The Psychology of the Incarnation in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century Theology

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ABSTRACT

The overall theme of my study concerns the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the point of view medieval philosophical psychology. This study will especially explore the following questions: what themes were included in the discussions about knowledge, will, and passions in Christ’s human nature, what the main psychological ideas employed in the psychology of the incarnation were, and whether the teachings about Christ’s human soul were derived from psychology as a discipline of natural philosophy. The method of this study is a systematic analysis of the psychological conceptions. This includes the historical and philosophical construction of psychological ideas in these discussions about Christ’s human soul. The most important sources of this study are commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. The sources of this study are composed, for example, by Alexander of Hales and other early Franciscan theologians, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol, Walter Chatton, Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude.

As theologians studied the knowledge, will and passions of Christ separately, this study is also divided into a corresponding set of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine the discussion about the knowledge of Christ. The main questions are what kind of knowledge the human Christ had and whether his soul knew everything that God knows. The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ’s human soul knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God, and that the soul had infused knowledge and experiences. Theologians were divided on the question of whether Christ’s human soul was able to know everything that God knew. For example, Bonaventure argued that Christ’s human soul habitually knew everything that God knows. Scotus first proposed that Christ’s human soul actually knew everything that God knows, but he ended up in the view that the soul knew everything habitually. Unlike Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas held that Christ’s human soul did not know everything, even habitually, as the soul did not know the unrealized divine possibilities.

In the second chapter, I study the discussion about Christ’s will and ask what kind of human wills Christ had and how these wills were related to each other. Peter Lombard argued that Christ’s human soul involved two human wills, as he divided Christ’s human will into the will of reason and the will of sensuality. Later theologians took Lombard’s basic division for granted, but they further divided the will of reason into will “as nature” and will “as reason”. That division became standard, although theologians understood its parts differently. For example, Thomas Aquinas explained that will as nature was the act of the will, whereas John Duns
Scotus associated it with the inclination of the will. The theologians of the period remarked that Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane (Matthew 26:39; Luke 22:42) implied that Christ both wished for death and wished to avoid it, but they argued that these wills were not contrary.

In the third chapter, I turn to a study of the passions of Christ. I ask how Christ’s human soul was passible, what passions he had and how he was simultaneously able to have pain, sadness and joy. All theologians thought that Christ had a passible soul. The early Franciscans argued that Christ’s human soul and the powers of its rational part were passible in an emotional sense. Later on, Franciscans like John Duns Scotus adopted this view. However, Aquinas explained that the soul was passible only accidentally and that the powers of the rational part of the soul did not have passions in a strict sense. Theologians agreed that Christ voluntarily assumed some but not all defects of human nature; among the assumed defects were pain, sadness, fear and anger. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that the pain, the sadness, the fear and the anger of Christ were sinless pre-passions. All the theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ’s human soul had pain and sadness, but their understanding about pain varied. They also argued that the pain of Christ touched his whole soul, including the powers of the rational part of the soul, but as their views about the passibility of the soul varied, their teachings on how pain touched the whole soul differed as well. Theologians thought that when Christ had pain and sadness, he also had the greatest joy. Although Aristotle claimed that a person cannot feel pain and joy at once, theologians tried to explain how Christ was able to have them at the same time.

My study proves that some emphases in the discussions about the psychology of the incarnation indicate that the early Franciscan theologians and Aquinas established two traditions about the application of psychology to Christology; while the Franciscan theologians usually followed the Franciscan tradition, the Dominican theologians usually followed the Thomistic tradition. However, the study also shows that the traditions were not unequivocal in terms of their flexibility on all questions, since not all Franciscan theologians followed the Franciscan tradition and not all Dominicans followed the Thomistic tradition. In addition, this study shows that in the discussions about the knowledge, will and passion of Christ, theologians applied various ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, but Christological views also influenced the philosophical thought of some theologians.
TIIVISTELMÄ


Tuomas Akvinolaisen mukaan Kristuksen sielu ei tienne edes habituaalisesti kaikkea, koska se ei tietäny Jumalan toteutumattomia mahdollisuuksia.


Tutkimus osoittaa, että eräät painotukset 1200-luvun keskusteluissa inkarnaation psykologiasta muodostavat kaksi tulkintaperinnettä suhteessa siihen, miten psykologiaa (ymmärrettynä luonnofilosofian osa-alueena) sovellettiin inkarnaatio-oppiin. Nämä perinteet ovat varhaisten fransiskaanien kehittämä fransiskaanitraditio ja Tuomas Akvinolaisen myötä kehitetty toimistinen traditio. Analyysi toisaalta osoittaa myös näiden perinteiden joustavuuden, sillä kaikki
fransiskaanit eivät seuranneet vain fransiskaanitraditiota ja kaikki
dominikaanit eivät puolestaan seuranneet varauksettomasti tomistista
traditiota. Tutkimuksesta käy myös ilmi, että inkarnation psykologiasta
käydystä keskustelussa teologia ja luonnonfilosofia vaikuttivat
huomattavasti toinen toisinsa. Teologit omaksuivat käsityksiä
luonnonfilosofian alaan kuuluneesta psykologiasta ja sovelsivat niitä
teologiseen keskusteluun. Toisaalta taas teologiassa kehitetyt käsitykset
vaikuttivat luonnontieteissä esitettyihin näkemyksiin sielusta kuten osoittaa
esimerkiksi keskustelu Kristuksen tahdosta järkenä ja luontona.
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My path with medieval theology started about fifteen years ago when I bought a Finnish translation of *Summa theologiae*. Aquinas’s intellectual way of treating theological problems inspired me so much that I decided to apply to study theology at the University of Helsinki. Luckily, the Department of Systematic Theology arranged the so-called “medieval school”, which provided me with a great opportunity to study medieval theology with researchers at the department. I wrote my Master’s thesis on Aquinas in the medieval school. On Professor Reijo Työrinoja’s recommendation, I continued my studies in medieval theology in the doctoral programme. As reading medieval texts is not an easy task, much practice and guidance is required in order to learn how to read and write about them. I am extremely grateful to all those people who helped and encouraged me during my doctoral studies and earlier. This project has taught me not only about medieval theology but also that one does not become a scholar without assistance from other, more learned scholars.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

| MS M₁ | Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92 (Peter Auriol, *Commentarium in III librum Sententiarum*) |
| MS M₂ | Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 93 (William of Ware, *Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum*) |
| OPh | Opera philosophica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae |
| OTh | Opera theologica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae |
| PG | J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Series Graeca |
| PL | J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Series Latina |
| *Sententia Ethic.* | Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* |
| *Super Io.* | Thomas Aquinas, *Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura* |
| *Super Sent.* | Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis* |
| <> | Indicate added material in transcriptions from manuscripts |
| {} | Indicate deleted material in transcriptions from manuscripts |
INTRODUCTION

Following the doctrine of the dual nature of Christ promulgated by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE), the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Latin theologians taught that Christ had a divine nature and a human nature united in a single person, which was the second person of the Trinity. From the twelfth century to the fourteenth century, the various consequences of this doctrine were widely discussed by theologians. A common question among theologians was, for example, what kind of metaphysical ideas could explain the union between two natures in a single person. Since the orthodox interpretation of the doctrine of dual nature implied that Christ had a human soul in his completely human nature, theologians also studied the doctrine from a psychological point of view. Extensively studied questions were, for instance, whether the soul of Christ had knowledge and will separate from his divine knowledge and will, as well as whether his human nature had passions even though his divine nature did not.

Such questions of knowledge, will and passions were mostly addressed apart from the doctrine of the incarnation. In the twelfth century, the nature of the soul was often treated in non-Christological theological treatises, and discussions in the thirteenth century extended beyond theology. Various early Christian works – especially Augustine’s texts, such as *De Trinitate* and *Confessiones*, and Nemesius of Emesa’s *De natura hominis*, John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa*, and later also the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Arabic *De anima* – influenced twelfth-century views about the soul. These works were still influential in the first part of the thirteenth century when Aristotle’s *De anima* began to be discussed in the universities with Averroes’s *Commentary* on it. Commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima* were part of natural philosophy, which was taught in the faculty of arts. However, philosophical and theological contexts of psychology were not entirely separate. Theologians applied the ideas of psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, and many of them were authors of treatises on the soul in the field of natural philosophy as well.

The overall theme of this study concerns the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the point of view medieval philosophical psychology. My study will especially explore the following questions: what themes were included in the discussions about knowledge, will, and passions in Christ’s human nature, what the main psychological ideas employed in the psychology of the incarnation were, and whether the teachings about Christ’s human soul were

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1 For Avicenna’s *De anima* and its influence on medieval psychology, see Hasse 2000.
derived from psychology as a discipline of natural philosophy. I am not going to describe in detail all the views about the psychology of the incarnation proposed by the theologians whose works are investigated, but instead will concentrate on the aforementioned topics as they were formulated in the twelfth-century, in particular their later development and the new ideas put forward in these discussions. The method of this study is basically a systematic analysis of the psychological conceptions. This includes the historical and philosophical construction of psychological ideas in these discussions about Christ’s human soul. Despite the fact that my main aim is not a comparative study of the medieval psychology of the incarnation, a systematic analysis of psychological conceptions also needs some kind of comparative approach. Although I pay special attention to new ideas proposed in the discussions about the psychology of incarnation, I also introduce the views of some theologians who based their work on an existing account, as these demonstrate doctrinal similarities between different theologians.

I shall discuss the basics of medieval psychological theories about knowledge, will and passions because these general views formed a background for the medieval discussions about the psychology of incarnation. In the thirteenth century, philosophical psychology was considered a part of natural philosophy, as Aristotle had explained that psychology was a branch of natural philosophy. Medieval Aristotelian psychology was a faculty psychology: it concerned what the powers of the soul were, what kinds of acts they had, and how the powers interacted. A standard view was that a soul had a vegetative part, a sensitive part and an intellectual part. Whereas the vegetative part was responsible for growing, generation and nutrition, the sensitive and intellectual parts had cognitive and appetitive powers. Proper to the study of psychology was an investigation of the sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul.

Theologians thought that the powers were necessary properties of the soul: a soul was never without them. However, theologians proposed different views on how the powers were related to a soul. For example, Thomas Aquinas argued that although the powers were necessary properties of the soul, the powers and the soul were really distinct because the powers were accidents of the soul. Scotus also expounded that the powers were necessary properties of the soul, but he believed that the powers and the soul were not really distinct. They were only distinct formally: the definition of the soul did not include the powers, but the powers and the soul

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2 For Aristotle and the faculty psychology, see King 2008, 255–258.
were existentially inseparable.\(^4\) However, William Ockham argued that the powers and the soul were not separated in any way: the powers and the soul were identical.\(^5\) According to medieval psychology, the powers of the soul had acts. Active powers elicited their acts intrinsically, whereas the acts of the passive powers were caused externally. Aquinas, for instance, explained that acts and the powers were distinguished by their objects. For example, the object of the cognitive powers was true and the object of the appetitive powers was good, and the object of the sensitive appetitive power was the sensible good and the object of the will was the immaterial good.\(^6\)

The standard view in medieval psychology was that the sensitive and the intellectual parts of the soul had cognitive and appetitive or motive powers. A human being was aware of the world through the cognitive powers and he engaged the world through the appetitive powers. Avicenna’s distinction between these powers framed medieval views about the powers in the sensitive part of the soul. His view was based on Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic sources. According to Avicenna, the cognitive powers of the sensitive part of the soul were external senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch, taste) and internal senses (common sense, imagination, the imaginative power, memory, the estimative power). The external senses received sensible forms from external things, whereas a common sense received all forms of the external senses and it joined these forms together. The imagination preserved the forms, whereas the imaginative power could establish various configurations of the sensible forms in imagination by combining and dividing them. Later, theologians usually combined these two powers into one power and called it the imagination or phantasy. The estimative power evaluated whether the objects of the external senses were convenient or inconvenient. The aspects of sensible things which were not perceived by the external senses were called intentions, and they believed to be stored in the memory.\(^7\) According to Avicenna, the sensitive part of the soul also had a moving power, which was divided into two parts. One part commanded behavioural changes and the other part effected motions through the nervous system and muscles. The motive power which commanded behavioural changes was further divided into two parts: the concupiscible part reacted to pleasurable things or things which were useful for achieving pleasurable

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\(^4\) Cross 2002b, 268–271; King 2008, 266–268. For the soul and its powers in medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima*, see Boer 2013, 209–299. For views about the soul and its powers from Augustine to Aquinas, see Künzle 1956.


\(^6\) King 2008, 258–264.

things, while the irascible part reacted to adversaries and harmful or destructive things.  

According to medieval psychology, the intellectual part of the soul also had cognitive and appetitive powers. Following Aristotle and Avicenna, theologians thought that the cognitive powers in the intellectual part of the soul were comprised of an active intellect and a passive intellect, which corresponded to the active and passive elements of intellective cognition. The appetitive power in the intellectual part was the will, which was the faculty of different kinds of volitions. Unlike the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, these powers did not require bodily organs for their acts. As Avicenna had claimed that the agent intellect was separate from the soul, the medieval theologians discussed whether there is only one active intellect common for all human beings or whether each human being had their own active intellect. The majority of theologians, most notably Thomas Aquinas, argued that each human being had their own agent and passive intellects. However, there were also theologians who doubted whether the intellectual part had these cognitive powers. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain argued that the intellectual part of the soul had only the passive intellect.

In medieval psychology, each power had a unique domain of psychological phenomena, but the activation of the powers included a complex interaction between the powers. For example, sensory cognition involved interaction between the senses, intellectual cognition needed interaction between the intellect and the senses, and willing demanded interaction between the will and the intellect.

How was a sensory cognition formed? Thomas Aquinas explained that sensory cognition originated in the exterior senses, which perceived an external singular thing, and it ended in the interior senses. His view of sensory cognition was based on the doctrines of Aristotle and Avicenna. Sensory cognition began when an exterior sense received through air, water or flesh a sensible species, being a matter-form composite, from an external singular thing. For example, when an eye received the sensible species of a cat, which was the form that informed the sensible matter, the sight saw the cat. Aquinas emphasized that sensible species were not what the sense perceived but the means by which it perceived, and, following Averroes, he explained that they were received spiritually in the sense organ. Different external senses were able to sense the same object at once. For

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9 King 2008, 254.
10 For Avicenna on the intellect, see Hasse 2000, 174–223.
11 McInerny 1993.
example, when seeing the cat, the eye received one sensible species, and while touching it the sense of touch received another sensible species. These sensible species were joined in a common sense, which collected sensible species received via different external senses. After that, phantasms followed in the phantasy or imagination, being kinds of images of the things perceived by the external senses. The imagination was held to be able to compose and divide different phantasms. For example, when the imagination combined phantasm of gold with phantasm of mountain, the imagination would imagine a golden mountain.\(^\text{13}\)

In Aquinas’s description of sensory cognition, the senses passively received the sensible species. Perception was the actualization of the sense which was passive power activated by received sensible species. However, the medieval theologians discussed whether senses were passive or active when they sensed external things. The Aristotelian view emphasized the passivity of the senses, whereas the Augustinian Neo-Platonic view supposed that the senses were also active. According to this view, sense perception included apprehension of bodily changes and a soul, but no external cause affected the content of the perception. For example, Robert Kilwardby proposed this view as an option for Aristotelian theory.\(^\text{14}\)

A standard view of medieval Aristotelian psychology was that intellectual cognition required sensory cognition. Aquinas also thought that although the intellect did not need a bodily organ in its act, normally it was not able to know without the bodily senses: when the intellect was thinking, the imagination was active as well. The intelligible species explained how intellectual cognition was related to sensory cognition. According to Aquinas, the agent intellect made unintelligible sensible things intelligible by abstracting intelligible species from phantasms. This abstraction of intelligible species meant that the agent intellect stripped the phantasms of individual sensible matter. After the abstraction, the agent intellect deposited the intelligible species in the passive intellect. As the agent intellect removed individual sensible matter by means of abstraction, the intelligible species were likenesses of universals. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the proper objects of the intellect were the universal quiddities of material things. The abstracted intelligible species activated the passive intellect. Aquinas explained that the intellect next formed the Augustinian mental word, and then the intellect apprehended an universal. However, the intellect was also

\(^{13}\) Stump 2003, 247–262. For the basics of the medieval views on sense perception, see Knuttila & Kärkkäinen 2014, 61–79; 131–145.

\(^{14}\) Silva 2008, 88; Silva and Toivanen 2010, 247–249; Toivanen 2013, 135–139.
able to form propositions, as it could compound and divide one understood thing from another, and to reason from the known to the unknown.\textsuperscript{15}

The details of the above-mentioned Thomistic view about intellectual cognition were under hot debate. For example, theologians discussed whether intellectual cognition required divine illumination, as Augustine had claimed. Bonaventure and Aquinas explained that intellectual cognition needed some kind of divine illumination, but Scotus argued that it did not.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, intelligible species were a much-debated theme. Although theologians like Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus argued that intellectual cognition required intelligible species, their need was also called into question.\textsuperscript{17} For example, Peter John Olivi, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, William Ockham and Durand of St. Pourçain expounded that intelligible species were not needed to explain how intellectual cognition was related to sensory cognition.\textsuperscript{18} Theologians also discussed how an act of the intellect and a mental word were related. For example, Thomas Aquinas explained that the mental word was the object of intellectual cognition, whereas Peter John Olivi and William Ockham argued that the word was an act of the intellect.\textsuperscript{19}

The question about the need for intelligible species was related to the discussion about the abstract and intuitive cognitions. John Duns Scotus was the first to introduce the ideas of the abstract and intuitive cognitions. He argued that only abstract knowledge required intelligible species, whereas intuitive knowledge did not. Abstract knowledge abstracted from existence, and it was indifferent about the existence of the thing. Intuitive knowledge was about a thing insofar as it was directly present in its existence. For example, a sense perception was intuitive cognition and the imagination was abstract cognition. He claimed that the intellect could have abstract knowledge, but he doubted whether intellectual intuitive cognition was possible in this life.\textsuperscript{20} Unlike Scotus, Peter Auriol argued that intuitive cognition was possible whether the object was present or absent. Auriol explained that intuitive cognition was immediate cognition and it required that a thing seem to be present and existent even when it was not present and existent. Therefore, unlike Scotus, Auriol explained there can be intuitive cognition of a thing which does not really exist. Auriol argued that sensory cognition was intuitive cognition, and he explained that the intellect can have

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\textsuperscript{15} Stump 2003, 262–272. For the basics of the medieval views on intellectual cognition, see Toivo Holopainen 2014; Perälä 2014.
\textsuperscript{16} Marrone 2001; Pasnau 2015.
\textsuperscript{17} Spruit 1994, 134–137: 156–174; 257–266.
\textsuperscript{18} Spruit 1994, 205–224; 281–283; 291–298.
\textsuperscript{19} Pasnau 1997, 254–289.
\textsuperscript{20} Wolter 1990b; Pasnau 2002a, 296–300.
it as well, although we do not have it in this life. William Ockham argued that intuitive cognition considered the existence and non-existence of a thing, and intuitive cognition could also take place when a thing was not actually existing, since one can have intuitive cognition about the non-existence of a thing.

The appetitive or motive power in the sensitive part of the soul was associated with the passions of the soul. Following Aristotle’s compositional theory of the passions of the soul, a standard medieval view was that passions in the sensitive part of the soul involved four elements: 1) a cognitive element, an evaluation that something positive or negative was taking place; 2) an affective element, which was a pleasant or unpleasant feeling based on the evaluation; 3) a dynamic element, being a behavioural suggestion toward action; and 4) the change of the body.

Avicenna’s view about the moving power of the sensitive part of the soul and its passions also involved these components. His view paved a way for the medieval theories about the passions of the soul. In Avicenna’s view, the estimative power evaluated whether the objects of the senses were pleasurable or painful. After the evaluation, the commanding motive power reacted to evaluations and it actualized the executive power, which moved nerves and muscles according to the aimed behaviour. However, in human beings, the actualization of the executive power did not necessarily follow from the act of the sensitive appetitive power because the will was able to prevent the acts of the executive power. Avicenna claimed that the passions of the soul included joy, pain, fear and anger, but his descriptions of them were quite cursory. They involved cardiac and spiritual changes, which were caused by the passions of the soul, but he thought that humours and the qualities of the spirit could also influence a soul. Sensible pleasure and pain were perceptions of the apprehensive power. Sensitive pleasure was the feeling aspect of the awareness that something positive was taking place, whereas sensitive pain was the feeling aspect of the awareness that something negative was happening. As the cardiac and spiritual changes and their relations to the passions of the soul were treated also in medical works, the medieval psychology of the passions was also related to medieval medicine.

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21 Tachau 1988, 104–112; Friedman 2015a.
22 Piché 2009, 426; Biard 2011, 568–571.
24 For the medieval views on the passions, see Knuuttila 2002; 2003; 2004; 2012; 2014; King 1999; 2010; 2012a; 2012b.
25 Knuuttila 2002, 58–62; 2004, 218–226. Already Plato explained that pain was the unpleasant awareness of something in the body and joy was the pleasant awareness of something in it. (Knuuttila 2002, 49.)
Thomas Aquinas’s view of the passions of the soul, which derived from Aristotle and Avicenna, was based on the thirteenth-century faculty psychology as the passions of the soul were held to be acts of the sensitive appetitive power. Following Avicenna and the compositional view of the passions, he expounded that the passions of the soul were caused by the evaluation of the estimative power and they were followed by bodily changes, such as fluctuations in the heart, the spirits and the humours. Aquinas explained that the passions of the soul were analogical motions to the state of motions of inanimate things (inclination, movement and rest), whereas Albert the Great explained that they were not motions but qualities. Aquinas’s major contribution to the medieval views about the passions of the soul was his taxonomy of the passions. According to Aquinas, the concupiscible power had three pairs of passions of the soul: love/hatred, desire/aversion and pleasure/pain. Love and hatred were the contrary directions of a sensible thing evaluated by the estimative power to be either good or evil. Desire and aversion were motions towards and away from a good or evil thing, whereas pleasure and pain were related to encountering a good or evil thing. The irascible passions were hope/despair, courage/fear and anger. Aquinas thought that the irascible passions presupposed concupiscible passions. When a desired object was arduous, hope or despair arose, and when an avoided object was arduous, fear or courage arose. Sometimes a present evil was followed also by anger. The medieval classifications of the passions of the soul were influenced by the view of the Stoics, who distinguished the passions by their objects (good/evil) and the temporal aspect (present/future). Pleasure was about a present good, whereas desire was about a future good. Sadness was about a present evil, whereas desire was about a future good. Sadness was about a present evil and fear was about a future evil.

Later, the Franciscan theologians gave up any clear distinction between the sensitive appetitive power and the will. Unlike Aquinas, who thought that only the sensitive appetitive power was divided into irascible and concupiscible powers, Scotus explained that the will also involved such division and it could have passions. The immediate concupiscible acts of the will were likes and dislikes, but they were not efficacious volitions like elections. An act of the intellect was the partial cause of these acts, but the will, which was free, was their efficient cause. Scotus argued that the will could have also pleasure and sadness, which were passions of the will separated from its acts. Unlike Scotus, Adam Wodeham thought that the passions of the rational part of the soul were cognitions. He

criticized a view proposed by Walter Chatton and William Ockham which emphasized a real distinction between love and cognition, as well as the view that the passions of the soul were judgments. While Wodeham thought that distinct cognition precedes acts called love, fear and hope, he argued that these acts were also cognitive acts but not acts of knowing.\textsuperscript{28}

The will as the appetitive power in the intellectual part of the soul was strongly debated in medieval psychology, and theologians made many distinctions in regard to it. Following Anselm of Canterbury, theologians explained that the will had an inclination to the advantageous and to justice.\textsuperscript{29} The will had also reactions, which were natural but not chosen,\textsuperscript{30} and whereas the will could wish for a thing absolutely, it also could wish for a thing conditionally (either actually or latently).\textsuperscript{31} The common view was that, like the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, an act of the will required cognition. Therefore, volitions required interaction between the will and intellectual cognition. The will wished for, wished against and chose objects represented by the intellect.

Unlike the lower appetitive power, the will was free, since the will was not under any necessity. The exact nature of the freedom of the will was intensely studied by medieval psychology.\textsuperscript{32} One of the discussions on this involved a debate about the wishing for beatitude. Thomas Aquinas explained that the will was a moved mover because it was moved by the intellect and it was able to move other powers of the soul, including the intellect and itself. The object of the will was immaterial good represented by the intellect. Aquinas thought that the will necessarily wished for beatitude and everything indispensable related to it when the intellect represented it to the will, because beatitude was the greatest good. Therefore, when the intellect represented beatitude to the will, the will could not but wish for it. In this respect, it was not free. However, the will was free in respect to all other things since it could choose freely and without coercion means to achieve beatitude. This freedom was based on reason, which could propose different means to gain ends.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, John Duns Scotus thought that all men wished for beatitude and the act of the will required intellectual cognition; unlike Aquinas, however, Scotus thought that the will was a self-mover and a free cause of its volition. He explained that the

\textsuperscript{29} For Anselm on the will, see Normore 2002, 29–47; Ekenberg 2005a, 301–313; 2005b; 2016. For the basics of the medieval views on the will, see Taina Holopainen 2014.
\textsuperscript{30} Robiglio 2002, 56–60.
\textsuperscript{31} Saarinen 1994, 75–82; Robiglio 2002, 82–90.
\textsuperscript{32} Kent 1995, 94–149.
\textsuperscript{33} Krezmann 1993, 146–149. For beatific enjoyment in the medieval discussions, see Kitanov 2006.
intellect was only a partial cause, whereas the will was the principal cause of the volition, since the will elicited its acts freely. Therefore, when the intellect represented beatitude to the will, the will did not wish it necessarily, because it was up to the will whether it moved itself to wish for beatitude. However, the will could not wish against beatitude because beatitude could not be an object of such volition.\textsuperscript{34} When Peter Auriol described how the will moved itself freely to wish, he explained that the will moved itself through the intellect by controlling the judgment of the intellect.\textsuperscript{35}

Covering the thirteenth to the early fourteenth century, my study examines texts written over a period of approximately a hundred years. Many important theologians who wrote about psychological issues during that time are not discussed here because their works did not include discussions of the psychology of Christ’s human soul or that subject was only mentioned here and there. There are also theologians who studied the doctrine of the incarnation, but did not approach it from the standpoint of psychology. However, most theologians who treated the psychology of the incarnation wrote about the knowledge, will and passions of Christ. I investigate the works by these theologians, attending especially to those who contributed to the discussion with original ideas. Theologically relevant questions about Christ are not examined if they are not psychological. For example, theologians wrote about Christ’s grace and merit, considering them to be related to his will, but as these treatises did not directly contribute to the psychology of the will of Christ, I have left them outside my study.

The main sources of this study consider the psychology of the incarnation, propose ideas which were new in comparison with predecessors and open questions in philosophical psychology apart from popular repetition. These sources offer a rich picture of various positions which aimed at new solutions in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions. As Peter Lombard studied the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ in the third book of his \textit{Sentences}, theologians treated these subjects in their commentaries on this work. These commentaries are the most important sources of my work, but I also attend to other theological works when they are relevant.\textsuperscript{36}

While I include twelfth-century texts, my main sources are from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Apart from the twelfth-century texts, the sources of this study can be divided into four groups based on the mendicant orders and periods between theologians. The first group concerns

\textsuperscript{34} Wolter 1986, 42–45.
\textsuperscript{35} Hoffmann 2015.
\textsuperscript{36} For the commentaries on the \textit{Sentences} in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, see Friedman 2002, 41–128.
SUMMARIAL THEOLOGY AND THE FRANCISCAN THEOLOGIANS

INTRODUCTION

Summa Halensis and the texts by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. These texts were composed by Franciscan theologians who formed the foundation of that order’s intellectual tradition. Of Alexander of Hales’s works, the sources used in this study are his Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum,37 which is dated between 1220–1227, and Quaestiones disputatae ante quem esset frater,38 which he composed before he became a Franciscan friar in 1236. Alexander of Hales was formerly thought to be the author of Summa Halensis,39 but the editors of the modern critical edition have questioned its authorship. Although Alexander possibly supervised the editing of the text, the specific author or authors of the work remain unknown. However, the work represents early Franciscan thought and it is an important source for understanding the development of early Franciscan theology. The final version of the Summa Halensis was edited by 1257.40 Concerning Bonaventure, I shall use mostly his Commentary on the Sentences.41 Bonaventure first commented on the Sentences between 1250–1252 and revised his text as a Master of Theology.42

The second group of texts are written by the Dominican theologians Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. This study uses Albert’s

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40 Alexander of Hales, the founder of the early Franciscan school, was born between 1180 and 1186 in Halesowen. He became Master of Arts before 1210 and regent Master of Theology in 1220/1221 in Paris. He entered the Franciscan order in 1236, attended the first Council of Lyon in 1244–1245 and died in 1245. The most significant contribution of Alexander to the medieval intellectual culture was his initiation of the practice of commenting on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. After Alexander, the Sentences became the standard textbook in theology. Students in Paris and Oxford who wanted to become Masters of Theology were obligated to lecture on the Sentences. (Cullen 2011, 62–63.)
42 Bonaventure was born in 1217/1221 in Bagno, Tuscany. He came to Paris in the 1230s, where he studied under Alexander of Hales. Bonaventure joined the Franciscan order in 1238/1243 and became Master of Arts in 1243. During his studies at the faculty of arts, the requirements of becoming of Master of Arts involved Aristotle’s Organon and De anima. Hence, he was less influenced by Aristotle’s works than the Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who were familiar with most of Aristotle’s corpus. Bonaventure received his teaching license in 1243 and assumed the Franciscan chair in theology in Paris in 1257. He became Minister General of the Franciscan order in the same year. Bonaventure became a cardinal and the bishop of Albano in 1273 and he died in 1274. (Noone 2014; Pereira 2011, 182–184.)
Albert wrote his *Commentary on the Sentences* around 1243 in Paris. The treatises *De bono* and *De incarnatione Verbi* also come from Albert’s period in Paris. Of Aquinas’s works, the most important for this study are his *Commentary on the Sentences*, the disputed questions *De veritate* and *Summa theologicae*. Aquinas commented on the *Sentences* between 1252–1256 and composed *De veritate* in the academic years 1256–1259. He started to write his *Summa theologicae* in 1265 and finished its third part in 1268, not managing to complete the *Summa* before his death.

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46 Albert the Great is best known as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, but scholars have emphasized his importance as an independent thinker for medieval philosophy in general. Albert wrote texts in various fields of philosophy and theology. For example, his commentaries cover some Neo-Platonic works as well as those of Aristotle. Albert was born around 1200 in Lauingen, Germany. He studied the arts in Padua in the 1220s and joined the Dominican order in 1220/1223/1230. After his studies in Padua, Albert went to Cologne, and he taught as a lector in various places in Germany within the Dominican order. The order sent Albert to Paris to continue his studies around 1240, and he became regent master in 1245. Thomas Aquinas became his student at this time. He taught in Paris until 1248, when he was sent to Cologne with Aquinas to open the studium generale for Dominicans. Albert was the prior of the German Dominicans in 1254–1257, and after that period he taught at the studium generale at Cologne, was bishop of Regensburg, travelled in Germany for many years as preacher of the Crusade, and lived in Würzburg. Albert died in 1280 in Cologne. (Führer 2016; Resnick 2013, 3–9; Anzulewicz 2013a, 34–35.)


50 Thomas Aquinas was born in 1224/1225 in a noble family at the family’s castle in Roccasecca, Italy. At the age of five or six, he was sent to the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino. This is where Aquinas became familiar with the Bible and the texts of Augustine and Gregory. Aquinas began his studies at the studium generale in 1239 in Naples, where he studied, for example, Aristotle’s natural philosophy and metaphysics, as well as the works of Averroes and Maimonides. Despite the opposition of his family, Aquinas joined the Dominican order in 1244 and was sent to Paris in 1245–1248, where he studied liberal arts and theology under the direction of Albert the Great. Aquinas was at a new Dominican studium in Cologne from 1248 to 1252, but he was sent again to Paris in 1252, where he became regent Master of Theology in 1256. Aquinas was at the General Chapter of the Dominicans at Naples and Orvieto, and he established a studium in Rome in 1259–1268. He went back to Paris in 1268, where he confronted the outbreak between mendicants and seculars who attacked the right of the mendicants to teach, conservatives who thought that Aristotle’s works were a threat to the Christian faith, and the monopsychism of the Averroist masters. Aquinas was sent to found a new Dominican studium in Naples in 1272. Because of mystical experiences and extreme physical and nervous exhaustion, he stopped writing and teaching in 1273. He died in 1274 at the Cistercian abbey of Fossanova. (Torrell 2012, 15–28.) See also Stump 2003, 1–12. The dates of the other referenced works are as follows: *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259–1265), *Expositio super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus*
The third group of sources first includes texts by the Franciscan and the Dominican theologians who wrote between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, and second, by the early fourteenth-century Dominicans who commented on Aquinas’s views. Theologians like the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise and the Franciscan Richard Middleton are theologians who wrote between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, whereas Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude are early fourteenth-century Dominican theologians who commented on Aquinas’s views. I shall especially use the commentaries on the Sentences of these authors. Peter of Tarentaise studied the Sentences between 1257–1259 and revised his commentary between 1259–1264. His commentary was influenced both by Aquinas and Bonaventure. Richard Middleton edited his commentary between 1285–1295 and it was influenced by Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. Durand wrote three versions of The Commentary on the Sentences. The first commentary (1307) was poorly received by the authorities of the Dominican order because of Durand’s departure from Aquinas’s doctrine, but the second version (finished in 1311) was more obedient to Aquinas’s teaching. However, Durand returned to his radical thinking in the third version of his Commentary on the Sentences (finished 1318–1325). This study is based on that text, which is the most important source for an understanding of his thought. Peter of Palude’s commentary...
was written against the commentary by Durand. The considerable part of his commentary consists of a text copied verbatim from Durand’s commentary and his critical comments on Durand’s text.

The fourth group of the sources consists of the texts by the early fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton. For Scotus, I am using his commentaries on the Sentences. The Lectura involves Scotus’s early notes for the lectures he gave as a bachelor theologian at Oxford. It is possible that the third book of the Lectura contains notes about the lectures which he gave at Oxford between 1303–1304 when he was in exile from Paris. The Ordinatio is the revision of the Oxford lectures. Since it is Scotus’s main work, the study is based on it in particular. The Reportatio is a student report of the lectures which Scotus gave in Paris between 1302–1303. Among Ockham’s texts, I am analysing his Exposition of Aristotle’s Categories, Commentary on the Sentences and Quodlibeta septem. Ockham composed his work on the Categories between 1321–1324, commented on the Sentences between 1317–1318 and completed Quodlibeta.
septem between 1322–1325. Also included among the sources of this study are Peter Auriol’s commentary on the third book of the Sentences, which he lectured on between 1316–1318, and Walter Chatton’s Commentary on the Sentences, which he delivered in 1321–1323.

Scholarly interest in studying the medieval theological discussions from the point of view of philosophy has increased during the recent years. Two works in this trend have especially inspired my approach. The first is the two-volume study titled Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University by Russell Friedman, which explores the psychological ideas that theologians applied in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions about the Trinity. Another work is The Metaphysics of the Incarnation by Richard Cross, which analyses metaphysical problems

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66 William Ockham was born around 1287 in Ockham, England. He joined the Franciscan order as a teenager and was sent to a Franciscan house in London, where he began his studies at a Franciscan provincial studium. Ockham began his studies in theology around 1310, either in London or at Oxford. He commented on the Sentences in 1317–1319 at Oxford, but he never graduated with a Master of Theology from there. He returned to the Franciscan studium of London in 1321, where his housemates were, for example, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. In 1323, Ockham went to the Franciscan province’s chapter meeting to defend his views, which some friars found to be suspicious. As Ockham was also charged with teaching heresy, in 1324 Pope John XXII ordered a commission in Avignon to study Ockham’s texts, but Ockham’s views were never condemned as heretical. In Avignon, Ockham took part in the debate on apostolic poverty, and he ended up claiming that the Pope’s view was heretical. Ockham fled from Avignon to Pisa, and he was excommunicated because of his departure from Avignon in 1328. Ockham left Pisa for Munich around 1329, where he eventually died in 1347. (Spade 2015; Brown 2011, 1410–1411; Friedman 2002, 83.)

67 Commentarium in III librum Sententiarum, Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92.

68 Peter Auriol was an innovative theologian who commented extensively on the views of his contemporaries, but formulated his views rather independently. Auriol was born in 1280 near the city of Cahors in France. He joined the Franciscan order before 1300, began his studies at the studium in Toulouse and studied theology in the 1300s in Paris. Auriol taught at Franciscan studiums in 1312 in Bologna and in 1314 in Toulouse. In 1316, he was sent by the Franciscan General Chapter to Paris in order to lecture on the Sentences. He had lectured on the Sentences already in Bologna or Toulouse and his Scriptum super primum Sententiarum was mainly finished when Auriol arrived in Paris. He lectured on the Sentences in Paris until 1318, when he became Franciscan regent master. He was made the Franciscan provincial minister of Aquitaine in 1320 and the archbishop of Aix-en-Providence in 1321. Auriol died in 1322. (Friedman 2015a; 2002, 81–83; Schabel 2011, 935–935.)


70 Walter Chatton was a critic of William Ockham and Peter Auriol, but a follower of John Duns Scotus. Chatton was born in 1285–1290 in the town of Chatton in England. He joined the Franciscan order before the age of 14, was ordained as sub-deacon in 1307 and was sent to study theology at Oxford, where he met William Ockham who was lecturing there on the Sentences. Chatton lectured on the Sentences for the first time in 1321–1323 and it is possible that he visited Ockham and Adam Wodeham at the Franciscan studium in London during that period. Chatton became Franciscan regent master in 1330 at Oxford. He was summoned to Avignon in 1333 in order to examine the texts of Durand of St. Pourçain, for example, and to be an advisor to Pope Benedict XII. He was appointed as the bishop of the Welsh See of Asaph, but he died in 1343/1344 before the See of Asaph became vacant. (Keele 2014; Brower-Toland 2011, 1377; Etzkorn 2005, IX–XI.)

71 Friedman 2013.
surrounding the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century doctrines about the incarnation. In an analogous way, my study approaches the theological discussion about the incarnation from the viewpoint of medieval philosophical psychology.

The psychology of the incarnation in the high and late medieval periods has been studied by modern scholars in terms of three aspects: the knowledge of the human Christ, his will and his passions. This division is based primarily on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, where Lombard studies the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ separately. Despite the fact that the psychology of the incarnation in the twelfth-, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions has been studied from the 1950s to the present, there are no monographs that examine all of these aspects in one volume. In addition, the texts are approached from the point of view of theology rather than from the point of view of philosophical psychology, and there are also significant texts which have remained unexplored. New studies on the history of medieval psychology and the role of medieval metaphysical and psychological issues in the doctrine of the incarnation and the Trinity have added to the need for such a comprehensive work.

The most important studies on the discussion about the knowledge of Christ’s human soul in the medieval times are works by Artur Landgraf, Johannes Ernst, Horacio Santiago-Otero, John Murray, William Forster and Laurence Vaughan. Landgraf and Santiago-Otero study the twelfth-century sources, whereas Murray, Foster and Vaughan treat the twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions but focus on Aquinas. The extensive book by Ernst covers the discussions from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, and it also includes analyses of manuscripts which are not yet edited.

The most essential publications on the passions and the will of Christ are those by Paul Gondreau and Corey Barnes. Gondreau studies the passions of Christ, whereas Barnes addresses the will of Christ. Both of them focus especially on Thomas Aquinas, but also briefly cover ancient and medieval theologians who influenced Aquinas’s thought. Aquinas’s teachings on the passions of Christ are also treated in a chapter of the recent

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72 Cross 2002a.  
74 Ernst, 1971.  
75 Santiago-Otero, 1970.  
76 Murray, 1963.  
77 Forster, 1958.  
78 Vaughan, 1957.  
80 Barnes, 2012.
work by Nicholas Lombardo, which partly rests on the book by Gondreau,\(^{81}\) and his view about the will of Christ is discussed in a treatise by Andrea Robiglio.\(^{82}\) Scotus’s view about the passions of Christ’s human soul has been investigated, since Scotus treats passions mainly when he deals with questions about Christ’s human soul. Recent texts about the topic include those by Knuuttila,\(^{83}\) Drummond,\(^{84}\) and Barnes.\(^{85}\)

The book *What Sort of Human Nature?* by Marilyn McCord Adams\(^{86}\) and the article “The Psychology of the Incarnation in John Duns Scotus” by Simo Knuuttila\(^{87}\) connect the different aspects of the psychology of the incarnation, as they study the discussions in relation to the knowledge, the will and the passions of Christ. The work by Adams is rather short, but it is a valuable analysis of the discussions about Christ’s human nature by Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus and Luther. The article by Knuuttila concerns Thomas Aquinas’s and John Duns Scotus’s views about the knowledge and the passions of Christ. Knuuttila remarks that their views about the psychology of the incarnation differ greatly, and this study was inspired by the question of why Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views were so different.

My study contributes to the recent scholarly discourse by providing an extensive analysis and new approach to medieval discussions on the psychology of the incarnation. It is based on sources which have not been studied before (for example, commentaries on the *Sentences* by Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton, Durand of St. Pourçain, Peter of Palude, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton), and it approaches them from the point of view of philosophical psychology rather than from the point of view of doctrinal theology. Also, where the main attention of the books by Murray, Forster, Vaughan, Gondreau and Barnes is on Aquinas, the focus of this study is not limited to Aquinas. There are also methodological differences between the previous studies and my study. Whereas the books by Gondreau and Barnes involve much analysis of the theological background of Aquinas’s view, I mirror the views of the theologians on philosophical psychology. I comment on recent scholarship on the subject when scholars have proposed considerably different views or when my interpretation differs from theirs.

\(^{81}\) Lombardo, 2011, 201–224.

\(^{82}\) Robiglio, 2002, 10–33; 56–60.

\(^{83}\) Knuuttila 2011.

\(^{84}\) Drummond 2012.

\(^{85}\) Barnes 2012, 300–312.

\(^{86}\) Adams 1999.

\(^{87}\) Knuuttila 2011.
The subject of this study is historically interesting since it sheds light on the medieval Franciscan and Dominican intellectual traditions: the birth and the development of these traditions, as well as the mutual connections between them. It is also interesting philosophically because the medieval discussions were related to psychology in natural philosophy, and theologians proposed views which challenged ideas derived from philosophical sources. Although the study first and foremost takes part in the recent discourse about medieval philosophy, it also has wider significance. As the doctrine of the incarnation and its psychological implications are still topical, this study provides a historical background and medieval solutions to be considered in these modern theological and philosophical debates. However, as the aim of this study is to provide accurate descriptions of the medieval views, it does not actively take part in this contemporary discussion.

This study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter concerns the theories of the knowledge of Christ’s human soul. The main questions are what kind of knowledge the human Christ had and whether his soul knew everything that God knows. The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ’s human soul knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God, and that the soul had infused knowledge and experiences. Peter Lombard argued that Christ’s human soul knew everything that God knew. In the subsequent discussions, this was thought to pertain to the knowledge about things in the Word of God. However, theologians were divided on the question of whether Christ’s human soul was able to know everything that God knew. Alexander of Hales claimed that the human Christ was omniscient in a sense that he knew all things which were, are or will be, but he did not know all things which God can create. Bonaventure was the first to argue that Christ’s human soul habitually knew everything that God knows. Scotus first proposed that Christ’s human soul actually knew everything that God knows, but he ended up in the view that the soul knew everything habitually. Unlike Bonaventure and Scotus, Thomas Aquinas argued that Christ’s human soul did not know everything, even habitually, as the soul did not know the unrealized divine possibilities. Theologians also proposed different views about the experience of Christ’s human soul. For example, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas argued that Christ had experiential certitude, which did not involve acquiring new intelligible species. In his *Summa theologiae*, however, he proposed the novel idea that Christ’s human soul had experiential knowledge, as his passive intellect acquired new intelligible species through the senses and an

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88 For the modern discussions about the incarnation, see Hick 1978; Morris 1986; Swinburne 2003; Cross 2002a; Marmodoro and Hill 2011; White 2015.
active intellect. The acquired intelligible species were new in a relative sense only because Christ already had them due to divine infusion. Scotus also expressed a new view about Christ’s experience when he explained that the experience of Christ’s human soul involved intuitive knowledge. Peter Auriol was one of the first to argue that the experience of Christ’s human soul was not intuitive knowledge, but knowledge acquired from memories.

In the second chapter, I study the discussion about Christ’s will and ask what kind of human wills Christ had and how these wills were related to each other. Peter Lombard argued that Christ’s human soul involved two human wills, as he divided Christ’s human will into the will of reason and the will of sensuality. Later theologians took Lombard’s basic division for granted, but they further divided the will of reason. The early Franciscan theologians added a new theme into the discussion by arguing that the will of reason was divided into will “as nature” and will “as reason”. Since then, that division became standard, although theologians understood its parts differently. For example, Bonaventure explained that the will as nature and the will as reason were different ways of wishing. Aquinas’s innovate explanation was that they were the acts of the will about a means and an end, while Scotus associated the will as nature with the inclination of the will. The theologians of the period remarked that Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane implied that Christ both wished for death and wished to avoid it, but they argued that these wills were not contrary. As Christ’s human will wished to avoid death, theologians studied how it was possible that Christ wished for something which did not take place. They also argued that Christ had free choice or free will, even though Christ’s will was able to wish only for good, not evil.

In the third chapter, I turn to a study of the passions of Christ. I ask how Christ’s human soul was passible, what passions he had and how he was simultaneously able to have pain, sadness and joy. All theologians thought that Christ had a passible soul. The early Franciscans argued that Christ’s human soul and the powers of its rational part were passible in an emotional sense, whereas Aquinas explained that the soul was passible only accidentally and that the powers of the rational part of the soul did not have passions in a strict sense. The different views about the passibility of the soul had a great influence on thinking about the passions of Christ’s human soul. Theologians agreed that Christ voluntarily assumed some but not all defects of human nature; among the assumed defects were pain, sadness, fear and anger. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that the pain, the sadness, the fear and the anger of Christ were sinless pre-passions, but they proposed differing views on how these were pre-passions. Theologians also studied what Christ feared and what kind of anger he had. All the theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ’s human soul had pain and sadness, but their understanding about pain varied. They also argued that the pain of Christ touched his whole soul, including the powers of the rational
part of the soul, but as their views about the passibility of the soul varied, their teachings on how pain touched the whole soul differed as well. For example, the early Franciscan theologians, Bonaventure, Richard Middleton and John Duns Scotus argued that the will of Christ had sadness as a passion, but Aquinas said that the will did not have sadness as a passion and that the powers of the rational part of the soul were changed only accidentally when his flesh was injured. Theologians thought that when Christ had pain and sadness, he also had the greatest joy. Although Aristotle claimed that a person cannot feel pain and joy at once, theologians tried to explain how Christ was able to have them at the same time.
1 THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

“[…] it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”¹

“But he will not be able to take ignorance upon himself…”²

“Jesus kept on growing in wisdom...” (Luke 2:52)

These quotations from Topics by Aristotle, Cur Deus homo by Anselm of Canterbury and the Bible exemplify philosophical and theological challenges which the medieval theologians encountered when they discussed the knowledge of the human Christ. According to Aristotle, a person cannot think of many things at once, but Anselm’s claim that Christ did not assume ignorance challenged Aristotle’s idea because, according to some medieval theologians, freedom from ignorance implied that Christ’s human soul was thinking of many things at once. In addition, in medieval psychology as a branch of natural philosophy, the intelligible species were abstracted from the senses, but the medieval theologians assumed that Christ had intelligible species, which were not acquired from the senses. Anselm’s view also involved a theological challenge. Since in the Bible it was claimed that human Christ was growing in wisdom, unlike Anselm’s view seemed to suppose, it appeared that Christ did not know everything.

While thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about passions in the soul of Christ were associated with his deficiencies, the discussions about Christ’s knowledge examined the perfections of the human nature. The views about Christ’s knowledge reflected changes in the philosophical ideas about the intelligible species, the connection between the intellectual and sensory cognitions, the number of simultaneous acts of the intellect, abstract and intuitive knowledge and experience. The discussions are also interesting because they make visible some differences between the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions. However, while scholars have argued that in discussions about the knowledge of Christ theologians were divided over whether they were in the Franciscan or the Dominican schools,³ and they have emphasized Aquinas’s influence on later debates,⁴ my study proves that the discussions were much more nuanced: the intellectual traditions were not so clearly defined and not all theologians agreed with Aquinas in all respects.

³ Vaughan 1957, 17–57.
⁴ Forster 1958, 110–122; Murray 1963, 94.
In this chapter, I focus on two questions in particular. First, what kind of knowledge did Christ’s human nature have and, second, did Christ’s human soul know everything that God knows? The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I make some remarks about the discussion in the twelfth century. Secondly, I focus on teachings regarding Christ’s knowledge by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas and some of his followers. Lastly, I expound on John Duns Scotus’s and Peter Auriol’s teachings.5

1.1. The Knowledge of Christ in Twelfth-Century Sources

Twelfth-century discussions about Christ’s knowledge, especially Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, framed the discussions that would follow in the thirteenth century. A central question was whether Christ had only divine knowledge or human knowledge as well. Hugh of Saint Victor was the best-known advocate of the view that Christ had only divine knowledge. In his *De anima Christi*, Hugh held that the wisdom of Christ’s human soul was the Word of God because his soul was united with it.6 As the wisdom of the divine nature was also the Word of God, Christ’s human and divine natures were wise through the same wisdom: Christ’s divine and human knowledge were identical.7 Hugh’s view was widely debated in the twelfth century. Unlike Hugh, many theologians argued that the wisdom of Christ’s human soul was not the Word of God but a created feature of the soul of Christ. One of the supporters of this view was Peter Lombard. According to Lombard, the knowledge of Christ’s human soul and the knowledge of Christ’s divine nature were not the same. Christ had human knowledge and divine knowledge because he had a human nature and divine nature.8

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5 For medieval discussions on Christ’s knowledge, see Knuuttila 2011; Adams 1999; Madigan 1997; Ernst 1971; Santiago-Otero 1970; 1975; Murray 1963; Forster 1958; Vaughan 1957. Murray (1963, 30–59), Forster (1958, 27–63), and Vaughan (1957, 18–40) also study the early 13th-century authors, who are not studied here.


7 “Ergo, inquiunt, tantam sapientiam habet anima Christi, quantum Deus habet. Quid facit comparatio? ubi unus solus est? Una est sapientia Dei, qua sapiens est anima Christi, nec participando sapiens est, ut hoc vel illud in illa, et per illum sapiat, sed plenitudinem habendo, ut totum possideat. Non ergo dicamus tanta aut quanta; sed dicamus tota sapientia Dei in anima Christi est, et ex tota sapientia Dei anima Christi sapiens est...” Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sapientia animae Christi* PL 176, 853A. Hugh’s text was a reply to Walter of Mortagne’s (1100–1174) letter where Walter argued that Christ’s human soul did not know as much as God knows. For Walter’s arguments, see Santiago-Otero 1970, 57–69. Later on, Robert of Melun argued against Hugh’s view, saying that it implied that Christ did not have a rational soul because the Word of God seemed to replace it. (*Sententiae* lib. 2, cap. 14, p. 31.) For Hugh of Saint Victor on Christ, see Coolman 2010, 83–102.

8 “His etenim evidenter traditur duos in christo esse principales sensus, siue geminam sapientiam. Neque ideo unitas et singularitas personae diuiditur, sed iuxta duas naturas, duas
Hugh assumed that Christ’s human soul knew everything that God knows because Christ’s human and divine knowledge were the same. While Lombard thought that Christ had created and uncreated knowledge, he argued that the human Christ knew everything that God knows but his uncreated knowledge was more complete than his created knowledge. Lombard explained that Christ’s human soul did not know as clearly as God knows and its wisdom was not as worthy as God’s wisdom. However, not all twelfth-century theologians held that the human Christ knew everything that God knows. For example, Gandolphus of Bologna argued that the human Christ knew everything which was, is and will be, but unlike God, he did not know which things and how many things (quot et quanta) God can create.

Although theologians disagreed about the question of whether the human Christ knew everything that God knows, they thought that since the moment of his conception the knowledge of the human Christ was as perfect as the knowledge of a human being can be. However, according to Gospel of Luke, “Jesus kept on growing in wisdom and maturity.” (Luke 2:52.) Did this indicate that the knowledge of Christ improved during his lifetime? Twelfth-century theologians usually denied that Christ progressed in knowledge. For example, Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Lombard described that Christ did not grow in wisdom, but the knowledge of his

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9 "Quibus respondentes, dicimus animam Christi per sapientiam gratis datam, in urbo dei cui unita est, quod perfecte intelligit, omnia scire quae deus scit, […] nec ita clare ac perspicue omnia capit ut Deus; et ideo non acquatur Creatori suo in scientia, etsi omnia sciat quae et ipse. Nec eius sapientia aequalis est sapientiae Dei, quia illa multo est dignior, digniusque et perfectius omnia capit quam illius animae sapientia.” Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 14, cap. 1, p. 90. The anonymous author of Sententiae divinitatis argues that the human Christ knew all things which exist and why they exist, and all things which do not exist and why they do not exist. However, the knowledge of the human Christ was not equal to divine knowledge because the human Christ received knowledge from God but God has knowledge inherently. (Sententiae divinitatis tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 82–83.)

10 “[…] nihil fuit vel est vel futurum est, quod non sciat anima Christi vel quilibet beatus spiritus. Non tamen scit anima Christi vel quilibet beatus spiritus, quot et quanta possit fieri a Deo, quod scit dei verbum. […] Scit tamen minus et paucior anima Christi quam verbum, quia etsi sciat, quaequid factum est vel fit vel est futurum, tamen non scit, quot et quanta possit facere dei verbum.” Gandolphus of Bologna, Sententiarum libri quatuor lib. 3, no. 96, p. 347–348; Murray 1963, 20, n. 72. Roland of Bologna also argues that Christ’s human soul did not know as much as the Word of God. (Roland of Bologna, Sententiae p. 170.)
disciples did when Christ taught them. Anselm of Canterbury and Bernard of Clairvaux claimed that Christ learned through experience, but the idea of experience was not associated with the discussion about Christ’s knowledge until Richard of Saint Victor. In his *De emmanuale*, Richard argued that Christ grew in wisdom because he progressed in experience. Through experience, Christ learned, for example, what was good about sensitivity and bad about passibility. Richard explained that since Christ did not know these things before he experienced them, he progressed in wisdom because he experienced new things in the course of his life.

1.2. Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure

Following Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales thought that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge, and like Richard of Saint Victor, he argued that the human Christ also had knowledge through experience. This indicates that Christ’s human knowledge was divided. According to Alexander, the human Christ had five kinds of knowledge.

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11 “Quapropter id quod dicit Evangelista, quod *proficiebat* Jesus aetate, sapientia, et *gratia*, non ita accipitur quasi in semetipse melior factus, sed quia hominibus quam ipse habebat sed latebat sapientiam et gratiam, prout ratio temporum postulabat, magis semper ac magis aperuit. Ita apud homines ipse proficiebat, quando homines ipsi in ejus cognitione profecerunt.” Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* c. 6, PL 176, 384A–B.


14 “Qui igitur formam servi accepit, qui in similitudinem carnis peccati venit, profecto ab ipsa hora conceptionis per experientiam didicit, et novit quid esset bonum sensibilitatis, et malum passibilitatis, utpote qui carnem sensibilem et passibilem accepit. […] Ab ipso itaque incarnationis exordio experiencing didicit, et per experientiam scivit quid esset juxta aliquid malum corruptibilitatis, et juxta aliquid quid esset bonum incorruptibilitatis, malum corruptibilitatis secundum poenam, bonum incorruptibilitatis secundum culpam.” Richard of Saint Victor, *De emmanuele* lib. 2, cap. 16, PL 196, 650D–651A. According to Murray, Richard takes this position because he emphasizes the literal meaning of the Bible. (Murray 1963, 15–16.) For Richard on experience, see Palmén 2014, 72–74.

15 “Sic et Christus postquam semetipsum exinanivit et formam servi accipiens factus est obediens Deo Patri, per experientiam didicit, quod prius per experientiam nescivit juxta hunc modum didicit ex usu cometionis quid esset inter malum famis et bonum refectionis.” Richard of Saint Victor, *De emmanuele* lib. 1, cap. 15, PL 196, 625C.
Christ’s human knowledge

| Knowledge proper to Christ’s human soul |
| Knowledge proper to the apprehender |
| Knowledge proper to sinless human nature |
| Knowledge proper to fallen human nature |
| Experience of penalties in affective power |
| Experience of sensible things in cognitive power |

As Christ had all these cognitions, he differed from a postlapsarian human being, who only had the knowledge proper to a fallen human being. This was one reason why the psychology of the incarnation differed from psychology, as it was a branch of natural philosophy, which concerned cognition proper to the postlapsarian human being. This implies that the categories of medieval psychology in natural philosophy were unable to explain all cognitive phenomena in the human Christ.

Alexander does not tell why Christ had these cognitions, but the *Summa Halensis* tries to do so when it explains that Christ had the knowledge proper to sinless human nature, because that proved that he was a true human being, and the knowledge proper to fallen human nature, because the redemption of the human race required experiences. Therefore, the doctrine of salvation explained why Christ had many kinds of cognitions, including cognitions which a normal postlapsarian human being does not have.

Alexander only describes knowledge proper to fallen human nature in detail, while his descriptions of other cognitions are quite indefinite. He expounds that the human Christ had knowledge proper only for him because of the hypostatic union, and he was aware of the mysteries of the incarnation, the redemption of the human race and his passion through such knowledge. The knowledge of the apprehender was about things that pertained to glory and the soul shared it with the angels and the blissful souls.

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16 “Sed quia assumpsit humanam naturam ut genus humanum per verum hominem redimeret, respectu istius finis necessaria erat duplex in Christo scientia, naturalis scilicet et scientia experientiae: scientia naturalis sive naturae integrae et perfectae, ut verus homo probaretur; scientia vero experientiae, ut genus humanum per sensum poenae et experientiam redimeretur.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 1, p. 164. Also, Forster remarks that the *Summa Halensis* explained why Christ had these cognitions. (Forster 1958, 45–48.) When the *Summa Halensis* studies the division of Christ’s human knowledge, it copies verbatim Alexander’s text. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 166.) Following Peter Lombard, William of Auxerre argues that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge, and the human Christ knew everything that God knows but God’s knowledge was more complete than the knowledge of the human Christ. William holds also that Christ did not progress in knowledge but the knowledge of his disciples did when Christ taught them. (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 5, p. 71–75.)
Furthermore, Christ had similar knowledge as the prelapsarian human being. Alexander adds that Christ also had special grace, by means of which he knew the number and the progress of things, but he claims without further clarification that such grace was not knowledge. It appears that Alexander’s reason to propose such grace was the perfection of Christ’s human knowledge since it explains why Christ was not ignorant about things he experienced. Knowledge proper to Christ’s human soul and knowledge proper to the apprehender included one continuous vision (aspectus), whereas knowledge proper to sinless human nature and knowledge proper to fallen human nature included a movement (decursum) from habitual knowledge to actual knowledge.

Knowledge of fallen human nature was experiential knowledge and it explained how Christ’s human soul grew in wisdom. Alexander states that Christ had two kinds of experiences. He had experience when he experienced sensible things through his cognitive power and the penalties of sin such as pain and sadness through his affective power. Alexander emphasizes that, unlike a postlapsarian human being, Christ was not ignorant about sensible things and affective penalties before experiencing them because he knew them through another knowledge in advance. Christ
knew affective penalties beforehand by means of the knowledge which was proper only to the human Christ, and he knew sensible things through special grace. However, Alexander’s idea is obscure since he does not explain how Christ’s human soul knew through special grace.

Alexander explains that Christ’s human soul grew in wisdom because his soul acquired experiential knowledge. When referring to Aristotle’s *Metaphysica* and *Analytica posteriora*, where Aristotle claims that memory arises from sense perceptions and experience is acquired from several memories, Alexander states that experiential knowledge involves a created habit. This implies that Christ acquired new habit by encountering new things. Although Christ acquired a habit, Alexander emphasizes that Christ was never ignorant about anything because he knew things in a nobler way before experiencing them. Alexander holds that the human Christ was omniscient in the sense that he knew all things which were, are or will be, but he did not know all things which God can create. It is worth noting that

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20 “Item est natura poenalis, et in hac didicit diversas poenalitates secundum experientiam in affectiva, quas data est per gratiam unionis; unde praescivit secundum eam quae fuit ex gratia unionis. Sexta est ad cognoscendum per experientiam, non ut prior, quae affectiva est, sed cognitiva ex sensu; unde specialis gratia quam habuit ad sciendum, fuit ei data quoad experientiam in cognitive. Unde non loquimur de experientia in affectiva, sed in cognitive.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 718. The *Summa Halensis* adds that experience of sensible things through cognitive power included that a sense had a similitude of a thing, whereas experience of penalties through the affective power included that a sense had the form of the thing. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 166.)

21 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I.1, 980b26–981b14; *Analytica posteriora* II.2, cap. 19, 100a 4–10.

22 “Dico quod habitus quidam relinquebatur in anima qui non fuit prius, sed et alius et nobilior fuit prius;” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 719; *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 142. The *Summa Halensis* emphasizes that Christ did not acquire new scientific knowledge (scientia) through several experiences because such acquiring implied ignorance but he knew things in a new way when he experienced them for the first time. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 167.)

23 “Nota tamen quod, si novit uno modo quo prius non novit, non debet dici propter hoc ignorantia, […] non enim potest dici quod alicui modo novit quod non prius, quia sensibilia quae addidicit per experientiam, prius novit per modum nobiliorem et perfectionem; ignorantia autem est defectus perfectionis.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’* q. 42, memb. 1, p. 718.

24 “Anima Christi dicitur omnisciens ratione omnium scitorum, non ratione omnium modorum omnia scienti. Et dico quod scit omnia per modum existentis; verbi gratia scit quod Deus fecit vel facit hanc creaturam; non dico aliud, scit facere omnia per modum existens. Unde, cum dico ‘omnisciens’, respicio rem in existentia respectu praesentis vel praeteritae vel future; sed omnipotentia dicitur respectu omnium operabilium, sive de aliquot, sive de nihil. […] Nihil igitur est scibile per modum entis praesentis, praeteritae vel future, quod non sit scitum ab anima Christi. […] Dicitur enim omnisciens et non omnipotens, quia cum dico ‘omnisciens’, hoc respicit rem existentem vel in praesentem vel praeteritae vel future; sed omnipotentia respicit operabile, et non existens.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’* q. 42, memb. 3, p. 712. In *Glossa*, Alexander claims that the human Christ knew everything that God knows but he did not have operative knowledge about everything. (“Et ita tot scit, quod ipse Deus vel Filius Dei.” *Glossa in quatuor libros*
Vaughan disagrees with my interpretation about experience, since he claims that, according to Alexander, Christ acquired knowledge in act but not in habit; however, Vaughan does not take into account that Alexander explicitly claims in his *Quaestiones disputatae* that the experiential knowledge involved the acquiring of a new habit.

Following Augustine, Alexander thinks that angels have morning knowledge and evening knowledge. The morning knowledge was about things in the Word of God and the evening knowledge was about things in themselves as created. Alexander argues that since Christ also had angelic knowledge, his soul knew things in the Word of God and things in themselves, but he emphasizes that the soul did not have evening knowledge. According to Alexander, the idea of evening knowledge includes that the knowledge about things in themselves involves the possibility of obscurity, which did not occur in Christ. He does not explain what the possibility of obscurity connected with evening knowledge is, nor how the knowledge about things in the Word of God and the knowledge about things in themselves fit with the above-mentioned division of the cognitions.

