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CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES ON SOCIAL VALUES, IDEOLOGY AND FINNISH EQUALITY

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation makes methodological and empirical contributions to understanding how we represent and use values that are important in defining ‘us’, and who ‘we’ consider ourselves to be. It also contributes to our understanding of how particular values, which we might typically assume as enhancing societal wellbeing, can be formulated ideologically in the sense that they are discursive representations and tools for elevating ‘our’ identities and subjugating ‘theirs’.

The study material consists of written responses to open questions that were produced by people who are differently positioned in relation to institutionalised norms on “sociability” and/or “sex/gender”: People contacted through a national random sample, people diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and people with transgendered experiences. I therefore also consider how being explicitly marked as psychiatrically, medically and socially ‘abnormal’ might interact with how social values are negotiated in identification and in ideological work. The perspectives informing this dissertation are interdisciplinary. I draw upon theoretical and methodological approaches to values, identification and ideology in social semiotics and critical discourse studies, critical and societal psychologies, semiotic sociology and cultural studies.

The first of two primary methodological contributions is in developing a framework for analysing social values as constructions that are formulated in dynamic identification processes. I specify analyses of social values firstly in relation to territorialising what ‘we’ consider to be important, desirable or obligatory; secondly in relation to formulating action programmes by positioning contents into relational participant roles; and thirdly in relation to evaluative positioning of oneself and others in relation to those territorialisations and action programmes. The second methodological contribution is in developing a framework for analysing ideologies as both structures and processes, from the perspective of modalities. Modality is amongst the discursive resources that function to connect and divide viewpoints, to build value projects and to build communities of shared values. The concept of modality is common to, and unifies, the methodological and empirical contributions in this thesis.

My empirical contributions in this dissertation deal with analyses of Finnish equality discourses; how equality is given meaning and used in identification processes. I also examine the extent to which equality as a concept is ideological such that its imbued meanings and uses work to produce and update relations of domination. I ask how discourses on equality are constructed and ‘done’ by Finnish people who are differently positioned in relation to specific institutionalised norms. I interpret four discourses on equality; that is, four different ways that differently positioned people classify

and represent equality. I also conduct close readings of value positioning, demonstrating how representations and implementations of equality occur in concrete identification processes.

I suggest that a network of ideological discourses on Finnish equality works to somewhat paradoxically produce and maintain symbolic and material inequalities. Integrating an historical analysis, I argue that this ideology is being constantly updated and maintained in part because of the interrelatedness in the historical path of equality with national projects on temperance, homogeneity, non-conflict and civil unity, the nation and sameness. Particular ways of continually referencing and integrating aspects of these projects into meanings and implementations of equality have been key to maintaining its ideological status. They are also key to understanding how ideological Finnish equality formulations might be transformed.

In sum, in this dissertation I demonstrate how social values and ideology can be analysed through classificatory, evaluative, representational and positioning aspects that are entangled with identification. Modalities are central in all of these processes, and the interplay between them. The methodologies provide means for understanding how particular social value formulations and identifications may participate in building or disarticulating ideologies and power imbalances. I use these methodologies in empirical examinations, claiming that specific Finnish equality representations are ideological. I demonstrate how these ideological equality representations are central in interpersonal ideological work and in constructions of hierarchical, power dominant identifications and social orderings.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tässä väitöskirjassa lisätään metodologista ja empiiristä ymmärrystä siitä, miten representoimme ja hyödynnämme arvoja, jotka puolestaan ovat tärkeitä määriteltäessä “meitä” ja “meihin” kuuluvia. Tutkimus tarkastelee myös sitä, miten tietyt arvot, joiden tyyppillisesti nähdään lisäävän yhteiskunnallista hyvinvointia, muuttuvat ideologisiksi siinä mielessä, että niistä tulee diskursiivisia työkaluja “meidän” identiteetin pönkittämisessä ja “heidän” identiteetin polkemisessa.

Väitöskirjan aineisto koostuu avokysymysvastauksista, joita kirjoittivat institutionaaliin sosiaalisuuden ja/tai sukupuolen normeihin eri tavoin asemoituneet vastaajat: satunnaisotoksella poimitut vastaajat, Aspergerin syndrooma -diagnoosin saaneet vastaajat ja transsukupuolisuuden kokemuksia omaavat vastaajat. Näin ollen huomioni kohdistuu myös siihen, miten psykiatrinen, medikaalinen ja sosiaalisesti “epänormaali” yhdistyvät sosiaalisten arvojen, identifikaatioiden ja ideologioiden välisissä neuvotteluissa.

Tutkimusta ohjaa poikkitieteellinen lähestymistapa. Nojaan arvoja koskeviin teoreettisiin ja metodologisiin suuntauksiin, sosiaalisemioottisiin ja kriittisen diskurssitutkimuksen identifikaatiota ja ideologiaa koskeviin suuntauksiin, kriittiseen- ja yhteiskunnalliseen (sosiaali)psykologiaan, semioottiseen sosiologiaan ja kulttuurintutkimukseen.

Väitöskirjani ensimmäisenä metodologisena kontribuutiona kehitän viitekehyksen sosiaalisten arvojen analysoimiseksi konstruktiivisena, jotka muodostuvat dynaamisessa identifikaation prosessissa. Määrittelen sosiaalisten arvojen analyysin ensinnäkin suhteessa sen kartoittamiseen, mitä “me” pidämme tärkeänä, suotuisana tai velvoittavana; toiseksi suhteessa toimintaohjelmien muotoiluun asemoimalla sisällöt relationaaliin osallistujarooleihin; ja kolmanneksi itsen ja toisen positioihin liittyvinä arviointeina, jotka kytkeytyvät territorialisaatioihin ja toimintaohjelmiin. Toisena metodologisena kontribuutiona kehitän viitekehyksen ideologioiden analysointiin sekä rakenteina että prosesseina modaliteettien näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna. Modaliteetti on yksi diskursiivisista varannoista, joiden puitteissa näkökannat yhdistyvät ja erottuvat, arvoprojektit rakentuvat ja yhteisöt jaettuine arvoineen muodostuvat. Modaliteetin käsite on yhteinen tutkimukseni metodologiselle ja empiiriselle kontribuutiolle.

Tutkimukseni lisää empiiristä tietoa suomalaisesta tasa-arvotutkimuksesta ja erityisesti siitä, millaisia merkityksiä tasa-arvolle annetaan ja miten sitä käytetään identifikaatioprosesseissa. Tarkastelen myös sitä, missä määrin tasa-arvo ideologisena käsitteenä tuottaa ja uusintaa valta-asemia. Kysyn, miten eri institutionaaliin normeihin eri tavoin asemoidut suomalaiset konstruoivat ja “tekevät” tasa-arvon diskursseja. Tulkitseen aineistosta neljä tasa-arvon diskurssia, eli tapaa, joilla eri tavoin asemoidut ihmiset

luokittelevat ja representoivat tasa-arvoa. Lähiluen myös arvoihin liittyviä asemoiteja ja osoitan, miten tasa-arvon representaatiot ja toteutukset saavat muotonsa konkreettisissa identifikaatioprosesseissa.

Esitän, että suomalaisten tasa-arvodiskurssien verkosto jokseenkin paradoksaalisesti tuottaa ja ylläpitää symbolista ja materiaalista epätasa-arvoa. Huomioimalla suomalaisen tasa-arvon historiallisen kontekstin, esitän, että tasa-arvoideologiaa päivitetään ja ylläpidetään jatkuvasti ainakin osittain sen vuoksi, että tasa-arvon historiallinen kehitys on sidoksissa muihin tärkeisiin kansallisiin projekteihin ja arvoihin kuten kohtuullisuuteen, homogeenisyyteen, konfliktittomuuteen, kansalliseen yhtenäisyyteen, kansakuntaan ja samankaltaisuuteen. Erityiset tavat, joilla näihin projekteihin on jatkuvasti viitattu tasa-arvon saamien merkitysten ja toteutustapojen yhteydessä, ovat olleet avainasemassa tasa-arvon ideologisen statuksen säilyttämisessä. Ne ovat myös avainasemassa sen ymmärtämisessä, miten suomalaisen tasa-arvon ideologisia muotoiluja voitaisiin muuttaa.

Lyhyesti, tässä väitöskirjassa osoitan, miten sosiaalisia arvoja ja ideologiaa voidaan analysoida identifikaatioon liittyvistä luokittavista, arvioivista, representationaalisista ja asemoivista näkökulmista. Modaliteetit ja niiden välinen vuorovaikutus ovat keskeisiä kaikissa näissä prosesseissa. Työssä hyödyntämäni metodologiat tarjoavat keinoja ymmärtää, miten sosiaalisten arvojen muotoilut ja identifikaatiot voivat osallistua ideologioiden ja vallan epätasapainon vahvistumiseen tai heikkenemiseen. Hyödynnän näitä metodologioita empiirisesti ja esitän, että tietyt suomalaisen tasa-arvon representaatiot ovat ideologisia. Osoitan, miten nämä ideologiset tasa-arvon representaatiot ovat keskeisiä vuorovaikutteisessa ideologisessa työssä ja rakennettaessa hierarkkisia, valtaapitäviä identifikaatioita ja sosiaalista järjestystä.

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At the beginning of 2006 I moved from the United States to Finland. The same year I also began studying as an undergraduate social psychology student. This doctoral dissertation reflects how and what I have come to understand about some specific aspects of Finnish culture as a social researcher, but also as an outsider. So in some ways this is an anthropological study. I have experienced and interpreted Finnish culture as an observer and participant observer, from mostly ‘unmarked’ (e.g. ‘white’) positions, and in the various sociocultural contexts that I have moved in – on the streets, in the buses, saunas, neighbourhoods, districts and regions, in housing blocks, as part of my experiences with the naturalization process, social and health care services and other aspects of welfare society, as well as in the interactions that I have had as part of this research. So many people have been involved with this negotiation of knowledge.

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For
Auri Lyn

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LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

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- I. Menard, R. (2016a). Analysing social values in identification; A framework for research on the representation and implementation of values. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 46, 122–142. Published by John Wiley and Sons.
- II. Menard, R. (2017). Analysing ideological complexes from the perspective of modalities. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- III. Menard, R. (2016b). Doing equality and difference; representation and alignment in Finnish identification. *Text & Talk*, 36(6), 733-755. Published by De Gruyter.

The publications are referred to in the text by their roman numerals.

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1 INTRODUCTION

This doctoral dissertation deals with how we represent and use values that are important in defining ‘us’; in defining who ‘we’ consider ourselves to be. It is also about how particular values, which we might typically assume as enhancing wellbeing, can become ideological in the sense that they are discursive tools for elevating ‘our’ identities and subjugating ‘theirs’.

Judith Butler (2008) discusses how particular versions and uses of ‘freedom’ are bigoted and coercive, these days often against Muslims. Her point is not to abandon freedom as a norm or cultural value, but to call into question how it is given meaning and deployed in othering practices. Ruth Wodak (2007) argues that tolerance values are ideological in many social spheres such that few would explicitly admit to exclusion or discrimination. For this reason, the study of how exclusion and inclusion are reproduced in discourse is not straightforward. Latent aspects of discrimination in everyday talk need to be examined by critical analysts. Such analyses are important, as latent yet discriminatory viewpoints are more likely to go unquestioned. Seemingly tolerant viewpoints can be both banal and powerful means of sustaining inequalities. Similarly, Michael Billig (1991, pp. 121-141) argues that in order to understand prejudice we first need to understand what people mean by prejudice, and how its ideological history is carried on in common sense, everyday thinking.

The research in this dissertation originated as an investigation into common sense knowledge on Finnish macro social structures; on how macro social orders are represented and used in cultural and societal level identifications to separate ‘us’ from ‘others’. While becoming familiar with some of the material that I analyse in this dissertation, it became apparent to me that equality values are salient and prevalent aspects of Finnish social psychological landscapes. The concept of equality is clearly a significant player in Finnish identity processes and social ordering. Regardless of whether influential social actors or laypeople, it seems that few are ready to explicitly promote inequality as a concept. Gender equality, in particular, is often perceived as part of who ‘we’ are; as an advanced and complete national project (e.g. Holli, 2003; Koivunen, 2003; Vuori, 2009). However, as Holli, Magnusson and Rönnblom (2005) among others have pointed out, there is a gap between its rhetorical deployment on one hand, and political and social practices around equality on the other. At worst equality is constructed in exclusionary ways, used rhetorically to legitimate discrimination and, paradoxically, to strengthen inequalities (e.g. Sakki & Pettersson, 2016; Tuori, 2007). While Finnish equality has been studied extensively and from diverse perspectives, there is a void in knowledge with respect to specific meanings that Finnish *laypeople* give to equality. We also do not know enough about how laypeople use those meanings to mark boundaries between ‘us’ and

‘them’. Thus my research on social order representation developed into a focused study on the meanings and uses of equality values.

Empirically in this dissertation, I investigate how equality values are given meaning through demarcations of difference, how they are used in identification processes, and the extent to which they are ideological such that their imbued meanings and uses work to stratify the social realm; to produce and update inequalities (Study III). I ask how discourses on equality are constructed and ‘done’ by Finnish people who are differently positioned in relation to specific salient norms. I also consider the extent to which equality, as a concept, is a contested space; how its various meanings and uses are actively built and deployed in relation to and, at times, against each other. Finally, I interpret and explain why equality values and discourses have evolved in the ways that they have, how they have been maintained, whether some of their meanings and uses are social problems and if so, how they might be transformed.

My contributions in this dissertation are also methodological, which is largely a result of two significant methodological difficulties that I faced as the study progressed. Firstly, it was not obvious as to how I would go about analysing equality as a discursively produced social value. The dominant paradigm on values research is geared towards trying to delineate which values individuals prioritise and consider as guiding principles in their lives. In this paradigm (e.g. Schwartz, 1992), the contents and structure of values are often thought to be universal and their meanings are taken for granted. Also in alternative psychologies – such as discursive psychology and social representations theory – the study of values has been overlooked. In critical discourse analysis, value meanings are also typically assumed by researchers (Sowińska, 2013). Thus theoretical and methodological approaches that take values as historically strained yet contextually shaped, and implemented in pluralistic, power imbalanced social spheres, is severely lacking. In empirical research on values, whether starting from positivist or interpretivist assumptions, meanings of values have been taken for granted.

Firstly then, in relation to methodological elaborations, I contribute to the theory and methodology of values as social constructions that are formulated in dynamic, ‘always becoming’ identification processes (Study I). In working towards this methodological aim, I start with the assumption that meanings and uses of values are shaped in historical processes, in naturalised and habitual social and cultural practices, by their embeddedness in social structures and relation to previous meanings, yet always being re-produced and updated in situated and dialogical text productions and discursive practices (e.g. Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011). From this starting point and drawing from positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990) and critical discourse studies (Fairclough, 2003; Martin & White, 2005), I develop a framework for analysing social values as evaluated and motivated *classifications* and *projects* for action in representational aspects of identification, and as *positionings* of oneself and others in relation to those

value representations, in interpersonal aspects of identification. The framework can account not only for intrapersonal, intrainstitutional and intracultural value pluralism but also attends to the neglect of issues of context in values research, as regards value meanings and uses. These methodological developments are thus a direct result of the one-sidedness in contemporary values research.

The second methodological challenge came about through my historical cultural analyses of the research context. In reviewing previous studies dealing with Finnish equality, I came across numerous claims in the literature regarding the ideological status of equality values in Finland. I found myself wanting to repeat such claims. By the mid-point of my study it was apparent that equality values were not only overall very salient in the respondents' texts, but also used in explicit and implicit ways to stratify the social sphere and reproduce power imbalances. At the same time, I found it problematic to name Finnish equality as ideological without being able to point to specific aspects in the corpus that make it so. So began my quest to figure out how to empirically examine the ideological investment in specific formulations and uses of equality in the material that I analyse in my study. Again I found a lack of methodological guidance, specifically with respect to analysing representational aspects of ideologies. This consequently led to my second methodological contribution.

My second methodological contribution is in developing a framework for analysing both representational and interpersonal aspects of ideologies (Study II). Ideology has been characterised in numerous ways. In this dissertation my approach to ideology is informed firstly by discussions on their dilemmatic and contradictory nature, and their role as resources in constructions of identity, in the compatible works of Stuart Hall (1981, 1986, 1988) and critical discursive psychology (Billig, 1991; Tileagă, 2007). I also follow characterisations of ideology in social semiotics (Hodge & Kress, 1988) and critical discourse studies (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough,), in which ideology is taken as both structures and practices that are formulated through viewpoints in alignment with projects of domination, and that work on (always unsuccessfully) eliminating contradictions and antagonisms. In critical discourse studies, *linguistic modalities* have been identified as empirically accessible means for examining ideology.

Modality is amongst the discursive resources that function to connect and divide viewpoints, to build value projects and to build communities of shared values (Martin & White, 2005; Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a). Modality is central in texturing identities (Fairclough, 2003), and in doing ideological work (Hodge & Kress, 1988). In social research inspired by critical linguistics, such as critical discourse analysis and social semiotics, modalities have been described as relevant to both interpersonal and representational realms of the construction of reality (Fairclough, 2003, p. 166; van Leeuwen, 2005, p. 160). Yet methodological developments and analyses have focused on interpersonal functions of modality in building solidarity and distance. Modalities that

function in representation to build social values, identities and ideologies are underexplored.

The concept of modality is common to, and unifies, the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions in this thesis. I work with Sulkunen and Törrönen's (1997a, 1997b) Greimas-informed framework on modalities. Their framework is unique in that they distinguish between modalities that build interpersonal meaning, and pragmatic modalities that formulate representational meaning. This distinction is imperative for the methodology on ideology that I develop in this thesis. Following their work, I approach modalities as discursive resources that are fundamental for evaluating truths and certainties, for constructing interpersonal solidarity and distance, as well as for evaluating and positioning classifications into participant roles in representation.

Both the methodological developments and empirical insights in this study would have been challenging if not impossible without some of the unique perspectives of those who participated. The respondents that have been vital to the methodological and empirical contributions in this dissertation are people who are positioned differently in relation to hegemonic and institutionalised constructions of "sociability" and/or "sex/gender": People contacted through a national random sample, people diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome and people with transgendered life experiences. My research interests therefore include how being explicitly 'marked' as psychiatrically, medically and socially 'abnormal' might interact with how social values are negotiated in identification and ideological work.

People with transgendered experiences violate normative sex and gender classifications. For example in 36 out of the 40 European countries that have provisions for legal recognition of a gender other than that which was assigned at birth, a psychiatric diagnosis is required in order to gain that recognition. In 23 of those countries, Finland included, sterilisation is required for legal gender recognition of transpeople (Transgender Europe, 2016). Although Finland's sterilisation laws have been criticised both locally and internationally, they are still operative and part of gaining access to transgender related healthcare. In psychiatric discourses and formal diagnostic codes, Asperger's syndrome is typically defined as a neurologically-based developmental disorder affecting social interaction. It is also typically located on the diagnostic spectrum of autism disorders. Yet in critical approaches the suggestion is that the diagnosis itself has evolved largely in relation to the normativisation of interaction styles (see e.g. Nadesan, 2005; Osteen, 2007). Alternative discourses on Asperger's and autism approach the 'autistic way of being' as a comprehensible self-expression style (Murray, 2008).

In this study I approach diagnostic criteria related to Asperger's and transgendered life experiences as institutionalised codifications of what it means to violate *socially constructed* norms of social interaction or "sex/gender". These diagnoses leave those who defy the norms that they

reference – i.e. those who express themselves differently than that which has come to be defined as acceptable or ‘natural’ as regards “sociability” or “sex/gender” – with a label that is often alienating and used as a basis for exclusion. I approach the accounts from respondents with transgendered experiences or Asperger diagnoses as coming from people with particular life experiences rather than, for example, from people with pathologies, disorders or disabilities.

In the course of my working on this dissertation I have had to regularly justify, or perhaps more accurately defend, my selection of respondents. A recurring question has been ‘why these groups’? This has been the case in both manuscript review processes and paper presentations. I eventually got used to explaining my choices to the point that I starting doing it pre-emptively, if for no other reason than to simply save time. The most efficient way of clarifying these methodological choices is by recalling some aspects of Donna Haraway’s (1988) discussion on situated knowledges:

[...] The standpoints of the subjugated are not “innocent” positions. On the contrary, they are preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretive core of all knowledge. They are knowledgeable of modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts – ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. [...] “Subjugated” standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world. (Haraway, 1988, pp. 583-584)

The passage resonates with my reasoning behind the participant sampling methods in this thesis. Some of the viewpoints of the respondents with transgendered experiences or Asperger’s functioned in my analyses and interpretations as openings into aspects of social orders that are mostly either absent or unelaborated upon in the randomly sampled respondents’ perspectives. Through their life experiences, respondents with transgendered experiences or Asperger’s diagnoses seemed to have gained knowledge with respect to being, quite literally, both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ important social values. That is they ‘know’ about the shared meanings and uses, but at the same time seem to feel that that ‘common sense knowledge’ does not make good sense – it is not adequately functional. Their viewpoints had extensive ramifications not only in the empirical study but also in nourishing my thought processes involved in the methodological developments in this thesis.

The theoretical and methodological backdrops informing this dissertation are interdisciplinary. I draw upon approaches to values, identification and ideology in critical linguistics, social semiotics and critical discourse studies (e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 2003; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Kress & Hodge, 1979; Martin & White, 2005), critical and societal psychologies (Billig, 1991; Davies & Harré, 1990; Tileagă, 2005; Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011; Tsirogianni & Sammut, 2014), semiotic sociology (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a, Törrönen,

2011, 2014) and Stuart Hall's (e.g. 1988, 1996) work on identification and ideology.

In short, this is a methodological and empirical dissertation dealing with social values and ideology. I approach social values and ideologies as concepts and discursive practices that are entangled with each other, as well as with processes of identification and social ordering. Methodologically, I develop tools for analysing social values as part of identification processes. I also propose a related methodology for analysing ideologies as structures and actions that are entangled with processes of formulating those social values. The methodologies developed here can be used concurrently and on the same research material, while it is also possible to work with either of them separately and on their own. My empirical contributions in this thesis are in analyses of lay discourses on equality in Finland, in written texts produced by differently socially positioned people. I examine how equality is represented and used in identification, while also considering the ideological investment in different formulations of equality.

The thesis is thus comprised of two methodological studies (Studies I and II), one empirical study (Study III), and this summary in which I explicate both the relations between the sub-studies as well as develop the theoretical foundations that inform them. Chapter 2 is devoted to outlining the backdrop for my methodological work on social values (Study I), while Chapter 3 does the same for my methodological work on ideologies (Study II). Chapter 4 characterises the framework on modalities that is fundamental to both the methodological and empirical contributions; that developed by Pekka Sulkunen and Jukka Törrönen (1997a, 1997b). Chapter 5 provides details on the respondents and materials that I worked with in the entirety of this dissertation. In Chapter 6 I summarise both of my methodological contributions (Studies I and II), while in Chapter 7 I summarise the empirical analyses (Study III). Chapter 8 is the conclusion, in which I reflect upon the methodological and empirical elaborations, limitations and future directions, and the implications of this work as a whole.

2 SOCIAL VALUES IN IDENTIFICATION

In this chapter I build the relevant theoretical aspects as regards both values and identification, which together provide the backdrop for the methodology that I develop on social values (Study I). My general starting point is that social values are historically embedded and constrained, as well as collectively produced and reproduced in situated and locatable utterances and practices. Social values are formulated in relation to previous utterances around topics that are perceived as being the same or similar to those currently being discussed, yet are nevertheless always under reformulation with each articulation, negotiation and use (cf. Bakhtin, 1981). Social values are categorised, represented and positioned interpersonally and in context, and therefore differently in different situations and by different people. Rather than simply 'eliciting' values from our cognitions and applying them to situations, we continuously negotiate their relevance and meanings in discursive practices.

Dominant paradigmatic and methodological trends in values research within psychology and social psychology have developed with different assumptions (see Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011; Tsirogianni & Sammut, 2014). Also in psychological paradigms that focus on constructions of meaning in interaction – such as positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990), (critical) discursive psychology (e.g. Wetherell & Edley, 1999) and dialogical approaches in social representations theory (e.g. Jovchelovitch, 2007; Marková, 2003) – the theorisation of value formulation and analysis of value meanings has been overlooked or left unelaborated. Similarly in critical discourse studies, social values are considered fundamentally linked to ideologies while meanings of values have been taken for granted in research (Sowińska, 2013).

