the field. My questions, observations and thoughts on the topic did not merely emerge from the experiences and empirical data, but were informed by previous knowledge, including ideas received from reading other researchers’ works and discussions with others. During the second field work period, from December 2004 to mid-May 2005, and my last short visit to the EUM in 2008, my aim was to understand how the different groups of actors are positioned in the control, their strategies, and the interplay between the conservation interventions and other processes affecting resource control.

3.3. Methods, materials and analysis

Most of the research material was collected through semi-structured interviews and thematic interviews of groups and individuals, and participatory observation. The most important research site was the southern part of the East Usambaras, and the villages surrounding the ANR. Yet, in line with the approach of anthropology of development, I assumed that although the ‘site’ of study would be local, the broad-scale analysis of
transversal logics of action, such as extra-local resources of actors or the intervention of 'outsiders' (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 2005), was necessary to take into account. I thus engaged with actors and agencies operating outside the area, which had been influential and shared interests in the future of the area.

In total, I worked with research assistants in eight villages of the eighteen 'buffer zone' villages bordering the ANR, and in one village bordering the proposed Manga Joint Forest Reserve in the lowlands (figure 3). The first field work, in the end of 2003, was conducted in six villages (table 2). In five of them, I stayed only for two or three days, whereas in Ubiri, I spent about a week. In all of the study villages, diverse conservation strategies had been promoted by various projects and organisations for several years, although their actual selection and timing varied. For instance, in IBC Msasa and Mikwinini, certain participatory approaches had been introduced already during the 1980s by the IUCN.

Figure 3. Location of the study villages in the southern part of the East Usambaras. Map produced by Dr. Jaclyn Hall, University of Florida.
The study villages were chosen so that they varied according to their altitude, and their location in relation to the boundaries of the reserved forests, land use patterns and social characteristics. The rate of residents originating from the district and other areas was initially to be used as criteria too, but the exact data was not available for all of the villages. Four of the study villages were at upper elevations, above 800 meters above sea level (a.s.l.), and two at the lower altitude, between 100 and 400 meters a.s.l., where the climate is drier and soil more fertile. Most of the villages and sub-villages where I worked in did not have access to electricity, although some few households, including more well-off people, were connected to the electricity network.

I only visited Kwatango next to Manga forest reserve in 2003, and shortly in 2008. This was in order to focus the study geographically and due to unexpected problems in the field. My plan was to spend a longer time in the lowland area and visit some of the neighbouring villages, but due to the sudden death of my research assistant, I did not follow this plan. Instead, I visited shortly Sakale, outside the ANR's buffer zone, where people had recently started to mine gold.

The ANR is a fragmented area, with two ‘Enclaves’ which are basically non-reserved land. Ubiri, Mboomole, IBC Msasa, Gereza and Sakale are located outside the outer boundaries of the reserve. Two of the study villages, Shebomeza and Sangarawe, the sub-village of Mlesa, were in the Enclave I (1807 hectares), where small scale cultivation both in open land and under the forest is common (the ANR General Management Plan 1998). In addition, the tea estates occupy about one fifth of the area, and there is a little natural forest left. Mikwinini village is located within the Enclave II (337 hectares), where about half of the area is under the tea estates and one fifth is covered by food-crop cultivation, whereas about ten percent of is planted with eucalyptus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village name &amp; population</th>
<th>Number of sub-villages in this study</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Principal interview methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ubiri (840)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>upland, bordering the ANR</td>
<td>Individual and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikwinini (673)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>upland, enclave II of the ANR</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC Msasa (2200)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>upland, bordering the ANR and Derema</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shebomeza (1873)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>upland, enclave I of the ANR</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gereza (850)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>lowland, bordering the ANR</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwatango (961)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>lowland, bordering Manga forest reserve</td>
<td>Groups and a few individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Names and locations of villages studied and principal interview methods. Population figures from village authorities.
The semi-structured format was applied in most interviews in order to keep the interviews flexible and to allow the interviewees to express their own interpretations (Bryman 2001). It was also selected because I did not speak Swahili fluently, so it was useful to have most of the contents of the questions ready for the assistant. Participatory observation included listening of people, observing their behaviour and asking questions (c.f. Bryman 2001). However, the level of participatory observation, for instance, whether I could make additional questions of interest, also depended on the language of communication and the atmosphere of the encounter. In addition, I made observations regarding the practices of resource use in the study villages and in the reserve. This was to cross-check information and get additional knowledge. Most of the time, I wrote a field work diary where I made notes about my observations, and sometimes included reflections that evolved as a result of discussion with informants and research assistants.

The group interviews were conducted separately for men and women, as women were less likely to contribute to the discussion if men were present, or very few women were confident to do so. The group interviews included between four and twelve participants. Mostly, the interviews were recorded and translated by another person. The criteria for selecting the interviewees were to find people from diverse social backgrounds, including people with different educational backgrounds, gender, and age. The participants were usually only from one sub-village. The method of selecting participants, however, could be affected by the existing social networks of the village authorities as they often helped to find people to participate. In addition to the groups of villagers, the chair person or other leaders of the village, such as village secretary, and members of the VEC were interviewed, in groups or individually. I also had informal discussions with them in many of the villages.

In Ubiri, I worked for ten days living at the teacher’s house. I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with individuals, to develop a more comprehensive understanding on the potential differences between social groups’ perceptions, interests and experiences related to conservation. The selection of the interviewees was mostly based on a wealth ranking exercise. The normal way of conducting the wealth ranking would be to do it in a group. However, I did not use the group approach to avoid the domination of the ranking by the most influential people. In the wealth ranking, the names of household heads from two of the sub-villages were first listed with the help of the village chairman and written down to a piece of paper. Then, the ranking was carried out by three individuals separately, including the chairman. The persons who conducted the ranking set the names into different wealth categories according to their own understanding, and explained the reasons they used for differentiating. Two of the informants used five wealth classes in the ranking exercise, whereas one of them - the village leader - used seven classes. The results were then aggregated to

16 In Manga, I did not have a chance to visit the reserve due to the accident encountered by the assistant.
divide the villagers into three wealth categories (poor-middle-rich) in order to make the selection process easier. Yet, in this system, the aggregation of the results from separate exercises was somewhat problematic, e.g. counting the means played down the differences in certain cases. Interviewees were then selected of each category so that the interviewees would be representative of the different groups[^17]. In addition, I interviewed an elderly person from another sub-village, and from outside the ranking. This was in order to get information on the history of forest control.

Out of the people interviewed in Ubiri ten were women and fourteen were men. In cases where the wife of the male household head was interviewed personally, the ranking of her husband was used. In some of the cases, however, the husband could have several wives, which was unfortunately not taken into account in the ranking. Other people interviewed included a community representative of the advisory board of nature reserve, the secretary of the 18 buffer zone villages’ environmental committees, local tour guides of the ANR, the staff of the ANR, field staff of the Tanzanian Forest Research Institute, and a tea company manager. In addition, higher level officials of FBD in Tanga and Dar es Salaam as well as a few researchers and experts engaged in different conservation-related activities were interviewed through thematic interviews.

In the early stage of the research process, I was interested in participatory methods. It was less because of their assumed empowerment of the local people but more because of the promise to gather material quickly and reach other than oral information. On top of the wealth ranking exercise discussed above, a time-line was drawn in two of the villages in order to assess the important past events and problems in the locality. In addition, a participatory mapping exercise was done in most of the villages. The idea was to draw resource maps to understand the villagers' conceptions about their environment, and the importance of different social and environmental elements to them. However, it was sometimes difficult to make the participants to express their ideas in equal terms. In addition, my own experience of their use was quite limited. I felt that to use them properly would require more resources in terms of people and knowledge. Thus, I decided to give up those methods, although the testing stage contributed to the research by providing some additional information on historical issues.

During the second field work, I made mostly individual semi-structured interviews in the villages in the EUM. Table 3 below presents the characteristics of the interview data collected during the second field work. I worked mostly in the same villages as during the first field work, but also spent some time in the villages where many people had been engaged in the gold mining activities, including Sangarawe (subvillage of Mlesa) and Mbomole. In addition, I worked in Sakele, the main mining site, and conducted interviews with miners. In the village and its surroundings, there were population centres named according to urban areas, such as Kariakoo

[^17]: Yet, I found out that a middle-aged lady had been left out of the list. The person had rather recently moved back to the village, and she was not much involved in the village life. I decided to interview the lady, whom I ranked to the poorest category based on my own observation and other people’s account.
of the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. This area, located near Monga tea camp, was largely occupied by the miners’ tents, huts and mining pits at that time. Yet, during the second field work, IBC Msasa was the main study site.

As during the first stage, people from different social backgrounds were interviewed. I identified potential respondents with the help of the research assistants, previous contacts and other interviewees. Moreover, I interviewed members of the Village Environmental Committees, either individually or in groups. Most of the interviews were recorded with a tape recorder. Exceptions were made if the interviewee was not willing to be recorded, or in a few cases due to the failing of the recording.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village name &amp; population</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of group interviews</th>
<th>Number of individual interviews (m/f)</th>
<th>Number of interviews, total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ubiri (840)</td>
<td>bordering ANR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (2/3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikwinini (637)</td>
<td>enclave of ANR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 (5/1)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC Msasa (2200)</td>
<td>bordering ANR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32 (20/12)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shebomeza (1873)</td>
<td>enclave of ANR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13 (11/2)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gereza (850)</td>
<td>bordering ANR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 (3/3)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mlesa (2750) (Sangarawe Subvillage)</td>
<td>enclave of ANR, upland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (3/1)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbomole (1950)</td>
<td>bordering ANR, upland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (8/1)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakale (2050)</td>
<td>north from the border of ANR, upland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 (12/3)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Names and locations of study villages and number of interviews, including number of female (f) and male (m) interviewees. Village population data from the village council and Muheza District Council’s Office.

In the individual interviews, normally only the person being interviewed was present. However, in a few cases where I intended to conduct an individual interview, children or other relatives or neighbours were present. I did not consider it proper to ask them to leave, if the interviewed person did not themselves do it. In addition, especially with elderly people, it was sometimes useful to have other members of family around because they could help the respondent to memorise things or add informative details.
At the second stage, a small household survey (n=48) was also conducted in two sub-villages of IBC Msasa, named Makanya and Kwekuyu. The survey was based on a random sample, drawn from a list of household heads provided by the village authorities. It included both closed and open-ended questions. The objective was to get data about land use patterns, the significance of forests in the local livelihoods, and the strategies in relation to the Derema conservation process. The sub-villages were chosen because of their rather different, but interesting relation to conservation interventions. Makanya was in the middle of the Derema where as Kwekuyu was closer to ANR. The sub-villages were also socially different. In Makanya, many people were Shambaa, whereas Kwekuyu was more heterogeneous. The survey was conducted with the help of an assistant.

In IBC Msasa, I also participated in two meetings related to forest conservation and village development. One was a meeting of the Village Environmental Committee, and the other was a meeting of the representatives of the farmers who had organised themselves to make claims on the compensations in the Derema Corridor process. The meetings were recorded. I participated in the meetings as an observer, even though my presence certainly had some effect on how the meetings were conducted. The use of tape recorder could possibly ‘distort’ the discussions somewhat. In addition, in the transcriptions of the meetings, the identity of the speakers could not be identified for the most part, as the quality of the recording varied and the number of people was high. Some of the participants were also new to me.

While staying in the rest house of the ANR and otherwise often spending time at the headquarters of the reserve, I became more familiar with some of the people working there, and many of the tour guides. These contacts, and the informal discussions I had with some of them, were also important. They could give backgrounds of certain ‘problems’ and areas of confrontation between the reserve’s management and the villagers or other groups. In addition, they shed light on the relationships within and between organisations involved in the conservation and control of the forests.

One way of contextualising the accounts of the actors was to investigate the history of resource control, including the institutional context and, the larger social and economic forces. As discussed earlier, there have been several research projects and conservation interventions in the study area that provided a source of secondary material. Most of the academic research, however, has been conducted in the field of natural sciences. The most important research reports on social and political aspects of land use and conservation in the EUM that I used as secondary material were by Jambiya and Sosovele (2001), Woodcock (2002) and Conte (2004). Their results and arguments were addressed when exploring the history and in the empirical chapters. Moreover, I used a range of project documents and studies ordered by the projects, such as ‘grey’ and more official reports on Derema and ANR. They were accessed through contacts, library visits as well as browsing in the web. They contributed to the construction of the history of conservation efforts, their changing strategies, their problems and some of
the outcomes. With the help of the secondary material, I was able also to contextualise some of the contestations around the forests and land.

During the analysis and writing, which I conducted at different stages, I used different ways of approaching the materials. The strategies were related to the type of material at hand, and the characteristics and quality of the material. I analysed the contents of the interviews and discussions I had been able to follow and record ‘selectively’, with focus on the issues, actors and processes that were most of interest to me. I addressed the contents of the discourse as well as how things were expressed. This included paying attention to the representations and expressions used by the actors about themselves, other actors or organisations. In addition, in line with the approach suggested by Feirman (1990, 21), I paid attention to the characteristics of the discursive situation, e.g. from which position, or institutional context, the speaker was communicating.

When exploring the secondary materials, research literature and ‘grey documents’, I focused on analysing the discursive practices used in them, e.g. the ways of defining the problem, goals and solutions. Yet, I also approached them as partial accounts of the historical events, changes and processes regarding forests, land use and conservation efforts in the study area. Yet, this double positioning in relation to the secondary data made it necessary to try to cross-check the information presented in the documents with other sources, such as accounts of the actors who had been involved in particular interventions or negotiations. In the analysis, I sought to compare information from different sources in building a trajectory of forest use and conservation in the East Usambaras, and exploring the relationships of co-operation and confrontation between the groups involved in resource control.

3.4. Working with research assistants

The role of the research assistants was a crucial one in my research, and thus deserves some reflection. I worked with five assistants (four male and one female), one assistant at a time. All of them were living in the East Usambaras and had worked as tour guides in the ANR. They all had secondary education, so their command of English was quite good. Due to this, and their work as tour guides and more frequent contacts with people from outside the area, they can be considered as being better connected and educated than most people in the study villages. As tour guides, their main tasks was to take tourists to visit the forests and provide them information on the region’s environment and history. They had also other activities and sources of livelihood than the job of a guide, mainly farming and keeping cattle. Some of them had been working as research assistants previously.

Due to my limited language skills in Swahili, and other locally used languages, I needed interpreters for most of the time when communicating with the interviewees. In addition to interpreting the questions and responses and other discussions, the research assistants often acted as ‘gatekeepers’ and introduced me to villages. First, they introduced me to the village authorities, which is a necessary step in conducting research in
countryside. The assistants also helped to find suitable persons to discuss with. However, there was a tendency of meeting first the most influential people, such as former village leaders, teachers or those who had been active in conservation. Yet, I tried to overcome this by instructing the assistants to also find people who were not that famous or ‘successful’. Furthermore, they were of great help in organising the practicalities of field work (figure 4).

![Figure 4. Tour guide and field assistant Mr Godfrey Msumari on the way to Gereza village, located in the south western side of the EUM, close to the Amani Nature Reserve. (picture by the author, February 2005).](image)

During my first field work, a leader of the local tour guides, Mr Peter Kabimba, worked as my assistant and interpreter. He was a middle-aged man with a wife and three children. Mr Kabimba had lived his childhood in the tea camp and later on in a village in Amani Division, and visited other areas of the country. On top of guiding, he was a farmer, and had in-depth knowledge on the environment. He knew well many of the villages and individuals in the study areas. In the 1990s, he had worked for the IUCN project as a village coordinator. Our co-operation was generally smooth, but the previous role of the assistant as a worker of the IUCN was sometimes reflected in the way he approached the farmers, e.g. he could try to ‘sensitise’ the participants of a group interview in some conservation related issues. I thus put effort in trying to clarify the differences between the types
of jobs, and emphasising the need to try to get the understanding of people as such, without judging if they were 'wrong' or 'right'.

While working in the poorly accessible lowland village of Kwatango in November 2003, Mr Kabimba fell seriously sick, and his condition worsened in a short time. This incident happened soon after an accident that he encountered when shifting our luggage by motorbike. Myself, and the family whose house we stayed at did not understand the seriousness of his condition until it was too late. In the village, there was actually a dispensary, a local health station, but it had only one staff member, no doctor nor any proper facilities. There was no access to telephone or a car in the village. Mr Kabimba did not recover after being admitted to hospital in Muheza after a few days. His sudden death was of course a shock to his wife, children, the group of tour guides, as well as his friends and many others who had the chance to know him. His death and the following sorrow made me more involved in his family's life, e.g. through the arrangements of his funeral. Losing a research assistant and a friend was also a shock to me. It made the research project stuck for some time. During the rest of my visit in 2003, I did not conduct more field work in the villages.

The fact that I worked with several assistants had both benefits and disadvantages. It always took a while to find a way to communicate and work together. There was variation in how detail the assistant managed to translate the contents of the interviews, and how well I could understand them. None of them were professional interpreters, which meant that the interviews and other communication situations were sometimes not conducted in as neutral a way as possible. However, we tried to improve the methods of communicating on the course of the research. With some of them the risk of losing information in the translation was bigger than with others. To some extent, the problem was addressed by recording the interviews. The recording partly helped to overcome the problem of not understanding the details of the responses and discussion in the first place.

Yet, the lack of common language in many situations and the need to rely on interpreters made my encounters with the interviewees sometimes frustrating. I felt that the communication occasionally remained superficial and less spontaneous compared to the situations where I was able to communicate directly. In addition, there were occasions when the interpreter suddenly made an additional comment, perhaps intended as a joke, or expressed the question in his own words, which was likely to affect the response. Yet, my language skills developed during the process. During the end of the second fieldwork I was able to better follow also informal discussions, and to chat with people directly with some confidence.

Acknowledging the limitations, the use of research assistants had some advantages. The fact that the assistants had been brought up and living in the study area aided through providing in-depth information about things at hand, and through facilitating the contacts and practicalities. They often helped by giving a contextualisation of certain places, ideas, and the backgrounds of events or people. In the first stages, the assistants often explained to me how I should behave in order to respect the cultural codes of
conduct. Yet, I sometimes took some liberties in following the recommendations due to practical reasons e.g. wearing trousers as we mostly moved by bicycle or motorcycle. I could also use my status as *mzungu* (white person or foreigner in Swa.) as an excuse to ask more or less self-evident things.

The research assistants also helped me to contextualise diverse points that came up in the interviews. For instance, they could interpret local sayings or proverbs. In addition, in terms of assessing the social position of the different people, their knowledge was useful. Yet, the situation, and level of ‘inside’ knowledge they had also varied between the villages and families. Their ‘insider’ position was also a constraint, as they were more likely to have their own agendas influencing on whom I should talk to or what issues we should try to avoid, compared to someone from outside. By getting to know them better, and cross-checking information with others, I was able to reduce the biases that could result from relying too much on their information and understanding.

3.5. Questions of motivation, positionality and research ethics

My motivation to conduct this research project derived from various sources, and changed somewhat along the way. The topic was of interest to me as it was related to one of the key global environmental concerns, the loss biodiversity, and the problems or challenges of sustaining the diverse values of the tropical forests. I conceive that conservation efforts are justified because of the utilitarian value related to the forests, e.g. ecosystem functions, and also because of the non-use or ‘existence’ value of nature, and our connectedness with other species and abiotic nature.

Yet, the major justification for this research was related to the concern on the social and political aspects of biodiversity conservation. I become to perceive the social side of the ‘conservation coin’ as more important to explore and address, especially in economically poor contexts. Historically, the negative social effects of conservation of wildlife or forests on local populations in Africa have arguably also undermined the ecological objectives, although the debate on this issue remains vivid. Furthermore, even if the development aspirations and livelihood concerns of the local population are officially given as much attention as the conservation goals, they can be still overlooked in practice (e.g. Neumann 2005). In addition, there were several other, more personal, reasons, to conduct the research project, such as willingness to broaden my knowledge on development studies, previous experiences in and interest in the study area.

As my concern was more on the social and power aspects of conservation, it meant working more with people than trees, which makes the questions of ethics focal in many situations. My position as a researcher and ‘outsider’ was not always easy to make clear and maintain, as I worked with people who had quite different backgrounds and expectation about the research. Some of the interviewees were familiar with scientific discourse and principles of doing research whereas most of them were not. On the
other hand, I was not familiar with many aspects of life in the East Usambaras and could first try to communicate with concepts strange to them. However, I think that I managed to improve my understanding somewhat throughout the process, and there was more common ground towards the end.

In principle, the interviewed people, both villagers and forest staff, and other parties, were promised anonymity in the research publication. This was to enable them to express their thoughts more freely. I used pseudonyms for the villagers, whereas to others I referred by using their title or position. In the latter case, the protection of the identity was somewhat weaker, as there were only one or a few individuals operating in a given position at a time.

In the interview situations, I wanted to stress that my role as a research, and a student, was a different from project staff or NGO people, as I was not to make any plans or provide funding for projects. At the villages, I or my interpreter introduced me as a student of development studies, whose aim was to do research on the villagers’ involvement in forest management and conservation, and the related benefits and problems. Yet, the emphasis that people used to put on the importance of conserving the forest, especially in the first encounters, and the tendency of village authorities to stress their need for further education and seminars on environmental issues, indicates that they conceived me as representing or somehow being connected to the projects that had been promoting conservation of forests in the area. The findings about the commonness of ‘pro-conservation’ discourse are thus likely to be affected by this positioning.

In spite of the fact that my aim was to have as objective as possible relationship to the different groups I engaged with during the research, there were certain moments in which I was close to turning into a development adviser or activist, and did not stay ‘impartial’. Even if my aim was not to try to affect the on-going processes directly, I realised that my work there has effects on the people and organisations I was engaged with, directly and indirectly. This could happen, for instance, through asking a question which could provoke a change in someone’s thinking. My research interests and choices were, to some degree, affected by the interviewees’ experiences and perceptions of being treated in an unfair way in the Derema process.

I was often faced with the question about the benefits of the research to the farmers whom I discussed with. I usually explained that the research could have a small contribution to the study villages’ development projects directly, through the fee paid by visitors to the ANR, of which a certain percentage should go to the villages. This was a purposeful strategy through which I could justify my requests for the time and help of the villagers. In addition, through my questions, I think that the research spread knowledge on some of the issues related to management strategy and rights of the villagers, as many people were not aware of the agreement between the villages and the ANR. In addition, I mentioned that the results can inform the policy makers, officials and donors’ representatives who make decisions
on policies and interventions. Thus, I explained that my research might have indirect effects, but I could not promise how or when.

Some of the informants had expectations about my ability to bring them development projects or help them in other way, despite of the explanations we had given about my role. Sometimes in the end of the interview, when I asked if the interviewee had anything to ask or comment, the interviewee could ask how I could help in accessing funds or resources for certain development initiative or if I could help to bring their concerns to other actors, such as the donors or organisations conducting development projects. Therefore it was not simple to communicate the local farmers my ‘separateness’ to the donors and development projects. The phenomena also reflects more common expectations towards a *mzungu*, where ‘Westerners’ are easily considered as being involved in, or at least connected with, development projects and funding agencies. I think this connection to other actors could not be totally avoided, and the responses needed to be contextualised and interpreted critically, bearing in mind the possibility of strategic responses in those situations.

In addition, as in the case of any researcher conducting empirical social scientific research, my positions in relation to different informants differed according to various factors, including age, education, gender and the language used. The most important issues for me were related to language differences, and my partial understanding of the local languages, as well as anticipated or experienced social proximity. The level of proximity was related to place of origin and the differences in life conditions and experiences.

In spite of the obvious distance in terms of dissimilar social backgrounds with most of the people I communicated with in the villages, in some occasions, the interviewees could come up with interesting connections between our experiences and cultures, thus narrowing the ‘gap’ between us. An example of this was an account given by an elderly man, *mzee* (Swa. for elderly person) Paul during a forest walk in Makanya. *Mzee* Paul explained me about the rituals that used to be conducted in the forest by his ancestors. He then argued that also the Westerners (*wazungu* in Swa.) had their traditions, as he had observed them conducting certain rituals. *Mzee* Paul explained: “When I was learning tailoring in Amani, *wazungu* came and went there, they took beers with them and they did their things. Yes, everyone has traditions, there is nobody without them” (interview, 14.1.2008, Makanya).

I think that my forestry background helped me in certain situations, albeit it was also a constraint in terms of limited experience in conducting social scientific research. However, I could make use of it, for instance, when discussing with or interviewing such people who worked for the FBD and had often themselves been trained in forestry. In spite of the fact that there are differences in the training between different countries, so the forestry background helped me in the sense that it was often relatively easy to find a common language with the forestry experts.
3.6. Strengths and weaknesses of methodology

My skills in and approach of conducting research evolved during the process. The principal research methods, semi-structured interviews of groups and individuals and participatory observation, provided a rich material for the research, which was contextualised and 'enriched' by other sources of information. At the start, I mainly relied on group interviews, some participatory methods and observation during forest visits in the proximity of the villages. Later on, after reflecting on the work and getting more experience, I put emphasis to individual interviews and observation.

The group interviews offered a good way to get people to chat, and allowed for cross-checking. Participants could correct if someone did not remember or otherwise did not tell things in a way that others would accept. However, the mixing of people from different social backgrounds was often a constraint as the participants could not express their views as openly as possible, and it affected that whose ‘voices’ were give priority. In some group interviews, I observed an effort to try to ‘silence’ someone from expressing his or her concerns, if they were contrary to the contents of the ‘on-stage discourse’ or the public transcript that was being presented and accepted by others in the group.

In addition, in the group interviews, the younger people were generally not as active as the elderly people, probably due to cultural reasons, e.g. that elderly people are to be respected by younger ones. In addition, if individuals from village leadership or the village committees were present in the group, the others were not so eager or confident to share their perspectives. When interviewing groups of women, it was also difficult to get the perspectives of all of the participants. For instance, in an interview of a group of women in IBC Msasa (16.3.2005), it was only one or two of the women who were expressing their views, even though the female research assistant tried to encourage others to participate in the discussion. At the second field work period, I decided to use more individual interviews to avoid the above problems. I also tried not to rely too much on the help of the village authorities in selecting the people for interviews, as their own preferences could play a role in selection. In addition, participatory observation on the villages, the meetings and in the forests provided a useful way to cross-check things.

There occurred a few situations, most often with elderly and those from the poorer social groups, when the interviews could not be finished, because the respondents were not willing to respond anymore. This was partly due to misunderstandings. Furthermore, another limitation in the interview material was occasional bypassing of questions. This was because of the unwillingness or inability of the interviewees to answer certain questions, as well as my interest in asking specific information from certain individuals. Another limitation with the material was that the level of transcriptions of the interviews and meetings was not always high due to the poor quality of the recording and the distance of the speakers from recorder, which also set limits to the analysis.
During the first stages of the field work, I came to realise that some of the questions were not formulated with enough care, in terms of being sensitive enough. For instance, the question “Have you faced any problems related to the presence of the forest?” did not work very well. Many villagers were not ready to discuss problems openly, as it was not appropriate to criticise others directly. It also appeared that some of the informants had interpreted the question about the problems in a different way as I had meant it, as the following example from a group interview illustrates: “We thought you were talking of the problems caused by man like someone going there and measuring up his own piece of land to be his farm” (interview of a group of men, 20.10.2003, Ubiri).

The use of English as a communication language with part of the informants enabled me to make instantly additional questions with them and ask for clarification, where as with those people with whom we used Swahili, the connection was less direct. When a third person was needed to mediate the messages, there was more room for misunderstandings. It affected the level of analysis as well, as the discursive practices of the farmers could not be analysed in as in-depth manner as possible. Yet, towards the end of the second field work, my Swahili skills improved so that I could participate in simple conversations, and make additional or follow-up questions in the interviews. In addition, the interviews of people who were more knowledgeable about conservation efforts, village involvement and history of interventions and control efforts offered the most relevant material and most detailed accounts. They were often more confident in sharing their ideas and experiences. Yet, this also ‘distorted’ the analysis in the sense that they were given generally more attention in the analysis. In addition, the perspectives and experiences of those social groups who were not so much involved in the communal issues did not receive equal emphasis in the analysis.

The approach of connecting and interviewing actors and organisations at different ‘levels’, and collecting different types of material made the research rather demanding in terms of need for time and organising. Yet, it was helpful in order to explore the non-local dimensions of resource control, and set the accounts of different parties in a larger picture. The interventions, actors’ responses, and changing practices cannot be understood in isolation from the larger scale. Thus, I made an effort to include the role played by actors and processes at other levels, as well as exploration of the historical context. Conducting the research at different stages allowed me to develop the methodology during the process. Nevertheless, it was a challenge to get a coherent view on the developments that had occurred at the times when I was not conducting the field work, e.g. due to changing people in different positions, new actors and organisations involved in the area. I do not think that I managed to fill all the gaps and thus the knowledge I was able to construct is somewhat fragmentary. Yet, with the help of the previous experiences, and reading and discussions in between the field works, there was scope for distancing myself from the field, and formulating new questions and ideas. The relatively long time-frame also
gave an opportunity to follow certain interesting processes, as well as shifts in the interventions, within a longer time span.
4. History of land use and forest control in the East Usambaras

4.1. Tracking continuities and shifts in the resource control

As the previous discussion suggests, fluctuations in the formal institutions affect how ‘nature’ and its different elements are conceived, negotiated and accessed by different social groups. Exploration on the discursive changes in these institutions, and how they are interpreted and received by agents of government and their subjects, provides a means to approach the more recent developments in natural resource control. The formal institutions supported by the state power can be regarded as an important source of authority for different groups and actors, as they provide legitimisation for use of power (von Benda-Beckmann 2005; Lund 2008). Yet, they are being negotiated between the different groups, who sometimes rely on other sources of power. Therefore, they do not determine the control of natural resources as such, and need to be addressed in combination with other processes of change.

In this chapter, I construct a trajectory of natural resource control in the EUM, largely relying on existing research and documentation. The main focus is on the changes in the discourses, and the related rationalities, embedded in the formal institutions on natural resources, such as laws, policies, and forest conservation strategies. In addition, I address the implementation of the formal institutions of resource control in the EUM and more widely, and related struggles. Firstly, I introduce key patterns in the social and environmental history of the study area, including pre-colonial natural resource use patterns and institutions. Then, I discuss the shifts in the policies during the colonial and post-colonial eras, and highlight the related contestations. My interest is particularly in the intended and actual position of the local people in the resource control. These historical patterns are of interest as they also affect the dynamics of more recent interventions, as they have shaped the experiences, discourses and strategies of action of the groups involved.

I argue that there is a continuity of more recent policy and discourse of participation in forest control to the elements of the earlier decades’ decentralisation policies. From the side of the experts, the key objective has been to enhance forest control by limitedly sharing authority to the ‘community’ level. The representatives of the government and conservation interests have used the discourse of participation to promote the process of territorialisation of the mountain forests. However, the discursive change towards participatory conservation, and related reforms in the forest control, has in certain areas occurred through interplays between the actors and organisations operating at different levels. Thus, there is no one-way relationship between global, national and local spheres of power in resource control.
4.2. Patterns of natural resource control during the pre-colonial period

Existing scientific knowledge on the pre-historical land use in the Usambaras is mainly based on archaeological, linguistic and botanical data (e.g. Conte 2004). Schmidt (1989) suggests that the people who came to inhabit the mountains exploited the forests, although in a localised manner, from the first millennium A.D. Groups of agriculturalists also settled on other forested highlands of the present-day north eastern Tanzania and southeast Kenya (Schmidt 1989; Conte 2004). There is evidence of human settlements in the northern zone of the EUM, which has been dated to the Early Iron Age (Soper 1967). However, the exact extent of the early exploitation of the forests is hard to verify, e.g. studies have concentrated on limited areas. The long history of forest exploitation was largely unknown to the Europeans who arrived to the area in the late 19th century, as the sites had been forested by the time of their arrival. They became to see the forests of the Usambaras largely as Urwald, understood as ancient, undisturbed forest stands existing in a state of ecological equilibrium (Conte 1996, 97). However, the Europeans were able to identify only the most recent stages in a series of land use changes. Some of the early sites of exploitation were also later on established as forest reserves under the colonial rule (Conte 2004, 88).

In addition to the Washambaa group who have settled the mountains for centuries, oral traditions maintain that lineages of pastoralist society, who became to be known as Wambugu, entered the mountains and resettled in the cool and dry plateaus sometime in the middle of the second millennium A.D. (Conte 2004, 10-11, 27-28). According to the oral traditions of Mbugu, their ancestors had been evicted by Maasai from Laikipia plateau of Kenya, and some of them moved on to the mountain plateau forests of Pare and Usambaras in search of a refuge. Their language, belonging to Cushitic group, was different from those spoken by the Bantu groups, including those identified as Washambaa. Prior to the political centralisation of Shambaa, the communities lived in locally centralised neighbourhoods or villages under the leadership of lineage heads or clan leaders (Feirman [1974] 2002, 78; Woodcock 2002, 40). The political centralisation in the Usambaras under a kingdom occurred gradually along with the Mbugu pastoralists' migration to the mountains (Feirman [1974] 2002, 76-90; Conte 2004, 28).

The Kilindi lineage of Washambaa united the area gradually under a more centralised political system at some time in the 18th century18 (Feirman 1990). The myth of Mbegha describes how the kingdom came into being through a transformation of the first king from a man of wilderness to a kind protector of the Shambaa people. Feirman ([1974] 2002, 65) argues that the myth includes an interplay between symbolic and historical statements, so it cannot be taken as an unproblematic historical evidence. Mbegha was known as a hunter from Ungulu, or Nguu Mountains, who fled his home after being condemned as a dangerous person by his relatives.

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18 Conte (1996) has timed the start of the Kilindi rule around 1740s.
Initially, Mbegha hunted wild pigs in the ‘wilderness’ (tunduwi in Shambaa) and exchanged them with the Washambaa. He was finally made the first ruler of Shambaa after killing a lion and being ‘humanised’ by the Shambaa (Feirmann [1974] 2002, 40-45; Illiffe 1989, 10). The descendants of Mbegha by Shambaa wives were identified as Wakilindi, who formed the ruling and royal class of the Shambaa (e.g. Dobson 1940; Illiffe 1979, 22).

The boundaries of the kingdom, the distribution of its population that paid tribute to the king and its degree of effective centralisation of power changed over time, from the establishment of the kingdom to its decay in the end of the 19th century. The capital was Vugha, located in the Western part of the mountains, and there were also other smaller capitals (Feirman 1990, 46-51). The Kilindi rulers extended their kingdom to the East Usambaras on the course of the 19th century. In the EUM, the farmers preferred the foothills and the relatively dry western sides of the mountains (Conte 2004, 87-88), possibly because the use of fire was easier in such areas than in the more humid forest blocks facing south and southeast.

In addition to the Shambaa, the Mbugu continued to inhabit some of the drier and higher plateaus of the Usambaras, and also paid tribute to the Shambaa (Feirman 1990). Yet, the Mbugu maintained their culture largely separate from the dominant group (Conte 2004). In addition, they maintained relationship to the Mbugu pastoralists outside the Usambaras: initiation rituals for males, called mshitu, were conducted in the forests of southern parts of Pare Mountains (Feirmann [1974] 2002, 81; Conte 1996, 101-102). Mbugu people also formed part of the EUM’s population in the 19th century (Conte 2004, 87). Other linguistic groups residing in the mountains and the surrounding lowlands were Wabondei, Wapare and Wazigua (e.g. Dobson 1940; Woodcock 2002, 40). There were occasionally conflicts within and between the different ethnic groups, but also social and economic ties, such as exchange of products (e.g. Feirman 1990; Conte 2004).

The Washambaa developed their farming systems to comply with the botanical characteristics of the environment. Their methods of farming were sophisticated, as irrigation of crop land was applied in the mountain farms. As a concept, Shambaai refers to the place where the Shambaa lived, with the literal meaning of the word being “where bananas thrive” (Feirmann [1974] 2002). Of importance for the Washambaa, and also the basis for identification of someone in the group, was the separation of Shambaai from nyika or the mountains from the plains. The two regions had different biophysical characteristics and agricultural conditions, of which the Shambaa had detailed knowledge. Nyika was considered as a barren land or wilderness by the Shambaa: Moreover, it was seen as a dangerous place due to mosquitoes, wild animals and foreigners. Yet, nyika was also vital for the local economy as many Shambaa farmers had fields on nyika. For instance, certain important crops, such as maize, were grown there (Feirman [1974] 2002, 19-23).

In the social organisation during the Kilindi rule, the king was in principle the ‘owner’ of all land. In addition, there were several local chiefs,
who were positioned under the king. At times, the sub-chiefs challenged the ruler’s authority and formed states independent of the Royal control (Feirman 1990, 85-87). The ownership of the land by the king implied that he had the right to collect ‘tax’ or tribute from his subjects, usually in the form of labour, food and cattle (Feirman 1990, 46, 51). In the Washambaa culture, the king was understood being responsible for taking care of the productivity of the land. In the Shambaa discourse, the king was believed to have the power to heal or harm the land (kuzifiya shi and kubana shi) (Feirman 1990, 6-7), which was related to the possession of rainmaking medicines. However, the king’s ownership was not totally exclusive, e.g. the position of the king as a rainmaker and ruler could be challenged by other chiefs.

According to Conte (2004), the forests existed largely in the margin of the Shambaa group’s culture, and they were used a provider of farming land, and occasionally an arena of hunting. In the Shambaa’s life world, forest (mzituwi in Sha.) was considered as belonging to the wilderness (tunduwi in Sha.), which was contrasted with kaya, a Shambaa word for homestead (Feirman [1974] 2002, 47-48). However, small tracks of forest were retained near the villages, for keeping dangerous medicines and burying the corps that could harm the living if located near the homesteads. So they were not unimportant for this group, either. The forests perhaps played a more central role in the culture and economy of the Wambugu herders, as suggested by Conte (1996; 2004, 29). For instance, the Mbugu altered the forest structure through using fire in order to create pastures for their cattle. Yet, their social institutions also limited human and animal populations, which helped to keep some of the plateaus under a forest cover.

For many resident groups, certain plant species and sites had a special symbolic meaning (Kessy 1998; Woodcock 2002). Woodcock (2002, 93-94) argues that the wilderness areas were thought to hold regenerative and healing powers by the Shambaa19. There were restrictions on the use of certain tree species and sites where rites or rituals were conducted. Some of the elderly people I discussed the issue with in the EUM could recount rituals of Washambaa and Wambugu. In spite of their decreasing importance, some villagers continued to practice them. Rituals were conducted most commonly if there was a lack of rain (c.f. Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994; Kessy 1998). In addition, certain tree species, including trees of Ficus genus have been, and are still considered as sacred by some people in the EUM (Woodcock 1995 & 2002; Kessy 1998). The sacredness was not restricted to the tree only, but also included the land surrounding the tree. In a broader scale, traditionally protected forests and related institutions have continued to exist also among other ethnic groups of the present-day Tanzania up to recent times (e.g. Woodcock 2002; Iddi 2003; Ylhäisi 2006).

19 According to Woodcock (2002, 94), the Shambaa language has two concepts for forests, mzitu, meaning thick and dense forest, and msitu, referring to open and grassy forest with small trees and bushes. The words have equivalents in Swahili, namely msitu and msitu. However, many of the people I interviewed did not consider differences between the different concepts.
Woodcock (2002, 48, 154) argues that before the colonial rule, some of the forests were conserved and some utilised by the Washambaa farmers. In Woodcock’s account, the authority over the forests rested on the customary leaders who managed the forests “for the people”. However, as Conte (2004) highlights, the relationship of the mountain dwellers to the forests was a dynamic one, and changed along with the shifting social and environmental conditions. In addition, patterns of exploitation of the forests shifted greatly in time and space (Conte 2004, 10). For instance, Krapf, one of the early European travellers who travelled in the region, reported of shortage of fuel wood in the Usambaras (Koponen 1988, 368). The forest utilisation therefore occasionally exceeded the rate of forest regeneration. During the latter half of the 19th century, the land use in general intensified, along with increasing deforestation and soil degradation in certain areas (Conte 2004, 30-40). In the context of rapid social and economic transformations and environmental calamities of the end of the century, such as slave trade, civil wars and other forms of violence, and droughts, the relationship between the mountain dwellers and their environment changed significantly. During the next century, the traditions and beliefs related to the forests lost their importance, but did not disappear totally.

4.3 Changes in land use practices and forest control during the German rule

In general, the late 19th and 20th century history of the Usambaras shows a pattern of intensified utilisation of the forests and land. In addition to the social and environmental turmoil described above, the German colonisation of East Africa, and the related efforts to promote agricultural production and to regulate the forest use, increasingly shaped the landscape and resource use practices in the Usambaras (e.g. Conte 2004). Major interests underlying the economic policies of the colony were promotion of plantation agriculture and ultimately, maximising the economic returns. However, in the natural resource policies, the Germans were also concerned about environmental issues and protection, including forest conservation (e.g. Koponen 1994, 529-530). The colonial administrators were sometimes faced with competing goals regarding natural resources, which delayed the implementation of intended measures of control and territorialisation. The position of the indigenous population in resource control weakened over time. They were mostly blamed for environmental degradation. The forest clearing by colonial actors was acknowledged, but the ‘mastery’ of the Europeans over nature, and their capacity to control the environment, was yet conceived to be greater than that of the Africans (Koponen 1994, 528-529).