Bonaventure’s view about Christ’s knowledge was influential, especially among the Franciscan theologians. He proposed new ideas like the view about habitual omniscience, which theologians continued to discuss until the early fourteenth century. In his *Commentary on the Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 143. "Anima Christi habuit scientiam cognitivam omnium, sed non habuit scientiam operativam omnium; unde non habuit scientiam operativam creandi omnia..." Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi lib 3, d. 14 (AE), p. 145.) However, the Summa Halensis claims that the human Christ knew everything that God knows. (Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, cap. 7, p. 172.)

25 Vaughan 1957, 42–43.

26 In *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine claims that angels have the morning and the evening knowledge because they know things in the Word of God and things in themselves. (Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* lib. 4, cap. 21–23, p. 120–123; PL 34, 311–313; lib. 5, cap. 18, p. 161; PL 34, 334.) See also Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 11, cap. 6, p. 326–327, PL 41, 322; cap. 29, p. 349, PL 41, 343. For Augustine on the morning and evening knowledges, see Goris 2012, 163.


28 Bonaventure studies Christ’s knowledge in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi* and *Breviloquium*. My study is based on the *Commentary on the Sentences*. Forster (1958, 63–74), Murray (1963, 59–65) and Hayes (2000, 112–116) study Bonaventure’s views in his other works as well. For Bonaventure and Aquinas on angelic knowledge, see Goris 2012, 149–185.
Sentences, Bonaventure claims that the human knowledge of Christ was divided as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christ's human knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the Word of God (knowledge of glory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of things in the Word of God (knowledge of glory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of things in themselves (knowledge of prelapsarian human nature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge through experience (knowledge of postlapsarian human nature)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike other human beings, the human Christ had all these cognitions because the perfection of his soul required them; lacking one of them would have indicated an imperfection in Christ’s soul. Unlike Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure explains that the cognitions were related to different parts of the soul: knowledge of the Word of God and things in it were located in the superior part of the reason, knowledge of things in themselves was in the inferior part of the reason and knowledge through experience was in the sensible part of the soul. Here Bonaventure uses Augustinian psychology to explain why Christ had these cognitions. According to Augustine, the reason was divided into the superior and inferior parts, which were two functions of the same power but not two powers. The superior part of the reason was about eternity, whereas the inferior part was about temporal things. Contrary to Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure argues that the human Christ did not have knowledge proper only to his soul, because the hypostatic union did not include that the Word of God was united with a soul like the knowable is united with that which knows it. Bonaventure expounds that Christ’s human soul had knowledge proper to him only in the sense that Christ’s knowledge of the Word of God was more excellent than such knowledge possessed by all other souls.

29 “Ratio autem huius est perfectio ipsius animae Christi, quae non tantum debuit esse perfecta secundum superiorem portionem, verum etiam secundum inferiorem et secundum partem sensibilem, non tantum quantum ad statum patriae, verum etiam quantum ad statum viae, qui duplex est, videlicet innocentiae et naturae lapsae. Et secundum hoc Christus habituit triplicem cognitionem isti triplici statui convenientem, videlicet cognitionem gloriae, cognitionem naturae integrae et cognitionem poenalis experientiae, ut de quolibet statu aliquid in se haberet. […] Patet etiam harum trium cognitionum sufficientia, necessitas et distinctio, quae potest sumi vel ex parte virium, scilicet superioris rationis, inferioris et sensualitatis;” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. (III, 319–320). Bonaventure claims that these cognitions also corresponded to the three states of the human being (the state of beatitude, the state before the Fall, and the state after the Fall) and three modes where things can exist (in the Word of God, in the intellect, and in their own nature). (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 1. (III, 319–320).) See also Vaughan 1957, 46; Murray 1963, 60–61.

30 Augustine, De Trinitate lib. 13, cap. 1. p. 381–385, PLL 42, 1013–1016. See also Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, pars 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564).

31 “Et ideo alii voluerunt dicere, quod quamvis alii homines cognoscant Verbum increatum mediante habitu cognitionis creatae, et Christus etiam quantum ad scientiam comprehensionis, in qua communicat cum alius hominibus; tamen quantum ad scientiam unionis, cum habeat
One of the questions discussed until the early fourteenth century was whether the knowledge of the Word of God in Christ requires the superadded light of glory, which somehow aided Christ’s human intellect to see the Word of God. Here the discussion about the knowledge of Christ engaged the discussion about the divine illumination of the human intellect, which was a major theme in medieval psychology. Bonaventure argues that like all other human souls, also Christ’s human soul requires the light of glory, because only a godlike soul is able to see God. He clarifies that the light of glory or the created wisdom is a habit that makes a soul godlike. The intellect does not have the light in itself, but God gives it. Christ’s human soul also had the light of glory, which was a created habit that disposed the cognitive powers of the soul to be able to see the Word of God. Bonaventure argues that since Christ’s human soul was more godlike than any other created soul, the soul knew the Word of God more completely than other souls. He explains that when Christ’s human soul saw the Word of God, it was passive rather than active; he bases this on the Aristotelian claim that thinking is receiving rather than acting. However, the human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because he did not know the Word of God completely (totaliter), since the Word of God was infinite. Nevertheless, he knew the whole (totus) Word of God, not only parts of it, since the Word of God was simple. Bonaventure expounds that it is difficult to understand how ipsum Verbum sibi intime unitum, cognoscit absque omni alio habitu medio. Cum enim habeat sapientiam increatam sibi unitam, non per medium, sed per se ipsam, cognoscere potest se ipsa; et hoc est solius illius animae proprium, quae a Verbo est assumta. [...] tamen hoc a veritate deviat, si quis intueatur. Verbum enim non unitur animae Christi in illa beata unione, sicut cognoscibile cognoscenti [...] sed est unio in unitate personae, quae potest esse absque cognitione; [...] Unde non est intelligendum, quod scientia unionis distinguatur a scientia comprehensionis, quasi non sit per aliquem habitum medium, sed quia excellenter et amplior deiformitas et claritas collata est animae Christi ex hoc, quod Verbo unita est, quam ex hoc, quod simpliciter est beata.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 297). See also Forster 1958, 65.

32 For divine illumination in the medieval discussions, see Marrone 2001; Pasnau 2015; Toivo Holopainen 2014, 263.

33 “Alium igitur modum unionis necesse est esse ad hoc, quod anima cognoscat Verbum sibi unitum in unitatem personae; hic autem est per assimilationem cognoscentem ad cognitum, et ita per aliquam influentiam, quae ipsum animam cognoscentem faciat Deo similarem ac deiformem, et ita per aliquem habitum ipsum animam informantem, qui quidem habitus non potest esse nisi aliud creatum. [...] Et propertia dicere oportet tertio modo, quod anima Christi, sicut et animae aliorum Sanctorum, Verbum increatum cognoscit per sapientiam creatam, quae disponit ipsarum animarum potentias cognitivitas et formarum reddidit, ut illud lumen aeternum cognoscant. [...] Anima autem Christi, quia a Verbo est assumta, maiorem habet deiformitatem, ac per hoc perfectiorem et eminentiorem cognitionem, quam aliqua anima beata per gloriem.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. (III, 297). See also Bonaventure, De scientia Christi q. 5, p. 29–30; Hayes 2000, 108.

34 “[...] dicendum, quod anima in cognoscenti Deum plus est in suscipienti quam in agendo, immo omnis potentia animae respectu Dei se habet in ratione passivi, - nedum potentia cognitiva active, quae de sua ratione dict quodam modo passionem, sicut dict Philosopher et Priscianus.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 3 (III, 305).
the soul knew the whole Word of God, but did not know it totally. He clarifies, for example, that in a corresponding way, a weak eye can see the entirety of a little white thing but it cannot comprehend the excellence of its whiteness.\textsuperscript{35}

Following Augustine’s view of angelic knowledge, Bonaventure explains that Christ not only knew the Word of God, but also all created things in the Word, which was the basis for knowing (\textit{ratio cognoscendi}) all other things. Since Christ knew the Word of God through the light of glory, which was a habit, the soul also knew things in the Word of God through the same habit.\textsuperscript{36} The most important of Bonaventure’s contributions to the discussion about Christ’s knowledge is his idea that the human Christ knew habitually everything that God knows. Bonaventure thinks that the question about the omniscience of Christ’s human soul pertains to the knowledge of things in the Word of God. Contrary to Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure argues that, unlike any other created soul, Christ’s human soul knew in the Word of God habitually everything that God knows because his soul had an inborn readiness to know all things in the Word of God. However, the soul did not know actually all things. Bonaventure describes that the soul was able to know habitually all things in the Word of God because the soul knew perfectly the Word and the Word was willing to reveal everything to the human Christ.\textsuperscript{37} He holds that the

\textsuperscript{35} “Et propterea est tertius modus communior, probabilior et certior, quod nec anima Christi nec aliqua creatura comprehendere potest immensitatem Verbi increatit sive ipsius Dei, et tamen ipsum totum cognoscit. - Et possunt ista duo simul stare, immo necesse est ponere, quamvis difficile sit intellectu nostro capere. Si enim vere ponimus Deum simplicem, immo quia necessarium est sic credere et ponere; si cognoscit, iam non secundum partem et partem, sed totus cognoscit. Rursus, si Deum ponimus immensum, quia hoc creditimus et fatermus; necesse est ponere, quod nunquam ab intellectu finito comprehendarunt totaliter; et sic Deus a quacumque creatura ipsum cognoscente totus cognoscit, sed tamen non totaliter. Si autem quaeratur, quomodo illud possit intelligi: dicendum, quod difficillimum est intelligere, quia plus reperitur in creaturis de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine. - Intelligamus tamen gratia exempli aliquem oculum, cuius aspectus non sit omnino clarus; et intelligamus aliquod parvum album, tamen intensum in luminositate et claritate coloris: oculus ille videbit illud album totum, tamen eminentiam illius albedinis non comprehendet; sic suo modo in proposito intelligendum est.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 300).

\textsuperscript{36} “Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum est sufficientissima ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a se […] ad hoc, quod aliquis cognoscat res in Verbo, non oportet in ipso esse gminam cognitionem ipsius Verbi et ipsius rei cognitae; gminam, dico, quantum ad habitum cognoscendi, propter hoc, quod habens deiformitatem gloriae, per quam cognoscit ipsum Verbum, habet unde assimiletur ipsi Verbo, quod est perfecta ratio cognoscendi omnia alia, et ita, cognosce Verbum, habet habitum, quo possit cognoscere alia, ita quod habitus ille, prout dicitur esse Verbi et aliorum a Verbo, non differt nisi sola comparatione.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 1 (III, 308). See also Adams 1999, 32–33; Hayes 2000, 109–110.

\textsuperscript{37} “Et propterea est tertius modi distinguendi, quod contingit aliquid cognoscendi cognitione habituali et cognitione actuali, […] Siigitur loquamur de cognitione quantum ad actum considerationis, sic dicendum est, quod anima Christi nunquam tot cognoscit, quod cognoscit ipsum Verbum. Per nullam enim gloriarn potest adeo sublevari creatura, ut simul et in actu
human Christ knew in the Word of God continuously and actually only things which pertain to glory, whereas other things he knew habitually.\textsuperscript{38} Even though Christ’s human soul was not able to know actually all things at once, it was able to know actually whatever thing in the Word of God whenever the soul wanted to know actually it because it was able to voluntarily actualize the habitual cognition about things in the Word of God.\textsuperscript{39} However, Bonaventure does not explain how the will could wish to know something which the intellect had not actually considered before.

According to Bonaventure, the human Christ not only knew things in the Word of God, but also in themselves through the infused intelligible species which God located in Christ’s human soul at the moment of his conception. Christ shared this knowledge with angels and prelapsarian human beings.\textsuperscript{40} The idea of intelligible species was a much-discussed theme in psychology as well as a branch of natural philosophy, where they were studied as being acquired through the activity of the agent intellect and the senses. Although the idea of infused intelligible species was based on this discussion, these differed from acquired intelligible species because God infused them in the intellect. Hence, the discussion about the psychology of the incarnation shows that a human intellect can have intelligible species.
which are not acquired through the activity of the agent intellect and the senses.

According to Bonaventure, because Christ’s human soul had all infused intelligible species which a human being can have from the moment of conception, it did not progress in this knowledge. However, the experiential knowledge progressed when the external senses apprehended things which they had not perceived before. Following Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure emphasizes that Christ’s human soul knew things before the soul perceived them. When an exterior sense of Christ perceived a thing for the first time, the soul already knew a thing through the infused intelligible species, but it knew the object in a new way when it came to know it through experience.

Although Christ had all intelligible species, his agent intellect also abstracted them. Bonaventure explains that, unlike the agent intellect of the normal human being, Christ’s agent intellect did not abstract the intelligible species in order to acquire new knowledge, since the intellect already had the infused intelligible species of all things, but in order for the intellect to form judgement about sensible things. He claims that when the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species for this end, the intellect does not acquire new knowledge but it begins to think about sensed things. It abstracts the intelligible species so that the intellect can consider a thing, which the senses perceive. Bonaventure argues that because the intellect cannot have two intelligible species of the same thing at once, Christ intellect was not able to acquire new intelligible species since God infused all intelligible species into Christ’s human soul.
1.3. Thomas Aquinas, Richard Middleton, Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude

Thomas Aquinas’s view of Christ’s knowledge differs from that of Bonaventure because Aquinas thinks that Christ’s human soul did not know everything that God knows. Furthermore, Aquinas bases his doctrine on Aristotelian psychology more than Bonaventure. According to Aquinas, the human Christ knew the Word of God, things in the Word of God and things in themselves. His soul also had experiential certitude or experiential knowledge.

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Aquinas claims, like Bonaventure, that knowledge of the Word of God required the light of glory because seeing the Word of God was beyond the natural capacity of the soul. The light of glory explained how the intellect of the human being could know the divine essence which it could not know by its natural capacity, as the intellect of the human being could know naturally only sensible things. Aquinas explains that the light of glory perfected Christ’s intellect so that it was able to see the Word immediately. In Aristotelian psychology, when the passive intellect is aware of the sensible realm, it is activated by the agent intellect and the intelligible species. Aquinas argues, however, that knowledge of the Word of God did not require an intelligible species or activity of the agent intellect. Therefore, Christ’s soul saw the Word immediately. Aquinas explains that the intelligible species were not needed because an intelligible species cannot represent completely the divine essence and the light of the agent intellect was not required because the Word of God was actually knowable. He explains that

formas sive novas species reciperet: ergo non potuit in cognitione proficere.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 14, a. 3, q. 2. (III, 322). See also Murray 1963, 63.

“Sed quia illa visio excedit omnum facultatem naturae creatae, ideo ad illum visionem non sufficit lumen naturae, sed oportet ut superaddatur lumen gloriae.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 co. “Sic igitur dicendum est, quod anima Christi in cognitione qua verbum videbat, indiguit habitu, quod est lumen, non ut per quod fieret aliquid intelligibile actu, sicut est in nobis lumen intellectus agentis; sed ut per quod intellectus elevaretur creatus in id quod est supra se.” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 20, a. 2 co. “[...] anima Christi videt verbum sine medio quod sit similitudo rei visae, sicut species in oculo est similitudo visibilis, vel sicut speculum est similitudo rei speculatae: non autem videt sine medio quod sit dispositio videntis.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Iª q. 12 a. 5 co; ad 2.
as the light of the agent intellect makes sensible things which are potentially knowable actually knowable, it is not needed when an object is actually knowable. Aquinas thinks that although Christ’s human soul saw the divine essence, his soul did not comprehend it: the created intellect was not able to attain the whole intelligibility of God as the light of glory which perfected the intellect was created and finite, and God is infinite. However, Christ’s human soul saw the divine essence more perfectly than any other creature because the soul had the light of glory more completely.

Aquinas’s answer to the question of Christ’s ability to know everything that God knows was different from Bonaventure’s account. The difference was significant because later the Dominican theologians mostly favoured the view of Aquinas, while the Franciscan theologians followed that of Bonaventure. Hence, the view about the omniscience of Christ was one distinguishing factor between the Franciscan and the Thomistic intellectual traditions. According to Aquinas, Christ’s human soul did not know in the Word of God everything that God knows. It knew everything

46 “In cognitione autem qua anima Christi...” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 co. “...animas Christi videt verbum sine medio quod sit similitudinem rei visae, sicut species in oculo est similitudo visibilis, vel sicut speculum est similitudo rei speculatae;” *De veritate* q. 20, a. 2 ad 1.

47 “Est autem impossibile quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam, sicut in prima parte dictum est, eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 10, a. 1 co. “Nullus autem intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscebile est. Quod sic patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 12, a. 7 co. See also *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 20, a. 4 co. The idea of God’s incomprehensibility was part of Aquinas’s view of negative theology. Aquinas argued that God was incomprehensible not only in this life but also in Heaven since God always exceeded every kind of knowledge. For Aquinas on God’s incomprehensibility, see Rocca 2004, 27–48. For Aquinas on Dionysian mysticism, see Blankenhorn 2015, 215–441.

48 “Huic autem verbo Dei propinquius coniungitur anima Christi, quae est unita verbo in persona, quam quaevis alia creatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis in quo Deus videtur ab ipso verbo, quam quaeque alia creatura. Et ideo prae ceteris creaturis perfectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 10, a. 4 co.
which was, is or will be, but it did not know things which were possible but never actual, that is to say, divine unrealized possibilities.\footnote{For Aquinas on unrealized divine possibilities, see Knuuttila 1993, 132.} Things that were possible but never actual were things which God could create, but he did not, which existed only in God’s power. Aquinas argues that Christ’s human soul did not know the divine unrealized possibilities because it did not comprehend the divine power and did not know things which were in God’s power as it did not comprehend the divine essence. However, Christ’s human soul knew all things that creatures can do but never do because it comprehended the essences of all creatures in the Word of God.\footnote{“Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an Christus cognoscat omnia in verbo, dicendum est quod omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie, ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quocumque tempus. Et sic dicendum est quod omnia Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. […] Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum quocumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non omnia cognoscit in verbo anima Christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae Deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaealibet cognoscitur per cognitionem eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima Christi in verbo. Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologicae} IIIª q. 10, a. 2 co; \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 4 co; q. 20, a. 5 co.} Hence, the human Christ did not know possible things that God could create, but he knew all possible things that creatures could do.

The distinction between knowledge of things that are actual sometimes and knowledge of things that never are actual corresponds to the distinction between God’s knowledge of vision (\textit{scientia visionis}) and knowledge of simple understanding (\textit{scientia simplicis intelligentiae}). Aquinas claims that God knows things that are actual sometimes by the knowledge of vision and He knows things that are never actual by the knowledge of simple understanding. The human Christ knew everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision, but he did not know everything that God knows by the knowledge of simple understanding.\footnote{“[…] Deus perfectius cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima Christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quocumque tempus, quae dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo habitum est. Scit ergo anima Christi omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae. Et ista plura scit Deus in seipso quam anima Christi.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologicae} IIIª q. 10, a. 2, ad 2. See also Thomas Aquinas \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 4 ad 1.}

Distinct from Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that everything that Christ’s human soul knew in the Word of God, it knew actually and continuously. Because the soul knew many things in the Word of God, this
indicates that it knew many things actually at the same time. However, this involves a philosophical problem, as Aristotle claims in his *Topics* that one can understand only one thing at once.\(^{52}\) How is Aquinas’s view compatible with Aristotle’s idea? Aquinas argues that according to Aristotle, the intellect can understand only one thing at once when the intellect knows through the intelligible species because only one intelligible species can inform the intellect at once. However, the intellect can understand many things at once when many things are known through one intelligible species or in one thing. For example, when the intellect understands the quiddity of the human being through one intelligible species, it can understand the ideas of the animal and rationality at the same time. Similarly, according to Aquinas, Christ’s human soul was able to know many things at the same time by one act of the intellect because the soul knew many things in the one Word of God.\(^{53}\)

The human Christ also knew things in themselves because the soul had infused intelligible species. Unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas explains that knowledge of things in the Word of God differed from knowledge of things in themselves because the medium of knowing (*medius cognoscendi*) was different. In the first case, the medium was the Word of God, whereas in the second case the medium was the infused intelligible species.\(^{54}\) Aquinas argues that although the soul knew things in the Word of God, it also knew them through infused intelligible species because the perfection of Christ’s passive intellect required them. This indicates that Aquinas’s view of Christ’s knowledge of things in themselves is based on the Aristotelian idea of the passive intellect. He expounds that the passive intellect is a potential for all intelligible beings, but it is imperfect when it stays in potentiality. Because Christ’s human nature was perfect, Christ’s passive intellect was actual through the intelligible species, which the Word of God located in Christ’s intellect. God gave to Christ’s intellect all the intelligible species...

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\(^{52}\) Aristotle, *Topica* II.10, 114b33–35.

\(^{53}\) “[...] ratio quam assignant Philosophi, quare intellectus noster non potest simul plura intelligere, est haec, quia oportet quod intellectus figuretur specie rei intelligibilis. Impossibile est autem quod simul figuretur pluribus speciebus, sicut impossibile est quod corpus simul figuretur pluribus figuris. Et ideo si aliqua cognoscuntur per unam speciem, illa nihil prohibet simul cognoscendi; sicut homo intelligens quidditatem hominis, simul intelligit animal et ratione. Et propter hoc etiam intelligens propositionem, simul intelligit praedicatum et subjectum, quia intelligit ea ut unum. Et ideo anima Christi cum intelligit omnia quae sunt in uno, scilicet Verbo, etiam simul et uno intuitu omnia cognoscit actu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4 co.

\(^{54}\) “Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod cognitio rerum in proprio genere et cognitio rerum in Verbo differunt, non quantum ad res cognitas, sed quantum ad medium cognoscenti quod est id in quo res cognoscitur; quia cognitio quae est rerum in Verbo, habet medium cognoscenti ipsum verbum; cognitio autem rerum in proprio genere, habet medium cognoscenti rerum similitudines quae sunt in intellectu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 co.
which a soul was able to have.\textsuperscript{55} The passive intellect knew by the infused knowledge everything that can be known through the light of the agent intellect in human sciences and other things only revealed through divine revelation.\textsuperscript{56} In the \textit{Summa theologiae}, Aquinas claims that Christ knew also all past, present and future particulars,\textsuperscript{57} but in his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences} he states without clarification that Christ did not know all the deeds (\textit{gestum}) of individual human beings\textsuperscript{58} and in \textit{De veritate} he explains that Christ did not know all future contingents and all thoughts of hearts.\textsuperscript{59}

According to Aquinas, the infused knowledge was habitual knowledge.\textsuperscript{60} His description about the habit of the infused knowledge differs in his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences} and the \textit{Summa theologiae}. In his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, Aquinas argues that Christ’s human soul had only one habit although he had many intelligible species because Christ’s knowledge about things in themselves was the clearest possible knowledge of things in themselves what a creature can have.\textsuperscript{61} In the \textit{Summa theologiae}, he claims that although Christ’s infused knowledge was the most perfect

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} “[…] debeat quod natura humana assumpta a verbo Dei, imperfecta non esset. Omne autem quod est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Intellectus autem possibilis humanus est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Reducitur autem ad actum per species intelligibiles, quae sunt formae quaedam compl etae ipsius, […] Et ideo oportet in Christo scientiam ponere inditam, inquantum per verbum Dei animae Christi, sibi personaliter unitae, impressae sunt species intelligibiles ad omnia ad quae est intellectus possibilis in potentia.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 9, a. 3 co; \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, q. c. 5 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 3 co; a. 6. co.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} “Et ideo secundum eam anima Christi primo quidem cognovit quaecumque ab homine cognocsci possunt per virtutem luminis intellectus agentis, sicut sunt quaecumque pertinent ad scientias humanas. Secundo vero per hanc scientiam cognovit Christus omnia illa quae per revelationem divinam honibilis innotescunt, sive pertinental ad donum sapientiae, sive ad donum prophetiae, sive ad quodcumque donum spiritus sancti.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 11, a. 1 co. See also \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 6 co.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} “Quia igitur Christus habuit plenitudinem prudentiae, secundum donum consili, consequens est quod cognovit omnia singularia praeterita, praesentia et futura.” \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 11 a. 1 ad 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} “[…] hoc genere cognitionis non cognovit ipsam essentiam increatam, nec alia omnia quae ad perfectionem intellectivae partis non pertinent, neque secundum naturam neque secundum gratiam, sicut sunt gesta particularium hominum et hujusmodi: quae tamen omnia cognovit in Verbo.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3 d. 14 q. 1 a. 3 q. 1 co.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} “Sed quaedam sunt ad quae naturalis cognitio nullo modo se extendere potest; sicut est ipsa divina essentia, futura contingentia, cogitationes cordium, et alia hujusmodi.” \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 6 co.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} “Et sic patet quod modus connaturalis animae humanae est ut recipiat scientiam per modum habitus. Et ideo dicendum est quod scientia indita animae Christi fuit habitualis, poterat enim ea uti quando volebat.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 11, a. 5 co. See also \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, q. 4 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 20, a. 2 co.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} “Unde cum anima Christi habuerit limpidissimam cognitionem inter omnes creaturas, scientia ejus fuit magis unita et per formas magis universales quam aliqua scientia creaturae. […] Quia ergo anima Christi habuit scientiam magis universalem quam aliquis angelus, ideo non habuit diversos habitus quibus cognosceret, sed uno habitu omnia cognovit quae ad hanc scientiam pertinent, quamvis diversis speciebus.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, q. 4 co.
\end{itemize}
knowledge, it involved many habits because it is natural for a human being to have many habits when he has many intelligible species. It seems that Aquinas made this change in *Summa theologiae* because he emphasized that the infused knowledge of Christ was related to the mode of the knowledge of the normal human being, albeit a normal human being does not have such infused knowledge.

Because the infused knowledge was habitual knowledge, unlike knowledge of things in the Word of God, the knowledge was not always actual. That is to say, the soul did not actually know everything that the soul was able to know by means of infused knowledge. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas seems to think that Christ’s intellect actualized his habitual knowledge when reason considered conclusions from principles like effects from causes, and the actual knowledge required that the possible intellect used phantasms as its object. In the *Summa theologiae*, he adds that command of the will actualized the habitual knowledge and this knowledge did not necessarily require phantasms. When Aquinas claims that the infused knowledge did not require conversion to phantasms, he departs from the standard Aristotelian view in psychology, as it was within a branch of natural philosophy that intellectual cognition needed sensory cognition. Aquinas thinks that the infused knowledge of Christ’s human soul differed from the knowledge of the normal human being in this respect because Christ’s human soul was blessed.

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62 “[…] scientia indita animae Christi habuit modum connaturalem animae humanae. Est autem connaturale animae humanae ut recipiat species in minori universalitate quam Angeli, ita scilicet quod diversas naturas specificas per diversas intelligibiles species cognoscat. Ex hoc autem contingit quod in nobis sunt diversi habitus scientiarum […] Et ideo scientia indita animae Christi fuit distincta secundum diversos habitus.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 11, a. 6 co. “[…] scientia animae Christi est perfectissima, et excedens scientiam Angelorum, quantum ad id quod consideratur in ea ex parte Dei influentis, est tamen infra scientiam angelicam quantum ad modum recipientis. Et ad huiusmodi modum pertinet quod scientia illa per multos habitus distinguatur, quasi per species magis particulars existens.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 11 a. 6 ad 1.

63 See also Murray 1963, 90–91.

64 “Unde non oportuit quod semper esset in actu.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 11, a. 5 ad 1.

65 “[…] secundum quam homo ea quae habitu tenet, in actu ducens, ex principii considerat conclusiones sicut ex causis effectus; et sic collativa scientia fuit in Christo.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent*. lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3 co.

66 “Et quia Christus cognovit intellectu possibili, cujus est objectum phantasma, ideo cognovit ea cum continuo et tempore, uten phantasmatis quasi objectis intellectus, non quidem sicut ab eis speciem accipientis, sed sicut species circa ea ponens; sicut in eo contingit qui habet habitum et actu aliqua considerat.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent*. lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 qc. 2 co.

67 “/Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus reductur in actum ad imperium voluntatis, nam habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 11, a. 5 ad 2.

68 “Ex hoc autem anima hominis viatoris indiget ad phantasmata converti, quod est corpori obligata, et quodammodo ei subjicet et ab eo dependens. Et ideo animae beatae, et ante
Aquinas’s argument is obscure since he does not explain how the infused knowledge was related to the blessedness of Christ’s soul.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences* and *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas not only proposes different views with regard to the infused knowledge, but he also changes his mind concerning the progression of Christ’s human soul in the knowledge. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas argues that Christ had experiential certitude (*certitudo experimentalis*), but he does not explain in detail what it was. He only mentions that a soul has experiential certitude about a thing when a soul perceives it. Aquinas argues that Christ progressed in experiential certitude because the knowledge of things in themselves became more certain when the soul perceived things which it already knew through the infused intelligible species. He holds that when Christ perceived things for the first time, he did not acquire more knowledge in the sense that the soul became aware of things which the soul did not know before. The soul knew all things it encountered since it had all intelligible species from the moment of conception; only the certitude of things already known increased.\(^{69}\) Aquinas explains that the acquiring of experiential certitude included the act of the agent intellect. When Christ acquired experiential certitude, the light of his agent intellect did not abstract new intelligible species, but agent intellect turned towards species which were in the phantasy.\(^{70}\)

In his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas proposes a new view of the progression of Christ in knowledge. The soul progressed in knowledge because it acquired new experiential knowledge. Aquinas argues that as the perfection of Christ’s passive intellect required knowledge through infused intelligible species, Christ’s agent intellect required acquired or experiential

\(^{69}\) “[…] scientia Christi nunquam crevit quantum ad genus cognitionis, quia illud genus cognitionis sequitur naturam humanam, quae in ipso semper permansit; nec iterum quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia omnia scivit a primo instanti suae conceptionis quae ad hanc scientiam pertinent: crevit autem quantum ad aliquem modum certitudinis. Cum enim anima nostra secundum naturam sit media inter intellectum purum, qualis est in Angelis, et sensus, dupliciter certificatur de aliquibus. Uno modo ex lumine intellectus, qualis est certitudo in demonstrationibus eorum quae nunquam visa sunt. Alio modo ex sensu, sicut cum aliquid est certus de his quae videt sensibiliter. […] et haec vocatur certitudo experimentalis. Et quantum ad hanc crevit scientia Christi inquantum quotidianaliter aliqua videbat sensibiliter quae prius non viderat; non autem crevit quantum ad essentiam.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 5 co.

\(^{70}\) “[…] per lumen intellectus agentis in Christo, non fuit aliqua species de novo recepta in intellectu possibili ejus, sed fuit facta conversione nova ad species quae erant in phantasla, sicut est in eo qui habet habitum scientiae eorum quae imaginatur vel videt.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 5 ad 3.
knowledge through acquired intelligible species. He argues that Christ’s agent intellect would have been useless if it had not abstracted new intelligible species. This is because an operation proper to the active intellect is to make intelligible species actual by abstracting them from phantasms. The agent intellect that does not perform its operation is useless. Since Christ had the agent intellect and he did not have anything useless, Christ’s agent intellect abstracted the intelligible species which his passive intellect received, and then the soul acquired the experiential knowledge. Acquired knowledge differed from infused knowledge because the former is from phantasms but the latter is given by God. Christ progressed in the acquired knowledge because the agent intellect abstracted more and more intelligible species from phantasms in the course of Christ’s life. The more the agent intellect abstracted intelligible species, the more the habit of acquired knowledge advanced. Therefore, according to Aquinas, Christ progressed in knowledge in the sense that the habit of acquired knowledge increased. He further explains that Christ also knew things which he did not experience through things which he did experience. For example, Christ knew causes which he did not experience through effects which he did experience.

71 “[...] scientia acquisita ponitur in anima Christi [...] propter convenientiam intellectus agentis, ne eius actio sit otiosa, qua facit intelligibilia actu, sicut etiam scientia indita vel infusa ponitur in anima Christi ad perfectionem intellectus possibilis.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 12, a. 1 co. “Deinde considerandum est de scientia animae Christi acquisita vel experimentalis.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 12 pr.

72 “Unde necesse est dicere quod in anima Christi non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens fuerit. Si autem in aliis Deus et natura nihil frustra fecerunt, ut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo, multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem [...]. Propria autem operatio intellectus agens est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus, [...] Sic igitur neceesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerunt aliqua species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibilis eius receptae. Quod est esse in ipso scientiam acquisitam, quam quidam experimentalem nominant.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 9, a. 4 co.

73 “[...] alia ratio est de habitu acquisito, et de habitu infuso. Nam habitus scientiae acquiritur per comparationem humanae mentis ad phantasmatum, unde secundum eandem rationem non potest aliquus habitus iterato acquiri. Sed habitus scientiae infusae est aliter rationis, utpote a superiori descendens in animam, non secundum proportionem phantasmatum. Et ideo non est eadem ratio de utroque habitu.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 9 a. 4 ad 3.

74 “Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere. Et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi aliquis habitus scientiae fuit qui per huiusmodi abstractionem specierum potuerit augmentari, ex hoc scilicet quod intellectus agens, post primas species intelligibiles abstractas a phantasmatibus, poterat etiam alias abstrahere.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 12 a. 2 co.

75 “[...] scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarumdam aliarum rerum, cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria. Sic igitur, licet Christus non fuerit omnia expetus, ex his
Why did Aquinas change his mind about the experiential knowledge in *Summa theologiae*? It seems that Aquinas thought that the view proposed in his *Commentary on the Sentences* was incomplete as related to Aristotelian psychology, because, according to Aristotelian psychology, the proper act of the agent intellect was abstraction of the intelligible species from phantasms, and without abstraction the agent intellect was useless.\(^76\) The view of Christ’s acquired knowledge was significant because Aquinas was the first to apply the idea of the acquired knowledge, which was a much-discussed theme in psychology as it was part of the natural philosophy, to the psychology of the incarnation.

Later on, Franciscan Richard Middleton based his view on the knowledge of Christ on Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s views, whereas Dominicans Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter of Palude followed especially Aquinas. While Forster claims that Richard was in substantial agreement with the Thomistic teaching,\(^77\) I think that he puts too much emphasis on the similarity between Middleton’s and Aquinas’s views, because Middleton was clearly influenced also by Bonaventure’s works. Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Richard Middleton also argues that the human Christ had a clear vision about the Word of God which was the ultimate perfection of the intellect.\(^78\) Such vision required the light of glory since the vision exceeded the natural capacity of the intellect. Richard explains that the human intellect can know naturally only sensible material things because the human intellect is rooted in a form which perfects sensible matter. Since the Word of God is pure existence (*purum esse*), the human intellect or any other created intellect cannot know it immediately and clearly without the supernatural light of glory.\(^79\) Following Bonaventure, he states that Christ’s intellect, including
his agent intellect, was purely passive when it saw the Word of God, and he explains that the light of glory disposed of Christ’s intellect to receive the vision from the Word of God, which was the present and immediate object of the vision. Richard expounds that the vision was a passion, which emphasizes that the intellect received rather than actively elicited the vision. The vision did not involve the intelligible species because if it had involved it, Christ would have been able to know the Word of God even when the Word was not present, since, according to Richard, the intelligible species is a sufficient reason for knowing a thing even when a thing is not present. The human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because Christ’s human soul did not attain the whole intelligibility of infinite God, as the soul was not able to elicit or receive the infinite act of the intellect.

According to Richard, the human Christ also had knowledge of things in the Word of God. He knew the Word of God and things in it through the same act because the subject of these cognitions were the same intellect, he knew the Word of God and things in it at the same time and through the same basis for knowing which was the Word of God. Following


81 “Ideo videtur aliis dicendum, quod intellectus animae Christi, et quicunque intellectus beatus in videndo verbum, pure passivum est. Unde cum intellectus per lumen gloriae sufficientes sit dispositus ad recipiendum in se istam passionem, quae est visio verbi, quae passio est perfectio, et salus ipsius intellectus, et ipsum verbum, cum sit praens, et intimum intellectui, potens sit per se ipsum immediate movere ipsum intellectum, sicut obiectum movet passivam potentiam, non requiritur aliqua species creatae, per quam, praedicta motione intellectui moveatur, vel per quam praedicta visio in ipso intellectu efficancetur, et secundum hanc opinionem, quamvis ipsa visio verbi sit in intellectu animae Christi, non tamen est ab ipso intellectu, sed tantum a verbo sicut a praesenti, et immediato obiecto, nec ex hac opinione sequitur, quod intellectus agens in videndo Deum, sit ociosus: quia tanta illud, quod est in anima, possibile est: sed illud, quod est in ea activum respectu visionis divinae, est passivum, quia illa passio nobilior est omni actione, quae per virtutem creatam possit efficere.” Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, p. 131.

82 “Ad istam questionem dicunt aliqui, quod anima Christi per aliquam speciem creatam videt verbum, […] Sed contra, si hoc esset verum, intellectus animae Christi per illam speciem videret verbum, etiam dato per impossibile, quod verbum sibi non esset essentialiter praesens, quia ea, quorum species est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi, ea eaequaliter cognoscentur absintia, sicut praesentia, dum tamen species eorum praesens sit apud intellectum.” Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 14, a. 1, q. 3, p. 131.


Aquinas, Richard clarifies that Christ knew actually things which were, are and will be, but not everything that God knows because the human Christ did not know actually all divine unrealized possibilities, as he did not comprehend the Word of God and he did not have an infinite power. However, contrary to Aquinas but taking a step toward Bonaventure, Richard claims that the soul knew actually some of the divine unrealized possibilities, but not all of them. In addition, the human Christ did not know all future thoughts of human beings and angels because the number of such thoughts are infinite. Richard also repeats Bonaventure’s view that the human Christ knew habitually things in the Word of God, but he does not express whether he favours it. He describes Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s views accurately when he says that, according to Bonaventure, the human Christ was able to know actually endlessly more and more things in the Word of God, but according to Aquinas, Christ was not able to know actually more things in the Word of God than he already knew.

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“Respondeo, quod anima Christi non videt actu in verbo omnia, quae videt verbum. […]”


“[…] unde credo, quod actu videt in verbo simul omnia praesentia, praeterita, et futura. Loquendo de illis rebus futuris, quantum una aliis non succeedit sine fine, quod dico propter cognitiones hominum, et angelorum respectu rerum in proprio genere, quarum una aliis poterit succedere sine fine. Unde si anima Christi omnia talia futura actu videre in verbo, actu videre in ipso, ultra omne determinatum numerum, et si sic actu videre infinita in verbo, videre etiam anima Christi in verbo multa fieri possibilis, quae nuncquam fieret.”


“Ad istam questionem dicunt aliqui, quod animae Christi de novo potest videre in verbo aliquid in actu […]”

Christ also knew things in themselves because he had infused intelligible species. According to Richard, the content of knowledge of things in the Word of God and knowledge of things in themselves overlapped, but cognitions differed from each other because the basis for knowing differed, since things were known in the Word of God and through infused intelligible species. Christ had the intelligible species of all past and present things, as well as future things which were limited in number, but not future things which were not limited in number, such as future thoughts. The infused knowledge of Christ involved only one habit, but several intelligible species and acts. However, Christ’s intellect did not have many acts at once because the intellect was not able to know perfectly many things at the same time. Richard holds that Christ’s knowledge of things in themselves did not involve discursive thinking, that is to say, Christ did not acquire knowledge of conclusion through knowledge of principles and he did not form syllogisms. Instead, Christ knew principle and all conclusions virtually included in it at the same time by the same act. Hence, Christ’s
The intellect did not either compose or divide. Richard expounds that Christ progressed in experiences during his lifetime, but he does not explain in detail whether the experience of Christ involved the acquiring of the intelligible species or experiential certitude (like Aquinas thought), or only the perception of the external senses (like Bonaventure thought).

As Aquinas thinks that the knowledge of things in the Word of God was always actual, and infused and acquired knowledge were actual sometimes, this implies that at least two of Christ’s cognitions with the same content were actual at once. Aquinas does not explain how this was possible, but Richard Middleton tries to do so. Richard claims that Christ’s intellect had two simultaneous acts when the intellect knew things in the Word of God and things in themselves. He explains that the intellect can have two acts at once when acts do not belong to the same universal species or when one of the acts is more perfect, directive or otherwise related to another act. Richard argues that Christ’s intellect was able to have two acts at once because Christ’s knowledge of things in the Word of God and knowledge of things in themselves did not belong to the same universal species and the first knowledge ruled the second one. Richard does not explain how the knowledge of things in the Word ruled the knowledge of things in themselves, but as he follows Bonaventure’s view that the first-mentioned knowledge was in the superior part of the reason and the last-mentioned knowledge was in the inferior part of the reason, this indicates that the knowledge of things in the Word ruled the knowledge of things in themselves, like the superior part of the reason rules the inferior part of the reason.

Although Durand of St. Pourçain adopted some ideas from Aquinas, his understanding about Christ’s knowledge also differed from
Aquinas. However, Durand did not base his view on the Franciscan sources. Rather, he agreed with Aquinas on the basic views about the knowledge of Christ’s human soul, but he interpreted some of them in a new way. This shows that the Thomistic intellectual tradition was not uniform and it was not challenged only by Franciscan theologians who supported the Franciscan intellectual tradition, but also by Dominican theologians who worked within the Thomistic tradition.

According to Durand, Christ had the beatific knowledge and knowledge of things in themselves. Like Aquinas, Durand claims that Christ’s beatific knowledge required the light of glory which disposed of his intellect to receive the beatific vision from God. It is noteworthy that in the fourth book of his Commentary on the Sentences, Durand seems to think, however, that the intellect does not need the light of glory to see God, as the immediate presence of the divine essence is enough.

Christ also knew things in the Word of God. Unlike Bonaventure but like Aquinas, Durand argues that the human Christ did not know everything that God knows, but he explicates the idea differently than Aquinas. He holds that the intellect can have a twofold knowledge of things. The intellect can know what a thing is (quid sint) and whether a thing is (an sint). The first knowledge is about the quiddity or the essence, whereas the second is about the actual existence of the thing. For example, Durand explains that in the winter one can know what a rose is, but one cannot know whether a rose exists. One can also know that a rose exists without knowing what a rose is.

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96 For Durand of St. Pourçain on Christology, see Iribarren 2009.
97 “Nunc est ita quod lumen naturale intellectus, et lumen gloriae non se habent aequo immediate ad visionem beatam, quia quamuis utrumque se habeat passiue ad visionem beatam, tamen non aequo immediate, quia lumen naturale, intellectus est ratio recipiendi remota, lumen vero gloriae est dispositio propinqua et immediate.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, p. 237r.
98 “Tertius modus est quod ad uidendum Deum clare et manifeste non requiritur […] aliquod lumen creatum elevans intellectum […] sed sufficit quod diuina essentia immediate representaetur intellectui creato…” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 4, d. 49, q. 2, p. 414r.
99 The distinction of knowing what a thing is and whether a thing exists is based on Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora II. 1–2, 89b23–90a5. Like Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise also claims that the human Christ did not know everything that God knows because Christ knew all past, present, and future things but not all possible things. (Peter of Tarentaise, In IV libros sententiarum commentaria lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 100.)
101 “[...] illae duae cognitiones sunt separate, quia una potest esse sine alia, potest enim cognosciri de re quid sit, ignorando an sit, sicut de rosa potest sciri in hyeme quid est, et tamen ignorantur an est, et e contrario scitur de aliqua re an sit, et tamen ignorantur quod sit in speciali, sicut est etiam de multis rebus inuisis si offerentur his qui alias eas non uidierunt, nec audierunt,
According to Durand, Christ knew in the Word of God the essences of all things, even the essences of possible things, but not which of those things existed.\(^\text{102}\) Why did the soul know only the essences of the created things? Durand explains that the divine essence represents things as a cause represents effects. Since the divine essence is the necessary cause of the created essences, the divine essence necessarily represents the created essences. However, the divine essence does not necessarily represent the existence of the things because it effects the existence freely.\(^\text{103}\) Therefore, the human Christ knew in the Word of God what things are, but not whether they are. For example, he knew in the Word of God what a human being was and what a donkey was, but he did not know whether a human being or a donkey existed.\(^\text{104}\) Durand claims that the human Christ did not know in the Word of God as much as God knows because he knew only the essences of the things, while God knows also which individuals exist. Since there are more individuals than essences, God knows more things than Christ knew in the Word of God.\(^\text{105}\) Durand does not explain in detail how Christ’s human soul knew the existence of things. He claims that knowing when the

tales scient, quia res illae sunt, sed nescient quid sunt.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 4, d. 49, q. 3, p. 415v.

\(^\text{102}\) “Dicendum ergo quod anima Christi uidendo deum cognoscit in ipso omnia entis, et possibilia, quantum ad id quod sunt, de nullo tamen cognoscit ex natura talis uisionis, an sit, an non.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r. Walter Chatton also argues that a soul can know the essence but not the existence of a thing in the Word of God. (Walter Chatton, \textit{Reportatio super sententias} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 101–102.)

\(^\text{103}\) “Cuius ratio est ista, intellectus creatus uidens claris diuinam essentiam, uidet in ipso omnia quae per ipsum naturaliter, et ex necessitate repraesentat, alio uero non, sed essentia diuina naturaliter, et ex necessitate repraesentat omnes res entes, et possibles, quantum ad illud quod sunt. Non autem quantum ad actualement existentiam (scilicet an sint, an non) ergo omnis intellectus creatus tam Christi quam cuiuscunque alterius, uidendo deum, cognoscit in ipso de omni re ente uel possibili quid sit, non autem an sit. […] Quod autem repraesentet eas naturaliter, et ex necessitate probatur sic, diuina essentia repraesentat res creatas, sicut causa repraesentat effectum. Sed diuina essentia est causa secundum potentiam omnium rerum naturaliter ex necessitate quantum ad id quod sunt, licet non sit actu causa producens nisi libere. Est enim in potestate diuinae libertatis producere quamlibet rem, sed non est in libertate diuinae naturae posse producere quacunque rem, immo ex naturali perfectione diuinae essentie est habere potentiam omnia producendi.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r.

\(^\text{104}\) “[…] intellectus videns diuinam essentiam, uidet in ea omnia alia, quantum ad id quod sunt: scit enim de quacunque ente possibili quid est, ut quid est homo, et quid est asinus: non tamen scit utrum homo uel asinus sint in rerum nature ex natura talis uisionis: nec in hoc intellectus Christi excedit alios intellectus beatos, nisi in limpiditate videndi.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237r.

\(^\text{105}\) “[…] scientia animae Christi non aequatur scientiis diuinae, per hoc quod uidet omnia quantum ad id quod sunt, neque quantum ad numerum scitorum, neque quantum ad claritatem cognitionis, non quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia Deus non solum scit de rebus quid sint secundum naturam speciei et quidditatis, sed scit de unaquaque specie rei quot individua sunt actualiter, ut erant pro quacunque differentia temporis, […] numerus autem individuorum excedit numerum quidditatum secundum speciem.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.
Judgement Day will be is to know its existence and Christ knew it because God revealed it to him. However, Durand does not describe how Christ knew the existence of other things.\textsuperscript{106}

It is noteworthy that Durand seems to think that the distinction between knowing the essence of the thing and knowing the existence of the thing is not the same as the distinction between abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge. When Durand studies whether one can have evident knowledge about the truths of the sacred doctrine, he claims that intuitive knowledge is immediate knowledge of a thing as it is present in its actual existence.\textsuperscript{107} One kind of intuitive knowledge is sense perception. For example, when one sees that a rose held in the hand exists, that is intuitive knowledge of a rose. Abstract knowledge is indirect knowledge of a thing which is not present in its actual existence. Knowledge of the essence of the thing is abstract knowledge because it is not known whether a thing exists. However, when one knows that a thing exists, it does not necessarily entail intuitive knowledge. Durand holds that one knows abstractly that a thing exists when it is known indirectly through demonstration. For example, an astronomer who is sitting in a room knows that a lunar eclipse exists at a specific moment because he knows that the earth, the moon and the sun are related, so that the lunar eclipse takes place. However, he does not know intuitively that the lunar eclipse exists, because he does not know this directly but through a demonstration.\textsuperscript{108}

According to Durand, Christ also knew things in themselves, but his understanding about this knowledge differs from Aquinas’s one.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} “[…] illa cognitio de die iudicii quando futura sit, est cognitio an sit, vel quando erit; et talem cognitionem nullus beatus praeter Deum habet ex natura visionis divinae, ut dictum fuit: nihilominus quamuis anima Christi hoc modo non habuit cognitionem de die iudicii, habuit tamen per revelationem: dicitur tamen nescire, quia non fecit nos scire.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII}, lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.

\textsuperscript{107} For more about Durand on intuitive knowledge, see Piché 2009, 423–429.

\textsuperscript{108} “Vocant cognitionem intuitivam illam quae immediate tendit ad rem sibi praesentem obiectui, secundum eius actualum existentiam: sicut cum uideo colorum existentem in pariete, uel rosam, quam in manu teneo. Abstractiuam autem uocat, omnem cognitionem, quae habetur de re, non sic realiter praesens in ratione obiecti immediate cogniti. Unde secundum istos cognition abstractiva dicitur non solum per abstractionem quidditatis ab esse, et a non esse […] sed etiam dicitur abstractiva illa cognition, per quam cognoscitur de re quod ipsa sit in rerum natura, dum tamen ipsa, ut sic, non sit praesens in ratione obiecti immediate cogniti. Verbi gratia, si eclipsis Lunae sit in rerum natura, et Astrologus existens in domo, sciat Lunam tunc actualiter eclipsari, quia scit adesse tempus et horam inter positionis terrae inter solem et Lunam, dum tamen non uideat eclipsim in se, dicitur habere de eclipsi cognitionem abstractiva, et non intuitivam.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 1, in prolog., q. 3, p. 7r.

\textsuperscript{109} Christ knew by means of this knowledge all natural things, the divine mysteries, and the thoughts and acts of human beings. (Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII}, lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 237v.) According to Peter of Tarentaise, Christ knew by means of this knowledge all natural things and everything
The difference becomes apparent if we look at Durand’s texts about the intellect in general. Durand criticizes the Aristotelian view of the intellect, arguing, for example, that the soul has only the passive but not the active intellect.\textsuperscript{110} He also argues that the passive intellect does not need intelligible species.\textsuperscript{111} Therefore, according to Durand, a soul does not have the active intellect and the intellect does not have intelligible species. Because of his refutation of intelligible species, Durand’s view of knowledge of things in themselves cannot be the same as Aquinas’s view based on infused intelligible species. Durand claims that Christ knew things in themselves because he had an infused habit, not infused intelligible species.\textsuperscript{112} However, he does not explain what kind of habit the infused knowledge was.

How did Christ progress in knowledge? Like Aquinas’s \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, Durand also claims that Christ progressed in knowledge when his soul acquired experiential certitude. For example, an astronomer who is aware of a lunar eclipse by means of a demonstration knows a lunar eclipse more certainly when he perceives it. Durand claims that when Christ saw things for the first time, he progressed in experiential certitude, even though he knew things he perceived in advance by infused knowledge.\textsuperscript{113}

Unlike Aquinas in his \textit{Summa theologiae}, Durand thinks that Christ did not have acquired knowledge. He explains that Christ was able to

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\textsuperscript{110} “[..] fictitium est ponere intellectum agentem.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 1, d. 3, q. 5, p. 27r. “Cum ergo intellectus agens non agat in phantasmata aliquid imprimendo vel aliquid abstrahendo, neque secundum rem, neque secundum rationem, nec agat in intellectum possibilem, nec sine phantasmate nec cum phantasmate ut deductum est, videtur quod non debeat ipsum ponere, nec Augustinus magnus philosophus unquam posuit ipsum ut prius dictum fuit.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 1, d. 3, q. 5, p. 28r. For Durand on the agent intellect, see also Friedman 2003, 251–252; Spruit 1994, 281–282.

\textsuperscript{111} “Non uidetur ergo quod in intellectu nostro sit aliqua species ad repraesentandum sibi suum objectum, nec in sensu ut prius probatur est, ergo etc.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 2, d. 6, q. 6, p. 139v. For Durand on the intelligible species, see also Friedman 2003, 252; Pasnau 1997, 17–18; Spruit 1994, 282–283.

\textsuperscript{112} “Christus habuit habitum scientiae infusae per quam cognoscit quicquid naturaliter est cognoscibile ut dictum fuit prius ergo per ea quae a sensibus accepit non fuit in ei acquisitus habitus nouus scientiae.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r.

\textsuperscript{113} “Alio modo est profectus in scientia quantum ad aliquem modum certitudinis. Sicut cum aliquis certus de alia conclusione per demonstrationem puta de eclipsi) eam postea sensibiliter intuetur. Per hoc enim noua certitudo additur et praececedens confirmatur. Et haec uocatur certitudo experimentalis, et quantum ad hoc creuit scientia inquantum quotidie aliquauidebat, quae prius non uiderat, licet ea sciret per scientiam sibi infusam.” Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII lib. 3, d. 14, q. 4, p. 238r. Peter of Tarentaise also follows this view of Aquinas, as he explains that Christ did not acquire intelligible species because he already had all intelligible species infused by God. (Peter of Tarentaise, In IV libros sententiarum commentaria lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 102.)
\end{flushright}
have acquired knowledge and infused knowledge if infused knowledge and acquired knowledge were not alike, but if they were, Christ did not have both of them. Since Durand assumes that infused knowledge and acquired knowledge were identical, he claims that Christ only had infused knowledge.\(^{114}\) Durand also thinks that Christ’s acquired knowledge would have been incomplete because Christ did not perceive all sensible things during his lifetime, and he claims that such view was absurd as Christ did not have incomplete knowledge.\(^{115}\)

Peter of Palude defended Aquinas’s view that Christ had acquired experiential knowledge. He argues that as acquired knowledge and infused knowledge were not identical, Christ could have both of them at once.\(^{116}\) However, unlike Aquinas, Palude thinks that Christ did not get acquired knowledge through an abstraction of the agent intellect and through the senses, but God also poured forth acquired knowledge into Christ’s intellect. Palude explains that Christ had two kinds of infused knowledge: infused knowledge \textit{per se}, which cannot be acquired through the senses, and infused knowledge \textit{per accidens}, which can be acquired through the senses. Infused knowledge \textit{per se} was through infused intelligible species which the soul cannot acquire through the senses, whereas infused knowledge \textit{per accidens} was through intelligible species which the soul can acquire through the senses. Palude thinks that the idea of infused acquired knowledge saves the perfection of Christ’s knowledge. Because God poured forth acquired knowledge into Christ’s intellect, Christ was not ignorant about things which he did not perceive.\(^{117}\)
1.4. John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol

John Duns Scotus’s view about the knowledge of Christ partly followed Bonaventure’s view, but it also involved new elements. According to Scotus, Christ had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge.¹¹⁸

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<td>Knowledge of the Word of God</td>
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Scotus thinks that when Christ’s intellect had knowledge of the Word of God, the intellect had an act. Christ’s intellect either passively received the act from the Word of God or it elicited it actively. Scotus does not take a clear stand on whether the soul received or elicited an act, but following Bonaventure and Richard Middleton, he seems to favour the view that Christ’s intellect received it¹¹⁹ because the Word of God caused it supernaturally in Christ’s intellect.¹²⁰ However, contrary to Bonaventure, Scotus argues that Christ’s intellect was able to receive the act about the Word of God without a preceding light or a habit.¹²¹ Unlike Bonaventure,
Scotus does not associate the light of glory with a habit. He claims that, being distinct from the light of glory, a habit does not dispose the intellect to receive an act but a habit results from an act. A habit explains how the intellect can know things which it does not actually consider, because a habit remains when an act changes. According to Scotus, the vision about the Word of God did not involve a habit because the vision was always actual.\textsuperscript{122} Although the intellect was able to receive the act about the Word of God without the light of glory, Scotus thinks that if the intellect had actively elicited the act, the intellect would not have been able to elicit it without divine aid.\textsuperscript{123} Following a standard medieval view, Scotus clarifies that the human Christ did not comprehend the Word of God because his intellect did not grasp the whole intelligibility of God.\textsuperscript{124}

Like Bonaventure, Scotus holds that the human Christ knew in the Word of God everything that God knows, but he proposes two different views regarding whether the soul knew everything actually or habitually. As I have shown above, Aquinas thought that Christ knew things in the Word of God actually and Bonaventure argued that the soul knew everything that God knew. Scotus mixes Aquinas’s theory of continuous actual knowing with

\textsuperscript{122} “Similiter, ad recipiendum ipsum visionem non requiritur aliquid habitus prior ipsa visione, quia habitus non disponit potentiam ad recipiendum actum, immo actus prius natus est recipi quam habitus. Tamen quia habitus in nobis acquisitus habet hanc perfectionem quod est immanens in anima transeunte actu secundo ut sic, intellectus, qui non potest habere perfectissimam notitiam plurium objectorum simul (quia non in actu), habet saltem notitiam eorum permanentem, sicut potest, et ita in habitu; sed si aliquid actus esset ex natura sua etiam permanens in actu sicut habitus respectu illius, non oporteret ponere habitum, quia actus talis haberet perfectionem actus primi et secundi. Sed visio beata ex natura sua est forma ita permanens in intellectu sicut habitus qui ponitur prior: uterque enim permanet semper ex praesentia perpetua objecti beatifici, et neuter potest aliter permanere.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 432.

\textsuperscript{123} “[…] si tamen intellectus compararetur in ratione activi respectu huius visionis, requiritur aliquid prius in intellectu.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 314. “Si autem quaeratur utrum sine tali habitu vel lumine […] possit intellectus creatus non tantum passive se habere ad talem visionem, sed etiam active se habere ad eliciendum tale visionem […] tune potest dici (sicut ad quartam quaestionem distinctionis praecedentis dictum est) quod si est necessaria connexio causarum secundarum etc.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 434. “Si primum istorum teneatur, tune dicendum est quod ad fruitionem tantam quanta posset elici a voluntate cum summa gratia, non potest voluntas agere sine summa gratia, licet possit illam recipere sine ea. Si autem secundum teneatur, tune dicendum est quod Deus posset suppleere actionem summae gratiae, ut voluntas sine illa posset secundum causalitatem suam agere ad summam fruitionem, Deo supplente actionem gratiae ut causae secundae.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 13, q. 1–4, p. 419.

\textsuperscript{124} “Breviter tamen, solus ille intellectus comprehendit aliquid intelligibile, cuius tanta est perfectio in intellectualitate et intelligendo quanta est perfectio vel intelligibilitas in intelligibilis ut possit intelligi; et ideo est ibi commensuratio et aedaequatio; […] Quia ergo nullus intellectus creatus potest habere tantam intellectualitatem, neque in actu primo neque in actu secundo, quanta est intelligibilitas Dei, immo in infinitum oporteret quod esset intellectualitates perfection quantum deberet commensurari huic intelligibili ex parte intelligibilitatis eius, ideo nullus intellectus creatus, etsi videat quodcumque quod est visibile ex parte Dei, potest ipsum comprehendere.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 438–439. See also John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 316–317.
Bonaventure’s theory of unrestricted omniscience, as he claims that Christ’s intellect knew all things in the Word of God either because the intellect had an infinite number of distinct acts at once or because the intellect had one infinite act. Scotus examines the view that the intellect had one infinite act only in passing, and he pays more attention to the idea that Christ had an infinite number of acts at once. This idea is interesting because it challenges two Aristotelian ideas. First, it confronts Aristotle’s idea that the intellect can understand only one thing at a time. Secondly, it challenges Aristotle’s opinion that actual infinity is impossible.

Scotus explains that according to the view about actual knowing, Christ’s intellect could have many acts simultaneously because, like the intellects of all human beings, it was able to receive many visions about all objects in the Word of God at once, since the intellect can receive knowledge of any object. This view not only holds that Christ’s intellect had many acts, but goes further to claim that Christ’s intellect had an infinite number of acts at the same time. How is this conceivable? Scotus argues that as two non-contrary properties can be in something at the same time, an infinite number of non-contrary properties can also be in something at once, because the reasons for the impossibility and incompossibility are the same whether two properties or infinitely many properties are considered. Therefore, if the intellect can have two acts at once, it also can have an infinite number of acts. Christ’s intellect was able to have infinitely many acts at once because the intellect had at least two acts when it saw things in the Word of God. Christ’s intellect passively received the acts from God.

125 “Ista conclusio posset poni duobus modis: Uno modo, quod anima Christi haberet unam visionem Verbi ut primi obiecti, et omnium refulcentium in Verbo ut obiecorum secundariorum, ad quae objecta secundaria non haberet respectus distinctios; nec propter hoc sequetur infinitas actus fundantis istos respectus, quia non essent nisi in potentia.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 452. For Scotus on the omniscience of Christ, see also Adams 1999, 80–82. It is worth noting that already Peter of Tarentaise reported a view about the actual omniscience of Christ, but he did not explain who proposed such a view. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 100.)


128 “Quod declaratur, quia quicumque intellectus est receptivus notitiae cuiuscumque obiecti, quia est totius entis, et per consequens ad quodcumque intelligibile habet desiderium naturale; et si quodcumque cognosceter, in hoc perficeretur naturaliter. Et sicut dico de notitia, ita dico de visione in Verbo, quia illa est perfectissima notitia possibilis haberi de obiecto; quilibet ergo intellectus est receptivus cuiuslibet visionis in Verbo, - et hoc loquendo divisim; igitur et conjunctim quilibet intellectus est receptivus simul plurium visionum in Verbo respectu omnium obiecorum.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 449.

129 “Cucumque potest quodlibet inesse: si enim possunt duo similum inesse, quia non opponuntur, et infinita talia simul eidem possunt inesse, quia nulla alia est ratio impossibilitatis vel incompossibilitatis respectu infinitorum quam respectu duorum; quodcumque enim illorum potest per se inesse, et quodcumque cum quodcumque potest simul inesse, quia non opponuntur, - et quodcumque simul possunt inesse, quia ex pluralitate inhaerentium non sequitur nova impossibilitas; et sic sequitur propositum. Sed sic est in
but did not elicit them, because the intellect cannot elicit an infinite number of acts simultaneously. Scotus holds that if Christ’s intellect had elicited infinitely many acts about infinitely many objects, the power of the intellect would have dispersed infinitely; it would have been infinitely small and thus nothing.\footnote{130}

Although Scotus describes the view about actual knowing in detail, he is doubtful about it. In the \textit{Ordinatio}, he claims that the view contradicts the texts of Aristotle and the saints because it implies actual infinity,\footnote{131} and in the \textit{Reportatio} he argues that that the human Christ did not know everything actually.\footnote{132} Following Bonaventure, Scotus defends the

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proposito: sicut enim visio in Verbo respectu cuiuscumque objecti potest inesse animae Christi, ita et visiones duorum objectorum simul, quia non repugnant, alter n non posset videre se beatam et aliquid aliud in Verbo, et ita cum semper videat se beatam in Verbo, nunquam posset aliud videre; ergo nec quaecumque multitudo ponit novam impossibilitatem (patet), nec novam oppositionem, quia si oppositio esset, illa esset alicius ad aliquid respectu cuiuscumque intellectus.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 449–450; \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 330–331. Unlike Scotus, Durand of St. Pourçain argued that the intellect can have only one act at the same time because every act of the intellect is incompatible with every other act of the intellect. (Friedman 2009, 434–435.) For Durand of St. Pourçain and Thomas Wylton on simultaneous acts of the intellect, see Friedman 2009.