My contributions to social values research are aimed at methodological developments that can account for structural and historical constraints, as well as situatedness, plurality, dialogism and transformation in social values. My contributions rely on the claim that as mutually and interdependently motivated and interested, social values and identification are inseparable and should be examined as such. I return to and justify this claim in Sections 2.2-2.3 of this chapter.

2.1 THE DOMINANT PARADIGM IN VALUES RESEARCH

The dominant contemporary research paradigm on values is largely based in older paradigms from the human sciences. A primary assumption in this paradigm is that individual cognition and emotions are the means by which social interactions originate (for a discussion on distinctions between old and

newer paradigms in psychology, see e.g. Harré, 2001). For example in a widely used theory and methodology developed by Shalom Schwartz and colleagues (e.g. Schwartz, 1992), values are taken as individual cognitive concepts or beliefs that pertain to desirable end states. They are characterised as transsituational and relatively stable across individuals' lifespans. In an effort at theorising them in absolute terms, value meanings are defined abstractly and approached as universal in content and structure.

Researchers working within this paradigm have pointed out various inconsistencies and potential problems with their use. For instance, 'priming for various contexts' has produced differing results in studies using abstract value surveys (e.g. Seligman & Katz, 1996). Similarly, Henry and Reyna (2007) have shown that judgemental value expressions, such as "people on welfare violate the importance of working hard in life", have stronger links with attitudes than do abstract value expressions, such as "I find it very important to work hard in life". The concept of abstract value expressions is parallel to popular descriptions of values in most values research in psychology (for a review, see Cheng & Fleischmann, 2010). Judgmental value expressions, on the other hand, are contextualised and used as conceptual tools in order to gauge whether or not a person or group is living up to a particular value.

The 'operationalisation' of abstract value models has led to a well-known discrepancy in the relationship between those values people consider as important guiding principles in their lives and their behaviour (Maio, Olson, Allen & Bernard, 2001). The relation between values and behaviour is thought to be only remote (see also Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Or there is said to be a relation only when there is a value conflict, or when single values are grouped into abstractly formulated value types during analyses. Or values may be related "to a single behaviour if the setting is controlled in a manner that reduces random variation and eliminates overwhelming situational influences" (Schwartz, 1996, p. 125).

I do not agree that values are only remotely related to behaviour, or related to behaviour only when there is a value conflict, when analyses are done in certain ways or when research is conducted in settings that are detached from everyday life. I also do not agree that values are individual cognitive constructs, or universal in content and structure.

In this study I approach values as both structures and practices – as both structured and structuring. As with all meaning making processes, values are imbued with meaning and implemented in discursive and social practices, and identifications (cf. Fairclough, 2003). Approaching values as formulated and used in discursive and social practices allows us to understand their *specific contextualised meanings and uses*. I also approach values as being *in* artefacts of behaviour (e.g. texts, images or alterations of material objects and natural environments) and macrostructures (e.g. representations, discourses, orders of discourses, social orders) as *meaning potential*. That is, previous utterances of social values are resources that are drawn upon in each production and use of values *in* behaviour. The assumptions that I start with in this study are

largely incompatible with those of the dominant paradigm in contemporary psychological values research.

Yet as scientific researchers we do not reflect enough upon how we judge and position others' work. We often criticise others' work as part of the 'academic survival game'. In doing so, we usually do not make explicit or question our own assumptions, or take others' criticisms into account – at least not any more than we are required to, by reviewers for example. We seem to be engaged in scientific practices that function according to neoliberal rules of competition and individualism. We are urged to 'pick a side' and stick with it, maintain and defend disciplinary boundaries, and discursively elevate our own approaches over others in the quest for academic survival.

*Competition and hierarchical domination over others, even the destruction of others, are legitimated if they lead to survival. The **terms** through which survival is guaranteed, however, cannot be questioned, since the possibility of non-survival is always present for those who do not adapt. (Davies & Bendix-Petersen, 2005, p. 89, emphasis in original)*

Such practices detract from the potential to create new knowledge. The point is that innumerable values researchers have found dominant frameworks on human values – such as that of Schwartz – valuable for exploring abstract goals or ideals and their relations to other variables. That knowledge has legitimacy in its own right and I respect work done in the dominant paradigm. Yet its practitioners have produced *a specific type of empirical knowledge on values*. For example we know that in large random samples, Finns in a rural community have consistently prioritised 'value types' such as benevolence (e.g. helpful, honest, trustworthy), universalism (e.g. equality, social justice), security (e.g. national, personal) and conformity (e.g. obedience) (Puohiniemi, 2002). But in many ways this knowledge is very abstract, for example in terms of what the results explain. We do not know, for example, how different Finnish people understand these values; that is, what is meant by them and *what they are used to accomplish* in different contexts. Different methodological approaches are needed in order to understand questions such as these. Values research could use some diversification.

2.2 CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL VALUES

An exception to how values research in psychology and social psychology is typically done is the theoretical and empirical work led by Tsirogianni, Sammut and colleagues (Sammut, Tsirogianni & Moghaddam, 2013; Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011; Tsirogianni & Sammut, 2014). They problematise numerous aspects of contemporary predominant values models: The implications of trans-situational stability in values, their emphases on universality in the content and structure of values, and their assumptions of

individuals' conscious awareness and conceptual clarity of value priorities and the role they play as guiding principles in their own lives. They argue that Schwartz's model promotes "a static, detached, objectivistic and purely descriptive view of values" (Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011, p. 457). They promote instead a values in action approach, which conceptualises values as both properties and processes. Social values are characterised as collectively generated beliefs and systems of beliefs that shape individual choices and act as guiding principles. Social values encompass both normative properties as well as contextualised, acted-out processes, and participate in ordering the social sphere in terms of what is preferable, morally imperative, and can legitimate and sustain collective identities. (Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011.)

In an empirical study, Tsirogianni and Sammut (2014) propose that values are linked to ideological systems, which in turn act as reference points for formulating viewpoints. They examine how value laden ideologies are drawn upon and used to negotiate perspectives on immigrants in Britain. Their starting point in the study is "that values cannot be understood in absolute terms, but are always and forever associated with particular meanings that points of view convey in particular social circumstances" (p. 5). They emphasise how value diversity underlies the capacity to form and 'take the perspective' of different points of view. Sammut, Tsirogianni and Moghaddam (2013) suggest that particular social values can serve as 'interobjective boundary objects'. The 'same' social value can be deployed in different sociocultural spaces to legitimate divergent courses of action. The authors argue that although the rights and duties attached to these divergent action plans may vary, interobjective social values may provide 'space in between' differing viewpoints for negotiating superordinate goals and mutual interests.

The work on social values by Tsirogianni, Sammut and colleagues has been a turning point as regards some of the ways in which values research in social psychology might begin to be respecified. Their discussions have informed my characterisation of social values as historically embedded, collectively produced, networked systems of classifications of the good, desirable, obligatory and important (Study I). Their work is also insightful in that bases of their examinations are on the links between values and perspectives or positions. One of the points that they promote theoretically, yet leave mostly unattended empirically and methodologically, is how particular values may take on different meanings and forms when negotiated through different points of view. This is one of the most fundamental starting points that I take up in this dissertation.

Rather than being abstractly defined, social values are imbued with meaning in representation and 'never complete' identification processes. Social values are not fixed or static, but rather always undergoing reformulation. At the same time, their meanings are constrained by the situational, historical cultural contexts and social orders within which they are formulated. Social values are constructed by people in interaction with their material and social worlds. The meanings of social values are affected by the

conditions of those material and social worlds, and by peoples' previous life experiences and future-oriented ideals in those worlds. Social values are embodied and discursive practices as regards what 'ought' to be. They are intertwined with micro, meso and macro level social ordering and identification. Social values are formed, transformed and used in representational and positioning aspects of identification processes. In the remainder of this chapter I develop justifications for these claims. I begin by describing three compatible approaches to identification that are foundational to my work on social values.

2.2.1 ON IDENTIFICATION

My understanding of identity construction is largely informed by Stuart Hall's (e.g. 1990, 1992, 1996) work on identification, by positioning theory (e.g. Davies & Harré, 1990; van Langenhove & Harré, 1994), and by a methodological framework developed by Jukka Törrönen (2001, 2014) for analysing subject position constructions.

2.2.1.1 Stuart Hall

Following Stuart Hall, my use of the term 'identification' is meant to emphasise that the construction of identity is multiple, shifting, fragmented and always in progress. Hall describes identification as a process by which subjects endlessly assume, dissociate from and perform the positions to which they are summoned (Hall, 1996, p. 14). Moreover, identity is "deeply implicated in representation" (Hall, 1992, p. 301). We only know what it is to be, for example, 'Finnish' because of *the ways in which* 'Finnishness' is *represented*. This category is not essential but rather culturally, socially, historically and discursively constituted. 'Finnish culture' is a *discourse*, as is 'queer culture', 'English culture' and so on. Discourses are used to construct representations that influence and organise our practices around them, and our conceptions of ourselves and others in relation to them (Hall, 1992, pp. 292-293).

Hall argues that 'national cultures' have come to dominate in modernity over other, more particularised sources of cultural identification. National cultures aim at unification by ongoing attempts to subvert social and (sub)cultural differences (e.g. race, class, gender, sexuality) and represent all people as belonging to one big national family (Hall, 1992, p. 296). Albeit 'stitched up' identities, national identities have come to dominate over more particularistic cultural identifications. Yet a destabilising force in nationalist projects has been globalisation, a primary feature of which is the compression of time and space. Human lives are much more quickly paced and the world feels much smaller. Time and space are also the primary features of representation, which means that the compression of time and space has

additionally led to the hybridity of representation. Because identity is bound to representation, the compression of time and space through globalisation has led to a proliferation of identity choices.

Hall (1992) also presents an historical account of the changing concept of identity. He distinguishes between three very broad historical periods, linked to different conceptualisations of the subject and identity. The rise of the highly individualised subject took place between the Enlightenment and the Renaissance periods. The 'Enlightenment subject' was conceptualised as a unified and fully centred individual, where the essential centre of the self was the person's identity. The concept of the fully centred subject faced the growing complexity of the modern world and the rise of capitalism, resulting in increasing fragmentation and decentering processes. The 'sociological subject' was conceived as being formed in relation to society, where identity bridges the gap between the 'inside' and 'outside', the personal and the public. We project ourselves into cultural identities and internalise their meanings and values. Among others, Mead (1932) conceptualised the subject in this way. There is still an inner core and 'authentic' self, but it arises in interaction with identities offered by cultural and social worlds that are 'outside' the individual.

This inner core is what is said to be now fragmenting, shifting and perhaps of fading significance in postmodernity as a result of radical structural and institutional changes. The 'postmodern subject' is absent of any stable, essential or permanent identity. If such an identity is experienced, it is only because we are constructing stories to protect ourselves from uncomfortable notions of an incoherent or ahistorical self. Identity is historically rather than biologically defined. Conceptions of a coherent identity are in crisis as individuals face displacement from their social and cultural worlds, as well as from themselves. Identity nevertheless remains an issue in part because of the very reason that it is in crisis. Because individuals are no longer able to easily construct stable and unitary identities, there are endless and ongoing attempts to do so.

2.2.1.2 Positioning theory

Similar to Stuart Hall, positioning theorists argue that identification processes take place in relation to attempts at constructing historically unitary and stable conceptions of the self. Positioning theory is a post-structuralist, narrative approach to identity that has developed in correspondence with discursive psychology. Following Vygotsky (1978), positioning theorists reject Cartesian dualism in 'locating' psychological phenomena as constantly moving between public and private, individual and collective dimensions (van Langenhove & Harré, 1994). Accordingly, selves emerge in social interaction not as relatively fixed or stable end products. They are also dynamic phenomena that are constantly reconstituted through the discursive practices that we participate in. Who we are is a matter of the subject positions made available in those

discursive practices, as well as the stories within them that we use to make sense of our own and others' lives.

The development of our own sense of how the world is to be interpreted – from the standpoint of who we take ourselves to be – entails learning the categories that order human relations (e.g. male/female, teacher/student, grandparent/parent/child). It means participating in the discursive practices through which meanings are allocated to those categories and storylines. It also means positioning oneself and others in relation to those categories and storylines, in terms of belonging or not belonging to them. This sometimes involves emotional commitments to particular categories. The development of selves always involves discursively developing *moral orders* that are constructed around belonging in the world in particular ways, from a particular perspective and understanding of the local expressive order. All of these processes evolve in relation to socially predominant understandings of the self, as historically continuous and unitary. (Davies & Harré, 1990.)

Positioning theorists posit that discursive events always involve both reconstructions of social reality, and the positioning of oneself and others in relation to those produced realities (Davies & Harré, 1990; van Langenhove & Harré, 1994, pp. 362–363). Positioning concerns how people locate themselves and others as participants in jointly produced storylines, to which are assigned particular rights, duties and obligations (Davies & Harré, 1990). To construct, offer and take up positions thus involves discursively negotiated permissions and compulsions, distributions of power, legitimisations for acting, and social ordering.

My interpretation of positioning theory is that analyses of identification can look at contents and structures of systems of categories and storylines, and how they strain interpersonal positioning through negotiations of moral orders. These negotiations occur through positioning oneself and others in relation to rights, duties, permissions and obligations that are relevant in the communicative and social context (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). From this perspective, identification can be taken as involving the selection, evaluation and positioning of content in the building of storylines, and the evaluation of oneself and others in relation to that content. Positioning theory has been influential to my methodological work in that identification is approached in relation to how categories are given meaning, *evaluated*, positioned in representation and oriented to action in the building of storylines, and projected through viewpoints and interpersonal structures onto our own and others' identities. In sum, in positioning theory is the implication that social values are continuously under negotiation in identification processes.

2.2.1.3 Analysing identification as classifications, participant roles and positionings

Jukka Törrönen (2001, 2014) draws from both Hall and positioning theory in developing an approach to analysing representational and interpersonal

aspects of identification that includes an implicit commentary on the role of values in identification, making it particularly relevant to my project on developing a methodology for analysing social values. The framework can be used to examine identification in relation to classifications, participant roles, viewpoints and interactive positions. In making *classifications* in identification, authorial voices demarcate boundaries between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ through categorisations and evaluations of, for example, the rational and irrational, proper and improper, civilised and uncivilised. In analysing *participant roles*, the aim is to examine how those categorisations are evaluated and qualified in storylines, and relationally positioned into roles in action programmes that are geared towards realising goals and objects of value.

Classifications and their positioning into participant roles concern representational aspects of identification, which also includes the production of values (see also Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a). These representational aspects of identification interact with interpersonal dimensions. The interaction occurs by representations being articulated through structures of viewpoint, and in relation to interactive positions. An analysis of identification as *viewpoints* illuminates from whose perspective(s) information is mediated, while an analysis of *interactive positions* is informed by positioning theory and deals with how speakers or writers position themselves and others into unfolding categories and storylines.

The implicit commentary on the production of values that I mentioned above is most evident in Törrönen’s (2001, 2014) explications of classifications and participant roles in subject position constructions. But we can also understand the interpersonal aspects of viewpoints and interactive positions as alignments with evaluative classifications and representations, which works to attach particular behaviours, styles, individuals and groups to particular value-laden meanings.

2.3 EVALUATION AND VALUES IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES

Arguing that value meanings have been taken for granted, Agnieszka Sowińska (2013, p. 793) makes explicit her aim “to initiate more systematic research into value” within critical discourse studies. She argues that research dealing with value and evaluation in linguistic oriented critical discourse studies have taken two main approaches: Firstly there is research informed by systemic functional linguistics that approaches values as being located *in* language (e.g. Fairclough, 2003). Secondly, there is research that is oriented towards values at discourse-pragmatic levels. This line of research deals with either utterances about sociocultural values (e.g. van Dijk, 1998), or with value judgements that involve legitimisation of political discourses by appealing to sociocultural values (e.g. Hunston & Thompson, 2000; Martin & White, 2005). Accordingly, she

proposes that values can be analysed at three levels: The micro-level of language in terms of its lexico-grammatical features, the meso-level of the utterance in terms of what social values are referred to and how they are imbued with meaning, and the macro-level of discourse in terms of how values are used strategically in legitimation.

2.3.1 APPRAISAL THEORY

Although value meanings have been taken for granted in critical discourse studies, there has nevertheless been extensive development of critical linguistic methodologies for examining *evaluation* and author *stance* in relation to the utterance (e.g. Hunston & Thompson, 2000; Lemke, 1988, 1989; Martin & White, 2005). These works have informed particularly positioning aspects of the methodology on social values that I develop in this thesis. Martin and White's (2005) Appraisal theory, which draws upon dialogical, marxist approaches to language (e.g. Vološinov, 1929/1986) and systemic functional linguistics (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) has been especially influential.

Martin and White (2005) describe Appraisal as interpersonal semantic resources for referencing, engaging with, evaluating and aligning with previous utterances, values and viewpoints around similar topics. The use of Appraisal resources entails not only engaging and aligning with those utterances, values and viewpoints, but also negotiating communities of shared values and identities. Appraisal theory and the approaches to identification outlined in the previous Sections 2.2.1-2.2.1.3 are conceptually compatible. This compatibility has been crucial in developing the methodology in this dissertation for analysing social values in identification. Appraisal theory deals with interpersonal linguistic resources of evaluation in three different semantic domains: ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION.

The domain of ATTITUDE is concerned with qualifications of Affect, Judgement and Appreciation (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 42-92). Affect deals with positive and negative discursive expressions of feelings (e.g. that was a very sad day in history), Judgement with positive and negative assessments of behaviour (e.g. they naively claim to be objective), and Appreciation with evaluations of semiotic or natural phenomenon according to how they are valued in particular genres (e.g. the poem is beautifully composed). The resources used to qualify in the domain of ATTITUDE deal with how Affect, Judgement and Appreciation are encoded in utterances, as well as with how those evaluative qualifications rhetorically construct affective positions for their real and imagined audiences. Examinations of ATTITUDE can thus be useful for research not only into affects and values of authorial voices, but also for understanding how affects and values work in interpersonal positionings.

ENGAGEMENT deals with how the authorial voice takes up positions, with respect to other voices and positions, using resources of Disclaim, Proclaim, Entertain and Attribute (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 97-135). Disclaim deals

with negating and offering counter value positions (e.g. I am not saying that you are dishonest, but...), while Proclaim works to confirm value positions and bring them in close to the identity of the authorial voice (e.g. of course discrimination is forbidden here). Entertain works to qualify the value position as one among other possibilities, working in some instances to construct more weakly bordered identities (e.g. I think this country is democratic). In other cases Entertain can, for example, work with Disclaim to build up sharp divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (e.g. I believe that people should be treated equally, but they do not). Lastly, Attribute works to position values onto others’ identities (e.g. they claim that the United States is the land of the free and the home of the brave).

GRADUATION is concerned with scaling the degrees of positivity and negativity in meanings built in the domain of ATTITUDE (e.g. she does adequate/good/amazing work), and with up-scaling and down-scaling ENGAGEMENT values (e.g. I suspect/believe/am sure he betrayed his partner) (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 135-160). GRADUATION of Force is scaling according to intensity or amount (e.g. the movie was a little/extremely scary). GRADUATION of Focus is scaling according to prototypicality (She is a true inspiration).

2.3.2 ASSUMED VALUES AND IDEOLOGY

Fairclough (2003, pp. 40-41, 47-59, 173) argues that value assumptions are ideologically significant. Value assumptions refer to evaluations and values that are implicit and embedded in texts. They reference ‘common knowledge’ on what is taken as important, desirable, obligatory and acceptable. As an example let us consider the statement ‘tolerance is important because it helps build equality’. Tolerance is positively evaluated, while equality is a value assumption. It is taken for granted that equality is something worthwhile or important to build. While social solidarity depends upon shared meanings and ‘correct’ interpersonal exchanges of assumptions, domination and hegemony depend in part on the capacity to shape the form and content of those shared meanings and assumptions (Fairclough, 2003, p. 55). Herein lies the significance of value assumptions to ideology.

Van Dijk (1998, pp. 74-77) suggests that social values are central in the construction of ideologies. They are used by groups of people that are organised by particular interests, and incorporated into their ideologies. For example from van Dijk’s standpoint, if social scientific researchers conduct research in a quest for ‘truth’, this is an ideological implementation of the social value of truth. Along with these claims come the implication that implementations of values affect how values are imbued with meaning. Differently constituted groups of people with different interests may invest the ‘same’ value with different ideological content. Moreover, ideologies developed by particular groups of people define the basis for those groups’

identities (van Dijk, 1998, p. 118). Together values and ideologies are the reference points for sociocultural evaluation.

That is, for all values that are especially relevant to us, we self-evaluate Us as better. At most we may grant them superiority on values that are less relevant for us, such as musicality, being good in sports or hospitality. (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 76)

The links van Dijk explicates between social values, ideology and identification contribute to the theoretical foundations of the methodologies developed in this thesis. His characterisations of social values are also largely compatible with my own, even if somewhat abstract. What is missing from his accounts is methodological guidance for analysing social values, for example as part of the ideological processes that they are claimed to be a part of. Also considering the centrality of ideology in critical discourse studies and that van Dijk has been so influential there, it is surprising that there is a lack of empirical research that focuses on, for example, meanings and uses of ideological values in specific institutional, cultural or social contexts.

3 IDEOLOGY

Ideology has been conceptualised in two primary ways: Marxist theories tend to emphasise that ideology is false consciousness or distorted reality, while sociological traditions generally take ideologies as inflexible worldviews (Eagleton, 1991). My approach to ideology is informed primarily by social semiotic and critical discourse analytic explications, which are typically post-marxist. At the same time, there have been various and sometimes conflicting interpretations of Marx's writings. There are also innumerable disagreements on which aspects of classic Marxist theory on ideology should be retained and which would be better revised (Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1996). Where is ideology 'located' – in texts, structures, cognition, events or elsewhere? Is ideology best approached negatively as distorted reality, or as neutral in the sense that it can refer to any idea that serves group or class interests? Is ideology constructed from 'above' or 'below'? Does ideology constitute subjects or do subjects constitute ideologies?

In this chapter I discuss theoretical accounts of ideology that have influenced the methodological framework for analysing ideologies that I develop in this thesis (Study II). In Section 3.1 I review classic theories on ideology, focusing on Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. In Sections 3.2-3.5, I discuss the approaches to ideology of Stuart Hall, critical discursive psychology and critical discourse studies. In Section 3.6, I present my reading of the social semiotic concept of ideological complex. Ideological complex is a term first used by Gramsci in his prison notebooks, and then later developed more fully by Hodge and Kress (1988). The concept is important to the methodological developments here, in part because modality is taken as central to it. I conclude the chapter in Section 3.7 with an explicit elaboration of my own understanding of ideology.

3.1 CLASSIC ACCOUNTS OF IDEOLOGY

Marx had a negative conception of ideology. Ideological ideas were considered distortions of reality for Marx, to the extent that they function to sustain relations of domination by concealing contradictions contained within them (Larrain, 1979). These contradictions are not merely epistemological, but also material. Subjects are seen as being deceived by contradictions in the market that are not easily unclouded; they deceive both dominated and dominating classes. Marx argued that what disrupts ideological formations are transformative political practices, rather than critical ideas or science (Larrain, 1996, p. 53-59).

A primary point of contention with Marx is that he considered individuals as being deceived by the distortions of ideologies, while he also seemed to

simultaneously consider himself as largely exempt from them. Marx's ideology as distorted reality or 'false consciousness' (a term coined by Engels) has been particularly unpopular in some contemporary work (e.g. Therborn, 1980) because it can be taken as promoting the idea that there are correct or true ways of viewing the world. Yet in some ways this concept has been difficult to discard. For example moral realists would consider the claim that 'some humans are inferior to others' as being just as false as the claim that 'the sun revolves around the earth' (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 11-18). For the moral realist neither of the claims are opinions, but rather facts.

