BUILDING PERSONAL LIVES AS INFORMAL MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA:
Narratives of Poor African Informal Migrants in Johannesburg

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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DEDICATION

This doctoral thesis is dedicated to Daughter, Dad, Mum and Mudia.
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ABSTRACTS

This study explores why poor African migrants remain in Johannesburg, South Africa’s harsh migration context, to build their lives, and how, in pursuit of a better future, they engage with the various forms of socioeconomic and political constraints that they experience. Popular as a destination for African migrants, South Africa is a country with a very high percentage of asylum seekers, but also a place where they are the targets of violent xenophobia. Yet such migrants are known to live for years in this situation, one which is generally considered socio-economically and politically marginalized and constraining. Their continued presence raises the pertinent sociological query of how and why such large numbers have remained in their host society, continuing to welcome new incoming members, while others have left, been imprisoned or murdered, or died of a range of ailments.

Methodologically, resilience theory - conceptualised as a dynamic process of interaction between the individual and his or her environment – is utilised as an explanatory and descriptive framework to examine the subject of this study. Data for the study were collected through life-story interviews with African migrants who are economically active on the streets of Johannesburg, and document analysis was utilised for triangulation purposes. Data were analysed using narrative analysis.

Empirical observations called attention to the prominence of aspirations for a better life amongst the informal migrants, an observation that is accompanied by several relevant findings: firstly, that the migrants’ resilience in their constraining environment cannot be attributed to itemized factors. Rather, their resilience takes the form of a dynamic and interactive engagement with the South African context. The interactions are orchestrated by their perceptions of opportunities in their home countries and the South African society, and combined with the application of faith and tactics in dealing with identified adverse conditions. Their resilience is presented as enduring but also transient, as it is subject to individuals’ evaluations and negotiations. In that light, the migrants are shown to be active agents but also victims in their harsh context, calling attention to the duality of the informal migrants’ experience in Johannesburg, irrespective of their violent xenophobic environment. Consequently, considerable challenges are posed to the projects of classifying informal migrants as either passive victims or active agents, and listing or identifying specific factors as means to attaining resilience.

Secondly, an observed fallout from the interviewees’ notion of hope – aspiration – is the productive use of ‘waiting time’. The hegemonic control of the interviewees’ time through, for example, official delays or manipulation in the processing of asylum applications, is challenged by the tactical and creative utilization of the period of waiting in which two things stood out: micro-entrepreneurship and development of their social and personal lives but particularly micro-entrepreneurship, as the interviewees focused on achieving a better life through micro businesses. Their engagement in trade and services in a context devoid of institutional support, and under dire personal circumstances, though borne of feelings of ‘no alternatives’, suggests creativity, with potential for growth. Furthermore, my interviewees were also able to make productive social use of the ‘time of waiting’ even as asylum seekers. Living in the city, my interviewees took initiatives to learn new skills, develop new intimate and business
relationships, had children, and so on. Their lives reveal that even as asylum seekers, they were slowly building the futures they desired, for instance, through savings and personal projects in the home country.

On the basis of empirical observations, the conclusions drawn indicate the limitations of policy in terms of improving the experience of informal migrants, and raises questions concerning the moral or ethical values (or lack thereof) involved in perpetuating their vulnerability – thus calling attention to questions of choice and agency in acts dehumanising informal migrants. Moreover, observations of micro-entrepreneurship beg another question. Could migration management be mutually beneficial if a context conducive to migrants’ entrepreneurial pursuits is promoted?

As a contribution to the body of knowledge of Social Policy, the author uses the perspective of the informal migrants as active agents and social victims to argue that political inclusion by the host country cannot be enough to improve the wellbeing of informal migrants. Thus, the author theoretically reflects on the relevance of Social Policy in improving human welfare and emphasizes the informal migrants’ experience of vulnerability as a creative opportunity to engage the development of Social Policy in Africa, for example, from a regional body. Therefore, the thesis postulates that the dilemma of better lives for informal African migrants is a regional political question of belongingness, care, and social responsibility.
TIIVISTELMÄ


Aiheen tarkastelussa käytetään resilienssiteoriaa, joka selittää ja kuvaa dynaamista vuorovaikutusprosessia yksilön ja hänen ympäristönsä välillä. Tutkimusmateriaali kerättiin haastattelemalla afrikkalaisia siirtolaisia, jotka ovat taloudellisesti aktiivisia Johannesburgin kaduilla, ja triangulaatiotarkoituksiin käytettiin asiakirja-analyysiä. Tiedot analysoitiin käyttäen narratiivista analyysiä.


Toiseksi on kyse kyynärkiksestä ja sosiaali- ja yhteiskunnallista luoamisesta. Tutkimuksen henkilöt ovat aktiivisesti ympäristössä ollut ja osoittaneet suurta kykyä ympäristöynnaan. Heidän elämänkäsityksen perusteella ovat ympäristössä ollut mahdollisuus ja kehitysmahdollisuus aktiivisesti olla ja toimia. Tutkimuksen henkilöt ovat ollut aktiivisesti ympäristössä ollut ja osoittaneet suurta kykyä ympäristöynnaan.

Lopuksi on kyse kyynärkiksestä ja sosiaali- ja yhteiskunnallista luoamisesta. Tutkimuksen henkilöt ovat aktiivisesti ympäristössä ollut ja osoittaneet suurta kykyä ympäristöynnaan. Heidän elämänkäsityksen perusteella ovat ympäristössä ollut mahdollisuus ja kehitysmahdollisuus aktiivisesti olla ja toimia. Tutkimuksen henkilöt ovat ollut aktiivisesti ympäristössä ollut ja osoittaneet suurta kykyä ympäristöynnaan.
Empiiristen havaintojen perusteella tehdyt johtopäätökset viittaavat siihen, että nykyisissä käytänteissä on parantamisen varaa, jos epävirallisten siirtolaisten kokemusta halutaan parantaa. Ne herättävät kysymyksiä moraalisista ja eettisistä arvoista (tai niiden puutteesta), joita heidän haavoittuvaan asemansa salliminen edellyttää. Huomio kiinnittyy epävirallisten siirtolaisten epäinhimillistämiseen liittyvien tekojen ja toimijuuden vapaaehtoisuuteen. Mikroyrittäjyyttä koskevat huomiot herättävät myös kysymyksen siitä, voisiko siirtolaisuuden hallinta olla molemmille osapuolille kannattavaa, jos siirtolaisten yrittäjyyteen liittyviä ponnisteluja tuettaisiin.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACMS: Africa Centre for Migration and Society
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union
BRICS: Brazil, Russian, Indian, China, and South Africa
CCMA: Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration
CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CoRMSA: Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
DHA: Department of Home Affairs
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
GCRO: Gauteng City-Region Observatory
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IOM: International Organisation of Migration
LHR: Lawyers for Human Rights
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
NDoH: National Department of Health
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
RAD: Refugee Affairs Directorate
RRO: Refugee receiving offices
RSDOs: Refugee Status Determination Officers
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SMME: Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise
TENK: National Advisory Board on Research Ethics in Finland
TFTA: Tripartite Free Trade Agreement
UN: United Nations
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This is a study of how informal African migrants manage their lives in Johannesburg, South Africa. It builds on previous studies of migrants’ marginalisation in the country in two ways: firstly, by focusing on migrants’ practices in terms of their self-organisation and progressive realisation of wellbeing; and, secondly, by exploring how such self-organisation is lived and sustained. Subsequently the study adopts an agency approach to examine the means by which informal migrants manage to remain in South Africa. This path of departure has theoretical and methodological implications: firstly, it calls for a theoretical approach that can explore the continued presence of informal migrants across a broad range of engagements; and secondly, it requires the use of methodologies that capture narratives of experiencing the processes of such engagements, with their successes, reversals, and contentions. This study thus utilises resilience theory as its guide, and takes a narrative approach to data collection and analysis (Riessman, 2008; Bonnano, 2004; Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000).

This chapter provides an overview of the study by presenting the nature of the problem, a review of previous studies, and the objectives and research questions guiding the study. Following this clarification, I delineate the concepts utilised in the thesis and end with an overview of its structure.

1.1 The Nature of the Problem

Recently, the issue of informal migration has become a burning political and social debate globally. With the refugee crisis in Europe, the mass deaths of would-be asylum seekers in the Mediterranean, and the proposed threat to build a wall between Mexico and the US, the lives of informal migrants have assumed centre stage in local and international politics. Irrespective of media coverage, and the political and social outrage amidst competing voices of support, informal migration has not stopped. For instance, in 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)\(^1\) reported an estimated 3,770 fatalities on all known migration routes into Europe. This attention to informal migration has focused on migratory attempts to enter and live in developed countries such as the United States or developed regions such as the European Union. Numbers of authors have, however, argued that international migration flows within Africa are also a major form of global international mobility (Vigneswaran & Quirk, 2015; Abel & Sander, 2014).

The Gallup survey, conducted between 2007 and early 2010, of nearly 350,000 adults in 148 countries suggested that residents of sub-Saharan African countries are the most likely to express the desire to migrate permanently (Esipova, Ray & Srinivasan, 2011); the report (ibid.: 2) noted that “36% of the adult population – or an estimated 166 million” in the region said they would do so if given the opportunity. Although the allusion to “36% of the adult population” raises the question of whether that is a statistical inference from the population of

\(^1\) http://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-204311-deaths-2443
the survey rather than representing the region’s actual population, it produces the image of a high and potentially higher mobility rate. Worth noting, and relevant to this study, is that South Africa stands out in the Gallup survey (ibid.) as one of the top fifteen desired destinations in the world, with an estimated eight million potential migrants wishing to move there from mostly sub-Saharan African countries. The majority of these migrants are between the ages of 15 and 65; specifically, 64% are between the ages of 15 and 29, while 34% range between 30 and 65. That suggests the possible large-scale movement of active adults and young adults to a country already suffering from a high unemployment rate. The Gallup survey also underscores contemporary immigration hurdles faced by South Africa that combine complex political, social, economic, and historical factors to create challenging experiences for African migrants and South African citizens alike.

For example, South Africa shares a 7,000 kilometre border with its neighbours Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Patrolling and policing such lengthy borders require great resources. A combination of cultural and political factors and leaks in border security has translated into anxiety on the part of many South Africans about the alleged presence of a vast number of undocumented immigrants in the country, although such anxieties are criticised as being unsubstantiated and without concrete evidence. Many South Africans believe that democratic South Africa is seen as a ‘land of milk and honey’ and has become the destination of survival for many people from other African countries (Peberdy, 2009: 160). During the apartheid years, Black African migration was predominantly from the southern region and labour driven. Since the end of apartheid, there has been sustained migration from other parts of Africa (e.g., West Africa) and increased migration from its southern neighbours due to ethnic and political violence, natural disasters, and a general economic downturn in the region. In addition, South Africans of all races can freely move within the country, which has led to mass migration to urban areas of people formerly prohibited from living in cities. Urban centres such as Johannesburg have come to represent places where Africans of different cultures meet and intermingle.

Statistics South Africa² reported that in 2012 migrants were issued 1,283 permanent residence permits and 141,555 temporary permits. The report revealed that Africans made up 54.4% of temporary migrants and 53.2% of permanent migrants. In addition, 17.2% and 10.0% of the temporary permits were given to Zimbabweans and Nigerians respectively, with the two countries combined sending the most migrants from the African continent. In the same year, the Department of Home Affairs, South Africa, reported that 78,142 asylum applications were received. In the context of a high influx of migrants and a high rate of unemployment³ in South Africa, the majority of migrants that have decided to remain in the country have resorted to self-employment in the informal sector. It is in the informal sector that African migrants, like many South Africans, find themselves living in poverty and struggling to meet their basic needs amidst harsh immigration realities.

Three factors raise empirical concern over attempts by migrants to build their futures in South Africa: firstly, the period spent in the country as an informal migrant could last for years,

³ Statistics South Africa reported an average of 25.31% unemployment from 2000-2016. The unemployment rate peaked at 31.20% in 2003 and was lowest at 21.50% in 2008.
encompassing the economically active part of the migrant’s lifespan; secondly, informal migrants are economically active in South Africa, making them productive members of society, but their residential status positions them as a socially excluded group; thirdly, the social context in which they live is documented and reported in the media and other publicly accessible platforms as beset with incidents of sustained xenophobic violence, discrimination, and dehumanization. Notwithstanding these challenges, however, informal African migrants are observed to be active and resilient in the context; it is therefore important to cast light on migrants’ perceptions of how they deal with their marginalised environment in order to understand the dynamic of the situation from an insider’s perspective. It is sociologically relevant that this vulnerable group of African migrants attempts to ‘make it’ (build their desired futures) in spite of tough economic, political, and social conditions. Furthermore, the means by which they remain and survive in such conditions in a context of pervasive social exclusions are significant from a social policy perspective.

1.2 Literature Review

This section presents previous studies that are relevant to the topic of this thesis in order to situate it in the relevant field of literature. Empirical studies of African migration in South Africa are numerous; however, they exhibit intersecting themes, and hence can be represented by a few selected authors. It is also necessary to narrow the broad scope of studies under review in order to achieve the important element of focus required of a doctoral thesis. Previous studies of African migrants in South Africa have generally centred on issues of xenophobia, immigration control, and migrants’ experiences and responses to the socio-economic and political climate. These areas are not mutually exclusive but, rather, are shown to be closely interactive in the texts reviewed, making thematic discussion challenging. Nevertheless, issues of xenophobia comprise a crosscutting theme in a number of contemporary studies of African migration in South Africa, shedding light on the socio-political context and African migrants’ experiences and responses to it, therefore, below, I present some key contributions to the discussions in South Africa and argue for the positioning of this study.

Hostility characterised as xenophobic is explained as a “denial of rights and entitlements, expressed through prejudice and stereotypes” (Neocosmos, 2006: 1) towards foreign others, in this case, African migrants. In May 2008, a spate of violent xenophobic attacks on African migrants in South Africa generated international criticism and national interest, and spurred several empirical research projects on xenophobia. These studies added to existing knowledge on social hostility and violence towards foreigners from the rest of Africa, yet several authors have called attention to strings of violence targeting foreign nationals in South Africa that long pre-date the violence of 2008 (Klotz, 2012). Going as far back as the 1890s, Klotz (ibid.) traced the exhibition of xenophobic violence in South Africa to the Durban protest against the arrival of indentured Indian labourers. Her discussion drew attention to historical evidence of violence against foreigners in South Africa.

Monson and Arian (2011), reconstructing past media coverage in the wake of the 2008 violence, note that in 1996 South Africans protested against the issue of visas to immigrants
with claims that “foreigners steal local jobs”. In 2000, Mozambican immigrants were attacked and their properties burnt in Alexandra, and in June 2007 South African drivers accused immigrant bus drivers of poaching their clients and attacked their vehicles. The authors observe that popular justice by vigilantes and ordinary citizens is a familiar form of community policing in Alexandra, thereby taking a more organized approach to the violence of 2008.

Exploring the May 2008 xenophobic violence and the reinvention of difference in South Africa, Hassim et al. (2008: 3) also note that 2008 did not mark the first unprovoked attack on African foreigners. Indeed, “Somali traders had been systematically burned out of their shops in the Port Elizabeth township of Motherwell in February 2007… and four ‘foreigners’ had been killed in Mamelodi township in Pretoria”. The edited volume contains graphic pictures and essays by more than ten authors, examining questions of violence, xenophobia, and ‘othering’ from various perspectives, with its editors claiming that it is important to examine why the events of May 2008 generated so much national shock.

Depending on the perspective, different explanations have been given for the violence, beginning with the then South African president, Thabo Mbeki, who eloquently identified common criminals as responsible. Mbeki’s argument, as reported by Hassim et al. (2008: 4), was that South Africans were incapable of xenophobia, as they were “heirs to a struggle for African unity and redemption”, which dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. Noting the inability of the post-apartheid state to provide basic socioeconomic entitlements and security for the newly enfranchised South African citizens Hassim et al. draw attention to “the unfinished and contradictory nature” (2008: 7) of the apartheid project, locating the cause of the violence in the apartheid experience and the unmet needs that continued after it came to an end. For example, they point out the constitutional emphasis on residence, but also the political perceptions and strategies that invoked entitled South African citizens based on ‘othering’, which instituted a structural difference in that rewards mainly targeted citizens. Surely, they argue, as long as socioeconomic rewards were reaped based on systemic racial classification, “it would be naïve to expect that race-based identities would be consigned to the dustbin of lived social history” (ibid.: 17).

In the same volume, Rolf Maruping (2008) identifies jealousy as the motivation for the violence of May 2008. In his argument, based on his personal experience as one of the victims of the attacks, he notes the common resentment toward migrants who were ‘progressing’ on the part of poor South Africans, who saw fit to disturb that progress by looting and driving them away. John Steinberg (2008) also suggests jealousy of migrants’ relative success as motivation for the South African hostilities. Steinberg’s qualitative study, conducted in the aftermath of May 2008, discusses the struggle for state patronage at the community level, as well as complaints from perpetrators of attacks that foreigners were taking South Africa’s resources across the border. Steinberg (ibid.: 1) thus argues that the findings suggest that South Africans misunderstand the national economy of their newfound democracy, seeing it as “as a finite lump around which people feed via their access to patrons”. Two implications arise from this conception: firstly, any economic success on the part of migrants is assumed to reduce the finite lump that rightly belongs to South Africans; secondly, any relative success outside the parameters of state patronage (as migrants are not eligible for this) is seen as a threat or as unmerited. Steinberg (2008) contends that the reason for this misconception of the workings
of the national economy is located in the distributive-state politics adopted by the post-
apartheid government.

Daryl Glaser (2008), taking a different line of inquiry, argues that the violent xenophobic crowd cannot be seen as motivated by the government’s stringent immigration policy. He exonerates politicians from manipulating anti-foreigner sentiment, citing the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast as contrary examples because of the broader extent of the ‘othering’ violence in both countries. In his analysis, the scope of the May 2008 violence was too narrow to be considered a consequence of manipulative politicians. However, Alex Eliseev (2008: 36), a journalist for one of South Africa’s daily newspapers, notes eerie similarities in the destruction and killings he witnessed as a media observer: “When I looked at the scene all I could see were the images that emerged from Rwanda. Later, our newspaper ran the photograph of the hostel massacre next to a file picture of Rwanda’s genocide and the similarity was as frightening as it was in my mind.”

Glaser (2008), meanwhile, lays indirect responsibility for South Africans’ xenophobia on the country’s leaders, based on their failure to address poverty and unemployment – in essence citing macroeconomic failure. In addition, he argues that xenophobia cannot be seen only as a morally deficit response to wider dynamics, but should also be understood as “patterns of pressure, opportunity, incentive and lived experience” that elicit the choice to act in certain (albeit unacceptable) ways. By claiming this, he is emphasizing the lived experience of subaltern South Africans who have to compete with immigrants daily. It is logical, he notes, that in struggling for scarce urban resources, South Africans see migrants as competitors, an observation which echoes Maruping’s (2008) reference to jealousy. Furthermore, the immigrants are seen as powerful competition, in Glaser’s (2008: 56) opinion, because they are “less work-fussy, less rights-conscious, more desperate, perhaps sometimes more industrious and skilled”. Thus, violent xenophobic outbursts have helped the marauding South Africans make their social landscape intelligible. Glaser’s (2008) argument is unique according to Pillay (2013) because, in a context of critical focus on South Africans and sympathetic support for the victims, Glaser switched the discursive attention. The chaotic and deadly landscape of violence became socially intelligible and the victimised and murdered immigrants emerged as advantaged competitors.

After the violent outburst subsided, a number of empirical studies were undertaken to examine its causes and possible preventive options. Several viewpoints (e.g., Neocosmos, 2008; Misago, Landau & Monson, 2009; Hadland, 2008) presented a range of underlying factors in the entrenchment of xenophobia in South Africa. In addition, the Human Sciences Research Council, a governmental research institution, published a report on xenophobia titled “Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa” immediately following the violence. The report recommended, among other measures, mass legalisation of all immigrants and refugees in South Africa and, thenceforth, a more efficient control of the borders to prevent further influxes. John Sharp (2008) criticised the report for its approach to xenophobia, arguing that creating a Fortress South Africa and neglecting the complexity of relationships and factors that culminated in the May 2008 violence departed from a logical representation of the South African context preceding and during the violence. Sharp (2008: 2) asserted that utilising the term “xenophobic violence” wrongly implied it was violence by South Africans against foreign
immigrants, whereas “South Africans from far-flung parts of the country” were also victims. This emphasized the construction of outsiders based on the structural construction of insiders or authentic South Africans, thereby reiterating similar arguments by Francis Nyamjoh (2006) and Michael Neocosmos (2006).

Michael Neocosmos (2006: V) begins by noting the profusion of empirical studies of xenophobia in South Africa, subsequently focusing his examination of it in an account which “combines theoretical sophistication with historical sensitivity”. He rejects arguments based on conceptions of human rights, as they place responsibility for redress on the state, assume a ready-made solution without rigorous examination of the problem, and contribute to strengthening the statist notion of citizenship. In the same vein, he debunks explanations for xenophobia based on arguments of relative deprivation, noting that such suggestions entail the misconception that xenophobia is a recent phenomenon in South Africa. Likewise, he argues that explanations for xenophobia based on the historical exclusion of South Africans from the rest of Africa by the apartheid state, or racial profiling, cannot be adequate. Instead, he claims that xenophobia is the outcome of “…a shift in nationalist discourse from a popular-emancipatory subjectivity to a state subjectivity, from an inclusive and active conception of citizenship to an exclusive and passive one” (ibid: pg. 123). He therefore confirms that nationalism is a relevant component of xenophobia in South Africa, while arguing that reasons for the specific expression of South Africa’s nationalism are rooted firmly in politics. Invoking the discussions of Frantz Fanon (1965, 2001), he observes the prevalence of xenophobia in post-colonial Africa, emphasizing that xenophobia is not a fixture of post-modernity but, rather, of post-colonialism.

Neocosmos then calls attention to the form of nationalism that is equated with “access to economic resources for accumulation by an aspiring middle class” (2006: 16-17) whose basis lies in indigeneity politicised as the exclusion of foreigners. Neocosmos presents four theses emerging from his examination of xenophobia in South Africa: firstly, that xenophobia is a discourse and practice of exclusion from community; secondly, the process of exclusion is a political process, thereby implicating the state as playing a central role in the creation and sustenance of xenophobia; thirdly, xenophobia is concerned with exclusion from citizenship, which denotes a specific political relationship between state and society – that is, “xenophobia is intimately connected to citizenship… to the fact of belonging or not belonging to a community”; and, fourthly, that xenophobia is the outcome of relations between different forms of politics. In that vein, Neocosmos argues that xenophobia is the result of the relation between state politics and popular politics, thereby calling attention to the interface between the political and the social. He concludes his arguments by categorically emphasizing that xenophobia is the outcome of liberalism, liberal democracy, and human rights discourse, noting that it “must be understood and can only coherently be understood as a result of politics where the state is seen as the sole definer of citizenship and where, given the absence of prescriptive politics among the people, passivity prevails” (ibid.: 133). The work of Neocosmos is unique because he interrogates often taken-for-granted conceptions of the state and politics. He takes the discussion from the political to politics, that is, from the socio-organisation of politics to the theoretical conceptions that created the platform for the political, revealing that there could be an alternative conception to liberal notions of the state.
Based on ten months of field study in Johannesburg, David Matsinhe’s (2011) contribution to the discussion of South Africans’ construction of others highlights the impact of colonial history in fostering hostility that targets other Africans. He argues that South Africa’s xenophobia is rooted in repressed inner negativities that are linked to the humiliating experience of apartheid for Black South Africans. In this case, the ideology of ‘makwerekwere’ (South African slang for foreign Africans with strong negative connotations, often used with contempt) emerged from the “psychological realm of characters who construct their identity by denigrating others” (Matsinhe, 2011: 310). Therefore, according to him, migrants are targeted because they are physical representations of the perpetrators’ internal repressions.

Matthew Smith (2011), taking a different tack, examines the role of the media in fostering xenophobia in South Africa in his systematic review of empirical studies on media representations of hostility targeting migrants. His findings produce evidence that South Africa’s media was xenophobic in its portrayal of African migration to South Africa before the May 2008 violence. However, he emphasizes that print media cannot be seen as directly complicit in fostering the violence, unless this is confirmed in light of further research (ibid.). In another take, David Everatt (2011: 7) uses qualitative and quantitative data to argue that xenophobia is “a deep-rooted social phenomenon, one that will require focused attention if it is to be tackled”. His study utilises data from focus group discussions conducted between April and June 2008 (before and after the May 2008 violence) and quantitative data from a survey commissioned by Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) in 2009. Everatt (ibid: 32) emphasizes afresh the deep-seated hostility targeting non-South Africans and argues that in the context of the failure of state policies to address socio-economic challenges experienced by South Africans, the hostility remains “a potentially lethal touchstone”.

Chigeza et al. (2013) also explore xenophobia in their study of relational experiences between African migrants and Black South Africans, and likewise make mention of heightened prejudice and dominant group dynamics displayed by South Africans against African migrants. Using focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, the authors collected data from 44 participants. Their findings show historical patterns of racial prejudice whereby migrants have been ignored, excluded, treated as different, and targeted with inhumane designations.

Another study that examines xenophobia by exploring the relationship between South Africans and other African migrants is Charlyn Dyers and Foncha Wankah’s (2012) research into the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Cape Town in which they utilise critical discourse analysis to process data on intercultural communication between South Africans and Africans. Their findings note the discursive construction of superiority in the language, cultural practices and behaviour of both groups. The study underscores the strong prejudice and crude stereotyping of migrants by South Africans, and exposes a close relationship between a state discourse of xenophobia and the daily practices of South Africans, with the “social process of news making” (ibid.: 244) cited as a possible contributory factor.

Nicola Jarea-Graham and Werner Böhmke’s (2013) study of South Africans’ discursive construction of the foreigner in Eastern Cape Town affirms Dyers and Wankah’s (2012) findings. Using a social constructivist framework to examine xenophobia, Jarea-Graham and Böhmke (2013: 30) investigated how South Africans discursively constructed the notion of self
and African migrants in their everyday conversations, producing findings indicating the creation of a superior self-identity. Yet, interestingly, the South Africans also discursively identify with foreigners on the basis of mutual humanity in a form of ‘fraternal inclusivity’ to emphasise the ethics of care and reciprocity. Revealing exploitative constructions built on the economic benefits provided by African migrants, the authors also call attention to a cost/benefit relational discourse displayed by South Africans in which migrants are assessed more heavily in terms of the cost of their presence in South Africa than on the benefits, and are constructed as threats, criminals, and strong competitors for scarce resources. The authors argue that the participants’ construction of themselves as magnanimous toward African migrants, meanwhile criminalising them because they are foreign, normalises xenophobia and creates a flexible ethical structure that reinforces the privileges of citizens.

Taken together, the scholarly works discussed above empirically identify xenophobia as entrenched in South Africa and reveal a complex mix of social, economic, and political factors that can be regarded as producing hostility. Yet, notwithstanding a common focus on deconstructing xenophobia through close examination of the social, economic, and political dynamics, a few studies have contended the generalisation of xenophobia as endemic to South Africa.

Owen Sichone’s (2008) anthropological study in Cape Town argues against the general view that poor South Africans are in a competitive relationship with African migrants. He shows that substantial numbers of South Africans appreciate the presence of migrants (and, notably, the presence of females in particular) for several reasons, noting that while some poor South Africans are consistently hostile towards migrants, some are agreeable, and many others oscillate between the two poles depending on the circumstances of engagement. Joshua Kirshner (2012) also argues against the position that links economic deprivation to prevailing xenophobia in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2008; Misago, Landau & Monson 2009; Dodson, 2010), basing his conclusions on a study of Khusong, a township that succeeded in curtailing the spread of xenophobic violence within its space while violence escalated in other cities. His findings show that interventions from local civic leaders, historical linkages to the mining industry and thus migrant labour, and non-nationalist unionising contributed to ensuring violence did not spread in the township. Together, these two studies call attention to the potentially ameliorating effect of close and sustained relationships for positive co-existence between migrants and South Africans. However, as findings are presented from the viewpoint of South African citizens, they also raise questions about the migrants themselves, and their everyday practices.

Given the context of reduced social hostilities vis-à-vis communities displaying positive relationships with migrants, some authors have turned their empirical focus onto migrants’ daily lives. Shannon Morreira’s (2010) study is one that directs empirical inquiry towards examining socio-economic and political contexts through the lens of migrants. Her study of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town highlights how, when leaving home, her respondents expected to get support and welcome from South Africans. Rather than solidarity, however, migrants were exposed to derogatory and hostile treatment from South Africans, and were, arguably, structurally conditioned to remain undocumented in South Africa. This shift from the macro context to a micro level reveals the migrants’ practical realities, highlighting
the ambiguity of the dichotomy of migrants’ political status as either refugees or economic migrants. Both types experience the push to move from their home countries and at the very least deserve that protection be extended to them, she argues. Based on data collected in the course of interviews conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, Morreira discusses how a negative political climate actively and passively creates unbearable socio-economic conditions for migrants. Essentially, she demonstrates that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is only theoretically relevant.

She also highlights structural violence against Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, using the case of Simba, a Zimbabwean asylum seeker, to present the daily experience of social, economic and political violations. Morreira’s study clearly emphasizes the continuity of the suffering of Zimbabwean migrants and how home and host countries structurally (re)produce their undocumented state. However, certain questions are raised by her discussions. Firstly, she notes that none of the fifty interviewees had plans to stay in South Africa permanently; rather, all emphasized that the permanence of their stay was contingent upon political, economic, and social factors in Zimbabwe and South Africa (ibid.: 439). On the surface, this argument sounds logical, but on closer examination, several questions emerge. Notably, there is the suggestion that, although the interviewees did not have permanent plans to remain, a hint of permanence was contained in their plans to attain improved wellbeing – a contradiction that suggests that the results of their pursuit of wellbeing would determine the constancy of their location.

In addition, Morreira presents the despair, betrayal, fear, and silencing of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, highlighting the continuous unpleasantness and dangers that they face in the country. In order to gain greater understanding of the phenomenon it is, therefore, important to investigate why and how migrants remain in this context of enduring constraints. Morreira (2010: 444), reports that Simba was repatriated when caught, noting, “As soon as Simba was back in Beitbridge (Zimbabwe), he left again and, using kinship networks and borrowed money, made it to Johannesburg.” Logically, one would expect that migrants’ conditions in South Africa would be known in Zimbabwe via social networks. However, this may not be the case because, as noted above, Morreira (2010: 442) also reports that interviewees expected solidarity and welcome in South Africa. Notwithstanding this puzzle, it is important to ask why migrants who are deported return, a question related to why they remain in the harsh context in the first place. The simple explanation that “It’s not crazy here [South Africa] like it is at home [Zimbabwe] these days”, does not suffice to indicate the robust and complex factors that inform individual decisions to remain in, or return to, the difficult socio-economic and political environment faced by the undocumented in South Africa. Yet, while Morreira examines this context, she does not present the complexity of migrants’ views and experiences as a separate socio-economic and personal dynamic. That is indicative of the approach and research goals of the author and not necessarily a fault in the analysis.

Another scholar, Caroline Kihato (2011), highlights the everyday life of migrant women and their relationship to the government in her study of cross-border migrant women living and trading in Johannesburg’s central business district. Her study shows that, although the asylum seeker permit is a legal document that allows employment and education in South Africa, migrants are often denied access to essential services such as healthcare, and are detained by police, precluded from employment, and so on. This implies that, even if migrants are
politically legal and documented, common everyday experiences, such as encounters with the police or hospital staff, continue to define them as illegal migrants. Kihato (2011: 353) notes that the lengthy period of refugee-status determination keeps asylum seekers in “legal limbo”, sometimes for years, the consequences of which include exclusion from employment, health care, and accommodation in the city. However, if harrowing everyday experiences are linked to non-recognition on the street of the rights attached to their legal asylum permit, then are those experiences only consequences of legal limbo? That is, would expedited processing of permits actually change the experiences of the migrants?

Kihato’s (2011) study highlights how social exclusion prevents migrants’ full participation in society; even their livelihoods are not exempt from exploitation, as police officers often conduct raids on the street to cart away goods, arrest traders or collect bribes in the form of cash or material gifts. Kihato’s work gives us a glimpse into the everyday challenges of migrant women in Johannesburg and frames the venal activities of the police and other agents of migration control as contestation of the government’s rule of law. Consequently, she argues that “[s]tate power has therefore to be understood as relational and coexisting with alternative centres of power and authority” (2011: 360). Once again, however, the framing of her discussion tones down the agency of migrant women, and she does not explain or flesh out the migrants’ everyday actions. Yet her caution concerning “presumptions that [the] government can codify and regulate its territory in ways that result in predictable outcomes” (Kihato, 2011: 360) because of the contradictory practices of its agents, can be applied to migrants from a perspective that does not frame them as victims but as active participants. For example, Kihato reports that female migrants often employ a South African spokesperson to negotiate informally with the police on their behalf; they also rely on a warning system (a whistle) to inform each other of the presence of police; and maintain invisibility by giving fake addresses or names when caught. These can be understood as active choices which, although they are not organised, reveal that people are not passive in the hostile context they inhabit. Migrants can thus codify and regulate their territory in ways that mitigate officially predictable outcomes.

Belinda Dodson (2010) has also examined migrants’ everyday experiences in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Her qualitative study of thirty-three African migrants, active in the informal sector and with employment in low-skilled jobs, sought to obtain information on the general experience of being a migrant in South Africa. Her findings reiterate the migrants’ everyday experiences of hostility, violence, exclusion, dislike, and disrespect, and their deep resentment about being its targets. While she stresses the uniqueness of each of the migrants’ stories of why they migrated to South Africa, she identifies two commonalities – economic or political motivation – and calls for further analysis of the opinions and attitudes of South Africans.

Taking a slightly different research perspective, Duncan Scott’s (2013) study of migrants’ self-propelled efforts to integrate into the social and political structures of a small community in Cape Town casts light on the complexity of the project. Utilising the theoretically constructed concept of “denizens”, which draws on the work of Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood (2003), Scott shows, through observation and interviews, how this group of migrants actively sought to influence their local political and social environment through self-organising; his findings are relevant to African migrants’ everyday experiences more
broadly as they present these activities as a route to inclusion and, ultimately, belonging. They also contradict Loren Landau and Iriann Freemantle’s (2010) formulation of the notion of a “tactical cosmopolitanism” that cast migrants’ everyday life as deliberate self-exclusion based on the socio-economic benefits of being ‘outsiders’ in Johannesburg.

Landau and Freemantle (2010) argue that, in order to claim rights in South Africa, African migrants in Johannesburg have developed tactical means of inclusion that bypass refugees’ rights claims and identify with broader cosmopolitan membership or rights of reciprocity. In the same vein, self-exclusion through transnational commitments and aspirations for a future outside South Africa are utilised to navigate social and structural constraints. In this light, migrants can approach their experiences “with a kind of scepticism, ‘objectivity’ and self-imposed distance”, with the goal of navigating through “systems of meaning and obligation” (ibid.: 386). Landau and Freemantle’s conception of tactical cosmopolitanism is not empowering or transformative for migrants, but rather, it comprises “…short-lived, contradictory and often ineffective practices” and so, although powerful, it cannot accommodate long-term objectives of changing the socio-political context (ibid.: 387).

Nonetheless, while actions of this nature may seem weak, inconsistent, and short-lived in terms of broad socio-political structures of hostility, they may carry different connotations within the narrow scope of individual goals. As Landau and Freemantle notes, tactical cosmopolitanism “…may be fundamentally transformative, although not necessarily in intended ways”.

In a similar vein of attainment of personal goals, Cawo Abdi (2011: 700) has discussed the steps migrants take to “cement their presence and even gain dominance” in informal settlements and townships in South Africa. His study of Somali, Ethiopian, and South African spaza shops in the Gauteng region, Western Cape and Eastern Cape, shows how migrants seek to instigate harmony with their South African hosts. The study emphasizes that, despite their being caught in the dynamics of structural violence, African migrants have accomplished diverse social and economic achievements, developing a range of different practices to negotiate harmony within their communities, including organising social engagements such as local football tournaments or employing South African sales staff. Also dealing with strategies to overcome everyday obstacles, Pragna Rugunanand and Ria Smit (2011) examine challenges to Congolese and Burundian refugees in Pretoria, South Africa. Stressing the migrants’ ongoing predicaments, such as appalling living conditions, they bring to the fore strategies that attempt to deal with these, like petty trading, hawking, or informal employment. They also continuously seek financial help from friends and non-governmental or religious relief organisations. The authors thus underscore that rather than being passive victims, migrants are active agents, while noting a dichotomy in the means employed: they may either play on being victims as a tool for financial gain, or be active in seeking out any available opportunity to earn financial rewards.

These studies have all reiterated the hostility, violence, and xenophobia in the everyday lives of migrants and exhibited the complexities of the socio-political context of African immigration in South Africa; some have discussed the practical responses of migrants to their harsh context. However, by employing a framework of an extensive, entrenched, and dire social, economic, and political environment they have downplayed migrants’ active responses. Although Landau and Freemantle (2010) present the active choice to identify with
cosmopolitan membership as a means for migrants to navigate their environment, it is argued that active choice is incapable of changing the socio-political context. In essence, this establishes the socio-political context as the active agent that can improve migrants’ lives if changed. An alternative understanding or perspective, however, could be that, because migrants are surviving irrespective of the socio-political context, they are contesting the power or influence of the socio-political context to shape their lives. This is a perspective that locates and centralizes the migrants’ responses as active.

In the framings of the reviewed literature, migrants’ responses are robbed of the potency of action accorded them in the Arendt tradition, which refers to the capacity to do something new and unexpected (Arendt, 1998). The active responses of migrants within the socio-economic and political framework of South Africa are presented as ineffective, illogical, fragmented, and disparate, while the imagery of the migrants’ everyday actions creates a puzzle. Firstly, if we examine their everyday lives by extending the frame of the social, economic, and political context of South Africa to include their home countries, we have to take into consideration remittances for family or business activities. The same everyday actions that appear ineffective, illogical, and fragmented will then take on the element of transnationality, incorporating social and economic impacts on the migrant’s home family and society and thereby offering a more migrant-empowering discourse. Secondly, the literature reviewed above understands migrants as temporarily located in South Africa, waiting to see if their wellbeing will improve; yet one cannot assume that if wellbeing does not improve the migrants will return to their home country. There is also the possibility that the migrant will remain in South Africa for years, even decades, making his or her stay unintentionally permanent. Framing migrants’ everyday actions within the socio-political context of the host country alone ignores the personal or individual context wherein decisions about everyday actions are conceived, implemented, and evaluated (Agustin, 2003).

It can be argued that the relevance of choice in the form of everyday action is deemphasized in the studies reviewed. Sassen (1999: 2) argues that “migrations are highly selective processes: only certain people leave, and they travel on highly structured routes to their destinations, rather than gravitate blindly toward any rich country they can enter”. The same view can be applied to migrants who remain in the harsh migration context. The decision to rebuild burnt down shops, to return to street trade after goods have been repeatedly confiscated, to go back to South Africa after deportation, to continue to eke out a low income, and so on, are indeed choices acted on by structural forces. However, individuals “do not lose the ability to think through their options” (Agustin, 2003: 3), neither do they “gravitate blindly toward…” (Sassen, 1999: 2) the same spot where their goods were vandalised.

Finally, the studies reviewed examine the everyday lives of migrants as a means of highlighting particular forms of social, economic, and political challenges and hostility in the South African context. Yet a complementary approach to the examination of the migrants’ everyday lives should call attention to their aspirations and their capacity to do the unexpected, formulate their choices, and negotiate their structural constraints in line with specific personal goals. My thesis research is located in this alternative space and thereby contributes to the broad discourse of African migrants’ agency in South Africa.
1.3 Contextualising the Problem

The context of informal African migrants’ lives in South Africa is framed by crosscutting socio-economic and political themes. In contextualising the problem, I call attention to the political, social, and economic environments in which migrants attempt to build their lives: in other words, the inherent contestations that migrants have to negotiate, navigate, and experience as they go about the task of building their futures. These themes are presented below in order to aid comprehension of the research problem within its broader setting. However, because these themes act as a guide to understanding the research questions, the full theoretical breadth and depth of their scope are not presented. Rather, the sub-section below is limited to presenting the information that I deem critical to the focus of the study, effectively narrowing the scope of my discussion.

1.3.1 The politics of bartering Citizenship: Migrants Inclusion and Exclusion

Unlike South Africans with citizenship rights and hence access to social welfare coverage, informal foreign migrants do not have substantive access to social security because of their immigration status (or non-status); suspended between two governments (home and host country), informal migrants are detached from their links to such support (Makhema, 2009). Hence, they are, to a large extent, dependent on erratic incomes from street trading – with the attendant vulnerability that comes with the activity - and possibly volatile individual social networks. Although the South African Constitution provides for the extension of socio-economic rights to everyone living in South Africa, some (such as social housing or social welfare) are concretely constrained by the government’s inability to extend the rights to all residents, and a myriad of implementation challenges (Deacon, Olivier & Beremauro, 2015; Makhema, 2009). In this global era of concentrated poverty-reduction initiatives and programs such as the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), informal migrants’ situations can be seen as a paradox of the global fight against poverty. Nevertheless, the structural disconnection between informal migrants and available social support is indicative of a political will to preserve national resources for citizens, and to deny others, such as informal migrants, the basic comfort to be expected from right of access (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Khosravi, 2010). In essence then, disconnecting the informal migrant from accessing social support is seen as supporting immigration control goals in cases where migrants are actively discouraged from remaining in the host society.

Several authors on immigration control (e.g., Coutin, 2005; Torpey, 1998), have suggested that, in the pursuit of migration control goals, governments of informal migrant-receiving countries have deliberately created a socio-economic space devoid of state support or obligations. In South Africa, the government’s attempt to inhibit the wellbeing of African migrants was revealed in its alleged complicity in criminal and often violent activity targeting migrants (Neocosmos, 2006; Landau, 2012). In this sense, coercion and exclusion become the social links between the government and informal migrants, with the aim of enforcing migrants’ compliance with immigration policy. Observed from a Weberian perspective (Tilly, 1985; Weber, Gerth, & Mills, 1977), the state has always enjoyed the monopoly of the legitimate use of force and expects its citizens and residents to abide by its rules. As is typical
of this hegemonic conceptualisation of a state’s autonomy, the individual is downplayed and conceptualised as either contesting the state’s hegemony, or as physical proof of the failure or success of the state.

The above understanding appears to frame the thrust of the design and practice of migration control, enacted as a coercive and exclusionary policy targeting those designated as foreign, such as in South Africa (Landau, 2011). For example, Landau argues:

The quest to divide privileged insiders and demonic outsiders is nowhere more evident than in post-apartheid immigration control. Through both design and by-product, the South African government has shaped cognitive and spatial divides between a deserving citizenry and outsiders who can be denied legal identities. (2011: 7)

Adding to this, Michael Neocosmos writes:

[T]he recent history of Southern Africa has been a history of the structuring and de-structuring of nationalities both in the “subjective” sense of the formation and dissolution of national or ethnic identities and in the apparently more “objective” sense of the destruction and making of nations and nationalities. (2006: 23)

This political power of the state is nowhere more relevant than in migration control and the goal to condition the migrant tacitly, which is openly challenged by informality in migration. This brings to light the Hobbesian (Hobbes, 1985) perspective, which cautioned, “No individual is obligated to do anything the sovereign orders which, in his own judgment, would be a threat to his preservation” (Darwall, 1989: 404). In a context where the individual exercises his or her agency in the interests of self-preservation (Hampton, 1986), the possible outcomes of a coercive thrust of political power, such as in immigration control, are effectively pluralised.

In South Africa, immigration policy has been strongly linked to the statal notion of citizenship and national identity (Peberdy, 2009), and the traditional conceptualisation of citizenship as subject-making. The latter follows the Foucauldian sense of self-making and being made by power relations that shape actions and reactions through schemes of coercion, discipline, and distributing and restricting access to rights and resources (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999; Foucault, 1991). Following the Hobbesian perspective and contemporary social contract argument in general (Freeman, 2007; Rawls, 1999), South African street traders as citizens have a relationship with the nation-state and community through conceptions of rights and responsibilities (Peberdy, 2009). However, informal migrant street traders are not expected to have rights and responsibilities such as those discussed above. Therefore, if individual compliance is thought to be influenced by the presence of individual rights and state responsibilities then, arguably, migrants are implicitly motivated by their substantive absence to deviate from compliance. A relationship that is otherwise acceptable to South African citizens becomes a deliberative relationship for migrants. For example, migrants must daily evaluate the benefits and costs of close interaction with the state (Buchanan, 2000) and
circumvent incessant forms of xenophobic violence.

One of the basic aspects of the political and social responsibilities of a sovereign nation-state is determining who is a citizen. It is one of the means of identifying the national community so that “admission and exclusion [forms] the core of communal independence” (Walzer, 1983: 62). The concept of citizenship thus highlights the political criteria for membership and the relationship of rights and responsibilities or obligations between the members of the national community and the nation-state. Therefore, citizenship assumes critical relevance in a context of high international immigration and globalized notions of individual rights, wherein emphasis on citizenship increases the pressure to regulate mobility by narrowing the pathways to inclusion. Meanwhile, notions of international human rights drag foreign individuals into the legal scope of the nation-state, thereby extending its boundedness (Jacobson, 1997), but also increasing its anxiety in terms of extended responsibilities. The nation-state is thus continuously engaged in negotiations with international institutions and members of its community in order to reach desirable outcomes. The acquisition of citizenship status is thus understood as providing the individual with the access or rights to the means to achieve wellbeing (Marshall, 1983).

The logical relevance of citizenship in a context of high levels of immigration is based on the qualities that are formally utilized to identify members of the national community- and hence, the regulation of inclusion. The nation-state plays a crucial role in identifying and welcoming the foreign immigrant as a member of the national community, a political prerogative that can be utilized or bastardized depending on the prevailing social and economic climate. Importantly, it gives the nation-state the privilege of bartering its criteria for exclusion. In that understanding, the historicity of the national community plays a definitive role, but so do economic and related financial opportunities as glimpsed through the lens of immigration. Historically, in South Africa the ability and individual capacity to be productively assimilated into the prevailing economic order and its machinery (for example, agriculture and mining) contributed to inclusion opportunities, while the relevance of racial domination to the government of apartheid South Africa privileged racial identification as a further basis. Furthermore, the conception of inclusion was fragmented to separate citizens’ privileges from natives’ benefits as members of the broader community – a divide that was established on racial lines, with Whites as citizens enjoying more elaborate privileges compared to the strictly regulated and meagre benefits articulated for Blacks as natives. The structurally fragmented conception of inclusion was also linked to residential rights to urban areas. Thus, the regulation of inclusion and exclusion in South Africa’s history follows the trajectory of racial, labour, and political prerogatives.

Contemporary South Africa’s regulation of inclusion and exclusion through immigration is framed in the language of development and security prerogatives, mirroring the global turn. Since the Immigration Regulation Act 2014, emphasis has been placed on critical skills, favouring the highly educated, professionals, experts, and other successful business people. Preference has also taken a geographical turn with, for example, a special⁴ visa initiative targeting the BRICS (Brazil, Russian, Indian, China, and South Africa) countries. Yet it must

⁴ A special multiple-entry visa can be issued to business executives from BRICS for a period of 10 years as against the maximum of 3 years for others.
be pointed out that the majority of the country’s migrants are from within the African region. Wealthy and successful individuals are also welcomed with an investment cut-off placed at 5 million South African Rand - a 100% increase from the previous 2.5 million. With such criteria for granting inclusion to foreigners, South Africa sets the bar for others that are implicitly defined as undesirable and preferably excluded from the national community. Hence, informal African migrants with technical skills such as welding and auto mechanics, and funds sufficient to start a micro-business, are not welcome or provided with inclusive rights, except through gaps provided by the international conception of human rights and protective privileges as shown in rights to seek asylum. South Africa’s experience with inclusion and exclusion (and hence immigration) has also benefited from international influences through what Audie Klotz (2012: 193) calls “the causal significance of a ‘rights-markets’ coalition”, referring to active advocacy that seeks to influence domestic policies with global norms.