The first Europeans to settle to the Usambaras during the 19th century were missionaries. They started to investigate the rich nature of the Usambaras (e.g. Iversen 1991), opening ground for more systematic biological and agricultural research in the subsequent decades. According to

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20 I use the term indigenous to describe the people and groups who inhabited the area of German East Africa prior to colonisation, so it does not refer to a certain ethnic group.
one of the explorers, Baumann, the East Usambaras were fairly sparsely populated during the 19th century (Koponen 1994). The indigenous population was described as being concentrated in villages on the Western escarpment (Hamilton 1989c, 36-37). However, the population of the WUM as a whole was under-estimated by the colonial explorers, deliberately or not (e.g. Koponen 1994, 191). There was also migration within the mountains and their surroundings due to the environmental and social changes. According to oral history from Magoroto Hill, a lowland area in the eastern side of the EUM, there was a flux of immigration in the (early) 1800s as people escaped famine in the lowlands or “tribal wars” in the West Usambaras (Woodcock 2002, 41).

The German conquest of the region was, to some extent, a violent one (Woodcock 2002). Yet, many chiefs soon gave up the resistance when they realised that the Germans had a superior force (Feirman 1990, 124; Conte 2004, 44). The appropriation of land in the EUM, as in the western part of the mountains, occurred through treaties between the Kilindi chiefs and the representatives of the Germans (e.g. Mihalyi 1969; Iliffe 1979, 99, 126-127; Hamilton & Mwasha 1989a, 39. Iversen 1991)21. In the EUM, only a small area of land at Mzirai was evidently left as a ‘native reserve’ (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989a, 39). Treaty-making was a common pattern in the colonisation process of East Africa, although such treaties were certainly dubious, e.g. their contents were unlikely to be known to the local parties, and they often exaggerated the mandates of the chiefs (Mihalyi 1969; Koponen 1994, 70-75). Germany declared the German East African protectorate in January of 1891 (Iversen 1991), and formally took control over the area. In the EUM, most of the land was formally transferred to the plantation companies, and gradually also to forest reserves (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989a, 39; Conte 2004, 59).

With the colonisation, the structure of the leadership changed drastically. In 1895, the Germans executed the Kilindi king of the Usambaras, and installed a ‘shadow’ ruler, followed by a series of others (Feirman [1974] 2002; Conte 2004, 107). The shifts in authority structures limited the access to land by the indigenous groups. European settlement in the territory was encouraged as part of the colonial policy (Neumann 1997b), although the government also tried to regulate the land appropriation process. As a result land regulations of the early 1890s, only the colonial government could occupy ‘ownerless’ land. However, it had less practical meaning, as it was not valid in the areas of the former protectorates of the German East Africa Company, known as Deutch Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft or DOAG (Sippel 1996). In the EUM, the DOAG had managed to get hold of large land areas through concessions and buying (Mihalyi 1969; Koponen 1994, 189). In the early 1890s, the DOAG formally covered over 160 000 ha

21There are different narratives about the details of land alienation in the Usambaras. Mihalyi (1969) and Hamilton and Mwasha (1989a) suggest that the basis for land alienation in the East Usambaras was a treaty made between a Shambaa chief and Herr Juhlke, acting for the Company for German colonisation around 1885, whereas Iversen (1991, 6) argues that there were two treaties made between the German military personnel and the Shambaa chiefs located in Mazinde and Mgambo.
of land in the Usambaras (Sippel 1996; Koponen 1994), establishing almost a monopoly (Mihalyi 1969). The large land holdings by the plantation companies constrained the scope for the indigenous population to access land for their own use.

In the EUM, coffee plantations were established by the end of the century in Derema and Nguelo (Iversen 1991, 8), which required the clearing of the forests. However, the DOAG lost the control of most of the land to the government within ten years (Mihalyi 1969, 89). With the Crown Land Ordinance of 1895, all ‘ownerless’ land in German East Africa was declared as Crown land, vested in the German Empire. The ordinance recognised the possession of land by the indigenous population, and reserved for them additional ground for rotation crops on the basis of assumed growth of population (Sippel 1996). The crown land was allocated to Europeans, both settlers and plantation companies, by the Governor after a request. The applicant became either a tenant or owner of the land (Sippel 1996, 21-23).

The land allocation for the indigenous groups was based on the customary right of the respective community. Therefore, the policies created a two-tiered system of property rights. The colonial policy discourse, which introduced the idea of clearly separate and static communities settled on a piece of land and following their own laws, was yet a simplification, as it tried to ‘freeze’ the local institutions in time and space. As Feirman stresses (1990, 29), many important institutions were not strictly bound to certain ethnic or cultural groups even in pre-colonial Africa. In addition, the people living in the Usambaras actually had flexible and dynamic rules governing access to land (Arnold 1996).

One of the important effects of the German land policies was that they limited the legal sphere of the indigenous population to freely choose where to settle, and own the land (Sippel 1996). They were not allowed to formally register their land, or sell it. Therefore, they could not take a similar advantage of the presumption of ownership as the Europeans. Moreover, the indigenous people were allowed to occupy considerably less land, about four hectares, than the Europeans who could be granted plantations up to 1619 ha. In addition, the indigenous population was sometimes forced to migrate to make room for plantations in the early years of German rule, but this was apparently not very common (Sippel 1996, 25-26; Koponen 1994, 291).

In the EUM, the absence of conflicts over land could be assumed in the light of the arguments made by early European visitors on abundance of land in the area (e.g. Mihalyi 1969; Hamilton 1989c; Iversen 1991). However, the size of unoccupied land in the area could also be overstated (c.f. above), and the situation changed with the seizure of land by the plantation companies. Overall, there was a scarcity of land in Tanga and West Usambaras by the end of the 19th century, due to large areas undertaken by the Europeans (Koponen 1994, 628-629). The area reserved for the ‘Africans’ in the indigenous reserves was estimated to have been too limited compared to the size of the population, and the minimum requirement of four hectares per household was not met in practice.
On the lowlands bordering the Usambara Mountains, rubber and sisal were cultivated in an extensive scale. The lowlands were included among the three most important plantation regions of the colony (Koponen 1994, 626). In the East Usambaras, most land outside the small native reserves was allocated to companies engaged in plantation agriculture22. Moreau (1935) states that after the arrival of the Europeans, much of the lowland forests were turned into rubber and sisal estates, and some were under ‘native crops’ whereas on higher elevations, large areas of forest were cleared for the coffee plantations between 1885 and 1914 (Moreau 1935). Still, not all of the land under the companies was cleared for cultivation, and tracks of forests also remained in the companies’ land (Mihalyi 1969; Koponen 1994; Conte 2004). For instance, the Usambara Coffee Company occupied a plantation of 4000 ha in Bulwa. Of the area, only some 214 hectares were under coffee trees by 1900 (Mihalyi 1969, 122). In addition, perennial labour shortage was a problem for the production in the Usambaras’ plantations (Mihalyi 1970, 23). Workers of the plantations were sometimes treated “brutally” (Mihalyi 1969, 154), and they were also recruited from outside. The small size of the land actively utilised was also due to the poor success of coffee production, due to poor fertility of the soil and droughts (Mihalyi 1969, 125-126; Conte 2004, 13-14, 89).

In order to support the plantation economy, exotic plant species were introduced and tested at the agricultural and biological research station of Amani, established in 1898 (Schabel 1990; Conte 2004). Among the species introduced by the Germans was cardamom, which become an important factor affecting the forest structure farmers’ income in the EUM in the 20th century. In addition, a botanical garden was established in Amani in 1902. Science was therefore used as a means to support the colonial efforts to exploit the land and other resources, as in many other colonial powers (Conte 2004, 24). The trials of the Amani station23 also had an impact on the land use patterns even beyond the colonial era. Seeds and seedlings of many species were distributed to the plantations. Some of them, including cardamom and other spices, were gradually adopted by the small-scale farmers24. In addition, over forty of the introduced species spread to the surrounding mountain forests, some of which became highly invasive (Conte 2004, 62).

The development of forestry branch of the German East Africa began slowly in the early 1890s, speeding up in 1903 with the appointment of the first full-time forester (Schabel 1990; Neumann 1997b). By 1912, a separate Forestry and Wildlife Department was established (Schabel 1990). The forest policy of German East Africa has been described as a mixture of conservation and exploitation goals (Schabel 1990; Koponen 1994). Principles of scientific forestry, which had been developed in Germany over a

22 Major plantation companies during the German period were Usambara Coffee Company, DOAG, Rhine Handei Company and W. German Trading Company (Mihalyi 1969, 129-131).
23 By 1914, over 500 plant species were cultivated in Amani (Mihalyi 1969, 142).
24 Some of the species, e.g. cardamom and black pepper, were spread by different development and conservation organisations operating in the area in the end of the 20th century.
century, were to be applied in the colonial forest management (Conte 2004). This included the application of the principle of sustainable yield in production of timber and silvicultural research. In the eyes of the colonial experts, the forests were to be 'ordered' to enable their efficient exploitation (Conte 2004.) The indigenous groups’ access to resources was also restricted by creating forest reserves and issuing administrative restrictions (Koponen 1994; Neumann 1997b). Yet, in practice, the implementation of the rules was only partial due to the lack of resources, and the policies were also challenged by their targets.

The activities of the Germans are said to have heavily reduced the original natural forests area in Usambaras (Schabel 1990). The early European observers stated that the “magnificent forests” at the lower parts of eastern Usambara had largely disappeared by 1898 (Schabel 1990). Yet, there is no exact data on the extent of the forest loss (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989a, 40; Conte 1996). Certainly, the logging activities, introduction of single-tree stands and the opening of plantations meant that the forest structure changed and their coverage reduced. Yet, the scale was not as high in the EUM compared to the WUM (Conte 2004). From 1906 onwards, private companies were given concessions to forest reserves in order to produce timber for export (Koponen 1994). A sawmill was established in Sigi of the East Usambara, where a company called Sigi Export Gesellschaft extracted and sold timber to East African markets (Siebenlist 1914, 29; Iversen 1991, 11). Under the German rule, sawmills were established in Derema and Kwamkororo (Schabel 1990). In addition, the German East African Lumber Company built a narrow railway of 24 kilometres from Sigi to Tengeni to transport timber from the mountains to the coast (Schabel 1990; Koponen 1994).

The environmental deterioration caused by the colonial projects, such as railroad construction and plantations, was admitted by the German colonists. Nevertheless, the forest destruction was mainly perceived to be caused by the indigenous population (Koponen 1994, 528-529). The Germans tried to regulate the practices of resource use by introducing several ordinances and rules. Forest fires were of special concern to the forestry staff of the colony (Schabel 1990). One of the earliest forest rules was the Usambara Forest Ordinance of 1895. It required protection of environmentally sensitive areas for climatic and erosion control. Furthermore, the Forest Conservation Ordinance was enacted in 1904, introducing the system of forest reserves (Neumann 1997b). The ordinance initiated the conservation of almost 75 percent of a million hectares of Crown Land in to forest reserves, where no settling or other unauthorized use was permitted (Schabel 1990, 133).

Schabel (1990) suggests that reasons for reservation of forest in German East Africa were more environmental than fiscal. Yet, the need to justify colonial exploitation also played a crucial role in shaping the natural resource policies (Koponen 1994). Between 1906 and 1914, all together 231 forest reserves were established in the German East Africa. The process restricted the African access to the forests (Neumann 1997b, 50). Under the forest laws, all African settlement, cultivation, grazing and burning were
outlawed in designated forest reserves (Neumann 1997b; Schabel 1990). By 1912, eight forest reserves were established in the EUM (Iversen 1991). In the WUM, Mbugu people were evicted from the areas that they had used for grazing previously (Conte 2004, 74-75). However, they could occasionally access areas inside the reserves ‘illegally’ by bribing the guards or circumventing the restrictions (Conte 1996), so the territorialisation, in the sense of increasing the control of population and environment, did not mean total exclusion in practice. In a more general level, the large size of territory and lack of resources hindered the effective enforcement of the rules. As a result, many ordinances were gradually abandoned, replaced, amended or modified in order to make them more realistic (Schabel 1990).

Force was sometimes used by the colonial administrators to make the local population comply with the rules and restrictions on natural resources. As in other parts of the tropical world, practice of colonial forest conservation was coercive as it relied on the use or threat of violence by the authorities (c.f. Peluso 1993). Accounts in the colonial reports suggest that the rules of forest reserves “were enforced with vigour and some brutality” (Hamilton & Mwasha, 1989a, 39). Such measures were usually ill-conceived by the local population. This was exemplified by non-co-operation with forestry staff and uprisings and other forms of resistance (Schabel 1990). The restrictions on forest use resulted in “bad blood” among the locals and, occasionally, in behaviour described as “deplorable indolence” or “passive resistance” by foresters (Schabel 1990, 131).

In spite of the fact that the control was not always efficient in practice, an important aspect of the German policies was that they introduced new discursive and physical boundaries between the diverse elements of landscape, including forests reserved for production and conservation and public land (c.f. Conte 1996, 109). Therefore, the German forest policies started the process of territorialisation of the mountain landscape, and came to affect the mountain dwellers’ relationship to the environment, economic opportunities and livelihood strategies over the coming decades. Through their acts of resistance and mobilisation, they were yet at times successful in challenging the control efforts.

4.4. Forms of exclusion and efforts to devolve forest control under the British

After the First World War the British came to rule the area nowadays equivalent to mainland Tanzania, as the League of Nations gave most of German East Africa to Britain as a mandate\(^\text{25}\). The territory was then named Tanganyika. As Neumann (1997b) highlights the government policies and ruling regarding rights of the indigenous population\(^\text{26}\) in relation to natural resources turned out ambiguous and even contradictory. Underlying the contradictions were several reasons, e.g. the decision to base Tanganyika's economic development on peasant production, and the implementation of

\(^{25}\) From 1945 to 1961, the British governed Tanganyika as a trusteeship from the United Nations.

\(^{26}\) Neumann (1997b) uses the term ‘African population’.
indirect rule. However, the 1922 League of Nations mandate agreement stated that 'native laws and customs' should be taken into consideration and respected when framing the laws of the British colony. Yet, this principle was often by-passed in practice (Neumann 1997b). In different ways, the colonial policies limited the indigenous people's legally recognised access to the natural resources, and created terrain susceptible for resistance.

The British followed the German land policy in terms of adhering to the idea that the ultimate ownership of the land was held by the government. Almost all lands, whether occupied or unoccupied, were declared public land, or Crown land. Moreover, the land tenure ordinance of 1923 (Cap 113) introduced the right of occupancy system, in which both 'natives' and 'non-natives' could hold rights to land. The ordinance was to set the legal sphere of land tenure in Tanzania for decades. It also shaped the post-colonial land legislation.

Land could be hold under a statutory grant with the ‘granted rights of occupancy’, or alternatively under customary law, under ‘deemed rights of occupancy’. The latter concerned the indigenous people (Twaib 1996; Neumann 1997b). The two-tiered system of land rights created confusion and conflicts over land between different groups, as in other colonial contexts (Li 2007a; 2007b). The position of the indigenous people in relation to land tenure was generally on a shaky ground. One could acquire land under customary law either by clearing previously not-used land or by inheritance (Twaib 1996, 84). The local people’s rights to the land were recognised, but they were not given certificate of occupancy. In practice, the land ordinance did not provide legal basis for the indigenous population against further land alienations by the government (Neumann 1997b).

In addition, the forest policies had direct and indirect impacts on resource control and access. The exclusive discourse and practices of control started under the German rule intensified during the British rule (Conte 1996). The British followed the German period's forest regulations. The forest reservation and strict regulation of access to the protected forests, and certain valuable tree species, was again justified in terms of both conservationist ideas and economic interests. A Forest Department was created and the Forest Ordinance established in 1921, incorporating the reserves designated by the Germans (Neumann 1997b). The area under the reserves was gradually extended, but some of the reserves were also exploited. The environmental degradation was conceived to constitute a threat towards exploitation interests, especially in the mountains (Conte 1999). In the late 1920s, the British Colonial Government resurrected some of the German Forest Reserves in the East Usambaras due to forest clearing (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 215). Porter (2006, 68) estimates that during the British rule, the total area under forest reserves in the Usambaras was around 70 000 ha whereas 33 000 ha were under the estates.

The British limited the indigenous people's access to natural resources also by launching a policy that allowed the 'natives' to get forest resources only to fulfil their household needs (Neumann 1997b, 55). In principle, the local people were allowed free use of forest products taken for their own use
from public land, and also in the reserved forests. Yet, their free access to tree species was then restricted by the forest department in 1928, when it issued that a fee had to be paid in order to use the scheduled species (Neumann 1997b), that became to known as government reserved species. Moreover, grazing was limited in the reserves. However, the strict regulations were not accepted without resentment by the local population. Forest reserve boundaries were sometimes challenged by the herders and farmers, as Conte (2004) describes in the context of the West Usambaras.

‘Encroachment’ to the reserves by the indigenous population was also reported to be common by Grant (1924) in the Usambaras during the period of 1914-1920 (Iversen 1991, 13). In the EUM, some of them left the native reserves for the abandoned estate lands (Conte 2004, 90). The indigenous people reclaimed the lands they had lost and regained that potential by converting it to agricultural land (Woodcock 2002, 109-111). Yet, they were again removed from the areas when the estates were re-established under the British Mandate in order to secure the interests of the colonial government (Conte 2004, 90). The colonial administration reacted to the encroachment in a forceful manner. In 1935 Moreau, a scientist of Amani, argued that the indigenous populations, with their constantly growing population, would have seriously degraded the forests until 1931, “...when serious action was taken to stop it” (Moreau 1935, 15). This illustrates the continuation of the fortress conservation discourse, and related practices of enforcement and exclusion, in the forest control.

During the British rule, an effort was also made to decentralise the control, in specific areas. A new decentralised institution, called Native Authority Forest Reserves27, was established in the early 1930s (Neumann 1997b). The program had multiple objectives. It was a part of the policy of indirect rule, but also a means to eliminate free issue by the indigenous people in a politically acceptable way. The idea was to delegate a part of the responsibility of forest protection for the ‘natives’ and to create a separate system of reserves that would provide for their needs. At the same time, the government forest reserves were to remain under the control and exploitation of the government and timber concessionaires (Neumann 1997b). A similar discourse of sharing some of the control and benefits from resources with the ‘communities’, while maintaining or increasing the control of other, often more valuable areas, can be identified in the recent interventions labelled under Participatory Forest Management. The table four below shows the development of area of Government and Native Authority Forest Reserves in Tanganyika until the early 1950s. However, this type of reserves were apparently not established in the EUM (e.g. Iversen 1991), probably as conservation values were seen relatively more important there, and due to the land tenure pattern. In general, the native forest reserves did not cover a large area of land.

27 Alternatively, they were referred to as 'Local Authority Forest Reserves'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government FR (ha)</th>
<th>Native Authority FR (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1 018 900</td>
<td>5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1 040 900</td>
<td>22100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1 051 500</td>
<td>27800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1 053 300</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1 494 400</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1 150 700</td>
<td>27800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1 157 700</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1 157 200</td>
<td>87900</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1 193 500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2 834 700</td>
<td>22100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Total area of designated Forest Reserves (FR) in Tanganyika between the years 1933 and 1952, according to Neumann (1997b, 51). Square miles have been converted to hectares. Native Authority FRs are alternatively referred to as communal forest reserves, tribal forest reserves or Native Authority forests.

In addition to the decentralisation, the objective of protecting the forests continued in the policies, as exemplified in the increase of land under Government Forest Reserves (table 4). The reservation of forests was supported by scientific discourse, and concerns over the maintenance of the mountain watersheds (e.g. Conte 2004). More land was gazetted as forest reserves in the East and West Usambaras, as a result of which the reserved area almost doubled by 1942 (Iversen 1991, 13). In addition, in Amani, research on biological and ecological issues continued. The research centre was re-opened under the name of the East African Agricultural Research Station. However, the economic interests also remained in the policy agenda, especially for the mountain areas which were considered to have agricultural potential. In Kwamkoro, where there is nowadays a tea factory, the state purchased a large estate for supporting estate agriculture in 1931. Yet, in general, the plantation agriculture did not appear as very profitable in the EUM between the wars (Conte 2004, 90).

The policy discourse on natural resource control was also influenced by the growing concerns and research on soil erosion. In East Africa, the scientists and administrators were worried that the indigenous farming methods would undermine the European interests (Conte 2004, 108). In addition, a British forestry expert Troup (1940, 56), who conducted a study

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28 In the early 1950s, the agricultural research activities of the station were moved to Nairobi and the silvicultural research to Lushoto, in the WUM (Rodgers & Homewood 1982; Iversen 1991; the ANR general management plan 1998). The Amani station was taken over by Malaria research institute.

29 In 1960, a forest reserve was established in Kwamkoro (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 214).
on forestry in Tanganyika, argued that “The formation of forest reserves in the mountains has achieved a great deal, but the amount saved from destruction is only a small percentage of the original forest area”. Troup presented that shifting cultivation, fire, and grazing had been extensive and denuded the mountain forests, and demanded urgent conservation of more forests. The argumentation in the expert’s discourse shows the continuation of the idea of the destructiveness of local agricultural practices. However, it was not only the local population that was thought of as ‘culprits’, but also the plantation farming and commercial logging was accused of contributing to environmental degradation (Troup 1940; Conte 1999; 2004). In the Usambaras, forest-clearing by the Europeans formed a potential risk in the eyes of the administrators (Troup 1940). At times, local Forest Department officials criticised the allocation of concessions for timber harvesting (Conte 2004, 71). The administrators also sought to limit commercial logging. The forest rules of 1933 stated that the clearing of private forest may be prevented or limited by proclamation, if the natural water-supply is likely to be endangered (Troup 1940).

In economic terms, forestry was not among the key areas during the early years of the British rule. According to Hamilton and Mwasha (1989b, 41-43), the timber industry would have been relatively unimportant in the EUM until the 1960s. Yet, this appears to be an understatement, although the pattern of land tenure and failures with coffee production certainly slowed down the cutting of forests in the EUM as compared to the West Usambaras (e.g. Conte 2004). Overall, the forest cover remained rather high in the early decades of the colonial rule in the East Usambaras (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 214-215). In 1938, when the value of timber started to increase, the Forest Department negotiated a concession to harvest *mvule* (Swahili for East African Mahogany 30) on the public lands that had been previously used by the indigenous farmers. This also limited access to the timber trees by the indigenous farmers. They arguably “had little incentive to do anything than to cut and sell” the *mvule* trees before they were taken under the concessions (Conte 2004, 89). This implies that the colonial policies sometimes resulted in controversial outcomes in terms of environmental change.

Forest clearing for the establishment of the tea plantations and production of timber accelerated in the EUM in the 1940s and 1950s, when several companies sought to make profit from the resources (FINNIDA 1988, 7; Hamilton & Mwasha 1989b; Iversen 1991; Conte 2004). In the 1950s, the Sikh Sawmills (SSM), owned by an Indian businessman, bought several tea estates in the EUM and opened sawmill in Bulwa (Iversen 1991, 14; Conte 2004). It concentrated on logging and milling the forests rather than on producing tea (Conte 2004, 156). The SSM also set up a small wood processing factory in Tanga (Jones 1983, 132).

Yet, at the same time when the commercial interests emerged, setting pressure on the remaining forests, environmental concerns were reinforced in the government. In the 1940s and 1950s, several land use surveys were

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30 *Milicia excelsa* in Latin.
conducted in the Usambaras, related to concerns on soil degradation (Rodgers & Homewood 1982). During the 1950s there was an overall tendency of increasing the state control of the forests and people in Tanganyika (Neumann 1997b). In the EUM, several new forest reserves were also established in the land that was previously under the estates in the 1950s to sustain the water catchments and provide timber for logging (Rodgers & Homewood 1982; Hamilton & Mwasha 1989b). In 1953, a new forest policy was approved, in which major consideration was given to forest reserves. They were recognised to be primarily for protection rather than for production. In many locations, the new policy implied stricter control and rule enforcement (Neumann 1997b).

However, the actual level of the control varied. The administrators gave controversial accounts regarding the role of the indigenous people in forest degradation. Moreover, the assumed rights of indigenous groups on natural resources were contested within the government (Neumann 1997b; Conte 2004). In practice, the institutions controlling resource use were implemented and interpreted varyingly (Neumann 1997b, 2000). For instance, criticism towards restrictive policies appeared among territorial governors, and down to district level officers. Some of the colonial administrators conceived wildlife and forest conservation proposals as disregarding ‘African’ claims of customary rights and tried to turn the outcomes less adversary (Neumann 2000). In the Usambaras, the foresters blamed the Africans for ‘encroachment’ in the forest reserves, whereas district officers were more sympathetic towards the indigenous population’s claims over natural resources (Conte 2004, 71).

In spite of the control measures, the social organisation among the indigenous population and their relationship to the bio-physical environment, continued to be affected by their previous conceptualisations on society and nature. In the Usambaras, the position of the Kilindi chiefs weakened after the colonisation, and they were often not supported by their assumed subjects (Woodcock 2002, 42). Yet, the connection made between leadership and rain still characterised the discourse of the Shambaa in certain instances (Conte 2004), including the food shortage and political crises in the 1930s. Some people in the villages where I worked also remembered rituals that had taken place in specific areas. For instance, an elderly man I interviewed in Makanya, IBC Msasa, also narrated that his grandparents used to conduct rituals, including initiation rites, in the forested areas nearby Kambai in the EUM in the 1930s (interview, 14.1.2008, Makanya). In addition, the discourse of healing and harming the land was used by the Shambaa to oppose the government’s anti-erosion scheme in the 1950s in the WUM. At that time, the policy concern over soil erosion was reinforced by the colonial experts. Extensive anti-erosion efforts were launched, including the famous Mlalo Basin Rehabilitation Scheme in the West Usambaras (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c; Iversen 1991; Conte 2004).

Some of the efforts to improve the agricultural methods were well received by the local farmers (Iversen 1991). However, the Mlalo soil conservation scheme led to fierce resistance by the Shambaa farmers.
The soil conservation technique promoted was in contrast with their production patterns, and conceived as setting impositions on them (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c). The resistance was also linked to the emerging independence movement. At that time, the Shambaa farmers elaborated the discourse of healing and harming the land for being used as a form of resistance (Feirman 1990, 23). The key figures included people who had worked previously as low level government functionaries, who had returned into farming, and possessed a relatively low level of education. This history of farmers’ resistance, and memories of it, possibly contributed to the more recent resistance towards certain interventions in the eastern part of the Usambaras.

In the end of the 1950s, new forestry research activities were launched in the EUM, with the aim of promoting the yield from economically important species. At the same time with the efforts to intensify forest exploitation, there was yet continued recognition of the biological value of the mountain forests. This is exemplified in the Annual Report of the Forest Department of 1959 (Tanganyika, Min. of Natural Resources 1960, 17) which stated that “...the forests were of a unique, submontane, rain-forest type with a very rich floristic composition”. Furthermore, the negative environmental effects of logging were recognised. The commercial tree harvesting in the EUM was conducted through clear-felling in the areas allocated for tea-growing in 1959 (Tanganyika, Min. of Natural Resources 1960). The next year’s report stated that flash flooding from a catchment area cleared for tea had swept away a bridge on the road to Longuza hardwood plantation and also a part of the road itself (Tanganyika, Min. of Agriculture and Co-operative Development 1961), indicating unsustainable practices of forest management.

In the EUM, the social composition of the population changed towards the end of the colonial period. As a result of the expansion of tea cultivation and timber harvesting, migrant labourers were brought in and moved by themselves in the East Usambaras (e.g. Stocking & Perkin 1992, 342; Conte 2004, 93-94). The workers of the tea estates also conducted forest clearing. For instance, extensive clear felling occurred near Amani (Conte 2004). At that time, the district level officials were worried about the forest cutting by the immigrant tea camp workers. The cultivation of cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum) – a valuable cash crop - in the forests also started to spread from the 1950s (Iversen 1991; Mwalubandu et al. 1991), and gave a source of income to many newcomers.

4.5. Post-independence policies and struggles over natural resources

After the independence in 1961, promotion of rural development became one of the major policy goals of the government. Natural resources

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31 At a later stage, however, the soil conservation measures were suggested to potentially have been ‘a degree of success’ (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c), showing the contrasting interpretations of land use history and politics among different actors, including researchers.
were among the central assets with which the new nation was to develop its export-oriented economy. Conservation of nature remained also high in the official policy agenda. Wildlife conservation was supported by the first president of the Republic of Tanzania, mwalimu Julius Nyerere (e.g. Neumann 1998, 143). The colonial organisations related to natural resource control, such as Tanzania National Parks and the Divisions of Forestry and Wildlife continued their existence, although their leadership changed from Europeans to educated Tanzanian bureaucrats (Neumann 1998, 77). In general, the colonial forest reserves were sustained in the early days of independence. From the 1970s, economic development through industrial forestry was given more attention at the forest policies. It also acquired funding through development aid channels. According to Conte (2004, 154), the post-colonial forestry policy meant “continued and dramatic biological simplification of natural forests and the increasing exploitation of both natural and plantation forests...” in the Usambaras. Yet, as discussed below, the conservationist objectives were considered too, and started to play a more central role in shaping the policies and the donor-funded interventions towards the end of the century.

A new national forest policy was introduced in 1963. Its main objectives were to produce forest products adequately to meet the national demand and to protect the main water catchments (Ylhäisi 2003, 286). In order to promote these goals, the government was to set aside land as forest reserves. In the EUM, most of the colonial forest reserves remained with their official status. However, by-passing of the regulations and resistance towards the strict restrictions continued. In the early 1960s, the forest administration reported about ‘encroachment’ in the existing forest reserves at the national level. The administrators stated that the encroachments in forest reserves were due to political changes “that gave rise in some quarters to a misguided notion that forest reserves were there for the taking” (Annual Report of the Forest Division 1961). They argued that the boundaries of the reserves had never been properly defined, or they had been neglected for the lack of staff or “carelessness” (Annual Report of the Forest Division 1961). The authorities then made efforts to intensify the rule enforcement in the early 1960s. The next year’s annual report described the situation as follows: “In Tanga region, improved boundaries and patrol reduced the danger of encroachment during the year” (Annual Report of the Forest Division 1962). At the same time, ‘squatters’ were evicted from the reserves, implying the continuation of exclusive control strategies by the representatives of the government.

The post-colonial government decided to maintain the colonial land laws, including the concept of public land. However, land and other policy reforms were soon introduced, which shaped the access to resources. President Nyerere introduced the idea of Ujamaa policies with focus on rural development. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 set down the principles of Ujamaa, a Tanzanian version of socialism. Furthermore, the villagisation program (1969-1977) was one of the key policy undertakings at rural land reform and development, although the legal basis of land reform was introduced with delay (Twaib 1996). For some years after the independence,
there were multiple land tenure systems, but in 1969 all lands were brought under the right of occupancy system with the enactment of Government leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act that re-established the Cap 113 of 1923 (Twaib 1996, 83). The President became to assume all the powers, rights and privileges formerly hold by the Governor.

In 1968, the villagisation directive was issued. It required rural families to move from their scattered homestead into more compact, permanent settlements (Lerise 2005, 25). It was thought as a key means to implement Ujamaa (Twaib 1996, 106). The president had insisted a voluntary movement of people, but forced movement also occurred (Twaib 1996, 106; Kessy 1998). In the mid-1970s, the villagisation program was implemented more vigorously at national scale, and a new law was launched to back up the program. In principle, it meant transformation of traditional territorial rights to land into collective ownership, to be controlled by the village councils (Ojalammi 2006). This complicated the land tenure system. It also contributed to the persistent land disputes in many regions, as the previous occupiers made claims to ‘their’ lands (Twaib 1996; Odgaard 2002).

However, in the Usambaras, the villagisation did not generally lead to forced migration (Arnold 1996, 113), but the village settlement was concentrated, and locations of some of the villages shifted were shifted. Areas under the villages became categorised as ‘village land’ (Kessy 1998, 63). In the EUM, immigrants established their settlements and new villages in areas under the leasehold of the estates, Muheza district’s development corporation, called SHUWIMU (Shirkala Uchumi Wilaya ya Muheza) and in some cases, also illegally inside the forest reserves (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c; Woodcock 2002). Elderly villagers remembered that the state had ordered them to shift the location of the settlement and to establish more concentrated villages in the post-independence era. During the colonial period, and increasingly after the Independence, people used to move between villages and shift their settlements sites. This occurred sometimes because of imposed orders from the authorities, whereas in other occasions they decided to move due to changes in the economic opportunities, social situation or environmental conditions. For instance, jealousy of the co-villagers could lead a successful farmer to relocate to another area (Woodcock 2002, 75).

In the low-land village of Gereza, elderly villagers argued that they had previously lived in the upper slope of the mountain, cultivating bananas and cardamom, but the village had to shift downwards several times. They expressed that they had been ordered to leave their houses and farms up in the slope in the 1970s due to forest conservation. Yet, this might have happened earlier too, since many of forest reserves that are now under the ANR were established between the 1930s and 1960 (Iversen 1991, 55-56). In the mid-1970s, Gereza village was established in its present position (e.g. group discussion with the VEC, 14.10.2003, Gereza). The village secretary explained that the change of village’s site was related to the villagisation (interview, 9.2.2005, Gereza). In general, the settlement was concentrated in the 1970s, and the village boundaries were defined, albeit not always in line with the official status of a given area (e.g. FINNIDA 1988).
Hamilton and Mwasha (1989c, 45) argue that in the East Usambaras, the shifts in land use were a result of change in the policies and the decreased capacity of the State to enforce the regulations. Yet, the non-enforcement of the regulations on reserves could partly be intentional as politicians needed to ‘buy support’ from the farmers, in a similar way to the WUM (c.f. Conte 2004, 152). In spite of the official emphasis put on forest conservation, there was a political pressure to let people in the forests in the post-independence era. Some forest reserves were purposefully degazetted for farming purpose in the WUM (Hurst 2004, 60) whereas in the EUM, tracks of certain forest reserves were given for small-scale farmers (Woodcock 2002, 47). Migration of farmers from the highly populated WUM and other areas also accelerated in the late-1960s and 1970s. The parents or grandparents of many farmers had moved to the area to work in the tea business, logging activities and in the search for land. According to Hamilton and Mwasha (1989c, 47), who refer to Tanga Regional Development Plan of 1975, the population increased by 17 percent in Amani between 1967 and 1975.\footnote{The population was reported to have grown from 14 888 to 17 400 individuals during the period of eight years.} The clearing of land for farms on the land under the tea-estates arguably started on “big-scale” in the EUM in 1967-68 (Hamilton & Mwasha, 1989c, 46). The newcomers\footnote{The ‘newcomers’ were described as people seeking for financial opportunities and people who had earlier worked in the tea estates (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c, 46).} acquired land that was held by the tea-estates by planting cardamom. The undeveloped land of the estates was considered as public land in line with the new land policy, but the status of the land was later on a source of contestation. Moreover, the appropriation of land by the immigrants caused some resentment among the previous residents.

In the EUM, pressure towards the land under the estates created conflicts between the estate managers and farmers. Some of the tea estates, including Kwamkoro and Bulwa, passed into the government’s control through nationalisation. This was because they formed part of the companies that were mainly involved in business in other sectors, including sisal and timber (Faber 1995). In addition, a part of the undeveloped leasehold land of the tea companies was converted to farming land. This was not necessarily legal, as suggested by Hamilton and Mwasha (1989c, 46). Partly as a result of the contestations over land, several mapping exercises were conducted from the 1960s to mid-1980s. The tea estates’ managers feared that all land might be lost to the farmers, and they approached to government to prevent such a development. Their initiative resulted in a visit by the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources who requested the villages to draw up new boundaries, with provisions for ‘buffer zones’ between farms and forests. Later on, a team was assigned to survey and mark the boundaries anew. The exercise, along with “firm estate management” arguably led to reduction in the rate of ‘encroachments’ in some of the estates (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c, 46). Overall, the mapping exercises were showing an effort to solidify the territorial control by the companies and the government.
Several policy reforms related to the forest control were also introduced in the 1970s. In 1972 there was a decentralization reform in the government, including forestry. The District Forest Officers became primarily responsible for most of the forest reserves. Hamilton and Mwasha (1989c, 52) argue, relying on the account by Ahlback (1986), that the forest department lost control of all central government forests, except for a number of reserves that were regarded as of national importance\(^{34}\). In addition, Hamilton and Mwasha (1989c, 52) point out, referring to Lundgren (1985), that decentralization of forest management resulted in a “serious loss of forests in Tanzania”, as the district officials had sought quick money by selling tree felling licenses, although they do not provide figures or other data to illustrate the extent of change in detail. The decentralisation effort was soon stopped, however, and the loss of control by the central government led to a ‘recentralisation’ effort soon after, with more emphasis put on the role of central government and its forest agency in forest management.

In 1976 most of the government forest reserves in the EUM were categorised as Catchment Forest Reserves. They were to become firmly under the control of the central government. The major goal in these forests was to protect water catchments, with conservation of genetic resources and production of timber as secondary objectives (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c, 52). However, despite of the reserve status of much of the forests, the more or less ‘illegal’ use of the forests continued in the 1970s. For instance, cardamom cultivation in the forest reserves was common (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 217). This implies, on one hand, that the forest department did not have enough capacity, such as staff or funds, to keep the people out of the reserved forests (e.g. Hurst 2004, 60-62). Furthermore, some of the people living next to the reserves did not conceive the government control as just or legitimate. Their ‘encroachment’ to the reserves could thus be a sign of resistance.

In the 1960s, the commercial logging activities had intensified (Mwalubandu et al. 1991). By the mid-1970s, however, many of the tea estates’ sawmills had closed down (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c), but commercial logging by SSM continued. Their forest exploitation at that time occurred with the help of external funding. The Finnish development co-operation in the East Usambaras started first with technical assistance and support for commercial forestry\(^{35}\). At the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Government of Finland supported two forest inventories, conducted by Jaakko Pöyry Co. It focused on commercially valuable tree species only. Both inventories were later on criticised for various reasons, e.g. over-estimating the allowable cut and the need for proper silvicultural practices (FINNIDA 1988). The Finns also supported the activities of SSM, which acquired wood from the EUM for its factory in Tanga.

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\(^{34}\) In the East Usambaras, the exceptions included Kihuhwi-Sigi, Longuza, Kihuhwi, Kwamsambia, and Kwamkoro.

\(^{35}\) High donor involvement and funding for forest sector was more widely shared phenomena in Tanzania (e.g. Hurst 2004).
With the nationalisation, the SSM had been bought by the National Development Corporation (NDP) of the Tanzanian Government by 1970 (Jones 1983, FINNIDA 1988). The company had been a subsidiary of a parastatal organization, Tanzania Wood Industry Corporation (TWICO) since the early 1970s (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985, 2). One of the main products of the company was packages for exporting tea (Jones 1983; Mustonen & Räsänen 1985). An indigenous tree species, *Cephalosphaera usambarensis* (*mtambara* in Swa.), was mainly used for this purpose. Between 1978 and 1985, the average input of logs by SSM was 15 800 m$^3$ whereas the average volume of timber sold to the pit-sawers from the forest reserves of the EUM was about 12 500 m$^3$ (FINNIDA 1988, Appendix I, 13). In addition, pit-sawing was conducted on the public land, the amount of which was not known (FINNIDA 1988). Therefore, the business of selling the logs was not efficiently controlled by the authorities, and some of them also benefited from the activities. Pit-sawing without licence, smuggling of planks to Kenya and bribing of forest officers were reported (FINNIDA 1988, app. I, 12-13).

Before 1987, most of the logs used by the SSM were harvested from the EUM, and over 80 percent of the stems were *mtambara* (FINNIDA 1988, 13). When a more ecologically-oriented forest inventory project was being planned with Finnish funding in the 1980s, the logging activities of SSM were described as selective and ‘exploitable’ by the forestry experts. Logging was targeted only to tree species considered as the most valuable (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985, 3). It also led to different environmental problems, such as soil erosion. Many felled and standing trees were damaged during felling and skidding of trees, and pit-sawing followed mechanical logging (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985). There was no forest regenerating program for the natural forests (Jones 1983). According to a forestry expert who had worked in the Usambaras in the mid-1980s, the technology used in the mechanical logging was too heavy for the site, and the transportation of logs degraded also the roads (interview of ex-project Manager 31.8.2005, Mikkeli, Finland). Evidently, the logging activities had effects not only on forest cover, but also on its quality. The logging also shaped the local livelihoods. Many of the long-time residents in Amani who had experienced the industrial logging remembered its negative consequences in terms of degradation of the roads, streams and the forests. Yet, others had also benefited through employment opportunities, so the local inhabitants had differentiated conceptions and interests in relation to the logging.

Conservationists started to criticise the logging activities in the EUM already in the end of 1970s, but the Finnish development aid for mechanical logging and wood industries went on until the mid-1980s. In the end of the 1970s, new environmental organisations emerged and there was increasing pressure for effective conservation of the remaining forests in the Eastern Arc Mountains. According to W.A. Rodgers (2000, 87), the starting point for Eastern Arc conservation movement was in 1978, after the East African Wildlife Symposium in Arusha. At that time, a group of biologists, foresters and land use experts were taken to visit Amani, in the EUM, for four days and they reported to government “on the biological values of the mountain forests and the threats facing them” (Rodgers 2000, 87). However,
conservation of the Eastern Arc forests had been discussed internationally already in the 1960s, in a conference of biologists in Uppsala, Sweden (Iversen 1991). Furthermore, the conservation concerns were also stressed by several colonial scientists working in Amani (Conte 2004).