\footnote{130}{\textquotedblright}Sed est ne possibile quod anima Christi habeat infinitas visiones ita quod eas eliciat, ut sic intellectus animae Christi sit causa partialis simul cooperans cum infinitis objectis ad eliciendum infinitas visiones simul? Videtur primo quod non, […] intellectus animae Christi quanto cooperatur pluribus objectis respectu plurium effectuum producendorum, minor crit, quia secundum hoc est magis dispersa; ergo si sit dispersa cooperando infinitis objectis respectu infinitiorum effectuum, in infinitum erit minor, - et per consequens nulla erit.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 335. \textquotedblright{Ideo si non placet dicere quod intellectus animae Christi possit habere simul infinitas visiones, respectu quarum concurrat in ratione causae effectivae, respondeantur tunc ad argumentum iam factum (quia forte soluble est) et dicatur quod possibile tantum est quod anima Christi formaliter habeat infinitas visiones respectu quarum habet rationem potentiae passivae recipientis eas, et sic tantum passive et formaliter potest habere infinitas visiones, non autem active.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 335–336; \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 453–454.

\footnote{131}{\textquotedblright}Alio modo posset poni quod respectu cuiuscumque objecti esset propria visio, ita quod essent infinitae visiones simul in intellectu receptae a Verbo causante. Et secundum istam viam secundum oportet ponere aliqua infinita esse, - quod videtur contradicere multis auctoritatibus Philosophi et sanctorum.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 453. \textquotedblright{Si ista territa via non placet, neque quod infinita videat elicitive (neque simul recipiendo infinitas visiones infinitiorum, vel unam visionem infinitam), - potest dici quod omnia habitualiter videt in Verbo …” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 454. In his \textit{Lectura}, Scotus does not claim that an opinion is against the texts of Aristotle and the saints, but claims that if this opinion does not please, one can argue that the human Christ knew everything habitually. (John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1–2, p. 336.)

\footnote{132}{\textquotedblright} […] actualiter, quod videat omnia actu elicito, ita quod habet propria visionem cuiuslibet visi; tamen in Verbo, sicut multa videntur in speculo, quae habent propria visionem ibi; et secundum hanc viam sequitur quod intellectus animae Christi actu videt infinita, et quod habet infinitas visiones distinctas in actu simul, quod tamen negatur communiter. Secundo potest intelligi, quod omnia videat actualiter, non per proprias, et distinctas visiones, sed quod illa visio sit una formaliter, et multae virtualiter, et habet unum objectum adaequatum, ut essentia divina, et infinita secundaria. Sed illa opinio ponit quod est una in actu, et infinitiorum intellectorium; […] ponit unam infinitam in actu intensive, quia illa una eminentes continet omnes illas visiones proprias, quas posuit opinioni prior, et non videtur probable quod aliqua sit visio in actu infinita intensive alicius creaturar.” John Duns Scotus,
view that the human Christ knew everything habitually. He explains that Christ’s human soul was able to see everything in the Word of God because the act of the intellect about the Word of God shined on everything included in the Word of God. Scotus argues that the act about the Word of God was like a habit, because in a manner of a habit it was the first act of the intellect through which the intellect was able to know everything habitually. Christ’s intellect knew a thing actually when his will commanded the intellect to direct its attention to a certain thing in the Word of God.

Christ also knew things in themselves and he had experiential knowledge. Scotus’s view about these cognitions is innovative because he argues that knowledge of things in themselves is abstract knowledge and experiential knowledge is intuitive knowledge. Abstract and intuitive knowledge were much-debated themes in early fourteenth-century psychology, and the discussion about the knowledge of Christ was one of the first contexts where these ideas were introduced. Scotus thinks that whereas intuitive knowledge is about the actual existence of a thing, abstract knowledge does not concern actual existence.

According to Scotus, Christ had abstract knowledge since it had the infused intelligible species required by the perfection of Christ’s intellect. A soul was said to have abstract knowledge of universals and particulars. Christ knew all universals abstractly, because the soul had the...
infused intelligible species of all universals.¹³⁶ Scotus then explains that particulars are known abstractly, either through the intelligible species of the universals or through the intelligible species proper to the particulars.¹³⁷ When particulars are known properly, they are known through the intelligible species proper to particulars. Thus, since Christ’s intellect knew particulars properly, it had the infused intelligible species proper to particulars. However, Christ knew only some but not all particulars abstractly because the intellect did not have infinitely many intelligible species about infinitely many possible particulars at the same time.¹³⁸ The infused abstract knowledge was habitual because Christ’s finite intellect was able to turn simultaneously towards only a limited number of objects and not towards all objects at the same time.¹³⁹

The experiential knowledge of Christ was intuitive knowledge. Scotus claims that intuitive knowledge is about the existence of a thing, and he expounds that there are two kinds of intuitive knowledge: perfect and imperfect. Perfect intuitive knowledge concerns a thing as it

¹³⁶ “De cognitione igitur abstractiva loquendo, quae scilicet est objecti sive singularis sive universalis, potest dici quod ista anima novit omnia universalia sive quiditates habitualiter per species infusas, quia cum ista notitia sit perfectionis in intellectu creato, pro eo quod intellectus creatus est passivus respectu cuiuscumque objecti intelligibilis (quia non habet in se perfectionem omnium intelligibilium, et carere perfectione sibi possibili respectu aliquis objecti est ponere intellectum aliquo modo imperfectum), videtur probable attribuere huic intellectui perfectionem respectu omnium intelligibilium, qualis attributur angelis, cum nec illa repugnet intellectui creato, nec sit imperfectio in eo, nec etiam est incompossibilis perfectioni illius cognitionis in Verbo quae ponitur competere huic animae...” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 465; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 349.

¹³⁷ “Sed hoc modo, scilicet per abstractionem et habitualiter, vel non novit omnia singularia sub propriis rationibus, - puta si non habet species infusas nisi quiditatum, quia illae non sunt rationes cognoscendi singularia sub propriis rationibus: sicut enim universale non dicit totam entitatem singularium, nec per consequens cognoscibilitatem eorum, ita nec illud quod est propria ratio cognoscendi universale, non est propria ratio cognoscendi singularare distincte et proprie.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 466. Also Aristotle explains that a person can have knowledge of universals and particulars. (Aristotle, *Analytica posterioria* I.1, 71a17–24.) For the knowledge of individuals in medieval philosophy, see Bérubé 1964.


¹³⁹ “Neque tamen quiditates neque singularia oportet ponere illam animam nosse simul actualiter, quia notitia actualis aliquaum in generi proprio est secundum virtutem naturalem ipsius intellectus in se; non autem potest intellectus finitus ad quoqueque objecta simul distincte perceptienda converti virtute naturali.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 475.
exists in the present, whereas imperfect intuitive knowledge involves either an opinion about the future or a memory about the past.\footnote{140}

According to Scotus, the intellect knows things through perfect intuitive knowledge when things are actually present in themselves (\textit{in se}) or actually present in the Word of God (\textit{in Verbo}). The human Christ had both kinds of perfect intuitive knowledge. Christ knew things intuitively in the Word of God when he saw things in the Word of God and in themselves when he came across things in the world. For example, Christ knew intuitively that Peter was sitting when Peter’s sitting in itself was present for Christ. Christ did not have perfect intuitive knowledge of all things in themselves because Christ did not come across all things in the world.\footnote{141} Scotus argues that God was not able to pour forth perfect intuitive knowledge of things in themselves into Christ’s intellect by giving infused intelligible species because the intelligible species represent objects as abstracted from the existence.\footnote{142} Since Christ did not know everything in themselves through perfect intuitive knowledge and God was not able to give such knowledge, Christ progressed in the perfect intuitive knowledge of things in themselves.\footnote{143}

According to Scotus, imperfect intuitive knowledge involves either an opinion about the future or a memory about the past. He does not explain in detail what kind of knowledge is an opinion about the future, but

\footnote{140} “Loquendo autem de alia cognitione, scilicet intuitiva, quae est de natura vel singulari ut concernit actualem existentiam, dico quod illa est vel perfecta, qualis est de obiecto ut existens est praesentaliter, - vel imperfecta, qualis est opinio de futuro vel memoria de praeterito.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467; \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 351–354.

\footnote{141} “Primo modo non novit omnia in genere proprio […] quia obiectum isto modo non est cognoscibile nisi ut actualiter praesens in se vel in aliquo in quo habet esse perfectius quam in se; sed cognitum hoc modo non est in genere proprio; non esset igitur nata cognosci ‘sessio Petri’ nisi praesens esset sessio Petri in se; et ita cum multa obiecta nec fuerunt nec esse poterunt praesentia illi intellectui secundum existentiam actuallem illorum, non poterit habere cognitionem intuitivam illorum.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 467–468.

“Et ideo non potest Christus habere cognitionem intuitivam de re nisi vel in Verbo vel in existentia propria; et quia non semper cognovit res in propria existentia in genere proprio, ideo secundum hoc profecit et cognitionem intuitivam acquisivit.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 352.

\footnote{142} “Et si dicatur quod potuit habere cognitionem omnium existentium pro quacunque differentia temporis per species infusas, - hoc falsum est, tum quia species infusae repraesentant obiectum ut abstrahit ab existentia actuali (quia eodem modo repraesentant, sive obiectum existat sive non existat, et per consequens non sunt ratio cognoscendi existens ut existens)…” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 468. See also John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 351–352.

instead focuses on memory.144 Scotus thinks that imperfect intuitive knowledge follows from perfect intuitive knowledge because those things that are known through perfect intuitive knowledge cause experiences and memories in the intellect.145 A soul can know an object which it knew in the past because a present thing causes the intelligible species in the memory. Scotus thinks that the memory is not aware of a past thing immediately because the past apprehension of a thing is the immediate object of the memory, whereas a thing is the immediate object of the past apprehension. Therefore, a past thing is the indirect object of the memory.146 Christ progressed also in the imperfect intuitive knowledge.147

Against Aquinas, Scotus argues that Christ did not have acquired knowledge. He explains that infused and acquired knowledge of the same thing were two accidents of the same kind, but the intellect was not able to have two accidents of the same kind. Hence, Christ had either infused knowledge or acquired knowledge, but not both.148 Scotus goes on to argue that even if the soul can have two cognitions of same kind, the intellect cannot have two perfect cognitions about the same object because then one

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144 “Sed quantum ad intuitivam cognitionem imperfectam, quals est opinio de futuro et memoria de praeterito, quae relinquitur ex ista perfecta…” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 469; Lectura lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 353–354. For Scotus on memory, see Wolter 1990b, 98–122. For the influence of the book Memory and Recollection by Aristotle on medieval philosophy, see Bloch 2007, 137–228.


146 “Et si obiciatur quod ex re praesente non derelinquitur nisi species intelligibilis impressa in intellectu et in parte sensitiva (ut in virtute phantastica) species imaginabilis, - hoc falsum est, quia de re praesente non tantum derelinquitur species intelligibilis in intellectu qua cognoscitur sub nulla differentia temporis, sed alia in potentia memorativa; et istae potentiae cognoscunt obiectum sub alia et alia ratione: una cognoscit obiectum ut existit praeasentialiter, alia cognoscit ipsum ut in praeterito apprehensum, ita quod apprehensionis praeteritae est obiectum mediatum recordationis.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 470.


148 “Contra conclusionem arguitur ex dictis opinantis, quia secundum eum 'duo accidentia eiusdem speciei non possunt simul esse in eodem'; cognitio rei infusa et acquisita eiusdem rei in genere proprio sunt eiusdem speciei.” Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 462. See also Adams 1999, 82–83.
of the cognitions would be redundant.\textsuperscript{149} He adds that also the blissed soul has the passive and agent intellect, but it does not acquire knowledge,\textsuperscript{150} and, unlike Aquinas, Scotus argues that the perfect person can have powers which are not actual.\textsuperscript{151}

When Peter Auriol studied Christ’s human knowledge, he built on the Franciscan emphases but also adopted some ideas from Aquinas. Following Scotus, Auriol thought that Christ’s intellect had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, abstract knowledge and intuitive knowledge. Unlike Scotus, however, he argued that Christ also had acquired experiences.

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\textbf{Christ’s human knowledge}
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Knowledge of things in the Word of God \\
Abstract knowledge \\
Intuitive knowledge \\
\hspace{1cm} Perfect intuitive knowledge \\
\hspace{1cm} Imperfect intuitive knowledge \\
Experience \\
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According to Auriol, the human Christ knew the Word of God and things in the Word of God by two acts. His innovative but quite obscure view was that these acts were related like acts are related in syllogistic thinking. The soul knew things in the Word of God like a conclusion is known in premises and like a particular proposition is known when a universal proposition is known. Like premises and a conclusion, which are known by two acts, the human Christ saw the Word of God by a prior act and things in the Word of God by a secondary act. Auriol goes on to explain that the act

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\textsuperscript{149} “Praeterea, contra conclusionem in se, arguo sic: etsi duae cognitiones eiusdem speciei possint simul esse in eodem, non tamen duae cognitiones perfectae eiusdem obiecti et secundum eandem rationem, quia aut utraque illarum perfecte cognosciitur objectum quantum cognoscibile est, et tunc altera cognitio superflueret, - aut non, et tunc neutra perfecta.” \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 463.


\textsuperscript{151} “Ex his instantiis et alis similibus patet quod haec propositio falsa est ‘potentiae in quibuscumque perfecte possunt in actus suos’: hoc enim verum est solum de imperfecto quod est in potentia ad terminos actionum illarum potentiarum; sed si ab alio agente, praeveniens stas potentias, induecit sint termini ad quos possent esse actiones istarum potentiarum, non poterunt agere ad istos terminos, - non propter imperfectionem sui, sed propter positionem termini ab alio praeveniens; nec propter hoc negandae sunt esse in natura, quia sunt simpliciter perfections naturae (sive habeant terminos perfections suae sive ab illa sive aliunde). ” \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 3, p. 464.
\end{footnotesize}
about the Word of God involved knowledge about things, like knowledge of the universal proposition “all triangles have three angles” involves knowledge of the particular proposition “this triangle has three angles”. Hence, according to Auriol, the act about things in the Word of God only explicated what the act about the Word of God involved.  

Similar to the above-mentioned Franciscan theologians like Bonaventure and Scotus, Auriol also argues that Christ’s human soul knew habitually all things in the Word of God. Christ’s human soul knew habitually an infinite number of things because the soul had knowledge of the Word of God, which virtually includes infinitely many propositions. When the intellect saw the Word of God, it was able to know infinitely many things, one after another, even though it was not able to know all things in the Word of God at once. Auriol seems to think that Christ’s created intellect was not able to elicit one act about infinitely many things or infinitely many simultaneous acts, even though it was able to elicit infinitely many acts one after another. The intellect also did not receive passively

152 “Dico, quod non eodem actu videtur divina essentia et creaturae licet eadem similitudine ut specie et habitu. […] videre aliquid in Verbo est dupliciter vel exemplariter, vel per rationem exemplaris. […] alio modo per rationem continentiae et inductive. […] Exemplum aliqua cognoscuntur in propositionibus et aliqua ex propositionibus. Nam propria dicitur passio cognosci in subiecto sed alio actu. Similiter angelus cognoscit conclusiones in principiis sed alio actu. Item Aristoteles […] cognoscens quod omnis triangulus habet tria cognoscit de isto particulari quod iste habet tria et cognoscit hoc in priori propositione quia sine medio. Unde dicit, quod statim inducens cognoscit unde ibi non acquiritur nisi explicatio et ideo nova scientia non acquiritur. Sic in proposito, actus quo creaturae videntur fertur in Verbo, sed non cognito isto actu quia esset beatificus nec in Verbo ut exemplar, sed in Verbo cognito priori actu sicut conclusio cognoscitur principio cognito per alium actum. Ergo virtute Verbo cogniti priori actu habetur ista cognitio. Nam sicut in una propositione continentur aliae ut in ista, omnis figura plana et cetera habet tres, continentur omnes propositiones de particularibus triangulis. Sic omnis creatura virtute continentur in essentia et eius cognitio in cognitione illius. Tunc cum fertur actus secundus super creaturam non est nisi explicatio eius quod in virtute prius continerbatur. Et istud est cognoscere in Verbo, et ex Verbo.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 430–431. Auriol’s idea is based on Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora I.1, 71a17–24. Unlike Auriol, William Ockham seems to think that a soul can know the Word of God and things in the Word of God by the same act. (William Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum sententiarum lib. 4, q. 15 (OTh. VII, 327). Walter Chatton also argues that the human Christ saw the Word of God and things in the Word of God by the same act. (Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, p. 99.)

153 My study on Peter Auriol’s Commentary on the Sentences is based on the manuscript Sarnano, Biblioteca comunale, MS E. 92.

154 “Dico quod anima Christi habuit notitiam infinitiorum in habito per lumen gloriae. Nam prior notitia continet in virtute infinitas conclusiones, et ex illa potest infinita inferre successive.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 14, q. 1, MS M, fol. 63r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 431.

155 “Dico ad quaestionem quod anima Christi non potest habere infinitos actus tales quibus infinita cognoscat, et ratio quia aut actus talis elicetur […] [ad] <ab> ipsa anima. […] Si autem est ab anima elicitive tunc impossibile est quod plura intelligent actu elicito vel quod eliciat infinita. Sed quae est ratio si potest intellectio elicere successive infinitos actus, quae non simul. Nec potest habere unicum actum infinitum quia esset infinitae perfectionis:” Peter
from the Word of God one act about infinitely many things or infinitely many acts because, according to Auriol, the intellect was not only a passive receiver but also active when it knew things in the Word of God. However, Auriol does not explain in detail how the intellect was active in this cognition. In addition, not even God was able to effect infinitely many acts in Christ’s intellect, because actual infinity is a contradiction and God cannot create a contradiction.

Following Aquinas and Scotus, Auriol thinks that Christ had knowledge of things in themselves because the perfection of Christ’s human soul required it. The knowledge of things in themselves was the abstract knowledge which Christ had because he had infused intelligible species. Following Scotus, Auriol argues that abstract knowledge is about universal and particulars, and Christ had the infused intelligible species of all universals. However, unlike Scotus, Auriol appears to think that the soul knew all particulars through the intelligible species of the universals, but not through the intelligible species proper to particulars.

As Friedman has argued, Auriol thinks that in the knowledge of the normal human being, phantasms are needed when an object is apparent.
to the intellect. 160 When Auriol studies the knowledge of the human Christ, he claims that Christ’s intellect was able to know without turning to phantasms since he had infused intelligible species. 161 This suggests that the knowledge of the normal human being requires phantasms but Christ’s infused knowledge did not. However, Auriol’s view begs a question because he does not explain how an object became apparent for Christ’s intellect without phantasms.

Although Auriol’s understanding about intuitive knowledge differs from that of Scotus, 162 he takes for granted Scotus’s opinion about Christ’s perfect and imperfect intuitive knowledge. 163 Unlike Scotus, however, he thinks that Christ not only had perfect and imperfect intuitive knowledge, but also acquired experiences which differed from intuitive knowledge. When Auriol studies the experience of Christ, he begins by defining it. Auriol’s view is based on Aristotle’s *Metaphysica* and *Analytica posteriora*, where Aristotle explains that memory rises from sense perceptions and that experience is acquired from several memories. Hence, according to Aristotle, we do not first experience and then have memories, but memories precede experience. 164

Auriol argues that experience is a habit, which is not a memory or scientific knowledge (*scientia*). Memories differ from experience because memories cause the habit of the experience. 165 Scientific knowledge also differs from experience, because the cause of scientific knowledge is a demonstration but memories are the cause of experience. 166 According to Auriol, experienced things are between particulars and universals. The habit

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160 Friedman 2015b, 161–162. For Auriol on intelligible species, see Friedman 2015b, 157–164.
161 Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.
162 For Auriol’s view about intuitive cognition, see Friedman 2015a; Tachau 1988, 104–112.
163 “Hic sunt quaedam bene dicta et quaedam mihi dubia. Credo(?) bene dictum tunc(?) de notitia intuitiva et abstractiva. […] Sed dubium est mihi alius dictum sed est extra propositum. Quod enim dict, quod objectum imprimit duas species unam in imaginacione secundam in memoria, illa non est via philosophica quia secundum commentatorem res solum imprimit speciem suam imaginotioni.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M1, fol. 65r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 434–435. Auriol only criticizes Scotus’s view that a thing causes a species in the imagination and in the memory. According to Auriol, a thing impresses a species only in the memory.
164 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I.1, 980b26–981b14; *Analytica posteriora* II.2, cap. 19, 100a4–10.
165 “Prima est quod ex memorii multiplicatis acquiritur notitia experimentalis alia a memoria. […] Notitia causans et causata non est eadem. Notitia experimentalis et memoria se habet huiusmodi: ergo, etc.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M1, fol. 65r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 435.
166 “Dico ex memorii et in hoc differ ab habitu scientiae qui est ex demonstrationibus.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M1, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 436–437.
of experience rises from the similitude of particulars and it grasps a universal in grasping the similitude. However, all conditions of universals are not available through experience. For example, one can experience that certain herbs cure a certain illness, but one cannot experience that those herbs cure that illness because of this cause. One who knows a universal also knows a cause why those herbs cure that illness. Hence, according to Auriol, the experience is not totally about universals and particulars.\textsuperscript{167}

Auriol thinks that Christ acquired experiences because God was not able to pour forth experience into Christ’s human soul in the first instant of its existence. He argues that experience requires memories, but God cannot give memories for the soul in the first moment of its existence because memory is knowledge of the past and the soul cannot remember a thing which the soul did not know the day before.\textsuperscript{168} Auriol expounds that God can give the habit of experience, but the habit cannot be actual without memories, since it is a contradiction to have an actual experience but not memories. He explains that God did not give the habit of experience to Christ because the habit of experience was useless without memories and God did not give anything useless to Christ.\textsuperscript{169} Auriol concludes that Christ

\textsuperscript{167} “Videndum est ergo quod experiuntur est medium inter universale et particulare. Nam experimentum est habitus ortus ex particularibus fundatus super simile tunc capiendo illam similitudinem capit universale. Sed omnes conditiones universalis non potest experiri, ut de tali herba <quod> curat talem infirmitatem ex tali causa. Unde nuncquam sciet dicere quod laborantibus talis tempore et tali aegritudine et tali causa ita haec herba curam efficiet sed non ergo ut sic non habet universale cum conditiones universalis non habet. Nec etiam habet mere particulare sed quasi quoddam implicitum. Tunc ista videretur esse intentio Aristotelis ubi dicit quod est universalis propositio experimenti ut dicere illa herba sanat illa et illa, ergo omnis talis. Sed quod sanet hanc aegritudinem ex tali causa procedente hoc est artis et scientiae, ergo isto modo potest ponere universali et tunc patet solum ratio.” Peter Auriol, \textit{Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M\textsubscript{1}, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 436.

\textsuperscript{168} “Dico quod in Christo iste habitus experimentalis fuit acquisitus. Probo, Christo non est datum a primo instanti quod capere non potuit. Sed Christus ab instanti suae conceptionis hunc habitum capere non potuit vel si cepisset frustra cepisset, ergo etc. Probatio minorem est, dico quod memoria non possit sibi dari a principio. Probo, quia memoria dicit notitiam praeteritit Deus autem non potest [facere] ut hoc quod heri nescivit meminerit. Unde impossibile est Deo istas memorias imprimere. Sed habitus est frustra nisi sit ex memoris [...] ergo etc.” Peter Auriol, \textit{Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M\textsubscript{1}, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 437.

\textsuperscript{169} “Iste habitus non potest dari non habenti memoriam [...] sed habitus experimentalis est notitia nonnisi ex memoris, igitur ubi non dans memoriam, etc. Sed an Deus possit istum habitum infundere non habenti memoriam. [...] Dico quod Deus non potest quia implicat contradictionem. Et primo de actu nam experimentum non solum vocatur notitia singularis sed notitia huius ex hoc, igitur intra conceptum notitiae experimentalis huius est ex hoc idest ex memoria. Dictetur ergo quod sit notitia huius singularis et non sit ex hoc est contradictio cum includatur intra conceptum eius. Unde bene Deus posset dare notitiam eius sed ista non esset experimentum. [...] Et dico de habitu experimentalis possit enim Deus eum dare sine habitu memoriam. Sed quia exire possit in actu sine illo est contradictio. Sed quia Deus nihil facit frustra et habitus sit sine actu [...] non dabit istum habitum sic sine actu.” Peter Auriol, \textit{Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS M\textsubscript{1}, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition, p. 437.
progressed in perfect intuitive knowledge, imperfect intuitive knowledge and experiences. Hence, following Scotus, he thinks that Christ had abstract knowledge and progressed in intuitive knowledge. Like Aquinas, Auriol furthermore states that Christ also had acquired experiences, but unlike Aquinas, who claims that Christ’s intellect had experiential knowledge, Auriol thinks that Christ had experiences by means of his senses.\footnote{Peter Auriol, \textit{Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum} lib. 3, d. 14, q. 2, MS Mi, fol. 66r, the 1605 printed edition p. 437.}
2 THE WILLS OF CHRIST

“We likewise proclaim in him [...] two natural volitions or wills [...] without division, without change, without separation, without confusion. The two natural wills are not – by any means – opposed to each other [...] but his human will is compliant; it does not resist or oppose but rather submits to his divine and almighty will.”¹

According to the above text from the third Council of Constantinople (680–681), Christ had two wills – namely, the divine will and the human will – which were not opposed since the human will was subjected to the divine will.² Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians took this Christological doctrine for granted, but they were especially interested in some basic questions about Christ’s human will that needed further explication. First, they asked what kind of human will Christ had? This question was associated with aspects of the appetitive powers. Medieval theologians differed from the seventh-century scholars in their understanding, positing that Christ’s human will was divided into several wills and the wills had even oppositional tendencies, and thus they asked how the appetitive powers of the human being can be directed towards opposing things at the same time. Theologians also studied briefly Christ’s free choice. Before studying the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions, I briefly present some earlier Christological themes concerning the human wills of Christ in those patristic and early-medieval sources, which are important for understanding the later discussion.³ Although some emphases about the wills of Christ were peculiar to the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions, these traditions were not as visible in this discussion as in the discussions about the knowledge of Christ.

¹ Denzinger 2012, 556, p. 193.
² For more about the patristic discussion about Christ’s wills, see Barnes 2012, p. 6–18.
³ The term ‘will’ (voluntas) was ambiguous in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions. It can mean the appetitive powers of the sensitive and rational parts of the soul, the appetitive power of the rational part of the soul, an inclination, or an act. When I use the terms ‘will’, ‘the will of reason’ and ‘the will of sensuality’, I mean the appetitive power(s) of the rational or the sensitive part of the soul if nothing else is said.
2.1. Christ’s Wills in the Patristic and Early Medieval Sources

One of the most influential sources for the later theologians about the doctrine of Christ’s wills was John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa*.4 According to John, Christ’s divine and human wills corresponded with his divine and human natures: the divine will was the will of his divine nature and the human will was the will of his human nature.5 The human will always wished what the divine will wished it to wish and when the human Christ naturally refused death, the divine will wished that he refused it.6 Although John thinks that the human Christ refused death, he also claims that his human will wished it. Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane (Matt. 26:39) exemplifies this.7 When Christ prayed “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me, nevertheless, not in accordance with my will but yours,” the human will wished the death.8 It appears that Damascus thought that the human will wished freely for death, because the human will was free and had free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), as all rational natures have.9 However, the human Christ did not choose and deliberate, because choosing and deliberating implied ignorance and Christ was not ignorant about anything.10

In the medieval discussions about the will, Anselm of Canterbury was a significant theologian. When he studied the will in general, he made some significant distinctions, which framed later discussions about the will. Anselm holds that the will (*voluntas*) can mean the power of the

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4 When Damascus studies the will in general, he makes a rather obscure differentiation between the notions of *thelisis* and *bulesis*, which came to be much used and discussed later on. For Damascus, *thelisis* is the natural and rational appetite for all necessities of life. *Bulesis* is a natural and rational appetite for definite ends, whether in our power or not, and for possible and impossible ends. (“Quare thelisis (id est voluntas) quidem est ipse naturalis et vitalis et rationalis appetitus omnium naturae constitutivorum, simplex virtus. […] Bulesis (id est voluntas) autem est qualitativa naturalis thelisis (id est voluntas), scilicet naturalis et rationalis appetitus alicuius rei. […] Cum igitur naturaliter motus fuerit ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem, dicitur bulesis (id est voluntas). Bulesis (id est voluntas) enim est appetitus et desiderium ciusdam rei rationalis. Dicitur bulesis (id est voluntas) et in his quae sunt in nobis, et in his quae non in nobis sunt, hoc est et in possibilibus et in impossibilibus. […] Est autem bulesis (id est voluntas) finis, non eorum quae sunt ad finem.” John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 135–137.) See also John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 140–141. Damascus adopted this division from Maximus the Confessor’s work *Opuscula theologica et polemica ad Marinum* PLG 91, 11C–14A.

5 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 58, p. 213–214; p. 217; cap. 36, p. 140.


7 For example, Augustine also claims that Christ’s prayer implied that Christ had the human will. (Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos* ps. 32, sermo 1, n. 2, p. 248, PL 36, 278; ps. 93, n. 19, p. 1319, PL 37, 1206–1207.) On patristic interpretations of Christ’s prayer, see Bathrellos 2004, 140–147.

8 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 58, p. 253–255; cap. 68, p. 268–269.

9 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 62, p. 254–255. On free will, see *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 138; cap. 41, p. 153; cap. 62, p. 254–255. According to Damascus, only rational beings have free choice. In this respect, he follows Aristotle, who claims that irrational beings do not choose. (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2, 1111b11–14.)

10 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 138–139; cap. 58, p. 225.
will, the act of the will or the affection of the will. A human being has only one power of the will. The will as power can move itself, other powers of the soul and external things like a pen and an axe. Since the will can also move itself, Anselm calls the will an instrument that moves itself. When the will has an act, the reason first considers the object of the will. The affection of the will is an inclination to wish something also when the reason is not considering the object of the will. The will has affection for the advantageous (commodum) and affection for justice (justitia). Anselm claims that all that the will wishes, it wishes either for the sake of the advantageous or justice. Affection for the advantageous is the reason why the will wishes for beatitude and affection for justice is the reason why the will wishes for rectitude and to be right.\footnote{Anselm of Canterbury, \textit{De concordia praescientiae} q. 3, cap. 11, 283–284; p. 281; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553. For Anselm on the will, see also Normore 2002, 29–47; Ekenberg 2005a, 301–313; 2005b; 2016. On the freedom of free choice, see Anselm of Canterbury, \textit{De libertate arbitrii} cap. 3, p. 210–213; Taina Holopainen 2014, 557–558. About the acts of the will, see Anselm of Canterbury, \textit{Fragmenta philosophica} p. 335; Taina Holopainen 2014, 554.}

Anselm also studies Christ’s wills. In his \textit{Cur Deus homo}, Anselm describes that Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane expressed his natural desire for safety, by which his human flesh escaped pain of death.\footnote{Anselm of Canterbury, \textit{Cur Deus homo} lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 15; Saarinen 1994, 49. See also Barnes 2012, 26–47.} However, Christ’s human will also wished for death. Anselm claims that God wished against (nolle) redemption of the human race in any other way except that a man should perform an action as such great as Christ’s death. Since Christ wished for the salvation of the human race, it followed that Christ wished for the death by means of which the human race was reconciled. God did not force Christ to die, but Christ wished for death voluntarily.\footnote{Anselm of Canterbury, \textit{Cur Deus homo} lib. 1, cap. 9, p. 15; Saarinen 1994, 49. See also Barnes 2012, 28–31.}

In the twelfth century, Christ’s wills was widely discussed.\footnote{For Christ’s wills in the twelfth-century discussions, see also Barnes 2012, 26–47.} One of the most important works was Hugh of Saint Victor’s \textit{De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo}, which argued that Christ’s human will was divided into the will of reason (voluntas rationis), the will of pity (voluntas pietatis) and the will of the flesh (voluntas carnis).\footnote{Hugh of Saint Victor, \textit{De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo} PL 176, 841B–841C. See also Hugh of Saint Victor, \textit{De sacramentis christianae fidei}, lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 11, PL 176, 404B–404D. For Hugh of Saint Victor on Christ’s wills, see also Gondreau 2002, 74–76; Coolman 2008; Barnes 2012, 34–35. Following Hugh, the Victorian author of \textit{Summa sententiarum} clarifies that Christ’s human nature had the natural appetite and will of reason. (\textit{Summa sententiarum septem tractatibus distincta} tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75D–76A.) The author of \textit{Ysagoge in theologiam}, whose name is Odo, also thinks that Christ had the natural appetite and will of reason. (Odo, \textit{Ysagoge in theologiam} lib. 2, p. 171.) Roland of Bologna argues that Christ’s human will involved the will of the flesh and the will of reason. (Roland of Bologna, \textit{Sententiae} p. 184–185.) Peter Abelard does not divide Christ’s human will, and he thinks that the human Christ did not really wish his death. Abelard holds that the human
explain how the human Christ was able to wish for his death and to avoid it, and how he was compassionate towards human beings. However, although Hugh’s division is notable, his remarks are scanty. As Barnes remarks, it is not clear whether Hugh thinks that the human wills were, for example, different powers or different aspects of the same powers.\footnote{Barnes 2012, 34.}

Hugh explains that the divine will and the will of reason, which was obedient to the divine will, wished the death, but the will of the flesh wished naturally against it.\footnote{Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo PL 176, 841D.} Furthermore, when Christ saw the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke 19:41), the will of pity wished against the destruction but the divine will and the will of reason wished for it.\footnote{Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo PL 176, 842B–842C.} Hugh argues that although the divine and human wills wished different things, the wills were just because each of them followed and desired what was fitting for them to follow and desire. The divine will followed justice, the will of reason followed obedience, the will of pity followed compassion, and the will of the flesh followed nature. The divine will wished justly for the death since it followed justice, and the will of the flesh wished justly against the death since it followed nature. Christ’s wills were not contrary. Hugh thinks that the wills are contrary when one will wishes against a thing because another will wishes for that same thing. Christ’s wills were not contrary because the will of the flesh wished against the death since it followed nature, not because the divine will wished the death, while the divine will wished for the death since it followed justice, not because the will of the flesh wished against it.\footnote{Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo PL 176, 842C–843A. Hugh seems to think that Christ’s wills also wished that other wills wished what was proper for them to wish. For example, the divine will wished that the will of the flesh wished against death and the will of pity wished that the divine will wished for the penalty of other human beings. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo PL 176, 841D; 845B.)}

The twelfth-century discussion on Christ’s wills had an influence on the later discussion, mainly through Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Lombard’s teaching on Christ’s wills was based especially on John of...
Damascus’s and Hugh of Saint Victor’s views. Lombard also divided Christ’s human will and claimed that the wills were not opposed. A new point in his teaching was the explanation of how Christ prayed or wished for something in Gethsemane that did not take place. Lombard argues that Christ had the affection of reason and the affection of sensuality, both of which were called human wills. Lombard does not clarify why he calls the human wills affections, but it seems that he had adopted the term from Augustine, since he refers to his works when he discusses the will of Christ. When Lombard studies human affectivity in general, he claims that a human soul has free choice (liberum arbitrium) and the sensitive appetitive power.

Free choice can choose good only when it is aided by grace. As God, angels and saints confirmed by grace have free choice but they cannot choose evil, the freedom of free choice is not the ability to choose good and evil. The freedom is the ability to desire and to choose without compulsion or necessity of what is declared by reason. Following Bernard of Clairvaux, Lombard argues that there are three kinds of freedoms: freedom from necessity, sin and misery. The free choice of good and evil beings has freedom from necessity, but only the free choice restored by grace has

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20 Lombard on Christ’s wills, see also Adams 1999, 23–24; Barnes 2012, 37–47.
21 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, cap. 1, p. 105. Already the author of Summa sententiarum studied whether Christ prayed or asked for something that did not take place. He expounds that it seems that Christ did this when he prayed to avoid death or when he prayed for the salvation of all human beings. The author claims, however, that it was not suitable that Christ’s prayers were not heard or that he prayed for something that did not please God. (Summa sententiarum septem tractatibus distincta tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 76A–76B.)
22 Peter Lombard’s student, Peter of Poitiers, holds that the human Christ had reason and sensuality. The sensuality of the human being has inferior and superior parts. The superior part of sensuality is the seat of the movements of the defects, like hunger and thirst, while the inferior part of sensuality is the seat of illicit movements like pride, lust and irascibility. According to Peter, Christ had only the superior part of sensuality because he was free from sin. Following Lombard, Peter argues that since Christ had reason and sensuality, he had the will of reason and the will of sensuality. The will of reason wished for death, but the will of sensuality wished not to die. Since the will of sensuality was the servant of the will of reason, the will of sensuality wished only in a qualified sense (cum adjuncto), whereas the will of reason wished simpliciter. However, the will of reason wished to avoid death in the sense that it effected the will of sensuality to wish to avoid it. (Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque lib. 4, cap. 15, PL 211, 1196D–1197D.) Peter remarks that in Gethsemane, Christ wished to avoid the death conditionally. (Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum libri quinque lib. 2, cap. 17, PL 211, 1007C; Saarinen 1994, 69–70.) Simon of Tournai also follows Peter Lombard’s account of human wills when he claims that Christ had the will of sensuality and the will of reason. He explains that the will of reason wished death because of the redemption of the human race. (Simon of Tournai, Disputationes d. 97, q. 1, p. 281.)
24 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453; cap. 5, p. 454. According to Lombard, free choice is the faculty of the will and reason. For more about free choice by Peter Lombard, see Sententiae lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453; d. 25, cap. 1–3, p. 461–463.
25 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 24, cap. 3, p. 452–453. See also Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 1, p. 461.
26 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 4, p. 464.
freedom from sin. Such free choice is freer than the free choice not restored by grace because the free choice which cannot sin is freer than the free choice which can sin.

According to Lombard, although the divine will and the will of reason wished Christ’s death and the will of sensuality did not wish it, Christ’s flesh did not desire against God and spirit (Gal. 5:17.). Lombard explains that God wished it, and it pleased the will of reason that the will of sensuality did not wish for death, because such wishing revealed that Christ had true human nature. Lombard adds that only the will of sensuality wished for things which did not take place (e.g. avoiding death in Gethsemane), but everything that the will of reason wished for took place.

William of Auxerre’s description of Christ’s human wills in his Summa aurea was based on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, but it was also influenced by the works of Aristotle and Augustine. Following Aristotle, who takes that the will belongs to the rational part of the soul, William emphasizes the primacy of the will of reason in relation to the will of sensuality. He argues that the will of reason is will in a proper sense because it is free, but the will of sensuality is not, as it is not free. Therefore, according to William, the will of reason and the will of sensuality do not belong to the same genus.

Like Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Lombard, William says that the will of reason and the will of sensuality were not contrary even though they wished for different things, but William offers a new explanation. Referring to Augustine, William argues that since the diversity of the wills rests on the diversity of the things wished, contrary wills wish for contrary things. This implies that the will of reason and the will of sensuality are contrary because they wish for contrary things: the will of reason wished for death but the will of sensuality wished not to die. William accepts that the contrary wills wish for contrary things, but this takes place

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27 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 8, p. 466. The division is based on Bernard of Clairvaux’s work Liber de gratia et libero arbitrio p. 168–171; Taina Holopainen 2014, 558.
28 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 2, d. 25, cap. 4, p. 463.
29 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, cap. 2, p. 106. When Augustine describes his well-known doctrine about the inner conflict of the human being who does not want what he wants, Augustine refers to this biblical text. See Augustine, Confessiones lib. 8, cap. 5, p. 120, PL 32, 753–754. See also Saarinen 1994, 26–31.
31 Barnes also studies William of Auxerre’s view of Christ’s wills. (Barnes 2012, 47–56.)
32 Aristotle, De anima III.9, 432b4–5; Topics IV.5, 126a13.
33 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 1, p. 78. Also Stephan Langton claims that the human Christ had the will of reason and the will of sensuality. He adds that the will of sensuality is the will in an improper sense; as, according to Aristotle, the will is in the rational part of the soul. (Stephan Langton, Sententiae lib. 3, dist. 17, p. 123–124.)
34 Augustine, De Trinitate lib. 11, cap. 6, p. 345–347, PL 42, 992.
only when the wills are in the same subject (*in eodem susceptibili*). The will of reason was in the rational part of Christ’s human soul and the will of sensuality was in the animal part of the soul. Therefore, the will of reason and the will of sensuality were not contrary even though the wills wished for contrary things. William also proposes another difference between Christ’s human wills, which explains why the wills were not contrary. He thinks that the will of sensuality escaped death as such (*secundum se*), whereas the will of reason wished the death because of (*propter*) the redemption of the human race, but not as such. Since the will of reason and will of sensuality did not wish contrary things as such, the wills were not contrary.\(^35\)

When William turns to study Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane, he holds that reason can be the spokesperson of sensuality as reason proposes the desire of sensuality to God. When Christ prayed to let the cup pass from him, it was partly the petition of reason and partly the petition of sensuality. It was the petition of reason because reason proposed it and it was the petition of sensuality because reason raised the plight of sensuality.\(^36\) However, according to William, reason was not a neutral spokesperson of sensuality. Reason added to the petition of sensuality the clause “if it is possible” to provide an instruction for us of how to subject the will of sensuality to the divine will and how to ask something from God conditionally.\(^37\)

### 2.2. The Division of Christ’s Human Will

The thirteenth-century views about the passions of Christ supposed a more nuanced teaching about the division of the human wills than the twelfth-century theologians had put forward. For example, since the thirteenth-century theologians thought that the will of the reason was touched by pain about death, they needed to explain how the will of the reason avoided death although it also wished for it. That required further additions to the will of the reason. These additions were significant since they were

\(^{35}\) William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 1, p. 78–79.

\(^{36}\) William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 3, p. 83. According to William, the will of reason also causes the movements of sensuality indirectly through the imagination. William describes that when Christ wished, the representation of his future death fell from the intellect to the imagination and from the imagination to the estimative power. Then, the future death fell from Christ’s estimative power to the sensuality and fear followed necessarily. William claims that then the will was not the proper but the accidental cause of the fear. The will gave an opportunity for fear since fear resulted in sensuality when the will caused the representation of death in the imagination and in the estimative power. (William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* lib. 3, tract. 6, cap. 2, p. 80–81.) Here William applies the Avicennian faculty psychology to Christ. For Avicenna’s faculty psychology, see Knuttila 2004, 219–222; Hasse 2000, 80–223.

adopted to the psychology of the will in general. In this chapter, I shall study how the medieval theologians divided the wills of Christ.

The thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians adopted Peter Lombard’s view that Christ’s human will was divided into the will of reason and the will of sensuality, which were two powers of the soul. Following William of Auxerre, they thought mostly that the will of reason was the will in a proper sense since it was free, but the will of sensuality was the will in a loose sense since it was not free.

However, Aquinas argues that the sensitive appetitive power of the human being is free, as it takes part in the freedom of the will when it is obedient to reason, and he claims that it is a will due to participation. The appetitive power of the animal is not a will because it is not free, but only follows natural instincts. As I shall explain in detail in the next chapter, Aquinas’s emphasis that the human sensitive appetitive power could be obedient to the reason was essential for his teaching about the passions of Christ’s human soul because Christ’s passions followed from the command

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38 Summa theologiae (Summa Halensis) lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 177; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366); Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, a. 5, p. 304; a. 2, p. 302; lib. 2, d. 24, a. 8, p. 406; Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1 co; Summa contra Gentiles lib. 4, cap. 36; Summa theologiae IIIª q. 18, a. 1 co; Peter of Tarentaise, In IV libros sententiarum commentaria lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, p. 122; Richard Middleton, Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, q. 4, p. 185; Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r; John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565; Lactantius lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424; Reportatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484; Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 461–462.

39 Summa theologiae (Summa Halensis) lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367); Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, a. 3, p. 302; De homine q. 65, a. 2, p. 550; John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565; Lactantius lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424; Wolter 1986, 41–42. For example, according to Summa Halensis, the will of sensuality is not free because God defines it to desire what sustains life and to escape what destroys life. (Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.) Albert argues that the will of human sensuality is not free since it does not act but is acted on, either by the command of reason or natural instinct. (Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, a. 3, p. 302.) Albert thinks that, for example, John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa cap. 36, p. 138, Aristotle’s De anima III.9, 432b4–5 and Topics lib. 4, cap. 5, 126a13 seem to imply that sensuality is not a will.

40 “Sed iste appetitus in aliis animalibus non habet rationem voluntatis, quia aguntur instinctor naturae potius quam agant, ut dicit Damascenus, et ita non habent liberum motum, quem voluntas requirit. Tamen in homine potest etiam dici voluntas appetitus sensibilis, inquantum est obediens rationi, ut dicitur in 1 Eth.; et ideo participat aliquid liberatatem voluntatis, sicut et rectitudinem rationis, ut possit dici voluntas participativa, sicut et dicitur ratio per participationem. Et ita in Christo quantum ad humanam naturam dicimus duos voluntates, scilicet sensualitatis et rationis.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, q. 2 co; Summa theologiae IIIª q. 18, a. 2 co. Scotus (Reportatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484.) and Durand of St. Pourçain (Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.) also claim that the will of sensuality is a will through participation.
Aquinas thinks that the sensitive appetitive power differs from the appetite of reason because they follow different kinds of apprehensions about different kinds of goods. The appetite of reason follows the apprehension of the intellect and reason about a universal good. The appetite of sensuality follows the apprehension of the senses about a particular good. Aquinas adds that the will differs from the sensitive appetitive power also because the will can determine its own inclination, but the sensitive appetitive power has an inclination defined by something else, and because, unlike the sensitive appetitive power, the will can move all powers of the soul except the powers of the vegetative part.

Bonaventure was one of the first to add that Christ has five more wills of sensuality, which correspond with five external senses because he thought that each external sense had a corresponding sensitive appetitive power. He notes, however, that Peter Lombard mentioned only the sensitive appetitive power, which corresponds to the cognition of sensuality, because, according to Augustine, the cognition of sensuality completes the cognition of the exterior senses. The idea that a human being has sensitive appetitive powers related to the exterior senses was a view favoured especially by the

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41 For how, according to Aquinas, the sensitive appetitive power can follow reason, see Chapter 3.3.
42 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 80, a. 2 co; Iª-IIae q. 8, a. 1 co.
43 Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 22, a. 4 ad 1; Kretzmann 1993, 147.
44 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 82, a. 4 co. However, according to Aquinas, the will is not only a mover. As Aristotle claims, the will is a moved mover. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª-IIae q. 9, a. 1 sed contra; *Sentencia De anima* lib. 3, cap. 9, p. 244; Aristotle’s *De anima* III.10, 433b10–21.) The intellect moves the will because the intellect presents an object for the will. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª-IIae q. 9, a. 1 co; Iª q. 82, a. 4 co.) The will can move also itself. When the will wishes an end, it can move itself to wish means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª-IIae q. 9, a. 3 co.) The will moves itself through the deliberation of reason, which is wished by the will. (Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* q. 6 co.) Giles of Rome also argues that the attention of the intellect activates the will to wish, but the will can control the attention. (Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* 3, q. 15, p. 178.) Giles’s view remains that of Aquinas but, as Hoffmann claims, it is more voluntaristic than Aquinas’s one because the will directs the attention of the intellect according to its own liking. (Hoffmann 2010, 421.) Hervaeus Natalis also argues that the will moves itself through the deliberation of reason. (Hervaeus Natalis, *In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum volumina scripta subtilissima* lib. 2, d. 25, q. 2, p. 28v.) The views of Aquinas, Giles and Natalis indicate that the Dominican masters favoured a view that the will cannot move itself directly, but only through reason.
45 “[...] dicendum, quod cognitio sensitiva exterior non habet perfectionem absque interiori. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, non est perfecta visio ex concursu organi et obiecti, nisi adsit interior intentio copulans unum cum altero, sicut dicitur in libro de Trinitate undecimo. Illam autem intentionem vocat Augustinus sensualitatem, dicens, quod sensualitas est illa, ‘per quam intenditur in corporis sensus’; et penes hanc attenditur appetitus carnis. Et ideo Magister ex parte cognitionis sensitivae unam tantum ponit voluntatem, scilicet voluntatem sensualitatis; si enim accipierit secundum sensum sensus exteriorem, iam non una, sed quinque essent voluntates secundum quinque differentias sensuum exteriorum.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).
Franciscan theologians. Franciscans like John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol followed Bonaventure’s view that Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to external senses, whereas Aquinas argued that Christ had only one sensitive appetitive power. Following Avicenna, Aquinas holds that the sensitive part of the soul does not have many appetitive powers related to the exterior senses because the exterior senses do not apprehend things as suitable and unsuitable, but the sensitive appetitive power follows the apprehension of a thing as suitable and unsuitable. Since only the estimative power apprehends things as suitable and unsuitable, the sensitive part of the soul has only one appetitive power, which is related to the estimative power.

Contrary to Lombard, the thirteenth- and the fourteenth-century theologians argued that the will of reason was divided further. Summa Halensis was one of the first to divide Christ’s will of reason into the will “as nature” and the will “as reason.” The will of reason was divided into the will as nature inasmuch as the will was united with flesh, and the will as reason inasmuch as the will in all respects conformed to divinity.

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46 “Sed communiter loquendo, accipiendo voluntatem pro appetitu, sic puto quod in Christo, sicut in nobis, fuerunt tot appetitus quot sunt potentiae apprehensivae distinctae in nobis; et ita sicut alia est apprehensio gustus et visus, alia tactus et odoratus, ita est alia virtus propria appetitus huius et illius, et alia delectatio propria consequens hanc apprehensionem et illam.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565–566. According to Scotus, the sensitive appetite commonly names only one power, which is the appetite related to the imagination. The appetite related to the imagination is called the sensitive appetite because it can desire and feel pain regarding the objects of all the particular senses. (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 565–566. See also Lectura lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424.) Also, Peter of John Olivi thinks that a human being has many sensitive appetitive powers related to external senses. (Toivanen 2011, 426–427.)

47 “Secundo voluntas humana dividitur quia quaedam est voluntas, quae est affectio sequens apprehensionem rationis, quaedam affectio consequens apprehensionem sensum. Et tertia est subdividitur. Quaedam enim affectio sequitur apprehensionem sensum exterioris, quaedam sensus interioris. Quarto, prima istarum subdividitur, quia tot sunt affectiones, quot sunt apprehensiones sensuum exteriorum.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 78r, the 1605 printed edition p. 461–462.

48 “[…] appetitus sensibilis non surgit nisi quando apprehenditur ut conveniens. Hoc autem non fit per sensum exteriorum qui apprehendit formas sensibiles, sed per aestimationem quae apprehendit rationes convenientes et nocivae quas sensus exterior non apprehendit. Et ideo in parte sensitiva non est nisi unus appetitus secundum genus, qui tamen dividitur, sicut in species, in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quam utraque sub sensuality computatur.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 2; qc. 3 ad 4; Summa theologiae 1º q. 81, a. 2 co.

49 “Praenotandum est quod Christus dicitur habuisse diversas voluntates quatuor modis. Primo modo, iuxta duas naturas divinam et humanam dicuntur in Christo diversae voluntates, divina scilicet voluntas et humana. Secundo modo, secundum humanam naturam dicuntur in Christo diversae voluntates, voluntas scilicet rationis et voluntas sensualitatis. Tertio modo, dicuntur in Christo secundum rationem diversae voluntates, quia ratio habet quamdam voluntatem ut natura est unibilis corpori, et habet voluntatem ut ratio est per omnia conformis divini, et secundum hoc dicentur diversas voluntates in Christo: voluntas naturalis et voluntas rationis.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 177. In his Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum, Alexander briefly makes the claim that Christ’s human will involved the natural will, which belonged to reason and sensuality, and the natural will
Halensis does not explain why it divides the will of reason into the will “as reason” and the will “as nature”, but a clear benefit of the division was that it helped to understand how Christ’s will of reason was also able to wish for death and wish for an avoidance of death, which was a prerequisite in explaining how the whole soul of Christ, including its rational part, was touched by pain. Although Summa Halensis did not clarify the division in detail, the idea was significant since it implied that the rational part of Christ’s human soul had will which was moved naturally but not freely. This distinction was also adopted to philosophical language about the will. Since the early Franciscans, a commonly accepted division of Christ’s wills was as follows.

Theologians specifically discussed what the will as nature and the will as reason were. Bonaventure associates the will as nature with thelesis and the deliberative will with bulesis in John of Damascus’s terminology, and argues that the will as nature and the will as reason are two modes of wishing. He emphasizes that they do not differ because of an object. Whereas the will as nature wishes good and avoids evil naturally and without deliberation, the deliberative will wishes good or evil after deliberation. In a peculiar way, the will as nature desires immutably beatitude and the deliberative will can...

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For the pain and sadness of the rational part of the soul, see Chapter 3.6. Taina Holopainen 2014.

50 For the pain and sadness of the rational part of the soul, see Chapter 3.6.
51 Taina Holopainen 2014.
52 “Item, voluntas secundum Damascenum dividitur prima divisione in thelesim et bulesim, hoc est in naturalem et deliberativam; istae duae differentiae constat quod fuerunt in Christo, sicut et praedictae:” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366). “Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit differentia in objectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum appellamus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et murmurat contra malum; et voluntatem deliberativam appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus bono, aliquando malo. Et sic divisio potentiae per naturalem et deliberativam non variat eam secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. […] Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicuntur naturalis, quia immutabiliter appetit eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contrarium inclinari.” Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 3. (II, 566). The will as nature desires immutably beatitude and the deliberative will can...
manner, Bonaventure also studies the division of Christ’s wills proposed by Hugh of Saint Victor. He expounds that the will of reason and the will of pity mentioned by Hugh were not two powers but different modes of the rational will to wish. The will of reason is to wish absolutely, whereas the will of pity is to wish conditionally. Why is the will of pity conditional wishing? Bonaventure explains that when the will absolutely wishes a thing, at the same time the will may conditionally wish for an opposite thing. The will can wish for the penalty of another human being and also wish for the opposite of the penalty if such wishing pleases God. Bonaventure’s view implies that the will of the rational part of the soul was able to wish not only absolutely but also under a condition. Bonaventure did not invent the distinction between absolute and conditional wishing, but his innovation was to use it to explain Hugh’s distinctions. It is worth mentioning that when Barnes explains Bonaventure’s distinctions, he claims that the bulesis/thelesis division is the same as the will of reason/will of pity division, although elsewhere Barnes notes that Bonaventure separates the will of pity from thelesis. However, I think that there is no reason to suppose that the divisions are the same, because Bonaventure describes them differently and he does not explicitly claim that they are the same.

Albert the Great did not associate the will as deliberative with bulesis, and he argued that different objects explain the division between the will as deliberative and the will as nature. According to Albert, the will as nature and the will as deliberative are two ways to consider the will of

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53 Note that here the will of reason is not the power but the mode of the power to wish.
54 “[…] ex illis auctoritatibus non potest argui, quod in Christo sint plures voluntates quam tres, nisi accipiatur divisio voluntatis secundum modos volendi; per quem modum rationalis voluntas multiplicari habet in voluntatem rationis et pietatis, hoc est secundum conditionalem et absolutam,” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367). See also Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 366).
55 “Aliquid ostendit se velle voluntate absoluta, sed oppositum velle, quantum in se est, ut mala, quae infligit. Et haec tenemur velle voluntate absoluta et deliberativa; tamen oppositum possimus velle voluntate pietatis, ut dicit Hugo. […] Unde Hugo distinguist in nobis triplicum voluntatem, scilicet rationis, pietatis et carnis, et in Christo quadruplicem, extendens nomen voluntatis. […] Et ideo voluntate rationis debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate pietatis possimus conditionalem, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle.” Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, a. 2, q. 2. (I, 858). William of Auxerre does not call the conditional wishing the will of pity but also he thinks that a compassion involves conditional wishing. (Saarinen 1994, 76–77.) Barnes claims that Bonaventure did not clarify what the will of reason and the will of pity are. (Barnes 2012, 106.) It is true that he did not explain these terms when he studied the wills of Christ, but he did it it elsewhere.
56 Barnes 2012, 99–100.
57 Barnes 2012, 109.
reason. Following John of Damascus, he expounds that the will as nature or *thelesis* and the will as deliberative are about possible external things which we can do. The will as nature is about the necessities of life, whereas the will as deliberative is about things, which are chosen and not necessities of life. The domain of *bulesis* includes all kinds of external things, which are possible and even impossible.

Like Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas thought that the will as nature and the will as reason were *thelesis* and *bulesis*, and like Albert the Great, he argued that they were related to different objects. However, Aquinas emphasizes that they were the acts of the will about an end and means. Aquinas’s use of an end-means distinction was an Aristotelian

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59 “Rationis vero aut est ut natura, aut ut deliberativa. Sed non facit mentionem de illa quae est rationis ut est natura: quia secundum substantiam et esse potentiae non differt ab illa quae est rationis ut deliberativa, sed potius est quidam modus considerationis ejusdem potentiae: quod enim sit ut natura, hoc accidit cuilibet potentiae animae rationalis in quantum est natura hominis.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 5, p. 304. See also Barnes 2012, 86. For Albert the Great on the sensitive appetitive powers and the will, see Reilly 1934, 59–63; 75–79.

60 “Naturalis enim est de constituentibus et salvantibus naturam. Deliberativa vero est de his quae secundum prohaeresim eliguntur. Tamen ex verbis Damasceni voluntas non naturalis nec etiam deliberativa est eorum quae possibile est fieri non per nos, et etiam impossibilium, sicut quod volumus nos nunquam mori, quod tamen est impossibile: et haec etiam voluntas est possibilium qua non fiunt per nos, sicut quod volumus esse reges, quod quidem possibile est, sed non fit per nos. Has tres voluntates nominat tribus modis. Prima enim dicitur thelesis, hoc est naturalis voluntas. Secunda autem proprie dicitur voluntas rationalis. Tertia vero dicitur boulesis, hoc est, qualscumque voluntas, eo quod generalis est appetitus possibilium et impossibilium, sive per nos, sive non per nos operandorum.” Albert the Great, *De homine* q. 65, a. 1, p. 548–549. “Objectum enim ejus aut est intra, aut extra. Intra, sicut potentiae animae quas omnes voluntas inclinat ad actum […] Si est extra, aut est de constituentibus et salvantibus naturam: et tunc est illa quae vocatur thelesis a Damascendo. […] Aut est de non pertinentibus ad naturam, sed hoc duobus modis, scilicet possibilium, et impossibilium. […] Si vero operandorum per nos, tunc est proprie voluntas rationalis: quia tunc est de quiquis ratio habet antecedenter inquirere et disponere et ordinare et consulere. Voluntas autem generalis ad tres ultimos modos, hoc est, impossibilium, et possibilium per nos operandorum, et possibilium non per nos operandorum, secundum Damascenum et Gregorium Nyssenum dicitur boulesis, nisi quandoque restringatur ad aliquod horum trium per specialem rationem.” Albert the Great, *De homine* q. 65, a. 2, p. 551. The division of the objects is based on John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 136–137. Damascus takes the division of the objects from Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea* III.2, 1111b20–26.

61 In *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claims that the will has three acts in relation to an end: willing (*voluntas*), enjoying (*frui*) and intending (*intendi*). The act of willing is about an end as such. (*Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 8, a. 2 co). Intending is about an end as related to means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 12, a. 1 ad 4.) Enjoying is the rest of the will in the last end. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 11, a. 3 co; a. 4 co.) The will also has three acts in relation to means: choosing, consenting (*sentire*) and using (*uti*). The choice is the act of free choice. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 13, a. 1 co.) The will chooses freely because the will can choose or not choose, and it can choose this or that. The freedom of free choice is based on reason, which can apprehend the same thing as good and as evil. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 13, a. 6 co.) Consent is about means deliberated on by reason. Aquinas explains that when reason deliberates that there are many means to achieve an end and all means please the will, the will consents to the means. After the consent, the will chooses one of the means. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 15, a. 3 ad 3.) The will involves the act of use when it moves the powers of the soul
feature of his view, since Aristotle applied the distinction when he analysed the concepts of will and free choice. The advantage of this emphasis was that it provided a clear and simple explanation of the division, which also was firmly rooted in Aristotelian psychology. In *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claims that the will as nature was an act about an end, whereas the will as reason was an act about a means to an end. As Aquinas argues in his *Summa theologiae* that the will wishes means only in relation to an end but not means as such, the will as nature was an act only about an end but not about means as such. The will as reason was an act of free choice, which was a choice about a means to an end. When Aquinas claims that the will as reason is *builesis*, he thinks that *builesis* is about a means to an end. He takes this to be John of Damascus’ view as well, even though Damascus explicitly claims that *builesis* was about an end.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, we find a sketchier view. Aquinas claims that the will as nature was not only about an end but also about means as such. He does not explain that the will as nature and as reason are acts of the will. This seems to be a later but illustrative clarification.

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63 "Si ergo voluntas accipiatur pro actu, sic oportet in Christo ex parte rationis ponere duas voluntates, idest, duas species actuum voluntatis. Voluntas enim, ut in secunda parte dictum est, et est finis, et est eorum quae sunt ad finem, et alio modo fertur in utrumque. [...] Et ideo alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid secundum se voluntum, ut sanitas, quod a Damasceno vocatur thelesis, idest simplex voluntas, et a magistris vocatur voluntas ut natura, et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenius vocat builesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 18, a. 3 co.
64 Although Aquinas explicitly claims that the will as nature and the will as reason were acts of the will, Gondreau seems to think that the will as nature was the inclination of the will whereas the will as reason were acts of the will. (Gondreau 2002, 314–316.)
65 "[...] in ea quae sunt ad finem, inquantum huiusmodi, non potest ferri, nisi feratur in ipsum finem." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª–IIae q. 8, a. 3 co.
66 "Et sic simplex voluntas est idem quod voluntas ut natura, electio autem est idem quod voluntas ut ratio, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii [...] Et ideo, cum in Christo ponatur voluntas ut ratio, necesse est ibi ponere electionem, et per consequens liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio, ut in prima parte habitum est." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 18, a. 4 co.
67 "[...] et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenius vocat builesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 18, a. 3 co. "Est autem bulisis (id est voluntas) finis, non eorum quae sunt ad finem." John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 135–137.
68 "[...] voluntas ut natura nunquam in Christo movebatur in aliquid sicut in finem, nisi quod Deus vult. [...] Voluntas ut natura, mota in aliquid non sicut in finem quod quidem non eodem modo se habet in bonitate et malitia secundum se consideratum et in ordine ad finem non conformabatur divinae voluntati in volito;" Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 17, q.
Aquinas explains that the will as nature is naturally moved towards a good thing as such, whereas the will as reason is moved towards a thing that is good in relation to something else. Aquinas emphasizes that the separation does not imply that a human being has two wills as powers. The root of the separation is the reason, which apprehends a thing to be good as such and to be good as related to something else. Therefore, the division is accidental for the will.\textsuperscript{68} It is worth noting that Aquinas’s description about the will as nature in the \textit{Commentary on the Sentences} is similar to that of Bonaventure, as Aquinas claims that the will as nature is moved towards a thing naturally and without deliberation. In \textit{Summa theologiae} and his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, Aquinas holds that Christ’s will of pity in Hugh of Saint Victor’s terminology was will as nature because it escaped a nasty thing as such, which happened to another human being.\textsuperscript{69}

Aquinas’s view that the will as reason and the will as nature were related to an end and means was popular among the Dominican and Franciscan theologians, undoubtedly because it was a simple and clear way to explain the distinction. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton and Durand of St. Pourçain also argue that will as nature and will as reason are about a thing as such and a thing in relation to something else, but only Peter of Tarentaise explicitly claims that they are acts of the will. Peter explains that will as reason is the will as it is moved rationally and it has an act about an object which is good in relation to something else, whereas that will as nature is the will as it is moved naturally and it has an act about an object which is good as such.\textsuperscript{70} Richard Middleton holds that the will as nature is the will ruled by the natural command of reason, whose object was a thing which was good as such. The will as deliberative was the will ruled by the non-natural command of reason, whose object was a thing which was good in relation to an end or circumstances.\textsuperscript{71} According to

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\item \textsuperscript{68} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 1; a. 2, qc. 1 co.
\item \textsuperscript{69} “[…] voluntas pietatis non videtur esse aliud quam voluntas quae consideratur ut natura, inquantum scilicet refugit alienum malum absolute consideratum.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 18, a. 3 ad 3; \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 6.
\item \textsuperscript{70} “[…] tertio modo secundum diversas operationes eiusdem potentiae, scilicet est nature, vel ut ratio: […] Differentia vero naturalis et deliberatiue voluntatis, non est nisi penes diversas considerationes, vel officia vel actus eiusdem. […] Eadem enim potestia prout mouetur modo naturali, scilicet in bonum absolute consideratum, dicitur voluntas naturalis; prout mouetur per modum rationis, scilicet in bonum secundum ordinem ad aliud, dicitur voluntas rationalis.” Peter of Tarentaise, \textit{In IV libros sententiarum commentaria} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, p. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{71} “[…] et appetitum naturalis voluntatis, qui est a voluntate, ut est natura regulata per naturale dictamen rationis, cuius objectum est bonum absolute: et appetitum voluntatis deliberatiae, qui est a voluntate regulata per aliquam regulam non naturalem rationi, cuius
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Durand of St. Pourçain, Christ’s will of reason is called the will as nature when it considers an object which as such is suitable or unsuitable for a nature. The will is called the will as reason when it considers an object which is good or evil in relation to an end and it follows the deliberation of reason.\textsuperscript{72}

John Duns Scotus’s new idea was to associate the will as nature with the inclination of the will. As he thinks that the will as nature is the inclination of the will but not the act of the will, and he does not associate it with a means or end, Scotus’s view differs from Aquinas’s one. Scotus claims that the will of reason included the natural will and the free will, and he argues that they were not two separate powers. He clarifies that the term “natural will” can be taken in three different senses.\textsuperscript{73} The natural will in the first sense is not a power or an elicited act but the inclination of the will towards its own perfection. It is a passive inclination because it inclines the will to receive its perfection. Scotus explains that the will is called “natural will” since it is inclined to its perfection and “free will” because of a feature (ratio) which characteristic for it.\textsuperscript{74} He relates the natural will with the will

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\textsuperscript{72} “[…] haec autem secundum nomen diuiditur in voluntatem ut est natura et ut est ratio non tanquam in duas potentia, sed fortius haec duo nomina vel duos modos quibus potest ferri in suum obiectum, quando enim voluntas fertur in aliquod secundum quod est conueniens uel nocicum naturae secundum se, sic uocatur voluntas ut natura, quando autem fertur in aliquod secundum bonitatem vel malitiam, quam habet in ordine ad finem, sic uocatur voluntas ut ratio, quia sequitur deliberationem rationis, quia cum eiusdem potentiae sit ferri in aliquod secundum se et in ordine ad finem, ideo eadem est potentiaria uoluntatis quae fertur suum obiectum.” Durand of St. Purçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.