The premise of exclusion based on economic, financial, political, and other similar prerogatives raises several questions. For instance, success or failure can be transient; the rich can become poor and the poor can become rich. The same applies to crime: the rich, educated, or highly skilled can engage in criminal activities just like the poor. It is puzzling, therefore, that migration policy indicates a government preference for the professionally skilled, wealthy, and highly educated as those best qualified to contribute positively to building the society. The increasing reliance on ephemeral factors as criteria for a ‘good migrant’ or resident is both intriguing and highly normative.

It also calls attention to the practical benefits or disadvantages to the host company of the presence of migrants lacking sufficient funds, powerful social and political connections, or critical skills. The argument of a human rights or ‘rights-market’ coalition for the advancement of inclusion of informal African migrants inadvertently echoes the political question of the immediate economic or, more generally, developmental benefit of the presence of informal migrants with highly vulnerable socio-economic profiles. The ensuing theoretical and political contention can thus be understood broadly as the result of, firstly, “the stubborn rigidity of the nation-state” (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 9) in defining its national community; and secondly, the vulnerability and the responsibility of care for the informal migrants. Several researchers have argued for a broadening of national communities; for example, in the case of South Africa, through a more inclusive approach to citizenship (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Shearing & Wood, 2003). Klaaren (2011: 145), discussing the South Africa situation, argues that “it may be that the demand for the recognition of transience pushes the official residence paradigm away from its focus on permanent residence status and towards a greater embrace of a spectrum of residential categories”. “A spectrum of residential categories” suggests a platform where regulations for exclusion are tempered by the need for inclusion through mutually beneficial policies and arrangements. It can thus be argued that those questions and puzzles mentioned above should be understood as opportunities to explore, and not a basis for discriminatory policies, or a cry

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5 Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted in 1948, guarantees the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. Subsequent regional human rights instruments have elaborated on this right, guaranteeing the “right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions.” American Convention on Human Rights, art. 22(7); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 12(3). http://www.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/ Accessed on the 16
for a blanket provision of political access.

1.3.2 Informal migrants’ vulnerability as product of the social

The vulnerability of informal migrants, although connected to their relationship with the host government, self-evidently also has a social or cultural aspect, as migrants cannot avoid daily contact with members of the local society, even if the authorities can be skillfully avoided. Consequently, the cultural aspect of vulnerability is relevant in understanding the context wherein informal migrants attempt to build their futures in South Africa. Jorge Bustamante (2002: 339) identified the cultural aspect of vulnerability as “the set of cultural elements (stereotypes, prejudices, racism, xenophobia, ignorance and institutional discrimination) with derogatory meanings which tend to justify the power differentials between nationals and non-nationals”. In South Africa, although discussion of informal migrants’ experiences often cites and explores cultural aspects of vulnerability such as xenophobia or prejudices, it largely and too often refers to the complicity of the political. This focuses and centralises the discourse of informal migrants’ vulnerability on the policies or institutionalisation of discrimination against migrants.

Without undermining the relevance of policies or institutional structures in creating and sustaining migrants’ vulnerability, cultural elements cast doubts on the sufficiency of policies to respond adequately to migrant vulnerability in South Africa. That understanding is relevant in the context of a contemporary society that is interested in the search for redress of the vulnerability of informal African migrants. As Neocosmos (2006) notes about the discussion of xenophobia in South Africa, although the government is widely identified as actively (and less often passively) complicit in fomenting xenophobia, analysis often lays responsibility for finding the solution on the government, thereby largely blaming the socio-economic experiences of the informal migrants on the failure of governmental immigration policies. The failure is then explained as the result of either the wrong policies or the inability to implement the right policies. Yet attributing the source and the solution of the problem to the same agent is likely to obstruct further rigorous inquiry into the problems or challenges of informal African migrants in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2006).

It is evident, however, that there is more to the problem than mere policy failure. For instance, Bustamante’s (2002) report of a United Nations-commissioned study of International Migrants and Human Rights violations calls attention to the structural and cultural nature of vulnerability. His discussion highlights the power differentials between foreign immigrants and citizens: the social relations between citizens and foreign immigrants, the role of power in fashioning them, and the various degrees of impunity this provides citizens in their treatment of foreign migrants. Such effects of power on social relations have interested sociologists for decades. For example, Howard S. Becker (1968) included it in his theorization of deviant behaviour, and the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1938) emphasized the central role that it plays in everyday social interactions. More recently, Reis et al. (2000) have expatiated on the significance of power as an organizing force that assists individuals to achieve their desire in relationship dynamics and outcomes.
Conceptions of power by citizens and informal African migrants alike assume significance in the framing of the social context in which futures are being built or, by extension, restrained from being built. Specifically relevant to this study is the problematization of power in social relations between citizens and international migrants as an enabler of ‘various degrees of impunity’. If power is assumed to be singularly related to citizenship status, the idea of a ‘calibration’ of impunity suggests other variables that may be at the least catalytic or at most constructive. The broad scope of factors that stimulate the vulnerability of informal migrants in South Africa thus draws attention to the role of the social alongside the political in the context where they build their futures.

1.3.3 Street trading as a source of livelihood

Street trading is relevant to this study because the ‘street’ is the platform where informal foreign migrants live and attempt to build their futures by garnering economic power. The term ‘street trading’, along with ‘street vending’, is used to refer to multiple types of informal trade (Skinner, 2008). Sharit Bhownik, (2005: 2256) defines a street trader as “a person who offers goods for sale to the public without having a permanent built-up structure from which to sell”. He adds that they “may be stationary in the sense that they occupy space on the pavements or other public/private spaces or, they may be mobile in the sense they move from place to place by carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets on their heads” (ibid.). Lyons and Msoka (2010: 1082) also acknowledge that street traders are “hawkers who have no fixed location but roam an area [and] vendors with a fixed location and possibly a shelter constructed in the public domain”. However, Fine (1999) criticises this lack of clarity or specificity in definitions of street trade.

Street trading forms one of the economic activities broadly referred to as informal. According to the African Development Bank (2014), informal economic activities account for 55% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and 80% of its labour force. The large number of actors in the informal economy is not only due to internal processes of urbanisation, but is also the outcome of international migration within Africa (Skinner, 2008), which draws attention to the participation of African migrants in informal economic activities in Africa.

Several studies in developing countries (Crush, Chikanda & Skinner, 2015; Roever, 2014; Willemse, 2011; Skinner, 2006) have highlighted the vulnerability entrenched in street trading as the main source of livelihood, and the constraints that arise from its economic, socio-cultural, political, and legal context. For example, a study of street vendors’ laws and regulation in South Africa (WIEGO, 2014: 1) points out that the content of Labour Laws and institutional frameworks creates a context of discrimination and vulnerability for street traders. The report notes, “The entire labour law system in South Africa, as in other countries, is based on ‘standard’ employment and their employers, typically in medium to large workplaces.” Hence, workers in ‘non-standard’ employment can only access limited legal protection, and employers can disregard all legal requirements in cases of informal employment. Sally Roever (2014: 21), in her report on findings from a longitudinal study of street traders in five global cities, including Durban, South Africa, also emphasizes the role played by the macroeconomic environment in street trading, observing that “street vendors overwhelmingly identified forces
related to the city and its government as the most significant drivers”. The report further specifies that, “without exception, vendors [street traders] in each city described government practices that undermined their ability to accumulate capital over time”. The most highly ranked is abuse of authority including police harassment, demands for bribes, arbitrary confiscations of merchandise, and physical abuse.

In South Africa, although the national policy for Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise (SMME) seeks to promote and develop the sector, street trading by-laws, which form the regulatory tool for street trading, still act to restrict and tacitly prohibit it. In essence, there is the suggestion of a disjunction between the policy and practice of street trading management in South Africa. Caroline Skinner’s (2006, 2000) discussion of policies that affect street traders in South Africa also records the policy gaps created by different localities’ practising differing levels of inclusion and exclusion. Such disjunctions often revealed themselves in seized wares, detention, and fines for street traders, and constant harassment from local government officials. Sally Roever (2014) notes the lack of market place rights and protection that heightens the vulnerability of the street traders, making them easy victims for corrupt officials. In addition to policy constraints, Lodene Willemse’s (2011) study of street traders in four urban centres in South Africa (Cape Town, eThekwini, Johannesburg, and Tshwane) mentions severe cash-flow problems, inadequate public transport, and difficulties in formalising businesses as additional challenges.

Indeed, street traders in Africa have an unforgiving life; the broader context (social, economic, and political background) is harsh; they are often criticised and excluded from political debates influencing their lives and livelihood (Brown, Lyons, & Dankoco, 2010; Skinner, 2008; Cross & Morales, 2007); they occupy the lowest socio-economic rung in society and suffer the consequences of this fact. When I was growing up in Nigeria, it was common to hear people complain about or sympathise with street traders. Complaints covered a broad canvas: obstructing human traffic, being a danger to motorists and themselves, being a den of thieves and criminals hiding behind a trading facade to rob unsuspecting passers-by, breaking the local laws of the society, and so on. Sympathy for their plight was not so common.

Street traders tend to be identified and categorised as unworthy entrepreneurs by business development service providers, and are also recognised as poor or chronically poor – and therefore worthy beneficiaries of handouts – by anti-poverty programs (International Labour Organization, 2002; Sethuraman, 1998; Moser, 1978). Such socio-economic qualification has mostly located the study of street trading between employment research and social pathology in traditional academic inquiry (Bromley, 1978), highlighting street trading as symptomatic of development challenges (Dewar, 2005). In fact, street trading is considered to be a political sign of massive underemployment or unemployment and backwardness in developing countries (Kamuyori, 2007; Bromley, 2000; Bairoch, 1973). Therefore, given the weak position established by links with social pathology or underemployment, it is not surprising that governmental approaches to street trading are often repressive and rarely supportive (Hansen & Vaa, 2004).

Meanwhile, because street trading falls into the contentious informal sector, it tends to form part of the debate on the economic contribution of the informal sector to national
development, In this, the conditions of street traders are seen as either positive or negative depending on whether the political position of the protagonist is neo-liberal or Marxist (Soto, 1989; Moser, 1984). However, both approaches (either the neo-liberal tradition that emphasizes the potential of the informal economy to create employment, or the Marxist perspective that emphasizes the informal economy as a structural problem) have been criticised as disempowering in some African countries (including South Africa), with a call to adopt an institutional approach (Skinner, 2000). This should provide macroeconomic and political policies that facilitate economic development and support those slipping through the numerous cracks in pursuit of capitalist endeavours. From this perspective, social policy in several forms (depending on the type of governance) has become one of the active macro instruments globally used to provide support and succour for the poor in general (O’Connor, 2009; Kangas & Palme, 2000). NGOs and activists working on poverty issues or small and micro business developments are also known to provide some form of support to the street traders in South Africa and other developing countries (for example, StreetNet and WIEGO). Nevertheless, there are still technical challenges to accessing or even qualifying for some support services; the intervention might focus on poverty alleviation and classify the street trader as “one who is trapped in poverty cycle” (Karungu, Marabwa & Stettler, 2000: 10), or brand them as small and micro enterprises in a way that obviates their unique needs (McGrath, 2003; Rogerson, 2000).

Nevertheless, as urban centres are often areas with high unemployment, street trading has come to act as an effective buffer to unemployment. Moreover, multinational companies have realised the potential support for corporate goals in the wide distribution and fast sales that characterise street trading. Street traders are known to act as chain distributors for multinational producers, often buying in bulk and selling in smaller quantities to their clients, making them a relevant link in the distribution chain of several manufacturing companies. Drawing on post-modernist tradition, Abdoumalique Simone has championed the relevance of the informality that characterises street trading, pointing out that “roughly 75% of basic needs are provided informally in the majority of African cities” (2005: 3), and that informal economic activities have come to represent “the determination of urban Africans to find their own ways” (ibid.). He earlier stressed the importance of examining informal economic activities “as a platform for the creation of a very different kind of sustainable urban configuration than we have yet generally to know” (Simone, 2004: 9). In this sense, despite the meagre income, insecurities, and vulnerabilities that characterise informal economic activities such as street trading, the African context demands that it is conceptualized as a means by which Africans make their lives work. Therefore, this study adopts a heuristic approach that neither glosses over the instability of the trickle of financial returns, nor exaggerates the agency of the conscientious traders.

1.4 Research Objectives and Questions

The research objectives of this study are twofold: firstly, it examines how informal migrants deal with socioeconomic insecurity in the attempt to build their desired future; and secondly, it demonstrates the interaction between informal
migrants and migration agency in the pursuit of desired futures.

In that light, this study explores two main research questions: Firstly, why do informal African migrants in Johannesburg remain and attempt to build their lives in a context of socioeconomic and political insecurity? Secondly, how do informal migrants deal with the harsh socioeconomic and political context in pursuit of their conceived futures?

1.5 Definition of Concepts

There are some important concepts (including migrants, poor, state, race identified, and street traders) utilised in this thesis, which are defined in this section.

**Migrant:** According to the Glossary on Migration by the International Migration Law series⁶, the term migrant is used to cover “all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of personal convenience”. In this definition, the reasons for migration, such as a decision to seek better economic and social conditions, are important. Somewhat differently, the United Nations⁷ defines a migrant as “an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular”. Thus, the UN’s definition places emphasis on the time spent in the host country, excluding all stays of less than one year. From these definitions, political categories have been derived to classify individuals moving across international boundaries for governmental control, administration, and management (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2012).

Several conventional categories politically identify a documented migrant as an individual who has entered the country lawfully and remains in the country abiding by the admission criteria. An economic migrant is a person who moves from the place of residence to another country to improve his or her quality of life; the term is also used to refer to a person moving for purposes of employment. Refugees are persons ‘fleeing’ persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion who are unable or unwilling to return to the country on account of their fear of harm. An irregular migrant is a person who lacks legal status in a transit or host country because of unauthorised entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa. This study utilises the term migrant, without applying such politically recognised categorisation, to refer to African nationals who have moved from their country of residence to South Africa for various reasons including residential, economic, political, or social.

**Informal migrants:** An informal migrant, in terms of this study, refers to African

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migrants who are un-documented but also may possess expired permits, asylum seeker permits, or one of a host of other immigration permits. I use the term informal migrant to differentiate them from formal or highly skilled African migrants. Formal African migrants are generally active in senior positions based on their specialized and professional skills, financial success, and popularity; they are privileged by immigration laws and, unlike informal migrants, are able to meet the stringent requirements of residential or work permits. Informal migrants, on the other hand, are socially excluded in their host society, often presumed to be a drain on its resources, and without any reasonable possibility to contribute to it or its economy. Given the porosity of the South African border and high unemployment, these migrants populate the informal sector in South Africa and their numbers are projected to increase at the same time as they face increasing challenges (Segatti & Landau, 2011).

**Poverty:** This may be defined qualitatively or quantitatively. Quantitatively, the poverty line is used to determine the poor in several developing country contexts. For example, the $1 per day measurement expressed in Purchasing Parity Power is widely used as an international indicator (Ravallion, 1995). More frequently, however, estimating the caloric value of household diets has been used to identify the poor in countries like Namibia (May and Roberts, 2005), and South Africa (Oosthuizen, 2008). Yet some researchers criticise the use of the poverty line as a measurement of poverty, claiming it is inadequate for comparison across time and space; instead they emphasize the multidimensionality of poverty, highlighting its social, psychological, and institutional dimensions (e.g. Amartya Sen, 2001). Sen (2001) discusses poverty as forms of ‘unfreedom’, which he characterises as a lack of social, economic, and political means or opportunities to live a life that is valued by the individual. In this study, I utilise Sen’s approach to poverty to categorise African migrants on the streets of Johannesburg as poor.

Sen’s conception of poverty is an appropriate choice for this study because, despite the diversity of socio-economic standing among informal foreign migrants, they share the experience of the social, economic, and political context. In that sense, Sen’s formulation homogenises the population of the study for the purposes of research. Moreover, economic success is achieved by informal foreign migrants through tactics or disparate measures which are criminalised: they are not only excluded from accessing the resources they need to take them out of poverty, but their very presence is criminalised, exposing them to arbitrary arrests, detention, and deportation. In this sense, irrespective of socio-economic level, Sen’s definition is highly relevant in defining the deprivations experienced by this group.

**State:** The term state is used extensively in this thesis, often to refer to the traditional nation-state conception, which denotes a sovereign political government of a population in a demarcated territory. This incorporates Max Weber’s (Weber, Gerth & Mills, 1977) entity and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force into Charles Tilly’s (1985) formulation of relatively centralised and differentiated organisations with officials that have relative control over concentrated means of violence. Nevertheless, I recognise the varied forms of contestation to the traditional conception of the state (Geertz, 2004).

At other times (in the first section of this thesis, for instance), I use the term ‘state’ to refer to the South African government and often use ‘state’ and ‘government’ interchangeably.
Race: In South Africa, racial identification is relevant to the historical and socio-political construction of daily experience for all. Although the repeal of the Population Registration Act in 1991 removed the apartheid-based categorisation of race, in contemporary post-apartheid society racial identification is still argued to be relevant to the socio-economic reality of South Africans. The latest (2011) census survey utilised racial categories, for example. When discussing the history of migration and contemporary migration to South Africa, I use the racial terms specified by the repealed apartheid Population Registration Act and identified by Statistics South Africa. South Africa’s apartheid law divided the population into four racial categories: Blacks, identified as dark skinned Africans, made up of 90% Nguni and Sotho ethnic groups and constituting 75% of South Africa’s total population; Whites, identified as Caucasians of European descent; Indians who are descendants of Asian migrants; and Coloureds of mixed White and Black racial origin and their descendants. Notwithstanding the above, I recognise the complexities of racial definition in South Africa (Shepherd & Robins, 2008; Boonzaier & Sharp, 1988). As this is not a study of race, however, I have decided to utilise the meanings clearly set out in the South Africa Population Act. A theoretical engagement with race as a concept would take me outside the scope of the study.

Street trading: The street trader is the social subject of this study. In common understandings, a street trader is someone who trades by the roadside, a description that only refers to the physical presence of roadside operators. Researchers (Lund, Nicholson & Skinner, 2000; Witt, 2000; Lund, 1998) have argued that the term is only accurate in its specific function; it does not highlight the diverse range and intricacies of micro-entrepreneurial activities within any sub-sector on the street. In line with this argument, I use the term ‘street trader’ in this study to refer to diverse micro-entrepreneurial activities that include trading and service provision. The principal focus is that participants in this study actively seek their income and economic patronage from the street, or have done so in the recent past.

1.6 Thesis Outline

The thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter One is an introduction to the research topic; it presents previous studies and contextualises the research problem. Chapter Two is a presentation of the conceptual and theoretical arguments that form the framework of this study. In it, I examine previous theoretical approaches to the study of poor migrants’ lives in host countries and locate resilience theory in the gap identified. Chapter Three gives background information on Africa and South Africa’s migration context. Chapter Four focuses on the methodology for this study. Chapter Five is a presentation of results and analyses. Chapter Six is the concluding chapter and contains a summary of the findings, discussion, implications of the findings and the contributions of this study.

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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

This chapter presents resilience as the theoretical construct that frames this study. I cannot talk about the benefits of this framing, however, without conceptualising the presence and experiences of informal migrants. Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of informal migrants’ lives in South Africa in which special attention is paid to the context – immigration policy and control – providing the formal and legal conditions shaping how such lives are led (Neocosmos, 2006).

This is followed by a review of theoretical approaches to the study of informal migrants in their host countries, focusing first on livelihood and integration models, which are popular in migration studies in developing and developed countries respectively. The strengths and shortcomings of each of these approaches are discussed before I move on to explore resilience theory as an alternative theoretical framework, one that is also relevant to examination of the socio-political context and informal migrants’ experiences and perspectives. As Bloch and Chimienti (2012: 9) argue, “scholars need to combine a multilevel analysis exploring irregular migrants’ lived experiences, their interpretations and subjective experiences, and their social and structural contexts”.

2.1 Contextualizing Informal Migrants’ Lives

Several authors have reminded us that migration is as old as the human race. People have always moved around for reasons that include the search for food, security, or a sense of belonging. Although there have been increases in international migration in the 1990s and the twenty-first century, there were periods of possibly more drastic international migration during the nineteenth century (Sorensens, van Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; de Haas, 2007). Indeed, Hein de Haas (2007) suggests that the perceived dramatic magnitude of contemporary international migration is not unprecedented; rather, it is the contemporary political, social, and media response to immigration which has drastically altered the migration context. The primary policy response to international migration in recent times has been to restrict the flow and strictly categorise migrants in socio-economic terms that constitute some as wanted and others as undesirable. This has created an international political context of increasingly restrictive immigration laws and regulations, intensified border controls, and produced more straightforward deportation processes (Aas & Bosworth, 2013).

While international migration has risen to prominence as a ‘problem’ in political discourse and institutional restructuring, this has not been accompanied by a reduction in flow. Rather, migrants have responded by utilising non-institutional means and bypassing legal channels of immigration. Illegal and/or undocumented migration has thus emerged as the contemporary migrant’s response to overly restrictive immigration policies – in developed economies as well as in centres of production and consumption in developing nations (Sassen, 1999; de Genova, 2007; Castles, 2000). In these unfolding complexities of increasingly restrictive immigration policies and practices, the response of ordinary migrants is seen as
unequivocally marked by their adjustment and resistance to, and creative transformation of, the processes and institutions that bind them.

While an increase in restrictions on contemporary migration is clear, there has also been an expansion of inclusive social benefits for certain classes of migrants. More attention has been paid, however, to restrictive immigration policies than to the improved socio-economic and political rights of desirable or regular immigrants in certain countries and regions. International migrants can move relatively freely (in as much as they meet the host country’s requirements), and as Sassen (1998) contends, migrations are produced and patterned. With globalisation a facilitator of integration, many migrants are included in social provisions and can transport such rights across borders. A good example is the European Union’s permanent resident permit that protects the rights of specific migrants within the countries that are contained by the Union’s borders (Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents). Such innovative, inclusive immigration laws are features of contemporary societies and a globalised world and mean that migrants can, to a certain extent, enjoy extensive social rights and live as full citizens. For example, depending on their immigration status, migrants may have extensive rights to social welfare provisions in times of need.

In this sense, the law – and by extension immigration policies – is so powerful that it can confer citizenship on selected foreigners and exclude informal foreigners, with potentially dire consequences. Hannah Arendt (1976), one of the most influential political thinkers of the twentieth century, emphasized the latter. She insisted that one of the root causes of totalitarianism in Europe during the two world wars was the total disregard for human life and the political designation of certain people as unwanted and stateless, thereby adeptly denying them the right to have rights. In emphasizing participatory citizenship and the principle of political equality beyond natural rights, she asserts that citizenship rights are critical to wellbeing and, arguably, should take precedence over other rights. However, since it is the state that can confer such rights on immigrants, they become meaningless in the context of a weak or non-existent state and in the unique circumstance of war (Moodie, 2006).

Susan Coutin’s (1998) study of Salvadoran immigrants in the United States towards the end of the twentieth century examines how they attempted to shape their futures and identities by working with activists to influence the policies that affected their lives. Yet, while informal migrants can collaboratively attempt to change policies with the assistance of supporting organisations or NGOs, individually they usually try to shape their futures by taking practical steps to guarantee and secure their wellbeing. As active residents, migrants can resist or alter the traditional conceptualisation of citizenship as a critical framework for promoting and facilitating access to resources for wellbeing (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 2000; Kang, 2012; Del Castillo, 2002; Ronaldo, 1997; Getrich, 2008). While arguing for the re-imagination of citizenship, Hye-Kyung Kang (2012: 522) maintains that “immigrant individuals, groups, and communities are actively engaged in practices that contest, resist, and negotiate the very discourses that construct them as the ‘other’”. Although such contestation refers to changing or expanding the coverage of citizens’ ‘rights’ as privileged access to social, economic, and political resources, a different kind of resistance may obtain the desired resources via means other than rights. Undeniably, in the developing South there are daily occurrences that highlight
the practical challenges to conceptualising citizenship rights as a critical pathway to wellbeing: citizenship rights do not guarantee personal welfare.

In light of this, the unique socio-political context with which poor and unskilled immigrants are dealing retains its relevance in the abstraction of how informal migrants build their lives. Not only are they afflicted with poverty but also a constantly changing and unsympathetic social and political context in the form of “discouragement policies” and the fortification of borders (van der Leun, 2003). In this age of global development, with its focus on poverty alleviation, the non-migrant poor enjoy the benefits of a sympathetic world, especially when this translates into pressure on political agents to act to alleviate or mitigate their situation – and civil society organisations work together for its improvement. Furthermore, unlike the migrant poor, they do not have to deal with an aggressive and hostile socio-political context on a daily basis. Although NGOs and civil society can and do intervene to ameliorate the sometimes devastating experiences of the poor migrant, such interventions are limited by their fragmentation and temporal design.

It is not difficult to observe the uncertainty and unpredictability of the socio-political context of poor and unskilled immigrants in developing countries, where building lives is intricately connected to the broader socio-political and economic environment. Sarah Collinson (2009), for example, has discussed the failure of contemporary migration research to analyse its subject as an integral part of social and economic transformation. Moreover, the fluid and flexible everyday activities of poor immigrants often resist any form of categorisation of either them or their practices. Unfortunately, popular approaches to migration studies continue to rely on “overly-simplistic dichotomies and categories” (Collinson, 2009: 3).

The reliance on categorisation as the basis for ‘focused’ study of groups of migrants does not reflect the reality of their situation. For example, Collinson (2009: 31) has suggested that migrants can be categorised as Survival/Coping, Unskilled/Skilled, Moderately skilled/Moderately endowed, etc. The reality, however, is that there are skilled (or highly educated) migrants who survive by using their limited knowledge of hair cutting, for example. One of the main obstacles to this reductionist line of reasoning is that reality for migrants has been shown by previous studies (Landau, 2006, 2012) to be complex and fluid, especially in urban centres in developing countries. Meanwhile, it can be argued that one of the key reasons behind the categorisation project is the increasing academic and political pressure to move the study of migration from the descriptive and explanatory to the predictive. Governments, and by extension policy makers, are increasingly interested in the dynamics of migration in order to further the political goal of migration control.

Evading the nets of typologies and yet vital to the contextualisation of migration and migrant survival is the relevance of ‘hope’ to the reality of migrant lives. Immigrant narratives are often saturated with hope, expressed either as religious belief or as inspiration (Lalami, 2005; Hagan, 2008), yet the dominant socio-economic and political cost-benefit approach to migration studies has often neglected this emic perspective. Arguably, neglect of this aspect of the migrant’s reality is one of the reasons why the crowded field of migration studies has been unable to produce immigration policies that efficiently control immigration. Although it can rightly be argued that not all migration studies promote immigration control, there are a few
that argue for open borders (Pâecoud & de Guchteneire, 2007).

The few studies and discourses that give significant attention to the dynamics of hope in migrants’ daily decision-making are those that discuss migration in the context of religion (Groody & Campese, 2008; Hagan, 2008). These examine unwavering faith in a spiritual being – expressed through faith-based organisations, devotional practices, signs, and messages – as an integral part of the migration process, suggesting that migrants’ decision-making may move from “a rational, real-world level to a very private, religious, and even mystical plane” (Hagan, 2008: 23). Such discussions have highlighted the relevance and power of inspiration through the focus on its theological content, but examination of inspiration amongst non-religious migrants has been limited. If we take religion to be a set of symbols, codes, and beliefs, we are assuming a coherent philosophy of religiosity; by extension, this elides inspiration from other sources. Researchers will go to interview Christians inside a church or to a mosque to get the views of Muslims but the hope and inspiration of those who do not belong to a recognised church may be overlooked. Loren Landau (2009) argues that religion within a dynamic and diverse urban environment is constitutive of people’s lived experiences: a form of ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ that is ever evolving and rhetorical.

A few decades ago, Hannah Arendt, in her book *Human Condition* (1998[1958]), stressed that the human capacity to begin, to do the unexpected, is endowed by birth and is inherent in all humans. Only the unexpected is predictable on the basis of our humanity. Closely connected to this natural freedom to act is the concept of plurality as explained by Arendt and conceptualised as both equality and distinction. The freedom to do the unexpected cannot be initiated independently from a plurality of actors because, by acting and relating to others, we are part of a network of actions and relationships that is infinitely complex (D’Entreves, 1993) - and sometimes the only support in the host society available to informal migrants (van der Leun, 2003). It is a network that extends beyond relationships with other migrants, however, to include links with members of the host society and representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including both supporting and control agencies. These are relationships fostered largely by our humanity which is either expressed through sympathetic or instrumental support. Such capacity to do the unexpected, backed by a plurality of actors, challenges efforts at predictive analysis of the behaviour of impoverished informal migrants.

### 2.2 Theorising the Presence of Informal Migrants in the Host Society

Theoretically, several approaches within migration-development discourses have been used to explore migrants’ sojourns in host countries. The livelihood approach, for example, is popular in studies of the developing South (de Haan, 2000; Ellis, 2000; Bebbington, 1999), while the integration approach is more common in research on the developed North (Soysal, 2012; Bonmes & Kolb, 2006; Heckmann, 2005). In this section, I examine both approaches to the study of informal migrants’ presence in host societies before making an argument in favour of an alternative approach.
2.2.1 The Livelihood Approach

The literature on migration and livelihood is very rich and inextricably linked to the migration-development nexus. From their study of migration and livelihood, Arjan de Haan et al. (2000) posit that migration is not an atomistic reaction to economic or environmental distortion; rather, it is embedded in social rules and norms of daily life. Thus, they suggest a people-oriented approach to migration studies. The livelihood approach meets that need, as a people-oriented and empirically-based approach to migration studies that attends to the realities of the day-to-day lives of migrants. When used in developing countries, the livelihood approach examines migration as a form of livelihood diversification on the part of the poor to counter income insecurity, with a positive impact on poverty and development (Ellis, 2000; Bebbington, 1999; de Haan, 1999). This is in line with the perception of migration as a household livelihood strategy for income diversification (Waddington, 2003; Hampshire, 2002; de Haan, et. al., 2002). Thus, the livelihood approach as a research strategy model gives insight into the various forms of household actions and decisions across space, time, and social groups. It highlights the fundamental role of human agency in improving welfare, irrespective of a constraining context. In this light, migration has been explored broadly as an optimistic approach to development.

Historically, from a development studies perspective, the relationship between migration and development (in terms of poverty reduction and inequality) has been either positively or negatively portrayed (de Haas, 2010; Taylor, 1999). For example, in the years 1973–1990, migration was viewed as primarily necessary for labour development in receiving countries, but detrimental to the development of sending nations, resulting in dependency and brain drain, respectively. That is unlike contemporary views on migration wherein the attitudes of receiving countries are predominantly restrictive and exclusionary, while those of sending nations are more optimistic, encompassing discussions of remittances, transnationality, and livelihood diversification (de Haas, 2010; de Haas & Plug, 2006; Gamlen, 2006; Hagan, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Meissner, Papademetriou & North, 1987). Notwithstanding the polarity of academic and political views on the impact of migration on development, several scholars have strongly suggested that migrant experiences and outcomes are largely fluid and flexible and subject to multiple factors.

Based on a study conducted in nine developing countries, Suzanne Speak (2010: 238) writes that “it is not the migration per se which causes or conditions the resulting negative outcome, but the context surrounding that migration” (emphasis added). By negative outcome she refers to homelessness, poverty, criminality, and so on. Speak uses a framework of ‘consequential context’ to highlight the individual context that conditions outcomes for migrants. In studies of migration spanning over a decade, Arjan de Haan (2011, 2006, 2000, 1999) has also promoted the individual context as fundamental to a sound academic analysis of the migration-development nexus, and to improving migrants’ experiences and outcomes through policy. Hence, de Haan, among others, has recommended that more attention be paid to the contribution migration makes to poverty reduction. Scholars of this school of thought often observe, for example, that migration can improve people’s welfare through multi-income generating activities, transnational engagements, and remittances (Human Development Report, 2009; de Haan, 2006; Ellis, 2003; Skeldon, 2002; Sorensens, van Hear & Engberg-
A search through the literature revealed that the livelihood approach has often been used in the study of migration in developing countries and in studies examining migrants’ poverty and inequality in developed countries. For example, in a paper that calls attention to the positive role played by migration in poor households, de Haan et al. (2002) utilise the livelihood framework in a study of two communities in Mali which examines strategies of persistence and risk management in the migration patterns of different groups. In her study of the economic and social relations of dry season migration among the Fulanis of Northern Burkina Faso, Kate Hampshire (2002) likewise notes that migration is one of several strategies to cope with livelihood failure and to optimise livelihood security. Sundari (2005) also uses the notion of livelihood strategy to highlight the trends, patterns, and nature of female migration in Tamil Nadu, India. She calls attention to the sizeable improvement in economic opportunities and gains female migrants experience after migration, but also the disadvantages of their position in the informal sector.

Scholars adopting this optimistic approach to the migration-development linkage have often embraced the livelihood security framework – which examines the strategies and capabilities of poor migrants to attain income security – as an analytical tool in the livelihood approach. The livelihood security framework originated in development studies’ literature on food security and famine and was developed by researchers conducting micro research in developing countries (Sen 2001; Swift, 1989). It is based on the claim that the poor are not passive victims; rather, they actively try to improve their livelihoods despite macroeconomic constraints. As Lieten and Nieuwenhuys (1989) point out in their paper on migrant strategies, human agency is vital to their lives and emancipation. Due to its concern for people and poverty, the framework focuses on how people make a living in a broad institutional context (e.g., social, political, economic, and environmental). It has proved reliable in recognising the diversity in livelihood-making, and the role of institutions in promoting or blocking livelihood strategies. It also draws attention to the socio-economic role of subsistence strategies, factors affecting vulnerability, and the micro-macro connection of vulnerability to policies (Ellis, 2003).

In migration studies, the livelihood security framework has been used to analyse human capital and the set of income-generating activities that contribute to household or individual livelihoods. In this sense, the livelihood framework explores migrants’ socio-economic, income-generating activities (Mitra, 2010; Briones, 2009; Thieme, 2008; Ellis, 2003), although several scholars have criticised its somewhat narrow focus (Carling, 2005; Rodenburg, 1997; Lieten & Nieuwenhuys, 1989). It has been suggested that, by emphasizing the household, the livelihood approach does not pay sufficient attention to the individual and the personal desires, plans, or strategies that create intra-household conflict or bonding dynamics. In addition, it can be argued that by focusing on human capital and diverse income-generating strategies, the role of the state in determining the livelihood outcome and experiences of the poor migrant is neglected. For example, a migrant who decides to migrate as a livelihood strategy can be effectively prevented from doing so by restrictive migration policies. Should movement across an international border be successful, other agents, institutions, organisations, and relations will influence the migrant’s experience and future.
2.2.2 The Integration Approach

Another approach to examining migrants’ lives in host societies is centred on the notion of integration, and is popular in migration studies in developed countries. Friedrich Heckmann (2005: 15) defines integration as “[a] long-lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations, and statuses of the receiving society”. Stephen Castles et al. (2002), point out that integration is a highly contested concept that is open to different definitions; nevertheless, it is ideally a two-way process requiring adaptation to each other by immigrants and the host society, with the emphasis on efforts by immigrants. Several mainstream migration studies have used the integration approach to explore immigrants’ assimilation into their host society from the perspectives of multiculturalism, acculturation, and social exclusion (Heckmann, 2005; Castles et. al, 2002; Bommes & Kolb, 2006; Chauvin & Garces-Maascarenas, 2012; Soysal, 2012; Herwig & Konietzka, 2012; Pero & Solomos, 2010), yet it is also favoured by scholars of irregular migration and scholarship on ethnic entrepreneurship. The focus of the latter discourses lies on economic and social inclusion; in other words, on the dynamics of migrants’ participation in the labour market, and key structural dimensions such as housing, education, health, and social relationships. The studies successfully highlight how migrants adapt to the changing context of their host country, whether by approved or unconventional means.

The integration approach has proved its strength in a two-way process of exploring both changing socio-political contexts and migrants’ corresponding adaptation strategies and tactics. In a broad discourse on migrant poverty and inequality, the integration approach has been used to highlight the role of the state (often a complicit role) in determining migrant welfare (Zolberg, Shurkhe & Aguayo, 1989; Zolberg, 1999; de Genova, 2002; Calavita, 2003; Lianos, 2001). Similarly, it has been used to frame migrants’ lives as tactical adaptations to their harsh and complex context (Burgers, 1998; Bolt & van Kampen, 2002; Entorf & Moebert, 2004). Yet it has also been suggested that because scholars of irregular migration have focused on the integration framework, they have paid insufficient attention to issues of vulnerability/capability (as related to livelihood security), and transnationality (Mazzucato, 2010) with regards immigrants’ improving their livelihood security outside of state institutions. That is, by focusing on the relevance to improved living conditions of integration into public institutions, they have neglected the importance of individual agency. Indeed, even when these studies examine the agency of migrants in poverty, they analyse it as a form of illegal means of integration.

There is a need for a multidisciplinary approach to how migrants deal with life in host societies that incorporates the benefits of livelihood and integration frameworks and holistically combines de Haan’s ‘context specificity’ and Suzanne Speak’s ‘consequential context’. Such an approach could contribute to understanding migrant welfare in several ways: firstly, by combining the benefits of familiar methods in a polarised discourse of developed and developing country contexts, it will expand what Stephen Castles (2007) and Alejandro Portes (1997) term ‘middle-range theorization’ in migration studies. By addressing the “narratives about how things got ‘from here to there’ including the multiple contingencies and

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reversals encountered in the process” (Portes, 2000: 13) the combination will cast light on the structural constraints and other obstacles affecting the pursuit of a better life, and the responses that help migrants cope in situations of change. Secondly, it will provide the opportunity to examine migrant integration and adaptation as a contingent process better described as adjustment: the consideration of opportunities and challenges in daily life. Thirdly, by exploring impoverished migrant livelihoods as the interaction between state institutions and migrant agency, it offers the opportunity to examine migrant lifeways as important facilitators of related institutional transformations.

2.3 Refreshing the Perspective: Resilience theory

In this section, I present resilience theory as the chosen theoretical framing for this study, examining the theoretical usage of resilience over time and across disciplines, though it is important to note that I do not refer to its linguistic or literal meaning. Relevant works of literature and different meanings of resilience are reviewed, along with how they have been used in its development as a theoretical concept offering the opportunity for holistic examination of how migrants survive in their host countries. The resilience concept provides room to explore a broad range of engagements in the course of adaptation and vulnerability. Therefore, it is important at this point to firmly situate the pertinence of the concept to this study and expatiate on its usage.

Resilience theory, although originating from studies on children’s psychopathology (Garmezy & Nuechterlein, 1972) has been popularised in the social ecology discourse on sustainability (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Ludwig, Walker & Holling, 1997). It is utilised here as a theoretical construct to explore how indigent African migrants survive on the streets of Johannesburg. Coming under the rubric of the term are the processes whereby individuals sustain their wellbeing in challenging and difficult situations (Hall and Lamont, 2013; Berkes, 2007). Although resilience has multiple definitions in the literature (Stewart, Reid & Mangham, 1997; Bernard, 1993; Lifton, 1993), some common attributes include the ability to overcome adversity and be successful irrespective of exposure to high risk (Fraser, Richman & Galinsky, 1999), and the ability to sustain competence despite pressure (Masten, 1994).

Resilience as a theoretical construct has proved relevant in core social science subjects such as sociology and political science. Recent innovative applications of the concept in studies exploring responses to vulnerability and traumatic socio-political conditions include Payne’s (2011) study of street-life oriented Black men, and Hall and Lamont’s (2013) exploration of neoliberalism from a micro-perspective. Indeed, the theoretical construct of resilience denotes two essential conditions: exposure to risk or vulnerable situations, and adaptation. Without vulnerability, there is no adaptation, so there is a dynamic process of interaction between the two. In this context, vulnerability refers to the diminishing capacity of individuals to cope with, or recover from, the effects of politically induced socio-economic stress and risks. A vulnerable situation is an obstacle to wellbeing as it reduces the possibility of a favourable response to perceived threats. For example, poverty is seen to trigger vulnerability in that it prevents individuals from achieving wellbeing (Cannon, 2008). In this light, vulnerability, adversity,
and adaptation are connected by the ability to take actions that can promote prosperity in the midst of unfavourable conditions.

In his seminal study, *Development as Freedom*, Amartya Sen (2001) argued that the capabilities of individuals gave them an advantage over vulnerability, defining capabilities as the “substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value” (ibid: 87). Sen thus argued that a vulnerable person in an adverse situation will have an improved likelihood of achieving wellbeing if socio-political factors strengthen his or her capabilities. However, informal migrants find themselves in the contrary position; their vulnerabilities could be seen as devoid of capabilities, pressing them to develop alternative means of living the life they desire and value in their host societies. Michel de Certeau (1984) referred to these means as tactics, which are utilised by migrants to gain relief from unfavourable regulations and laws in the host society.

The relevant point here is the tactical contingency of the adaptation based on active interaction within the wider socio-political context. In the course of what de Certeau (1984: xix) refers to as the “the practice of everyday life”, tactics “have no proper localisation [and their exercise] often takes place in the territory of the other [and] involve[s] combining disparate elements to gain a momentary advantage”. De Certeau’s elaboration on tactics is pertinent to exploring the lives of poor migrants in Johannesburg in significant ways as it expands the relevance of territoriality and space in migration studies by highlighting the malleability of space for day-to-day living. As Harrison, Moyo, and Yang (2012: 900) elaborate: “while state and capital impose spatial strategies to organize cities, the subordinate manipulate space” which, according to de Certeau (1984: 95), might involve their operating “without points where one can take hold of them”. Meanwhile, James Buchanan (2000: 89) suggests that tactics refer to “the sets of practices that strategy has not been able to domesticate … they offer daily proof of the partiality of strategic control”. Therefore, while tactics are not “inherently transgressive” (Colebrook, 2001: 547) they could be extra-legal – contravene formal laws and regulations – and, consequently, can be understood as resilience, although their use is not necessarily a positive (or desired) resort.

A literature search revealed that the concept of resilience has interested researchers for decades and been widely used, most commonly in the fields of developmental psychology, ecology and disaster response (Parker & Hackett, 2012; Walker & Cooper, 2011; Almedom & Glandon, 2007; Rutter, 1993; Holling, 1973; Garmezy & Nuechterlein, 1972). In the field of developmental psychology it has been employed in a variety of ways to examine life stress, risk, and the developmental pathways of vulnerable children, youths, and families (Cowen, 1994; Rutter, Maughan & Ouston, 1979; Garmezy, 1976). Michael Ungar (2008) observes that there is considerable overlap between the various conceptualisations of resilience, which has been used to refer to a child’s developmental outcome that has exceeded expectations due to disadvantaged circumstances; to competence shown in children who are dealing with stress; and to positive functioning after a traumatic experience. Researchers studying children’s developmental pathways agree that it is a response to adversity and that it can be influenced by a child’s environment and cultural specificities (Masten & Powell, 2003; Arrington & Wilson, 2000; McCubbin et al., 1998).
The concept of resilience is also common in ecology with regards disaster response, especially in the interdisciplinary field of sustainability where it has attracted researchers because of its potential to connect social and natural sciences, particularly in the sub-field of social ecology. Carl Folke et al. (2002: 438) write that it is related to the “magnitude of shock that the system can absorb and remain within a given state, the degree to which the system is capable of self-organisation, and the extent to which the system can build capacity for learning and adaptation”. Similarly, Neil Adger et al. (2005: 1036) conceptualise resilience as the capacity of linked social-ecological systems to absorb recurrent disturbances, retain essential structures, processes and feedbacks, self-organise (versus lack of organisation or organisation forced by external factors) and build capacity for learning and adaptation. Central to these characterisations are understandings of resilience as the ability to absorb and recover from disturbance. Thus, as a theoretical construct, it denotes two essential conditions: exposure to a high-risk, vulnerable situation or adversity, and the ability to achieve success or adapt positively notwithstanding. Therefore, sustainability researchers have traditionally used resilience as a diagnostic and evaluative tool for socio-ecological disturbances, and more recently, as a prescriptive tool for policy intervention.

In recent usage, resilience theory has moved beyond the boundaries of social ecology and its emphasis on individual factors. For example, some researchers have argued that resilience is also a trait of the social and political context, thereby calling attention to the relevance of the environment, as well as individual factors (Luthar, 2003; Seccombe, 2002; Luthar, Cicchetti & Becker, 2000). The prescriptive application of the concept of resilience has led to concrete suggestions on how to improve the resilience of vulnerable systems. For instance, Karen Seccombe (2002: 438) notes:

[R]esiliency cannot be understood or improved in significant ways by merely focusing on these individual-level factors. Instead careful attention must be paid to the structural deficiencies in our society and to the social policies that families need to become stronger, more competent, and better functioning in adverse situations.

Resilience has, therefore, become popular in programmatic studies of interventions successful in making certain systems more resilient (Garmestani & Benson, 2013; Osbahr, 2007).

The resilience concept is also becoming popular in sociological studies focusing on disadvantaged groups and societies, such as studies of refugees and asylum seekers that examine the positive experiences of vulnerable groups in order to identify the pathways leading to these outcomes (Sleijpen et. al., 2016). Another example is provided by Yasser Payne’s (2011) study of street-life-oriented Black men in New York, wherein he criticises assumptions embedded within traditional, value-laden perceptions of resilience. His study calls for a more subjective interpretation of street life and hence resiliency – in this case one that listens to the views of street-life-oriented Black men – as he argues that street life (although carrying negative connotations in mainstream discourse), is used by some Black men as a site of resilience. He thereby effectively demonstrates the relevance of a broad complex of socio-economic and political factors to his research participants’ enactment of resilience. Peter Hall and Michele Lamont’s (2013) exploration of neoliberalism from a micro-perspective also
utilises the notion of resilience to highlight the possibilities for fruitful, active lives by individuals, irrespective of the widely held negative conception of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005).

Although Hall and Lamont (2013) adopt a communal approach to studying resilience, they innovatively apply the concept to a range of responses to challenges that may not be included in mainstream discourses. For example, they argue that neoliberalism should not be seen as a development with a single, distinct effect; rather, it should be regarded as a more open-ended stimulus that produces a variety of responses. They thus employ the term ‘social resilience’ to investigate the social and cultural frameworks underpinning different forms of community response to neoliberal challenges. Their discussion highlights lived realities and how responses are constructed from cultural capital and previous experiences. Other studies include Kristen Magis’s (2010) study of ‘community resilience’, in which she applies the resilience concept to examining how a community lives and engages with change, uncertainty, and the capacity to thrive. Michael Ungar (2008) also explores the resilience concept in his study of 1,500 young people globally. His findings frame resilience as a cultural and contextual process comprising navigation and negotiation rather than static experiences. Also studying youth, in this case in rural South Africa, Linda Theron et al. (2013) likewise critically assess a priori conceptualisations of resilience. Fundamentally, the term social resilience refers to the condition whereby members of a group sustain their wellbeing in the face of sometimes severe challenges and oppositions, the emphasis being on communal actions. Social resilience is thus explored as the basis for understanding the capacity of groups to secure favourable conditions, particularly in unfavourable circumstances (Hall & Lamont, 2013).