Gramsci, among others, criticised Marx for reducing social formations to being simply determined by economic foundations. Gramsci considered subjects as being constituted by diverse ideologies. He approached "common sense" as both a repository of the diverse effects of past ideological struggles, and a constant target for restructuring in ongoing struggles" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 92). Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, which in his writings is characterised as having both ideological (symbolic) and material foundations (e.g. Gramsci, 1971, p. 144-145). Hegemony is domination of knowledge and material production, as well as manufactured consent from the subaltern classes through education and other forms of cultural labour. When non-coercive consent fails, the state enforces discipline through coercive power. No hegemony is absolute and total, nor are they the products of homogenous social classes. Gramsci argued that once hegemony is achieved, it has to be endlessly and constantly updated and practiced (see Hall, 1988, p. 54). He described 'historically organic ideologies' as having psychological validity such that they compartmentalise the social sphere by forming the terrain upon which individuals move and become aware of their positions (Gramsci, 1988, p. 199). They are long lasting, in contrast to sporadic and fleeting movements. At the same time however, Gramsci considered organic ideologies as being constantly in motion, moving through periods of greater and lesser degrees of stability and rapid, radical change (see Fairclough, 1992, p. 92).

For Althusser (1971), ideology works by igniting desires and nostalgia, in social practices through the force of affect, rather than through representations. For him, ideology is regulated through apparatuses of the state, for example through education systems. 'Ideological state apparatuses' reproduce governing ideologies, which are nothing more than their functioning in habitual and ritualistic social practices. Establishing relationships with ideologies is part of socialisation and developing cultural competency. Subjects come into being through interpellation, or being hailed to ideology, insofar as they recognise themselves in those interpellations. Ideology produces social relations that are connected to dominant relations of production. Ideology originates in those social relations, rather than in individuals. Yet ideology is also material for Althusser, operating through the production of subject positions (see Hall, 1988, p. 48). His conception is neutral in the sense that ideology can be identification with dominant or

counter representations, although he focuses his attention on ideology as a dominant formation (see Eagleton, 1991, p. 18).

3.2 STUART HALL; POST-STRUCTURALIST IDEOLOGY

The writings of Stuart Hall have influenced most dimensions of this dissertation, including my stance on ideology. Influenced largely by Gramsci and Althusser as regards the concept of ideology, Hall defined it as “those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make sense’ of some aspect of social existence” (Hall, 1981, p. 31). Yet Hall (1988, p. 44) considered classic marxist theory of ideology flawed because of the assumption that the masses are thoroughly deceived as to where their interests lie. It posits ‘them’ (the masses) as fooled, whereas ‘we’ (the knowledgeable and privileged) can see the ‘truth’. He argues that the first thing to ask about an ‘organic’ ideology is not what is false about it, but rather what “makes good sense” about it (Hall, 1988, p. 46). That is, what aspects of ideologies are those that are regularly assumed or oriented to as being good and true?

Hall agrees with Gramsci in that material foundations do not directly determine ideologies, but that the material must nevertheless be studied in order to understand the limits and conditions of historical development (Hall, 1986, p. 13). From these conditions the analyst can gain insight into primary tendencies that might favour particular lines of development.

[T]he circle of dominant ideas does accumulate the symbolic power to map or classify the world for others; its classifications do acquire not only the constraining power of dominance over other modes of thought but also the inertial authority of habit and instinct. It becomes the horizon of the taken-for-granted: what the world is and how it works, for all practical purposes. (Hall, 1988, p. 44, emphasis in original)

Thus although insufficient in that they cannot account for the historical movement of ideas in society, social position and material factors are logical starting points for analyses of ideology (Hall, 1988, p. 45). This is a point that I take up explicitly in this dissertation: The selection of study respondents starts from the question as to whether and the extent to which particular social positions and life experiences influence the viewpoints through which we draw upon and negotiate ideologies, construct values and take up positions in identification.

Hall (1981) makes three points about ideology that also shape some of the methodological developments in this dissertation. First they consist of ideological chains, or sets of relational meanings. He explains that for example in liberal ideology, ‘freedom’ is linked to individualism and the market, whereas in socialist ideology, ‘freedom’ is linked to the collective and equality of conditions. In looking for a theory of ideology that could explain the rise and

success of Thatcherism, Hall (1988, p. 49) suggests that the question regards “the capacity of new political discourses to articulate themselves on and through the fractured, necessarily contradictory structures of formed subjectivities [...] to interpellate already formed subjects in new discursive relations.” This is accomplished through ideological chains, in relation to which people are addressed. When addressed in relation to ideological chains, addressees must take up multiple, specific positions that simultaneously hail them as, and assume them to be, knowledgeable in specific ‘truths’. Addressees must produce their subjectivities in relation to those specific truths. Hall’s claims about ‘the good sense’ and ‘truths’ in ideologies and ideological chains are important to keep in mind in the following Chapter 4, which deals with modalities.

The second point Hall makes about ideology is that ideologies pre-date individuals. Ideologies are not produced by individuals, but rather individuals formulate their interests within the ideologies that they are socialised into. Ideologies work best when naturalised, taken-for-granted and largely invisible as ‘common sense’. Ideological struggle does not take place merely ‘in the head’ but also in the political realm and social practices (Hall, 1981). He departs explicitly from Althusser as regards the site of ideological production. Rather than taking ideology as being transmitted through already existing state apparatuses, Hall follows Gramsci in that he sees civil society as a key site for ‘consensually’ produced hegemony. He argues that ideologies are transformed collectively. Hall (1986) suggests that Gramscian analyses must be historical in order to reconstruct relations between structure and ideology, and to distinguish between organic and short-lived ideological movements. Both material foundations of social structure and ideology are constituted relationally, inclusive of more and less material and immaterial domination.

The third point is that ideologies function by constructing positions of identification for subjects, which utter the ideologies that hail them as their own (Hall, 1981). This claim is most clearly informed by Althusser and directly related to Hall’s theory of identification. Taken together with the first point of Hall’s discussed above, it also alludes to relations between social values, identification and ideology. These relations are carried out discursively, interpersonally and in representation.

Before proceeding it is worth pointing out that as with Gramsci and most of Althusser’s writings, Hall’s theorisation of ideology is considered neutral. In neutral neo-marxist theories, ideologies are not seen as inherently distorted versions of reality. Particular ideologies can be criticised but only from the perspective of another ideology, rather than from claims to what is real and true (Larrain, 1996, p. 53).

3.3 INTERLUDE: RETAINING MARXIST CRITICALITY

Larrain (1996) argues that to neutralize Marx's concept of ideology is a significant loss to critical social science. He maintains that both neutral and negative versions of ideology are needed, because they serve different functions. Eagleton (1991) similarly argues that both neutral and negative understandings of ideology have something interesting to tell us. He promotes openmindedness to both narrow and broad characterisations of ideology; in many ways adopting a 'whichever works' stance. He however emphasises that such an approach threatens to dilute the political force of ideology as a concept. He therefore offers various characterisations of what ideology is, and makes various arguments against what it is not. For Eagleton (1991, pp. 28-31), ideologies are world views that symbolise the conditions and life experiences of a specific, socially significant social group. These world views work through distortion in action-oriented discourse to systematically legitimate, sustain and promote the interests of ruling classes, in the face of opposing interests. Ideological world views arise from material social structures; thus 'thought' is linked to structure, ideology to 'lived relations' and ideological change as dealing with more than merely changes in representations (Eagleton, 1991).

3.4 CRITICAL DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY; COMMON SENSE THINKING AS IDEOLOGICAL

Pointing to classic critical and Marxist theories which hold common sense thinking as a form of ideology, Michael Billig (1991, pp. 1-30) argues that the project on developing a rhetorical psychology involves studying how processes of common sense or everyday thinking are processes of ideology. Billig builds a theory of ideology that is based in the concept of dilemmatic and contradictory everyday thinking. In doing so, he revisits the contrasts in the images of ordinary people in classic theories on ideology. On one hand the dignity of ordinary people is respected and people are entitled to liberation from oppression. On the other, ordinary people are thought to be duped by the erroneous forces of ideology. Billig argues that the thematic nature of common sense is dilemmatic and based in contradiction, which is precisely what enables argumentation and rhetoric. 'Ideological dilemmas' reflect contradictions in everyday thinking that enable dialogue, alternative viewpoints and transformation.

Discursive psychology has focused on studying interactional process; on how things are said rather than on content. Yet Billig notes that in employing themes on common sense, people are debating about what is to be taken as common sense. Analysts of common sense and ideologies should look at not only *how* common sense knowledge is uttered, but also *what* is uttered as common sense (Billig, 1991, p. 20). Prejudice can only be understood in

relation to its meanings and their historical paths; how they are transported spatially and temporally in ideological, everyday thinking and 'common sense' knowledge (Billig, 1991, 121-141). Like Hall, Billig does not accept that ideology simply constructs the subject. He criticises the disappearing society in cognitive social psychology, as well as the disappearing individual in Gramsci and especially Althusser's theories on ideology. In rhetorical psychology as well as in critical discursive psychology (e.g. Wetherell & Edley, 1999), the social is presumed formative of cognition and common sense thinking. The relationship is dynamic and mutually determinate.

Cristian Tileagă (2007) characterises the 'critical' aspect of critical discursive psychology as emphasising that research projects are to examine how discursive practices function in formulating and reformulating ideological meanings. In turn, ideological meanings shape social relations, category relations and relations of domination and power (Tileagă, 2007, p. 722). In critical discursive psychology, the ideological context accounted for in analyses is both inside and outside of the text and talk (Tileagă, 2005; Verkuyten, 2001). Ideological discourses are those in which categorisations of the world are done in ways that maintain and update patterns of social inequality and unequal power relations (Tileagă, 2005, p. 606). Ideologies have content that is historically embedded and contextually applied. They are also continually updated each time they are drawn upon and positioned in specific, situated discursive events. Ideologies are not only social ordering, but ordered by material and discursive social relations.

In his work dealing with discourse on moral exclusion of Romany people in Romania, Tileagă (2007) emphasises that constructions of otherness and instances of depersonalisation, delegitimation and dehumanisation are situated applications of ideologies. These ideologies of moral exclusion

are embedded in descriptions of located spatial activities and moral standings in the world and the power to exclude that comes from invoking and building a socio-moral order linked to notions of sub-humanity (non-humanity), (spatial) transgression, out-placeness and abjection. (Tileagă, 2007, p. 732)

He describes ideological work that has exclusionary or 'eliminationist' effects as processes in which 'we' (the moral, civilised, reasonable) categorise 'them' as beyond the limits of reasonable difference, as out of place, and as transgressing morality and proper 'ways of being' (Tileagă, 2005, p. 605). Spatial compartmentalisations in morally exclusionary ideological work are done by drawing clear boundaries between 'the moral order' and those constructed as being out of place – i.e. those positioned in the 'constitutive outside' of the moral order with no permissions or rights to being inside.

These aspects of spatiality and boundary work, and their function in constructing moral orders and otherness, are relevant to both my methodological and empirical aims in this dissertation. They resonate with the concept of moral order in positioning theory, as well as with Törrönen's (2001)

characterisation of spatial aspects and boundary work in identification. The contribution of Tileagă to my methodological and empirical aims that I outlined in Section 2.2.1.3 is the acute attention paid to the relevance of these aspects to ideology and exclusion.

Positioning theory has been implemented as an analytical tool in Edley and Wetherell's critical discursive psychology (e.g. Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Drawing upon Stuart Hall's characterisation of ideologies as functioning by constructing positions of identification for subjects to take up, critical discursive psychologists describe historically constituted language cultures (interpretive repertoires) as supplying the many 'ways of talking' about objects, events and people. Out of these many possible ways of constructing phenomena, some are more available than others, have become hegemonic, and serve specific interests. For example although there are many ways of doing masculinity, some forms are more functional than others. In many sociocultural settings males learn early on that there are typically more *permissions* and *duties* for taking up positions of, for example, assertiveness rather than submissiveness, and emotional reservedness rather than expressiveness. Ideological forms of masculinity are a matter of habit(us) and what 'works best', rather than essence or hormones, for example. Masculinity is discursively accomplished, in terms of historically delineated language cultures (Edley, 2001). At the same time, ideological dilemmas are the means by which (jointly negotiated) agency is possible. Traces of ideological dilemmas in subject position constructions may signal ideological shifts or struggles, and negotiations of agency.

3.5 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES ON IDEOLOGY

In critical discourse studies, ideologies are systems of ideas and values that explain particular political and social orders, legitimate hierarchies and preserve group identities (Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002). The locations of ideologies are in both structures and events (e.g. Fairclough, 1992, p. 88-89): Ideologies are representations that contribute to relations of domination, that are 'enacted' in ways of acting socially (e.g. etiquette, genres), and that are 'inculcated' in identities (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 9, 218).

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) describe ideologies as practices constructed from particular viewpoints, which iron out contradictions and antagonisms in ways that align with the motivations and projects of domination. Approaching ideologies as *constructions of practices* means that ideology is seen as being constituted in social life (economy, politics, culture, everyday life) through actions which are both temporally and spatially located, and have become habitual ways of doing things. Social worlds, and the ideologies in social worlds, are produced by people in their ongoing, every day, and often mundane practices. In taking ideologies as constructed through particular perspectives or *viewpoints*, the emphasis is on contradictory

positionings that can constitute antagonisms between different subjects or within the same subject. In line with the stance on identification taken in this dissertation, identities are heterogeneous and shifting. Subjects are subjected to and constrained by ideologies, while subjects' agencies are both effects of the constraints of ideology and mechanisms that transform them. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, pp. 21-26.)

In viewing ideology as practices constructed from particular viewpoints that *iron out contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms*, the message is that extensive exclusion of dialogicality and difference in text production may indicate expression of authority, domination and doing ideological work (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 41-61). The last point is that ideology is taken as being produced through particular viewpoints that bracket difference *in ways that align with projects of domination*. This means that analyses of ideology necessarily entail social analyses, where the aim is to interpret and explicate those projects of domination from cultural and historical standpoints. This last point also implicates the claim in social semiotic accounts of ideology that hegemony is never fully accomplished. Social practices are determined by endlessly diverse mechanisms that are mutually influential, which means "that outcomes are never entirely predictable, and that resources for resistance are always likely to be generated" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 25).

Jaworski and Thurlow (2009) take the interrelatedness of ideology and identity as central. Their research deals with elitism and elitist stance. They describe elitism as a discursively achieved identity and subject position that makes claims to superiority or distinctiveness on the grounds of status, knowledge, experience, insight or any other quality that is used to justify the authorial voice taking a higher moral, intellectual, material or any other type of standing in relation to another or others. As with other propped up identities that require ongoing protection (see Bauman, 1992), elitism is a bid "for an enduring identity position which requires constant, momentary and interactive enactment" (Jaworski & Thurlow, 2009, p. 196). Elitism is a semiotic achievement, and is not exclusive to material affluence or political standing. Following DuBois (2007) and Kress (1995), Jaworski and Thurlow take stance as a dialogically achieved act that involves evaluation of objects, positioning and alignment/disalignment with others in relation to systems of value – or ideologies. Stance constitutes identities, while elitist stance is the constitution of superiority in the construction of identity. In my reading, elitist stance is ideological in that it is a positioning and evaluative act made in a *quest* for material or symbolic placement in hegemonic orders. It is a subject position constructed in alignment with and in the promotion of dominance and hegemony.

3.6 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXES

Social semiotic theory (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1988; van Leeuwen, 2005) is informed by Hallidayan (e.g. 1978) and critical linguistics (e.g. Fowler, Hodge, Kess & Trew, 1979; Vološinov, 1929/1986), and Marxist theories of language and ideology. In social semiotics, forms of signs are assumed to be conditioned by the manner of societal organisation and hierarchical relations in which they are formulated, as well as by the immediate context. Language use is taken as inherently motivated, such that no “utterance can be put together without value judgment. Every utterance is above all an *evaluative orientation*. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has a meaning but also has a value” (Vološinov, 1929/1986, p. 105, emphasis in original).

Kress and Hodge (1979) follow Saussure in characterising language as a social psychological phenomenon that originates in the social realm and is inseparable from thought. They also describe language as the ongoing life and practical consciousness of society; a consciousness that is inevitably partial and false. Language is used for both communication and control. Audiences are both informed and manipulated. From this perspective, all language is ideological. “We can call [language] ideology, defining ‘ideology’ as a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view” (p. 6) that “involves a systematically organized presentation of reality” (p. 15). Language is ideological in the sense that it involves systematic distortions that serve class interests. The social fabric is characterised as being divided between the dominant and dominated (Hodge & Kress, 1988). The dominated attempt to sustain their dominance through representing the world in ways that are advantageous to their project of domination. Dominated groups are not always blind to structures of domination but are rather often resistant to them. Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 83) follow Vološinov in that they take conflict and contradiction as being the norm in society, rather than assuming coherence or homogeneity. For them difference is the motor of text production.

Hodge and Kress (1988, pp. 2-5) borrow and develop Gramsci’s (1971) term ‘ideological complex’ in an effort to emphasise that ideology is a dynamic between contradictory, interdependent representations of the world: Those coercively imposed by one social group on another and constructed in terms of their own interests, and those offered by another social group in attempts at resisting domination and that are in line with their own interests. Ideological complexes function to sustain relations of domination, by representing social orders as simultaneously serving the interests of both dominant and subjugated social classes. Behaviour is constrained by ideological complexes, as action is based upon them. Contradictions in complexes are founded upon ‘real’ conflicts of interest, which are sometimes difficult to detect due to illusions in social order representations that everyone’s interests are being fulfilled. 41

Ideological complexes are regulated by 'logonomic systems', which are second level messages or sets of rules that control ideological content by controlling productions of meaning. Logonomic systems operate through 'production regimes' that control who can communicate meanings in particular circumstances and with what modalities; how, when and why they are able to communicate those meanings. Logonomic systems also operate through 'reception regimes' that control who can claim to know those meanings in those particular circumstances, and with what modalities. Simple examples of logonomic systems are 'jokes' and irony. For example racist 'jokes' rely on production regimes that function in permitting particular people in particular contexts to utter them, and on reception regimes that control who can claim to have particular knowledge for their 'correct' reception as 'jokes'. Alternatively, the recipient may be allowed to claim the 'knowledge' necessary to understand the intended message, but nevertheless reject the 'joke' and interpret it as an instance of discrimination, bigotry or oppression.

As with ideological complexes, logonomic systems work on controlling interpersonal relations according to the 'unspoken rules' in social relations. Messages are coded in ways that are reflective of the conflicts and contradictions in the power imbalanced social relations within which they are formulated. Because logonomic systems are involved in expressions of ideological content through the regulation of interpersonal productions of meaning, "ideological complexes and logonomic systems are related in function and content" (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 5). The contradictions in ideological complexes work to "both legitimate and ameliorate the premises of domination" (ibid). Logonomic systems rely on visibility to function, for example through etiquette or legislation. When unchallenged, they serve dominant social classes by making ideologies unambiguous and taken for granted as the way the world should be (represented). When relations of domination are undergoing challenge, logonomic systems are also likely being contested. Messages are received with suspicion or doubt, or completely rejected.

The networks of classifications that comprise the contents of logonomic systems are historically embedded, resulting from struggles over meaning. Yet they ultimately derive from the dominant ideas of dominant groups. They consist of sets of rules that serve the dominant. They also consist of alternatives or exceptions to those rules, which serve the function of circumscribing or consuming oppositional stances and resistance. Logonomic systems imply a theory of social order, a theory of knowledge and a theory of modalities (Hodge & Kress, 1988).

Briefly, from the perspective of social semiotics and critical discourse analysis, modalities are linguistic resources that are used to take up positions in relation to the content of communication and in relation to audiences. They are tools for constructing 'reality' and 'truth. Before moving to the following Chapter 4, which is devoted to unpacking my stance on modalities, I would

like to first clarify the position on ideology that I proceed with in the remainder of this dissertation summary.

3.7 IDEOLOGY AS CHAINS OF SUBJUGATING RESOURCES AND PRACTICES; RESEARCHER STANCE

In terms of its definition, I closely follow those outlined in critical discourse studies. Ideologies are structures: They are systems of ideas and values that explain social orders, legitimate power imbalances and preserve dominant cultural and societal level identity constructions. Ideologies are also habitualised, everyday practices that are constructed through specific viewpoints, in which attempts are made to bracket differences and flatten contradictions in ways that align with projects of domination. Ideology is thus entangled with representation, evaluation, action and identification.

Rather than being solely dominating representations and social practices that are imposed from above ideologies are reproduced, grappled with and transformed by ordinary people in common-sense, everyday thinking. Ideologies reflect the contradictions and dilemmas in those processes of everyday thinking. Ideological complexes are relational, contradictory and sometimes competing discourses and discursive practices. Because of their networked, contradictory and dilemmatic characteristics, ideologies are transformable in the very practices within which they are drawn upon, renegotiated and positioned in representation and identification. I thus retain *both* notions of the constraining and homogenising forces of dominating/dominant ideas and habitualising/habitualised practices, *and* the transformative potentials that are embedded in negotiations of identity that take place in reference to networked and contradictory ideological complexes.

My understanding of ideology is also informed by Stuart Hall's explication of how ideological chains make multiple subject positions available that people are hailed to, and either take up or reject. As taken-for-granted common sense 'truths' that precede utterances, ideologies are foundational to constructions of identity. Ideological practices are constructed through viewpoints that aim at homogenisation, even though hegemony is never fully successful. I draw from positioning theory in that I conceptualise ideologies as being sustained in habitualised distributions of permissions, obligations, duties and prohibitions that occur in instantiations of ideological complexes. In every instantiation, humans and non-humans are positioned in various kinds of relations (identification). Positionings are thus interpersonal negotiations that are (modally) organised, structured and driven in terms of the ideologies that make them available. Positionings also (modally) organise, structure and drive ideological contents.

In working towards the methodological contributions in this thesis, my aim is to explicate how discursive *modal* resources for positioning content in

representation on one hand, and for positioning oneself and others in relation to that content on the other, are empirically accessible means for analysing social values, identities and ideologies that are produced 'in dialogue' with one another.

4 MODALITY

The concept of modality is central in this dissertation. This is due to its fundamental role in stance taking, in building and aligning with values, in identification, and in drawing upon and contributing back to ideologies. Modality is thus common to and underlies both of the methodological contributions (Studies I and II), and is also implemented as an analytical tool in the empirical Study III. In this chapter I outline my interpretation and theoretical approach to modality. We can think of modality as discursive resources for qualifying ontological status and probability, for building interpersonal solidarity and distance, and for constructing values. Characterising modalities as ‘resources’ rather than, for example, tools, implicates that the way they are ‘used’ in discourse is affected by previous implementations as well as the micro, meso and macro social orders in which they are formulated.

I begin in Section 4.1 by giving a brief introduction to conceptualisations of modality that have been important in my work. I elaborate upon these approaches in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In viewing language and discourse as both strained by social structures as well as socially constitutive, Fairclough (e.g. 1995, 2001) delineates three dimensions of discourse that correspond to three levels of discourse analysis. I discuss these dimensions in Section 4.4, as they are vital to the methodologies. The chapter concludes with Section 4.5, which explicates the main research problems that I deal with in this dissertation.

4.1 A SNAPSHOT OF MODALITY

Classification is one of the most basic aspects of meaning making. But classification is also basic to thought itself, and to social control (e.g. De Schauwer, de Putte, Blockmans & Davies, 2016; Kress & Hodge, 1979, pp. 62-63). Classifications occur in patterned ways that reflect social orderings and power imbalances. Kress and Hodge (1979, p. 85) suggest that classification systems of language exist prior to utterances in that they provide speakers with resources for communication. At the same time, some classification processes are performed *on* utterances such as those indicating degrees of truth, validity, reliability and authority. They refer to these ‘minimal classifications’ as *modality*. Hodge and Kress’s (1988) conception of modality is broad. They characterise modality in terms of interpersonal stance – the construction of interpersonal solidarity and distance – and evaluation of the truth values, reliability, authority and ontological status in utterances.

They take modalities as interpersonal discursive resources that are used in positioning and for making claims to knowledge, authenticity and truths.