\textsuperscript{73} For Scotus on the natural wills, see Wolter 1986, 41–42; González-Ayesta 2012, 38–52. For Scotus on the division of Christ’s wills, see also Barnes 2012, 301–302. González-Ayesta argues plausibly that when Scotus identifies the natural will with the intellectual appetite and the affection for what is advantageous, this holds in a fictional case where the will has only affection for the advantageous but no affection for justice. However, in a real situation the will has both affections. (González-Ayesta 2012, 42–48.)

\textsuperscript{74} “[…] dico quod voluntas naturalis […] non est voluntas ut potentia, sed tantum importat inclinationem potentiae ad recipientum perfectionem suam, non ad agendum ut sic; […] unde naturalis potentia non tendit, sed est tenditania illa qua voluntas absoluta tendit - et hoc passive - ad recipiendum. Sed est alia tenditania, in potentia eadem, ut libere et active tendat elicendo actum, ita quod una potentia et duplex tenditania (activa et passiva). Tunc ad formam dico quod voluntas naturalis, secundum illud quod ‘formale’ importat, non est potentia vel voluntas, sed inclinatio voluntatis et tenditania qua tendit in perfectionem passive recipiendam.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 570–571. “Sed quid de voluntate naturali et libera, sunt ne duae potentiae? Dico quod ‘appetitus naturalis’, in qualibet re; generali nomine accipitur pro inclinatione naturali rei ad suam proprietatem, […] Tunc dico quod sic est de voluntate, quia voluntas naturalis non est voluntas, nec velle naturale est velle, sed by ‘naturalis’ distrahit ab utroque et nihil est nisi relatio consequens potentiam respectu proprietatum: unde eadem potentia dicitur ‘naturalis voluntas’ cum respectu tali necessario consequente ipsam ad perfectionem, et dicitur ‘libera’ secundum rationem propriae et intrinsecam, quae est voluntas specifical.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 566–568. “[…] primo videndum est quid est appetitus naturalis, et dico quod non est actus elicitus,” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184. See also
as nature when he holds that the will as nature is a will as it desires its perfection. He adds also that the will as nature is the will as it is inclined to an object proper to it because an object perfects the will and to the object of another appetitive power because of its affection for the advantageous. It is worth noting that González-Ayesta claims that the natural will is an inclination to the objects that perfect the will, whereas Wolter explains that the natural will is an inclination to an act. I think that González-Ayesta’s reading is more plausible than Wolter’s one, because, as I show above, Scotus explains, for example, that the advantageous and justice are the perfections of the will to which the will is inclined. It seems that the advantageous and justice are the objects rather than the acts of the will.

The natural will in the second sense is the will as having only natural properties, and it is opposed to the supernatural will, which is the will informed by gratuitous gifts. Scotus argues that the natural will in this sense is free because it is the natural property of the will that it wishes freely. Therefore, the natural will and the free will are not two powers. In the third sense, the natural will is the will as it elicits an act, which is uniform with the natural inclination to advantageous. Also then the natural will and the free

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John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424–425; p. 428; *Ordinatio* lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 184. According to Scotus, the will also has an active and free inclination when the will elicits an act.


76 “Voluntas ut natura dupliciter accipitur: Uno modo, ut tendit naturaliter in obiecta propria huius potentiae ut haec, circumscibendo alia, et tantum intelligendo hanc potentiam ut est perfectibilis circa obiecta et ipsa obiecta sua. […] Alio modo dicitur voluntas ut natura, intelligendo omnem ordinem eius ad quodcumque consequens naturam voluntatis, - et hoc proprie non ut libera, sed ut est tantum appetitus intellectivus, sive ut habens affectionem commodi, non iustitiae. Et sic habet ordinem ad compatium appetitus inferiori non tantum in ordine illius obiecti ad primum obiectum voluntatis ut voluntas, sed - circumscripito illo ordine - circa quodcumque sic compatitur, et ita in hoc se habet ac si ad aeternum referri non possit. […] Breviter igitur voluntas ut natura, primo modo, est voluntas ut tantum naturaliter inclinata ad su præparta obiecta; secundo modo est voluntas inclinata ad obiecta alterius appetitus, cui coniungitur mediante inclinatione illius. Primo modo est tantum portio superior, secundo modo tantum inferior. Ita generaliter potest accipi voluntas ut natura, quod includit utrumque, et sic pertinent ad utrumque portionem.” *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 517. See also *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.

77 González-Ayesta 2012, 52.

78 Wolter 1986, 42.


80 “Secundo modo accipitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ in quantum voluntas est in propriis naturalibus; et sic voluntas est libera, quia ex puris naturalibus vult aliquid libere. Et sic manifestum est quod non est alia potentia.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 425.
will are the same power, because the will is free when it elicits an act uniform with the natural inclination to the advantageous.\textsuperscript{81}

According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will includes affection for the advantageous and affection for justice. The idea of two affections was based on Anselm of Canterbury. Scotus clarifies that the will is inclined towards things that are good for a person himself because of affection for the advantageous and inclined towards justice because of affection for justice. The affection for justice is the inner freedom of the will, since the will can wish that which is just and not advantageous for oneself because of that affection.\textsuperscript{82} Scotus explains that if the will had only affection for the advantageous, the will could not but elicit the act of wishing for the advantageous. Hence, the affection for justice provides that the will can also refrain from wishing (\textit{non velle}) for the advantageous.\textsuperscript{83} According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will includes both affections because the advantageous and justice are perfections of the will. However, affection for the advantageous rather than affection for justice is called the natural inclination because the advantageous rather than justice follows nature.\textsuperscript{84}

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\item \textsuperscript{81} "Adhuc tertio modo accipitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ ut elicit actum conformem inclinationi naturali, quae semper est ad commodum; et sic est libera [in] elicendo actum conformem sicut in elicendo actum oppositum, quia in potestate eius est elicere actum conformem vel non elicere (voluntas supernaturalis tantum actum conformem)." John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 568. See also John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 425–426; \textit{Reportatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.

\item \textsuperscript{82} "Hoc etiam probatur, quia in voluntate, secundum Anselmum, assignantur duae affectiones, scilicet affectio iustitiae et affectio commodi, […] Nobilior est affectio iustitiae quam commodi, non solum intelligendo de acquisita et infusa, sed de innata, quae est ingenita libertas, secundum quam potest velle aliquod bonum non ordinatum ad se. Secundum autem affectionem commodi, nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, - et hanc haberet si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam sicut appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam. Ex hoc volo habere tantum quod, cum ‘amare aliquid in se’ sit actus liberior et magis communicativus quam ‘desiderare illud sibi’, et conveniens magis voluntati in quantum habet affectionem iustitiae saltem innatae, alius autem conveniat voluntati in quantum habet affectionem commodi," John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 26, q. 1, p. 35–36. For Scotus on the affections of the will, see Wolter 1986, 39–41; Boler 2002, 136–138; Ingham 2010, 141–153; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553.

\item \textsuperscript{83} “[…] dico quod voluntas, quae est potentia libere agens, non necessario vult commodum, sicut nec necessario vult iustum, actu elici; tamen si ista una potentia consideretur ut habet affectionem commodi et non habet affectionem iustitiae, id est in quantum appetitus non-liber, - non esset in potestate eius sic non velle commoda, quia sic praecise esset tantum appetitus naturalis naturae intellectualis, sicut appetitus bruti est appetitus naturalis naturae sensitivae." John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 2, d. 39, q. 1–2, p. 463. González-Ayesta similarly describes the interplay between these two affections. (González-Ayesta 2012, 42.)

\item \textsuperscript{84} “[…] respondeo: inclinatio naturalis est duplex, - una ad commodum, alia ad iustum, quorum utrumque est perfectio voluntatis liberae; una tamen inclinatio magis dicitur naturalis quam alia, quia immediatius consequitur naturam - ut distinguuit contra libertatem - commodum quam iustum;" John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. III, Dist. 15, q. 1, p. 502. See also John Duns Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484. Peter Auriol claims that the will of reason was divided into the natural will and the deliberative will. He explains that they were not two powers and the natural will was affection that was planted in the human nature.
According to Scotus, the natural will as the inclination of the will necessarily desires beatitude because beatitude is the greatest perfection of the will. Whatever else it desires, it desires because of beatitude. When the intellect presents beatitude for the will, the will also actually wishes for beatitude in most cases because it usually elicits acts corresponding to the natural inclination. However, the will in act does not wish beatitude necessarily but freely, because the will can elicit and refrain from eliciting the act of wishing when the intellect presents beatitude for the will.

Although Scotus thinks that the will elicits its acts about beatitude freely, he
argues that the will cannot wish against (nolle) beatitude and it cannot wish (vole) the opposite of beatitude (i.e., misery). The will can only elicit the act of wishing against misery. Even though the will cannot but wish against misery, it wishes freely against misery because the will can elicit the act of wishing against and it can restrain from eliciting the act of wishing against. Similarly, although the will cannot wish against beatitude, it freely wishes for beatitude because it can wish or not wish (velle sive non velle) for it. The will cannot wish for misery and it cannot wish against beatitude because misery cannot be the object of wishing and beatitude cannot be the object of wishing against. Hence, if the will elicits an act related to beatitude, it is necessarily an act of wishing, and if the will elicits an act in relation to misery, it is necessarily an act of wishing against.  

2.3. The Conformity and the Fulfilment of the Wills in Christ

When Christ prayed “O my Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me, yet not what I want but what you want” (Matthew 26:39; Luke. 22:42), thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ’s human will diverged from the divine will in his divine nature and asked for something which did not take place. A standard view was that the divine will and the will as reason wished the death, but the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish it. Since the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish for death but the divine will wished for it, were Christ’s human wills contrary to his divine will, and, consequently, did Christ sin? The medieval theologians argued that he did not sin, since Christ was free from sin and Christ’s wills were not contrary but conformed to each other.

89 “Respondeo, quod nec necessario volo beatitudinem, nec necessario nolo miseriam. Unde non sequitur: ‘Non volo esse miseriam, ergo nolo miseriam’ sive ‘nolo me esse miserum.’ Nec sequitur: ‘Non possum velle esse miserum, ergo de necessitate nolo esse miserum,’ quia nolle est actus voluntatis positivus sicut velle, et ita liberum unum sicut alium. Ideo neutrum necessario elicio circa quodcumque objectum, et ideo possum non elicere nolle circa malum sicut velle circa bonum; tamen sicut circa malum ostensum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi nolle, ita circa bonum apprehensum et oblatum non possum elicere actum voluntatis nisi velle.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 192.

90 “Respondeo, quod a voluntate excluditur actus volitionis respectu miseriae, et actus nolitionis respectu beatitudinis, quia miseria non est nata esse objectum volitionis nec beatitudo nolitionis. […] Dico ergo quod voluntas sic determinatur ad volendum beatitudinem et nolendum miseriam, quia si eliciat aliquem actum circa objecta ista, necessario et determinate elicit actus volendi respectu beatitudinem et actum nolendi circa miseriam. Non tamen absolute determinatur ad unum actum eliciendum nec ad aliam.” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 4, suppl. d. 49, q. 9–10, p. 192.

91 Theologians thought that when Christ prayed “Father, forgive them, for they don’t know what they’re doing” (Luke 23:34.) or “I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their message, that they may all be one” (John 17:20–21.) also then he wished something which did not take place. Christ’s human will departed from the divine will also when he cried over Jerusalem (Luke 19:41).
How, then, can the wills of a sinless person wish for different or even opposed things but still conform to each other? The views of the theologians about the conformity of the wills in Christ aimed to provide an answer to this question.

In the *Summa Halensis*, there are two views why the will of sensuality and the will of reason were not contrary, even though they wished for contrary things (i.e. life and death). According to one view, the will of sensuality and the will as reason were not contrary since they did not wish for morally contrary things, but they were contrary since they wished for naturally contrary things. Things are morally contrary when one thing is good and another thing is evil. Since both Christ’s life and Christ’s death were good, the wills did not wish for morally contrary things and they were not morally contrary. However, because life and death are natural contraries and the will of reason wished for death and the will of sensuality wished for life, the wills were contrary in this sense. The second view, which the *Summa Halensis* favours, is that of William of Auxerre: Christ’s human wills were not contrary, as the will of sensuality was in Christ’s sensuality and the will of reason was in his reason, and as they did not wish the same, because the former wished for life and the latter for death. According to the *Summa Halensis*

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92 “Dicendum ergo quod in Christo fuerunt diversae voluntates, sed non contrariae: nec voluntas sensualitatis contraria voluntati rationis, nec voluntas humana contraria voluntati divinae, nec voluntas naturalis contraria voluntati rationis, […] quamvis quidam distinguant quod est contrarietas naturalis duplex: naturalis et moralis. Contrarietas moralis est, quae est de contrariis in moribus; contrarietas autem in moribus determinatur secundum rationem boni et mali. Quia ergo in Christo utrumque erat bonum, siccellet vivere et mori, voluntas sensualitatis et rationis non fuerunt contrariorum in moribus, cum utrumque sit bonum. Contrarietas vero naturalis est illa, quae est de contrariis in natura; contraria autem in natura attenduntur secundum contrarias dispositiones in natura. Unde secundum hoc vivere et mori sunt contraria; et voluntas sensualitatis et rationis secundum hoc fuerunt contrariorum et secundum hoc voluntates contrariae. Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod inordinatio fuerit in Christo, quia ordinatio et inordinatio attenduntur secundum rationem moralem, id est secundum rationem boni et mali.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178. According to Alexander of Hales, the appetite of the sensuality did not want but the appetitive of the will wanted the death. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 16, d. 4, memb. 2, p. 269.)

93 “Sed dicendum est rectius secundum Ioannem Damascenum quod Christus habuit diversas voluntates, sed non contrarias. Contraria enim nata sunt fieri circa idem; quia ergo non erat circa idem voluntas mortiendi et vivendi nec secundum idem in Christo, quia unum circa sensualitatem, alium circa rationem, non erit contrarietas voluntatis sensualitatis et rationis.” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178. *Summa Halensis* adds that even though the will of sensuality and the will of reason wished for contrary things, Christ’s flesh did not desire in opposition to the spirit (Gal. 5:17). The flesh desires in opposition to the spirit when it desires a thing and the spirit does not wish for the flesh to desire that thing. This did not take happen in the case of Christ because his spirit wished that his flesh desired life. (*Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.) Alexander of Hales argues that sensuality can wish for a thing which reason does not wish (*non velle*), wish for a thing because reason wishes that sensuality wish for that thing, or wish for a thing which is opposite to that which reason wishes. When this occurs, the flesh desires against the spirit. Alexander claims that this did not take place in Christ, because, according to Augustine, everything in Christ was in at peace. (Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* d. 17 (AE), n. 4, p. 175.) Following the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure
Halensis, the will as nature and the will as reason were not contrary either since the will as nature wished for life as such but the will as reason wished for death in relation to the redemption of the human race.  

When the Summa Halensis turns to study Christ’s prayer, following William of Auxerre it claims that when Christ prayed in Gethsemane, reason proposed what sensuality desired. Opening a new point, the Summa Halensis expounds that the prayer involved matter and form. The matter was “let this cup pass from me” and the form was a conditional clause “if it is possible”. In making the prayer, reason took the matter from sensuality but the form from itself. As the Summa Halensis claims that all Christ’s prayers were heard in respect to the form of the prayer, it thinks that the desire of the sensuality was not heard.

Bonaventure expounds that the conformity of the wills is based on the conformity of the things wished for and on the conformity of the reason for willing (ratio volendi). The reason for willing is in conformity when the wills wish for the same thing in the same way or when the inferior will wishes for a thing in a way that matches how the superior will wishes for the inferior will to wish for a thing. The benefit of Bonaventure’s division was that it helped to explain in a simple way how the wills can wish for even contrary things without the wills being contrary. Bonaventure clarifies that the perfect conformity of the wills involves that the wills wish for the same thing and that the reason for willing is the same, whereas conformity requires

claims that Christ’s flesh or sensuality did not wish against the spirit or reason since sensuality had an act which reason wished it to have. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 370.).)  

“Praeterea, voluit absolute sive in spiritu quod voluit sensualitas, scilicet vivere; cum conditione nostrae redemptionis voluit oppositum, scilicet mori. Voluntate ergo naturali voluit idem cum sensualitate, scilicet vivere; rationali vero voluntate, consideratione nostrae redemptionis, voluit mori; nec sunt voluntates contrariae, sed diversae.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 1, cap. 2, p. 178.


“Dicendum quod in omnibus est exauditus, quantum est de se, secundum formam petitionis.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 4, q. 2, cap. 2, p. 180.
only that the reason for the willing is the same. The wills can conform to each other even if they wish contrary things.

Christ’s wills conformed to each other even though they wished for different things, because the will of sensuality wished in the way in which the rational will wished for it to wish, the rational will wished in the way in which the divine will wished for it to wish, and the wills of sensuality and pity wished in the way in which the divine will wished for them to wish. As Bonaventure explains that the will of sensuality, the rational will and the divine will wished even for contrary things, Barnes’s claim that “Bonaventure allows only a non-identity in the thing willed” (i.e. the wills of Christ wished for only different but non-contrary things) begs the question.

Bonaventure argues that Christ’s prayer was heard or fulfilled when the human will and the divine will wished for the same thing. Because the will of reason wished the same as the divine will, all prayers which arose from such volition were heard, but prayers which arose from the will of pity and the will of the flesh were not always heard. It is worth noting that as

97 “Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem in duobus consistit, videlicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito dico, quando diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitatem in ratione volendi dico, quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera earum vult illud eodem modo, quod superior vult eam velle. Cum igitur ad perfectam conformitatem ista duo concurrant, alterum corum est de necessitate conformitatis, videlicet conformitas in modo, alterum vero aliquid de necessitate, aliquando de congruitate, aliquando praeter necessitatem et congruitatem, videlicet conformitas in volito.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 368).

98 “Possibile est enim, quod voluntates sint conformes, ita quod una subsit alteri; et tamen non volunt idem, quia voluntas superior non vult inferiorum velle, quod ipsa vult, sed magis velle contrarium.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 362).

99 “Quoniam igitur conformitas in ratione volendi fuit in omnibus voluntatibus Christi, quia sic volebat sensualitas, sicut volebat ratio eam velle; sic volebat etiam ratio Christi, sicut divina voluntas volebat ipsam velle: ideo concedendum est, quod in Christo fuit voluntatum concordia et consonantia, quamvis ex parte volitó non esset identitas, quia unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat volebat. […] Et sic patet, quod licet diversa essent volita, voluntates tamen in Christo habuerunt consonantiam.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 368–369). See also Bonaventure, Breuiloquium pars 4, cap 8, p. 249.

100 “Unde in praedicto verbo insinuatur duplex voluntas in Christo, una videlicet rationis, quae erat similis et subiecta divinae voluntati; altera vero sensualitatis, quam ratio subiiciebat voluntati divinae, licet ipsa sensualitas contrarium appeteret; et ita, quamvis non esset similis, erat tamen subiecta, ac per hoc non erat contraria.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 369).

101 Barnes 2012, 103.

102 “Dicendum, quod cum oratio sit petitio procedens ex voluntate et desiderio; secundum quod voluntas humana fuit in Christo secundum triplicem differentiam, sic et oratio. Nam quaedam oratio fuit expressius sive procedens a voluntate rationis, quaedam a voluntate pietatis, quaedam a voluntate carnis. - Oratio procedens a voluntate rationis procedebat a voluntate, quae quidem requirebat exaudiri; et talis oratio in omnibus est exaudita, tum propter hoc, quod ista voluntas erat per omnia conformis voluntati divinae; […] Oratio autem procedens a voluntate pietatis et voluntate carnis non fuit in Christo exaudita per omnia, tum quia hac voluntate non conformabatur Deo in omni volitó, […] Concedendum est enim, quod Christus exauditus fuit in omni petitione, qua petit, ut exaudiretur, hoc est in omni eo, quod petit voluntate rationis sive voluntate absoluta. […] Concedendum est nihilominus, quod non
the will of pity was the mode for the rational will to wish, Bonaventure thinks that even the rational will wished for things which did not take place.

Albert the Great’s contribution to the discussion was that he used four Aristotelian causes in explaining how Christ’s wills conformed. Like Bonaventure, also Albert explained how the conformity of the wills did not require that Christ’s wills wished for the same thing. He claims that there are four kinds of conformity of the human will and the divine will, which correspond to material, formal, final and efficient causes. When the human will and the divine will wish for the same thing, the conformity of the wills corresponds to a material cause. This is the lowest grade of conformity. When the human will and the divine will wish for something because of love, the conformity of the wills coincides with a formal cause. When the human will and the divine will wish for something because of the same end, the conformity corresponds to a final cause. Albert explains that such conformity does not require material conformity of the wills because the human will and the divine will can wish for different things because of the same end. When the human will wishes for that which the divine will wishes it to wish, the conformity of the wills corresponds to an efficient cause. Then the human will and the divine will can also wish for different things.

Albert holds that the conformity of Christ’s human and divine wills pertained to the material and the efficient causes. Christ’s human will and the divine will conformed with each other in accord with the material cause when the human will wished the death because of the redemption of the human race. When the human will wished not to die as death was against nature, the human will and the divine will were uniform, according to the efficient cause, because the human will wished what the divine will wished in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate carnis vel pietatis, fuit exauditus, […] Non enim petebat, ut exaudiretur, sed ut nos erudiremur; sicut petiit, calicem a se transferri, et suis crucifixoribus condonari, unum ex voluntate carnis ad ostensionem naturae assumtac, alterum ex voluntate pietatis ad ostensionem benignitatis et misericordiae.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 373–374).

For Albert of Great on the conformity of the wills, see also Barnes 2012, 80–85. For how Albert’s and Bonaventure’s views are related, see Barnes 2012, 104.

“[…] dicendum quod conformitas est quadruplex qua voluntas nostra conformatur voluntati divinae, scilicet in volito: et haec secundum materiam est, et est minima, ut velim hoc quod Deus vult: […] Est etiam conformitas secundum formam volendi, ut ex eadem charitate velimus quod volumus, ex qua Deus vult quod vult: […] Tertia conformitas est in fine volendi, ut propter idem velimus propter quod Deus vult, id est, propter gloriarum suam: et haec iterum est laudabilis, et facit ad meritum, etiamsi sit difformitas in materia voliti: […] Quarta conformitas est in causa efficiente volendi, quando scilicet volo id quod Deus vult me velle […] ergo vult me velle quod ipse non vult: et haec non sunt contraria.” Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, p. 299. See also Albert the Great, Summa theologiae pars 1, tract. 20, q. 80, memb. 3, p. 897. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain applies Albert’s view. (Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r.) See also Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qe. 1 ad 1.
for it to wish since God gave a natural appetite to Christ’s human nature. Albert explains that when Christ’s will as nature wished not to die, it was not fulfilled and such willing was not a perfect wishing but *velleitas*. When explaining Albert’s view about the fight between the wills, Barnes claims that Albert allowed for some contrariety of wills in Christ, because Christ’s wills wished for contrary things (dying and not dying) and the wills were contrary when they wished for contrary things. However, Barnes’s reading is dubious because when he argues this, he refers to the text where Albert explains the fight between the wills. Albert openly denies such a fight in Christ, and he explains that the fight not only includes that objects are contrary but other features as well, like firm resistance of the inferior will against the superior will. In addition, Albert does not claim anywhere that Christ’s wills were contrary.

Like Albert the Great, Aquinas thinks in his *Commentary on the Sentences* that Christ’s human and divine will conformed with each other because they wished for the same thing or the human will wished for what the divine will wished it to wish, but he puts forward a new view on how the wills wished for the same thing. Aquinas claims that the will can wish for a means to an end where the will rests completely, as well as a means to an end.

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105 “[…] duplex est conformitas ad voluntatem divinam. Una secundum causam materialem, quae est in volito, et hac conformavit se Christus voluntati divinae, secundum quod voluit mortem, secundum quod est ordinata ad redemptionem. Alia est secundum causam efficientem, scilicet quando nos volumus id quod deus vult nos velle, et hac conformavit se Christus voluntati divinae, quando voluit non mori, secundum quod mors contraria est naturae. Eo ipso enim quod deus dedit ei talem naturam, eo ipso dedit ei appetitum naturae et voluit ipsum dolere de separatione.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208–209; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, p. 299–300.

106 “[…] quod nihil prohibet, quod secundum voluntatem rationis ut natura est, homo ille in quantum homo, aliquid appetierit quod non est consecutus: et etiam oravit quod non est datum, eo quod non oravit ut ex deliberatione hoc volens, sed potius ut nostram infirmitatem ostendens:” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303. “[…] et hoc notatur cum dicit: Si non potest hic calix transire nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Et hoc quidam antiquorum, scilicet Antisiodorensis, vocat velleitatem, et non voluntatem perfectam.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303.

107 Barnes 2012, 85; 88–89; 110–112. As Albert does not explicitly allow contrariety of wills in Christ, Barnes’s claim that Albert’s and Bonaventure’s view differed in this respect is dubious. (Barnes 2012, 112.)

108 According to Albert, the flesh fights against the spirit when the inferior will has a firm resistance against the superior will because it is reinforced by the spark of sin (*fomes*). Because Christ did not have such reinforcement, his inferior will did not fight against reason but followed it. Albert expounds that, according to one opinion, the will of sensuality did not fight against the will of reason and the will as nature did not fight against the will as reason because the wills did not concern the same thing. As Barnes claims, here Albert seems to refer to the opinion of William of Auxerre and the *Summa Halensis*. (Barnes 2012, 85.) Albert argues that this opinion is absurd because it entails that a sinful human being would have no fight between the wills. While arguing against this opinion, Albert adds that the fight between the wills not only involves firm resistance but also that things wished for were contrary and that things wished for drag the wills after themselves. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 17, a. 4, p. 303.)
end where the will does not rest in that way. The will can also wish for means as such, but not as complete ends. The will may wish for means as such if nothing is discovered to be against such wishing. Aquinas goes on to argue that the will as nature wishes perfectly for an end and wishes imperfectly and conditionally for means as such, whereas the will as reason wishes perfectly for a means to an end.

According to Aquinas, Christ’s will as nature and the divine will conformed with each other since they always wished for the same end. Christ’s will as reason wished for a means to an end which the divine will also wished; therefore, the wills conformed as well. When the will as nature wished not to die (non pati) because the death as such was evil, it wished conditionally and imperfectly a different thing than the divine will, which wished for the death in relation to the redemption of the human race. However, the will as nature, the will of sensuality and the divine were uniform because the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished what the divine will wished for them to wish. The will of sensuality also wished...
what the will of the reason wished it to wish, because the will of sensuality wished for a thing when the will of the reason ordered the will of sensuality to wish for it. Furthermore, the will as reason and the will as nature were not contrary because their objects were not contrary. The will as nature wished not to die because the death as such was evil and the will as reason wished the death because the death was good in relation to an end. Aquinas argues that since the death which was evil as such and the death which was good in relation to an end were not contrary, the will as nature and the will as reason were not contrary. He goes on to explain that because the will as nature and the will as reason wished absolutely an end and a means to an end, all prayers based on such wanting were heard. However, since the will as nature, which wished means as such, and the will of sensuality did not wish absolutely, prayers based on them were not heard. Aquinas’s view that the wills of Christ were not contrary because their objects were not contrary supposes that the wills are contrary when they wish for contrary

divinae voluntati in actu volendi, quamvis non in volito: quia quamvis Deus non vellet hoc quod sensualitas vel voluntas ut natura volebat in Christo, tamen volebat illum actum utriusque, inquantum, secundum Damascenum, permittetebat uniciique partium animae pati et agere quod sibi erat naturale et proprium, quantum expediecibat ad finem redemptionis, et ostensionem veritatis naturae. Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 co.

114 “[…] secundum voluntatem rationis, Christus diversa volebat, non tamen uno modo, sed alterum absolute, alterum autem sub conditione et imperfecte. Et ideo non erat contrarietas in voluntate, quia contrarietas in habitu vel in actu est ex contraria ratione objecti. Ratio autem secundum quam unum contrariorum volebat voluntas ut ratio, et alterum volebat ut natura, non habet contrarietatem. Quod enim aliquid ex ordine ad finem bonitatem habeat, quod sine illo ordine in se malum esset, non habet aliquam repugnantiam secundum quam, ut dictum est, in diversa feratur voluntas ut ratio et voluntas ut natura.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co.

115 “Et ideo hoc solum Christus absolute voluit quod secundum rationem voluit ut finem, vel in ordine ad finem; et omnis talis suoratio fuit exaudita. Quod autem secundum sensualitatem voluit, absolutus non voluit. Et ideo ratio non ad hoc orando proposuit ut impetraret. […] Similiter quod volebat ratio ut natura, si in eo non sicut in fine quiescebat, non simpliciter volebat, ut prius dictum est; et ideo haec etiam non ad hoc proposuit orando ut impetraret. Et propter hoc hujusmodi orationes non fuerunt exaudita.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 4 co. Aquinas argues that when Christ prayed for the salvation of the whole human race, he wished for this by means of the will of pity, as part of the will as nature. Because the will as reason did not wish for the salvation of all human beings, the prayer was not heard. Aquinas goes on to explain that God wishes for the salvation of all humans by his antecedent will, but God does not wish for it by his consequent will. Therefore, Christ’s human will wished imperfectly and conditionally what God’s antecedent will wished, and Christ’s human will wished absolutely and perfectly what God’s consequent will wished. (Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3 q. 4 ad 2; Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 ad 2.)
things. This indicates that, unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that the wills cannot wish for contrary things and be in conformity.

Like in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in *Summa theologiae* Aquinas explains that the will of sensuality turned away from pain and the bodily injuries and the will as nature escaped the death, which was against nature and evil as such. However, the divine will and the will as reason wished for the death and the pain because of the salvation of the human race. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not wish for the same thing as the divine will and the will as reason, whereas the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing. Although the wills did not wish for the same thing, the wills were not contrary. Unlike in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, in *Summa theologiae* Aquinas holds that the contrariety of the wills requires two conditions. First, it requires that the wills wish for things that are contrary in the same respect (*secundum idem*). For example, if a king wishes to hang a robber because of the good of the state but the robber’s relative wishes that the robber is not hung because of personal love, the wills are not contrary as a king and a robber’s relative do not wish for contrary things (to hang and not to be hung) in the same respect. The wills would be contrary if the relative’s will wished to impede the good of the state in order to preserve a personal good. Second, the contrariety of the wills requires that the contrariety pertains to the same will. For example, when the will of reason wishes for one thing and the will of sensuality wishes for another thing, the wills are not contrary. Aquinas clarifies that the will of sensuality and the will of reason are contrary only when the movement of the sensuality reaches the will of reason, so that the will of sensuality changes or delays the will of reason.

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116 “Manifestum est autem quod voluntas sensualitatis refugit naturaliter dolores sensibiles et corporis laesionem. Similiter etiam voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huismodi. Hae lamen quandoque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem, […] Voluntas autem Dei erat ut Christus dolores et passiones et mortem pateretur, non quod ista essent a Deo volita secundum se, sed ex ordine ad finem humanae salutis. Unde patet quod Christus, secundum voluntatem sensualitatis, et secundum voluntatem rationis quae consideratur per modum naturae, aliud poterat velle quam Deus. Sed secundum voluntatem quae est per modum rationis, semper idem volebat quod Deus.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIº q. 18, a. 5 co.

117 “Ad hoc igitur quod sit contrarietas voluntatum in aliquo, requiritur, primo quidem, quod secundum idem attendatur diversitas voluntatum. Si enim unius voluntas sit de aliquo fiendo secundum quandam rationem universalem, et alterius voluntas sit de eodem non fiendo secundum quandam rationem particularem, non est omni contrarietas voluntatum. Puta, si rex vult suspendi latronem in bonum reipublicae, et alii quis eius consanguineus velit eum non suspendi propter amorem particularum, non ert contrarietas voluntatis, nisi forte se in tantum extendat voluntas boni privati ut bonum publicum velit impedihi ut conservetur bonum privatum; tunc enim secundum idem attendatur repugnancia voluntatum. Secundo autem requiritur ad contrarietatem voluntatis, quod sit circa eandem voluntatem. Si enim homo vult
In Aquinas’s view, Christ’s will of sensuality and will as nature were not contrary to the divine will and the will as reason in Christ’s suffering because the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not reject the purpose why the divine will and the will as reason wished the death (i.e. the salvation of the human race). The will as nature wished the salvation of the human race and the will of sensuality was indifferent about it. The wills were not contrary either, because the wills did not impede each other. For example, it pleased the divine will and the will as reason that the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished what they wished.\footnote{118}

When Aquinas goes on to study in \textit{Summa theologiae} whether Christ prayed for something which did not take place, he explains that Christ’s will as reason wished absolutely and \textit{simpliciter}, whereas the will as nature and the will of sensuality wished \textit{secundum quid} because they wished conditionally.\footnote{119} They would have wished for a thing if the deliberation of the reason did not find anything to resist such wishing. Such wishing of the will as nature was called \textit{velleitas}. Aquinas claims that everything that Christ prayed or wished for absolutely took place because the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing but what Christ wished conditionally did not take place.\footnote{120}
When Peter of Tarentaise and Richard Middleton explained how the wills were uniform, they primarily followed Aquinas’s teaching in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. Like Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise argues that Christ’s wills as nature and as reason were not contrary since they did not wish for contrary things, because the will as nature avoided the death as evil as such and the will as reason wished for it as something good in relation to the redemption of the human race. Richard Middleton’s view combined other above-mentioned view as well. Like Aquinas, Bonaventure and Albert the Great, Middleton holds that the will as deliberative was in harmony with the divine will because the will as deliberative and the divine will wished for the same thing, but, following Bonaventure and Albert the Great, he adds that the will as deliberative also wished as the divine will wished for it to wish, because the will as deliberative wished because of charity. Furthermore, like Aquinas, Middleton describes that the will as nature was uniform with the will as deliberative even though the will as nature escaped the death and the will as deliberative wished for it because the death which was evil as such and the death which was good in relation to the redemption of the human race were not contrary, and the will as nature wished what the will as deliberative wished for it to wish. Richard adds that Christ’s sensitive appetitive power was at peace with the will as deliberative since the...
sensitive appetitive power desired or avoided according to the command of the will and the movement of the sensual appetitive power did not impede the will as deliberative. 124

Giles of Rome applies the idea of God’s antecedent and consequent will in his explanation. Following Aquinas, he claims that the will as reason is the will simpliciter and the will as nature is the will secundum quid, but he adds that God’s antecedent will is the will secundum quid and God’s consequent will is the will simpliciter. Giles thinks that Aristotle’s example of a merchant who throws goods into the sea in distress to save his life exemplifies the will as reason and the will as nature. 125 The act of throwing was voluntary simpliciter because the will as reason wished for it in relation to an end. The act of throwing was involuntary secundum quid because the will as nature did not wish for the throwing as such. 126

Giles explains that Christ’s human wills were similar to the divine will because the divine and the human wills simpliciter and the divine and the human wills secundum quid wished for the same thing. God’s antecedent will and Christ’s will as nature did not wish Christ’s death, whereas God’s consequent will and Christ’s will as reason wished for the death. 127 According to Giles, although Christ’s will as reason and the will of sensuality wished for different things, they were not contrary. The will of sensuality and the will of reason are contrary when the will of sensuality desires something against the right reason and it causes an impediment in the will of reason. Giles argues that this did not take place in Christ because when the will of sensuality wished for one thing and the will of reason wished for a contrary thing, the will of reason wished for the will of sensuality to

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124 “[…] in Christi appetitus sensibilis non discordauit in aliquo a voluntate rationis deliberativa, quia quamuis non appeteter illud, quod voluntas deliberativa volebat refugiendo mortem corporis quam illa volebat: tamen illud quod appetebat, et refugiebat ad imperium voluntatis appetebat vel refugiebat, nec per motum suum appetitum voluntatis deliberativa retardabat, vel impediebat, et ideo illi concordabat.” Richard Middleton, Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi lib. 3, d. 17, a. 1, q. 4, p. 183.

125 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea III.1, 1110a8–19.

126 Giles of Rome, Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio) d. 17, q. 28, p. 206; Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis) q. 28, p. 425–426.

127 “Intelligendum tamen quod, comparando uniformiter voluntatem Christi ad voluntatem divinam, conformatur in volito, comparando simpliciter ad simpliciter et secundum quid ad secundum quid, quia voluntas antecedens Dei est voluntas secundum quid […] et hac voluntate vult Christum non mori, quia humane nature vult bonum absolute, et sic similiter voluntate naturali, que est secundum quid, vult Christus non mori. Similiter voluntate consequente vult Deus Christum mori, et hec est voluntas simpliciter; ita Christus, voluntate simpliciter et ut est deliberabilis, vult Christum mori.” Giles of Rome, Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio) d. 17, q. 28, p. 206–207; Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis) q. 28, p. 426.
wish for an opposing thing, and the will of sensuality did not cause an impediment in the reason.\footnote{128} Durand of St. Pourçain also uses the idea of God’s antecedent and consequent wills. He holds that all of Christ’s human wills wished what God’s consequent will wished for them to wish because everything that God’s consequent will wishes takes place. However, only the will as reason wished what God’s antecedent will wished for it to wish because the will as reason was superior.\footnote{129} He also adds that only the will as reason and the divine will wished for the same thing.\footnote{130}

Like Aquinas, John Duns Scotus also argues that Christ’s will wished \textit{simpliciter} for the death, but wished conditionally and \textit{secundum quid} against it. Departing from Aquinas, however, he explains that Christ’s will wished \textit{simpliciter} when the will was not distracted and \textit{secundum quid} when it was distracted. Christ wished \textit{secundum quid} for the cup to pass from him because his wishing was distracted, as the condition “if it is possible” was

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{128} Giles of Rome, \textit{Lectura super librum tertium Sententiarum (reportatio)} d. 17, q. 29, p. 207; \textit{Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio monacensis)} q. 29, p. 426.
\item \footnote{129} “De uoluntate autem sequente deliberationem patet, quod fuerit codem modo conformis uoluntati divinae. Quia uoluntas diuina consequens quae est uoluntas simpliciter semper impletur […] ergo quicquid Deus uoluit tali uoluntate Christum uelle Christus uoluit et non solum Christus, sed quicunque alius, uoluntas autem antecedens innotescit nobis per praecepta, prohibitiones et consilia, et huic uoluntati quanto magis uoluntas humana conformatur tanto melior effectur, sed uoluntas deliberativa Christi fuit optima, ergo fuit uoluntati antecedenti maxime conformis.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r–242v. Durand explains that since God gives the natural inclination of the thing, the will as nature and the sensitive appetitive power wished what God wished them to wish. (Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242r–242v.)
\item \footnote{130} “Si autem loquamur de conformitate que attenditur secundum obiectum uolitum, sic uoluntas naturalis et uoluntas per participationem non conformantur in Christo uoluntati divinae […] Voluntas deliberativa conformis erat uoluntati diuinae.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 242v. Peter of Palude describes three opinions about the conformity of Christ’s wills without telling which one he favours. The first view is the above-mentioned view of Durand. According to the second opinion, Christ’s will as nature and the will as deliberative wished for contrary things. The wills were contrary \textit{secundum quid} but not \textit{simpliciter}, because the will as nature wished conditionally not to die as such and the will as deliberative wished for death in relation to the redemption of the human race. Aquinas argued in his \textit{Summa theologicae} that the will as deliberative wished \textit{simpliciter} and the will as nature wished \textit{secundum quid}, but Palude states that, according to this opinion, the will as deliberative wished \textit{secundum quid}, since it wished for the death because of a supposition (i.e. the redemption of the human race), and the will as nature wished \textit{simpliciter}, since it wished not to die as such. The sensitive appetitive power and the will of reason were not contrary because the sensitive appetitive power was moved according to the command of the will and the passion of the sensitive appetitive power did not confuse and impede the will. In terms of the third opinion, Palude explains that all of Christ’s human wills conformed with the divine will according to an efficient cause, because all human wills wished what God wished them to wish but only the will as deliberative and the divine will wished for the same thing (i.e. death). (Peter of Palude, \textit{Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum} d. 17, q. 1, p. 90r–90v.)
\end{itemize}
not fulfilled. However, he wished *simpliciter* to drink from the cup because this wishing did not involve a condition that distracted the will.\(^{131}\)

Scotus claims that what Christ’s free will wished *simpliciter* happened and the opposite of the wished thing never took place. However, the free will wished conditionally for things which did not take place and wished conditionally against things which did take place. For example, it wished conditionally against the death, which was a prerequisite for the sadness of the will about the death.\(^{132}\) Christ’s natural will as inclination was not always fulfilled because it was inclined to the good of the person, but the opposite took place.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{131}\) “In proposito etiam non videtur Christus nolle mortem nisi cum determinatione distrahente, scilicet ‘si bene fieri posset aliiud’, quae ideo distrahit quia condicio non exstat. Conceditur autem secundum istam viam ‘velle mori’ sine omni condicione distrahente, quia si addatur ‘propter honorem Dei’ vel ‘propter iustitiam’ vel ‘propter salutem hominum’, finis actus non distrahit ab actu in talibus; igitur hoc non est simpliciter nolitum quod aliquis facit vel pattitur, sed secundum ‘quid...’” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 528. “Dico tamen quod mihi videtur quod nec hic oravit pro aliquo, nec aliquid optavit quin eventit. Nam cum primo oravit, Matth. 26: Mi Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste, non oravit quod calix ab eo transiret, sed sub condicione distrahente, scilicet ‘si possibile esset’ [...]. Cum quo stat quod simpliciter voluit oppositum (ut de proiectione mercium in mari); unde subdit: Verumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis; et iterum oravit dicens: Si non potest transire calix iste nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Hic optavit voluntatem Patris simpliciter, sine condicione distrahente, quia non fuit possibile calicem transire nisi biberet illum. Ideo fuit simpliciter volitum ‘calicem bibere’, et sic factum est sicut oravit.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, p. 430. “Dices: illud est securum quid volitum, et sic Christus secundum quid volens. Contra, illud est simpliciter volitum, quod sine condicione distrahente est volitum: sed proiciens merces nulla condicione distrahente vult proiicere merces. [...] Sed alia conditio, ut velle saluare merces distrahit, quia vult sub hac condicione, si posset aliter saluari, sed illa conditio expressa est falsa.” *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479. See also *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484–485. For more about Scotus on conditional wishing, see Chapter 3.6.


\(^{133}\) “Voluntas eius, ut natura est (hoc est inclinatio eius naturalis), non semper fuit impleta, quia inclinatio naturalis fuit huius voluntatis in bonum huius personae, - cuius oppositum evenit.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 428. See also John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 2, p. 484. Scotus also asks whether Christ’s created will was a master of its acts since it followed the divine will. Scotus says that it was. He clarifies that the Word of God did not have influence on Christ’s created will any more than if Christ’s human nature was not united with the Word of God. Therefore, Christ’s created will was the master of its acts and the will elicited its acts as freely as any other created will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 569; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 426; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 484.) See also Barnes 2012, 302–305. How does the Trinity have an effect on the created will? Scotus answers that there are two opinions about this. According to one opinion, the will is the immediate and complete cause of its act. The Trinity only creates the will and allows the will to move itself, but it does not take part in the causation of the act. Accordingly, the Trinity had an effect on Christ’s human will in the sense that the Trinity created the will but did not cause the act of the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 569;
Scotus appears to think that Christ’s will wished actually when it wished *simpliciter* without distraction but habitually when it wished *secundum quid* and conditionally with distraction. This indicates that Christ’s actual wishing was fulfilled because what the will wished *simpliciter* took place. Peter Auriol seems to follow Scotus when he argues that Christ’s human will as actual was in conformance with the divine will. He specifies that Christ’s human will had two kinds of acts: acts which were at rest and those which were not acts *simpliciter* and at rest. It is not clear what these acts are, as Auriol does not describe them in detail. However, since Auriol thinks that the desire of the will is the movement towards an object and the pleasure of the will is rest in an object, it is possible that the act of the will which is not at rest and an act which is at rest correspond to desire and the pleasure of the will. He clarifies that acts which were not acts *simpliciter* and at rest were not always in conformance with the divine will, and Christ’s will engaged in such an act when he asked that the cup pass from him. However, all acts at rest were similar with the divine will, and they were fulfilled.

Among the aforementioned theologians, William Ockham was the first to claim that Christ’s appetitive powers did not conform.
According to Ockham, when Christ was thirsty on the cross (John 19:28), his sensitive appetitive power desired to drink, but the right reason wished against drinking since he was going to die soon anyways. Ockham says that there was conflict between the sensitive appetitive power and Christ’s human will, but adds that this was not vicious because Christ’s human will did not wish viciously.\footnote{137}

\subsection*{2.4. The Free Choice of Christ}

While the free choice of Christ was a minor theme in the debates about the psychology of the incarnation, it was a much-discussed theme in medieval philosophy. However, in these Christological discussions, theologians proposed views which were also interesting from the point of view of the psychology of the will. For example, the discussions show that, according to the medieval theologians, the freedom of free choice or the will was not an ability to wish for good or evil. In addition, the discussions demonstrate that choosing did not require deliberation, even though Aristotle explained that choice was deliberated desire.\footnote{138} Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians agreed that Christ had free choice or free will.\footnote{139} They were interested in the following three questions: whether

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\item “Si quaeras iuxta praedicta utrum in Christo fuit aliqua rebellio inter vires inferiores et superiores, respondeo quod non fuit aliqua rebellio vitiosa. Quia quantumcumque in appetitu sensitivo eius fuisset inclinatio et desiderium ad actum fornicandi – ponamus – dummodo non haberet viliationem respectu illius actus nec unquam peccaret. Quia, ut patet alibi, in sola vilitatione consistit peccatum et nullo modo in actu exteriori nisi quadram denominacione extrinseca. […] Sed quantum ad illos actus qui communiter non dicuntur vitiosi etiam denominacione extrinseca, cuiusmodi sunt comedere, bibere, quiescere etc., fuit rebellio inter illos appetitus sive vires. Dixit enim in cruce: Sitio. Et postquam ieiunavit quadraginta diebus esurivit et per consequens per appetitum sensitivum desideravit cibum et potum. Et tamen secundum rectam rationem noluit bibere in cruce quando statim fuit mortuus, et secundum rectam rationem noluit comedere quando tentator accessit ad eum. Igitur in istis sensibilibus actibus fuit rebellio inter illos appetitus. Et codem modo fuisset in hominibus si stetissent in statu inoccentiae, sed illa rebellio non fuisset virtuosa nec vitiosa.” William Ockham, \textit{Quaestiones variae} q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 270–271).
\item Aristotle, \textit{Ethica Nicomachea} III.3, 1113a1 I.
\item Alexander of Hales, \textit{Glosse in quatuor libros Sententiarum} d. 18 (AE), n. 13, p. 196; \textit{Summa theologiae} (\textit{Summa Halensis}) lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 3, cap. 5, p. 483; Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 12, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 269); Albert the Great, \textit{Sententiae} lib. 3, d. 18, a. 2, p. 315; Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 5; \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 18, a. 4 co; Richard Middleton, \textit{Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi} lib. 3, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, p. 189; Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII} lib. 3, d. 18, q. 2, p. 243v; Peter of Palude, \textit{Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum} d. 18, q. 1, p. 91v; John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 366–368; \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, p. 424–425. According to Alexander of Hales, free choice is the whole motive part of the soul or the part of the image of the Trinity in the motive part of the soul. (Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 33, d. 2, memb. 2, n. 54, p. 584–585.) The \textit{Summa Halensis} holds that free choice is a habituated power. (\textit{Summa theologica} lib. 2, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 1, p. 468.) Bonaventure thinks that the deliberative will and reason are two parts of free choice, which is
Christ’s free choice had an act in the first instant of his being, whether the free choice was free even though it was not able to sin, and whether Christ chose and deliberated?

According to Peter Lombard, beginning from his conception, Christ merited for himself the impassibility of flesh and soul because he had the perfect will and he was obedient to God. Alexander of Hales claims that this implies that Christ’s free choice had a movement beginning from his conception (*ab instanti suae conceptionis*), but he argues that Christ’s free choice did not have movement at the first instant of his being because Christ did not begin to be and be moved at the same instant because being precedes moving. Following Alexander, the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure and Albert the Great argued that Christ did not use free

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choice in the first instant of his being because being precedes acting but immediately after that instance. However, Durand of St. Pourçain states that Christ’s knowledge was the reason why the free choice did not choose in the first instant of being. He argues that the act of Christ’s human will related to his merit required actual, infused or experiential knowledge, but Christ did not have them at the first instant of his existence because the actual knowledge required the perfect bodily organs and the perfect senses. Christ’s human will was not able to have an act in the first instant of being because his bodily organs and senses were imperfect at that moment.\(^{145}\)

Contrary to the aforementioned theologians, Aquinas argues that Christ used his free choice at the same instant as when he was conceived. He clarifies that if one cannot have an act at the first instant of being, it is because of three reasons: first, one does not have perfection which is required for the act; second, an external thing impedes the act; and third, the nature of the act is successive. As Christ did not lack any perfection which a meritorious act required, there was no impediment and the act did not involve succession. Therefore, Christ used his free choice in the first instant of his being.\(^{146}\) Scotus argues that Christ had the act of the merit at the first instant

\(^{145}\) “[…] si Christus meruit in instanti suae conceptionis aut meruit actione beata, aut alia. Non actione beata, […] nec per aliam, quia actus ululuntatis in quo consistit meruitur sequitur actum cognititio, in Christo autem praeter cognitionem beatam non fuit nisi duplex cognitio scilicet infusa et experimentalis. Neutra autem istarum cognitionum fuit in Christo secundum actum in primo instanti suae conceptionis propter imperfectionem organorum et urium sensitiuarum quorum actus sunt necessarii ad usum scientiae infusa et experimentalis […] ergo in Christo non potuit esse in primo instanti suae conceptionis aliqua actualis motus ululuntatis quod meretur, […] Si autem anima Christi in primo instanti suae conceptionis potuit exire in actum scientiae infusa, non video quin potuerit exire in actum ululuntatis meritorium, sicut ponit praecedens opinio,” Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 2, p. 243v. Durand thinks, however, that if Christ had been able to have actual infused knowledge when he was conceived, his will would have been able to have an act.

\(^{146}\) “Unde, cum possibile sit ipsum in primo instanti suae conceptionis actum meritorium percesse, dicendum est Christum in primo instanti conceptionis meruisse. Quod enim aliqua res in primo instanti in quo est non possit suam actionem habere, non potest contingere nisi tribus modis. Primo, ex hoc quod deest sibi aliqua perfectio quae requiritur ad agendum; […] Alio modo, propter aliquod impediens extrinsecum; […] Tertio, ex natura operationis quae successionem habet; […] Constat autem quod in Christo non deficiebat aliqua perfectio ex parte ipsius agentis, quae est necessaria ad meritorium actum. Et iterum nihil erat quod impedire posset. Ipse etiam motus caritatis quo movebatur indivisibilis erat et non successivus; et ideo in ipso instanti conceptionis mereri potuit. Quidam autem dicunt, quod in ipso instanti conceptionis non meruit quantum ad usum virtutum; […] Sed prima opinio mihi magis placet, et secundum eam respondeo ad argumenta in contrarium facta.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3 co. “Talis autem est operatio voluntatis et intellectus, in qua consistit usus liberis arbitriis. Subito enim et in instanti perfectur operatio intellectus et voluntatis, multo magis quam visio corporalis, eo quod intelligere, velle et sentire non est motus qui sit actus imperfecti, quod successive perfectur; sed est actus iam perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit usum liberi arbitrii.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologicae* III* lib. 34 a. 2 co. Following Aquinas, Richard Middleton argues that Christ’s human will had an act in the first instant of his being because of three reasons. First, the will was perfect because Christ’s
of being because he had perfect power and grace, the Trinity for which Christ wished well was present through the intellect, there were not impediments, and the act of the will did not take place successively.\textsuperscript{147}

Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians thought that Christ was sinless, which indicated that Christ’s free choice was able to choose only good. Alexander of Hales was one of the first to argue that although Christ’s free choice was able to choose only good, it was free. Following Bernard of Clairvaux, Alexander claims that there are three kinds of freedom: the freedom of nature, which is freedom from coercion, the freedom of glory, which is freedom from misery, and the freedom of grace, which is freedom from sin.\textsuperscript{148} Alexander holds that Christ not only had freedom of nature but also freedom of grace, because grace determined his free choice to choose only good. Therefore, although Christ was able to choose only good, he was free since he was free from coercion and sin. However, Alexander does not clarify whether Christ was free from misery.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{147} “[…] omne habens actum primum perfectum, et obiectum praesens in ratione obiecti, et non impeditur, et actus secundus sit permanens et non successivus, potest agere pro quocumque instanti: ista omnia concurrunt, nec plura requiruntur ad actum; sed omnia haec fuerunt in Christo in primo instanti suae conceptionis, quia potentia perfecta, gratia, obiectum praesens per intellectum, scilicet tuta Trinitas, cui posset velle bonum propter se, et non impeditur, et actus volendi est permanens (quia actus beatificus stans est); igitur etc.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 11. For Scotus on the sin of the angels in the first moment of existence, see Hoffmann 2012, 304–305. When Scotus explains how Christ had merit, he first proposes one view but ends up with another. According to the first position, the will merits when it wishes good for God following affection for justice but against the affection for the advantageous. As Christ’s senses and the inferior part of reason were aware of many objects which were against the affection for the advantageous and which the inferior part of the will was able to wish for, the inferior part of the will had merit when the will wished for these things for the sake of God. However, Scotus’s own position is that all acts of the superior part of the will were also meritorious, including the blessed act of Christ’s will, which was not against affection for the advantageous. He expounds that all Christ’s acts were meritorious because all acts accepted by God as good and praiseworthy were meritorious. Therefore, not only the acts of the will, which were against the affection for the advantageous, but all of Christ’s human acts were meritorious. (John Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 5–9. See also John Duns Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 486–487.)

\textsuperscript{148} “[…] dicendum est quod triplex est libertas, naturae scilicet, gratiae et gloriae. […] Haece libertas gratiae est contra servitutem culpae, […] libertas vero gloriae contra servitutem miseriorum; libertas naturae contra coactionem […] Nihilominus tamen libertas naturae est in homine omni, scilicet libertas a coactione.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 33, d. 1, memb. 1, n. 15, p. 571. See also Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 33, d. 2, memb. 1, n. 38, p. 578–579.

\textsuperscript{149} “Quam cito enim ponis diversam potentiam [et] substantiam a Creator, necesse est ponere libertatem quoad naturam, licet ex gratia possit esse determinantio, ut in Christo.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 33, d. 1, memb. 1, n. 17, p. 572. Also,
Following Anselm of Canterbury’s view that the will is an instrument that moves itself, Bonaventure explains that free choice is free because it can move itself to wish, not because it can wish for a thing and its opposite. Therefore, the will which can wish only good but not evil is free, as the freedom is an ability to move itself but not an ability to wish for opposites. Bonaventure thinks that the will wishes freely when the deliberative will moves the will to wish. The will is not free when it is forced to wish something unwillingly. This takes place when the will wishes for a thing against the act of the deliberative will because an external power moves the will.

However, unlike Bonaventure, Albert the Great thinks that free choice is free because it can choose this, not to choose this, or to choose something else. Although Christ’s free choice was able to choose good and not able to choose evil, it was free since it was able to choose this good, not to choose this good and to choose some another good. Like Albert, Thomas Aquinas explained that Christ’s free choice, which perfect grace made wish only good, was free because it was able to choose or not to choose this good thing and to choose this or that good thing. The free choice chooses an evil means only because of an intellectual defect, which is the reason why means is regarded as good when it is evil in reality. Although Aquinas...
does not mention it, his view about the perfection of Christ’s knowledge also explained why the free choice of Christ was not able to choose evil means.

The discussions about Christ’s free choice indicate that, according to medieval theologians, choosing did not require deliberation, even though Aristotle explained that choice was deliberated desire. Already John of Damascus had argued that Christ did not choose because choosing implied ignorance, but the theologians did not accept Damascus’s view unconditionally. The *Summa Halensis* argues that Christ chose because choosing does not always indicate ignorance. In one sense, choosing involves taking one of two things, but in another sense it is about taking one of two things which is unknown before choosing. When a chosen thing is unknown before choosing, deliberation precedes the choosing and choosing implies ignorance. The author argues that since Christ was not ignorant, he chose only in the first sense and he did not deliberate.

Aquinas also argues that choice does not always imply ignorance. He states that when a person deliberates about means, he does not know by which means an end can be achieved. Therefore, deliberation implies ignorance. Aquinas argues that the choice can include deliberation but does not require it. The choice follows from the judgment of the reason. When the reason doubts what to do, the reason deliberates about the means by which an end can be achieved and makes judgment after the deliberation. When the reason does not doubt, it makes a judgment without deliberation.

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157 "Damascenus excludit a Christo electionem secundum quod intelligit in nomine electionis importari dubitationem. Sed tamen dubitatione non est de necessitate electionis, quia etiam Deo competit eligere [...] cum tamen in Deo nulla sit dubitatio. Accedit autem dubitatio electioni, inquantum est in natura ignorantiae." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica* III q. 18, a. 4 ad 1.
and then also choice follows without it. According to Aquinas, Christ chose in the first instant of his being without deliberation because his soul was full of knowledge from the first moment of his conception.  

Like Aquinas, Scotus also argues that choice does not always require deliberation. He explains that when practical reason makes a judgment, reason does not reason anymore and the will elicits an act. If practical reason is able to make a judgment without any preceding reasoning, the will elicits an act without reasoning. When this is possible, practical reason makes a judgment and the will elicits an act in the same instant. Scotus states that because Christ had perfect abstract knowledge in the first instant of his being, his reason was able to make a judgment without reasoning and the will was able to choose in the first instant of his being.

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158 “[…] electio praesupponit consilium, non tamen sequitur ex consilio nisi iam determinato per iudicium; illud enim quod iudicamus agendum post inquisitionem consili, eligimus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo, si aliquid iudicetur ut agendum absque dubitatione et inquisitione praeecedente, hoc sufficit ad electionem. Et sic patet quod dubitatio, sive inquisitio, non per se pertinet ad electionem, sed solum secundum quod est in natura ignorante.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 18, a. 4 ad 2. “[…] simul cum terminatur consilium vel deliberatio, potest esse electio. Illi autem qui deliberatione consili indigent, in ipsa terminacione consili pribo habent certitudinem de eligendim, et ideo statim eligunt. Ex quo patet quod deliberatio consili non praexigitur ad electionem nisi propter inquisitionem incerti. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis, sicut habuit plenitudinem gratiae justificantis ita habuit plenitudinem veritatis cognitae, secundum illud, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Unde, quasi habens omnium certitudinem, potuit statim in instanti eligere.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 34, a. 2 ad 2. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2.

159 “[…] discursus sive syllogizatio practica est ad hoc quod habeat actus electivus voluntatis; et facto iudicio per conclusionem practicam, voluntas elicet; et quando voluntas elicet, ratio practica non discurrat, sed sententiat, scilicet facta conclusione practica de elicendo. Si igitur ista sententia ultimata possit haberi sine discursu praeecedente et in instanti, ita perfecte posset voluntas libere eligere seu elicere sine discursu sicut cum tali discursu. Sed perfectus in cognoscendo non discurrat […] Cum ergo Christus fuerit perfectus in cognitione omnium – abstractive saltem – a principio, perfecte cognovit sine tali syllogizazione; et ideo in primo instanti potuit esse electio, quae electio est actus simplex de se.” John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 18, q. 1, p. 12.
3 THE PASSIONS OF CHRIST

According to the Bible, in the events of Holy Week, Christ’s human soul felt passions like fear and sadness. These events played a crucial role for the identity of Christians in the Middle Ages, as Christians thought that they were called to follow Christ’s life in their lives. The passions of Christ emphasized that even the ideal Christian life involved passions. In this respect, the medieval view differed, for instance, from Clement of Alexandria’s view that Christians should seek freedom from passions (apatheia) because Christ was free from them. However, the idea that Christ had passions was not without problems. For instance, as Aristotle had argued that a soul was not really moved, how could Christ’s human soul have passions? In addition, since Seneca explained that a wise man cannot be sad, how could Christ, the wisest man in the created universe, be sad? And, since Aristotle seemed to claim that there was not sadness in the intellect and the same person cannot feel pain and joy at the same time, how, then, could Christ’s human soul be full of pain and how could he feel great pain and joy at the same time? Furthermore, theological authors had also proposed challenging views; for example, Hilary of Poitiers claimed that Christ did not feel true pain.

The passions of Christ were one of the much-debated themes in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about the psychology of the incarnation. In their responses to problems like the aforementioned, the medieval theologians explained that Christ had a passible soul and affective movements like pain, sadness, fear and anger, which they called pre-passions rather than passions. They added that the powers of the sensitive part of the soul had pain and sadness, but disagreed about whether the powers of the rational part had sadness. They also thought that the superior part of Christ’s reason had beatific vision and joy, and they asked how Christ’s human soul could have pain, sadness and joy at the same time. The discussions about the passions of Christ exemplify some significant differences between the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions, and they shed light on the earlier roots of ideas, like the passions of the will, which have been regarded as fourteenth-century ideas.