Forest conservation started to gain more political weight in the 1980s, in the Usambaras and more widely in Tanzania (e.g. Rodgers & Homewood 1982; Hurst 2004). Researchers tried to promote conservation of the Usambaras by publishing scientific articles on the topic. The unique biological value of the forests was also stressed by the Tanzanian forest experts (Rodgers 1993). In addition, the water catchment value of the mountain forests was emphasised, in a similar manner to the colonial era. In the end of the 1980s, Kalaghe et al. (1988, 46) argued in the journal of the Tanzanian foresters that “Farmers are dependent on intact catchment forests for the sustainability of their agriculture”. The shift in the policies’ focus was also a reaction to the growing international pressure to protect the mountain forests.

One of the key narratives in the evolving conservation discourse was the rapid deforestation in the EUM and other Eastern Arc Mountains. In this, the scientific knowledge was used to redirect the policy discourse, and justify support to forest conservation. In the early 1980s, Rodgers and Homewood (1982) estimated the extent of forest loss in Amani to be 50 percent between 1954 and 1978. The Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) supported a forest inventory in the mid-1980s which suggested different figures for deforestation. Yet, the inventory used different categories to describe the forests, and differed in terms of geographic coverage. The “intact forests” was estimated to be only 23 percent of the area surveyed (23 000 ha) in the mid 1980s, whereas “exploited forests” covered nearly 50 percent (FINNIDA 1988, App. II, 10). According to Newmark (2002, 70; 140), the original natural forest cover of the whole East Usambaras, reaching 95 000 ha, had dropped by 57 percent by 1998, much of it in the low lands. Due to the differences in the geographic areas considered to form ‘the East Usambaras’ and differences in categorisation of land use, the various figures are not comparable (e.g. Johansson & Sandy 1996). Yet, there is much indication that the forest cover of the EUM has reduced considerably in the latter half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the estimates have helped to justify the urgency of conservation to donors and policy makers.

4.6. Experiments of participatory forest conservation in the East Usambaras

The IUCN started to advocate forest conservation activities in the EUM in the 1980s. Its intervention, the East Usambara Conservation and Agricultural Development Project\(^{36}\) (EUCADP), which started in 1987,
became one of the first experiments in community involvement in forest conservation in East Africa. The approach of the EUCADP has been described as a trial of Conservation with Development (Stocking & Perkin 1992; Kessy 1998). The project launched various approaches of involving the local people in conservation, many of which were later on 'recycled' or copied by the other conservation and development agencies operating in the area.

The IUCN had first become involved in the area through assisting in ecological research of the forests in the 1980s. The project was funded by the Norwegian government. The research work also resulted from the growing concern over the ecological effects of the logging activities among researchers and conservationists (interview of a senior biologist, 16.12.2004, Dar es Salaam). The IUCN survey and related activities were conducted in connection to the Finnish-funded Amani Forest Inventory and Management Plan (AFIMP), carried out in 1986-1987 (FINNIDA 1988; Hamilton 1989a). The AFIMP was largely a response by the FINNIDA to the growing critique towards the impacts of mechanical logging activities. Through it, and the pressure from conservationists, the emphasis of the Finnish funded interventions in the EUM shifted towards conservation (interview of an ex-project manager of AFIMP, 31.8.2005, Mikkeli).

During the planning of the AFIMP, the reasons underlying forest degradation were conceived to be selective logging, pit-sawing, spreading of the *Maesopsis eminii* species, failures in regenerating *Mtambara*, and cultivation in the forests by the villagers (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985, 3). However, other factors, including the decreasing productivity of nationalised tea companies from the end of 1970s until the early 1990s (Faber 1995), probably also played a role as an underlying factor. Some of the villagers I met had also previously worked for the tea estates, but had then turned into farming as the tea plucking did not provide them enough secure living.

Furthermore, the capacity of the forest department to regulate the logging activities was argued to be poor in the 1980s: “the volume of pit-sawing is not known and the activity is hard to control” (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985, 3). The outlined objective of AFIMP was to produce a forest management plan to the EUM, including conservation and production goals (Hamilton 1989a, 5-8). It was also to ensure sustainable benefits to the people and the Tanzanian economy, e.g. supply of timber and fuel wood (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985, 4). Thus, the utilisation function was not rejected in the management planning by the experts in spite of the increasing emphasis put on conservation.

The initiative for the IUCN project came from Dr. Rodgers in 1983, who was the IUCN/WWF Tropical Forest Coordinator in Tanzania (Hamilton 1989a, 3-4). The IUCN project was implemented in collaboration with three parties: the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, through the Tanga Regional Authorities, the Forestry Division and IUCN, and funded mostly by the European Community (EC) and its Food Aid Counterpart Fund. It was officially started in 1987 (Stocking & Perkin 1992), but the

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37 The project also received limited funding from other sources (Wells et al. 1992, 20).
continuity of the project operations suffered from inadequate funding. The EUCADP and another large conservation project that started a few years after, the East Usambara Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP) were both designed to contribute to conservation, but partly through different strategies and in distinct areas.

The IUCN project’s rationality regarding local people and their role in forest control appears as controversial. The planners of the conservation interventions in the EUM, as some researchers previously (Rodgers & Homewood 1982), represented the local population and their agricultural practices as the biggest threat to the forest. Previously, while the planning of the AFIMP was on-going, much of the forest destruction was argued to be directly or indirectly caused by logging (e.g. Mustonen & Räsänen 1985). Yet, the main focus of the EUCADP was on reducing the pressures towards the forest caused by the local population (Stocking & Perkin 1992). For instance, the IUCN planning team argued after its field visit to the EUM “…that forest reduction was related to the existence of unproductive, non-sustainable agricultural practices…” (Hamilton 1989a, 3). Furthermore, the cultivation of cardamom under the forest cover was conceived as a serious problem. The AFIMP inventory estimated that over thousand hectares of cardamom had been planted inside the reserves. It also concluded that increasing population caused the biggest threat to the forests (FINNIDA 1988, Appendix I, 7).

In addition, the pattern of land tenure remained unclear in the EUM. Several mapping exercises and surveys of land use had been conducted in the late-colonial and post-colonial eras (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c), but the land tenure was still described as unclear in the end of the 1980s (FINNIDA 1988; Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c; Wells et al. 1992). The administrative boundaries of the villages that had been established in the previous surveying exercises were found to be inaccurate. The AFIMP inventory argued that the borders of the reserves were not often marked clearly in the landscape and there were gaps in the information on the boundaries between public lands and the estates (FINNIDA 1988 Appendix II, 7). In addition, in the maps produced in the 1970s, some of the villages were actually situated in the forest reserves. Thus, the maps produced did not match the reality, as it was conceived by the experts at that time.

In a similar way to other ICDPs, the IUCN project aimed to improve the villagers’ living conditions and livelihoods, and contribute to conservation goals simultaneously, e.g. “… adequately preserving the forests’ biological diversity and environmental value” (Wells et al. 1992, 19-20). Conservation was to be achieved by reducing the pressures towards forests by improving the agricultural systems (e.g. Kessy 1998; Sjöholm et al. 2001, 69), and sensitising the villagers. On top of the on-farm and village activities, the EUCADP sought to improve the control of the reserves. In the field, the emphasis was set on surveying villages, including discussions with local people about the project goals, and promoting substitutes for cardamom. In addition, local participation was promoted through selecting and educating

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38The project’s funding for the period of 1989-1991 was one and half million US dollars.
village coordinators (Wells et al. 1992, 36-37), some of whom became well known and respected figures. Yet, the establishment of a linkage between development activities and conservation goals was questioned later on (Stocking & Perkin 1992). The project faced managerial and funding problems, which contributed to the fact that it was assessed as a ‘failed’ project at a later stage (Ramsay & Kessy 1996; Newmark 2002). Ultimately, in 1997, the EUCADP was connected to the EUCFP.

The IUCN project’s interpretation of participation was clearly an instrumental one (c.f. Nelson & Wright 1997). The activities to involve the villagers were targeted to the predetermined objectives of improving forest control and status, and generating income to the farmers. Mzee Paul, an approximately 60-years old male farmer from Makanya sub-village of IBC Msasa, and the cousin of the sub-village chairman, with whom we visited some of the areas taken later on to the Derema Corridor, described how the IUCN project had tried to educate the villagers about the importance of forest conservation and its linkage to the availability of water: “The IUCN gave us advice, jamani (Swa. ‘Oh, my people’) if you cut so much you destroy the environment [and] all areas depend on it, because all water people drink in Tanga comes from this forest” (discussion, 14.1.2008, Makanya). The people living next to the forest reserves were conceived as a threat, as in many other Integrated Development and Conservation Efforts (e.g. Korhonen 2006). In addition, they were conceived to need education so that they would become more supportive of conservation. The project also made follow-up on and reported to authorities about illegal activities, such as pit-sawing and mechanical logging (Tye 1995).

However, the farmers also offered a source of labour force to the project. One of the means used to involve the villagers, was the boundary demarcation of forest reserves: clearing of the area and planting it with exotic, non-invasive species. The local farmers were paid for participating in these tasks (Wardell 1992). The goal was to prevent illegal activities and forest encroachment. The results were assessed to be promising in terms of increased survival rates of seedlings. Anyhow, difficulties emerged when the project wanted to demarcate the surveyed but not yet gazetted boundaries of a proposed forest reserve: in two cases the farmers inverted planted teak trees at the boundary into stumps. Wardell (1992) argues that through this action, the farmers made political statements against the boundary demarcation process due to the negative effects it had on their agricultural activities. The IUCN’s activities therefore reflected the exclusive conservation thinking, e.g. increased rule enforcement and trying to keep farmers out of the reserves, and a form of participatory conservation. Some of the responses and strategies of the local actors, including the acts of resistance in the case described by Wardell (1992), were also similar to typical fortress conservation. The role given to the local people in the projects formal discourse, e.g. as workers and educators of others, indicate that the understanding of participation in the project was closest to the consultative and functional levels in the typology of participation (Barrow & Murphree 2001). The decision-making, and establishment of the groups, was determined by the experts’ interests, although they tried to balance between
different interests related to the resources, including income and livelihood needs. Yet, the groups also used the opportunities opened up by the project to promote their own interests, as the case of the pit-sawing groups described next indicates.

The project promoted small-scale pit-sawing in the village land, and tried to establish groups to conduct it. Yet, this did not turn out as ‘success’ (Stocking & Perkin 1992) in terms of conservation, but arguably led to controversial outcomes. The permitting of pit-sawing was later on accused by critics to have conflicted with the conservation goals (Stocking & Perkin 1992; Newmark 2002). For instance, some of the pit-sawers who had been allowed to cut dead and fallen trees had felled live trees (Tye 1995; Newmark 2002, 152). My field assistant who had been working for the project at the village level in the 1990s argued that some of the pit-sawers harvested more trees that they were formally allowed to, which the project then tried to address (pers. communication, 15.10.2003, Amani).

Moreover, common to many projects, the project was criticised of having built an organisation that relied too much on external support, which risked its continuation (Burgess & Nummelin 2000). However, this issue was affected by the lack of trust between the parties, related to the alleged involvement of some of the authorities to illicit logging, but probably also to wider social phenomena. In general, the concentration of power during the post-independence era had resulted in low level of trust towards the governmental institutions in Tanzania, e.g. as a result of unfulfilled promises by the government and self-righteous behaviour of the leaders (Hydén 1994). According to an expert who had worked in the project in the early 1990s, among the obstacles were the lack of suitable local organisations upon which the project could have been built and a high level of corruption among the government agencies (interview, 3.6. 2004, Denmark). The relationship between the IUCN project leadership and the government agencies involved was thus not smooth at that time. Obviously, the conservation efforts were also undermined by involvement of some of the forest department and local government staff to illicit activities in the forests (Pirinen 1993), discussed more below.

In spite of the several efforts made to enhance local livelihoods and educate the farmers on environmental issues, the non-authorised use of the forests did not stop totally. There were signs of every-day resistance, or what Scott (1990) calls hidden transcript, in relation to the strict rules set by the conservation experts and forest department, as in other protected areas in Tanzania (Neumann 1998). For instance, illegal hunting and trapping of animals was assessed to be a common activity in the forest reserves of the EUM in the early 1990s (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 10). During the village meetings organised in Amani by a consultancy team hired by EUCFP, the villagers explained that they were not aware of the regulations. Hunting was probably also related to the farmers’ efforts to reduce the number of destructive animals coming from the forests to their fields. However, it could partly be a form of every-day resistance to the strict rules on forest access. In addition, an area of contestation between the forest authorities, conservationists and villagers was related to harvesting of timber.
A timber harvest ban in the reserved forests of the EUM was launched in 1987, implemented following a decline in key commercial timber species (Roe et al. 2002, 66). The ban was directed towards mechanical logging. Yet, this ban was said to have increased the level of pit-sawing ‘massively’ (Rodgers 1993, 302). The pit-sawing involved villagers, immigrants and businessmen, and occurred largely illegally and focused on public land forests. Soon after in 1989, a new control measure, a moratorium on pit-harvesting was issued by the Director of FBD, but a concession was made to allow pit-sawing for the trees that had already been felled for the making of school desks (Tye 1995). The new ban, however, was covering only Amani Division (Roe et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the illegal pit-sawing was said to flourish throughout the area in the years following the ban (Stocking & Perkin 1992; Roe et al. 2002; interview of an ex-project advisor of EUCADP, Denmark, 3.6. 2004). It was arguably also conceived as a major threat towards the forests by the villagers in the early 1990s (Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994). This response, however, could be affected by the fact that the consultancy research by Kajembe and Mwaseba (1994) was issued by the EUCFP. For instance, some of the villagers were also involved in, and profiting from, the tree harvesting.

According to Roe al. (2002) the bans led to an increase in illegal timber trade both in reserved and unreserved land. It also led to the increasing scarcity of the best timber species. The activity and business involved and benefited different groups of actors. The forest guards and officers at different administrational levels, village authorities of several villages, as well as the former head of a research institute based in Amani were arguably engaged in it (Interview of an ex-project advisor of EUCADP, 3.6.2004, Denmark). Furthermore, in the early 1990, it was found by the EUCADP that most of the regulations on small-scale timber harvesting were not followed and the loop-holes (such as permits for the villages to pit-saw timber to make school desks) were being exploited (Tye 1995). According to Rodgers (1993, 302), who established his account on Wardell (1990), the harvesting of timber in the EUM had been authorised in some form. In addition, there were intra-community disputes regarding the control of illegal pit-sawing in the early 1990s (e.g. Mikkola & Tengnäs 1993; Andrua 1995).

4.7. New solutions to and contradictions of forest control under EUCFP and beyond

During the 1990s, the objective of biodiversity conservation emerged as a key factor that directed the forest related interventions in the East Usambaras, although protection of water sources was also used as a justification for conservation. The mountains were classified to be among the 25 global ‘biodiversity hotspots’, or the richest and most threatened reservoirs of plant and animal life (EUCAMP 2002b).

In addition to the IUCN project and catchment forest project that was partly built on the plans made during the AFIMP, smaller conservation projects were started in the East Usambaras in the 1990s. One of them was
the Kambai Forest Conservation Project which was initially planned by two conservationists, following their research work in the area (Tye 1995). The project was implemented by the TFCG. The Kambai project first worked only in the villages surrounding the Kambai forest in the lowlands of the EUM, starting in 1993. The project shared the same overall goals with the bigger conservation projects (Kessy 1998), and tried to promote both conservation and development goals, e.g. by supporting establishment of village forest reserves and tree planting. However, the most significant intervention in terms of budget and resources targeted to forest control in the 1990s was the EUCFP, funded by the GoF and GoT. In the last stage of the project, the name was changed to EUCAMP, and the project was partly funded by the EU.

Compared to the IUCN project, the emphasis in the first phase of EUCFP (1991-1993) was more clearly set on the activities that were to contribute to forest protection (e.g. interview of an ex-project manager of AFIMP, 31.8.2005, Mikkeli). As the name of the project indicates, securing availability of water from the catchment forests was a major goal. The water catchment function of the forests was not justified only by national interests, but it was also to serve the interest of the local farmers. In addition, biodiversity conservation was defined as a major objective, supported by global concerns over biodiversity loss and uniqueness of the area.

Throughout the project period, the EUCFP worked intensively to increase the area and control of the reserved forests. The project efforts therefore contributed to territorialisation efforts by the government and conservation organisations operating in the EUM by surveying the land use and preparing maps and management plans for different categories of forests and land use. At the early stage, land use and distribution of different types of forests in a large part of the EUM were studied (c.f. table 5 below), to find out about the area and location of existing and potential forest reserves. According to the project’s Chief Technical Adviser (CTA), the results showed that “most of the valuable forest areas are in the process of becoming legally protected” (c.f. Sandy & Johansson 1996). In addition, in relation to biodiversity conservation objective, a totally new category of a strictly protected nature forest reserve was created when the Amani Nature Reserve was established in 1997.

During the first two phases, the EUCFP increased the area of reserved forest from about 17,000 hectares to more than 30,000 ha by 1998 (see also figure 2). According to the project documents, acceptance from the villagers was asked, or they were at least consulted for before the establishment of new and the enlargement of old reserves (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993; Pirinen 1993). However, the experiences of the villagers on this varied. The farmers who had given up their farming land to reserves often complained about not being compensated properly, or sometimes at all (Jambiya &

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39 Gradually, TFCG extended its activities to other areas in the EUM, including ‘corridors’ that were not reserved between the Catchment Forest Reserves. It also started to co-operate with other conservation and research agencies working in the East Usambaras, e.g. WWF and the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF).

40 Yet, the preparations and planning of the reserve required several years (discussed more in chapter 5).
Sosovele 2001; Sjöholm et al. 2001, appendix 1). Moreover, a consultancy report stated that only 11 percent of the sample population, which consisted of 230 individuals, said they had been consulted before the reservation (Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994, 9, 19). Not surprisingly, the reservation of new areas created tensions, as it limited the villagers’ access to the land and forest products\(^\text{41}\) (e.g. Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994; Woodcock 2002). Many of the villagers were yet well aware of the benefits of the existence of the forests, and stressed the connection between them and rainfall (Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994, 16).

There were also persistent controversies in relation to how the government, and its different agencies, operated in the forest control. Some of the staff of the EUCFP was found to be involved in the illegal activities (Pirinen 1993, 5-6) that had continued in the early 1990s, although the result of investigations was kept confidential by the FBD (Mikkola & Tengnäs 1993, 17). In addition, in the early 1990s, the relationship between the FBD staff and the villagers was problematic. The EUCFP’s forestry adviser expressed this in an indirect way in the project report: “the reputation of Forest Officers is not so good” (Pirinen 1993, 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use class</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>42 121</td>
<td>50,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>35 909</td>
<td>43,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant farming</td>
<td>31 716</td>
<td>88,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea plantation</td>
<td>2 363</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa plantation</td>
<td>1 107</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal plantation</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlands</td>
<td>4 113</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassland</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds and rivers</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barren land</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83 601</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Distribution of land use classes in the EUM as classified by Hyytiäinen (1995) and presented by Sandy & Johansson (1996). Forests include both plantations and natural forests, with different level of utilisation.

The change of biodiversity conservation discourse at global level in the 1980s and 1990s was also reflected in conservation strategies of the EUCFP/EUCAMP. During the second stage of the project, communities’ participation became a more central focus of the project (Koponen 2001, 77-78), in its official discourse. In 1994, the EUCFP ordered a consultancy on extension and communication, which was to promote co-operation between

\(^{41}\) In the early 1990s, among the negative aspects of the existence of the forest reserves, as expressed by the villagers, were shortages of land and tree products, as well as the presence of destructive animals (Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994, 17).
the farmers and the project. The resulting report by Kajembe and Mwaseba (1994), identified the needs of the farmers, and suggested how to develop the extension methods, and promote participation of both extension workers and the local population. Participation was mainly understood as consultation of the villagers in the early stages of the intervention.

Gradually, efforts to devolve part of the decision-making power to the ‘communities’ were started by the EUCFP. The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) of the second phase of EUCFP was more interested in the community involvement than the previous one. According to the staff members of the second phase, (www-source, Johansson et al. 1997), the consultative approach used in pilot villages was emerging as more successful compared to the enforcement approach. However, they also argued that the consultative approach might be too slow, without the initial enforcement with court cases and fines for illegalities, in a situation where the control had been low for a long time. Thus, the discourse used by the project included both elements of the fortress conservation discourse, and participatory thinking, in a similar way as in the IUCN project.

As the project documentation implies (Sandy & Johansson 1996, www-source, Johansson et al. 1997), participation was mainly meant to support conservation objectives, as previous strategies of conservation had not turned about to be efficient enough. In practice, much effort was still put into rule enforcement throughout the 1990s, at the same time when benefit sharing and community-based management initiatives were designed and piloted. In the mid-1990s, processes were launched which aimed to devolve part of the resource control responsibility to the village level. The intended level of participation in the forest control also depended on the category of the forest. The project introduced different income generating activities in the villages, such as bee-keeping, building of fuel wood saving stoves, and nursery groups to increase tree planting. In addition, the project sought to raise the awareness among the local people on the mountain forests’ environmental values (e.g. EUCFP 1999). Elderly people were involved through so-called Elders in Conservation program in which the idea was to transfer traditional environmental knowledge to the school children.

At the early stage of the second phase of EUCFP, a consultancy was organised on participatory management. The consultancy was to help especially in the planning of Village Forest Reserves (VFR), where the forest management was to be based on the idea of the local communities self monitoring (Ellman 1996, 1-2), showing an instrumental and functional interpretation of ‘participation’ in which the villagers and their groups were to fulfill the management goals designed by the experts. Within the subsequent years, management plans for VFR were developed with a number of surrounding villages (Mustalahti 2002).

In the end of the 1990, a positive image of the progress made in the EUCFP regarding participatory approach was created, and supported by the representatives of the project and donors. The final report of the second phase stated that the local people “now feel” that the forests are for them and the participatory management had been successful (EUCFP 1999, xi).
Furthermore, the attitudes towards forest conservation among the local people had arguably evolved towards a positive direction (e.g. EUCAMP 2002b; Newmark 2002, 160). However, the image of success made by the project was questioned by the critical mid-term evaluation (Sjöholm et al. 2001) and prior that, by some researchers and consultants (Ramsay & Kessy 1996; Mallya 1998). Furthermore, the debate shows the different objectives connected to ‘participation’ by experts. Arguing from a more transformative perspective, the critics of the conservation approach used by the EUCFP suggested that participation of the local people in the project had remained at the level of ‘implementation’, and real decision-making power was held by outsiders (Mallya 1998). In addition, the participation of farmers in the different activities with potential benefits, such as study tours, was said to be biased towards the notable villagers. Furthermore, in Woodcock’s (2002, 1-10) account, the participatory projects of the 1990s suffered from an “economic bias”, as local people were in the role of beneficiaries instead of being an actor in resource management.

Problems in land control that had been previously identified remained unsolved. Kessy (1998, 126) argued that unclearly defined land ownership conditions were common in the EUM. In Kessy’s analysis, the unclear patterns of land ownership also contributed to ‘forest encroachment’ on general lands in the 1990s. Yet, this phenomenon was also affected by the unequal distribution of land between different groups. Many immigrants had to borrow land from the people who had been living in the area for a longer time, and had relatively bigger areas of land (Kessy 1998, 63). In addition, in spite of the tightened control measures, illegal activities were reported to have continued in the end of the 1990s, such as burning of forests and trading of wild animals and timber. The concern among the villagers about the involvement of some of the forest officials in the illegal activities continued, indicating that the discourse of good cooperation between the local people and authorities in forest control was not supported by all parties. For instance, in 1997, a forest guard was claimed to be involved in illegal pit-sawing in the public forest in Kambai (Woodcock 2002, 71-72). There were thus signs of suspicion and lack of trust between the ‘partners’ supposed to jointly manage the forests.

Another problematic issue that the conservation projects tried to address was the forest fires, in the reserves and outside them. Newmark (2002, 28) states that over six hundred hectares of lowland forest burned during the dry season in 1998 in the East Usambaras, as a result of fires spreading from fields. The forest and bush fires that result from the land preparation42 can occur unintentionally, and due to lack of proper counter measures. The risk of the uncontrolled fires is increased by the dry weather conditions during the season when land is being prepared. Fire is also sometimes used by the hunters in the EUM (Kajembe & Mwaseba 1994, 19: Woodcock 2002; author’s field notes 15.10.2003), and it may spread into wider areas and the forests as a result. However, the large forest fires in

42 Fire is often used as a means of land preparation before the rainy season in the EUM, and it is generally considered as a cheap method of clearing land (author’s observation; EUFRL 2006).
some parts of the mountains, e.g. those in the newly established reserves were likely to reflect acts of resistance towards the exclusive elements of conservation, although it is not possible to verify this at a later point of time. However, it is clear that the conditions of the forest control and selected strategies, such as acquiring large areas of land under strictly protected reserves, were also experienced as unfair by many of the farmers who gave up their land for conservation, and did not get the expected compensations (Jambiya & Sosovele 2001; author’s fieldwork observation). The lack of legitimacy of the decisions made about forest control and land use could contribute to resentment and resistance, as in other areas (e.g. Wilshusen et al. 2003, Conte 2004). During year 1997, when the ANR was formally established, an extensive area within the reserve was affected by fire (ANR general management plan 1998). Such large areas of forests would probably not have been burned if all the villagers followed the rules of burning land and were engaged in the fire control.

Furthermore, illegal trade of animals started in early 1990s. The traded volumes peaked in 1994/1995 (Roe et al. 2002). Some villagers were also involved in it, most commonly young males, due to lack of alternatives and problems in land access. This activity had continued until recent years in some of the villages close to the ANR. However, the regulations on trade at global level arguably decreased the illegal trade of wildlife considerably in the early 21st century (Roe et al. 2002), showing the interconnections of the forest control in the EUM to the changes at the broader political and economic setting.

In the last stage, more funding was provided for the project and a social forestry advisor was hired in the EUCAMP. According to the CTA and the social forestry advisor (interviews, 19.3.2003 and 2.9.2004, Helsinki), forest conservation remained as the most important objective. The project staff communicated with researchers experienced in the ecology of the EUM, when they needed advise in conservation issues (interview of CTA of EUCAMP, 2.9.2004, Helsinki). The project’s leaders conceived participation of communities largely as a means to fulfil the ultimate goal of biodiversity conservation. As one of the staff members defined it, the community involvement was foremost a means to address the needs of the villagers, and to reduce their dependency on the forest (interview of social forestry adviser, 19.3.2003, Helsinki). In addition, one of the celebrated outcomes of the last stage of the project was the nomination of EUM as a Man and Biosphere Reserve43. The concept of participation was also integral to the MaB thinking. In principle, in the MaB areas, the goal is to build organisational and institutional arrangements that allow participation of different stakeholders and groups in the management, including ‘communities’ (Myllylä 2001). This effort to push for a new international status for the EUM, and the assumed shift in the formal institutional sphere, exemplifies how the project tried to achieve new symbolic value, and international

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43 The idea of MaB reserve had been introduced already in the AFIMP inventory in the 1980s, with the objective of contribute to funding of development and research activities (FINNIDA 1988).
recognition for the area. It was also about securing material resources to support for the conservation activities.

The project also continued to work with the establishment of VFRs on non-reserved land. Furthermore, a new model of JFM was launched in a few CFRs, including Mtain and Manga reserves (c.f. Vihemäki 2005). Planning workshops and facilitation was conducted at the selected areas (Veltheim & Kijazi 2002). The villagers were also to be involved in the management of the ANR although its strict conservation status set limits to the level of devolving control to the village level. In addition, attitude education among the villagers was conceived important (interview of the manager of TCFO, 22.12.2004, Tanga). Thus the villagers were being not only perceived as ‘partners’ in protecting the forests but also conceived as constituting a threat towards the conservation objectives. Intervention was needed so that the communities would not enter the reserved forests. Therefore, a rather conventional and instrumental rationality, based on awareness-raising and providing incentives to the farmers not to enter the forests, was underlying the project’s understanding of participation, in a similar way to the previous conservation and development efforts in the EUM. At the same time, it was an effort to shape the conduct of the population to a more environmentally-friendly direction, in a similar way to many other conservation projects (Bryant 2002). The focus on ‘communities’, common to many conservation interventions, is also related to the incapacity and reluctance of the interventions to address more complex, the structural political and economical mechanisms that contribute to environmental degradation, as suggested by Li (1996; 2007a).

However, the way ‘participation’ had been defined and promoted by the representatives of the EUCAMP was not approved by all experts engaged with the project. Among the issues criticised by the mid-term reviewers of the last phase of the project was that the EUCAMP, in their eyes, had continued to use a protectionist conservation strategy where land is acquired for conservation, and the lack of alternative approaches and adequate community involvement (Sjöholm et al. 2001). The discourse used by the team members in the evaluation report implies that their understanding of community participation in forest control was a more radical one, seeking to empower the ‘communities’. They suggested that the EUCAMP should “[t]ake on board an empowering development approach, to replace the more educative and sometimes top-down delivery approach used so far” (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 5). The involvement of the villages in forest control was also argued to be cheap and efficient way of managing the forests, so it was conceived as a win-win solution. Annoyed about the strong criticism towards the project, the CTA of the EUCAMP suggested that the evaluation team did not have much experience in conducting such tasks, and that they had misunderstood the goals of the project. Referring to the evaluation team, the CTA argued in a sarcastic manner that a team member “...evaluated a project that should have been named East Usambara Participatory Village Forest Management Project. He/she did not evaluate East Usambara Conservation Project.” (interview, 2.9.2004, Helsinki). Therefore, the optimal level of participation and means of promoting conservation were not agreed
upon by the experts. However, the criticism then led to the rewriting of the project document.

Since the end of the EUCAMP, other organisations have continued to promote participatory management models and other forest conservation related activities in the EUM with support from diverse donors. Some of them are led by the FBD, whereas others are led by NGOs and research organisations. Through these projects, there is some continuity in the processes started by the previous interventions. In these recent interventions, community participation is also a key concept. For instance, the TFCG and WWF Tanzania implement jointly the East Usambara Forest Landscape Restoration (EUFLR). The project has since 2004 taken over some of the VFR establishment processes started by the EUCAMP (www-source, Malugu et al. 2008; author’s field notes, January 2008, Amani). In a similar way as many ICDPs, the EUFLR project aims to contribute to both biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction, and improve connectivity between certain forest blocks through affecting the land use in the ‘gaps’ between the reserved forests. In addition, it supports diverse income generating activities and environmental education. Another project, led by the ICRAF, and implemented by the TFCG, supports and conducts research on participatory land use planning processes in the villages, aiming also to integrate and affect both conservation and livelihood concerns.

4.8. Formalisation of land tenure and institutionalisation of PFM

The idea of involving ‘local people’ in natural resource management and conservation found increasing attention among the conservation organisations and resources in the end of the 1980s and early 1990s in Tanzania, as in many other developing countries (e.g. Benjaminsen 2000; Wilshusen et al. 2003). In Tanzania, steps towards participatory natural resource management and conservation were taken in different regions. One of the early efforts to involve ‘communities’ in environmental conservation was the Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga (HASHI) project, started in 1986 and funded by Norwegians. It was to combat land degradation and deforestation in Shinyanga Region (Iddi 2003). Formally, the objective of HASHI was to devolve the management of natural resources, as much as possible, to the communities (Iddi 2003). Another early development, conceived as a model community-based forest management, was the protection of Duru-Haitemba forest by the villages surrounding the forest since the end of the 1980s. During the next decade, participatory discourse became institutionalised in the new forest policy, under the concept PFM. It drew largely from the experiences of pilot projects and initiatives, but was also a reaction to the shift in the global discourse, and donor demands.

In addition, there were efforts to settle land use disputes and clarify the patterns of land tenure in different parts of Tanzania in the 1990s. A new

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44The NGOs’ joint conservation project is led by the WWF-Finland (www-source, Malugu et al. 2008). In 2009, it was allocated 150 000 Euros by the GoF.
Agricultural Policy had been passed in 1983. It has been considered as an initial effort to consolidate local people’s control over land (Iddi 2003, 64). However, the policy was never properly implemented because some Party officials insisted on Ujamaa and collective land ownership under Village governments (Ojalammi 2006, 37). In its further effort to solve the problems of land tenure, the Government introduced a Bill in 1992, which the legislature then passed into law. The Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act removed all customary titles to land that had been acquired before the villagisation program (Twaib 1996, 107), thus severely undermining the legal position of those people who had occupied land under that category.

However, soon after, the National land policy (1995) and legislation was prepared to clarify the tenure and secure the position of farmers holding land under customary rights. The need for reform was related to the existence of two modes of land rights in the previous legal system. In practice, the customary land rights had often been neglected (Twaib 1996; Neumann 1997b). The goals of the policy reforms were, among other things, to divide the land fairly and legalise the land rights of those people without official documents (LNRLPS 2004). Furthermore, with the introduction of the trade liberalisation policy, the economy was opened up to private investors, which caused pressures to better control the economic transactions over land. Overall, formalising the land tenure system was a central goal of the reform.

According to the land legislation of 1999, the President continued to be entrusted with the ownership of all the land. Yet, groups or individuals were entitled to hold use rights, and rights to land could now be officially exchanged in the markets. The Village Act (1999) named existing and well-established Village Councils as land managers (Ojalammi 2006) and sought to strengthen the village councils in land matters. The new land law has been argued to provide a better recognition of customary rights compared to previous laws and sets the stage for integration of customary and formal tenure by legislative means (Okoth-Ogendo 2000, 124). However, the President can still require that land under the villages is allocated for other purposes, in which case the representative of the respective department needs to negotiate with the village council and pay an adequate compensation for the required land (LNRLPS 2004).

In addition to these policy and legislative reforms, the patterns of resource control and the best ways to handle environmental issues were discussed in, and redefined, through other processes. In general, participation of communities in resource control was argued to be relevant for achievement of sustainable development and improved resource control. The Tanzania Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) of 1989, developed partly as a reaction to global conservation pressures, stressed the principle of participation (Ylhäisi 2003). The discursive break-through of participation at environmental institutions was evident in different conservation related strategies produced in the 1990s (www-document, URT 2001), including the National Conservation Strategy for Sustainable Development of 1994. Furthermore, the FBD continued ‘piloting’ participatory forest management
through various projects over the country. According to a review of national level developments, between 1994 and 1999, 544 villages were involved in the management of more than 1500 village forest reserves, community forest reserves and private reserves whereas only 11 villages were involved in the management of government forest reserves (Wily & Dewees 2001). The pilot projects were assessed to be cheap and sustainable by the FBD (Ylhäisi 2003) reflecting a rather instrumental rationality underlying these efforts.

The idea of participation in forest management was also promoted by foreign experts, some of whom emphasised strongly the transformative version of participation. An example of the populist style sometimes used by the proponents of PFM is given by Wily (1997, 4), who suggests that forest management should be “a state people collaboration in which the state supports the efforts of the people rather than the people supporting the efforts of the state”. The view implies that the management goals should rather come from the assumed community, than from the state, and implies an opposition between the two.

Furthermore, the emerging discourse of participatory conservation included the idea of communities with strong ties to the environment, and interest to protect the forests. For instance, Wily and Dewees (2001, 24-25) argued that the forest-adjacent communities in Tanzania hold enough “custodial interests” to manage forests in a sustainable way and recommended sharing of authority and decision-making powers. In terms of persistence of traditional institutions of forest control, there is some ground for the argument (e.g. Kessy 1998; Newmark 2002; Iddi 2003; Ylhäisi 2006). For instance, in his research among Pare and Zigua ethnic groups, Ylhäisi (2006) highlights the continuation of the traditional institutions related to the forests in some areas, although their continuity is presented to be at risk. Traditions have been seen as a way to promote conservation goals, e.g. through the concept Traditionally Protected Forests (TPF). Forestry experts and some researchers have presented that the traditions can be supported or ‘reinvigorated’ to promote conservation goals (Kessy 1998; Iddi 2003). Yet, the continuity of the traditional institutions and their outcomes in terms of conservation are highly uncertain, and also dependent on non-local processes of change.

The proponents of participation conceived it also as a way to promote democratic governance of natural resources and empowerment, especially among the poorest people. Wily (2003, 53), argued that PFM in Africa “…is giving reality for declamatory policies towards decentralisation and more inclusive governance”. In addition, the assumption on the empowerment and democratisation of society through handing over the responsibility over the forests to local people were evident in other expert accounts of the early 21st century (e.g. Wily et al. 2000; Wily 2002, Woodcock 2002; Ylhäisi 2003). Yet, the shift in the policies, and institutionalisation of participation, was not only a result of external actors, such as researchers and consultants, and actors representing the government.

In certain regions and cases, the initiatives of the local people, and some groups among them, contributed to the establishment of the pilot
projects to protect the natural resources through community-based initiatives (e.g. Brockington 2004; communication with Dr. K. Havnevik, May 2008, Uppsala). Local actors have typically mobilised themselves to push for forest conservation when they have shared enough common interests with other actors, such as NGOs (Brockington 2004), but this is also a context-dependent issue, being influenced by intra-village politics, and wider forces, such as market opportunities.

In the case of Mpanga forest in the northern part of the EUM, the representative of the traditional authority, who had been the ritual leader in the forest, started to co-operate with forest officials and businessmen from the town in timber harvesting (Kessy 1998, 103). The commercial utilisation of the traditionally protected forest created resentment not only among those people who conceived the breaking of the traditions as illegitimate but also among the groups who did not benefit from the business, as suggested by Kessy (1998). Subsequently, the villagers concerned with the destruction of the forest (and unequal benefit-sharing) approached the EUCFP, which then supported the establishment of the Village Forest Reserve in Mpanga. The case of Mpanga VFR exemplifies the importance of avoiding simplistic notions about homogenous, common minded and stable communities, as pointed out also by researchers in other contexts (e.g. Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Kumar 2002; Nygren 2005).

The several pilot projects in Tanzania, and experiences from them, contributed to the change in the policies, and institutionalisation of PFM, at the national level. However, the new discourse and concepts were not agreed on straight-a-head by all of the key actors (c.f. Kajembe & Kessy 2000). The director of FBD in the mid 1990s was critical to PFM discourse, and was later suddenly replaced to a new one (interview of an ex-project advisor of EUCADP, 3.6.2004, Denmark). The donors were, arguably, dissatisfied with a return to the ‘basics’ approach to forestry linked to the FBD director’s personal scepticism of community forestry. However, there was no overarching consensus about the conservation approach in the donor side either. A forestry expert who had been engaged in planning of the first phase of EUCFP argued (interview, 31.8.2005, Mikkeli, Finland): “I do not believe even now that it could be done only through ‘empowerment’, but there has to be some kind of a system that ensures that the areas established as protected areas will fulfil the nature conservation goals.” Clearly, some of the forestry experts and government’s representatives involved in the planning of forest conservation had also reservations about the conceptual shift in the conservation strategies.

At the national level, the major conceptual change took place with the introduction of the new National Forest Policy of Tanzania in 1998. The document was prepared with financial assistance from the GoF, and technical assistance of a consultancy company, Indufor (interview of the former Director of FBD, 19.1.2008, Morogoro). The general aim of the policy was to enhance the contribution of forestry and beekeeping sectors to sustainable development of Tanzania and the conservation and management of natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations (NFP 1998). More specifically, it aimed to sustain a sufficient forest area under
effective management and promote ecosystem stability through conservation of biodiversity, water catchments and soil fertility. In relation to management institutions, the objective was enhanced national capacity to manage and develop the forest sector in collaboration with other stakeholders. Communities’ participation was not mentioned explicitly as a goal, but PFM was introduced as a general strategy. The forest law of 2002 further consolidated the idea of community participation in forest control. Among the objectives of the new law were to promote and facilitate the active participation of people in sustainable planning, management, use and conservation of forests through the development of individual and community rights. Furthermore, it was “...to delegate responsibility for management of forest resources to the lowest possible level consistent with the furtherance of national policies” (The Forest Act 2002, 1169-70).

Yet, there were certain controversies in the forest policies, as the communities were not only seen as partners, but also presented as a threat. For instance, NFP (1998) framed some of the problems in forest control as follows: “Government forest reserves, i.e. gazetted forests, are constantly threatened by encroachment and shifting cultivation resulting from a high population pressure. Wild fires are taking place annually affecting both natural forests and plantations, unclear boundaries and inadequate resources for controlling have led to illicit felling of trees...” Moreover, in his article on participatory forestry in Tanzania, Iddi (2003), states that “forests and woodland resources face enormous pressure from the expansion of agricultural activities, settlements, livestock grazing, fires, charcoal-making, illegal harvesting and mining”. This illustrates continuities to certain elements of the previous conservation discourse. This implies that there are conflicting representations regarding local communities’ relationships with the forests at discourse embedded in policies and forest management and conservation strategies.

In addition, in Tanzania, the government continues to limit access to certain valuable tree species, often referred to as ‘government reserves species’ on general land. Previously, they have not been allowed to be cut without a permit and payment of a fee in any location, including the village land. This has sometimes created tensions in practice, as the logic is not understood or accepted by all citizens. However, the new forest law of 2002 allows exemption from this rule in the formally registered villages, where the villages are not obliged to share the royalties with other levels of government

45 (Blomley 2006; Blomley & Ramadhani 2006).

In the new forest policy and subsequent legislation, PFM was set out as the official strategy. JFM and CBFM were defined as its main approaches, the choice of which was to depend on the status of the forest. CBFM has been described as management system in which the forest is “under the control and eventual ownership” of the communities (Iddi 2003; MNRT 2003), including different models of management. In the Village land Forest Reserves (VFR), the whole village is responsible for management, and special

45 The reserved species list, under the Forest Act, Section 65 (3), does not formally apply to forests on village land, and is only applicable to trees on general land (Mariki et al. 2004).
committees are formed to manage the VFR area. In case of Community Forest Reserves, the management responsibility of the forest area is delegated to a more limited group. In principle, with the introduction of CBFM, decisions on harvesting, licensing and collection of revenue from forestry are transferred from districts to the Village Councils (Blomley 2006). The assumption has been to make conservation and management of forest resources beneficial for both the people and the forests.