Modality is considered of primary importance in the project of critical linguistics to theorise language as a social practice that originates in and reproduces relations of domination (e.g. Fowler, 1996; Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979; Kress & Hodge, 1979). Social semiotics maintained this project, emphasising the centrality of modality in ideological processes (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1988). Fairclough (e.g. 2003), characterises modality as nodal in constructing identificational meanings and values. Even though modalities have been described as relevant to both interpersonal and representational realms of the social construction of reality (Fairclough, 2003, p. 166; van Leeuwen, 2005, p. 160), the analytical focus has been on linguistic modalities as a relationship between authors, their texts and their audiences; on the interpersonal functions of modality in building solidarity (closeness) and power (distance). The emphasis has been on how modality works to express interpersonal meaning by making claims to knowledge, authenticity and truths (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 126-129). Understanding how modalities work interpersonally in building ideologies has thus been given significant attention in the methodologies of social semiotics and critical discourse studies (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1988; Kress & Hodge, 1979; Fairclough, 1989, pp. 126-127). Understanding how modalities work to build ideologies in representation has not.

In developing a framework for analysing the production of values in discourse, Sulkunen and Törrönen (1997a, 1997b) specify two types of modalities. *Enunciative* modalities function interpersonally to construct competent authorial voices in terms of what is taken as true and real on the one hand, and in terms of the quality of knowledge being constructed on the other. *Pragmatic* modalities work in ordering representation by qualifying, evaluating and positioning classifications relationally and hierarchically, in action programmes geared towards realising objects and phenomenon of value. Key to the contributions in this thesis is delineating the significance of pragmatic modalities in representational aspects of ideologies and social values. Also key are the dynamics between pragmatic and enunciative modalities in drawing upon and reproducing or transforming ideologies on one hand, and in formulating and implementing social values in identification on the other.

4.2 CRITICAL LINGUISTIC APPROACHES TO MODALITY

The ways that modality is approached in critical linguistics, social semiotics and critical discourse analysis can usually be traced back to Halliday, who divides the modality system into ‘modalizations’ and ‘modulations’ (e.g. Halliday, 1970, pp. 336-338; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, pp. 618-621). Modalizations qualify authorial stance on propositions, in relation to

probability and usuality (e.g. ‘the state might cut welfare services’, or ‘the first thing presidents typically do after inauguration is write executive orders’).

Modalizations are elsewhere often referred to as epistemic modalities. Modulations qualify proposals in terms of obligation and inclination (e.g. ‘they are required to comply with the law’, or ‘they want to comply with the law’). Modulations are elsewhere often referred to as deontic modalities and qualifications of ability (e.g. ‘she can see with her glasses on’) are “on the fringe of the modality system” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 621). Halliday divided the semantic system into three primary metafunctions; the ideational, interpersonal and textual (Halliday, 1978, pp. 128-151). The ideational function corresponds to representational meaning. The interpersonal function pertains to modes of meaning enacted in social interaction, and in interaction with emerging utterances. The textual function manages the other two functions, giving texts coherence and context dependency. One of the ways that interpersonal meanings are embodied in grammar is with modalizations, while ideational meanings can be expressed with some modulations (Halliday, 1970, pp. 336-338).

Fairclough (2003, pp. 26-29) distinguishes between three major types of meaning; representation, action and identification. Representation corresponds to Halliday’s ideational function of language, while action and identification are closest to Halliday’s interpersonal function. These types of meanings are dialectically related and overlapping, yet distinguishable analytically. Fairclough argues that modality can initially be seen as dealing with interpersonal positioning, commitments to truth, judgements, and identificational meaning. At the same time, he states that dialectical relations between representational, actional and identificational meanings are ‘particularly clear in the case of modality’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 166). He nevertheless focuses on interpersonal functions of modalities; on epistemic modalities that deal with knowledge exchanges (e.g. they believe that we betrayed them) and deontic modalities that deal with activity exchanges (e.g. you must fulfil the requirements) (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 165-170). Fairclough characterises modality as a point of intersection in discourse between representation and the enactment of social relations, linking it to the interpersonal function of language (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 158-160).

In social semiotics, modality describes the stance of speakers and writers in relation to “the state and the status of the system of classification of the mimetic [representational] plane” (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 122). The concept of modality is restricted to qualifications of solidarity with utterances; to the construction of truth and reality. ‘Truth’ is a state when participants in semiosis accept the system of classifications. ‘Reality’ refers to the representations that are both ‘secure’ and at play in the communicative event. This way of characterising modality is in rejection of both realist and idealist ontologies. In realist ontologies ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are unproblematic, whereas in idealist ontologies these categories are difficult to access or entirely unavailable. Hodge and Kress (1988, 122-124) take the categories of ‘truth’ and

‘reality’ as basic to, and mediated by, semiotic processes. They are categories that mark agreement or conflict over those specific parts of systems of classification that are included, referenced or implicated in utterances. As categories, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are just as empirically accessible and interpretable as other semiotic categories. Also and as with other signs, the meanings and effects of modal signs are embedded historically and socially. Particular uses of modality ‘code’ particular states of the plane of representation at the particular time of their occurrence; they are effects of the semiotic plane (interpersonal realm) projected onto the mimetic plane (representations). Lastly, modality is the site where particular groups impose ideological systems upon other groups, as well as where they are contested and renegotiated (Hodge & Kress, 1988, pp. 122-124).

In their project to prioritise social psychological dynamics of meaning making, critical linguists and social semioticians emphasise the interpersonal functions of language. This makes sense in many respects, one of which is in the claim that “Whoever controls modality can control which version of reality will be selected out as the valid version in that semiotic process” (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 147). Yet there are problems with neglecting how modalities function in building and structuring that ‘valid version’ itself. My argument is that social control can also lie in direct control of the reproduction of representational content. One of the ways that this control of (ideological) content takes place is through the selection, evaluation and positioning of classifications in representation. This means of social control – in particular and most clearly the positioning of classifications in representation – is not dealt with in social semiotic theory or critical discourse studies.

4.3 ENUNCIATIVE AND PRAGMATIC MODALITIES

Sulkunen and Törrönen’s (1997a, 1997b; see also Törrönen, 2001, 2003) framework on modalities is integral to the methodological contributions in this thesis. Their framework is informed by Greimas’s (e.g. 1966/1983, 1987) actant model and its accompanying theory of modalities.

Sulkunen and Törrönen (1997a, pp. 50-51) argue that values are constructed modally in utterances in which interpersonal modal structures are only implicit, for example when uttering subjects do not explicitly include themselves in their texts. For analytical purposes they distinguish between modalities that function interpersonally in producing values, and modalities that function in value production to qualify and position classifications in representations. They refer to these as enunciative and pragmatic modalities, respectively. In developing the methodologies in this thesis, I take as a starting point that both social values and ideologies are formulated in discourse with enunciative modalities that build interpersonal meaning, and pragmatic modalities that formulate representational meaning.

4.3.1 ENUNCIATIVE MODALITIES; EVALUATING EPISTEMIC KNOWLEDGE AND STATES OF THE WORLD

Enunciative modalities function in positioning authorial voices and their audiences in relation to each other and in relation to the classifications and representations in their utterances. There are two types of enunciative modalities; those that qualify the certainty and quality of knowledge, and those that function to compare appearances of the world with the speaker or writer's knowledge of how the world really is.

Epistemic modalities qualify speaker's and writer's certainty relative to what they are discussing, from the position of the addressee. Knowledge constructed with epistemic modalities can be certain, doubtful, assumptive or imaginary, for example. Epistemic modalities work on building alliances and power imbalances between authorial voices and their audiences. They function in building interpersonal solidarity and alliances in the sense that they are resources for establishing competent and legitimate speaker images, which their audiences can trust. Epistemic modalities are also means for building interpersonal hierarchies, for example through inflexible, authoritative constructions of certain and absolute knowledge.

Veridictory modalities function to establish ontological status by comparing appearances with perceptions of truths. These modalities work on qualifying illusions (something *appears* like this, but *is* really *not* like that), secrets (we are sure that this thing *exists*, but it has *not yet appeared*) or errors (we tried to *see* something until we realised that it does *not exist*) regarding that which is being discussed, or confirm that the *truth is* in line with *how it appears* to our senses (Törrönen, 2003, p. 309). Veridictory modalities position text producers and recipients on the same footing by reporting and commenting upon what the world looks like to anyone observing it (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a). They work on solidarity between authors and their audiences, are persuasive and used in rhetorical texts. Veridictory modalities construct reader- and listener positions by offering them competencies for identifying with speakers' and writers' viewpoints. Veridictory modalities can be realised grammatically using evidential expressions, for example. Evidentials are resources for indicating speakers or writers sources of knowledge; for indicating how they have come to know what they are claiming (e.g. Hart, 2011, p. 758; van Dijk, 2014, p. 259). These include perception or observation, inference, reporting and hearsay (e.g. 'they may seem supportive, but I know they are actually misogynist and racist because I heard them talking about women of colour'). Veridictory modalities can also be realised in non-grammatical and less explicit ways; for example through logic and argumentation in the building of narratives and narrative fragments.

Veridictory and epistemic modalities work together and imply each other. For example if an author "points out that some argument is epistemically assumptive, he/she makes room for the advent of another kind of ontological view of it" (Törrönen, 2003, 310; cf. Papafragou, 2006). They work on arousing emotions and building motivation in audiences to adopt positions

offered to them. They also establish confidence and solidarity, or lack of confidence and distance, between the people involved in producing and consuming texts. (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997b, p. 122.) The concept of epistemic stance overlaps with the concept of enunciative modalities. In critical discourse studies, ‘epistemic stance’ refers to those acts ‘aimed at the legitimization of the assertions, through the expression of speaker/writer’s degree of certainty regarding the realization of the event and/or the reference to the sources and modes of access to that knowledge’ (Marín-Arrese, 2015a, p. 211). Among the linguistic tools for accomplishing epistemic stance are epistemic modalities and evidential expressions. The resources of epistemic stance can serve ideological purposes by managing the validity of the communicated information, and by persuading audiences to adopt speakers or writers viewpoints (Marín-Arrese, 2015b, p. 262).

4.3.2 PRAGMATIC MODALITIES; POSITIONING PARTICIPANTS IN REPRESENTATION INTO ACTION-ORIENTED ROLES

Perhaps in part due to the theorisation of pragmatic modalities being based in Greimas’s (e.g. 1966/1983; 1987) structural semiotics, their relevance to constructions of values, identities and ideologies has been underexplored. My claim is that a post-structuralist reading of the concept of pragmatic modalities is indispensable for analysing and understanding how power imbalanced social ordering intrudes representation.

In building storylines, pragmatic modalities function to relationally position actions and human and non-human participants into participant roles that are often differently valued. Participant roles include subjects, objects, helpers, opponents, senders and receivers. Subjects express modalities of volition or inclination that specify *wanting-to* (desire, passion, lust, willingness) elements of action towards obtaining value objects. For example, in the phrase ‘she wants to be treated equally’, ‘she’ is the subject, ‘equal treatment’ is the value object, and ‘want’ is the modality of volition. Helpers and opponents activate modalities that qualify *being-able-to* (abilities and situational resources) and *knowing-how-to* (acquired and internalised competencies and skills) aspects of action that are needed for subjects to obtain objects. In the utterance ‘without legal representation she is unable to prevent her managers from discriminating against her’, the helper ‘legal representation’ is modalised as an ability that is lacking. Senders and receivers work to motivate, activate and legitimise subjects’ actions towards obtaining objects, expressing deontic modalities that qualify *having-to* (obligation, duty, compulsion, command, interdiction, permission) elements of action. In the phrase ‘the state requires that citizens pay taxes so that everyone can have access to health care’, the deontic modality positions ‘the state’ as the sender and ‘everyone’ as the receiver of a requirement to pay taxes.

4.4 MODALITIES AS RESOURCES IN TEXTUAL, DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES

Central in the approach to modality that I work with in developing the methodologies here is the viewpoint in critical discourse analysis (as well as critical discursive psychology) on language use and discourse as being forms of social practice (Fairclough, 1995). The significance of this viewpoint is that language use is seen as both socially strained by discursive conventions and habits as well as other forms of material and social structures, and as a mode of action that is socially structuring. Exploring the dialectical relations and tension between these two aspects of language use is essential in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995, p. 131). These dialectical relations are not straightforward but rather entangled with coexisting and sometimes conflicting discursive practices. At the same time, particular discursive events always occur in relation to previous events and conventions around the same topic.

The 'critical' in critical discourse analysis is directly related to exploring the dialectical relations between discursive events, practices and texts on the one hand, and macro social and cultural structures, relations of power and struggles over power on the other. Critical discourse analysis always involves an examination of the links between texts (broadly defined) and ideology, or hegemony. These links can be explored through three dimensions of discourse, which correspond to three levels in critical discourse analyses; those of text, discursive practices and social practices (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 25-26; 1992, pp. 73-100; Fairclough, 1992, p. 4-5). The levels can be understood as three viewpoints that discourse analysts can interpret texts and communicative events through.

Analyses of the *textual* dimension of discourse deal with the interdependent aspects of form and meaning (Fairclough, 1995, p. 133-134). Analyses of discourse as text involve examinations of, for example, lexicalisation, grammar and text structure. Textual level analyses tend to be the most descriptive, focusing on properties of texts and their relevance in the context of utterances. At a higher level of abstraction are analyses at the level of *discursive practices*. The dimension of discursive practices is analysed in relation to sociocognitive aspects of text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1995, p. 134). That is, how discursive events are related to networks of discourses and what discourses are drawn upon and combined. Thus relevant in these analyses are traces of interdiscursivity in texts. The concept of interdiscursivity concerns how, in the production and interpretation of texts, multiple discourses and genres are drawn upon and combined to produce heterogeneous texts. This dimension of discourse thus mediates between the dimensions of text and social practices. In approaching discourse as *social practice*, the analysis focuses on the social-institutional aspects of text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1995, p. 134). Issues of situational, institutional, cultural and social context are relevant here. The

analysis through this lens views language use as historically embedded, and also concerns the ideological investment in texts; whether or not, and the extent to which, particular texts and patterns in corpuses of texts sustain hegemonic meanings and relations of domination. An analysis at the level of social practices also may bring macrotheories into the interpretations. These levels of analysis are not approached linearly, but rather cyclically and dialogically. The boundaries between the three dimensions are fluid and overlapping.

My motivation in discussing the three dimensions of discourse is to suggest a characterisation of modalities as not only linguistic resources that are analysed at the level of text, but also as discursive resources that are realised through inference. My claim is that modalities function in all three dimensions of discourse and should be analysed in relation to each. Thus analyses of enunciative and pragmatic modalities at the level of text are related to linguistic, grammatical realisations of modalities. The analysis focuses on modal qualifications of classifications, and their significance to representational and interpersonal meanings and orderings. Modalities are typically analysed at the level of text, as linguistic resources. But modalities are also realised through implication on the semantic plane. For instance with assumptions, which are analyses that deal with dimensions of discursive and social practices, there is reliance on correctly reproducing and interpreting shared knowledge. Assumptions in utterances often implicate pragmatic modalities, which in turn function through inference in building values. For example in the claim 'tolerance helps build equality' there are no explicit pragmatic modalities. At the same time, equality is an assumed value classification, with tolerance as its helper. Tolerance as a helper implicates a pragmatic modality of competence. The interpretation at the level of discursive practices is that tolerance is implicitly modalised as internalised knowledge, which can be used as a resource in building equality. Veridictory modalities are also often realised argumentatively and through implication, in building veridictory logic.

4.5 RESEARCH AIMS

The above discussions provide the theoretical backdrops in my efforts to fulfil my aims in this dissertation. My general aim in this dissertation is to contribute to the respecification of social values in social scientific research as structures and processes that are negotiated in identification, and that reference ideologies with which their meanings, uses and statuses at times becomes entangled. I proceed with this general aim by working in three dialogical directions. First, I work on contributing methodologically to critical discursive and societal psychological research on social values. Second, I work on contributing methodologically to critical discourse studies on ideology, approaching ideology as both structures and practices. Third, I work on

empirically examining formulations of Finnish equality. This third aim both facilitates and is informed by the other two.

Methodologically, I therefore explore the following questions:

1. How can we analyse social values as structures and processes that are entangled with identification and ideological work? (Study I)
2. How can we analyse both representational and interpersonal aspects of ideological work from the perspective of modalities? (Study II)

My empirical analyses of Finnish equality are guided by these questions:

3. How do differently positioned Finnish people represent and implement 'equality' in identification? What are the primary discourses on equality in the study material?
 - a. Which aspects of these representations, implementations and discourses contribute to and uphold relations of domination? Which aspects are counter-hegemonic? (Studies II and III)
 - b. What modalities organise these discourses? (Studies II and III)
 - c. Are there relations between social position and how discourses on equality are formulated and implemented? (Studies I, II and III)
 - d. Why have equality values and discourses evolved in these ways? (Study III)

5 STUDY RESPONDENTS, MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES

In working towards both the methodological and empirical aims in this dissertation (Studies I, II and III), I analyse and present example extracts from the same corpus of texts. The texts were written by people who are differently positioned in relation to institutionalised norms on “sex/gender” and/or “sociability”.

I used two strategies for recruiting study respondents. Because we have little knowledge on how social values and ideologies are built and deployed among the majority in Finland, I firstly recruited people through a national random sample obtained from the Finnish Population Register Centre (N=240, aged 16 to 70 years, 155 female, 85 male). These people were contacted by letter through the post. I also wanted to invite people whose “ways of being” are defined as abnormal and who are therefore positioned in the margins by particular structures and norms; people who may conceptualize and position values differently than those contacted randomly. Respondents with transgendered life experiences (N=40, aged 17 to 46 years, 9 female/MtF¹, 15 male/FtM, 16 transgender) and people diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome (N=24, aged 16 to 48 years, 15 female, 8 male, 1 Transman) were contacted through local support organisations and online Finnish discussion forums.

How do the ways in which these respondents’ sex/gender embodiments and sociabilities are labelled by institutions – as diagnosable psychiatric disorders – align with my perspective on identity? I take these institutional labels as reified identity categories that are imposed upon individuals. That is, these are ‘marked’ identity categories that both reflect and strengthen the normative, institutionalised and exclusionary discursive and social practices on “sex/gender” and “sociability” that they reference. They are also deficient

¹ Participants with transgendered life experiences are classified according to their self-categorised gender identity. F/MtF designates those who were born male, had or were seeking treatments, and identify as female or a transwoman. M/FtM designates those who were born female, had or were seeking treatments, and identify as male, a transman or transmasculine. TG designates those who were born male or female and who identify as transgender, gender neutral or androgynous. Two people who responded as Asperger-diagnosed participants have also had transgendered life experiences. The first is a person who had a male name and a male sex categorisation when responding in the study presented in this paper. In the second study of my research project two years later, she had since transitioned and taken a female name and gender identity. This person is therefore classified here as a female Asperger participant. The second of these two participants described himself as a transman. Although these two respondents have both transgendered life experiences and an Asperger’s diagnosis, I have classified them as only Asperger-diagnosed participants, so as not to confuse the reader regarding the total number of participants reported in this study (N = 304).

identity categories, and one among many that are available to these respondents while constructing and positioning values. Because these respondents have been explicitly marked as psychiatrically, medically and socially ‘abnormal’, their answers provide unique material for exploring how people who are positioned as somehow ‘disabled’ or ‘deficient’ in relation to gender norms and norms of social interaction may negotiate ideologies and social values. Marked categories have much power due to their being constantly in need of attention. Such constant attention is likely to affect, in one way or another, how one perceives reality. To return to the point made in the introductory chapter, knowledge constructed from subjugated standpoints is often built from places with a clearer view of the modes of denial that are often made from the perspectives above; those which claim to see comprehensively yet can afford – and seemingly more often tend to – forget repression and repressive acts (Haraway, 1988).

I chose to use an open questionnaire method for several reasons. I wanted to use a nationwide random sample and also wanted respondents with Asperger’s diagnoses and/or transgender experiences to be located in as geographically diverse regions as possible. Meeting hundreds of respondents nationwide would have been impossible. I also thought that respondents with Asperger’s diagnoses and/or transgendered experiences may consider themselves as being in sensitive positions, and consequently may find the method of writing responses to open questions more comfortable than others that I considered. Lastly, I wanted all respondents to be able to respond anonymously.

The study was framed as dealing with how Finnish people conceptualize Finnish social structures and society, and themselves and others in society. Respondents were instructed that their responses were voluntary and would be handled confidentially, and that they would not be identifiable in any published articles or reports. I collected data by asking participants to write responses to eight open questions. I developed the questions with the intention of indirectly exploring social values; how they are classified, imbued with meaning and structured, used in positioning and identification.

Respondents were asked to give and explain their opinions on eight very basic, open questions dealing with perceptions of oneself and others in Finnish society, the social structure and the state. The specific questions were: Are people basically the same or basically different?; What types of people and groups of people do you like and what types do you not like?; What are the advantages or disadvantages of minorities living in Finland (for example the Sami, Swedish-speaking Finns, homosexuals, Muslims)?; What are Roma beggars doing in Finland?; Please complete the following sentence in your own words: The social structure in Finland is...; Is the Finnish state fair?; Does everyone have equal opportunities to realize their goals?; Do you see yourself belonging to any social strata, classes, segments or other such groups? Thus some of the questions were very open, while others were provided as stimulus items. For example, the topic of “Roma beggars” (*Romanikerjäläiset*) was

prominent in the media and public sphere. I used this term on the questionnaire as it is the primary term used in the Finnish media to refer to non-Finnish Roma populations in Finland.

The questions and responses were written in Finnish. The length of the written responses ranged between two sentences to two paragraphs. I excluded responses that were less than a sentence from the analyses. The responses were translated into English by a Finnish translator and bilingual (Finnish and English) Finnish colleague. Different types and phases of analyses were conducted on the translated texts and original Finnish texts. I worked with the original Finnish texts in discourse analyses.

The initial phases of the analyses were conducted using abductive theory building methods of categorisation, constant comparison and saturation, and development of the categories into more generalizable analytical frameworks that may be relevant outside of the research setting (Charmaz, 2006; Silverman, 2010). As part of these analyses, I coded the entire corpus of texts. The coding process was facilitated by the Atlas.ti (Friese, 2014) computer-assisted data analysis program. I explain the coding procedures further in Section 6.1.4, as they were developed collaboratively with the methodological framework on social values.

6 METHODOLOGICAL ELABORATIONS; SOCIAL VALUES AND IDEOLOGIES

In this chapter I further elaborate and demonstrate the methodological contributions in this thesis: The framework for analysing social values in identification on the one hand (Study I), and ideological complexes from the perspective of modalities on the other (Study II). These methodologies are distinct in some senses, and can be used separately. At the same time, they are based in the overlapping and complementary theories and methods of critical linguistics (e.g. Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979), social semiotics (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1988; van Leeuwen, 2005), critical discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 2003; Martin & White, 2005; Wodak, 2001), and sociosemiotic approaches to modalities (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a, 1997b) and identification (Törrönen, 2001, 2014). Thus depending on the research questions, they can be used in an integrative manner.

In developing these methodologies, I approach the relations between social values, identification and ideologies as dialogic, dynamic and interdependent. The contributions of Stuart Hall and positioning theory that I discussed above are relevant as regards the entanglement of these structures and processes. On the one hand, structural and artefactual aspects of ideologies and ideological complexes provide the subject positions that individuals take up and oppose in building social values. On the other hand, habitual, ideological discursive and social practices are embodied in (identificational) aspects of building social values. In other words, ideologies are located in both structures that are referenced, positioned and reformulated, and in habitualised discursive and social practices that include processes of building social values in identification. Moreover, particular representations and embodiments of social values may themselves be ideological.

6.1 ANALYSING SOCIAL VALUES IN IDENTIFICATION

In Sections 6.1-6.1.4, I focus on the methodologies developed in this dissertation dealing with the critical discursive and societal psychological respecification of social values (Study I). I approach social values as structures and processes that are continuously imbued with meaning and deployed as tools for social comparison in representational and interpersonal aspects of identification. Social values are collectively produced classification systems and representations of desirability, acceptability and importance that are embedded in social and cultural orders, always undergoing transformation in identification processes, and used in interpersonal positioning and to define social orders. In accordance with this definition, social values can be analysed

in relation to representational aspects of value classifications and value projects, and interpersonal aspects of value positionings.

Value classification involves drawing boundaries around what ‘we’ consider as good, moral, necessary and important. In building *value projects*, elements that comprise the representational content of networks of value classifications are positioned into participant roles that are differently valued. In *value positioning*, social values are implemented and embodied in discursive and social practices – in constructing interpersonal solidarity and distance, social orders and identities.