In this chapter, I focus on the passibility of Christ’s human soul, on his pre-passions, and on anger, fear, pain and sadness. In studying

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1 For the imitation of Christ in the Middle Ages, see Constable 1995, 143–248.
2 Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 1.2.4.
3 Aristotle, De anima 1.4, 408a30–408b1.
4 Seneca, De clementia 2.5.5.
5 Aristotle, Topica 1.15, 106a38.
6 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VII.14, 1153b19–21; 1154b13–15.
7 Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate lib. 10, PL 10, 361A.
Christ’s pain and sadness, I address first the views of pain and sadness in the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, and then the views of sadness in the powers of the rational part of the soul. At the end of the chapter, I examine how Christ was able to have pain, sadness and joy at the same time.

3.1. The Passibility of Christ’s human soul

Thirteenth-century theologians began their study about the passions of Christ by first defining what a passion was and whether Christ’s human soul was passible. Following the doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, theologians taught that Christ’s human nature was passible, which implied that his soul was also passible.8 The idea that Christ’s human soul was passible was not without problems, since Aristotle had argued that a soul was not moved except accidentally, as what it dwells in was moved.9 Theologians also treated the passibility of the powers of Christ’s human soul, in particular the passibility of the powers of the rational part.10 Since their understandings about a passion were different, their views about the passibility of Christ’s human soul and its powers varied as well. In this section, I shall discuss how theologians defined a passion when they studied Christ’s human soul, how Christ’s human soul was passible and which powers of the soul were passible. First, I make a brief survey of the concept of the passion in the ancient and early medieval texts, which were the most important sources in later discussions, and then I examine the views of the passibility of Christ’s human soul and its powers in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions.11

8 Denzinger 2012, 801, p. 266.
9 Aristotle, De anima I.4, 408a30–408b1. Theologians also remarked, for example, that, according to Aristotle and Augustine, a passive thing was inferior to an active one (Aristotle, De anima III. 5, 430a17–20; Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram lib. 12, cap. 16, p. 402–403, PL 34, 467), but as Christ’s human nature was not inferior to any creature, it seemed that it was not passible. (Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones disputatione q. 16, disp. 1, memb. 1, p. 226; Summa Helensis, Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 58; Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 267; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica II, q. 15, a. 4 arg. 1.)
10 The views of the theologians about how a soul was related to its powers varied. For example, Aquinas argued that the powers were the properties or the accidents of the soul because they were united with a soul accidentally and therefore really distinct from it, whereas John Duns Scotus held that the powers and the soul were formally distinct. (Cross 2002b, 268–269; Pasnau 2002b, 143–170; King 2008, 264–266.)
11 In the twelfth century, there was already a lively debate about the passibility of Christ’s human nature. For example, in De sacramentis Hugh of Saint Victor claims that Christ assumed passible flesh. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis christianae fidei lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 7, PL 176, 389B–389C.) In De quatuor voluntatibus, he proposes that Christ’s flesh had passion and his mind had compassion. As this suggests, he thinks that not only Christ’s flesh but also his mind was passible. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in christo PL 176, 844B.) According to Peter Lombard, Christ assumed a passible human nature as he assumed passible flesh and a passible soul. (Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d.
The ancient and early medieval sources used by the medieval theologians do not propose one coherent idea of passions, but rather a bunch of disparate or loosely connected views. From the viewpoint of the medieval discussions, Aristotle’s most important ideas are that the notion of passion has many meanings or uses, that passion is one of the categories, and that there are passions of the soul. In his *Metaphysica*, Aristotle states that ‘passion’ has many meanings, but does not elaborate on how these different meanings are related to each other. He claims that a passion can be a quality with respect to which a thing is changed, the act of the quality, or the change of the quality, and he goes on to explain that a passion is especially a harmful change, a great misfortune or sadness.\(^{12}\)

In his * Categoriae*, Aristotle studies passions in chapter eight, which is about the category of the quality, and in chapter nine, which is about categories of action and the passion. In chapter eight, Aristotle claims that the third group of the quality consists of a passible quality and a passion. A passible quality is a quality which in one sense causes a passion related to the senses, and in another sense is a quality caused by a passion, which is permanent and hard to change. If a cause is easily rendered ineffective or removed, an effect is not a passible quality or a quality, but a passion.\(^{13}\) However, Aristotle’s account of the third group of the quality is confusing because it is not clear how a passion is a quality.\(^{14}\) In chapter nine, he holds that an action and a passion are two categories, both of which allow contraries and grades. For example, an action like heating is the opposite of cooling, and a passion like being warm is the opposite of being cool and enjoying is the opposite of being sad. In addition, an action and a passion involve grades, because one can warm something more or less, and one can be warmed more or less.\(^{15}\)

In his *De anima*, Aristotle studies the passions of the soul. He argues that the passions of the soul like anger, courage, desire and sensation are psychosomatic: the soul cannot have them without flesh because they entail flesh being moved. Therefore, the definition of the passions of the soul contains a material component. For example, the definition of the anger includes it being a boiling of blood and heat around the heart.\(^{16}\)

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15, cap. 1, p. 92–93.) See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 17 Pl. 211, 1204B–1204C. Although the twelfth-century theologians taught that Christ assumed a passible human nature, they did not incorporate studies of the concept of passibility in their Christological texts. For Christ’s passibility in the twelfth century, see Landgraf 1953, 199–272.


13 Aristotle, * Categoriae* 8, 9a28–9b33.

14 Knuuttila 2004, 237. For passions in Aristotle’s *Categories*, see also Knuuttila 2003, 261–262.


16 Aristotle, *De anima* I.1, 403a3–403a27.
describes joy, sadness and anger as movements which belong to a human being rather than a soul, because a soul is not moved except accidentally, as what it dwells in is moved.17

The most important source in the thirteenth-century discussions about passion and passibility was John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa*, where he proposes descriptions of passion, which he copied verbatim from Nemesius of Emesa’s *De natura hominis*.18 Like the discussion in Aristotle, the notes on the passion in Nemesius and John do not form one coherent idea. They share Aristotle’s insights that the word ‘passion’ has many different meanings, and they describe that there are passions of the soul, passions of the flesh and passions in a broad sense. The passion of the soul is the sensible movement of the appetitive power when good and evil are imagined or the movement of the irrational soul through suspicion of good and evil. Diseases and wounds are the passions of the flesh. A passion in a broad sense is a movement which one thing has from another thing (ex alio in alius) or a movement which is against the nature of the moved thing. They elaborate that not all received movements are passions, but only those which are strong and sensible. Thus, small received movements, which are hidden to the senses, are not passions. They go on to explain that a passion in a broad sense is the opposite of operation. In the first description of the passion in a broad sense, a passion is the movement of the receiver, whereas an operation is the movement of that which moves another thing or brings about a movement in another thing. In the second description of the passion in a broad sense, a passion is a movement against the nature of the moved thing, whereas an operation is a movement according to the nature of the moved thing. Unlike in the first description, a movement is an operation or a passion regardless of whether it belongs to a mover or a moved thing.19

The ideas of the early Franciscans regarding passions and passibility were influenced especially by John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa*. Alexander of Hales was the first thirteenth-century theologian to incorporate theories about passions and the passibility of the soul in a study about the passions of Christ.20 According to Alexander, passibility has four

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17 Aristotle, *De anima* I.4, 408b1–408b19.


19 John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 36, p. 132–134. According to John, Christ’s flesh and soul were passible but his divine nature was not. His soul was passible, as it had a passion with the flesh. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 70, p. 270–270.)

20 For Alexander of Hales on the passions of Christ’s human soul, see also Gondreau 2002, 91–93. Gondreau also remarks that Alexander of Hales paid attention to these abstract terms. (Gondreau 2002, 93.)
meanings. In the first and the most general sense, passibility is an ability to receive \((\text{recebtibile})\), in the second sense an ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion which is moderate, and in the third sense an ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion which is immoderate. Passibility in the fourth sense is not only the ability to have a passion, but the necessity to have it, and it is a penalty.  

Alexander takes for granted that Christ’s human soul was passible because, according to Christian faith, Christ assumed a passible soul. The soul was passible in all four senses, passible as such, and passible as related to the flesh. When Alexander turns to study the passibility of the powers of Christ’s human soul, he is especially interested in the passibility of the superior part of Christ’s reason. He expounds that all powers of Christ’s human soul were able to receive a passion and holds that the superior part of reason was also able to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion inasmuch as it was related to flesh. The passibility of the superior part of reason was based on a distinction between reason “as nature” and reason “as reason”. Alexander claims quite vaguely that the superior part of reason as nature was united with the flesh and it apprehended things by natural knowledge, whereas reason as reason was united with God and


22 “Concedo conclusionem, et fidei nostrae est. Fides enim nostra dicit quod Christus assumpsit animam cum passibilitate.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 1, p. 240. “Anima enim eius, in quantum est spiritus creatus, habet passibilitatem, sicut habet vertibilitatem in quantum est creature, sicut dicit Damascenus. Praeter hoc autem ex unione ad carnem habet anima Christi compassibilitatem.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 1, p. 241. Alexander’s view of the passibility of Christ’s human soul presupposes his view about the passibility of Adam’s soul. According to Alexander, Adam’s soul before the Fall was passible in the first, second and third senses. Unlike Christ’s human soul, Adam’s soul was not passible in the fourth sense because Adam did not have passions necessarily. (Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, disp. 1, memb. 1, p. 231; 233.) Alexander describes that a soul is passible in the first sense because it can receive, for example, an intelligible species, which, according to Aristotle, is a passion. (Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13–20.) John of la Rochelle claims that Augustine also considered a soul as able to receive. According to Augustine, a soul is able to receive all kinds of intelligible and sensible species, just as prime matter is able to receive all kinds of natural forms. (John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 60, p. 48.)

23 “Secundum ergo quod passio gaudium dicitur, possibilis fuit ad passionem secundum omem vim animae suae Christus; et sic dicitur passio a ‘patin’, quod est informatio.” Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246.
apprehended things with deliberation and election.\textsuperscript{24} Only the superior part of Christ’s reason as nature had compassion with the flesh, while as reason it did not have this compassion but was passible in the sense that it had joy necessarily.\textsuperscript{25} Alexander proposed this quite obscure distinction between the reason as reason and the reason as nature because he thought that it explained how the superior part of Christ’s reason was touched by pain and joy at the same time.\textsuperscript{26}

Like Alexander of Hales, the \textit{Summa Halensis} also thinks that passibility involves receiving but differs from Alexander by maintaining that immoderation or moderation was not a dividing factor in explicating different meanings of ‘passion’. According to the \textit{Summa Halensis}, a passion is a movement from something in something else (\textit{ex alio in alium}) and a movement can be suitable or unsuitable for the nature of the receiver. When a movement is suitable, it is a passion in a broad sense,\textsuperscript{27} and when it is unsuitable, it is a passion in a strict sense.\textsuperscript{28} The passion of the soul is the

\textsuperscript{24} ‘Respondeo: Superior portio rationis consideratur dupliciter: quia ut est ‘natura’, scilicet ut est quaedam potestia animae in se, secundum se carni unita, et apprehendens ex cognitione innata, […] Vel dicitur ratio ut ‘ratio’, scilicet quando apprehendit cum electione et deliberatione.’ Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246. “Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unitae sit deitati, ex illa ordinatione non est compassibilis dolore mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246. According to Alexander, the powers of the inferior and the superior parts of Adam’s soul were passible as they were able to receive a form and as they were able to receive a moderate passion. However, unlike the superior part of Christ’s reason, the superior part of Adam’s reason was not compassionate to the flesh, as it was illuminated by God. (Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 1, memb. 3, p. 235–236.)

\textsuperscript{25} “Sed tunc quaeritur an fuerit passibilitas a ‘pati’. […] Dico ergo quod ratio superior in Christo, ut natura, fut possibilis ad quoddam pati; sed ratio ut ratio disposita fuit ad passibilitatem quae est gaudium; vel non tantum etiam disposita, sed habuit necessitatem ad gaudium, propter unionem cum deitati. Dico ergo quod secundum superiorem partem ratio unibilis est carni, quia secundum omnem partem unibilis est ei. Sic, secundum quod est natura quaedam, compassibilis est. Secundum vero quod ratio unitae sit deitati, ex illa ordinatione non est compassibilis dolore mortis, sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 2, memb. 3, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{26} For the simultaneity of pain and joy in Christ, see Chapter 3.7.

\textsuperscript{27} “Secundum Ioannem Damascenum, ‘passio generaliter dicta est motus ex alio in aliud’. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel in aliud ‘secundum naturam’ vel in aliud ‘praeter naturam’. Si vero in aliud secundum naturam sit mutatio vel motus, dictetur tunc passio et passibile a μεταβείνειν graeco, quod sonat informationem; et hoc modo dicitur anima passibilis, id est receptibilis ipsorum intelligibilium, scientiarum et virtutum, ad quod secundum naturam nata est. Hoc modo generalissime dicitur passibilitas respectu cuiusque creaturae, in quantum est receptibilis cuiuscumque perfectionis.” \textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{28} “Si vero praeter naturam, tunc passio dicitur specialiter, secundum quod distinguist Ioannes Damascenus inter operationem et passionem,” \textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59–60. This description of the passion evidently unites John of Damascus’s view of a passion as a received movement with the view of a passion as a movement, which is against nature.
movement of the soul when good or evil is apprehended. Christ’s human soul had passions in a broad and in a strict sense, and the passions of the soul. The soul had a passion in a strict sense as it was united with the flesh. Because it claims that Christ had perturbations as movements of sensuality and movements of the reason as nature but not as movements of the reason as reason, the Summa Halensis seems to hold that Christ had the passions of the soul in sensuality and in the reason as nature. Like Alexander of Hales, also the Summa Halensis holds that the powers of the rational part of Christ’s human soul were possible since Christ’s reason and will had sadness, which was a passion.

Bonaventure does not combine an analysis of the concepts of passibility and passion in his study about Christ’s passions, but in other parts

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29 “Potest igitur dici quod suspicio proprie sumitur, et sic dubitationem importat, et sic non sumitur in ratione Remigii. Sumitur etiam nomine extenso, prout dicit apprehensionem sive cognitionem, et sic sumitur in ratione Remigii sub hoc sensu: ‘passio est motus animae per apprehensionem boni vel mali’, et sic sumitur in Christo.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60. It is not clear who is the Remigius mentioned here. However, Nemesius of Emesa and John of Damascus propose this description. For the sources of this description in Nemesius of Emesa’s De natura hominis, see Sharples 2008, 130, n. 646.

30 “[...] ‘passio est motus animae per apprehensionem boni vel mali’, et sic sumitur in Christo.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60. “Si vero in aliud secundum naturam sit mutatio vel motus [...] Hoc modo generalissime dicitur passibilitas respectu cuiusque creaturae, in quantum est receptibilis cuiuscumque perfectionis.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59. “Si vero praeter naturam, tunc passio dicitur specialiter [...] Distinguendum est ergo secundum hunc modum quod, cum passibilitas sit potentia patiendi, potentia autem tripliciter consideratur: primo ut potentia indisposita ad patiendum, secundo ut disposita ad patiendum, tertiio ut necessitas ad patiendum; dicendum ergo quod in Adam fuit potentia ad patiendum, sed indisposita in statu innocentiæ; in nobis vero est potentia, quae est cum necessitate ad patiendum; in Domino vero fuit modus medio, scilicet potentia cum dispositione ad patiendum.” (Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 59–60.) Following Alexander, the Summa Halensis holds that passibility is an ability to receive (potentia patiendi) a passion in a strict sense and it can be non-disposed (indisposita), disposed (disposita) or necessitated to receive (necessitas ad patiendum) such a passion. The Summa Halensis claims without further clarification that the passibility of the prelapsarian human being was non-disposed and the passibility of the postlapsarian human being is necessitated to receive. Christ’s human nature had an ability disposed to receive a passion in a strict sense, but it was not necessitated to receive because Christ’s passibility was subject to his will, as his human nature received when his will wished it.

31 “Nam in animabus parvulorum est passibilitas per compassibilitatem [...] ita et anima Christi ex unione ad carnem habet compassibilitatem [...] Sic ergo est quaedam convenienitia passibilitatis animae Christi et parvulorum. Est autem dissimilitudo, quia anima parvuli habet necessitatatem ad pati, et hoc ex culpa contracta; anima autem Christi habet dispositionem ad pati, non ex culpa contracta, sed voluntarie assumpta.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 61.

32 “Perturbatio quandoque est motus sensualitatis, quandoque partis rationalis. Prout est motus sensualitatis, sic fuit in Christo. Prout est motus partis rationalis, potest esse dubus modis: vel in parte prout est natura, et sic potuit esse in Christo ex infirmitate vel dispositione assumpta; vel prout est ratio sive rationalis, et sic nequaquam.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 60.

33 For more about the Summa Halensis on the passions of reason and the will, see Chapter 3.6.
of his *Commentary on the Sentences* he claims that a soul is passible as it can move itself.\(^{34}\) He also says that the will is passible because it can have a passion as movement, which the will effects in itself when it moves itself, and as a penalty when the will sins.\(^{35}\) When he studies the sadness of Christ, he further adds that the rational powers of Christ had sadness as a passion.\(^{36}\)

Albert the Great’s view of a passion was influenced by Aristotle’s works.\(^{37}\) Unlike the Franciscans, Albert held that a passion in a broad sense and in a strict sense is the category of the passion, whereas a passion of the soul is the possible quality of the sensitive appetitive power which is effected by a passion or which effects a passion.\(^{38}\) A passion in a broad sense is a received form and movement\(^{39}\) and a passion in a strict sense was influenced by Aristotle’s works.

34 For Bonaventure on the passions of Christ’s human soul, see also Gonreau 2002, 96–98. Bonaventure explains that there are two opinions of how a soul suffers. According to one opinion, a soul suffers (*pati*) accidentally because it has compassion for the flesh. According to another opinion, adopted from Augustine’s *De musica*, a soul suffers because of itself (*patitur ex se*), but a soul takes an occasion to suffer from the flesh. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (III, 347).) Bonaventure supports the second opinion in explaining how a damned immaterial soul feels pain caused by a corporeal eternal fire. Following the Augustinian view of perception, which emphasizes the activity of the soul in sense perception, Bonaventure argues that a soul itself moves naturally to sense the heat caused by eternal fire, but the fire offers for the soul an occasion to itself move naturally to sense heat. As a soul itself moves naturally to sense heat, an immaterial damned soul can also have a passion and sensation about the corporeal eternal fire. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 44, pars. 2, a. 3, q. 2 (IV, 934).) The Augustinian account of sense perception differed from the Aristotelian account. According to Augustine, a soul is active in sense perception. Unlike Augustine, Aristotle emphasized the passivity of sense perception. For sense perception according to Augustine, see O’Daly 1987, 80–105; Silva 2008, 88; Silva and Toivanen 2010, 247–249; Toivanen 2013, 135–139.

35 When Bonaventure studies sin, he claims that there are two kinds of passions of the will. The passion of the will can be the movement of the will, which takes place when the will moves itself, or a penalty, which the will does not cause directly but deserves when it effects a faulty act. (Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 35, a. 1, q. 2. (II, 825–826).) The view of the passion of the will as a movement is based on Anselm of Canterbury’s idea that the will in an act is an instrument that moves itself. (Bonaventure, 2 Sent. d. 24, pars. 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564).)

36 For the sadness of Christ’s will, see Chapter 3.6.

37 For Albert the Great on the passions of Christ’s human soul, see also Gonreau 2002, 94–96.

38 “Et dicit Ioannes Damascenus, quod ‘passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginacione boni vel malii’. Et aliter: ‘Passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel malii’. Et aliter: ‘Passio est motus ex alio in alio’. Philosophus autem sic: ‘Passio est effectus illatioque actionis’. […] Dicendum, quod primum duae definitiones dantur tantum de passione, secundum quod est species qualitatis illata in sensibilem partem animae et non inferens. […] Duae autem ultimea dantur de ipsa passione, secundum quod est genus generalissimum, sub quo est ordination praeudit acientialum.” Albert the Great, *De bono* q. 5, a. 1, p. 195–196. “Secundum autem quod dicitur pati secundum qualitatem passible, quae a passione inferuntur vel passionem inferunt, non omnis potestia animae erit passiva, sed affectiva sensibilis tantum.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 3, p. 222. See also *Summa theologiae* pars 2, tr. 14, q. 83, p. 129.

is a received form and movement which corrupts nature.⁴⁰ Although John of Damascus thinks that passions are movements, Albert claims that passions are not movements in reality. He explains that John calls passions movements improperly, but that a passion is a movement in the sense that a movement causes a passion.⁴¹

According to Albert, a passion of the soul is the act of the appetitive power.⁴² Albert seems to think that a passion of the soul as possible quality is a possible act. He explains that a possible act is a passion because it is caused by an apprehended thing. It also has an aspect of action because a soul acts in the flesh when a soul has it. For example, when a soul has joy, the heart is widened.⁴³ Following Aristotle, Albert states that the subject of the passion of the soul is a soul-flesh composite (conjunctum). When such a composite has the passion of the soul, the flesh is changed and the soul is changed somehow (aliquo modo), because the soul has compassion for the flesh.⁴⁴

Albert thinks that a soul is passible through its powers since all apprehensive and appetitive powers can receive a suitable or an unsuitable form from their objects and the sensitive appetitive power can have passible qualities.⁴⁵ Unlike the aforementioned Franciscans, Albert separated the

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⁴⁰ “Proprie autem dicitur passio quod in naturam sive contra naturam agit ut contrarium et nocivum naturae, […] Et hoc modo passio non dicitur a receptione simpliciter, sed dicitur a receptione contrarii et nocentis agentis ad corruptionem naturae vel esse…” Albert the Great, Liber de sex principiis tract. 3, cap. 2, p. 333.
⁴¹ Albert the Great, De bono q. 5, a. 1, p. 197; Liber de sex principiis tract. 3, cap. 1, p. 331. For more about Albert’s criticism of the idea that passions are movements, see Knuuttila 2004, 238. For Albert on passions, see also Knuuttila 2002, 70–71.
⁴² Albert the Great, De bono q. 5, a. 1, p. 196.
⁴³ “Animae enim actionum unaquaeque passio dicitur: quas tamen secundum intentionem praedicamenti actionis sub actione locamus, sicut est amor, et odium, et tristari, et gaudere, quae omnia passibiles actiones animae vocamus: haec enim omnia passiones sunt secundum quod a conceptis sunt illatae. […] Actiones autem sunt, quia in his agit anima in corpus et movet corpus secundum systemicam et diastolem, sicut diximus.” Albert the Great, Liber de sex principiis tract. 3, cap. 1, p. 332–333. An anonymous author of the Liber de sex principiis, on which Albert comments, claims that an act causes a passion but sometimes an act causes a passion, which is also an act, because a passion further causes another passion. Since the author claims that such a passion-act is a quality, he seems to think that it is a possible quality. (Liber de sex principiis PL 188, 1261B–1261C.)
⁴⁴ “[…] in anima enim hominis secundum partem sensibiliem quae est in ea. alteratio contrarietatis secundum motum passionum inventur, ut tristitiae et gaudii: quamvis enim motus passionum gaudii et tristitiae sint conjuncti et non animae, ut subjecti, ut dicit Aristoteles; tamen, ut dicit Averroes, in his compatitur anima corpori, et sic aliquo modo variatur,” Albert the Great, Liber de sex principiis tract. 1, cap. 2, p. 309; tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 323–324. See also Averroes, De anima lib. 1, comm. 14, p. 20–21.
⁴⁵ “Et secundum quod pati determinatur per recipere quodcumque, sic omnes potentiae apprehensivae et motivae in comparatione ad sua objecta erunt passivae, secundum quod motum dicitur passum et movens dicitur agens. Obiectum enim dicitur et est movens, et potentia est mota. Secundum autem quod dicitur pati secundum qualitates passibles, quae a passione interfunction vel passionem inferunt, non omnis potentia animae erit passiva, sed affectiva sensibilis tantum.” Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 3, p. 222; a. 1,
passibility of the powers of the soul from the passibility of corporeal matter. He argues that while corporeal matter receives a corporeal form, the power of the soul receives an intention abstracted from material form. Therefore, matter receives *simpliciter* whereas a soul receives *secundum quid*.\(^{46}\) Christ’s human soul was passible because its powers received intentions of suitable and unsuitable forms\(^{47}\) and the sensitive appetitive power had the passions of the soul. Albert adds that Christ’s human soul was passible also because it was able to have pain when his flesh was violated.\(^{48}\)

Thomas Aquinas’s view about the passibility of Christ’s human soul was also distinctly Aristotelian.\(^{49}\) His quite complex view about the passibility of the soul was an interpretation of Aristotle’s view of how a soul was changed only accidentally. It differed from the Franciscan views, as Aquinas argued that a passion was a change, which involved not only receiving but also losing, and the soul itself was changed only accidentally.\(^{50}\)

Following John of Damascus, Aquinas clarifies that a passion in a broad sense includes receiving, but unlike the Franciscans, he adds that a passion in a strict sense is a change where a thing receives one quality and loses the

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\(^{46}\) “Dicimus, quod potentia patiendi in anima non est eiusdem rationis cum potentia patiendi in materia corporali. In materia enim corporali una materia numero potest esse sub forma agentis in ipsam, quae fuit prius sub forma contrarii, ita quod illae formae sint actus ipsius et perfectiones secundum esse et naturam ipsarum formarum. Sed potentia patiendi in anima non est ad receptionem formarum secundum esse et naturam formarum, sed secundum receptionem intentionis abstractae ab illis formis. […] Et tale esse formae non est esse simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et ideo anima etiam non patitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 2, p. 221. The debate of whether, according to Aristotle, perception involves a material change has been active. For example, Burneyt argues that in Aristotelian theory perception does not involve a material change (Burneyt, 1992), but Nussbaum, Putnam (1992) and Sorabji (1992) have argued that it does involve a material change. For more references to this debate, see Toivanen 2013, 195, n. 3.

\(^{47}\) “Dicitur enim pati secundum receptibile formae convenientis vel non convenientis quocumque modo. […] Et hoc modo anima Adae fuit passibilis et similitur anima Christi.” Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 1, p. 220; *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268.

\(^{48}\) “Alia etiam ratione passibilis est anima iterum secundum quod passionem difinit Damascenus, quod est motus animae suspicioane boni vel mali. […] Tertio modo dicitur passio sensus doloris ex dissolvente continuum corpus conjunctum animae, […] et hoc modo quaeritur hic de passione: et sic dicimus animam Christi compassionem esse corpori.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268. For how the passibility of Adam’s soul and Christ’s human soul differed, see Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 2, p. 222; a. 7, p. 225–226.

\(^{49}\) Gondreau also claims that Albert the Great’s and Aquinas’s views about the passions of Christ were especially based on Aristotle. (Gondreau 2002, 114–115.)

opposite quality, and a passion in the strictest sense is a change where a thing receives a form not suitable to it while simultaneously losing the corresponding form suitable to it. Aquinas took the idea that a passion involves that something is removed and something is received from Avicenna.

Like Albert the Great, Aquinas also thinks that the passibility of the body differs from the passibility of the soul. He explains that only a corruptible body can have a passion in a strict sense because a change supposes that its subject subsists per se, a subject is a body since only a body is changed, and a subject can have opposing qualities. Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that a soul is changed only accidentally inasmuch as a soul is united with the flesh. A soul is united with the flesh as the form and the

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51 “Respondeo dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiciatur a re, […] Alio modo dicitur pati proprio modo, quando alicuius receptio alicuiu abiectione. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiciitur id quod non est conveniens rei, […] Alio modo, quando e converso contingit, […] Et hic est proprissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, quod autem receedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad alium trahit.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae P–IIae q. 22 a. 1 co. “Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicuius quocumque modo […] Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt, prout scilicet alicui quod recipitur in patiente esse contrarium.” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 1 co; Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1 qe. 1 co. In De veritate, Aquinas adds also a third, the transferred sense of the passion. Then a passion means that something is impeded from having what belongs to it. (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 1 co.) According to Aquinas, a quality according to which an alteration takes place is the third species of the quality and an alteration is the category of the passion. (Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Metaphysicae lib. 5, l. 20, n. 8–10.) Aquinas describes that a passive receiver is assimilated with an agent by means of the received thing and then an agent draws a passive one. An agent draws a passive one maximally when a passive one loses a suitable form. When this takes place, a passion removes something from the substance of the passive one (omnis passio abicit a substantia). (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 1 co; Summa theologicae P–IIae q. 22 a. 1 co; Sententia Metaphysicae lib. 5, l. 20, n. 10.) Aquinas adopted these ideas from Aristotle. In his Topica, Aristotle holds that a passion corrupts the substance of the thing (Aristotle, Topica VI.6, 145a1–5.) and in his De generatione et corruptione he claims that an agent makes a passive one similar to it. (Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione VII.7, 324a10–1.)

52 Avicenna, Liber de anima pars. 2, cap. 3, p. 137.

53 “Ad hoc autem quod sit alteratio, requiritur ex parte alterati quod sit res per se subsistens, alter enim subjectum motus esse non posset; et quod sit corpus, quia solum tale movetur, ut in VI Phys. probatur; et ulterius quod habeat naturam contrarietati subjectam, quia alteratio est motus inter contrarias qualitates. […] Sed ulterius ad rationem passionis requiritur quod qualitas introducta sit extranea, et qualitas abjecta sit connaturalis. […] Unde patet quod illorum tantum corporum est proprae pati quae possunt extra naturam suam trahere; et haec sunt corruptibilis.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qe. 1 co; De veritate q. 26, a. 1 co; Summa theologicae P–IIae q. 22, a. 1 co. In De veritate, Aquinas adds that a soul also has a passion when its operation is impeded. (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 1 co.)
mover of the flesh.\textsuperscript{54} The soul of human Christ’s was also passible in this way.\textsuperscript{55}

Aquinas’s understanding of how a soul as a form is changed is important because it explains also how a soul as a mover is changed. A soul as the form of the flesh is changed accidentally when the flesh is changed, because then also the soul-flesh composite is changed and the soul is changed since it is part of this composite.\textsuperscript{56} A soul as a mover is changed accidentally when a soul changes flesh and the change reaches the soul as the form of the flesh. Aquinas holds that a passion which originates in the flesh is a corporeal passion. For example, a corporeal passion like an injury of the flesh begins in the flesh, and the soul is changed accidentally as the form of the flesh. A passion which originates in a soul and ends in the flesh as a soul changes the flesh is a passion of the soul.\textsuperscript{57} Aquinas’s description

\textsuperscript{54} “Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corporei applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori et secundum essentiam suam, secundum quod est forma corporea, et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum, prout est motor ejus.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 2 co. For Aquinas on a soul as a substance and the unity of the flesh and soul, see Pasnau 2002b, 45–99. For Aquinas on a soul as the form of the body, see Dales 1995, 107–112; 138–149; Bazán 1997; Pasnau 2011, 350–354; 2012, 501; McInerny and O’Callaghan, 2015.

\textsuperscript{55} “[…] ideo passibilitas inerat illi animae ex parte illa qua conjungibilis erat corpori; […] Conjungetur autem corpori dupliciter: scilicet secundum essentiam, inquantum est forma et secundum potentias, non tamen omnes, sed quasdam;” \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 co. “Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, […] corpore perturbato per aliquam corpoream passionem, necesse est quod anima per accidentis perturbetur […] Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale […] necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passabilis esset. […] Passione autem animali pati dicitur anima secundum operationem quae vel est propria animae, vel est principalis animae quam corporis. […] propriissime dicitur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent.” \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15, a. 4 co. Gondreau claims that in \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, Aquinas “allows for the passibility of Christ’s soul only on account of the passibility of his body, i.e., only because bodily suffering affects the soul to which the body is joined as matter to its form, and not because of the proper operations of his sensate soul as such” (Gondreau 2002, 248). However, his claim begs a question because Aquinas does claim that the sensitive part of Christ’s human soul had, for example, sadness, which as an act of the sensitive appetitive power was the proper operation of his sensate soul. \textit{(Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; a. 3, qc. 2 co.)

\textsuperscript{56} “[…] nam id quod est compositum ex materia et forma, sicut agit ratione formae ita patitur ratione materiae, et ideo passio incipit a materia, et quodam modo per accidentem pertinet ad formam;” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 2 co. “Passio autem cum abiectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidentes, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I\textsuperscript{a}–IIae q. 22, a. 1 co. See also \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co.

\textsuperscript{57} “Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animae per accidentes: uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in anima secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma, et haec est quaestum passio corporalis; sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidentes ipsa anima patitur, quae secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod passio incipiat ab anima in quantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus, et haec dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in icta et timore et aliis huiusmodi, nam huiusmodi peraguntur per apprehensionem et appetitum animae, ad quae sequitur corporis transmutation; sicut transmutatio mobilis sequitur ex operatione motoris secundum omnem modum quo
of the passions of the soul indicates that they are passions because they involve a corporeal change.\textsuperscript{58} In this respect, Aquinas’s view of the passions of the soul differs from that of Albert the Great, because Albert thinks that the passion of the soul is a passion because an apprehended thing causes it. Aquinas explains that Christ had passions of the body\textsuperscript{59} and passions of the soul.\textsuperscript{60}

The idea that only the flesh can have a passion has received some attention in literature. However, for example, James does not mention the idea although she studies the concepts of passion and action.\textsuperscript{61} Gondreau claims that “most properly a passion appertains to the movement of the sensitive appetite”,\textsuperscript{62} but unlike what Gondreau claims, a passion cannot pertain to the sensitive appetitive power most properly, as Aquinas thinks that only a flesh has a passion. However, among the powers of the soul the act of the sensitive appetitive power is related to a passion most properly, as I shall show below. Lombardo claims that “Aquinas locates the passions principally in the soul and describes them as \textit{passiones animae}”. He continues, “Nonetheless, the passions affect the soul only through the medium of the flesh, and therefore, in a somewhat secondary fashion.”\textsuperscript{63} As Aquinas thinks that a soul has a passion \textit{per accidens,} Lombardo’s claim that a soul has passions principally needs further clarification. Minor seems to think that a soul has a passion accidentally because the act of the sensitive appetite belongs to a soul and the flesh.\textsuperscript{64} However, Aquinas’s idea is that a soul is changed accidentally when the sensitive appetite has an act because then the soul moves the flesh and the soul is changed, as the soul is the form mobile disponitur ad obediendum motioni motoris. Et sic corpore transmutato per alterationem aliquam, ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 2 co; \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15, a. 4 co. See also \textit{Super Sent}. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co.

\textsuperscript{58} “[…] ira, et similiter quaelibet passio animae, dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum propriam rationem irae, et sic per prius est in anima quam in corpore; alio modo in quantum est passio, et sic per prius est in corpore; ibi enim primo accept rationem passionis: et ideo non dicimus quod anima irascatur per accidens, sed quod per accidens patiatur.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 2 ad 5.

\textsuperscript{59} “Propriis quidem corporali patitur per corporis laesionem. […] Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est, necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passibilis esset.” \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15, a. 4 co; \textit{Super Sent}. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3 qc. 2 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 3 ad 1.

\textsuperscript{60} “[…] propriissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent.” \textit{Super Sent}. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 3 ad 1; a. 8 co. Gondreau seems to think that Aquinas was the first to claim that Christ had the passions of the soul as the movements of the sensitive appetitive power. (Gondreau 2002. 252–253.) However, already the \textit{Summa Halensis} claimed that Christ had the passions of the soul and the movements of sensuality.

\textsuperscript{61} James 1997, 47–64.

\textsuperscript{62} Gondreau 2002, 205.

\textsuperscript{63} Lombardo 2011, 45.

\textsuperscript{64} Minor 2009, 32.
of the body. I think that Sarot provides the most detailed and accurate description of how a soul is changed accidentally when the flesh is changed.  

Aquinas clarifies that when the change of the flesh is for the worse, it is a passion in a more proper sense than when the change is for the good. Since he concludes that sadness is more of a passion than pleasure, he seems to think that sadness involves a corporeal change for the worse but pleasure includes a corporeal change for the good. Miner argues that Aquinas adopted the idea that a passion in a strict sense is for the worse through experience. However, unlike Miner, I think that Aquinas adopted the idea from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* since, in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Aquinas claims that a harmful change is a passion in particular. McInerny explains that, according to Aquinas, all meanings of passion are based on the meaning of passion as a change of the flesh for the worse. He expounds that for Aquinas, ‘passion’ is an analogous term, and he claims that a passion as a corporeal alteration for the worse is *ratio*, which is common for all meanings of passion. All meanings of passion involve some element of that *ratio*. However, McInerny’s interesting interpretation is not without difficulties. Aquinas does not explicitly argue or even hint that ‘passion’ is an analogous term; it seems that he just adopted the idea that passion has many meanings from Nemesius of Emesa or John of Damascus.

Aquinas’s teaching about the passibility of the powers differs from the Franciscans since he emphasizes that only the act of the sensitive appetitive power involves a passion in a strict sense. He argues that because only the powers of the vegetative and the sensitive part of the soul are connected with the flesh but the powers of the rational part of the soul are not, only the acts of the vegetative and the sensitive powers involve a passion in a strict sense. The acts of the intellect and the will are passions only in a

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66 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P–IIae q. 22, a. 1 co; P-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co. See also Gondreau 2002, 221–222.

67 Miner 2009, 33.

68 Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Metaphysicae* lib. 5, l. 20, n. 10.

69 McInerny 1968, 30–33.

70 “Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori […] et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum […] In viribus autem animac quantum ad operationem applicatur corpori solum vires partis sensitivae et nutritivae. […] Sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit propri passio, quia immaterialiae sunt, tamen ibi est aliquid de ratione passionis…” *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qe. 2 co. “[…] et ideo huiusmodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est aliusui organi corporalis actus;” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* P-IIae q. 22, a. 3 co; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 4. A passion in a broad sense explains why the acts of the sensitive rather than the vegetative part are passions. According to Aquinas, the powers of the sensitive part are moved, but the powers of the vegetative part are not moved. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qe. 2 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 co; *Sententia Ethic.* lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3.)
broad sense since the potential intellect receives an intelligible species and an apprehended thing moves the will. However, according to Aquinas, the will rather than the intellect has a passion in a broad sense because good and evil move the will, whereas truth and untruth move the intellect. Aquinas explains that because goodness and evilness are in a thing, but truth and untruth are in a soul, a thing moves the will rather than the intellect.71

The acts of the senses and the sensitive appetitive power involve a passion in a strict and in a broad sense because the flesh is changed and the powers are moved when they have an act. According to Aquinas, however, the act of the sensitive appetitive power rather than the act of the senses is a passion in a broad sense because a thing as it is in itself moves the sensitive appetitive power, but a thing as it is in a soul moves the senses;72 it is a passion in a strict sense because the act of the senses involves a spiritual change of the flesh but the act or movement of the sensitive appetitive power includes only a natural change of the flesh.73 It is noteworthy that scholars

71 “Sed in virtibus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen ibi est aliquid de ratione passionis, quia in apprehensione intellectus creati est receptio; […] In appetitu autem intellectivo, est adhuc plus de ratione passionis, quia voluntas movetur a re secundum quod est bona vel mala, quae sunt conditiones rei; intellectus autem movetur secundum apprehensionem veri vel falsi, quae non sunt rei per se, sed secundum quod sunt in anima; quia bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum et falsum sunt in anima, ut dicitur in VI Meta.. Unde magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum;” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co; Summa theologiae Iª-IIae q. 22, a. 2 co; In De divinis nominibus cap. 2, l. 4; Sententia Ethic. lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3. When Aquinas claims that true and false are only in the soul, he refers to Aristotle, Metaphysica VI.4, 1027b25–28. See also Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Metaphysicae lib. 6, l. 4, n. 1; 8–18; Schmidt 1966, 237–238; Wippel 2007, 65–112.

72 “Sed quia sensus non movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem movensis, cum forma sensibilis non recipitur in sensu secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium sensui […] ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum, aut debilitat. Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur secundum vires appetitivas sensitivas, quia haec vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed ipsius rei; et secundum hoc habet res convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem:” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2 co; De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co; Summa theologiae Iª-IIae q. 22, a. 2 co; Sententia Ethic. lib. 2, l. 5, n. 3.

73 “[…] dupliciter organum animae potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se inventur in actu apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, […] Est autem alia naturalis transmutatione organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, […] Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatione, unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; […] Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis inventur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Iª-IIae q. 22, a. 2 ad 3; De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co. Aquinas explains that a sight involves only a spiritual change whereas other senses involve also a natural change. (Summa theologiae Iª q. 78, a. 3 co.) According to Aquinas, the act of the senses involves that a sense receives a sensible form, which has a spiritual but not material existence in a sense. For more about natural and spiritual reception, see Stump 2003, 250–254. There are many studies about Aquinas’s idea that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement; for example, see James 1997, 62–63; Knuuttila 2004, 248–251; Miner 2009, 38–46; Gondreau 2002, 209–210;
have discussed whether, according to Aquinas, the acts of the senses involve a corporeal change. For example, Burnyeat has argued that they do not involve a corporeal change, whereas Nussbaum and Putnam have claimed that they do. I think that Nussbaum and Putnam are right, as Aquinas’s view about the passibility of the powers indicates that the acts of the senses involve a corporeal change.

Aquinas describes that only the sensitive appetitive power has the passions of the soul because solely its act involves only a natural change of the flesh. However, a corporeal passion can touch all powers of the soul because all powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, which is the form of the flesh. When the flesh has a corporeal passion and a soul as the form of the flesh is changed accidentally, then the powers are also changed accidentally since they are rooted in the essence of the soul.

Later on, the views of Franciscan theologians mentioned above and Aquinas were widely discussed. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise proposes the triple senses of the passion and explains that Christ’s human soul as the form of the flesh and as the mover of the flesh was changed accidentally. However, unlike Aquinas, Peter adds that Christ’s human soul as a substance was also possible inasmuch as his will received the species of

Lombardo 2011, 37–40. Gondreau claims that the acts of the sensitive appetitive powers are movements because they involve “passage from the sense appetite’s potential inclination towards some object to its actual inclination towards a specific object”. (Gondreau 2002, 209–210.) Lombardo argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a movement toward our telos. (Lombardo 2011, 37.) Minor claims that the act of the sensitive appetite power is a movement because it is the change of the soul-flesh composite. (Miner 2009, 40.) Knutsill argues, I think rightly, that a bodily movement caused by the act of the sensitive appetite power is not a reason for why the act of the sensitive appetite power is a movement. The act is a movement towards or away from an object. (Knutsill 2004, 251.)

76 “Passio vero animalis, cum per cæm ex operatione animae transmutetur corpus, in illa potentia esse debet quae organo corporali adiungitur, et cuius est corpus transmutatur; et ideo huismodi passio non est in parte intellectiva, quae non est alculius organi corporalis actus; nec iterum est in apprehensiva sensitiva quia ex apprehensione sensus non sequitur motus in corpore nisi mediante appetitiva quae est immediatum movens. Unde secundum modum operationis eius statim disponitur organum corporale, scilicet cor unde est principium motus, tali dispositione quae competat ad exequendum hoc in quod appetitus sensibilis inclinatur: [...] Et sic in appetitiva sensitiva sola animalis passio proprie invenitur.” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co; De veritate q. 26, a. 3 ad 11; Summa theologiae Iª–IIae q. 22, a. 2 ad 3; 1ª q. 64, a. 3 co. See also Sarot 1994, 71–72; Miner 2009, 34.
77 “Poetis tamen haec passio attribuit alicui potientiae tripliciter: uno modo secundum quod in essentia animae radicantur; et sic, cum omnes potentiae radicentur in essentia animae, ad omnes potientias pertinet praedicta passio.” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co; Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 co; Summa theologicae IIIª q. 46, a. 7 co. Aquinas emphasizes that only the sense of touch can apprehend a corporeal passion. A corporeal passion can also impede the act of the incorporeal power. For example, since the act of the intellect requires phantasies, a corporeal passion can impede the act of the intellect when a corporeal passion injures the organ of the imagination. (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 3 co.)
the unsuitable thing and lost the species of the suitable thing. Applying Aquinas’s view of passion in a strict sense to the will of Christ, Peter departs from Aquinas, who thought that only the flesh can have such passions. This shows that the question about the passibility of Christ’s soul was partially responsible for the breaking up of the Thomistic tradition.

Richard Middleton also proposes three meanings of the passions. Since he argues that Christ’s human soul had passions in all these meanings, he does not favour Aquinas’s view that the soul was changed accidentally. However, like Aquinas, Richard expounds that Christ’s sensitive appetitive power rather than his senses had passions, but following the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, he argues that Christ’s will also had passions. Durand of St. Pourçain was more faithful to Aquinas. Like Aquinas, he distinguishes the passions of the soul from corporeal

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78 Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 108–109. However, right after this he argues that only a corruptible body can have change, which is a movement between contrary qualities. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, p. 109.) This implies that when the will receives the species of the unsuitable thing and loses the species of the suitable thing, such process is not a change. However, Tarentaise does not explain how this process differs from a change. Also Aquinas thinks that a soul is subsistent (MacInerny and O’Callaghan, 2015), but he does not incorporate the idea in his theory of the passion. Thomas of Sutton also thinks that a passive one receives by means of a change. (Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta* q. 1, p. 3–4; p. 8.) For more about Thomas of Sutton, see Klima 2011, 1294.

79 Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 1, p. 159. Unlike Aquinas, Richard adds that an accident is a passion in the most broad sense. He describes that as Aquinas thinks that Christ’s human soul had a passion in a strict sense only when the flesh-soul composite was changed, according to Aquinas, the soul as such did not have joy and sadness. However, Richard thinks that Christ’s human soul had a passion, as he argues, for example, that Christ’s human soul had sadness. For more about Richard Middleton on the sadness of Christ, see Chapters 3.5. and 3.6.

80 Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, p. 159–160. According to Richard, the sensitive appetitive power rather than the senses had a passion, because the appetitive power involves a natural change of the flesh. Unlike Aquinas, Richard argues that these reasons cannot be used in an argument for the claim that the will is more passible than the intellect. He explains that although the will moves towards a thing more than the intellect, the will is less passible than the intellect in the sense that the will moves itself, whereas a thing moves the intellect. Nor can the second reason be used, as the movement of the will is more spiritual than the movement of the intellect. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, p. 160.)

81 Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, q. 3, p. 161. Richard explains that when the object of Christ’s sensitive appetitive power and the will were the same, the sensitive appetitive power rather than the will had a passion because the sensitive appetitive power was more passible than the will. However, when the object of the will exceeded the object of the sensitive appetitive power more than the passibility of the sensitive appetitive power exceeded the passibility of the will, a passion was greater in the will than in the sensitive appetite. Therefore, Christ’s will rather than his sensitive appetitive power had a passion because the sensitive appetitive power did not have as strong sadness as the will had when the will had sadness about God’s dishonour. As Richard thinks that the will can have passions, he follows the early Franciscans’ and Bonaventure’s view about the passibility of the will, but when he claims that the will is not as passible as the sensitive appetitive power, he also comes closer to Thomas Aquinas.
passions and expounds that a corporeal passion can be taken in a broad, strict, and strictest sense. The passion of the soul is the movement of the appetitive power, which arises from the apprehension of a corporeal passion. The passion of the soul in the strictest sense is the movement of the appetitive power, which follows the apprehension of an unsuitable corporeal passion.

In line with Aquinas, Durand states that Christ’s will had passions only in a broad sense.

The early fourteenth-century Franciscans like John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton did not consider the possibility of Christ’s human soul, but their views about the possibility of Christ’s will varied. Following the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, Scotus and Ockham held that the will was possible. Scotus taught that the passion of the will was an externally caused quality in the will which was not the act of the will.

However, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that the will did not have passions. Like Aquinas, Auriol also argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion, whereas the acts of the will, the intellect and the senses are not passions. He holds that the act of the sensitive appetitive power causes a corporeal change and explains that the

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82 Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v.
83 Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v.
84 Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.
85 Ockham reiterates the three meanings of the passions but, unlike Aquinas, he claims that the intellect has a passion in a strict sense when it loses the habit of error and acquires the habit of knowledge. (William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* lib. 3, q. 7 (OTh. VI, 213). He also claims that the acts, joy and sadness of the will are passions of the will. (William Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* quodl. 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 186–187). The acts of the sensitive appetitive power are also passions, but joy and sadness, which follow from the act of the sensitive appetite, are passions improperly. (William Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* lib. 3, q. 12 (OTh. VI. 401–402). Joy and sadness are passions related to passible qualities. For example, sweetness and bitterness are passible qualities, which cause joy and sadness in a sense. Colours are passible qualities, which are caused by joy and sadness. (William Ockham, *Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 14 (OPh. II, 277–279). For Ockham on passions, see Eitzkorn 1990, 269–270; Hirvonen 2002, 155–160; 2004, 52–65. For Ockham on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.
86 For Scotus on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.
87 “Responsio dico quod actus appetitus sensitivi vocantur passiones et tamen actus voluntatis nec intellectus nec apprehensivae sensitivae vocantur passiones. Tamen in appetitu sensitivo vocantur passiones.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in IIII librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M, fol. 67v, the 1605 printed edition p. 440. Auriol claims that the will and the sensitive appetitive power have, for example, sadness and joy, which are acts of the appetitive powers. (Peter Auriol, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* d. 1, sect. 7, p. 394; *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, fol. 67v, the 1605 printed edition p. 439.) For Auriol on the acts of the will, see Knuuttila 2004, 272–274.
88 “Nunc de tertia propositione. Hoc non oportet probare quia non est verecundia quin rubescat sic est malus. Sed dubium est, utrum tales transmutationes præcedant et sint primæ ut cause vel post ut primo sit gaudium et post transmutatio. […] Contra, videtur de alia parte
act is the first species, whereas a corporeal change is the third species of the quality. Because corporeal changes like heating and frosting effect movements like the increasing and rarefaction of the heart, which are passions, a corporeal change is a passive quality that effects a passion. Unlike Aquinas, who explained that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion since it entailed a passion in a strict sense (i.e. receiving and losing in the flesh), Auriol concludes that the act of the sensitive appetite is a passion because it causes a passion through a corporeal change. The acts of the apprehensive powers and the will are not passions since they do not cause passions.

Although Auriol’s view is similar with Aquinas’s one, Auriol criticizes Aquinas’s argument that only the sensitive appetitive power has
passions. He holds that Aquinas’s view about a passion involves two elements: 1) a passion is concurrent with a corporeal change, and 2) a passive one is dragged towards an active one. This dragging explains why an act of the appetitive power is a passion but an act of the apprehensive power is not a passion. A corporeal change is the reason why the act of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion, but the act of the will is not a passion. Auriol criticizes the second element of the passion in particular. He argues that from Aquinas’s idea, it follows that where there is not dragging there is not passion. According to Auriol, since hatred and sadness do not involve dragging towards an object but rather escaping an object, it seems that they would not be passions. However, Aquinas claims that they are primary passions. In addition, love drags especially towards an object, but Aquinas claims that it is not a primary passion. Auriol goes on to explain that a thing is dragged towards an object when it is made similar to an object. Hence, where there is maximal likeness of the receiver and an agent, according to Aquinas’s first criterion there would be maximal passion. Auriol argues that since the acts of the will and the apprehensive power involve maximal likeness with an object, it follows, unlike what Aquinas thinks, that these acts would be maximal passions. In addition, Auriol says that the definition (ratio) of the passion cannot involve both a dragging and a corporeal change. The definition of the simple form like a passion involves only one thing, and as the dragging and the change are two things the definition of the passion can involve only one of them.92

Walter Chatton also thinks that among the appetitive powers, only the sensitive appetitive power has passions. Unlike Auriol, however, he describes that a corporeal change effects the act of the sensitive appetitive power. He holds that the acts of the senses and the sensitive appetitive power are passions because they are effected by a corporeal change, but the act of the sensitive appetitive power rather than the act of the sense is a passion because only the act of the sensitive appetitive power is inclined to pursue or avoid an object.93

92 Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 67v–68r, the 1605 printed edition p. 440.
93 “[…] et tunc dicitur ab aliquibus quod quia passio appetitiva infert passionem sensitivi, sicut patet de passione verecundiae, quae causat ruborem in facie. Non sic apprehensiva; ideo ista proprie dicitur passio, heac non. Sed teneo oppositum, quod passiones et transmutationes organorum causant passiones appetitivas et non e contra,” Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, p. 200. “[…] si quaeras utrum omnis sensatio sit passio, id est sit causata ad transmutationem organi, dico quod sic. […] Si sic quod immediate incineret ad prosecutiones et fugas, dico quod non, sed mediante passione appetitiva; et ideo requirunt virtutes moderativas. Unde primo modo omnes actus sensitivi sunt passiones, sed tertio modo soli appetitivi et non apprehensivi immediate et primo, sed mediate et virtualiter.” Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, p. 201–202.
3.2. The Assumed Defects of Christ

Medieval theologians thought that Christ voluntarily assumed some of the defects of human beings, but not all of them. They adopted the list of defects especially from Peter Lombard’s Sentences. According to Lombard, Christ assumed the defects voluntarily, but we have them necessarily as a consequence of the Fall.\(^\text{94}\) Christ had defects of the flesh, like hunger and thirst, and defects of the soul, like sadness, fear and pain.\(^\text{95}\) However, Christ assumed only the defects of the penalty for original sin but not the defects of the sin, because he was free from sin. Lombard restricts the variety of Christ’s defects even more and argues that Christ did not assume all defects of the penalty. Christ assumed only defects which did not diminish his excellence and were profitable.\(^\text{96}\) The assumed defects were profitable because they demonstrated either his true humanity (such as fear and sadness), assisted in the fulfilment of his mission (such as passibility and mortality) or raised our hope of immortality (like his death).\(^\text{97}\) Christ did not assume defects like ignorance, the difficulty to will good or any diseases.\(^\text{98}\)

Thirteenth-century theologians made only some minor additions to Lombard’s view. They all accepted that Christ was totally free

\(^\text{94}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 95–96. Lombard’s view about the passions of Christ’s soul was especially influenced by John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa. (Gondreau 2002, 78–80.) For Lombard on the affectivity of Christ’s human soul, see also Gondreau 2002, 80–88. Hugh of Saint Victor states that Christ had passions because he wished to assume them, and, therefore, Christ had passions voluntarily. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De quatuor voluntatibus in christo, PL 176, 845C–846B; Gondreau 2002, 74–76.) The author of the Summa sententiarum describes that, according to Pope Leo I (c. 400–461), Christ assumed our defects except sin. (Pope Leo I, Sermo 63, c. 4, PL 54, 355B–355C.) Christ voluntarily assumed the defects of the flesh, like hunger and thirst, and the defects of the soul, like sadness and fear. (Summa sententiarum tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75A–75C.) Peter Abelard expounds that Christ’s flesh seemed to have sins because it had the penalties of sins, but he did not have sins. (Peter Abelard, Scito te ipsum p. 56; Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad romanos lib. 3, cap. 8, p. 211.) According to Robert of Melun, Christ assumed flesh, which was free from all kind of sins, but his flesh was similar to sinful flesh since it was mortal and passible, and thus thirsty, hungry and sleepy. (Robert of Melun, Sententiae lib. 2, cap. 18, p. 45.) According to Odo, Christ’s human nature was free from sin, but Christ had hunger and thirst in order to prove that he had true flesh, and he had sadness and fear in order to prove that he had a true soul. (Odo, Ysagoge in theologiam lib. 2, p. 170.) See also Landgraf 1953, 222–223. Abelard was accused of claiming that Christ did not have fear of God, but Abelard answered that he had not claimed that. (Peter Abelard, Apologia contra Bernardum p. 360–361.) Unfortunately, Abelard’s defence is not extant. (Buytaert 1969, 350–351.)

\(^\text{95}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 93. See also Madigan 2007, 68; Rosemann 2004, 135–136; Adams 1999, 22–23.

\(^\text{96}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 93. When Peter claims that Christ did not assume defects which diminished his excellence, he seems to follow John of Damascus. According to John, Christ assumed natural passions and passions that did not demean his dignity. (John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa cap. 64, p. 259–260.)

\(^\text{97}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 95. See also Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum lib. 4, cap. 15, PL 211, 1196D–1197A; cap. 17, PL 211, 1204B–1204C.

\(^\text{98}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 94–95. It is quite strange that according to medieval theologians, Christ did not have any diseases, even though defects emphasized his humanity.
from sin⁹⁹ and that he voluntarily assumed the penalties of the sin.¹⁰⁰ The Summa Halensis adds that the penalties of the sin included error and the spark of sin (fomes), which are causes of sin, and penalties like needing to die, be thirsty and be hungry, which are not. Christ had only the last penalties and not all of them, since he had penalties which all human beings have but not penalties which only some individuals have (like diseases).¹⁰¹ Bonaventure explained that postlapsarian human beings have defects necessarily from their parents. The offspring of the postlapsarian human being is subject to the culpability of sinful carnal desire and has penalties because its parents have such carnal desire when they beget it.¹⁰² However,
God’s Son had immaculate flesh made of the flesh of the Virgin Mary, which was possible but cleaned from all sin by the Holy Spirit, and this flesh was united with his rational sinless soul. Bonaventure held that Christ was able to have flesh which was free from the passibility of miseries because it was free from sin, but Christ voluntarily assumed the defects of the penalty of the sin because of his wish to save the human race.\(^{103}\)

Albert the Great was the first to explain that Christ assumed only the defects that God placed in the human nature. He states that human flesh is mortal and has hunger, and a soul feels pain and sadness because God planted various elements in our flesh. Christ assumed defects such as mortality, hunger, pain and sadness since they resulted from this divine act and were common to all human beings.\(^{104}\) However, he did not assume, for instance, ignorance, the difficulty to do good, the spark of the sin and the battle of the flesh against the spirit because God did not place them in our nature; nor did he assume defects like illnesses, which only some people have.\(^{105}\)

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\(^{103}\) “In Christo autem secus est; ipse enim neutro modo fuit propagatus, nec secundum propagationem legis naturalis nec secundum corruptionem libidinis; sed Spiritus sanctus, adveniens in ipsum Virginem et ipsum fecundans, carnem eius ab omni foeditate corruptionis purificavit, passibilitatem tamen reliquit. Ex illa autem carne sapientia Patris, scilicet ipse Filii Dei, aedificavit sibi corpus immaculatum, et illud corpus univit sibi et animae rationali, quae quidem immunitatem habuit a culpa et in se et in carne coniuncta. Et sicut immunitatem habuit a reatu culpae, sic secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae immunitatem habere debuisset a passibilitate miseriae. Quod ergo in carne illa remansit poenalitas, hoc fuit ex dispensatione ipsius assumentis, concurrente simul acceptione illius animae rationalis, quae in primo instanti suae creationis habuit usum cognitionis, et placuit sibi tali corpori uniri propter salutem generis humani. - Et sic patet, quod tales defectus in Christo fuerunt non necessitate generationis, sed voluntate dispensationis, voluntate, inquam, divina praevieniente, sed voluntate creatæ concomitante.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 335).

\(^{104}\) “In plantatione autem naturali plantavit Deus corpora nostra convertendo elementa in humores, et humores in membra similia et dissimilia: et de plantatione illorum sunt quaedam ex parte corporis, et quaedam ex parte animae: ex parte dissolutionis, sicut fames ex agentibus qualitatibus primis in substantiam: et ideo illos assumptis. In anima autem affectus naturales conjunctos consequitur dolor et tristitia separationis et mortis, et illos assumptis: et istic sunt naturales defectus omnis hominis:” Albert the Great, \textit{Sententiae} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274; \textit{De incarnatione} tract. 4, q. 4, p. 210. See also Gonreau 2002, 95. Bonaventure criticizes Albert’s opinion. According to Bonaventure, the idea that Christ assumed defects which God planted in our nature cannot explain why Christ did not assume all diseases or why he had the defects of penalties which did not result from a divine planting. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 333.).)

\(^{105}\) “Considerandum igitur, quod natura nostra plantata est duobus modis, scilicet in principiis naturalibus, et gratia innocentia, et utramque plantationem fecit Deus: gratiae autem amissionem non fecit Deus, sed culpa hominis: et ideo quae praeter naturam consecuta sunt culpam, non assumptis, quia illa non plantavit, sicut est ignorantia, et inimicis bene agendi in anima, et fomes libidinis in corpore, et pugna carnis adversus spiritum: et ideo illa non assumptis.” Albert the Great, \textit{Sententiae} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274. “[…] sed lepra, et gibbus, etc., sunt defectus personales iusti vel illius, et ideo non sunt per se naturae: et cum ipse venit totam naturam reparare, ideo illos non debuit assumere.” Albert the Great, \textit{Sententiae} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 5, p. 274. See also Albert the Great, \textit{De incarnatione} tract. 4, q. 4, p. 209–210.
According to Thomas Aquinas, Christ assumed defects to redeem the human race, to cause faith in incarnation and to give an example of patience. Since the redemption of the human race required perfect grace and knowledge, Christ did not assume defects which implied a lack of grace or knowledge (e.g. the difficulty to do good, the spark of sin, and ignorance). He also did not assume personal defects like illnesses, which only some individuals have. According to Aquinas, Christ had defects which did not demean his dignity and natural defects, which are common to all postlapsarian human beings. The natural defects (e.g. death, hunger, thirst and pain) are common to all human beings since the natural principles cause them because of Adam’s and Eve’s sin.
3.3. The Pre-passions of Christ

It was a common medieval view that pain, sadness, fear and anger were among Christ’s assumed defects. However, a view that Chris had, for example, sadness was not without a problem. As Seneca claimed that a wise man cannot be sad, it would follow that Christ, who was the wisest man in the created realm, could not be sad. The medieval theologians solved the problem by arguing that Christ’s sadness was not a passion but a pre-passion. They added that the pain, fear and anger in Christ’s human soul were also pre-passions, not passions, and they explained that Christ’s pre-passions differed from our ordinary pre-passions. These views are especially interesting because they show that, unlike the passions of the postlapsarian human being, Christ’s pain, sadness, fear and anger were thought to be strictly subjected to his rational powers. In this chapter, I study these views on the pre-passions of Christ’s human soul.

The views on Christ’s pre-passions were based on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, where Lombard states that Christ had fear and sadness only as pre-passions, but we have fear and sadness as pre-passions and passions. In the twelfth-century discussions, a pre-passion and a passion were commonly treated as stages of sin. The idea goes back to Jerome, who claims that a passion is a sin but a pre-passion is the beginning of the sin. A pre-passion is a non-deliberated, emotional reaction but a passion involves consent. Although Lombard regards pre-passion and passion as stages of sin, he claims that the punishments of the sin also involve pre-passions and passions. Therefore, there are two kinds of pre-passions: sinful pre-passions and sinless pre-passions. A sinful pre-passion is the motion of the sensuality which catches the attraction of the sin and precedes the consent of reason.