The policy shift has been reflected in practices too, e.g. in the extent of land area formally or informally under different forms of participatory management. The area of forest and woodland under CBFM and JFM has increased since the introduction of the new policies, often with the assistance of donor and NGO support. Mainly, CBFM initiatives have been started in the dry land areas, such as miombo woodlands. In 2008, it was estimated that 4.1 million ha of forest, equivalent of 12.8 percent of the total forest area of the country, was under some form of community management or co-management in Tanzania (URT, MNRT, FBD 2008), compared to approximately 0.35 ha in 1999 (table 6). However, the figures also include areas that have not been formally established as CBFM or JFM reserves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CBFM area, million ha</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th>JFM area, million ha</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th>Total PFM, million ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1457</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. The forest areas estimated to be under different types of Participatory Forest Management in 1999 and by mid-2008 in Tanzania and the number of villages involved in their control. The number of villages includes those with established management agreements, and those in the process of agreeing on a participatory management scheme. Sources: Wily & Dewees (2001) and URT, MNRT, FBD (2008).

According to the proponents of PFM, the history of village level government in Tanzania is highly advantageous for implementing participatory forest management, mainly in the form of CBFM (Wily 2001, 11), but this view has been questioned by others (e.g. Brockington 2007; Brockington 2008). There is evidence of the ‘failures’ of the local government bodies, including the village councils, properly to manage their financial affairs, and lack of transparency in using of the tax money from the past (Brockington 2007, 841). Such non-transparent practices of decision-making and control of communal resources are likely to affect the on-going CBFM arrangements and their outcomes and benefit-sharing in Tanzania, if efforts are not made to change them by the actors and organisations involved.

While CBFM is about devolving management responsibilities and rights of ownership to the villages, JFM is concerned with shared management responsibility between ‘community’, such as village or group of villagers, the government, and possibly other actors, e.g. NGOs. The ‘original’, Indian version of JFM included both socio-economic objectives, in
terms of reducing poverty, and forest conservation goals\textsuperscript{46}. The underlying rationality was that ‘communities’ will carry part of the work of forest controlling, and obtain benefits that are to compensate them their participation.

In Tanzania, the government and communities are supposed to co-manage both central and local government forest reserves through special JFM agreements\textsuperscript{47}, which define the rules governing the reserve and the powers and duties of the parties (the Forest Act 2002, 1181-1182). The JFM guidelines suggest that agreements are made for five years, but in practice, the agreements have often been made for a trial period of a year, and then reviewed and amended if needed (Katila 2008). The design of JFM, especially in case of strictly protected forests, where there is officially no scope for logging, matches mostly with the functional level of participation (c.f. Barrow & Murphree 2001). Sharing of management responsibility is meant to serve the objectives set by outsiders. For instance, in a report produced by the experts of the Conservation and Management of Eastern Arc Mountain Forests project, the establishment of JFM in catchment forests is anticipated to halt illegal activities and improve forest condition (FBD 2006, 20). The role assigned to the communities is to act as forest guards, a task previously held by the FBD. In principle, however, the JFM agreements are also supposed to enhance the rights of the villagers to make use of forest produce within the reserves (LNRLPS 2004), so they involve different objectives.

Officially, a key feature of JFM is cost-benefit sharing between the central or local government and the communities (Blomley & Ramadhani 2007). Yet, legally binding benefit sharing arrangements were not agreed upon by 2008, but the guidelines for JFM suggest that villages should receive 40 percent of timber royalties in production forests (Katila 2008). In the case of protected forests, where timber harvesting is basically not allowed, the villagers can usually have limited access to some minor forest products, such as fuel wood, fruits, honey and wild vegetables, and use the area for bee keeping. In principle, the local managers are entitled to 100 percent of the fines from offences, as well as 50 percent of the entry fees and half of the value of the confiscated forest products, but there are also differences between different JFM agreements (Katila 2008, 96). Moreover, according to the manager of Tanga Catchment Forest Office (TCFO), who had been involved in the running of the EUCAMP and preparation of JFM plans, the idea is that the local people, especially the members of the forest management committees, will benefit indirectly from their participating in forest conservation (interview, 22.12.2004, Tanga). There are different non-monetary assets to motivate them, e.g. study tours and seminars, and getting t-shirts for free. The special position of the committee members in a village is also supposed to motivate them to participate in forest control.

\textsuperscript{46} In India, JFM was developed against the background of violent conflicts created by the continuation of colonial forestry practices during the post-colonial period (Sundar 2001, 329).

\textsuperscript{47} In the case of National Forest Reserves, the agreement is made between the FBD and the communities. In the Local government reserves, the District councils sign the agreements with the communities.
Some analysts have already made positive statements about the opportunity of the PFM to make the practices of forest control more legitimate and socially inclusive. For instance, Woodcock (2002, 46-48) argues that the new policy is a sign of the emergence of political negotiation paradigm, enabling political negotiation between the stakeholders. However, Woodcock does not discuss the actual implications of the reforms in detail, due to the time scope of the study (1994-1998). Yet, as suggested by Fay (2007, 90), in the context of South Africa, management models that are based on win-win assumptions have been promoted also in order to hide conflicting interests.

In spite of the positive statements and expectations, there is also evidence of unequal social outcomes of CBFM processes. This is related to the fact that the political patterns at local level that previously contributed to the unequal resource access, do not necessarily disappeared with the introduction of new principles of management. For instance, in the context of Handei VFR in the EUM, Zulu (2004) argues that the ‘imbalances’ in local power relations in favour of the small village elite contributed to the unwillingness of most villagers to participate in ‘participatory’ initiatives and follow the regulations. Some of the forest committee members were also accused of being involved in illegal logging. Furthermore, Bildsten (2002), who explored the case of Mpanga VFR, found that some important user groups living nearest to the forest were excluded from the control of the forests, and the sharing of benefits from the village forest.

The assessments of the JFM model and its outcomes so far have been largely critical. According to one of the early assessments on the impacts of JFM, by Kajembe and Kessy (2000), there has been a rather wide ‘gap’ between the policy and practice of JFM in Tanzania. This is because foresters have not been aware enough of the institutional change. Moreover, due to the pilot nature of many JFM areas, the commitment among forest authorities to the reform may have remained low (Kajembe et al. 2005, 13). In addition, it has even been suggested that the use of JFM in protected forests is a “misconceived application of JFM” because of the very restricted benefits available for communities (email communication with Dr. G. Shephard 9.1.2007). The lack of adequate benefits for the participating villagers has also been conceived as a central deficient of the JFM in strictly protected catchment forests by the representatives of Forest and Beekeeping Division (e.g. URT, MNRT, FBD 2008). In a review of Participatory Forest Management, Mariki et al (2004) suggest that the ‘communities’ should rather be paid for the protection of strictly protected forest reserves through labour contracts for activities like boundary clearing, planting and patrolling.

One of the challenges is also that a large part of the officially approved income and benefit for the villagers in the JFM systems is to be based on fining of illegal activities (e.g. Katila 2008, 97). If the forests are under effective control, however, the income for the managers is likely decrease over time (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006). Moreover, as in other developing countries (e.g. Katila 2008), not all groups at the local level are necessarily aware of the rights they are entitled to as a result of to the reforms.
At the national level, the shift towards the JFM has faced challenges due to the bureaucracy of the administration and slow progress in changing the benefit sharing arrangements. By mid-2008, only 155 Joint Management Agreements of the more than 860 planned ones had been signed and several agreements were pending (URT, MNRT, FBD 2008, 6). The previous PFM advisor of the FBD (interview, 5.1.2008, Dar es Salaam), stated that there are already many existing JFM reserves in Tanzania, where the FBD and the local people share revenue. However, they were not legal due to the unsettled issue of introducing the benefit sharing system. This was explained by the unsettled issue of the new benefit sharing system, which was to be negotiated between the Treasury and the FBD. In addition, the FBD official conceived that a lack of legal status of the JFM reserves was a constraint for the local people and the management: “the communities are not happy” (interview, 5.1.2008, Dar es Salaam). Yet, the fact that the formal processes of JFM, also at the national level, have proceeded slowly can be partly caused by the unwillingness of the government actors to actually devolve powers over valuable resources (Kajembe & Kessy 2000; Kajembe et al. 2005; Mustalahti & Lund 2007; Reuterswärd & Vihemäki 2007). Therefore, the social and political outcomes of the policy shift remain largely uncertain.

The future also depends on how the costs and benefit-sharing of the resource control will be organised and applied in practice, and the sustainability of the mechanisms. In Tanzania, as in many other poor countries, new forms of financing forest and biodiversity conservation are currently being tested (e.g. Zahabu 2006). These initiatives are often discussed under the concept Payments for Environmental Services or PES. They reflect so-called neo-liberal conservation thinking, in the sense that market solutions are seen as a key means of funding conservation (e.g. Adams & Hutton 2007). They include various approaches, such as compensation from carbon retained in the forest biomass, related to the scheme developed as part of the global climate change policy processes, named Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).

The new funding mechanisms are also being integrated to the PFM, with the intention of proving incentives for the ‘stakeholders’ involved in management of the forest (e.g. URT, MNRT, FBD 2008). For instance, two of the key conservation organisations in the EUM, WWF and the TFCG are planning and initiating schemes for PES in the EUM, such as payments for water conservation (e.g. www-document, Yanda & Munishi 2007) and initiatives to pilot REDD. Yet, their social and economic implications for the different groups of actors depend not only on the principles of sharing resources and division of work between ‘communities’, government agencies and experts, but also on the context, such as intra-village politics and the accountability of decision-making systems regarding the resources. In addition, the processes are affected by developments beyond the ‘local’ sphere, such as decisions made in the global climate change policy negotiations.

It also remains uncertain, what are the environmental and ecological effects of the processes of involving the local people in the control in the
strictly protected forests. Some studies have been conducted (e.g. Kajembe & Kessy 2000; Kajembe et al. 2003; Kijazi 2007), which indicate that the JFM initiatives in different parts of Tanzania have led to various outcomes for the condition of the forest, and also in terms of benefit-sharing. Kijazi (2007, 40) who compared the forest condition of the ANR in 2005 to that of 2001, when the JFM was not yet properly in place, suggests that the impact of JFM on forest condition have been positive in terms of good regeneration and recruitment of indigenous tree species. However, the fact that the number of bigger trees had reduced\(^{48}\) sets the efficiency of the control into question. In addition, the pressure to utilise the timber trees on the general land seems to be increasing.

4.9. Efforts to intensify forest control, ‘empower’ people and the contingency of practices

The exploration of the history of forest control in the EUM and more widely in the Usambaras implies that the relationships between the indigenous population and the environment have been unstable over time, depending on the changes in the wider social and environmental context, even prior to the colonisation. Still, some of the pre-colonial discourses related to the forests and land in the Usambaras, such as the taboos concerning certain forests, included ideas that in the present-day thinking could be interpreted as conservationists, in that they helped to maintain parts of the forests. Yet, the idea promoted by some advocates of participatory conservation about local people as custodians of land (e.g. Wily & Dewees 2001), and conservation-minded appears as simplistic, as much of the traditions are not having the same significance anymore, and the relationships between the different groups of local people to the forest are not stable, and dis-connected from wider economic and social changes.

From those days, external actors’ interests on the resources and ideas on people-environment relations have played an important role in shaping the resource control and the position of the different groups in it. However, the tight restrictions on access, deriving partly from the history of natural resource control, have also been challenged by the ‘target populations’. In the EUM, much of the forests have been officially under the central government control for a long time, and exclusion of humans from the reserves has been a prevailing policy, if not always the practice. Elements of the colonial policy discourse on the relationships between people and the forests have also persisted in the post-colonial era, and affect the thinking and practices of forest control. One reason is that policy makers often have an incremental approach to policy, rather than totally rejecting earlier policies (Adams & Hulme 2001). The history of forest control and people’s diverse experiences of the related interventions also shape their conceptions and strategies in relation to the new initiatives and conservation interventions.

\(^{48}\)A reduction of basal area and stock volume of trees in most of the higher diameter classes was reported, although it was not a statistically significant one (Kijazi 2007).
Within past three decades, a number of projects have promoted participatory forest conservation and management in Tanzania, often with help of external funding and facilitation. The discursive shift at the policy level during the 1990s has its roots in these previous pilot interventions, as well as in the wider debates on conservation and development. Yet, precedents of 'participatory management' can be identified in the colonial era, in the efforts to decentralise part of the forest control. Different rationalities and interests underlie these initiatives. As in the colonial era, emphasis on local control of natural resources has been mainly presented in the forest policies as a way to reduce the costs and make management of the resources more efficient. It has also provided a means to legitimise the increased control of the forests, and thus can be perceived as a territorialisation strategy by the government and other actors.

However, at the context of the EUM, the meaning of participation in the conservation intervention has also varied over time, and between different actors and groups. Initially, the participation of communities was used, rather instrumentally, by the IUCN project to create or 'buy' support for conservation, but the local people could also use the initiatives to promote their own goals, such as access to timber or development funds. For the EUCFP/EUCAMP, the approach to participation was first consultative and targeted towards building consent among the communities. Yet, gradually also more 'in-depth' forms of participation were included in the project strategies, such as the support for Village Forest Reserves. In recent years, some researchers and experts involved in the conservation projects have promoted participatory approaches not only as a means to control the forests more efficiently, but more importantly also as a way to 'empower' people and democratis forest control. In the EUM, as in more general in Tanzania, the devolvement of forest control to the villages, however, is mainly targeted to areas that are not of high conservation value. The emphasis of community participation in the areas considered of high conservation value is put more on the benefit-sharing, through JFM model.

'Participatory' process may indeed create changes in the practices of resource control by bringing in new groups to negotiate the modalities of control, and creating expectations and raising awareness among the 'target' population. In certain cases, the representatives of the forest-adjacent villages have also been active in initiating the change in the rules and practices of forest control in Tanzania. Yet, the long-term social and economic effects of these initiatives remain uncertain and are context dependent. Furthermore, the varying experiences of the villagers of the government’s territorialisation strategies and control efforts, and sometimes non-transparent practices, during previous decades are also likely to set challenges for new interventions in the area. Therefore, it is important to explore how 'participation' and related concepts are interpreted in each process and by different groups of people, and what kind of practices of control and benefit-sharing arrangements they are connected with. I will illustrate this, and the changing relationships between the actors, in the case of the establishment and management of the ANR.
5. Shifting relationships of the ‘partners’ in the case of Amani Nature Reserve

5.1. Successful community involvement or imposed participation?

As the discussion on the forest history of the East Usambaras shows, much of the forest area was, at least formally, under the central government’s control in the colonial period. After a period of intensifying utilisation of the forest resources in 1970s and early 1980s, conservation of the forests started to receive more attention. In the next decades, increasing area of land was formally transferred under the category of strictly protected forests in the EUM, including catchment forests and the first nature reserve of Tanzania, the Amani Nature Reserve. Simultaneously, efforts were started to involve the forest-adjacent villages more in the conservation activities, by various means.

The ANR provides an interesting setting to study the changing practices of conservation as it is one of the first places where participatory approaches to conserve biodiversity-rich forests has been introduced and tried out in Tanzania. The formal institutional set-up defines biodiversity conservation as the most important objective for the reserve (ANR general management plan 1998). At the same time, however, the local people are represented as the main stakeholders of the reserve. The ANR has been considered as one of the first, and also most successful, examples of application of JFM in the protected forests nationally by Kajembe et al. (2004). In addition, a Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funded project supporting the ANR financially argues that it “[...] has successfully demonstrated the viability of the Government policy on Joint Forest Management [...]” (www-source, GEF Small Grants Programme 2006). In the recent years, the ANR has also been internationally awarded for its success in simultaneously contributing to poverty reduction and conservation, e.g. through promoting “sustainable use of biodiversity” (www-source, GEF Small Grants Programme 2006; www-source, UNDP 2007). However, from the perspective of the actors and groups at the local level, the picture is more diverse, e.g. some of the villagers involved and affected by the conservation efforts clearly question the idea of ‘win-win’ outcomes of the reserve and its management mechanisms.

In this chapter, I first address the process of establishing the ANR during the EUCFP, including the conditions and rationalities for the local people’s participation in the management. The relationships between the different groups involved in the process are also discussed. In addition, I address the formal set-up of the management of the ANR. Then, the conceptualisations and strategies of the different groups regarding the control of the forest-related resources are explored, including the representatives of the communities and village leaders, other villagers and

49 In 2007, the ANR received Equator Prize, accompanied by a U$ 30,000 cheque (www-source, UNDP 2007).
the representatives of the FBD. Through examples related to specific resources I explore how different actors and groups comply with and/or resist, and try to transform the prevailing discourses and related institutional mechanisms of resource control. I also highlight the connections and gaps between the discourse and actions of the actors and the discourse embedded in the formal management rules and institutions. The case shows that the experiences of different social groups vary: some groups have clearly been in a more beneficial position where as others have been in a more marginal position, losing more than winning.

5.2. Farmers’ participation and exclusion in the process of creating the reserve

The idea of establishing a strictly protected forest reserve, or a nature reserve, in the EUM was a result of growing research activities and international concern over the threats to the biological values of the remaining forests. The need for up-grading the conservation status of certain forest reserves was presented by Cambridge University’s researchers who made an ecological expedition to the EUM in the end of the 1970s (Rodgers & Homewood 1982, 221). In the early 1980s, there was also a plan to enlarge some of the forest reserves that belong to the present-day ANR for their water catchment value. Yet, the plan was not completed due to lack of funds (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 5). In the 1980s, researchers and conservationists started to search publicity for the conservation of the EUM and other Eastern Arcs (e.g. Rodgers & Homewood 1982). This led to a debate in the international media and pressure towards the government to stop the logging of the natural forests. The plan of establishing a nature reserve was formally launched in the management plan produced by the AFIMP (FINNIDA 1988).

During the initial planning, the objective was to combine the forest reserves that contained the largest ‘intact’ forests to ensure the conservation of genetic resources and to maintain the forests’ catchment value. From the point of view of the government, conservation was therefore largely a question of territorialisation, with the aim of increasing control over the area, its resources and the population (e.g. Vandergeest & Peluso 1995). Yet, the initial size of the proposed nature reserve was much smaller than the final size of the ANR, only about 3 700 ha (FINNIDA 1988, 8). The formation of the actual boundaries and management rules of the ANR included many steps and negotiations. The funding became available through the EUCFP. The process of establishing the nature reserve was launched in concrete terms at an early stage of the project. Firstly, a consultancy (1991-1992) was ordered by the EUCFP to design the boundaries of the reserve and make a management plan. The consultants first surveyed ‘roughly’ the forest area and then organised meetings with different groups, such as local administrators, representatives of the tea estates and the villagers (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 2). The proposed size of the reserve was extended to 6 876 ha, as the team found that there were additional areas of intact forests that could be included in the ANR.
In regards to local people’s participation, a central concern of the designers was on how to make them accept the conservation goals and restrictions on resource access. The criteria presented for planning the ANR’s boundaries were largely ecological and biological, such as occurrence of endemic and rare species and the previous level of forest use (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 3-5). However, the consultants also addressed the social effects of the process, at least explicitly, as the needs of the villagers were mentioned in the criteria. The consultancy team even argued that “land use planning without the participation of local people and those of who it may concern is definitely prone to failure” (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 5). Therefore, participation of the villagers was conceived as a necessary condition for successful conservation, in a similar way to many protected areas (e.g. Brockington 2004). The consultants yet noticed that the attitude among the villagers towards the establishment of the reserve was “cautious” but they were anyhow optimistic about the future co-operation of the local people “if they were given the possibility to participate and defend their rights” (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 11). In addition, the emphasis on participation was promoted and stressed upon by the representatives of the local government.

In practice, participation of local people was promoted through organising meetings in the villages surrounding the planned reserve. It was mostly consultative in its approach. In the meetings, “the planning process was introduced to the people and their involvement and contribution was asked” (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 2). The team presented the planning objectives to the participants, discussed the use of the forest reserves with the villagers, and identified alternatives for different forest products. The main concerns of the villagers were said to be related to access to fuel wood and building poles. Previously, the cutting of building poles in the forest reserves had, in principle, been possible with permission from the forest officers and upon a fee (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 7-9). However, the consultants suggested that be stopped with the introduction of the status of strictly protected area. The more restricted access to reserves was to be compensated through establishing separate production areas on catchment forest land, where the local people could get firewood and building materials (Häkkinen & Wambura 1993, 16). In the planning, the conservation objectives, and the need to ensure efficient control, were given more emphasis compared to livelihood goals. In addition, access to timber was not addressed, which implies that certain interests of the villagers were bypassed in the planning process at that stage.

After the consultancy, the EUCFP continued to push the process and ordered another consultancy from the IUCN’s Environmental Law Centre to study the legal aspects of the process (Masilingi 1993). This was because the old forest law and other existing legislation did not include a category of nature reserve, and “…as it is a new type of protected area to be managed by special measures which in a large measure curtail freedoms of people and likely to impose penalties on violations” (Masilingi 1993, 19). The report suggested that the Natural Resources Ordinance Cap. 259 would be amended for this purpose. However, the suggestion made by the consultant
was not followed after. The legislation on the reserve was instead made under the forest law. The consultant also discussed the need for “fair” and “adequate” compensations for the land, including the land used by the farmers, as required by the existing legislation (Malisingi 1993, 20). After the first consultancies, the size of the planned reserve was again extended by the project. The survey and mapping of the ANR was completed in 1994 (ANR general management plan 1998, 22). However, there were contrasting understandings about the goals and means of the plan within the EUCFP. According to a forestry expert involved, the Tanzanian project leader of that time sought to acquire as much land as possible within the reserve, even though not all of it was socially viable and it became financially too costly (interview of the CTA of the EUCFP, 10.6.2003, Vantaa).

Subsequently, the level of compensations for the farmland became a source of tensions and an arena of negotiation between the farmers, the government and the donor. The total area of land in the extended reserve that was previously under the small-scale farmers was about 1,220 ha (ANR general management plan 1998). During the consultancy on legal aspects, the local people’s land tenure was recognised as deemed right of occupancy under customary law (Masilingi 1993, 18). The Government of Finland and the Government of Tanzania agreed that Finland would pay 20 percent and Tanzania 80 percent of the value of the compensations. The decision on the payments was confirmed by the GoT in 1996 (www-source: Sunday Observer 24.12.2006). Yet, there were not sufficient funds in the side of the Tanzanian government to pay their share. As a result, various government agencies under the Regional Commissioner conducted negotiations with the villagers (EUCFP 1997b, 15). According to the FBD’s representative and project documentation, an agreement was formally reached with the villagers on the compensation within the frame of the available funds (EUCFP mid-term review 1997, 15; interview of an FBD official, 3.5.2005, Dar es Salaam). In December 1995 and January 1996, crop compensations were paid to the farmers (EUCFP 1997b; Kessy 1998). However, only the Finnish government’s share of the compensations, about 140 million Tsh, was paid to 1800 farmers (interview of a high level FBD official, 3.5.2005, Dar es Salaam; judgement by J.J. Mkwawa 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga).

In addition, the compensations did not reach all farmers who had cultivated crops inside the new reserve. Some of the farmers with plots inside the ANR appeared not to have been present at the time of the setting of the boundaries, probably because of information gaps. In their experiences, the approach used in the establishment of the ANR was far from a participatory one, showing the ‘gaps’ in distribution of information, and incomplete character of the negotiations over conservation. In Kwekuyu, a sub-village of IBC Msasa, a few families whose land was taken to the ANR stated that they had not been compensated at all by 2005. Mama Asha (interview, 19.3.2005, Kwekuyu), around 50 years old lady with two children narrated her experience of the setting up of the boundaries of the ANR as follows: “They went there with force (Swa. kuva ngwuu) and set their border.”

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50 The land subject to compensations includes only the land where ‘unexhausted improvements’ have been made, such as buildings, plantations or crops (Masilingi 1993).
For her, as for others in the sub-village who had loosed their fields to the ANR, the establishment of the reserve was clearly an imposed thing, without any space of negotiating the conditions of conservation. In spite of the participatory efforts and goal of achieving consensus by the EUCFP, not all parties affected were adequately involved and aware of the conservation process.

In addition, after the compensation payments, many of the farmers involved started to complain about the compensations and the process (e.g. EUCFP 1997b, 19; Jambiya & Sosovele 2001). They expressed anger and the EUCFP's representatives together with the district officials had to convene more meetings in the villages. The farmers were advised to make their complaints in the district office individually (Kessy 1998, 68). In addition, a conditional promised was made to the farmers about the payments of the rest of the compensations if the funds were secured. However, the promise did not smooth down the farmers. According to Jambiya and Sosovele (2001, 24) most of the affected farmers expressed not having been adequately compensated. A very small number of people also said that they were not compensated at all. The farmers gave a number of reasons for not being compensated, including that they were not present at the village during the time of valuation and verification, and that the tenure of the farms was unclear (Jambiya & Sosovele 2001, 24). Furthermore, the subsequent strategies of the farmers in the dispute, and their collective action, indicate that the agreement of partial compensations was not accepted univocally.

The compensation dispute created adverse attitudes among the farmers who gave up their land towards the foresters and the reserve (Jambiya & Sosovele 2001, 24; interview of a high level FBD official, 3.5.2005, Dar es Salaam). It was not clear if the affected farmers, who lost access to their shamba and were marginalised in economic sense, had initially agreed the partial compensation, as different sources gave different accounts. The FBD representative who had been involved in the process explained that the farmers had agreed to a lower amount of money after new negotiations were hold in the villages, but that they had probably agreed because of fear of losing the chance of getting at least some compensation. In his account, the farmers would then have started to make claims on the remaining money at a later point of time (interview of a high level FBD official, 3.5.2005, Dar es Salaam). According to the statement made by the same official in the court, the farmers had originally agreed to give up the remaining share “for the love of their country”, after being told that the government did not have the funds (judgement by J.J. Mkwawa 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga). Whatever the actual level of consensus among the farmers, the outcomes and the long term scope of the dispute indicate that the farmers’ had not been able to negotiate on an even ground with the government and conservation interests. Therefore, their negotiation power over the conditions of conservation appears very limited at the early stages of the intervention.

Yet, many of the farmers who had given up land to the reserve soon questioned the legitimacy of the decision made on the compensation (EUCFP 1997b, 16-19; judgement by J.J. Mkwawa 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga;
interview of an elderly villager, 9.2.2005, Gereza). As a result of the dissatisfaction, some of them decided to start a legal process against the government in 1997 in order to be compensated more. During the process, their representative in the court denied that the farmers would have agreed to give up the remaining 80 percent, contrary to what the government representative argued. Three men representing 329 farmers in Korogwe and Muheza districts applied to file a representative suit against the government, represented by the Attorney General of Tanzania (judgement by J.J. Mkwawa 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga). In 2003, during my visit to Gereza, the farmers raised up the issue of unsolved compensation dispute (e.g. group interviews of women and men, 14.10.2003, Gereza). They claimed that they should be paid the remaining money, or otherwise given back the fields. Thus, the resistance towards the decision made on partial compensations had persisted, which is understandable as the legal process had not yet reached a solution.

Another, yet much more uncertain, sign of resistance was the continued forest fires in some of the lowland villages. In 2003, there was a forest fire in the village land of Gereza, which spread to the edge of the reserve (field notes, 15.10.2003). I do not have enough evidence to judge whether the fire had been set purposefully, or whether it was accidental. One of the village leaders claimed that the fire had been set purposefully by someone who wanted to undermine his position as a leader (discussed more below). Yet, in general, the environmental conditions also made the area susceptible to fire: the south-western corner of the reserve is drier compared to other areas of the ANR, which increases the possibility of accidental forest fires during the land preparation. In addition, one of my research assistants had worked in the villages where people had given up land to the ANR in the end of the 1990s, without being compensated fairly in their perspective. At that time, some farmers had argued that they had set fire purposefully in the forests as a protest to the low level of compensations. Nevertheless, this argument was strongly rejected by the head of the reserve when I discussed the fire problem with him later on (interview, Amani, 12.1.2008). He stressed that there was no such acts of resistance towards the reserve. Yet, the strategy of denying such acts of resistance by authorities has been shown to be a common feature of many protected areas (Holmes 2007). It could also be the case here. The forest fires, especially in the lower lands, continued to cause problems in the subsequent years (pers. com. with an ANR official, January, 2008). In my interpretation, resistance may partly explain the phenomena of forest fires inside the reserve and its surroundings. Yet, as previous research on conservation and resistance indicates, it is often difficult to determine the actual causes of forest fires in an unproblematic manner (Neumann 1998; Holmes 2007).

The legal process regarding the compensations from land appropriated from the farmers to the reserve was a complex and long one, e.g. the original application was withdrawn and replaced by a new one in 1999 and the number of people suing the government about the unpaid compensations increased to 1288 individuals in 2002 (judgement by J.J. Mkwawa 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga). This implies that the information on the legal
procedure had reached new people who had since then joined the ‘battle’. The farmers’ strategy of suing the government was yet slow to produce concrete outcomes, keeping the situation uncertain for a long period of time (1997-2005). Finally, after several years of waiting, on May 2005, the judge at the High Court of Tanzania at Tanga ordered the government to pay 1288 farmers in Korogwe and Muheza Districts the remaining 80 percent of the compensations, plus an interest of nine percent from the date of the filing of the suit to the date of payment (judgement by J.J. Mkwawa, 3.5.2005, High Court of Tanga)

The process of establishment of the ANR illustrates controversies in the relationships between the key parties involved, including the EUCFP, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and the farmers surrounding the reserve. In spite of the efforts made by the project to build a communicative relationships and consult the villagers, and thus create support for the reserve among the ‘communities’, at the same time, the rights of the farmers were bypassed in the compensations. The strategy of the government representatives in the process was to put pressure on the farmers to give up the land without full compensations. However, the farmers showed a considerable level of agency and organising skills, by suing the government. In addition, some level of resistance towards the reserve and rules of access persisted, although different forms of co-operation between the reserve and the communities were introduced.

5.3. Inclusions and exclusions in the planning of the reserve

In spite of the on-going contestation on the compensations between the affected farmers and the government, represented by the FBD, the process of establishing the ANR continued. The EUCFP staff made efforts to involve the villages in the planning, albeit the approaches chosen, such as PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal), were largely conditioned by the expert’s concerns and interests. After years of preparations and negotiations, the ANR was established in May 1997. The total size of the nature reserve was 8 380 ha. In addition to areas of former forest reserves and farming land (1 220 hectares), 1 065 hectares of forest land of the East Usambara Tea Company (EUCTO), and another tea company, Karimjee Agricultural Ltd was included within the nature reserve (EUCFP 1997b).

The design of the management strategy was yet to be completed. At the time of preparations for the declaration of the reserve, the rules of the ANR

51 Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to visit the villages where the farmers were waiting for the compensations after the judgement had been issued.

52 The legal establishment of the ANR was published in the special supplement to the Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania, no. 19, vol 78 as Government Notice no. 151 and 152 (www-source, Eastern Arc Mountains Information Source. 2001).

53 The FBD made so-called Forests Dedication Covenant agreement on the management of the forests that were under the leasehold of the tea companies.
were drafted by a small group under the leadership of the Director of Forestry in a short time (EUCFP 1997a; EUCFP 1997b). The rules were to form the legal instrument for the management of the ANR together with the declaration. The ANR’s management plan was drafted between 1997 and 1998. The ANR general management plan was initially meant to cover the period of 1999-2002, but it was still in use in early 2008 (interview of the Conservator, 12.1.2008, Amani). According to the ANR general management plan (1998, 114), the management plan was produced by a planning team consisting of 10 experts, including two Finns and eight Tanzanians. The team worked on and gathered information from four components, namely PRA, biodiversity, ecotourism and institutional issues. PRA was conducted in sixteen villages surrounding the reserve, in order to take into account the views and the needs of the ‘local communities’. It included various research methods, e.g. group meetings, household interviews, sketch mapping, as well as SWOT\(^\text{54}\) analysis and ranking (EUCFP PRA report ND). During the PRA, emphasis was on natural resources issues and the expectations of the villagers (ANR general management plan 1998). The villagers’ involvement in the decision-making was to focus on the areas outside the core area of the ANR, and the buffer zone.

The participatory process was mainly to justify the outsider’s agenda for increasing the control of the forests, as it was framed in a way that it did not leave room for the villagers to set new agendas for the discussion and suggest alternative goals for the management. The ‘conservatism’, in sense of restricted room for negotiating the objectives and means of planning, which characterised the PRA in case of planning the ANR’s rules, is a more general feature of participatory processes. Mohan (2001, 153) argues that the relationships of authority between the facilitator(s) and the grassroots are seldom challenged by using participatory research methods. The documentation available on the planning does not indicate how many people actually participated in the exercises and interviews (EUCFP PRA report ND). Mostly, the farmers I interviewed in the villages stated that they had not been involved in the planning of the management of the reserve, although some had experience of participating in the ANR related meetings as listeners.

The PRA process was mainly consultative in nature and targeted towards data collection to provide material for the planning (EUCFP PRA report ND). The participants in the village meetings argued that they needed several forest products from the reserve, including fuel wood, poles, medicine, ropes and vegetables, and that they requested the right to utilise them (ANR general management plan 1998, 33). They also requested the right to use the forest paths and worship sites in the ANR. One of the key outcomes of the PRA was the Village Natural Resource Plans, in which the villagers identified the problems and opportunities of their village, and drew action plans to address the problems (ANR general management plan 1998, 33). After the PRA exercise, the representatives of the villages participated in the workshops, in which the management strategies were refined (ANR

\(^{54}\) SWOT refers to Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Risks, used typically in strategic planning of companies, projects and organisations.
general management plan 1998, 34). In addition to the villagers and their representatives, the planning process involved other stakeholders, such as politicians, conservation and other organisations operating in the area (ANR general management plan 1998; EUCFP 1999, 1).

In the ANR management plan, protecting and maintaining biodiversity values and the forest ecosystems were defined as the main purpose of the management. African violet (Saint Paulia), an endemic flower of the Easter Arcs, was selected to the logo of the ANR. This illustrates the importance put on conservation of endemic species. However, in spite of the species richness and the existence of wide range of forest types in the area to be included in the ANR (Hamilton 1989a), some of the areas included were actually far from intact; they had been under considerable utilisation and management in the past. The ANR is in fact a mosaic of different types of vegetation and land use. Most of it was covered by submontane forests and lowland forests. In addition, poorly stocked lowland forests, affected by former logging, fire or ‘encroachment’, covered about six percent of the area (ANR general management plan 1998). A small area had also been turned to tree plantations of exotic species in the 1960s. Furthermore, one of the experts working in the area suggested that the biological value of the ANR was not as high as that of another forest block of the EUM, Nilo (e.g. interview of a biologist working in the EUM, 11.10.2003, Amani). Evidently, the decision-making on the location of the first nature reserve of Tanzania was considerably affected by other reasons than biological value, such as accessibility and available facilities.

As a nature reserve, the ANR was to become more strictly protected compared to Catchment Forest Reserves. In addition to protection of biodiversity, other reasons were provided to justify the territorialisation effort, including symbolic and environmental values. According to the representatives of the EUCFP (www-source, Eastern Arc Mountains Information Source 2001) “The Amani Nature Reserve may soon be part of the image that Tanzania presents to the world, and we hope that in the near future people abroad will associate the ANR with Tanzania just as they do with Kilimanjaro, Ngorongoro or Serengeti.” In addition to nationalist discourse, the idea of undisturbed wilderness was used to justify the intervention, as in many other protected areas in Africa (Neumann 1998). In an English language advertisement poster, the ANR was recently represented as “the remaining paradise of Africa” with a picture of dense mountain forests with no signs of human presence or influence. However, also more utilitarian reasons, including water catchment value, were used to support the plan, in line with the long-term emphasis on water services of the mountain forests (ANR general management plan 1998). Moreover, ethno-botanical and cultural values of the reserved forest to the local people were listed among the reserve’s important values.

According to the ANR general management plan (1998), the level of the community participation would vary across ‘management zones’. The goal was to create spaces with differentiated levels of management intensity, and gradually reduce the overall human impact. The intended level of villagers’ participation was to be linked to the zonation of the reserve. The ANR was
divided into four zones with different conservation status, including a biodiversity preservation zone (77 percent of the area), restoration zone (13 percent of the area), and a local use zone (six percent of the area). In addition, the Botanical Garden occupied four percent of the area. The villages and village land within and around the ANR, including the enclaves, were defined as ‘buffer zone’ area.

Biodiversity preservation zone was to be an area where least human action was allowed, continuing the exclusive conservation agenda. In the local use zone, there was more scope for human activities. In that case, the objective was to “temporarily contribute to the local communities’ needs for forest products by allowing ecologically sustainable utilisation of forest products without jeopardising the primary conservation objectives of the ANR” (ANR general management plan 1998). The idea was to provide the villagers limited access to certain minor forest products in the local use zone. In addition to objective of the buffer zone was to reduce the dependency of the villagers on the reserve and to contribute to social and economic development by involving the 18 villages in the ANR’s management. In the ANR general management plan (1998), the specific objectives in relation to local communities were to:

- Involve the local communities and the other stakeholders in the decision making of the ANR;
- Practise transparent and open management strategies;
- Contribute to the local communities’ development by creating and practising fair methods of benefit sharing;
- Promote tourism-related businesses;
- Promote effective land use practices in the buffer zone; and
- Promote the implementation of the Village Resource Management Plans to contribute to the sustainable production and utilisation of natural resources.

The general responsibility for the management of the ANR was to be with the Conservator of the ANR, who was positioned directly under the FBD. In addition, several officers worked under the Conservator in the headquarters of the reserve, in Amani, and in its field stations. The administrative structures to promote community participation included different models, including the ANR advisory board and the establishment of Village Environmental Committees (VEC) under the village councils of the buffer zone villages. Furthermore, the leaders of the villages and the environmental committees occasionally gathered to meetings at the headquarters of the ANR, called Village Conservation and Development Committee meetings. Other forms of cooperation between the ANR’s organisation and the villages included e.g. joint patrolling and fire control.

55Originally the number of villages affected by and involved in the management of the ANR was 16.
56Village councils are a part of the local government structure. The members are selected by voting by the village assembly, consisting of all adult villagers. In addition, the village administration includes village executive officers (also called village secretaries) that are working under the local government.
extension (ANR general management plan 1998, 10). In addition, village environmental by-laws were required to be formulated for effective control of the environment.

The VECs' duty was formally to ensure that the villages fulfil their role in protecting the reserve and the buffer zone. They were also to co-operate with the village government, to supervise the use of natural resources and protect the environment in the village land, e.g. to look after availability of clean drinking water and sanitation. The ANR's staff members were also to participate regularly in their meetings (ANR general management plan 1998, 70). The VECs were supposed to ensure that the management plan and Village Resource Management Plans were followed after (PRA report of the ANR general management plan, ND). The VEC members conceived that their key responsibilities were to ensure that there is no environmental destruction in the protected areas and the village. Their tasks included organising people to fight forest fires and controlling illegal activities, and encouraging people to plant trees on their farms and build so-called ‘permanent houses’ made of burned bricks (e.g. group interview of VEC, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa; interview of the VEC chairman of Ubiri, 21.10.2003).

In principle, the VEC membership was subject to change every five years, when the election of the village councils was held.

In order to make the co-operation more formal agreements, called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), were made with the 18 buffer zone villages. They defined the rights and responsibilities of both parties concerning the different zones. For instance, the agreements allowed people to collect fire wood on local use zone twice per week, and to collect medicinal plants with a special permission for eight years from signing of the agreement. In addition, as a compensation for reduced access and involvement in the protection activities, the villages were to receive 20 percent share from the entrance fees paid by the tourists, fees from photographing and guiding, and the research fees paid by permitted researchers.

However, during the negotiations between the ANR staff and the villages, not all of the buffer zone villages initially welcomed the agreements. Three of the 18 villages, the representatives of the villagers first refused to sign the contract with the ANR (Sjöholm et al. 2001), probably because of the fear of losing more than gaining. For instance, in Kisiwani village, the villagers interviewed by a research team as a part of the EUCAMP’s mid-term review (Sjöholm et al. 2001, appendix 1), argued that the agreement had not addressed their basic problems and needs. In Ubiri, one of the arguments used in the initial objection of the agreement was the threat of increased number of destructive animals because of the reserve. This problem was, partly strategically, also used by the ex-chairman of the village, Rashid, to criticise the way the ANR’s staff had addressed the problem, and the bypassing of the livelihood concerns of the villagers.

57 This, and the other names of individuals used are pseudonyms, except for the names of researchers.
The ex-chairman of Ubiri, *mzee* Rashid was much involved in the village matters. He was a traditional healer, visited by people beyond his village, and a member in the village council and a leader of *balozi* (Swa. for ten households’ unit). *Mzee* Rashid argued (interview, 23.10.2003, Ubiri): “...The forest needs to have somebody to take care of the animals so that they won’t get into our farms. [...] So they agreed that they would fulfil that condition since we had refused to sign the eight years memorandum. So they said they would assign somebody to take care of the animals in the farms. So that is what we had agreed but they never fulfilled it and it is like they had played it a trick that way...So we are affected and that is why we continue to be poor.” *Mzee* Rashid thus expressed strong resentment about the process, by claiming that the villagers would have been betrayed by the representatives of the reserve’s management authority. However, due to his previous position as a chairman, and a mediator between the different interests related to the forests, he also stressed the usefulness of forest conservation in other situations, and argued that there was now a good cooperation between the ANR and the villagers. The rather controversial accounts by *mzee* Rashid imply that in spite of the officially approved concept of joint management of the ANR by the villagers and the forest authorities, there were reservations about the approach. In this case, such open criticism was probably easier as the man was not anymore the village leader.