6.1.1 ANALYSING VALUE CLASSIFICATIONS

Classifications are basic to meaning making and representation. Bourdieu (e.g. 1977, pp. 466–484) described classification as a process that involves individuals’ embodiment of social structures, which have been collectively imbued with meaning along their historical paths. Developing cultural competence involves negotiating and internalising social structures in particular ways that are linked to social class and life experiences. This internalisation of social structures allows individuals to classify for pragmatic purposes, as part of everyday consumption and cultural practices. Bourdieu thus approached classification as interested. It is a means of evaluation; a means for distinguishing the practices of oneself from the practices and tastes of others.

In Davies and Harré’s (1990) positioning theory, classification is described in similar ways as by Bourdieu. Their focus is on how classifications are part of developing viewpoints on the world, parallel to processes of developing a sense of who we take ourselves to be. We develop theories of ourselves, and of the world from the perspective of those theories, by participating in discursive practices. In doing so, culturally relevant meanings are allocated to all sorts of categories that partition the world of humans, such as male/female, grandparent/parent/child, manager/worker etc. In Moscovici’s (1961/2008) theory of social representations, classification involves inserting an unfamiliar phenomenon or concept into already existing classification systems. The classification process may involve transforming relations in those already existing systems, while also ‘anchoring’ the unfamiliar into that which is already understood. One of the functions of classification in social representation is to draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and to territorialise values (Moscovici, 1961/2008, pp. 70–72, 105, 180; see also Howarth, 2006; Jodelet, 1991).

These are just a few of the social scientific approaches in which classification is considered as never neutral. Rather, classification is taken as being entangled with evaluation and the elaboration of values. It is motivated and takes place in representation, and in identification processes. *Value classification* involves compartmentalising moral orders in relation to the good, desirable, important, necessary and so on. In the classification of social

values, boundaries are drawn around what ‘we’ consider important, desirable and obligatory. Value classification concerns how social values are imbued with meaning, as previous discourses and values around the same issue are referenced and evaluated. In taking up positions, for example, authorial voices classify their own and (human and non-human) others’ perceived characteristics, competencies, abilities, values and moralities (e.g. Harré & van Langenhove, 1991; van Langenhove & Harré, 1994).

This classificatory, representational aspect of social values can be analysed by looking at relations between evaluations and the classifications they refer to, value assumptions (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 55-59, 171-173; see also Section 2.3.2) and lexical realisations of values (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 61-68). In terms of looking at relations between evaluations and classifications, evaluations of ATTITUDE – affect, judgement, appreciation – can be analysed (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 42-91; see also Section 2.3.1). For example, value classifications may be formulated in assertions and judgements (e.g. “Democratic elections are vital”), deontic modalisations (e.g. “Democracy should be mandatory”), affective evaluations (e.g. “We enjoy democracy”) and evaluations of appreciation (“Democracy is beautiful”).

Value classifications may also be realised indirectly as assumptions (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 171-173) or through selecting content in particular ways such that they are implicated (cf. Martin & White, 2005, pp. 61-68). For example in many contexts, producing and ‘correctly’ interpreting the phrase “the long term plan will help build equality” relies on situational or cultural knowledge that building equality is desirable. Values are classified in interaction with real and imagined others as well as with unfolding and previously uttered texts and discourses. Thus although value classification is a process of representation, it is also always an interpersonal process regardless of whether the texts in which they occur are produced, for example, by someone writing alone, by two or more people having a conversation on the bus, or by multiple participants in a focus group interview setting.

Let us look at the following Excerpt 1, in which value classifications are underlined. This text was written in response to the question that asks about the benefits or drawbacks of particular minorities in Finland. We can interpret value classifications by looking for explicit attitudinal evaluations in texts on the one hand, and by interpreting value assumptions and values implicated through selection of content on the other.

Excerpt 1

Different people and ways of life are enriching. By seeing how other people live, we can learn more about our own models and question them. All people have some sort of an idea of how life should go, and by confronting different views we can genuinely consider what might be the right way for me to be in this world, instead of automatically

choosing the way that we consider to be normal. (Respondent² 24, Transman with Asperger's diagnosis)

In Excerpt 1 discourses on diversity are drawn upon to mark the first value classification, which occurs using attitudinal linguistic resources to draw boundaries of enrichment around 'different people and ways of life'. The remaining value classifications occur lexically through modalities of ability ('can') and through assumptions about what is desirable – 'learning about and questioning our own models' and 'the right way to be in the world'. We can interpret these value classifications as referencing each other, being entangled and related to 'open-mindedness to diversity of practices'.

6.1.2 ANALYSING VALUE PROJECTS

The construction of meaning and identities is formed discursively, and entails categorising and conceptualising the rights, duties and competencies of oneself and others (Harré & van Langenhove, 1991). Value projects are formulated as authorial voices draw upon relevant ideologies and previous life experiences, qualifying the contents of social values in relation to wanting, duty, ability and competency (cf. Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Törrönen, 2014).

We can understand *value projects* as networks of value classifications and other contents that are modalised, positioned into relational roles, and oriented to action in the building of storylines and representations. An analysis of value projects deals with interpreting value hierarchies and meanings relationally and in context, and the participant roles believed to be necessary and a hindrance for realising social values.

An analysis of value projects implicates an analysis of qualifications of participant roles using pragmatic modalities. For example, participant roles in value projects can include *subjects* and *anti-subjects* that are qualified with wanting-to elements of action for obtaining, respectively, 'our' and 'their' *objects* of value. Value classifications and other contents are positioned into *helper* and *opponent* participant roles with modal qualifications of being-able-to and knowing-how-to elements of action. Subjects need helpers in order to successfully realise their value projects. Anti-subjects need opponents in order to obtain their own (anti-)objects; two participant roles that symbolise the territory 'outside' of 'our' values. *Senders* and *receivers* motivate, activate and legitimate the action and action goals, expressing the having-to aspect of the project. Sender and receiver roles can be indicative of ideological investment in social values. (Greimas, 1966/1983, pp. 196–217; 1987, pp. 84–88, 106–120.)

² In subsequent example excerpts respondents are referred to as R plus their respondent number. For example this respondent is designated as R24.

Let us return to Excerpt 1, analysing it this time in relation to value projects. One of the first things to consider in an analysis of value projects is whether there are implicit or explicit references to who or what ‘Us’ and/or ‘Them’ are believed to be. That is, is there someone or something that occupies the participant roles of subject and anti-subject or opponent?

Excerpt 1

Different people and ways of life are enriching. By seeing how other people live, we can learn more about our own models and question them. All people have some sort of an idea of how life should go, and by confronting different views we can genuinely consider what might be the right way for me to be in this world, instead of automatically choosing the way that we consider to be normal. (R24, Transman with Asperger’s diagnosis)

For example in Excerpt 1, ‘we’ are subjects in action. Helpers include ‘seeing how other people live’ and ‘confronting different views’, both of which are positioned into helper roles with the pragmatic modal qualifier ‘can’³. ‘Automatically choosing the way considered to be normal’ can be interpreted as an opponent, with ‘we’ as the anti-subject. The analysis of participant roles is useful in interpreting value projects that texts are organised around. Here we can consider which value classifications seem to be nodal in orienting the participant roles to action; i.e. in structuring the value projects. In Excerpt 1, we can interpret value projects being constructed around action programmes on ‘openness to social diversity’.

The significance of analysing value projects becomes evident when we begin to compare how the ‘same’ discourses are drawn upon in different, and sometimes divergent or polemical ways. For example in other texts in my study, diversity discourses are used to formulate and legitimate exclusionary social values and identities. Analyses of value projects unravels how value classifications, events and human and non-human actors are positioned into relational roles in storylines, and how those roles are differently valued. These types of examinations can also illuminate

6.1.3 ANALYSING VALUE POSITIONING

Meanings are constructed through different viewpoints and positions. Research programmes on social values are strengthened by taking into account how social values are built and used in the simultaneous processes of positioning oneself and others. *Value positioning* involves the implementation of value classifications and action projects, which works reciprocally in

³ Can is often regarded as an epistemic modality. However in these two instances it is used to qualify ‘internalised know-how’, therefore functioning as a pragmatic modality.

constituting their meanings. Using Fairclough's terminology, value positioning involves the formulation of identificational meanings of social values (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 157-164).

Value positioning is the most performative aspect of social values; the aspect most closely linked to their rhetorical deployment in identification. We use language not only to imbue representations with meaning, but also to orient ourselves in relation to those meanings, in relation to our putative audiences, and in relation to the beliefs that we perceive our audiences as holding (Lemke, 1989, 1998). This means that in formulating our social values we are not only classifying, structuring and sharing information about our passions, desires, obligations, imaginaries, disavowals and so on. We are also building identities as well as often implicitly and explicitly inviting others to join our value projects (cf. Martin & White, 2005, p. 95; Törrönen, 2003). Value positioning is thus also concerned with how productions and deployments of social values are social ordering.

Analyses of value positioning deal with how speakers and writers (dis)align with evolving social values and the individuals and groups believed to be (not) sharing them. Value positioning analyses can look at how social values are formulated in dialogue with, or bracketing of, other viewpoints. Interacting with viewpoints other than one's own can be achieved using, for example, enunciative modalities (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997b) or dialogic positioning resources of ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION (Martin, 2004; Martin & White, 2005). The concepts of enunciative modalities on the one hand, and ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION on the other, are related and overlapping in that they are all tools for building solidarity and distance between speakers or writers, audiences, and contents of communication. There are also explicit overlaps between the conceptual frameworks: For example, ENGAGEMENT resources of 'entertain' are described as inclusive of epistemic modalities, while 'attribute' can include evidentials. GRADUATIONS of 'focus' can sharpen or soften categories in ways that are typical of veridictory modalities (e.g. 'they live in a true democracy').

Again I would like to return to Excerpt 1, this time with an analytical focus on how value positionings are elaborated.

Excerpt 1

Different people and ways of life are enriching. By seeing how other people live, we can learn more about our own models and question them. All people have some sort of an idea of how life should go, and by confronting different views we can genuinely consider what might be the right way for me to be in this world, instead of automatically choosing the way that we consider to be normal. (R24, Transman with Asperger's diagnosis)

The text is produced dialogically, by engaging with others' viewpoints. For example, 'an idea of how life should go' is attributed to all people. Using an

epistemic linguistic modality, entertain works to convey that there is more than one viewpoint regarding ‘what *might* be the right way’. Entertain and disclaim (‘instead of’) work together in distancing the evolving meanings of social values and identifications from unquestioning acceptance of normative notions of what that right way is⁴. ‘Genuinely’ works as a veridictory modality to qualify ‘consider’, and to construct the idea that interacting with and considering other viewpoints is the only way to *truly*, intentionally and consciously, make choices about our own ways of living and being. The logic is that considering other viewpoints is the only path to true knowledge, while ‘automatically’ accepting traditional practices may only give us the illusion of that. These rhetorical moves work together in constructing an identification in alignment with the social values of ‘diversity of people and practices’ and ‘open-mindedness’. Importantly, value positioning occurs in the construction of a loosely bordered identity where the interpersonal realm transpires in dialogue with other viewpoints, rather than in exclusion of them.

From this analysis we can also interpret that the value project related to ‘openness to social diversity’ does not adequately account for the social values being negotiated here. What is important is not only acknowledgement of alternative viewpoints, but also a sort of dialoguing with ‘differences’ that is inclusive of questioning normativity or our own established and habitual practices.

6.1.4 ANALYSING SOCIAL VALUES ACROSS TEXTS; INTERPRETING PATTERNS, STYLES, NETWORKS AND IDEOLOGICAL INVESTMENT

Patterns in styles of evaluation and stance are related to structural aspects and power relations of the institutional or social context, the topic and content of communication and the ways in which interpersonal aspects of text production transpire (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 161-162). Particularly in research on social values with a sizable corpus of texts, analyses may include examinations of patterns in value classifications, value projects and/or value positionings. Identifying patterns in the three aspects of social values can be important in terms of interpreting ideological investment in social values. Patterns may also be relevant to the status of social values; for example for building grounded theories on dominant, hegemonic and subordinating forms of social values, and emerging, subaltern, counter-hegemonic and antagonistic meanings and uses of social values.

Interpreting patterns in particular aspects of social values, the relevancy of patterns to the status of social values, and the ideological investment in aspects of social values are dynamic research processes. For example, interpreting the

⁴ In this study, when Disclaim resources are used the process often entails taking up oppositional stances in relation to hegemonic social values that are perceived to be exclusionary.

relevance of particular patterns to hegemonic forms of social values informs analyses of counter-hegemonic forms, and vice versa. This is because they are built relationally and are mutually dependent on each other for their meanings and uses. Identifying patterns can be useful for understanding how particular value classifications, projects and positionings may update and maintain, or disrupt and transform, habitual discursive and social practices.

My interpretations of patterns in the present study were facilitated by coding value classifications and value projects. Value positionings were not coded, but rather discourse analysed with guidance from positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990) and tools from Appraisal theory (Martin & White, 2005). The first round of coding included marking value classifications, as well as refining value classification codes through methods of constant comparison. In the second phase of coding I worked from the basis of the value classification codes to build a coding scheme dealing with value projects and the participant roles (subjects, senders, receivers, helpers, opponents, anti-subjects) therein. Here the focus is on storylines, interpreting representational contents and structures of social values. Thus although multiple discourses are drawn upon in producing a particular piece of text, storylines are often organised thematically and value projects are typically hierarchically structured. Value projects are discernible by examining which value classifications and modalities the text is organised around thematically.

Second cycle analyses can focus on how constructions and implementations of different social values work together in identification processes. For example in my study, nationalist and equality values are formulated together in the construction of Islamophobic identities (see Study I, pp. 129-132, 134-135; Study III, pp. 745-747). Classifications of the nation and equality intersect, and their meanings are inseparable. What this second cycle analysis meant in practice was that I interpreted networks and entanglements of social values, and discourses on Finnish equality. Although facilitated by the analytical tools in Atlas.ti (query tool, code co-occurrence explorer and code co-occurrence table), this phase was nevertheless qualitatively driven. After many months of working with the data, the contents, modal styles, and statuses of the different discourses on equality were clearly interpretable. However as the discourses on Finnish equality that I name in Chapter 7 were also coded, I did take note of their prevalences. This was helpful in my interpreting particular discourses as hegemonic, others as more marginal, and still others as counter-hegemonic.

6.2 ANALYSING IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MODALITIES

Using examples, in this Section 6.2 I explicate the methodology developed in this thesis for analysing ideological complexes from the perspective of modalities (Study II). The methodology is developed in close correspondence

with Sulkunen & Törrönen's (1997a, 1997b) framework on enunciative and pragmatic modalities (Section 4.3).

In Section 4.2 I pointed out that in the social semiotics of Hodge and Kress (1988, pp. 122-124), modality is marked as the site where particular groups impose ideological systems upon other groups, as well as where they are contested and renegotiated. This occurs as particular uses of modality 'code' particular states of the plane of representation at the particular time of their use. Particular uses of modality are described as being effects of the interpersonal realm projected onto representations. For Hodge and Kress (1988) however, modality is restricted to qualifications of affinity with the utterance; "the dimension of the grammar of the clause which corresponds to the 'interpersonal' function of language" (p. 158).

In critical discursive psychology and critical discourse analysis, ideology is said to concern both representational and interpersonal meanings. Nevertheless in empirical research on ideology in critical discourse studies, the emphasis tends to be on ideological processes rather than content. My position is that it is unnecessary and counterproductive to rank whether studying ideologies as processes or as representations is more important. Rather, an integrated approach which looks at the dynamics between how contents and positionings in ideological work unfold together contributes to both critical social psychology as well as critical studies of ideology. Such integration is my aim in developing the methodology for analysing ideologies from the perspective of pragmatic and enunciative modalities.

In analysing representational aspects of ideological work, the analyst is attuned to the use of pragmatic modalities in positioning values and other contents of representation into relational roles that are oriented to action. The aim is to clarify which participant roles are recurring in ways that contribute to relations of domination. In examining interpersonal aspects of ideological work, the analytical lens is tuned to how interpersonal hierarchies are built with enunciative modalities. An analysis of ideology from the perspective of pragmatic and enunciative modalities also tends to how interpersonal relations of domination interact with re-presentation; how uses of pragmatic and enunciative modalities are interdependent and mutually constitutive.

Analysts of sites where ideological complexes are negotiated should therefore approach modalities not only as resources for determining *how* particular versions of the world are negotiated as real and true. They are also resources for qualifying the *what* of ideological complexes themselves; for qualifying what is to be taken as common sense. Modalities can function to repeatedly imbue relations of domination in meanings that constitute texts, which in turn constitute some of the discursive aspects of the always becoming historical cultural context. In this contextual backdrop are contradictions in the common sense knowledge that comprise ideological complexes and logonomic systems. These dialogically constituted ideological complexes are referenced and updated in discursive events around the same topic. It is also the contradictions in everyday thinking to which transformation of ideologies

and ideological social values can be contributed. Fairclough (1992, pp. 88-89) emphasises that ideologies cannot be analysed solely at the level of text. In examining how ideologies are built and reformulated with modalities, we need to take into account the three dimensions of discourse that were discussed in Section 4.4. These are the dimensions of text, discursive practices and social practices. My claim is that modalities operate not only linguistically and grammatically, but also more implicitly in discursive and social practices. Without specifying levels of analysis, the question is left unattended as to how modal qualifications in texts, and the social values constructed using them, are relevant to macro ideological structures.

6.2.1 DEMONSTRATING THE FRAMEWORK

Working with two textual examples, I briefly demonstrate how analyses of ideological complexes from the perspective of pragmatic and enunciative modalities might unfold. Let us consider firstly Excerpt 2, which I chose in part because it is not an entirely transparent instantiation of ideologically invested orders of discourses. Yet considering such ‘mundane’ instantiations of and contributions to ideology are important. In reminding the reader of some of the main points of focus in the literature review on ideology in Chapter 3, Excerpt 2 is an example of how ideological discourses may be nourished and updated in the ongoing, sometimes banal ebb and flow of everyday negotiations of talk and text.

Excerpt 2

Minorities are enriching for Finland and they teach the majority to accept different people. Nowadays it's gone a bit overboard when they demand rights so vigorously (the homosexuals) and some Muslims don't understand that 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do'. (R255, Female from random sample)

Excerpt 2 begins by explicitly drawing from discourses on diversity and tolerance. Although ‘teach’ can be interpreted as a qualification of competence, and ‘demand’ as a deontic modality that qualifies force or coercion, these pragmatic modalisations rely on the audience having ‘common knowledge’ to be able to ‘correctly interpret’ the participant roles linked to them. For example – particularly when analysing Excerpt 2 in relation to the entirety of my study material – it is possible to interpret the modality of competence (‘teach’) as also working intertextually through assumptions and references to external, hegemonic discourses, to qualify minorities as helpers. Minorities are instrumental in ‘teaching’ the majority to learn how to ‘accept different people’, which is assumed as desirable or obligatory. The value goals of ‘diversity and of ‘acceptance’ or ‘tolerance’, and of minorities as resources in learning acceptance, are interpreted here as qualifications that function as efforts in managing the impressions that follow.

‘Nowadays’ specifies a distinction between the concept of minorities as helpers for learning acceptance, and the present ‘reality’. This works as a veridictory modality to rhetorically position the putative audience into the viewpoint of ‘Finland’ and ‘the majority’. This aspect of the interpersonal is entangled with representation as she negatively orients to and projects excessive demands for [equal] rights onto the viewpoints of homosexuals. Homosexuals are anti-subjects that use resources of excess (‘overboard’, ‘vigorously’) to disrupt assumptive value projects related to ‘moderation in striving for [equal] rights’, in turn constructing them as a hindrance to the majority project on acceptance. Similarly, she projects incompetence in normative cultural practices onto the viewpoints of Muslims. Muslims are anti-subjects in the majority’s project on acceptance. A modality of obligation is implicated by the metaphor ‘do as Romans do’ (*maassa maan tavalla*), which simultaneously produces values related to conformity and cultural assimilation. These values are also implicated as assumptions, as common knowledge that Muslims are claimed to not understand.

These are textual traces of ideological investment. The modalities in the text are patterned in ways that, especially when taken together with the entire corpus of texts, are indicative of networks of hegemonic discourses and social values. For example with respect to the question that deals with minorities, study respondents often begin their texts by drawing upon normative discourses on diversity, tolerance and/or equality and reiterating them in unelaborated ways. They often then subsequently reposition themselves into more rigidly bordered standpoints. Pragmatic modalities reference and work on stabilising participant roles of stigmatised ‘Others’ as hindering these networks of hegemonic social values. That is, various minorities – most often Muslims – are recurrently positioned into opponent and anti-subject participant roles. These are rhetorical strategies that work to firstly build a competent, trustworthy speaker image by referencing socially acceptable, normative discourses related to ‘diversity’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘equality’. They are attempts at keeping face (see e.g. van Dijk, 1989, 1992 on face-keeping) for what is to come in the text that follows.

The veridictory logic built in the pattern is ‘although we often hear (appearance) that minorities and immigrants enrich culture, some ways that they are a hindrance (being) are (a, b, c...). It is very difficult to be tolerant of them when they practice a, b, c.’ In this logic, ‘a, b, c’ are very often based in stereotypes and generalisations that are projected onto identities of minorities and people with migrant backgrounds. These projections work on *producing* ‘truths’ as regards their values and practices, as the essence of an entire category of people. In the arguments are often standardised themes that function as warrants (*topoi*⁵) to legitimise the ‘us’ and ‘them’ standpoints built therein (Wodak, 2008). Excerpt 2 is a negotiation of dominance through pragmatic modalisations of competence and veridictory modalisations of

⁵ for example in the case of Muslims, topoi of gendered violence, terrorism, misogyny

truth. An ideological co-effect of these arguments is that similar practices among 'ordinary' or 'original' Finns are glossed over, unilluminated, or at most discussed as individual divergences rather than the sociocultural, moral or religious incompetencies attributed to minorities and migrants.

In an analysis of ideological investment at the level of social practices (Fairclough, 1995), we may also bring cultural knowledge, relevant previous research, and macrotheories into the interpretation. In addressing the question of ideological investment here, we can consider how the instantiation is reflective of hegemonic culture and practices, as well as the potential consequences that it has on the networks of discourses that it contributes to. Besides conforming to patterns in pragmatic and enunciative modalities, there are other clues in Excerpt 2 indicating as to how it may be ideologically invested – i.e. how it may reflect and contribute to power imbalancing orders of discourses.

We can for example refer to Stuart Hall's point as regards ideology (see Chapter 4): Is there something about any suspected ideologies referenced in this text that 'makes good sense' in the context of the produced text? Is there something that is regularly accepted as 'common sense'? I have already implied some of the value assumptions made in Excerpt 2. The authorial voice relies on the audience having the common knowledge needed to be able to correctly interpret taken-for-granted values as socially important, mandatory, acceptable and so on: 'accepting different people', 'same for everybody', and 'assimilation'. Accordingly, I also interpreted as a social value assumption 'moderation' (in demanding [equal] rights). These interpretations are supported by patterns in the study material, in which there is ongoing interplay between discourses on moderation, non-conflict, tolerance, universalism and egalitarianism. I will return to this discussion in the empirical chapter.

There are a multitude of relevant macrotheories that may be brought into the modal analysis of Excerpt 2. From an intersectional theoretical perspective, we might be prompted to note that until we interrogate how we regularly modalise the categories 'Islam' and 'Muslim', as well as the racialisations associated with those modalised categories, any strategies of liberation, democratisation or equity that we may associate with our politics will often reproduce and reinforce the subordination of Muslims and racialized people (cf. Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1252). We might consider discussions by Sara Ahmed (2003) pertaining to how discourses of fear and anxiety that have been in high circulation since 9/11 work as affective economies of 'truth'. By sticking to some bodies more readily than others, fear slides between signs and constitutes bodies as objects. When Muslims are continually conceptualised and implicated as *potentially* (or actually) misogynist, homophobic or terrorists, discourses of fear and anxiety intervene, slide between, connect and concretise these signs (Muslim, misogynist, homophobic, terrorist). In this way, Muslim bodies are produced *as* categorical objects of fear. They have been essentialised as threats to our ways of life, and to our lives themselves.