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108 Seneca, De clementia 2.5.5.
109 Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 2, p. 98. See also Gondreau 2002, 84–85. See also Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum lib. 4, cap. 18, PL 211, 1205C–1206A. Before Lombard, the author of Summa sententiarum noted that, according to Jerome, Christ only began to be sad. He explains that Christ began to be sad in the sense that his passions did not dominate the soul and submerge reason. Otherwise, a passion leads to sin. (Summa sententiarum tract. 1, cap. 17, PL 176, 75C–75D.) See also Jerome’s Commentariorum in Matth. 26, 37, p. 253–254. The author of the Sententiae divinitatis clarifies that Christ’s human soul had sadness and fear, but the mode of Christ’s sadness and fear differed from the mode of sadness and fear in postlapsarian human beings. (Sententiae divinitatis tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 89.) According to Hugh of Saint Victor, as Christ was free from sin, he did not have the movements of the vices which preceded the consent of reason. Postlapsarian human beings have such movements because of original sin. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis christianae fidei lib. 2, pars prima, cap. 7, PL 176, 389B–389C; 391D–391B.) For pre-passions as a stage of sin in the twelfth century, see Knuuttila 2004, 178–188.
111 According to Lombard, the stages of sin are as follows: 1) The sensual motion catches the attraction of the sin. 2) The sensual motion suggests sin to the inferior part of reason. 3) The inferior part of reason consents to the suggestion. 4) The inferior part of reason suggests sin to the superior part of reason. 5) And the superior part of reason consents to the suggestion.
According to Lombard, Christ’s sadness and fear were sinless pre-passions because they did not separate his intellect from rectitude and the contemplation of God. When the intellect suffers in this way because of sadness and fear, they are passions.\textsuperscript{112}

Following Peter Lombard, many medieval theologians thought that Christ only had pre-passions, but their understanding of these varied. Alexander of Hales claims that a pre-passion is an unexpected movement which is not foreseen by reason or the powers of the sensible part of the soul. Christ had only the last mentioned pre-passions because the powers of the sensual part of his soul were not aware of everything; he did not have the first mentioned pre-passions because his reason was aware of all movements that took place in him.\textsuperscript{113}

Unlike Alexander, Bonaventure holds that a pre-passion as an unexpected movement is a movement of sensuality without the judgment of reason, whereas a pre-passion in a general sense is a diminished passion of sensuality, which is below reason as reason. Christ’s pre-passions were of the latter but not the former kind.\textsuperscript{114} Bonaventure explains, however, that


\textsuperscript{113} “Secundum enim quod propassio est ‘subitus motus cui non consentitur’, ut ‘subitum’ dicit illud quod non praevidetur et secundum quod ‘consensus’ dicitur rationis esse, sic propassio non fuit in eo, quia nulla mutatio fuit ita repentina, quae non praevidetur a superiori parte. Sed pars inferior, scilicet sensibilis, non omnia cognovit; unde uno modo poterat ibi esse ‘subitum’, secundum autem aliun modum non. Secundum ergo quod propassio dicitur ille motus qui nullo modo praevidetur, sic non fuit in eo propassio; sed [ut dicitur] subitus motus, qui non praevidetur in parte inferiori, sic fuit in ei propassio.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 255. See also Alexander of Hales, \textit{Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum} d. 15 (AE), p. 152. According to Alexander, a passion is an immediate movement of the inferior part of the soul, which a soul cannot resist, or an unordered inclination to consent. Christ did not have passions, as he was able to resist the domination of the immediate movements because of the grace of the union. (“Secundum quod dicitur ‘passio’ quando cedit anima impotens in resistendo, sicut ex vehementi delectatione accidit aliquando mors, quando scilicet huiusmodi immoderatio venit non cum cautela in parte inferiori: nulla talis immoderatio fuit in anima Christi, et haec immoderatio ‘passio’ appellatur. Unde bene dicit Hieronymus quod ‘passio non dominabatur animae eius’, quia per gratiam unionis potens fuit resistere ne dominaretur ei aliqua huiusmodi immoderatio.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae} q. 16, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 254–255. “Passio autem est illa inclinatio, quae est inordinatio, ad consensum.” \textit{Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum} d. 15 (AE), p. 152.) As Christ’s sadness, fear and anger were not immediate movements, they were not perturbations which caused disorder. (Alexander of Hales, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae}, q. 16, d. 2, memb. 7, p. 253.) See also \textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 1, p. 61. See also Gondreau 2002, 92. However, Gondreau does not note the difference between the two kinds of pre-passions.

\textsuperscript{114} “Dicendum, quod propassio secundum generalem nominis sui aceptionem dicitur esse passio diminuta: haec autem est illa qua sitit infra rationem, ut ratio est, et ita propassio dicit passionem partis sensualis, vel virtutis naturalis; et hoc modo vult dicere Magister et Hieronymus, huiusmodi passiones fuisse in Christo. Erant enim ex horrore sensualitatis, non rationis partis in quantum rationalis. Ad illud vero quod obicietur, quod definitur propassio, quod est motus subitus; dicendum, quod iti definitur propassio, secundum quod quod est in
Christ’s sensuality had movements which touched his reason as nature, but as they did not touch reason as reason they were pre-passions.115 Bonaventure added the distinction between reason “as reason” and reason “as nature” to his view about the pre-passions because it explained why the sadness of Christ’s sensuality was a pre-passion, even though it also touched the rational part of Christ’s soul.116

Following his account of pre-passions, Bonaventure claims that sadness, fear and anger can be before, against or subject to the command of reason. When they are before the command of reason, they arise secretly and are pre-passions as unexpected movements of sensuality. When they are against the judgment of reason, reason is subject to sensuality and perturbed (perturbare) since reason is turned away from righteousness. When sadness, fear and anger are subject to reason, reason commands the sensitive appetitive power to have them. According to Bonaventure, a wise or unwise, good or evil man has movements before the command of reason, but a wise man does not have them against it. Christ had sadness, fear and anger only after the command of his reason117 since his reason commanded them (for example, through the imagination).118 Bonaventure’s view of Christ’s pre-passions was based on the Summa Halensis that the passions of Christ were nobis, in quibus sensualitas movetur praeter iudicium rationis; in Christo autem non fuit hoc.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 4. (III, 342). See also Gondreau 2002, 98.

115 “[…] dicendum, quod rationem attingi per modum rationis repugnat perfectioni sapientiae, non autem attingi per modum naturae. Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non auferit rationem propassionis. […] Et sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experibatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferrebatur gaudio virtuoso.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354–355).

116 For Bonaventure on the sadness of the rational part of the soul, see Chapter 3.6.

117 “… in Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est. Est enim quaedam tristitia, quae est praeter rationis imperium; et est tristitia, quae est contra rationis iudicium rectum; et est tristitia, quae est subiecta rationis imperio et iudicio. Et illa tristitia est praeter rationis imperium, quae consurgit ex quadam necessitate et surreptione, sicut motus primi; et haec quidem communis est sapientibus et insipientibus, et bonis et malis. - Illa vero tristitia est contra rationis iudicium rectum, in qua ratio subicetur sensualitati nec tantum turbatur, sed etiam perturbatur. - Illa autem est secundum rationis imperium et iudicium, quando quis tristatur, ratione dictante et suadente, ipsum tantum et taliter super aliquo debere tristari. Dico ergo, quod in Christo fuit tristitia tantum isto tertio modo, quia de nullo tristatus fuit, nisi secundum quod dictabat ei ratio. […] Primis autem duobus modis non fuit in Christo tristitia.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 338–339); dub. 3. (III, 342); q. 3. (III, 340). “Perturbatio autem autem dicit deflexionem rationis ab aequitate; et hoc modo sapiens nec tristatur nec perturbatur.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 339). See also Madigan 2007, 69–70.

118 “[…] ratio praevidens mortem instantem fecit imaginacionem mortis in ipsa parte sensuall; qua quidem facta, sensualitas mota fuit et horrore mortis concussa. […] Praecipua, nos ipsi imaginari possimus quod volumus, quamvis non possimus, quando volumus, sentire exterius. Et ita timor in Christo de morte futura potuit esse in parte sensuall, ut merito secundum Hieronymum et Magistrum potissit et debet dici propassio.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 4. (III, 342).
subject to his will. The *Summa Halensis* describes that Christ’s will was able to prevent the passive powers from having a passion and the will was able to command the act of receiving in the passive power. However, the passive powers of ordinary human beings are not subject to his will because they follow nature. Therefore, we suffer whether or not we wish to suffer.\(^{119}\)

Albert the Great also thinks that Christ’s sadness, fear and anger did not perturb his reason, but unlike Bonaventure, he does not apply the distinction between the reason “as nature” and the reason “as reason” to pre-passions. Christ’s sadness, fear and anger were pre-passions because Christ’s reason did not turn away from righteousness, but they were not pre-passion as unexpected movements.\(^{120}\) Like Albert, Thomas Aquinas also holds that a pre-passion or an imperfect passion is the movement of the sensitive appetitive power, which does not change reason to iniquity, or an unexpected movement of the sensitive appetitive power, which takes place before the command of reason. The movements of Christ’s sensuality were of the former kind and not of the latter, because his reason ordered all movements of the sensitive appetitive power.\(^{121}\) Aquinas explains that the

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\(^{119}\) “Dicendum igitur quod, cum sit potentia activa et passiva, potentia activa in nobis est solum subiecta voluntati, potentia passiva non, sed sequitur conditionem naturae; in Domino vero Iesu potentia passiva sicut et potentia activa fuit subiecta voluntati, ut esset domina sui actus et suae passionis, ut sicut voluntas nostra habet dominium sui actus potens prohibere cum vel educere, ita Christi voluntas dominium habuit et potens fuit prohibere passionem a potentia patiendi assumpta vel ipsam ducere in actum patiendi. Et ideo, quia passio in effectu in Christo dependebat a voluntate, quamvis esset potentia disposita pati in carne...” *Summa theologica* lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 197. It seems that the *Summa Halensis* adopted the view that the passions of Christ were subject to his will from John of Damascus’s *De fide orthodoxa* where John claims that Christ wished to hunger, thirst, fear and die. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 64, p. 260.) Philip the Chancellor also described that Christ’s sensuality was subject to reason, as the movements of Christ’s sensuality were ordered by reason. (Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono* q. 2, p. 213.) See also Knuuttila 2004, 190. Peter of Tarentaise follows Bonaventure’s view. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 13, a. 1, p. 110.)

\(^{120}\) “In Christo autem nihil fuit subitum ex parte ejus in quo fuit: fuit tamen subitum ex parte passionis. Vel dicatur, quod non secundum illam rationem accipitur hic propassio, sed secundum effectum: quia scilicet non deflectit rationem ab aequitate vel aequalitate regiminis.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 9, p. 284. “[...] perturbatio dicit deflectionem rationis ab aequitate. Aliud enim est rationem turbatione, et non deflectit: et aliud est tangi, et deflecti ab aequalitate regiminis quo in regno animae regit: et aliud est tangi, et deflecti ab aequalitate virtutis. Sapiens enim tangitur et patitur ratione passionis, sed non deductur deflexus ab aequalitate et aequitate. Imperfectus autem sapiens patitur, et tangitur, et deductur ab aequalitate quidem, sed non recedit ab aequitate. Insipiens autem patitur, et deductur ab aequalitate, et aequitate.” Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 8, p. 281. See also Gonreau 2002, 95. According to Albert, the passion of the imperfect wise man turns reason away from the righteousness of control by which reason rules a soul, but not away from the righteousness of virtue. The passion of the unwise man turns reason away from the righteousness of control and the righteousness of virtue.

\(^{121}\) “[...] quando ratio non immutatur a sui aequalitate vel aequitate, non dicitur passio, sed propassio, quasi imperfecta passio. Et hoc modo fuit in Christo. Et ideo dicendum ad primum quod propassio proprie loquendo, est immutatio infertoris partis tantum; et quando talis immutatio in nobis accidit, non praecordinarit a ratione, ideo Glossa secundum statum potentiarium in nobis loquens, dicit propassionem subitum motum. In Christo autem alter fuit,
movement of the sensitive appetitive power is a passion when it changes reason from equity to iniquity so that reason follows the suggestion of passion by consenting to and choosing it. A wise man has pre-passions as unexpected movements since he has the movements of the sensitive appetitive power which do not change reason to iniquity but which are after the apprehension of the senses but before the judgment of reason. However, Christ had passions of the soul only when his reason dictated his sensuality to have passions.

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"Sciendum tam en quod duplex est turbatio. Quaedam procedit ex carne, quando scilicet quis turbatur praeter iudicium rationis ex apprehensione sensuali, quae quidem turbatio quandoque quidem consistit intra limites rationis, in nullo eam obnubilans. Quae non perfecta passio, sed propassio dicitur a Hieronymo; et haec in sapientem cadit." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Io.* cap. 13, l. 4; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9, ad 1; *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 15, a. 4 co; ad 3. A pre-passion as an unexpected movement is a venial sin when it aims at a forbidden.

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"Sed in Christo nunquam surgebat motus tristitiae nisi secundum dictamentum superioris rationis quando scilicet dictabat ratio quod sensualitas tristaretur secundum convenientiam naturae suae; et ideo in eo neque, fuit tristitia rationem pervertens, neque fuit necessaria, sed voluntaria quodammodo." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Io.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qe. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 2; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qe. 1 ad 2; *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 15, a. 6 ad 2.

"Alia est turbatio quae procedit ex ratione, quando scilicet ex rationis iudicio et deliberatione turbatur quis in appetitu sensitivo. Et haec turbatio fuit in Christo: [...] In Christo enim omnia ex deliberacione rationis etiam in inferiori appetitu sensitivo proveniabant: unde nee subitii motus sensualitatis in Christo fuerunt." Thomas Aquinas, *Super Io.* cap. 13, l. 4. In *De veritate*, Aquinas proposes four differences between the passions of the soul: 1) The passion of the soul can be about an unsuitable thing or about a suitable thing. When it is about an unsuitable thing, it is a passion in a more proper sense than when it is about a suitable thing. 2) It can be aroused unexpectedly or the will can cause it. When it rouses unexpectedly, it is a passion in a more proper sense. 3) It can drag reason or remain in the sensitive appetitive power. 4) It can be an intense or a mild change. An intense change is a passion in the more proper sense than a mild change. A sinner has the passions of the soul about suitable and unsuitable things, they are mostly unexpected, reach the will, and are intense and frequent. A just man does not have perfect passions because passions do not reach reason. An imperfect just man has intense passions but the perfect just man have mild passions because his moral virtues restrain passions. A just man has mostly unexpected passions and passions about good and evil. Christ, prelapsarian human beings and the blissed souls have no unexpected passions since their reasons command all movements of the sensitive appetitive power. Prelapsarian human beings and the blissed souls have passions of the soul only about
According to Aquinas, the essential feature of the pre-passions of Christ’s human soul was that they followed the order of his reason. He thinks that the sensitive appetitive power can be subject to the powers of the rational part of the soul in four ways. First, the sensitive appetitive power is subject to the rational powers when the sensitive appetitive power has joy or sadness because reason represents a delectable or a sad thing to the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. Second, it occurs when the sensitive appetitive power has an act because the will wishes something and the intensive movement of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power. Third, it is thus subject when the will prevents the sensitive appetitive lest it proceed to an external act, because the sensitive appetitive power moves limbs only after the command of the will. Fourth, it takes place when the sensitive appetitive power follows the particular reason or the cogitative power, which further follows the universal reason.

suitable things. However, Christ had passions about both unsuitable and suitable things. (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 8 co.) In Summa theologiae, Aquinas holds that our passions may be about forbidden things but Christ’s passion were never about forbidden things, our passions frequently precede the judgment of reason but Christ’s passions arisen always after the judgment of reason, and our passions do not stay in the sensitive appetitive power but may drag reason whereas the passions of Christ stayed in the sensitive appetite power. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 15, a. 4 co.) See also Thomas Aquinas, Compendium theologiae lib. 1, cap. 233. Durand of St. Pourçain also follows Aquinas’s view on how the passions of Christ differed from our passions. (Durand of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

Murphy 1999, 178–184; Miner 2009, 101–104; Lombardo 2011, 94–101 also consider how passions are related to reason. For how a passion can effect on the will, see Pasnau 2002b, 252–253. In his Commentary on De anima, Aquinas explains that a higher appetitive power can move the lower appetitive power like the heavenly bodies of the higher sphere moves the heavenly bodies of the lower sphere, and he claims that this is the natural order of things. However, when the lower appetitive power moves the higher appetitive power, it is against the natural order and it leads to sin. (Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia De anima lib. 3, cap. 10, p. 250–251.) This indicates that the perfectly ordered soul is like well-ordered universe, where inferior spheres are moved by the higher spheres.

126 “Subduntur autem appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, rationi triplici: primo quidem ex parte ipsius rationis; cum enim eadem res sub diversis conditionibus considerari possit et delectabilis et horribilis reddi, ratio opponit sensualitati mediante imaginacione rem aliquam sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis secundum quod ei videtur, et sic sensualitas movetur ad gaudium vel tristitiam; […] Secundo ex parte voluntatis: in viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et connexis ita se habet quod motus intensus in una earum, et praeципue in superiori, redundat in aliam; unde cum motus voluntatis per electionem intenditur circa aliquid, etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequuntur motum voluntatis; […] Tertio ex parte motivae exequiens; sicut enim in exercitu progressio ad bellum pendet ex imperio ducis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualiscunque motus fiat in inferioribus viribus: unde ratio irascibilum et concupiscibilum reprimit, ne in actum exteriorum procedat;” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 25, a. 4 co; Summa theologiae P q. 81, a. 3 co; P–IIae q. 24, a. 3 ad 1. Aquinas thinks that a human being has two motive powers (vis motiva). The sensitive appetitive power commands an external act, and another motive power executes an external act. (Summa theologiae P q. 75, a. 3, ad 3.) The idea of two motive powers was based on Avicenna’s Liber de anima pars. 1, cap. 5, p. 82–83.

127 “Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium.
Aquinas does not describe how the passions of Christ’s human soul followed from the order of reason, but his general account implies that the passions followed from reason either through the imagination or the particular reason, or because the sensitive appetitive power did not exercise an external act without the command of the will.

Aquinas’s idea that the intensive movement of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power is quite obscure and scholars have proposed different interpretations about it. Murphy claims that when the sensitive appetitive power has a movement because the will has an intense act, then sensory cognition is also involved. Lombardo suggests that the overflow takes place when the will moves the intellect, the intellect causes the particular reason to form an intentional object, and a passion follows in the sensitive appetitive power. However, Aquinas’s rather obscure account of the overflow from the will to the sensitive appetitive power does not involve explicitly the idea that sensory cognition is also involved (as Murphy claims) or that the will affects on the intellect, which affects on the sensitive appetitive power through the particular reason (as Lombardo claims). Aquinas seems to think that when the will has an intense act, the sensitive appetitive power has a similar act because the act of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power, but, as Miner notes, he does not claim that this involves some kind of mechanism between the will and...

Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluuntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivio, qui distinguetur per concepisicibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 81, a. 3 co. According to Aquinas, the particular reason apprehends sensible things with intentions (e.g. good or harmful) and it knows intentions when it compares particular intentions, as the universal reason compares universal intentions. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 78 a. 4 co.) For Aquinas on the particular reason, see King 1999, 126–130; Pasnau 2002b, 253–257; Miner 2009, 76–82; Lombardo 2011, 23–25; 96–98. For Aquinas on the relation between the particular reason and the universal reason, see King 1999, 128–130, Pasnau 2002b, 253–258; Lombardo 2011, 96–98. When Aquinas studies whether the passion of the soul increases or decreases the goodness or evilness of an act, he claims that the passion of the soul follows from the judgment of reason when a person chooses to be affected by it in order to work promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetitive power. Aquinas does not explain how the passion of the soul follows from a choice, but it seems that this takes place either through the imagination or the particular reason. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Iª–IIae q. 24, a. 3 ad 1.) Although Murphy claims that the judgment of reason and the will can effect a passion, when she comments on this text she claims that Aquinas here introduces a new way of how passion is reason-dependent. Murphy explains that a person does not choose to elicit a passion, but chooses “that an already occurring passion should have its full effect on oneself”. (Murphy 1999, 183–184.) Miner agrees with Murphy’s reading. (Miner 2009, 104.) However, nothing in Aquinas’s text suggests that the sensitive appetitive power is taken to have a passion before choosing. Rather, it seems that here also Aquinas thinks that the judgment of reason causes a passion.

128 Murphy 1999, 179, n. 32.
129 Lombardo 2011, 90.
the sensitive appetitive power. It seems that, according to Aquinas, the act of the will just overflows into the sensitive appetitive power like the joy of the will overflows into the inferior powers, into the essence of the soul and into the flesh. Aquinas thinks, however, that all passions of the soul have an object. As Aquinas does not describe how the overflow takes place, it is not clear how the passion of the sensitive appetitive power has an object when the act of the will overflows into the sensitive appetitive power.

Aquinas thinks that our sensitive appetitive power is not always obedient to reason because the imagination and the senses can also move the sensitive appetitive power independently from reason. Since the imagination and senses can move in their own right the sensitive appetitive power, our sensitive appetitive power enjoys autonomy in respect to reason. However, Christ’s sensitive appetitive power was perfectly subject to his reason because, according to Aquinas, Christ did not have the affective spark to sin (fomes), which was the habitual unordered desire (concupiscientia) of the sensitive appetitive power of that which was against reason. He did not have the affective spark to sin because the irrational part of Christ’s human soul had perfect moral virtues, which made his sensitive appetitive power obedient to reason. This indicates that the affective spark to sin is the

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130 Miner 2009, 103.
131 For more about this overflow, see Chapter 3.7.
133 “Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natura est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principi irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in alios animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigat universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamus aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Iª q. 81, a. 3 ad 2. Aquinas founds his idea on Aristotle’s Politics, where Aristotle claims that a soul’s control over the flesh is a despotic one, but the mind’s control over the sensitive appetitive power is a political one. (Aristotle, Politica I.5, 1254b2–15.) Aquinas explains that as the subjects of a despotic ruler cannot resist his commands, limbs cannot resist the command of the soul; by contrast, the subjects of a political ruler are able to resist his commands. According to Aquinas, reason is like the political ruler since the sensitive appetitive power can resist its command. See also King 1999, 130–131; Pasnau 2002b, 257–264; Gondreau 2002. 273–276; Lombardo 2011, 99–101.
134 “[...] fomes nihil aliud est quam inordinata concupiscientia sensibilis appetitus, habitualis tamen, quia actualis concupiscientia est motus peccati. Dicitur autem concupiscientia sensualitatis esse inordinata, inquantum repugnat rationi, quod quidem fit inquantum inclinat ad malum, vel difficiliter facit ad bonum.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIª q. 27 a. 3 co. For the fomes peccati, see Gondreau 2002, 342–349.
135 “Virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae, eam facit rationi esse subiectam, et tanto magis quanto perfectione fuerit virtus [...] Ad rationem autem fomitis pertinent inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem. Sic igitur patet quod, quanto virtus fuerit magis in aliquo perfecta, tanto magis debilitatur in eo vis fomitis. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit virtus secundum perfectissimum gradum, consequens est quod in eo
reason why our sensitive appetitive power can follow the senses and the imagination independently from the command of reason.

Since the movements of Christ’s sensitive appetitive power always followed reason, it seems that Christ’s sensitive appetitive power did not have autonomy. Gondreau and Lombardo disagree, however. Gondreau claims that Christ “could experience spontaneous affective movements that initiated with his sensitive appetite, yet which would have gone no further if they conflicted with reason”. Following Gondreau, Lombardo claims that “Aquinas must mean to apply to Christ his preferred metaphor of reason ruling the passions politically, implying that Christ’s passions enjoyed their own proper autonomy and spontaneity, while also instinctively following the guidance of reason. In other words, Aquinas does not mean that Christ became angry only after he commanded himself to become angry, but rather that Christ spontaneously became angry in ways that complemented his reason and cooperated with its implicit judgments.”

However, Madigan states, “In Jesus’s soul, reason is never a reactor; it is always a dictator.” I think that Madigan is right. Aquinas does not argue that Christ’s sensitive appetitive power had autonomy in respect to reason or spontaneous movements, as Lombardo and Gondreau think. Gondreau claims that the movements of the sensitive appetitive power were spontaneous because they were natural movements. However, Aquinas does not claim that the natural movements are spontaneous. Instead, he explicitly claims that the natural movements of the sensitive appetitive power were ordered by the reason. Lombardo founds his view on Aquinas’s idea of the political ruler, but it is not clear how the idea fits with Christ’s human soul since the movements of Christ’s sensuality did not precede his reason.

John Duns Scotus’s view about pre-passions was new, since he argued that Christ’s will had pre-passions. This view was founded on the idea that the will can have passion, an emphasis which was favoured especially by Franciscan theologians. Scotus explains that when the intellect represents a thing which makes the sensitive appetitive power sad, the will has sadness without the act of the will. Since sadness is without the

\[fomes\ peccati\ non\ fuerit\ldots\]

Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15 a. 2 co. However, Christ’s bodily powers and corporeal fluids were not subject to reason. (Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15 a. 2 ad 1.)

\[137\text{ Lombardo 2011, 211.}\]
\[138\text{ Madigan 2007, 70.}\]
\[139\text{ Gondreau 2002, 316.}\]
\[140\text{ See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2 co; d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co; \textit{De veritate} q. 26, a. 8 co; \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 18, a. 6 co; \textit{Super Io.} cap. 13, l. 4.}\]
\[141\text{ For more about Scotus on the passions of the will, see Chapter 3.6.}\]
\[142\text{ See Chapters 3.1. and 3.6.}\]
act of the will, Scotus says that it is a pre-passion as the unexpected passion of the will. A pre-passion can be also the passion of the will, which follows from the act of the will but does not ruin reason. Christ’s will had pre-passions in both senses because the will had a passion that preceded the act of the will and a passion that followed from the act of the will but did not ruin reason.

Peter Auriol reiterated the traditional view that Christ’s passions did not precede, but instead followed reason. Therefore, for example, when Christ’s reason judged that it was good to desire, to be sad or to enjoy, the act of the interior appetitive power followed. However, Walter Chatton held that Christ had passions which did not follow reason. For example, when Christ felt pain on the cross, the crucifixion caused pain immediately in the sensitive appetitive power without the command of reason.

3.4. The Fear and Anger of Christ

When the medieval theologians examined Christ’s passions, they studied only Christ’s fear, anger, pain and sadness. Christ’s joy was studied...
merely in relation to his pain and sadness. In this chapter, I focus on the
discussion about Christ’s fear and anger. The medieval theologians thought
that Christ’s human soul had fear and anger above all because in the Bible
was claimed so: Christ had fear in Gethsemane (Mark 14:33) and anger when
he threw merchants and moneychangers out of the temple (John 2:17). Fear
and anger were not major issues in medieval Christology and the views about
them were quite sketchy.

The discussion about fear was based on Peter Lombard’s
*Sentences*, where he lists five kinds of fears.148

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<tr>
<th>Fear</th>
<th>Christ had</th>
<th>Christ did not have</th>
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<tr>
<td>Natural or human fear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worldly or human fear</td>
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<td>Servile fear</td>
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<td>Pure, filial or friendly fear</td>
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Lombard explains that natural or human fear is about death and a
penalty.149 Worldly or human fear is about the peril of the flesh or the loss of
possessions. It is a sin and an evil, since Christ forbade it (Matthew 10:28).150
Servile fear is about Hell, and it is good because it helps avoidance of sin.151
Initial fear is about punishment and offending beloved ones. It takes place
when one begins to love. Lombard states without further clarification that all
kinds of charity remove servile fear, whereas initial fear is compatible with
initial charity but not with perfect charity.152 Friendly fear arises from perfect
love, and blessed souls have it.153 According to Lombard, Christ did not have
worldly, servile and initial fears because worldly fear is evil, and servile and

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147 In his *De fide orthodoxa*, John of Damascus examines passions like joy (*laetitia*),
sadness, fear and anger. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 27–30, p. 119–124.) In
the Christological part of his work, he only deals with Christ’s fear. According to John, Christ
had natural fear since his soul wished against his death. Christ did not have an irrational fear,
which arises from a disturbance in thinking. Such fear takes place, for example, when one
fears a noise at night. (John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* cap. 67, p. 265–266.) John’s idea
about Christ’s fear is in line with the statements in Maximus the Confessor, *Disputatio cum
Pyrrho* (PG 91, 297D.), and Pseudo-Athanasius, *De incarnatione domini nosti Jesu Christi
contra apollinarium* (PG 26, 1123A–1124A). On fear of Hell in the patristic period, see
Bernstein 2000, 183–205.
148 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 192–193; *Collectanea in omnes D.
Pauli apostoli epistolae in epistolam ad Romanos* cap. 8, PL 191, 1140A.
149 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 35, cap. 9, p. 198. See also John of Damascus, *De
fide orthodoxa* cap. 67, p. 265–266.
150 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 193. See also Cassiodorus, *In
psalterium expositio* ps. 127, PL 70, 931B.
151 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 4, p. 193. See also Augustine, *Enarrationes
in psalmos* ps. 127, n. 6–9, p. 1871–1874, PL 37, 1680–1683.
152 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 6, p. 196; cap. 4, p. 193.
initial fears are not compatible with perfect charity. Christ had natural fear and friendly fear since he respected God.\(^\text{154}\)

Following Lombard, Alexander of Hales writes that Christ had natural fear and fear of respect, but he did not have worldly, servile or initial fears. Christ’s human soul had natural fear because the soul wished against death. Furthermore, reason as nature had natural fear since it wished against death, but reason as reason did not have it since it wished for the death.\(^\text{155}\) Like Alexander, the Summa Halensis also claims that Christ had natural fear and fear of respect, but it adds that natural fear can be: 1) fear about death, which takes place when a soul wishes against death, 2) the fear of sensuality about a future evil apprehended by the senses, 3) the fear of reason about an understood evil, like Hell and divine judgment, or 4) irrational fear, which follows from a disturbance in thinking and from incredulity, together with ignorance. Christ had only the first two natural fears mentioned here.\(^\text{156}\) Bonaventure also claims that Christ had natural fear,

\(^{154}\) Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 34, cap. 9, p. 198; cap. 8, p. 197.

\(^{155}\) “Timorum nomen duplicem habet intelligentiam. Est enim timor naturalis, nolente anima dividiri a corpore, propter eam quae a principio a Conditore imposita est [ei] naturalem compassionem; unde timor naturalis fuit in eo. Est alius timor rationis, et iste non fuit, quia supervenit opus rationis, scilicet eligentia, qua voluit separationem.” Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones disputatae, q. 16, d. 2, memb. 4, p. 247. “Eodem modo in parte superiori non erat omnino separata a timore, sed timor ille erat naturalis, absque omni deliberatione; sed quando advenit opus electionis, statim fit opus et sic fuit appetitus separationis.” Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones disputatae, q. 16, d. 3, memb. 3, p. 259. “Utrum timor servilis sit in Christo, nulla est dubitatio. Sed, cum in eo fuerit timor reverentiae, quaeretur utrum maior fuit effectus timoris reverentiae in Christo quam in nobis.” Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum d. 15 (AE), p. 156. According to Alexander, fear of respect belongs to reason and heavenly souls also have it. Initial fear is about an inability to satisfy sins for God, servile fear is about eternal punishment, worldly fear is about the loss of earthly goods, and human fear is about wounds and injuries. Alexander goes on to explain that there is sensual fear, which is twofold. A prelapsarian human being can have sensual fear as an irrational impetus when a terrible thing is apprehended. A postlapsarian human being has sensual fear as a prepassion, which is an unexpected movement. (Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum d. 15 (AE), p. 153–154.) According to Alexander, when a soul has fear, a heart is not always moved. For example, a heart is not moved when a soul fears God through filial fear or fear of respect. However, a heart is moved when a soul fears an external thing. (Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum d. 15 (AE), p. 150–151.)

\(^{156}\) “Timor naturalis dicitur multipliciter. Est enim timor naturalis per modum naturae, quo modo dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod ‘timor naturalis est, nolente anima dividi a corpore’ etc., ‘propter quod anima naturaliter timet et agoniam patitur et refugit mortem’ velut natura morbum. Est iterum timor naturalis per modum sensualitatis in apprehensione futuri malorum sensum, secundum quod ipse Ioannes Damascenus dicit alibi quod ‘malum, quod expectatur, constituit timorem’, et hoc ex parte sensualitatis, non rationis. Et ists duobus modis fuit timor naturalis in Christo. Est etiam timor naturalis secundum modum compunctionis, quae est secundum rationem, secundum quod dicitur termini malum intelligibile, ut gehenna vel judicium divinum, et hic timor non fuit in Christo. Est etiam timor naturalis secundum immoderationem naturae, secundum quod dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod timor est ‘ex perditione cogitationum et crepiditate cum ignorantia, qui timor praeter naturam est’, quo modo non fuit timor in Christo, […] Item, timor gratitudinis dicitur multiplex, scilicet serviliis, initialis et filialis, qui est duplex; timor offensae et reverentiae; quod ultimo modo fuit solum timor gratitudinis in Christo,” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, sq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 64. The fear of sensuality about a future evil apprehended by the
The Passions of Christ

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namic, fear of death and fear of respect, but he explains that Christ only had fear of death which was subject to his reason. Because Christ was free from sin, he did not have lustful fears like worldly fear.157

While the aforementioned Franciscans views were based on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas’s view is derived from Aristotle’s works. Following Aristotle, he holds that fear is the passion of the irascible power, which takes place when the sensitive appetitive power escapes an apprehended future harmful thing and there is hope that a thing can be avoided even though it is difficult.158 Natural fear is about things which are repugnant to one’s natural desire to exist, whereas non-natural fear is about things which are repugnant to the desire of the appetitive power but not against one’s nature.159 Aquinas claims that Christ’s sensitive appetitive

senses is based on John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa cap. 26, p. 119. Following Peter Lombard, the Summa Halensis claims that gratuitous fears are servile fear, initial fear and filial fear, and filial fear is either fear about an offense or fear of respect.

157 “Timor autem gratuitus est in tripticli differentia: quidam enim est timor poenae, quidam est timor offensae, quidam reverentiae. Prima et secunda non fuit in Christo, pro eo quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem utrumque; sed secundum tertiam differentiam fuit in Christo, quia sic a perfecta caritate non expellit timorem utrumque, sed potius consummatur, […] Est et alius timor libidinosus, et iste similiter in multiplici differentia est: quia est timor mundanus, et est timor humanus; et nullus istorum fuit in Christo […] Est iterum timor in tertia differentia, timor scilicet naturalis, et iste est in tripticli differentia: quidam est sensualitatis praevienientis rationem, quidam sensualitatis subiacentis rationi, quidam vero est ipsius partis rationalis. Primus timor est naturae corruptae et quodam modo inordinatae, similitur et tertius; secundus vero est naturae corruptae, sed tamen ordinatae. Quoniam ergo in Christo, quamvis esset defectus passibilitatis, non tamen fuit defectus inordinationis et vitiositatis; hinc est, quod fuit in eo timor medio modo, non primo vel tertia. […] non fuit in eo timor, qui rationem eius praevieniret, vel rationem eius perturbaret;” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 3. (III, 341–342).

Following William of Auxerre, Bonaventure describes that Christ’s fear about his future death took place when his reason foresaw his future death and formed an imagination about it in the sensual part of the soul. Fear followed in Christ’s sensuality after this imagination. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, dub. 3. (III, 342).)

158 “[…] timor causatur ex apprehensione mali futuri. Apprehensio autem mali futuri, si omnimodam certitudinem habeat, non indicat timorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod timor non est nisi ubi est aliqua spec evadendi, nam quando nulla spe est evadendi, apprehenditur malum ut praesens; et sic magis causat tristitiam quam timorem.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae IIIª q. 15, a. 7 co. “[…] ita objectum timoris est malum futurum difficile cui resitii non potest.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae P–Iaee q. 41, a. 2 co. See also Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3 co. Aquinas’s description is based on Aristotle, Rhetorica lib. 2, cap. 5, 1382a22–1383a11. Since fear is the passion of the soul, it involves a corporeal change. The corporeal change of the fear is the contraction of heat and the spirit from the outer parts of the flesh to the inner parts. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae P–Iaee q. 41, a. 1 co; q. 44, a. 1 co.) For Aquinas on fear, see Gondreau 2002, 404–414; Miner 2009, 231–251. Albert the Great does not propose a detailed description of fears or go over which fears Christ had. He explains that fear can be virtue, sin or a condition of nature, but he does not describe in detail what such fears are. Fear as virtue is when a brave man fears, fear as sin is worldly fear, and fear as a condition of nature is when a morally settled man fears. Albert states that since fear does not always entail sin, Christ had fear. (Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, a. 8, p. 282.) In Gelisemane, Christ felt fear about his forthcoming death. (Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 4, q. 2, a. 3, p. 209; Sententiae lib. 3, d. 17. a. 7, p. 308.)

159 “Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est iterum de malo
power had natural fear about his future death. He also describes that uncertainty of a future event can cause fear, but Christ did not have such fear, as Christ’s human soul was not uncertain about future things. Christ did not fear his death from the moment of his conception because, according to Aristotle, fear is about an imminent future evil thing. Aquinas was the first to state that Christ also had admiration, which was not fear. He holds that admiration is about a new unaccustomed thing. Christ had admiration because he encountered things which were unaccustomed to his experiential knowledge.

Richard Middleton deviates from the views of the aforementioned Franciscans and Aquinas, arguing that Christ did not have sloth (segnities), blushing (erubescentia), shame (vereundia), astonishment (admiratio), stupefaction (stupor) or anxiety (agonia), which were fears listed by John of Damascus, Nemesius of Emesa and Thomas Aquinas.

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160 “Sic igitur timor potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad hoc quod appetitus sensitivus naturaliter refugit corporis laesionem, et per tristitiam, si sit praesens; et per timorem, si sit futura. Et hoc modo timor fuit in Christo, sicut et tristitia. Alio modo potest considerari secundum incertitudinem futuri adventus, sicut quando nocte timemus ex aliquo sonitu quasi ignorantes quid hoc sit. Et quantum ad hoc, timor non fuit in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologicae* Iª–IIae q. 41, a. 3 co. See also Aristotle, *Rhetorica* II.5, 1382a22–23.


163 “[... ] admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito. In Christo autem non poterat esse aliquod novum et insolitum quantum ad scientiam divinam; neque etiam quantum ad scientiam humannam qua cognoscebat res in verbo; vel qua cognoscebat res per species inditas. Potuit tamen esse aliquod sibi novum et insolitum secundum scientiam experimentalem, secundum quam sibi poterant quotidian aliqua nova occurrere. Et ideo, si loquimur de Christo quantum ad scientiam divinam et scientiam beatam, vel etiam infusam, non fuit in Christo admiratio. Si autem loquimur de eo quantum ad scientiam experimentalem, sic admiratio in eo esse potuit.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologicae* IIIª q. 15, a. 8 co. Avicenna also examines admiration. (Knuuttila 2004, 224.)

164 Following John of Damascus (*De fide orthodoxa* cap. 29, p. 121–122) and Nemesius of Emesa (*De natura hominis* cap. 14, p. 103–104), Aquinas claims that the species of the fear are sloth, blushing, shame, astonishment, stupefaction and anxiety. Sloth (segnities) is fear of toil that burdens a nature. Aquinas clarifies that a person who avoids working because he fears excessive hardship has sloth. Blushing (erubescentia) is fear of disgrace given by another person because of a future act. Shame (vereundia) is fear about a disgrace given by another person because of a past act. Astonishment (admiratio) is fear about a great future evil which a person cannot understand. Stupefaction (stupor) is fear about an unfamiliar future evil which is estimated to be great. Anxiety (agonia) is fear about a future evil like misfortune, which is
Richard explains that Christ did not have sloth and stupefaction because they were a superabundance of fear, while Christ had only mild fear. He did not have blushing and shame because he did not have shameful acts, astonishment because he was able to consider the causes of all kinds of evils, and anxiety as he was able to see all future evils.\(^{165}\) While Richard holds that Christ had fear about his future death, he does not clarify whether he also feared other things.\(^{166}\)

Walter Chatton’s view about the fear of Christ’s human soul is especially interesting, since it includes an explanation of how the will can weaken and control fear in the sensitive appetitive power. According to Chatton, Christ had moderate fear because it followed the right reason and did not destroy the right reason and incline Christ’s will to choose life.\(^{167}\) He


\(^{166}\) “[…] ideo ex apprehensione mortis futurae, orta fuit in appetitu sensitiuo animae Christi passio timoris non contra imperium, nec praeter imperium ratonis, nec etiam de necessitate; quia Christus si voluisset, se potuisset praeferre a passione timoris.” Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiuarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165. According to Richard, the sensitive appetitive power has fear when a soul apprehends an arduous future evil that does not take place necessarily in the near future and cannot be avoided without difficulty. Richard claims that evil that will take place after a long time does not cause fear or it causes only mild fear (*modica*). However, if one has a strong imagination about a great, inescapable evil that occurs after a long time, fear follows. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiuarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165.) Richard explains that the sensitive appetitive power can have fear about a future evil as the estimative power can apprehend things that take place in the near future, which external senses do not sense. Richard claims that even animals can perceive future things. For example, an ant carries a grain into a cave before rain because its apprehension apprehends a future rain. Moreover, the apprehension of reason can move the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiuarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, q. 3, p. 165.) Durand of St. Pourçain holds that since the apprehension of a future evil causes fear and Christ apprehended his future death, he had fear. (Durand of St. Pourçain, *Petri Lombardi sententiarum theologicas communitoriarum libri IIII* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

\(^{167}\) “Et primo dico quod illud quod supponitur, scilicet quod timuerit, est rationabile.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 137. “Cum igitur quae resid uitum habuerit moderatum timorem, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi. Aut quod habuerit timorem conformem rectae rationi; aut timorem remissum et non in summo. Et dico quod sic ad utrumque intellectum. Nam si praehabuisset timorem in summo de passione futura, ille tune vehementissime retraxisset a sustentatione passionis, recta ratio et electio conformis inclinasset ad oppositum. Igitur fuisset in Christo rebellio et contrarietates magna.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 137–138. Chatton says, however, that fear inclined Christ’s will to wish against death conditionally, even though it
expounds that fear is moderate when the command of the will restrains the inferior powers from not behaving in the way in which a passion inclines to or the will weakens it through the imagination. Chatton’s idea that the will can weaken fear through imagination is based on his view that the rational powers can control the passions of the sensitive appetitive power. According to Chatton, the will cannot control passions directly. He describes that a change in the heart directly and naturally causes the passion of the sensitive appetitive power. Since the change causes a passion naturally, the causality is not subject to the command of the will. For example, blood that arises around a heart effects a desire for reverence, but the will cannot control the arising directly. However, the will can cause the passion of the sensitive appetitive power indirectly through the imagination. Walter clarifies that thinking and volition can cause imagination, which causes a change in the heart, and such change naturally causes a passion of the sensitive appetitive power.

did not incline the will to wish against death absolutely. (Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, p. 138.)

168 “Dico aliter quod moderatio timoris potest intelligi fieri [...] dum timor est in anima, quod per imperium voluntatis cohibeantur potentiae inferiores ab executione inordinata in quam inordinate inclinat ille timor. [...] Quia recta ratio et electio libera conformis rectae rationi debet impedire et potest ab executione deordinata in quam inclinat passio. Potest etiam mediate remittire huiusmodi passiones modo superius exposito.” Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135–136. Chatton states that, according to the common view, fear becomes moderate when the will commands the sensitive appetitive power to fear more mildly, but he criticizes this view because the will cannot command the sensitive appetitive power immediately. (Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135.)

169 “Et primo probo quod timor non sit actus immediate elicitus a voluntate, quia illa passio non causatur immediate ab aliquibus principiis vel potentiis quae habent immediate obedire voluntati, quia est actus organicus, id est causatus ad transmutationem et alterationem organicorum et a qualitatibus eorum, [...] Item, ubi consequentia est necessaria, si antecedens non sit in potestate nostra, nec consequens. Sed non est in potestate nostra quin sanguis ascendatur circa cor, et ex hoc consequentia necessaria sequitur appetitus vindictae. Igitur appetitus vindictae non est immediate, sicut actus elicitus, in potestate nostra.” Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, p. 136. “Hoc non est imaginabile quod illud quod causatur naturaliter a causis praesentibus [...] quod tale immediate subit imperio voluntatis, [...] Arguo igitur sic: aut illa passio causatur immediate ab anima in appetitu sensitivo, aut ad transmutationem organi corporalis per causas naturales. Si secundum, propositum. Quia tunc sicut est in potestate mea approximare ignem vel non, sed tamen ipso approximato quod est in potestate mea quin agat et quin effectus proveniat, similiter in proposito.” Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 135.

170 “Dico ad praesens quod ad vehementem cogitationem intellectivam et actum volendi vel nolendi causatur imaginauto vehemens. Hoc enim experimur quod vehementem imaginatio causari potest ad vehementem dictamen intellectus et imperium voluntatis, et ad vehementem imaginationem moventur humores circa cor, quod quorum transmutationem et alterationem transmutatur organum cordis aliquando motu dilationatis, aliquando motu constrictionis; et causantur in appetitu sensitivo, cujus organum est cor, passionis gaudii et tristitiae in tantum quod aliquando ex vehementi imaginazione aliquis incurrit febre vel aliam infirmitatem. Et ideo dico quod omnes actus qui necessario sunt in nobis ad praesentiam causarum naturalium mutantur immediate ad transmutationem organi, sed bene mediate potest causari per actum intellectus et voluntatis,” Walter Chatton, Reportatio, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127.”
Contrary to Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales claimed that Christ also had anger.\textsuperscript{171} In this interpretation, Christ had anger through zeal, which was an act, but not anger as a passion, which is a perturbation.\textsuperscript{172} Christ did not have the anger which, according to Augustine, was a turbulent appetite of the mind about that which impedes the facility of action. Since the fluids of Christ’s flesh were well disposed, Christ also lacked the anger which, according to John of Damascus, was a fervour of the blood around the heart resulting from an exhalation of bile.\textsuperscript{173} The \emph{Summa Halensis} states that anger is desire for revenge. When it arises from the impatience of injured desire, it involves perturbation and is a turbulent appetite and a fervour of the blood. When it arises from a love of justice, it is without perturbation. Christ had only this last mentioned type of anger.\textsuperscript{174}

Unlike the earlier Franciscans, Bonaventure thought that Christ’s anger involved perturbation and progress of the blood. He explains that anger is the affliction of detestation about an evil thing and it can involve perturbation, which touches only the sensual part of the soul but not the eye of the mind, or it can touch the sensual part of the soul and the eye of the mind only temporarily (anger through zeal), or it can touch the sensual part of the soul and darken the eye of the mind (vicious anger). Bonaventure holds

\textsuperscript{171} When John of Damascus studies anger, he claims that anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart or the desire for revenge. There are three kinds of anger: bile (\textit{fel}), mania and madness (\textit{cotus/furor}). (John of Damascus, \textit{De fide orthodoxa} cap. 30, p. 122–123.) John took this terminology from Nemesius of Emesa, \textit{De natura hominis} cap. 19, p. 102–103, which he copied verbatim.


\textsuperscript{173} “Augustinus, Ad Nebridium: ‘Ira est turbulentus animi appetitus auferendi ea quae facilitatem actionis impediant’; et ita in Christo non fuit ira. – Ioannes Damascenus: ‘Ira est fervor eius qui circa cor est sanguinis ex vaporatione fellis’; et ita in Christo non erat ira, quoniam in eo erant humores secundum verissimam dispositionem.” Alexander of Hales, \textit{Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum} d. 15 (AE), p. 151. Alexander refers to Augustine, \textit{Epistulae} 9, p. 22, PL 33, 73. and John of Damascus, \textit{De fide orthodoxa} cap. 30, p. 122–123. Aristotle says that anger as fervour of the blood around the heart is the material definition of anger. The formal definition is the desire for revenge. (Aristotle, \textit{De anima} I.1, 403a30–403b1.) Although Alexander deals with the anger of Christ, Gondreau claims that Bonaventure was the first who studied it. (Gondreau 2002, 97.)

that Christ had anger as the affection of detestation which touched only his sensuality, but not the eye of the mind.\textsuperscript{175} Christ’s anger also involved ascent of blood around the heart, but this ascent was moderate. In ordinary human beings, the ascent is not moderate because sensuality fights against reason.\textsuperscript{176}

Aquinas explained that Christ had the anger of the will and the anger of the irascible power. In his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, he argues that anger of the will is willing to take revenge for an evil, whereas the anger of the irascible power aims at destroying a thing which is apprehended to be contrary to a thing which is desired. The anger of the irascible power is zealous when reason orders it and it is vicious when reason does not order it. According to Aquinas, Christ had the anger of the irascible power as anger through zeal.\textsuperscript{177} In the \textit{Summa theologiae}, he expounds that anger is a complex passion of the soul since it arises when one has sadness and desire for revenge.\textsuperscript{178} The objects of anger are revenge and the person on

\textsuperscript{175} “[…] ira uno modo dicit pure affectionem, et sic dicitur ira affectus detestationis aliquius mali, vel apparentis mali. Alio modo ira dicit affectum cum poena; et sic ira habet perturbationem et inquietationem annexam. Hoc autem potest esse in triplici differentia: quia aut perturbatio illa solum tangit potencias inferiores et nullo modo tangit oculum mentis; aut tangit oculum mentis ad tempus turbando, sed non excaecando; aut oculum mentis attingit ipsum perturbando et obnubilando. Et secundum hoc motus irae in quadruplici differentia reperitur, secundum quod colligitur ex dictis Sanctorum: uno modo pure dicit affectum detestationis; et hoc modo potuisset esse in Adam in statu innocentiae. Alio modo dicit motum detestationis cum inquietatione et perturbatione partis sensualis sine aliqua perturbatione mentis, et hoc modo fuit in Christo affectio irae; […] Tertio modo dicit affectum detestationis cum commotione et perturbatione partis sensualis sed etiam mens, sed quid commotio illa habet se cum perturbationem mentis annexam, vel ad illam est ordinata; et sic est ira per vitium, et reperitur in peccatoribus et prohibetur a Domino.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340). A wise man has the second kind of anger and a sinner has the third kind. Adam also had anger before the Fall, but his anger was the affection of detestation without perturbation. (Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340.).)

\textsuperscript{176} “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ira est ex accensione sanguinis circa cor; dicendum, quod illud verum est in nobis, in quibus caro repugnat spiritui, et sensualitas rationi, qui non tantum habemus corruptionem poenalitatis, immo etiam foedinitatis; hoc autem non oportet esse in Christo. – Si quis tamen dicet, in Christo fuisse accensionem sanguinis, sed moderate, non videtur esse inconveniens.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3. (III, 340).

\textsuperscript{177} “Quandoque enim ira ponitur pro habitu vel actu vitii, quod opponitur mansuetudini, quod in IV Eth., irascibilitas dicitur: […] Alio modo dicitur ira voluntas vindicandi aliquod malefactum. Et sic ira non est passio, proprius loquendo, nec est in irascibili, sed in voluntate. Et sic ira est in Deo et beatis et in Christo fuit. Tertio modo dicitur ira propri quaedam passio vis irascibilis, quae contingit ex hoc quod vis irascibilis tendit ad destructionem aliquius quod apprehenditur contrarium volito vel desiderato; et si quidem sit ex ordine rationis insinuens, vel ordinata ratione, sic dicitur ira per zelum, et sic fuit in Christo; si autem sit inordinata, sic erit ira per vitium, quae in Christo nullo modo fuit.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, q. 2 co. Anger can also be irascibility, which is opposed to mildness. For Aquinas on Christ’s anger, see also Gondreau 2002, 434–441.

\textsuperscript{178} “Non enim insurget motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes uliscendi,” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} 1–IIae q. 46, a. 1 co. See also Aristotle, \textit{Rhetorica} II.2, 1378a32–1378b5; 1379a9–15.
whom revenge is desired.\textsuperscript{179} The desire for revenge is a sin when it takes place without the order of reason (anger through fault), but sinless when it follows justice (anger through zeal). Christ had anger through zeal since he had a sinless desire for revenge and sadness.\textsuperscript{180} Richard Middleton also thought that Christ had anger of the will and anger of the sensitive appetitive power. He claims that anger of the will was willing to inflict a penalty for wrongdoing and the anger of the sensitive appetitive power was a desire to revenge wrongdoing, which was possible but difficult to accomplish. However, Christ did not have irascibility, which was an abundance of anger.\textsuperscript{181}

3.5. Pain and Sadness of the Sensible Part of the Soul

In the medieval discussions about the psychology of incarnation, the idea of whether the human Christ had true pain begs a question because, for instance, Hilary of Poitiers (c. 310 – c. 367) claimed that Christ did not feel

\textsuperscript{179} “Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} Iª–IIae q. 46, a. 2 co. See also Aristotle, \textit{Rhetorica} II.2, 1378b1–5.

\textsuperscript{180} “Et sic ira est passio composita ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae. Dictum est autem quod in Christo tristitia esse potuit. Appetitus etiam vindictae quandoque est cum peccato, quando scilicet aliquis vindictam quaerit sibi absque ordine rationis. Et sic ira in Christo esse non potuit, hoc enim dicitur ira per vitium. Quandoque vero talis appetitus est sine peccato, immo est laudabilis, puta cum aliquis appetit vindictam secundum ordinem iustitiae. Et hoc vocatur ira per vitium, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod zelo domus Dei comeditur qui omnia perversa quae videt capit emendare: et, si emendare non posit, tolerat et gemit. Et talis ira fuit in Christo.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} IIIª q. 15, a. 9 co; ad 1. Following John of Damascus and Nemesius of Emesa, Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of anger. Bile (\textit{fel}) is quick anger. Mania (\textit{mania}) is anger caused by sadness which remains in the memory a long time. Madness (\textit{furor}) is anger that does not rest until a revenge takes place. (Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} Iª–IIae q. 46, a. 8 co.) Durand of St. Pourçain follows Aquinas in stating that sadness is the cause of the anger because desire to take revenge for a done injury arises from sadness. As Christ had sadness, he also had anger. However, Christ did not have anger through fault, which preceded the judgment of reason, but anger through zeal, which followed from the judgment of reason. (Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII}, lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.)

pain. In his *De Trinitate*, Hilary explained that Christ did not feel pain although his body was injured. Despite Hilary’s text, the medieval theologians argued that Christ had true pain, primarily because the Bible claimed so. The medieval theologians proposed different ways of interpreting how Hilary’s text was in harmony with the view that the human Christ had true pain, but it is dubious how successful these interpretations were. In this chapter, without paying attention to the medieval interpretations of Hilary’s text, I study the nature of Christ’s pain and sadness in the sensitive part of his soul. The psychology of the incarnation was one significant locus where theologians studied what pain was. Since John of Damascus and Avicenna, pain was associated with the perception of the apprehensive power, but the discussion about the psychology of incarnation shows that in the thirteenth century, pain was also associated with the movement of the sensitive appetitive power. In this respect, pain was similar to the passions of soul like sadness, fear and anger. The discussion also exposes that Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan theologians after him proposed different views about the pain. It should be noted that when the medieval theologians used *dolor*, it could refer to pain related to the sense of touch and non-physical pain, whereas *tristitia* refers to non-physical pain. Aquinas also remarks that these terms are used in this way. In this and the following chapters, I use the terms ‘sadness’ or ‘pain’, depending on which term the author in question prefers.

182 In the twelfth-century discussion, the central theme was how to interpret authoritative texts where it was claimed that Christ did not have true pain. Hugh of Saint Victor remarks that a theologian, whom he does not name, has claimed that Christ did not have true pain when his flesh suffered. He argues that the idea is absurd because the Bible proves and the redemption of the human race required that Christ had true pain. (Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* lib. 2, pars 1, cap. 7, PL 176, 390C–390D.) The most discussed author who seemed to deny that Christ had pain was Hilary of Poitiers. Peter Abelard is one of the first twelfth-century author who claims that the idea is from Hilary’s *De Trinitate*. According to Hilary, Christ’s flesh was pierced, for example, but he did not feel pain. (Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* lib. 10, PL 10, 361A). In his *Sic et non*, Abelard does not argue against Hilary but quotes a Gallo-Roman theologian Claudianus Memertus, who explained that when Hilary claimed that Christ did not feel pain, he meant that Christ did not suffer diminishment of merit. (Peter Abelard, *Sic et non* q. 80, p. 283–296; Claudianus Memertus, *De statu animae* lib. 2, cap. 9, PL 53, 752B.) Peter Lombard described that when authors claim that Christ did not have true pain and sadness, they claim that Christ did not have pain and sadness as passions and he did not have them necessarily. (Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 2, p. 98; cap. 3, p. 100–102.) See also *Sententiae divinitatis* tract. 4, cap. 3, p. 89; Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiarum* lib. 4, cap. 18, PL 211, 1205C–1206A. Madigan explains in detail how Hilary’s view was related to Arian theology. Madigan says that the medieval commentators of Hilary’s text changed its meaning, since they tried to interpret Hilary’s unorthodox view (i.e. Christ did not feel pain) for the better. (Madigan 2007, 51–62.) However, Pomplun argues that the interpretations of the medieval theologians were plausible. (Pomplun 2009, 202–211.)

183 “Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur. Unde Augustinus distinguuit dolorem animae secundum se qui propriie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus, qui propriie dicitur dolor.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2 co.
Following John of Damascus, Alexander of Hales describes that Christ had pain which was a sensation (sensus) of the injury of the flesh. Like Alexander, Bonaventure also states that Christ had pain because he had an injury of the flesh and sensation of the injury, but he adds that Christ also had sadness of the sensitive and the rational concupiscible powers about the injury and evil things that took place for others. Bonaventure clarifies that Christ’s human soul had pain of the passion about death and pain of the compassion about our sins. Both pains were extremely intense and both were in Christ’s sensuality and the rational part of the soul. The pain of the passion was first in Christ’s sensuality and then in other powers, but the pain of the compassion was first in the rational powers and then in his sensuality.

Thomas Aquinas thought that pain was related to sensation, but wavered about whether pain was a corporeal passion or passion of the soul. In his Commentary on the Sentences and De veritate, he clarifies that
pain is a corporeal passion rather than the passion of the soul as it begins in the flesh, whereas sadness is the passion of the soul. Pain differs from sadness because pain is about a thing (i.e. the injury of the flesh) that is unsuitable for nature and the sense of touch, but sadness is about a thing that is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Furthermore, pain follows from the apprehension of the sense of touch, but sadness follows from the apprehension of the inner sense, and pain is in the sense of touch but sadness is in the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁸⁸ Christ had pain since his sense of touch perceived the injury of his flesh,¹⁸⁹ and sadness since the inner senses perceived the injury as unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power.¹⁹⁰ A different view is found in the *Summa theologiae*, where Aquinas writes that

¹⁸⁸ “Primo quantum ad contrarietatem: quae quidem in dolore attenditur quantum ad ipsam naturam dolentis quae per laesivum corrupitur; sed in tristitia quantum ad repugnantiam appetitus ad aliquid quod quis odit. Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est, in tristitia autem secundum apprehensivam interiorem. Tertio, quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum, quia dolor incipit in laesione et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectione. Unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu. Ex quo patet quod tristitia est passio animalis, sed dolor est magis passio corporalis.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 3 ad 9; a. 9 co. According to Aquinas, the sense of touch has pain because a thing which is unsuitable for the flesh is unsuitable also for the sense of touch. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1 co.)

¹⁸⁹ “Unde cum in corpore Christi fuerit vera laesio, quia fuit divisio continui per clavos, et fuerit ibi verus tactus; de necessitate oportet dicere, quod fuerit ibi verus dolor.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1 co; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 7. When Aquinas studies Hilary’s text, he explains that Hilary either: 1) withdrew his teaching in a text saw by the bishop of Paris, 2) proposed the idea against those who denied Christ’s divinity, 3) denied the dominium of pain over reason, or 4) claimed that Christ did not have pain necessarily, as he was free from sin. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expos; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 7; *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 15, a. 5 ad 1. See also Gondreau 2002, 380–403.) According to Albert the Great, Christ had pain when the sense of touch or the estimative power apprehended the injury of the flesh. The immediate cause of pain was the apprehension about the injury as contrary to the union of the soul with flesh. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 2, p. 268; *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 4, p. 223–224.) For Albert on the inner senses, see Ashley 2013, 303–314. In his *De incarnatione*, Albert describes that when Hilary claimed that Christ did not have pain, he argued against those who claimed that Christ was merely a human being. Albert was the first who also claimed that the bishop of Paris, Wilhelmus Parisiensis, had seen a book where Hilary changed his view. (Albert the Great, *De incarnatione* tract. 6, q. 1, a. 5, p. 224–225.) In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert adds that some of Hilary’s texts can be understood so that Christ did not have pain because of sin, as Christ assumed pain voluntarily. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 10, p. 287.) Peter of Tarentaise also says that Christ had pain, as he had the injury of the body and he perceived it. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112.)

¹⁹⁰ “[…] hic quaecumque contraria secundum quod est passio animalis in parte sensitiva. […] Et ideo cum accedebat aliquid contrarium delectationi inferiorium partium, erat de eo tristitia;” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1 co. “[…] quamvis laesio corporis in Christo non fuerit nolente ratione, fuit tamen contra appetitum sensualitatis, et sic fuit ibi tristitia.” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26, a. 8 ad 10.
pain is also a passion of the soul in the sensitive appetitive power.\textsuperscript{191} Although pain and sadness are in the same sensitive appetitive power, they differ because the object or mover of the pain is the injury of the flesh sensed by the sense of touch, whereas the object or mover of the sadness is an evil thing apprehended by the imagination. When Christ’s sense of touch perceived the injury of his flesh, he had pain, and when his interior sense apprehended the injury, the sins of his disciples and the Jews who killed him, he had sadness.\textsuperscript{192} Aquinas holds that Christ’s pain and sadness were the greatest pain and sadness that a human being can have in this life.\textsuperscript{193} Peter of Tarentaise states that Christ had pain because his sense perceived the injury of the flesh, but he does not define in which power pain was.\textsuperscript{194} He adds without further clarification that Christ’s sensuality had signs of pain like crying, when the inferior part of his reason and the will as nature had pain and sadness about evil things which took place for other human beings.\textsuperscript{195} Following Aquinas’s view in his \textit{Summa theologiae}, Durand of St. Pourçain holds that Christ had pain and sadness, which were the passions of the soul and the movements of the sensitive appetitive power.

\textsuperscript{191} “Unde dolor, secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae,” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} P-IIae q. 35, a. 1 co.

\textsuperscript{192} “[…] ad veritatem doloris sensibilis requiritur laesio corporis et sensus laesionis. Corpus autem Christi laedi poterat, quia erat passibile et mortale, […] Nec defuit ei sensus laesionis, cum anima Christi perfecte haberet omnes potentias naturales. Unde nulli dubium debet esse quin in Christo fuerit verus dolor.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15, a. 5 co. “Sicut autem dolor sensibilis est in appetitu sensitivo, ita et tristitia, sed est differentia secundum motum, sive obiectum. Nam obiectum et motum doloris est laesio sensu tactus percepta […] Obiectum autem et motivum tristitiae est nocivum seu malum interius apprehensum, sive per rationem sive per imaginationem, […] Potuit autem anima Christi interius apprehendere aliquid ut nocivum, et quantum ad se, sicut passio et mors eius fuit, et quantum ad alios, sicut peccatum discipulorum, vel etiam Iudaeorum occidentium ipsum. Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 15, a. 6 co; P-IIae q. 35, a. 2 co. Also, Sarot (1994, 68, n. 21.) and Gondreau (2002, 380–384.) remark that Aquinas changed his mind about pain in this way in \textit{Summa theologiae}.

\textsuperscript{193} “[…] in Christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in Christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae.” Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\textsuperscript{a} q. 46, a. 6 co; \textit{Super Sent.} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 co.

\textsuperscript{194} “Ad complementum doloris vel delectationis duo requiruntur: unum est concionectio conuenientis aut disconuenientis: alterum est perceptio conjunctioeis. In Christo fuit vera conjunctioeis conuenientis, scilicet laesiuii corporei et rationis; et vero eis perception in anima, cum non esset per fruitionem abstracta a sensibus: unde fuit in eo verus dolor.” Peter of Tarentaise, \textit{In IV libros sententiarum commentaria} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112.