In Gereza, where we discussed changes in the use of the forests with a group of men, one of the participants questioned the rules of the ANR. Again, the opposition was related to the negative consequences for livelihoods. An old man who had stayed in the village since 1940s, and who was possibly a little drunk, and therefore dominated the discussion, explained: “You get there in the forest [...] to get that tree for the treatment of a kid and that tree is not found in these areas where we live. You have to get them from up there and if it happens that they get hold of you there then you are already at the court. That is disturbing us a lot because they say you want to fire. Now we do not know how you will help us to put that somewhere so that we could be allowed to get there and get our medicines normally” (group interview, 14.10.2003, Gereza). However, finally, the representatives of all villages had signed the agreements (Interview of an ANR officer, 5.11.2003, Amani). Nevertheless, those who had signed the agreement on behalf of the village, usually the chairpersons of the village councils, were likely to represent the views of the others only partially. This was evident, for instance, in that women had experienced problems in access to fuel wood due to strict rules and conditions of access (discussed more below).

In addition, the information about the content of the agreements had not reached everyone. In some of the villages I met people who were worried that the agreement would deny all use of forests in the reserve after the eight years have passed, which shows they were not all without reservations about the deal. In Mikwinini, some elderly farmers suspected that the reserve staff would have planted eucalyptus trees near water sources in order to make living more difficult for the villagers in the future (group interview of men, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini). Eucalyptus was commonly considered an
environmentally harmful tree by the local people due to its extensive uptake of water. As a farmer in the group stated “...we are worried that maybe in the future the people of the reserve want to shift us from here by draining the rivers” (group interview of men, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini). This shows that in spite of the formal agreement made between the parties, some of the affected farmers still had reservations about the aims of the authorities and the consequences of the reserve for their livelihoods.

The increased control of the forest resources through new rules on access and the taking of more land to conservation also created discursive resistance among those villagers who had lost land, or whose fields were close to the reserve. In Gereza and Ubiri, some farmers continued to use the ‘destructive animals’ argument as a discursive strategy to question the rationality and conditions of conservation, although at the same time they usually stressed the importance of protecting the forest for securing good weather and rains. In Gereza, these controversial statements can be, at least partly, explained by the unsettled compensation issue related to the establishment of the ANR. Yet, the existence of the ‘destructive animals’ certainly affected the lives of the villagers whose land was close the reserve, as the crops needed guarding. Those farmers who had their farms close to the forest were also arguing that they should be given a permit to kill baboons and other ‘destructive animals’ in the forest, because they were difficult to catch in the farms.

In addition, a source of dissatisfaction among women in Mikwinini, Sangarawe and Gereza was the lack of fuel wood from their farms, village land and the local use zone of the ANR. Some farmers also occasionally collected firewood or cut building poles from the tea company’s land, because they did not have enough access to them in other areas (e.g. group interview of women, 9.10.2003, Mikwinini; interview of an elderly woman, 24.10.2003, Ubiri). This occurred with and without the permit of the company’s staff. This implies that the interests of different groups of people had been taken into account in the decision-making over the management rules in a partial way.

One of the means to enhance community involvement in the decision-making of the ANR was the formation of an advisory board. The Conservator was expected to discuss important issues with the advisory board, which in principle met twice a year or upon need (ANR general management plan 1998). According to the ANR general management plan (1998, 11), “The Advisory Board oversees all the activities and the implementation of the General Management Plan.” Its tasks included approving the budget and the work plan for the ANR (EUCAMP 1998, 62). The board consisted of representatives of different stakeholders, including two representatives of local communities 58, and regional and district authorities, and representatives of other organisations, such as tea companies and the Tanzanian Forest Research Institute (TAFORI). The mechanisms of involving ‘stakeholders’ through the ANR advisory board had operated rather actively

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58 Originally, there was only one representative of the villages, but later on the amount was raised into two, if only in principle.
during the EUCAMP support, although the first community representative felt that he had not had any real decision-making power (interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa). The board had ceased to operate regularly after the end of the EUCAMP, reducing the scope for the villagers to formally take part in management.

The former community representative of the advisory board, Mr Bakari, was an approximately sixty-year old man from the village of IBC Msasa. Mr Bakari was a teacher by profession, although he was now retired and also engaged in farming. In the local standards, he was a well-off and well-connected person. He had acted in the local government as a ward level representative (diwani in Swa.), and was therefore accustomed to deal with higher level authorities. Mr Bakari’s role had been to act as a mediator between the reserve’s management agency and the villagers. In principle, he supported the idea of community involvement in conservation, but he was also very critical about how the board of the ANR had operated while it was active. The main objective for him as a board member had been to bring benefits to the villages, such as development projects. However, Mr Bakari criticised procedure of selecting the new community representatives and claimed that it had been undemocratic. In addition, he was disappointed on the decision-making practices of the ANR. Mr Bakari argued (interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa): “I have learnt, during the three years I was in the management that the community is involved but not the way it should be. Because what we did there was only to scrutinise the budgets for running the administrative system, but not really what I was elected for. Because as the representative of community I think that there should be some projects that were entirely involved with community development”. His argumentation implies that the actors who had been closely involved in the conservation activities sometimes used the elements of participatory discourse, and certain transformative interpretation of it, to question the practices of the ANR’s management and operation of the leadership of the reserve.

In my visit in 2005, the Conservator explained that the board had ‘collapsed’ as it had not gathered since the new members had been elected in 2003 (pers. communication, 6.1.2005, Amani). According to the Conservator, the new board members had not yet been officially nominated by the MNRT. However, the leadership of the ANR still communicated with some of the board members frequently, such as the manager of the tea company and the head of the TCFO. In addition, the VEC leaders were called to the meetings of the Village Development and Conservation Committee in the headquarters of the reserve to address various problems related to conservation and village development, and to share their experiences. Thus, the formal mechanisms of participation appeared to have been used selectively. In addition, more informal communication with the different actors occurred. Overall, in spite of the outlined objective and diversity of means used to involve the villages in the control of the reserve, related negotiations and addressing their needs, the approach to participation in the design of the management of the ANR was rather instrumental and focused on enhancing benefit-sharing.
5.4. Benefit sharing and related disputes between the actors

The 20 percent from the tourism and research activities in the ANR to the buffer zone villages was one of the ways to compensate the farmers their reduced access to forests, and their contribution to controlling activities. It was supposed to benefit the villages as a whole. The sum per village from the 20 percent from ANR had been rather modest in the early years, when the number of tourists was low. In addition, in 2001, the spread of fear of terrorism decreased the number of tourists to Tanzania, showing the vulnerability of tourism as a source of income. In 2003/2004 the 20 percent was not paid because of the problems in controlling illicit mining in the reserve. However, in the case of the ANR, there was a tendency of increasing the total amount of visitors, and income from tourism, over years. Table 7 below shows how the tourism income to the villages developed between 2000 and 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Sum paid per village in Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) and Euros (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001*</td>
<td>31 700 Tsh (41 €)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002**</td>
<td>96 000 Tsh (92 €)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>143 000 Tsh (109 €)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>255 000 Tsh (165 €)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>215 500 Tsh (130 €)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 7. The amount of 20 percent income from ANR to the villages.* the figure from an ANR official, and **the figure from EUCAMP (2002a). The figures for 2004-2007 from ANR staff member (email communication with an ANR officer, 4.2.2008). The amount in Euros is counted by using the FXConverter and the interbank currency rates on first of July in the end of the respective financial years.

However, the village leaders and VEC people, and officials of the ANR gave somewhat different information about the amount of money the villages had received from the reserve in each year. This could be due to lack of adequate book keeping by the villagers or poor memory. Other possible reasons for the differences are that there had been differences between the villages in how much they had been paid, or that some of the village leaders involved deliberately reported false figures, but these options could not be confirmed. For instance, in 2005, the VEC’s chair person in Gereza told that only 68 000 Tsh had been paid last time59 (interview, 9.2.2005, Gereza),

59 One of the representatives of the reserve also sent me information that the sum was 68 000 Tsh for the financial year 2001/2002 (email communication 16.3.2009). In addition, the figures for other years were slightly different than what was stated in other sources.
whereas in Mbomole, the chairman argued that they would have received the same sum plus additional amount of 80,000 Tsh in the end of the year (interview, 12.1.2005, Mbomole). Yet, in IBC Msasa, the amount was said to have been about 100,000 Tsh last time (VEC meeting, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa). The lack of a consensus on the actual level of this ‘incentive’ from the ANR indicates that the villagers did not receive up-date or adequate information, or that they could be treated differently. Furthermore, in 2005, some of the village leaders claimed that they had not been paid for the previous financial year (2003/2004) (e.g. interview of village chairman, 12.1.2005, Shebomeza; meeting of the VEC of IBC Msasa, 5.4.2005). A staff member of the reserve explained that the money had not been paid as it was needed to control illegal mining in the reserve. Later on, however, I was told by another staff member that the non-payment of the 20 percent (2002/2003) was due to environmental destruction related to mining in the village areas (email communication, 16.3.2009). This indicates that the non-payment of the 20 percent was also used as a strategy by the managers of the ANR to try to put pressure on the village councils.

In some of the buffer zone villages the money they had been paid from the ANR had been used for community development, such as construction of a school or a road, whereas in other villages, the money had arguably not been used for any purpose so far. The non-use of the money was said to be due to there not being enough money to start anything, or there was not yet a decision made by the village council. However, occasionally, the delays to allocate the money to communal projects created space for suspicions among other villagers. In the meeting of the VEC members in IBC Msasa (5.4.2005), some members were worried about misconduct in the use of the 20 percent by the leaders of the village. This is not entirely surprising claim and might have some basis in reality, taking into account the ‘weaknesses’ and existence of different forms of corruption in the local government structures in Tanzania, as discussed also by Brockington (2007). Yet, in spite of the signs of suspicion, the discussion in the VEC meeting in IBC Msasa (5.4.2005) indicated that the committee members could at least voice their concerns in public. In the meeting, the leadership was requested to be more accountable, which indicates that the VEC could provide an opportunity for the members to question the conduct of the village leaders.

The village council members and the VEC people were generally more aware of the 20 percent share. Those people conceived that it was an incentive for the village to protect the forests. Yet, many also expressed that the money had not been much in actual terms and that their percentage should be increased. In addition, the villagers who were not members or did not have relatives in or other close contacts with the village councils and VEC were more often unaware about the 20 percent, or if they knew, they did not know about its use. In the household survey I conducted in IBC Msasa in 2005, only six percent of the respondents knew about this incentive. This is a relatively low rate, taking into account that in one of the sub-villages, Kwekuyu, some land had been appropriated to the ANR in the
In 2003, about half of the interviewed people in Ubiri knew about the twenty percent. Therefore, the villages were different in the distribution of information. The gaps in the information gave room to speculation and rumours about the use of common resources. Later on, there had been discussions within the management agency of the reserve that there should be a follow-up system. According to a staff member of the ANR, a follow-up system had been put in place, and the village leaders’ would now have to report for which purpose they use the money when they come to collect it (email communication 4.2. 2008).

Moreover, several income generating activities had been launched to compensate the farmers for the reduced access to forests and to improve their livelihoods, at the same time as promoting conservation. Many of them had been introduced during the IUCN project and then continued by the EUCFP/EUCAMP. For instance, beekeeping groups had been initiated in 13 villages around the ANR (EUCAMP 2002b). The beehives were set partly in the reserved forest and partly in the general or village land. They were also to diminish the risk of forest fires, as the groups would protect the beehives from fire. In those villages involved, special groups usually took care of the hives and got the product for their own use and for selling. In Gereza, the beekeeping group worked well in economic terms. However, there were problems in the benefit sharing related to village politics and divisions between different groups. Some of the villagers who were not involved were discontent with such initiatives because they blamed that the group members were connected to the former political leadership of the village, and the project did not benefit all.

Tree planting on the farms of the buffer zone villages was another activity that had been promoted in order to reduce the ‘pressure’ towards forest (e.g. EUCAMP document 2002b). The trees were to provide building material and fuel wood for the farmers. During the last phase of the EUCAMP; 34 village nurseries had been established around the ANR buffer zone villages, producing several thousands of tree seedlings (both exotic and indigenous trees), although the follow up mechanisms were seemingly not very reliable after the end of the project. Also groups to establish and tend tree nurseries had been started in many villages. For those who had planted trees, they were a source of timber and building poles. Yet, for the poorer people without land, who had to rent or borrow it from others, or who had only small plots, there was little incentive in participating in this activity.

During the EUCAMP, and since its completion, also other organisations emerged in the ANR’s ‘buzzer zone’, promoting particular conservation and development activities. One of the initially separate initiatives was a butterfly farming project, started by a researcher working in the area. Later on, the project was advertised by the ANR as one of its income generating activities. The project was built on the model of an ICDP, in the sense that income generation activities were to subsidise farmers the

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60 However, it is also possible that the contestations on land and compensations in the Derema process affected how they replied to the questions (Derema process is discussed more in next chapter).

61 Organisationally, the Amani Butterfly project is under the TFCG.
restricted access to the forests. In addition, it was to contribute to conservation by providing incentives to the farmers producing butterfly pupae to protect the forest, as they depended on the forests as a source of host plants (tree seedlings) and butterflies. At the first stage, four villages were selected to take part in the project (interview of the project's initiator, 11.10.2003, Amani), including IBC Msasa (figure 5). In 2004, about 60 percent of the income produced by butterfly business went to the approximately 300 farmers involved, whereas one fourth went for project running costs and seven percent was allocated to 'community development' in the respective villages, and the rest to Tanzania Wildlife Division (www-source, Amani Butterfly Project 2004). Initially, the project was not self-sufficient, and the start of the project was slowed down by the bureaucracy in getting the permits from the Wildlife Division for exporting the products. However, gradually, the project started to create more income to the farmers participating in the butterfly business.

People from other villages, where the project was not operating, had showed interest to participate in butterfly farming. This was the case for instance in Shebomeza, where the village leader made requests to have the project in their village during my field work. However, after the starting phase and establishment of the groups of butterfly farming, there were some constraints for new people to join in the groups: "If you want to join the project you have to pay some...money for what others have contributed. This is why people are not joining" (group interview of the village leaders, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa). Yet, by early 2008, the project had extended its operations into two new villages, involving more farmers. The project had also started to conduct environmental education, and was buying land in order to establish village forest reserves.
In 2003, also the so-called Masambu project was introduced by the TFCG in co-operation with the ANR, Unilever and the World Agroforestry Centre (also known as ICRAF). The idea was to create income through commercial use of the seeds of msambu (Allanblackia stuhlmannii) tree. The price paid for the farmers was 100 Ths per one kilogramme of seeds in 2005. The seeds were collected and sent to the town to be used in oil production by Unilever. In 2005, many people in the villages that were involved in the project had started to collect the seeds from their own or from their neighbours’ land, as it provided them some additional and seasonal income. Especially young people and children collected msambu seeds. However, some of the activities that were supposed to support conservation were to some degree in contrast with that objective. According to the village government members (group interview, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa), the villagers were not officially allowed to collect the seeds from the ANR and the proposed Derema Corridor, but they sometimes entered there ‘secretly’ (group interview, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa). In addition, the Conservator argued that the project was partly contravening conservation objectives, as it reduced the amount of the Allanblackia seeds in the forest (interview, 12.1.2008, Amani), although the harvesting was not supposed to take place there. The ability to get income from the msambu seeds, illicit or not, also

62According to a report submitted to the WB (URT, MNRT 2006, 23), two hundred tons of seeds were bought in the early 2006 harvest from over 640 farmers. This means that the average collector received about US$ 400.
illustrates the dynamic nature of the way the farmers conceived and used the reserved and non-reserved forests. Both the butterfly project and the *msambu* project reflected a strong linking of conservation discourse and practice with the more market-oriented mechanisms, thus aiming to transform the local farmers into ‘environmentally conscious’ producers.

However, the lack of accountability in the leadership related to the potential benefits from the development and conservation projects was considered a problem by those who were not involved in and directly benefiting from the projects. An example of this was given by Mama Maria, about fifty-years-old farmer living in Ubiri. Mama Maria had moved in to Ubiri from Magoroto, in Muheza for about 35 years ago when she was married to a worker of the tea company. However, in spite of living in the village for a long time, Mama Maria was not in a good relationship with the current village leadership, and argued that the chairman of the village favoured his relatives or friends whenever there were some development activities with potential benefits introduced in their village (interview, 24.10.2003, Ubiri). In her account, this was also a reason why some people would not be active in participating in the meetings. Similar accounts were sometimes made in other villages too.

Problems of unequal benefit-sharing within the village and ‘biased’ representation of different sub-groups have been emphasised also by studies in the EUM (Bildsten 2002; Zulu 2002) and in other protected areas (e.g. Campbell et al. 1999; Agrawal & Gibson 1999). Yet, the unequal distribution of information on different projects and benefits was probably also related to the level of people’s attendance in the general meetings, where the adult villagers were supposed to discuss and share information on village projects and possible problems. Many villagers were periodically much involved in other income generating activities, such as tea plucking, and occasionally travelled to other areas to meet relatives or to earn money, so that they could thus miss the opportunities to get knowledge and access benefits also for that reason. In addition, women were usually less able to participate in meetings due to their large work load.

5.5. Farmers’ conceptions on forest conservation

In principle, forest conservation was conceived as a positive thing, especially in the on-stage discourse used in the interviews by most people. They argued that the most important benefits of forest conservation were the protection of water sources, good weather and secured rain fall. In their accounts, the assumption of a connection between rain fall and the existence of the forests was evident. The rain was conceived as important, because availability of rain was a key condition for agriculture. Many farmers stated that they were therefore supportive for conservation goals. This is similar to other regions of Tanzania, as forests and rain are often conceived to be closely connected, giving an impetus for forest conservation (e.g. Brockington 2004). The idea about the connection between forests and rain probably partly originated from the beliefs and practices that had prevailed at earlier
times among Washambaa and Wambugu, including the pre-colonial rain rituals conducted in the forests by certain clans. In addition, the emphasis on conservation of catchment areas in the German and British colonial policies had strengthened the idea of connection between forest and water. Yet, the connection had also been stressed as a part of more recent conservation interventions, so the presently common discourse derived from several rationalities.

In the EUM, as in other Eastern Arc mountains, traditional institutions have historically contributed to the protection of trees or small patches of forests. However, the role of traditions usually varies between different villages, as suggested by Ylhäisi (2006, 24), and also between the social groups within a village. In the villages with a high rate of immigrants the significance of the traditions has typically decreased most. For instance, in Gereza, I discussed the traditions related to forests with mzee who had lived in the area for a long time. After explaining how they had participated in a ritual for making rain where chickens and goats had been slaughtered the man stated, in a controversial manner, “For sure God is very merciful, when we reached home we already saw some clouds covering the mountain while they used to just pass by. However since we got Independence who cares for those issues anymore? No one.” (interview, 13.10.2003, Gereza).

While describing the ritual as a ‘success’ in terms of bringing rain, he also used an expression of Christian origin, showing the combination of different world views. In addition, other people often stressed that many had given up traditional practices, or it was just some few people who followed them. Therefore, on top of the ‘indigenous’ understandings, awareness-raising conducted by the EUCAMP and other projects had contributed to the fact that most people stressed the value of forest as a source of water and rain.

The idea of traditional institutions of conservation, such as sacred sites and rituals, were also used as discursive strategy by the village leaders or others more involved in conservation interventions to back up their arguments about ‘pro-conservation’ minded local people. In Ubiri, the ex-village chairman, mzee Rashid, explained me about their traditions (interview, 23.10.2003, Ubiri), “So there were some special areas which needed to be taken care of, and by that time there were terrible animals so when we entered there we had to abide to the conditions. So you just looked at the tree and if you wanted to have a tree for construction purposes then you would need to take the ones you had been allowed. You could not mix. You took that tree and went to build your building...because they knew that the forests brought rainfall.” Mzee Rashid also explained that for those people like himself who had resided in the place for a long time, it was easy to get used to the new restrictions on forests, due to the traditional institutions. Especially the village leadership and environmental committee people argued that they or their ancestors, or the villagers in general, had preserved the forests. This was said to be one reason why they needed to protect it also for the future generations. This shows how elements of a more recently introduced conservation discourse, and its idea of sustainable development, were ‘mixed’ with the discourse stressing traditional practices of forest control.
Many farmers I discussed it with were, in principle, supportive to the idea of protecting forests, and restricting the use of the forests. It was also a common view that the forests had become ‘bigger’ or thicker since the conservation efforts were started and the rules restricting access were enforced more vigorously. This can partly be a strategic thing – the researcher is given ‘the right answers’ by the informants. However, the discourse, in which the protection of forest is seen as beneficial for the villagers and future generations, should not be interpreted solely as strategic action. At the level of outlined statements by people adjacent to protected areas, the support for conservation objectives has been found to be a general feature. Newmark and Hough (2000, 588), present that in surveys conducted in different countries in Africa, most people agreed on the need for protected areas, or were opposed to the idea of abolishing them. In addition, as Brockington (2005, 114-115) reminds in his study on environmentalism in Tanzania, there are situations in which the actual ecological conditions influence the ways in which people conceptualise the world, giving reason for their ‘environmentalist’ discourse.

However, in spite of the expressed support for conservation, the formal rules of management of the reserve and the conditions of resource control had largely been determined by other people than the local farmers. The process of negotiating the boundaries and rules of control was clearly more shaped by the conservation interests. This is exemplified, for instance, in the way a group of women in Mikwinini described the meaning of *msitu* (forest in Swa.): “We are forbidden to cut trees and fuel wood from there [reserve]. We are given borders” (Group Interview, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini). The fact that the word *msitu* had became to mean reserve (*hifadhi* in Swa.) reflected continuation of the exclusive conservation thinking and practice. Commonly, forest was seen as something where one should not enter without permit expect for the fuel wood collection on the agreed days and places.

The farmers in the study villages were generally well aware of the main restrictions on forest use. In Ubiri village, which had been one of the pilot villagers of the EUCAMP development and conservation activities, the rules and regulations on access to forests were conceived generally in a positive way (figure 6). Increased emphasis on the enforcement of the regulations and environmental education during the conservation projects had probably contributed to the generally positive image people gave about the importance and outcomes of conservation. The accounts of many farmers suggest that the control of the forests would have been improved in the recent years. For instance, Mama Maria explained (Interview, 24.10. 2003, Ubiri): “When I came here people just went into the forests to collect whatever they wanted. They went there to collect traditional medicines, ropes and other things but now it is not allowed at all”.

It was somewhat surprising to me that the farmers often considered the increased forest control as a positive thing. Partly, this could be also explained by the fact that in some cases they associated me with the conservation groups and the ‘FINNIDA’, or GoF’s development assistance to conservation, and tried to answer the questions strategically, or in a way that was thought to be appropriate. However, it was evident that many of the
farmers were also truly concerned on availability of rain, as it was one of the preconditions of their agricultural activities. In addition, their positive views on strict control of the forest can be explained by the negative effects that the mechanical logging of trees had had on the local livelihoods of those people who were not involved and benefiting from the logging in the 1980s.

Yet, the emphasis on rule enforcement by the conservation projects had also meant more limited access to forest products. In addition, some complained about the frequent ‘disturbance’ from the wildlife to the farmers’ crops, although this also depended on the location of the village and farms in relation to the reserve. The strict conditions of access had had negative social and economic effects especially for those people who were more dependent on forest use. For instance, the collection of fuel wood in the reserve had become more restricted, and the strict rules on access to timber and building materials were a problematic issue. Furthermore, the restrictions were not always obeyed in practice, as there were signs of ‘illicit’ forest use, such as traps to hunt animals and cutting of poles, and a few pit-sawing sites, in the reserve. On the basis of my observation within the ANR, albeit not representative of the whole area, the level of forest utilisation for timber or poles was yet not extensive inside the reserve, but took place mainly in the boundary areas. This indicates that the control mechanisms
had effect on people’s behaviour and use of the resources, although much of it was probably due to the fear of being fined or otherwise punished.

A more important risk towards the forests’ biological and ecological value was probably the forest fires which had destroyed large areas in the western part of the reserve in the end of the 1990s (Newmark 2002). Yet, the fires could also result from natural processes, or be unintended. In some areas, cutting of the planted boundary marker trees of the nature reserve had been a common. This practice indicates a continuation in the forms of resistance as such activities used to occur in the reserved forests also during the colonial era in the Usambaras (Conte 2004).

However, there was also ‘adaptation’ by the villagers to the limitations on access to forest products. One of the strategies of discouraging the use of forest products, especially timber and building poles, used by the EUCAMP and the government authorities, had been to promote the use of bricks as a construction material, and emphasis on building ‘modern houses’. The requirement to use bricks for building of new houses had also been introduced as a village by-law in some areas, and new houses were commonly built by using bricks made locally. However, some amount of timber was still needed to finish the house, e.g. in building the window and door frames.

The accounts of the villagers on their participation in conservation and the authority in forest control were varying, but certain tendencies could be identified. The leadership of the village council, former leaders, and generally the well-connected people, had been more often involved in the projects related to forest conservation, and they were better aware of the reforms in the institutions. The *uwaze* (Swa. plural for elderly people) usually had least knowledge about the changes in the principles of resource control, expect those who had been in the village leadership positions earlier, or otherwise more actively involved in conservation issues. For instance, some of them explained that the forest officers can issue permits to cut building poles in the reserve if the villagers need it (e.g. interview of *mzee* Wales, 8.2.2005, Gereza). This practice had been used in the reserves previously, so they were not all aware of the new rules of forest management and access.

People who knew more about the economic incentives also often mentioned the temporary jobs, such as clearing the reserve’s boundary, or the 20 percent, as a reason for their participation in forest conservation. For instance, Mama Mwanaishi, a female farmer from Ubiri, was supportive of the idea of the farmers’ participation in forest conservation. She had also participated in the related activities. Mama Mwanaishi was around 35-years old mother of the poorest wealth group. In her view, there was a good cooperation between the foresters and the villagers (interview, 2.11.2003, Ubiri): “…if the distracters do anything to the forests then the foresters or FINNIDA will come to ask us. So we co-operate with them and it is mostly that we are managing the forests”. However, her husband was a member in the village government. The people who had a connection to the village council or the VEC were best aware of the new principles of forest control and had also participated in related activities.
In general, many people stated that they would participate in forest conservation and management activities, such as the fire control or boundary maintenance work, if asked to do so by the village leaders or VEC. The idea of villagers being guardians of the forests had thus some support at the local level. The farmers who had direct benefits from the projects, such as those involved in butterfly farming or those who had been participating in different trainings and study tours during the EUCAMP, represented themselves more often as being responsible in forest control. In Ubiri, where there had been several conservation activities, and which used to be kind of a model village shown by EUCAMP to its visitors, a male farmer explained that they now knew the importance of the forests and stated that “Everybody is a forest guard now” (group interview of men, 20.10.2003, Ubiri). However, in practice, the position of the villagers was a contradictory one, due to the strict regulations. As one of the men expressed the situation in relation to the reserve (group interview, 20.10.2003, Ubiri), “…we the villagers are going there, but we understand that there is strong guard and they are saying do not cut trees. You see, or do not kill any animal that is in the forests…then maybe we should say that is the supervision by the concerned people.” In spite of the new role of the villagers as forest guards, the strict regulations had also limited their access to forest products, which caused problems especially to poorer people.

The authority to control the forests, especially those in the non-reserved land and also the local use area of the ANR, was conceived to be concentrated in the hands of few leaders, together with the foresters. For instance, in Ubiri, many people argued that it was mainly the village chairman, or the chairman of the VEC, who was a twin brother of the village chairman and had hold several important positions in the village, who was looking after the forests and deciding upon the use of the trees growing in a ‘village forest’, which was a stand of eucalyptus. For instance, when asked “who controls the use of forests?” Mama Maria, who had been living for more than 30 years, explained (interview, 24.10.2003, Ubiri), “Here in our place it is the chairman because he catches all those who are destroying the forests. He is also calling upon the people to leave the forests alone. He is also telling people to plant trees since the forests will be closed for good so that we will never be allowed even to collect fuel wood.”

In spite of the commonly used discourse of co-operation between the village leaders and VEC in forest control by the villagers, some of them were largely excluded from knowledge on and opportunities related to the conservation, because of their commitment to other tasks, or partial communication with them and the village leadership and VEC. In Gereza, a young female farmer explained her experience of forest conservation as follows (group interview, 14.10.2003, Gereza), “…we the villagers do not know anything, we just come here so they can tell us what is going on and sometimes read the reports for us from the forest experts but what they have really planned we have no idea”.

The ultimate authority in forest control was conceived mainly to be in the hands of the ANR and FBD, although the agencies were referred to by different names. Some people explained that the forests were controlled by
FINNIDA, which, however, usually referred to the conservation projects (EUCFP/EUCAMP), or the agency of the ANR (and thus ultimately the FBD). Such confusion in names of organisations implies that they had connected these agencies to the conservation interventions partly funded by GoF that sought to enforce the strict rules on forests and extend the forest reserves. In Mbomole, an elderly man who had previously occupied a position in the village leadership, suggested that the villagers used to control the forests together with FINNIDA in the past, but now the forest was only controlled by FINNIDA (interview, 5.3.2005, Mbomole)\textsuperscript{63}. Furthermore, the elements of the exclusive conservation discourse were evident in how people expressed their relationship to the forests. Many of the farmers expressed that they were afraid of going into the forests, because they could be questioned about their reason to be there, or caught by the foresters or by the village leaders and VEC members involved in control. Some even argued that they do not go to the forest at all, or not during the non-allowed days, because of the risk. Furthermore, people could talk about themselves or, more commonly, of their neighbours or other villages as thieves who collected different products in the forests against the rules, and about the forest authorities as guards.

Occasionally, I observed signs of mistrust towards the village council, the VEC and other committees among those villagers who were not members in these bodies, or who did not have much contact with them. Yet, such arguments were seldom expressed directly, or in the first encounters. They were often presented by people whom I get to know better, after more trust had evolved between us. For instance, Mr Abduel, a young male farmer who had been actively involved in the butterfly farming project and one of the group leaders of the project, explained to me the problems of benefit sharing in his village (interview, 7.5.2005, IBC Msasa), “...But when we hold meetings of the village government, there are those small committees that are under the central government, so we may question them but I think that they lie, they are only more concerned about their jobs.” Mr Abduel thus questioned the authority of the representatives of the villagers in the committees under the village council. However, his position in the butterfly farming project, and the networks and knowledge created through that involvement, gave him better chance and confidence to criticise the ‘non-transparent’ conduct of the representatives.

The social divisions within the village, e.g. the leadership and the other villagers, affected how the works and the economic benefits from conservation interventions were distributed. There were instances where the benefits and opportunities related to conservation activities, such as payments for boundary maintenance work, had strained the relationships within the villages, and also between the villagers and the forest authorities (field notes, 7.10. and 15.10.2003). In Mikwinini, a group of men claimed that they were not paid properly from their boundary clearing work. They suspected that the village leadership had taken advantage of the funds allocated for the work. Such examples imply that the authority of the leadership of the village, and accountability of their decisions, was

\textsuperscript{63} According to a recent study conducted by Mwanyoka (2006) in few villages bordering the ANR, most people conceived that the forest belonged to FINNIDA.
sometimes questioned by others. Claims of corruption or non-transparent practice have also been targeted towards the village authorities and committees involved in the management of VFRs, as the case of Mpanga and Handei village forests in the EUM shows (c.f. Kessy 1998; Zulu 2004).

However, the VECs and the village councils were subject to change of the members, through elections that were held once in four years. This provided a potential means to challenge the previous relationships of authority. There was some evidence of transformative processes in relation to the practice of elections. In Ubiri, I became first familiar with Mama Aisha during 2003. She was a widow of about 50 years, and now lived in the village with one of her children, and farmed land owned by her father’s family. While her husband was alive, Mama Aisha had lived in Lushoto, West Usambaras for many years. She had then returned to Ubiri in 1997, and worked in the tea estate, but was now retired. In 2003, she argued that the forest department workers control the forests nearby the village. She had heard about the VEC, but was not involved with them. Next time, Mama Aisha had been selected to the village council through ‘special seats’ for women representatives. She presented that the Chairman of the VEC had the authority in controlling the forests (interview, 21.1.2005, Ubiri). As many others in the village, Mama Aisha conceived that the decision-making power over the forests and the related resources was concentrated on the village leadership. However, she then argued: “We were very far from the village council, so we did not know the secrets between the village chairman and the village executive secretary, but now we shall know and we will make follow up” (Interview, 21.1.2005, Ubiri). As a new member of the council, she had a better opportunity to make follow-up on the use of money and other matters, implying a potential change in the practices.

5.6. Village leaders and environmental committees in forest control: experts, guardians or thieves?

According to the management plan of the ANR, the village leaders and VECs play a central role in conservation of the reserve and village lands, and motivate the people to act in line with the regulation. Elements of this official discourse were common in how the VEC people and village leaders expressed their position, especially during the first encounters. They suggested that they themselves or the villagers in general were protecting the forest or shared the responsibility with the forest department and the ANR staff, usually both in the reserve and the village land. Moreover, the leaders of the VEC co-operated occasionally with the security committee in taking care of their tasks (e.g. interview of the VEC’s chairman, 21.10.2003, Ubiri). The fact the ‘on-stage’ discourse used by VEC people was often in line with the formal, institutionalised conservation discourse can be explained by their organisational and hierarchal position, and the fact that many of them had been actively involved in various conservation interventions, and benefited from them. However, they also implied, implicitly or sometimes openly, that they faced many challenges and constraints in their duty. In addition, in
some of the villages, there were members who questioned the rationality of the villagers’ participation, mainly due to the lack of or inadequate benefits.

The village leaders and VEC members can be considered brokers in resource control, as they have to address needs and demands of both the conservation agencies, and those of the villagers. Especially the leaders of the committees tried to make sure that the village would benefit somehow from the conservation activities and development projects, at the same time as they needed to make sure that the rules of control were not by-passed. Therefore, they had to balance between the different interests and lines of thinking. Many committee members explicitly followed the official thinking of conservation when describing their tasks, and also expressed that there was social prestige related to the position. VEC people and village leaders stressed that they had been given training on environmental issues and leadership skills. They often seemed to be proud of their special position in the village and regarded themselves as ‘teachers’ or experts, who were to educate others about conservation issue. Some argued that they served the community also in other matters than forest conservation.

One of the environmental committee people with whom I became more familiar with was the secretary of VEC of IBC Msasa, named Mr Petro. He had moved to the village in the early 1980s in order to cultivate cash crops. Mr Petro had also been active in environmental issues for a long time, which had probably also ‘exposed’ him to conservationist discourse. He was also a minister in the church of Amani, so he held many positions at the village, and more broadly. Mr Petro and his large family depended on the farming of cash crops, subsistence crops and he was also involved in butterfly farming. When I asked about his reasons for joining the VEC, Mr Petro first argued that he does not like destruction of forest and stressed his knowledge on environment (interview, 22.3.2005, IBC Msasa). He then explained that he had been educated about environmental conservation while he took part in the IUCN project, and the experience in the project had made him even more interested in conservation.

However, in addition to presenting themselves as experts, the VEC members, and also the village leaders, often asked for more education for themselves or for the village in general. This also reflects the high value given to expert knowledge, as a source of authority. Yet, an interest to receive more training through seminars and study tours, is also understandable in the sense that the participants had benefited from them not only through the leaning of new skills, but also financially though small allowances or tips sometimes given to the participants. Nevertheless, after the termination of the EUCAMP in 2003, the availability of such resources and training had become much more limited in the villages surrounding the ANR. The lack of such benefits was an issue that the VEC members often mentioned about.

Financial and other material incentives, such as the 20 percent and the opportunity to access certain benefits, were often stated reasons for

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64 In the villages where the TFCG and WWF projects operated, such support continued or became available between 2003 and 2008, but most of these villages were not in the buffer zone of the ANR.
participating in the committees and the conservation activities. The VEC secretary in Mikwinini, for instance, explained (interview, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini), “We have to prevent the people because of the 20 percent”. Furthermore, the monetary incentive for looking after the forest emerged in the accounts of those people who had been engaged in other conservation activities and knew about the possible benefits. Mzee George of Ubiri village, who had been involved in the *Elders in Conservation* programme during the EUCAMP and was aware of the reforms in the discourse of conservation, explained the motive for participating in the conservation as follows (Interview, 30.10.2003, Ubiri), “...it is the tourists who bring us the need to take care of the forests.” However, non-participation, or partial participation of the VEC members in their meeting and activities, appeared to be common in practice. In the VEC meeting in IBC Msasa (4.5.2005), only members from four of the seven sub-villages were present. In the meeting, the chairperson of VEC took up the problem of getting the members in their meetings. Non-presence of members of VEC also limited the distribution of information.

In addition, the incentive to the committees in the form of the 20 percent from the ANR’s entry fees was conceived as being too small. The equal share between the 18 villages was also an issue that caused protests among the committees. Many of the VEC members complained about the lack of any real salary for their work. In addition, in the meeting of the Village Conservation and Development Committee in 2003, the VEC leaders of certain villages that had received more visitors, complained that they should also be given a larger share of the income and that the other villagers would be causing problems where as their villages were contributing to conservation. In addition, the VEC members and village leaders in IBC Msasa argued, “Because we take care of the whole forest they should pay a bit more” (Group interview of VEC members and village leadership, IBC Msasa, 16.3.2005). As patrolling in the forest is a time-consuming and tedious job in the eyes of many people, so the actual involvement of VEC people, as they are not paid direct compensations, is likely to be less than the officially stated. Furthermore, the lack of a direct salary or clear compensation for the VEC made the patrolling work difficult to arrange in practice.

In spite of the ‘on-stage’ discourse of co-operation commonly used by the VEC members in the initial stage of the discussion, some of them were not so confident about their ability to control the forest use because of the lack of tips and/or other material support. For instance, Mr Petro, with whom I was communicating more regularly and became closer, explained (interview, 22.3.2005, IBC Msasa) the constraints of the committee work as follows: “There is no salary. That is why sometimes you may find that we arrange a day we should go and visit the forest when the day arrives there are only few members with whom you will go to the forest, most of them are in their own activities.” Lack of benefits for ‘local people’ about their participation in forest control through JFM has been suggested in other regions, e.g. by Kajembe et al. (2005, 14), who addressed impacts of JFM in Same district of the Kilimanjaro region.
It was not only direct payments, or *chai* (small gifts or tips in Swa.) that the committees demanded to be able to control the reserve and other areas more efficiently. The environmental committee members and the village authorities often suggested that they would need other material support from the conservationists, as well as something to show their identity as forest guards, such as special uniform or identity card. This had also been discussed in the meetings of the VDCD in Amani. The VEC chairperson of Gereza explained about their last meeting with the ANR staff (interview, 9.2.2005, Gereza), “We also requested them to provide us with boots for patrol in the forest, what they answered is that they don’t have boots [...] We also requested tree seeds to grow in our farms, they told us the Station in charges are responsible for that, but we sometimes ask these Station in charges but they say that they don’t have seeds to provide.” In addition, it was argued that the villagers in general needed more education on conservation, from the experts. The village chairman of Shebomeza expressed his worries about the conduct of the fellow villagers (interview, 12.1.2005) as follows, “Because if these specialist people would come and provide education, it would be easier for them to understand, compared to me, as I’m with them every day. They don’t take me seriously all the time.” This comment also illustrates that the village leaders sometimes experienced a lack of authority, or respect, in conservation matters.

In some cases, the relationship between the VEC people and the other villagers had turned out to be tense, or prone to conflicts. For instance, in Mikwinini, one of the VEC members regarded their role in forest conservation as policemen who tried to control the thieves, who are people from the same village, or more often from neighbouring ones. During my first field work, the secretary of VEC of Mikwinini, Mr Selemani, was critical about the conduct of other villagers in relation to the forests, and described his role as follows (interview, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini), “Actually they are afraid of me like they afraid the policemen. Whenever they find me in the forest they run away.” His comment also illustrates the ‘twisted’ position of the village leaders and VEC members in the control. The VEC members and village leaders were of course part of the social configuration of their village, and the broader society. They had to deal within the limits and opportunities of their social networks in their conservation related tasks. This included different, and sometimes shifting, levels of authority in respect to others. Mr Selemani’s argument indicates a low degree of trust between him and some of the other villagers. Discussions with some of the ANR’s authorities suggest that in Mikwinini, where many of the people were present or ex workers of the tea estates, the position of village leaders and their capacity to enforce regulations was somewhat weaker than in other villages.

During my second visit, the VEC secretary of Mikwinini participated in a group interview with another committee member and a female forest attendant. Then, he did not express as critical comments as earlier. At the explicit level, the participants of the group interview seemed to support the idea of their participation in the forest control (group interview, 17.1.2005, Mikwinini). They explained that they as the committee, and more generally all villagers, should now act as the guardians of the forests. Nevertheless,
other comments and reactions in the speech of the committee’s secretary indicated that he had reservations about the rationality of this. For instance, Mr Selemani laughed, seemingly in an ironic way, after saying that the villagers now protect the forest. Moreover, he used the word ‘we’ in the end, when he explained about the illegal activities that had taken place in the forest (group interview, 17.1.2005, Mikwinini). Mr Selemani first represented his role as the guardian of the forest, but then included himself in the group of villagers, who are also the ‘thieves’.