Discourses of fear and anxiety work as technologies for producing ‘truths’, for judging ‘failures of truth’, and for securing norms by containing – literally and symbolically – those who are perceived as failing normative embodiments (Ahmed, 2003).

Our scientific knowledge is suggestive of such affective discourses of fear and anxiety in the Finnish sociolinguistic context – they work by recurrently building the ‘truth’ of Finnish equality against the threat of ‘immigrant’⁶ and Muslim bodies. For example in a case study of both media coverage and public discussions of three unsolved rape cases in Oulu during three months in 2006-2007, Suvi Keskinen (2011) shows how a nationwide, gendered and racialized fear of immigrants and asylum seekers was deployed in building the Finnish nation in relation to gender, sexuality and race. The emphasis was on the unidentified perpetrators’ ‘foreignness’; their reported non-white phenotype and ‘African-sounding language’. In public discussions, refugees and asylum seekers were primary targets, while the rapes were explained in terms of ‘their’ culture and lack of attention to gender equality. Even though the rapists were never identified, the links made in these discussions resulted in demands for action on immigration policy and integration. In another case study by Lähdesmäki and Saresma (2014) in which they analysed readers’ discussions of one newspaper article that focused on Muslim homosexuals in Amsterdam, the authors demonstrate how discourses on gender equality and gay rights were used to oppose Muslim immigration.

Alternatively, the macrotheory on interobjective social values (Sammut, Tsirogianni & Moghaddam, 2013) might be brought into the interpretation. The implied rights and duties in Excerpt 2 can be interpreted in relation to discourses that are drawn upon in producing them, such as discourses on heteronormativity and integration. There are also implicit values linked to these discourses that are perceived as threatened when homosexuals or Muslims fail normative embodiments (e.g. moderation, equality, ‘family values’, Lutheranism, continuity of tradition, Finnishness, security). There have been no studies to date in which understandings of equality (or moderation, or security) by Muslims or people with migrant backgrounds are the focus. Thus we have no idea as regards the potential of these values for being superordinate common interests. Does or could ‘equality’ occupy a ‘common space in between’ differently conceptualised action programmes for realising it – action programmes that are constituted by differently occupied participant roles and differently distributed rights, duties, obligations, permissions, prohibitions and/or competencies? Or might it be simpler than that? Might it rather be the case that understandings and action plans on

⁶ As Finnish identities are embedded in concepts of ‘whiteness’ and cultural homogeneity, people of colour in Finland are usually perceived as immigrants even if they are Finnish citizens that were born and raised in Finland (see e.g. Häkkinen & Tervonen 2004; Keskinen 2012; Leinonen 2012; Rastas, 2004, 2005).

equality of 'ordinary Finns', Muslims and people with migrant backgrounds are partially overlapping? As long as we do not know the answer to these questions, any assumptions of radical difference based on second hand experiences and mass mediated information may be ideologically invested.

These are examples of how macrotheories, cultural and scientific knowledge can be drawn upon in modal analyses of ideology at the level of social practices. In such examinations we note whether and how similar styles of metaphorical, categorical, evaluative and modalised instantiations recur in the data set, interpreting them in relation to the discursive and social practices within which they were produced and contribute back to. We also note traces, such as those in Excerpt 2, always considering them in relation to the surrounding texts, the corpus, our own cultural knowledge, and scientific knowledge.

Ideological discourses always implicate counter-discourses, whether they are being actively produced or they otherwise exist as unrealised potential. When researchers interpret patterns in modalities that function to reference and reformulate dominant and subjugating discourses, they may also notice patterns in which modalities are used to reference and oppose those discourses. Alternatively, we may notice modal qualifications that are seemingly constructed in reference to some yet-to-be empirically delineated external discourse. These qualifications may also provide analytical openings for identifying any hegemonies that they may reference and oppose. For example in my study, in a significant number of texts respondents use modalities to both construct counter-discourses and position themselves in opposition to networks of discourses on equality, conformity, moderation and sameness that are overall salient in the corpus.

I would like to look at the following Excerpt 3 in relation to how modalities might be used in building oppositional positionings and discourses. The methodological aim is to demonstrate how analysing these ways of using modalities can be insightful to both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic representations that together constitute ideological complexes.

Excerpt 3

People are evened out and different people are marginalized according to the ideal of normality. This is not done openly, but with unspoken agreements etc. [...] No. [People do not have equal opportunities.] Sociability has too much meaning, people are not openly informed even about official things. If you want to live your life your way, but others think it's a weird way, few people want to support you. Instead, if you want to become normal – what else does society demand of us? (R18, Female with Asperger's diagnosis)

Using enunciative modalities, the respondent builds a confident and competent speaker-image. The text is constructed assertively and without epistemic modal markers. The text is constructed through the viewpoints of

‘people’, ‘different people’, ‘you’ and ‘us’. At the level of discursive practices, we can interpret the phrases ‘this is not done openly’, ‘unspoken agreements’ and ‘people are not openly informed’ as building veridictory logic. Using these veridictory modal resources, the author argues for the invisible mechanisms of hegemonic social values of normativity. This invites the reader to become aware of the ontological secrets that dictate marginalisation; the evening out processes (being) that exist but ‘are not done openly’ (not appear). The veridictory logic here provides the audience with the discursive resources that are needed for ‘correctly’ receiving the concluding text. The response ends with an epistemic modalisation that takes the form of a question. This rhetorical strategy functions to position both the writer and audience as subjects in action (see Törrönen, 2003 on the concept of ‘pending narrative’); it positions readers into questioning ourselves as regards our role in maintaining marginalisation and normalisation processes.

The interpersonal realm interacts with the realm of representation. Pragmatic modalities are organised around social obligations to normality, a will for freedom and individuality, and prohibitions on non-normative sociability. In referencing the social values of normativity and sociability, the participant role of an agentic subject is occupied by others, while society can be interpreted as the sender of these values. The respondent constructs freedom and social support as personal values *against* social values of normativity and normative sociability.

In an analysis at the level of social practices, it is worth recalling the points made by Donna Haraway (1988, pp. 583-584), as regards subjugated standpoints (see Chapter 1): Is there evidence that the knowledge built in this text is done so from spaces ‘below the platforms of the powerful’ and if so, does the vision from any of those places provide insight into any power dominating spaces with views from above? The ways that this text is modalised conveys a personal and lived experience of failing or lacking the will to ‘normalise’ and as a result, having a lack of support from others. The text conveys a lived experience of *social practices* of normalisation processes and social exclusion. Storylines on these processes are built elaborately, from a place of situated knowledge.

The analysis of Excerpt 3 provides a good example of how enunciative and pragmatic modalities may be used in ways that can be indicative of both hegemonic and counter discourses. If this text were to be analysed disjointed from the larger corpus of which it is a part, stripped from the context in which it was produced, interpreted solely at the level of text or without further reflection on what actions and identities it accomplishes, the researcher might interpret the text as merely an opinion on marginalisation processes. However interpreting the text as part of the larger corpus of which it is a part, my claim is that these modalities fall in line with a pattern that runs counter to dominating patterns. This claim is based upon my analysing these oppositional patterns in relation to each other. They are mutually informative and thus likely comprise networks of discourses and discourse fragments that

are constructed against each other; i.e. discourse representations that which modal analyses can be insightful for unravelling ideological complexes.

6.3 IDEOLOGICAL SOCIAL VALUES

In terms of ideological social values, we can think about reformulating Stuart Hall's recommendation in relation to the aims in this study. Rather than asking what is 'false' about particular seemingly hegemonic formations of social values, we might instead ask 'what makes good sense about them'. What is it about particular social values that is habitually taken as good and ontologically true? Particular meanings of social values can and often do become taken for granted 'truths' that stabilise and persist. Their arbitrariness goes unnoticed and their 'legitimacy' goes unquestioned. Naturalised social values are readily accessible tools that can be implemented in explicit or subtle, intentional or habitual practices that subjugate, discriminate and oppress. Social values that we have good reason to suspect may be taken for granted as 'good', 'moral' and 'true' are appropriate starting points for critical values research. Potentially hegemonic social values are relevant research topics in the sense that they are readily assessable tools for maintaining power imbalanced social ordering.

Van Dijk (1998, p. 74) makes theoretical claims as to the relations between social values and ideology, arguing that "values play a central role in the construction of ideologies". My methodological contributions resonate with those claims, while explicating practical tools for exploring the links. Value classifications, value projects and value positionings are meaning making processes that involve the use of pragmatic and enunciative modalities (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a), and resources of Appraisal (Martin & White, 2005). Analyses of pragmatic modalities typically deal with value classifications and projects; with representational dimensions of meaning makings of social values. Analyses of enunciative modalities and ENGAGEMENT and GRADUATION resources deal with value positioning; with interpersonal dimensions of meaning makings of social values. My claim is that these discursive resources are also foundational in building identities as well as representational and interpersonal aspects of ideologies.

Table 1 outlines the main principles and tools related to the methodologies, also giving an image of the relations between social values, identification and ideological complexes.

Table 1. *Characterisations, and analytical foci and tools according to levels of analysis, in frameworks on social values in identification and ideologies (Studies I & II)*

		<u>REALM OF REPRESENTATION</u>		<u>INTERPERSONAL REALM</u>	
		<i>Value classifications</i>	<i>Value projects</i>	<i>Value positionings</i>	<i>Ideological practices</i>
Characterisation	<p>Territorialisations of the good, desirable, important, necessary</p> <p>Drawing conceptual boundaries around 'us and our practices / values' and 'them and their practices / values'</p> <p>Compartmentalising moral orders</p>	<p>Modal positionings of value classifications and other contents into relational participant roles, which are differently valued</p> <p>Orienting social value contents to action, in processes of building of storylines and conceptual meanings</p>	<p>Systems of ideas and values that explain social orders, legitimate power imbalances, and preserve dominant cultural and societal identities</p> <p>Taken-for-granted common-sense 'truths' that precede utterances</p>	<p>Deployment, performance of value classifications and value projects in identification</p> <p>Aligning / disaligning with value classifications & value projects, as well as individuals / groups not sharing them</p> <p>Inviting others to join value projects</p>	<p>Habitualised practices constructed through particular viewpoints, which iron out contradictions in ways that align with the motivations and projects of domination.</p>
Analytical foci and tools					
<i>Level of text</i>	<p>Evaluations of ATTITUDE (Martin & White, 2005)</p> <p>Value assumptions (Fairclough, 2003)</p>	<p>Participant roles, pragmatic modalisations (Greimas, 1966/1983; Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Törrönen, 2001, 2014)</p>	<p>Participant roles, pragmatic modalisations (Greimas, 1966/1983; Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Törrönen, 2001, 2014)</p>	<p>Instances of ENGAGEMENT / GRADUATION Viewpoints</p> <p>Enunciative modalisations (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Törrönen, 2003, 2014)</p>	<p>Instances of ENGAGEMENT / GRADUATION Viewpoints</p> <p>Enunciative modalisations (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a; Törrönen, 2003, 2014)</p>
<i>Level of discursive practices</i>	<p>Value assumptions</p> <p>Lexical realisations of values (Martin & White, 2005)</p> <p>Interpreting what discourses are drawn upon in value classification</p>	<p>Implicated / lexical realisations of participant roles, pragmatic modalisations</p> <p>Interpreting social value themes</p> <p>Dialogicality / engagements with alternative value projects</p>	<p>Implicated / lexical realisations of participant roles, pragmatic modalisations, and discourses that they reference</p> <p>Metaphorical instantiations of modalities</p> <p>Dialogicality / engagements with</p>	<p>Implicated / lexical realisations of ENGAGEMENT / GRADUATION, viewpoints, enunciative modalisations</p> <p>Dialogicality / engagements with alternative value positions, viewpoints, truths, knowledges</p>	<p>Implicated / lexical realisations of ENGAGEMENT / GRADUATION, viewpoints, enunciative modalisations</p> <p>Dialogicality / engagements with alternative value positions, viewpoints, truths, knowledges</p>

Level of social practices	Interpreting what discourses are drawn upon in building value projects	alternative action programmes, value projects	Interpreting what discourses are taken up in positioning	Interpreting what discourses are taken up in identification
<p>Second cycle analyses: patterns, networks redundancies / divergences, prevalences</p> <p>Are value classifications normative / innovative, stabilising / disrupting hegemonies?</p> <p>Macrotheories</p>	<p>Second cycle analyses: patterns, networks, redundancies / divergences, prevalences</p> <p>Are value projects normative / innovative, stabilising / disrupting hegemonies?</p> <p>Are 'Others' recurrently positioned into anti-subject, opponent roles?</p> <p>Are sender, receiver, subject participant roles occupied by 'we', society, 'everyone' etc.?</p> <p>Macrotheories</p>	<p>Second cycle analyses: patterns, networks, redundancies / divergences, prevalences</p> <p>Are participant roles / value projects normative / innovative, stabilising / disrupting hegemonies?</p> <p>Are 'Others' recurrently positioned into anti-subject, opponent roles?</p> <p>Are sender, receiver, subject participant roles occupied by 'we', society, 'everyone' etc.?</p> <p>Macrotheories</p>	<p>Second cycle analyses: patterns, networks, redundancies / divergences, prevalences</p> <p>Are value positionings normative / innovative, stabilising / disrupting hegemonic value positions, viewpoints, truths, knowledges?</p> <p>Are authorial voices / audiences positioned into hegemonic / counter-hegemonic value positions, viewpoints, truths, knowledges?</p> <p>Macrotheories</p>	<p>Second cycle analyses: patterns, networks, redundancies / divergences, prevalences</p> <p>Are cultural / societal identifications normative / innovative, stabilising / disrupting hegemonic value positions, viewpoints, truths, knowledges?</p> <p>Are authorial voices / audiences positioned into hegemonic / counter-hegemonic value positions, viewpoints, identities, truths, knowledges?</p> <p>Macrotheories</p>

7 EMPIRICAL ELABORATIONS: REPRESENTING AND POSITIONING FINNISH EQUALITY

In this chapter I present my main empirical contributions, which deal with how respondents represent and position Finnish equality discourses in constructions of identity (Study III). In Section 7.1, I revisit the historical paths of Finnish equality. Using example textual responses from the corpus, in Section 7.2 I characterise the main discourses on equality that I interpreted in the empirical study.

7.1 SITUATING FINNISH EQUALITY

Finnish equality has developed at least partially in correspondence with major nation building projects and historical events that are part of collective memory. Collective memory (see Halbwachs, 1950/1980) can be understood as common-sense lay knowledge or master narratives of history that are performed in ‘collective remembering practices’, such as visiting historical sites or participating in national celebrations. For example March 19th is designated as ‘equality day’ in Finland, and is one of the twenty plus legal or customary ‘flag days’. Each year on this day, Finnish flags are flown in commemoration of novelist, playwright and political activist Minna Canth, who was born on the day in 1844 and fought for women’s rights. It is an official day for celebrating and collectively remembering struggles for equality, particularly gender equality. Collective remembering can also occur in everyday discursive and social practices, such as reusing and recycling national imagery (e.g. images of national heroes or national symbols) in newspapers, textbooks or advertisements (Hakoköngäs & Sakki, 2016). Collective memories are fundamental not only in building national identities (Liu & Hilton, 2005), but are also at play in constructions and implementations of social values in identification. The ways in which social values and collective memories are built and used are foundational to interpersonal and intergroup relations; to solidarity and antagonism, social stability and conflict, continuity of tradition and social transformation.

The development of Finnish conceptions of equality can be traced back at least to the influences of the Lutheran church and its efforts to uniformly educate the population, and nationalist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. The Lutheran Reformation of the 16th century introduced the idea of vernacular education. The aim was to foster widespread literacy so that everyone could read the bible (Sarjala, 2013). The year 1809 is often regarded as a starting point for the political development of a Finnish national state. As a result of the Swedish-Russian war of 1808-09, Finland became a part of

Russia and was established as an autonomous Grand Duchy. This resulted in a Finnish national awakening in the mid-19th century. This awakening culminated in the nationalist movement of the Fennomans, who aimed to promote Finnish language and culture.

Strong incentives for nationalist mobilization existed in the Finnish-speaking middle class as well as the Swedish-speaking upper class populations. Importantly, the movement also gained widespread support from the wealthy Finnish-speaking freeholding peasantry (Alapuro, 1979). This allowed the nationalist movement to advance smoothly without significant conflicts and, quite to the contrary, establish solidarity between 'all people' in Finland; including solidarity between the ruling elite and the ruled peasantry. Of primary importance to the current study is that the nationalist movement promoted as being among their key objectives the idea of equality in relation to raising the general level of education and enabling access for common people (*rahvas*) to the educational system. The education system contributed to the equality project in many ways; for example by teaching both Finnish and Swedish languages, schooling women and generally aiming for the 'civilization' of rural people (Ahonen, 2003).

Finland was predominantly an agricultural country until the 1960s. The rise in importance and style of Finnish equality has been attributed to peasant and rural working class populations; populations that have also been central in national identification (e.g. Häkli, 1999; Mäkelä, 1985; Lempiäinen, 2002; Räsänen, 1989). Historian Irma Sulkunen (1990) has discussed foundational links between nationalist, temperance and suffrage movements of early 20th century Finland. The temperance movement was the strongest civic organisation of this period, recruiting its membership mainly from the rural working classes and its leadership from the upper nationalist classes. One of the demands of the temperance movement was equal and universal suffrage. Nationalist, temperance and suffragist movements thus shared a support base as well as common objectives, and at times merged into each other (Sulkunen, 2007; Sulkunen & Alapuro, 1987). Among the primary values of the peasantry were moderation, nation-building, anti-elitism and equity (Granberg & Nikula, 1995).

Also relevant to this study is a nation building effort after Finnish independence (1917) and the Civil war (1918), in which ethnic, sociocultural and linguistic differences were seen as a threat to unification, and suppressed (Häkli, 1999; Paasi, 1992). Häkkinen and Tervonen (2004) argue that this unification project resulted in the production of a myth of Finland as an ethnically homogenous nation. Tuori (2007) argues that important for understanding contemporary Finnish discourses on multiculturalism is that popular understandings of Finland as 'previously homogenous' have become entangled with public knowledge of increasing immigration rates, while the two phenomena are understood as interdependent. This perceived interdependence contributes to 'ethnicity' being seen as the significant 'difference' in the nation.

The nationalist and homogenising projects discussed in this section are relevant to the extent that there is some empirical evidence that Finnish discourses on equality, moderation and cultural homogeneity have become entangled in ways that appear to be problematic. For example, research into pedagogical practices in Finland has shown that while the national education curricula in Finland takes as a primary aim the development of communality based upon equality and tolerance, teachers in Finland tend to homogenise the majority in their talk, set it as the norm, contrast it with a 'special' minority and make numerous distinctions by positioning students inside or outside of what is considered normal (Arnesen, Mietola & Lahelma, 2007, pp. 100-101). Nordic feminist legal scholars argue that gender equality is linked to sameness to such an extent that there is little room in political and legal spheres for the recognition of difference (Svensson, Pylkkänen & Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2004).

Furthermore, multiculturalism has been perceived as posing challenges to basic principles of Finnish welfare society. For example, individual rights are challenged by group rights such as circumcision, equal treatment is challenged by equality of results and affirmative action, and the assumption of welfare society that all people are essentially similar by the assumption of multiculturalism that differences between people should be recognised and taken into account. (Puuronen, 2004.) While gender equality in Finland is often seen as a successful, indigenous national project, multiculturalism is perceived as an import commodity; as 'coming from the outside' and external to Finnishness (Holli, 2003; Tuori, 2007). Normative discourses on gender equality in Finland have been argued to contract the space for diversity of practices, consideration of power imbalances and differential social positions (Honkasalo, 2011, p. 91; Julkunen, 2002, p. 92).

7.2 ANALYSES OF FINNISH EQUALITY DISCOURSES

In this section I summarise my analyses of study respondents' texts by characterising the discourses on Finnish equality that I interpreted from the corpus. The analyses are based in the methodologies summarised in the previous Chapter 6. My examinations thus deal with how study respondents imbue social values of equality with meaning by distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' (representation), and how they deploy those meanings by aligning with the classifications and representations in their texts (identification). In this summary I present exemplary texts in order to merely characterise each discourse. Discourse analyses of value positioning can be found in the original empirical article (Study III). In the remainder of this chapter as well as in the conclusion, I also qualitatively interpret how particular value classifications, value projects and value positionings may update or subvert hegemonic and subjugating discourses on equality.

By identifying patterns in classifications related to how equality was imbued with meaning by marking boundaries between 'us' and 'them',

interpreted two dominant and two marginal discourses on equality. The two dominant discourses were used in representing and positioning equality to greater and lesser extents by most of the respondents. I have named these Equal Sociability and *Equality Contracts*. I refer to two more marginal discourses that I interpreted as *Equality as Sameness* and *Equality with Differences*. Equality as Sameness was rarely constructed by respondents with an Asperger's diagnosis and/or transgendered experiences. Conversely, Equality with Differences was articulated primarily by respondents with an Asperger's diagnosis and/or transgendered experiences.

7.2.1 EQUAL SOCIABILITY

Excerpt 4

Without different minorities culture would be too homogenous. Different people are enriching and they have different viewpoints. For example, having Swedish-speaking Finns gives us an opportunity to learn Swedish and that is useful in co-operation between Nordic countries. People who have moved to Finland from abroad have brought with them different cultures and internationality. On the other hand, having different people causes racism and discrimination in the original population. This may cause violence and crime. Usually though minorities enrich the culture. (R132, Female from random sample)

In the discourse on Equal Sociability, the equality of 'us' is built in relation to non-hierarchical sociability and social solidarity. Equal Sociability is built interdiscursively by drawing on networks of discourses related equality, tolerance, diversity, solidarity, peace and moderation. In terms of value positioning, egalitarian social relations are integral to who 'we' consider ourselves to be. Storylines are built upon the idea that egalitarian social relations are antithetical to practices of self-elevation, self-distinction, conflict, interfering with or discriminating against others. Value projects are organised around pragmatic modalities that qualify goals, abilities and competencies in terms of two interrelated themes: Moderation and togetherness.

In doing Equal Sociability in terms of *moderation*, positively evaluated 'us' classifications are recurrently related to perceptions of ordinariness, normality, authenticity, humbleness and having moderate or 'realistic' goals. Negatively evaluated 'them' classifications typically deal with perceptions of greed, wealth, elitism, selfishness, arrogance, self-elevation, extremism, fanaticism and noisiness. Equivalencies are thus made between 'ordinary people', moderation and those who do not noticeably distinguish or elevate themselves. Equal Sociability is imbued with meaning in relation to these types of practices. Excerpt 2 was an example of how Equal Sociability is used to build identities in relation to moderation, which I will return to at the end

of this Section 7.2.1. The following Excerpt 5 is another example of the use of Equal Sociability in negotiating identities on moderation.

Excerpt 5

I don't like organized crime, or whatever underlying cause that terrorism has. Violent, war-like and racist groups are also distasteful. Similarly, the sects of misfits in the surrounding society. Fortunately, however, the majority of the world's people are ordinary peace-loving moderate and quite tolerant shoe consumers. (R74, male from random sample)

In using this discourse to represent egalitarian social relations in relation to *togetherness*, positively evaluated 'us' classifications recurrently deal with tolerance, respect, non-conflict and non-interference. The unequal social inabilities of 'them' are generally classified in relation to disruption and violence, interference, conflict, discrimination, and subjugation. As with Excerpt 4 and the following Excerpt 6, minorities, immigrants and 'diversity' are first often positioned as helpers to value projects on equality and diversity, then subsequently repositioned into opponent and anti-subject participant roles – as 'causing' racism, discrimination and inequality.