Nevertheless, the wide usage and application of various constructs of the resilience concept have led to its interdisciplinary scrutiny and a barrage of critique, amidst growing concerns about its scientific value. One major criticism is the contention that it adds nothing significant to the more general term of ‘positive adjustment’, therefore it is not relevant to define it as a separate term; other scholars have noted inconsistencies and ambiguities in the usage and application of the concept (Kaplan, 1999; Luthar & Cushing, 1999; Tarter & Vanyukov, 1999; Tolan, 1996; Cicchetti & Garmezy, 1993). For example, in studies of irregular migrants some scholars conflate the theoretical construct with other themes such as protective factors, or merely how refugees cope with psychological distress (Goodman, 2004; Henley & Robinson, 2011; Leavey, et al., 2004; McCarthy & Marks, 2010). Michael Ungar (2012: 387), however, cautions that “[r]esilience is not ... synonymous with population-wide phenomena like coping, adaptation, or developmental assets”, calling attention to the ambiguities in the concept’s usage. On the other hand, a number of studies have produced empirical evidence to the effect that systems may achieve or generate resilience or positive adaptation in different ways. Moreover, the presence of adversity or vulnerability is not a necessity for positive adjustment unlike resilience. These findings suggest that resilience and positive adaptation can represent different constructs (Luthar, Cicchetti & Becker, 2000). Indeed, Ungar (2012) locates resilience in processes and negotiations that are helpful in overcoming adversity, differentiating it from engagements such as the exercise of personal agency when being coerced into criminal activity, which are positive outcomes only in the sense that they are desired actions.
Payne (2011) has identified four problematic assumptions in conceptions and applications of resilience constructs within sociological studies. Firstly, he notes that there is a middle- and upper-middle-class orientation to what constitutes resilience: a mainstream, value-laden conceptualisation that tends to define as non-resilience those values and goals which seemingly contradict traditional value systems. He underlines his point with the rhetorical question: “Under whose criterion?” (ibid.: 432). That is, if certain behaviour or actions are labelled as maladaptive or harmful, it is important to enquire who is setting the standard for evaluation. Secondly, he criticises the ‘ahistorical’ stance when applying the resilience conceptualisation to social research, stressing that a historical perspective is needed to allow researchers to examine patterns of resiliency across time. He also expresses concerns that certain individuals, who may have shown resilience in previous periods of their lives, may be labelled maladaptive or non-resilient based on the examination of a current situation. Thirdly, he argues against an individualised perspective on resilience; and, fourthly, he notes a related failure to incorporate a structural dimension to studies of individual or group resilience.

Likewise, Howard Stevenson and Gwendolyn Davis (2004) argue that notions of resilience must not be understood as either-or approaches that assume that some people have it while others do not. They call for a ‘both-and’ perspective that does not imply a binary or dichotomous conception, pointing out that the latter lacks the means to capture the fluidity of resilience, especially if expressed through behaviour. The system approach to resilience (Adger, 2006; Berkes, Colding and Folke, 2003; Berkes and Folke, 1998) also emphasizes that resilient systems can survive, adapt, and grow in the face of vulnerability and adverse disruptions. Folke (2006: 259), meanwhile, argues that resilience is not just about persistence but also about, “the opportunities that disturbance opens up”; therefore, resilience adaptation allows for dynamism without implying it is “always a good thing”. Finally, Payne (2011), in agreement with Malcolm Gladwell (2008), calls for a less empirical focus on resilience outcomes achieved at a particular point and place, and more emphasis on process, in acknowledgment of the dynamism and fluidity of social resilience.

Contemporary usage and application of the notion of resilience follows a problem-oriented, action-driven, and policy-influenced approach. In this sense, the relevance of the concept is related to its instrumentality in decision-making and intervention. However, while critique has called attention to its limitations, it has also suggested avenues for growth and development in its application to social research. The broad interest and interdisciplinary use of the concept show its relevance in bridging discourses across disciplines. In the same vein, it suggests a potential for its contribution to understanding the pursuit of better lives by impoverished migrants in their host countries when utilised to examine ”narratives about how things got ‘from here to there’ including the multiple contingencies and reversals encountered in the process” (Portes, 2000: 13). Along those lines, I adopt a working definition of resilience as the capacity of individuals to pursue favourable conditions for wellbeing. I do not use capacity to refer to any bulleted list of factors that are expected to facilitate a positive outcome. Rather, I use it to refer to negotiations of the subjectivities (perception and experiences) that are utilised by migrants in their quest for a desired outcome. The emphasis thus moves from specific factors to the migrants’ experiences and perceptions at the time of recounting the narrative. This difference is relevant to the application of resilience theory as a descriptive and not prescriptive construct.
This study thus adopts a conceptualisation of resilience that is not value driven and does not frame adaptation as an outcome but a process (Garmestani & Benson, 2013; Seccombe, 2002), an approach that creates a more realistic frame for the “sheer restlessness of poor migrants’ lives” in an urban centre (Genova, 2002: 420). It also offers the opportunity to explore resemblances between these migrants and ‘regular people’ engaging with their broader society. Indeed, although low-skilled migrants may not be citizens, and their immigration status can be problematic, they are still residents who engage in the geopolitical space at the socio-economic level.

2.4 Locating and Operationalizing Resilience

In this section, I draw on the insights of resilience critique and opt to view it as a process that incorporates individual, social, and political factors. Of primary concern is the dynamic interaction between resilience and its negative context, thus framing resilience not as an outcome, but as a state that is continually negotiated. Accordingly, I use the term resilience to denote the process through which poor migrants interact with their adverse context and keep that interaction ongoing for present or future gains. In simplified terms, I see resilience as dynamic: not as an achievement defined in time and place but as the pursuit of wellbeing. That acknowledges gains and losses in the route towards personal welfare, and the story of how things got to where they are, with attention to reversals and forward movements.

To answer the question, “how do poor and informal African immigrants remain in their harsh context to build their lives?”, the resilience approach first considers that people respond to challenging situations from resources in various spheres that may be connected to one another. Firstly, one should consider the institutional and cultural props that support or bar them, with an eye to the opportunities available or absent. Secondly, the resilience approach explores the presence of migrants as an on-going process with setbacks and successes, giving primacy to their views and conceptions. For example, one cannot say that a poor migrant is not resilient because he is a street trader with few articles on his trading table. Rather, one listens to that immigrant narrate how he is sponsoring several siblings going to school in his home country from that trade, or how he has ‘brought in’ his wife to the host country and given her money to start her own trade. He may also narrate how life was in his home country, what he could afford then in comparison to present conditions in the host country. In this approach, resilience gains a different meaning from the face-value, economic logic, and societally approved version. This is in line with Folke’s (2006: 259) argument that resilience subsumes opportunities that open up, without always implying a ‘good’ thing.

In this context, ‘good’ is likely to refer to mainstream materialistic or financial advances or similar expectations. The emotional and psychological relief of being able to ‘bring in’ one’s wife and to sponsor siblings whom one considers an important personal responsibility may be unobservable but relevant to wellbeing. From this perspective, resilience becomes a living experience, with moments that are high and low, complex and broad, and powerfully active and interactive. This is a radical but meaningful approach to migrants’ lives compared to the
other theoretical approaches discussed above. When migrants’ lives are explored at the level of lived experience and realities, it becomes apparent that the presence of poor migrants in the host country is a function of multiple factors and sources. Even when there are no open resources for sustenance, they do not just give up – they create new avenues in order to meet their needs. This response is similar to what Marja Jarvela and Eva-Marita Rinne-Koistinen (2005: 386) refer to as “a dynamic coping strategy” in their study of the social construction of purity and dirt in a shantytown in Lagos, Nigeria, howbeit in this case, a tactical strategy.

In terms of that understanding, I operationalize the resilience approach by identifying three central themes relevant for migrants’ resilience in their host city. Firstly, my approach emphasizes hope, not just as a religious belief, but also as mental reorganisation and reinterpretation of harsh reality, one that is facilitated by expectations for the future as well as past experiences. Thus, I examine hope as it appears in migrants’ narrated evaluations of the possibilities of achieving an envisaged wellbeing from their present socio-economic positions, drawing attention to the discrepancies between available practical resources, vulnerability, and the migrants’ evaluations.

Secondly, the discussion of resilience theory accepts the everyday practices of informal migrants as relevant to their pursuit of wellbeing. I have defined informal migrants’ overt and covert actions utilised to pursue and secure their subjective favourable conditions as tactical responses. In line with this understanding, I also identify tactics as relevant to the migrants’ survival on the streets of Johannesburg because they call attention to the dynamic interaction between the political context and the informal migrants’ actions or responses. I adopt Michel de Certeau’s (1984) theoretical understanding of tactics as the disparate actions taken by my respondents to gain an advantage over the restrictions and constraints of the context, operationalizing them, therefore, as the practical measures and activities undertaken by informal migrants to benefit themselves. They are tactical because they are conceived and executed without deference to formal legislation. I utilise the term tactics as a feature of calculative agency and consequently I have refrained from value-colouring the means and actions that are so identified. In this way, I avoid criminalising poor migrants’ activities and rather discuss them as a practical response to their harsh socio-political context.

Thirdly, I identify survival as a central concept in understanding the lives of poor and informal migrants, examining it as the progressive realisation of the migrants’ wellbeing. This is contrary to the conventionally negative presentation of the harsh reality of the poor migrant, and rather emphasizes their agency as purposive creativity. In this vein, my approach conceptualises survival as a process that is neither negative nor positive, but simply a route to wellbeing. This shifts the analytical emphasis from ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions, in tandem with the intellectual contestation that the form in which a question is posed has a decisive bearing on the content of the answer provided. Correspondingly, I operationalize migrants’ survival through their stories of how things got from where they were to where they are, and how they see the route to where they aspire to go.

Finally, immigration policy is the foreground that gives vivacity to the resilience of poor and informal migrants, without forgetting the point that, although powerful, state policies are not immune to ’struggles from below’. As Deborah Posel (1991: 22) argues, “state power is
contested in organised and unorganised ways, which play havoc with the state’s capacity to control its destiny”, while simultaneously it is “constantly on the defensive against the threat of destabilisation”. Thus, my approach presents a two-way analytical discussion of the enduring presence of informal migrants in Johannesburg.
CHAPTER THREE: MIGRATION AND THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of migration in South Africa, especially the formation of its immigration policy, is complex, heavily politicised, and the product of many actors and interests, although the intent of the Boer Republic and later the South African state was always one of preserving Whites’ supremacy. Nonetheless, the sheer diversity created a platform for lobbying, struggle, and conflict (Posel, 1991). For example, agents such as Afrikaner farmers, local industrialists, state bureaucrats, the White working class, and Bantustan elites, had mostly conflicting interests. In this sense, the apartheid state was not monolithic in terms of the development of its immigration policy, and even in contemporary times the democratic South African state is still a terrain of struggle.

To capture a suitable background for the study, I present a general snapshot of migration in Africa before narrowing the focus to the historical legacies of African immigration to Johannesburg, which arguably underpin current immigration policies and practices (Klotz, 2013). While it is crucial to highlight South Africa’s history of migration and immigration policy starting from its colonial years, contemporary migration, with attention paid to the state’s administrative role in forging immigration policy and migration patterns, is also relevant to my discussion. This contextualising chapter does not provide exhaustive details of South Africa’s long and complex past; rather, it summarises its migration history to provide a context for this study, although the authors referenced (such as Thomson, 2001 and 1960; Posel, 1991; Welsh, 1998; Malan, 1990; van Onselen, 1982a&b) offer insights into the nation’s complexity.

3.1 Contextualising African Migration

Increasing numbers of Africans are moving across national boundaries within Africa. The high rate of intra-regional migration in Africa is motivated by the search for job opportunities in neighbouring countries and the complexities of arbitrary border formation by colonial masters, amongst other factors. Statistics show that about 65% of total emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa is intra-regional, making it the largest intra-continental movement of people in the world (Ratha et al., 2011), while 90% of emigration from North Africa is directed outside the continent. Such a high rate of intra-regional migration in Africa is motivated by the search for job opportunities in neighbouring countries and the complexities of arbitrary border formation by colonial masters, amongst other factors. Nevertheless, while income differences are shown to drive migration towards more prosperous countries (such as South Africa), researchers have noted that Tanzania is an exception. For example, migration flows from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia are mainly towards Tanzania, even if the gross domestic product (GDP) is more favourable in the source country (Ratha et al., 2011). That hints at the complexities and an interaction of factors obscured by unreliable and

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10Of those emigrating, more than 70% in West Africa, 65% in Southern Africa, 50% in Central Africa, and 47% in East Africa migrate within the sub-region.
 unavailable data that drive intra-Africa migration.\textsuperscript{11} However, the majority of migrants that move within Africa lack the financial capacity, education, or skills required to immigrate successfully to richer countries in the developed North (Ratha et al., 2011). That arguably implies that mobility within Africa is seen as an alternative to migration outside the continent.

Against that backdrop of highly active intra-regional migration flows, researchers have consistently argued that mobility within Africa is the norm and not an exception (Vigneswaran & Quirk 2015; Bakewell & de Haas, 2007; Adepoju, 1995; Addo, 1975; Sudarkasa, 1975). Hence, it is not enough to start a discussion of regional migration in Africa in the framework of this study with a reference to crossing national borders because starting with the nation-state inherently implies the fallacy that there was no migration before European colonisation (Bilger & Kraler, 2005; Arthur, 1991; von Oppen, 1995; White, 1960). In some states in present-day Africa, African migrants are subjected to xenophobic violence that suggests, as a phenomenon, they are politically and socially excluded. It is sociologically relevant to ponder if it has always been this way. Thus the puzzle goes beyond the practical act of crossing national borders (since national borders are directly related to state formation) to questions of assimilation and integration into the social and economic fabric of society.

Moreover, most African people did not live in a nation-state until colonial rule and this has prompted several authors to argue that the nation-state is essentially a vehicle of oppression (Fanon, 2001; Mamdani, 2013; Wiredu, 1996). In the same vein, Lonsdale (1981: 139) points out that “the most distinctively African contribution to human history could be said to have been precisely the civilised art of living relatively peaceably together not in states”. In this sense, it becomes significant to investigate if and how ‘foreigners’ were incorporated or integrated into pre-colonial societies in ways that maintained the security of livelihood of both foreigners and hosts. Although it is an appropriate source of a snapshot of migration management during pre-colonial times in Africa, several writers have criticised the academic attraction to African pre-colonial history, noting that such research is prone to ethnic propaganda and an over-emphasis on pre-colonial tribal authorities and their presumed savagery, and also querying the meaningfulness – or rather meaninglessness – of such pre-colonial history to present day conditions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008; Hamilton, 1982). Conversely, other scholars have lamented that contemporary discussion of South African immigration policy and practice is almost ahistorical. For example, Peberdy (2009: 15) argues that “it is difficult to understand and analyse the present without understanding the legacies of the past that are woven into the present-day tapestry of immigration”, noting that the current migration discourse sounds almost as if “the new [South African] government inherited a tabula rasa”. Although Peberdy is referring to the impact of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid years, the same can be said about discussing migration during colonial and apartheid period as if the colonial masters met a bare land devoid of people and cultures.

Critical challenges to contemporary African migration studies argue that we should interrogate pre-colonial Africa as a geographically fluid entity: that is, explore the historical dynamism of the everyday practice of living together despite differences in cultural, religious, ethnic or political institutions (Mamdani, 2013). As Aderanti Adepoju (1995) posits, migration

\textsuperscript{11} For example, 24 countries have data for the 1990s and only 15 countries have data for post-2000.
in African societies can better be understood in the context of their political and historical evolution. Anthropological studies have shown that migration was part of the everyday lives of pre-colonial Africans. Movements could either be permanent (to open up new lands), or seasonal, depending on hunting or agriculture (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007; Addo, 1975; Sudarkasa, 1975). In the absence of what are now termed national borders, Africans moved freely over vast areas, restricted only by negative natural conditions or warfare (Hance, 1970). As Adepoju (1995: 90) maintains, “Migrants have always considered most parts of the region as a free zone within which people moved freely.”

Yet each of the multiple communities that made up the continent had systems for identifying members and integrating newcomers (Manby, 2015) although the contemporary concepts of nationality or citizenship were not of relevance in that era of lower population and less complex migration patterns. In that context, membership was instituted through various forms that included residence (Mamdani, 2013), but also family, religion, or ethnicity. As Manby (2015: 6) notes:

In the densely forested areas of central Africa, communities tended to be small enough that membership was effectively determined by family linkages rather than political, ethnic or religious affiliations. In larger communities, even in quite similar geographical zones, political structures varied widely, and membership systems accordingly...

Access for new members could be through male or female descent, initiation rituals, or even through payment of tribute to indicate allegiance to a monarch (Manby, 2015). Nevertheless, the concept of care cannot be disassociated from the systems and organisation of economic production in societies. One can imagine a society where all have access to available social care and there are not the contemporary restraints of informality and criminality – the migration pitfalls for some present-day African migrants. Hence, to conceptualise social care in such pre-colonial societies one must visualise the existence of significant surpluses that could be exchanged, shared, or traded in forms that created equality in possession or access – a visualisation hampered by the concept of communal ownership of land or produce. On that note, members of these societies did not experience forms of contemporary inequality or vulnerability based on relationships tied to economic means or ethnic affiliation. In addition, in pre-colonial societies, as only a scant level of surplus was produced, people needed to labour continuously to provide for themselves. Hence, a means of expanding the labour force contributed to motivate and facilitate the ‘integration’ of foreigners. Furthermore, it has been argued that the existence and subsequent treatment of slaves in pre-colonial African societies was non-exploitative but, rather, what Manby (2015) referred to as an “attenuated form”. Food production was central to both migrants and the hosts, and people fit to labour to that end were integrated to facilitate production and minimise conflict.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008: 75), the history of the Ndebele (an ethnic group known as Southern Ndebele in South Africa and Northern Ndebele in Zimbabwe) has two distinct phases: the migration and violence phase (1820-1840); and the settlement and nation-building stage (1784-1893), which saw the formation of a heterogeneous society made up of migrants. He further notes that “[t]he refugees and captives of earlier decades (pre-1820s-
1830s) and those who were acquired in the Southwest now coalesced into a nation, broadening the heterogeneity of the Ndebele state” (ibid.), highlighting the fluid integration of foreign others as members of the society. Likewise, the king distributed captives from war and raids; females old enough were made servants of the king or given in marriage to Ndebele men with the means to provide for them. Therefore, the captives as foreigners were incorporated as members, emphasising integration rather than ‘otherness’ as crucial to the functioning of the society.

Thomas (1970) describes the social conditions of integrated captives as very humane, and Bhebe (1979) records that some prisoners so enjoyed being Ndebele that they voluntarily translated their totems from Shona to Sindebele. Historians thus emphasize the existence of ‘foreigners’ in pre-colonial African societies, and the prominence of integrative processes that promoted assimilation and communality irrespective of differences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008; Wiredu, 1996). Although the suggestion of ‘forced marriage’ may be considered unacceptable from a contemporary human rights perspective, two points that emerge from this brief overview are relevant to this study: firstly, the centrality of labour to mobility within the region and, secondly, the model of integration and assimilation rather than exclusion and criminalisation.

Quite important to note is that there were different systems in place in different communities or ethnic groups. Different regions had varying political systems and membership structures, which could, for example, have been based on gender, favouring either males or females depending on the region; some communities boasted of either simple or complex ceremonies or entry requirements for strangers. In that sense, hierarchical levels of rights were conceived, especially in terms of land use: the Tutorat system in Ivory Coast, for example, is based on the authority of ‘first comers’, while Burkina Faso operated under the chefs de terre12, regulations by earth priests. The emphasis, however, was on means of inclusion rather than exclusion (Manby, 2015).

### 3.1.1 Colonial and post-colonial period

The colonial period in Africa was characterised by political and economic changes that strongly shaped the experience of mobile Africans within the continent (Cohen, 1987). Firstly and most importantly, the nineteenth century saw the creation of colonial states in Africa defined by arbitrary borders, hegemonic colonial authorities, and foreign institutional forms of governance. With the creation of geopolitical territories, new institutionalised means of identification were enacted and laws and regulations became the – politicised – mode of managing membership. Secondly, economic production based on the exploitation of natural and human resources shifted to benefit colonial masters, creating a socio-political hierarchy that was foreign to previously existing social groupings (Lonsdale, 1981; Lonsdale & Berman, 1979; Weis, 1979). Two outcomes of these changes are relevant to this study: firstly, the development of the capitalist state and its articulation of modes of production; and, secondly, the management of immigration – or political membership.

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12 Earth Priests
During the colonial period in Africa, immigration management was strongly defined by the expansion of production in the extractive industries, commercial farming, and trading. There was increased need for labourers, and immigration laws were designed in ways that allowed their movement between the newly drawn borders. In the southern part of the continent, unskilled labourers migrated to South Africa to work in the mines; in the west, people moved to Nigeria to participate in trade and services provision, and to Ghana to work on cocoa farms, railway lines, and in trade (Shimeless, 2010; Stahl, 1982; Peil, 1974; Beals & Menezes, 1970; Harvey & Brand, 1974). African migration was quite high as shown by Ghana’s 1960 census (three years after independence from colonialism): 98% of the 12% of foreign nationals in Ghana were Africans (Anarfi et al., 2000, 2003). In addition, there was increased internal migration within countries as people moved to take advantage of new economic opportunities. This meant that the African migrant experience in Africa was shaped by participation in economic production, while the notion and criminalisation of informality was mitigated by the availability of opportunities for economic participation. Hence, economic participation was a form of socio-political inclusion for the informal migrant.

The mid-twentieth century ushered in the post-colonial period in Africa, as several states attained independence from their colonial rulers. The first decade after colonial governance saw several of the African states enjoying a macroeconomic boom that translated into expansive governance for the citizens and expanding economic activities that incorporated African migrants without discomfort. However, this was soon followed by a severe macroeconomic downturn that changed their experience. With economic hardship, governments and citizens in several African countries turned against the African migrants in their societies and demanded they return to their home country. In 1969, Ghana’s promulgation of the Aliens’ Compliance Order demanded the expulsion of all immigrants without relevant permits, the majority of whom were African. Then, in 1983, Nigeria’s President Alhaji Shehu Shagari ordered that all immigrants without the right papers must leave Nigeria within two weeks, a presidential decree that affected more than two million African migrants. Ghanaians constituted over 50% of these, leading to the popular “Ghana must go” phrase (Aremu, 2013). In 1985, still suffering under worsening economic conditions, the Nigerian government expelled another 300,000 migrants from the country (Otohile & Obakhedo 2011).

In addition to economic crises, newly found national identities provided fresh grounds for expulsion. Tensions arising from institutionalising Ivorian national identity as the mode of access to political and economic opportunities led to the expulsion of over 1,000 Burkinabes in the 1990s (Wiafe-Amoako 2015). Evidently, worsening economic conditions singled out the African migrant as ‘the other’ who was in competition for scarce economic opportunities. The majority of countries in Africa are still experiencing economic and political challenges, with high levels of poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. However, the migration context has seen changes that include more complex migration patterns, institutionalised and pervasive consciousness of nationality, and increased activities promoting migrants’ human rights by civic and non-governmental agencies (Ratha et al., 2011). Essentially, migration within the continent remains pervasive; however, African informal migrants are often distinguished according to highly dichotomised contemporary migration control categorisations of formal, informal, or refugee status. Despite those categories, the African migrant’s experience in the host country is still substantially shaped by relationships with labour, livelihood, and
employment, although the global conception of human rights creates a theoretical and sometimes practical difference between various groups, for example through the works of NGOs. Labour is a relevant criterion to gaining formal permission to immigrate to the host country as governments tend to offer residency or work visas to professionals or migrants with technical skills that are in short supply in their countries.

High-skill migration is seen as relevant to African countries, in the form of remittances by emigrants, and skill transfer from highly skilled immigrants that augment the supply of critical professional services in the host country (Ratha et al. 2011). Conversely, high-skill migration can also harm the development of a country through brain-drain, a concept that refers to a loss of professional and technical skills needed for long term development (Ratha, et al. 2011). Some authors (Kok et al., 2006; Adepoju, 2001) have emphasised the relevance of labour policy in managing the flow of African migrants within and clandestinely outside the continent, but also for improving the experience of migrant workers in their host countries. Sub-regional migration policies are thus developed to facilitate the movement of formal workers across national borders, and they also incorporate protection for workers in accordance with operating regulations. Yet national immigration laws are also effectively utilised to influence the quality of protection available through labour laws (Olivier et al., 2003). The government at national, sub-regional, and regional levels anticipates economic benefits from formal and skilled mobility across borders; nevertheless, the question of labourers, who are often unskilled but active in the informal sector, raises fundamental questions that centre on the vulnerability and uncertainty that characterises informal work. Further, in the context of poverty and underdevelopment, the nationality of those active in the sector becomes relevant, as it is key to the political responsibility for social care.

It is also important to mention the role of war and conflict in shaping Africa’s migration within the continent. Firstly, the struggle to wrestle political power from colonial masters led to conflicts (for example, in Algeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe) that triggered mass migration from affected countries (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Currently, conflict, war, and the fear of war still act as strong incentives for people to migrate; internal conflicts in countries such as Angola, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Congo, and Central Republic of Africa have caused massive emigration from the countries involved (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014; Bakewell, 2000; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989). The uncertainty, political tensions, and instability associated with the development of states in Africa is identified as a strong migration control valve that either inspires or constrains would-be migrants (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Natter, 2014; Adepoju, 2001; Skeldon, 1997).

Africa’s population growth has also been identified as a relevant factor in shaping migration flow in the continent13, transforming demographics and spatial dynamics (Adepoju, 2004). Typically, increases in population are expected to drive rural-urban migration, as people move from traditional low-productivity areas to cities or urban spaces, known for higher productivity. Although the broader consequences of increasing population and rural-urban migration in Africa are outside the scope of this study, two elements are relevant to the discussion. Firstly, because urbanisation in most African countries is growing, without

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13 Although Zlotnik (2004:33) argues that “there is no simple or unidirectional relation between natural increase and net migration”.

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commensurate industrialisation (Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath, 2016), people are being severely hit with unemployment and inadequate service provision. The African Development Bank economic outlook report (2015) highlighted dissatisfaction with local public services as a push factor in the movement of people within the continent. Secondly, faced with unemployment in urban areas, the informal sector is the immediate viable alternative. Currently, this is estimated to be the highest employer of labour in Africa. For example, in East Africa, the informal sector is estimated at 28-36% compared to the 16% share of the formal sector (Filmer & Fox, 2014; Jutting & de Laiglesia, 2009). The large size of the informal sector in Africa has been demonstrated as relevant to Africa’s economic perseverance, but it has also been criticised as entrenching low incomes, under-employment, poverty, and exclusion. Nevertheless, the informal sector is relevant to cross country migration in Africa for several reasons that include cross-border trade (for example see figure 1), ethnic entrepreneurship and ease of entry for informal migrants (Simone, 2004).

Table 1: Population growth in Africa, 1950 - 2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>East Africa</th>
<th>Central Africa</th>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
<th>West Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDESA (culled from African Economic Outlook, 2015)

Note: Medium fertility scenario

Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933206855
The map demonstrates how informal sector cross border traders connect the retail and wholesale sectors of Gauteng to cities, towns and villages across Southern Africa.

**Legend**
- 1 - 7
- 8 - 20
- 21 - 85
- 86 - 281
- Cross border trading routes
- Gauteng
- South Africa
- Country

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**Source**
GCRO 2014 survey of informal cross-border traders, SA Demarcation Board, DIVA - GIS

(Figure 1 – Map of trade routes for cross border trade Southern - Eastern Africa)
Table 2: Relative contribution of explanatory variables to overall variation in migration intentions, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Contentment with the local public services</th>
<th>Satisfaction with personal living standard</th>
<th>Area security</th>
<th>Confidence in the country’s institutions</th>
<th>Wealth index</th>
<th>Perceptions of the change in a country’s overall situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 6.8 from African Economic Outlook (AFDB, 2015) based on Gallup World Poll 2012. 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933206914

3.1.2 Cross-country migration in Africa

African governments have arguably been active in improving the experience of Africans interested in crossing national borders, although their attention has been directed to the movement of formal labour and commerce. The objective of promoting visa-free, sub-regional migration is framed under regional integration efforts, the aim being to facilitate the smooth and free movement of people and their rights of residency in central economic communities in Africa. The signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 was one such move, setting out modalities for establishing a progressive African Economic Community in six stages over a period of thirty-four years (Martin, 1992). More recently, Betts (2011) has recognised that regional arrangements to govern international immigration are gaining popularity globally. States are increasingly realising that a unilateral approach to managing immigration cannot achieve optimal results. In Africa, such initiatives abound: for instance, Article 2 of the 1989 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)14 and Article I of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD);15 while the protocol of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)16 and the member states of the Economic Community of West African States

14 A treaty between five countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) in North Africa that seeks the progressive implementation of the free circulation of persons, services, goods, and capital.
15 A trade block established by six countries in 1998, currently with 27 members, which cuts across sub-regional unions or communities.
16 First signed 16 March 1994 and revised on 25 June 2008, with attention to the free movement of people in the CEMAC zone made up of six countries.
(ECOWAS)\textsuperscript{17} adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment in Dakar, Senegal, on 29 May 1979.

Thus, several sub-regions have adopted initiatives to pursue the states’ cooperation through economic activities and the movement of people. Indeed, one could say that Africa does not lack policy initiatives for the free movement of Africans in terms of their residency and labour; citizens from ECOWAS, for instance, can travel visa-free within the region. However, immigration management concerns are known to act as impediments in the pursuit of such sub-regional cooperation – SADC is a case in point (Segatti and Landau, 2011). Furthermore, other pressing challenges concern the implementation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of the policies (Adepoju, 2011; Akinboade, 2013; Awad, 2009; Betts, 2011). Nevertheless, such sub-regional cooperation tends to reinforce historical migration patterns that reflect common linguistic, ethnic or trade routes (see figure 2a & 3b\textsuperscript{18}).

\textsuperscript{17} Made up of fifteen member countries.

\textsuperscript{18} Migration routes and patterns should be understood as dynamic and responsive to broader context, even as it is represented as historical. See Ciabarri, L. 2014. International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 13 (2), 246-262.
West and Central Africa Areas of High Emigration and Migratory Corridors

(Figure 2a – West and Central Africa Migratory Corridors)
Map made by Hein de Haas, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. Arrows do not indicate migration routes, but depict major country-to-country migration flows. Due to a lack of reliable quantitative data for many countries, arrow dimension do not indicate the exact size of movement, but are estimations based on information compiled from existing studies and data sources.

Research shows that Kenya is a common migration destination for Tanzanians and Ugandans in East Africa, while Nigeria is popular for migrants from Ghana, Cameroun, Republic of Benin, and Niger. However, the contemporary migration pattern also demonstrates the movement of African migrants across sub-regional boundaries. For instance, Libya, in the north of Africa, is shown to be a destination country for African migrants from Sub-Saharan countries. Although African migrants in Libya are generally assumed to be en route to Europe, research has shown that a large percentage settle permanently in the country (de Haas, 2007; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). South Africa is another case in point, attracting African migrants from East, West, and Central Africa in large numbers. Importantly, the contemporary pan-Africanist drive for trade, cooperation, and integration suggests that intra-regional migration in Africa will continue to grow in the near and distant future. For example, the 1.2 trillion dollars Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) that was initiated in 2008 and signed in June 201519 will open the borders of 26 African countries for trade purposes.

Table 3: Estimated total stocks of migration from, to, and within Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa to the rest of the world</th>
<th>The World to Africa</th>
<th>Within Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1 830 776</td>
<td>2 811 930</td>
<td>6 176 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5 418 096</td>
<td>1 872 502</td>
<td>7 966 359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8 734 478</td>
<td>1 532 746</td>
<td>10 500 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 2 in Flahaux and De Haas (2016)

While formal agreements like the TFTA predictably open trade within the region, informal cross-border trade20 has been known to connect cities, towns, and villages across Africa. Although often imbued with connotations of illegality, informal cross-border trade is a source of income to about 43% of Africa’s population (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012), the majority of whom are women. Traders can be either individuals or firms, operating entirely or partially outside the formal economy. The sheer size of the trade underscores its relevance to cross-country migration in Africa, and links informal migration in the continent to the social and economic fabric of a developing and cohesive Africa. For example, the value of informal cross-border trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is estimated at $17.6 billion dollars. In Eastern Africa, Uganda’s total informal exports to her neighbouring countries in 2009 were estimated at $790.73 million and informal imports were estimated at $66.49 million in 2010. West Africa also boasts entrenched, extensive, and complex informal cross-border trade, estimated to have a range of GDP contributions within the region: for example, a 20% GDP contribution in Nigeria and a 75% GDP contribution in Republic of Benin (UNECA & AFDB, 2012).

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19 TFTA was created from the merging of three trade blocs (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA], the East African Community [EAC], and the Southern Africa Development Community [SADC]).

20 Although there is no universal definition of what constitutes informal cross-border trade, Afrika and Ajumbo (2012, pg.2) define it as “trade in processed or non-processed merchandise which may be legal imports or exports on one side of the border and illicit on the other side, and vice-versa”. It is informal because it is not subjected to statutory border formalities.
3.2 Apartheid and African Migration to South Africa

Several authors have noted that states carry the institutional legacies from their origins far into their future. O’Meara (1996: 470) declares that the struggles that give rise to a state “fashion its dominant social and political forces, shape its founding myths and establish political cultures and political issues”. With regards South Africa, Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (1979) suggest that its fragmented nationalism connects to the history of regional divisions, racism, and political class struggles that emerged at the same time as the union, while Audie Klotz (2013) notes that the political transition during the early 1990s signified an important juncture for immigration issues in South Africa. Furthermore, Sally Peberdy (2009) reasons that its past and present efforts to construct a national identity is crucial for understanding immigration issues confronting the nascent South African state. Thus, historical struggles for inclusion and exclusion and the creation of South African nationalism form an essential background for understanding the present South African immigration policy context.

Charles van Onselen (1982b) traces the first economic and political stirrings of contemporary South Africa to 1870 when alluvial gold was discovered in the Murchison range of the Zoutpansberg district. Within 30 years, a dramatic economic transformation occurred as the Witwatersrand gold mining industry grew to be a significant global supplier, with a production of about 40% of the world’s output (van Onselen, 1982b). As the country transformed economically, its social and political platform drastically evolved. Politically, the emergent and fledgling state took purposive and at times shameless strides in ordering its social and economic fabric. Some authors have argued that capitalist intentions were the active ingredients that shaped South African society (Lonsdale, 1981; Wolpe, 1980), and others have pointed to the interactive relationship between social, economic, and political developments (Davies, 1979; O’Meara, 1996). Critical to this study is that suddenly and within a relatively short time, society changed from agriculture-based to industrial. Thus, what later became urban centres (such as Johannesburg, Durban, and the Cape) grew from the increasing service needs of the developing industry. Also relevant is the fact that, with the growth of industrial centres, there was a massive movement of people from within and outside of the South African region to these centres. Between 1896 and 1914, the original mining camp at Witwatersrand grew from about 3,000 gold diggers to over a quarter of a million inhabitants, putting considerable pressure on the municipality (van Onselen, 1982b).

As mining camps grew into towns (for example, Johannesburg), service providers for the miners and workers also grew in numbers. Markets formed loosely around mining towns filled with produce merchants, traders, shops, bars, and canteens. Thus, until the economic crisis of 1896-1898, the mining towns were filled with people of different races all economically linked directly or indirectly to the mining industry. For example, opportunities for self-employment opened for Black South Africans in providing laundry services to miners. However, because of the period of drought and rinderpest in the countryside more Blacks were forced to make the move to the growing mining towns in search for employment (Posel, 1991).

Important to note is how an agricultural society developed into established industrial centres, built around the mining industry. People moved from the agricultural sector to towns in pursuit of employment and the numbers of labour migrants from surrounding African
countries also increased in order to serve the growing mining industry. Indeed, the possibilities of employment (even if scarce) in the Witwatersrand and the promulgation of the Pass Laws\textsuperscript{21} in 1896 meant that the presence of Blacks in the town was related to their formal employment (Klotz, 2013; Posel, 1991; van Onselen, 1982b). This is relevant because it illustrates how, historically, the movement of South African Blacks to Johannesburg was tied to formal employment.

With the promulgation of the Pass Laws in 1896 and the formation of the South African Union in 1910, the government took definitive steps to create the desired nationhood from the colonies and the Republic. The ruling class had to determine membership criteria and formed a new social order to construct the desired form of national identity. It is important to highlight that during this period, as the new state of the Union went about creating a ‘White man’s land’, immigration legislation was highly relevant as it was used for controlling movement, and also as a tool of social engineering and economic protection of its industries. Immigration policies were, therefore, in Marxist terms\textsuperscript{22}, a form of hegemonic imposition (Posel, 1991). In the Union’s pursuit of capitalism, it focused its power of control over labour and, by extension, wage relationships, between those deemed undesirable but required for their labour. Through its legislation and policies, the Union attempted to control the labour of the excluded, using administrative sanctions and police to enforce compliance. This reflects Peberdy’s (2009: 49) argument that the “state sought social stability with exclusionary immigration policies serving as a crucial instrument for shaping White identities”. The important point here is the use of legislation as a tool of coercion and marginalisation, in this case for social engineering that displayed disregard for individual agency.

The government extended a heavy hand in moulding the social and economic fabric of the society through policies, laws, and administrative fiat. For example, when the Indian population grew in the South African Republic, in the late nineteenth century, and the Whites perceived it to be an economic, political, and social threat, the government responded by introducing harsh and restrictive measures to control and deal with the situation. In Natal, where the Indian population outnumbered the White, a head tax on former indentured labourers was introduced in 1895 to encourage re-indenture or out-migration, thus meeting the Union’s economic needs for more workers combined with the social desire to control any non-White residence in the Union. In addition, legislation was introduced to restrict Indian access to trading licenses as a means to curtail their economic activities. Similarly, movements of African migrants in and out of the Union were strictly controlled by legislation and administrative fiat in ways that benefitted the labour needs of the agricultural and mining sectors.

\textsuperscript{21} The Pass Laws are government legislation that aimed to control the movement of specific persons within designated areas. The individuals are given a government-issued identity card in the form of a book, called the Pass Book. See Saunders & Southey 1998.

To facilitate labour supplies to its industries, the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913\(^{23}\) denied immigrant status to Black Africans from other nations, but, through discretionary power the minister sought to promote easy mobility of Black labour. The ruling elites chose to use coercion through the law to control the movement and residence of its African population (Posel, 1991; Davenport, 1971) because of the growing urban numbers and their potential for political flammability. However, the results of their policies and legislations were contrary to the goals. The Pass Laws that attempted to control the movement of Black South Africans into towns and their employment also failed to achieve their aims, while the attempt to restrict the movement and activities of Indians had the opposite effect on the size of the Indian population. Rather than discouraging immigration and promoting their re-indenture, the restrictions provoked political activism and civic protest that effectively resulted in some positive changes for Indians with the Indian Relief Acts of 1914.\(^{24}\)

Importantly, local authorities simply lacked the necessary resources needed to achieve the objectives and targets of the 1923 Urban Areas Acts\(^{25}\) (Klotz, 2013). The success of the influx control system depended largely on ubiquitous policing to identify those whose permits had expired or who lacked them altogether. Thus the implementation of coercive legislation depended on the administrative capacities of local authorities – which in this case could not cope with the onerous task of identifying all permit defaulters. Faced with the failure of influx control and the Urban Area Acts to curb the presence of Africans in urban areas, the ruling class amended the latter with stricter controls and tightening of the labour policy. That led to the 1930 Urban Area Acts Amendment, while a further attempt at influx control resulted in the 1937 Native Law Amendment Act. Again, the government chose coercion and exclusion over a realistic and participatory approach to immigration management. However, while the attempt at influx control was becoming more formidable in law and on paper, in practice the system failed to achieve its goals. Several structural and economic reasons made it impossible or illogical for the legislation and laws to be effective: the meagre incomes for Black labourers in agricultural production as either small peasant farmers or paid labourers were insufficient to feed their families, and 1942 was a year of severe drought, which exacerbated an already desperate situation in places such as the reserves. Men, women, and children abandoned their rural ties and moved to towns, and grinding poverty and malnutrition on White-owned farms ensured that Blacks refused to remain as permanent labour. Nevertheless, Posel (1991: 43-44) argued that the reason for the failure was due in large part to regulatory loopholes: “deficient coordination in the administration … and failure to oversee its implementation in any consistent way”.

\(^{23}\) One of the primary purposes of the Act was to exclude Indian immigrants. However, previous provincial restrictions that regulated the movement of South African blacks between provinces, and prohibited their entry into the Orange Free State, were incorporated into the 1913 Act. Thus, black South Africans were subject to the same piece of legislation that governed entry to the country by non-South Africans- defined as migrants. In addition, the Act had an exemption clause that gave the minister some discretion to allow entry to certain groups of people such as migrant labourers with contracts in the mining industry, indicating the need for black labour.

\(^{24}\) These removed the head tax on Indians and amended the 1913 Act to recognize marriages conducted in any religion.

\(^{25}\) The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act segregated urban space and defined Black Africans as temporary members who were only allowed in urban areas to perform services for Whites. The Act also prohibited the authorities from granting freehold property rights to Africans on the above grounds.
Still, mostly ignoring the structural conditions and economic realities that were pushing African populations to urban areas, and alarmed at the ineffectiveness of influx control, municipalities repeatedly pressed for more coercive and restrictive measures in influx controls. With failures to address the ineffectiveness of influx control, the 1948 election became a key moment in choosing the state’s strategies for successfully achieving this goal. Yet the victory of the National Party in 1948 showed that (voting) South Africans once again preferred a hegemonic approach to participatory or reconciliatory means of resolving the pressing challenges of the nation’s socio-economically and politically disadvantaged groups. The state understood the problems in urban areas as simple problems of control, and felt that apartheid presented solutions to better control over Africans, better control of influx administration, and a better way to combat the frustration and disorder of poverty. Apartheid thus served not only to legitimise the state’s use of hegemonic approaches to ensure White domination but also acknowledged the state’s tacit consideration of individual agency as frail and ineffectual (Posel, 1991; Simkins, 1983).

During the apartheid era, South Africa’s internal migration was strictly controlled by laws for non-Whites and especially Blacks. The Pass Law Act (1952) restricted the movement of Black South Africans between the rural areas and urban centres by requiring that those over the age of 16 years carry a passbook for the administrative monitoring of their movement. This discriminatory restriction was gradually repealed, starting from the 1980s when some freedom of movement was allowed within selected urban areas. In 1986, the Pass Law was abolished, and the last discriminatory migration laws for Blacks came into effect in 1991. Since the end of apartheid rule, migration from the rural areas to urban centres has increased, especially labour-related Black migration (Posel & Casale, 2003). It is worth noting that Whites, Asians, South Africans, and the majority of Coloureds were already urban residents and so subsequent migration has been predominantly to urban areas (Bekker, 2006). The fall of apartheid in 1994 represented the failure of the long-term use of coercive and hegemonic instruments to resolve socio-economic problems (Peberdy, 2009; Crush, 1998). Through the ushering in of democracy, disenfranchised Blacks and minority races in South Africa were given participatory and reconciliatory opportunities to resolve difficulties.

### 3.2.1 Apartheid and the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion

The making of contemporary South African citizenship is predicated on its history of mobility along lines of race, labour, and rights (Klaaren, 2011; Peberdy, 2009; Nyamnjoh, 2006). Klotz (2012) and Klaaren (2011) trace the controversies and tensions surrounding South Africa’s citizenship to the history of the Union’s immigration legislation, designed to regulate ‘Asiatics’ with a language test, and subsequently applied to Africans and Europeans. In order to qualify Asiatic immigrants considered desirable, the selection of suitable language for use in the test was politically debated; meanwhile the political retained the authority to overrule the legal provision if it determined there were other grounds for disqualification.

Quotas were designed and utilized to control immigration flow by streamlining the number of immigrants of undesirable nationality and allowing more from countries whose nationals were in demand, with the Quota Act of 1930 favouring nationals from Western and
Northern Europe, and limiting the immigration of European nationals from other countries. By the early to mid-1930s, anti-immigration sentiments and legislation were an active part of the political and social space in South Africa, resembling current post-apartheid, anti-immigrant sentiments but with a notable difference in targeted nationals or race. For instance, during the period of intense Jewish influx, immigration readily became a subject of political campaigning and disagreement, as Jewish immigrants were perceived to be in competition with low-skilled Whites. Anti-Semitism thus served political and social purposes during the early 1900s (in particular, the 1924 election), with political parties promising to promote or prohibit the immigration and inclusion of Jews. In present day South Africa, anti-immigrant sentiments are reportedly directed towards African immigrants generally, but especially certain nationals such as Nigerians. These migrants are perceived to be in competition with black South Africans and mainly engaged in criminal activities.

Furthermore, the structural control of movement to urban centres, associated with access to jobs and employment for the Black populace, also connected national identities with economic privileges. That, argues Neocosmos (2006), highlights the Nationalists’ conception of the nation as a fundamentally urbanized idea. The resistance to this forced control of access to the city centred on the migrant labour system as the revolting basis of anti-apartheid, alongside ideologies of imperialism in the development of opposition. This calls attention to the politics of resistance to the apartheid government, shown to be framed by notions of nationality and citizenship in opposition to the migrant labour system. Neocosmos (2006: 25) argues that “both from the perspective of the state and from that of the people, it is the migratory phenomenon which has provided the most important context for the development of democratic conceptions of citizenship in the region”.

Politically, it is important to note that, during the apartheid period, questions of immigration were not applied to foreign Blacks from outside South Africa, who were treated as synonymous with South African Blacks – that is, as foreigners, excluded from the discourse of citizenship. In this sense, the discriminatory and harsh experience of apartheid is framed as also applying to Black African migrants. Thus, the debate about immigration as it relates to residency rights and citizenship was “a sphere relegated to whites-only politics” (Klotz, 2012: 195). Klotz (2012) further argues that the legalization of non-white immigration was not achieved through immigration policy reform but through the efforts to legitimize the Bantustan, while the political sphere still reserved the privilege to influence immigration in South Africa, irrespective of legal promulgations. Additional opportunities to allocate immigration slots at the discretion of the immigrants’ selection board were provided for in the Quota Act of 1930. Hence, one can understand the question of inclusion (therefore, citizenship) in South Africa as not only a legal prerogative but also a political presumption that incorporates specific interests from economic powers such as representatives of Labour, Industry and Agriculture. Furthermore, the conception of migration in the above setting moves beyond ‘mobility’ and ‘border management’ to notions of confirmation and contestation of national identity. In this vein, migration is a form of mobility that both contests and reaffirms citizenship in South Africa.

The historical period chronicles weak advocacy for rights of immigrants that allowed political and social dynamics to determine the experience of immigrants more than legal
victories, especially those based on global conceptions. That strongly contrasts with the present context of strong advocacy for the rights of immigrants, and the relevance of global norms in fashioning the democratic processes. Although, the possible positive effect of rights-based advocacy for immigrants is challenged and limited by widespread public hostility to foreigners and the government’s lacklustre response to protecting them (Klotz, 2012). Nevertheless, advocates of migrants’ rights have in certain instances successfully challenged administrative exclusions and discriminations through constitutional provisions.