He maintains that Christ’s sensitive appetitive power had pain when his sense of touch perceived the injury of the flesh and sadness when his interior apprehensive power (e.g. the imagination) perceived his death.\textsuperscript{196}

Contrary to Aquinas, Richard Middleton argued that although the sensitive appetitive power had pain, the subject of the pain and the subject of the sadness were not the same power. Middleton’s view was based on the teaching favoured by the Franciscan theologians that each exterior sense has an appetitive power proper to it. He explains that pain follows the apprehension of the exterior sense about a present evil, and it is in the exterior appetitive power, whereas sadness follows the apprehension of the interior appetitive power and it is in the interior appetitive power.\textsuperscript{197} Richard’s view is opposed to what Aquinas says in his \textit{Summa theologiae}, because he thinks that the subject of the pain differs from the subject of the sadness.\textsuperscript{198} Richard is also opposed to Aquinas’s view in his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, since he claims that the subject of the pain is not the sense of touch but the exterior appetitive power related to it.\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196}“Primum est, quod in Christo fuit vera passio, prout dicit motum appetitus sensitivi. […] ubicumque est vera passio corporalis percepta per sensum et motum appetitus sensitivi secundum conditionem apprehensionis, ibi est uera passio animalis, sed in Christo fuit uera passio corporalis percepta per sensum et motum appetitus sensitivi secundum ordinem apprehensionis: ergo in Christo fuit passio animalis. […] Et per rationem patet quia dolor sensibilis causatur proprie ex perceptione eius quod laedit temperamentum corporis. Et haec perceptio est per solum tactum, qui inter alias sensus est discretius eorum, quae concurrunt ad temperamentum corporis. Constat autem quod in Christo fuit aliquid laesuum temperamenti corporis, quia percipiebatur per tactum qui fuit in Christi temperatissimus: ergo sequetur ad hoc uerus dolor: […] tristitia causatur ex nociau naturali, seu ex malo apprehenso per imaginationem, vel aliquam uirtutem interiorem: sed talis apprehensio fuit in Christi, frequenter enim fuit imaginatus mortem antequam patetur, ergo fuit in eo uera tristitia.” Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri III} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, p. 239v–240r.
\item \textsuperscript{197}“Dico ergo, quod differunt penes apprehensionem, quia dolor exterior est post apprehensionem particularis sensus maxime tactus, ita quod haec apprehensio, etiam si nulla alia adesset possit sufficiere ad causandum exteriorem. Dolor interior post apprehensionem mali praecentis interiorem, sive illa apprehensio sit per imaginationem, vel per rationem, vel per utramque, et talis apprehensio possit sufficiere ad causandum dolorem, non assentiente apprehensione per aliquem particularum sensum. Differunt etiam penes appetitus in quibus est dolor, quia dolor interior, qui speciali nomine dicitur tristitia est in appetitu interiori voluntario seu sensitivio, vel in utroque. Dolor exterior est in appetitu, qui dicitur exterior, eo quod immediate mouetur post exteriorem apprehensionem, maxime sensus tactus.” Richard Middleton, \textit{Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 4, p. 171.
\item \textsuperscript{198}“[…] dicunt aliqui, quod in codem appetitu sensibili est passio tristitiae, et dolor qui dicitur esse in sensu exteriori, quia non dicitur esse in sensu exteriori, nisi sicut in causa ex eo, quod per apprehensionem sensus tactus, qui est sensus particularis causator. Tritstitia autem causatur ex apprehensione interiorem.” Richard Middleton, \textit{Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 1, p. 168.
\item \textsuperscript{199}“Ideo aliis soluunt aliter ad argumentum, quod sicut sensus tactus […] apprehendit, quae temperamento corporis conueniunt, vel disconueniunt, ita appetit conuenien, et refugit disconuenientia, unde in ipso inquantum est, refugiens corporis laesionem est, ille dolor sensibilis, qui dicitur esse in sensu exteriori.” Richard Middleton, \textit{Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi} lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 1, ad 3, p. 168.
\end{itemize}
According to Richard, the interior sensitive appetitive power of Christ’s human soul had sadness when his interior apprehensive power perceived a disagreeable thing like death, which was present or was inescapably going to take place in the near future. The interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness also about an evil thing taking place for others. Richard thinks that sadness about his death and sadness about others were the same kind of sadness because Christ, who loved his neighbor, apprehended the evil experiences of others as evil things that he met himself. Richard is the first who holds that there are many kinds of sadness, but Christ did not have all of them. Richard takes the list of sadnesses from John of Damascus and Nemesius of Emesa.

He clarifies that accidia and achos represent a superabundance of sadness. Accidia is exaggerated sadness and achos is intense sadness which removes the voice. Richard states that Christ did not have accidia and achos since he had only moderate sadness. Envy is sadness about another’s good which is apprehended to be evil to the person feeling envy. Christ did not have envy because he did not apprehend another’s good as evil to himself. However, Christ had compassion when he apprehended that another had a good thing, which was actually evil for the owner’s soul. Richard goes on to claim that Christ had misery, but he does not describe what the misery was.

Later, Richard Middleton’s view of pain was followed especially by Franciscan theologians. Like Bonaventure and Richard, John Duns Scotus thought that each sensitive apprehensive power had an appetitive power related to it, and, following Richard, he explains that the
subject of the pain is the sensitive appetitive power related to the senses because only the appetitive power is inclined or disinclined towards an object, whereas the senses apprehend an object. An unsuitable object like the injury of the flesh caused pain in Christ’s sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch when an object was close to the sense of touch and its appetitive power.

Unlike Aquinas, who thought that sadness was an act of the sensitive appetitive power, William Ockham clarifies that pain and sadness are passions and qualities, but not the acts of the sensitive appetitive power, and he states that the apprehension of the sense and the sensitive appetitive power are the causes of the pain. He argues that the act of the sensitive appetitive power is not the cause of the pain. The act of the sensitive appetitive power is about an absent thing and it ceases when a thing is present, whereas pain is about a present thing. Ockham explains that the act of the sensitive appetitive power cannot cause pain, as it does not exist when the appetitive power has pain. Unlike Scotus, he thinks that an object does

disinclination is unsuitability (inconvenientia), but he does not specify this further. Scoto states that when sight and an object which the sight is inclined to are close to each other, the sight receives perfection from the object, which is delight. Delight of seeing is a passion as an object causes it and it is a quality of the faculty. (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 493–494; Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371–372.) When the sight and an object which the sight is disinclined towards are close to each other, the sight receives pain. (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 494; Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371–372.) For Scotus on pain and sadness, see also Adams 1999, 87–90; Knuutilla 2011, 743–747; 2012, 119–122; Drummond 2012, 53–72; Barnes 2012, 306–312.

205 “Quod si quaeratur cui imprimitur ista forma, ut perfectibili inclinato quae dicitur ‘delectatio’, vel ut perfectibili contra-inclinato quae dicitur ‘dolor’, an scilicet potentiae sensitivae apprehensovel appetitu eius. - videtur magis quod appetitui, quia possimus distinguere potentiam qua anima potest hoc apprehendere et qua inclinatur in hoc ut perfectivum extrinsecum, quae inclinatio nata est terminari apprehensione tantum praecedente; et ita sicut sensui per se attribuimus apprehendere, ita videtur quod sic inclinari, ita scilicet quod terminatio illius inclinationis sequatur ad apprehensionem, convenient appetitui sensitivo:” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 495–496; Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 371. As Drummond notes, the interaction between the passive and the active powers requires that they are brought together. Therefore, the interaction between the sensitive appetitive power and the object requires that the object is present to the appetitive power through the apprehensive power. (Drummond 2012, 63.)

206 “[...] in Christo fuit verus dolor in parte sensitiva, quia obiectum approximatum tactui suo et appetiti sensitivo erat disconveniens illi sensui:” John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505–506; Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 374–375; Reportatio ib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478. According to Scotus, Hilary claimed that Christ did not feel pain because Christ did not feel pain necessarily, as Christ was able to not feel pain if he wished, and because he did not have the cause of suffering, which is original sin. (John Duns Scotus, Reportatio lib. 2, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479; Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 363; p. 392.)

207 “[...] quod dolor, qui proprius est passio et qualitas appetitus sensiti, ab apprehensione sensitiva causatur, et non ab obiecto apprehenso [a] sensu nec ab actu appetitus, sed solummodo ab apprehensione et potentia appetitiva et Deo.” William Ockham, Quaestiones variae q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 251).

208 “Actus enim desiderandi vel fugiendi numquam est nisi respectu rei non habitat, respectus cuitis pro tunc non est delectatio nec tristitia. Sed quando res concepita habetur, tunc cessat actus uteque et causatur dolor vel delectatio immediate ab apprehensione sensitiva,
not cause pain, but an object is only an indirect cause inasmuch as it causes the apprehension of the sense.²⁰⁹

Peter Auriol also thought that pain is the passion of the exterior appetitive power.²¹⁰ He explains that pain involves a corporeal change and the apprehension of the exterior sense, but not the evaluation of the estimative power because the exterior appetitive power is related only to its exterior sense, not to inner sense.²¹¹ Christ’s exterior sensitive appetitive power had pain and the interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness as passions.²¹² Auriol also examines whether the interior sensitive appetitive

²⁰⁹ “Primum, scilicet quod dolor in appetitu sensitivo non causatur ab obiecto apprehenso, patet per propositionem frequenter acceptam quod effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis causis essentialibus et dispositionibus earum. Sed destructo obiecto, remanente apprehensione obiecti in sensu, nihilominus potest causari dolor vel delectatio in appetitu.” William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 251). “[…] est solum causa mediata respectu illius passionis et solum causa causae quatenus naturaliter causat cognitionem intuitivam in sensu et cam conservat, quae cognitio causat immediate passiones praedictas modo praedicto.” William Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 250).

²¹⁰ According to Auriol, the pleasure of the flesh (*delectatio carnalis*), the pleasure of the soul (*delectatio animalis*), and pain and sadness are the passions of the sensitive appetitive powers. The pleasure of the flesh and the pleasure of the soul differ from each other because the pleasure of the flesh follows the exterior senses, but the pleasure of the soul follows the estimative power. The pleasure of the flesh is in the exterior sensitive appetitive power, but the pleasure of the soul is the interior sensitive appetitive power. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, MS M 1, fol. 70r, the 1605 printed edition p. 445.) What Auriol says about the pleasure of the flesh and the pleasure of the soul applies also to pain and sadness. Therefore, pain is the passion of the exterior sensitive appetitive power and sadness is the passion of the interior sensitive appetitive power.

²¹¹ “Nunc dico quod mihi videtur hic. Si loquamur de facto quantum ad radicem de immutazione corporali dico quod de facto dolor et tristitia corporalis non sunt sine immutazione aliquo reali.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M 1, fol. 72v, the 1605 printed edition p. 449. “Sed ego non teneo quod ad causandum dolorem exigatur iudicium aestimativae. Sed dico quod sola apprehensio exterior requiratur et ratio est quoniam dolor est in appetitu exteriori subjective unde non est subjective in corde quoniam alius est dolor carnis et delectatio quam dolor et delectatio cordis. Tunc aestimativa non causat aliquid exteriori, ergo etc.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M 1, fol. 72v, the 1605 printed edition p. 450.) Auriol’s teaching about pain was based on Henry of Ghent’s and Scotus’s views. According to Auriol, Henry says that pain requires a corporeal change, which is perceived by the sense and evaluated to be evil by the estimative power. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M 1, fol. 72r, the 1605 printed edition p. 449; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XI, p. 460r–460v. However, unlike Henry, Scotus thinks that pain supposes only the apprehension of the sense, but not the apprehension of the estimative power and a corporeal change. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, MS M 1, fol. 72r, the 1605 printed edition p. 449; John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 488–492.)
power has sadness necessarily when the exterior sensitive appetitive power has pain. He holds that when an animal has pain, it also has sadness because the exterior sense, the imagination and the estimative power apprehend the same object. However, when a human being has pain he does not have sadness necessarily, because when the exterior sense, the imagination and the phantasy apprehend that the passion of the flesh is evil, the estimative power of the human being can judge that a passion is good as related to the future, since it can be aware of the future things. When the estimative power judges that a passion is good, joy follows in the interior appetitive power.

Contrary to Auriol and Ockham but following Aquinas, Walter Chatton stated that pain was either the act of the sense of touch or the act of the interior sensitive appetitive power, but not the act of the exterior appetitive power. Christ had pain as the act of the interior sensitive appetitive power. Chatton argues that pain was not the act of the will because

[...]

Tota igitur ratio quare sic se concomitantur tales passiones diversarum potentiarum est ex connexione obiectorum [...]. Quando potentiae sic se habent quod praesente obiecto unipotentialae fuit obiectum conforme alteri necessario ex passione causata ab obiecto illa potentiae fuit passio conformis in alia. Sed ad praesentiam obiecti extra fit necessario obiectum praesens in imaginacione et ab ista fit obiectum conforme in aestimatiaue et obiectum sic iudicatum necessario est obiectum appetitus etc. Igitur de primo ad ultimum praesente obiecto in sensu extra fit necessario obiectum praesens potentia non libera sequitur necessario passio in appetitu et hoc in animalibus aliis ab homine.

Tertio dico, quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M1, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Unlike Auriol, Walter Chatton thinks that Christ’s will had sadness because the will wished against the death conditionally. The sadness of the will was not a passion, but the act of the will or the indirect cause of the passion. (Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125–126.)

“Secundo dico quod in homine non necessario sequitur passio in appetitu interiori ex passione corporalis appetitus. [...] Dico enim quod quandocumque fit passio exterior et recipiatur ab imaginatione vel phantasmate potest esse immutatio in iudicio aestimativae. Aestimativa enim discurrerit, compeletique futurum bonum cum praesentie malo et iudicat passionem exteriorum apprehensam esse bonam. Et tunc sequitur necessario gaudium in corde quod exspresse patet in matribus in cuiuis iudicium propter gaudium futurum non sequatur necessario passio in appetitu et hoc in animalibus aliis ab homine.” Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 74r, the 1605 printed edition p. 453. Auriol explains that an object is present in many apprehensive powers because all powers of the soul are rooted in the same essence. (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 74r, the 1605 printed edition p. 453.)

the immediate cause of the act of the will was the will. Pain was the act of the sensitive appetitive power, which was caused immediately by a change in the heart. However, the will and reason could be indirect causes of the pain since they can cause pain through the imagination. Unlike Auriol, Chatton thinks that the sensitive appetitive power has a passion necessarily when the exterior sense perceives its object. He describes that when a sensible thing effects perception in the exterior sense, first follows the act of the imagination and then the change of the heart, which causes necessarily a passion in the sensitive appetitive power.

### 3.6. Pain and Sadness of the Rational Part of the Soul

In part of his argumentation for the claim that Christ had true pain and sadness, Lombard quotes Augustine’s *Enarrationes in psalmos*, where

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216 “Et dico ad hunc intellectum quod dolor passionis qua Christus principaliter erat afflicitus, non erat actus volitivus, sed erat actus causatus ad transmutationem organi corporis, quia sicut pluries tetigi, omnis actus causatus immediate a voluntate est volitio vel nolitio.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 126; d. 33, q. 1, a. 7, p. 209.

217 “Dico ad praesens quod ad vehementem cogitationem intellectivam et actum volendi vel nolendi causatur imaginatio vehemens. Hoc enim experimur quod vehemens imaginatio causari potest ad vehemens dictamen intellectus et imperium voluntatis, et ad vehementem imaginacionem moventur humores circa cor, ad quorum transmutationem et alterationem transmutatur organum cordis aliquando motu dilatationis, aliquando motu constrictionis; et causantur in appetitu sensitivo, cuius organum est cor, passionis gaudio et tristitiae in tantum quod aliquando ex vehemens imaginatione aliquis incurrit febrem vel aliam infirmitatem.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 127. For how, according to Chatton, reason and the will can cause a passion indirectly, see Chapter 3.4.


219 “Tertio, videndum utrum passiones cordis necessario causentur ad sensationes exteriore. Dicunt aliqui quod sic in bruto, sed non in homine, quia cogitativa in homine est potestas discursiva. […] Sed ista non reputo vera, quia primi motus non sunt in potestate nostra, et hoc non tantum est verum de sensationibus exteriore, quia ibi non est appetere animale, sicut probatum est. Et hoc patet etiam, quia primum motus spei et desperationis non possunt esse in sensibus exteriore, et tamen nec illi sunt in potestate nostra, quia tunc in primis motibus posset esse peccatum mortale. Igitur necessario causantur ad sensationes exteriore, et hoc ante deliberationem. Quod etiam dicunt de cogitativa non est verum, quod per eam ante omnem deliberationem possit vivi ne ad praesentiam sensationum causantur passiones cordis. Nam ad praesentiam sensibilium necessario ante deliberationem causantur sensationes, et illis positis imaginationes, et illis positis transmutationes et alterationes, ad quas ita naturaliter causantur ibi passiones, sicut calor in calefactibili ad praesentiam ignis.” Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super sententias* lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, p. 204–205.
Augustine claims that Christ’s human soul was full of pain. Although Lombard does not further elaborate on this idea, many medieval theologians thought that this indicated that pain also touched the rational part of Christ’s human soul. Albert the Great reported also a historical reason why theologians argued that pain touched the rational part of the soul. He explains that an anonymous abbot had been preaching that the superior part of Christ’s human soul did not suffer when his flesh suffered, but masters at the University of Paris condemned the doctrine. However, unlike the teaching of the anonymous abbot, the view that pain also touched the rational part of Christ’s soul was not without philosophical challenges because Aristotle seemed to claim that the intellect could not have sadness. In this chapter, I study the discussions about the pain and sadness of the rational part of Christ’s human soul. The discussions reveal that the Franciscan and Thomistic conceptions of the passibility of the soul and its powers framed the ideas of rational pain and sadness, and John Duns Scotus’s influential view about the sadness of the will was based on the formulations of earlier Franciscan theologians.

According to the Summa Halensis, the powers of the rational part of Christ’s human soul had a passion as sadness, as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Superior part</th>
<th>Inferior part</th>
<th>Will</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As nature</td>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>As nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>As reason</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>As reason</td>
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220 Augustine, Enarrationes in psalmos ps. 87, n. 3, p. 1209, PL 37, 1110; Peter Lombard, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, cap. 1, p. 96.

221 While the twelfth-century theologians were usually not interested in the question of how Christ’s whole soul was full of pain, Hugh of Saint Victor proposed an answer related to his notion of will. He relied on Augustine’s teaching that sadness is the dissent about those things which happen to us against our will. (Augustine, De civitate Dei lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.) Hugh taught that the will of pity was related to the sufferings of other human beings. Since the will of pity wished against the destruction of Jerusalem, it had pain because of that. (Hugh of Saint Victor, De quattuor voluntatibus in christo PL 176, 842f.) In Hugh’s view, when the will wishes against a thing that takes place, there will be pain or sadness in the will. In his Scito te ipsum, Peter Abelard also claims that a passion follows from wishing against. He proposes his well-known example of a man in a prison who wishes to put his own son in prison in his place so that he may seek his own ransom, and he explains that the father does not wish to put his own son in prison since it involves the great pain of the soul. For Abelard, the wish is here a passion rather than a will. Since the father desires an end (i.e. to seek ransom), he tolerates a means which he does not wish and which causes a passion. Like Augustine, Abelard says that a passion follows when something takes place against the will. (Peter Abelard, Scito te ipsum p. 8–10.) See also Saarinen 1994, 56. For emotions as volitions in Abelard, see King 2010, 173.

222 “Fuit enim praedicatum, quod Christi anima non fuisset passa secundum partem superiorem a quodam abbate, sed Parisiis ab universitate Magistorum pro haeresi condemnatum est.” Albert the Great, Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, a. 3, p. 270.

223 Aristotle, Topica 1.15, 106a38.
Following Alexander of Hales’s teaching about the passibility of the powers, the Summa Halensis teaches that like the will of Christ, his reason was also divided into reason “as nature” and reason “as reason”. The reason as nature desired a union with the flesh and avoided separation from it, whereas reason as reason was not compassionate for the flesh. The Summa Halensis holds that Christ’s reason as nature and as reason had a passion, which the Summa Halensis associates with sadness. The inferior part of Christ’s reason as nature had a passion about the injury of the flesh and as reason about the sins of the disciples. However, the superior part of reason had a passion only as nature but not as reason.

According to the Summa Halensis, Christ’s will also had a passion, which was pain. The will as nature, which wished life as such, had pain about the injury of the flesh, but the will as reason did not because it wished for the injury in relation to the redemption of the human race. Unlike Aquinas, who argues that Christ’s will as reason wished for death absolutely, the Summa Halensis claims that the will as reason wished the death conditionally. It explains that the will wishes for a thing conditionally when it wishes because of a condition, which pulls or pushes to wish for a thing. When a condition does not take place, the will wishes against a thing. Christ’s will as reason wished for death conditionally since it wished for it for the sake of the redemption of the human race.

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224 “[…] est considerare rationem dupliciter, secundum quod dicit Augustinus quod ratio dividit se in duo, in superiorem et inferiorem secundum duplicem comparationem. Item, ratio dupliciter potest considerari, vel ut natura vel ut ratio; secundum quod consideratur ut natura, appetit unionem cum suo corpore et refugit separationem. Sic igitur in Christo fuit passio in ratione, secundum quod ratio et secundum quod natura. Unde Hieronymus, Matth. 26, 38, Tristis est anima mea etc.: ‘Contristatur propter scandalum Apostolorum’. Et hoc intelligendum est de inferiori ratione; scandalum vero non est solum in ratione ut natura […] sed in ratione ut ratio. In superiori autem parte fuit passio ut est natura, non ut est ratio.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 2, p. 200; tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 2, p. 63. “[…] rationem ut naturam, secundum quam unitur corpori et naturaliter per hoc compatitur; et est considerare rationem ut rationem, secundum quod non se habet ad corpus, immo actum habet extra corpus.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 201. The view of the Summa Halensis that reason can have sadness, which is a passion, is interesting because it implies that the passion of reason is cognition. The fourteenth-century Franciscan, Adam Wodeham, maintained that a passion can be cognition. (Pickavé 2012, 99–109.) Although the view of the Summa Halensis is too vague to be compared with Wodeham’s defined view, it is possible that the theories of the early Franciscan theologians had an impact on the later Franciscans to consider a passion as cognition.

225 “In naturali ergo voluntate fuit passio, sed non in deliberativa. Naturalis autem voluntas est per comparationem ad suum corpus, et dolet de contrario, scilicet de separatione; ideo passio fuit in voluntate naturali. Deliberativa est secundum quam contulit utilitatem passionis, et secundum hanc non fuit passio.” Summa theologica lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 201.

226 Summa theologica lib. 1, pars 1, inq. 2, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, memb. 2, cap. 1, a. 3, p. 64. The view of the Summa Halensis that reason can have sadness, which is a passion, is interesting because it implies that the passion of reason is cognition. The fourteenth-century Franciscan, Adam Wodeham, maintained that a passion can be cognition. (Pickavé 2012, 99–109.) Although the view of the Summa Halensis is too vague to be compared with Wodeham’s defined view, it is possible that the theories of the early Franciscan theologians had an impact on the later Franciscans to consider a passion as cognition.

wished without a condition, this implies that the will as nature wished against death. Since the *Summa Halensis* seems to suppose that the passion of Christ’s will was related to the willing, it indicates that it had in mind Augustine’s description of sadness as dissent about those things which happen to us against our will.\(^{228}\) Hence, the will as nature had sadness about death because it wished against it.

Like the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure also held that the powers of the rational part of Christ’s human soul had pain as a passion about our sins and the injury of his flesh. Following his view that the will can have passions and Augustine’s view of sadness, Bonaventure states that Christ’s will had pain about our sins because the will wished against sin taking place.\(^{229}\) He goes on to explain that reason as reason did not have pain about the injury of the flesh, whereas reason as nature had. The reason as reason had joy about the injury, because the will as deliberative wished for the injury after the deliberation of reason, which considered the injury in relation to the salvation of the human race.\(^{230}\) However, Christ’s reason as nature had pain since the will as nature wished against the injury.\(^{231}\) The superior part of

228 Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.

229 “[...] et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali crat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex cognitione peccatorum nostrorum.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354). When Bonaventure studies contrition, he explains that pain can be the dissent (dissensus) of the will or the passion of the sensitive part of the soul, which the dissent of the will produces. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (IV, 383–384).) The idea of pain as dissent is based on Augustine’s account of pain. (Augustine, *De civitate Dei* lib. 14, cap. 15, p. 438, PL 41, 424; cap. 6, p. 421, PL 41, 409.) The dissent requires that the will wishes against a thing that takes place or a thing displeases the will. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. (IV, 384).) When the will wishes against a thing that takes place, the will causes pain. Bonaventure does not clarify where the will causes pain, but presumably it causes pain first in the will and then in the sensuality. (Bonaventure, 4 Sent. d. 16, pars. 1, a. 3, q. 2. (IV, 393).) Both absolute and conditional wishing can effect pain. (Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, dub. 4. (I, 861); 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).) Before Bonaventure, William of Auxerre stated that conditional willing or *velleitas* effected sadness. (Saarinen 1994, 76–77.)


231 “Si autem consideretur ratio ut natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et inclinationem ad corpus, utpote perfectio ad perfectibile, patibatur, corpore patiente. Anima enim rationalis non tantum est perfectio corporis humani secundum potencias sensibles, cum corpus humanum sit ordinatum ad nobilem perfectionem, quam sit corpus brutale; sed secundum se totam, hoc est, secundum complementum suae essentiae et suarum potentiarum
Christ’s reason as reason also had joy, but reason as nature had pain about the injury.\footnote{232}

As Bonaventure thinks that Christ had sadness in the concupiscible power,\footnote{233} and he argues that Christ’s will had sadness, this supposes that a soul not only has sensitive but also rational concupiscible and irascible powers.\footnote{234} His view about the rational concupiscible and irascible powers is partly based on the idea that the rational appetitive power can have passions. In his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}, Bonaventure explains that the rational appetitive power is the will when it rules and the concupiscible or the irascible power when it is affected and ruled, and it can have a passion when it is moved and ruled by itself.\footnote{235} This indicates that the rational concupiscible and irascible powers are the seats of the passions of the will. Bonaventure’s view about sensual and rational concupiscible and irascible powers is a kind of mixture of views proposed by Bonaventure’s teacher, John of la Rochelle. When John describes Augustine’s division of the powers of the soul, he makes a distinction between the rational, the irascible and the concupiscible powers of the soul. A soul is apt to know by means of a rational power, which involves all cognitive powers, and it is apt to be affected by means of irascible and concupiscible powers, which involve all affective powers.\footnote{236}

When John describes John of Damascus’s idea of motive powers, he makes a division between rational and irrational motive powers. The universitatem, est corporis perfectio et habet ad ipsum naturalem appetitum et inclinationem et coniunctionem, ac per hoc delectationem et compassionem. Conce dedendum est igitur, quod anima Christi fuerit compassa corpori secundum rationem, secundum quod consideratur ratio ut natura, cum passio corporis fuerit acerbissima, sicut ostensum fuit supra.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354). “[…] dicendum, quod nihil impediat, quod ratio de aliqua gaudeat ut ratio, et contristetur ut natura, pro eo quod aliquid potest repugnare voluntati secundum appetitum naturalem, et consonare voluntati secundum appetitum deliberativum.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354).

\footnote{232} “Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem. […] anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflic tum tota patiobatur et affligrabatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tectum patiatur. Et sic dolor fuerit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationem partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356). “[…] sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experientiabatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferabatur gaudio virtuosus.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. (III, 354–355).

\footnote{233} “Secundo, utrum habuit tristitiam in concupiscibili.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 336). “[…] absque dubio […] in Christo fuit vera tristitia.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 15, a. 2 (III, 338).

\footnote{234} Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 717); \textit{Breviloquium} pars 2. c. 9, p. 227.

\footnote{235} Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3. (III, 717); 2 Sent. d. 25, pars. 1, a. 1, q. 6. resp. (II, 605); d. 24, pars. 1, a. 2, q. 2. (II, 564). For Bonaventure on concupiscible and irascible powers, see Prentice 1957, 30–36. Later on, for example, John Duns Scotus also argues that the will was divided into the irascible and concupiscible powers. (John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 33, q. 1, p. 295–296; Knuuttila 2004, 267.)

\footnote{236} John of la Rochelle, \textit{Summa de anima} cap. 63, p. 64; cap. 67, p. 72.
concupiscible power and the irascible power are the irrational powers.\textsuperscript{237} Like John of Damascus, Bonaventure seems to think that a soul has rational and irrational motive powers, but because he also adopts Augustine’s idea, he divides both motive powers into irascible and concupiscible powers.

After Bonaventure, the view that the powers of the rational part of Christ’s soul had sadness as a passion was favoured, especially among the Franciscan theologians. For instance, Richard Middleton, who argued that Christ’s will could have passions,\textsuperscript{238} thought that Christ’s will related to the inferior and superior parts of his reason as nature had sadness about the injury because the reason as nature apprehends the injury as evil and the will naturally escaped it. The will related to the inferior part of reason as reason also had sadness about the injury since the reason apprehended the injury as evil, whereas the will related to the superior part of reason as reason did not since the reason apprehended the injury as good.\textsuperscript{239}

The teaching of Albert the Great about how the whole soul of Christ suffered is quite obscure, but it is noteworthy given its similarities with Aquinas’s teaching. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Albert states that the whole of Christ’s human soul as nature suffered with his flesh, but the whole soul as the principle of the act did not.\textsuperscript{240} Christ’s intellect as nature

\textsuperscript{237} John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 74, p. 92. John explains that Avicenna also divides the appetitive power into concupiscible and irascible powers. (John of la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* cap. 105, p. 180.)

\textsuperscript{238} See Chapter 3.1.

\textsuperscript{239} “Primo modo ille dolor qui fuit in sensu Christi exteriori attingebat istum intellectum, nomine intellectus comprehendendo totam partem intellectuam, quae comprehendit intellectum, et voluntatem non intelligendo, quod in parte intellectuam esset dolor sub ratione qua sensibilis, sed tristitia pro dolore in exteriori sensu, quia absolute naturali apprehensione apprehendebatur, ut malus, et ideo ipsum voluntas naturaliter refugiebat. Secundo modo intellectus potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo inquantum considerat bonum, et malum in comparatione ad causas inferiores, et sic habet rationem inferiores portionis. Alio modo inquantum considerat bonum et malum in comparatione ad causam superiorem, quae est voluntas Dei, et etiam inquantum superiorem causam contemplabatur secundum se, et sic habet rationem superiores portionis. Primo modo erat tristitia in voluntate Christi pro sui corporis passione, quia inquantum apprehendebatur in comparatione ad patientis innocentiam, et inquantum illam inferentes faciebat contra rationem rectam voluntati displicebat, et ita patet, quod in inferiori portione partis intellectuie fuit tristitia pro corporis passione: et inquantum consideratur, ut natura, et inquantum consideratur, ut ratio. Secundo autem modo in parte intellectuia animae Christi nulla penituis fuit tristitia, quia inquantum intellectus apprehendebatur corporis sui passionem, ut diuinae placitum voluntati ad redimendum genus humanum sic voluntas Christi de sui corporis passione gaudebat inquantum etiam ipsum voluntatem Dei secundum se contemplabatur anima Christi, planum est, quod non tristabatur, sed in summa suauitate fruebatur, et sic patet, quod in superiori portione animae Christi, et si pro sui corporis passione fuerit tristitia inquantum considerabatur, ut natura, non tamen inquantum consideratur, ut ratio.” Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, p. 169. According to Richard, the intellectual part as nature apprehends naturally good and evil as such, whereas the intellectual part as reason apprehends good and evil in relation to something. (Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, p. 168–169.)

\textsuperscript{240} “Sed intelligendum, quod in anima duo est considerare, scilicet quod est natura hominis, et principium operationum humanarum. Quantum ad primum tripliciter consideratur:
also suffered with the flesh, but not as the principle of the contemplation.  
In his *De incarnacione*, Albert holds that Christ had sadness in his sensitive appetitive power and will, whereas his senses and reason apprehended a sad thing.  
He explains that since the superior part of reason apprehended the death in relation to the redemption of the human race, sadness about the death and joy about the redemption of the human race followed in the will.  
Since Albert thinks that pain and sadness in appetitive powers were qualities but only the sensitive appetitive power can have passible qualities, he seems to think that the sadness of the will was a quality and the sadness of the sensitive appetitive power was a possible quality. This implies that the will and the sensitive appetitive power of Christ had different kinds of sadness.

Aquinas’s view on how pain touched Christ’s whole soul differed from the Franciscan views, partly because their conceptions about the passibility of the rational part of the soul varied. Regarding his view on the passibility of the powers, recalling Albert, Aquinas explains that the whole soul of Christ as the form of the flesh was changed accidentally when the flesh had an injury. The injury also accidentally touched all powers of the soul, including the superior part of reason, since the powers were rooted in the essence of the soul.
Aquinas adds that Christ’s reason and will also had sadness but, unlike the sadness of the sensitive appetitive power, sadness was not a passion of the soul. The reason can have sadness in the sense that it reveals for the will a thing which is opposed to the will, and the will can have a similitude of sadness, which is a simple act of the will but not a passion of a soul nor an externally caused change in the will.\(^\text{247}\) The superior part of Christ’s reason did not have sadness except accidentally, that is, because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. Aquinas explains that since the object of the superior part of reason was eternal good, which was not opposed to the will, the superior part of reason did not have sadness. However, the inferior part of Christ’s reason had sadness since it revealed to the will the injury of the flesh and our sins and miseries.\(^\text{248}\) The superior part of reason did not have sadness due to the miseries and the defects of human beings since it apprehended all these in relation to the divine wisdom. Therefore, the superior part of Christ’s reason apprehended the defects of the human beings as allowed by the divine wisdom and miseries as punishments of sin.\(^\text{249}\)

\(^\text{247}\) “[…] tristitia non potest esse in ratione sicut in subjecto, sed solum sicut in ostendente id quod est voluntati repugnans; nisi ratio accipiatur prout comprehendit vim apprehensivam et affectivam, in qua est tristitia sicut in subjecto, quamvis non tristitia quae est passio quae solum est in sensitiva parte, ut prius dictum est.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 co; a. 3, qc. 2 co. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise holds that when Christ’s body suffered, all powers of the soul as nature suffered. The inferior and the superior parts of reason as reason had joy, because the inferior part considered the injury as related to the redemption of the human race and the superior part saw the injury in the Word of God as related to the salvation of the human race. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 112–113.)

\(^\text{248}\) “Objectum autem superioris rationis sunt bona aeterna, ex quibus nihil erat contrarium voluntati Christi. Unde in ratione superiori, secundum quod ad objectum suum comparatur, non poterat esse tristitia in Christo; poterat autem esse, quantum ad rationem inferiorem cuius objectum sunt res temporales in quibus aliquid contrarium voluntati ejus aliquo modo accidere poterat […] Sicut ipsa laesio corporis erat contra aliquam voluntatem Christi, qua naturaliter mortem refutabat, et similiter etiam mala humani generis ei displicebant. Unde in ratione inferiori poterat esse tristitia etiam secundum quod ad objecta suae comparatur.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3 expos; *Summa theologiae* Iª–IIae q. 26, a. 9 co; ad 7. Although Aquinas claims that the will of God, angels and human beings can have joy and sadness, he emphasizes that they are bare acts of the will, which do not involve a passion in a proper sense. (Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 9 co; ad 7.) On God’s emotions in Aquinas, see Sarot 1994, 76–82; Westberg 1996; Pasnau 2002b, 242–243; Miner 2009, 35. According to Peter King, the acts of the will are pseudopassions. The acts of the will are not passions since they do not involve a corporeal change, but they are similar to the acts of the sensitive appetitive power. All passions of the sensitive appetitive power have analogouse dispassionate passions of the will. For example, sadness as a passion has a counterpart in the will, which is a dispassionate sadness. (King 2012a, 22–29.) See also Lombardo 2011, 75–77.

\(^\text{249}\) “Et quamvis dilectio proximi ad superiorem rationem quodam modo pertineat, in quantum proximus ex caritate diligatur proprie Deum, superior tamen ratio in Christo de proximorum defectibus tristitiam habere non potuit, sicut in nobis habere potest. Quia enim ratio superior Christi plena Dei usione fruebatur, hoc modo apprehendebat quidquid ad
Aquinas thinks that his view about how the injury of the flesh touched Christ's reason is consistent with the ideas proposed by the Franciscans. When Franciscan theologians claim that Christ's pain reached the superior part of reason as nature, according to Aquinas, they claim that the injury reached the superior part of reason because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. However, pain did not reach the superior part of reason as reason, which is reason as related to its act and an object, because the superior part of reason did not reveal the injury as opposed to the will. The inferior part of reason as nature suffered because it suffered the injury of the flesh accidentally and the inferior part of reason as reason because it revealed the injury as opposed to the will. Aquinas explains that the distinction between reason "as reason" and reason "as nature" can be understood also in another way in the inferior part of reason. The reason as nature makes a judgment about things, which are naturally known as good and evil and which are naturally desired or avoided. The reason as reason makes judgment about things, which are good or evil as related to something, and it knows them as desirable or avoidable in this way. Christ's death was evil as such, but good in relation to the redemption of the human race. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the inferior part of reason as reason did not have sadness about the death, but the inferior part of reason as nature had sadness about it, though not as a passion of the soul.250

Above I argued that, according to Aquinas, not only Christ's sensitive appetitive power but also his will and reason had sadness. However, Lombard disagrees with this as he claims that "Christ's sorrow was only in the sense appetite".251 It is true that, according to Aquinas, Christ had sadness as the passion of the soul only in his sensitive appetitive power, but his other powers also had sadness, although then sadness was not the passion of the soul. Lombard bases his view on Summa theologiae, but he does not consider Commentary on the Sentences and De veritate disputation. Whereas in his Commentary on the Sentences and De veritate Aquinas claims that the reason and the will of Christ had sadness, in his Summa theologiae he does not state that so clearly. However, here he seems to think so as well. As Aquinas argues in Summa theologiae that other powers than the superior part of the

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Aquinas, Thomas. Compendium theologiae lib. 1, cap. 232. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise states that the natural will, the inferior reason and sensuality had the pain of compassion, but the superior will of reason did not have it. (Peter of Tarentaise, In IV libros sententiarum commentaria lib. 3, d. 15, q. 3, a. 2, p. 111.)

250 Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 co; De veritate q. 26, a. 9, ad 7.

251 Lombardo 2011, 217.
reason were causes of Christ’s sadness, this indicates that the inferior part of
the reason also had sadness in the sense that it was the cause of the sadness.
In addition, when Aquinas explains that Christ’s death caused sadness
because the will of Christ did not wish for death as such, he seems to think
that the will had sadness as well.\(^{252}\)

Although Durand of St. Pourçain explained that Christ’s will
had a passion, which was the movement of the will, his view about the
sadness of the rational part of Christ’s soul was Thomistic rather than
Franciscan. Durand explains that as the apprehension of the sense about an
unsuitable thing causes the movement of the sensitive appetitive power, the
apprehension of the intellect about an unsuitable thing causes the movement
of the will. Since Christ’s intellect apprehended an unsuitable thing, his will
had a corresponding movement, which was dislike. As Durand claims that
dislike was a passion in a broad sense, he moves toward Aquinas but steps
back from the Franciscan intellectual tradition about the passibility of the
powers. It is noteworthy that Durand does not argue that the superior part
of Christ’s reason had sadness but, like Aquinas, he seems to suppose that the
superior part of reason had only joy.\(^{253}\)

It is generally acknowledged that John Duns Scotus’s view
about the passibility of the powers differed from Aquinas’s view.\(^{254}\) Scotus
thought that the will can have passions like joy and sadness which are not
merely acts metaphorically called passions, as in Aquinas. Scotus’s teaching
is based on the prior Franciscan views about the sadness of the will,
especially Bonaventure’s thought, but it is more detailed than these. The
aforementioned Franciscans did not formulate what kind of feature sadness
as a passion of the rational power was, whereas Scotus clarified that sadness
as a passion of the will is an externally caused quality in the will and not an
act of the will.\(^{255}\) He defines sadness as a passion, but not a free act of the
will like wishing (\textit{velle}) or wishing against (\textit{nolle}), because the will cannot
effect sadness immediately as it can effect wishing or wishing against,\(^{256}\) and

\(^{252}\) Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III\(^{a}\) q. 46 a. 6 co; III\(^{a}\) q. 15, a. 6.
\(^{253}\) Durand of St. Pourçain, \textit{Petri Lombardi sententias theologicas commentariorum libri
III} lib. 3. d. 15, q. 2, p. 240r.
Drummond 2012, 55–56. For Scotus on the passions of the will, see especially Bouloino 2003;
\(^{255}\) “[…] sequitur approximatio huius objecti, videlicet apprehensio quod volitum vel
nolitum habet esse; et ex hoc ultimo videtur sequi in voluntate passio ab objecto ipso sic
See also Jonh Duns Scotus, \textit{Lectura} 3. d. 15, q. 1, p. 373.
\(^{256}\) “Non est etiam passio ista in voluntate a se ipsa effective, quia tunc esset immediate in
potestate voluntatis, sicut volitio et nolitio sunt in potestate voluntatis. Sed hoc est falsum:
nolens enim, si nolitum eveniat, non videtur immediate habere in potestate sua tristitiam; si
esset etiam a voluntate ut a causa activa, esset eius operatio, sicut 'velle' quod est ab ea et in
ea.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} 3. d. 15, q. 1, p. 499. As Scotus thinks that an object
because God and blessed souls can wish against but they cannot be sad, since what they wish against does not take place.\textsuperscript{257}

In Scotus’s detailed analysis, the will has sadness when the intellect apprehends that an object unsuitable to the will takes place, as follows: 1) when the will freely and absolutely\textsuperscript{258} or 2) freely and conditionally wishes against it.\textsuperscript{259} Scotus thinks that the will can have sadness because of conditional wishing against even when it wishes for a thing absolutely. He explains that when the will wishes against a thing conditionally but the condition is not fulfilled, the will can wish absolutely for a thing but has sadness because of such conditional wishing against. Scotus refers to Aristotle’s example of a merchant in a storm to illustrate such conditional wishing against. Here a merchant wishes against throwing goods into the sea conditionally; he would wish against throwing away the goods if he were able to avoid drowning in some other way. Since that condition is not fulfilled, he does not wish against throwing but instead

\textsuperscript{257} “Quod autem tristitia proprie sumpta sit passio voluntatis, videtur, quia non est aliqua eius actio vel operatio, quia non ‘velle’, patet; nec ‘nolle’ nec ‘non velle’, - probatio, quia Deus et beati possunt summum nolle et non velle aliquid, non tamen possunt tristari, quia non potest evenire illud respectu cuius habent nolle vel non velle; ‘tristitia autem de iis est quae nobis nolentibus accidunt’, secundum Augustinum.”

\textsuperscript{258} “[…] non sic objectum comparatum ad voluntatem, quae libera est, licet aliquod ex natura sua sit conveniens voluntati, puta ultimus finis, cum sit ultimate conveniens sibi per actum voluntatis acceptantis et complacens sibi in illo. Et talis conveniens est posita per velle objecti, vel disadvenditiam per nolle objecti, et ita relationibus convenieniens et disconvenieniens - concomitantibus rationes volit et nolit - sequitur approximatio huius objecti, videlicet apprehensio quod volitum vel nolitum habet esse; et ex hoc ultimo videtur sequi in voluntate passio ab objecto ipso sic praestante; gaudium scilicet et tristitia.”

\textsuperscript{259} “Praeter modos tristandi praeeditos duos (vel tres, si secundus modus dividatur in duos), videtur posse ponit tertius (vel quartus) modus tristandi, proprium nolle condicionatum, quando scilicet aliquid nollet aliquid quantum in se esset, tamen in aliquo casu vult illud.”
wishes absolutely to do so; nothing coerces him to wish, but he wishes to throw the goods away because of circumstances which he did not wish. According to Scotus, such conditional wishing against is sufficient for sadness. As Scotus claims that the will has sadness when it wishes absolutely or conditionally against a thing, he follows Bonaventure’s view that absolute and conditional wishing against effects the sadness of the will when the opposite takes place.

An object is also unsuitable for the will when: 3) it is unsuitable for the will naturally or 4) when it is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Scotus explains that when an object is unsuitable for the will naturally, the will has sadness about it necessarily and the will cannot naturally wish for an object when it wishes naturally for the contrary object. An object unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power is also unsuitable for the will because of a natural connection between the sensitive appetitive power and the will. When an object is unsuitable for the will naturally and unsuitable for the will because it is unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power, the will has sadness without an act of the will.

It is noteworthy that, in the *Ordinatio*, Scotus states that the will has sadness when the will wishes against a thing, but he adds that is doubtful whether the will has sadness because an object is unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive

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261 Bonaventure, 1 Sent. d. 48, dub. 4. (I, 861); 3 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. (III, 367).
262 “Sic igitur, recolligendo istud membrum, videtur de quadruplici 'disconveniente voluntati' esse tristari proprie: [...] tertio modo, quia disconveniens voluntati ut natura; quarto modo, quia disconveniens appetitu sensitivo…” John Duns Scotus, * Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505.
263 “[…] disconvenientia obiecti naturalis ab ipsa voluntate ut naturali potestia, absque hoc quod ipsum obiectum sit nolitum nolle elicio, sufficit ad tristitiam voluntatis causandam. […] velle naturale alieius sufficit ad non posse naturaliter velle oppositum illius, et per consequens ad non posse naturaliter gaudere de opposito illius et ad necessario tristari de eo, sicut velle beatitudinem naturalem sufficit ad tristandum de miseria naturali.” John Duns Scotus, * Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 501–502. Scotus thinks that when a thing which is against an inclination to the advantageous takes place, the will necessarily has sadness. (John Duns Scotus, * Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 502; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 390.) For more about the inclinations of the will, see Wolter 1986, 39–41; Williams 2002b, 345–349; 2016; Taina Holopainen 2014, 553–554.
264 “Ad secundum potest dici quod etiam illa connexio voluntatis cum appetitu sensitivo, dum tamen appetibile intelligatur et per intellectum possit praesentari voluntati, sufficit ad hoc ut 'conveniens appetiti sensitivo' sit conveniens voluntati, et 'disconveniens' disconveniens et triste: sic enim ponitur aliqua delectitia subrepticia praecedere in voluntate omnem actum liberum voluntatis.” John Duns Scotus, * Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 503. Scotus explains that when the sense perceives an object unsuitable to the sensitive appetitive power, the intellect reveals an object for the will and the sadness of the will results, as the object is unsuitable also to the will. Since the will is passive with respect to all passions of the will, it does not co-act with the sensitive appetite but co-suffers. (John Duns Scotus, * Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 503.)
It is not clear whether Scotus thinks in the *Lectura* that the will can have sadness without the act of wishing against. There are texts where he claims that the will can have sadness only when the will wishes against an object and texts where he describes how the will has sadness without the act of the will. In the *Reportatio*, Scotus studies Christ’s sadness only as related to absolute and conditional wishing against. Although Scotus studies at length how the will has sadness when an object is unsuitable naturally for the will and unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power, and he argues that it was possible that Christ had sadness because of these reasons, this indicates that he is, however, unsure whether the will can have sadness without the free act of the will.

Unlike Aquinas, who claimed that the superior part of reason and the will related to it did not have sadness, Scotus held that the superior part of Christ’s will had sadness. He divides Christ’s will into superior and inferior parts and states that the superior part of the will in a strict sense is the will as it considers only God and eternal things, and in a broad sense as it wishes for something related to God. Since the superior part of Christ’s will did not wish against God and divine perfection, the superior part in a strict sense could not have sadness. However, the superior part in a broad sense and the inferior part of the will can have sadness about the lack of fruition, sins, and evil things in a person himself or beloved ones. The

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265 “Praeter istum modum tristandi, qui videtur manifestior, quando videlicet objectum sit disconveniens per nolle voluntatis, - videtur dubium de disconvenientia alia ipsius objecti utrum sufficiat ad causandum tristitiam: videlicet si objectum est disconveniens naturaliter (et non volitum libere), - vel si objectum est disconveniens appetitui sensitivo et sibi triste, et per hoc sit sufficienter disconvenier voluntati, dum tamen ostendatur sibi per intellectum propter colliqantiam voluntatis cum appetitu sensitivo.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 501.


269 “[...]+ primo videndum est de quo tristatur Christus secundum superiorem portionem. Et illa dupliciter accipitur: uno modo stricte, pro intellectu et voluntate prout respiciunt sola aeterna; alio modo large, pro intellectu ut iudicat de quocumque secundum regulas aeternas aeternas, et pro voluntate ut vult quaecumque referendo ad aeterna” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 510–511; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.

270 “Primo modo non potest portio superior voluntatis ordinate tristari, quia talis tristitia sequetur ad nolle Deum in se vel ad nolle aliquid perfectionem intrinsecam sibi inesset; [...] et hoc non pertinet ad portionem superiorem stricte sumptum.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 511–512; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 378.

271 “Secundo modo loquendo de portione superiore, de tribus possit tristari talis portio: primo videlicet de carentia fruitionis respectu objecti aeterni; secundo de peccato sui vel alterius voluntatis; tertio de alius malis, suo supposito disconvenientibus vel alius personis dilectis.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 511–512. “Et quoad duo prima objecta, scilicet fruitionem et iustitiam, non oportet distinguer inter portionem superiorem et inferiorem, [...]. Sed quoad tertium objectum, videlicet passionem Christi, oportet aliter dicere de portione una et alia, et hoc secundum quattuor vias positas in primo articulo de
superior part in a broad sense and the inferior part of Christ’s will did not have sadness about the lack of Christ’s fruition or Christ’s sin because Christ was not without fruition and he never sinned. However, they had sadness about other people’s sins, since they wished against sins which others had.\(^{272}\)

When Scotus turns to study the sadness of Christ’s will about his death, he applies the four ways of being sad.\(^{273}\) The superior part of Christ’s will had sadness about the death because it wished against death naturally and conditionally. In *Ordinatio*, Scotus describes that because the superior part of Christ’s will as nature wished naturally for Christ’s personal good, it naturally wished against death and had sadness about it.\(^{274}\) However, in *Lectura* he seems to think that the superior part of Christ’s will did not have sadness because of natural wishing.\(^{275}\) The superior part also had sadness, as it wished against death conditionally, since it would wish against death as such if justice and all favourable things could happen without death.\(^{276}\) However, the superior part of the will did not have sadness because

\(\textit{disconveniente contristante, - de quibus videndum est si omnes possunt poni circa utramque portionem.}’’ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 514.

\(^{272}\) “Quoad primum istorum, anima Christi non tristabatur, quia non-fruitio vel non-perfectio eius (quae fuit nolita) non evenit in morte, […] Quoad secundum, de peccato proprio, non tristabatur, quia nolitum habuit, sed de alieno, puta de infidelitate discipulorum dubitantium, de crudelitate Iudaeorum persequentium.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 512. “Et quoad duo prima objecta, scilicet fruitionem et iustitiam, non oportet distinguere inter portionem superiorem et inferiorem, quia sicut inferior intellectus potest habere ista pro objectis, ita voluntas inferior de quibusdam non tristabatur sicut superior, quia non evenerunt nolita, et de quibusdam evenientibus tristabatur, ut de peccatis, quia et sic erant nolita.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 514; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 378–379; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478.

\(^{273}\) Scotus’s view of Christ’s sadness about the death is based on the concept of the will as nature. When Scotus studies Christ’s sadness, he claims that the will as nature has two meanings. The will as nature in the first sense is the will as it aims at an object that perfects the will, and in the second sense the will is related to something because of the natural constitution of the will. While the will as nature in the first sense is the inclination of the will to an object proper to the will, the will as nature in the second sense is the inclination of the will to the objects of other appetitive powers as well. According to Scotus, the superior part of the will is the will as nature in the first sense and the inferior part of the will is the will as nature in the second sense. Hence, the superior part of the will is naturally inclined to an object proper to the will and the inferior part of the will is naturally inclined to the objects of the inferior appetitive powers as well. The will as nature in general involves the superior and the inferior parts of the will. (John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 516–517.)

\(^{274}\) “Ulterius, ad propositum applicando adhuc objectum voluntatis Christi quod est ‘passio’. […] Et primo de portione superiore, patet de voluntate ut natura quod ipsa sic voluit bonum esse huissus personae et in ordine ad aeternum, - et sic nolitum eventit, et hoc nolitum contra affectionem commodi, non tamen contra iustitiam; nolitum autem sic, scilicet contra affectionem commodi, est sufficiens causa tristandi (ex primo articolo); igitur hoc modo superior voluntas ut natura tristabatur de passione.” John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 518.

\(^{275}\) “Respondeo quod naturale nolle non sufficit ad tristandum de eo quod accidit contra velle naturale, […] et ideo ad tristandum non sufficit voluntas naturalis.” *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 380.

\(^{276}\) “Tertio, videndum est de portione superiore ut libera est, et de nolitione condicionali […] Sic videtur dicendum esse quod illa portio nolut passionem, id est noluiisset quantum in se fuisset si omnia prospera et iusta secundum se appetibilia aequae fuissent sine ea.” John
of absolute wishing against, since the superior part of reason judged that the death was good and, as a consequence, the superior part of the will wished absolutely for the death.\(^{277}\)

Scotus criticizes Aquinas’s view that pain reached the superior part of Christ’s reason because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. According to Scotus, this view does not fit with Aquinas’s idea that the powers of the soul are united with a soul accidentally. Scotus explains that a predicate (i.e. pain) does not belong to a subject (i.e. the superior part of the reason) because of something that happens to a subject accidentally. Therefore, it cannot be said that the superior part of the reason had pain because a soul has pain if, as Aquinas says, the superior part of the reason was united with a soul accidentally.\(^{278}\) Scotus also criticizes Aquinas’s idea that a soul as the form of the body had pain. According to Scotus, because a soul as the form of the body cannot have pain or consider the object of the pain, a soul as the form of the body cannot be the reason why the powers of the inferior and the superior parts of the soul have pain.\(^{279}\)

According to Scotus, the inferior part of Christ’s will as nature had sadness about the death since it had compassion for the sensitive appetitive power. Scotus explains that when Christ’s sensitive appetitive power had pain about death, the intellect revealed the death to the inferior part of the will and it had sadness.\(^{280}\) The inferior part also had sadness as it wished against the death conditionally. As for the question of whether the inferior part of Christ’s will absolutely wished against his death and had sadness because of such wishing against, Scotus proposes two opinions.\(^{281}\)

\(^{277}\) John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479.

\(^{278}\) John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 484; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 365; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 477. According to Aquinas, the powers are united with the soul accidentally, but Scotus argues that the powers and a soul are formally distinct. (Cross 2002b, 268–269.)


\(^{281}\) John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 522–523; *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 522–523; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 522–523; *Lectura*
According to the first opinion, which Scotus favours, the inferior part of the will did not absolutely wish against his death because, for example, the inferior part of reason did not conclude that the death was evil. According to the second opinion, the inferior part of Christ’s will had sadness about the death because of absolute wishing against. Scotus explains that when the inferior part of Christ’s reason considered the death without attending the end of the death, it did not declare it to be wished, and in this sense the inferior part of Christ’s will did not wish (non vult) his death. However, Scotus criticizes this opinion. Whereas the opinion claims that the inferior part of the will did not wish (non velit) for death, according to Scotus, not wishing (non velle) does not indicate wishing against (nolle), which sadness of the will requires. Scotus also states that when the inferior part of Christ’s reason considered the death without the end, which was the reason...
why the death was wished, the inferior part of reason did not reveal the death as wished against but as neutral.\textsuperscript{286}

As the first opinion holds that the inferior part of Christ’s will wished for the death absolutely and wished against it conditionally, did this indicate that the inferior part of Christ’s will had two contrary acts at the same time? Scotus answers that the will did not have two contrary acts because the conditional wishing against was latent or habitual, since unrealized conditions hindered Christ’s will to wish against his death.\textsuperscript{287} Scotus explains that the will wishes against a thing conditionally when it wishes against a thing because of a condition. When a condition is fulfilled, the will wishes against actually, but when a condition is not fulfilled the wishing against is hindered. Christ would wish against his death if the human race could be saved by another means, but because the condition “the human race could be saved by another means” was not fulfilled, it hindered the actual wishing against death. Therefore, the will wished against the death habitually, which was sufficient for sadness. Scotus thinks that when something impedes the wishing, the will wishes \textit{secundum quid}, but when nothing hinders the will it wishes \textit{simpliciter}. As the wishing against was hindered, the will wished against the death \textit{secundum quid} and since the will wished against the death habitually it was able to wish for the death actually.\textsuperscript{288} However, Drummond proposes another quite speculative explanation how the will is able to wish a thing and to wish against a thing conditionally at the same time. When Drummond describes the Aristotelian example of a merchant who throws goods into the sea, he explains that, according to Scotus, before a merchant wishes to throw goods into the sea, the will had an act about an end, which is the reason why a merchant wishes against throwing. Such willing against leaves a habit in the will and, therefore, the will habitually wishes against the throwing.\textsuperscript{289}

Following Scotus, William Ockham also held that the will can have passions.\textsuperscript{290} He expounds that a passion is a form of the appetitive power which requires actual cognition and which can be regulated by the

\textsuperscript{286} “Declaratur hoc, quia ratio inferior, si ostendat a sine circumstantia finis ultimi, propter quam a est volendum, ostendit a non ut volendum, nec tamen ut nolendum, sed quasi neutrum, quia determinabile circumstantiis volibilittatis, non autem determinatum ad nolibilitatem, quia tunc non esset per alium volibile.” John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 531.

\textsuperscript{287} John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505; \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 505.

\textsuperscript{288} John Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 528; \textit{Reportatio} lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478–479.

\textsuperscript{289} Drummond 2012, 69–70.

\textsuperscript{290} For more about William Ockham on the passions of the will, see Hirvonen 2004, 107–170; Knuutila 2004, 272.
right reason. Sadness and the joy of the will are passions of the will. Ockham differs from Scotus in arguing that the will has sadness only when the will wishes against a thing absolutely or conditionally, because the act of the wishing against causes the sadness of the will. The will does not have sadness when an object is naturally unsuitable for the will or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Like Scotus, Ockham also separates the act of the will from the sadness of the will because the will can wish against a thing without sadness. However, unlike Scotus, Ockham thinks that the will can wish against a thing which takes place without sadness since, for instance, God can prevent the act of wishing against from causing sadness.

Although Peter Auriol argued that the will cannot have passions, he held that the will can have sadness as an act of the will. However, Auriol was the first to claim that Christ’s will did not have sadness at all, even though Christ’s exterior sensitive appetitive power had pain and the interior sensitive appetitive power had sadness as a passion. Auriol is aware that he steps back from the traditional doctrine that Christ’s will had sadness in one form or another, but he justifies his opinion by claiming that,

291 “[…] dico quod per passionem intelligo omnem formam existentem in potentia appetitiva natam reguli ratione recta ad hoc quod sit recta, quae requirit actualem cognitionem ad suum esse existentem. […] Ex isto sequitur quod tam actus appetitus sensitivi, et breviter omnes, quam actus voluntatis quam etiam delectatio et tristitia quae sunt in voluntate, sunt passiones; quia omnia ista sunt formae distinctae a cognitione, et sunt subjecte in potentiis appetitivis, et sunt regulabiles recta ratione mediate vel immediate, et requirunt actualem cognitionem ad suam existentiam.” William Ockham, Quodlibeta 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 186–187).

292 “Et utraque tam volitio quam nolitio absoluta et condicionata est sufficiens ad causandum tristitiam et delectationem modo prius declarato. Ex quibus patet quot illi duo modi quos loamines ponit causare delectationem et tristitiam non sunt veri.” William Ockham, Quaestiones variae q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 265).

293 “Sed delectatio et tristitia distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet ex hoc quod actus voluntatis possunt remanere sine delectatione et tristitia,” William Ockham, Quodlibeta 2, q. 17 (OTh. IX, 187).

294 “Similiter, cum angelus bonus habeat actum nolendi respectu multorum quorum opposita eveniant, puta angelus bonus deputatus ad custodiam hominis habeat actum nolendi respectu peccati hominis absolute et tamen homo peccat, quare non tristatur ex hoc sicut homines et angeli malii: […] Vel potest dici, sive velit aliquid absolute sive condicionatier cuius oppositum accidit, non tamen tristitia causatur; vel per miraculum, puta quia Deus non concurrat cum tali volitione ad causandum tristitiam; vel quia tristitia et summa delectatio sibi repugnant quoad potentiam creatam, sicut prius dictum est.” William Ockham, Quaestiones variae q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 267; 257–258; 270).

295 See Chapter 3.1.

296 “Tunc dico, quod dolor de passione fuit vehementissimus in appetitu exteriori. […] De appetitu autem interiori dico, quod in corde habuit dolorem non summum sed temperatum […] Tertio dico, quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, MS M., fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Unlike Auriol, Walter Chatton thinks that Christ’s will had sadness because the will wished against the death conditionally. The sadness of the will was not a passion, but the act of the will or the indirect cause of the passion. (Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, p. 125–126.)
according to Hugh of Saint Victor, Christ felt the greatest pain only in the flesh.  

Since the sensitive appetitive power of Christ’s human soul had sadness but his will did not have it, Auriol thinks that Christ’s affectivity differed from the affectivity of all other human beings. Auriol explains that normally the interior sensitive appetitive power is connected with the will, so that when the will has an act, the interior sensitive appetite has a similar act. For example, when the will has love, the interior sensitive appetitive power has love and a corporeal change follows.  

The coincidence of the acts of the will and the sensitive appetitive power results from the coincidence of the judgments of the intellect and the estimative power. When the will has an act, the intellect has a corresponding judgment, and when the intellect has a judgment, the estimative power has a similar judgment because the intellect is turned towards the senses. Since the act of the sensitive appetitive power follows from the judgment of the estimative power, the interior sensitive appetitive power has an act when the will has an act.  

However, according to Auriol, when Christ’s exterior sensitive appetite had the greatest pain a human being can ever have and his
interior sensitive appetite had mild sadness, Christ’s will had only joy. Christ’s interior sensitive appetitive power and the will did not have similar acts because Christ’s intellect was able to know without turning towards the senses, since Christ’s intellect knew things in the Word of God and through the infused intelligible species. Therefore, the intellect and the estimative power were able to judge differently and the interior appetitive power was able to have sadness when the will had joy as an act of the will. In this respect, Christ’s human soul differed from the souls of all other human beings.

In contrast to Auriol’s view, Walter Chatton thinks that the will and the sensitive appetitive power in ordinary human beings can have dissimilar acts simultaneously because the will does not move the sensitive appetitive power directly. For example, when the sensitive appetitive power desires fornication, the will can wish against fornication at the same time. Chatton holds that this is possible since only a contrary passion destroys the passion of the sensitive appetitive power instantaneously, but the will cannot cause a contrary passion except through the imagination, which does not take place instantly. Therefore, it is possible for the will to wish against fornication while the sensitive appetitive power desires it.

300 “Tunc dico quod dolor de passione fuit vehementissimus in appetitu exteriori. [...] De appetitu autem interiori dico quod in corde habuit dolorem non summum sed temperatum qualem docet virtuosum.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 76r–76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 457–458. Sadness was mild because Christ’s estimative power considered Christ’s joy. (Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 77r, the 1605 printed edition p. 459.)

301 “Tertio dico quod nullus actus doloris fuit in voluntate. [...] nam dolor de passione erat in carne ut in subiecto. Sed gaudium de fruitione in voluntate non esset in corpore vel corde.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

302 “Intellectus qui in actu suo non utitur organo nec alligatur ad phantasmata non sequitur necessario est conforme iudicium potentiae illius organi. Sed intellectus animae Christi est hic. Ergo etc. Assumptum probatur quia Christus vel iudicabat per species infusas vel videbat in Verbo et ideo non egebat potentia organica scilicet phantasia.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 76v, the 1605 printed edition p. 458. For Auriol on the knowledge of Christ, see Chapter 1.4.

303 “[...] dico quod in Christo intra intellectum et aestimativam non fuit colligantia in conformiter iudicando. Cuius oppositum est in nobis quia nullum actum habere possimus quin habcamus illum conformem aestimativae. Sed ubi intellectus est separatus sed non quod oportet quod utatur specie fantastica sicut est in Christo qui habuit species infusas vel innatas. Ubi sic est non oportet habere omnem actum conformem iudicio aestimativae. Et ex hoc Christus potuit dimittere stare iudicio aestimativae et iudicare secundum intellectum bonum est pati et tamen non oportet quod iudicet hoc aestimativae. Et ideo simul ad eliciendum illum fuerunt talis dolor in corde et iudicium tale aestimativae cum alio iudicium intellectus et actu voluntatis non dolentes.” Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in III librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS M1, fol. 76v–77r, the 1605 printed edition p. 458.