In addition, VECs had experienced problems due to political fractions and disputes between different groups of villagers. In Gereza, there were struggles between the VEC secretary’s family and the current village leadership in 2003. One of the current village leaders blamed the former village head, who was the wife of the VEC’s secretary, of having caused the forest fire that spread to the reserve (field notes 15.10.2003). He explained that through the forest fire, the former leader wanted to show that the new leadership was too weak. The political dispute had complicated the operation of the VEC: the position of its secretary was unclear. Some of the VEC members were not willing to co-operate with each others, explicitly due to political shifts. The present chairperson of the VEC explained (interview, 9.2.2005, Gereza), “the committee secretary and her wife have shifted from the leading party CCM65 to another one [...] those members in CCM they do not like her and her husband...” Yet, underlying the dispute over authority were also questions of access to and distribution of benefits from the forests and conservation projects, such as the opportunities to benefit from the income generating activities.

The dispute in the leadership of Gereza was also reflected in how the VEC people conceived their relationship to the forest authorities and the reserve. The current leadership stressed co-operation, where as the previous leader and the VEC secretary argued against it. For instance, the village secretary stressed that there was good co-operation within the village and between the village and the forest authorities (interview, 13.10.2003, Gereza), to give a positive image of the situation. However, the secretary of the VEC, Mr George, who was the husband of the previous village head, had a completely different view. He first explained that the VEC was involved in the control of the forests, together with the village council and the forest officials. However, he then argued that there had been a break-down in the co-operation between the village and the staff of the ANR and that the relationship had changed to worse in recent times (interview, 13.10.2003, Gereza).

The VEC secretary explained that he had stopped the illicit felling of trees on village land in 2003, but the process had not resulted to any action against the culprit. The official who was responsible had arguably not taken any action in the case nor given the VEC any instructions on it. To prove the unsettled issue he showed us some confiscated timber positioned in his

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65 CCM stands for Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution in Swahili), which was the only party under the single-party system, and continued to be the ruling party nationally and in local governments in many rural areas.
Mr George was frustrated about the lack of help from the ANR’s staff in the issue. In 2005, the situation had not shifted much. In Mr George’s view, the villagers were used only as a labour force, and there was a lack of contact between them and the ANR staff. He argued (interview, 8.2.2005, Gereza), “The foresters come when there is a problem, such as fire. They would ask where did the fire start, let’s go and put it off. But in other matters they never come.” Underlying the complaints were probably the lack of development projects and resources for running the reserve. In 2005, similar complaints were made in other villages. Particularly, the people who had been more involved in the control of the forests were not content about the co-operation, and the conditions of it, such as limited benefits and payments.

5.7. Institutional reforms and practices of control of village land

In the villages, the control of the resources under their areas should now be under the village council, at least in principle. With the introduction of the new forest law, the village governments are supposed to establish and use their own by-laws in order to manage and control the resources in the village area. This is supposed to make the sanctions fairer to the villagers, or any other people who illegally use the forest areas under the authority of the villages, as the village governments can adjust the sanctions to better fit with the local income level. It can also be perceived as a mean to ‘empower’ the village governments to control the use of resources more directly. In general, the village authorities stated that they have the village by-laws which they can use to deal with such issues. Yet, the legal status of the by-laws was uncertain. The Conservator argued that the procedure of formalising the by-laws and registration of the villages had actually not been completed in most of the villages (e.g. interview of the Conservator, 6.11.2003 and 12.1.2008, Amani). In 2008, the process was on-going in a few villages (interview of the Conservator, 12.1.2008, Amani). In addition, in case of ‘serious’ offences, including cutting of timber trees, the village leaders were to contact the ANR’s staff.

In practice, many of the village government and VEC leaders argued that they had not yet used the by-laws to punish villagers who had breached the rules governing their area and the local use zone, or that they used them very seldom. Instead, they only warned those who had breached the rules, therefore trying to make them obedient subjects in relation to conservation goals. The village leaders and committee members had therefore their own, flexible, way of controlling the use of resources. They also acted as mediators in the implementation of the rules. Practises of control, such as procedures in case of illegalities, varied and were not systematic between the different study villages, and also depended on the seriousness of the case. For instance, the VEC chairman of Ubiri (interview, 21.10.2003) argued that they had used punishments, e.g. setting fines or requiring the culprit to give a chicken or two, if they had found someone cutting building poles in the reserve or doing some other minor illicit acts. Yet, the village authorities or
VEC people in some villages had also co-operated with the sungu sungu (a village security group), security committee, the staff of the ANR and sometimes the police in the control of illicit activities in the village area and the local use zones, for instance in the case of illegal mining (discussed below). It meant that in such 'crises' situation, they were not able to exercise the control over the areas without external support, as there were also mixed interests among the villagers.

The interpretation of the by-laws and rules, and the setting of the punishments, was also shaped by the social position of the offender. For instance, in Gereza, I was first told by the chair person of the VEC, who was a middle-aged lady, that if someone wants to cut poles, he or she would have pay 2000 Tsh to the village government (interview, 9.2.2005, Gereza). However, in practice, the rules on and fines were negotiable. The last time the committee was said to have caught someone violating the regulations was in 2004. The offender was a young boy who had cut down three Teak (*Tectona grandis*) trees in the forest boundary. After being caught, the VEC's members had taken the boy to the police station where he was fined only 1000 Tsh. The fee was said to be small because the young man was poor. In a similar way, the chairman of Shebomeza, explained that he had not punished an elderly farmer who had burned some land outside his farm, because the old man would not have afforded it (interview, 12.1.2005, Shebomeza). In another village, there was a case where the fire used by a farmer for preparing his land had escaped to the neighbour's land, and the 'culprit' was ordered to grow and plant tree seedlings in his neighbour's *shamba* (Swa. for field).

In my first visit to the Mikwinini, the decision-making over how to address the breaching of the rules was concentrated in to the leadership of the VEC. The VEC secretary, Mr Selemani, argued that he was “leading the decision-making over how the rule breaker would be charged or punished” (interview, 7.10.2003, Mikwinini). Yet, in 2005, the situation was described in a different way. The VEC members argued that they have the by-laws, but do not normally use them. As one of them stated, “Maybe we have never applied them. But we have applied minor punishments for the people who cut... ee... poles or bamboos to construct houses. We normally warn them. We have not yet started to implement the law of collecting fines, but we have warned a lot of them” (group interview of VEC members, 17.1.2005, Mikwinini).

When asked about the control of forests outside the reserved land, the Conservator referred to the forest law first (interview, 6.11.2003, Amani). He explained that the by-laws of several villages had not been approved by the district authorities, and thus their status was not official. This was related to the fact that most of the villages surrounding the reserve had not completed the process of registrating the village land, so the new legislation on managing forests on village land was not yet applicable to them. However, the Conservator also suggested that the village governments can use the 'customary laws' to punish the rule breakers and thus the lack of official by-laws would not be such a big problem in relation to controlling the forests.
under the responsibility of the village, e.g. village land (interview, 6.11.2003, Amani).

However, the former Forest Act had occasionally been used to punish rule-breakers in ‘village land’ or what the villagers considered as being village land, especially when valuable timber species had been cut without a permit (e.g. meeting of the VEC of IBC Msasa 5.4.2005; interview of a village chairman, 3.3.2005, Mbomole). This had created some tension between the villages and the ANR. During my stay in Amani in 2004 and 2005, there had been recent instances where illegally cut trees on the areas under some villages were confiscated by the reserve staff. The village leaders and many VEC people conceived that there was no real benefit-sharing if illegal timber was confiscated on the village area (e.g. meeting of the VEC, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa), and they expressed discursive resistance by accusing the foresters of taking advantage of the situation. A similar situation, where illicitly felled timber in the village area was confiscated by the foresters and nothing was given back to the village, was claimed by the village leadership of a Kwatango, in the lowlands (interview of the village chairman, 12.11.2003). This exclusive effect of the forest legislation and the strictness of the rules regarding access to forest products were experienced as a problem by some forest officials as well, especially in terms of building co-operation with the villagers. For instance, a staff member of the ANR argued “…with law enforcement it is not easy to make participatory forest protection” (interview, 15.10.2003, Amani). The enforcement approach used by the forest and conservation authorities in such situations, with little space for negotiating benefit sharing for the villagers, implied that there was continuity in the practices of resource control, especially in relation to the control of valuable resources.

5.8. Contestation over access to and control over timber

Since the shift to emphasis on forest conservation in the 1980s, timber harvesting became more regulated. New rules were issued on timber harvesting and efforts were made by the conservation interventions to enforce them. The sub-village chairman of IBC Msasa, who had given up some of his land to conservation, expressed the controversial situation in relation to the forests, especially regarding access to timber, as follows (19.3.2005, Kwekuyu), “…the forests are the ones that benefit us and yet we are not allowed to cut down trees”. However, the institutional situation was fuzzy, in the sense that there were different accounts on the possibility to get access to timber on non-reserved land, and who had the authority of issuing permits for accessing timber. For instance, the status of the ban on pit-sawing issued in 1989 for Amani division was not clear. According to the Conservator (interview, 6.11.2003, Amani), the harvesting of trees, meaning probably only the government reserved species, was not at all allowed in Amani. Furthermore, many farmers also stated that they were not allowed to harvest the timber trees in non-reserved areas, referring mostly to the
government reserved species66, where as others argued that it is possible if one pays the fees. Yet, some of the foresters I met claimed that the ban on logging in Amani Division was never official, and the paper could not be found either in the district or the regional forest offices when I asked to see it.

However, some harvesting of trees in the non-reserved land occurred: the carpenters in the villages had timber to from the nearby areas, and some people harvested trees for selling. According to Roe et al. (2002, 65-66), in the EUM, the policy is that licences and permits for logging timber trees on general or village land should be obtained from the forest authorities, but the license fees for the reserved species were considered very high. The problem of accessing timber was also strategically used by the farmers to criticise the operations of the ANR and forest department. They questioned the legitimacy of the government’s control on the logging of the reserved, indigenous trees outside the nature reserve. The ANR agency did not formally have a stake in issuing permits or licenses for the un-reserved land, but they could stop illegal activities. When I discussed the issue of timber control on the non-reserved areas with the Conservator (interview, 6.11.2003, Amani), he argued that “the authority to harvest is not ours, but the authority to protect is ours”. He suggested that the ANR officials were not in the position to give permits for harvesting timber, but that they could still take action if they found that someone was harvesting without having the permits. Occasionally, they tried to confiscate illegal timber in the villages, or on the way. For instance, during the field work in the end of 2003, I observed one truck carrying timber that was chased after by the ANR officials on the road to Muheza.

One of the very critical voices related to the strict regulations was Mr Abdi, the chairman of Shebomeza village, located near the head quarters of the reserve. The chairman argued that the parties of the MoU had agreed that ‘public land’, meaning village or general land, was not going to be under the responsibility of the ANR, but that the reserve people would have breached the contract (interview, 12.1.2005, Amani Division). After explaining in detail the problems in access to timber met by the farmers, he stated that he had put forward similar claims in a meeting in the District office (interview, 12.1.2005, Amani), “This meeting was also attended by the president of conservation, and they gave us papers to arise problems or comments about conservation, and all the village chairmen of the District had this issue about access to timber as a number. In my paper, I wrote that are the reserve people involving the local people or are they forcing the local people to be involved in the conservation...” In his argumentation, the village chairman clearly opposed the way participation of the villagers had been used as a way to enforce strict rules of control by the conservation organisation in the surrounding areas.

The fact that the farmers had not been allowed to cut certain valuable tree species on their farm land without the permit from the forest officials (or paying high fees) had also caused resentment in the past (Jambiya &

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66 These are also considered as valuable timber species.
Sosovele 2001; Sjöholm et al. 2001) and continued to do so. The problem of accessing timber was brought up by several other village leaders and sometimes by other villagers. An old farmer, mzee Geoffrey, (interview, 8.2.2005, Gereza) who had worked for the Sikh Sawmills company in the past, described the situation as follows, “It is like giving birth to a child and then he/she becomes government property, not yours. You give birth to a child and then decide to kill it. It is my child, let me kill it. They will arrest you and lock you up.” The way the mzee described their position suggests that he experienced the system to be unfair. However, in practice, the access to timber was not always so complicated, as people could also access valuable timber trees without permit or consultation of the forest authorities. For instance, in Mbomole, I came across with a situation when a farmer had a large tree (indigenous species) fallen in his farm, and another farmer from the village came to request if he could get a piece of the tree trunk for his use.

In spite of the fact that many of village leaders emphasised co-operation between the villages and the ANR staff in general, in other occasions they claimed that it was very difficult to get a permit from authorities to cut down certain tree species in the farms. In principle, villagers were required to report to the authorities and get permission from them to cut down a tree or to use a fallen log\(^{67}\). However, this was considered as a time consuming and expensive procedure, with no certainty about the outcomes. Mr Abdi argued (interview, 12.1.2005), “They will send you to Muheza and on reaching there you will be going round and round […]

But the headache is timber…we cannot get any, we have written a lot of letters and if you go there they will tell you to go to Tanga. So you will make that rotation and they will not answer you. They are saying they do not let people saw timber from this mountain, however, that is making people illegally steal the timber they need.” The chairman of Mbomole also expressed his concern about the logging of the trees in the nature reserve due to the limited access on timber outside the reserve (interview, 3.3.2005, Mbomole). He argued, “If that is done in the reserve that will be theft and so people do not take from nearby areas. All the same if they are determined to build they will still go and take what they need”. The arguments put forward especially by the village leaders indicate that the conditions of access regarding valuable timber species were conceived unfair, and resisted through discursive strategies.

In addition, the rationality and conditions of the villages’ participation in forest control was questioned by the VEC of IBC Msasa, when the villagers were asked to participate in the control of ‘illicit’ or partly illicit logging by the EUTCO\(^{68}\) tea company in 2005. Some villagers had observed forest destruction in the company’s area, located near the village. Yet there was officially a good co-operation with the ANR and the EUTCO (interview of the

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\(^{67}\) Complains about the restrictions to get access to the timber trees, even if they would have fallen down due to old age or wind, have been reported in different studies and evaluations also earlier (c.f. SIA 2000, Sjöholm et al. 2001).

\(^{68}\) The EUTCO (East Usambara Tea Company Ltd) was established by the Tanzania Tea Authority and CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) in 1988 (Ellman 1996, 1).
Conservator, 6.11.2003 and 12.1.2008, Amani). It was anyhow admitted that problems had emerged in 2003 when the company harvested big trees, and species that were protected, without a permit in its forests. This was as the company seasonally needed more fuel wood than available in the plantations (interview of a forest officer, Amani, 16.5.2005). The activity had been stopped in 2003, but the EUTCO had then repeated its logging activities in its land in 2005 close to IBC Msasa.

In 2005, some of the VEC members and village administrative secretary had been on a follow-up visit in the forest with the representatives of the ANR and the TCFO. The ‘higher level authorities’ had then informed them that the VEC should take action in the matter, and write a letter to the district in order to stop the logging. This was as the logging was said to be harmful to the villagers, due to deterioration of water sources. Some of the villagers also blamed that the tea companies were ‘guilty’ to environmental destruction as they had planted eucalyptus on their land. However, the debate in the meeting of the VEC (5.4.2005, IBC Msasa) implies that there procedure that they were told to follow by the forest authorities was a complex one, frustrating many of the VEC members in their meeting. Several levels of the local government were to be engaged in the process, before the activity could formally be stopped. Overall, it appeared as highly bureaucratic process.

The members were also unaware on why they should to act on the issue. They debated about whether the VEC should act and whose responsibility it eventually was to take action. The VEC secretary, Mr Petro pointed out the importance of the VEC in taking an active role. He said that they had been trained and given authority, so that “our committee is even more powerful than that of the Government” (meeting of the VEC, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa). Yet, others were frustrated with the unclear procedure and responsibilities, and questioned why they should be involved. Another committee member argued “I think that there is a risk of going around here [...] The meaning is that the manager of the project has come here to see that area [and] those people of Amani have already seen it and again we who are smaller than those big [fellows] of ours who came to see it and then we are told to write a letter, and who should we write it again...” (meeting of the VEC, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa). Some of the VEC members also questioned the rationality of the committee’s engagement in the process, indicating resistance to the demand for their participation. One reason was the problematic access to timber on the non-reserved land. This is related to persistence of strict rules on timber harvesting and the related injustices experienced by the farmers.

The claims that the tea company had logged reserved tree species for fuel wood also raised questions whether they had been allowed by the forest authorities. The VEC members and village leaders complained that the forest department staff’s control of the illegal activities meant that villagers did not benefit of it. In some accounts, the forest staff were also claimed to have profited from the related illegalities (meeting of the VEC, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa). Similarly, the chairman of Mbomole village, Mr Mathew argued that a farmer who had cut down some Mhesi trees (Maesopsis eminii) from his
farm for construction purposes without a permit was ordered to pay too high fines by the staff of the ANR. Mr Mathew argued (interview, 3.3.2005, Mbomole): “They are giving us hard time because they know that we do not know many of the things and so they take advantage of our ignorance of the law, we are not free...” Such controversies in the statements of the villagers’ representatives imply that the relationship between them and the forest officers was not as smooth as stated in the ‘on-stage’ discourse. Illusory or real experiences about such conduct were also reflected in how some of them questioned the authority of the forest officials. The leadership of the village government of IBC Msasa argued that if illegal timber is found in the village land, it is confiscated and taken away by the forest officials without any share given to the village, and maybe taken advantage of by the authorities, without return of any benefit for the village (group interview, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa). Similar accusations were made by the VEC members in the meeting of the VEC in IBC Msasa. As a result, it was proposed in the meeting that if the villagers confiscated illegal timber in the future they should not inform the forest officials.

During my short visit to the EUM in 2008, the harvesting of timber for commercial purposes seemed to have increased in scope. One day, I observed three large trucks loaded with logs that were stopped in Amani station to be checked up before transportation. The trees were said to be from the village land, as some farmers had decided to sell timber for the markets, and been given permit for that. In addition, four sawmills were operating in the way between Amani and the closest town Muheza at that time. This also increased the demand for timber from the mountains, although much of their raw material came from the teak plantations.

5.9. Mixed interests in the control of mining

Gold mining of alluvial deposits began in Sakale village and general lands close to the ANR in the end of 2003, after gold had been found in Sakale. Mining of other minerals had taken place in some of the forest reserves of the EUM earlier (e.g. Kessy 1998), so it was not a totally new threat towards conservation goals. The gold mining boom in the EUM also reflected the reforms in Tanzanian mining codes introduced in the 1990s, which meant more liberal policies and led to a substantial increase in the number of small-scale miners (Kulindwa et al. 2003). A gold strike had occurred earlier in 2003 in the Semdoe forest reserve, where the locals had started to prospect for gold. In that case, however, the activity had been controlled by the district authorities (Newmark et al. 2003).

In Sakale village and its surroundings, the mining occurred first in the village lands by small-scale miners, e.g. in valley bottoms and along the streams (Newmark et al. 2003; Doggart et al. 2004). On course of time, both newcomers and some villagers started to mine gold, not only on village land and non-reserved areas but also inside the ANR. At the highest point, the number of miners in the EUM was estimated to have reached 100,000 individuals. The knowledge on mining techniques quickly spread from the
'outsiders' to the villagers, some of whom went mining in Sakale (figure 7). Others started to mine in their own village. For instance in Sangarawe, a sub-village of one of the buffer zone villages of the ANR, the villagers had started experimenting with mining in 2004. When they discovered gold, 'outsiders' from Sakale joined them (interview of the sub-village village chair person, 8.3.2005, Sangarawe). In addition to direct income, the mining activities provided the villagers some business opportunities, such as selling of alcohol and food. Gold mining activities were being conducted both in Sangarawe and the nearby reserve in early 2005, although officially all mining had been banned in the area. In addition, all of the mining was said to be illegal in the sense that the miners did not pay any royalties to the government (pers. communication with an NGO staff member, January 2005, Amani).69

Mining led to disturbances in the forest ecosystems in different areas (c.f. Newmark et al. 2003), and there were signs of trees cut and water pollution in the area where mining had taken place. A farmer from Amani Division who had been mining previously explained that the miners decided to enter the ANR as the mining in the village land become difficult due to increased control. The mining in the reserve was conducted both by ‘outsiders’ as well as local people. In addition to ecological changes, such as water contamination and felling of trees, the gold mining caused social unrest, as the efforts to stop it caused intra-village conflicts, for instance in Mbomole. In early 2005, some villagers wanted to continue with mining and let ‘outsiders’ come in to the villages, whereas others resisted. The control of mining also strained the relationships between the forest authorities and the miners.

The representatives of the ANR officially gave a positive image about the co-operation between the committees and the reserve staff in the control of ‘encroachment’ by the miners. The positive statements on the co-operation are understandable, because of the need to create and maintain a positive image towards outsiders. Yet, the co-operation between the villages and the ANR staff was not always smooth in practice, because of contradictory interests regarding the use and control of the resources. At one point, the Conservator expressed the need for communities’ participation, but also the challenge of it as follows, “We might fail to conserve this biodiversity hot spot unless we become more creative in providing alternatives in the buffer zone area. [...] If there is a fire break-out, we cannot combat the fire ourselves, we are only about 13, but the local communities are helping a lot. What are we offering to them?” (interview, 6.11.2003, Amani).

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69 The minister responsible for Energy and Minerals gave an order to stop all mining activities in Sakale on the 3rd of February 2005 (interview of village chairman, 28.2.2005, Sakale), and later on, mining was banned also in other villages (interview of sub-village village chairman, 8.3.2005, Sangarawe).
Figure 7. Main gold mining site called ‘Kariakoo’ in Sakale (picture by the author, March 2005).

Staff members of the ANR involved in the control of mining complained about the security problems in their work, including the threat of violence when chasing after the miners in the reserve (e.g. informal discussions with two ANR officers, 26.12. 2004 and 8.1.2005, Amani). The miners were often more in numbers, and sometimes armed. The staff also co-operated with the villages and their local militia men, sungu sungu, when patrolling in the reserve, but there was variation in participation between different villages. The reserve staff hired mainly sungu sungu from one village only, Mbomole, as their security group was said to be well organised. The chasing of illegal miners was considered as a dangerous job by many. Stories were common about sungu sungu being injured in the patrolling. The members of sungu sungu, who were mainly young men, were paid 3 000 Tsh per day for their participation in the control, so it was not voluntary work.

The Conservator of the ANR argued at some point of the ‘gold boom’, in an informal discussion, that the participation of the villagers in the control of mining had actually not been adequate. In the West Usambaras, where there was also an extensive gold rush at the same time, the government had used force in their efforts to stop the illicit mining (interview of a staff member of TFCG, 13.12.2004, Dar es Salaam). The conflicts related to mining were intensified by the fact that in some areas, also the villagers, typically young
men, were involved in mining within the village areas and some of them also in the ANR. The participation of the villagers in the control of gold mining was discouraged by the fact that the mining had provided some of them a direct or indirect source of income. Those people who had made good money through these activities also complained about the restrictions set on mining, especially in the village areas. For instance, the chair person of Sangarawe sub-village of Mlesa, whose husband had a position in the environmental committee, suggested (interview, 8.3.2005): “[I]f they could control outsiders and leave us to eat slowly in our areas”. The new opportunities to financially benefit from the environment opened up by the mining thus made the control of the activities a controversial task in those places that were found to have gold.

One of the ANR staff with whom I discussed the control of mining was a female forest attendant of the ANR, positioned in Mikwinini. Mrs Margaret was commonly known as mama miti (Swa. for female forester) and she worked with three villages. She was a well-known figure in Mikwinini, where she had stayed for some years, after being transferred from another village. Mrs Margaret did not want to go back to her previous station, as she had ‘enemies’ there. She also argued that she was supposed to attend the meetings of the VEC. The new committee had invited her to their meetings, but the earlier one had not (interview, 18.1.2005, Mikwinini). Mrs Margaret stated that this could be because some members feared that if she participated in the meeting, she would have tried to stop their illicit mining. Some of the last VEC members had also been involved in the gold mining at ‘non-allowed’ areas. Another member of the ANR’s staff gave a similar account, stating that the previous chairman of the VEC had been involved in the illicit gold mining (interview, 15.5.2005, Amani). Furthermore, Mama miti argued that she had been threatened by villagers who were involved in the illegal gold mining activities.

In addition to the claims made by the foresters about the VEC members in some areas being involved in the illegalities, a few villagers openly blamed the foresters for taking advantage of the business. For instance, Mr Martin, an ex-village Chairman of Mbomole, who had first complained much about the strict rules on timber harvesting and who was critical about the ANR, suspected that the gold mining was actually benefiting the conservation people, “And when the minerals fever erupted in our areas we thought perhaps it was income for our FINNIDA partners” (interview, 5.3.2005, Mbomole). Moreover, some staff members of the reserve and a worker of one of the NGOs operating in Amani claimed that some of the foresters were involved in, or benefiting from the illegal mining (e.g. interview of a forest official, 15.1.2005, Amani; pers. communication with a former NGO employee, January, 2008, Dar es Salaam). However, whether the alleged activities were conducted in reality by the forest authorities, and to which extent, cannot be judged with certainty with the data available.
5.10. Partial participation and fragmentation of control

Overall, the history of the establishment of the ANR indicates that despite the efforts to involve the local people in the process, they often have been in an uneven position in the negotiations. The conditions of control have been perceived as too strict by many farmers, although the idea of protecting the forests is generally supported. Furthermore, the meetings and exercises organised by the EUCFP during the participatory planning of the ANR did not manage to solve all the issues that involved conflicts between the ‘partners’. At the same time when some of the farmers were involved in the negotiations concerning the rules of management, some of them were also ‘fighting for the rights’ in the compensation dispute. The process of creating the ANR can be viewed as a territorialisation effort by the government, its forest department and conservationists, as it led to exclusion and inclusion of groups of people within particular geographic boundaries, with the goal of controlling the access to the natural resources within those boundaries (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 388).

In the study area, elements of the exclusive conservation practice have thus co-existent with the more recent participatory processes and reforms, and continue to shape the understandings and strategies of the diverse actors. The strategies used to control the ANR and its ‘buffer zone’ creates resentment, and sometimes even resistance, among certain groups. From the farmers’ point of view, the establishment of the reserve created both hopes about the future benefits, and negative feelings and resentment, especially among those who had to give up farms without full compensations. Uneven access to information also shapes actual benefit sharing from the resources and new opportunities brought by the interventions. In addition, the changes in the level of the external financial support to the reserve and the material benefits available to the actors involved in conservation affect how willing the ‘communities’ and different groups among them, are to commit their time into forest control and conservation.

One of the interesting findings related to the local people, is that many of them are indeed supportive to the goal of conservation, mainly because of the conceived importance of the forests for their livelihood. Similar findings have been made in other parts of Tanzania (e.g. Brockington 2005) and globally (e.g. Vermeulen & Sheil 2007). This type of ‘positive’ relationship to conservation can potentially provide a good basis for increased co-operation. However, there is variation in how the local people interpret their actual position in the forest control, their interest to take part in the conservation activities, and their experiences of the conservation interventions. The experiences of different parties involved in the process of establishing and controlling the ANR imply that ideas embedded in the participatory conservation discourse are not accepted or resisted in a uniform manner. The interest to participate in the control is mostly explained by the opportunities to get diverse benefits from it, such as material and symbolic assets. The concern over the forests is not only instrumental, but it is partly
grounded in the actors’ experiences of and/or knowledge on the past negative changes related to forest degradation.

However, in spite of the reforms, many people view that they do not have much authority regarding the forests. Partly, this is because of the lack of resources, continuity and unwillingness to devolve the control. The access to conservation-related opportunities and processes of change in the formal control mechanisms are partly undermined or constrained by the short timeframes of the projects promoting them, and lack of continuity. Moreover, elements of the previously dominant discourse of control and the related authoritarian practices have also persisted among different groups. Cooperation between the actors is also constrained by mistrust due to lack of information and persistence of non-transparent practices. Furthermore, contrasting interests and political battles between individuals and groups within the villages can hinder effective intra-village co-operation, showing the contingency of such processes. Not all groups seem ready and willing to participate in the control, as they consider the conditions of control unfair. Bearing this in mind, the rationality of participation easily appears as questionable especially for the people who have not benefited from the devolved control and conservation-related projects.
6. Imposing or negotiating conservation schemes? The case of establishment of Derema Corridor

6.1. Mashamba or a Forest Corridor?

The history of forest utilisation and conservation in the East Usambaras, and the case of Amani Nature Reserve, illustrate the gradual changes but also the continuities in the discursive and non-discursive strategies of the actors involved in resource control. From the viewpoint of some conservationists and researchers, the ANR is a ‘successful’ Joint Forest Management case, whereas most of the farmers surrounding the reserve still do not consider themselves as being responsible for forest control. Instead of sudden changes, the control of the forests, other resources and the relationships of authority in the protected areas, evolve through negotiations between the actors, including interpretation of the institutions of resource control and access, and strategies of co-operation and resistance, that relate to the benefits available. However, the position of the different groups of actors in these negotiations is very uneven, as I illustrate in more detail in the following narrative on the establishment of Derema Corridor.

In recent years, the need to extend the forest area under strict conservation in the EUM has been justified by the issue of forest fragmentation. Efforts have been started to connect the existing forest reserves with so-called ecological corridors. This, in turn, affects the land use and livelihood patterns of the farmers that have previously used the area, partly under unclear conditions of land tenure. In this chapter, my focus is on the process of establishing the Derema Corridor, and the related interactions and negotiations between the groups and organisations involved. The Derema Corridor is intended to connect ANR in the south with some of the central government forest reserves. Historically, part of the area has been utilised for different purposes, e.g. for commercial logging and cultivation of cash crops. In the farming system commonly used by the small-scale farmers, some indigenous trees have been retained in the mashamba (Swah. plural for farms) as shadow trees for the crops. The area looks like a forest from a distance. Derema is considered by representatives of conservation organisations, forest authorities and many researchers as one of the biggest unprotected tracks of sub-tropical forests in the EUM (e.g. Newmark 1993; Newmark 2002; FBD et al. 2004). Ecological research has shown that bird species have been lost from smaller fragments of formerly continuous tracks of forests. Moreover, their populations are declining in the larger tracks of remaining forests. Creation of the corridors has therefore been justified by the goal of reducing forest fragmentation.

70 In this context, Derema Corridor refers to the 960 ha that was proposed to be protected by the EUCAMP. The titles used for the proposed reserve, suggested size and model of management have varied at different stages of process. The recent resettlement action plan by URT, MNRT (2006) uses the term ‘Derema Forest Corridor’ to refer to the area.
The Derema Corridor is surrounded by tea fields, more or less open farming land and five villages, including IBC Msasa, where I conducted field work. I explore the implications of this explicitly participatory conservation process for the affected people’s role in the decision-making in the conservation process, their ability to advance their goals through different strategies, and limitations to it. I first address briefly the history of land use and forest utilisation and conservation in Derema, to set the more recent developments in their historical context. Then, I explore the steps taken and the related contestations between the parties in the early stages of the conservation intervention. I also analyse the contestation between the farmers, the project, government agencies and donors regarding the means and the conditions of conservation, including the rate of compensations.

6.2. History of land use, forest conservation and population in Derema

In a similar way to other areas in the EUM, there was likely to be scattered population of farmers in the area now known as Derema and its surroundings before the colonial period. Makanya sub-village was considered by villagers and a previous study conducted in the area (Andrua 1995) as one of the oldest inhabited areas of IBC Msasa, dating back to the early 20th century. Some of the elderly inhabitants of Makanya and the sub-village chairman suggested that their ancestors had lived there since the colonial times, or possibly even prior to that. An around 65 years old farmer I became familiar with argued that his family had lived in the village for at least during three generations (interview, 14.1.2008, Makanya). However, the location of the village had changed somewhat over time. The population had first lived in more scattered habitations until the 1960s, when they were brought together to live in a more concentrated village (interview of sub-village chairman, 9.-10.10.2003, Makanya).

Colonial plantation economy affected the land use and social configuration in Derema area since the end of the 19th century. New claims towards the land emerged, as the estates occupied more areas, testing coffee and tea as a means to make profit. The German East Africa Company established coffee plantations in Derema and Nguelo by the mid-1890s (Mihalyi 1969, 102-104). In addition, a saw mill operated in Derema and Bulwa (Schabel 1990). Tea as a plantation crop was also experimented with at an early stage. The cultivation of the cash crop also shaped the social setting in the area, as workers were recruited from other areas to pluck tea. According to the Forest Department’s Annual Report of 1930, in the 1890s, the Derema Estate had more than 4 100 tea shrubs (Iversen 1991, 9). However, in general, the forested areas of the EUM that were officially under the companies were not all opened up during the German period (e.g. Conte 2004). During the British colonial era, the area of the present-day Derema was probably under the Derema Tea Estate, which comprised of 11 212 hectares of land in the early 1930s. About 3 900 hectares of the estate was protected as private land forests (Iversen 1991, 64). This reflected the forest

71 Possibly Nguelo refers to the place nowadays called Ngu, near Mikwinini.
policy of the British rulers, in which environmental degradation was perceived as a threat to exploitation interests (e.g. Conte 1999; 2004).

The Derema tea estate, which had been bought by Karimjee company in the 1940s (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989b), had a factory nearby the present-day Kwekuyu sub-village. The villagers stated that it was closed down in the 1980s or 1990s. According to Mr Timothy, a man of about 35 years old, and spice trader living in Kwekuyu, his grandfather had moved into the site of the tea factory a long time ago (interview, 1.4.2005, Amani), meaning probably the colonial period. From the 'original' place of their habitation, however, they were shifted to the area of the present day sub-village, few hundred meters aside, when the factory was started. At that time, it was said to be owned by Karimjee. This implies that the intensification of plantation economy meant forced settlement for some of the local people, but it also provided a source of labour to many, and 'pulled' new comers to the region.

Logging activities in Derema or its vicinity were started in the 1950s (URT, MNRT 2006) or a decade later. Some of the elderly villagers remembered that mechanical logging activities were exercised in Derema only since the mid-1960s. The present village of IBC Msasa was formally registered in 1975, joining three villages\(^{72}\), which subsequently became its sub-villages\(^{73}\). The village was named after a firm called International Business Combine (IBC) that had run a saw mill in the area of the present day village. It was bought by SSM in 1971 (FINNIDA 1988), which was then government owned. In the forested area nearby Makanya, logging by SSM was started around 1973 and stopped by 1984 (Andrua 1995, 56). The saw mill was then closed in 1986 (Iversen 1991, 21, 64)\(^{74}\). Mechanical logging and the subsequent pit-sawing activities were licensed by the Forest Department and supervised by the Ward Forest Assistant and Village Government officials (Andrua 1995, 56).

Pit-sawing became a popular activity in the areas where mechanical logging had previously been conducted (Mustonen & Räsänen 1985; Andrua 1995). At that time, conflicts between the villagers, the pit-sawers and logging company occurred (Andrua 1995, 56), which contributed to the establishment of a village forest reserve in the area of Makanya sub-village. Many of the present villagers or their relatives had moved in the area to work for the tea estates\(^{75}\), in logging, and some of them were also engaged in pit-sawing. The high rate of migrants is general feature in the villages surrounding Derema. The Social Impact Analysis (SIA), produced prior to the establishment of the corridor in 2000, estimated that nearly 45 percent of the villagers surveyed in five villages surrounding Derema were not born there. Yet, there are differences between the villages and sub-villages. For instance, in Makanya sub-village, many identify themselves as Washammbaa,

\(^{72}\) Makanya, Magoda and IBC Msasa were the first sub-villages (Andrua 1995). The village of Kwekuyu, located near the tea factory was probably not included at a later point of time.

\(^{73}\) New sub-villages were included in IBC Msasa later on.

\(^{74}\) Iversen (1991, 21, 64) uses the term Derema Saw mill, but it is most likely to refer to the one of IBC.

\(^{75}\) Other tea estates operating nearby the Derema included Bulwa and Marvera.
where as in Kwekuyu, and some other sub-villages, the rate of people originating from other areas is higher.

Cardamom has been an important cash crop for the farmers of the area during the past three or four decades, and it has 'pulled' more people to the area. The crop has apparently been cultivated by the small-scale farmers since the early 1950s in Amani (Iversen 1991; Masanyika 1995; Sah 1996). According to information from an old villager (interview, 26.4.2005, IBC Msasa), people started planting cardamom in the forests while the logging and saw mill activities were conducted to increase their income. Andrua (1995, 54) argues that the planting of cardamom in Makanya part of the Derema forest started in the 1960s, on the areas that had been opened during the logging activities. However, it is likely that by that time some of the area was still officially under the leasehold of the saw mill company and/or the tea companies. A member of the VEC of IBC Msasa suggested that before the saw mill company left, the people were already “secretly” securing some land in the area by planting crops there (group interview of VEC, 9.10. 2003, IBC Msasa). Planting of the crop was thus a practical, if not official, means to gain access to farming land (figure 8).

The cultivation of cardamom thrived during the 1970s and early 1980s (Sah 1996, 19-20). Cardamom was then seen as a viable option for promoting economic development at a larger scale. In 1970, Tanga Development Corporation (TADECO) acquired some land near the present-day Makanya village for growing cardamom and bananas (Andrua 1995). However, at some point, the project was said to have failed because the organisation was unable to pay back its loans to another development organisation at the district level, Shirika la Uchumi Wilaya ya Muheza or SHUWIMU76 (Andrua 1995, 55). By the early 1990s, however, the title deeds to that piece of land were held by a bank that had provided two loans to SHUWIMU, which the organisation did not manage paying back (Tye 1995), and there were disputes about the land tenure. At that time, EUTC0 was interested to promote small-holder tea cultivation in the SHUWIMU land in Makanya, but it agreed to hold back such plans due to the concerns about potential forest destruction expressed by EUCADP. A track of the area opened up by TADECO or SHUWIMU in Derema was still observable along the access road to Makanya, and part of it was still cultivated by the local farmers during my field work.

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76 It remains unclear, if the SHUWIMU really provided loan to TADECO, or if there was a misunderstanding by the researcher.
It was not only the logging and cardamom cultivation that changed the forests and land use. Tea production affected the area not only through clearing of the forest for planting the tea, but also through cutting down trees for fuel, and replanting of some areas with exotic species, mainly eucalyptus. Before the oil crises of 1970s, the Derema tea factory relied on diesel to provide heat for drying, but afterwards the factory used wood for fuel. The wood was then obtained from the forests growing on the company’s land (Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c). In addition, the fluctuating price of the tea leaves and the related need for labour in the tea production caused changes in the demand for farming land among the new-comers.

The exact history of land use change and tenure in the area is hard to verify, for land rights and tenure had become a very sensitive issue in the Derema Corridor, not least due to the controversial compensation process. The interpretations of the history of resource use can also be used as strategies to claim access to land and resources (Walker & Peters 2001), as was the case also in Derema. According to the household survey I conducted, about 76 percent of the farmers had acquired their land solely or partly through inheritance\footnote{Most of them stated that had inherited their land, where as others had acquired the land through both inheritance and buying.}. The farmers themselves considered that they owned the farms in the forests even if they did not have documents of ownership. However, the tenure of the areas that had previously been under the estates was considered unclear already in the 1980s (e.g. Hamilton & Mwasha 1989c). Some farmers stated that they had accessed their land...
through inheritance and clearing from forest after the Arusha Declaration. However, this expression refers to the political reforms undertaken after the independence. In addition, about 15 percent of the respondents had only bought their land, indicating that they did not originate from the place and that informal land markers had been in place for a long time, in a similar manner to the West Usambaras (Conte 2004).

The unclear pattern of the land tenure is evident from different documents, and partly controversial accounts given by different actors involved in the conservation process. The existence of multiple interpretations suggests that the history of the land use was an area of negotiation, and contestation during the process. The status of the land to be included in the corridor was not clear to the EUCAMP either, when the intervention was started (Mallya et al. ND). According to an evaluation report ordered by the project, the proposed corridor was previously in the category of public land, and some of it was occupied by the EUTCO under ‘Rights of Occupancy’, although the exact area was arguably unknown (Mallya et al. ND, 1). The consultants involved in the compensation process at later stage, explained that the villagers did not have any official title to their land (Mallya & Young 2003, annex 2, 3). In addition, a former EUCAMP officer (interview, 21.4.2005, Dar es Salaam) argued that most of the area of proposed corridor was formally not village land, but it would actually have been under the tea companies, except a small area in Makanya that was under the SHUWIMU.

However, the villagers considered themselves as owners of some of the land that was to be included in the proposed corridor. For instance, Mzee Paul, an elderly farmer from Makanya, argued that the forests were previously owned by two tea companies, Karimjee and Bombay Burmah (interview, 14.1.2008), but later on “given to the villagers”. After the start of the Ujamaa, land was commonly allocated for the farmers by the village authorities. The village authorities and the VEC members also suggested that (some of) the village land used to belong to the Derema estate in the past, but it was given for the citizens in 1967, after the Arusha Declaration (VEC group interview, 9.10.2003; interview of village leadership, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa). Furthermore, a representative of the village in the workshop organised after the Social Impact Analysis (SIA) argued that almost all farming land had been distributed to the farmers of IBC Msasa as a result of Arusha Declaration (SIA 2000).