Socially, South African conceptions of citizenship, expressed in the mass opposition to apartheid, utilized a ‘rights’ perception to agitate for participatory citizenship and non-racial inclusion (Neocosmos, 2006; Mamdani, 1996). The mass protest of September 1984 indicated the active participation of ordinary people in the opposition to apartheid, a change from the usual practice of top-down leadership (Lodge et al. 1991; cited in Neocosmos 2006). Neocosmos notes that mass rebellion grew during the first declaration of a state of emergency (1985-1986) through, for example, the setting up of ‘street committees’ that assumed local government functions in ungovernable areas. As a local activist noted:

In the streets where you live you must decide what issues affect your life and bring up issues you want your organization to take up. We are not in a position to remove debris, remove buckets, clean the streets and so on. But the organization must deal with these matters through street committees. (Lodge et al., 1991: 82; cited in Neocosmos, 2006: 55)

Thus, the popular participation of individuals in the crafting of a new nation stands out in addition to a statist approach. The important elements in the process can thus be understood as active citizenship based on popular nationalistic politics and an urbanized conceptualization of community that was highlighted by the populist movement. Neocosmos (2006) argues that the conception of active citizenship and inclusiveness was seen as somewhat stronger in township and trade unions.

Yet, under assailment from the state, the trade unions and townships lost the distinct populist characterization of their struggle, and retreated to being directed by their leadership. In the ensuing political discourse of resistance to apartheid, rural and migrant workers were slowly excluded from the conception of community (Neocosmos, 2006). The resulting nationalistic perspective of the exiled movement conceived of migrant labour as serving the goals of apartheid, and agitated for its abolition. Thus, Neocosmos (ibid.: 69) argues that “this made it possible after 1994 to think of the exclusion of migrants as a progressive politics precisely because this meant dismantling the migrant labour system”. Neocosmos’ arguments accord the 1980s’ populist social movement against apartheid a non-racialized and genuinely democratic status. He notes that the social movement achieved that status because it was non-elitist and incorporated the services and contributions of White ‘progressives’ in its activities, contrasting it with post-apartheid attempts to repair the wrongs of apartheid through affirmative programs on race lines. Neocosmos’ perspective identifies the dynamics of exclusion and xenophobic discrimination as the manoeuvres of elitist activists, leadership, and the government. From that perspective, migrant labour is demonized as it carries with it a taint from the apartheid regime.
3.3 Post-apartheid African Migration to Johannesburg, South Africa

A number of researchers (e.g., Landau, 2011; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Peberdy, 2009; Hassim; Kupe; & Worby, 2009; Mngxitama, 2008) have argued that some South Africans have developed an intense fear of the foreign migrant, with a particular focus on foreign African migrants. Conversely, the post-apartheid state has been signatory to numerous international and regional regulations for fair, human rights-based, and at times free mobility (within the SADC region): South Africa has a bill of rights embed in its Constitution, while Article 5 of the SADC Treaty in 1992 called for “policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of the peoples of the region generally, among members’ states” (Segatti, 2011a: 23). Subsequent regional agreements and protocols, however, are less explicit on the issue of freer movement of people within the region. Cases in point are the 2003 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC, and the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan adopted in 2003. Although the 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons encourages bilateral agreements on migration between member states, the treaty has been criticised as lacking binding mechanisms or specific periods, thus creating implementation loopholes (Segatti, 2011a; Oucho, 2006; Williams, 2006).

South Africa is signatory to all international treaties on refugees and asylum seekers. Since the year 2000, the National Refugee Act came into effect, incorporating the standards of international conventions. However, despite legal progress in favour of refugees, the implementation of its legislation has been criticised as ineffective and inefficient because of a laissez-faire attitude, mismanagement, corruption, and a lack of administrative capacity (Segatti, 2011b). Although the present South African state promotes discourses of constitutionality, democracy, human rights, and diversity, its practices of immigration control and management allegedly follow a contradictory and inconsistent approach, more in resonance with its apartheid history than with the ostensibly promoted discourses (Klotz, 2013; Peberdy, 2009; Crush, 1998; Reitzes, 1998). Researchers have noted that the attitude towards African migrants and the tactical practice of immigration control are actually in line with the approaches to influx control of the apartheid years. For example, some authors have linked the current ‘demonization of outsiders and human mobility’ to historical roots in the apartheid era, observing that the apartheid state rationalised and pursued its concerns for economic utility and protection of entitled insiders through arbitrary control of citizenship and residential rights (Klotz, 2013; Nieftagodien, 2012; Segatti & Landau, 2011; Landau, 2010).

Questions of benefits and access to resources remained vital as nation-building took the route of social development, redistribution, and the correction of past injustices. Tellingly, however, the post-apartheid government promised formerly oppressed and disenfranchised

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South Africans economic emancipation *through political inclusion* (Landau, 2010). Thus, the logic of foreign others as a drain on resources meant for privileged insiders apparently continues to sustain the logic of apartheid. As Deborah Posel (1991: 76) writes: “In the [apartheid] state’s view, the larger the urban African proletariat, the greater the concomitant threats to the country’s political stability and industrial peace.” In a new context of what Reddy (2012: 17), calls the “crisis of the Nationalist project”, and Landau (2010: 226) labels the “failed Renaissance and wrath of a demonic society”, South Africans continue to view migrants as coming to steal their jobs, housing, and any other resources available, because, as Reddy (2012: 17) observes, “for the masses of Black South Africans, citizenship crucially means material well-being and dignity, and ‘payback’ for their experiences of apartheid”.

In the past several years, international media attention has fixed on bursts of violence against migrants from African countries, especially in the big cities in South Africa. As the nation’s society continues to rebuild, it is still experiencing the scourge of poverty, which has contributed to the perception of migrants as culprits responsible for the economic woes. The migrants, being the foreign others, are easily targeted as the cause of suffering (Landau, 2011). Moreover, as citizens witness migrants’ economic success (both among professionals and in the informal sector), and their sporadic but excessive displays of wealth, some have reached the conclusion that such migrants are reaping wealth which they did not sow (Steinberg, 2008). Indeed, Steinberg (ibid.: 8) records a comment by a South African interviewee following the 2008 xenophobia violence to the effect that “[t]his entire country is leaking into the pockets of Mozambicans”. On the other hand, migrants refer to their willingness to work hard as a competitive advantage that poor and unskilled migrants have over their South African counterparts. Such migrants have come to dominate economic activities that require hard labour and patience, as one explained:

> To be selling fresh vegetables by seven in the morning, I must start making my way to the fresh produce market in City Deep at 3 am. I can say that there is not a single South African awake at that time. The people on the street preparing for work are foreigners, every one of them. For the South African, 3 am is too cold. He must sleep until eight. (Steinberg, 2008: 7)

Jonathan Crush (1998) argues that, implicit in the accusations that migrants are taking the jobs of South Africans, is the disturbing thought that South Africans are afraid of competition. Moreover, the labour market is not fixed in a way that matches the available employment opportunities to the number of South Africans.

Still, it is important to point out that, despite its hostile attitude and harsh approach to immigration control, under pressure from human rights activists and the private sector the post-apartheid state has taken measures to include and facilitate the immigration of skilled individuals. In addition, from 1996-2002 three amnesties have been implemented for SADC nationals: the first was for contract mineworkers, the second for undocumented SADC nationals, and the third for Mozambicans (Segatti & Landau, 2011; Peberdy, 2009). Moreover, there have been improvements in the application process for asylum seekers. According to the Amended Immigration Act of 2004 (Government Gazette, 2004: 38), all persons who register a claim for asylum at a South African border should be admitted and given a temporary permit.
for two weeks until they can make a formal claim at a Refugee Reception Office. Typically, after going through the decision process, the migrant is given a temporary permit that is renewable after six months.

While this signifies a positive change for those seeking asylum, implementation has been truncated and anticipated positive effects impaired by several factors. Highly complicit in the failure to translate positive changes in policy to a positive experience for migrants are alleged administrative ineptitudes and sustained informal and extra-legal immigration control practices (Vigneswaran et al., 2010; Peberdy, 2009). Poor and low-skilled African migrants who comprise the majority of Africa’s regional migration flows suffer most from such constraints. Ted Leggett, (2003: 99) commenting on a public opinion survey of household victims of crime in Johannesburg Central and Hillbrow, has claimed that “the present system of granting visas to seekers of political asylum has opened a loophole through which masses of economic refugees have paraded”. He goes on to suggest that South Africa’s approach to migration management has contributed to the increase in inner city crime.

Administratively, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) – reported to be grossly mismanaged and poorly endowed compared to other agencies (Segatti & Landau, 2011) – has been in charge of immigration management in South Africa, despite accusations of corruption and extra-legal activities: Department officials regularly take actions outside the national regulations to control immigration informally, and sometimes collude to elicit bribes from anxious would-be migrants (Vigneswaran, 2011; Vigneswaran et al., 2010). Supported by informal control tactics like racial and ethnic profiling and increased patrols of immigrant enclaves by the South African Police Services (SAPS), the DHA has a high deportation rate of foreign nationals, with more than 300,000 deported in 2007 (Vigneswaran, 2011). Allegedly, various other actors are involved in related corrupt and extra-legal activities, including DHA officials, SAPS, migrants, criminal gangs, and entrepreneurial smugglers (Andersson, 2006; Coplan, 2001; Vigneswaran et al., 2010). Some researchers (Vigneswaran, et al., 2010; Roitman, 2006, 2004; Tilly, 1985) argue from an institution-building perspective that the monopoly of the state, and the agency of police officers directed at preserving that monopoly, may account for such extra-legal activities within South Africa’s formal institutions. In this sense, they assume that the extra-legal activities of state officials are the informal extension of the enduring power of the state in pursuing its objectives, which, they argue, should be understood as the persistence of the state in upholding its hegemonic power. However, if the extra-legal activities that help to enforce informal migration control can be explained as informal collective efforts by South Africans to preserve the autonomy and authority of the state over immigration, how can prevalent corrupt practices that assist migrants in ways that are directly contradictory to national goals be explained?

The formulation of immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa has also been severely criticised on the basis of content (Polzer & Segatti, 2011; Segatti, 2011b). For example, the reform of the Aliens Control Act of 1991, one of the final pieces of late apartheid legislation governing immigration, was not reviewed until 2001. The slow process to reform immigration policy inherited from the apartheid years is due to the contentious character of immigration control in South Africa. Segatti (2011b) observes that for South Africa’s policymakers, immigration is not simply about border control and access to jobs in South
Africa; rather, there are bilateral agreements that dated back to the colonial era, such as labour migration agreements in the SADC, and also conflicting and contesting interests from political parties, businesses, civil society, human rights advocates, and so forth. Nonetheless, while contentions and the consultative process for the reform of immigration stipulations could have slowed the review process, it did not significantly change the new legislation that emerged (Crush & McDonald, 2001). The legal and regulatory framework of the apartheid years still governed the regulatory immigration system years later.

Against that backdrop, the most recent review of South Africa’s immigration regulations in May 2014 raised many concerns. That was the first review since 2004, and the changes made affected rules for visit, study, and work visas, in addition to residence and business permits. While there are several changes in the new immigration regulations, those that will probably most affect the participants in this study include the following: 1. Visas can only be modified outside South Africa. 2. Entrepreneurs seeking to start a business in South Africa should commit to ensuring that South Africans comprise at least 60% of the staff. 3. The period for asylum seekers to report to refugee reception centres is reduced from fourteen to five days, and the penalty for overstaying a visa increased to a prohibition from entering the country for a period proportional to the overstay. 4. Certain businesses (such as micro-businesses categorized as street trade) will be listed as undesirable undertakings. 5. Work permits by quota or for exceptional skills have been repealed and replaced with critical skills work visas. These changes will usher in stronger restrictive immigration requirements, a harsher approach to asylum management, and a vigorous punitive approach to migrants’ economic activities including an anticipated increase in preventive and punitive actions against informal migrants’ participation in the informal sector generally, and in street trade specifically. That indicates, yet again, South Africa’s reluctance or inability to implement empirical reports and advice that suggest a more reconciliatory, participatory, and inclusive approach to migration management in South Africa. It also indicates a significant gap between migration research and policy-making in migration matters in South Africa. Although South Africa has a very active research and advocacy environment in comparison to other countries in the region, this section demonstrates that real changes in legislation and processes for migrants have been slow.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The question of how poor African migrants attempt to build their futures in South Africa demands qualitative approaches to showcase the migrants’ experiences, perceptions and practices. Various methods were used in order to accommodate the multi-faceted nature of this study. The core of the data is derived from life story interviews of nine informal African migrants in Johannesburg, South Africa; narrative analysis was used to analyse the interview data, while qualitative document analysis was added to provide triangulation. The study also benefited from the application of ethnographic principles of observation and participation. An essential aspect of ethnography and the life story interview is to keep detailed fieldnotes as part of the research process (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999); this was especially important in this emotionally and physically challenging field setting with its requirement of reflexive empirical data collection (Erickson & Murphy, 2008; Zenker & Kumoll, 2010; Lassiter, 2001).

4.1 Data Collection Methods

In this section, the research methods are explained in detail, including how the participants were identified, the methods used for data collection (interview and document analysis), self-reflection as the researcher, the atmosphere in the interviewing room, and methods of data analysis.

4.1.1 The Life Story Interview

The life story interview is a qualitative research method, evolving from oral history and life history studies, that is used to gather the subjective fundamentals of interviewees’ lives (Atkinson, 1998). Robert Atkinson (1998: 8) thus defined the life story as “the story a person chooses to tell about the life he or she has lived, told as completely and honestly as possible, what is remembered of it, and what the teller wants others to know of it, usually as a result of a guided interview by another”.

The life story interview is normally recorded and transcribed, and produces a narrative in the words of the person telling the story. Catherine Riessman (2008) argues that at the heart of the narrative method lies a diversity of meanings and applications in social research, something also emphasized by other authors (Squire, Andrews, & Tamboukou, 2012; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009; Alasuutari, 1997). Nevertheless, storytelling is the central ingredient of the narrative approach whereby the speaker “connects events into a sequence that is consequential for later action and for the meanings that the speaker wants listeners to take away from the story” (Riessman, 2008: 3). Life story interviews thus allow the interviewee to “see life across time as it all fits together or as it seems discontinuous, or both” (Atkinson, 1998: 5), exposing the interviewee’s understanding of his or her world. The interviewees’ construction of their reality and the story they tell about it are the keys to using life story interviews in this research. As Atkinson (ibid.: 5) observes, “if we want to know the unique experience and perspective of an individual, there is no better way to get this than in the person’s own voice”.

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Life story interviews are part of a broader qualitative research method called narrative inquiry, (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009; Riessman, 2008; Chase, 2005) which could refer to a range of different discursive practices including “speech units as small as brief utterances, topical stories, extended speech about substantial aspects of life, accounts of political events and social change” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2012: 1). Within this field, life story interviews apply to the examination of life as a whole, in pursuit of in-depth knowledge about individuals, while resulting data can be used in a variety of ways, depending on the theoretical and substantive thrust of research. For this study, I interviewed nine African migrants making their living as either traders or service providers on the streets of Johannesburg, from July to October 2013. I utilise their narratives primarily to examine how migrants live with the socio-economic, political, and personal challenges that are current in the South African migration context. I started the interview sessions by saying, “Tell me about yourself”, as an open-ended invitation to the interviewee. Some responded by talking about their lives before coming to South Africa and others started their stories from when they arrived in the country. Depending on how they responded to the invitation, I followed up with questions that encouraged them to expand on various aspects of their response. Therefore, I treated ‘narrative’ as both talk organised around important events and dialogue in the form of the questions and answers typical of interviews.

Some interviewees were bursting to recount as much as they could, while others needed prompting in the form of questions to encourage them to continue telling their stories. This stems from what Matti Hyvärinen (2008: 448) refers to as a facet of narrativity: an “aspect of texts, experiences and action that invites more or less direct narrative responses”. Depending on the experience of the interviewee, the outcome was more or less a linear story as the interviewee’s experiences and actions were reported as strings of exceptional or important events and acts that they felt related their points of view or opinions.

In a life story interview, the act of telling one’s story is often considered meaning-making, implying that meaning comes with telling – creating new understanding for the interviewee and interviewer (Denzin, 1989). Denzin (ibid.: 81) further notes that “there is no truth in the painting of a life, only multiple images and traces of what has been, what could have been, and what now is”; thus, although the question of meaning is vital to the researcher, the stories are “always open-ended, inconclusive and subject to multiple interpretations”. All meaning-making reflections by the interviewees were treated as part of their story in this study, and reported as part of the respondents’ reality, with the goal of understanding and constructing how migrants make sense of their lives within the constraints of migration control. For Denzin (ibid), this subjectivity in life stories makes their use an interventionist method that gives voice to those not allowed to speak. In this sense, the life story method produces writing that “transgresses structures of domination [and] reproduces the struggle for voice of those on the wrong side of the power relationship” (Clough, 1988: 3; in Denzin, 1989: 82). In this approach, the role of the researcher is also emphasized as relevant to the meaning-making process.

4.1.1a Implementing Life Story Interviews: Seeking and Identifying Interviewees

I set out for fieldwork in July 2013 and returned home in October 2013. It was my second visit but my first study sojourn in Johannesburg, South Africa. During this time, I was attached
to the Africa Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, as a visiting researcher, with Professor Loren Landau guiding and supervising my fieldwork. From experience, my ACMS supervisor advised me to go to the street to meet and solicit participation in the study, rather than operating with one of the many NGOs that work with migrants in Johannesburg; this would avoid the problem of recycling the same participants for different research projects. Migrants that work with related NGOs have often participated in several of the migration studies coming out of Johannesburg. Although this advice had the noble goal of facilitating the originality of my data, it was daunting to consider moving around in the allegedly dangerous neighbourhoods where migrants congregate. I was encouraged by the thought that, as a non-South African national and fellow African, the migrants might be positively tuned to cooperating with me. With this in mind, I identified Yeoville and Hillbrow as locations for fieldwork because African migrants are known to trade in the areas. I needed participants who were migrants from African countries, not formally employed, and making their livings from informal entrepreneurship at the micro level. Thus, I used purposive sampling to choose the participants for this study.

Identifying participants started with visits to Yeoville and Hillbrow. My strategy was to approach a street trader, buy some of the displayed goods, and ask for the origin of the seller while making payment. Once I identified a friendly trader (warmly responsive to my chat), I visited him again, buying goods and spending some time talking about life in general and exchanging country news. After several days, I had my first participant in Yeoville. He agreed to the interview, but settling on a date and time was quite problematic. Street traders operate every day of the week, from early mornings to late evenings, meaning that any time allocated to an interview was a distraction from selling. Conducting an interview by their wares, on the other hand, was impossible, as the loud noise from passing cars and voices in the street market impede hearing; the trader would also be unable to concentrate on the interview while soliciting and attending to buyers. Eventually, we agreed on a time before trading began early on a Sunday because he reported that trade is normally slow at the start of Sunday mornings. This became the strategy for getting other traders to agree to participate: suggest an interview time very early in the morning before trading started and on a Sunday. I also asked one of the NGOs located in Yeoville Street if I might use their office for the interview sessions, to which they kindly agreed.

Worthy to note during this phase of the fieldwork is that most of the female street traders approached on cold calls were not interested in participating. The majority of them cited the time factor as the major reason, but a few others were quite aggressive about students coming to them without improving their lives. Nevertheless, two females, identified by suggestions from the male participants, did agree to take part. I scheduled the first three life story interviews (all traders in Yeoville) via one-on-one solicitations and relied on chain referral for the other participants.

It took more time to get participants in Hillbrow, the main reason being that the reserved office space for interviews was in Yeoville and most of the potential participants felt it was too far from their places of trade. My participants in Hillbrow were service providers (engaged, for example, in hair braiding), making my routine visits quite different. I was compelled to spend less time chatting with them as they were often standing by the roadside soliciting potential
clients. Overall, nine African migrants participated in the study, three in Hillbrow and six in Yeoville. They were from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Cameroun and Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Benin Republic, and Malawi.

4.1.1b The Interview Room: Creating the Self We Want Others to See

At the centre of a life story interview is the individual telling the story. James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium (2000: 3) write that despite the uniqueness of the self, it still produces “stories disciplined by the diverse social circumstance and practices that produce them”. In this sense, the self is constructed by the judgment of what we should be in the context of time and space; although this self is socially grounded, it is able to negotiate its adaptation to the social context. Individual agency combines with the social to create a mutable self that can confidently engage with the social and respond to its needs.

Eight of the interview sessions for this study were carried out in the office lent by the obliging NGO and one took place in a fast food restaurant close to the participant’s place of work. During the interview, the participants displayed social grounding in their current challenging milieu but also the dexterity and reflexivity to engage with the social for their individual benefit. They considered themselves to be helping the law by looking out for themselves. Some, recognising their social selves as informal migrants (and thus criminalised), justified their extra-legal activities as the only logical options available to them. Their utterances and stories about themselves in the interview sessions portrayed active agents taking responsibility for personal well-being. While they talked about some of their practices, they focused on engaging with their socio-political context, their goals, objectives, and the constraints they face in taking responsibility for themselves. They exhibited a very active conception of who they were which translated into the ‘turn’ of my discussion of the data.

The self is also staged to accomplish particular moral goals that can be translated by using stories for argument and persuasion (Riessman, 2008; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000). The interviewees take into account the perspective they want to create for the interviewer. In this sense, the observed and interpreted self of the interviewer can shape the editing, focus, and particular story told. In this study, the participants were informed that I was not a South African, that I was writing my doctoral thesis in the field of social and public policy, I lived in Europe, and I was attached to the Witwatersrand University of South Africa; understanding that I was also a migrant elicited trust in the participant that I could identify with their challenges. Their interpretation of my particulars could have influenced the type of story they narrated and the perspectives they strived to create, and my educational status may have created feelings of “here is one of us that can do something positive about our situation”.

In addition, quite importantly in the narrative tradition, the emotions, empathy, and perspective the participants are able to provoke and create can contribute to influencing the decisions that the researcher makes in the questioning, transcribing, and editing processes of the research. Denzin (1989) reminds us that stories are value laden and even value driven, and so they should not be read as the exact record of everything. The interviewee will tell her stories from an interpretive point of view, and so may present to the researcher the self she wants the researcher to see or the self she is struggling to be. This has implications for the validity of life
story research, as no two interviewees will narrate the same experience of the same event.

### 4.1.1c The Researcher as Part of the Story

From the start of the life story interview, the researcher is considered a part of the story. At the centre of the researcher’s role is the resulting social context of the interview itself: the interplay between the interviewee and interviewer. This two-way flow of the narrative method means the researcher is not in control of the story told (Atkinson, 1998): the reality produced is thus regarded as situational and fluid. In fact, Robert Miller (2000: 129) likens this effect of the interviewee-interviewer interaction to the Hawthorne effect or the social version of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The Hawthorne effect refers to a series of studies at an electric plant in the 1920s where the researchers realised that a major cause of changes they noticed in workers’ performance was that the workers knew they were being observed. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, on the other hand, is from sub-atomic physics where many of the phenomena are so delicate that any measurement will interfere with the phenomenon. In applying it to the social context Miller (ibid.: 158) observes, “one must ask questions in an interview to get a respondent to tell about their views, but this questioning will affect what they tell and how they tell it”. At the end of some of my interview sessions, I was left with the feeling that the interviewees were thinking, “Now you know what we are going through, can you do something about it?” Or, possibly: “Do not forget us; come back to Africa to work for us.” During the sessions, I kept wondering if the interviewees, knowing my background, were embellishing their stories for my benefit.

It was a situation where, for once, they had the ears of someone outside their social league. Most of these migrants were not familiar with working with NGOs or other civil organisations and, for some of them, it was the first time they had related their story to someone who was not a migrant street trader like themselves, and they were not assured they would get sympathy. At the same time, they emphasized their agency: what they can and are doing without social support. The men in particular seemed to present the male ego in play, showing a female that it is not all bad, that they are in control. In my discussion of my findings, I strive to navigate these effects by combining parts of stories from different participants to strengthen my conclusions. My idea is that if several of the participants’ express similar points on a given issue, or if different stories are used to express similar points, then the issue becomes relevant and therefore I emphasize it. Furthermore, in their responses to some questions, it was the atmosphere in the interview room, the certainty and tone of the voice of my interviewees, and the pauses, sighs, and their posture that stayed with me and gave me direction during analysis of the data. Thus, in the interview room I was keenly observing my interviewees and listening to them. I also tried to capture the feelings their narrations evoked during the interview by setting up a blog page where I recorded my feelings and experience during each interview session.

The researcher is also present in the story in the type of questions asked, the decision on areas to probe, when to stop the narration, and how to encourage it. At each point of the interchange, the researcher has to make decisions. Riessman (2008) notes that such decisions can be substantially affected by the researcher’s background, opinions, theoretical leanings, and other subjectivity. In this case, my migrant background sensitised me to the feelings
expressed by the participants. Certainly, empathy was provoked because I could identify with some of their challenges, but several of the experiences narrated were hard to accept as real because of their sheer heinousness. On the other hand, my experience as a migrant also gave me the basis to probe their stories critically, asking and rephrasing questions to facilitate discussions. For example, after listening to a number of different stories of vulnerability and dehumanisation from migrants who had created a thick interview context filled with emotions of sympathy and sorrow, I might ask a question about the home country or future plans and the stories would change to tales of struggles, economic activities, and agency in dealing with their circumstances.

Holstein and Gubrium, (1997: 113-114), advise that “treating interviewing as a social encounter in which knowledge is constructed suggests the possibility that the interview is not merely a neutral conduit or source of distortion, but is instead a site of, and occasion for, producing reportable knowledge itself”. Although the implications of this ‘production’ of knowledge in the narrative approach are positioned on a continuum of low to high, narrative researchers argue more for relaxation than a prohibition of the interviewer effect (Miller, 2000). Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1993: 160 - 161) argued against the common prohibition of emotional involvement in social research from a feminist perspective, saying, “The researched will have feelings about us as much as we will about them, and also feelings (and theories) about the research itself”. They state that the pursuit of emotionally free social research is a “mythology which presents an over simplistic account of research. It is also misleading in that it emphasised the objective presence of the researcher and suggests that she can be there without having any greater involvement than simple presence”. They also note that “all research involves the presence of the researcher as a person, personhood cannot be left behind ... One’s self cannot be left behind, it can only be omitted from discussions and written accounts of the research process, but then, it is an omission, a failure to discuss”. The narrative approach incorporates the recognition of the researcher as part of a story’s analytical core. What is commonly referred to as subjectivity, and thus a potential problem in social research, is reversed and accepted as one of the cornerstones of narrative analysis, highlighting the interactions and perceptions of the interviewee and interviewer (Holstein & Gubrium, 2012; Riessman, 2008).

Riessman (2008) further claims that the narrative approach is not a search for truth or fact, but rather it helps in displaying the human experience of the subjects. Surely then, the human experience should take centre place in the discussion of the data. I endeavoured to do this by utilising the words of the interviewees as often as possible and quoting them verbatim. I allowed the voices of my interviewees to guide the discussion and present the points; I used them to start or end some sections; and interweaved them into the discussions. However, I also used my observations, secondary data, and theoretical frame to strengthen, link, and highlight the points made. The output thus comprises an analytical chapter that presents the human experience of surviving as a migrant on the harsh streets of Johannesburg.

4.1.1d Analysing Data from Life Story Interviews

Catherine Riessman, (1993) warns that narrative analysis cannot be separated from transcription, emphasizing the interrelatedness of the narrative process, from the collection of
data to drawing conclusions. Notwithstanding this, Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, (1998) and Riessman (1993) provide practical models for analysing narrative texts. Lieblich et al. (ibid.: 12) note that there are many possibilities for reading, interpreting, and analysing life story data, but emphasize two principal independent analytic dimensions: holistic versus categorical and content versus form approaches. The categorical approach is similar to traditional content analysis; that is, “the original story is dissected, and sections or single words belonging to a defined category are collected from the entire story or from several texts belonging to a number of narrators”. The categorical approach is preferred when a group of people shares the studied problem or phenomenon. In contrast, the holistic approach focuses on the story as a whole and is adopted when the individual’s position is the focal interest of the study.

In the second set of analytic dimensions, Lieblich et al. (1998) differentiate content from form approaches. Content approaches focus on the implicit content of the text, querying the meanings, motives, what happened, who participated in the event, and why. Form approaches to narrative analysis are concerned with the structure of the plot, its sequence, coherence, style, choice of metaphors, and so on. However, these two differentiated analytic dimensions often intersect, creating four approaches to reading a narrative: Holistic – Content, Holistic – Form, Categorical – Content and Categorical – Form. I adopted the categorical – content analytical approach in my empirical data analysis, choosing it because my participants arguably share similar experiences, as presented in my systematic literature review; on the other hand, previous studies have also highlighted the individual position of subjects similar to those in my study. Thus the main focus of my research lies on the perspectives of my participants, in terms of their meanings, reasons, and motivations, and how these relate to their everyday presence and practice in South Africa; thus I utilised the experiences of events and interests of my participants to voice their perspective and produce rich content.

Lieblich et al. (1998) advise that categories can be theoretically developed, and I started my analysis with the three concepts developed in my theoretical discussion in Chapter Two around which I created a table with ‘narrative of hope’, ‘narrative of tactics’, and ‘narrative of survival’ as headings. Next, I carefully read and reread each story, colouring the sections of the texts that fit with the concepts – starting with hope – before listing the coloured texts in their respective tables. For example, under the hope narrative, I classified all the sections in which the participants presented their presence in South Africa in terms of aspirations, goals, and visions of the future. Lieblich et al. (1998) note that utterances might be from a single speaker or from several speakers. Narrative text can be either long or short, in the form of a story or pertaining to specific incidents, events, or aspects of one’s life (Chase, 2005) and I found I utilised both long stories and short statements pertaining to specific events and opinions. Lieblich et al. (1998) add that conclusions may be reached by counting, subjecting data to statistical computations, or describing data to formulate a big picture. I draw my conclusions by discussing the content under each category to re-construct the participants’ viewpoints on their presence in South Africa. In order to incorporate data from document analysis, I did not subject my empirical data to counting or statistical computations.

In narrative text analysis, Riessmann (1993) warns that there is the danger of reading the narrative only as content, without highlighting the relevance of structure or what Lieblich et al.
(1998) called “form”. Although I adopted the content approach to analysing my data, I remained aware of the structure comprising the contextual basis of my participants’ narrative, constantly asking why and seeking the meanings hidden in the narrated events. Moreover, as noted earlier, the triangulation incorporated into the research design both provided and supported contextual structure for the narratives. This approach gave relevance to the participants’ voices, but, as Riessmann (1993) notes, interpretations are unavoidable. Thus, she emphasizes that individual’s narratives are situated in particular interactions and social, cultural, and institutional discourses. Finally, in acknowledging the important role of the researcher in the analysis of narrative texts, Riessmann (1993) situates the process in the tradition of interpretive and hermeneutic inquiry, where the choices made by the researcher in analysis link to the research questions, theoretical and epistemological positions, and personal biography. That implies that the choices of the researcher may not be seen as a problem to be fixed, but a basis to be acknowledged and clarified.

4.1.2 Qualitative Document Analysis

According to Glenn Bowen (2009: 27, 32), document analysis is “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents … [I]t entails a first-pass document review, in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identified.” Corbin and Strauss (2008) show that document analysis is utilised both to generate empirical information and to gain an understanding of an existing subject. According to Bowen (2009), researchers can utilise document analysis to generate data on the context of research participants, identify new questions and issues to be examined in the course of an ongoing research, produce a supplementary source of data, show trends over time, and triangulate findings from other sources. I utilise document analysis to produce a supplementary source of data on the context.

4.2.2a Document types: Inclusion criteria and collection

To identify documents to be used in analysis I had to consider the purpose of the analysis, the organisation that would best provide the type of information needed to meet the purpose, and the availability of the document through the Internet. I also had to consider the quality of the documents: that is, how the document was prepared and for what purposes. Bowen (2009) advises that the researcher should ascertain the relevance of the documents to be analysed in relation to the specific focus of the study. My research questions examine why African migrants remain in South Africa’s immigration context to build their lives, and how they do so; therefore, I chose to examine documents that provide information on the formal control of migration in South Africa to complement and triangulate empirical data on the context of my research participants. Bowen (2009: 33) cautions the researcher to be concerned with the quality of the documents and evidence, observing that documents should not be treated as “necessarily precise or accurate” and should be assessed for balance.

I decided to substantiate the information from the formal documents with analyses of documents from non-profit organisations that monitor the practices of migration control through the experiences of migrants. Therefore, I utilised annual reports (2007-2008, 2009-
2010, and 2011-2012) from the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA)\textsuperscript{28} and reports (2008, 2009, 2011) from the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA)\textsuperscript{29}. I chose to analyse annual reports because these are public documents and are accessible online without bureaucratic delays. Further, annual reports give information about the activities of the publishing organisation in the preceding year and therefore reports from several years can track changes in the organisation’s activities. Bowen (ibid.) emphasizes that sheer quantity should not be the main concern when identifying documents for analysis; if it is being used for triangulation, a few documents can be effective. On that note, I decided to examine annual reports from a three-year period because this would effectively show migration control practices relevant at the time of this study.

The annual reports from the DHA have been audited and prepared in accordance with the legal requirements of South Africa’s Public Finance Management Act (Section 40 [1] [d] and section 55 [1] [d]). Divided into three parts as set forth by South Africa’s National Treasury – general information, program performance, and statutory requirements – the purpose of the reports are to present the activities and achievements of the DHA in relation to the stated annual goals, with information on key developments within the institution and the broader context. The report is submitted to South Africa’s Parliament and freely available to the public. After assessing the documents, I chose to focus analysis on program performance, with specific attention to the program on immigration control.

The NGO targeted in document analysis, CoRMSA, is made up of member organisations and individuals working for the protection and welfare of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in South Africa. Its objective is to advocate for rights-based immigration policies, promote best practice, and encourage compliance with the rule of international and national law as pertains to immigration in South Africa. Its annual reports on protection of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants in South Africa are produced in commemoration of World Refugee Day and contain research findings by its members and research institutions in South Africa. Data for the reports are collected through surveys, in-depth interviews with migrants, telephone interviews with officials and service providers, and review of relevant documents. Thus they are drawn from a broad database which is collected over a period of at least six months, and cover a wide range of migrant issues identified as relevant each year. The information in the reports is utilised for advocacy and public awareness. From the report summary, I identified policy, legal, and migration control as themes that are relevant to my research questions and that complement the thematic content of the annual reports from the DHA. I chose CoRMSA as a source because of the broad data base of its reports, the range of researchers that work together to produce them, and the consistency of format over the selected period.

\textsuperscript{28} http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/about-us/annual-reports

4.1.2b Analysing the documents

This study is framed with theoretical concepts from resilience theory (see Chapter Two) and the primary data source is from life story interview data, therefore document analysis is not utilised for theory building in the grounded theory tradition. Rather, the documents are analysed with thematic knowledge gleaned from my review of previous empirical research (see Chapter One) and the theoretical thrust of the study (see Chapter Two). Bowen (2009) advises the researcher to rely on skills and intuition to examine the data through an interpretive lens made of identified, theoretically relevant concepts. After the first review of the documents, I decided to utilise thematic analytical approach from a realist perspective, a choice based on the need to reflect the reality of the migration context to corroborate my empirical findings.

Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke (2006: 7) claim that it is important that the researcher show how themes have been identified, pointing out that an “account of themes ‘emerging’ or being ‘discovered’ is a passive account of the process of analysis, and it denies the active role the researcher always plays in identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest”. I developed nine questions drawn from my literature and theoretical review to help identify the themes relevant to my research questions in the documents, utilising the same codes for the documents from DHA and CoRMSA, even though the latter have more detailed information on migration control in South Africa. Each document was carefully read, and text that described or responded to the codes was highlighted and then assigned the number allocated to similar content across the document range. This was then collated. I read each text to determine the meaning, relevance, and context and collapsed four of the codes into two, based on similarity of content, narrowing the number of codes to seven. I then re-read the reserved material and reviewed the codes to produce four over-arching themes, which were then used to present and discuss my secondary data for triangulation purposes.

4.2 Ethnography

Although this is not an ethnographic study, data collection techniques have benefited from methods identified as ethnographic (O’Reilly, 2005): I made use of observations, participated in the activities of my respondents, and kept reflective fieldwork diaries as part of my data collection process. These methods are traditionally considered basic ethnographic tools, yet ethnography is more than the mere use of methods to include a theory of social life as practice (ibid.). Several disciplines use ethnographic methods in diverse ways (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Heyl, 2001; Savage, 2000). However, I did not qualify my research as an ethnographic study for two main reasons: contacts with my participants were intermittent and fragmentary, and in my reporting and data interpretation, I relied on my respondents’ narratives rather than a rich description of their experience and the cultural context. Thus, as a general principle, the praxis of this research is based on the narrative approach.

Nonetheless, my research subject called for reflection during fieldwork – for observation and participation in the trade of my respondents – as part of relationship-building for data collection. Thus, the study benefited from traditional ethnographic methods. Keeping field
notes during fieldwork was a means of transferring strong emotions into writing. During data analysis, months after completing my fieldwork, going back to the field notes and blog posts helped reawaken the emotions generated by interviewees’ stories. These fresh emotions are crucial in my interpretations of the data, contributing to my meaning-making process in analysis. Atkinson (2007) emphasizes that in life story data interpretation, the relationship and specific interaction with respondents and the subjective perspective of the researcher are significant for interpretation. In this sense, the empathy evoked during interview sessions became relevant in framing the interpretation.

I also spent time on the street with my respondents in the course of research. At first this was part of building a trusting relationship to encourage participation, but eventually it developed into part of becoming involved, of knowing their lives better in the course of a built relationship. In practice, this required that I spend time visiting with my participants before and after they were interviewed. Building trust before the interview was important, as my interviewees had very busy lives that were often tied to income-making activities. Therefore, making time for the interview session was considered a favour to the researcher. Similarly, keeping the relationship warm after the interview was necessary to see the interviewees in their daily interactions outside of the interview room. Moreover, I relied on the first few participants to introduce me to other migrants in a process of chain referral.

Spending time with my respondents revealed the impoverished conditions in which they lived and the hardship that shaped their everyday lives. For instance, from my routine visits to the study participants I came to recognise how hard South African weather conditions could be on street traders. From August to October, the period in which I conducted my fieldwork, the weather was chilly and windy in the morning, extremely warm by midday and into late afternoon and chilly again at night. When I left my house in the morning to start the visits, I was warmly dressed but by 12 pm the sun was normally quite high; it became rather hot, my choice of clothing became unsuitable, and I became highly uncomfortable. At about 2 pm the heat became unbearable and I started wishing for the cold again. Yet the migrants were subject to these weather conditions daily, plying their trade from sunrise to nightfall.

While the time spent with the respondents gave me a glimpse into their everyday lives, I realised that it would require more than cursory visits to immerse myself in their feelings, meanings, and true way of life. Nonetheless, in my data analysis I reflexively drew upon the glimpse into the lives of my respondents to help frame the discussion.

4.3 Triangulating: Bringing it all together

My triangulation method is based on a process of analysis guided by the theoretical framework. Kaisa Schmidt-Thome (2015) depicts the process as a triangle with entry points, virtual imagery that helped in thinking through bringing the data together. The puzzle for me was how to incorporate the data from different methods in a systematic and reasonable way. In bringing my data together, I started by “searching for entry points” (ibid.: 164) that linked the content from my empirical and secondary data in a clear and systematic way. The data for the
analysis contributed to the study in three ways: identifying the research gaps and deciding how they should be filled; understanding the context of my research participants; and providing insights into their experiences, perspectives, and actions. Analysis and discussion rests primarily on my empirical data, but I used other data to highlight social and political conditions and support empirical findings. That is, the empirical and secondary data were analysed separately, and categorised with similar texts that highlight actions and conditions for action.

Thus, I started by examining my data sets based on my theoretical framework and using my research questions as guidelines. First, I interrogated my empirical data with the questions: did this experience answer my research questions? If so, why and how did it do so? Next, I carefully read my secondary data with the same questions, often going back and forth between the data sets, comparing, contrasting, and confirming the content of the data, developing the arguments in this thesis through this dynamic interaction. This triangulation allowed me to bring together my empirical data systematically with individual life stories and other data on the socio-political context of actors and factors relevant in the unique migration context of South Africa. For each presentation of my participants’ narratives, I use other data to show its social and political context; one is incomplete without the other, as the relationship between the practice of agents and the political climate is in constant flux. Despite the instability, however, my study is grounded in both agents’ perspectives and political context, to give balance to my analysis and arguments.

4.4 Data Collection Sites - Hillbrow and Yeoville

Roger Sanjek (1978: 257) advises that urban researchers must select “certain actors, activities or locations as the anchor points for fieldwork”. I chose the country of study location guided by several factors, of which four of the principal were: firstly, the existence of a thriving and excellent academic community on the research subject and their willingness and interest to support my fieldwork with academic resources; secondly, the presence of a substantial population of poor African immigrants; thirdly, a socio-political context of active immigration control vis-à-vis a dynamic and growing social development environment; and fourthly, the possibility to carry out interviews in English and broken English (or Pidgin English). Due to these factors, I chose South Africa and narrowed the location to Johannesburg based on the opportunity provided by a visiting researcher position at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), University of Witwatersrand.

Administratively, the area known as Hillbrow (see Appendix I: Map of Hillbrow) is a populous, low-income, residential, tenement neighbourhood located in inner city Johannesburg. Its character is shaped by the population density, poverty, crime and the high concentration of African migrants that live in it. With its high concentration of poor African migrants and pressing unemployment, central Hillbrow bustles with migrants engaged in informal economic activities: street trading, hair cutting or hairdressing, and hawking. Statistically, the area has the highest population density in South Africa (City of Johannesburg, Economic Development, 2006) with an estimated 100,000 people per 10.28 square kilometres (Leggett, 2003). Although predominantly a residential area, there is a small commercial hub
Historically, the area was a high-density White residential zone favoured by European immigrants as an entry point to Johannesburg. In the late 1980s the area was reclassified as a Grey Group Area, mainly accommodating Coloureds and Indians. With the lifting of the Pass Laws in the 1980s, there was a massive change in the ethnic and racial make-up of Hillbrow. Whereas in 1985 Africans comprised about 10% of the population, by 1996 the figure had risen to over 80%. Today, Hillbrow is classified as a lower-middle-income residential area and, unofficially, a hotspot for Nigerians. It is reported as riddled with crime, along with allegations that African migrants to the area are mainly criminals (Leggett, 2003; Mpe, 2001). Legett (ibid., 98, 49) notes that “the bottom line is that a significant portion of the inner city population is not South African... [and] ...new migrants, both domestic and international, may be especially vulnerable to becoming both victims and perpetrators of crime.”

Hillbrow is characterised by high-rise apartment blocks that feature prominently in Johannesburg’s skyline. The blocks of flats are mostly dilapidated, with grilled security gates and signs. The poor conditions (crumbling walls, faded paint, heaps of garbage, broken elevators, etc.) of the majority of the buildings mean that rent is cheap, and squatters are abundant. During the day, the streets are filled with hawkers and street traders, and local grocery entrepreneurs extend their shops onto the pavements, alongside African food restaurants and local fast food brands (e.g. Nando’s). Amongst the hawkers and street traders, there are people sitting or standing in apparent idleness, but they are on the lookout for potential customers for hair braiding and cutting, and the sale of prohibited or illegally acquired goods.

My first visits to one of the hair braiding salons left me with mixed feelings. My respondent worked as a hairdresser and solicited passers-by on the roadside. At one of our meetings, I suggested that I would like to see the shop where she braids her customers’ hair – about five minutes’ walk from where she customarily sits (she explained that this is so that metro police cannot link them to the hair salon). We got to the grilled gate and stood still to be looked-over by the security man (he can carry out a body check if he judges one as suspicious), and after some minutes he allowed us in without a frisking. We walked down a corridor into a large hall blurry with fumes where there were several women fixing hair and a corner where males were busy barbering. There were about 10 to 15 workers inside, and with clients around 20 people altogether. I wondered what would happen if a fire broke out, how many would make it out alive, but the pressing problems were the fumes and the overpowering chemical smell. I asked about it, and my respondent informed me that it was coming from the hair sprays and the mini grills used by each hairdresser for curling hair extensions. Combined with minimal ventilation, it was a severely polluted environment and presented serious health hazards. My respondents informed me that although the owner of the saloon is a South African, the workers were African migrants who rented their working space. The presence of an armed security man during the day and the scrutiny we, even as conventionally-dressed women, received, are indications of the high rate of violent crime and levels of insecurity in the area.

At night, Hillbrow’s shebeens (local drinking bars) are mostly full of men and a few women drinking, smoking, and relaxing. Street traders are replaced with young boys selling grilled chicken, roasted corn (when in season), and homemade food in wheelbarrows. Late at
night, homeless people (often migrants) sleep in front of large warehouses that have closed for the night. Day or night, Hillbrow is rarely quiet or empty.

Yeoville (Appendix II: Map of Yeoville) is a vibrant community of African nationals from several countries, with the energy and pulse of a very active informal sector, especially on the main streets of Raleigh and Rocky. Historically, Yeoville was built for wealthy Europeans that sought to live outside the noise and dust of Johannesburg. It was a place designed for peace and quiet that later became home to working class families and migrants. Over the years, with the growth of nightlife along its commercial strip, the atmosphere changed to a more bohemian culture of artists and mixed races, with a highly mobilised anti-apartheid community during the apartheid years. At the end of apartheid, especially with an increase in African immigrants and other socio-economic factors, the racial composition of Yeoville changed again to become predominantly Black. In the late 1990s, the area suffered economic decline; properties were severely devalued and abandoned when they could not be sold. An increasing number of impoverished people moved into the area and squatters invaded the houses in large numbers (Smithers, 2013).

With a dense population of low-income residents suffering from high unemployment, most people in Yeoville eke out a living in the informal economy. Along the main streets of Raleigh and Rocky, one finds a tremendous number of street traders, people braiding and cutting hair by the road, spaza shops, traditional food vendors, and so on. As street trading expanded, relations between the government and street traders deteriorated, with the government continuously attempting to remove the traders forcibly. Eventually, in 1999, the government built a market with stalls for the sellers, but it was rather unsuccessful. It was too small to accommodate all the vendors and was built without consultation with them. In addition, as the new market was located in a side street, those that moved into the stalls created room on the street for newcomers. Then, as they came under pressure, street traders readily formed strategic partnerships with stall sellers as suppliers with somewhere to keep their wares when confronted by government officials during the trading period. Present day Yeoville is the image of a low-income community, with vibrant street trading and a large population of African migrants of diverse ages (Community report, Brown University, 2010).30

4.4.1 Reasons for selecting the sites

I chose South Africa as the location for the study because it is one of the popular destinations for African migrants, due to its relatively stable economy, strong currency in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and relatively weak border control when compared to Europe. In addition, it is a country with a highly restrictive immigration policy and social exclusions actively enforced by government agents and citizens (Segatti & Landau, 2011; Peberdy, 2009). Foreign African migrants, devoid of opportunity to seek employment in a country with a high unemployment rate, often turn to informal trade and employment for survival. Therefore, the numerous foreign African migrants who are socio-economically vulnerable in South Africa and are active in street trading became the subject of my research. Having selected my research

subject and country of study, I made a pre-fieldwork visit in 2011 to two urban centres (Cape Town and Johannesburg) in South Africa to select the city for fieldwork. I decided to carry out my fieldwork in Johannesburg for two reasons: firstly, Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa, with a booming economy that makes it attractive to migrants from all over the continent. Secondly, the Africa Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) in Johannesburg agreed to provide academic support and guidance during my fieldwork. ACMS is a leading migration research institute in South Africa with over a decade of quality research and an experienced faculty. As a visiting researcher to South Africa, it was crucial to have access to their academic resources for if I were to conduct successful fieldwork.