304 “Item, ad volitionem aliquam qua quis vult fornicari, sequitur vehementia cogitatione et vehementia imaginatio, qua mediante causatur alteratio humorum circa cor et cordis illam imaginacionem consequentem sequitur passio concupiscientiae in appetitu sensitivo, si quae posita et stante, aut potest homo librare exsequi, et habetur propositum. Aut non, sed e
3.7. Pain and Joy

“Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. [...] Pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong.”

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that pleasure and pain are incompatible since a person who takes pleasure in something cannot feel pain. Aristotle’s idea was puzzling when related to Christ because medieval theologians thought that Christ had great pain and beatific joy at the same time. In this chapter, I study how theologians solved this problem.

Alexander of Hales states that the joy of the superior part of Christ’s reason seemed to exclude sadness because perfect joy implies the total absence of unsuitable conditions but sadness indicates union with an unsuitable condition. Alexander argues, however, that the superior part of Christ’s reason had perfect joy and sadness at the same time because the
superior part of reason as reason had joy but reason as nature had sadness.\textsuperscript{309}
Following Alexander, the \textit{Summa Halensis} holds that although the greatest
joy weakens sadness maximally,\textsuperscript{310} the joy of Christ’s will did not weaken
the pain of the will because joy and pain were not in the same part of the will
as the will as reason had joy but the will as nature had pain.\textsuperscript{311}

Unlike these early Franciscans, Bonaventure thought that the
superior part of reason was able to have pain and joy at the same time because
pain and joy were not contrary. He explains that they were not contraries,
since pain was about death whereas joy was about God, and joy was in the
superior part of reason per se because of its gratuitous union with divine
nature, but pain was in the superior part \textit{per accidens} because of its natural
union with the flesh.\textsuperscript{312} Further reasons why the superior part simultaneously
had joy and pain were that the superior part of reason rejoiced about pain
since Christ’s pain was the matter of his joy\textsuperscript{313} and pain and joy did not
weaken each other because Christ was the only human being whose superior
part of reason was turned towards God and the flesh at the same time.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{309} “Ibi fuit passio; et illa, sicut dictum est, pervenit ad superiorem partem rationis ut est
natura, sed ratio ut ratio vincebat omnino illam, quia in illa fuit gaudium.” Alexander of Hales,
\textit{Quaestiones disputatae}, q. 16, d. 4, memb. 3, p. 260.

\textsuperscript{310} “Passio, quae magis habet sibi coniunctam delectationem minor est, et quae maxime
coniunctam minima est; sed Christus semper fruebatur; ergo minimam habuit passionem.”
\textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 5, cap. 1, p. 214. The \textit{Summa
Halensis} also states that, according to Augustine, a soul as a soul is united with the flesh, but
a soul as a spirit is not united with the flesh. Because Christ’s human soul as a soul had a
passion and the soul as a spirit had the greatest joy, the different parts of the soul had joy and
a passion at the same time. (\textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars 1, inq. 1, tract. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3,
memb. 1, p. 61; tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 1, p. 198.)

\textsuperscript{311} “[...] dicendum quod delectatio fuit in voluntate ut est ratio, passio vero in voluntate ut
est natura, et ideo non ex eadem parte fuit delectatio et passio.” \textit{Summa theologica} lib. 3, pars
1, inq. 1, tract. 5, q. 1, memb. 5, cap. 1, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{312} “Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probabilia,
videlicet quod gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non
sunt respectu eiusdem nec omnino codem modo insunt eadem, sed unum inest per se, alterum
per accidens: quia gaudium inest propter coniunctionem gratuam ipsius cum Deitate, sed
dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem ipsius cum carne; et quia non sunt affectiones
contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem partem.” Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a.
2, q. 2. (III, 356). Adams also studies Bonaventure’s view of the simultaneity of joy and pain.
(Adams 1999, 47–49.)

\textsuperscript{313} “Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huissiodi dolor et gaudium non sunt contraria,
sed unum est materiale respectu alterius: et ideo simul eadem inesse poterat, sicut in viro
poenitente videmus, quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum
naturam corpori patienti commatiatur, tamen de illa passione et compassionse laetabatur.”
Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356).

\textsuperscript{314} “Tertia suppositio est, quod Christus simul erat viator et comprehensor, ita quod viatoris
cognitio non impediabat comprehensoris cognitionem, nec affectio affectionem; et illud fuit
in Christo singulari propter officium mediatoris, quo debeat experiri et divina et humana.
Unde sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos, ita quod una
illarum conversionum alteram non impediabat nec retardabat: sie potuit secundum eandem
partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a
gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore patetetur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem.”
Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d. 16, a. 2, q. 2. (III, 356). In his \textit{Breuioloquium}, Bonaventure argues that
Unlike Bonaventure, Albert the Great held that the greatest joy and the greatest sadness were contrary. Since they were contrary, it seemed that Christ’s reason did not have them at the same time because, according to Aristotle, contraries cannot be in the same subject at the same time. However, Albert explains that contraries can be in the same subject when one of them is the cause and the matter of another. Christ had joy and sadness simultaneously because sadness was the cause and the matter of joy, since Christ enjoyed his sadness. Albert criticizes the solution of the early Franciscans because, according to Albert, the division between reason as nature and reason as reason is conceptual, but a conceptual division cannot explain how contraries can be in the same subject at the same time.

that the superior part of Christ’s reason as reason had great joy because it was united with God, but the superior part of reason as nature suffered since it was united with the flesh. Bonaventure thinks that the superior part of reason of the human being cannot normally suffer and have joy at the same time, but Christ was exceptional in this respect. (Bonaventure, Breuiloquium pars 4, cap 9, p. 250.)

“Dicit philosophum, quod contraria non sunt simul in eodem secundum idem. Sed summus dolor et summus gaudium sunt contraria. Ergo non sunt simul in eodem. Ergo non secundum rationem Christus summam habuit tristitiam, cum secundum rationem frueretur aperta vision dei, quae est summum gaudium, ut dicit Augustinus.” Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227. Aristotle, Metaphysica IV.6, 1011b17–19; lib. 5, c. 10, 1018a24–26. Albert remarks that joy and sadness seemed to be equal (ex aequo) because they were about equal things since Christ’s reason apprehended the death as unsuitable and the fruition as suitable. However, according to Aristotle, reason cannot think about two equal things at the same time (Aristotle, Topica II.10, 114b33–35.), which seems to imply that the appetitive power related to reason was not able to have joy and sadness at the same time. Albert, however, argues that joy and sadness were not equal because reason did not apprehend two equal things at the same time since it considered the death as means and the redemption as an end. Therefore, the appetitive power was able to have joy about the redemption and pain about the death at the same time. (Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227–228; tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208.) Thomas Aquinas explained that since Christ’s intellect was able to know the divine essence and the sense of touch was able to perceive the injury of the flesh at the same time, Christ was able to have joy and pain at the same time. Even if the intellect, the senses and the imagination could not be aware of different things at the same time, the inferior appetitive power can have pain and the superior appetitive power can have joy simultaneously because the same thing known can cause pain and joy in different appetitive powers. (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 10, ad. 10.)

“Et similiter tristitia et gaudium ex parte affectus non sunt ex aequo, sed unum de altero ut gaudium de passione. Et ita patet, quod non est inconveniens contraria inesse eidem simul, quorum unum est causa et alterum causatum, et quorum unum est materiale et alterum finis rationis.” Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227–228; tract. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 208; Sententiae lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, p. 272.

Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227. Albert also rejects supernatural explanations. He explains that, according to one solution, only Christ’s reason was able to have the greatest pain and joy at the same time because Christ’s human nature was united with the divine nature. Christ’s reason as related to the divine nature had the greatest joy and his reason as related to the flesh had the greatest sadness. Albert does not accept this solution because it implies that Christ was different human being than others since Christ had a different reason than others did. According to another solution, Christ was able to have two contraries in his reason because Christ as God was omnipotence. Albert thinks that this solution is not plausible because it entails that Christ’s reason had sadness miraculously but, according to Albert, reason had it naturally. (Albert the Great, De incarnatione tract. 6, q. 1, a. 9, p. 227.) According to Albert, one might try to solve the problem by arguing that pain and
Thomas Aquinas’s innovative solution was based on his view about the passibility of the powers. He holds that although the superior part of reason had joy, it was also touched by pain because it had joy about its object but pain as it was rooted in the essence of the soul. This pain was not located in the intellectual power and did not cause any real change to it. Aquinas obviously thinks that he is in line with the Franciscan theologians because in Aquinas’s terminology this means that the superior part of Christ’s reason as reason had joy and the superior part of reason as nature had pain. The inferior part of reason, the sensitive appetitive power and the sense of touch also had sadness and pain because of an object (i.e. the injury of the flesh), although in different ways. Aquinas admits that contraries impede each other, but he claims that Christ’s pain, sadness and joy were not contrary. They were not contrary because they were not about the same object, pain and sadness could be the object of the joy, and they were not in the same power (and if they were in the same power, they were different acts of the power).

According to Aristotle, intensive pain not only hinders joy as its opposite, but any kind of joy, which implies that pain and sadness impede joy even if they are not contrary. Aquinas says that pain and sadness may

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joy were not contrary because they were about different objects. However, Albert does not accept this since he thinks that joy and pain were contrary at least in their effects but he does not clarify what the effects were. (Albert the Great, *Sententiae* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, p. 272–273.)

318 “Relinquitur igitur quod superiorem rationem attingebat ipse dolor, in quantum in esse animae radicatur, et erat ibi gaudium summum in quantum per actum suum Deo fruebatur; et sic ipsum gaudium conveniebat rationi superiori per se, quia per actum proprium, dolor autem quasi per accidentem, quia ratione essentiae animae, in qua fundatur.” Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26 a. 10 co; ad 9; *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 ad 5; *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 46, a. 8 ad 1. For Aquinas on the simultaneity of pain and joy, see also Gondreau 2002, 441–452. Following Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise claims that the superior part of reason as nature had pain and the superior part of reason as reason had joy. Peter holds that reason as nature was reason as rooted in the nature of the soul, but unlike Aquinas, he adds that therefore reason had a natural desire to preserve a human being. Peter explains that pain and joy were not contrary because the pain of the superior part of reason was about the injury of the flesh as such, whereas joy was about the injury of the flesh as related to the redemption of the human race. (Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV libros sententiarum commentaria* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, p. 113.)

319 “[... ] sed in ratione inferiori et in sensualitate et in sensu erat tristitia et dolor, etiam secundum comparationem ad objecta, inquantum secundum has potentias dolebat de poena corporis et aliis hujusmodi: qui tamen dolor erat quoddammodo materia gaudii fruitions, inquantum gaudium illud se extendebat ad omnia illa quae apprehenduntur ut Deo placita. Et sic patet quod dolor qui erat in anima Christi, nullo modo gaudium fruitions impediabat, neque per modum contrarietas, neque per modum redundantiae. Tristitia enim contrarium gaudium impediit, sicut quoddam coniugium impediit a suo contrario. Tristitia autem quae erat in anima Christi, nullo modo gaudio fruitions contraria erat: quod patet ex tribus. Primo, quia non inerat eidem secundum idem, sed vel in diversis potentiis erat, vel in eadem secundum diversam operationem; secundo, quia non erat de eodem; tertio, quia unum erat materia alterius, sicut accidit in poenitente qui dolet, et de dolore gaudet.” Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 ad 5; *De veritate* q. 26, a. 10 ad 9; *Summa theologiae* IIIª q. 46, a. 8 ad 1.
impede any kind of joy because the sadness and pain of one power can overflow into other powers. He explains that the overflow takes place between the powers of the soul and between a soul and flesh because the powers of the soul are united (colligantia) in one essence and a soul and flesh are united in one existence of the soul-flesh composite. According to Aquinas, the overflow explains why the apprehension of the soul sometimes heats or cools the flesh or why joy, sadness and love sometimes cause health, illness or even death. It also explains why the change of the flesh touches a soul, why an act of the sensitive appetitive power follows from an intense act of the will, why an intense contemplation impedes an act of the inferior powers, and why intense passion of the sensual appetite clouds reason.

According to Aquinas, the overflow between the powers of the soul belongs to the normal order of nature. However, Christ was able to prevent the overflow between the powers whenever he wished since the natural order was subject to his will because of the divine arrangement. Therefore, Christ’s joy did not expel his pain and sadness since the joy of Christ’s superior power did not overflow into inferior powers, into the essence of the soul and into the powers as they were rooted in the essence of the soul. Aquinas explains that joy did not overflow into the essence of the

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320 “Sed ulterius omnis tristitia, secundum philosophum in VII Eth., impedit omnem delectationem per quamdam redundantium, secundum quod nocuementum unius potentiae redundat in aliam.” Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 ad 5; De veritate q. 26, a. 10 arg. 2; ad 2.
321 “[...] secundum naturae ordinem, propter colligiantiam virium animae in una essentia et animae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus invicem in se effluent quod in aliquo eorum superabundat;” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 10 co.
322 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26, a. 10 co, Aquinas’s view of colligantia and overflow has similarities with Peter of John Olivi’s teaching of colligantia. For example, like Aquinas, Olivi thinks that colligantia takes place between the powers of the soul and between a soul and flesh. Since Aquinas does not explain the nature of colligantia and overflow in detail, it is not clear whether it includes efficient causality, whereas Olivi explicitly argues that it does not. For Peter of John Olivi on colligantia, see Toivanen 2013, 70–75.
323 “In Christo autem secus est, nam propter divinam virtutem Verbi, eius voluntati subjectus erat ordo naturae; unde poterat hoc contingere ut non fieret praedicta redundantia sive ex anima in corpus vel e verso, sive ex superioribus virtibus in inferiores vel e verso, virtute Verbi id faciente, ut comprobaretur veritas humanae naturae quantum ad singulas partes eius, ut decenter impletur quantum ad omnia nostrae restorationis mysterium, [...] Sic ergo patet quod, cum in ratione superiori esset summum gaudium, in quantum per eius operationem anima Deo fruebatur, ipsum gaudium in superiori ratione persistebat, et non derivabatur ad inferiores vires animae neque ad corpus; alias nullus dolor nec passio in eo esse potuisset. Et sic effectus fruitionis non pervenit ad essentiam animae in quantum est forma corporis, neque in quantum est radix inferiorum virium; sic enim et ad corpus et ad inferiores vires pervenisset, ut accidit in beatis post resurrectionem.” Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26 a. 10 co; Super Sent. lib. 3, d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2 ad 5; a. 2, q. 1 co; Summa theologiae IIIª q. 15 a. 6 co; a. 5 ad 3; q. 14 a. 1 ad 2; Compendium theologiae lib. 1 cap. 231.
soul as it was the form of the body because Christ’s flesh was not glorified and as it was the root of the inferior powers since joy did not expel sensory pain and sadness. Joy reached the essence of the soul only in that it was the root of the superior reason.\(^\text{324}\)

In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas proposes a detailed view of how sadness and joy are contraries, but he does not apply the idea to Christ’s pain and joy. According to Aquinas, an object specifies sadness and pleasure. They are contraries generally as sadness escapes and joy pursues an object. When they are about the same object, they are contrary specifically. For example, sadness about death and joy about death are contrary specifically. Aquinas explains that sadness and joy are not contrary specifically when objects are separated or opposed. When objects are separated, then also sadness and joy are separated, and when objects are opposed, then sadness and joy have mutual fittingness. For example, pleasure about good and sadness about evil can be in the same subject at the same time.\(^\text{325}\)

Following Aquinas’s general view on how sadness and joy are contrary, Richard Middleton argued that although sadness and joy in the superior part of the soul were contrary, the same power of Christ was able to have them at the same time because they were related to different objects. Joy was about God and about the injury of the flesh as it pleased the divine will, and sadness was about the injury as it was contrary to human nature and the innocence of the sufferer.\(^\text{326}\) Peter of Palude appears to hold confusingly

\(^{324}\) "Si enim consideretur essentia animae in passione Christi prout est actus corporis, sic fruitor ad eam non perveniatebat: alias corpus eius gloriosum factum fuisset. Similiter nec ad essentiam, secundum quod est radix inferiorum virium: quia sic fruitionis gaudium dolorem passionis, qui erat in viribus inferioribus, totaliter evacuasset. Perveniebat autem ad essentiam animae secundum quod est radix superioris rationis. Et quia essentia animae est simplex, et est tota in qualibet potentia; ideo dicitur quod tota anima fruebatur in Christo: in quantum scilicet est radix superioris rationis; et tota patiebatur: in quantum scilicet est radix inferiorum virium." Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 2 co; *Summa theologiae* III\(^{4}\) q. 46 a. 8 co.

\(^{325}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I\(^{1}\)–IIae q. 35 a. 4 co; a. 3 co.

\(^{326}\) "[...] contraria, quae specificantur ex sui comparatione ad alium cuiusmodi sunt tristitia, et gaudium, quae specificantur ex sui comparatione ad objecta possunt esse in codem, secundum rem diuerso, tamen quantum ad rationes, et comparationes diuersas: unde in eadem potentia animae Christi secundum rem potuit esse gaudium in comparatione ad superiori cauساm, et in comparatione ad corporis passionem inquantum comprachendebatur, ut diuinae placitae voluntati: et in eadem potentia potuit esse tristitia inquantum comparabatur ad suum radicem scilicet animae essentiam: et per comparationem ad ipsam passionem inquantum apprehendebatur ut contrario bono naturae patientis: et in comparatione ad patientis innocentiām." Richard Middleton, *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169. The inferior part of Christ’s human soul had sadness and the superior part of his soul had joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary, as they were not about the same object and sadness was a matter of joy since the superior part
that joy and pain in Christ were not contrary because the objects of the joy and pain were not contrary (i.e. the divine essence and a temporal injury). However, this opinion remains obscure since Peter does not explain why pain and joy about contrary things would be contrary (e.g. joy about virtue and sadness about sin). He also adds that Christ’s pain and joy were not contrary for the further reason that the pain of the will was natural pain, but the joy of the will was supernatural joy. He explains that a person cannot normally have supernatural joy and natural pain at the same time because of the common law of justice, but as Christ lived under the special law he had them simultaneously. Scotus’s view about the simultaneity of joy and pain shows similarities with Aquinas’s view, although their ideas of joy and sadness apprehended that sadness pleased God’s will. (Richard Middleton, Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi lib. 3, d. 15, a. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169.)

327 “Dolor autem iste et gaudium in Christo bene potuerunt simul esse: quia non habent contrarietatem adinuicem nam in contrariis causatis ab aliis secundum modum causarum accipiendus est modus effectuum. [...]. Cum igitur dolor et gaudium solum habeant contrarietatem ex relatione ad alia cum sint motus quidam et passiones que habent contrarietatem semper ex relatione ad alia: et tale gaudium et dolor in Christo accipiantur ex relatione ad alia que inter se contrarietatem non habent: sicut gaudium ex relatione ad essentiam diuinam et dolor ex relatione ad aliquod temporale quid diuine essentie non contrariatur.” Peter of Palude, Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum d. 14, q. 2, p. 82v–83r. Peter reports three opinions for why Christ was able to have pain and joy at the same time. According to the first opinion, which remains that of Peter Auriol’s view, as the sensitive part of Christ’s human soul had only pain and the intellectual part of the soul had only joy, Christ had great pain and joy at the same time because the different parts of the soul had them. Peter states that this opinion is opposed to John of Damascus’s view that Christ had a sad intelligence (mestam intelligentiam), which implies that the intellectual part of Christ’s human soul had sadness. According to the second opinion, a soul can be considered as nature and as power. Christ’s human soul as nature had pain, but the soul as power had joy. Peter says that this opinion involves several problems. First, it indicates that the same had pain and joy at the same time because joy overflowed from the soul as power into the soul as nature. Second, since a bond between the soul as nature and the soul as power is greater than a bond between the soul as nature and the sensitive powers of the soul, and the soul as nature suffered when the sensitive power had a passion, therefore also the soul as power suffered when the soul as nature suffered. According to the third opinion, which Peter seems to favour, Christ’s human soul can be considered as nature, as the inferior reason and as the superior reason. The whole soul as nature suffered since Christ’s sensitive and intellectual souls suffered. However, whereas the inferior reason had pain, the superior reason did not. (Peter of Palude, Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum d. 14, q. 2, p. 82v.)

328 “Primum patet: quia videtur quod fruiqu et dolor naturalis non contrariantur formaliter et ideo simul possunt stare de potentia absoluta: quia non sunt unius generis [... ] qua contraria formaliter sunt unius generis cuiusmodi non sunt naturale et supernaturale: sed secundum legem communem iusticie non simil si stant vera damnatio et quodcumque gaudium: quia ab omni gaudio illi merentur excludi. similiter vera Gloria et dolor cuiuscunque: sed lege speciali: quia Christus debuit esse comprehensor et viator: quia essentia merendi et satisfaciendi sunt in actu voluntatis cadem congruentia cum actu fruendi statab actus merendi et actus satisfaciendo. dolor autem voluntatis quem de morte habuit fuit meritorius et pro nobis satisfactorius. unde in sola voluntate Christi beate cum summo gaudio fuit dolor: sicut in illa sola cum premio fuit meritum.” Peter of Palude, Tertium scriptum super tertium sententiarum d. 14, q. 2, p. 83r.
According to Scotus, the superior part of Christ’s will had sadness and joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary. Scotus explains that as the passions of the will are dependent on an object essentially, joy and sadness are opposed only when they are about the same object. Scotus remarks that, according to Aristotle, a great pleasure prevents all kind of sadness and, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time because the intense act of one power prevents the intense acts of other powers. Scotus describes that this is so because the powers are united (colligantia) with each other and the pleasure and sadness of one power overflow into other powers. However, the greatest joy in the superior part of Christ’s will did not overflow into the superior part of the will as it considered the death, the inferior part of the will or the sensitive appetitive power because of a miracle.

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329 According to Scotus, the superior part of Christ’s will had sadness and joy at the same time because sadness and joy were not contrary. Scotus explains that as the passions of the will are dependent on an object essentially, joy and sadness are opposed only when they are about the same object. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 392–393; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.) Scotus remarks that, according to Aristotle, a great pleasure prevents all kind of sadness and, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time because the intense act of one power prevents the intense acts of other powers. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 361–363; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 477.) Scotus describes that this is so because the powers are united (colligantia) with each other and the pleasure and sadness of one power overflow into other powers. However, the greatest joy in the superior part of Christ’s will did not overflow into the superior part of the will as it considered the death, the inferior part of the will or the sensitive appetitive power because of a miracle. (John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 394–395; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478; 479.) When Peter of Aquila studies the simultaneity of Christ’s pain and joy in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he proposes four opinions about it. Three of them are verbatim the same opinions which Peter of Palude proposes in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. The fourth opinion is Peter of Aquila’s view, which he claims to be the same as Scotus’s opinion. According to Peter, Christ had maximal pain due to the injury of his flesh and joy did not weaken this pain, as joy did not overflow from a soul into the flesh. Christ’s deliberative will did not have sadness because it did not wish against the death, but the will as nature had sadness since it wished against the death. Peter states that Christ’s pain and joy were not contraries because they were not in the same way in the same subject and the object of the pain differed from the object of the joy. (Peter of Aquila, *Commentaria in quatuor Libros Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 123–125.)

330 John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 392–393; *Reportatio* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479. When Peter of Aquila studies the simultaneity of Christ’s pain and joy in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he proposes four opinions about it. Three of them are verbatim the same opinions which Peter of Palude proposes in his *Commentary on the Sentences*. The fourth opinion is Peter of Aquila’s view, which he claims to be the same as Scotus’s opinion. According to Peter, Christ had maximal pain due to the injury of his flesh and joy did not weaken this pain, as joy did not overflow from a soul into the flesh. Christ’s deliberative will did not have sadness because it did not wish against the death, but the will as nature had sadness since it wished against the death. Peter states that Christ’s pain and joy were not contraries because they were not in the same way in the same subject and the object of the pain differed from the object of the joy. (Peter of Aquila, *Commentaria in quatuor Libros Sententiarum* lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 123–125.)

superior part of the will as it considered the death, the inferior part of the will or the sensitive appetitive power because of a miracle.  

A new feature in Scotus’s thinking is his argument that although joy effects an expansion and sadness a constriction of the heart, Christ was able to have joy and pain at the same time. He explains that either the joy of Christ’s will did not change his heart since this joy did not overflow into his heart, or joy and sadness moved his heart equally or unequally. If joy and sadness moved Christ’s heart equally, then the heart was not moved because the changes of the heart impeded each other, and if joy and sadness moved his heart unequally, then one of the changes of the heart dominated the other.  

Like Aquinas and Scotus, William Ockham thought that the will of Christ had sadness and joy at the same time because of a miracle, which he elucidated with new examples. According to Ockham, joy naturally destroys sadness, but God can prevent the corruptible action of the joy. Since God prevented the corruptible action of Christ’s joy, Christ had joy, pain and sadness at the same time.  

Peter Auriol’s solution to the problem of how Christ was able to have joy, pain and sadness at the same time included new medical ideas. Auriol traditionally held that although joy and pain were contrary, Christ could have them simultaneously since they were in separate powers: Christ’s exterior appetitive power had pain and his will had joy. Auriol remarks  

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332 John Duns Scotus, Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 394–395; Reportatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 478; 479.
333 "Unde potest dici, uno modo, quod gaudium non redundabit in cor, quia etiam non redundabat in portionem inferiorem; unde gaudium potentiae voluntatis Christi, quod habuit circa objectum aeternum, non redundabat in candem potentiam circa alium objectum; ideo nec est mirum si non redundabat in cor. - Vel aliter, quod aut gaudium et tristitia circa cor fuerunt aequalia, aut non? Si sic, ergo non movebatur motu dilatationis nec constrictionis, quia tunc unum impediret actionem alterius […] Si autem fuerunt inaequalia, tunc unum dominabatur, et qualitercumque fuerit corpus eius, constringebatur; unde contristabatur cor eius, - nec tantum dilatabatur per gaudium sicut si esset per tristitiam commotum. Et ideo non tantum redundantium habitu gaudium super cor eius, sicut dolor aut tristitia." John Duns Scotus, Lectura lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 395–396; Reportatio lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, p. 479.
334 "Per hoc patet ad secundum de Christo quod nolitio condicionata sufficit ad causandum tristitiam, [sed Deus] suspendit miraculose, ultra generalem influentiam, actionem summæ delectationis respectu illius tristitiae corrumpendae. Quia summa illa delectatio, quantum est ex natura sua, expelleret omnes tristitiam si aliqua inesset, et impediret ne causaretur si non inesset, nisi eius actio corruptiva et expulsiva suspenderetur per potentiam Dei. Sicut Deus concurrit secundum generalem influentiam cum corpore ad movendum se de uno loco ad alium, et istud corpus expelleret alium corpus de alio loco ne simul exsistant, nisi eius actio expulsiva suspendatur per miraculum. In angelo autem bono, licet concurrat secundum generalem influentiam cum volitione condicionata ad causandum tristitiam, tamen non suspendit activitatem illius summæ delectationis respectu tristitiae destruendae. Et propter hoc in angelo bono non causatur tristitia sicut in Christo, quantumcumque objectum nolitum eveniat." William Ockham, Quaestiones variae q. 6, a. 9 (OTh. VIII, 269; 264).
335 "Nunc his praemissis deduco sic solutionem prima difficultatis. Arguo sic duo actus vitales oppositi non [sunt in] <insunt> complete eidem essentiae sed solum potentiae, quod
that this indicates that Christ’s human soul had intense pain and intense joy at the same time, but, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time.\footnote{336} Auriol’s new point was that the problem arises because all bodily powers require spirits. He explains that when one power has an intense act, the spirits multiply in the organ of the power and the organs of other bodily powers lose the spirits, such that the acts of these powers become weak.\footnote{337} The acts of incorporeal powers like the intellect and the will do not require the spirits directly.\footnote{338} However, the act of the will requires the spirits indirectly because when the will has an intense act, the intellect and the estimative power also have an intense act. When the estimative power has an intense act, the spirits multiply in the organ of the estimative power and, as a consequence, other bodily powers have fewer spirits and they cannot have an intense act. Therefore, since the act of the will requires the spirits through the acts of the intellect and the estimative power, the greatest pain and the greatest joy cannot coexist at the same time. However, the intense act of Christ’s will did not weaken the act of the sensitive appetitive power because Christ’s intellect was not tied with the senses, as it knew things in the Word of God and it had the infused intelligible species. Therefore, the intense joy of Christ’s will did not require the spirits through the acts of the intellect and the estimative power, and joy did not weaken the pain of the exterior sensitive appetitive power.\footnote{339}
Walter Chatton argued against Auriol’s view that the same subject had joy and pain at the same time, because the immediate subject of vital acts such as joy and pain was the soul, not the power of the soul. Therefore, the subject of Christ’s pain and joy was his soul. Chatton argues that Auriol’s view that the same subject did not have pain and joy was inconsistent with Auriol’s other claims. Chatton explains that, according to Auriol, a power and a soul are the same thing and the subject of the vital act is a power. Since Auriol argued that the subject of Christ’s pain differed from the subject of the joy, and a power and a soul are the same thing, according to Chatton, this indicates that Christ had two souls. However, according to Chatton, Auriol claims that human beings have only one soul. Chatton adds that Auriol’s claim that Christ’s will did not have pain was also inconsistent. Chatton explains that since Auriol thinks that wishing against is a sadness of the will, it appears that Christ’s will had sadness because the will wished against the sins of the Jewish people and it conditionally wished against death.

According to Chatton, Christ’s human soul was able to have the joy of the will and the sadness of the appetitive power simultaneously because the conditional wishing against of the will could effect sadness in the sensitive appetitive power when the will had absolute wishing. Chatton explains that these two acts of Christ’s will were not contrary because the object of one act was a thing as such, but the object of the other act was a thing under a condition. Chatton applies Aristotle’s example about distress to demonstrate that the will can wish for a thing absolutely but wish against it conditionally at the same time. In this example, the will wishes for throwing of the goods absolutely and it wishes against the throwing of the goods conditionally. Although the will and the sensitive appetitive power

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340 Walter Chatton, Reportatio super sententias lib. 3, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, p. 125–126.
342 Peter Auriol, Commentarium in IV librum Sententiarum lib. 3, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, MS Ms, fol. 77va, the 1605 printed edition p. 460.
can have contrary acts at the same time, according to Chatton, the sensitive appetitive power cannot have contrary passions at the same time because, as Chatton claims against the view of Scotus, the heart cannot have the changes of expansion and constriction simultaneously.\textsuperscript{344}
CONCLUSIONS

The overall focus of this study concerned thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century academic discussions about the incarnation from the viewpoint of philosophical psychology as it was understood in medieval times. My study explored the following questions: what themes did the discussions about knowledge, will and passions in Christ’s human nature include, what were the main ideas in the psychology of the incarnation, and how was the teaching about Christ’s human soul related to psychology in natural philosophy. The investigation provided a new approach to the psychology of the incarnation in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theories by examining many unexplored sources and addressing them from the viewpoint of philosophical psychology rather than doctrinal theology.

As theologians studied the knowledge, will and passions of Christ separately, this study was also divided into a corresponding set of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examined the discussion about the knowledge of Christ, in the second chapter the discussion about the will of Christ, and in the third chapter the discussion about his passions. Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians began their study about the knowledge of Christ by considering the division of knowledge. Following Peter Lombard, they argued that Christ had divine knowledge and human knowledge and, following Richard of Saint Victor, they added that the human Christ also had experiential knowledge about singular matters. Alexander of Hales was one of the first thirteenth-century theologians to further divide the human knowledge of Christ. His division was significant, even though not all of his related ideas were long-lived. He claimed, for example, that Christ had human knowledge that was proper only to him, but the subsequent theologians did not adopt this view. From Alexander on, however, the standard view was that the human Christ had knowledge of the Word of God, knowledge of things in the Word of God, knowledge of things in themselves, and experiential knowledge.

The divine illumination of the intellect was a much debated theme in medieval theology. Related to this discussion, theologians asked whether Christ’s knowledge of the Word of God also required the light of glory. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas argued that it did, because the light of glory disposed Christ’s human soul to see the Word of God. However, John Duns Scotus held that such light was not needed since the Word of God gave a vision of itself directly to Christ’s intellect. Although theologians thought that Christ’s human intellect was the most perfect of created intellects, they stated that God also remained incomprehensible for the human Christ since he did not comprehend the infinity of God.

Medieval views about the omniscience of the human Christ reflected different opinions about the intellect’s abilities. Peter Lombard
taught that the human Christ knew everything that God knows, but not all theologians followed his view. Later theologians agreed that the question was centred on the knowledge about things in the Word of God, but they disagreed about whether the human Christ knew everything that God knows. Bonaventure was the first to suggest that the human Christ knew everything habitually, and later on the Franciscan theologians were disposed to follow his teaching. John Duns Scotus first argued in a radical way that Christ knew everything actually that can be known, since his human intellect had infinitely many acts, but Scotus also ended up proposing that the human Christ knew everything only habitually. Thomas Aquinas’s view was opposed to that of Bonaventure. He argued that the human Christ knew things actually in the Word of God, but not habitually, and he did not know everything because he did not know the divine unrealized possibilities. The Dominican theologians tended to follow Aquinas’s thinking. For example, Durand of St. Pourçain maintained that Christ did not know everything in the Word of God. However, his view was new in the sense that he held that Christ knew the essences of all things, including the essences of possible things, but not which of the things existed.

The intelligible species was a much-debated theme in medieval psychology, and it was treated also in the psychology of the incarnation. Medieval theologians thought that the human Christ knew things not only in the Word of God but also things in themselves, since he possessed infused intelligible species which God located in the intellect at the first instant of its existence. The idea of Christ’s infused intelligible species differed from the Aristotelian idea of acquired intelligible species treated in the commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. According to the standard Aristotelian view, the intellect acquires intelligible species through the senses, but the idea here was that Christ had intelligible species which were not acquired but poured into the intellect. Durand of St. Pourçain’s view about the knowledge of things in themselves was a new one, as he held that the intellect did not need intelligible species, which implied that Christ’s intellect did not have infused intelligible species. Scotus was the first to associate knowledge about things in themselves with abstract knowledge, and he argued that Christ had abstract knowledge about universals and particulars. Basing his idea on Aristotle’s view of how particulars are known in universals, Scotus held that Christ knew particulars through the intelligible species proper to particulars. Thus, Christ did not know an infinite number of particulars, but only some of them. However, Peter Auriol thought that Christ had abstract knowledge of all actual particulars and he knew particulars through the intelligible species of the universals.

One theme of the discussions about the knowledge of Christ was his experience. The notion of experience was discussed already in the twelfth century. Bernhard of Clairvaux and Anselm of Canterbury claimed that Christ had experiences, but Richard of Saint Victor was the first to argue
that Christ progressed in experiences. Thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians followed Richard’s teaching and they discussed what Christ’s experience was. Alexander of Hales argued that Christ experienced sensible things through the cognitive power and the penalties of sin such as pain and sadness through the affective power. Aquinas proposed two views about Christ’s experience. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he argued that experience was the experiential certitude which Christ’s human soul acquired without the intelligible species when the soul perceived things for the first time. In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas claimed that Christ’s experience was acquired knowledge which he gained through the senses when his agent intellect abstracted intelligible species from phantasms. Scotus associated experience with intuitive knowledge, while Peter Auriol stated that Christ had experiences in the Aristotelian sense of experience, which were not intuitive knowledge but knowledge acquired through memories.

Aquinas was the first to maintain that Christ acquired experiential knowledge because his agent intellect abstracted intelligible species. Since he thought that this knowledge was needed because an operation proper to Christ’s active intellect was to make intelligible species actual by abstracting them from phantasms, his view about Christ’s knowledge had a strong Aristotelian tone. Aquinas’s opinion implied that Christ knew the same thing through three cognitions: in the Word of God, and through infused and acquired intelligible species. Later on, theologians discussed the question of whether Christ had acquired knowledge, since it seemed to be useless because he also had infused conceptual knowledge. Peter of Palude stated that Christ had acquired knowledge, but he did not get it through the senses since God located it in Christ’s intellect. However, John Duns Scotus and Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not have acquired knowledge, because such knowledge does not differ from infused knowledge.

Since Aristotle thought that the intellect can know only one thing at the same time, this gave rise to a discussion about whether the intellect can have only one simultaneous act. This question was dealt with also in respect to Christ. Aquinas stated that Christ knew things in the Word of God actually. If Christ also knew actually the same things in themselves or through intelligible species, it would follow that Christ’s intellect had more than one act at the same time. While Aquinas did not study this possible outcome, Richard Middleton argued that Christ’s intellect was able to have more than one act at once. Scotus went further and explained in his early work that Christ’s intellect was able to have even infinitely many acts at the same time when the intellect saw things in the Word of God, but he later changed his mind.

In the second chapter, I studied thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century discussions about the will of Christ. The main themes of
the discussions were how the will of Christ was divided, whether the wills were contrary and whether Christ had free choice or free will. When John of Damascus wrote about the will of Christ, he stressed that Christ had divine will and human will. Hugh of Saint Victor further divided Christ’s human will, but more influential was Peter Lombard’s view that the human Christ had the will of reason and the will of sensuality as two different powers. This became the standard medieval view. Franciscan theologians like Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol added that the human Christ had as many wills of sensuality as he had senses, but Aquinas argued that he had only one will of sensuality. William of Auxerre was one of the first to follow Aristotle’s view that the will was in the rational part of the soul, and he argued that only the will of reason was a will in the proper sense. Later on, all theologians adopted this view.

One of the main divisions in respect to medieval teachings about the will involved its division into the will “as reason” and the will “as nature”. This idea was introduced by the early Franciscans in a discussion about the will of Christ in order to explain how the will of the reason wished for and avoided death at the same time. Bonaventure associated the will as reason with thelesis and the will as nature with bulesis, which were Greek words derived from John of Damascus, and he argued that these were two ways of wishing for something. Albert the Great described the division between the will as reason and the will as nature in a new way, as he thought that different objects explained it. Aquinas added a new explanation, describing that the will as reason and the will as nature were acts of the will about an end and a means to an end. John Duns Scotus’s innovation was to associate the will as nature with the natural will, which was the inclination of the will but not its act.

The second main theme of the debate about the will of Christ was the question of whether his wills were contrary. This theme was related to the question of whether the same person can wish for contrary things at the same time. Theologians argued, for example, that although in Christ the divine will and the will as reason wished for death and the will of sensuality and the will as nature sought to avoid it, the wills were not contrary. There were many ways to explain how the wills were not opposed to one another. One of the standard explanations was based on John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa and Peter Lombard’s Sentences, which taught that Christ’s human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish. When Christ’s human will wished not to die and his divine will wished his death, the wills were not contrary as the human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish.

Theologians proposed other explanations as well. William of Auxerre and the Summa Halensis argued that even though the will of reason and the will of sensuality wished for contrary things, the wills were not contrary because the will of reason and the will of sensuality were in different parts of the soul, and the will of sensuality wished for life as such but the will
of reason wished for death because of the redemption of the human race. Albert the Great used Aristotelian causes to explain how the human will can be uniform with the divine will. He argued that the conformity of Christ’s human will and divine will corresponded to material and efficient causes since his human will and divine will wished for the same thing or the human will wished what the divine will wished for it to wish. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas introduced a new explanation based on the means-end distinction. He expounded that the will of reason and divine will were not contrary when they wished for the same end and means to an end. When the will of reason and the will of sensuality wished for means as such, these human wills and the divine will did not wish for the same thing, but the human wills wished what the divine will wished for them to wish. In the *Summa theologiae*, however, Aquinas did not apply the end-means distinction; instead he argued that Christ’s wills were not contrary because the will of sensuality and the will as nature did not reject the reason why the divine will and the will as reason wished for death, and because the wills did not impede each other. Giles of Rome was one of the first to hold that Christ’s human wills were similar to the divine wills because God’s antecedent will and Christ’s will as nature wished for the same thing and God’s consequent will and Christ’s will as reason wished for the same thing. Durand of St. Pourçain also introduced a new explanation, as he argued that all of Christ’s human wills wished what God’s consequent will wished for them to wish, but only the will as reason wished what God’s antecedent will wished for it to wish.

Theologians thought that since Christ’s human wills wished for contrary things, not all of his wills were fulfilled. They proposed that volitions *secundum quid*, conditionally, habitually or non-actually or the will of sensuality were not fulfilled. However, what Christ wished *simpliciter* and through the will as reason was always heard. The *Summa Halensis* stated that the desire of Christ’s sensuality was not always heard. Aquinas held that the fulfilment of Christ’s will depended on whether the will wished absolutely or conditionally. What the will of Christ wished absolutely and *simpliciter* took place, but what the will wished conditionally and *secundum quid* did not happen. Furthermore, John Duns Scotus stated that the will of Christ wished *simpliciter* when it wished without condition and *secundum quid* when it wished conditionally. The wishing *simpliciter* was always fulfilled, but the conditional wishing was not. Scotus introduced a new theme in the discussions when he argued that the will of Christ wished actually when it wished *simpliciter* and it wished habitually when it wished *secundum quid*. This implied that Christ’s actual non-conditional wishing was always fulfilled. Following Scotus, Peter Auriol explained that Christ’s human will as actual conformed with the divine will. Among the aforementioned theologians, William Ockham was the first who claimed that there was a rebellion between Christ’s appetitive powers.
Free choice and free will were a major topic in medieval philosophy, but a minor theme in the discussions about the will of Christ. Theologians asked whether Christ’s free choice involved an act at the first instant of his being, how his choice was free and whether Christ chose and deliberated. The early Franciscans, Bonaventure, Albert the Great and Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not use free choice at the first instant of his being, whereas Aquinas and Scotus argued that Christ did. The discussion about Christ’s free choice shows that, according to the theologians, freedom of choice was not based on an ability to choose good or evil. All theologians thought that Christ’s choice was free, but since he was a sinless human being, he was able to choose only good. Alexander of Hales stated that Christ’s free choice was free from coercion and sin. Following Anselm of Canterbury’s view that the will was an instrument that moves itself, Bonaventure held that free choice was free because it was able to move itself to wish. However, Albert the Great explained that Christ’s will was free as it was able to choose this good, to not choose this good or to choose a different good.

The question of whether the choosing required deliberation was mainly dealt with in relation to theological problems about the free choice of God and Christ. John of Damascus taught that Christ did not choose because choosing implied ignorance. However, the Summa Halensis, Aquinas and Scotus argued that since choosing did not always imply ignorance, Christ was able to choose. For example, Aquinas stated that deliberation indicated ignorance, but choosing did not require deliberation because choosing followed from the judgment of reason. As Christ’s reason did not doubt what to do, it made a judgment and chose without deliberation.

In the third chapter, I studied the discussions about the passions of Christ. The main themes of the discussions were how Christ’s human soul was passible, what passions he had, and how he was able to have pain, sadness and joy at the same time. The views of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians about the passions of Christ based on the views about the passibility of the soul and its powers. The passibility of the soul was also treated in Aristotle’s De anima, where Aristotle argued that a soul was not passible except accidentally. However, the orthodox doctrine taught that Christ had a passible soul. When theologians studied the passibility of Christ’s human soul, they first treated the question of what was a passion and then how the soul of Christ and its powers were passible. Following Aristotle and John of Damascus, theologians argued that ‘passion’ had many meanings, and they stated that the notions of passion and passibility in a broad sense involved receiving. However, their views about passion and passibility in a strict sense varied. According to Alexander of Hales, passibility in a strict sense was the ability to receive a suitable or an unsuitable passion, which could be moderate or immoderate. The Summa Halensis held that a passion was a received movement, which was suitable.
or unsuitable for a receiver. Thomas Aquinas’s view about passions differed significantly from these early Franciscan views. Aquinas said that passion in a strict sense was a change where a thing received a form while simultaneously losing a contrary form. Later on, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard Middleton and Durand of St. Pourçain adopted Aquinas’s view that a passion involved receiving and losing as its basic hallmark.

Following Aristotle and John of Damascus, theologians regarded it as a trivial fact that there were also passions of the soul. Like John of Damascus, the *Summa Halensis* also thought that the passion of the soul was the movement of the soul when good or evil was apprehended. Albert the Great argued that the passion of the soul was the act and the possible quality of the sensitive appetitive power. It was a passion because the sensitive appetitive power had it when it was moved by the apprehended thing and it was an act because a soul acted in the flesh when a soul had it. Thomas Aquinas’s view differed from that of Albert the Great, as he thought that the passion of the soul was a passion because it involved the change of the flesh and it was a movement rather than a quality. Aquinas separated the passion of the flesh from the passion of the soul, and he argued that the passion of the flesh was a passion which began in the flesh, whereas the passion of the soul was the movement of the sensitive appetitive power which involved the change of the flesh.

Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis* taught that Christ’s human soul was passible in all senses of a passion, but Aquinas, following Aristotle, argued that Christ’s human soul was passible only accidentally. Aquinas held that Christ’s human soul was changed accidentally when his flesh was changed because the soul as the form of the flesh was part of the soul-body composite. Aquinas’s view had some similarities with Albert the Great’s view in this respect. Albert explained that a soul was changed somehow when a soul-flesh composite had a passion, and he argued that the passibility of the flesh differed from the passibility of the soul.

Theologians also studied the passibility of the rational powers of Christ’s human soul. They agreed that all powers of Christ’s human soul were able to receive, but disagreed on whether the powers of the rational part of the soul were able to have passions in a strict sense. Alexander of Hales was the first to argue that the superior part of Christ’s reason as nature was able to have a suitable or unsuitable passion with the flesh. The *Summa Halensis* and Bonaventure added that the will of Christ also had a passion when it had sadness. Aquinas’s view differed from the Franciscans since he restricted the passibility of the powers of the soul to the sensitive appetitive powers. Like the Franciscans, Aquinas held that reason and the will can have passions, but he clarified that they were acts and passions only in a broad sense or metaphorically. Only the acts of the sensitive appetitive powers were passions in a proper sense, because they included the real change of the...
bodily organ. However, Aquinas stated that the passions of the flesh touched accidentally all powers of the soul. Aquinas’s view that the powers of the rational part of the soul cannot have a passion except metaphorically did not receive unconditional acceptance. Peter of Tarentaise expounded that the will was able to receive the species of the unsuitable thing and to lose the species of the suitable thing, and, following the Franciscans, Richard Middleton argued that the will was able to have passions. Early fourteenth-century theologians like John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Peter Auriol, Walter Chatton and Durand of St. Pourçain did not consider the passibility of Christ’s human soul, but their views about the passibility of the will varied. Like the early Franciscans and Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus and William Ockham taught that the will of Christ could have passions. In earlier Franciscan accounts, it was unclear what kind of quality the passion of the rational power was, whereas Scotus clarified that it was an externally caused quality in the will and not an act of the will. However, like Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that only the sensitive appetitive power can have passions and Durand of St. Pourçain held that the will can have passions only in a broad sense.

According to medieval theologians, Christ did not assume all defects of human beings. For example, Christ did not assume sin but the penalties of sin, which are common to all human beings. Although theologians emphasized the humanity of Christ, they taught that Christ did not suffer any diseases. Among the assumed defects were fear, anger, pain and sadness, which theologians called pre-passions rather than passions. When twelfth-century theologians discussed the nature of sin, following Augustine and Jerome, they taught that a pre-passion was a stage of sin. Peter Lombard adapted the idea of the pre-passions to Christology and explained that the fear, pain and sadness of Christ were sinless pre-passions. The understanding of theologians about Christ’s sinless pre-passions varied. Alexander of Hales held that Christ had pre-passions which were unexpected movements, since they were unseen by the sensible part of the soul. However, many theologians thought that Christ did not have pre-passions as unexpected movements because Christ’s fear, anger, pain and sadness as the movements of the sensitive appetitive power were subject to his reason. Bonaventure clarified that Christ had pre-passions as diminished passion of sensuality, which remained under reason as reason since reason commanded them. Thomas Aquinas claimed that fear, anger, pain and sadness of Christ were pre-passions of the sensitive appetitive power which did not turn his reason away from righteousness. They were not pre-passions as unexpected movements of the sensitive appetitive power, because the movements of Christ’s sensitive appetitive power followed the command of his reason. John Duns Scotus proposed a new view about the sinless pre-passions of Christ when he taught that the will of Christ had pre-passions as passions of the will, which preceded the act of the will or did not cloud reason.
Following Peter Lombard, theologians argued that there were many kinds of fears but Christ did not have all of them. The early Franciscans and Bonaventure applied Peter Lombard’s list of fears and held that Christ had natural fear about his death and friendly fear in respect to God. Thomas Aquinas also claimed that Christ had fear of death, but he did not mention other fears. Richard Middleton studied the question of whether Christ had the fears listed by John of Damascus and ended up claiming that Christ had a mild fear of death, but not the fears mentioned by John. Walter Chatton also stated that Christ had mild fear about his death as, for instance, his will weakened the fear of the sensitive appetitive power through the imagination. Unlike Peter Lombard, later theologians taught that Christ also had anger (for example, when he threw the merchants and moneychangers out of the temple). The early Franciscan theologians emphasized that Christ had anger without perturbation. Bonaventure, however, thought that the anger of Christ was the affection of detestation, which involved perturbation that touched the sensual part of the soul but not the eye of the mind. Aquinas argued that Christ had anger of the will and anger of the irascible power. The anger of the will was not a passion of the soul, but a bare act of the will, while the anger of the irascible power was anger through zeal since it followed the command of reason.

One of the most discussed themes in the psychology of the incarnation was Christ’s pain and sadness. Medieval theologians agreed that the powers of the sensitive part of Christ’s human soul had pain and sadness, but the views of the theologians regarding these varied. Following John of Damascus, the early Franciscans and Bonaventure explained that the pain of Christ was a sensation of the injury of the flesh. Bonaventure added that the sensitive concupiscible power of Christ also had sadness about the injury and evil things taking place for others. In his different works, Thomas Aquinas proposed two views about the pain and the sadness of Christ. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he claimed that pain was a corporeal passion and sadness was the passion of the soul. Christ’s pain was in the sense of touch and it followed the apprehension of that, whereas sadness was in the sensitive appetitive power and it followed the apprehension of the inner apprehensive power. However, in his *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas stated that pain was also a passion of the soul in the sensitive appetitive power. Christ had pain and sadness about the injury of the flesh and the sins of human beings. Richard Middleton proposed a new view about the pain and the sadness of Christ when he argued that pain was in the external sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch and sadness was in the interior sensitive appetitive power related to the interior apprehensive power. Like Richard, John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol also argued that the subject of Christ’s pain was the sensitive appetitive power related to the sense of touch.

All theologians accepted that the suffering of Christ touched the powers of the rational part of his soul, but they disagreed on whether the
powers had passions and whether the superior part of reason had sadness. This discussion demonstrates that the early Franciscan theologians and Bonaventure had already put forward the idea that the will can have sadness as a passion, while Aquinas denied it. Their views differed because their understanding about a passion varied. While the Franciscan theologians thought that a passion and passibility involved only reception, they did not demarcate the powers of the rational part of the soul outside the passibility. Although Aquinas also thought that the will can have passions since the will was moved, unlike the Franciscans he stated that the will did not have passions properly because a passion was a change related to the flesh. Later on, Scotus developed the Franciscan view of the passions of the will.

The *Summa Halensis* and Bonaventure stated that the will of Christ and the superior parts of his reason had sadness as a passion, but they did not elaborate on what kind of passion sadness was. Following Augustine, who claimed that sadness occurred when the will wished against a thing that took place, Bonaventure thought that the will of Christ had sadness (for instance, when his will wished against the sin of other human beings). Unlike the Franciscans, Thomas Aquinas argued that the will of Christ had sadness as a passion only metaphorically and the superior part of reason did not have sadness except accidentally. John Duns Scotus’s view about the sadness of Christ’s will followed Bonaventure’s teaching in particular, but it was much more detailed. Scotus argued that the will of Christ had sadness when the intellect apprehended that a thing unsuitable for the will took place. An object was unsuitable for the will when the will wished against it absolutely or conditionally, or it was unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Scotus described the superior and the inferior parts of Christ’s will as having sadness about other people’s sins because the will wished against sin taking place. The inferior and the superior parts also had sadness about death because they wished against the death conditionally, because the death was unsuitable for the superior part naturally, and because it was unsuitable for the inferior part since it was unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power. Following Scotus, William Ockham also explained that the will can have sadness as a passion of the will, but he argued that the will can have sadness only when it wishes against a thing absolutely or conditionally. An object which was unsuitable for the will naturally or unsuitable for the sensitive appetitive power did not cause the sadness of the will, as in the view of Scotus. However, following Aquinas, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton argued that the will of Christ did not have sadness as a passion. Auriol denied that the will of Christ had sadness in any sense, whereas Chatton argued that the will had sadness as an act of the will.

One of the main questions in the discussion about the passions of Christ was how the human Christ was able to have beatific joy, pain and sadness simultaneously. The idea was problematic as, for example, Aristotle...
argued that a person cannot have pain and joy at the same time. Theologians solved the problem in many ways. Alexander of Hales was the first to argue that Christ had pain and joy at the same time because the superior part of reason as reason had joy, but the superior part of reason as nature had sadness. Unlike Alexander, Bonaventure argued that Christ had pain and joy at the same time because they were not contrary, Christ was the only human being whose superior part of reason was turned towards God and the flesh at the same time, and the superior part of reason rejoiced about pain. Albert the Great thought that the pain and the joy of Christ were contrary, but held that contraries can be in the same subject when one of them is the cause and the matter of another, like the sadness of Christ was the cause of his joy. The idea that Christ had joy about his pain became the standard, even though it is difficult to imagine how a person can be happy about great pain. Following his view about the passibility of the soul, Aquinas explained that although the superior part of reason had joy, it was touched by pain accidentally and not subjectively because it was rooted in the essence of the soul. He furthermore proposed a new problem related to the joy and the pain of Christ when he remarked that, according to Aristotle, pain does not hinder only contrary joy, but any kind of joy. Aquinas solved the problem by explaining that pain and sadness normally impede any kind of joy because the sadness and the pain of one power overflow into other powers of the soul. However, such an overflowing did not take place with Christ because of the divine arrangement. Later on, Scotus’s view of how Christ was able to have pain and joy at the same time was similar to that of Aquinas, although their ideas of joy and sadness were different. A new point in his thinking was to argue that although joy causes expansion in the heart and sadness a constriction, Christ was able to have joy and pain at once.

Peter Auriol added a new theme to the discussion when he pointed out that, according to Avicenna, the powers of the soul cannot have many intense acts at the same time. As the pain and the joy of Christ were great, this indicated that Christ’s human soul had two intense acts at once. Auriol explained that a human being is not able to have many intense acts at the same time because the acts of the corporeal powers require spirits. However, the will of Christ did not require the spirits through the corporeal powers, because his intellect was able to know without turning towards the senses. Therefore, Christ was able to have the greatest pain and joy at the same time. Auriol also argued that the same subject did not have pain and joy simultaneously as the sensitive appetitive power of Christ had pain, but his human will had joy. Contrary to Auriol, Walter Chatton argued that the same subject had pain and joy at the same time because the subject of the pain and joy was Christ’s human soul.

The discussions about the psychology of the incarnation were also interesting in the sense that they provided comparable pictures of the Franciscan and Thomistic intellectual traditions. In general, some emphases
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about the psychology of Christ’s human soul indicated that the early Franciscan theologians Bonaventure and Aquinas established two traditions about the application of psychology to Christology. The Franciscan theologians were usually apt to follow the Franciscan emphases and the Dominican theologians were generally apt to follow Aquinas’s views. However, the discussions also revealed the flexibility and movement between the traditions: Not all Franciscans followed the Franciscan intellectual tradition as, for example, Richard Middleton, Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton also followed Aquinas. And all Dominicans did not always adhere to Aquinas unconditionally, as there were Dominicans like Durand of St. Pourçain who criticized him.

For example, questions like whether Christ knew everything that God knows, whether Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to the external senses, and whether Christ’s soul and his will had passions were questions associated with different Franciscan and Thomistic emphases. Franciscan theologians from Bonaventure to Peter Auriol defended the view that Christ knew everything that God knows, whereas Dominicans from Thomas Aquinas to Durand of St. Pourçain argued that Christ did not know everything. However, there were divisions inside these traditions; for example, the Franciscan Richard Middleton, following Aquinas, claimed that Christ did not know everything actually and wavered in terms of whether Christ knew everything habitually. In addition, Bonaventure, Middleton, Scotus, and Aureol argued that Christ had many sensitive appetitive powers related to exterior senses, but Aquinas argued that Christ had only one sensitive appetitive power. Whereas Alexander of Hales and the Summa Halensis thought that a passion involved receiving and a soul was passible, Aquinas argued that a passion involved not only receiving but also losing and that the soul itself was changed only accidentally. The outcome was that most Franciscan theologians argued that the powers of the rational part of Christ’s human soul were also passible, but Aquinas restricted the passibility of the powers to the sensitive appetitive power. Following Aquinas, the Dominican Durand of St. Pourçain claimed that the will had passions only in a broad sense, but the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise departed from Aquinas, as he explained that the will can have passions. The Franciscan intellectual tradition was also partly divided in this respect, as Peter Auriol and Walter Chatton thought, following Aquinas, that the will cannot have passions.

However, these positions were not essential in all parts of the discussions, and all theologians treated the same basic questions established by Peter Lombard. For example, all theologians agreed that Christ knew the Word of God and the things in it, he did not comprehend God, he had infused intelligible species, and his will was divided into the will “as reason” and the will “as nature”. Furthermore, for example, the question of whether the knowledge about the Word of God required the light of glory divided
theologians regardless of whether they were Franciscans or Dominicans. Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Richard Middleton argued that Christ had the light of glory, but Scotus explained that such light was not needed.

The medieval discussions about the psychology of the incarnation were interesting also from the viewpoint of philosophy. They revealed that theologians applied various ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy in developing their views about theological matters, but Christological views also influenced the philosophical thought of some theologians. In the discussion about the knowledge of Christ, theologians mainly applied ideas from philosophical debates. The question of whether Christ had the light of glory was based on the debate of whether understanding required divine illumination. Following Augustine and Neo-Platonic sources, Bonaventure and Aquinas argued that all intellectual knowledge required some kind of divine illumination, whereas Scotus stated that not even the beatific knowledge included supernatural light. Influenced by Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, many medieval theologians taught that a human being can have only negative knowledge of the divine essence. It was thought that not even the perfect human intellect can know God completely, since Christ did not fully comprehend God. The debate on the omniscience of Christ reveals that there were different opinions about whether the created intellect was able to know everything that God knows. Theologians proposed different limitations regarding Christ’s knowledge; while Scotus was the only one to argue that the human intellect can know everything actually through separate infinite acts, but he later gave up this idea. His argument was associated with the question of whether the notion of actual infinity is consistent and whether there can be several different acts in the intellect simultaneously.

One major theme in psychology as a branch of natural philosophy concerned the intelligible species. Theologians applied this debate when they explained how Christ had infused knowledge. In Aristotelian psychology, the intelligible species were considered to be acquired through the senses, but in the discussions about the knowledge of Christ it was assumed that a human intellect can have intelligible species which are not acquired through the agent intellect and the senses, as in Christ’s infused knowledge. Interest in the question of how many simultaneous acts the intellect can have grew when some theologians assumed that Christ knew the same things through different actual cognitions, although Aristotle had argued that a human being can have only one act of the intellect at once. Philosophical views of experience were also often applied. The question about experience was dealt with in twelfth-century theological psychology, but later theologians developed the concept of experience in the psychology of the incarnation. They proposed that experience was, for instance, either sense knowledge, experiential certitude,
acquired knowledge, intuitive knowledge or habit acquired from memories, all these being derived from a special philosophical context of their own.

The discussion about the will of Christ shows that the Christological themes also influenced philosophical conceptions. In the twelfth century, sensuality was treated in many contexts, but the idea of the will of sensuality and the will of reason was introduced chiefly in the psychology of the incarnation. The early Franciscans proposed that Christ’s will of reason was divided into the will “as reason” and the will “as nature”, the teaching of which was adopted into philosophical language. Whereas the ideas of the affections of the will, absolute and conditional will, and free choice were taken from philosophical discussions into Christology, the question of whether choosing requires deliberation was mainly dealt with in theological contexts. Although Aristotle had explained that choice was deliberated desire, the medieval theologians argued that Christ chosen without deliberation. Furthermore, the discussions indicate that, according to the medieval theologians, free choice is free even if it can wish only for good.

Furthermore, in the discussions about the passions of Christ, theologians adapted ideas from psychology as a branch of natural philosophy, but also introduced new ideas. The medieval theologians argued that Christ’s human soul was passible even though Aristotle had claimed that a human soul was moved only accidentally. The ideas of the inferior and superior parts of the soul, the apprehensive and appetitive powers, and the irascible and concupiscible powers were treated by the faculty psychology and applied to Christ’s human soul as such because medieval theologians thought that Christ had the powers of an ordinary human being. However, Christ’s human soul was free from sin, which was a central reason why the psychology of Christ differed from the psychology of ordinary human beings. Christ’s freedom from sin influenced thought about pre-passions. Pre-passions also explained how Christ, who was the wisest man in the world, was sad, even though Seneca had claimed that a wise man cannot be sad. Following Augustine and Jerome, the twelfth-century theologians studied pre-passions when they treated stages of sin, but pre-passions had a crucial role in Christology as well. The debate about Christ’s sinless pre-passions proved that theologians thought that at least a sinless human being can have emotions which are not spontaneous, but subject to the rational powers. When theologians discussed Christ’s pain and sadness, they derived ideas of pain and sadness from earlier discussions, as these were examined going back to ancient philosophy, and applied these ideas to Christ. Although the passions of the will were also treated in other contexts, theologians developed their views in relation to Christ. For instance, Scotus proposed his influential doctrine on the sadness of the will when he examined the passions of Christ. The question about the simultaneity of Christ’s pain and sadness was based on Aristotle, but when they theorized about Christ’s human soul theologians challenged Aristotle’s teaching that a person cannot have pain
and joy at the same time. When theologians explained how Christ could have pain and joy simultaneously, some of them applied the idea of the *colligantia* between the powers, which was a much debated theme in psychology as a branch of natural philosophy.

The psychological approach in Christology was also related to medieval medicine and metaphysics. When Scotus dealt with the changes of Christ’s heart and Peter Auriol examined the spirits of Christ’s flesh, these were questions studied in medicine. Metaphysical questions about instants of time, divine possibilities, and the passibility of the soul and its powers were also considered in relation to Christ. These can be taken as examples that show how theological and philosophical discussions about the nature of the soul influenced each other in the context of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Christology.

The medieval debates about psychology in Christology were also interesting theologically as they shed light on medieval views about Christology. Following the Council of Chalcedon, all medieval theologians thought that Christ had a human nature which he shared with all other human beings. Therefore, he had the same cognitive and appetitive powers as we have. Theologians explained that although the human Christ was as perfect as possible, he also had some defects similar to those of a postlapsarian human being: the human Christ felt pain, sadness, anger, and fear. For example, therefore, theologians abandoned the Docetist claim that Christ did not feel true pain. However, the medieval theologians thought that the passions of the human Christ differed greatly from those of postlapsarian human beings as Christ was free from sin. Unlike postlapsarian human beings, Christ had only pre-passions, which were strictly subjected to the powers of his rational part of the soul. In addition, Christ was the only human being who could feel the greatest pain, sadness, and joy at once. The medieval discussions also demonstrate that, according to the theologians, a human being can wish for different or even opposed things than God without sin and the perfect vision about God is not possible for a created intellect. This last idea emphasizes that for the medieval theologians, God was ultimately a mystery.
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