The understandings of the conservation and government agencies on land tenure were not constant, however. The recent Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) report (URT, MNRT 2006), made in order to clarify the process to World Bank, and to secure funds to pay part of the compensations to the farmers affected by the process, suggests that the land in the Derema Corridor was previously under the category of village land, which can overlap with the existence of individual plots. The changes in the formal institutional context had also contributed to the ‘fuzziness’ of land tenure conditions at the village level78. The official record of land tenure at the

village level had not been established before the process of conserving Derema started (Mallya & Young 2003, Annex 2; URT, MNRT 2006), although the farmers generally knew the boundaries of their fields.  

6.3. Cardamom: a threat to the forest or a source of living?  

Cardamom cultivation has been considered environmentally unfriendly by many conservation organisations and researchers working in the area, although the experts’ suggestions on how to address the ‘problem’ have varied over time (e.g. FINNIDA 1988; Sengoe 1994; Andrua 1995; Masanyika 1995; Newmark 2002). Cardamom has also promoted immigration to the EUM and therefore increased the need to convert forest to agricultural use. However, for the small-scale farmers, cardamom has been a cash crop with high economic returns (Newmark 2002, 33), but the price fluctuations and political economic changes have made the income from it less predictable. After the collapse of the first governmental marketing co-operative in early 1980s, the income from cardamom and other cash crops became more varying (Andrua 1995; Sah 1996). In addition, cardamom production has played a significant importance at the larger scale. From 80 to 90 percent of the national production of the crop came from the EUM in the mid-1980s (FINNIDA 1988). According to Andrua (1995, 29, 42), about 90 percent of the households in the village of IBC Msasa were involved in cardamom cultivation in the mid-1990s, and most of them sold the product through middle men.  

The crop is normally cultivated under a tree canopy, and co-planted with different tree species, yams and bananas, so that the forest cover is retained to some level. Traditionally, the fields have been left to fallow when the production rates declines, usually after about 10 years from planting, or 7-8 years from the start of production (Masanyika 1995; Sah 1996). Variation in the practices of cultivation is documented inside a single village. According to Andrua (1995, 37), the fallow periods in IBC Msasa varied between 2-3 years to 6-10 years in the mid-1990s. According to Sah (1996, 24), the traditional practice of shifting cultivation has been replaced by reorganisation of plots and plot-fallowing. Another strategy has been to plant other crops in the old cardamom plot, such as banana and yams, and later on maize. This means reducing the tree cover, and finally changing of the landscape into open areas (Stocking & Perkin 1992; Masanyika 1995; Sah 1996). Around the mid-1990s, a lack of accessible forested land to replace degraded fields with new ones was reported (Masanyika 1995).  

One of the main problems identified in the production was that the cardamom plants take up a lot of nutrients from the soil, and thus without  

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79 Andrua (1995, 49) states that in the mid-1990s, the boundaries of farms used by different families or individuals were generally well-known, although no clear demarcation of boundaries existed.  
80 Informal personalised market evolved later on with a few big merchants (Sah 1996). In recent years, some of the farmers transported cash crops directly to Muheza or Tanga to increase the income.
input of new nutrients, such as manure, the soil becomes exhausted. In another, the cardamom production in the villages includes drying of the seeds, in which fuel wood is commonly used. Problems in access to firewood were observed in the 1990s by Sengoe (1994). The report by FINNIDA (1988) suggested, however, that cardamom cultivation could continue in Derema, if it was organised in a sustainable way. This was similar to the perception of many farmers. Yet, the persistence of ‘cardamom threat’ argument in conservation circles is evident. The cardamom cultivation is said to radically change the forests’ composition, and thus forming a threat for the preservation of biodiversity (Newmark 2002; Reyes et al. 2006).

However, in the discourse commonly used by the cardamom farmers, the effect of their cultivation practices on the forest appeared to be opposite. Many of the villagers of Makanya claimed that the forest of Derema had been sustained because of their cardamom cultivation practice. This was related to the fact that cardamom as a crop is grown under a shade. The farmers argued that they had purposefully retained indigenous tree species, but also planted bananas and spices, such as clove trees, in their mashamba ya msitu (Swa. forest farms) or mashamba ya pori (Swa. wilderness or forest farms). Yet, it does not mean that their cultivation system would necessarily have been ecologically sustainable, especially on the longer term. However, it is evident that through their arguments, the farmers challenged the prevailing image of the cardamom cultivation system. In the farmers’ conception, their practice of land use was more or less compatible with conservation. This also implies that the farmers could selectively used elements of conservation discourse in the encounters with others.

6.4. Disputes and co-operation between the different actors involved in forest control

After the Independence, the idea of protecting Derema forest was first proposed in 1974. At that time, there was a plan to establish a forest reserve of about 840 ha (Iversen 1991). According to a former official of EUCAMP, the idea was to make it a local government forest reserve, but there was not enough money to complete the process (interview, 21.4.2005, Dar es Salaam). The area was anyhow surveyed and a map was produced, but the borders were not demarcated (SIA 2000, interview, of an ex-official of EUCAMP, 21.4.2005, Dar es Salaam). In addition, Iversen (1991, 64) suggests that in the mid-1980s, a larger area of forest, more than 3 000 hectares, was planned to be under the control of the Tanga Catchment Forest Project (TCFP). However, the area was not gazetted as a forest reserve, and it remained under an unclear status. It also provided a source of farming land for the people. During the following decades, there were shifts in the discourse used by the foreign experts, local people and the representatives of the government regarding on the optimal system of management and category of land use, as illustrated below. In addition,
tensions emerged on the use of the forests between representatives of the government and different groups of villagers.

When a new inventory of the forests was conducted by AFIMP, part of the Derema forest was again surveyed. The inventory suggested that the northern corner was ‘inaccessible’, and should not be allowed for exploitation at all, whereas the southern part was considered suitable for light manual logging (FINNIDA 1988 part III, 15). Conclusion was that “it is doubtful if this area is worth reserving anymore” as there was extensive cardamom cultivation and the money available for paying the compensations was limited (FINNIDA 1988 part III, 8). Nevertheless, it was proposed that one option could be to turn the area to village based plantations for domestic uses or trials of sustainable cardamom cultivation. Production goals were therefore conceived as a more central objective for the particular area by the forestry experts, although conservation was to be promoted in other areas of the EUM.

IBC Msasa was among the villages involved in different conservation and development activities introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. A Village Environment Conservation Committee (VECC) was established in the 1990s under the IUCN project. Its tasks included guarding of the ‘village forest’ (Andrua 1995, 39). At that time, a trial of community forest management was implemented in Makanya with the IUCN support. The village leader had suggested in the mid-1990s that the forest officials were involved in supporting environmentally harmful activities, such as issuing licences, and the villagers were not in a position to control the area. Andrua (1995, 56) states that the ex-chairman of the village had commented that “the village government was too weak to work against the saw-millers who had obtained concessions and licenses from national and regional offices”. Therefore, the utilisation of the forest also created contestations among the different groups.

From the perspective of the villagers, the use of forests was arguably conceived as a threat against their ancestral property. In addition, they villagers reported decreased rainfall, which endangered their agricultural activities (Andrua 1995). The worry over forest destruction, and the related representation of the forest as ancestral property, can be conceived also as a strategy of increasing the control of the forest by the villagers. However, although not to be under-estimated, this line of argumentation is not likely to apply to the whole population. Some of the inhabitants had moved in IBC Msasa rather recently, and others had also been involved in pit-sawing. Therefore, conflicting interests occurred not only between the business interests, forest authorities, and villagers, but also within the village. This was also suggested by Mr Omari, the present sub-village leader, when I asked him about the history of village forest later on. In his account, not all of the villagers were ready to protect the forest when the reserve was planned (interview of sub-village chairman, 12.1.2008, Makanya).

According to Andrua (1995, 55-56), IUCN “helped” the villagers to demarcate the forest reserve in Makanya in the early 1990s as a result of the requests by the local community to be given the control of forest. Yet, the
initiative of protecting the village forest was also promoted by IUCN (e.g. interview of sub-village chairman, 12.1.2008, Makanya). No formal survey had been carried out, but the villagers had anyhow established “a firm control over the forest” and that it was “perceived and recognised by the village community and government agencies as a village forest reserve” (Andrua 1995, 56). The exact size of the Makanya village forest reserve had not been measured, but it was estimated to cover around 100 hectares. However, the status of the forest reserve was not legally binding (Andrua 1995, 51-53). Sjöholm et al. (2001, 164) argued a few years after the study that the particular area was still maintained “for all intents and purposes” as a village forest, although an “unmanaged one”, implying that the area was under some level of utilisation, but the tree cover was retained. When I worked in the area, the farmers suggested that the villagers had protected the forests against external interests (e.g. group interview of men, 9.10.2003, Makanya). Furthermore, Mr Frank, around 30 years old male farmer from Makanya, who was politically active and involved in CCM’s youth organisation, explained that during the IUCN project, the village used to co-operate with IUCN to protect the forest against ‘illegal’ uses, such as timber harvesting (interview, 31.3.2005, Makanya). The ‘village forest reserve’ area was still considered as a source of fuel wood and other minor forest products for the whole village, and some of the boundary areas where used for cultivation.

During my last visit in January 2008, mzee Paul from Makanya, explained to us the boundaries of the village forest and the history of the IUCN activities. The village forest, to which mzee Paul referred mostly as ‘IUCN forest that was protected by the villagers’ had been included in the proposed Derema Corridor. Yet, there were some crops, including cardamom and food crops, growing there. Some crops had been planted recently under the tree canopy. Mzee Paul stated that there was not any special committee looking after the forest but that the villagers had protected the forest anyway, because they understood its value (informal discussion 14.1.2008, Makanya). The old man used a similar representation about conservation-minded local people as the village authorities had used in the mid-1990s, showing continuity in the discursive strategies. Other villagers involved in the conservation process expressed similar ideas. This indicates that the IUCN’s conservation intervention, and some of the villagers’ participation in it, was reflected in how they defined their role. The history of village forest therefore had contributed to a formation of a discursive strategy, that some of the people also used later in the negotiations related to the Derema Corridor. However, the sub-village chairman described the history of the village forest in a similar manner, but reminded how the local people were now discouraged to protect the forests because of not being paid the compensations from their crops. He also expressed strong worries about the future of the forest.
6.5. Negotiations on the boundaries and management of the Derema Corridor

During the 1990s, the idea of protecting Derema was taken up by the EUCFP. The growing support for the corridor among the experts and conservationists were related to advances in the field of ecology. An experienced ecologist recommended the Government of Tanzania to reconnect the nine largest remaining forest blocks in the EUM with a system of ‘wildlife corridors’ (Newmark 1992; 2002). Derema was proposed as one of the key corridors. During the second phase of EUCFP, a preliminary survey of the area was conducted. The forested area was then estimated to be about 1 300 ha, including both intact forests and forest with cultivation (SIA 2000). The same survey had estimated that about half of the area was then used for cardamom cultivation\textsuperscript{82}. However, the conservation plan was again buried, allegedly due to its expensiveness.

Initially, the reservation plan did not have much support among the local population. An elderly woman remembered that the villagers of IBC Msasa had participated in a meeting related to the conservation plan in the early 1990s. She explained the situation as follows, “...they came and said they would take [the forest and] conserve and we did not believe and left it as it was” (VEC group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa). This implies that there was a continued ‘threat’ of further reservation of the land experienced by the long-term inhabitants of the area.

Towards the end of the 1990s, interest on conservation of Derema re-emerged among the donors and experts, and the process was restarted under the last stage of EUCFP/EUCAMP. A Social Impact Assessment of the proposed reserve was conducted in July 2000. In the following exploration of the early steps of the Derema conservation process, I draw much on the SIA report to build the trajectory of the course of action, but also compare the narrative given in the SIA with the experiences and accounts of the farmers who were involved in the process, and some of whom had participated in the negotiations regarding the intervention.

The explicit objective of the SIA was to identify positive and negative impacts on the livelihoods of the local people. Furthermore, it was to propose measures to minimise negative and enhance positive impacts (SIA 2000). Through the effort, the project therefore tried to make the process socially and economically more inclusive. However, the goal of emphasising people’s participation was ultimately about the need to ensure support for the plan designed by outside actors, and thus similar to the rationality underlying many of the previous forest conservation interventions, including the establishment of the ANR. In that sense, participation was promoted from an instrumental perspective (c.f. Nelson & Wright 1997). However, although the language of participation appeared as a means to promote conservation on one side, it also had the effect of enabling some of the farmers affected by the project to express their concerns and interests in public.

\textsuperscript{82}Yet, in the mid-1990s, a survey conducted suggested that over 85 percent of the proposed Derema Corridor, covering 790 ha in the respective report was “cultivation under forest” (Johansson & Sandy 1996, 31).
The attitude of the farmers in the villages towards the initiative was mostly negative at the early stage of the intervention, as the documentation and the farmers' accounts imply. The secretary of the VEC of IBC Msasa, Mr Petro, who was one of the active individuals in the compensation dispute that emerged later on and supportive of conservation of forests as such, described the early stages of the process as follows (Interview 22.3.2005, IBC Msasa), “...so they saw it is better to include us, so they started to include us and they first started to ask questions...what do you think if we conserve this area? We told them that we do not want because these are our farms that help us, and it is our hope that the next generation after”. The account illustrates the farmers’ worries about the potentially negative livelihood impacts of the intervention. At the same time, however, Mr Petro combined elements of sustainable development thinking in his discourse, stressing the need to fulfill the needs of the coming generations. By this way, the VEC secretary also engaged with the conservationists in his argumentation. This strategy of 'mixing' elements of different discourses was possible because of his long experience in working with the conservation organisations, such as the IUCN.

A common line of thinking among the farmers in the beginning was an open rejection to the idea of protecting Derema as a forest reserve. The farmers who had used the area seemed to think that they would lose more than gain with the gazettement of the reserve. The SIA (2000) suggests that the participants in the survey referred to their experiences of the compensations during the ANR's establishment process. Some elderly villagers in IBC Msasa I discussed with also referred to a similar process and farmers' negative experiences in Zirai forest in the EUM, where the issue of unfulfilled compensations to the farmers who had give up their land for forest conservation had been taken to the court.

In addition, the intention of the project to participate the villagers into the initial steps faced challenges in practice. Documentation suggests that they were instances when the SIA team met with open acts of resistance when it came to talk to the villagers. According to the SIA (2000, 8), in Kambai village “the team was unable to conduct its work in an open and democratic manner because the village leadership was so suspicious of the objectives and the teams' mission and acted in very unfriendly manner such that only a handful of people came out for interviews...some members of the team were asked to leave even before they had finished interviewing.” However, not all the local people opposed the conservation plan. As discussed previously, many people in the EUM conceive forest conservation as a good thing in principle. Minority of the farmers interviewed by the SIA survey team arguably supported conservation “as a good thing for the future generation” (SIA 2000, 28). In Makanya, I also discussed with farmers who had been involved in a previous conservation effort during the IUCN project, and they were in principle supportive of forest conservation. This reflects the diversity of conceptions among the villagers, some of whom had been more involved in the conservation and development projects in the area, and thus also more likely to have been ‘exposed’ to the discourse of forest conservation more than others.
There were some gender differences in how the plan was received by the farmers living close to the proposed corridor, and expectations on its effects. The SIA (2000) suggests that the women were more concerned about the change in the access to non-timber forest products, such as fuel wood, herbal medicines and wild vegetables if the area was to be reserved. They also wanted to be allowed to use the footpaths traversing Derema. In addition, they feared that the decision-making over the use of the compensations would be dominated by the males if the area was gazetted, as much of the spice crop fields were owned by men, and the men were more likely to control the use of compensation money in the family. An elderly farmer who had acquired the farming land through the allocation by the village leaders under the Ujamaa era, opposed the plan by arguing that it is ironic that the government now wanted to take the land for conservation purpose when the government had given it to them to cultivate earlier (SIA 2000, 26). The previously dominant concept of development under the Ujamaa, based on the idea of self-reliance and promotion of small-scale subsistence agriculture, was thus also used as a part of the discursive resistance towards conservation of the area.

After the SIA, a workshop was organised in late 2000. The authors of the SIA report stated that the idea of the workshop was to share the findings with the ‘stakeholders’ and make recommendations on how best proceed with the process (SIA 2000, 56). Yet, the representative of the EUCAMP stressed that the workshop was not an occasion to make any final decisions on the gazettlement (SIA 2000), and thus the future of the corridor and the farming lands was still ‘in the air’. In spite of this, the research process, the meetings and the workshop itself were likely to raise expectations and fears among the farmers about the future conservation of the area and potential compensations. Furthermore, the establishment of the Derema Corridor had been in the agenda of the EUCFP/EUCAMP for a long time, so there were strong interests to complete the process from the side of the project.

There were all together 51 participants in the workshop (SIA 2000). About half of them were representatives from the affected villages. Five of the farmers’ representatives were from IBC Msasa. One of them was Mr Bakari, who became later the representative of the communities in the ANR’s board. He was selected as the chairman of the meeting (SIA 2000). The election of the chairman of the meeting reflects, from its part, the importance put to local participation at the formal arena. Furthermore, the idea of participation was stressed by many speakers in the workshop, including the regional and district administration and the project. The Regional Commissioner of Tanga assured that “should the government decide to go ahead with the proposed development then the exercise will be transparent and participatory” (SIA 2000). The documentation indicates that in the formal arena of negotiating the conservation plan, the participation of farmers in the process was supported widely, both by officials and the representatives of the farmers. However, it became evident that the participatory approach chosen by the project still excluded some villagers from access to information and from the

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83 The discussions that took place in the workshop were documented in the annex of the SIA (2000), *Summary of the Conclusions of Muheza Stakeholders’ Workshop*.
decision-making over the land use. For instance, the objective of the conservation was not clear to all of the farmers who had lost land to the Corridor, as the interviews I conducted in IBC Msasa in 2005 implied. This was especially case with farmers living in the more remote sub-village of Kwekuyu.

In the SIA workshop, the villagers’ representatives expressed many concerns. They wanted to avoid the delays, and related problems, of the earlier conservation processes in the EUM (SIA 2000), including the one related to the ANR. A representative of IBC Msasa brought up the issue of uncompensated farms in the Kwekuyu (SIA 2000, 66). The representative of the ward answered in the workshop that the issue will be dealt during the next financial year.84 Another strategy used by the farmers’ representatives was to try to engage with whom they considered as potentially powerful actors. A villager of IBC Msasa wanted to ensure that the local Member of Parliament (MP) would be present before starting the discussions in the workshop (SIA 2000, 56). At a later stage, especially before the elections of 2005, an MP candidate of Muheza was again involved in the compensation dispute, showing certain continuities in the farmers’ strategies.

After the workshop, more meetings were conducted by the representatives of the EUCAMP with the farmers in the five villages and other levels of the local government. The farmers who would be directly affected by the conservation initiative, the ones who had their mashamba in the corridor, officially agreed to give up their area, as they were promised to be compensated the value of the crops (e.g. FBD et al. 2004; Interview of the VEC secretary, 22.3.2005, IBC Msasa). However, there were different interpretation of the reasons of this, and the level of consent was not as profound as the documentation and account of the VEC secretary imply. In the discourse used by the representatives of conservation interests (e.g. FBD et al. 2004), and some of the farmers who had been more involved in conservation activities, the expectation of receiving the compensation payments was a major reason why the farmers of Derema agreed to give up their mashamba. Yet, the subsequent developments, and discourse used by other people in IBC Msasa, imply that the consent was not as broad as suggested. The slowness of the payments for the inbound also caused a growing resentment about the conservation intervention in IBC Msasa. The fact the formal consent was achieved was influenced by 'lack of choice' by the farmers, and the experiences of past governmental or other interventions which had used an authoritarian and exclusive approach.

In the affected farmers’ discourse in IBC Msasa, the lack of choice in relation to establishing the Derema Corridor was a common feature. For instance, Mama Mary, an elderly lady who was a well connected person and more affluent than most people in her village, stated (interview of women, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa): “We accepted since we knew that when the Government decides to do something, no one can refuse, and this came from the Government”. At a later stage, however, Mama Mary became one of the

84 Yet, the issue remained unsolved a few years after when I worked in the village (discussed more below).
active people in the committee that the farmers established to make follow up on the delayed compensation payments for the value of the crops that they gave up to the Derema Corridor (discussed more below). This implicates that in spite of the discourse that indicated feelings of deprivation and lack of decision-making power in relation to the government, the affected farmers did not accept the conditions of conservation passively and without resistance, but rather tried to shape the outcomes of the process by collective action and organising themselves to a committee.

During the EUCAMP, and with its support, the boundary of the Derema Corridor was surveyed in early 2001. The boundary had the width of three meters and the length of 27 km, so it was only a narrow strip. Then, the crops were counted and they were slashed down later during 2001. A few of the villagers also participated in the work of opening the boundaries, and they were paid for the work. The crops that were counted included cardamom, cinnamon, cloves and black pepper, along with some fruit trees. The value of the crops was estimated at a later stage. The villagers were to have a say on the location of the boundaries. However, resistance by the affected farmers emerged at that stage. This included strong ‘disagreement’ about the boundary’s location in Makanya (Sjöholm et al. 2001). Mr Petro confirmed that there had been a disagreement between the villagers and the project about the location of boundaries (interview, 22.3.2005, IBC Msasa). He argued that the villagers would have earlier agreed to give up a smaller area than the boundary marking team suggested, probably referring to the survey. The occasion led to a short break in the demarcation (Synopsis of Derema Corridor ND; FBD et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the disputes were arguably settled down between the parties involved (Synopsis of Derema Corridor, ND).

Another way the affected farmers acted on the issue was trying to engage with local politics. While the demarcation was going on, villagers of IBC Msasa had a meeting with the project and a local MP. In the meeting, several concerns were raised up related to the corridor, including the location of the boundaries. The representatives of the villagers wanted the boundary to be moved in two places (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 54). Other concerns of the affected farmers were the price of the crops and the timing of the compensations. The negotiation reflects the problems that the farmers had in accessing knowledge on the conditions of conservation, which was characteristic to the process as a whole.

The management model of the corridor was discussed at several stages. Within the project, and between the experts and reviewers, there was no uniform idea about the best management option (Synopsis of Derema Corridor ND; Sjöholm et al. 2001). When the third phase of EUCAMP was being planned, the options suggested by the project were national forest reserve or village forest reserves, and the choice between them was to be decided upon after consulting the villagers (EUCAMP 1998, 21). There was thus an interest among the planners to promote the farmers’ participation in

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85 Of the crops counted, more than 90 percent were cardamom plants (URT, MNRT 2006, 8).
86 This was probably related to the meetings organised in the villages earlier in the process.
the decision-making over the management of Derema, albeit in a limited scope. The CTA of the EUCAMP, however, stated that the original plan was to make the corridor a ‘normal’ forest reserve (Pers. Comm., 9.5.2007, Finland), referring probably to a national forest reserve. This indicates shifts in the discourse used by the project, related to how its staff members and experts conceived the pros and cons of the different management models.

In the workshop arranged after the SIA, the representatives of the farmers were arguably willing to have a JFM system in Derema (SIA 2000). The idea of JFM was probably introduced by the EUCAMP staff, as there were some JFM initiatives in other parts of the EUM. Few of the farmers in the affected villages were likely to be familiar with the concept at that time. The farmers’ representation in the workshops was limited to a rather small group, such as the village council leaders and sub-village chairmen (interview of sub-village chairman, 9.10.2003, Makanya). Therefore, the assumption of wide support for JFM decision is questionable. A sign of disagreement about the conservation plan and possible co-operation with the authorities in the management emerged when the EUCAMP’s mid-term evaluation requested whether the villagers would be ready to help the government in managing the forests. The question was received with laughter in one of the villages they visited (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 55). Such a reaction, although occasional, indicates a low level of enthusiasm among the particular group regarding co-operation with the FBD, which would be a precondition for any ‘successful’ JFM. The history of exclusive control in the area, including memories of forest authorities abusing their position, and unfulfilled promises of compensations, could contribute to this. However, there was also variation between different social groups regarding their willingness to participate and expectations of the process. Usually the village council and environmental committee people had been involved in different conservation activities and also benefited from them, so they were probably more ‘positive’ about the plan.

However, accounts of the villagers and the EUCAMP’s mid-term review (Sjöholm et al. 2001) imply that the opposition to the conservation of Derema had not disappeared in spite of the explicit consent of the farmers in the meetings. To some degree, this can be explained by the partial attendance of the villagers in the village meetings. Yet, it can also be attributed to the partial representation of the concerns of the different groups of people in the official meetings and negotiations. The practice of presenting the situation as consensus could also be used as a way of trying to negate politics by the project and the government, in a similar manner that Chottray (2004) suggests in the context of a ‘participatory’ watershed project in India. However, the fact that the SIA had been conducted, and that meetings were arranged in the villages, where they or their representatives could voice their concerns, meant that the negation of politics was not pervasive, or did not manage to turn the process apolitical one.

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87 JFM was not yet in place in the EUM, except from the ANR. Some of the affected villages were involved in the ANR, but it was a rather new thing to many of the local people.

88 The report does not specify the village or group of people in question.
Criticism towards the process affected the following negotiations on management, showing the existence of conceptual differences on the experts’ side. The mid-term review of EUCAMP (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 53-66) suggested that the SIA had not explored alternative routes to conservation. The evaluation team argued that “to create forest reserves by land appropriation first, and then invite adjacent communities to ‘participate’ in management makes no sense” (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 64-65). The review team included a member who is known for highlighting the success stories of VFM in other parts of Tanzania. This partly explains the optimistic view of the report on devolving control over the forests to the villages by establishing VFRs.

Yet, the suggestion of establishing VFRs did not receive support in the subsequent meetings organised by the EUCAMP. In a workshop organised in August 2001, the plan of establishing VFRs was rejected by the farmers’ representatives (FBD et al. 2004). The reason for rejection remains unclear (c.f. URT, MNRT 2006). The shift is somewhat surprising, as villagers, especially women, had had concerns about securing access to wood and other smaller forest products on the earlier stage (SIA 2000). However, the village forest option would also have meant losing the opportunity for receiving the compensations, which was of importance for the men, as they normally decided about the use of money from cash crops. In the meeting, the farmers were said to have been very much concerned about the compensations of the boundary crops (Synopsis of Derema ND).

The available documentation on the process (Synopsis of Derema ND; FBD et al. 2004; URT, MNRT 2006) suggests that the parties agreed again that the JFM approach would be used in Derema. This decision was represented as widely supported by the villagers: “people preferred establishing Derema Corridor as Government Forest Reserve with commitment to the formation of a JFM agreement with the government and local people” (FBD et al. 2004). However, the concept of JFM was likely to be a new one to most of the farmers in the five villages surrounding the corridor, and the actual benefit-sharing arrangements of JFM approach had not yet been established, as discussed previously. Therefore, the villagers or their representatives were probably not aware of the detailed conditions and implications of JFM. At later stages, debate on the management remained a side in the negotiations between the parties for some years, as the compensation process became severely delayed.

The management model was addressed again in the document that was published in 2006 (URT, MNRT 2006), after the involvement of new actors, funding opportunities and organisations in the process. At that stage, the area was to be gazetted as central government forest reserve, meaning strict rules of access. However, after the formal completion of the compensation process in 2008, the management models to protect the corridor were being debated again: “The proposals range from gazetting the Derema forest corridor as a non-extractive forest reserve to handing complete control of the forests to the local communities (www-source, The Amani Nature Reserve, 2009).
Overall, at the formal arenas where the conservation plan was negotiated, there was fluctuation regarding the formal goals and means of conservation, such as the level of community involvement and the optimal management status of the reserve, especially on the side of the experts. The farmers first resisted the conservation plan, but formally gave their consent after long negotiations. In the meetings and workshops, the affected farmers and their representatives could, to some extent, express their concerns and take part in decision-making over the management. However, often they were represented only by a couple of individuals, whose concerns reflected partially those of the different social groups among the farmers. As in the case of the ANR, some of the farmers conceived that they lacked alternatives, as the project’s representatives and government officials involved pressed for conservation. In addition, overall, the farmers’ participation in the process, including their acceptance to give up land and the choice of JFM model, expressed the interests of males more than females. It was also fuelled by their expectations of being paid good compensations of the farms.

6.6. Adjusting the level of compensations

After the agreement to give up the land, the assessment of the amount of compensations was conducted. It turned out to be a complicated process, straining the relationships between the actors. The change in the land law also added to the unpredictability of the process. The Derema Corridor was the first time when the new Village Land Act was used to assess the crops on the village land in Tanzania (Mallya & Young 2003). During the process, the system of calculating the compensations was negotiated between different agencies within the government. In addition, the process was affected by the concerns of the donors and conservation organisations.

Several estimates about the sum to be paid for the boundary crops, and later on for the inbound areas, were produced. This prolonged the process and created occasional protests among the affected farmers. The first estimate for the compensation of the boundary crops was only 9 308 160 Tanzanian Shillings (Synopsis of Derema ND; UM/1777, DAR 0003-9). At this point, number of affected farmers was calculated to be 175, and the average payment about 53 000 Tsh. The shift in the way of evaluating the crops was propelled by the review report of EUCAMP. The report claimed that in Derema process, “local human and land rights are being possibly abused, and in ways now defined in land law as illegal” (Sjöholm et al. 2001, 8). One of the main critiques towards the assessment was that it did not take into account the implications of the new land legislation. The appraisal was also questioned in terms of its poverty eradication effects. A new evaluation was then commissioned.

The next valuation of the boundary crops was produced by District Valuation Team (Mallya et al. ND). At that stage, there was an increase in the total sum of about 13, 5-fold in comparison to the first estimate. Latest at that time, the representatives of EUCAMP became concerned about the high costs of the corridor. Finally, the level of compensations was settled,
and the payment of 113 770 904 Tsh was made to 172 farmers who had had crops in the boundary in March 2002 (UM/1777, DAR0003-9; URT, MNRT 2006). Yet, there were occasional disputes when the rights to claim compensations were established (Mallya ND, 4-5). Overlapping claims to land were made, sometimes also by individuals within a single family. Mallya (ND, 5-6) reports of a case, where the “so-called wife” of a farmer who had a plot in the area tried to convince the valuation team that her husband was dead in order to gain access to the compensation, which was not the case, however. Therefore, the process contributed to intra-village disputes over the land rights, by adding the expected value of the land.

In addition, the money from the compensations of the boundaries was distributed very unevenly between the individuals, and very few people received a lot of money from the first compensations. This was likely to sharpen the economic differentiation in the villages. Most of the farms in Derema were very small, not more than one acre, whereas “a handful of farmers” had more than five acres (SIA 2000, 19). According to an evaluation report, which was not the final version, the amount paid per farmer varied between less than 10 000 Tsh and nearly 6 million Tsh. In IBC Msasa, 15 people out of 89 who were entitled to compensations received more than one million Tsh (Annex 1 of the boundary crops evaluation document, ND). As a result, a minority of the farmers received very good compensations, if one compares to what would be the normal income from selling the crops (e.g. Mallya & Young 2003). Those who had received compensations used it for various things, e.g. for buying land in Muheza town or elsewhere in the lowland, building better houses, or educating the children. For instance, mzee Victor, a long-term resident of Makanya who had also acted as a village chairman in the past, had managed to build a new house with the boundary compensation money and cleared land and planted cardamom in the field he had bought near Kwemdimu village (interview, 29.3.2005, Makanya).

Rather controversially, the boundary compensations created an incentive for people to clear areas and plant new cardamom and other crops inside the corridor. During my information discussions in IBC Msasa, I found out that some of the villagers, but also people residing outside the mountains, as far as Dar es Salaam, who had networks to the area, started to plant new crops in the fields within the Derema Corridor, and to previously uncultivated areas in the hope of being compensated with good money. This strategic action to increase income level through the conservation process led to negotiations and some barrel between the evaluators and the farmers when the inbound crops were counted at later stage (Mallya & Young 2003). Yet, many of those people had succeeded in their claims to be compensated (pers. communication with researcher S. Rantala, 5.10.2009, Dar es Salaam). In addition, the estimated yield of cardamom per plant used in the compensation calculations was based on the farmers’ own estimations. According to a researcher working on cardamom cultivation in the EUM, however, it was actually many times higher than the normal yield from cardamom under those conditions (email communication with Dr. T. Reyes, December 2007). This strategic action by the farmers increased the costs of the process.
The inbound crops were assessed in mid-2002 by a consultant company, Proper Consult Ltd. The field work was conducted by a team, in which representatives from Muheza District, forest officers and four assistants from the villages went through the areas (URT, MNRT 2006, 18). The farmers were told that they should not plant new crops but they could go on with tending and harvesting the crops in the mashamba they would give up (Mallya & Young 2003). The farmers I discussed this with in 2003, explained that they had agreed that they could harvest the crops, and to limited extent use other resources in the proposed corridor until the payments were made. Yet, they were not allowed to plant new crops or extend the farms, or cut down trees for timber. However, some also suggested that they had been denied to tend their old crops, which would of course decrease the harvests and income. Obviously, there was confusion about the conditions of access and the level of compensations among the farmers. The restrictions on livelihood practices also contributed to the resentment that was evident at later stages.

The inbound crops’ evaluation was another complicated and lengthy issue. The farmers who had a farm, or several of them, in the proposed corridor went to verify the borders and ‘ownership’ of the fields together with the evaluation team and village leaders. At that stage, the crops were counted and “a leaf was cut or bent to indicate inclusion in the count” (URT, MNRT 2006). However, the farmers I interviewed at a later stage, often used much stronger expressions to describe their experience. They argued that their cardamoms plants were destroyed and their crops or mashamba had “died” due to the process, also showing their resentment. At the evaluation, the farmers were given the number of the crops verbally, but not a copy of the evaluation document. It was promised, that the village chairmen would get the copy later on. Yet, according to the documentation (Mallya & Young 2003; URT, MNRT 2006) and the accounts of the farmers in IBC Msasa, this did not take place. The controversy between the promises made and the practices of the project and the government was likely to increase the disappointment and anxiety among the farmers. This illustrates the inconsistencies in the outlined plans and practices of conservation.

In the first evaluation made by the consultancy company, the total sum of the compensation was estimated to exceed three million US dollars, which again raised concerns among the donor and the government. After the EUCAMP, a desk study was ordered to settle down the disputes and to give a more realistic assessment. From where the new figure for compensation sum was derived from, remains unclear. Finally, the amount of compensation was about one third of the first sum, about 1, 16 billion Tsh (UM/1777 DAR0010.9; UM/1777, HEL 1081-27). The number of affected farmers was 1128 and number of farms 1 547 (see table 8 below). Majority of them were from IBC Msasa. Yet, indirectly, through family relationships, much more people were likely to be affected by the process.

89 There were different versions of the report, giving varying figures for the total compensation sum.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Village</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Farmers affected</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>Farm plots taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kisiwani</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwendimu</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC Msasa</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwezitu</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambai</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7878</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>1547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Number of affected farmers, their percentage of the village population, and number of plots taken in different villages. The population figures are from the village secretaries, based on the national census of 2002. Source: URT, MNRT (2006, 12).

The inbound crops were not compensated during the EUCAMP, but in the closing report, the project’s staff expressed concerns over the potential negative outcomes of the process (EUCAMP 2002b, 49), suggesting that “lfailure to secure additional support outside the contribution of the GoT will not only result in failure of gazettement and the loss of investment, but also in conflicts within and between local communities, policy makers and the conservation institutions in the Tanga region.” The additional funding was thus conceived as a precondition for success in completing the conservation plan, whereas the responsibility to gather the money and complete the process was largely left to other actors and organisations. After the pull-out of the EUCAMP, the gazettement of the Derema Corridor became pushed by conservation organizations, including WWF, as well as some conservation experts and consultants who had interest in completing the process. The Conservation and Management of the Eastern Arc Forests (CMEAF) project then became the lead organisation in the promoting the establishment of the reserve (URT, MNRT 2006). However, the payments of the compensations for the remaining area were started only in 2005. In the meantime, there was a growing tension about the compensations among the villagers in IBC Msasa.
One reason for the slow progress after the pull-out of the project was probably a misunderstanding between the representatives of the Finnish and Tanzanian governments related to funding available to complete the process. A staff member of the FBD who had worked in the project suggested that a promise had been made by the Finnish representatives during the EUCAMP that the Finns would contribute part of the money needed for completion. However, according to the ex-project CTA of EUCAMP (pers. communication, 9.5.2007, Finland) there was no promise made about paying for the rest of the area. Yet, the advisor admitted that it was likely that the farmers expected that the inbound crops will be paid, because acquiring the rest of the area for conservation would appear as 'natural'.

The unclear institutional context, lack of continuity in the funding and presence of the agencies promoting the process, and partial commitment within the organisations involved, contributed to the considerable delays in the process, and gaps in the information flows. As Sharpe (1998, 26) points out, the conservation projects are often planned over short-time, although
conservation is explicitly thought to be addressed to the long-term future. Conservation requires a long time span and commitment among different parties involved, which is constrained by the temporarily and spatially limited projects. In the subsequent years in the Derema process, the affected farmers lacked information on the steps taken and decisions made regarding the compensations and the whole effort, and created room for speculations and rumours. For instance, some villagers of IBC Msasa suggested that some officers were maybe 'eating the money', an expression used for corruption. This indicates a lack of trust among the affected farmers towards the government. In addition, I heard speculations by some villagers that the FBD might bring wildlife, such as big mammals, into the Corridor after it was gazetted, which implied the existence information gaps between the 'stakeholders'.

6.7. Farmers’ diverse strategies in relation to conservation and compensations

The payments from the boundaries gave a signal that the inbound crops are of high value and created expectations that the rest would be compensated based on a similar rate. According to the villagers, they had been announced that the compensations would be paid in half a year’s time from the end of the survey process, around the end of 2000. However, the process did not proceed as planned, and as expected by the farmers. While waiting to be compensated, they started to make complains and gradually to mobilise themselves. The discourse of participation embedded in the project plans and the early negotiations over conservation, and the discourse commonly used by the farmers, in which the farmers were the victims and the government was cheating them, were often in a stark contrast.

Different strategies were used by the farmers in their efforts to try to access the compensations, and resist the conditions of control that were experienced as unfair by many. One of the strategies was resistance towards how the conservation effort had been handled, which was evident also in the public transcript, or discourse used by the affected groups in situations where they met with ‘outsiders’, such as researchers (c.f. Scott 1990). In the end of 2003, the atmosphere in the village was very tense, especially in Makanya. I could sense hostility, which was directed towards the forest authorities and conservationists in the way people expressed their ideas to us. The comments by the villagers I discussed with and interviewed in late 2003 expressed open discursive resistance towards the way the conservation process had been handled, and its outcomes. To some degree, their discursive resistance also derived from economic loss and anxiety experienced by the farmers, many of whom used to depend on the appropriated land as a source of income.

For instance, the villagers told that a group of researchers had gone to look for plants in the planned forest corridor without asking their permission. As one of the farmers stated (Group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa), “We do not allow people to get into the forest now without our permission because that is not a forest; it is some people’s farm, and those
farms have not been compensated for.” That they stood for a different representation of the place, as mashamba and not a forest is a sign of discursive resistance in itself. Some people also argued, perhaps strategically, that the younger farmers would go and slash down the remaining forest in their areas and crops that need more light, such as maize, in the planned Corridor if the money was not paid soon.

The exclusion of the farmers from the farm land as a result of the conservation intervention meant social and economic marginalisation, especially in the stage where most people had not received compensation or accessed alternative land. In their discourse, the farmers who had lost land to the proposed corridor often used the Swahili expression ‘tumeathirika’, meaning that we are negatively affected or hurt. They stressed the negative effects of the unfinished conservation and compensation exercise for their livelihoods, and more generally for the promotion of development goals. This was a reflection of the experienced negative effects through diminished yields and income. Yet, at the same time, it was also a strategy to back up their demands to be paid the remaining compensations.

In addition, the negative outcomes were influenced by the fact that many of the people who had given land to the corridor did not tend the farms actively anymore. They were looking forward the compensation money, so that they could open up farms elsewhere, or invest in something else. Yet, fuel wood, some cardamom and other products were still collected from the corridor. There was also a plan that the farmers would gain access to new farming land on the lowlands, mainly in Misoswe. However, the process of allocating land in the lowlands became prolonged (e.g. interview of a WWF official, 8.1.2008, Dar es Salaam), and a few people had yet started to cultivate there during my field work in early 2005, either on land accessed by relatives or bought. The constraint faced by the farmers in establishing new fields was also the lack of money for the initial costs (e.g. interview of a sub-village chairman, 19.3.2005, Kwekuyu).

The marginalisation effect of the conservation was not only economic, but included symbolic aspects, and fears of being deprived of the place of living. Especially the women in Makanya were not willing to leave their present village (group interview, 10.10.2003). They expressed a sense of belonging to the place that was now being threatened in their view. As Brosius (2006) argues in the context of Penan group in Sarawak, specific places in the landscape have different meanings for the inhabitants of the specific area, some of which are directly connected to livelihoods, where as others can be meaningful for the people in biographical sense, and based on personal experience and memory. The open discursive resistance of the farmers in Makanya towards how the conservation intervention had been conducted was thus not only based on material reasons, but included symbolic aspects as well.

The farmers in Makanya who had lost their fields to the corridor commonly argued that the failure of the government and the project to pay the compensations had impoverished them, especially because the harvests of cardamom had collapsed. However, the exact reduction of the yields and
income could be over-stated, as the estimates given for the yields varied much. For instance, a female farmer in Makanya suggested (group interview, 10.10.2003) that “…the farms which used to give 500 kilograms give only 20. There is nothing…if you used to get ten buckets you may end up getting only two.” Another, stronger form of discursive resistance was exemplified by the comment of a member of VEC, who argued that the conservation people had caused famine among the villagers (group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa). In addition, others emphasised their inability to fulfil development goals as a result of the process. For instance, members of the village council referred to the President’s goal of poverty reduction, and claimed that it was endangered because they had not been paid. In addition, a male farmer expressed his view on the condition that had emerged as a result of the conservation process, “we are now unable to develop” (group interview, 10.10.2003, Makanya). The poverty was understood and experienced as a failure to meet the family's needs in the different areas of life, e.g. subsistence, sending children to school and accessing health services.