On arriving in Johannesburg for fieldwork, I conferred with senior researchers and the professor supervising my work at ACMS about locations where informal African migrants congregate for various reasons. Hillbrow and Yeoville were suggested as truly multinational areas for informal trading and other services rendered by African migrants. Walking along the streets of Yeoville and Hillbrow during my first visit liberated me from the identity of my nationality. I was with many Africans in the same area; they were speaking different languages, laughing and trading by the street sides. There were the Zimbabweans; I could easily identify with their dreadlocks, I could also hear French being spoken — those brothers and sisters must come from the Francophone countries, I thought. Yoruba and Igbo were easily recognizable to me. I thought to myself, “My Nigerian brothers are here.” And then there was the sing-song dialect I have come to recognized as one of the many official languages of South Africa, also spoken by some of the migrants from countries around South Africa. I identified canteens and shops catering to national cuisines and selling their ingredients and spices. After that experience, I was confident that I would find enough participants (African migrants from different African countries) to suit my research design and so I settled for these areas as relevant sites.

4.5 Revisiting the Field: Temporality and the Researcher

In December 2014, I revisited the participants of this study, to discuss my interpretation of the data with them and to explore if and how the recent changes in South African immigration regulations have affected their lives. Although I felt it was important to get their feedback on my interpretation of their stories, I was also very much interested in exploring how possible changes in their lives (in response to changes in immigration regulations) would affect my interpretation of the study data. However, on arriving in Johannesburg, I discovered that all the mobile phone numbers that I had been given by my interviewees were unreachable. I decided to visit their places of trade at the time of the interviews, but at the end of my visit, I was only able to meet one of the previous participants; I also conducted one extra interview with a migrant whom I found in the same trading spot as a previous participant.

Temporality in a migrant’s life has often been discussed in relation to their activities in space and time. In this sense, not finding my participants in the same location after an interval of 12 to 15 months is to be expected of a highly mobile group in a socio-economically dynamic context (Hunter & Skinner, 2003; Madhavan & Landau, 2011). In their study of migrant street
traders in Durban, South Africa, Hunter and Skinner (2003) note that their respondents had been street traders for an average of 27 months and that, according to their respondents, foreign traders move into other activities more quickly than South African traders. Sally Peberdy and Christian Rogerson (2003) confirm this finding by observing that foreign traders used street trading as an entry point to the city. This also resonated with my participants, as some of them reported that they have been engaged in different income-making activities in Johannesburg. Thus, they are active in different forms of generating income only as long as they provide a reasonable return.

This finding is relevant to a study that focuses on the everyday practice of informal African migrants in Johannesburg. While the emphasis on the everyday is used to infer regularity, and thus commonality, as an established practice, it also reflects the fluidity of understanding of these qualities by the interviewees. That is, practices can change daily, emphasizing variety and flexibility. These dual points of reference in informal migrants’ stories provide challenges for reliability, and sensitize the researcher to the subjective negotiations that produce the data and the discussions. This gives rise to numerous questions in response to narrative content (see the section entitled “Meet the Interviewees” below). For example: Was Mary from Zimbabwe able to get institutional help for her grandchild and start her trading? Was Bali from the Benin Republic able to save enough money to travel to Japan? Did Daniel from Cameroun get his residence permit without giving a bribe to a middle-man? The temporality of the stories presented in this study opens up the findings and discussions to further research and examination.

Discussion of the data is also depicted as a “negotiated polyphonic process” (Cunliffe, Luhman & Boje, 2004: 274). That is, meaning-making is a multiple process of interactive responses to immediate surroundings and the otherness of one’s context. The implication of this reflexivity could act in two ways: either provoke an ambiguous and equivocal approach to analysis and discussion of the data, or infuse them with a decisive and discernible focus. I chose the latter approach for two concrete reasons: firstly, I accepted my migrant background as a positive factor in obtaining access to my interviewees and gaining their trust and confidence. As informal migrants, my interviewees are understandably wary of anyone outside their immediate acquaintances. They also rarely commit their time to non-income making activities, and their very limited free time is reserved for leisure activities, which are often indirectly linked to generating income. Being identified as a migrant gave me access to them and to their stories. Secondly, the insertion of this section on temporality ensures that readers are also made aware of the basis of the negotiations that produced the discussion. By explicating the reflexivity of this research, I open “communicative opportunities” (ibid.: 278) to other voices and also take responsibility for the study.

4.6 Meet the Interviewees

At this point, it becomes relevant to meet the participants in this study whom I present in order to highlight the variety in socio-economic background, the commonality of their goal to improve their lives, and the diversity of their means of livelihood in South Africa. Below, I
present short introductions to the nine participants. Generally, their ages range from 28 to 55 years, with the majority in their late 30s. They come from different socio-economic backgrounds yet, while they made the decision to travel because of a range of experiences, they all wanted to achieve a better life. They migrated from different parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, so most of them entered South Africa with a visitor visa and paid for their plane ticket themselves. Detailed reflections on each of the interview sessions can be found in the virtual diary I kept on the research blog (http://ogmudio.wordpress.com/). Below I reveal their country of origin but change their names.

Ebi from Nigeria

Before migration: He was born in 1977 in the Eastern part of Nigeria. He has five siblings, all females, in an ethnic group that favours the male child, which means he enjoyed a privileged socio-economic position within his family. His father was a successful businessman until his death while Ebi was in South Africa. While in Nigeria, he was living with his parents in his own apartment in the family building. He dropped out of university to focus on his musical talent. In 2006, he migrated to South Africa as part of a visiting musical band to perform in a Pentecostal church in Johannesburg. Prior to migrating, he was a professional member of a cultural musical troupe, owned a thriving barber salon, and participated in local sporting events (football, swimming, and table tennis). According to him, life was good, but it could have been better. He migrated to South Africa with a three-month visiting visa because his courier/host, one of his family’s pastors, promised him employment and a work permit within those three months.

In South Africa: I met him in a Nigerian shop in Hillbrow where I went to buy local spices. He stood out from the other customers in the shop because of his formal attire so I asked him where he was from. At the time of the interview, he had just been released from a four-year jail term for possession of hard drugs. According to his report, he was framed because any successful Nigerian in South Africa is believed to be a drug courier.

Ebi had married in South Africa and had two children at the time of our interview. His major source of income while in South Africa was playing musical instruments for Pentecostal churches, modelling, and acting. On a typical day, formally dressed in a tie and two-piece suit, he hangs out with friends while waiting for prospective calls from modelling agents. He said the pastor had disappointed him and could not provide him with a work permit, so he applied for asylum. He lived in South Africa on the basis of the asylum permit, but this was withdrawn at the end of his prison term, so at the time of the interview he was undocumented.

Plans: He planned to make a successful life in South Africa and spoke about the growing modelling and acting industry in the country; he expected to make a career in it.

Second fieldwork visit: On my second fieldwork visit, I was informed that he had returned to his home country, but that he could be contacted by phone if I had a business proposition for him.

Pila from Nigeria
Before migration: She was born in 1985 in Edo State, Nigeria, and she is a Christian. She is the elder of her mother’s two children. Her mother was a businesswoman who traded between the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria and spent months away from home; Pila reported that she was responsible for herself and younger brother from a very young age. She dropped out of secondary school to migrate to Europe via South Africa in 2001 or 2002. She travelled with the assistance of a pastor as a courier, funded by her ex-boyfriend, and entered South Africa with a visitor’s visa as the guest of her courier. South Africa was to be the first stop in the process of migrating to Europe where she planned to continue her studies hosted her boyfriend’s sister who was a long term European resident.

In South Africa: Her husband introduced me to her and after subsequent visits to her place of work in Hillbrow, she agreed to be interviewed. In South Africa, she discovered her courier was part of a prostitution ring and she decided to make a new life for herself. She applied for asylum and at the time of the interview she had an asylum seeker’s permit. She had married another migrant in South Africa and they have two children. At the time of the interview, her main source of income was hair braiding and trading in imported cosmetics. A typical day for her starts with dropping the children at a private day-care centre before soliciting customers for her braiding.

Plans: She planned to remain in South Africa and develop her imported cosmetics trade into a big business. She also expects to own her hairdressing salon when she is able to save enough money.

Second fieldwork visit: I was informed that she has moved to a different location, most probably outside Johannesburg.

Musa from Ethiopia

Before migration: He was born in 1980 and migrated to South Africa in 2005. His father was a successful music conductor who travelled a lot. He graduated from technical college in Ethiopia and was working before he moved to South Africa. At the time of migrating, he did not know anyone in South Africa but he decided to resign from his job and migrate because “I want to see better life”. He entered the country with a three-month visa.

In South Africa: An Ethiopian student introduced me to him after I had eaten lunch in his roadside restaurant in Yeoville. I spoke with Musa and he agreed to participate in the research. He was the owner of the restaurant which was his source of income at the time of the interview. His family had not supported his migration plans and had severed contact with him for years. When he arrived in South Africa he overstayed his visiting visa and applied for an asylum seeker’s permit, which he retained until he raised enough money to meet the financial requirement for a business permit. He started his business life in South Africa by selling second-hand belts and socks at the taxi and bus stations, and moved on to selling local South African pieces of jewellery and fashionable clothes on the Botswana border before starting the restaurant. At the time of the interview, he mentioned that he had just received his business permit a few months earlier and was planning a trip to Ethiopia after years away. He had
reconciled with his family. He is a Christian and was unmarried at the time of this interview.

Plans: He would like to travel on to the USA. He also thinks he might go back to Ethiopia to start a business in construction, saying that he would make one of his relatives manager of his restaurant while he attempts the new venture.

Second fieldwork visit: At the time of the second fieldwork, I was informed he had travelled to visit his family in his home country.

Daniel from Cameroun

Before migration: He was born in 1970 and migrated to South Africa in 2009. His father was a successful businessman and he has seven siblings, one of whom is a Roman Catholic priest (a prestigious position for the family in their community). Four of the others are professionals working in the USA and the UK. He studied nursing and used to work as a lecturer in a nursing college in Cameroun. Prior to being a lecturer, he worked as a surgery nurse for over three years. He also acted as the manager of his father’s firm from his mid-teens until he left Cameroun. He migrated to South Africa with a three-month visiting visa and paid a South African host to meet him at the airport and provide accommodation for one month. He made these arrangements via the Internet. He decided to migrate to South Africa after several failed attempts to get a UK study visa from Cameroun. He had planned to work as a nurse in South Africa at the time of migration.

In South Africa: He overstayed his visa in South Africa and applied for an asylum seeker’s permit. Unable to get employment as a nurse, he made his living working odd jobs as a security guard, bricklayer, house painter, and so on, before settling for hair cutting. At the time of the interview, he was renting a work space in a barber’s salon in Yeoville. He solicits clients on the street and cuts their hair in his space in the salon. He has been unable to change his asylum permit to a residence permit, even though he married a South African woman. He is a Christian.

Plans: He said he has saved quite a substantial amount of money and plans to leave South Africa once he regularises his status with a residence permit. He wants to start a business with his savings in another African country where African migrants feel welcome and secure.

Second fieldwork visit: I was informed he had been unwell and had not been to the shop for some days.

Bali from the Republic of Benin

Before migration: He was born in 1980 and is married with two children who live with their mother in Togo. He grew up with his mother because his father was imprisoned as an illegal migrant in Germany when he was born. His mother was a street trader in Lagos, Nigeria and later moved with him when he was three years old to the Republic of Benin, where she continued street trading. When he was in his early teenage years, his father returned and took him from Benin to Togo. Bali was largely responsible for himself in Togo and made money by
selling goods to passing vehicles. He saved enough money to travel to Nigeria to buy two mobile phones with which he started a mobile phone business that made him a successful businessman, but then he twice lost the entire contents of his shop to robbers. Burdened by loans and emotional trauma, he sold his properties (two buildings and two cars) to repay his business loan, set his wife up in a small business and paid a courier to take him to South Africa in 2012. He is a Muslim and claims dual nationality: the Republic of Benin and Togo.

In South Africa: At the time of the interview, he was selling bananas and peanuts by the roadside in Yeoville although he had started by selling candies and cigarettes bought from other roadside retailers. After saving enough money, he started going to the market to buy bananas in bulk to resell by the roadside. He overstay ed his visitor’s visa and applied for an asylum seeker’s permit.

Plans: He has plans to save enough money to migrate to Japan, where he said he will do odd jobs to save more money so that he can start his electronics business again. He also said that most probably he would move from South Africa to another African country if the police continue to disrupt his street trade.

Second fieldwork visit: I was informed that he has moved from South Africa to another African country. Interestingly, in May 2015 when I had the opportunity to briefly visit Johannesburg, I was informed by one of my research participants that he had called from Brazil, where he is now living.

Oliver from Ivory Coast

Before migration: Oliver was born in 1985 and grew up with his grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins in a large family home. His mother migrated to Europe when he was very young and she sends him money regularly. He was working as an accountant and studying for a master’s degree in accounting, but his mother suggested migrating to South Africa because of the political instability in Ivory Coast. However, his grandparents and other members of the family refused to support his migration plans. His mother sent money for a courier, and directed him to a pastor to host him in South Africa. He said he planned to continue his studies while in South Africa. He migrated to South Africa with a three-month visitor’s visa in 2011. He overstayed his visa but refused to apply for an asylum seeker’s permit.

In South Africa: At the time of the interview, he was undocumented. I met him as a street trader in Yeoville, selling fruit (apples, pears, oranges, etc.). He stopped selling before my fieldwork came to an end, saying that he was tired of constant police harassment. He also did some house painting and several informal jobs when available. He said he had applied to several schools to continue with his education but was unsuccessful with the applications. He was very unhappy with his economic condition in South Africa. Without his street trading, a typical day for him was spending time at an Internet café or hanging out with friends at their trading spots. His mother continues to send him money regularly, so he said he did not have the same financial pressure as other migrants, although he disliked accepting money from his mother at his age.
Plans: He said he was making plans to return to his home country to resume his previous studies and start working. He was expecting his mother to send him the money for his flight back home. He planned to complete his studies and possibly travel to join his mother in Europe; otherwise, he may return to South Africa, but will not live in Yeoville.

Second fieldwork visit: He called me early in 2014 to say that he was moving back to his home country, so I did not meet him during the second visit to the field.

**Mary from Zimbabwe**

Before migration: She was born in 1960, in Zimbabwe. She grew up in a village where her parents were small-scale farmers, dropping out of school at an early age because her father could not pay the fees and; she had to marry early. Her husband is also a small-scale farmer, but she is the financial backbone of the family, paying for rent, food, and her children’s school fees. She had been a cross-border trader between Zimbabwe and Botswana but eventually moved to Botswana as a domestic worker for a European family because her trade was not making enough money to support her family. That job ended when she had to return to Zimbabwe to care for a severely physically disabled grandchild. She told me that she was informed that South Africa has special schools and medical facilities that could accommodate her grandchild so the two of them boarded a bus to migrate to South Africa in 2012. She applied for an asylum permit at the border.

In South Africa: On arriving in Johannesburg she stayed with her eldest daughter, but later moved to her own room. She started trading from her room and later moved on to street trading in Hillbrow. However, she could not cope with both trading and caring for the child, so she had to stop her street trade. Soon after, she was introduced to a Christian couple who gave her financial and legal assistance through their NGO to enable her to access the special facilities her grandchild requires. At the time of the interview, she was panhandling with her grandchild by the roadside on days when the weather was not too warm. She was introduced to me by the Christian couple whom I met when I volunteered to work with their NGO, taking blankets to homeless people.

Plans: She hoped to start trading again once she can arrange formal care for her grandchild.

Second fieldwork visit: I was unable to locate her, as the contact phone numbers were not functional.

**Eduard from Malawi**

Before migration: Eduard was born in 1980, growing up without electricity or piped water in a “very poor” village in Malawi. His father crossed the border (from Malawi to South Africa) to work and later migrated permanently to South Africa. His mother later joined his father and the children remained in Malawi with family members. The father was irregularly employed while the mother was a domestic worker. In 1997, he migrated to South Africa to join his parents and continue with his studies. He is a Christian and introduced to me by another
In South Africa: He continued high school in South Africa but did not get distinctions in the grading of his final exams and so could not get a scholarship to further his studies at university; he was, however, offered a scholarship to study bookkeeping at a technical college. When he graduated, he started working as an assistant accountant in Johannesburg. He lost his job in 2009 and, unable to secure further employment, he was advised by friends to teach mathematics to high school students for negotiated fees. At the time of the interview, he was operating an informal mathematics ‘lesson’ (after school teaching) in his apartment in Yeoville, and at the homes of some of his clients for an extra fee, and commented that there are months when he makes more money than he could earn if employed. He said he is still unmarried because he has a drinking problem.

Plans: He said he hopes to develop his teaching practice into a registered teaching centre for high school students having difficulty understanding mathematics. However, he said he would first have to overcome his drinking problem, as he spends all his money on alcohol every weekend.

Second fieldwork visit: On my second visit to the field, I could not locate him because he had moved from his previous residence.

**Tola from Nigeria**

Before migration: He was born in 1987 in Lagos and lived with his parents in a poor part of town, becoming responsible for himself at a very young age and dropping out of secondary school to fend for himself. He was not sure what his father does, but his mother was a trader in the open market; in Nigeria he had worked in factories packaging goods, in a bakery, a flower shop, and a supermarket. With the help of a pastor, he migrated from Nigeria in 2012 to seek a better life in South Africa, arriving with a three-month visitor’s visa which he overstayed; he then applied for an asylum seeker’s permit.

In South Africa: I met Tola during my follow-up fieldwork in December 2014. He was selling avocado pears by the roadside although he had started by selling used clothes and shoes, collecting a few pieces from street traders on credit and then reselling to individuals in their homes, shops, or on the street. Through this activity he had saved enough money to start his fruit trade.

Plans: He hopes to save enough money to start a proper business, although he did not know what he would sell. However, if the police continue to disrupt his trade, he may have to return to Nigeria.

**4.7 Setting the limits of the Study**

As a qualitative study, the generalizability of my findings is one of the main constraints.
Polit and Hungler (1991: 645), define generalizability as the “degree to which the findings can be generalised from the study sample to the entire population”. There were nine participants in this study, they were all economically active in the informal economy, eight out of the nine participants had asylum seekers permits and together they came from seven African countries (Nigeria, Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Togo, Malawi, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe). As is typical with the life story interview method, the limited number of participants is not intended to produce results able to predict the behaviour of a broad classification of migrants. Rather, it is designed to produce in-depth and robust data on the practical life experiences and expectations of the participants with findings that provide a good basis for future-focused hypothesis studies to verify and expand my conclusions experimentally.

4.7.1 Time and Budget

Time and budget constraints also set limits to this study which had the goal of examining migrants’ enduring presence as a diachronic process linking their histories and their aspirations. It would have greatly benefitted from a long-term approach that tracked and interviewed the same migrants over a period to capture the changes in their lives. Thus, ethnography employing participant observation would have been an alternative qualitative method for this study. However, as a doctoral candidate, with a strict budget and time constraints, this was not something I could afford. Nevertheless, by adopting a life story methodology (Riessman, 2008), I captured migrants’ daily activities as narratives. By giving the individuals the power to discuss their lives and tell their stories, I was able to record the process of change between what came before the interview and plans and expectations for the future.

I only had one formal interview session with each participant because time was a huge constraint for them. However, I spent several days with each interviewee during their trading periods, at their place of trade and after trading hours: sitting with them during sales, chatting and listening to conversations with other foreign migrants, and observing their activities while trading. I went as a guest to the home of one of the interviewees, and followed another interviewee to pick up her children from day-care. I also exchanged mobile phone numbers with each participant on the understanding that I could call them at any time with new questions or for clarification of previous statements. For example, months after the fieldwork, one of the participants called to inform me that he was leaving South Africa to return to his home country. Thus, ‘the feel’ which is part of reflexive ethnography supported the life story data during analysis.

To the migrants, time is money, and time spent in the interview sessions meant time away from their street trading. Although I tried to get around this by having meetings during non-trading hours (e.g. early Sunday mornings or late evenings after selling finished), I had to stick to one interview session per participant because such hours were their only limited leisure time. Time constraints also created difficulties in achieving a gender balance with the selection of participants for this study. A number of female migrants informed me that their non-trading hours were strictly for household chores, and so they were unable to participate in the study. In the end, only two women took part, possibly creating a gender bias in my findings.
4.8 Ethical Issues: Considerations and Challenges

A handbook on Ethical Evaluation of Research in Finland (p. 3)\(^\text{31}\) advises that the “most important issues concerning research with human beings … are the consent of the research subject and the risks and inconvenience inflicted on him or her compared to the benefits to be gained from the research”. The American Anthropological Association emphasizes that consent of the research subject should include three key components, namely, communication of information, comprehension of information, and voluntary participation. To this end, the National Advisory Board on Research Ethics in Finland (TENK) is charged with disseminating information about ethical standards in Finland. The University of Helsinki strictly adheres to the ethical guidelines promoted by TENK and endeavours to inculcate such standards in students through a rigorous research process from the writing to publication stages. In addition to adherence to ethical guidelines as rules and regulations, the moral obligations of participants’ consent and mitigation of risks and inconvenience to research participants are emphasized.

I familiarised myself with the guidelines for ethically sound research as published by TENK through the website of the Academy of Finland before embarking on the fieldwork trip. Furthermore, I was attached to a research institute (Africa Centre for Migration and Society) affiliated to Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg during fieldwork, and thus was able to acquaint myself with the ethical considerations promoted in the research community of South Africa. Essentially, these emphasize issues of informed consent and the autonomy of participants as significant for responsible conduct in studying informal migrants. However, some authors have cautioned that, for the criteria of informed consent to be met, researchers should be clear and forthright about the purpose of the study and the role and limits of participation of the research subjects (Miller & Bell, 2002). It is thus advised that consent and ethical considerations should be on-going and re-negotiated in the process of the research. Before the start of each interview session, I verbally informed my interviewees about the purpose of the study, the use to which the information they shared with me would be put, and their freedom to stop the interview session if they felt uncomfortable at any point. I also spent over three months in the field and throughout the period I was in regular contact with my interviewees, visiting them after their interviews to give them the opportunity to talk about the interview session in the event that they wanted to recant any part of their narrative or consent. I also called them when I was unable to visit their trading places.

Working with my interviewees, two emotions stood out: empathy and fear. I spent hours listening to stories, some of which were heart breaking, to put it mildly. Some of the interviewees were very emotional during the telling of painful events. They had tears in their eyes, spoke in broken voices, wistfully recalled periods of friendship and success in their home countries, and queried the reasons for their dehumanisation in the socio-political context in which they currently found themselves. The entire fieldwork was an emotionally charged affair. The stories were many and diverse, covering all aspects of their lives. Empathy contributed in directing the discussion of my findings towards a humanistic approach.

Their experiences were so laced with the hatred and violence perpetrated by South

African citizens and the police towards African migrants that I became scared for my safety while walking in the area of the study. Although I had been informed that the area was notorious for criminal activities, I was far more scared of the police and other voluntary agents of the government. I had changed my clothes and hairstyle to blend in more with the locals, yet each time I went out to solicit an interview or visit prospective interviewees, I had my heart in my mouth – I felt safe only in the confines of my room. With strong emotions, I was constantly reflecting on the stories I heard, the individuals that permanently lived in such tense situations and the indomitableness of their spirit. Their determination and the courage they displayed were a constant inspiration to me. I started keeping a blog to document the mental effects of these emotions, the best way I could imagine to record my reflections and share them with friends and family who were not with me.

Empathy also contributed to building a relationship of trust between the interviewees and me, as it was present during the interview sessions; there were some long pauses and sympathetic comments. For example, when I asked to see where one of the interviewees lived, he did not hesitate before agreeing to take me to his home even though it was a place he was not proud to show me. At the time of my leaving Johannesburg, I went to visit each of the participants to thank them for taking part in the research. We gave each other long hugs accompanied by their stating that we might not see each other again and my knowing that their stories would have a long effect on my career and writing. It was a surprise and a relief that my fieldwork had been so safe and smooth despite taking place in localities framed as violent and highly dangerous by local media. I consider myself lucky and cannot attribute my safety to any specific factor or factors.

As noted above, principles of reciprocity and empowerment are incorporated as intrinsic parts of the narrative approach, making it suitable for studies where the autonomy of the participants is an issue (Chase, 2005; Holstein & Gubrium, 2012). Nevertheless, renegotiating the participants’ consent and keeping the participants actively informed during the analytical and report-writing stage of this study became challenging. Some researchers have highlighted the difficulties that the dynamic nature of social research poses in terms of keeping research subjects informed from start to finish of a study (Luff, 1999; Mauthner, 2000), and, in this case, the dynamic and fluid lifestyles of participants defied the ideal goals of maintaining consent. Being unable to locate the majority of the participants on my second visit to the field meant that I was unable to discuss my analysis of the data with them. In partial recompense, chapters from my data analysis have been presented to researchers and experts on African migration at conferences and seminars in both South Africa and internationally.
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Migrant Testimony: Vulnerability

The concept of vulnerability has been used to call attention to the universal fragility of the human condition (physical) and to the social dimension (political, legal, economic etc) of individual lives. The social dimension of vulnerability suggests a wide range in the likelihood of individuals’ experiencing various magnitudes of vulnerability that depends on their social context. Therefore, “[v]ulnerability is a relational concept” (Macioce, 2017: 2) that situates individuals in a specific social context (Fineman, 2008) and highlights their dependence on others for their wellbeing (Butler, 2004). Thus, the socio-political context and the individual are relevant variables in informal migrants’ experiences of vulnerability.

For my interviewees, living in an uncertain context did not begin in South Africa, though they had lived in different circumstances before migration. This is not surprising as risk and uncertainty are part of everyday life (Tulloch & Luton, 2003); as Judith Mehta (2007: 3) writes, “We all encounter situations of risk in our everyday lives, where choices have to be made, and where the stakes can range from the almost trivial to the deeply serious”. Migration seems to exemplify such a risk-fraught choice as it is understood to be either a response to anxiety and designed to ameliorate it, or as a cause of uncertainty in itself (Williams & Balaz, 2012).

Two facets of migration’s causative relationship with uncertainty are of especial relevance to this study: how South Africa’s immigration management reproduces precariously for the interviewees and those like them, even when it attempts to ameliorate negative experiences; and how contingency is perceived, experienced, and reacted to. John Tulloch and Deborah Luton (2003) suggest that uncertainty in migration comes from two sources, which they label “imperfect knowledge” and “unpredictability of the future”. My interviewees, irrespective of their different stories, came searching for the same thing in South Africa: a better life; and South Africa’s migration management aims to improve the migrants’ experience while also meeting the political objective of immigration control. Despite these positive intentions, however, uncertainty, vulnerability, and volatility of circumstance are inevitably reproduced for the migrants.

5.1.1 The Double Side of Migration Management

The notion of migration control implies a selection process, hence criteria and regulations to determine what is being controlled – as well as how. South Africa’s migration laws therefore specify the characteristics of foreigners allowed into the country, but migration officials must also perform the onerous task of enforcing compliance with the nation’s migration goals on migrants already within the country. Such tasks at times have the sole objective of increasing efficiency in the migration control process, but they are also designed to improve the experience of migrants – although secondary data shows that even the noble objectives of the
immigration control process does not preclude migrants to South Africa experiencing uncertainty and vulnerability. Yet, while management procedures tend to be a principal source of uncertainty for the interviewees, conversely, they may also be an unintended source of hope.\textsuperscript{32}

Uncertainty for informal migrants starts with the definition of their legal status in South Africa. Given the political and social zeal to identify and punish ‘illegal migrants’, any ambiguity in official meanings can be expected to have unpleasant consequences. The large number of migrants that will be affected as a result makes lack of clarity a vital factor in creating the backdrop for their experiences in South Africa. As can be seen in Table 5, South Africa receives a vast number of asylum applications. For instance, the DHA annual report for 2007-8 indicated that 207,206 people applied for asylum permits; in 2009-10, 364,638 asylum applications were received; and in 2011-12 the figure was 81,708. Yet in 2008 CoRMSA called attention to ambiguity in the definition of illegal migrant in South Africa’s Immigration Act (Act no 13 of 2002, as amended) in which Section 32 specifies that “[a]n illegal foreigner shall be deported from South Africa”, defining such a person as “a foreigner who is in the Republic in contravention of this Act”. CoRMSA (2008) reported that the broad definition of an illegal foreigner has resulted in overburdening the migration management system with the frequent arrests and detention of asylum seekers and recognised refugees while they are waiting to submit an application or while their applications are being processed.

In 2008, the DHA initiated wide-ranging transformation processes that also targeted South Africa’s refugee reception system and were expected to improve the experiences of asylum seekers. The DHA annual report for 2008-9 indicated that they had achieved their goals of rapid processing of asylum permits while the annual report of 2010 showed a partial achievement, indicating dedication to improvement goals. CoRMSA’s annual report (2009) noted that the turnaround strategy addressed some of the challenges – including eligibility applications and asylum-status-determination interviews – but it also drew attention to migrants’ experiences with a system committed to rapid processing. The report noted that officials are placed under duress as they attempt to meet the targets set by the DHA for the number of asylum interviews to be conducted each day. The ambitious goals of the turnaround strategy created a situation where Refugee Status Determination Officers (RSDOs) were left with less than an hour to “conduct an interview and write a decision”. Pressured to meet the set targets, in several cases researchers saw RSDOs fail to make individual decisions but “simply cut and paste from previously written documents” (ibid., 2009: 86). Therefore, it is possible for asylum cases to be arbitrarily decided, and more importantly, for the decisions to be seen as subjective and random by asylum seekers.

With such extreme pressure, DHA efforts to improve migration management processes often do not guarantee great improvement in the experiences of informal migrants. For instance, CoRMSA (2009) reports that asylum seekers are not given enough time to explain their reasons for seeking protection and that staff at reception offices do not assist asylum seekers with the application process. The outcome of the DHA’s positively intentioned changes

\textsuperscript{32}The double side of migration management as an unintended source of hope is discussed fully in the sections on tactics and survival. In this section on vulnerability, the focus is on how migration management inadvertently creates uncertainty and precariousness for unwanted migrants.
led to problems of overburdened refugee receiving offices (RRO) with massive backlogs of applications. The government opened a sixth RRO, while the DHA responded by opening an interim RRO to focus on applicants from the SADC countries. The DHA noted the need to strengthen its human resources and initiated a reorganisation of staff and recruitment to fill the identified problem areas. These measures were expected to improve the applicants’ experiences while augmenting the efficiency of migration management.

The 2010 CoRMSA report mentioned these improvements, meanwhile indicating a gap between staff practices and the anticipated outcome of the amendments. For instance, with more RROs, the Refugee Affairs Directorate (RAD) informed the public that asylum seekers’ records had been centralised, meaning that applicants could go to the closest office to access services. In practice, however, CoRMSA (2011) reported that asylum seekers were “told that they must report to the office where they initially applied or arrange a file transfer” because the RSDOs asserted they were unable to locate applicants’ records at different branches. In essence then, RROs in populous cities tend to be overburdened. For example, it is cheaper and better to apply for an asylum permit in the city where the applicant wants to reside because it cuts down on travel, but a centralised system tends to create a heavy workload for the staff of RROs located in urban centres. This leads to the situation of RSDOs’ cutting and pasting from earlier documents, making arbitrary decisions on asylum applications, and becoming indifferent to their official responsibilities. In that scenario, the majority of asylum seekers were receiving negative decisions which had the knock-on effects of overburdening the deportation centre, making migrants vulnerable to exploitation as they sought to overturn a negative decision or submit a new application, or meaning they simply lived undocumented – until they were arrested and detained in centres for eventual deportation.

Noting that its deportation centres were overburdened, the DHA made efforts to reduce the pressure on staff by engaging private providers for supplementary services, such as road transport for deportees. The 2011 CoRMSA report duly announced that daily operations at Lindela, South Africa’s deportation centre, had been contracted out to private service providers. In the DHA document (2008-9), the contracts were lauded as milestone accomplishments, but CoRMSA raised concerns that the contracts had blurred the lines of authority. Detainees in the centre are prevented from accessing immigration officials and are compelled to register their complaints first to private security guards who, although untrained in immigration issues, are expected to determine which complaint cases will be heard by immigration officials. Information from the management and administrative documents showed that the political location of the informal migrants within a context of control and restriction was producing a continuous state of uncertainty among them.

Thus, in the South African context, migration management is generally seen as reproducing uncertainty for informal migrants, even when it is supposedly acting for the migrants’ benefit.

5.1.2 Health

The interviewees reported a range of social, economic, and political challenges that had
made them more vulnerable and hence affected their pursuit of a better life. For instance, health is paramount in the pursuit of economically active everyday life, so access to affordable health facilities became essential for the participants in this study. The South African Constitution contains provisions for access to medical care on the part of asylum seekers, as the country is a signatory to the International Bill of Human Rights. Article 2 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights further guarantees migrants’ rights to decent healthcare, while section 27 of the Bill of Rights in South Africa’s Constitution recognises the rights of everyone to have access to health care services. Article 27 of South Africa’s Refugee Act also clarifies that, like citizens, refugees have the right to access essential health services (Williams et al., 2002; Sechaba Consultant and Associates, 2002). CoRMSA documents (2008, 2009, 2011) also showed that South Africa’s Department of Health (NDoH) identified with the need for basic health services to be accessible to people irrespective of their migration status, but, despite NDoH directives, access remains challenging. Data from CoRMSA documents make it clear that refugees’ and asylum seekers’ rights to healthcare are not recognised in public hospitals and that they face discrimination and are often denied access to treatment. Inadequate monitoring of the implementation of NDoH directives has been implicated as responsible for the gap between health policy for asylum seekers and the migrants’ actual experiences. Several other studies have also documented abuse, degradation, and denial of healthcare services as common in public hospitals (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Sigsworth et al., 2008).

Interview data suggests a gender imbalance in accessing available health facilities in South Africa caused by the fear and experience of discriminations and endangerments. Male interviewees reported that they did not use the health services in their host society because of the xenophobic reactions of hospital staff, whereas female respondents could not avoid using them during pregnancy and childbirth. Pila, when talking about her experiences during two childbirths in South Africa, indicated the high level of victimization informal female migrants face during this especially vulnerable period.

It was the hospital; the antenatal was very good because it was being taken care of by the White people mainly. But when it came to the day of delivery. Oh I saw hell, I will never forget that day. So many things; they were even saying that I am smelling. So I told her [a friend], “They said am smelling”. She became very angry; then she went to the person and confronted the person. All of them became really angry with me; they started treating me more bad and worse. From morning till night, I was in labour. The centimetre was not increasing. Then one of the nurse[s] came and said, “Ah, we are booking people for operation.” [She said to], sign, putting pressure on me to sign while my husband was outside. So I now signed; I did not even know what I was doing because of the pressure and the pain. When my husband came in and asked what [was] going on, I said, “They asked me to sign for operation and I signed”. He said “No”. I said, “OK, fine”. I called the lady back and I said, “I cancel, because we don’t believe in the operation. We believe I am going to give birth normally, and nothing will happen.” She became angry. She cancelled everything and became very angry; she started treating me even worse. Then she said she will not check me; she just abandoned me. So I was like, my husband was like, “OK, so you don’t want
to take care of her and have abandoned her, so transfer her to another hospital.” They said no; they will not check me; they will not do anything with me; they will leave me there. (Female, 28 years)

Her husband called a friend and together they removed her from the hospital without a formal discharge and took her to another public hospital. However, the nurses at the first hospital called the second and informed them the patient had not been formally released from hospital.

When I went there, they said, “You are not attending antenatal here so we cannot admit you”. So my husband was crying, he was saying, “So why are you treating us like this? Is this because we are foreigners?” One Zimbabwe lady heard it and said, “I am also a foreigner; I cannot allow you guys to be treated like this. Come.” And she admitted us. So after the admission, I went to the labour ward. The person that was in charge of me really treated me [badly]. She was insulting me, hitting me. You know, any little thing she will smack me, saying, “Listen, I am not going to be kind to you. You think I don’t know you; I know you: you did yourself self-transfer. I will deal with you.” She was treating me very badly, [saying] “I will make the student doctors use you to do experiment, and they will treat you very harsh.” She was treating me very harsh and would make the student doctors to come and they will just [put a hand] deep inside of me in a very harsh way; no sorry, nothing. You know they were doing it purposely. You know I was pushing and they never told me not to push, that it was not yet time. By the time it got to the time that I should push, my legs were like paralyzed. I was very tired, I couldn’t even utter a word; all I was saying was hmm. (Female, 28 years)

Her life was spared when another doctor intervened and helped her through the delivery process, although she had similar experiences with the birth of her second child. This sort of treatment is not a rare occurrence and stories about such experiences are passed on to others who have not yet needed to make use of a hospital. Consequently male migrants feel that they are places which it is better to avoid except in emergencies. When I asked a male respondent what happens when he falls sick, he replied:

I will go to a pharmacist; I will describe what is wrong and then I will get my treatment. It is there that everybody, all our brothers trust. That is where we go to be safe. Sometimes they give you something. If I tell you in hospital here people die. They kill people, am telling you. At night people doesn’t come out from there safe; they must die. Well it’s God that is taking care of us here. (Male, 36 years)

Generally, therefore, my interviewees reported that they experienced considerable insecurity with respect to accessing adequate health care. They also expressed their fears about falling ill, as a serious ailment could mean loss of income or even death. Pila also recounted a story of how she suffered multiple fractures to her hand after a fall in her bathroom.
I went to the hospital. I had a fracture, a very bad one. I stayed at home for almost 7 months. Last year (2012) from November until April, May. I just started [resumed] work, not up to 2 months ago. The little money that I saved was exhausted. I was going to hospital, but they were not attending to me nicely; they want money. I used to tell them, ”No, am no longer working; I do not have money”. That was life and death, it was broken, it was completely out. The only thing stopping this hand from falling was the skin. It was painful. And before they attended to me – imagine! this thing happened around 10 am – before they attended to me the hand was like this [demonstrating how swollen and big the hand was], about 5 or 6pm. [I was] in the hospital, on the queue; even in emergency, on the queue. I couldn’t even move. I was sitting in one place, while my husband was queuing [sighs]. This country, they really don’t care about your life; you are like a mosquito. They treat you like a mosquito. They don’t care! It’s like they use to have award for killing [sighing]. I was at home with a broken arm because there was no money for me to pay in the hospital. [They said] I am a Nigerian; there is no war in my country, I must go back. For one week the hand was separated. (Female, 28years)

Unable to pay the fee demanded and in increasing pain, they decided to patronise an informal caregiver. One of her clients suggested a local healer and paid the healer’s fee.

This woman that called me now, she is my customer. Her husband said, “Ah, you are doing my wife’s hair nicely; this hand must be OK so that you can start doing my wife’s hair again. Let me take you to this local guy to do it for you; he can help you.” We went there; the bone was already healed. This guy should have said, “I don’t know anything about all the therapy.” [But] the guy took my hand like this [demonstrating; long silence]. The hand was like this [dangling it]. The hand was broken again. “Eh”, he said. “Yes, it is fine. Why your hand is like this, is because the veins are open that is why it is shaking like that, it’s good, nothing is happening.” The hand was broken. “Go!” [said the therapist]. I couldn’t walk; this man was putting pressure on me. “Go!”

He has broken the arm. Oh! He started telling me to go. I was doing like this [acting out holding her hand and shaking]. Labour is not painful, oh! [implying that the pain is far worse than the pain of child birth]. Labour is very nice. Even [in] the taxi that was taking me home, I was crying inside, because once the taxi moves I will scream. I couldn’t move. I was on the bed for days; the hand was swollen more and more. I was on the bed for about 5 days. The hand was swollen; I couldn’t even sit, even to shift on the bed. I couldn’t.

(Female, 28years)

She exhausted the foodstuffs at home, and when she collapsed in front of her apartment,
a neighbour took her to another hospital, and they provided emergency health care for her.

I witnessed the case of a young male migrant in 2013 who was ill but stayed at home for over a month with pills purchased from the pharmacy (I was introduced to him as a Nigerian migrant). When he became too ill to walk, his flat mate took him to the hospital but it was too late for him; he died the same night. The doctor lamented that he was brought to the hospital too late. Yet all my respondents confirmed the reluctance migrants had about visiting hospitals when ill, due either to fear or previous experiences of discrimination, verbal or physical assault, or the possibility of altering their medical treatment to cause them harm. CoRMSA (2011) reported that migrants are the most affected by the financial and human resources challenge in public hospitals, particularly with regards frontline healthcare providers, and data on the monitoring of migrants’ rights indicate that less than 50% of international migrants utilise essential health care services in South Africa (CoRMSA, 2008).

5.1.3 Livelihood

Respondents also reported insecurity in terms of subsistence, emphasizing two ways their economic lives exacerbated the state. As my respondents spent a large part of their time as street traders, they expressed concerns that this was not allowed, even though marketplaces are not provided, and that they lived daily with the fear of being arrested or of having their goods confiscated by the police. They reported that they made huge losses whenever the police descended on them, visiting a particular street up to four times in a week for arrests and confiscation of goods. The respondents in Yeoville told me of how they were promised a market place with stalls, but that the market that was built was too small to accommodate a sufficient number of street traders. One respondent complained that if they were allowed to trade freely, he would be assured economic success. Another noted that in the absence of employment, it was better to engage in trade because, depending on the goods on offer, people will undoubtedly buy, but the daily loss to the police makes trading unprofitable.

CoRMSA (2009: 112) also highlighted the frequency of raids on migrant businesses active in the informal sector, mentioning the case of a police raid in Mitchell Plain in 2008. After the raid, migrants accused the police of “using excessive force, assaulting traders and stealing money and goods from them. Those who attempted to complain at the local police station were allegedly told that police would not take statements from anyone regarding the raid.” The report suggests that such raids are often outside the official remit of police powers, but migrants can only make their complaints to the police, the same institution responsible for them. Migrants have thus come to live with the expectation of regular raids.

Some of the respondents were engaged in service provision, such as hair cutting, security, house painting, and so on. While migrants in these categories of economic activity do not suffer from regular police raids, they report serious cases of discrimination and abuse from South African clients whereby their services are exploited but resulting financial, moral, and contractual obligations are not met. Yet, as migrants, they perceive that they are not in a position to enforce or demand that their clients honour the agreed terms. Thus, although the migrants are hard working, they are susceptible to victimisation and discrimination that denies
them earned income, generating high levels of anxiety and vulnerability for those migrants engaged in service provision. One of the interviewees, Daniel from Cameroun, illustrated the frustrations of being unfairly treated and powerless in a description of what he termed one of his worst experiences in South Africa. He and some friends were employed by a South African to remove rubble from the eighth floor of a building that was being renovated, on the understanding that they would be given permanent employment if the job was completed within the expected period.

I had this job from universal church; you know what we used to do? We use to carry a bucket here [indicating shoulders]; they were cleaning rubbles. That is when they broke the walls they wanted to renovate. We were cleaning those rubbles; we were taking it down. They didn’t want us to use lifts. They employed fifty South Africans; they couldn’t do it in four months.

So they came and met us and say, because they believe we Nigerians are stronger. In that group we were seven – one Nigerian, two Cameroonianians and then the rest were Congolese. We did it for two weeks, what fifty South Africans could not do. That is, we used to carry those rubbles from eighth floor and rush down and go up again. Cleaned the whole place, the place was clean. The problem is that they promised us that after that they will give us a job, permanent or at least temporary permanent, till the work is complete. We finished, the last day we were finishing, that was the hardest work, we cleaned everything; everywhere is clean. When we finished, that same day we were replaced by South Africans. My brother, he looked at it and started crying there. They sent us away. We waited and waited and waited. (Male, 43 years).

According to CoRMSA (2011), while some aspects of South Africa’s laws protect the migrant worker, the immigration policy undermines the substance of the rights. For instance, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) extended their services to protecting the rights of undocumented workers but, because South Africa’s immigration laws criminalise their employment, CoRMSA noted that the majority of migrants prefer not to seek the CCMA’s help; while even those whom it assists to a successful conclusion still have difficulty securing the stipulated compensation. This highlights the migrants’ vulnerability despite protection laws: complaints are not made because of fear of arrest and deportation. The report notes that arrested migrants are unable to claim salaries and benefits before deportation and that some employers recruit services without contracts with the deliberate aim of denying workers their dues, thereby implicating contractors’ transactions that make it easy for brokers to abdicate responsibility. Compounding the problem, immigration officials who fail to consider labour rights or are unaware of them, erroneously reiterate to migrants and employers that migrants do not have any.

Nonetheless, despite the overwhelming unpredictability of the livelihoods available to informal migrants, reports do indicate relentless efforts by third parties and some governmental agencies to counteract the structural and institutional biases and legislation that promote migrant vulnerability. For example, CoRMSA (2008) noted that the Department of Education
initiated initiatives to hire foreign-qualified teachers to address skills gaps in the education sector, while the Labour Court gave a ruling that confirmed undocumented migrants have the same labour rights as South Africans.

5.1.4 Characteristics of Uncertainty

The experience of uncertainty in the migrants’ lives appears extensive and linked to social and political location. Although their political position as asylum seekers suggests the protection of national and international laws and regulations, and non-governmental rights-based activism and initiatives, it is not guaranteed in South Africa because the political actions of immigration control are implicated in the vulnerabilities experienced by informal migrants. The interviewees’ experiences draw attention to the ‘unwantedness’ of the migrants that could be construed as beyond statutory construction or reconstruction (and thus beyond rights). The experience reveals itself as social alteration of the human value and, by implication, characterises the migrant as undesirable. It is almost as if there is a prevailing belief among some RSDOs that a day at an RRO should be sufficient to convince the asylum seeker of this unwantedness, if the inhuman treatment meted out to migrants is anything to go by.

As far as you are a foreigner, they are not fair. You will go there and say you want to apply for asylum; some of us, many of us have real problem. That is why we are here, and [we] don’t want to be illegal criminals. So we go to Home Affairs to table our problem; but you will find the Home Affairs people, whipping people, beating people with cane. They will be collecting and demanding money, saying, “You must pay 2,000 rand before they can take you in”. Ordinary to get a stand in the line, they will tell you, “You must pay 100 rand!” If you refuse and say it is not fair, they will say [to] you, “Then you will be there. Nobody will attend to you.” And they will be there in the office, playing; and just leave you there. ... If you talk, they will say, “Don’t talk to me”. Nobody will attend to you; they will tell you they are tired, and they will leave. They will go for lunch and stay for long, when they come back they will not attend to you. Then they will say they have closed, and you are there. (Male, 26 years).

My interviewees’ narratives also highlighted the prevalence of uncertainty in their homelands, and so they are not strangers to it; indeed they described their previous lives with feelings of anxiety, distrust, and scepticism. Their narratives suggested that, at the time of their leaving, they did not think it possible to achieve the futures they desired in their homelands, evaluations that rested heavily on the general political, institutional, and infrastructural contexts they had encountered there. Although it is argued that emigration because of poor public services is inefficient (World Bank, 2009), the interviewees’ entrepreneurial ambitions call attention to the relevance of public services to their future-building efforts. This resonates with a report that claims that “dissatisfaction with local public services accounts for 60% of the variation in migration intentions” (AFDB, African Economic Outlook, 2015: 21). In the host country, the uncertainty of the future was cushioned by notions of possibilities and opportunities for individuals to negotiate, trick, pray, or gamble their way around obstacles and
vulnerabilities. That suggests that the particular forms of vulnerabilities that incapacitate the agency to seek a better life and crush individualistic notions of how to make it happen have the greatest potential for increasing insecurity.