Excerpt 6

Finnish minorities are a part of our history and our future. The benefit is cultural enrichment. The harm is conflict and inequality. (R168, Male from random sample)

This discourse is often represented and used in ways that are reflective of collective memories of cultural homogeneity, as well as a historical embeddedness and entanglement of equality, consensus and temperance values. There are redundancies and patterns that are relevant to interpreting how Equal Sociability is represented and used in ways that are ideologically invested; how it is drawn upon, represented and used in hierarchical social ordering. For example, there are patterns in the corpus that can be interpreted as referencing networks of discourses that link 'indigenous Finnish equality', 'historical cultural and ethnic homogeneity' and 'incoming multiculturalism'. In this pattern, minorities and immigrants are qualified as 'helpers' who 'bring' the 'difference' or 'diversity' that is needed for the majority to learn tolerance. Minorities' value is thus often instrumental. This interpretation resonates with those from previous studies, in which Finnish equality is understood as something essential and inherent to the nation, while multiculturalism is seen as something coming from the outside (see Tuori, 2007).

Additionally, qualifications related to 'excess' are recurrently positioned as opponents and anti-subjects in projects on tolerance and equality. In this pattern pragmatic modalities function in positioning the majority as being senders or subjects of tolerance and equality, as well as being competent in

moderation and other cultural knowledge that others cannot properly make claims to. 'Unbridled tolerance' and 'excessive difference' are recurrently positioned as threatening social cohesion, Finnishness and equality itself. Equal Sociability is often used to shun distinctiveness and 'standing out' to such an extent that doing things differently than 'how they have always been done' is perceived as self-elevating and inegalitarian, rather than simply non-normative. This discourse is also drawn upon, redone and performed in claims to universal and equivalent experiences of people that are differently socially valued and positioned. This works to semantically homogenise diverse life experiences, and to 'enforce' the myth of Finnish cultural homogeneity. Equal Sociability is not infrequently discursively practiced in the non-recognition, invalidation and suppression of what or who is perceived, assumed or attributed as meddling, distinctive or causing conflicts.

I would like to conclude this section by asking the reader to revisit Excerpt 2 – which I brought into my methodological demonstration of analyses of ideological complexes in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1. Excerpt 2 is traceable to patterns in the texts that are indicative of those discourses of fear and anxiety discussed by Ahmed (2003). These types of affective discourses intertwine here as technologies for producing and maintaining particular ideological 'truths' of Finnish equality. The specificity of these truths on Finnish equality are maintained by recurrently and habitually constituting particular bodies as objects of essential and undesirable difference, and inequality. These discourses of fear and anxiety work in perceiving, instilling and actualising threats to 'our' ways of life, or life itself. One of Ahmed's (2003) contributions here is that she invites us to think on not only the origins and effects of these affective discourses, but also on the material structures and practices that maintain them. To perhaps think a bit less on how to continually prop up our identities, and perhaps a bit more on how we might ourselves be complicit in producing 'undesirables' and 'others'.

Excerpts 2 and 6 are examples of patterns in the data that indicate how Equal Sociability can be formulated and deployed in ways that have negative ramifications for cohabitation and dialogue between those who can freely claim the 'truths' of Finnish equality, and those whose access to it is arguably often constrained or denied. Such constraints and prohibitions are typically acute for people of colour and people with particular migrant and religious backgrounds. At the same time, the borders around Finnish equality are also culturally distinct in ways that certain 'white' Finns, such as those with Asperger's diagnoses and transgendered experiences that participated in this study, also in many ways sense restricted access to equality structures and practices, although presumably in largely different ways and intensities than do people of colour.

The societal implications in these patterns as regards social practices related to 'integration' should be noted. Integration is dependent on more than

⁷ My placement of 'white' in scare quotes indicates my stance on 'race', as a racializing discourse.

the practices of people with perceived (radical) differences and/or migrant backgrounds. Primary is the *availability* of cultural level subject positions that are produced in dialogue with difference. Primary is the *ability* of those with access to dominant cultural level subject positions to recognise differences not only in ‘others’, but also in them/ourselves, as well as in the power differences that are implicated in ‘different types of differences’. Primary is the *willingness* to take responsibility for our own human rights violations, rather than constantly diverting the focus to others’. Following the lead of Stuart Hall (e.g. 1991; 1996) on diasporic identities, the intention is to explore potential and unrealised avenues for thinking and acting with sociocultural and value differences, rather than simply and pre-emptively against them – without falling into a relativist downward spiral (Hall, 2012, p. 29).

7.2.2 EQUALITY CONTRACTS

Excerpt 7

[The social structure in Finland is] democratic and people live according to the laws here. Differences in income are relatively small on average. The characteristics of the Nordic welfare-state are realized well. Education, health care, social security function. (R111, Male from random sample)

The discourse on Equality Contracts is drawn upon to classify, represent and position equality in relation to the same for everybody in universal rights and resources, and the same from everybody in terms of individual contributions to the common good. In Equality Contracts, identities are constructed for the state as well as for the ‘proper citizens’ that are meant to maintain it. The state is meant to provide the same rights and resources for everybody, while the same responsibilities to contribute to the social good are expected to be fulfilled by all citizens.

Excerpt 8

[The social structure in Finland is] a welfare society, where everyone is taken care of with shared tax revenue, at least better than in many other countries. [...] Everyone has the same rights and responsibilities, it's up to you how you behave and if you are in your opinion mistreated. (R178, Female from random sample)

Representations of Equality Contracts are thus on the one hand built upon value classifications related to *the same for everybody* in laws and rights, education, social services and resources, voice and participation, and social class. In value projects, pragmatic modalities are organised around obligations and abilities of the state; obligations to provide the same rights and resources for all, which are also qualified as the means by which equality is obtained.

Universal and equivalent education is a primary helper in value projects on Equality Contracts as the same for everybody. In value positioning, equality is modalised according to its perceived veridictory truth value, which also has an effect upon the breadth of the viewpoints from which these values are constructed. When respondents align with the idea that everyone is provided with the same rights and resources, equality is modalised as veridictory truths and classified through broad viewpoints such as everybody, we, society and Finland. This way of doing Equality Contracts is ideologically invested to the extent that equality is frequently formulated in entanglement with neo-liberal discourses. The idea is that “Yes [everyone has equal opportunities to fulfil their goals]. You just need to work to achieve them, which is something everybody is not willing to do” (R225, Female from random sample). Equality is thought to be a commodity that is available for all and that can be taken by individuals through effort.

When respondents perform Equality Contracts as the same for everybody in low solidarity with the classification system – i.e. when they disalign with Equality Contracts as the same for everybody – equality is modalised as faltering, an illusion or false. Disaligning performances are overall uttered through narrower viewpoints and with less epistemic certainty than are those aligning with ‘the truth’ of equality as the same for everybody. One respondent disaligned with Equality Contracts by expressing that “I don’t believe equality will ever be reached in that matter [of everyone having equal opportunities to realise their goals]. Many long-term unemployed people have also studied at lot” (R77, Male from random sample). The respondent interacts with previous utterances, with common sense knowledge, that have expressed the logic that ‘equal educational opportunities’ are an indicator of existing Finnish equality. This is interesting as regards the ideological investment in the discourse on Equality Contracts. The way that enunciative modalities unfold here signals respondents having to contend on an individual level with deeply embedded, social normative and taken for granted ‘truths’ about Finland being equal, fairly equal, or equal as compared to other cultural, social or national contexts.

Doing Equality Contracts as ‘not the same for everybody’ can work to destabilise the truth status of ideological representations and positionings of equality as the same for everybody. However although inequalities are recognised, Equality Contracts as ‘not the same for everybody’ can nevertheless also be ideologically invested. This occurs for example when equality is seen as something inherent to the nation, while inequalities are understood in relation to ‘external yet incoming’ forces – e.g. ‘globalisation’ – that are actively threatening that essence. The focus is therefore on how to keep inequalities ‘out’ of Finland that would otherwise be essentially equal, rather than recognising that inequalities are also internally produced. In addition, equality as ‘not the same for everybody’ is typically constructed in reference to economic status and access to material resources.

Discourses on Equality Contracts were also used in representing equality as *the same from everybody*. Here, equality is formulated in terms of

obligations to contribute to the building and maintenance of equality. In these value projects, ‘proper citizens’ that contribute to the common good are those perceived as having specific competencies related to being hard-working, independent tax-payers.

Excerpt 9

I like people who “do their bit” for this society. Who go to work and pay their taxes. I don’t like “freeloaders”. (R189, Female from random sample)

Proper citizens also are conceptualised as behaving in accordance with laws that define the prohibitions and obligations that are expected of everyone. This way of doing Equality Contracts as the same from everybody is based in traditions of national solidarity, work and individualism, welfare capitalism, as well as in newer neo-liberal discourses. Incompetencies that work against society receiving the same from everybody are self-interest, laziness and abusing social services. In value positioning, these opponents are attributed to stereotyped identities of ‘non-contributors’ to societal wellbeing. It is in relation to these incompetencies that Equality Contracts as the same from everybody is used to position others into subjugated standpoints and update relations of domination.

7.2.3 EQUALITY AS SAMENESS

Equality as Sameness is the most explicitly subjugating way of formulating and ‘doing’ Finnish equality in my study. This discourse is built by drawing upon the two dominant discourses presented above, emphasising, positively evaluating and aligning with elements related to moderation, sameness and the nation, and negatively evaluating and disaligning with elements related to diversity or difference in social and cultural practices. Equality representations are referenced to facilitate constructions of stereotyped identities of ‘them’, whose mere existence is positioned as being at ‘our’ expense and to the detriment of societal wellbeing.

Excerpt 10

The Swedish-speaking Finns are harmful because we have to have a bilingual country which causes extra expenses. Muslims. Fanatics, oppressors of women, oppressors of young people, they compel [people] into their religion by mass force. Useless waste of time 5 times a day “sticking out their behind” towards Mecca. The burqa headdress is the symbol of oppressing women, suicide bombers = the destruction of the world, I wonder if a suicide bomber will be at my door the next morning? (R97, Male from random sample)

In Equality as Sameness, ‘us’ classifications are related to sameness or similarity, naturalness, normality, assimilation, tradition, authenticity and nationalism. Negatively evaluated ‘them’ classifications include immigrants, foreigners, minorities and difference. Value projects are organised around obedience and defiance, where ‘Others’ are individuals and practices that are perceived as working against national solidarity, such as ‘non-traditional’ values and ways of life, or ‘special services’ for minorities and immigrants. In value positioning, this discourse is used to construct a national identity by aligning with equality, ‘original’ Finnishness, and continuity of tradition. Equality values are performed by positioning ‘us Finns’ as stewards of equality, while storylines of inequality and oppression are mapped onto the identities of ‘Others’.

Equality as Sameness is closely linked to domestic and international, *intersecting* Eurocentric, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic and racist orders of political discourses. The way that this discourse is built and deployed exemplifies explicitly how equality values can be technologies for building relations of domination. It reflects how social phenomena such as transnationalism, migration, cultural diversity and increasing inequalities in Finnish society are being interpreted by parts of the populous. One of the distinguishing aspects of Equality as Sameness is that there are strong conceptual links made between ‘Finnishness’, the nation, sameness and equality.

This discourse was built and used primarily by randomly sampled respondents. Nevertheless, respondents with Asperger’s diagnoses and/or transgendered life experiences also formulated equality with sameness (for examples, see Studies I and III).

7.2.4 EQUALITY WITH DIFFERENCES

In order to call hegemonic discourses into question they must first be recognised, and their potentially problematic aspects illuminated. Equality with Differences is constructed in recognition and opposition to aspects in the other discourses on Finnish equality that are perceived to be problematic, dominating and subjugating – most notably sameness, nationalism, ordinariness and conformity. This discourse is formulated in a polemicized struggle most evidently with the discourse on Equality as Sameness, as regards the roles of sameness and difference in the meaning of equality.

Excerpt 11

[The social structure in Finland is] built to remind [us of] the nation. In Finland children all go to the same schools and get the same experiences and instruction, they go to the same types of jobs and live in the same types of conditions, in standardized homes that have been designed for the same types of families. It reflects the Finnish idea of equality. (R27, Transman)

In building this discourse there is motivation to illuminate obstacles in accessing or realising Finnish equality, while acknowledgements and considerations of differences are perceived necessary for realising equality. Pragmatic modalities function in systematic criticisms of exclusionary aspects of Finnish equality – particularly those aspects in which ‘difference’ and those attributed as ‘different’ are positioned as opponents and anti-subjects.

Excerpt 12

No [people do not have equal opportunities to realise their goals]. Among other things, disability prevents people from studying and they are forced into the narrow way designed by the society. Healthy people have opportunities, but all people are different and that’s a good thing. (R179, Female from random sample – self-categorised as a mother of a disabled child)

Envisioned equality representations are built upon ‘us’ classifications related to inclusion, difference, equal rights, equal worth and treatment, and equal voice and participation. In value projects, obligations to conformity, ordinariness, non-conflict, normativity, sameness and continuity of tradition are positioned as opponents and as working against access to equality. Pragmatic and enunciative modalities work together in important ways in this discourse. They work on dislodging ‘difference’ from opponent and anti-subject roles in hegemonic equality projects, and repositioning it into helper or subject roles.

Excerpt 13

Minorities living in Finland give Finland variety in a positive way. Many minority people (for example Muslims) are enterprising and therefore some of them have opened restaurants at their own expense. Some Finns do complain that foreigners take their jobs, I’ll remind them about these restaurants which Finns don’t lift a finger for. The more there are different kinds of people in Finland the easier it is for children to learn to be tolerant and who knows this might someday influence the prevention of wars. (R15, Female with Asperger’s diagnosis)

In value positioning, hegemonic discourses on Finnish equality are recurrently modalised as illusory or false. These utterances are formulated with less overall epistemic certainty than, for example, those of Equality Contracts as the same for everybody, which modalise equality as an ontologically true aspect of the social order. Such patterns can be indicative of ideological complexes. Respondents questioning the truth of hegemonic discourses are required to do so from divergent, marginal and isolated viewpoints. Differences from the norm are aligned with equality, innovation and societal wellbeing, and proclaimed as inevitable truths. Differences are

modalised as existing (being) but as not recognised (appearing) or *permitted* in the dominant order.

Excerpt 14

[...] The Finnish state is not just because individuals are not fully equal and full equality is not realistically possible. Especially when an individual clearly or strongly differs from the majority, s/he might find it very difficult to gain acceptance and equal treatment in society. Therefore s/he belongs to a minority, who often has to resign him/herself to majority's requirements and decisions. A person belonging to a minority doesn't always gain rights that a person in the majority would, because of their exceptionality. (R45, Female with transgendered experiences)

Equality with Differences is the most marginal of the discourses in my study. It was constructed primarily by respondents with Asperger diagnoses and/or transgendered life experiences. Sometimes the way that Equality with Differences is formulated clearly represents and positions the three other discourses on equality outlined in this chapter as being hegemonic, dominating and subjugating. This discourse is also the most clearly indicative that those aspects are being contested. It is worth pointing out, however, that this discourse is built and used in ways that are more and less inclusive of different kinds of differences. Difference is relative, and scalable. Recognitions and inclusions of different kinds of differences in this discourse are sometimes abstract, as in Excerpt 14 for example. In this excerpt, we do not know who the author is referring to when she writes about minorities. We do not know if, or how extensively, she recognises, 'thinks and acts on' different kinds of differences. In Excerpt 13 on the other hand, the author specifically recognises and positively dialogues with the 'difference' of Muslims. This is one of the very few instances in the entire corpus of respondents' texts in which anti-Muslim discourses were referenced and explicitly opposed. This is significant in that xeno-racism, which targets asylum seekers, has been extended to Muslim communities in European (and other) countries (see e.g. Fekete, 2004), including in Finland (see e.g. Sakki, Hakoköngäs & Pettersson, 2017; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016). Anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment is of course a key feature of contemporary European far-right discourse (e.g. Zúquete, 2008).

7.3 DISCUSSION ON EMPIRICAL EXAMINATIONS OF FINNISH EQUALITY DISCOURSES

The Finnish equality discourses that I interpreted from the study material form an ideological complex. This network of discourses is referenced in representing aspects of social orders in ways that largely function in sustaining relations of domination. An ideological complex on Finnish equality both reflects and is reflected in concrete social structures, as well as in the ebb and

flow of everyday life. Some of the ways in which these aspects are interrelated, imbued with meaning and deployed are at the expense of societal wellbeing in Finland.

When respondents take up discourses on Equal Sociability, elements of moderation, non-conflict, consensus, homogeneity, tolerance, minorities and difference are often positioned into helper participant roles in majority value projects. It is not difficult to argue that discursively placing oneself above others runs counter to projects on equality. However, this discourse is also often built by tightening identity borders to the extent that self-distinctions or differences that are perceived as ‘excessive’ are used as legitimising tools for pushing ‘them’ outside of the boundaries of ‘our moral orders’. In excerpts 2 and 4-6, we see how minorities and their ‘differences’ are positioned as *causing* inequalities and discrimination. Thus one of the main contradictions in how this discourse is used in identification is with respect to the role of difference, minorities and tolerance in value projects on equality. Minorities and difference are often initially positioned into helper participant roles in unelaborated utterances of tolerance and multiculturalism, for purposes of managing subsequent less tolerant or exclusionary positionings.

Discourses on *Equality Contracts* are often formulated in correspondence with collective memories of Finnish equality values, and their entangled development with national projects such as those on suffrage, those aimed at levelling class, cultural and linguistic distinctions, and the gradual process of building the welfare state. While guaranteeing universal resources and rights for everyone is understandably a desirable value project, this discourse is often used as a legitimising tool. In these instances Finnish equality is positioned as an ontological truth, as ‘evidenced’ by ‘equality between the sexes’ or ‘equal resources provided by the state’ for example. Such ways of doing Equality Contracts clearly fail to acknowledge parts of the population that find equality as being inaccessible. Equality Contracts is also referenced in representing inequalities as something ‘external’ to Finnish borders; as an external global force that is unavoidably making its way ‘inside’. The effect of this is that internally produced and sustained inequalities are left unaddressed and legitimated. These ways of doing Finnish equality include contradictions that contribute to relations of domination and power imbalances.

These are some of the aspects of the logonomic system on Finnish equality; some of the ways that interpersonal interaction is controlled by sets of contradictions that legitimate the assumptions upon which domination lies. Some of the rules in this logonomic system link ordinariness and moderation to Equal Sociability, whereas distinctions, ‘standing out’ and dissent are seen as inherently inegalitarian (see also Törrönen & Maunu, 2005). In the discourse on Equality Contracts, the existence of social classes is often denied, justified or simply accepted as inevitable. These dominant discourses seem to be most often represented and used in socially exclusionary ways by individuals that recognise few dissociations between their life experiences and ‘reality’. There seems to be “a perfect fit between the system of classification

and the objects which that system describes: a relation which seems at once transparent, natural, and inevitable” (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 122). These are some of the unmarked viewpoints of ‘the equal’. These viewpoints have the power to both assert the equalities ‘here’, and to mark the inequalities ‘out there’.

Equality as Sameness and Equality with Differences are competing discourses that are formulated in stark disagreement over the roles and meanings of diversity, difference, sameness, the nation, moderation and Finnishness in equality. They are formulated in opposition to each other by drawing upon the dominant discourses in divergent ways. *Equality as Sameness* is entangled with social values related to continuity of tradition, nationalism and cultural homogeneity. This discourse corresponds to current trends in the rise of right wing populist parties and politics in North America, Great Britain and Europe. In the respondents’ texts in this study, the discourse on Equality as Sameness is built around obligations to conform to normative social and cultural practices of ‘us Finns’. Moderation, sameness and Finnishness are constructed as abilities that are needed for ‘doing equality’. Importantly, these abilities are built as essential to who ‘we are’ as Finnish people. They are attributes that are not easily accessible to non-Finnish ‘others’ that are assumed to lack some sort of ‘culturally specific knowledge’ for practicing egalitarianism. Formulations of Equality as Sameness function to uphold relations of domination through the use of equality for practices of othering.

In this study and on a general level, discourses on equality are often ideologically invested and used to do ideological work. Respondents with Asperger diagnoses and/or transgendered experiences more often opposed specific aspects of hegemonic Finnish equality discourses than did respondents from the random sample. In doing so, they simultaneously sought to redo Finnish equality in ways that can accommodate diversity, innovation and differences. These respondents seem to draw upon knowledge that the roles of elements in ‘our equality’ – such as moderation, normativity and sameness – are habitually used as tools for elevating the identities of some at the expense of ‘Others’; at the expense of those marked with ‘unreasonable difference’, distinctiveness and non-normativity. In *Equality with Differences*, efforts are made to illuminate some of the ways in which dominant and dominating discourses on equality are exclusionary and marginalising. The ways in which this discourse is formulated are in efforts to clear space for diversity of practices in Finnish equality. Equality with Differences is particularly insightful as regards the claim that life experiences and social position can affect how specific social values are classified, represented and implemented in identification. It demonstrates that ‘subjugated positionings’ are often built through viewpoints in which illusions and falsities in ideological knowledge on Finnish equality are seemingly more visible, taken up and questioned.

The four discourses that I interpreted from the material were drawn upon and represented in both spatially and temporally stable, as well as in diverse, sometimes contradictory and ideologically dilemmatic ways. They were drawn upon by different respondents, but also by the same respondents that drew upon more than one or all of the discourses in moving through different contexts, viewpoints and positionings. They were sometimes all drawn upon by the same respondent in one narrative. It is worth pointing out, however, that even though respondents at times drew upon contradictory discourses in ideologically dilemmatic ways, the ways in which they were combined and deployed were functional in the sense that they were ‘put to use’ in motivated efforts to accomplish particular things. These accomplishments at times work towards contributing to societal wellbeing, while at other times they work against it. Thus although Equality as Sameness was formulated and deployed to primarily to prop up rigid identities and accomplish social exclusion, and Equality with Differences was formulated and deployed primarily to accomplish deflation of subjugating aspects of all of other the discourses, they are always becoming in each instance that they are drawn upon and negotiated in identificatory practices. And even though the ‘always becoming-ness’ of hegemonic discourses is often unnoticeable, analyses should nevertheless proceed such that any transformations are noted, and any liberatory potentials are highlighted.

The concept of cognitive polyphasia refers to the idea that thought is heterogeneous and that societies produce different modalities of knowledge, which serve different functions in their various contexts of production (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici 1961/2008). The significance of cognitive polyphasia is that heterogeneous thinking and doing are both residuals of thinking and acting with difference, and stimulants and resources for personal, interpersonal and social transformation. Cognitive polyphasia can occur with respect to dimensions of representational content, processes and emotions (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015). In this study, the cognitive polyphasic characteristics of Finnish equality occur in all of these dimensions. Finnish equalities are imbued with contradictory *contents*, such as same/different, moderation/dissent, exclusion/acceptance, which give rise to the different representations of Finnish equality. Cognitive polyphasia is also generated in *processes* around Finnish equality, such as the advocating of contradictory (strict and open) immigration policies to protect or enhance Finnish equality. Polyphasic *affects* are bound to ideological discourses on Finnish equality. The discourse on Equality as Sameness, for example, is bound to affects of insecurity, fear and sometimes anger, but also positive affect as regards the ‘fatherland’. Equality with Differences is also often entangled with affects of insecurity, while positive affects are generated in relation to sociocultural diversity.

I may be self-evident how different ways of ‘doing’ these contradictory contents, processes and emotions impacts and interacts with how orientations to differences unfold. Although all texts are dialogical in the sense that

multiple discourses and voices are brought into their production, texts differ in how they orient to difference (Bakhtin, 1981; Fairclough, 2003; Marková, 2003). The discourses on Equality as Sameness and Equality with Differences are clear examples of contrasting ways of orienting to difference. Equality with sameness is authoritatively produced, working to bracket dissenting voices and suppress difference. Equality with Differences is built in recognition, exploration and dialogue with multiple voices and differences. Equal Sociability and Equality Contracts are less polarised – they are not as clearly univocal or multivocal. Yet on a general level, these two dominant discourses are often focused on solidarity and on attempts to discursively overcome and resolve differences, rather than acknowledge and engage with them. Again, the significance is that reflectively and reflexively acknowledging and engaging with divergent, oppositional and radically different modalities of knowledge can indicate broadened or the broadening of viewpoints (see Fairclough, 2003, pp. 41-44; Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015; Tsirogianni & Sammut, 2014) and act as catalysts for micro, meso and macro social transformation.

8 CONCLUSION

Representations and positionings of social values are dynamic, ongoing and never complete process that are entangled with identification. Yet as part of everyday discursive and social practices, formulations of social values always reference previous utterances and discourses around the same topics. Thus social values, as well as the identifications and ideologies that they are entangled with, are not only always becoming but also show greater and lesser degrees of continuity. Social values do not come from nowhere. Their situated formulations are constrained by ideologies and the cultural and societal level subject positions that they make available. Particular social values can also themselves become naturalised, and hegemonic.