In 2003, the most critical and provocative individuals argued that farmers might go and destroy the forest soon if they were not paid. This strategy was obviously used to put pressure on other actors, implying that things would soon be ‘out of control’ and threaten the conservation goals. This was probably done to set pressure on the donor side or the government through me as potentially having contacts to such 'higher level' actors. Some also claimed that if they were not going to be paid, so they should be given the fields back so they could continue with their farming activities. This was an attempt to secure access to the farms, and income, in the context of uncertainty. Yet, at the same time, many people stressed the importance of forests and tried to engage with language used by the conservationists. A similar strategy has also been used in other regions. This ‘double-positioning’ in relation to the dominant discourse and a more 'local' one reminds of the Penan’s strategies in contestations over forest control in Indonesia (Brosius 2006).

One of the key constraints experienced by the farmers in the compensation dispute was related to gaps in the distribution of information. The affected farmers claimed that there was a lack of communication between the villagers and the government authorities responsible. Particularly those actors who were involved in making follow-up demanded that the government should come ‘closer’ to them. The members of the VEC also demanded that the farmers should be given the copy of the list of crops to be compensated (group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasas), which they had been promised. The delay in the compensation payments was also reflected in how the VEC people conceived their tasks, and their position (e.g. group interview of VEC, 9.10.2003; meeting of the VEC, 5.4.2005, IBC Msasa). They tried to convince their co-villagers that the money would be paid, although it was very uncertain if and when this was going to happen. The committee members had also received requests from other villagers about the payments. A member of the VEC explained, (group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa), “…we told them that they may show up any time, which is not true, anyway, and they are telling us that we have lied to them.” Despite
such problems, the farmers’ representatives were at the same maintaining their hope to get the payments at some point, and trying to give hope to the others.

Another discursive strategy that was used especially by those people involved more in forest control was trying to connect with the conservationists’ concerns about protecting the forest. Many VEC members argued that the control of the forest was more difficult than previously, and it was difficult to keep the forest ‘undisturbed’. For instance, a member explained that “you cannot prevent someone from slashing down weeds from his farm while he is not yet paid” (interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa). Another VEC member explained the controversial position of the committee as follows (group interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa), “…if you are a member of the environmental committee, the questions and challenges we receive are very many and some of them we even fail to answer and sometimes when certain destruction happens it is more difficult to control them […] But we thank that in collaboration to the Government all the wrong doers are controlled and there is nothing wrong but it has become more difficult this time.” The positive assertion expressed by the VEC member on the continued control of the forest was related to his position as a mediator between the conservation interests and the livelihood concerns of the farmers.

The representative of the farmers in the board of the ANR, Mr Bakari, was also in a similar ‘double’ position, and made critical claims regarding the process. He commented on the future of Derema as follows, “the government should come down to the villagers and talk to people and sit together with them and make them suggest how they can guard and manage their forests and tell them the future benefits, coming to an agreement [...] But if it is like the other decisions made in the ANR, I say that it is uncertain, very uncertain…” (interview, 9.10.2003, IBC Msasa). The argumentation reflects, on one side, the importance put on conservation, but also shows his concerns for negotiating the conditions and implications of the Derema process on a more equal ground, and in a democratic manner. The argumentation used by the farmers' representative can also be considered as a form of discursive mediation, which is often characteristic to the individuals in higher social positions in a given local context (e.g. Feierman 1990).

In addition to discursive strategies of stressing participation and transparency in decision-making by the well-connected people, such as Mr Bakari, more practical means were used by the Derema farmers in the subsequent years, through which they managed to have some influence on the process. An important strategy was collective action, or mobilisation of the farmers to defend their interests of being compensated from the lost access to the fields. By 2005, when I returned to IBC Msasa, I found that the farmers of the five villages had organised themselves in a committee to make follow up and try to gain access to information on the process, and payments of the compensations. Some of the representatives were from different sub-villages of IBC Msasa.
One of the members of the Derema farmers’ committee was Mr Petro, who had given up around a thousand cardamoms to the Derema Corridor (interview, 12.1.2008, IBC Msasa). Mr Petro and another committee member whom I got to know better, Mama Mary, were both also otherwise important figures in the village’s social configuration, showing concentration of authority. Mr Petro acted as the secretary of the affected farmers’ committee in 2005. He had also participated in several follow-up delegates. Mr Petro’s previous experience in and networks created during the conservation interventions provided him better means to communicate with the government authorities than many others.

Another member, Mama Mary was also a member in the village council and a better-off person than average villagers. She had relatives in Dar es Salaam, to whom she relied for financial and other help, when she made follow-up on the compensations. According to Mama Mary, the start of the committee in 2004 was related to the approaching presidential elections (of 2005), as the farmers would have been were worried that the new President might to be concerned with their requests. In her account, this was as the promise of compensations had been made under the leadership of the previous president (interview of Mama Mary, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa). Such worries over the potential effects of the shift in the national power sphere indicate a great uncertainty about the commitment among the authorities responsible for forest conservation to complete the process. However, the parliamentary elections (2005) also provided the farmers an opportunity to try to put political pressure through the selection of Members of Parliament (discussed more below).

The affected farmers’ actions bear similarity to the case of Arusha National Park (Neumann 1998). In spite of the conflicting interests within ‘community’, they were submerged and collective action evolved due to negative consequences of conservation to the livelihoods. In Derema, the farmers’ committee sent several delegates to the districts office to meet with district leaders. In addition, they sent people to Tanga regional commissioner’s office and to the Tanga Catchment Forest Office. The Derema farmers’ committee also used their existing social networks. For instance, the Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam, with whom they had some previous contacts, was visited. However, administratively, he was not supposed to be involved in the issue. The strategy of approaching government agencies at higher level was not only used because of lack of proper responses and disappointment towards the outcomes of delegates sent at lower level (e.g. interview of a delegate member, 16.3.2005, IBC Msasa), but also because the elections of 2005. Contacting the ‘higher’ level agencies was probably a means to try to put political pressure. In addition, a candidate of CCM who competed for a position of MP got involved in the compensation debate. During early 2005, the unsettled compensation issue was used in his campaigning for the MP position.

Moreover, on top of the Derema farmers committee, there were separate attempts of follow-up, related to the ANR. The issue of uncompensated farms given by farmers of Kwekuyu during the establishment of the ANR continued to be unsettled in 2005. One of those
who had been economically affected by the establishment of the reserve was Mr Timothy, who was a spice trader and a technician, but also had had some land to farm spices and food crops. He had done his own follow-up in the compensation issue, and visited several offices. Some of his family’s farms had been taken to the ANR without any compensation (interview, 1.4.2005, Amani). Mr Timothy’s family also had farms in the Derema Corridor. In his account, their income had been much affected because of the conservation efforts. He had stopped his farming activities since the limited land available and focused on small business for some years, such as trading spices. He had also planted teak near his house. The young man explained that he had been absent from the village, working in the city, at the time of the boundary demarcation of the ANR. When he came back, he found out that the farms had been taken. About seven other villagers had also lost farming land to the ANR without being paid compensations for the crops.

As a result of the follow-up visits by Mr Timothy, promises about the money had been made, but the compensations had not yet materialised. Mr Timothy argued that he supported the goal of forest conservation, but there was clear frustration in his expressions because of the unfulfilled promises. Similar accounts and expressions of frustration were common among others involved in the follow-up and the compensation process. Many conceived that the promises made by different agencies and politicians were not met, or not met in time. The farmers also had limited means to put pressure on the other actors, such as access to phones and costs of travel. In order to send the delegates, people also had to contribute money, making the process costly to them (the meeting of the affected farmers, 26.4.2005, IBC Msasa). There was much uncertainty whether the government was going to compensate the crops. Some also suspected that there could be someone in the agencies involved taking advantage of the money, indicating a lack of trust towards the government.

During the first months of 2005, the tension between the village and the government was not as strong as before, because more time had passed. Furthermore, new promises had been made by different actors about the payments. Yet, the farmers in IBC Msasa still looked forward the payments, and continued to make claims on them when I requested them about the process. In addition, while waiting for the outcomes, many farmers had partly shifted to other strategies of making their living. In addition of being means of making living, some of these activities by the farmers could also be interpreted as hidden resistance to exclusive control efforts (e.g. Scott 1990). Some had started with alternative sources of income, such as the masambu project, tea plucking or (illicit) gold mining. For instance, while working in other areas, I met young men from Makanya sub-village, who had started to mine in Sakale mines during the gold rush. They suggested that it was because of the lack of alternatives in their village, including the appropriation of the Derema farms. In addition, many farmers tried to secure income through cultivating the remaining fields outside the proposed reserve, and some also inside the proposed corridor. When working in the village, I also came across with some evidence of actions that showed
resistance against the conservation intervention, such signs of previous mining and cutting of trees inside the corridor.

The changes in the land use in the proposed Corridor were affected by the livelihood strategies of the farmers in respect to very unpredictable future conditions. Not all access and control of land was therefore negotiated openly. The villagers made claims that other people, e.g. neighbours or people from other villages, were illicitly using the crops or other products in their forest fields in Derema. This was by cultivating their land or harvesting the remaining crops and other forest products. However, the legal status of the utilisation and access to the products in the forest farms was not clear due to prolonged compensation process. Some considered that the people using their former land were thieves, whereas others thought that it is not banned to use the areas. Often, the original farmers were not actively using their land anymore, so it could appear as ‘unoccupied’ to others. The boundary between what was considered as legitimate and illicit forms of access and control was thus fluid in practice.

At the higher level, new negotiations were conducted between the donors and the government. In 2004, a WB supervision mission\(^{90}\) visited the area, and “heard loudly” from IBC Msasa how annoyed the villagers were at that time by the payment delays (URT, MNRT 2006). The representative of Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam announced that GoF was to support the compensation process in order to “speed up the establishment of the corridor” in late 2004. Furthermore, conservation organisations, including IUCN, WWF and TFCG started to work with the FBD to accomplish the conservation plan. They launched a joint report on the importance of the Derema Corridor to attract new funding. Interestingly, their report (FBD et al. 2004) gives a picture that the villagers would know the amount of money they would be paid for the inbound crops after the agreement was made, arguing that “since then the villagers have been waiting for their money”. However, this was not the case with the farmers I met in IBC Msasa.

Furthermore, the CMEAMF project became involved in the Derema conservation and compensation process in 2005. Some of its staff members had earlier published an article in the journal of the TFCG in which they stressed the importance of finalising the Derema process. The representatives of CMEAMF approached different conservation funds and other organisations, including WB, in order to gather the remaining money. WWF also allocated money\(^{91}\) for facilitating the compensation payments in the villages. The purpose of it was to establish the working mechanisms for a compensation scheme funded by the government and the donors, including the conservation funds. The work by the CMEAMF and others to collect money allowed partial payments of the compensations for the inbound crops of the Derema Corridor to be made at the end of 2005. However, the level of

\(^{90}\) The mission was related to the WB funded Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project, and included people from UNDP, Danida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, NORAD, WWF, and a number of senior Tanzanian government officials (URT, MNRT 2006).

\(^{91}\) The WWF money originated from the WB.
compensations was again being negotiated and caused resentment among the Derema farmers.

In spite of the new efforts and progress, lack of information on the rates of compensation for different crops and the date of payment continued to be a common source of complaints in early 2005, before the partial compensation payments were made. Farmers in Makanya, especially those in a higher social position, presented provocative claims that the farmers had been betrayed by FINNIDA or the government (e.g. interview of Mzee Victor, an ex-village chairman, 29.3.2005, Makanya), implying a strong resentment towards the actors conceived as being responsible for the process. The same line of argumentation was again repeated by the sub-village chairman of Makanya in 2008. The Derema farmers’ mobilisation and efforts to put pressure on the decision-makers and administrators had not resulted in concrete outcomes until the early 2005. The farmers representatives were asked to come back or wait until certain date for several times, which frustrated them. In addition, they were not certain who made the important decisions.

To some extent, the holding back of information, or providing of misleading information by the governments’ representatives and politicians was likely to purposeful, e.g. trying to calm down the situation. Yet, the problem was also that they were not in a position to make independently decisions over the course of action in the compensation issue, as the funding for conservation came largely from outside organisations. This type of lack of clear authority towards which individuals or groups could make claims is common in many protected areas (Holmes 2007).

In early 2005, the farmers were asked if they would be willing to take first 40 percent of the compensation money first. However, they rejected this offer. The fact that they chose to reject the partial compensations and take a risk of not getting the money is a sign that the farmers’ representatives were surprisingly positive about their bargaining power. The stated reason for rejection was the experience of other farmers from another compensation process. Some of them referred to other compensation processes in the EUM, where the farmers had been first paid only small share of the money, and they had not received the rest. This implies that experiences by other residents were made use of when the farmers in Derema rejected the proposed partial payment plan.

In late 2004 and early 2005, new sources of funding became available. GoT committed some money (100 million Tsh), and the Conservation International of the U.S.A., through its Global Conservation Fund, committed a grant of $350 000 for the compensation payments (URT, MNRT 2006). In addition, the Government of Finland together with some other donors and organisations were to contribute to the remainder (CMEAMF 2005, 44). At a later stage in 2005, half of the compensation payments determined in the 2002/2003 evaluation process were paid to the farmers. This progress was probably also affected by the elections of 2005, e.g. questions had been put about the Derema issue in the Parliament (URT, MNRT 2006, 11, interview of an FBD official, 17.1.2008, Tanga). The political
pressure caused by the farmers’ delegates and their co-operation and connections with local politicians was likely to contribute to this. However, the payments did not happen without the involvement of actors and organisations at other levels, e.g. the conservation experts and consultants who pushed forward the compensation process.

The evaluation made after the involvement of the CMEAMF, however, reduced the estimated production per plant from five kilograms of dry cardamom to three kilos (URT, MNRT 2006, 21), which of course affected the level of compensations to be paid for each farmer. The lower level of compensations caused further complaints and dissatisfaction among the Derema farmers. However, with the involvement of the WB and the new evaluation of the compensations, also the interest of the delayed compensations was to be counted, so there were adjustments made to the level of compensations.

The actual payment of the first part of the remaining compensations was not a smooth exercise. RAP report (URT, MNRT 2006, 29) describes the situation at the time of the payments were made as follows: “In Msasa IBC villagers forced the team to stop the verification exercise, and police had to rescue the team”. During my short visit to IBC Msasa in 2008, I was also told that at the time of the payments of the first half of the compensations, there had been disputes between the farmers and the authorities involved. For instance, some of the people who were supposed to get compensations had not turned up to collect the money at all, as they were not ready to take the partial compensations. This implies that they questioned the decisions made earlier by the representatives, and the consensus over the steps to be taken in the compensation issue was not as broad as assumed by the authorities and the representatives of the conservation interests.

Subsequently, there was again adjustment in the rate of compensations, arguably to make it fairer for the farmers (e.g. interview of Mr Petro, 12.1.2008, IBC Msasa). This was related to the RAP consultancy that was precondition for provision of a substantial loan by WB to the GoT for accomplishment of the process. The decision was made that the farmers should be also paid the interest of the compensation money that they had been waiting for years. *Mzee* Paul from Makanya, explained the negotiations about setting the new compensation rates between the consultant and the government representatives as follows (discussion, 14.1.2008, Makanya): “The clever people wanted to reduce it so the man told them it is not allowed to reduce it, because the citizens are shifted by you, so why are you taking away their right?” In his understanding, the involvement of non-governmental actors had thus been beneficial to the affected farmers, as their rights were being better addressed. Another condition that related to the WB policies was that a proper resettlement program is arranged, so that the farmers will have access to farming land elsewhere. However, the fulfilment of this condition became delayed (pers. communication with a WWF staff member, 9.1.2008, Dar es Salaam), and caused further resentment at the later stages among the affected farmers (pers. communication with researcher S. Rantala, October 2009).
During my visit to the IBC Msasa in early 2008, the representatives of the affected farmers were planning to arrange a demonstration at the district headquarters in order to be paid the remaining money, as there was again delay in the timing. Furthermore, Mr Petro argued that the affected farmers had earlier accepted the lower rate of compensations for the inbound crops, although they conceived that the rate was unfair (interview, 12.1.2008, IBC Msasa). This was because there was a considerable reduction from the rate used for the boundary crops. In spite of the alleged consensus after the RAP and the adjusted rates, some of the farmers in Makanya were still very critical about the compensations and the whole process in early 2008. Furthermore, the village chairman of IBC Msasa stressed the poverty effects of the process for the village. The most anxious individuals even raised the option of suing the government to the court if they were not paid the ‘full amount’. In the end, the claimed ‘consensus’ over the new rates of compensations seemed to be only partial. The claims put forwards by the affected farmers also imply that their strategies were influenced by their personal or their neighbours’ or relatives’ experiences of previous conservation efforts, including the ANR compensation dispute.

6.8. Opportunities for and limitations of the farmers to affect the conservation process

In the process of establishing the Derema Corridor, the conservation intervention was both resisted and supported by the affected farmers, depending on the stage of the process and their experiences of other conservation interventions. The affected farmers were not totally excluded actors in the process, and they were able to mobilise themselves and put pressure on the other parties. After a delay in the process, the affected farmers’ representatives actively made follow-up and tried to put pressure on the government. The process of negotiating the conditions of the plan with the farmers at the early stages of the process, although limited in scope, probably gave them a better opportunity to defend their interests. The case thus illustrates how the negotiations over the conditions of conservation, albeit at uneven ground, led to ‘unintended participation’ of the affected farmers, also in the more profound form of social mobilisation. In addition, the involvement of several external actors such as the representatives of conservation organisation who tried to ensure the completion of the process and secure funding for it contributed to the affected farmers’ scope to defend their interests. Yet, the multitude of actors and arenas of decision-making also complicated the process, making the position of authority of different organisations unclear to the farmers. The farmers and their representatives’ ability to access adequately information was often limited. Their efforts remained with highly insecure outcomes for a long time, keeping the compensation payments and future of the area open and requiring constant follow-up and efforts.

The local history of resource control and the farmers’ experiences of previous conservation efforts and of collective action shaped their discursive
and other strategies. Selective interpretations of the history of the land use of the area were part of their strategies to make claims on the land and, later on, to secure the compensations. Nevertheless, people of different social background had somewhat different experiences of the previous interventions, and diverse expectations about the outcomes of the process. The farmers who became more actively involved in the negotiations and acted as representatives were mostly well-connected people, with earlier experience of different conservation interventions, high education, or other ways in a good social position.

Some of them had been actively involved in the planning and implementation of the conservation plans at previous stages, and thus were more knowledgeable than others about the language used by the experts, and the goals and conditions of conservation. The farmers’ representatives used both their existing social networks and the formal bureaucratic channels to influence the process, and to gain access to compensations. They could also mediate between different discourses, combining elements of the livelihood and conservation discourses to make claims towards other actors and engage with them. The people who acted as mediators or brokers between the conservation interests and livelihood interests were generally more supportive to the conservation goals.

The long time-frame of the exercise, especially the delay and unclear conditions of the compensations, however, caused scepticism and frustration among many. The farmers were also faced with the non-transparent practices of the authorities, reflected in the problems they encountered when attempting to get information. While the process was prolonged, some farmers ‘lost their hope’ for eventually being paid the compensations. There were some who had continued with planting new crops and tending the fields inside the Derema Corridor, which could risk the conservation goals, at least in the short-term. Some of the strategies of the farmers can also be interpreted as resistance towards the conservation project, such as tree cutting. In addition, the rhetoric used by the farmers, especially in the highly affected areas, showed continued resistance, even if the process and new conditions of control had been agreed formally.

In the Derema process, the drawbacks, mobilisation and open and hidden acts of resistance should not be considered only as a result of one factor. Overall, the approach of the conservation intervention in Derema lacked coherence due to the high number of actors and organisations, lack of funding, institutional change, and the limited time frame of the project that initially pushed the process. The farmers’ possibility to defend their interests, e.g. claim compensations from the lost crops, was also limited due to lack of information and commitment by the key agencies. Due to the multitude of government and other agencies involved, and unclear relationships of authority, it was often difficult for the affected farmers to receive information after the delay in compensation payments, and know which agencies they should approach to make their concerns and claims known.
7. Conclusions

7.1. Participatory conservation as a way to promote socially more inclusive conservation or further exclusion?

In this dissertation, I have described and analysed the changes in the discourses of conservation among different actors and groups, and actual practices of resource control in the context of the EUM where several interventions have promoted ‘participatory conservation’ of the strictly protected forests. In the dominant, institutionalised discourse of conservation in the study area, the local people and their representatives in the village level committees are assumed to become and act as the government’s partners in protecting the forest reserves. At the same time, conservation is to benefit the ‘communities’ and offer them alternative sources of livelihoods. The research focused on, and was directed by the following underlying questions: Does the critique concerning the increased state control through participatory conservation initiatives seem valid in this context? If not, are there any signs of socially transformative potential of such conservation efforts, in terms of the actors challenging the previous, more exclusive practices of resource control, and if, how and why? To address the problems, I explored the changes in the institutional and organisational set-up of forest control, the strategies of the different groups involved in certain participatory conservation efforts and related negotiations, and the changes in the relationships of authority between the villagers and forest authorities. Particularly, the focus was on the inclusion and exclusion of the local farmers from the negotiations and decision-making over resource control.

To conclude, the gap between the discourse embedded in the official strategies and policies of forest conservation and the actual practices of control is evident. This is not surprising, as the assumptions of and solutions produced by the conservation interventions seldom are in line with the complex realities on the ground. The contingency of social processes and the different interests underlying participation in conservation adds to the unpredictability of the outcomes of any interventions. Yet, in spite of the fractures between the language embedded in the policies and protected area management strategies, and the mixed and contingent practices of the forest control, there are also signs of transformative processes that have been propelled by the interventions.

An unintended effect of the conservation projects in the East Usambaras has been that some of the affected farmers have mobilised to promote their rights in relation to land tenure and compensation disputes. This implies that the rural residents are not as marginalised as groups in resource control as suggested in the context of some other conservation interventions in Tanzania (e.g. Brockington 2004). There is also evidence from other contexts in Tanzania of the local people becoming more active in demanding changes in the resource use practices and allocation of resources.
by the state (e.g. Snyder 2008), so this may also reflect a more general process of democratisation in the society.

7.2. Reflections on theoretical approach and methodology

My theoretical and methodological approach was influenced by the debates and theorising on conservation, development and natural resource control in the fields of political ecology and in development sociology and anthropology. The approach of engaging with and exploring the interests, rationalities and strategies of the actors was an important starting point. Yet, this was to be combined with the assumption made by some political ecologists about the need to understand how more persistent aspects of power relationships limit the scope of farmers or groups of local people to affect their living conditions. Moreover, this relates to the often unequal conditions for different social groups to promote their interests in the negotiations and decision-making over the control of and access to natural resources (e.g. Ribot & Peluso 2003; Wilshusen 2003a). I was thus interested to address the interplay between these different spheres of power in a specific historical and social context.

I assumed that the practices of conservation and resource control are formed, maintained and changed in a dynamic way both through the operation of discourses through the institutions, and the strategies of the actors involved in the conservation interventions and other efforts to control of natural resources. The individuals and groups of people could support, or alternatively, contest the institutionalised discourses through their speech acts and other actions. I assumed that discourses may change the position of the parties not only through the institutions, but also through providing the actors discursive ‘weapons’ in negotiations over resource use, control and access to the benefits. The dynamics between the forms of discursive and other power was also understood to be context-dependent (Ribot & Peluso 2003).

My approach would probably appear too narrow from the point of view of some political ecologists, as political economic conditions and forces were not given as much attention as the analysis of negotiations and contestations ‘on the ground’, and strategies used by different actors in them. On the other hand, the focus enabled me to understand more deeply the dynamism in the relationships between the actors, their diverse rationalities and strategies. The methodology of interviewing and observing different actors and organisations made the study rather time-demanding, and somewhat fragmented. Yet, it helped me to set the events and accounts I observed at local level in a wider context.

As in any ethnographic or qualitative research approach, my position in relation to the informants differed according to various social factors. In this case, the most important ones were related to language differences and anticipated or experienced social proximity with the informants and also between the interpreter and the informants. While communicating with the villagers and their representatives, with whom I often did not have a
common language, the local research assistants gave me valuable, e.g. providing background information on people, events and places. However, the use of the interpreters also made the encounters with these people less spontaneous and more complicated socially, as it added another layer of interpretation.

In addition, it was often a great challenge to not to become associated with the conservation organisations or the donors in the eyes of the respondents, especially in the villages. This could not be totally avoided, and it was reflected in the sometimes strategic answers people gave me. However, I considered this issue when analysing the materials. Furthermore, in the analysis, more attention was put on those actors who were more ‘knowledgeable’ about conservation issues and related problems in the forest and resource control, such as the VEC members, as they usually were most enthusiastic and used to share their views and provide information to ‘outsiders’.

7.3. Institutionalisation of participatory conservation and challenges of benefit-sharing

In spite of the controversies and ruptures between the policies and practices of conservation, certain ideas embedded in the ‘modern’ participatory conservation discourse have become dominant, in the sense that they are institutionalised both at national policies and more local institutions of forest control. The high level of outside influence and funding in the process is evident, as suggested also by other researchers (e.g. Woodcock 2002). Yet, the shift would not have occurred without the interaction and co-operation between Tanzanian and ‘external’ actors, such as donors, experts and policy-makers. In addition, particular local contestations over the control of the forests and the negative social and environmental effects of forest loss experienced by some segments of the population led to pilot projects in participatory conservation and resource management. These, and the experiences they provided, also contributed to the discursive shift and institutionalisation of participatory at the policy level.

In addition to the recent emphasis on ‘community involvement’ in the policies and conservation strategies in Tanzania, traditional discourses on the forests and environment in general, and related institutions have persisted in certain areas. In such areas, the long-term residents and groups have controlled patches of forests for diverse purposes. As suggested by Iddi (2003), community participation in forest control can thus be said to have a long history in Tanzania, although in a rather small and geographically fragmented scale. Traditional institutions of control, such as protecting small patches of forest for ritual use, have remained also in some parts of the EUM. Yet, they are gradually deteriorating, as in other parts of the country (e.g. Bildsten 2002; Ylhäisi 2006). In the discourse of some experts, the traditional local institutions of forest protection are presented to be able to offer a basis for (re)arranging the resource control on a more sustainable
and locally legitimate basis. However, although the traditions can play a role in sustaining the forest patches in a small scale, in the wider picture this appears as a somewhat romanticising idea, as the society and people-environment relationships are in a constant state of transformation.

Furthermore, in relation to the reforms in the policies, conflicting interests and understandings among the implementing organisations and actors render their effects unpredictable, and highly contingent. In spite of the fact that many forest and local government authorities, such as district officials, in their on-stage discourse support the idea of the community participation in resource control and conservation, the devolvement of formal powers and inclusion of new actors into decision-making is also resisted by some representatives of the government agencies, including the forest department. Furthermore, some of the reform processes, especially in relation to JFM agreements, have proceeded slowly. The implementation of the reforms in resource control faces challenges not only because of resistance among some key actors, but also because of financial constraints and dependency on external funding. The participatory processes of forest conservation may also easily lead to high expectations among the ‘target population’, and different groups among them, that are not met, or not met in time, causing resentment. In spite of the changes in the policies and official forest conservation and management strategies, elements of the previously dominant exclusive thinking and related forms of control also continue to shape the practices. These controversies are also reflected in the local actors’ mixed perceptions about the relationship between the different parties involved in forest conservation.

7.4. Local actors’ shifting position and strategies in resource control

In the EUM, the exclusion of the local people, mainly small-scale farmers, from the formal control of the forest reserves has historically been a dominant feature. This reminds of the fortress conservation discourse and related exclusive strategies of control (e.g. Neumann 1998; Adams & Hulme 2001; Brockinton 2002) that have been common in many protected areas in Africa and more widely. Yet, the implementation of policies has varied, not least due to lack of resources within the government agencies and twisted interests regarding the forests. In the EUM, the diverse development and conservation interventions led by the government and external actors have shaped the livelihood strategies of the local people, and their relationship to the forests. For instance, utilisation of the forests and extension of area under farming by the small-scale farmers during the first decades of the post-colonial rule was partly fuelled by the donor-supported logging activities, and shifts in the government’s policies.

In the 1980s, the forest and natural resource policy discourse shifted gradually towards greater emphasis on conservation, as well as community participation in conservation. Since that era, the conservation interventions in the EUM have promoted territorialisation of the forest and land, by trying to restrict the forest use and shape the local people’s conduct and their land
use practices. At the early stages, participation was mainly consultative and functional in its scope. From the side of the conservation interests, the discourse of participation has thus been used rather instrumentally to give legitimacy to the interventions. However, through the consultations and participatory exercises, such as meetings, the actors representing the affected farmers have also been able to express views rather openly, and promote their own agendas to some degree.

In the case of Derema Corridor, the conservation and compensation process led to the affected farmers' mobilisation. Some of the farmers were in the position to openly express their concerns, condemn the non-transparent practices of the government and make their demands towards the other parties. In this sense, the intervention propelled more substantial level of participation than perhaps initially expected. However, this was also contributed by the transformations in the institutional context and the strategies of the non-local actors that tried to complete the conservation intervention. In spite of the shortcomings in the process, such as lack of continued communication between the ‘stakeholders’, a high level of agency among the affected people emerged.

In general, the increased enforcement of the rules and control as a result of conservation interventions is represented as a positive thing by many people in the EUM, as the existence of the forest cover is conceived to secure rain fall. In certain areas, village level actors have also co-operated with the conservationists in trying to conserve the forests on the village areas, implying common interests between the parties. At the village level, certain elements of participatory discourse that became institutionalised in the 1990s, such as more equal benefit sharing and representation of the villagers as guardians of forests, are being reinforced by the more actively involved actors, such as village chairmen and VEC members in their ‘on-stage’ discourse. Their rationalities have shifted as the interventions bring benefits for their families and villages, at least temporarily. Such key actors, however, also tend to navigate between several rationalities (Olivier de Sardan 2005, 63). This is shown, for instance, in how the village heads and the VEC members describe their relation to the forest. Sometimes they represent themselves as guardians who help to keep the forests for the benefit of the present and future generations. In other occasions they consider themselves and other villagers as poor and uneducated farmers that need more education and resources to be able to participate in the forest control.

Often, these mediators have been able to use the elements of participatory conservation discourse strategically to promote their social and economic interests, and also wider interests of the villagers, or certain groups among them. Such people are more positive and enthusiastic about the idea of sharing the control of forests. The membership in the environmental committee or other involvement in the conservation activities has provided them new opportunities to access material benefits and symbolic resources, such as social prestige. The fact that some of the actors advocating the rights of the farmers in the process of establishing the Derema Corridor had been active in conservation activities also implies that
these actors have been able to use their experience, networks and skills to promote the interests of wider groups. Nevertheless, the representatives of the local people also face many challenges in their position, e.g. due to limited resources, and conflicting interests regarding the resource use.

The cases from the EUM imply that the ideas embedded in participatory conservation interventions have affected the agency and discursive strategies of the actors in resource control. Yet, there are differences among the different groups in their position and ability to shape the control. In spite of the widely held notion of importance of the forests among the population, the different social groups diverge in how much they are willing and able to invest their time in conservation activities. The strict conditions of control and rules on access to forest products, especially outside the strictly protected reserves, are conceived as socially unjust by many. The access to information regarding conservation rules and related projects and benefits is also 'biased'. There are gaps in the extent to which the benefits from conservation are known to those members of village who are not active in the communal matters or well-connected. Similar processes of unequal access to information and participation in decision-making have been identified by researchers as well (e.g. Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Shackleton et al. 2002). The differences are also related to social attributes such as age, social status and gender. The elderly people and women have generally been less aware of the opportunities and reforms at stake. Moreover, the limited time scope and lack of continuity in the operation of the interventions, makes the relations between the different social groups in the forest control fluctuate, as the expected benefits can suddenly be reduced or disappear.

In the EUM, tensions have emerged over the condition of resource control in the forest reserves and their surroundings, both within the villages and between the forest authorities and the villages. Signs of resistance towards the control include circumventing the rules, e.g. continued ‘illicit’ use of resources. Therefore, not all people regard the conditions of control as legitimate, or they are unable to comply with the rules. Also the VEC members sometimes question the rationality of their participation. It is evident that suspicions towards the forest staff and motives of the conservation agencies have not suddenly disappeared with the reforms. In addition, assumptions about the local people’s participation and their ‘common interests’ turn out problematic against the history of weakness of the village councils and the other levels of local government administration in managing the resources ‘accountably’ (c.f. Brockington 2008). This weakens the trust towards the government and the responsible village bodies.

The cases show how the discourse of participation and related institutional and organisational reforms are both supported and resisted by the primary ‘target group’ of conservation intervention, the people living around protected forests. Their relation to the discourse and understanding of their role also depends on their expectations regarding new and experiences from previous interventions. In spite of the changes, exclusion of certain groups from the negotiations and decision-making over resource
control continues to cause resentment towards the principles, means and advocates of conservation. The expectations and strategies of the local actors also depend on other fields of power, such as shifts in the strategies of the organisations promoting conservation, economic opportunities and limitations, as well as reforms in the legislation and other institutions.

The social outcomes of participatory conservation are not equal among different groups of local people. Those of the local actors, such as leaders of the environmental committees or village leaders, who have been in a more beneficial position, have some authority in the control of the resources, especially in the villages. Yet, many of the people who are supposed to participate in conservation and benefit from the related opportunities and income generating activities are still positioned at the 'margins' of the formal decision-making over resource access and control. In addition, their livelihood strategies are limited by the strict regulations of resource access, and conditions of conservation. This contributes to both open resistance, as implied in the discursive strategies of the villagers and their representatives, as well as to its more hidden forms, such as illicit use of timber or hunting (c.f. Scott 1990).

7.5. Fragmented practices of resource control

In contrast to the accounts that conceive participatory conservation and development interventions mainly as strengthening the previous state-centered forms of control (e.g. Olson 2001; Sundar 2001; Chottray 2004), I argue that in the processes and cases I explored in the EUM, the position of the local people, especially those actors representing the villagers in the negotiations on conservation, has shifted, although not equally for all groups. Certain elements of the participatory conservation discourse and the practices which are supported by them, such as negotiations between the different parties, have contributed to the fact the local people in general are not as marginalised as in the typical fortress conservation interventions (e.g. Neumann 1998; Wilshusen et al. 2003, Brockington 2004). This has happened, for instance, by opening up new arenas for the representatives of the local people affected by conservation to voice their concerns, access information, and question and oppose the exclusive forms of control.

The operation of both the 'old' and 'new' actors and institutions in the arenas where resource access and control is negotiated, has rather contributed to the fragmentation of control. In the EUM, the present practices of forest conservation do not totally exclude the characteristics of coercive conservation, in spite of the on-stage discourse of local people's participation and benefit sharing. In addition, there are persistent gaps between the formal rules and principles of resource control, and the more fluid practices, which derive largely from the conflicting interests regarding the resources and over-lapping authority of the different actors. Informal strategies of control and 'illicit' means of access to forests have persisted in spite of the efforts to increase control by conservationists. Furthermore, the related tensions between different groups continue, and make conservation efforts contested in practice.
However, there is also the implication, that more actors are getting involved in negotiations over resource use and the conditions of conservation. Ideas embedded in the discourse of participatory conservation are, in principle, reinforced in the village by-laws, resource plans and the creation of the Village Environmental Committees, although they are not always formally legitimate and effectively operational. Those actors who are involved in or close to the village leadership or the VEC often stress their role in forest control and support the new institutional forms of control. The semi-official or ‘unclear’ position of the new institutions, however, sets certain limitations to the village actors to defend the rights in case of conflicting interests regarding the natural resources. In addition, the new principles of control and benefit-sharing are not necessarily used in practice, or if they are, not in a systematic way. For instance, punishments for breaching rules depend on the relationships between the parties. This condition, where there are formal and informal rules governing access and not clear line between legal and illegal, also contributes to the fragmented nature of the control.

Among the obstacles of more substantial transformation are unclear institutions of control and relationships of authority. The rationality and legitimacy of the restricting rules and the often non-transparent practices create controversies, and sometimes even resistance among the local people. As in many developing countries, such institutional pluralism is part of the actual control of natural resources also in this context (Lund 2008). It lefts room for negotiations and manoeuvring by the actors representing the villages and the forest agencies. For instance, in the EUM, the alleged logging ban in Amani makes it more difficult for the local people to gain access to timber trees on the farms in a formally legitimate manner. In such a context, it is likely that the actors representing the government can also benefit from the unclear rules. Such tendencies create contestations and mistrust towards the government authorities. The villagers and their representatives can also accuse the higher level authorities of “eating” the expected benefits, such as compensations, or hiding information on the benefits. In some cases, however, the villagers also question the conduct and use of ‘communal’ money by the village leaders.

As the case of Derema Corridor implies, the exclusive practices of resource control continue to be contested by the affected individuals and groups. However, the fact that the affected people have been able to openly criticise the actions of the government and conservationists is also a departure from practices of fortress conservation (Holmes 2007). The emergence of such a conflict situation and the related strategies and agency among the affected farmers may thus have more transformative capacity than more ‘planned’ forms of participation in practice. Not to under-estimate the hardship and frustration among the farmers, changes in the power relationships and the related rights to resources by the different groups, are likely to be stronger if the villagers actively oppose the previous practices of natural resource management (Brockington 2008, 122-123).

My observations in the study area, including the signs of disturbance to the ecosystems caused by mining, implies that the control of land, trees
and other forest products within the nature reserve and non-reserved land has not been totally efficient although it cannot be characterised as ‘open access’ situation either, as suggested by Woodcock (2002) in the context of other forest reserves of the EUM. In addition, there is adaptation by the farmers to the strict rules controlling the forests and access to timber and other products, such as reduced use of timber and poles for building purposes. The use of bricks as a building material is one of their strategies, also promoted by the village councils and higher levels of the government. Many people have also planted some trees on their farming land, so that they could better access timber and construction materials. Nevertheless, as a result on strict rules on the protected forests, pressure seems to have developed towards the forests outside the reserved areas.

7.6. Suggestions for further research and emerging questions

From the point of view of conservation goal and organisations, the ecological outcomes of devolved control mechanisms in biodiversity rich forests are of central interest, on top of the livelihood concerns and social transformations addressed in this and other research projects. The level of utilisation and the changes in the forest use and structure both within reserved and non-reserved areas of the EUM need to be studied further. Some preliminary knowledge exists already on specific JFM areas of Tanzania, but the coverage of space and time is fairly limited. In general, the lack of detailed knowledge over the ecological effects relates to the difficulties in assessing the impacts of devolved natural resource management on ecosystems and biodiversity (Sayer et al. 2005, 124-125). In the EUM, the need to study further the forests’ ecological dynamics, processes and characteristics is not only because the ultimate policy goal of conservation, but also because the forests are valued for diverse reasons both locally and nationally.

In addition, additional research on the micro-politics at the local level, including characteristics of the leadership and level of representation, in relation to the interpretation and implementation (or non-implementation) of the participatory forest control, as well as the new benefit sharing mechanisms, would be interesting. Some of the newest initiatives in the EUM have started to integrate the PES approach to conservation, with much emphasis put on market-oriented strategies. These are likely to open new opportunities for some actors in the villages to financially (or otherwise) benefit from conservation. For instance, CARE International and WWF Tanzania are in a process of establishing a project called “Equitable Payment for Watershed Services” in Ulugurus and the EUMs (www-document, Yanda & Munishi 2007). In addition to creating new expectations and providing opportunities to materially benefit, they are also likely to shape how the forests and the environment is conceived, controlled and accessed by the parties involved in such interventions.

It has been anticipated that the REDD payments (or other reward mechanisms) can bring new benefits to local people, but these benefits also
depend much on the operation of the national governments (Katila 2008, 123). However, also the organising practices of the village governments and their relationships to other actors and other levels of government shape the outcomes of the new mechanisms. This can turn out to be problematic and uneven, as the experience from the benefit-sharing systems applied in the ANR indicates. Related research questions could include: Which formal and informal arenas and practices are used by the village leadership and other responsible actors in the negotiations and decision-making resource control? How do the existing village organisations and networks affect the control, distribution and access to benefits? Under which conditions do the interventions benefit mainly a minority and when are the benefits distributed more widely? Moreover, the interrelationship between democratisation and conservation interventions could be explored further. Does the formal processes of village politics, e.g. through the elections and special seats for women, add transparency in the decision-making in relation to the VFM or JFM, and social inclusiveness of the resource control?

Moreover, the continuities of organising practices and the patterns of allocating resources in the administrative system of the government and its different levels would need further exploration. The discursive and other strategies of the actors operating within them can enable and, alternatively, constrain changes in the relationships of power in resource control. Among the persistent problems in Tanzanian society, also more generally, are non-transparent practices in the different levels of the government and among politicians. The lack of resources in different sectors has also been fuelled by the cut of the public costs during the structural adjustment reform (e.g. Snyder 2008), contributing to the phenomenon. Exploring in more detail the forces, actors and networks involved in and reproducing those practices could help to understand some of the obstacles to making the control of the mountain forest more socially inclusive and just.
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