In addition, my data called attention to social networks, although not the mainstream notion of a social network as social capital that could provide support and opportunities for migrants. Rather, it was the absence of a social network at the time of migrating, and the individual actions and activities to initiate, expand, and appropriate his or her network in the destination country that became interesting. This individual aspect of the social network does not highlight social capital; rather it calls attention to precariousness, invariability, uncertainty, and risks in building or becoming a part of a network. Therefore, it is the individual’s ability to create, utilise, scrutinise, and discard a network that becomes relevant in the usefulness of a social network to the migrant.

Musa from Ethiopia resigned from his paid employment to immigrate to South Africa on the basis of his aspirations to achieve a better life. Ordinarily, unemployment is discussed as an uncertainty but, to Musa, uncertainty was not about employment, but rather about his aspiration for the future and whether his work in Ethiopia would assist in achieving it. Bali from the Republic of Benin repaid his bank loan, closed a business that had been robbed twice, and immigrated to South Africa. In popular development discourse, not having access to a small business loan is regarded as a source of uncertainty; however, to Bali, the possibility of achieving his aspirations in a context where he could just as easily lose all his assets in one day, without any chance of compensation, is the crux of his uncertainty. In defining their aspirations for the future, my interviewees also defined what constituted uncertainty for them. Uncertainty, though interlinked with vulnerability through the migrants’ dependency on the socio-political (others and government agents) context, also assumes personal traits linked to perception and aspirations. In that sense, uncertainty does not only denote vulnerability but also agency.

5.2 Migrant Testimony: Hope

Silverman (2011: 60) noted that “whatever theory you use, concepts will shape your research”. In Chapter Two, I operationalise my theoretical approach with three themes, of which hope is the first. This section on hope examines my empirical data by drawing attention to the interviewees’ evaluations of the likelihood and method of achieving their desired wellbeing.

The word hope is associated with optimism and a positive mental attitude in the presence of a crisis, and often differentiated as realistic or false. Such dichotomised understanding is based on an evaluation of the possibility of actualising what is expected or anticipated. If such evaluation is positive, hope can be construed as realistic, while being regarded as naïve or hopeless if the results of the assessment are negative (Snyder, 2000). Over the years, Charles Snyder (a distinguished professor of clinical psychology) has discussed hope not merely as feelings without an identifiable source but as a positive motivational state that is based on an
The work of Snyder and his colleagues thus constitutes hope as goal-related thinking that consists of goals, pathways, and agency.

Snyder (2000: 5) narrates how he was introduced to the study of hope, or what he refers to as “the other side of excusing”, while doing research on people making excuses when faced with their error or inadequacy. His research participants informed him that the focus of the study restricted them from fully expressing themselves. The study centred on “how people want to increase the distance between themselves and their bad outcomes”, but the research participants contended that they were also motivated to “decrease the distance to their positive life goals” (ibid.: 6). In essence then, Snyder argues that when faced with unfavourable outcomes or situations, people’s reactions have two sides. They will want to take measures to reduce the experiencing of the unfavourable outcome, but the adverse outcome is not the only determinant of their reaction. Increasing access to their positive life goals is also a source of motivation.

My interviewees’ narratives called attention to the central element of their positive life goals in the harsh experiences of their everyday lives. Ebi, an interviewee from Nigeria, migrated to South Africa in 2006. At the time of the interview, he was married with two children. He had just completed a four-year jail term for possession of narcotics, although he claimed the police had wrongfully accused him. Ebi was unemployed, without a residential permit, and was hiding from immigration officials to avoid deportation. He said that, in the years he had lived in Hillbrow, he had experienced and witnessed a number of dehumanising situations as a migrant, mentioning discrimination, humiliation, and acts of violence. His story of being part of a crowd that watched a migrant bleed to death for over 45 minutes after a fight, because nobody, not even the police, would provide first aid or help, indicates he is not ignorant of the harsh realities of being an African migrant. In his story he dwelt on the insecurity of migrants’ lives, and the economic hardship, poverty and vulnerability they experience. In other words, he described his context as extremely insecure, highly vulnerable, and socio-politically risky:

Well it’s God that is taking care of us here as in survival. It’s not easy but all I know is that it is in the hands of God. Anything one will be in this country is in the hand of God. People die like chicken every day. Could you believe, last two weeks, opposite Okoro shop [the shop where I met him] – ask anybody. In the evening like this, I don’t know, they said they stab the guy all over; he was fighting somewhere in the club. So he was running, the blood has wasted [he was bleeding heavily]. The guy just sat down there.

My anger was that we Nigerian – you know that it happens, you know that area [Hillbrow] – they see it as where Nigerians are. So I saw this metro cops they were passing, we waved them. “Please help this guy.” They look at us [and said in their language], “Ah ai ai he is a Nigerian”, and left. They

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thought the guy is a Nigerian. That guy died there. They let him die. At least that guy wouldn’t have died. He died there. The guy was sitting with head on his knees; you know he couldn’t sit and then he laid down, before we know what is happening. You know everyone is crowded, so we were watching him. I saw him he was alive, just bleeding, still breathing. That he is tired, still alive up to 45 minutes, before he laid down. He could not; he has given up; he is gone. You don’t even know this country am telling you. [Emphasizing I cannot imagine the experiences of migrants like him in the country.] (Male, 36 years).

Nevertheless, in talking about his life in South Africa and how it related to his future, Ebi spoke about perceived opportunities in the harsh context and expressed confidence that he could achieve economic success irrespective of the challenges:

I have seen the possibilities, the future is bright. You know, South Africa is a nice place. He must make a way; that is what I say to my God. (Male, 36 years)

He understands the unfavourable aspects of living in South Africa from his own experiences and those of friends, yet his reactions are not only about putting a distance between himself and the harsh conditions, but are also motivated by his visions of a positive future.

Another respondent, Musa from Ethiopia, resigned from his job in his home country and migrated to South Africa in 2005 to start street trading. He began his life in South Africa with 100 rand (approximately 10 Euro), with which he bought belts and socks and started selling at bus and taxi stations, slowly improving his economic wellbeing.

Six months I was selling belt and socks for bus station; after six months I was thinking it’s better selling for street. I was selling the clothes for street almost a year. After that I buy one old car. I buy one old car, I buy stock from Johannesburg. I will go 500 kilometres to the border, Botswana border. I will sell the clothes that side, almost two years I was working just like that. This life is changing. Now I am working and own a restaurant, here in South Africa. (Male, 33 years)

Musa notes that the economic context for migrants was better in 2005, when he migrated to South Africa, than in 2013, lamenting that it was currently much harder.

You know that time I was come in 2005? It was better, transportation, business also. Economically it was nice in South Africa. I think it is very tough now. You know most people them are suffering, even, am not talking about the foreigner, even the South Africa people. They can’t afford their life, you know, now everything is tight. I was buying bread 1 rand 20 cents [in 2005], now it is almost 10 Rand. When I come into South Africa I had so
many obstacles in my life in this South Africa. For example, am losing almost two or three cars, they hijack it. Almost 120,000 rand. You know what? Most of the people are criminal in South Africa, which is the big problem. You see young persons; they are jobless, they run out of employment, [so] when they see you doing well, they are not happy. (Male, 33 years)

Notwithstanding his gloomy evaluation of South Africa, he locates the reason for his presence in the country in his high motivation and determination.

In my life I never give up, even when I go back… I will never give up, until I die. I will never give up no matter what, that is my life. I learn that life is not straight, so I keep on going. (Male, 33 years)

He spoke with confidence and assurance about his aspirations and expectations for the future. He was quiet for a while and then spoke these words, later smiling as if he could see something that I could not. The fact is that at that moment, based on the stories I had heard, I – as listener and observer – could not see the future he was talking about. Only he could relate to the potential and opportunities of the future despite the tough and challenging present.

In the same vein, Bali from the Republic of Benin, whom I met selling a few bananas and peanuts on a Johannesburg street, expressed a strong positive mental attitude and clear aspirations. He grew up selling to motorists on the road during slow traffic in his home country. Later, he slowly developed a mobile phone importation business – beginning by importing two mobile phones but ultimately owning two successful shops that traded mobile phones to individuals and companies.

When I wanted to start the phone business, I started with two phones, I went to Lagos, I buy two phones. I push for pocket because if immigration see it they will start to complain. So from there two, I sold it. When I sold it, I didn’t eat [spend] my profit. I said, “When I go back again I must buy three or four phones back”. From two, then three, four, five, then I did not put phone in pocket to cross border again, I dey put for the carriage [started importing a large quantity in containers]. (Male, 33 years)

He reported that he was successful, had loans from the bank to expand his business, had properties, and got married to start a family. However, he lost his business to robbers who broke into both of his shops and carted away all his goods.

I was selling... the second shop I was selling phones. I went to Ikeja [in Lagos, Nigeria] computer village, to go and buy phones there. I bring to Togo to sell it; everything was moving. I buy land, I build a house, I marry 2006, December 18. I was married, everything was going, moving. Now 2008, August, I went to Lagos, to go and buy all my stock that I sell in the shop, I buy everything in Ikeja, then I take it to Egutero [a place in Lagos],
to put it in a car or no – I do not know what they call it in English, but the transport that you put your loads – and they take it to Togo from Nigeria in three days. It gets to Togo in three days. When I want to go to market to go and buy stock, I will leave on Monday night; I will reach Ikeja, Tuesday, around 6, early morning. When I buy the things, I finish, I will take it to Egutero; from there I will leave my stock there, after three days they bring for me on Thursday and Friday [in Togo]. But August on the 18, 2008, the thing delay, it did not come early. It was supposed to come around Friday or Thursday, but it didn’t come early, it was delayed. It come on Saturday night, before they arrived in Togo. When it came, I sent all my boys [shop assistants] to go and collect the goods to bring to shop. When the stock comes, I must take the ones for the other shop, take it [go] there and leave the ones I sell here, here, because that time it was night, on Saturday. On Sunday, we are not work. “OK”, I say. “What we have, we put it down on one shop.” I said, “Sunday I will come and share it to the second shop and the one remain I will leave it here.”

I was in the house on Sunday, my boys they called me and say all the thing I put in the shop, nothing inside again. I said how come? [breathing heavily] I call the phone, I pick my motor come there. I reach the shop; I see the thing is opened empty.

He has been robbed of all his goods.

Ah, how come this thing empty like this? The thief opened the ceiling. Before this thing happened, I put metal thing to protect it; I put light inside. If you want to touch the thing, electricity will shock you. I did not know how they remove that electricity before they cut the thing, and open ceiling to enter. Ah, when the thing happen, I reached there, I have to go back home again, because I confuse, I don’t know what to do. I want to go back home again. I enter the motor to kick motor to go, but they said no I cannot take motor to go. They collect the key from my hand. OK, when they collect the key from my hand, I say OK, I take okada [motorbike] to go home to go and sleep. I can’t sleep. I wake up, I come back shop, I go and report for police. So, so, so, they take down everything, they started investigation. Three days to ten days they didn’t get any solution, I say ah, three-ten days no solution, so I said, I am supposed to start eating again. So I go and drop the case. I say no case again because they find the solution but didn’t see anything about it. OK.

When I start again, I start to go to... because the money that remain is not too much again – so I started beginning again. (Male, 33 years)

He started trading again with loans from the bank and after a few months his shop was broken into again, and again all his goods were stolen. Burdened by business loans he had taken
from the bank, he sold his properties, which included two houses, cars, and other assets, paid off the loan from the bank, set up his wife in a micro business and paid migrant couriers to take him to South Africa. At the time of the interview, he was a street trader in Johannesburg selling bananas and peanuts.

In our discussion, he bemoaned the calamity that he had experienced and talked bitterly about the ineffectiveness of the police when he contacted them after the first break-in. His story also centred on his future goals and desires. He said that he had plans to move to another country, continue trading to save more money, and eventually go to Japan, where he will search for work and save enough money to start buying and selling electronics again. He said his dream had been to own a big household electronics importation business. When I asked him if this was still his plan considering his present socio-economic position as a street trader and the constraining political context, he replied:

Yeah, I know I will do it, it still dey my plan. I will do it, that one I know. That is life, if you have something you want to do, you must put your program. If not that thieves come and stole my things I for started to go to China and Dubai. To do international business that is my program, but I still know I will do it. (Male, 33 years)

Despite having experienced such a drastic social and economic downturn, he could also project a quite different reaction to that of despair: a motivation to pursue his high aspirations.

In the book, *Illegal Traveller: an auto-ethnography of borders*, Shahram Khosravi (2010: 42) wrote about his experience in Karachi, where he had become stranded as an illegal traveller seeking to migrate to Europe as a refugee. At one point, he noted, “Karachi had become a blind alley. We could not find a way out.” In that dire situation, he expressed his feelings about his “desperate situation’ and informed another traveller (a middle-aged man from a prominent Baluchi Clan) that he was “pessimistic about being able to leave Pakistan”. All my respondents’ narrated experiences fit the phrase “dire situation”, especially in their socio-economic dimensions. However, something interesting here is that, although Khosravi as a vulnerable informal migrant evaluated his situation, and impliedly his future, as having “no way out” and being a “blind alley”, most of my interviewees expressed hope for a positive futures despite their challenging situations. In Khosravi’s (ibid.) narration, the middle-aged man, his listener, responded, “My son, the world’s door cannot be closed’.

However, in my interview room, with their words, the certainty in their voices, the gravity with which they spoke, and their determination to persevere, my interviewees seemed to be saying that *South Africa’s* door cannot be closed. Their attitude suggested that, in their eyes, their current state of deprivation, poverty, and vulnerability was fertile ground for positive developments: that while they lived in dire situations, they had positive expectations. This form of hope cannot be considered blind or passive, because it is enacted and reinforced in their everyday lives34, thereby assuming the methodological momentum entailed in the lived anticipation of “what has ‘not-yet’ become” (Miyazaki, 2004: 14). In this understanding,

34See the next sections on how the interviewees act out their hope.
expectations are not bounded by constraints but are based on the buoyancy of hope in a context of severe uncertainty. To the migrants, uncertainties and risks denote a situation of endless possibilities and opportunities, neither definite nor conclusive.

At that point, in the interview room, the interviewees were talking to a ‘relative stranger’ about their pasts, presents, and futures. Their stories were not pleasant and the atmosphere in the interview room was never light or jovial as they recalled painful memories. Knowing my background, they had reason to sound despondent and pessimistic and bemoan their situation as they did, but in talking about the future, they spoke with a seriousness and certainty that still resonates in my mind years after the interviews. Naturally, they were unhappy and frustrated and complained about their predicament during throughout the period I spent with them – during interviews and at their places of work – and the stories they recounted of their vulnerability were a form of bemoaning their situation. Nevertheless, at the end of the interview sessions, what stood out for me was that it was I who was pessimistic about their futures, while they were telling me that options existed and their futures would be well. That for me is significant, and it is crucial that this theme voiced by the interviewees is given its rightful position in analysis. A sliver of hope, even in a context consumed by vulnerability and suffering, remains what it is – hope.

5.2.1 Resilience in Hope

With increasing rights, but without access to or benefit from them, the dexterity of hope becomes relevant to the continued presence of migrants. As noted above, the resilience approach attends to the interplay between risks and resilience whereby the migrants’ focus shifts from risks and uncertainty to available responses. In that sense, hope here becomes similar to “running water: If you put a stone in its way, you might stop it for a while but it soon finds another course” (Khosravi, 2010: 42). Thus, the migrants’ state of hope is one that is continuously being negotiated as they interact with their environment. While the socio-political and economic context is ordinarily understood as dynamic, perceiving migrants’ hope as active implies two tasks they must fulfil: the first is that each migrant must locate a source of hope and the second is to identify or create the means to keep it enduring and sustainable. These are difficult tasks to accomplish in a context devoid of socio-political security and loaded with daily oppression, including threats of deportation. The discussions above reveal some aspects of the adversity and precariousness of the migrants’ context, which cannot be overemphasised. For example, graphically captured images of a recent (2015) outbreak of xenophobic attacks in South Africa (Bernardo, 2015) reveals the harrowing reality of how dangerous the migrants’ environment can be. However, as noted earlier in this section, evaluating adversity as insurmountable can lead to the conceptualisation of hope as naïve or blind, thereby removing its propelling force as motivation and activation.

35See Chapter Four (methodology) where I discussed this study’s benefiting from ethnographic methods, mentioning that I spent time with the interviewees at their places of trade and business and even visited the home of one of the interviewees. Hence, although a stranger, I had established a ‘relationship’ with them.

36 See section 4.1.1c The Researcher as Part of the Story. They know that I am a migrant from ‘Europe’, a place commonly assumed on the streets to be a safe and good place for migrants.
On the other hand, the notion of resilience, operationalised as hope, emphasizes the migrants’ personal goals and perceptions of their own agency and routes to attainment of their objectives (Snyder et al., 1991). Through hope, resilience shifts the frame for remaining in the host country to the individual’s perceptions and understandings, which may suggest that he or she is not compelled to capitulate to the context but is obligated by personal goals to identify or generate pathways within it. But Snyder et al. (1991) warned that perceiving successful agency is not the same as conceiving successful paths to goals. It is logical to assume that, to start with, being in South Africa is understood by informal migrants as concomitant with successful agency because, as informal migrants, they took the initiative to migrate without the invitation or permission of the host country, and successfully mobilised various resources to get there. Thus, for informal migrants, resilience in the form of hope is exhibited in the identification, perception, and creation of pathways to their goals. In this study, Ebi narrated a story about another migrant to make the point that not everybody can face the challenges an informal migrant encounters daily.

It’s not easy, my dear, so many of us have gone back. A Nigerian brother, I saw him in town one day, he said he is tired and he want to go, they should deport him. Now the cops, they were pushing him out of their van, the guy was like, “Please deport me, take me to Lindela, I want to go back home. I am doing nothing here, am suffering, I never knew it was like this.” While he was in Nigeria, he was doing well, business, but his friends ask him to come, so when he came it wasn’t easy; things turned upside down. They accommodate him like normal [initially], then they will tell him that my man see what will happen now; you will go out to the street to go and hustle. That was how the guy came out in the street and ended up in the street, eating in the street. If you see him now, I saw him last week or last month, I saw the guy last month, I couldn’t believe. If you see his hair now, his beards, very dirty. If he opens up his mouth and tell you he is a Nigerian, you will run. He doesn’t look like our brothers again, very dirty like street kids, searching for food in the dust bin. (Male, 36 years).

The story is interesting here because Ebi had gone through a similar experience of ‘going to hustle on the street’. Indeed, all the interviewees still work on the street, touting for customers or clients to patronise their businesses; the respondents in this study, however, had experienced adversity but then identified pathways that supported their belief that they will reach their goals. Shahram Khosravi (2010) argued that if hope is lost, the resulting despair and trauma can lead to a variety of outcomes like moving on to another country, returning to the homeland, or depression and even mental illness. In their discussion of hope, Snyder et al. (1991: 571) note that “agency/pathways and pathways/agency iterations continue throughout all stages of goal-directed behaviour”. Thus, in a goal-related frame that highlights resilience, perceptions of successful agency and pathways towards goals are continuously interactive. Resilience is thus seen as the dynamic outcome of hope. Conversely, the informal migrant who does not perceive potential pathways and successful agency, or who conceives of these as inadequate, will reproduce a focus on failure with ambivalence towards goal-related activities. Significantly, resilience as hope thus de-emphasizes the common approach of listing resources.
or means by which vulnerable groups are able to achieve success. Rather, it calls attention to sometimes individualistic negotiations, motivations, and actions that combine to enable informal migrants to find pathways to their desired goals.

5.2.2 Resilience in Economic Activities

Economic activities in the form of either informal employment or individual business are perceived by my interviewees to comprise concrete means to a better life. At the time of interview, four of my respondents were street traders selling cigarettes, candies, fruits, and biscuits. The others provided services like hair cutting, hair braiding, teaching, and modelling. Some of the participants informed me that they were engaged in several additional trading and informal service activities like house painting or roof repairs that brought in extra income aside from their primary source. They had all sought informal employment when they were unable to find work in the formal sector, and thus were compelled to start their businesses, something that required creativity on the part of some interviewees, who at times rendered services without prior experience or training. Business started slowly and they had to develop the patience and skills required for expansion through direct experience. The time and effort put into their trade and services made the activities central in their lives as informal migrants.

Seven of my respondents had searched for formal employment based on their skills, educational background, and work experience, but for this a South African residence permit was required. Eduard from Malawi reported that he had initially secured employment, but felt discriminated against, earned a very small salary, and worked longer and harder than his South African colleagues. He narrated an incident where he had to take a performance evaluation test, after which he was informed that he had failed the assessment and his work contract was terminated. When he asked, as was his right, to see the result of the written examination, his boss refused; hence his suspicions that they did not want him because he was a foreigner. The last time he had been formally employed was in 2008, although he resigned from the job due to unfair treatment. Taking his case to South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Media and Arbitration that looks into equal and fair labour treatment for employees, Eduard was not given any assistance, and, highly discouraged, he remained unemployed from 2009 to 2011, moving in with his parents.

The type of trade or services undertaken depended on personal networks or chance, but each of my interviewees’ stories indicated creativity and determination in producing and utilising a network, and even ‘chance’ has a calculated aspect. Networks do not just happen; one must be at the right place, at the right time, and actively put together a helpful network. Eduard remained without a trade for almost a year while living with his parents. But then things changed.

In 2012, a certain man approached me and said, you know what. I started slowly ... as a joke. I was teaching kids, like volunteering you know, when I see kids are struggling with maths. I was helping them here and there, so, a certain man was impressed with what I was doing. He said to me, “Can you teach my son, like after school, after lessons?” So I said, “Let’s negotiate
about the price.” And we negotiated – it was about 30 rand per hour – then he offered to pay every week. Just one. So every week I was receiving an amount of 150 rand, just to survive with it. Then I decided that maybe this thing is something I can do. Then I started making pamphlets, small pamphlets in the form of business cards. Then I was sending them to people, giving to people that I know. Then luckily I found another lady, she said to me, “Teach my child, I will be paying you 200 rand per month; that is what I can offer.” But they are two, so that was 400 rand per month. So I started teaching that lady’s kids. It started same year, I think it was in March and April. And again I looked at it and I said, this may possibly work, let me try and talk to people. I can do this thing well, let me make it like my own business. Then I started telling people that this is what I do; if you need any help, let me know. Then I started getting more clients. (Male, 33years)

At the time of the interview, Eduard was handing out pamphlets to people on the street, but he had established clients with permanently scheduled periods and had extended his teaching lessons to college, university, and professional students needing extra lessons in mathematics. He moved from his parent’s accommodation and rented his own apartment, telling me that he expected to be able to afford to rent a permanent location for his extra lessons and that business would be good for a long time because he is currently too busy to be able to meet the demands of clients. It was his negative experiences with formal employment combined with a rare opportunity that started him on his entrepreneurial pursuits; indeed, becoming an entrepreneur was not amongst his initial expectations. Although he is not yet a successful businessperson as he has pressing challenges with the cash flow of his business, it remains the anticipated pathway to his goal of a better life.

His story is not so different from those of my other respondents: social, economic, and political challenges created pressure and the need to seek alternative means of earning a living or take up one of the other options: deportation or voluntarily moving to another country perceived as having better opportunities. However, as long as my interviewees perceived a path to their desired goals that involved their trading or the services they offered, they concentrated on developing them. Daniel had to learn new hair cutting skills while on the job; Bali started trading in bananas and peanuts with as little as 50 to 100 rand (5 to 10 Euros), telling me that after months of being unable to find employment in Johannesburg, he became desperate for any income-making activity.

I find [searched for] the job, but I didn’t see the job. That is why I started to sell on the street until now. Am selling before; I start from there, I get small money, I buy banana from [retail market]. I come market here, I buy one box [of banana]; when I finish selling, I will go market again to buy one box again to go and sell it. I sell like that before I get small money [saved], wey [which] I take go [took to] [wholesale] market myself to go and buy it to sell [in retail quantities] after I leave [stop selling] cigarette. Only me was selling the cigarette and later banana. (Male, 33years)
At the time of the interview, he reported that he was still saving towards his desire to start a business of importing home electronics from Japan for sales in his home country.

The critical point being made is that interviewees could perceive a reprieve from the harsh socio-economic context by virtue of future success in their income-generating activities rather than due to current earnings. The businesses, although tiny in terms of turnover, still embodied the interviewees’ hopes of achieving success in South Africa – a state of mind symptomatic of their resilience. They covered their daily living expenses, paid their rent and bills, and at times sent remittances to their home countries to support or sponsor family members. Eight of my respondents were saving some part of their income for future needs. They appeared to endure the harsh conditions because they could carry out informal business activities, which supports the findings of studies of the economic and social relevance of entrepreneurial activities to migrants that are socially excluded in their host societies (Rath, 2000), specifically South Africa (Hunter & Skinner, 2003; Maharaj & Moodley, 2000). This gives weight to the proposal that resilience theory should call attention not to the evaluation of immediate benefits but to the perception of pathways, and to their active conversion into economic and social benefits.

5.2.3 Religion and Pastors as Hope Brokers

In addition to the cognitive aspect of the informal migrant’s hope for a better life, which pertains to economics and income generation, there is also an emotional aspect which encompasses the perception of and motivation to reach set goals – and therefore the estimated probability of attaining them. The salient presence of God, faith, and belief in the narratives of my interviewees demonstrates the role of religion in reinforcing the emotional aspects of their hope, a finding supported by migration research which has also identified the relevance of religion to the survival of impoverished migrants, especially in developing countries (Hagan, 2008; Sarat, 2013; Kivisto, 2014). In the words of Leah Sarat, (2013: 194), “Prayer and worship have become intertwined with earning and consuming, as religion helps people navigate the disparity of wealth and poverty”. In the face of uncertainties, high vulnerabilities, and risks, migrants, according to the migration-religion discourse, cling to the pertinence of divine intervention in miracles and success.

All the interviewees frequently referred to God, their pastors, and their place of worship in their narrations about living in South Africa. Their aspirations and future expectations of success were often verbally anchored in God’s assistance, making religion an integral element in their goal-related motivation, while religious attachments were manifested by their close relationships with their pastors and church activities. The centrality of religion to migrants’ daily engagements in South Africa became relevant in two ways: practical and motivational. Practically, some of my respondents reported that they turn to their pastors for financial aid during tough times while, in motivational terms, the migrants’ aspirations and expectations are often based on their belief that God will help them to succeed when facing challenges. When Bali experienced significant financial problems and frustrations, he turned to his traditional religious beliefs and a traditional priest, both for courage and in order to communicate with the gods about how he could recover his losses.
When the thing happened to me he take me go somewhere in Nigeria ... for Juju man, whatever, he take me go there. I reach there, because when I reach there my mind, my mind come. When I reach there, I told that [juju] man, say I want to do money juju – how to call it, juju for money? I tell them say I want to do it. I say I want to do it; he say my age at least is still young; everything can be OK for me again, make I nor worry.

That was what he told me. If not so, because I don’t know how I can do again? That man he encourage me, say I still young, my age still good, say that it will be good again make I nor worry, make I just pray for God just like dat. I believe my God; I believe my God say everything can be OK. (Male, 33 years)

He was able to overcome his mental and financial challenges and start life all over again with the encouragement of a traditional priest. At the time of this interview in 2012, Bali was still holding on to the motivational words of his priest while addressing his struggles to make a life in South Africa.

The respondents strongly linked their goal-related motivation to their belief in God and their own agency in navigating economic constraints. That suggests my interviewees utilise their belief in God as a confirmation of the viability of their aspirations. Hirokazu Miyazaki (2004: 12) similarly noted that the “question of hope … naturally invites the question of God [and] the problem of the limits of human agency”.

Mary, who had decided to move from Zimbabwe to South Africa to seek professional help for her physically disabled grandchild, also emphasized the relevance of God to her expectations for the future. Although her daughter, who is partially blind, lives in South Africa, Mary said she panhandles by the roadside to make a living, so Mary knew she could not expect any assistance from her. She said she was anxious about migrating to South Africa with a handicapped grandchild, but decided to make the trip because of her faith that God would help her.

And when I left, I only pray that God, you are my everything, you are my shelter, I am going with Pritchard [grandchild], you know where am going I don’t know anything, can you lead me, I don’t know where am going. When I came, I came in my daughter’s house ... That is when we started to look for and to get help from Nigel [and his wife, a Christian couple running a local NGO], may God bless them, because today, am with Pritchard; Pritchard can talk, he can laugh, now he can lift his arms and am happy. Sure! Am very happy. As time goes, I know that Pritchard will be at school, through this people, I thank them so much. (Female, 53 years)

Nigel and his wife supported her with financial and other resources to help the child get treatment and education.
Although my interviewees all expressed faith in God, some of them narrated a more complicated relationship with their church and pastor involving negative experiences and resulting distrust. Three of the interviewees (Ebi, Pila, and Oliver) referred to their pastors as con men and tricksters only interested in making money, although these interviewees were still members of the same churches and one of them lived with his pastor and worked for the church. Pila claimed that pastors used the name of God to make money from the members of their churches, reporting that she was couriered to South Africa by a pastor and during her first few months in South Africa the same pastor maligned her and rendered her homeless because she tried to stop him from appropriating care money sent to her from abroad. She reported that pastors are couriering people from neighbouring countries with con stories and demanding substantial fees.

In 2001 or 2002. So I now came, I came with a pastor, ... my first place in South Africa was Port Elizabeth; he took me to a South African home and those people they were pastors. I stayed with them for two months. He was eating the money [referring to the courier’s appropriation of money being sent to her by her ex-boyfriend’s sister in Europe] and then he just left me; he abandoned me. You know, I was with this South African couple; at a time he came there to start telling that I was a bad person. You know, because I was telling them what he was doing, he was not taking care of me; they gave him money to take care of me but he was eating the money, and I was suffering there. So he started telling them that I am bad; then they chased me out of their house. Also, before my husband came – we were still dating then – he was living with that same pastor. He came through the invitation with that same pastor, and then, at a time, the wife of the pastor told them to leave the house also. He came with other two guys; they were three, she [the pastor’s wife] told them to leave the house to go and sleep in the church. You know, he was not eating well, and he was suffering, staying in there, cold; he will be bleeding though his nose, no food. When he [the pastor] chased me, I didn’t have a place to go, so I went to another Nigerian guy in town. There I saw another group of Nigerian guys that also came through him [the pastor] that he frustrated. He told them the same story; that he will help them to go to Europe. He left them. (Female, 28 years)

Ebi, the model/musician from Nigeria and also one of the migrants mentioned by Pila, narrated the same complex relationship with his pastor.

So I came to South Africa through a church invitation, so they promised us. We are about three of us; we are musicians, [I] am a drummer in the group. So it happened that when we came, according to the story the invitation he gave us and things he promised us wasn’t what we saw when we came. [He promised] accommodation and salary for the job we are going to do for the church. So when we came if was not really as we discussed with him, so he dumped us; he gave us accommodation in church, just to be
sleeping in the church, but not a home. We were sleeping on the tiles; you know what can we do? He brought us [to] Johannesburg. Here in Hillbrow, it was not easy; we will see people being killed in the street, people being shot each other. And you see other ones sleeping as well, about 200 and something, 280 sleeping in the church. Both women and their kids and some guys and men as well. So as time goes on, he wasn’t paying us as he promised; what he was giving us was, what will I say, 20? Tell me what 20 Rand will be able to afford for someone. But since we have come, it is no longer easy for us to, because he has allowed our visa to expire, he promised us he is gonna fix our papers in Home Affairs [South African immigration agency]. (Male, 36 years)

Pila also mentioned that the pastors utilised tricks and sweet words to get money out of the congregation.

He [the pastor] will say, the account number… “Somebody is going to deposit the money. In fact he just received the money now.” [The pastor will predict that a member of the congregation will receive unexpected money in his or her bank account, expecting this information to motivate the member to give money in church.]

They will say God laid a thing in my heart, you have to sow a seed of 10,000 Rand, you can even sow anything that is precious to you, but for where, miracle will not come… [The pastor claims that God has informed him that the migrant should give a financial offering of 10,000 Rand or any expensive property to the church, and God will reward the migrant with a miracle.] (Female, 28 years)

She complained that they were compelled to give financial offerings in her previous church in expectation of miracles, but after several years of attending and giving money, she did not receive any miracles. Yet, even though she realised that her giving would not facilitate a miracle, this did not prevent her from continuing to give. Rather, she decided to join a church that did not emphasize financial offering and so did not compel the members to give. It was important to her to be able to exercise her freedom on what and how to give to the church because, while she did not experience a miracle, she still considers giving to her church a sacred responsibility and relates it to future blessings from God.

Seeds, you will sow seeds [give money]. Oh I was so stupid; I used to sow, sow for miracles. For where? Miracles did not come. Now I attend Mountain of Fire [a church]. The only thing they need from me is my tithe and offering [the tithe is 10% of income earned and the offering is voluntary giving for other things]. They don’t force you; offering time, you will bring out your tithe and offering and will be rushing to take it out. Other churches, you must sow seed, if you do not sow that seed, it will look as if that blessings will not follow you home. (Female, 28 years)
Another interviewee, Oliver, also reported that he did not believe in pastors anymore.

They [the pastors] are using people to make money. They will tell you, you can do fraud, I will pray for you; if you do fraud, you will get money, and we will share it. If police catch you, I will go to police, and I will tell police this is my volunteer to church and anything to cover you. They will tell you I know many police in South Africa. (Male, 28 years)

Despite these stories, the interviewees reported they are still committed to their churches, attending church services, making financial offerings, and visiting the pastors when in trouble. Their relationships with the pastors demonstrated conscious and active agency in choosing how they wanted to utilise their religious beliefs. For instance, they appear not to apply the dogma of their religion to the pastors just as they do not relate it to themselves. The pastors could be couriers who lied to the illegal migrants they were escorting, broke their promises, and stole money from them, yet the interviewees continued to regard their church and its pastors as middlemen between their faith and their needs. Pila recognised that the pastors were not holy men of God, that their stories were just designed to con members, and that giving did not lead to receiving miracles; but this did not prevent her attending her choice of church, to which she continued to give from her meagre resources. In this light, her religious giving was not a sign that she was ignorant, naïve, or gullible, but a demonstration of her enduring hope that God would help her. The complex relationship with the pastors also indicated that the interviewees’ faith is more goal-related than pious.

My data also suggest that the emotional aspects of interviewees’ hope also come from self-motivation and affirmation. As part of the strong self-motivation they expressed, the interviewees appeared to be able to separate their religious faith from religious activities. One of the interviewees, Musa, said he is very active in his church, but he has not received any financial assistance from it through periods of pressing needs and, although he reiterated that God helps him, he claimed his mental approach to the challenges of life was relevant in his difficult circumstances.

When I asked one of the respondents, Tola, if his faith is the main reason for his presence in South Africa, he responded:

It is not really the big part, but the only thing is you must believe in yourself, you must have the strength, because [when] you leave your country and go to another country, you don’t just believe everything will be easy. And the way we live our life, our culture is different at home. Maybe you have problem you can go to one or two persons, and you tell them; people will stand and try to help you. But here, there is nothing like that, nobody will help you here. You are on your own, you just do things on your own, so you don’t expect things to be easy. So that is it because you are in a different country you must face the challenges. (Male, 26 years)
In acknowledging that he is truly alone without access to any help, Tola realises that his survival is contingent upon himself. He must summon the courage to confront his circumstances and be self-driven in seeking opportunities to achieve his goals. Bloch (1986) reiterated that needs, vulnerability, and hunger create motivation rather than fear. Without fear, learned hunger becomes “revolutionary - a force against all stronghold of deprivation, creating self-preservation in hope” (Bloch, 1986: 66).

According to previous studies, people give to their churches for either religious or economic reasons. Religious justification is related to feelings of communality and economic reasons to Weberian instrumental rationality (Warner, 2008; Collins R., 2004; Greeley, 1985; Iannaccone, 1985) in which “humans seek what they perceive to be rewards and avoid what they perceive to be costs” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987: 27). The narratives of my interviewees suggest a more nuanced dynamic in their decisions whether to give, however, because of the opposing pull of tactical agency versus religious fundamentalism that excludes profit maximization (Deneen, 1999). Even though the migrants gave their hard earned cash to their places of worship and actively participated in the religious activities of their faith, their agency was steered towards pragmatic self-preservation. That is why religious faith, activities, and leaders (pastors) can be understood as hope brokers to the migrants. The emphasis again is not on religion as a source of resilience for the informal migrants, rather, it is on the ‘brokering’ relationship and negotiations that can also make religion a source of exploitiation, and hence vulnerability.

5.2.4 Resilience

Resilience is thus experienced through the mental reorganisation and reinterpretation of the interviewees’ hard lives in the present, which is facilitated by expectations for the future. Significantly, however, expectations for the future are also framed by failures, vulnerabilities, and harsh realities. Khosravi (2010: 37) argued that the desire to migrate (illegally) could be based “on a desire for and fascination with the modern lifestyle of the industrialised world”. He referred to the “imagination” of the migrant that creates alternative worlds and lifestyles, and ignores “failure, discrimination, racism and the harsh realities of the life facing immigrants”. According to Khosravi, the outcome is disillusionment for the migrant. However, while resilience experienced as hope highlights the interviewees’ ‘imagined’ future, it does not ignore the harsh realities of life. The relevant question, then, is what does the migrant do with such an acknowledgement? In my analysis, the answer is linked to the projects and actions pursued by the interviewee, with a socially informed but individualistic pathway. Resilience as hope thus connects the interviewee’s thoughts to action. The interviewees in this study spoke of positive expectations in the face of vulnerability, persecution, and poverty.

Data from document analysis suggest a milieu of active advocacy and struggle for the protection and support of migrants that could be seen as props for positive expectations in an unforgiving environment. Such data also indicate stringent immigration control, accompanied by a disregard for rights, rules, or regulations by officials that negates or tampers with the objectives of control. This, arguably, could unintentionally induce the migrants resort to seek

37 That is, a relationship where pastors and religious fundamentalism act as intermediaries for the successful achievement of the migrants’ goals
a positive decision for their asylum applications informally, as in bribery. The data from document analysis can be interpreted as contributing to positive expectations through administrative and management gaps in a context that would otherwise reproduce irrevocable disillusionment.

5.3 Migrant Testimony: Tactics

As has been reiterated, the interviewees reported that they were in South Africa to seek better lives. Their narratives denoted two central paradigms: an unacceptable or unsatisfying experience in their home countries (providing the reason for emigrating), and the agency to search for improvements to their situations (affecting the decision to immigrate). In contrast, migration control signifies two activities: regulation and categorisation. So, at each node of interaction between the migrant and the state, the two logics are pitted against each other: the logic of ‘looking for a better life’ vs. the logic of regulation and categorisation.

Starting from the first level of interaction, as dictated by the state (the first step being applying for a permit to visit), the incompatibility of the operational schemes of logic becomes evident. In the sub-section below, I interrogate the visa application form with the narrated experiences and intent of my respondents as an illustration of the dissonance, and the interviewees’ responses in a situation of constraint. Although some of the interviewees entered South Africa by informal means (without applying for a visa), to interrogate the ‘unwantedness’ of the respondents becomes necessary in order to call attention to the development of tactics as responses to concrete, experienced, or perceived constraints.

5.3.1 State: Purpose of Visit? Migrant: Looking for Better Life

My data suggest that there is no straightforward or single explanation for the presence of my respondents in South Africa. Thus it is misleading and impractical to assume that the reason (actual, emerging, or expected) for migrating can be solicited with the question, “Why did you travel to South Africa?” Nevertheless, the attraction of simplifying human actions, of capturing and categorising them into logical groups, is relevant to the administrative, monitoring, and coordinating duties of the state (Gellner, 1983; Scott, 1981). There is rarely a simple reason behind migration specifically or human action generally (Arendt, 1998). As I spoke with my interviewees, I learned to use a ‘how’ question to start our conversations on their presence in South Africa. This allowed the respondents to begin their narratives of life chances, choices, and happenings in a network of small experiences that culminated in their presence in Johannesburg. Consequently, while their narratives contain the common theme of ‘looking for better life’, informal migration assumed an indeterminate part of the process of living in the process of talking about it, with networks and the flows of actions, decisions, and outcomes of a number of people combining to facilitate the decision to migrate. That reiterates the resilience argument, emphasising a broader context of adversity and a concurrent capacity to pursue favourable outcomes (Payne, 2011). Importantly, my interviewees’ stories made it clear that the move to look for a better life was not a criminal act, insubordination, or resistance. Rather,
it was a manifestation of the exercise of agency, a move to try something new that could change
the situation, introduce innovation, or move the agent in a goal-related direction.

When I asked Mary, a 53-year-old female interviewee, how she had migrated to South
Africa, she replied with a narration of her previous life, beginning by saying that it had been
hard for her because her husband earned very little income. She started by travelling to
Botswana, a neighbouring country to her home, Zimbabwe. She sold anything just to contribute
to the family’s cost of living - at times, female apparel and at other times, peanuts – sustaining
the family with this cross-border trade for years until her youngest child became a teenager.
When the income from trading slowed down, Mary switched to working as a maid in Botswana
with a family that gave her extensive financial support and occasionally took her with them
when they travelled to Johannesburg for visits. She told me that one of her younger daughters
was impregnated by a local man, giving birth to a severely physically disabled child. The father
abandoned both child and mother and the responsibility for looking after the child fell to Mary.

All the other years [when trading was slow] I went to find a job in
Botswana; I worked there as a maid. I found nice people; they knew I was
paying fees and paying rent [in Zimbabwe]. I didn’t know Jo’burg. I knew
Jo’burg through them [through visits with her employers]. I had a woman
who was staying with the children at home. I asked her to come and stay with
us so that she can cook for the children when the father is gone to work, so
that she can look after the home [while Mary was living in Botswana as a
maid]. Then the other man (im)pregnate my daughter Cynthia, my second
daughter. Then that man ran away from Zimbabwe to UK, he decided to go
away because the boy is crippled; he can’t walk. My grandson. His name is
Pritchard. It was so painful to me. I started to work hard, so that he [grandson] can get everything; unfortunately he didn’t get everything. She [the mother]
used to take him to the physiotherapist, until he said bye bye. You find out
the room is there but there is no help, people are not paid, they are not work,
they are not there [indicating the hospital was empty because the government
was unable to pay the salary of the staff]. It was so painful to me; when I
came home I was only crying again. How am I going to stay with a child like
this at home? He is not learning, just seated. (Female, 53 years)

Mary spoke of resigning from her job in Botswana so that she could concentrate on taking
care of Pritchard, and the struggles of trading, farming, and borrowing to cater for the family
and the physically challenged child.

That woman [the one taking care of the home] started to be faithful in
the first days. The time goes on, she started to leave that child outside by
himself after the other ones have gone to school and the [grand]father has
gone to work; she will leave the child alone. If those ones they come from
school they will find that the child is outside since morning ... The neighbours
will talk, they will say what are you doing? Please take care of the child.
When the woman phoned me I was in Botswana, it was so painful. I went
home and I found that the child is thin. Even the grandfather was saying, “No you better come back; this woman is now not even faithful. She can’t keep this boy anymore, you will find this boy dead outside.”

So I went back to say to those people [previous employers], “Thank you very much, now I am going back [to Zimbabwe]”. They didn’t want to hear that, they didn’t want to hear that ... They said, “No, you better go and take that child and bring [him to Botswana]”. I said, “No, I can’t bring him here, how am I going to work? How is he going to eat? It will be the same because he will be alone again, when am at work.” So those people say, “OK, we are giving you a month to think about it, so that we can prepare your money, your gratuities and everything ... We want to give you everything.” It was last year [2012]. I left them April last year. (Female, 53 years)

Then finally, Mary described coming to South Africa with the grandchild, living with her eldest daughter in Johannesburg, panhandling on the street, embarking on street trade, searching for a school for the child, and so on. It was a long, hard story she told, one that did not end when she eventually found help for her grandchild in the form of medical therapy and a school.

I didn’t feel good, because I know that now how am I going to close this gap? At home things are not even make sense, the end doesn’t meet. If I leave the job, how am I going to survive? What about these ones who are at school? Then I just decided to leave the job and go home. They gave me what they gave me... then they phoned me again and said, “Please come and visit, because the children they are crying [asking to see the maid]”. So I went back to visit them and they said, “No, you will be coming every month and we will be giving you something”. So I said ... “I can’t manage because that boy will be alone again, even alone he can’t walk, he can’t eat, he can’t even sit”. So I ended up telling them that no. I am suggesting that I want to take this boy to South Africa, I think there I can get something better for him. Here [in Zimbabwe] they said 380 [Zimbabwean] Dollars for his school, which I can’t even think that I can get... I better try somewhere else, where I can take him to get some help. (Female, 53 years)

Mary’s story continued up to the present, as she continued to eke out her living from street trading activities. Her narrative presented a composite of experiences that, combined, brought her to Johannesburg, whereas a single reason like “I came to live with my daughter” or “I came for medical reasons” completely fails to cast light on her trajectory. Nevertheless, on the immigration form required for a visitor or residence permit in South Africa, the third question in the second section – PURPOSE OF VISIT – offers a single dotted line for the answer. How should the migrant capture the fusion of past, present, and future intent in one sentence? From my data, the realistic response would seem to be ‘seeking a better life’, signifying anticipations of a benign unknown offering hope for a rosy future. For the state, however, ‘the purpose of visit’ lies at the core of the migration control system’s categorisation.
and regulation of incoming foreigners, which functions on the basis of its unicausal logic.

Musa, 33, from Ethiopia, described his needs as a longing for something new and different, with the possibility of its being better. For him, ‘seeking a better life’ offers a transformation of his environment from hardship and unpleasantness to adventure and potential.

I graduated from technical college and was working in Addis Ababa Municipality. I had salary, it was small, I was young, and I just want change in my life. Because this is my time to make change in my life. I am thinking maybe outside is better. Even my father, he is a music conductor, did not support me when I come for South Africa. But it’s my option, when I come, I come alone, I did not have anybody in South Africa. (Male, 33 years)

In further illustration of the variety of reasons motivating cross-border movement, Nigerian Ebi indicated that it was his mother’s wishes that urged him to seek a better life via migration, and her support was one of the motivating factors in his final decision.

I came to South Africa through a church invitation … A pastor invited me to play [musical instruments] for his church in South Africa. My mother was like, “It is a pastor, you must go.” It wasn’t like she doesn’t like the gifts [musical talents] God gave me, but she doesn’t want me to follow that kind of way when I grow up: to be travelling with them [cultural troupe]. So the man of God [pastor], when he came, he prayed and did everything, so we believed him. So we came here. (Male, 36 years)

For Daniel, 43, from Cameroun, the need to escape social and personal embarrassment motivated migration, a notion that introduced a mental shift in the schema of seeking a better life. He had manoeuvred himself into a no-option situation and, finally, just wanted to get away from his home country. He reported that he had been working as a lecturer in a nursing college in Cameroun and in 2004 he decided he wanted to travel to study because he had saved enough money to sponsor himself. He had aspirations to get his master’s degree in Public Health and a doctorate, and then he could lecture in a university where salaries were better than in a nursing college. His unsuccessful attempts to get a study visa and the years and financial resources spent in processing unsuccessful university applications frustrated him and motivated his decision to emigrate to South Africa.