In this dissertation I have developed methodologies for analysing social values and ideologies. These methodological developments have been facilitated in correspondence with empirical examinations of representations and implementations of Finnish equality discourses.

8.1 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

My first methodological contribution is to the respecification of research on social values. I have demonstrated that social values can be studied by examining how value classifications occur through attitudinal expressions and value assumptions, how value projects are formulated by positioning classifications into participant roles in representation with pragmatic modalities, and how engagement and graduation resources as well as enunciative modalities are used in positioning values onto identities. This contribution responds to the first point listed in my research aims (Section 4.5). Value classifications, projects and positionings are all dynamically at play whether constituting elements of social values are being solidified and contributing to the ideologicalisation of social values, or being repositioned and contributing to their transformation.

Analyses of *value classifications* are important for understanding what is taken or assumed as important, good, mandatory and desirable to ‘us’ and ‘them’. In examining *value projects*, researchers gain knowledge regarding networks of values and value hierarchies. This type of analysis is also critical for understanding the participant roles of elements that contribute to the content, work on formulating the structure, and partially determine the functions of particular social values. The characters that participant roles are with thus also influence how values are used in constructing negative, positive, stereotyped and motivated identities. Analyses of *value positioning* are informative as regards how social values are used as tools in building interpersonal solidarity and distance. This type of examination is useful for

understanding how social values are projected onto the identities of ‘Us’, ‘Not-us’ and ‘Others’.

This methodological development was inspired by a severe lack in conceptual and analytical tools for analysing values as both structured and structuring, as both always becoming and continuous, and as both socially and situationally constituted. Value meanings have been taken for granted in both mainstream and more critical values research in psychology and social psychology, as well as in interdisciplinary critical discourse studies. In discursive psychology, perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the focus has been on action rather than representational content. In critical discourse studies, the assumption is that the interpersonal realm is socially constitutive and primary. In contrast to critical discourse studies and discursive psychology, social representations research has tended to take as its focus representational content rather than how particular social representations are used in action and identification. There has also been longstanding discussion in social representations research as to how social representations and identity are related (e.g. Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011; Lloyd & Duveen, 1992; Maloney & Walker, 2007; Sammut, 2011). The methodology developed here gives further insight into those relations and a practical framework for examining them, while also emphasising the role of social values in both representation and identification as well as their inseparability.

If researchers wish to focus on what values are used to accomplish in specific discursive events – i.e. if the focus is on value positioning – such examinations are comprehensive only to the extent that we also understand how those values are classified, what their roles in value projects are, and what elements they work with in positioning narrators and audiences. If researchers are interested primarily in shared or situated meanings of particular values, the focus might be on value classifications and value projects. However without considering positioning aspects of social values, researchers fail to acknowledge that meanings are produced interpersonally. Meanings produced through value classifications and projects are shaped not only by speakers and writers, but also by hearers and readers – and thus in the dimension of discursive practices. Value classifications, projects and positionings are thus interdependent, yet analytically distinguishable. Leaving any of the aspects out of analyses can detract from comprehensively interpreting the conveyed meanings and what they accomplish in particular discursive events.

Value classifications, projects and positionings are situationally, culturally and socially strained in the sense that they are always formulated in relation to previous utterances, discourses, styles, representations, identifications, and discursive and social practices. Analyses of social values shall occur dialogically and cyclically. Analyses also benefit from being conducted in relation to different dimensions of discourse that correspond to different levels of analysis: those of text, discursive practices and social practices (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995). Such dynamic yet systematic examinations of the three aspects of social values at different levels of analysis helps in overcoming some

of the problems associated with assuming value meanings in empirical research on values. Examining conceptualisations of social values in classifications and projects, and their implementation in interpersonal positioning opens doors for unravelling how formations of social values and identities are interdependent. It also provides a starting point for understanding for whom particular meanings of social values are functional.

With increasingly pluralistic public spheres, hegemonic forms and practices of social values are likely contested through counter-hegemonic formulations. Every formulation and implementation of social values is unique, occurring in specific contexts of interpersonal relations and social orders, and from specific standpoints within those contexts. Because situated contexts always vary in terms of place, space, time, motivations, economic and cultural capital, social positions, available subject positions and so on, previous and recurring classifications continually face potentially destabilising forces that may cause them to ‘slip’ (see Jameson, 1987, p. xvi). It is therefore problematic to focus solely on hegemonic social values, as such a focus contributes to their recurrence. Thus another aspect of values research that is in need of diversification is in exploring the numerous differences in how particular social values are experienced and lived (cf. Hall, 1990). My empirical entry point as regards this was social position, in relation to normative categories on “sex/gender” and “sociability”. My concluding remarks on this methodological strategy came towards the end of the previous Chapter 7, in my highlighting the differences between social and subject position.

One of the many contributions of intersectional feminist theory has been to emphasise that power is relational, that entwinements of social categories, divisions and oppressions are both historically specific and continuous, both independent and interdependent (Collins, 1993; Collins & Bilge, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2017), while also emphasising that some categories stick more readily and systematically to some bodies than they do to others. Thus on one hand subjugated categories may intersect in particular bodies in particular contexts in multiply penalising them, for example in bodies designated as *both* transgender *and* Asperger in secondary school settings. Yet in other spatiotemporalities, for example when Whiteness is implicitly attached to the same bodies in racial desegregation processes of secondary schools, the previous penalisations based on intersecting categories of transgender and Asperger may be trumped in importance by Whiteness. Nevertheless, even though this relationality is at play for many categories attached to many different bodies, some intersections have been recurrently built in particularly oppressive ways (e.g. Black transwoman, Black woman, gay Black man, victimiser Muslim man, victimised Muslim woman). It is precisely in these simultaneous considerations of intersectionality, spatiotemporality and identification that ideology becomes relevant (cf. Bilge, 2010, p. 67).

The second primary methodological contribution in this dissertation proceeds from the entangled and dialogical relationships between social

values, identification and ideology – an entanglement which occurs modally. This contribution is in response to the second question listed in my research aims (Section 4.5). I develop a methodology for analysing ideological complexes from the perspective of pragmatic and enunciative modalities (Sulkunen & Törrönen, 1997a), and in relation to three dimensions of discourse: text, discursive practices and social practices (Fairclough, 1989, 1995). The methodology resonates with claims in critical linguistics that examining *epistemic modalities* is an avenue for studying power imbalanced interpersonal ordering (e.g. Kress & Hodge, 1979, pp. 122-128). They function in building confident, knowledgeable and authoritative speaker-images. But in the methodology developed here I take further the claims as regards interpersonal ordering with modalities: Interpersonal aspects of ideological work that function more in building ontological status are empirically accessible by examining *veridictory modalities*. These enunciative modalities are rhetorically deployed to compare ‘appearances’ with ‘truths’, and to bring hearers and readers into the viewpoints of the authorial voice.

Pragmatic modalities function in representational aspects of ideological work. This aspect has been particularly neglected in social scientific methodologies inspired by critical linguistics and discourse analysis. When analysts examine value projects at levels of text, discursive and social practices, they are also examining whether and how representational aspects of those values are ideologically invested. Such analyses are important because representational aspects of social values and ideological complexes persist as artefacts, which provide the backdrops upon which future meanings are built. Analysing pragmatic modalities in relation to different dimensions of discourse is helpful for understanding how power imbalanced social relations intrude meanings of social values, whether and how they are ideologically invested, and the ideologies that are drawn upon in imbuing them with meanings.

Caroline Howarth (2006, p. 79-80) argues that social representations theory is critical to the extent that practitioners implement the theory through an ideological framework. While ideological representations are historically embedded and impose themselves upon us, she argues, they are also a means for coding reality according to particular interests and to the benefit of particular identities. The message is that researchers should better account for how social representations are used to do ideological work, in social practices. (Howarth, 2006.) The concept of ideological complex (Hodge & Kress, 1988) addresses not only theorising ideology as both structures and practices, but also as contradictory representations of social reality that are both coded through power imbalanced social relations and that provide the context – the ideological backdrop – for future ideological social practices. Researchers in critical discursive psychology and critical discourse studies have nevertheless tended to emphasise the importance of analysing processes of ideological work.

I agree that studying what is *done* with representations is both imperative and has been neglected in much social psychological research. It is worth emphasising, however, that prioritising practices in terms of their importance in ideological work, seemingly often at the expense of a comprehensive examination of ideological structures, is unnecessary. I have directed my efforts at understanding how structures and processes are mutually constitutive, the dynamics between them, and how they can be analysed as such. This is true in the methodologies on both ideology as well as social values. An integrated approach contributes to social scientific research via the emphasis on the dynamic relations between representation, identification, and ideological work. This is the approach I have taken in developing the methodologies in this thesis.

8.2 EMPIRICAL REFLECTIONS

My empirical analyses focus on how Finnish equality discourses are built and deployed in respondents' written texts. I interpret four discourses on equality; that is, four different ways that differently positioned laypeople classify and represent equality. I also conduct close readings of value positioning, demonstrating how representations and implementations of equality occur in concrete identification processes. Previous studies focusing on Finnish equality discourses have focused on, for example, political discourses, legal discourses and pedagogical discourses. This study contributes to our understanding of *common sense knowledge* as constructed and implemented by *lay populations* that are *differently socially positioned as regards institutionalised norms* on "sex/gender" and "sociability".

I demonstrate how some formulations of Finnish equality are easily accessible tools for stratifying the social sphere in power lopsided ways. Common sense knowledge on equality is often ideological to the extent that it is used as a tool to classify other phenomenon, to position oneself and others in identification, and in hierarchical social ordering. Seemingly benign classifications and representations of equality that have been consistently formulated in alignment with moderation, non-conflict, sameness and tolerance for example, are often taken up and performed in ways that elevate some identities and subjugate 'others'. At the same time, tools of subjugation are also targets of contestation. While a primary aim in critical research is to expose exclusionary practices, critical researchers could more often explore, examine and illuminate active opposition to those exclusionary practices that they have exposed in their studies.

It is worthwhile to recognise, consider and critically analyse the viewpoints of people who are frequently positioned into subjugated standpoints. People whose life experiences include being 'cast outside' normative notions of competently practicing acceptable, desirable or obligatory ways of being may have interesting insight into 'ontological truths' and hegemonic forms of social

values. From these standpoints often evolve innovative and feasible means for resisting hegemonic discourses and values that restrict, discriminate or oppress. These voices are also less often accounted for. Critical and social justice research seems to focus on studying powerful social actors. While illuminating how the powerful practice their power is undeniably necessary and important, it is also worth including subjugated standpoints in our studies. The aims are still to expose, evaluate and explain relations of domination, while texts produced from subjugated standpoints may offer unique knowledge and tools for transforming those relations. If hegemonies are being actively resisted through subjugated viewpoints, regardless of the force of that resistance, it is essential to highlight it in our studies. Transformations in representations, discourses and social orders do not 'emerge' mysteriously. While there is always historical continuity, likewise there are also always fractures in that continuity whether they are earthshattering, steadily multiplying or lying dormant.

Some of the life experiences of the respondents in this research include being marked as 'other' in relation to particular psychiatric diagnostic categories. Some of the texts produced by respondents with Asperger diagnoses and/or transgendered life experiences have proved particularly insightful in terms of the ideological investment in discourses on Finnish equality. Some of their identity constructions were undoubtedly accomplished by aligning and reproducing hegemonic and subjugating discourses on equality. However at least in this study and in response to questions 3b and 3c (Section 4.5), they often recognised and offered insight into the 'tricks' that comprise hegemonic knowledge and ontological 'truths' on Finnish equality, such as the 'modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts – ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively' (Haraway, 1988, p. 584). These 'tricks' in Finnish equality discourses are related to the taken-for-granted and hegemonic status of equality, to elements gathered along its historical path that often constitute its meanings and seemingly tend to be homogenising (e.g. sameness, moderation, non-conflict, consensus), and to the implementation of equality in exclusionary practices of nationalism and obligatory conformity to continuity of tradition.

There are contradictions in social practices that regulate who, how and under what circumstances Finnish equality can be claimed. For example discrimination based upon sex or gender, sex or gender identity, and sexual orientation is prohibited by Finnish law. Yet same-sex couples are legally forbidden to adopt children other than those birthed by their partners. People seeking to change their gender marker have been allowed to do so only after extensive psychiatric exams, being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder of transgenderism or transsexualism, and sterilisation. In April of 2017, the European Court of Human Rights found obligatory sterilisation for people wanting to officially change their gender marker as being in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. This ruling is symbolic in setting an official precedent and recommendation to EU member states. However, the

ruling has no jurisdiction to demand changes in Finnish law. At the time of this writing, Finnish sterilisation laws remain intact. The transformative force of the EU ruling is also somewhat contradictory and deflated in the sense that fluid, non-binary and trans-gender embodiments are still categorised as diagnosable, psychiatric disorders.

Likewise, diagnostic codes on autism are medicalised, institutionalised constructions that have been standardised and cross-culturally applied. They both reflect and stabilise what has been represented and performed as permissible, acceptable or desirable styles of social interaction. The codes originate in the United States and United Kingdom, whose cultural contexts are different than those in Finland. How these diagnostic categories contribute to personal and societal wellbeing in Finland is unclear, while they arguably provide structural legitimation for exclusionary social practices. These are some of the contradictory social structures that legitimate power imbalanced logonomic systems, discursive and social practices on ideological equality.

8.3 LIMITATIONS, OPENINGS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Developing methodological frameworks is time consuming. Although I do not regret that over half of my contributions in this dissertation are methodological, it would have been ideal to include a second empirical article dealing with my analyses of value classifications and value projects on Finnish equality. This would have given the reader more insight into structural aspects of Finnish equality discourses. It also would have provided a forum for further elaborating how analyses of value classifications and value projects may unfold. The significance of value projects in particular, and how to proceed with this type of analysis, may need more attention than I have been able to provide here. Analyses of value projects are key to understanding power *in* social values, in the structured and structuring dimensions of social values. It would be beneficial in future studies to integrate an analytical focus on value projects.

Related to this, some readers may have liked the methodological frameworks on social values and/or ideology to have been explicated in more formal terms, or wished for a step-by-step explication as regards how to proceed with analyses of social values and ideologies. My analysis were very comparative, cyclical and abductive. I feel that formalising the method any further may have detracted from the image that I wish to convey of social values and ideologies, as well as analyses of them, as dynamic and never complete. I feel that the steps that the researcher can take are better left open and formulated in relation to, for example, researcher position, the research questions and the characteristics of the data. Thus leaving the methodological frameworks with some 'play' is a stylistic choice, allowing researchers to

specify their use according to their own research requirements and ontological and epistemological leanings.

Thus alternative analytical tools as well as the epistemological assumptions that may accompany them could potentially be used in the methodological frameworks developed here. For example in analyses of value classifications, affective boundary work occurring in affective/discursive practices (Wetherell, 2013; see also Venäläinen, 2017) might be the focus. Such a focus might then also implicate that analyses of value projects and value positionings of the same texts would also be attuned to affect. In terms of value projects, analyses of transitivity systems of language (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, pp. 280-302) or an analyses from the perspective of actor-network theory (Latour, 2005) might also be appropriate methods for analysing action programmes. Examinations of value positioning may proceed by an attunement to focalisation or viewpoints (Genette, 1980; Törrönen, 2014), or by using Goffman's (1981) concept of footing. In analyses of ideology, some researchers may wish to cite frequency counts of instantiations of particular discourses, of particular pragmatic modalisations and participant roles, and of particular styles in enunciative stance, in aims at better convincing their audiences of hegemonic, marginal or counter-hegemonic statuses. Leaving the methodological frameworks developed here with some flexibility for exploring alternative or supplemental methods may serve as potential openings for future methodological developments in research on social values and ideology.

Apart from the potential limitations and openings as regards the methodological work done in this study, potential directions for empirical research on (ideological) social values are certainly endless. This is true not only in terms of discourses on Finnish equality, but also the orders of discourses in which Finnish equality is embedded. My claims pertaining to the historical lineage and significance of temperance, homogeneity, non-conflict and civil unity, the nation and sameness in Finnish equality could be explored further by studying the meanings and implementations of equality longitudinally and from a historical perspective, in different archival sources. Future studies could also focus on meanings and uses of specific types of equality, such as sexual equality, ethnic equality, cultural equality, equality in education and social class. Discourses and meanings of Finnish gender equality have been studied quite extensively, yet the studies seem to take the traditional male-female binary as a point of entry. It would be interesting to study conceptions and implementations of gender equality from a more gender fluid starting point. The hegemonic status of equality could also be further explored by situating the research in different institutional or sub-cultural contexts. Researchers could also include people who have unique life experiences that might be relevant and insightful in terms of aspects of Finnish equality that seemingly update relations of domination. These are just some of the ways that we could further explore the diversity and homogeneity of meanings in different types of equality. Lastly, there are of course other potentially ideological values that could be examined. Such studies could

specify how particular values unfold in particular or multiple spatial and temporal contexts.

8.4 ENDING REMARKS

In taking a critical discursive approach, the intentions are to not only describe meanings and uses of ideological phenomenon in the material, but also to ask why those meanings and uses “are as they are, and how they are sustained or changed” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 79). Critical discourse studies tend to start with social problems, to ask whether those problems are needed, who benefits from them, and to seek solutions to them (see e.g. Fairclough, 2003, pp. 209-210). Critical discourse analysts are also meant to explicitly reflect upon their analyses in relation to their own stances and social positions; to position themselves as researchers, in relation to their analyses and research projects. Critical research is unapologetically evaluative, and social justice oriented.

My stance is that an ideological complex on equality in Finland is being constantly updated and maintained in part because of the interrelatedness in the historical path of equality with national projects on temperance, homogeneity, non-conflict and civil unity, the nation and sameness. I contend that the habitual referencing and integration of these aspects in equality discourses have been key to the maintenance of ideological equality. They are also key to understanding how ideological Finnish equality representations and implementations might undergo transformation. In my assessment, two of the most apparent aspects of ideological Finnish equality formulations in need of close critique are firstly that of moderation and its entanglement with normality, non-dissent and indistinctiveness, and secondly that of togetherness and its entanglement with non-conflict, conformity and sociocultural homogeneity. My claim is that when these categories become both entangled and emphasised, discourses such as Equality as Sameness are the result. These claims address point 3a as described in my research aims (Section 4.5). The remainder of this summary as well as my historical analysis in Section 7.1 address points 3b and 3d.

From a cultural historical perspective, the tendency in Finland has been to strive for consensus and cooperation. Social engineering, national and political projects have aimed at building solidarity between the ruling and powerful classes on one hand, and the peasantry, rural and working classes on the other (e.g. Alapuro, 1979). The divisiveness and collective trauma of the Civil War was followed by a period of healing. Political policies in this healing process focused on civil unification and solidarity, which have been carried out in political, educational, linguistic and sociocultural realms. National projects after the Finnish Civil War specifically sought to downplay ethnic, sociocultural and linguistic differences (Häkli, 1999; Paasi, 1992).

The National Coalition Party (*Kokoomus*) was founded after the Finnish Civil War. Amongst the proclamations from their founding meeting was the stated need for a national coalition to unify people who think the same but are separated by party lines (Kansallisen Kokoomuspuolueen Perustamisjulistus, 1918). Their project on civil unification was aimed at ‘stamping out the Bolshevik threat’ through monarchical rule, compulsory education and fostering ‘morality and civility’ of citizens. Also primary in their aims was equality between men and women. (Kansallisen Kokoomuspuolueen Ohjelma, 1918.) Today this party is stronger than ever, while their contemporary political platform is based upon principles of freedom, individualism, tolerance and equality of opportunities (Kokoomus Periaateohjelma). Some of the ways that the discourses on equality are represented and used in this study resonate with typical neoliberalist formulations of equality; that is, equality of opportunities, where individualism and effort are arguably fundamental in its meaning. In my study, equality of opportunities often seems to mean that ‘equal primary school’ is modalised as an ontologically true, existing helper of equality that ensures everyone the same starting points. Equality as ‘the same for everybody’ – as an ontological truth that is ready to be ‘taken’ through effort – is an example of a neoliberalist form of equality that is salient in my study.

The temperance movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries promoted both moderation and equality (Sulkunen, 1990). The membership of the temperance movement overlapped heavily with that of the Agrarian League, which was the influential rural political party of the time (Mickelsson, 2007). The contemporary successors of this party are the Centre Party (*Keskusta*) and the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*). Along with the National Coalition Party mentioned above, these two parties are amongst the four most popular in Finland. Both of these parties also have equality as central in their political platform, while their members tend to be value conservative. For example most of these parties’ parliament members voted against marriage equality (gender neutral / same-sex marriage) in 2014 (Yle, 2014). The Finns Party is a populist party that combines support for welfare society and working classes with morally conservative, right-wing, anti-immigration and racist values. Finns Party parliamentary members have used Finnish equality to justify their racist stance on multiculturalism and immigration policies (e.g. Sakki & Pettersson, 2016).

The ways in which these political projects and parties have concurrently and interactively developed are visible in the discourses on equality that I have interpreted in this study. They are key to understanding how consensus, non-conflict, moderation and sameness are recurrently positioned as important helpers and value objects in discursive projects on Finnish equality. The habitual positioning of these elements into helper and object participant roles is central in facilitating the practicing of Finnish equality discourses as tools for domination and subjugation. This occurs when, for example, consensus slides into conformity and obedience to majority practices, when non-conflict

is given meaning in relation to monologism and avoiding disagreement, when moderation and sameness are understood as obligations to indistinctiveness and continuity of tradition.

Another central feature of the ideological complex on equality is the modalisation of equality as an existing truth; a truth that is threatened by external forces, a truth that is ‘as true as possible’ or a truth that is ‘true when making international comparisons’. These are contradictions, attempted diversions and derailments of dissent, and cover-ups. Asserting and arguing for the ‘truth’ of Finnish equality in these ways draws attention away from precisely those aspects mentioned above that I claim detract from wellbeing inside Finnish borders. I have already pointed to some of the ‘home-grown’ Finnish legal, diagnostic and social practices that currently delegitimise claims to Finnish equality. There are other citable examples. For example just by their presence asylum seekers are challenging the Finnish equality hegemony, both by their ‘marked difference’ as well as by creating dialogue regarding immigration and asylum policies. Refugees in Finland are usually not allowed to work, for example, nor are they able to access health care. It is no coincidence that male refugees are increasingly working as prostitutes in Finland (Vasantola, 2017). In looking for work, refugees have often not experienced the ‘truths’ of Equality Contracts in Finland.

The ways that texts take form inevitably reflect dominant, taken for granted discourses circulating in the social realm. Yet texts are also produced by people that are continually positioning and repositioning themselves, and being positioned and repositioned by others, as we move through endlessly variant spatial, temporal, psychological and emotional, interpersonal, institutional, cultural and social contexts. Our ways of speaking and writing are characterised by the many voices of these social psychological contexts (see Pietikäinen & Dufva, 2006, pp. 209-210). The multi-voiced and intertextual character of discourse is both reflective and constitutive of the social psychological realm. It is both a product and process of social ordering, continuity and change.

Ideology ‘works’ by controlling the culturally available subject positions, which provide people with repeated ‘invitations’ to identify with their socially constructed ‘common sense’ status (Hall, 1981, 1988). Common sense knowledge includes assumptions about what social values ‘we’ find worthy of maintaining and obligating. Common sense knowledge and assumptions are therefore motivated, while motivation and stance are some of the primary discursive practices linking social values, identification and ideology. Motivation and stance, finally, are discursive practices that are accomplished modally. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how social values and ideology can be analysed through classificatory, evaluative, representational and positioning aspects that are entangled with identification. Modalities are central in all of these processes, and the interplay between them (Fairclough, 2003, p. 166). Given that social values are entangled with ideological work, the methodologies provide means for understanding how particular social value

formulations and identifications participate in building or disarticulating ideologies and power imbalances. I have demonstrated how, in the Finnish context, particular ways of representing equality are ideological. I have demonstrated how ideological equality representations are central in interpersonal ideological work, and in constructions of hierarchical, power dominant identifications.

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