I was working, teaching in a nursing college in Cameroun; I was working like that because I was sponsoring my junior ones. So what happened, after 2004, I said I wanted to travel. I had money, lots of money, so I said the best thing to do is study [abroad]. So I got interested in, say maybe if I get the master’s in public health I will be lecturing, and a doctorate. I will lecture in the university; the salary was very good. I said maybe I should study in England, the one [school] in America did not accept my application.
So I showed my experience and they [English school] gave me admission. And I went to British Embassy. I had never wanted to leave Cameroun, I don’t know what pushed me to apply that I want to study in England. Everything was fine. I even had to resign from my job, because I couldn’t be going and collecting documents around, so I resigned. That was when I started spending my money; I was 100% sure, because there was no reason why I will not be given the visa. That’s when it started [laughing derisively]. The thing is, they kept saying bring this, bring that, year after year. So when I did not get that visa, I did not want to go back again to get my salary. My expectations were different now. I registered with the Alberta [Canada] Association of Registered Nurses; that one again I did not get a visa. So that is how I came to South Africa. (Male, 43 years)

The popular logic of migrating to search for a better life thus camouflages various reasons for leaving the homeland and seeking to enter the host country. While this general goal may unite migrants conceptually, the flagella of individual experiences, purposes, and drive act to create a personal and subjective character. This means that the migration control stipulation – for categorisation purposes – of a single reason for entry to South Africa does not fit the circumstances of the interviewees and hundreds of thousands like them. The migrant’s interpretation of ‘purpose of visit’ will always be influenced by multiple, complex experiences, desires, and drives, making it difficult to apply for a legal visa or permit to enter South Africa – or, should one do so, impossible to report actual intent.

As it is common that the stated reason for migrating may or may not be related to intended activity in the host country, it arguably makes no sense to require potential immigrants to state the purpose of their stay. Concomitantly, while statistics can tally the number of formal border entries, they are inadequate to reporting migrants’ actual activities or length of stay once within the country. Thus, administrative requirements aimed at effective immigration control fail to achieve their objectives and goals. This is the result of two important factors: the dissonance between actual reasons for migration and the permitted grounds for immigration permits; and the futility of attempting to predict and control actions that are tactical and, therefore, often extemporary (Guiraudon & Joppke, 2001). De Certeau illustrated his definition of tactics by introducing the term “la perruque” (1984: 25), a type of diversionary practice initiated by dominated groups or individuals to circumvent repressive systems. He explained, “la perruque is the worker’s own work disguised as work for his employer. ... It differs from pilfering in that nothing of material value is stolen ... Under different names in different countries, this phenomenon is becoming more and more general.” Similarly, increasing numbers of informal migrants disguise their real purpose by listing one of the officially permitted purposes on visa forms, thereby applying ‘la perruque’ to the South African system of immigration control. De Certeau (1984: 29) further defines tactics by suggesting a dimension of tenacity or refusal to acknowledge the established order as having the final say. In other words, despite measures taken to repress them, successful tactics find a way of ‘making do’.
5.3.2 State: Duration of Stay (Days, Weeks or Months)? Migrant: Until I Locate the Better Life

Immigration control requires that visitors to South Africa inform the authorities of their proposed length of stay. On South Africa’s visa application form (B1-84), the question is followed by parentheses containing the permitted duration in days, weeks, or months, indicating that the applicant is only allowed to remain in South Africa as a visitor for a specific period measured in a maximum of months; a residence permit is required for a longer stay. Realistically, however, for the informal migrant the question should, rather, reference the length of time that they expect it will take to find the sought-after better life in the country. Discussing their thoughts before migration with my interviewees, they informed me that at the time of leaving their home country, their consideration of South African immigration was directed towards the few available access and residence options rather than the exclusionary and preventive regulations.

Oliver, who came to South Africa from Ivory Coast because his mother suggested it to him, described his thought processes on the subject.

My mother asked me if I want to go to South Africa? I said OK. I called that man [a migrant courier] and said I want to go to South Africa. He said, “Ok. But when you get to South Africa, what do you want to do?” I said I will study. I did not finish my master’s; about six months remained to finish [it]. It was after the war in my country, I wanted to continue study and work in South Africa.

He did not complete his master’s degree before migrating to South Africa, where he intended to continue with the studies and get employment. Yet, rather than applying for a study visa, he arrived in South Africa with a three-month visiting visa; furthermore, as French is the official language in Ivory Coast, his knowledge of English (the language of instruction in South Africa’s higher education institutions) was very weak.

Pila, as already noted, reported that she came to South Africa with a three-month visiting visa, although she was en route to Europe.

I came here in 2001 ... when I was 17 years. So my aim of coming here was to go - I was not actually coming to South Africa, I was supposed to go to Europe. They said it is more easier to go from South Africa, so I came to South Africa. (Female, 28 years)

These narrations suggest that long-term goals – related to a nuanced conception of ‘making it’ or becoming successful – are the principal concern, while little consideration is given to possible challenges in the host country; the view seems to be that these will be addressed in ad hoc fashion, with a focus on the future. Significantly, no mention is ever made of how long it will take to achieve the envisaged success; rather, it was simply another stage in the journey of life, where anything might befall them. The duration of stay in South Africa was
not bound to time but rather to “the plural mobility of goals and desires” (de Certeau, 1984: xxii). The search for a better life by migrants, formal or informal, denotes the exercise of agency in the pursuit of goals, and a readiness to take active steps to change locations if goals are seen to be elusive or impossible within the new environment. In this sense, it is not the expiration of the visa that determines the period of sojourn or the departure date, but the perception and evaluation of experiences.

Oliver, for example, expressed strong regrets for making the decision to migrate to South Africa. He had arrived in 2011 and worked as a street trader until 2013 when he decided to quit. He said the chances of his finding a better life in South Africa were almost impossible because he was arrested for trading on the street several times and his goods were confiscated. He could not save in such a situation, yet he wanted to continue his studies and not remain a street trader for life.

Ah, it is a mistake [to have come to South Africa], a big mistake. I know many friends; they left wives and kids to come to South Africa. I know one Nigerian; he left his son and daughter. Now he is going to 13 to 14 years [in South Africa]. Now he is sick, the family said they want to buy him ticket and send him home; he said he will kill himself. He said if he want to go home he will go with strong body and not sick. He has spent 14 years here but he does not have paper [residence permit]. Many people from Benin, Nigeria, West Africa, have been here for 13 or 14 years, still no paper. Sometimes they ask you for 10 or 20 rand. Ah, tell this thing, it is not good for people to come to South Africa. (Male, 28 years)

A few months after the interview, Oliver called me to say that he was on his way home to Ivory Coast. Interestingly, he handed over his trading space to a migrant newly arrived from the same country. The individual, subjective evaluation of the situation determines whether to remain or not in South Africa. Other migrants react differently and remain, eking out a living, irrespective of experiences similar to those described by Oliver.

5.3.3 State: Wishing to Work for the Republic? Yes or No: Migrant: Making Do

Creating and conserving employment for citizens is one of the main concerns of the South African government in a context of high unemployment (an average 25.31% from 2000-16). This becomes particularly pressing in a situation of high influx of immigrants, when the state is less likely to welcome migrants wishing to work in areas or professions with already limited job opportunities for citizens. Yet my interview data suggest that migrant unemployment does not equate with economic unproductiveness. Hence, while the government focuses on controlling migrant employment and curtailing the admission of qualified migrants, the interviewees entertained a ‘making do’ approach – taking advantage of whatever was available and creating economic opportunities where there appeared to be none.

The majority of my interviewees had been engaged in different types of economic
activities at various times. Denied access to formal employment, they developed the art of generating income, using available space to meet the identified needs of their host community. Most interviewees indicated that they were engaged in several trades or services as their means of income. Some of them had to learn a new trade or enter business fields that were totally new to them, exhibiting a mix of creativity and the determination to address their difficult context.

Without formal qualifications or experience of hair braiding, Pila, for example, rented a seat in a saloon and went out to search for customers, learning as went along.

In South Africa, I just entered the saloon, using my experience of doing my friends hair back home. I was picking up, you know, and the owner [of the saloon] just liked me. In that saloon I was the youngest, but I was dominating, I was ahead of all of them. After the owner of the place it was me. I did hair more than all of them, I was faster; I use to work on the street. We stay by the street and stop customers and then take them to a place that is really like a shade, where you can sit and do hair. I also sold popcorn, to see if there will be more money … in addition I sold razor blades. I tried selling different things. (Female, 28 years)

Daniel’s story of how he got his previous and present jobs in Johannesburg encapsulates the arbitrary trajectories produced by migrants’ identification of income-generating trade, services, or employment. Having been a surgical nurse in Cameroun, Daniel said he started by seeking formal employment in Johannesburg but could not find any and so he went out on the street, searching for work.

We use to do anything; you go out on the street. When I first got in, I started looking for jobs, I went everywhere. I was going around seeking from people. So I was passing, I came and met one guy, I don’t know how. When he came he said. “Oi’ boy, what are you looking for?” I said, “Man, I am looking for job”, and he said, “Come on Sunday”. So that is how we started work; you will mix the cement, pour in wheelbarrow, renovating, that is how I started. They just call you when there is something available that South Africans cannot do. If they call you every day, you will work; you have to just wait. They will call you: they want you to fall all these bricks and put them in that floor; you will say yes. But I was happy, at least I have food. Struggle, struggle, struggle – it is something I am use to, I was surviving a day.

I met one guy; he is a painter, so I started painting. I met this other guy; they said he owns a security company… When I had money, I even wanted to do a short certificate course for security job, so one guy told me, “Don’t waste your time; they will give you the certificate but not work”. But I lost that job. That job paid well but it is too risky.

At that time I use to sit with these brothers who own [a haircutting]
saloon. That is when I say, “Eh, I can learn how to barb [cut hair].” Then I started learning. I didn’t have clipper and it was difficult to start, but as time go on you get used to it and then you come and cut so many hair. And then I said, “Ah, I can actually earn more than the security guard” … When I came during winter, I even did street trade; we used to go and buy these gloves, caps, and socks from Jeppe [a street in Johannesburg]. We ... just spread and throw them [on the ground]; we use to make very fast money. (Male, 43 years)

For the interviewees, work was about making do and finding ways of benefiting from the restrictive working conditions, armed with a creative plurality of tactics. All of the interviewees were officially unemployed, but this did not mean they had no income; rather, their economic state suggested irregular revenue generated by dogged micro-entrepreneurship. That is a significant distinction in a context of high unemployment, high population density, and a struggling government and, importantly, also suggests that the interviewees experienced vulnerability irregularly, with possible periods of high and low income. Instead of assuming a flat experience of vulnerability due to their ‘unwantedness’, an undulating experience should be envisaged.

5.3.4 The Relevance of Time and ‘Waiting’ to Tactics

In his discussions of tactics, de Certeau (1984: 38, 39) conceptualises time as an accomplice, noting that “tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to time”. He also differentiates tactics from strategies by elucidating that tactics rely on the “clever utilisation of time”. Indeed, in seeking opportunities and making do in the pursuit of goals, the informal migrant learns to work with and befriend time as an ally in attaining eventual success. As Daniel said:

…you have to just wait. I was surviving a day (at a time), you have to go and sit in that place during winter, from morning until evening. If there is somebody who didn’t show up for work, and you are lucky, then you will get a job. (Male, 43 years)

Time is strongly implicated in the opportunities that aid informal migrants in their quest for better life.

Examining the experiences and activities of my interviewees from the time they arrived in South Africa until the point of the interview, I observed that each of them had made productive use of the period of waiting for refugee permit. Mary from Zimbabwe entered South Africa in 2012 with her physically challenged grandson and at the time of the interview in September 2013, she was still waiting for her refugee permit to be processed. However, she had used the waiting time to search for medical intervention for her grandson and at the date of the interview, her grandson was receiving physical therapy through the help of an NGO. Bali, who had arrived in South Africa from Benin in 2010, reported that he had borrowed 50
rand from another migrant and started selling cigarettes and biscuits by the roadside. At the
time of this interview, he said he was paying the school fees of two of his younger brothers in
his home country with income from his street trade in bananas. He was still renewing his
asylum seeker permit every six months, and expressed less concern about the bureaucratic
delays in processing his application for refugee status than about the metro police that disrupt
his trade. Daniel from Cameroun utilised his waiting time to operate his hair-cutting business,
 had married a South African, and was saving money towards starting a trading business after
he gets his refugee permit, while Musa, the restaurateur, had been able to acquire assets during
the years his refugee application was being processed. In his words, he was now ready to go
back to his home country. Eight out of my nine respondents were saving money towards a
project, and some of them were remitting money to family members in their home country
while their permits were being processed.

Recently, migration scholars have started to pay more attention to the migrants’
experiences of time, especially when waiting for official decisions on their residential permits
(Andersson, R. 2014a; Khosravi, 2010; Dhillon & Yousef, 2009). These studies build on an
established body of literature on the study of time that ranges from Frank Kafka’s parable,
Before the Law (1915), about a man waiting before and for the law, through Samuel Beckett’s
theatrical play, Waiting for Godot (1953), about endlessly waiting for someone who never
comes, to explorations of the concept of time in community, social processes, mobility, and so
on (Bastian, 2014, 2011; Adam, 1994; Hall, 1980). Although migration has traditionally been
interrogated as a spatial process in the literature, some migration scholars have argued that it
is as much about time as about space. In this sense, gains from the social study of time have
benefited the discourse of migration where, for example, the concept of time is discussed with
regards migrants’ experiences of temporality and waiting.

As in Kafka’s parable, my respondents have spent years waiting for permits that will
afford them all the associated opportunities and, resonating with de Certeau’s (1984) discussion
of tactics, have utilised the time in ways that grasp the opportunities rather than the
uncertainties that come with waiting. In their everyday practices, my respondents continually
had to wait for customers, wait for jobs, and wait for decisions on their applications. In their
narratives, they recorded waiting with the anticipation that in due time what they expect will
come to pass. Time thus becomes the ally of informal migrants in navigating the socio-
economic and political constraints that they face in their daily lives. For example, when they
receive a negative decision on their asylum application, they simply fill out a form to reapply
and usually utilise the bureaucratic processing time to continue with their business and lives.
Though several of the interviewees bemoaned having a temporary permit for as long as ten
years, they used the time to engage in trading and service businesses, acquire new income-
generating skills, and start new families, putting the long bureaucratic processing times for
residence permits to good purpose.

In contrast, migrants’ temporal expectations of the duration of stay in the host community
have been argued to create ambivalence among them and discourage commitments and ties to
the host country (Roberts, 1995). Time has also been explored from the institutional
perspective, suggesting that policy makers and governments use the passage of time or length
of stay as instruments for the control and categorisation of migrants (Cohen, 1994). This
interpretation frames bureaucratic delays in the processing of immigrants’ permits as a manipulation of their time and a display of hegemonic power. According to Pierre Bourdieu (2000: 28), “Making people wait … delaying without destroying hope is part of the domination”. More recent studies of immigration control exploring migrants’ experiences of hegemonic control of time, explore the profound feelings of uncertainty, instability, powerlessness, and passivity this engenders (Andersson R., 2014b; Griffiths, 2013; Richards & Rotter, 2013). Yet, although my participants expressed feelings of uncertainty raised by enforced waiting, their experiences of powerlessness in relation to economic activities were an even greater concern. In this sense, emphasis was on the right and the freedom to carry out street trading activities without disruption.

It is worthy to note that while migration researchers have drawn attention to the hegemonic control of migrants’ time, scholars such as Comaroff and Comaroff (1997), Scott (1985), and Bourdieu (1972) have noted that the dominated do not passively experience forms and systems of oppression such as the usurpation and control of migrants’ time. A resilience approach to the study of migrants’ lives thus highlights the agency exerted in their utilisation of time. It also must be noted that, although my respondents utilised their time productively during processing periods, they still constantly had to deal with spatial issues.

My respondents did not have a physical space they could call their own. Their street trading pitches were temporary – they were constantly on the lookout for police officers seeking to arrest them and confiscate their meagre wares. In addition, because their applications were being processed, they were always in danger of being deported either because they had received a negative decision or because of the overzealousness of xenophobic police officers. Logically, it could be expected that such issues would influence their experiences of time while waiting for decisions on asylum permits or the success that they seek in South Africa. Thus, the stronger the spatial temporality of the informal migrant’s experiences, the less likely he or she would be to form ties that contradict the flexibility of temporality. Conversely, it can be considered that because the informal migrant engages time as his or her tactical ally, or probably as a natural course of order, he or she often develops ties that contrast with their conditions of temporality. For example, several of my interviewees were in personal relationships and had produced children while waiting for decisions on their asylum applications. In some cases, the relationships were with other informal migrants. When both parents were unsure of how long they had in South Africa before deportation, they had to rely on their informal tactics to extend their stay as long as possible.

Time is not always productive for informal migrants, however. Oliver from Ivory Coast discussed his engagement with time with an emphasis on his failure to achieve his goals despite years of being in South Africa, expressing frustrations that he is far from achieving his personal goals of further education and employment. He gave examples of other asylum seekers who have spent years in South Africa and have yet to receive refugee status or achieve economic success. To him, the years spent in South Africa had been unproductive, and he could have achieved more if he had spent those years in his homeland. His case differs from the other interviewees because he did not apply for asylum, deciding to remain undocumented because he did not want to sever his citizenship ties with Ivory Coast. Nevertheless, Oliver’s story raises questions about the economic difference that receiving an official decision would make on the
lives of the informal migrants. In a context of a high unemployment, the mere right to residence cannot guarantee access to employment and by extension economic security. That suggests that the response of the informal migrant to the waiting period depends on the perception of, and ability to utilise, economic opportunities within the host society, an insight which can be applied more broadly to the pursuit of goal-related activities within the host community in general. For informal migrants in South Africa, not being confined to an asylum centre is an opportunity in itself.

Another effect of waiting is that when an unfavourable decision is received, the apparent stability established by the informal migrant is destabilised. For example, on my second fieldwork visit in December 2014, I discovered that several of the migrants that I had interviewed in the autumn of 2013 had moved from their street trading pitches, changed phone numbers, and were consequently unreachable. When I asked after Ebi, the musician/model with a wife and two children in South Africa in 2013, I was told he had gone back to Nigeria, and the whereabouts of his family was unknown. If he had received an unfavourable decision and was subsequently arrested and deported, then what he had achieved in terms of family life while waiting for his decision was effectively shattered with, presumably, dire consequences for the family left behind in South Africa. A CoRMSA (2010) report also documents the experiences of informal migrants who are unable to collect earned salaries or work benefits because of arrest and deportation, indicating that although waiting time could be productively utilised, the benefits could be fleeting.

5.3.5 Resilience in Tactics

The practices narrated by my interviewees were not designed to confront the system, rules or individuals that constrained them; rather, they leaned more towards irregularity. For example, Bali reported that he beats the long queues and bureaucratic delays at Home Affairs by placing money between his papers before passing them to the officer in charge of renewal. Another interviewee, Daniel, spoke about some older migrants who, for a fee, would act as middlemen between a new migrant seeking asylum and the Department of Home Affairs. Furthermore, their practices are piecemeal. For instance, recognising that street trade is prohibited, and that they can be arrested if apprehended, they have developed makeshift ways of selling on the street. I was informed that migrant street traders would bring out their goods in small quantities when selling, making it easier for them to move their property if alerted that the police were arresting traders, and minimising their losses if their goods were confiscated.

I also noticed that migrants who provided services like hair braiding or cutting acted as lookouts for street traders; as soon as a police van was sighted, they would signal each other to avoid being apprehended. I witnessed one such occurrence in 2013 during my fieldwork; in less than five minutes the bustling street was quiet, with goods previously on tables strewn everywhere as the traders tried to move their wares swiftly. All I heard was a whistling that increased in volume as more migrants participated to alert other sellers while running with their goods. By the time the police van got to where I was standing, the street was empty of traders, so the police merely carted away goods abandoned in haste. It was chaotic and painful to watch, yet the adroitness of the migrants in evading arrest and their perseverance in returning
immediately after the police left was quite admirable. The migrants also employed clever tricks to get away with prohibited activities. For example, on 14th August 2013, as I sat with one of my respondents, Bali from republic of Benin, to help and keep him company with his street trading, I noticed that most of the uniformed security guards were buying without paying. When I asked him about it, he replied that he sells to them on credit so that he can be in their good books as a form of protection against future arrests.

These are just some of the ways in which the migrants’ actions and activities have been adapted to the constraints of their environment, highlighting their resilience. Neil Adger et al.\(^ {38} \) (2005) point out that one characteristic of resilient action is a capacity to absorb recurrent disturbances, postulating the persistence of adversity as an element that compels the development of resilience. In this interpretation, migrants’ tactical agency is provoked by recurrent experiences of dissatisfaction with life’s circumstances and the motivation to address the discomfiture and discontent. For my respondents, dissatisfaction with their life situation predated their presence in South Africa, and thus cannot be disassociated from a broader context; furthermore, their narrations revealed that dissatisfaction may have rather disparate content. For instance, Eduard stated that he came to South Africa because he wanted to further his studies and seek a better way of living.

Life in Malawi is a very difficult life. I was so poor in Malawi that I lived in a house which had no electricity. My parents also had a very bad background; [they] did not come from a rich family, so it became a problem to me also. So when I came here, I wanted to further my study and continue to live a better life. (Male, 33 years)

The source of Eduard’s discontent can be located in the macro politics and economic condition of his home country, and in the economic situation of his parents that translated into dissatisfying life conditions. Migration thus became his chosen way to absorb the political and personal elements in his experience of discontent.

Once my respondents had decided to migrate, identifying the means by which they could get into South Africa became the next challenge. Seven entered with a short-term visiting visa, and the others caught a bus through the border. Those with visiting visas had been required to fill out application forms, supplying the expected answers in order ensure a positive response. To achieve perfect responses to the many questions in the visa application form, two of the respondents had paid courier agents specialising in South Africa immigration; three interviewees relied on their pastor courier to fulfil the strict conditions of migration regulations. An examination of the visa form and the narrated activities and thoughts of my respondents underlined the inadequacy of the migration control apparatus, revealing that from the first point of contact, the preoccupations of the migrant are incompatible with the demands and expectations of migration control. The dissonance between the available legal instruments and the migrants’ intent compels “a dynamic coping strategy” (Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen, 2005) in migrants’ attempts to shape their futures or achieve their goals.

\(^{38}\) Neil Adger, Terry Hughes, Carl Folke, Stephen Carpenter, and Johan Roskstrom (2005)
Resilience theory has often emphasized positive adaptation or adjustment in contexts of adversity. In Chapter Two I discussed criticisms levied against this common conception of the resilience construct in sociological studies by Payne (2011) and Stevenson and Davis (2004), who argue against a value-laden dichotomisation of behaviours as either resilient or mal-adaptive when applying the resilience construct to the study of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. They also express concerns over the absence of structural dimensions and historicity in studies using the construct. Their arguments are relevant to this study given that analysis of my data concerning the theme of survival identifies the dynamic pursuit of a better life as the culmination of my respondents’ hopes and tactics. In the section below, I examine institutional and social barriers to this pursuit in light of the histories of my respondents and their present daily lives, emphasizing neither triumph nor failure but agency and choice in the pursuit of expectations and aspirations – in this case, a better life. I begin with an examination of the context in a bid to underline the relevance of structural and institutional factors to a study of disadvantaged individuals from a resilience perspective.

5.4 Survival

5.4.1 Politics as the ‘Making’ of Informal Migrants’ Adversity

The resilience approach calls attention to two juxtaposed lines of inquiry in this study: Does the disadvantaged group under analysis (informal migrants) experience adversity because of its position within society? Or is the context adverse because adversity is its natural state; that is, would everyone experience the same adversity as informal migrants if they were in the same socio-economic position – but without the politicisation attendant on the whole issue of immigration? Therefore, in this section I discuss the relevance of the migration context in the building of personal lives by the informal migrants, examining the elements that contribute to their socially and politically disadvantaged position.

You cannot pay your rent; it is a big problem here. You can’t pay your rent in my country, if you can’t pay your rent, the owner will come take the key from you. If you don’t want to leave, they will go to police station, after police station they will take court, then after that, they will take your key. But here, you never pay once, they close the door [lock you out]. I don’t believe this country. I don’t believe this country. (Male, 28 years)

Here Oliver from Ivory Coast relates what happens when an informal migrant is unable to pay his rent on time, narrated to highlight the injustice and discrimination people experience as informal migrants in South Africa. My respondents usually described the environment of their country of origin as one in which they have rights, where they are accorded basic social dignity and courtesy.

Thus, before migration, the individual may be politically conceptualised as living in a setting where policies, rules, and regulations are enacted in his or her best interest. The political
apparatus for creating this situation was embodied in the expected roles and obligations of the nation-state (Micklethwaith & Wooldridge, 2014). In the understanding of my interviewees, therefore, their home country provided a more equitable socio-political context, and, by migrating to the host country, they had moved from a favourable context to one where their rights could be abused, possibly without recourse or substantive help from the law or agents of the state. The responsibility or blame for that is placed on the change in the relationship between the individual (now an informal migrant rather than a citizen) and the nation-state of current residence, and on the ‘informalness’ of the migrant’s relationship with the state which has resulted. By implication, as an informal international migrant the individual can be abused, while a desirable, ‘legal’ migrant can turn to the law for recourse and to check exploitations. Thus the adversity in the informal migrants’ context is perceived as a product of the relationship between the migrant and the nation-state, of how the nation-state qualifies the relationship and the rights and responsibilities it assigns to it (Johansen, 2013). Therefore, the adversity experienced by the informal migrant assumes a political ‘making’ based on a constructed relationship between the nation-state and the migrants. In cases where this relationship between the migrant and nation-state is defined as negative or unclear, a negative social experience is created for the migrant.

Data from document analysis (CoRMSA, 2010, 2009, 2008) illustrate ambiguity in the migration laws and regulations of South Africa that creates a context of adversity for asylum seekers in particular and foreign migrants in general. For instance, an asylum seeker may be arrested while waiting to submit an application at the RRO or while in the process of renewing an expired asylum seeker’s permit, and eventually deported. In this situation, the migrant is undocumented but not illegal, but my data highlight that the DHA Directorate for Admissions and Aliens control is quick to treat undocumented as a synonym for illegal. The data (CoRMSA 2008) also show that ambiguity in national guidelines for immigration policing has facilitated a context where different precincts utilise their subjectively drawn linkages between undocumented foreign migrants and crime in order to harass informal African migrants as criminals. Furthermore, the data make it clear that asylum seekers and refugees are excluded from subsidised National Housing Schemes because their residence status is conflated with undocumented or illegal standing. The Housing Codes and guidelines do not make a distinction between legal and undocumented migrants generally, nor do they specifically mention asylum seekers and refugees as legal residents. Ambiguities in immigration law and associated regulations therefore facilitate a situation of abuse and discrimination in South Africa.

Several authors (e.g., Coutin, 2000; Sassen, 1999; Torpey, 1998; Harris, N. 1995) have poignantly posited illegal migration (one form of informal migration) as the result of state’s intervention in migration. The nation-state actively creates adversity by the migration policies it pursues and their effects on foreign migrants. Adversity in the host country is produced in several ways, starting with the political construction of belonging. John Torpey (1998: 245) argues that the idea of belonging that the state has painstakingly crafted to perpetuate society is threatened when people move across international borders, “leaving spaces where they ‘belong’ and entering those where they do not”. As an individual migrating from home to host country, the basis of his or her belongingness is changed from citizenship to that of the desired criteria, characteristics, and qualities identified by the host country in migration control regulations. An inability to meet the stipulated criteria for belonging to the host society
relegates the migrant to those experiences which are politically prescribed for those that do not belong. The informal migrant is subjected to political criminalisation, as both identification and as the basis for socio-political responses to their hardships (Aas & Bosworth, 2013).

As an identification, the criminalisation of informal migration extends from migrants’ experiences in the legal sphere to the social; hence, as already noted, legal ‘rights’ do not necessarily translate into positive experiences for migrants. In 2007, South Africa’s National Department of Health (NDoH) issued directives that refugees and asylum seekers should have access to public health care. They must not be charged ‘foreign category’ fees and should be exempted from paying for ART (Antiretroviral Therapy). However, CoRMSA data (2008) highlight several factors that prevent refugees and asylum seekers from accessing public healthcare services, such as demands for fees for emergency care, the need for documentation, and ignorance on the part of medical personnel of migrants’ rights to services and appropriate fees. My respondents also emphasized the human element in their experiences in public hospitals. For example, Pila reported that she was compelled to skip immunising her two children because of the aggressiveness of the nurses towards African migrants.

Even my children this thing – immunisation - I don’t even go, since I came to this Hillbrow, because of the harshness. They will be hitting you, put your child in order. They will be so harsh, especially when you are a foreigner. (Female, 28 years)

Data analysis also called attention to rights to employment, showing that migrants’ access to work continues to be limited by institutional factors including delays in the processing of migrants’ applications, the frequency of renewal, and limited public information for employers on the rights of asylum seekers and refugees.

Interviewees also reported that simply because they have asylum seekers’ permits they were treated as criminals by the police who can legally stop them, and (illegally) confiscate whatever money they find. If the police decide to be kind, then the migrant will be compelled to share the money with them; this way the migrant gets to keep part of it.

Sometimes they will just enter [a shop], everybody on the floor, intimidating people; they search, and they see money, maybe it is money for business. “What are you doing with this kind of money?” [they ask]. “What I do with this kind of money? Maybe I am keeping my rent!” They will be after the money; you must share something at least. (Male, 36 years)

That interviewee, Ebi from Nigeria, told of how the police stopped some of his friends and asked them to lie face down on a dirty and muddy spot by the roadside as part of their ‘stop and search’ duties against migrant crimes. Another respondent, Daniel from Cameroun, described how police went into a local bar where African migrants gather after working hours and started shooting indiscriminately with rubber bullets. He said one of his migrant friends lost an eye as a result.
Political criminalisation creates social and political adversity for the migrant that is relatively absent in the home country. Daniel Nordman (1987), as translated in Torpey, (1998: 239), noted that “The Vagabond is by definition a suspect”, encapsulating one of the social consequences of politically labelling informal migrants as criminals, whereby the state indirectly facilitates and provokes social acrimony between its citizens and migrants. In South Africa, social distrust and conflicts between citizens and informal migrants have contributed to tensions that have led to extreme violence against migrants (Landau, 2011).

Political criminalisation and labelling also blinds state officials to migrants’ contribution to society. Theodor Adorno (Jarvis, 1998) argued that identification of migrants circumscribes the scope and facets of the subject to the desired level only. However, the reverse is also the case. Such identifications also bind the scope and aspects of the identifier within a frame from which he cannot break free to explore his unlimited ability to create the world he desires. In this sense, by identifying migrants and, in particular, poor and unskilled migrants, as ‘undesirable’ and/or ‘disastrous’ to a fully functional and successful South African society, state officials are blinded to the advantages and contributions migrants make, despite studies drawing attention to them. They thereby also confine themselves to pursuing policies that seek to address negative labelling rather than maximising migrants’ contributions. For example, the most recent (26th May 2014) review of South Africa’s immigration laws and regulations has criticised them as draconian and as closing the gate against its African migrants (Hamill, 2014).

Moreover, as discussed in Chapters One and Three, South Africa’s public discourse of fear of the political ‘other’ in the shape of migrants has also been linked to its apartheid history, suggesting that South Africa’s immigration strategies re-enact the apartheid imagery of African migration as a threat to a fully functioning society.

However, the relationship between the police and ordinary citizens from low income levels is rarely perceived as being as good as it might be, irrespective of the migration element. There is also a possibility that the interviewees’ self-perceptions as being ‘informal’ or ‘foreign’ may contribute to how the migration context is experienced. For example, the fear of deportation could prevent an informal migrant from seeking redress when wronged. Alternatively, as in the case of the harsh landlord, the informal migrant may have proven in the past to be such an exemplary tenant, worker, partner, and so on, that out-of-character behaviour provokes a harsh response. The point being made is that, while the political context of migration is seen as creating adversity for the informal migrants, the actual experiencing of it becomes broader than the political. Therefore, one of the dilemmas of the migration context is that adversity is situated at the nexus where polity, society, psychology, economics, and even morality interact. At that point, adversity may not take the form of objective knowledge, but a living experience – highlighting its mutability and complexities.

5.4.2 Survival as Migration Management

Migration management refers to the administrative, policy, and legal activities that are initiated to harness migration potential for the host society and the migrants. However, the data from document analysis indicate that migration management provides the grounds for contestations, struggles, and divisions. The thrust of control suggests a divide between
developing informal migrants’ potential and benefiting the development of the host society. That is self-evident, as South Africa’s immigration laws identify some migrants as desirable, with the goal to “maximise the benefit of immigration and minimise risk to South Africa … and also support the building of the South African economy through the facilitation of scarce and required business skills” (DHA annual report, 2010-2011, 40). By implication, migrants that are unwanted increase the risks to South Africa; so immigration management is geared to keeping them out and dissuading them from moving to South Africa. While the government preoccupies itself with its immigration objectives, the unique context of South Africa has fostered a thriving and potent third sector of NGOs which are actively working to remodel migration management in South Africa to meet international human rights values. Documentary evidence (CoRMSA, 2008, 2009 and 2010) indicates that their activities are progressively seeking to change the migration context in ways that protect and uphold the dignity and rights of informal migrants. This is seen as contributing to informal migrants’ wellbeing, and changing South Africa’s migration landscape from exclusion and control to one of gradual survival, thereby emphasizing give-and-take, dynamism, and informal migrants’ development.

Document analysis shows a high number of legal contestations in the practice of migration management in South Africa. In the case of Minister of Home Affairs vs. Tafira and others (2007; SCA case 155/07), The Law Clinic of the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, took the DHA to court to contest the pre-screening process for asylum seekers at the RROs in Marabastad and Rosettenville. The court found in favour of the Law Clinic; the DHA appealed the decision but lost, and was ordered to re-assess the asylum applications that went through the pre-screening process. In another case (Van Garderen vs. Refugee Appeal Board case no: 30720/2006), Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) challenged the rejection of an asylum application from three Congolese children who lost their father after they arrived in South Africa. The DHA rejected their request for asylum and their subsequent appeal for review from the Refugee Appeal Board also received a negative decision. The court handed down a decision that favoured the children, finding that the Appeal Board erred in demanding from the children a standard of proof that was too high, and faulting the Board’s conclusion that the situation in DRC did not pose a danger to the children. The decisions of the Refugee Status Determination Officer and the Appeal Board were disregarded, and asylum was granted to the children.

In some cases, a favourable decision can have impact on the lives of all other migrants and set a precedent for positive change in human rights. For example, the rights of migrant workers were positively improved with the decision from a court case (Discovery health vs. CCMA and others, Labour Court, case JR 2877/06) involving Lanzetta, an Argentinean, and his employer, Discovery Health. Lanzetta was dismissed, despite his work contract, because his work permit expired, with Discovery Health citing the prohibition by the Immigration Act against employing an illegal immigrant. However, the court ruled that Lanzetta was still an employee under the Labour Relations Act. The decision is interpreted to mean that employment contracts are valid irrespective of immigration status. The court ruling also strengthened the decision of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) to extend its services to undocumented foreign nationals. Notwithstanding these examples, not all court cases are considered favourable for the foreign migrant, and at times they can have mixed
results with some gains for the foreign migrant and some for the government. For instance, in the case CoRMSA and Others vs. Minister of Home Affairs and Others (WLD: CASE 08/6709), LHR challenged the procedure of detaining foreign migrants who made asylum claims while in detention. The court ordered the release of asylum seekers in custody but did not find the DHA process in error because the foreign migrants applied for asylum after detention. Another case (Adela Mbalinga Aken vs. Minister of Home Affairs, case 46875/07 TPD) also sought to challenge the review and extension of the detention of illegal foreign migrants. The court gave a judgment favouring the DHA, and held that warrants of detention under the Immigration Act may be extended for ninety days, confirming that the total period is one hundred and twenty days. Advocates for migrant rights considered the decision to be a punitive approach to migration management, as detainees are made to suffer because of administrative incapacity.

Despite these activities of the third sector, not all foreign migrants can take their individual cases to court. Moreover, legal gains do not always translate into improved experiences for the migrants, as previously discussed. Acknowledging the challenges of enforcing or implementing legal improvements in the rights of the foreign migrants, activists for human rights are taking practical steps to improve migrant well-being. NGOs and faith-based organisations provide housing for foreign migrants unable to access private or public housing, and after the violent xenophobia attacks in 2008, NGOs, religious groups, and other agents worked to provide materials and care for displaced migrants. Although foreign migrants still face enormous individual challenges, South Africa’s migration context is undoubtedly being affected by the efforts of the third sector and individual activists. Document analysis reveals increasing awareness of the challenges and rights of foreign migrants in the police, media, local government, and private sector. From the perspective of the activities and efforts of the third sector, South Africa’s migration management context is seen as a landscape of resilience in which control and exclusion are replaced by survival, which is defined as the progressive realisation of the foreign migrant’s wellbeing.

5.4.3 Survival as a Personal Project

Two things stood out from my empirical data: the often painful experiences of the interviewees, and their perceptions of individual responsibility for the success of their goals. Although both points have been discussed separately in the previous two sections, taken together they emphasize individual goals as pivotal to the migrants’ presence.

Here in South Africa, if you are suffering, like now, your life can change anytime. Today people see you walking on the street, tomorrow they can see you driving a car, probably a very expensive car, because of opportunities. (Male, 26 years)

The interviewees revealed that they regarded their present situation as an opportunity to build the future. Unlike the poor who supposedly live by meeting their immediate needs, my interviewees live on meeting their future desires. This shift in emphasis from the Now to the
Future is at the crux of the interviewees’ narratives of their dire living conditions. Their contemplation of the future thus defines the orientations of their hope and tactics and hence presence in South Africa, and allows engagement with their present conditions from a perspective or dimension outside of restrictive migration policies.

Using the future to facilitate the present is not a new tactic. For example, it is the engine that revolutionised the financial industry and extended financial services and products to the previously thought ‘unbankable’ poor in the present day multi-billion dollar microfinance industry (Collins et al., 2009). Before the advent of microfinance, it was assumed that the poor could only move out of poverty through either charity or incorporation into a social welfare institution. It was assumed that the only choice offered to the poor was to go without (with consequences that threatened their lives and destroyed opportunities) or, if available, sell valuable assets to meet current needs. However, a number of studies (e.g., Collins et al., 2009; Jurik, 2005) have revealed that the poor often use future income to fund pressing needs through a plethora of social networks and informal accounting systems.

My interviewees follow a similar approach but, rather than future income, they use the mental picture of a fruitful and rosy future to navigate, endure, and evaluate present hardship. Folke (2006), however, argues that resilience is not only about the persistence that comes from this focus on the future, but also about the opportunities that are created; there is dynamic interaction between the present and the future in the contemplation of goals and not merely a delusional preoccupation.

South Africa is not good for foreigners, West Africa foreigners. But if you have money it is good, but if you don’t have money, it is not good. People come here to make money, but what money? Ah, there is no money in that [selling fruit by the roadside]. [Un]like Ivory Coast, [where] it is easier to get money, ... here it is not easy. [In Ivory Coast] I can speak the language, I can do anything, and if I want to go to Benin, to Nigeria [West Africa countries], I can go. But here [South Africa] I can’t go anywhere. They [the police] will ask you [for] working permit; if you don’t have working permit, they will say, my man you suppose to pay 3,000 rand because you stay in South Africa illegally. Or they will send you to jail. After six months, they will release you, release you back in South Africa without the paper and they can still catch [arrest] you again and if you don’t have the 3,000 rand, they lock you again. (Male, 28 years)

The hopes of migrants like my interviewees face real challenges, and they practice their tactics within tight constraints and risks; at times they simply decide to move on, depending on their evaluation of opportunities in South Africa. Oliver, for example, who eventually voluntarily went home to Ivory Coast, glorified his past life; the expectations and aspirations he discussed in the interview were based on this prior life and were not possible for him to achieve in South Africa. His focus on his previous life differentiated his narratives from other migrants, who spoke about possibilities and opportunities with a focus on the future. This suggests that the greatest challenge to migrants’ hopes arises when they focus on and
contemplate their tough situation, and when their orientation shifts back to the past rather than forward to the future. Then the question of how the past was experienced becomes relevant: if conditions in the home country are perceived as worse, then a focus backwards can act as part of the motivation to continue.

Yes, because you are in a different country you must face the challenges because you leave your country to come here. But if you can’t bear it anymore, then the best solution is to go back home. That is how most of us do it. Even me, I am just watching the metro [police]. (Male, 26 years)

The key criterion that keeps them on the streets of Johannesburg is the ability to see opportunities beyond the relative confinement of constraints. “Today people see you walking; tomorrow they can see you driving a car, probably a very expensive car” is a powerful visual summary of the essence of my respondents’ hopes, tactics, and survival. But returning home is not the only option if the host context is evaluated as not conducive to achieving their goals. Some of the migrants may take the same goal-related decision to move to a third country.

One person can stay by the road and sell and make it, that is survival, but another person will stay, one month, two months, and get tired and go do something else, maybe sell drugs, maybe do illegal paper and go to Europe. (Male, 26 years)

To the migrant, survival becomes a matter of persevering until success is achieved, and selling drugs or procuring an illegal document for immigration to Europe, as attempted by Musa from Ethiopia, can also be construed as a survival technique suggesting resilience, depending on whether the attitude that generated the activity was one of determination or despair. That resonates with Payne’s observation (2011) that if certain behaviour is labelled negatively, it is important to inquire who set the standards and on what basis.

On my second fieldwork visit, I was informed that Bali, the ex-phone shop owner from the Republic of Benin trading in bananas in Yeoville, had successfully migrated to Brazil. He was one of the interviewees who had vehemently complained about police raids on street traders. At the point when the informal migrant decides it is not possible to make it in the host society, ‘giving up’ can seem like a failure to make a success of the expected opportunities in the host community. However, the resilience perspective (Payne, 2011; Gladwell, 2008; Stevenson & Davis, 2004) suggests that return migration or subsequent international migration cannot be separated from the goal-related pursuit of a better life, an understanding that acknowledges agency and fluidity in response to constraints and structural context.

In summary, the future-building of the interviewees may be seen in the form of a gamble; decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, with the impetus of a big win (better life) as a spur. In this context, uncertainty becomes the certainty.
5.4.4 Informal Migration as Survival

According to some of my respondents, at the time of migrating they thought that once they were in South Africa, they would start ‘making it’. Indeed, a potential migrant may make several attempts to cross the desired border despite the financial cost, as long as they see it as the barrier between their present unacceptable situation and the envisioned one. Unfortunately, for most, crossing the border into South Africa turns out to be the easiest part of life as an international (informal) migrant. Most of my respondents expressed mixed feelings about the decision to migrate to South Africa based on their disappointment with their present socio-economic conditions, but also with the continuous xenophobic violence targeted at African informal migrants.

You know what? Just I come there, I want [to] see the better life. When I come to South Africa, [it] was a regret ... because, when I see the refugee life in this country, I don’t feel happy, am sorry. Before, [I was] thinking maybe outside is better, but now am thinking maybe home is better. (Male, 28 years)

However, even those expressing disappointment with their socio-economic experiences in South Africa did not show the desire to move quickly on, preferring to take their chances of achieving their aspirations where they were, or biding their time until they identified another opportunity. One reason for this could be their perception of the challenges they face in South Africa in light of possible opportunities, with their activities framed as ferreting out the gains.

Because you leave your country and go to another country, you don’t just believe everything will be easy. Even if you go to America, the same thing, because it is not your country. There is no father, there is no mother, there is no any relation, there is no family. And the way we live our life, our culture is different. (Male, 26 years)

One of the initial challenges my interviewees had to overcome was getting an official permit to remain in South Africa; otherwise they faced deportation. Understanding that they did not meet the immigration regulations for a normal residence permit, they readily and without much thought applied for asylum seeker’s status. Seven out of the nine interviewees who participated in this study had an asylum seeker’s permit as the available alternative to illegal status and swift deportation. They all had different reasons for choosing to apply for the permit, but all agreed that it was the only viable way to remain legally in South Africa.

When I was still in Port Elizabeth, I tried to extend. They didn’t, but I didn’t know anything. I didn’t know what to do, I was just going there. Nobody explained what was happening there because I know nothing. Everything that I came with, he [the courier agent] was the one that did it, so I didn’t know what to do with the visa. I only apply for the asylum when I was in Port Elizabeth, but they were making things complicated for me,
making things very hard, very harsh, and I got scared until the thing expired.  
(Female, 28 years)

Pila mentioned that when she went to Home Affairs to enquire how to remain in South Africa, she had to leave because the personnel were very harsh with her and she became scared that she would be deported. She said she wanted to follow the legal regulations because she was new in South Africa; she now considered her enquiry was naïve, however, because seasoned informal migrants do not expect any positive response from such a course of action. After about a year of living without registration in South Africa and becoming part of the migrant community, she was told about the informal way of applying for asylum permit.

That lady now took me to Home Affairs, then she paid somebody money. The person said that the information I had at Port Elizabeth is still in the system, that they need to wipe it out. Otherwise, they will send me back to Port Elizabeth to go and renew. So I said no, I can’t go back; number one the transport, the distance, it is going to be stressful for me. So the only thing to do was to pay that person [the official] to wipe out the old one and put in a new one, so they put in the new one. (Female, 28 years)

Changing her information provided the opportunity to apply for asylum following regulatory channels. The South African context of high demand for official permits to remain in South Africa gives rise to informal solicitation for the coveted permission. Meanwhile, data from document analysis (CoRMSA 2008, 2009, 2010) pinpoints the inadequate monitoring of immigration officials as contributing to the exploitation of asylum seekers. However, it also shows that management checks at the DHA tend to focus on asylum applications that receive positive consideration. That created a context where immigration officials prefer to give negative decisions for asylum applications irrespective of claims. In effect, more negative decisions place increased pressure on informal migrants to seek alternative or informal means to achieve a positive decision. The broad scope and numbers of informal agents supporting informal migrants’ quests for residence permits indicates that there are increasing incentives for illegality and exploitation.

Six of my interviewees paid money to informal agents who promised they could provide them with residence permits, only to be duped. Without any money, and feeling stranded, they opted to apply for asylum permits. For instance, one of the respondents who came with a pastor that promised them a work permit reported that when the pastor failed to deliver his promise of a work permit, he met someone else and paid him a huge amount to get him the work permit.

So within the three months, he [the pastor that brought him into South Africa] promised us he is gonna give us work paper, work permit to work with the church, but at the end the pastor didn’t do that. So I ended up meeting another person that robbed me, I gave him 45,000 rand [about 4,500 Euros] that he is going to make work permit for me, all were stories. The guy ran away, so I ended up going to seek for an asylum. (Male, 36 years)
Another respondent, Bali from the Republic of Benin, went through a similar experience of paying an enormous sum to his host to help him get his residence permit.

The guy that live here, he take my money; he said he want to do permit for me, so, he take 10,000 something [in South Africa Rand] from me, because when I come I bring like, when I change the money, the money was like 25,000 something [Rand]. I give the money, because I did not know, because I was new here. I did not know anybody, I believe him, I give the money. When I give him money, three days, I didn’t see him in the house again, himself go ... I don’t know what to do. (Male, 33 years)

When the host absconded with the money, he was forced to apply for an asylum permit. Although the amount being paid to informal agents varies and is contestable, the relevant point is that the limited options of remaining legally in South Africa and the pressing need for migrants to acquire papers have contributed to creating an illegal market with both charlatans and real agents. My respondents quickly fell victims to immigration frauds in South Africa, so paying to get the asylum permit can be construed as a form of relief for them.

Importantly, all the interviewees were still renewing their asylum seeker’s permit at the time of the interview. Musa reported that he had received the approval to change his asylum seeker permit to business permit, but it was yet to be effected. The interviewees were compelled to apply for asylum because of the unavailability of a legitimate option suited to their needs and situation while the asylum seeker’s permit is readily accessible and, to an extent, a permanent temporary resident permit whose availability and duration are negotiable by foreign migrants via informal means. Thus, it becomes a ready tool or means to utilise in the bid to remain in South Africa and gradually achieve their goals.

5.4.5 Survival as Resilience

We survive but not all Nigerians survive. Some people will come here but they can’t bear it, they need to go back. [It] depend on the kind of business, your strength, and faith. Some people believe if you are earning small thing, and you are able to pay your house rent, you are able to feed yourself, little things, maybe you can keep some things, from there, maybe the person will decide this one is better, is just for the time being. Just for me to get one or two things, save some money, maybe to face the next level or the next step. [I] will know what [I] will do; just for [me] to know that this is my plan, because now [I] can’t work in the bank, even if I have the skill [I] can’t work there. So it is better to create something for yourself which you think you can do that can give you small change. I think from there you can keep growing, maybe; then from there you can be saving one or two things. Maybe 10 rand, 20 rand, 50 rand, from there maybe you can pick up. I think it is like that, because the thing of this place is that maybe you are doing something. Once you are doing something, and that thing is giving you
maybe small change, you don’t depend on anybody, you are able to pay your house rent comfortably; then maybe at least it is a matter of time you can make it. You can still survive it, like some of us. Maybe we don’t live in a good environment back home, we don’t eat good food, we don’t have access to all those things. You know, those things, simple, normal life, maybe some of us don’t have access to it, but here everybody is the same. If you have something that is bringing everyday money, without police you can survive, and there will be more job like that. (Male, 26 years)

Faced with a context that on the one hand constrains them and on the other hand facilitates their tactical agency, migrants have to deal daily with questions of how to remain on the streets of Johannesburg and continue their income making activities. This question of ‘how’ resonates with the resilience approach as a descriptive process rather than a list of factors. For Musa, who has tried several types of income-generating activities (street trade, driving, cross-border trade, an illegal attempt to migrate to the USA, and is contemplating returning to his home country), survival is all about the ability and tenacity to keep trying. At the time of the interview, he informed me that he has been able to save 50,000 rand (about 5,000 Euros) from his trading activities in South Africa, and had just received formal permission to start a small business. He is one of the successful stories of informal migrants in South Africa, yet he emphasized in the interview that he is just surviving.³⁹

If you know what you are doing, if you know what you are doing, know whatever you want to do in life. You must have a program. If you do not have your program, you don’t have your program on whatever you do, you cannot survive. (Male, 33 years).

As I go through my data, the migrants’ explanations of how they remain on the street, which they called survival, emerge as distinctly different from the common adverse inference drawn from the term ‘survival’. Typically, survival is used as the antithesis of thriving, to emphasise the bare essentials of the migrants’ lives, the missing comforts, and uncertainty of their lifestyle. But, for the migrants, survival is about the continuous pursuit of set life goals; it denotes dissatisfaction and the determination to achieve a future oriented goal.

The interviewees’ implicit and explicit references to goal-directed motivation and focus highlights their perception of the current socio-economic situation in which they find themselves. Their understanding emphasizes the strongly individualistic element of thriving in motivation, drive, and self-preservation but one that is augmented by engagement with their context. In this view, survival shifts from the absence or presence of material ‘goods’ to the dynamic interaction of ‘having a program’ and ‘doing something’ towards achieving the desired goal. Resilience is thus highlighted by the examination of how – and why – informal foreign migrants continue to remain in South Africa, irrespective of the financial worth of their trade, services, or businesses.

³⁹ See the story of Musa from Ethiopia, in page 103.
5.5 Summary

My respondents acknowledged the enormity of the challenges in their host society, narrating dehumanising experiences and discriminatory practices. The response of most of the interviewees to their harsh context and vulnerability was to indicate their determination to continue to live in South Africa and their conviction that they could become successful in South Africa. Through their narratives, they manipulated religion, self-motivation, and the perceived availability of resources and opportunities in the host society to overcome the debilitating effects of the challenges. Their aspirations for better lives and expectations for achieving them while taking into account their vulnerability and the obstacles they face constituted their hope as resilience-based, although interviewees’ responses could be pessimistic if they dwelled on the negatives when appraising their futures. At the same time, if their aspirations and desires for better futures were not expressed through actions or activities, then they could have been seen as fantasising. However, in a context of huge challenges, the interviewees constantly orchestrated their faith, perception of opportunities, and aspirations through their everyday activities. This highlighted their resilience but also showed it as transient and tied to the outcomes of their continuous evaluations and negotiations. Therefore, I do not consider only those migrants who have achieved some measure of economic success as resilient. For those migrants who have succeeded in keeping hope buoyant and sustained, as long as there is hope, there is resilience. Resilience, in this case, does not merely comprise outcomes or a list of sources of resilience, but incorporates the ‘journey’ towards the migrants’ expected results. For example, narratives of religion as a source of exploitation and vulnerability duly challenged the common practice of listing religion as a source of resilience.

The interviewees experienced vulnerability and expressed hope, but their actions created their operational socio-economic space where they attempted to build their future. Their presence in Johannesburg was established through the daily practices that overtly consolidated their stay, sought opportunities and relevant information, and generated personal income. For example, interviewees in this study had lived in South Africa for between two and twelve years and some reported knowing migrants who had lived in Johannesburg for over fifteen years. Within this time, they had been engaged in a variety of trades and services, started families with other migrants or South Africans, or saved enough money to sponsor a spouse or family member to join them in South Africa. The interviewees presented themselves as active but responsive to the political rules and regulations that sought to constrain or prevent them from pursuing aspirations for a better life. Thus, their everyday actions were utilised to avoid and co-exist with the many restraints and constraints that were present in their unique context.

Furthermore, analysis identifies the basis of practical responses of the interviewees to the socio-political constraints and challenges that they face in South Africa whereby ‘practical response’ is seen as the expression of the dissonance between immigration control and the interviewees’ desires, and the choice to pursue individual goals and aspirations. The actions, here labelled ‘tactics’, are overtly and covertly taken to build a life in South Africa. Utilising resilience theory to examine the migrants’ actions, I shed light on the participants’ activities as non-criminal in conception and borne out of response to socio-economic exclusions and constraints. In addition, de Certeau’s (1984) discussion of tactics calls attention to the institutional constraints faced by the interviewees as they attempted to live their daily lives in...
South Africa’s society, and analysis indicated that the South African migration context influences the generation or sustenance of practices seen as undermining state objectives of migration control. Therefore, tactics are seen as the logical response for building a future as an informal migrant in the host society.

Analysis also disclosed that the study participants had nuanced experiences of the bottlenecks and constraints that characterise South Africa’s migration environment. At times, the constraints acted as props for their tactical agency and at other times they restricted and deterred the effectiveness of their tactics. Given this variation of experiences, the respondents stressed the importance of determination, perseverance, and opportunities as they worked towards achieving their aspirations. Attention is called to the interviewees’ determination and perseverance in waiting for and productively utilising opportunities. In addition, the analysis underlines the migration context of South Africa as inherently adverse, a situation arising from the large stream of informal migrants, in this case as asylum seekers. Pursuing its goals of stringent controls, the country’s migration management apparatus (human and infrastructure) are hard pressed to attain effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the activities of the third sector (NGOs, human rights agencies) and how their interaction with the government’s immigration control activities contributed to creating a complex immigration situation in South Africa. Thus, analysis has identified interaction, perseverance in seeking and utilising opportunities, and South Africa’s immigration dynamics as prominent factors in how the research participants build their lives on the streets of Johannesburg.
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

I set out to understand how poor informal African migrants in Johannesburg survived in an environment of high socioeconomic and political vulnerability and insecurity, and to examine how they built their futures within this context. Through purposive sampling, I conducted life story interviews with nine African migrants who made their living from trade and offering services on the streets of Yeoville and Hillbrow in Johannesburg, South Africa; I also utilised reflexive ethnographic methods (including participant observation) during street-based fieldwork, while document analysis was added for purposes of triangulation. Narrative analysis was applied to empirical data and thematic analysis was utilised for select documents. The methodology of this study called attention to the voices of the interviewees, the subjective negotiations that produced the narrated stories, and the temporality of the data. I operationalised resilience theory with the concepts of hope, tactics, and survival, utilising them to examine my data. In this concluding chapter, I highlight the empirical observations and implications of this study, discuss its contributions to the field, and suggest opportunities for further research.

6.1 Empirical Observations

Three relevant points were highlighted by analysis. The first of these is that my respondents survived their harsh surroundings on the streets of Johannesburg due to their aspirations and hopes for the future, thereby shifting the emphasis from the now to the future. The desire for a better life motivates the move from their home countries, and the hopes of making a better life keep them in the host country. In the stories of my respondents, ‘a better life’ was used to refer to a host of positive conditions and material acquisitions both from personal and country perspectives, and called attention to aspirations within a context of insecurity and vulnerability.

The second main finding of this study was the centrality of the micro-entrepreneurship or economic activities that my interviewees undertook in order to build their futures. All were informal migrants but eight had asylum seekers’ permits and one was without any form of permit. As a result of South Africa’s system, which does not place asylum seekers in refugee camps, my interviewees were able to scrape together micro businesses, acquire new trades and skills, and provide services for financial gain, thus – importantly for future building – calling attention to saving, planning, tactics, and perseverance. Khosravi (2010: 70) argued that, irrespective of the differences in camps worldwide, their logic situates informal migrants outside society through “expelling and excepting refugees”.

Living in the city came with the opportunity to engage in economic activities for sustenance and future-building. My interviewees were able to use the ‘time of waiting’ productively – both socially and economically – even as asylum seekers. In contrast, according to a member of Sweden’s Migration Board (a country that holds asylum seekers in refugee camps, often located outside major cities): “As an asylum seeker, one should not marry. One should not fall in love. And it becomes awkward if one is going to have a baby with another
asylum seeker” (Artikel, 14 March 2006, 3; reported in Khosravi, 2010: 119). My interviewees were able to fall in love, marry other asylum seekers, and have children. The despondence, existential alienation, and estrangement often identified amongst refugees in camps were not observed amongst my interviewees (Khosravi, 2010; Agier, 2008: Malkki, 1995), although their narratives suggested frustrations with obstacles to their economic activities and feelings of dehumanisation resulting from xenophobic discrimination and distortions. Their lives reveals that even as asylum seekers, irrespective of the violent and constraining context, they were slowly building the future they desire, for instance, through savings and personal projects at home country.

Thirdly, my interviewees interacted with their harsh context as a space but also place of opportunities; their daily actions were thus calculated to search for prospects and appropriate them for future gains that extended beyond getting positive decisions on their asylum applications. That finding calls attention to the beneficial potential of creating or enabling a facilitating context for micro-economic activities among informal migrants. By engaging with their socio-politically allocated space as place, my interviewees’ ways of life highlighted the relevance of individual choice, agency, and purpose to their resilience, meanwhile querying the South African Government’s stance on immigration policy as an instrument of stringent exclusion. Irrespective of policy connotations and political identification, the interviewees established their presence in Johannesburg with their daily activities. Although not citizens, they are residents and thus demand constructive attention from the government. In addition, the notion of place becomes relevant in the socioeconomic difference between confining the asylum seeker to refugee camps and allowing them the freedom for social and economic interaction in the society. When Khosravi (2010: 70) argues that refugee “camps are spaces and but not places”, the notion of ‘space’ is utilised to invoke the temporality and alienation of informal migrants (Agier, 2008) in a life that “lingers in nondescript places, neither here nor there” (Edward Said, quoted in Marrouchi, 2004: 119). In contrast, ’place’ suggests living life with meaning, significance, and agency that is directed towards a desired future (Ramadan, 2010).

6.1.1 Synthesising empirical observation: Hope - Vulnerability

Researchers (e.g., Sleijpen et al., 2016) studying adaptive behaviour and positive outcomes for vulnerable groups have often highlighted the interconnectedness of risks and resilience. In their discussion of hope, Snyder et al. (1991) link the presence of goals and the demonstration of hope. By implicating goals, the conception of hope logically indicates future-oriented desires or aspirations, but also the experience in the presence of obstacles spurring the orientation towards the future. In this way, hope and vulnerability are interlinked.

The hope expressed by my interviewees draws attention to the relevance of the future and their aspirations for it amongst the vulnerable. The respondents did not remain as informal migrants in South Africa because they were seeking basic welfare – or a basic living income as guaranteed by social welfare support. In other words, they did not remain in South Africa just so that they could afford a daily meal, housing, and clothing. Rather, they persevered because they aspired to own their own successful electronic business, start a construction
company in the home country, or establish an international concern. In essence, my respondents
would not have been satisfied merely with the provision of a social safety net; they were
seeking a better life which, according their stories, involved a broader, stronger, and more
subjective acquisition of economic and social resources. Resilience is thus the channelling of
my respondents’ hope, tactics, and perseverance towards the goal of a better life.

Although this study is not designed to examine the individual aspirations of the
interviewees, the notion of aspirations becomes relevant in the conception of their hope,
creating an interesting polarisation of survival – on the one hand is severe vulnerability, on the
other, the ‘grand’ visions of the future. That shift from victims of xenophobic violence to
people with aspirations, which may appear irrelevant from an observer’s distance, becomes
critical in the day-to-day decisions and choices of the migrant. From my data two things
become relevant concerning interviewees’ aspirations. Their aspirations as hope implied non-
substantive achievement, and hence room for fluidity, flexibility, and change. Thus, in building
their future, informal migrants create the image of a temporary agent – one without long-term
plans – to an observer (Hagan, 1994). Perhaps, however, the means to achieve the plan for a
better life should be considered temporary and fluid, while the hope of building a better life
can be seen as more enduring and sustaining. Therefore, survival as future-building
incorporates some form of deliberation, organisation, and planning, into the notion of chance
and opportunity. Furthermore, highlighting informal migrants’ aspirations in the survival
context (i.e., in a context of struggle and harsh constraints), implies that there is the possibility
of delusion, whereby the migrant continues to hold on to aspiration without socioeconomic
mobility or envisaged opportunity for change. This could lead to what Czaika and Vothknect,
(2014: 3) call “a hedonic treadmill”, that is, increasing aspiration even when the economic
returns achieved are lower or continue to fall. On the contrary, there is the possibility that the
situation Appadurai (2004) refers to as “aspiration trap” may be generated, when aspiration is
adjusted downwards to avoid the strain and frustrations of perceived failure to achieve original
goals. In that light, the interviewees’ tactics became relevant in their engaging with the harsh
context for returns. Notwithstanding the level of productiveness of this, they evaluated their
trickling returns from a broader perspective, calling attention to life chances in their home
country and the possibility of moving on to other countries with perceived better opportunities.
Masja van Meeteren (2014) also calls attention to this phenomenon when she suggests that
migrants compare their present situation with conditions in their home country in evaluating
their social mobility in the host country.

The above hope-aspiration approach to building futures become relevant in
understanding the migrants’ vulnerability and survival. While the struggles and constraints are
evidenced and experienced, they do not remain the only basis for action, although they do raise
the question of why migrants such as my interviewees see possibilities and potentialities in
what is apparently a dire situation. The high number of struggling and unsuccessful (or not-
yet-successful) migrants challenges an assumption that the few (very) affluent or economically
successful migrants motivate them. One answer might be the potentiality that is commonly
associated with entrepreneurship. While economists and other agents may call attention to the
size of the business holding – hence Micro, Small, Medium, Large actors/entrepreneurs – my
findings suggest a shift in emphasis from size to the profit-making process itself. However, this
does not satisfy the puzzle of why informal migrants do not practise entrepreneurship in their
home country (provided conditions are not impossible in terms of violence, war, and political persecution). That puzzle could call attention to the relevance of infrastructure that aids trade in the destination country, a point highlighted by the findings that 60% of would-be African migrants are discontented with local public services (AFDB, 2015).

Although the interviewees worked to manage the financial vulnerability associated with economic uncertainty, they were highly susceptible to victimisation, humiliation, and oppression from the host (citizens and institutions) in their everyday lives. In this sense, the interviewees’ stories also build on the experience of despair, desperation, and frustrations. Indeed, the scope and gravity of the narrated experiences of vulnerability and hardship self-proclaimed their prominence and critical relevance. Migration researchers observe that victimisation, humiliation, and abuse of informal migrants are socially justified with the logic that the victim is a foreigner, a reasoning that is shown to be fuelled and supported by prevailing national, political, and media discourses and propaganda. Meanwhile, the vulnerability experienced by my interviewees highlights the limits of political actions or policies in creating a better experience for informal migrants. For example, even when there are policies that make provision for informal migrants’ healthcare, such as access to healthcare services, hospital staff acts as an obstruction. Attention is then drawn to individual members of society, to the breakdown of morality and ethics, and to the juncture where the guarantee of social security meets with citizens’ desires and fear of the future. While state criminalisation of informal migration has received wide theorization and empirical examination in South Africa (Vigneswaran, 2011; Landau, 2012) and globally (Aas & Bosworth, 2013; Khosravi, 2010; Macklin, 2007; de Genova, 2002; Torpey, 1998), the criminalisation, or in this case dehumanisation, of informal migrants by ordinary citizens of otherwise good standing in society needs closer examination. The argument that the state or political figures reproduce the dehumanisation of informal migrants as ‘the norm’ in society, does not satisfy the question of choice and why or how some citizens resist the norm and others embrace it. Individual responsibility for acts of dehumanisation against informal migrants raises the anthropological question of ethics or what it means to be human in our society today, and specifically, questions about the social ethics of care in South Africa.

Moreover, the experience of despair, desperation, and frustration among the interviewees cannot be seen as a uniform state, but as a process with points or junctions of varying forms of experiences that range between despair and joy. Indeed, the same interviewees talked about hope – as discussed in the study – as spoke about vulnerability and the frustrations of living in the harsh context. The resilience perspective applied in this study calls attention to the notion of survival as a story of how things got from there to here, acknowledging the negotiation of periods of success and failure as constituting resilience. Thus, the resilience approach applied in this study does not conceptualise failure as the antithesis of success. Rather, it highlights the dynamic negotiations that intertwine conditions that ordinarily would be termed failure with conditions considered successful. In that scenario, I highlight the fragility or sturdiness of the negotiations and interactions that transform an unwanted situation to a desired outcome.

In this study, I examined the interviewees’ interactions and negotiations in their context by utilising de Certeau’s conceptualisation of tactics, in that their tactical navigation of their circumstances created or discovered opportunities in line with their goals. For example, if
several of the interviewees had been able to find employment, they may not have started the trade or service provision that sustained them. Moreover, one year after conducting the interviews, I could not find the majority of the interviewees in the same places as I had met them. In essence then, their stories would have changed, highlighting the transience of notions of failure or success as presented in the resilience approach.

6.1.2 Synthesising findings: Tactics and Survival

In discussing survival in Chapter Five, tactics are strongly implicated and hence synthesised. However, in light of how central micro-entrepreneurship and service provision are for my interviewees in their interactions with South African society, it becomes pertinent to wonder if, rather than criminalising informal migration, it would be possible to cooperate with it. That is, could immigration management in South Africa be remodelled not in the form of exclusions and pervasive control, but in a more inclusive and mutually beneficial way? In this study, micro-entrepreneurship stands out as having the potential to mutually benefit South Africa and its informal migrants. As seen from this study, the situation of informal migrants and South African migration management highlights financial wastage, opportunities that remain untapped or abused, and a relational engagement that unintentionally reproduces the problems it is set up to prevent.

Meanwhile, the economic contribution and potential of poor African migrants through informal trade and services remains unrecognised and undeveloped because of the focus on restrictions and exclusions. These unintentionally foster illegality, corruption, and exploitation (between agents of migration control and informal migrants desperate for permits) rather than facilitating a better entrepreneurial environment for migrants to expand their businesses. That compromises the goals of migration control and adversely affects security, social cohesion, and cooperation within the community. Finally, an emphasis on restrictions and exclusions only spurs the multiplication and diversification of informal migrants’ tactics and determination, which causes further complication and deterioration in the migration situation. This conclusion suggests that changes to migration management practice and policies are necessary to create and facilitate a beneficial migration experience for South Africa and its immigrants.

The possibility of more inclusive and cooperative immigration management in South Africa is not farfetched within the African context. For example, Ghana has taken steps in that direction by providing a visa on arrival for Africans. Rather than being locked in a lose/lose relationship, there could also be cooperation between informal migrants and the government in South Africa in which tactics would not be conceived of as survival, hinting of randomness, chance, and furtive activities. Rather, tactics could be transformed and channelled for the benefit of the state and the migrant, instead of the migrant and corrupt officers. South Africa has a highly active third sector (including NGOs and other instruments of civil society) that monitors and fight for the rights of informal migrants. Therefore, there is the assumption that the South African political arena is knowledgeable about the rights of informal migrants, especially in terms of international human rights. The challenging question, then, is how informal migrants’ rights might translate into benefits for the South African state. Alternatively, how can the South African state perceive and appropriate the benefits of the
presence of the migrants? Examination of those questions is outside of the scope of this study, yet my discussion has raised them, highlighting the potentiality of micro-entrepreneurship.

6.2 Xenophobia and Informal African Migrants’ Quest for Better Life

As a country with a high number of asylum seekers who are politically and socially unwanted, contemporary South Africa is a society where xenophobia and the resilience of informal migrants exist side by side. Politically, xenophobia reveals its relevance to the migrants’ construction of future wellbeing through examination of how narrowly the nation-state defines its circle of inclusion. Indeed, the stringency of rules of admission into the national community is often invoked to link the nation-state to the enduring presence of xenophobia in South Africa. For example, several authors have called attention to the role of the South African Government in fostering a climate of violent xenophobia against African migrants through its formal and informal discourses of migrants’ rights or absence of rights (Landau, 2011; Peberdy, 2009). The resilience approach in this study highlights how unwanted migrants tactically contest and utilise the nation-state’s narrow definition of who is permitted to access its inclusive community in personal pursuit of better life. The link between xenophobia and resilience is revealed as the composite structure of institutions and members classified as the nation-state – first from a position of power that seeks to create and claim specific experience, and then from a compromised position that threatens its capacity to control its fate. Both perspectives contain the imagery of a villainous state, one that through its authority to define its community and exclude those considered ‘unwanted others’, creates and sustains vulnerability and harm. This means that there is shrinking space for the state to claim the position of victim, yet contemporary forces, such as informal migration, and other global economic and social interconnectivities, continue to pose dire challenges to the conception of the nation-state and citizenship (Babacan & Singh, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

The inherent exclusivity of the nation-state is based on political sovereignty, which is not only about communal independence but also the dispensation of care in a context of spiralling local and global economic tensions and vulnerability. Hence, one cannot only understand the constructed relationship between a nationality-focused government with strictly bounded notions of geography and culture from the perspective of belonging. It is equally important to construct and highlight the prevailing political discussion of care as the responsibility of the government to provide for the economic anxieties of its citizens from a stagnant or dwindling national ‘purse’ (Clarke; Newman, & Westmarland, 2007; Clarke, 2005; Procacci, 2010). Although South Africa is not classified as a welfare state (Leisering, 2003; Zacher, 2013), the historicity of social policy – the policies of care of a national government – strongly links the idea of welfare state to the processes of nation building, and specifically societal integration compared with a disjunction between state and society (Germany) and inequality within society (Britain and France). That puts discourses of substantive social care in a central position on political agendas of governments, and situate institutions of care as part of the conglomerate of political institutions that form the nation-state. Furthermore, South Africa’s ruling political party’s efforts to correct the wrongs of apartheid have affirmed that the country’s current social
welfare policies are crucial to poverty alleviation amongst its apartheid-marginalized and vulnerable populations (Brown & Neku, 2005). Therefore, poverty and the means to alleviate it often feature in political and social arenas, and have become critical in political discussions of immigration and social discussions of xenophobia.

Frantz Fanon (2001) has called attention to the perils of national consciousness, noting that economic competition lies at the root of the struggles over belonging, and arguing that strong economic competition from those identified as ‘others’ will create pitfalls in the national consciousness, giving rise to a permanent see-saw in African unity. When the political and economic elites demand stringent exclusivity based on nationality, they “do not spring from an authentic movement of nationalization but merely correspond to an anxiety to place in the bourgeoisie’s hands the power held hitherto by the foreigner, the masses on their level presents the same demands” (Fanon, 2001: 126). Although Fanon is apparently implicating the greediness of the elitist class that seeks to appropriate economic resources for selfish purposes, his argument can be applied to the scarcity of resources in developing countries when anxiety, hopelessness, and expectations are important variables in the demands for exclusivity as well as greed. The uncertainties and anxieties of citizens continue to increase in the contemporary world, along with the flow of information, capital, goods, and humans, as well as dwindling economic opportunities amid slow or stagnant industrialization such as in South Africa. Following Fanon’s arguments, Nyamnjoh (2006: 1) notes that the context of spiralling uncertainty only brings “about an even greater obsession with citizenship and belonging”. That aggravates the pressure and tensions placed on policies of inclusion/exclusion.

The salient points can thus be seen as the utilisation of economic resources to meet the needs of citizens and the anxieties that are developed and sustained as basic needs remain unmet. Ghassan Hage (2003: 3) argues that a society that fails to distribute hope “generates worrying citizens and a paranoid nationalism”. The modern nation-state’s obligations to intervene in macro-economic dissonance, and ameliorate its impact on citizens, makes it a key player in the provisions that deal with uncertainty. In apartheid South Africa, the notion of citizenship embraced privileges, with economic benefits linked to improved welfare. In post-apartheid South Africa, the inclusion of Blacks did not change the political rhetoric of commitment to nurturing its citizens, generating a situation described by Landau (2011: 3) as “a politically entitled but materially deprived citizenry”. Meanwhile, failure to deliver substantive care to the majority of citizens can be seen as producing the insecurities and worry Hage mentions. Hage’s (2003) argument is significant as it connects citizens’ anxieties to their attachment to the perception of the nation as capable of securing their immediate and future needs. Such anxieties are also experienced by political agents of the government. Thus, for the nation-state, the subjective selection of individuals allowed into the circle of inclusion is a necessary logical response to facilitate its capacity for productive management of the economic and political tensions from home-grown and international dynamics. Therefore, the nation-state is motivated to shape its inclusion criteria around possession of socioeconomic qualities that are politically determined to meet the national needs.

The situation of informal African migrants in this scenario can be sharply contrasted with that of formal migrants socioeconomically described as experts, professionals, successful, prosperous, and so on. The threat to deport and the fear of deportations can be seen as
contributing to the activation and deployment of tactics adopted by the interviewees in this study but did not overshadow the social and economic insecurities and hardship they reported. Therefore, the political context of informal migrants remains significant in the framing of reported vulnerabilities and insecurities. That raises the question of whether formal migrants’ rights of inclusion exempt them from experiences of the xenophobia that is shown to be prevalent in South Africa. Concomitantly, would politically inclusive rights, without economic stability and security, eradicate the vulnerability and xenophobic discrimination experienced by informal migrants? Empirical data were not collected from formal migrants on the subject; however, it can be deduced that the situation of formal migrants is mitigated by the social and economic benefits provided by their positions, organization, and self-recognition. For instance, the formal migrant can patronize private hospitals that promise better care and services either through organizational arrangements or individual affordability. The same can be said of livelihoods, where street trading signifies income insecurity and vulnerability to the informal migrant while the formal migrant, by virtue of protections offered by labour laws and regularity of income, can experience relative levels of stability and security. It is important to highlight, however, that formal migrant labour is also subject to varying degrees of precariousness depending on the intersection between labour and migration laws (Schierup et al. 2015). Therefore, it is arguable that improved well-being in the form of, for example, stable and adequate income, could mitigate the intensity of the experience of xenophobic discriminations. It is thus appropriate to wonder how stability in wellbeing can be achieved by informal migrants in their unstable personal and political context.

The role and presence of the nation-state in dealing with the uncertainties and insecurities of its populace has evolved over time. In the words of Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2014: 9), the “government used to be an occasional partner in life, the contractor on the other side of Thomas Hobbes’s social contract deal (1651a), the night watchman looking over us in John Stuart Mill’s (1859) liberty”. Today, in a developmental state, it is seen as an omnipresent nanny. To the citizens, the nation-state has assumed the role of the middleman between them and their uncertainties in a context of substantive social rights such as social welfare. In this globalized world where people are more confident about the power of their computer chips and less certain about their ability to meet their future basic needs or daily bread, protecting their futures becomes equated with controlling the inclusion and incursion of the international migrant. The position of the international migrant as economically weak is thus problematized both at the level of citizens and the government. As the citizens deal with uncertainty at the micro level, the government manages its political and economic uncertainties, and the international community seeks to ameliorate socioeconomic tensions, international migrants assume the position of chips in the barter of contemporary uncertainties. In that exchange, the value of the migrants is assessed according to social, economic, and professional achievements, and human rights overlooked if contradictory to national prerogatives.

Inclusion into the national community in times of high unemployment, extreme inequality, and poverty raises the issue of an unproblematised conceptualization of citizenship in the tradition of the normative liberal understanding in which citizens’ rights are respected, individuals are protected and their basic needs prioritized by the state, they have access to quality education, health care, employment opportunities or means to a secured livelihood, and so forth. Those elements are part of the theoretical liberal imaginary, but the real picture in
countries such as in South Africa could be very different. For instance, an Oxfam research report on environmental sustainability and social justice in South Africa (Cole, 2015) noted that the country has “the triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment … over half of South Africans live below the poverty line and more than 10% live in extreme poverty, on less than $1.25 per day”. In 2013 official unemployment rates were reported as 25%, jumping to 27.7% by the second quarter of 2017 (one of the highest in the world), with a Gini index over 0.60 that also makes it one of the most unequal countries globally (World Bank, 2016). The wealthiest 4% of households get 32% of the total income, while 66% of households get 21% (Visagie & Posel, 2013). While an idealized version of the relationship between the state and citizens is crucial for envisioning a better society, it is also important to acknowledge that “in practice things are less tidy” (Arditi, 2007). In that un-ideal society the place for the informal migrant is hotly contested.

That challenge can arguably be seen as a platform for extending the discourse of inclusion as political acceptance, belongingness, and responsibility that stretch beyond the confines of the nation-state. There is, as suggested by some authors (e.g., Nyamnjoh, 2006; Klaaren, 2011), potential in a flexible conceptualization of citizenship. However, that alone cannot be enough in dealing with the reported vulnerability of the informal African migrant in South Africa. Attention is thus called to the absence of, yet need for, institutional structures of support for them.

In that vein, Social Policy becomes relevant in the quest for humane improvements to the experience of informal African migrants. Indeed, from its foundational inception, human wellbeing has been the central concern of Social Policy both from the socio-cultural perspective of interdependency and the Public Policy perspective of political systems and institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Titmuss, 1958, 1970). Hartley Dean (2012, p. 5) notes that Social Policy still “remains a highly rigorous subject because it retains a highly specific commitment to the cause of human wellbeing”. Its commitment to human wellbeing has seen the extension of the provision of care through Public Policy to women, children and foreigners and minorities over the years (Sevenhuijsen, 2000; George & Page, 1995; Jencks, 1992; Williams, 1989), raising the question, why not to informal migrants in Africa in light of their context and position as agents and social victims?

Emerging forms of inequality and the scarcity of economic resources continue to raise new terrains to engage the relationship between Social Policy and human wellbeing. Contemporary Informal migration is one such terrain, and African informal migration becomes a specific terrain to creatively engage the enduring relationship between Social Policy and human wellbeing. An ideal situation would address the socioeconomic vulnerability of informal African migrants not just as victims, but also as economic agents. In that scenario, informal migration would establish its relevance to the African continent through the sheer size of cross-border trade, as discussed in section 3.1.2. One can thus hypothesize at this point of the thesis, that the dilemma of better lives for informal African migrants is a regional political question of belongingness, care, and social responsibility. That line of argument lies beyond the scope of this study, and represents a fruitful avenue for further study.
6.3 Implications of Findings

This study’s findings have policy and practice implications for migration control in South Africa. They highlight two critical socioeconomic spaces in the context of the interviewees’ life stories – economic activities and vulnerability – which intersect with the migration control goal of responsibly harvesting the benefits of African migration for South Africa’s development. In this study, I caption informal migrants engaging in economic activities as street traders to highlight the informality, size, and location of the activities. However, I also depict street trading as micro-entrepreneurship to illustrate the creativity, dedication, and financial expectations of the engagements. In the South African context of high unemployment, the country would stand to benefit from developing the space for migrants’ micro-entrepreneurship. Such benefits would include creating local employment opportunities and collecting a trickle of payments in taxes and other trade permit fees that would go into government coffers instead of to corrupt officials.

In this study, the second space – vulnerability – brought into focus the social and political discrimination against the informal foreign migrant, as well as their exploitation and humiliation. My interviewees’ vulnerabilities are shown to be the result of institutional weaknesses, social animosities, and individual economic insecurities. The interviewees’ productivity is negatively affected by their vulnerabilities, which in turn are aggravated because social and political agents define them as unproductive or as appropriating South Africa’s resources for personal gain. This creates a circle of real or apparent unproductiveness. I believe that policies designed to provide for the development of appropriate social insurance for informal migrants could spread the burden of care from the government and guarantee the provision of care for informal migrants when needed.

To enable such developments, African migration control in South Africa should be practised more in terms of management of migrants’ micro-entrepreneurship and less as control of illegal entry. In essence then, migration management would assume an objective of facilitating the identification of opportunities for development rather than focusing on control and exclusion. This can be seen in the example of Ghana’s recent visa-on-arrival policy for African migrants and Namibia’s ongoing discussion to adopt the same form of policy. However, this raises questions about the burden of care if and when income from micro-entrepreneurship cannot cover vulnerability and insecurity. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, there has been contemporary progress in providing social security or protection for the vulnerable and extending such coverage to many formally unreachable migrants (ILO, World Social Protection Report, 2014/2015). With that knowledge, we can view the situation of poor migrants that are economically active in the informal sector as a creative opportunity rather than an unfavourable burden.

6.3 Contribution to Knowledge

This study contributes to knowledge in several ways: firstly, to the study of vulnerable groups through its theoretical application of resilience. The utilisation of resilience theory
creates a unique perspective that situates and examines vulnerability and agency as a dynamic pairing, while incorporating the institutional context and element of choice. Thus the study reflects previous research that calls attention both to migrants’ vulnerability and migrants’ agency, as it also presents migrants as concurrently vulnerable and active. For example, Rugunanan and Smit’s (2011) study of the survival of Congolese and Burundian refugees in Pretoria emphasized that, rather than being passive victims, the migrants were active agents. This study adds to that by concluding that it is not always a case of either ‘passive victims’ or ‘active agents’; victims could be active without losing the experience of victimhood. Hence, while the interviewees claim tactical agency, they also acknowledge their vulnerability, thereby more accurately presenting themselves as ‘active victims’. Moreover, utilising resilience theory as a descriptive rather than a prescriptive framework advances the development of the theory. In this study, the interviewees’ vulnerability is shown in tandem with their resilience as an ongoing process of setbacks and successes. Factors that enable coping are also shown as creating vulnerability, calling attention to the interactions and negotiations that reproduce resilience. By highlighting the individual’s interactions, negotiations, and meanings as producing resilience this study challenges the mainstream fascination with identifying a long list of factors that do so. The study takes the resilience argument further by showing that resilience cannot be understood outside of the individual context, even when the social and political arenas are included in analysis.

Secondly, the study contributes to the academic discussion of migrants’ temporality in South Africa. For example, some studies (e.g., Amisi & Ballard, 2005; Landau, 2006) invoke African migrants’ temporality in South Africa as a geography of space, conceptualising the presence of the migrants as ‘just passing through’. Landau (2006: 128) captioned such notions of temporality as the migrants’ “shared discourse of self-alienation and permanent mobility”. In addition to that, this study suggests that the perception that their aspirations are attainable contributes to migrants’ survival. The keyword becomes perception; if and when opportunities are perceived in South Africa, a brief sojourn can assume unintentional permanence.

Thirdly, the study set out to give voices to informal African migrants attempting to build a better future despite extreme challenges in their host society. In allowing the interviewees’ voices to be heard, this study confirms, augments, and amplifies other studies that highlight the social and political vulnerability of informal African migrants in South Africa (e.g., Kihato, 2013; Vigneswaran, et. al., 2010; Worby, 2010; Nyamjoh, 2006; Landau, 2004). In addition, the study went further and situates the discussion of informal African migrant vulnerability within the discourse of Social Policy, a theoretical and conceptual diversion from mainstream Human Rights and citizenship centred arguments.

6.4 Reflexivity and Truth Value

Frequently attendant upon qualitative research techniques are critiques of the reliability and validity of results that query whether results accurately reflect the data, and raise issues of researcher and methodology bias that may distort findings (Smith & Noble, 2014; Rolfe, 2006), as well as the veracity of interviewees’ narratives. With regard to the latter, Denzin (1989: 81)
argues that “there is no truth in the painting of a life, only multiple images and traces of what has been, what could have been, and what now is”. Thus, although the question of meaning is vital to the researcher, the stories are “always open-ended, inconclusive and subject to multiple interpretations”. As Roos (2003: 27) puts it, what that means, “crudely – is that there is no truth, no Reality, not one true way to connect the object world and the spoken or written world, but instead lots of interpretations, all equally possible”. Conceptualising meanings in narrative texts as “infinite chain of signifiers” (Peter Burger as quoted in Lash & Friedman, 1992: 95) is attributed to the post-structuralist thesis that displaces the author (or the narrator in the case of life story) (Smith, 1995).

Roos (2003: 28) notes that the post-structuralist approach to reading texts, especially narrative texts, is a recent development; earlier sociologists embraced narrative texts as “the ideal material to get to know what really happens or has really happened in the society, as well as to explain what has really happened”. Nevertheless, the post-structural effect on the narrative text produces an awareness of the complex relationship between the narrator, the text, and the reality, but also highlights the relevance of the text. Contemporary sociologists have moved on from the post-structuralist approach, introducing greater reflexivity but without neglecting the relevance of the text. In that light, Atkinson (1998: 5) argues, “if we want to know the unique experience and perspective of an individual, there is no better way to get this than in the person’s own voice”. Roos (2003: 30) also writes:

The autobiographical pact is that of an auto(bio)grapher wanting to tell others about life, how it really was, what has happened, what are his/her views of it. Unless we accept this, we may indeed talk about the end of autobiography… in the sense of having thrown out the baby with the bathwater.

One study that analyses narrative data as chains of different interpretations and sacrifices the voice of the narrator in favour of interpretation is Minna Säävälä’s (2010) study of Kosovo Albanian and Russian female migrants living in Finland. In analysing her biographic interview data, Säävälä adopts a methodology she attributes to sociologists Kohli (1981) and Schutze (1992), noting, however, that there are different interpretive traditions. Säävälä’s (2010: 1143) methodological aim was to “reconstruct the underlying structure of the subject’s interpretations of her or his life, which often goes beyond the subject’s own intentions”. Hence, her interpretation went “beyond the subject’s own intentions”, differentiating it from Atkinson’s (1998) argument, quoted above, that “if we want to know the unique experience and perspective of an individual, there is no better way to get this than in the person’s own voice”. In Säävälä’s report, the voice of the narrator was thus displaced, and the researcher’s voice (in this case Säävälä’s) became the authentic voice.

I treated my data by using the interviewees’ words when possible, as stories owned and told by them to inform me of how their lives are. I saw my role as presenting/re-presenting the story as they told it to me. I did not see my role as one of an interpreter shaping their narratives to fit a particular template. In that sense, I read my data in order to understand ‘the subjective sense’ of how the interviewees built their future in the harsh environment. According to Pertti Alasuutari (1997: 50), to grasp the subjective sense, “data are considered as materials in which

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40 Robert Smith’s work on Jacques Derida and Autobiography
people tell how they conceive of their action; what their motives for action are, and what meanings they give to different things”. Roos (Alasuutari, 1997) also utilised this approach in his discussion of social change through the medium of life stories. Roos (as quoted in Alasuutari, ibid.: 182) noted that his use of autobiographies to examine lifeways over four generations “gives us a direct glimpse into the experience of generations”. For this study, my attraction to and use of the life story interview format is mainly because it allows a direct glimpse into how informal migrants build their lives in frequently dire conditions.

By adopting this approach to my data, I had to deal with the problem of the trustworthiness of the source. Alasuutari (1997) argues that the assessment criteria when such material is utilised in the subjective sense depends on how the information is viewed. In broad terms, he divided the viewpoint into ‘indicator’ – when information is considered indirect evidence about the question one is trying to solve – and ‘testimony’ – when the source is considered as a testimony to what is being studied. From those two perspectives, he highlighted a ‘mechanistic’ (avoiding reactivity) and ‘humanistic’ (developing rapport) approach to improving the veracity of information from an interview source.

I utilised several approaches to improve the trustworthiness of my data: foremost, I worked on developing a very good rapport with my interviewees by spending time with them before and after the interview sessions. I also incorporated the findings of document analysis into my discussion to contextualise data in the interviewees’ socio-political environment. Moreover, I subjectively read the atmosphere in the interview room; these were real people talking about real and serious experiences, issues, and plans. What I can only call the ‘atmosphere’ was real and it provided an emotional experience that made certain points or issues stand out from the interview sessions. I decided to utilise documents that provided separate data on the interviewees’ context for triangulation as I felt that, because of their socioeconomic conditions and knowing that I am from Europe (creating an imagery of socioeconomic success), there was the possibility that their hardship and challenges may have been embellished to elicit financial or other forms of support. Moreover, in reading through my data, I sought the stories and views that connected with the ‘atmosphere’, which translated the ‘atmosphere’ into texts and connected it with the theoretical framework. In that sense, throughout the theoretical framing of the study, interpretation guided analysis, but it was not all interpretation.

Hence, in the analysis, reflexivity took the shape of a delicate balance between interpretation (theorization) and fact value. For example, in discussing hope, I also commented on the vulnerability that the interviewees reported. I discussed hope as aspirations and motivation, without editing out or camouflaging the intensity of the experiences that were products of their disadvantaged position. However, my discussion draws attention to motivation and aspirations, because that was the feeling and atmosphere at the end of the interview sessions, and that helped shape my theoretical framework. Attention is also drawn to those parts of their perception that are less obvious, but salient in their overall outlook on the future. As Roos (2003: 30) noted, “Life stories are serious texts. There is no post-modern frivolity or lightness, play with identities or mere identity-relationships … For the people who write of their lives, these lives are real, in a very concrete sense, not just situation or relation or perspective bound.” In this thesis, the fulcrum becomes the seriousness of the texts and of the
lives that produced them.

In writing this thesis, I took deliberate and concrete steps to acknowledge the complexities of the narrative method that I utilised for data collection and analysis, with a detailed chapter on methodology. In Chapter Four of this thesis, I recognised the existence of multiple realities in a detailed discussion of the subjective meaning-making processes that inform the life story interview. I also presented basic information on the background of my participants to give the reader a view of the ‘person’ behind the quotations and perspectives that comprise the data for this study. By addressing such issues meticulously I demonstrated my knowledge and understanding of the challenges in the use of narrative method, and set out the basis for the steps I took to display methodological rigor.

6.4.1 Validity

The validity of a study refers to the believability of the findings, which is connected to questions of whether data interpretation is warranted or skewed, and why. In regard to narrative analysis, just as in qualitative research more generally, numerous authors (e.g., Riessman, 2008; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Van Maanen, 2011; Connelly & Clandinin, 1990) debate the issues of validity and reliability of findings. Van Maanen (2011) suggests that the focus on validity and reliability in the discipline of anthropology is overrated, calling attention to the criteria of apparentness and verisimilitude that subsume the properties of being easy to understand. Taking a different approach, Riessman (2008: 188) claimed that the validity of narrative research lies in its ability to inform future studies and empower participants. Hence, she advised that to meet the criteria of validity and reliability, researchers “must demonstrate how they develop and/or used methods appropriate to their research questions, epistemologies, and situated perspectives”. Connelly and Clandinin (1990: 7) noted that narrative explanation is constituted by the whole; that is, “narratives are not written (or read) according to a model of cause and effect, but according to the explanations gleaned from the overall narrative”. Nevertheless, the attention to the particular presented in narratives is a source of thick description and “we learn something essentially human by understanding an actual life or community as lived” (Connelly & Clandinin, ibid.: 7). Therefore, notions of validity and reliability in narrative research rest largely on issues of plausibility, defined by Connelly and Clandinin (ibid.: 8) as an account “that tends to ring true”. That largely implies that the discussion of validity and reliability in narrative research is an ongoing one that leaves opportunities for scholarly debates and “added diversity” (Riesman, 2008: 200).

In this study, I dealt with the issue of believability in two ways. Firstly, in the chapter on methodology, I discussed clearly and in detail, how I applied the chosen method to this study. In that chapter, I elaborated on the ‘situated perspective’, paying attention to the researcher as part of the study and presenting relevant information on the background of the interviewees for contextual understanding of the data. Secondly, in the presentation of the analysis, I paid attention to the details in the story that were theoretically relevant for this study, without losing the wholeness of the story. I did this by presenting the empirical observations in this study under three theoretical concepts to highlight relevant particulars of the stories. Together, they formed the life story, and they cannot be separated as unique and different experiences. For
instance, the interviewees that expressed hope as part of their narratives also expressed desperation and despair at the level of the vulnerability experienced as informal migrants. In addition, the interviewees who framed their tactics as the everyday actions they took to coexist with the constraints in their context in 2013 were not in the same locations in 2014 when I returned for a follow-up discussion. Indeed, two of the interviewees had moved back to their home countries (one of them voluntarily, the other involuntarily) and a third had moved to another country. Thus the analytical sections should be read together as a whole (Connelly & Clandinin, ibid.), or rather as different parts that have to be understood as a whole. The interviewees’ life stories are therefore presented as stories with experiences of hope, despair, coping, and moving away.

In addition, as life stories, the data utilised for the analysis are representative of the life experiences, perceptions, and activities of the individual interviewees, which is why I presented anonymised information on the backgrounds. This also implies that different migrants may have different experiences, perceptions and activities, an understanding which is relevant to this study in two ways. On the one hand, the life stories of other migrants who were not interviewed cannot be expected to change the experiences, perceptions, and activities presented by the interviewees. Therefore, the empirical observations gleaned from these life stories is expected to inform further or future studies. On the other hand, there is the puzzle of the information I would have gleaned from the life stories of other informal migrants. Would the stories have differed or confirmed the empirical observations of this study? These questions also suggest the need and avenues for further research.

6.5 Suggestions for Further Research

Finally, the findings from this study raised some questions worthy of further study within South Africa and the sub-Saharan region more broadly. The first question concerns the links between migration age, informal migrants’ conceptions of hope and survival, and his or her practice of tactics. It would be interesting to explore the effects which age and life course have in this context and how the concept of survival changes or is affected by life stages. This leads to the theme of how gender, intersecting with life course and age, changes informal migrants’ approach to hope, tactics, and conceptions of survival. Thirdly, in relation to uncertainty and resilience, how do social interventions affect the tactical agency of migrants? That suggests a comparative study of migrants with access to social support (for example, refugees) and migrants without access to such support, possibly in two different countries or within the same country but with different levels or forms of access. Such studies would have important implications for policy and practice and contribute to ongoing discourses in human development and innovative social policy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Lastly, and most significantly for me, are questions on micro-entrepreneurship, informal migration, and immigration management in Africa. What would be the experience of the host society and the migrants if immigration management becomes focused on developing the space for migrants’ micro-entrepreneurship and de-emphasises controls such as exclusions and criminalisation? The newly initiated visa-on-arrival policy for Africans by Ghana’s
government strengthens the case for future comparative studies of poor African migrants in different countries in Africa.
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APPENDIX I

Historical map of Hillbrow and Hospital Hill 1897

APPENDIX II

Regional map of Yeoville, South Africa

Source: http://noma.net/features/map/placedetail.1018778/Yeoville/ visited 20 November 2017